On previous occasions, missile were treated as predictable, and stockpiles were estimated within acceptable margins. Furthermore, adversaries were expected to operate within known constraints, as even confrontation followed patterns that intelligence agencies had learned to anticipate.Ģż

Such assumptions are now , not in isolation but across multiple dimensions at once. This is evident in the reported long-range strike toward Diego , regardless of operational outcome, which exposed how fragile those had become. Moreover, a base was positioned deliberately beyond the reach of regional actors only to be secured by distance alone. That distance, however, no longer appears sufficient.

For years, Iran signaled that its missile range was effectively capped at around kilometers. This was not a formal limitation, but it functioned as a strategic . It reassured capitals while preserving deterrence within the region. It created predictability.

The intelligence gap: when strategy lags behind the battlefield

The of wars has now been disrupted. Whether through technological , altered payload configurations, the use of proxy launch platforms, or external assistance, the apparent of reach suggests that prior intelligence frameworks were incomplete. The precise mechanism matters less than the implication. Systems built on those assumptions are no longer reliable.

This is not an isolated discrepancy. Pre-conflict of missile inventories now appear increasingly uncertain. The persistence and scale of launches that stockpiles were either underestimated, better concealed, or continuously replenished despite expectations to the contrary. The growing use of coordinated and missile attacks on shipping and infrastructure, often deployed in waves, has further complicated detection and interception. Air defense designed for more predictable threat patterns are being forced to adapt in real time.

At the same time, the expansion of maritime in the Red Sea and surrounding corridors has demonstrated how quickly conflict can extend beyond traditional battlefields. shipping has been rerouted around conflict zones, insurance costs have risen, and naval deployments have increased. In some areas, shipping traffic has sharply , yet no single actor fully controls the escalation dynamic. These developments reflect not just tactical , but a broader shift in how pressure is applied across domains. Each of these trends points to the same conclusion, as the war is evolving faster than it is being understood.

Furthermore, when intelligence lags behind reality, strategy becomes . Decisions are made on shifting assessments rather than a stable understanding. Under such conditions, escalation is not always intentional. It emerges from , misreading, and compressed timelines. This aforementioned structural uncertainty is being amplified by political inconsistencyĢż

The perils of strategic ambiguity: when signals fail to constrain

In recent weeks, Washington has moved between signaling and preparing for expanded engagement. Statements suggesting de-escalation have been accompanied by continued military positioning and readiness. The coexistence of caution and coercion within the same strategic posture does not create flexibility but ambiguity.

However, at this level is not stabilizing as it complicates coordination and incentivizes worst-case assumptions for allies and adversaries, respectively. Additionally, in the case of the conflict itself, it narrows the space in which de-escalation can be credibly . When words and actions diverge, signaling ceases to function as a constraint.

The result is not one of controlled pressure, but cumulative . An instance in this regard constitutes ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s operational approach, symbolizing a parallel dynamic. The expansion of the battle-space to include infrastructure, proxy networks, and indirect targets may generate short-term tactical advantages. But it also increases the number of in play as each additional domain introduces new risks, new actors, and new pathways to escalation. Therefore, expansion is often treated as leverage as it frequently reduces control for all practical purposes.Ģż

This volatility is further by the growing role of real-time intelligence systems and automated analysis tools. While these technologies accelerate data processing, they also compress decision timelines. Leaders are required to act faster, often on incomplete or rapidly changing information. The speed of interpretation has , but the stability of understanding has not. As a result, decision-making becomes more reactive, not more informed.

On a different note, the conflict is no longer confined to direct military exchanges. infrastructure and maritime routes have become central to global energy and to the logic of escalation. Threats surrounding the of Hormuz, disruptions in the Red Sea, and the of desalination and energy networks are no longer peripheral concerns. They are central to how escalation is being conducted. This is how wars expand without formal declarations.

At the same time, more actors are being drawn in indirectly. The UKā€™s of its regional posture following heightened tensions illustrates how quickly geographic distance is losing its protective value. European states may not seek direct , but they are increasingly exposed through energy dependence, trade flows, and strategic vulnerability.

Beyond control: when war outruns its structuresĢż

Exposure is expanding faster than control. This is evident in the growing role of external support networks, whether , logistical, or informational, further the landscape. The conflict is no longer defined solely by its principal actors. It is shaped by a broader ecosystem that is more difficult to track and even harder to manage. This diffusion makes escalation less visible, but more unpredictable. The most dangerous phase of a war is not when it becomes more intense. It is when it becomes less intelligible.

Such a threshold is approaching. When intelligence become uncertain, when political signaling becomes inconsistent, and when operational boundaries expand faster than they can be managed, the conflict begins to lose its structure. It does not collapse into chaos. It becomes unpredictable.

As for , it alters the nature of risk. In predictable conflicts, escalation can be managed, even if imperfectly. In unpredictable ones, miscalculation becomes more likely, reactions accelerate, and feedback loops tighten. Actions taken for may be interpreted as preparation for escalation. Defensive moves may trigger offensive responses.

War ceases to be guided by strategy and begins to be driven by momentum. The assumption that this remains controllable depends on the belief that the systems managing it are still keeping pace, which is not the case. War is no longer just being fought. It is outrunning the intelligence, leadership, and structures meant to contain it. When such is the case, even powerful states lose control over outcomes they believe they are shaping.

[Ainesh Dey edited this piece] 

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Velocity of Violence: How Technology Is Outpacing Human Command appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Beyond the visible damage, the conflict offers lessons that go well beyond the battlefield. It forces us to look past simple claims of victory and defeat and ask a harder question: What did this war reveal about power, credibility, dependence and the real cost of confrontation?

The US and Israel: tactical gains, strategic limits

The US appears to have achieved some of its immediate aims, including damage to parts of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s and pressure on its wider military posture through the war and ceasefire process. Yet the broader outcome is less clear. According to Reutersā€™ summary of the ceasefire, core disputes over uranium enrichment, missiles and regional remain unresolved.Ģż

Meanwhile, Israel demonstrated a sustained ability to strike across the region during the conflict, even as the ceasefire left major political questions unresolved. on continuing Israeli operations in Lebanon outside the truce framework suggest that military reach did not automatically translate into a broader political settlement.Ģż

Europe: between alignment and distance

Some European governments responded with a mix of support and hesitation. Italy, for example, to Sigonella air base for operations related to the conflict and ruled out Hormuz patrols without a UN mandate. That points to a degree of European unease about escalation, even as Europe remains closely tied to the US on security matters.

In practice, that dependence still shapes Europeā€™s room for maneuver, especially when regional crises affect shipping routes, energy security and the risk of wider military spillover. This does not mean Europe has become strategically independent, but it may give some European governments a little more room to resist American pressure when interests do not fully align.

China and Russia: gaining without engagingĢż

China and Russia benefited without entering the conflict directly. They avoided the military, diplomatic and financial costs of war while watching the US absorb the burden of escalation without securing a decisive political outcome. For Beijing, distance reduced risk while preserving economic flexibility and the appearance of restraint. For Moscow, non-engagement meant that Washingtonā€™s attention and resources were stretched without Russia having to assume new obligations.

This is what makes the conflict relevant to the broader shift toward a more multipolar order. The point is not that American power has disappeared; it is that outcomes are increasingly shaped by several competing centers of influence, and rival powers can gain an indirect advantage when Washington struggles to translate military pressure into durable political results. In that kind of system, American power remains significant, but it faces sharper limits and more frequent challenges.

Iran: external position, internal pressure

The conflict also exposed the limits of personalized leadership. US President Donald Trumpā€™s handling of the war drew criticism abroad and at home. Reuters reported that Pope Leo Trumpā€™s threat against Iran as ā€œtruly unacceptable,ā€ while other reporting showed that most Americans the war and wanted it to end quickly. These reactions matter because they highlight how the display of force did not produce a clear political mandate, and how personalized foreign-policy rhetoric can weaken credibility as easily as it can project resolve.

From ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s leadershipā€™s perspective, easing some American demands may be presented as a form of resilience. Reutersā€™ reporting makes clear that the truce did not settle the central American demands regarding enrichment and missile capabilities, thereby allowing Tehran to frame the outcome as endurance rather than surrender.

But any external gain comes with a serious domestic cost. Attacks on Iranian energy and the broader economic disruption caused by the war have increased pressure at home. Over time, those internal costs may prove just as important as any regional advantage.

Ordinary Iranians have also paid a high price. The war has intensified economic pressure, deepened insecurity and damaged basic infrastructure. Evidence of strikes on energy and industrial facilities illustrates how the burden of conflict extends well beyond military targets. 

At the same time, the war may encourage a deeper reassessment of political paths and outside dependence. There are signs of a stronger emphasis on self-reliance alongside caution toward foreign intervention. Whether that becomes a lasting social and political shift remains uncertain, but the experience itself will not be easily forgotten.

The Gulf States: exposed dependence

For the Gulf states, and especially across the Persian Gulf, the war exposed continuing vulnerability. Iranian attacks targeted oil, power and desalination in Kuwait, while a key Saudi oil was also hit. These incidents underline how heavily regional security still depends on external protection, especially from the US.Ģż

That may push Gulf governments toward a more pragmatic regional approach, including a reassessment of how they manage relations with Iran in the years ahead.

At the same time, this kind of disruption may deepen public awareness of what war really costs and may strengthen support for diplomacy in future crises. The war also exposed something deeper than strategy. It showed how easily humanitarian concerns can be pushed aside when conflict becomes politically convenient. Some of those who supported or justified the war did so while minimizing its human cost.

In any future transition, political or otherwise, the role of actors committed to basic ethical standards will matter greatly. Without that commitment, the danger is not only instability but moral erosion.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post After the Ceasefire: Power, Limits and the Future of Global Order appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Economic toll

Unlike Iran, the other Middle Eastern states, especially the six members of the GCC, have strengthened their economic ties with the West. One major example of such economic ties is the one between the EU and the GCC. The 1989 has resulted in over $170 billion in exports and imports between the two sides in 2023.Ģż

Over the past five decades, these countries have also worked hard to attract foreign investors, entrepreneurs, and even wealthy individuals seeking to invest in luxury real estate and opulent lifestyles. To name a few examples of such steps, Dubai a five-year multiple-entry visa for business trips in 2021, and the UAE began five-year residency and renewable 10-year visas to those who own real estate in the UAE valued at $5 million and $10 million, respectively. To attract foreign capital, both and have introduced Golden Residency programs that grant wealthy foreigners, including their families, long-term residencies of ten years or longer.Ģż

States such as the UAE and Qatar have become reliable hubs for travelers reaching their destinations globally. In 2023, an 18.25% share of the UAEā€™s GDP was through aviation. In practice, this means $92 billion in revenue and 992,000 jobs. It is a similar trajectory for Qatar. In 2025, only Qatar Airways Group reported a 28% over the previous year, surpassing $2 billion. Qatarā€™s tourism revenue surpassed , up 25% from 2023.Ģż

Saudi Arabia is another Middle Eastern power with considerable financial clout. Its economic reform for the post-oil Kingdom, known as , aims to sector to become not only self-sufficient but also an exporter and global hub for biotechnology. Within this project, other strategies include the mining sector with a focus on minerals, and even the gaming and Esports to host international tournaments, as well as attracting foreign companies to Saudi Arabia. The program is reliant on the non-hydrocarbon sector, comprising foundational pillars namely construction, tourism and tech, which are integral to Saudi Arabiaā€™s economic growth, as the World Bank states, ā€œthe non-oil economyā€™s share of GDP grew from 60 percent in 2015 to 68 percent by 2024ā€.Ģż

With the risks of collapsed tourism, damaged energy infrastructure and logistics disruptions growing manifold, the Gulf countries face an imminent crisis. Amid the worsening security crisis in the region, all of these countries face a heavy blow, with the looming threat of economic devastation, as they remain heavily dependent on such critical sectors to attract foreign investment and capital while diversifying away from oil exports. Their economic leverage rests on regional stability, which has been put under immense strain due to the volatile situation. 

More alarming is the emerging scenario in which large companies tend to act quickly to secure their assets and withdraw from a conflict zone; however, their return is a slow, cautious process. Consequently, if the war results in the departure of some foreign companies from the region within a few weeks, their return may take months or years, which would be detrimental to the economies of the GCC in the long term.

Ironically, Iran will not face such a risk, as the Islamic Republic has not been a destination for international firms due to sanctions and an inadequate environment that has not been conducive to foreign investment. 

Damaged reputation

Over the past few decades, the Gulf countries have built a reputation as a safe destination. This feature has attracted not only investors and foreign companies but also pensioners and those fleeing high taxation in their home countries. As their reputation is now tarnished by the escalating conflict, it will take a long time to rebuild it and recover from the damage inflicted. During the early stages of the war, Iran hit back hard. Missiles and drones were fired at numerous targets, including , and industrial complexes.Ģż

One small example is the UAE. It to around 240,000 British expats. The USā€“Israelā€“Iran war has distressed the majority of expats living across the region. It has gone as far as being by some Western news outlets, such as tabloid Daily Mail, as ā€œā€˜Dubai Is Finishedā€™: Expats say they will leave and never come back as tax-free dream is shattered by war and officials begin prosecuting people for posting videos of missiles.ā€Ģż

Worthy US alliance?Ģż

Except for Iran and Yemen, the US is in some sort of alliance with all states in the region. The closest allies are Israel, followed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan and others. Israel, for instance, has $330 billion in aid, both military and civil, from the US since its foundation.Ģż

The alliance between the Gulf states and the US dates back to the 1940s, when, for instance, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Abdul Aziz Al Saud aboard USS Quincy in 1945. The result was access to Saudi oil for security assurance to the Kingdom. And other Gulf states suit and went into an alliance with the US.Ģż

Fast forward to 2026, although the Gulf countries do not receive US military aid on the same scale as Israel and Egypt, their arms deals with the US are among the largest. Between 1950 and 2024, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE have $182 billion, $40 billion, $35 billion and $34 billion, respectively. These massive purchases have certainly helped these countries defend themselves against Iranian drones and missiles; however, the cost of munitions for them is considerably higher than for Iran, as a Shahed-136 drone costs under $50,000, compared with, say, Patriot interceptor missiles that cost per shot. The ineffectiveness of US military equipment to deter attacks, coupled with USā€™ waning commitment to uphold its alliesā€™ defense under its security umbrella in the region, propels the Gulf countries to recalibrate their security ties with the US.Ģż

After all, it was never their war to begin with, yet they face dire consequences simply for allying with the US (which now appears more to be a grave liability). Since the beginning of the war, Tehran has justified its attacks on ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s neighbors by claiming that any location in the region hosting a US military presence is a legitimate target. However, most of the missiles and drones thrown at the Gulf states were not precisely aimed at the American bases, either deliberately or due to a lack of precision, as it has been that the Circular Error Probable of Iranian missiles is between 20 and 500 meters. This makes it even harder for states such as the UAE to convince foreigners to stay or even consider returning, once the war is over. Expats, especially those who are attracted by luxury and 0% income tax rate, will hardly be willing to live in a place where even a one percent chance of missile penetration exists, should another round of conflict emerge.Ģż

Post-war scenarios

While efforts were recently made to a peace deal between the US and Iran, with Pakistan acting as a primary mediator, the talks in Islamabad stalled; however, reports are now that the conflicting parties are expected to re-engage in negotiations soon.Ģż

Regardless, for the Gulf countries, there are mainly two outcomes as of now. The first prediction is that the Iranian regime will be toppled and a new Iran will emerge. In this case, the Gulf states can simply claim that the old threat no longer exists. Hence, it will be relatively easier to convince expats and companies that departed in haste to return. And the Gulf states would emerge shaken but ultimately ā€œvictoriousā€, and their alliance with the US would be seen as worthwhile. Their domestic publics would also be less likely to question the rulersā€™ strategies and policies. However, this scenario appears very unlikely, given ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s position in surviving the war and transitioning to a ceasefire and negotiations, as well as the US stance shifting toward achieving a mere exit strategy.

A second scenario, which is the most likely one to consider, is that the  Iranian regime survives the war, in which case the main losers will be the Gulf countries. Iran, the US and Israel will all claim victory and, to an extent, those claims will be correct. The leaders of these three countries will be able to convince their publics that they have achieved their objectives, at least among those who support their governmentsā€™ policies. The new Supreme Leader, whether it is still Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei or a successor in case he is also killed, will claim that they have defeated the US plan to overthrow the regime, and the IRGC, Basij and regime supporters across all strata will buy it. President Trump will tell his MAGA supporters that he has ā€œobliteratedā€ the threat of a ballistic and nuclear Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu will tell Israelis, mainly his supporters, that ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s capability to attack Israel is diminished. 

However, for regional countries such as the UAE, there wonā€™t be a victory narrative to pursue. They will not be able to convince their constituencies by claiming victory, as they have, at best, been defending themselves in a war that was not theirs. The public will be anxious about what the alliance with the US (and in the case of the UAE with Israel) will bring next. The Gulf states will face criticism from their people regarding the alliance with the US and any ties to the state of Israel. History bears witness to this, as public perception in Gulf states has often diverged from government narratives, and state decisions have not sat well with the public. 

The defiance was most noticeable in relation to the alliance between the US and Gulf state leaders, which does not always align with how the Arab public perceives the US and Israel. During the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, a reservations to customers who would like to enjoy their meals while watching Iranian missiles roaring towards Israel. A similar case happened during the Gulf War. On January 18, 1991, Saddam Husseinā€™s Iraq launched missile attacks on Israel. In his book, The Achilles Trap, Steve Coll writes that five Iraqi Scud missiles hit Tel Aviv and Haifa while Saudi officers and American counterparts were in the coordination center, C3IC, observing the attacks. The Americans were shocked when they saw the Saudi officers cheering the Iraqi strike with Allahu Akbar.Ģż

Now, while the times may differ, similar sentiments persist. Gulf states have to tactfully handle public opinion while simultaneously preventing their economies from falling into the doldrums. Henceforth, the path for the Gulf states is certainly fraught with difficulties on multiple fronts. 

In the end, therefore, it is not the US that loses investors and entrepreneurs, nor is it Israel, which is a startup country with the most powerful military in the region. Iran will not suffer from the mistrust of foreign investors either, as the country has few or no foreign investors, especially Western ones, due to sanctions and an unfriendly environment for foreigners. Tehran has little involvement in the international trade community to worry about losing it. What Iran has never had will not be a loss to Tehran in the post-war period. The real costs will be borne by the Gulf states.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post How the USā€“Israelā€“Iran War Costs the Gulf States appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Reports that is considering arming Iranian Kurdish groups point toward a familiar and dangerous strategy of proxy regime change ā€” one that rests on a fundamental misreading of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s demographic and political realities and carries potentially catastrophic risks not only for the US, but for the wider region and beyond.

A geographic misunderstanding 

To begin with, the strategy appears poorly informed about ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s internal political and demographic realities. ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Kurdish population represents a relatively small minority of the countryā€™s roughly 90 million people. Most place their numbers between 8% and 10%. 

They are concentrated largely in the mountainous northwest of the country along the borders with Iraq and Turkey, hundreds of miles from the political and economic center of gravity around Tehran. By contrast, the majority of the population is ethnically Persian, around 60%, with a long and deeply rooted sense of national identity stretching back more than two millennia. Two factors further make the idea even more problematic. 

First, most Iranian Kurds are Sunni Muslims in a country where more than of the population is Shia. That sectarian divide is not trivial. Sunniā€“Shia tensions have shaped Middle Eastern politics for centuries and continue to structure alliances and rivalries across the region. Arming a small Sunni Kurdish minority in the hope of toppling a Shia Persian state suggests a fundamental misreading of the countryā€™s ethnic and sectarian realities by US national security advisers.  

Second, the largest Kurdish population in the region is not in Iran at all but in southeastern Turkey, where Kurdish groups have fought a bitter against Ankara, in the capital of Turkey, for more than 40 years. During the Syrian Civil War, the US armed and supported forces as part of its campaign against the Islamic State. 

Once that mission was largely accomplished and American support began to recede, Turkey intervened militarily to weaken those same Kurdish forces, fearing they would embolden its own Kurdish minority. In other words, Kurdish proxy strategies rarely remain neatly contained within national borders.

Poor strategizing and underestimating 

There is also a broader strategic risk. Attempts to overthrow regimes from the outside often produce the opposite of the intended effect. Rather than weakening the government in Tehran, overt foreign support for insurgent groups could encourage Iranians, many of whom are critical of their own leadership, to rally around the flag in the face of . 

Iran also possesses far stronger state cohesion than many outsiders assume. While the regime faces significant domestic dissent, as evidenced by the in recent months, the Iranian state itself has proven resilient, a war with Iraq, decades of sanctions and sustained external pressure.

The alternative scenario may be even worse. Iran is a country of 90 million people, geographically larger than Texas and California combined, with a complex ethnic mosaic and a long history of regional power politics. If the state were to fragment into civil war, the conflict would almost certainly draw in outside powers. Russia and China, both of which maintain with Tehran, could support competing factions to counter American influence.

History offers few examples where external powers successfully engineer regime change through minority proxies. Far more often, such strategies produce fragmentation, civil war and prolonged instability. Pursuing that path in Iran risks turning one of the Middle Eastā€™s largest and most historically cohesive states into the next Syria, only vastly larger and far more dangerous. 

 [ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Road to Quagmire in Iran: Why Arming the Kurds Risks Destabilizing the Region appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The proposal outlines a step-by-step process for removing and disarming the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, commensurate with an Israeli withdrawal, a reduction in Israeli airstrikes, the demarcation of their shared land border and promises of reconstruction aid for Lebanon. 

A difficult process

Realizing the complete ceasefire agreement is tantamount to pulling teeth. No amount of policy gymnastics can identify the right combination of carrots and sticks for fulfilling the agreement. Additional negotiations, extending deadlines, and revisions to stipulations and processes are pointless endeavors while a critical partner to the agreement ā€” Lebanon ā€” retains a perverse sense of entitlement. 

Much of Lebanon is afflicted with a debilitating narcissism. The narcissism would not warrant much attention if the Mediterranean country resembled Singapore, but in the last 50 years, Lebanon has begun to rival Somalia in its dysfunctional and dystopian qualities.

On the one hand, Lebanese governments and many of its people demand respect, attention and support as a state, society and governing system historically grounded in ā€œmulticulturism,ā€ ā€œtoleranceā€ and ā€œequity.ā€ But on the other hand, when that state, society and governing system goes awry and affects other countries (which it repeatedly does), the Lebanese demand that they remain the master of their domain. 

The delusion enables a culture of fecklessness that has enveloped leadership and its supporters over the years. Excuses, half-measures, half-truths, indifference, a lack of urgency, platitudes, political theater, victimhood and window dressing consume how the Lebanese state and society discern and function. Even when an opportunity for improvement presents itself (as it did with the November 2024 US-mediated ceasefire), the self-defeating and self-inflicted behavior and thinking prevail, subjecting the country to a painful future.   

On October 8, 2023, the Lebanese militia, Hezbollah, an unprovoked attack against Israel. The militia framed their attack as an act of solidarity with Hamas and their Palestinian allies in Gaza. The Lebanese militia, which proclaims itself as a defender of Lebanon, did not notify the Lebanese government or seek the approval of the Lebanese people prior to their ā€œact of solidarityā€ with another nationality, no less.

Similar to previous acts of aggression by Hezbollah, the Lebanese state and large swathes of the population were expected, at a minimum, to tolerate the groupā€™s unilateralism and accept any fallout.

Crisis after conflictĢż

Thirteen months of deadly and destructive conflict between Israel and Hezbollah ensued before US shuttle diplomacy ā€œpersevered.ā€ Amos Hochstein, former US President Joe Bidenā€™s envoy, traveled to and between Israel and Lebanon throughout 2024 to realize the ceasefire.

The Lebanese ā€œtoleranceā€ of Hezbollahā€™s unilateralism resulted in thousands of Lebanese casualties, hundreds of thousands internally displaced, and billions of dollars in damage to property and infrastructure. The conflict compounded the problems and suffering of an already devastated country and people. A historic economic collapse that witnessed the Lebanese pound lose of its value entered its sixth year in August. One of the largest non-nuclear blasts leveled the port of Beirut, killing over and injuring thousands. Five years later, no one has been held for the egregious case of mismanagement, lack of enforcement and prolific corruption. The events add to a state and society that has not fully recovered from the effects of a 15-year civil war and a 29-year Syrian occupation.Ģż

For those unfamiliar with Lebanon, the announcement of a ceasefire on November 26, 2024, provided a glimmer of hope for the ravaged and exhausted country. Biden it as a ā€œnew start for Lebanon.ā€ French President Emanuel Macron that it created ā€œconditions to restore lasting calm.ā€ĢżĢżĢż

Biden and Macronā€™s optimism deserved some merit. By the start of the ā€œceasefire,ā€ Israel had weakened Hezbollahā€™s leadership and capabilities to a degree that Hezbollahā€™s Lebanese opponents had only dreamed about. Roughly one week after the announcement, longtime Hezbollah ally Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia, the flow of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah.

Adding to the optimism, one month later, Lebanese Parliamentarians elected Joseph Aoun to the Presidency (the office had been for 26 months due to political squabbling). One month later, the Lebanese agreed on the formation of Prime Minister Nawaf Salamā€™s government (a caretaker government had operated for the previous 33 months because of political disagreement).Ģż

However, hope does not spring eternal in Lebanon. One year later, Biden and Macronā€™s words ring hollow, and the celebration falls on deaf ears. The absence of Assad in Syria has not deterred Hezbollah from attempting to acquire Iranian arms. Aoun and Salam disappoint like their predecessors.

The calm between Lebanon and Israel is a myth. The initiator of the conflict, Hezbollah, remains unequivocal in forsaking its absolutist ideology and arms. Witness the recent of Hezbollah leader, Naim Qassem: ā€œWe will not abandon the weapons that honor us, nor the weapons that protect us from our enemy.ā€ Reports grow about Hezbollahā€™s gradual rearmament. Israel remains in five positions on Lebanese territory near their shared border and regularly Hezbollah personalities and weapons depots with drones and airstrikes.Ģż

Lebanon has not moved forward

The president and the prime minister remain ineffective in their duties to uphold Lebanonā€™s international obligations and their capacity to enforce the law and policy within its borders. Hezbollah fighters remain in South Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces lag in their disarmament of Hezbollah, raising serious doubts about whether it will ever be completed. How can leadership expect investment in their beleaguered country when their words (thus far) are worthless?  

The Biden administrationā€™s zeal for a diplomatic ā€œsolutionā€ to the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2024 gave little thought to the history and parties responsible for instituting the ceasefire. The Trump administration inherited a portfolio that requires too much oversight and arm-twisting with too little reward for a country that is not a US national security priority. As each day passes since November 26, 2024, Lebanonā€™s perverse sense of entitlement triumphs over constructive change and genuine improvement.      

For years, Lebanese officials have sold a bill of goods that tugs at the heartstrings of the world. Officials present the 82-year-old bankrupt and fractured Mediterranean country with an oversensationalized past as a model of Christian-Muslim coexistence and power sharing ā€” using its 18 recognized religious confessions as a vital example of diversity to the world.

Despite its dystopic and dysfunctional state, the international community is that Lebanon cannot be abandoned to unscrupulous actors (i.e., Iran) and allowed to dissolve. Lebanonā€™s complete failure will be a stain on the world and somehow raise questions and concerns about the future of Christian-Muslim coexistence and diversity elsewhere.Ģż

International assistance has not made things better

The Lebanese succeeded in promoting their exceptional model and issuing their dire warnings. Since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, the state and society have tens of billions of dollars in aid and assistance with few strings attached. Europe has hosted at least a half dozen international aid conferences, with more proposed. Evidence of European-backed projects is scattered throughout the country. Qatar much of southern Lebanon after the Hezbollah-initiated war with Israel in 2006. At times, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia filled financial shortfalls and funded projects. The United States regularly arms, pays and trains the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

Western Europe, America and the monarchies of the Gulf enabled Lebanonā€™s continued failure. Their 35-year gravy train helped maintain the faƧade of a state and societal divisions while deepening a culture of inflated self-worth. They bolstered attitudes and behaviors found among long-term welfare recipients. Assistance from others is constantly requested and expected. Accountability is largely absent. Blame is pointed elsewhere. The will to change is fleeting. Given the history, the last 13 months of failing to fully employ the stipulations of the Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire are expected. 

The Lebanese state and, by extension, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) cannot disarm Hezbollah because it has never matured and rarely been held accountable. Providing basic services like a full day of electricity has been a challenge for decades. Delivering justice remains elusive. Even the family of ex-Prime Minister Rafik el-Hariri could only get a in absentia for his murder on Lebanese soil via an international tribunal in The Hague. In 2017, the LAF required the of Hezbollah to defeat an ISIS force along its eastern border.

The failings of the state fuel the continued apathy for the Lebanese nation. Lebanonā€™s much-acclaimed ā€œco-existenceā€ and ā€œdiversityā€ perpetuate an environment in which oneā€™s communal identity competes with or supersedes the national identity. For that reason, the LAF remains a hollow institution. How can it be an effective force when many of its members have a greater affinity for its religious community than the people of Lebanon?

The latest US proposal gives the LAF until December 31 to finish the job it has failed to complete in the last nine months. Are four additional months going to reverse long-term attitudes and deep-seated behaviors in the institution? 

To obfuscate the failings and the facades, leadership and its supporters resort to hollow words, half-measures, half-truths, excuses, demands and warnings. Instead of acknowledging that the ceasefire was signed under false pretenses or going back on its word, Lebanese officials seek out opportunities to distract and displace blame. Some measures are insulting, while others manipulate fallacies and fears. 

For eight months, President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam have gone through the motions and indulged in platitudes about the sovereignty and supremacy of the Lebanese state. A recent example appeared on the streets of Beirut. A poster with pictures of the two officials proclaimed: ā€œAll of us are with you. One army. One weapon. One state. A new era for Lebanon.ā€ Like leadershipā€™s various feckless words, these posters and slogans will eventually be replaced by a new one.  

In August (five months after the creation of the government and considerable US pressure), the Salam government finally issued the unprecedented authorization to the LAF to disarm the militia. On September 5, the LAF plans to the government for disarming the militia. Were they not obliged to disarm Hezbollah since the start of the ceasefire? What then exactly was the LAF doing between November 2024 and August 2025 in the absence of authorization?ĢżĢż

Noticeably absent from the disarmament plans are deadlines. After 13 months, the LAF is supposed to finish disarming Hezbollah in southern Lebanon (south of the Litani River) by December 31. But no evidence exists of deadlines for the rest of the country. Hezbollah maintains a presence in Beirut, Baā€™albek, Jbeil and Hermel. The ceasefire agreement is centered around UN Resolution , which explicitly states that Hezbollah must be disarmed throughout the country. At the current rate, Hezbollah may be disarmed in ā€¦ five years?

Lebanese officials couple the platitudes and theater with the celebration of issues that are of secondary importance. ā€œStrong wordsā€ are directed at Iranian officials. Political posters in urban areas are removed. Palestinians in Lebanon (at least the non-Hamas and non-Marxist ones) are disarmed. The Beirut International Airport and the Lebanese-Syrian border are secured (for now) to prevent cash and weapons transfers to Hezbollah. 

While initially encouraging, the endeavors and words can only distract from the elephant in the room ā€” Hezbollahā€™s retention of weapons ā€” for so long. When distractions no longer suffice, excuses and alternative outcomes are employed and suggested to (re)direct the blame, buy some time and impede outcomes.  

Israel is a popular excuse

Antisemitism, disdain for Zionism and conflict with its southern neighbor have produced a cottage industry in Lebanon for identifying Israeli complicity in many, if not most, of Lebanonā€™s woes. The Beirut Port blast in 2020, a case of gross negligence by government authorities, was initially on an Israeli missile strike by many Lebanese. One can visit Lebanon today and find citizens who still believe Israel played a role in one of the largest non-nuclear explosions or perceive the investigation into the blast as Israeli subterfuge.Ģż

Not surprisingly, the same Lebanese leaders and politicians, whose litany of empty promises are many, claim that the Israeli ā€œoccupationā€ and actions are responsible for their dereliction of duties. Nine months after the deadline extension, the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament for 33 years and Hezbollah ally, Nabih Berri, Israel for delaying the complete deployment of the LAF in southern Lebanon.

In the absence of Lebanese agency and execution, Israel is painted as the aggressor. President Aoun and other Lebanese politicians repeatedly tell the world that Israeli actions are counterproductive. If Israel only withdraws from its five remaining positions inside Lebanon and ceases the targeting of Hezbollah members in the south, the Lebanese could disarm the militia and bring calm to the Israeli-Lebanese border. 

History tells a different story. In 2006, Lebanon UN Resolution 1701, which stipulated an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah. Israel withdrew only to witness the Lebanese government go back on its word and watch Hezbollah rearm and reembed itself along the border.Ģż

Most Lebanese will tell you that they do not trust their government. Why should Israel trust the Lebanese government ā€¦ again?

Another popular excuse is Lebanonā€™s ā€œfragility.ā€ 

How to move forward?

Lebanese officials assert that Lebanon cannot be pushed to disarm Hezbollah. Previous Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdullah Bou Habib and others that immediate disarmament will trigger communal violence. They guilt the world into believing that Lebanonā€™s Christian-Muslim coexistence equation and diversity hang in the balance if they are pressured.ĢżĢż

Therefore, the process is delicate and requires time. The LAF requires more funding and soldiers. A dialogue with Hezbollah must occur. The disarmament is a ā€œā€ operation and progress is kept from the public to not humiliate the militia and its Shia supporters.ĢżĢż

All the money in the world and more troops cannot make the LAF an effective fighting force. Money does not generate a love for the nation and the defense of the state. Young Lebanese males who learn to operate sophisticated military equipment do not magically become zealous guardians of a nation they previously had little affinity for.   

Aounā€™s dialogue strategy to avert conflict with Hezbollah and its Shia supporters is peculiar. What concessions can be given to a party and its supporters that are already political actors, represented in parliament and members of the government? Surrendering weapons is a black and white issue ā€” you either submit to the will of the state or not. Who exactly dictates the actions and interests of the state? 

A dialogue also raises temporal issues and further questions. Has this dialogue already begun? How long will it last? Should Israel have to wait for the Lebanese to iron out their issues? What if the dialogue breaks down? Then what? Like its struggles to carry out policy, the Lebanese track record with domestic dialogues is poor.

The ā€œclassifiedā€ disarmament process is ridiculous and unusual for a Lebanese state prolific in incompetence and a society rooted in spectacles. Can one expect a lid to be maintained on a physical, audible and destructive operation by a state that struggles to maintain any sense of order (just try driving in Lebanon)? With the prevalence of social media, can Hezbollahā€™s Lebanese enemies be restrained from trying to humiliate the party? Some in the Shia would also welcome the opportunity to portray the operation as the victimization of the community at the hands of the state, colluding with Israel and America. 

With the exception of when soldiers died from the explosion of Hezbollah ordnance, the only footage the world witnesses of Hezbollahā€™s disarmament is when Israel targets their weapons depots. The absence of proof creates doubt about the sincerity and thoroughness of the LAFā€™s operations. Is it merely a coincidence that the LAF claimed to run out of explosives needed to destroy Hezbollah armaments and infrastructure in the days before the arrival of US deputy special envoy Morgan Ortagus in October?ĢżĢż

History demonstrates that ā€œdelicatenessā€ is a ploy to avoid accountability and maintain power. The Taif Agreement, a Lebanese document which bring an end to the 15-year Lebanese civil war in 1990, stipulated political reforms. Itā€™s thirty-five years later, and some of the reforms remain unfulfilled. Why? The powers to be in Lebanon deem it not an appropriate time ā€” it would be too disruptive for the fragile nature of Lebanon.Ģż

The Lebanese reliance on excuses demonstrates a spectacular exhibition of hubris. Many Lebanese officials and elements of society believe the rules do not apply to them despite their precarious plight and predicament. For Lebanon, the beggar can indeed be the chooser. 

Deadlines are made to be broken. The government agreed to institute the ceasefire agreement by January 27, 2025. It then agreed to a 22-day extension. Ten months later, and after considerable arm-twisting, it remains unclear if even one-third of the country will be free of Hezbollahā€™s weapons. Letā€™s not forget that the Lebanese agreed to the disarmament process (UN Resolution 1701) almost 20 years ago.

Accountability is for others. After ten months, it remains doubtful that even one-third of the country will be free of Hezbollahā€™s weapons. Its contempt for accountability is made more outrageous by the bankrupt and broken countryā€™s belief that it can dictate future deadlines for disarmament at its convenience.  

The Lebanese understanding of sovereignty is privileged. Sovereignty is contingent on the actions of others ā€” Israel and the United States. It lacks agency while telling others to mind its own business. The Lebanese mindset is: ā€œIf the United States could only prevent Israel from protecting itself, then we could get along with our business, and tomorrow we will start disarming Hezbollah.ā€ Does this country and its leadership believe that it can get away with doing next to nothing ā€” making a few concessions ā€” and expect genuine improvement? Is Lebanon the only country where its sovereignty is the job of others?

The Lebanese exceptionalism further manifests in how it dictates future interactions (or lack thereof) with Israel. Often overlooked in the last 13 months is the continued Lebanese refusal to normalize relations with Israel. Lebanese officials believe it can formally deny the existence of the Israeli state while keeping the forces of ā€œresistanceā€ (i.e., Hezbollah and its allies) at bay. It is a delusional belief by a state that is challenged to deter people from criminal activity, let alone disarm the very people who yearn to eliminate Israel. 

A recent and maybe the most spectacular example of hubris is the by Lebanese officials for additional negotiations with Israel. What is there to (re)negotiate? 13 months ago, Lebanese officials agreed to terms that they failed to fulfill. They have not offered any concessions to reopen negotiations. Why is Lebanon entitled to more negotiations, particularly since it is the weaker of the parties? Do they expect it will simply occur out of compassion?Ģż

The arrogance, delays, excuses, half measures and further negotiations are a blessing to Hezbollah. The militia thrives at undermining processes and impeding outcomes, as demonstrated by reports of its rearmament. The organizationā€™s absolutism ā€” rejecting ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s existenceā€”compels it to disrupt and ā€œdiscoverā€ outstanding issues to justify its armament. 

Two notable examples

On the eve of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah announced that Israel occupied the Shebaa Farms (an area unbeknownst to most Lebanese until then). It attempted to discredit the withdrawal as complete despite the UN declaring the Israeli withdrawal as full (the UN recognizes Shebaa as Syrian territory).

More recently, in 2022, following the demarcation of the Israeli-Lebanese maritime border, Hezbollah that some Lebanese waters remained occupied by Israel despite the Lebanese governmentā€™s endorsement of the agreement.Ģż

Lebanese behavior and thinking are quite perplexing. They enable opportunities to delegitimize the ceasefire agreement or discredit the process. It comes at a costly price. Violence perpetuates. Economic recovery stalls. Poverty deepens. International goodwill and patience erode. 

Lebanese narcissism has created an unviable environment for enacting policy and international agreements. Has Lebanon earned some special status in the world because of its demographics and history to act and think in such a manner? Is Lebanon serious about wanting a monopoly on violence in its territory? Is the country sincere about wanting to create a viable future? The excruciating exceptionalism of Lebanon endures. 

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Excruciating Exceptionalism of Lebanon appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

These systems do not want peace because their survival depends on sustained conflict. This is why diplomatic summits, ceasefire deals and foreign interventions consistently fail: they target symptoms, not causes. If the problem is structural, then so must be the solution. Peace in the Middle East will not come through negotiation. It will come through a civilizational shift, and it demands three acts of moral courage.

The first is capitalist liberalization. Every individual must gain the right to produce, to trade and to own. No government has the right to command his labor, confiscate his earnings or dictate his future. Capitalism is not a system of greed. It is the only system that recognizes the moral right of a person to live for his own sake.

The second is cultural conservatism. A society cannot survive without roots. When families collapse, when traditions vanish, when morality fades into relativism, chaos follows. A rational culture does not erase its past. It protects what gives life meaning, not by coercion, but by conviction.

The third is institutional transformation. No regime that survives by crushing liberty, spreading violence and fueling sectarian hate can remain in power without destroying the future. People must not reform such systems. They must replace them. Political freedom requires new institutions built on justice, law and individual rights.

This is the foundation of what I call Conservative modernism. It rejects both Islamic totalitarianism and secular technocracy. It affirms that peace cannot exist without liberty, and liberty cannot exist without moral strength. This is not a policy. It is a philosophy.

Sectarian wars and the legacy of doctrinal politics

We cannot understand the Middle Eastā€™s political instability apart from the theological and sectarian divides embedded within Islam itself. The ā€” originating from a dispute over the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad ā€” has long outgrown its historical moment to become the structural backbone of regional conflict. This divide was never merely theological; it became during the first Islamic civil wars and later into full-fledged state ideologies during the rise of rival empires like the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate and the Shia Safavid dynasty.Ģż

These empires did not merely represent competing political centers ā€” they embodied competing claims to spiritual authority. In modern terms, regimes seeking to legitimize their power through religious division have hardened, institutionalized and weaponized these doctrinal fault lines rather than letting them fade. 

The legacy of these doctrinal wars lives on in todayā€™s proxy conflicts, from Yemen to Syria, Iraq to Lebanon. Iran, as the self-appointed guardian of the Shia cause, has instrumentalized this divide to its revolutionary ideology through paramilitary proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq and Syria.Ģż

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, while less overtly ideological, have with their versions of sectarian patronage and security alignments. The result is not simply a clash between states, but a doctrinal cold war that perpetually destabilizes the region through religious identity and existential fear.

Political Islam, once unleashed as the doctrine of the state, does not merely challenge liberty ā€” it annihilates the very concept. Its metaphysical certainty surpasses even the most dogmatic ideologies of the West. It does not see disagreement as an error. It brands it as blasphemy. What follows is inevitable. The state becomes paranoid. It cannot rest. It must constantly search for new traitors to purge. Reform becomes a crime. Dialogue becomes apostasy. There can be no middle ground, no compromise ā€” only absolute control.

In this system, truth belongs to the ruling sect alone. To think differently is not a mistake ā€” it is treason. The state no longer governs; it sanctifies itself. Power fuses with theology. Rule becomes divine command. And from that moment, every act of dissent becomes a threat to the sacred order. No regime built on this logic can tolerate peace. Peace implies coexistence. It suggests that another version of truth might exist. But in sectarian totalitarianism, there is only one truth ā€” and only one authority to speak it. The heretic becomes more dangerous than the foreign enemy, because he corrupts the system from within. That is why these regimes live in constant fear of internal betrayal. They do not govern citizens; they hunt them.

Colonial powers did not build the modern Middle East into nations. They it into fragments. They drew their borders without reason. National identities remained shallow. In this vacuum, sectarian ideology offered a seductive substitute. It gave rulers a way to seize power without earning it. They did not ask for the peopleā€™s consent. They claimed divine authority instead.

Theocrats wrapped themselves in clerical robes to escape accountability. In Iran, the doctrine of placed unchecked political power in the hands of a cleric. Ayatollah Khomeini did not rule as a man ā€” he ruled as a voice of God. Sunni radicals followed the same path. Groups like ISIS declared caliphates not to govern, but to sanctify tyranny. These regimes do not fear criticism, because they do not answer to men. They answer to the metaphysical fiction they claim to represent.

Islamic regimes use a dangerous illusion. They raise the banner of anti-Zionism not to unify but to distract. They Judaism and Israel as the ultimate enemy, hoping to forge a sense of solidarity across sectarian lines. But the truth remains: no propaganda can erase centuries of hatred between Sunni and Shia, between Salafi and Sufi, between Arab and Persian, between Turkic and non-Turkic. The hatred runs deep, and it does not disappear when leaders shout slogans against Israel.

This is not unity. It is manipulation. Anti-Zionism becomes a tool to dissent at home. It channels public anger away from corruption, poverty and tyranny, and toward an invented external enemy. It does not heal division; it hides it. The regimes that use this tactic know they cannot survive on truth, so they survive on scapegoats. But lies do not last. The cracks widen. The rhetoric grows louder, while the people grow poorer.

This is the real engine of Middle Eastern conflict. Not just land. Not just oil. It is the battle for the right to define Godā€™s will ā€” and to use that claim as a weapon. No treaty will break this system. No ceasefire will fix it. If regimes like Iran continue to export sectarian revolution as a matter of policy, the region will remain trapped in endless war. Peace will never begin on a battlefield. It begins in the mind. We must name doctrinal tyranny, expose it and defeat it. Only then can the Middle East escape from the chains of sacred war and step into the realm of civil peace.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution

The 1979 was not simply a change of regime; it was a civilizational rupture that produced a theocratic state with an unprecedented mission: to restructure the Islamic world according to the vision of Shiite clerical rule. ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s revolution claimed divine authorization through the doctrine of Vilayat al-Faqih. This doctrine, enshrined in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s constitution, granted religious elites not only domestic supremacy but also a global mandate.Ģż

Article 154 explicitly that the Islamic Republic was duty-bound to ā€œsupport the just struggles of the oppressedā€ worldwide. This ideological euphemism laid the legal foundation for regional insurgencies, proxy warfare and transnational terror networks. This new paradigm made ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s foreign policy an extension of messianic doctrine.

The Islamic Republic institutionalized this transformation of ideology into action by creating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (), and specifically its external wing, the , which carried out the mission of exporting the revolution. These were not simply elite military units but ideological vanguards ā€” armed missionaries designed to reshape the region in Tehranā€™s image.

The IRGC and funded Shia militant factions during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, inside Iraq, creating the blueprint for what would later evolve into militia-state fusion. As early as 1982, Iran establish Hezbollah in Lebanon, embedding its revolutionary DNA in a new Shia militia that would grow into the regionā€™s most sophisticated paramilitary movement.Ģż

But Iran did not confine its ambitions to its sect. Tehran built connections with Sunni groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran and its allies bypassed doctrinal differences when they faced a shared strategic enemy in Israel and the West, proving that ideology would bend to power.

Of all ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ideological exports, Hezbollah remains the most enduring and institutionally complete. Born in the rubble of Lebanonā€™s civil war, Hezbollahā€™s 1985 founding manifesto allegiance to ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Supreme Leader and its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. As Massaab Al-Aloosy has, Hezbollah evolved into a uniquely hybrid entity ā€” a terrorist organization, political party and social welfare provider. This model of Islamic fascism does not simply mimic the authoritarian features of 20th-century totalitarian regimes. Instead, it integrates them with theological absolutism.Ģż

In Hezbollahā€™s worldview, the enemy is not merely political dissent or a foreign occupier. It is ideological impurity. Its of martyrdom, strict sectarian loyalty and rejection of pluralism form the core of an authoritarian theocratic identity, where the sect and the imamate define the sacred political community.

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s reach and pragmatism allowed it to overcome sectarian lines when necessary. Nowhere is this clearer than in its alliance with Hamas, a Sunni group originally rooted in ideology. Initially antagonistic due to theological differences, Hamas gradually embraced ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s vision of resistance as its conflict with Israel intensified. Iran financial aid, smuggled weapons, supplied tactical training and built tunnel infrastructure that allowed Hamas to survive and militarize Gaza.Ģż

By the mid-2000s, especially after the groupā€™s electoral victory and its, Hamas began to mirror ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s revolutionary language, re-framing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a divine struggle, not a solvable territorial dispute. Its leaders visited Tehran, received IRGC guidance and adopted a media strategy aligned with the broader.

This model of revolutionary partnership extended to Yemen, where Iran found a new ideological canvas in the , also known as Ansar Allah. Originally a local revivalist faction rooted in, Iran helped morph the Houthis into a more radicalized, Twelver-aligned militia. The groupā€™s , ā€œDeath to America, Death to Israel,ā€ is lifted directly from ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s revolutionary chant. By the 2010s, Iran supplied or engineered sophisticated missile and drone capabilities for the Houthis. These weapons the group to strike deep into Saudi Arabia and threaten global commerce in the Red Sea.

The of Saddam Hussein in 2003 provided Iran with its greatest strategic opening since 1979. Iraq, long a bulwark against Iranian expansion, became a vacuum of fractured authority in which Iran could embed deeply rooted proxies. The US-led dismantling of the Iraqi state allowed Tehran to co-opt existing militias such as the and new ones like Kataā€™ib Hezbollah and Asaā€™ib Ahl al-Haq.Ģż

All these militias pledged spiritual allegiance to ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Supreme Leader. These groups infiltrated Iraqi security institutions, won parliamentary seats and turned Iraq into what I call a militia democracy. What distinguishes them from conventional insurgents is their ideological DNA. Rather than acknowledging themselves as part of a civil war, they present their struggle as resistance to Sunnis and Western imperialism.

Syriaā€™s civil war further deepened ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ideological project. Though the ruling Alawite regime under Bashar al-Assad does not follow mainstream Shiism, its geopolitical vulnerability made it an ideal ally. As protests spiraled into war, Iran intervened with billions in military aid, deploying not just IRGC troops and Hezbollah fighters, but also recruiting tens of thousands of Afghan Shia fighters from the impoverished Hazara population into the.Ģż

These fighters, lured by salaries and promises of martyrdom, became part of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s transnational jihad. Syria thus became the geopolitical artery of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s vision: a corridor of power from Tehran through Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut to the Mediterranean. Iran entrenched what many call the by establishing an ideological, financial and logistical presence in Syria.

Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria are no longer just battlefields. They are proving grounds for a new form of tyranny. These lands have become ideological laboratories, where fanatics test how far they can bend reality to fit a totalitarian creed.

Islamic socialism

The ideological machinery of post-1979 Iran introduced a new hybrid: . While the term may appear contradictory at first glance, it captures the unique fusion of theological absolutism with populist redistributionism. Islamic socialism is an economic-political framework that retains the authoritarian hierarchy of religious fascism, complete with doctrinal obedience and paramilitary enforcement.Ģż

At the same time, it borrows heavily from socialist structures such as centralized welfare, state control over key industries and class-based grievance politics. Just as European fascists in the 20th century adopted socialism to win popular support while retaining autocratic control (e.g., the Nazi ā€œStrength Through Joyā€ ), the Islamic Republic has developed a theology of resistance economy. Here, economic hardship is not only tolerated but sanctified as martyrdom against global injustice. In this model, people must endure poverty collectively, heroically and violently rather than overcome it through liberal development.Ģż

Shiite theology provides the foundation for this socialist-fascist hybrid, on concepts of suffering, resistance and collective martyrdom. Shiism glorifies the mustadŹæafÄ«n, a group that Islamic texts frame as the downtrodden destined for divine justice. Khomeiniā€™s revolutionary rhetoric this religious concept into a political-economic category, portraying the global poor ā€” and particularly the Shia masses ā€” as victims of Western imperialism.Ģż

Economic disparity is not a result of governance failures or global markets, but of cosmic injustice. Similar to how Nazi ideology peasant sacrifice and national suffering as the price of destiny, the Islamic Republic elevates economic deprivation into a moral calling. It framed subsidy cuts, sanctions and austerity as acts of loyalty to a divine cause.

Crucially, leaders do not just impose the model of Islamic Socialism from above; they enforce it through tribal structures and sectarian identities. It replaces civic institutions with kinship loyalty and doctrinal submission. In the Iranian-led axis, traditional tribal instincts are not suppressed but weaponized. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shia militias in Iraq all demonstrate this structure. 

War footing as the foundation of economic life

These groups offer not only salaries and protection, but welfare, housing and education ā€” all contingent upon ideological alignment and collective loyalty. They systematically erase individualism. Oneā€™s worth is not measured by merit or autonomy but by oneā€™s allegiance to the sect, the tribe and ultimately, the martyrdom cause. This mirrors how Italian fascism and German Nazism pre-modern collectivism to erase individuality and convert citizens into functionaries of myth, soldiers of a destiny beyond themselves.

In these theocratic-socialist regimes, the individual disappears as a political subject. Rather than a bearer of rights, the person becomes a vessel of duty ā€” primarily to the sect, then to the Supreme Leader. Ideological training begins early, often in religious schools controlled by paramilitary arms of the state or proxy groups. These institutions teach loyalty not just to God but to the revolutionary cause. 

The regime trains the youth, like those in Nazi Germanyā€™s, not to think but to serve and sacrifice. Hezbollahā€™s and ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s indoctrination programs illustrate this well. Here, Islamic Socialism becomes a mechanism for total identity control: dictating what to believe, what to fear, who to love and who to kill. Welfare is no longer a civic right ā€” it is a weaponized privilege, allocated according to sectarian discipline and revolutionary usefulness.Ģż

Moreover, this system depends on a dual moral economy: one inward-facing, promoting solidarity, and one outward-facing, glorifying hostility. Internally, Islamic Socialist leaders teach their communities to see themselves as pure, righteous and chosen. Externally, however, the world is divided into oppressors and enemies ā€” whether they be the West, secular liberals, Sunni rivals or Zionists. 

The stateā€™s leaders direct the economic and military engines toward this perpetual war footing. ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s leaders speak not of GDP growth but of jihad of production and economic resistance as if commerce itself were warfare. People allocate resources not to produce prosperity but to sustain ideological conflict. They Nazi Germanyā€™s approach by fusing industry, propaganda and violence into a single war-making machine.

The myth of the Promised Land

Islamist regimes have spent decades weaponizing one of their most enduring myths: the belief that Israel seeks to fulfill a biblical prophecy by expanding its territory. According to this myth, Israel aims to restore the so-called Promised Land, stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates. Islamist leaders and propagandists frequently this claim in Friday sermons, regime media and militant manifestos.Ģż

The narrative serves both psychological and strategic purposes by fostering a sense of perpetual victimhood among Muslim populations and justifying preemptive violence. However, no formal Israeli policy ā€” past or present ā€” has ever such a fantasy. This contradiction between perception and reality is not an accident. It is the product of Islamic fascism.

Arab and Islamic leaders never admit that the biblical Promised Land in the Old Testament covers far less territory than Islamist propaganda claims. While and do reference land covenants, these verses are highly symbolic, varied in interpretation and not presented as a modern political blueprint. The more expansive version ā€” suggesting Israeli claims over half the Arab world ā€” is a misreading or deliberate distortion.Ģż

Even within Jewish religious scholarship, there is no consensus on whether the land covenant is literal, spiritual or eschatological. More importantly, Israel, as a modern state, has never built policy around these verses. The secular Zionist movement that founded Israel drove its actions with political pragmatism, not theological maximalism. The Declaration of Independence, for instance, contains no reference to religious prophecy as a legal or territorial foundation for the state.

Prominent biblical scholars have repeatedly argued that the Promised Land verses do not apply to modern statecraft. Walter Brueggemann, a leading Old Testament theologian, that the land promises in Genesis and Ezekiel symbolize divine fidelity and human obligation. Ezekiel 47:13ā€“23 outlines a limited, region-specific territory tied to historical tribes, not a universal conquest map. Jewish exegetes widely the Nile to Euphrates phrasing in Genesis 15:18 as covenantal poetry, not a literal border plan. Contemporary Jewish religious institutions and ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s Chief Rabbinate have never endorsed any policy derived from these verses.

Oslo Accords and the recognition of a two-state framework

±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s territorial policy shows a consistent pattern of contraction and compromise, not expansion, contrary to the myth of expansionism. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Israel accepted the1949 rather than pressing beyond. In 1967, during the , Israel captured territory (including Sinai and the West Bank) but returned the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1982 under the.The (1993ā€“1995) and subsequent negotiations all recognized the concept of a two-state solution, even with territorial compromises. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza, dismantling settlements without a peace agreement.Ģż

These historical milestones disprove the idea of a consistent theological or messianic territorial agenda. Even in contentious areas like the West Bank, Israeli officials and lawmakers debate expansion according to legal and political frameworks rather than divine mandate.

Regimes like Iran and ideological movements like Hezbollah and Hamas the Abraham Accords as an existential crisis. The accords, signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, were a public rejection of the expansionist myth. They demonstrated that Arab nations ā€” particularly those with strategic awareness ā€” do not believe Israel is seeking to fulfill some ancient prophecy. These are not naĆÆve regimes; they signed normalization agreements based on economic cooperation, technological exchange and geopolitical calculations.

The path forward

Real peace in the Middle East requires structural change. This approach rejects the shallow cycle of summit diplomacy and short-term ceasefires. Structural change demands a civilizational shift: leaders must dismantle sacralized politics and stop using religious narratives to justify power. This isnā€™t Western-style secularism but a deliberate separation of divine claims from state rule. Only through this shift can the region build lasting peace ā€” rooted not in utopias or despair, but in economic freedom, cultural cohesion and strong institutions.

offers a clear alternative to ideological extremes. It doesnā€™t fuse them. It escapes them. Unlike secular technocracy, which often alienates traditional societies, conservative modernism respects the cultural depth of the Middle East and promotes practical reform. It builds on Enlightenment ideals like individual liberty and economic autonomy while honoring civilizational continuity.Ģż

Its foundation rests on three pillars: economic liberalism, cultural conservatism and institutional reform. It doesnā€™t force secularism, nor does it permit theocracy. Instead, it preserves spiritual identity while disarming messianic violence. It respects tradition without falling into tribalism, and religion without surrendering to religious absolutism.

offers a powerful historical model within this framework. Mustafa Kemal AtatĆ¼rk launched it in the early 20th century as a bold top-down effort to secularize Turkey. He abolished the Ottoman Caliphate, replaced Islamic law with Western legal codes and built a civic nationalism rooted in republican values. Kemalism stands as one of the few successful cases in the Islamic world where state institutions stripped religion of political power without erasing faith itself. Yet, the project also imposed authoritarian control, censorship and bureaucratic rigidity.Ģż

Today, the Middle East can draw lessons from Kemalism ā€” not as a complete solution, but as a foundational blueprint. It shows how nations can curb clerical authority without destroying religious life and how civic nationalism can overcome tribal and sectarian divides by building loyalty to the state.

Kemalism needs a complement. Its authoritarian legacy demands correction through the principles of libertarianism, which counters centralized coercion. Many in the Middle East misinterpret libertarianism as a Western indulgence or a form of moral anarchy. In truth, it is a philosophy of restraint ā€” placing clear limits on state power. 

Within conservative modernism, libertarianism protects individual dignity from being sacrificed for national unity. It upholds free association, freedom of speech, private enterprise and personal conscience as essential pillars of post-sectarian societies. When paired with Kemalist reforms, libertarianism softens the stateā€™s edges and makes room for civil liberties to thrive where ideological control once prevailed.

This fusion directly targets what I call the tribal complex ā€” the web of kinship, patronage and sectarian loyalty that cripples modern statehood across the Middle East. In tribal systems, the individual never stands alone; he serves as a proxy for his group, bound by blood ties and religious allegiance. Tribal logic dictates political loyalty, economic access and legal protection, leaving little room for citizenship or merit. 

This is the real enemy of peace: the absence of a civic concept of the individual. Kemalism dismantles tribal structures through land reform, education and militia disarmament. Libertarianism then builds the culture of self-ownership and economic agency needed to prevent tribalismā€™s return.  

Conservative modernism demands a profound psychological transformation. Middle Eastern societies must abandon the mythology of martyrdom and embrace the everyday heroism of building families, businesses, schools and institutions. Peace begins when people stop seeking symbolic sacrifice and start pursuing tangible contribution. The new citizen must become a rational actor ā€” focused on dignity through property ownership, child-rearing and value creation. Economic liberalism, in this vision, goes beyond material systems; it launches a moral revolt against fatalism.

Turkeyā€™s potential role in reshaping the Abrahamic framework

Turkey holds the key to securing lasting peace in the Middle East through its integration into the Abrahamic framework. Turkey is a historic power. Unlike the Gulf monarchies that are dependent on petroleum dollars and foreign support, Turkey possesses the internal civilizational strength to lead. Its NATO membership, industrial capacity and nuanced relationship with Islam give it a unique ability to balance religious heritage with strategic logic. Including Turkey in the Abraham Accords would shift the regional balance. It would show that ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ideological barriers are not only penetrable but also collapsing. 

Turkeyā€™s participation would also redefine Muslim solidarity, moving it away from perpetual hostility toward Israel and shared goals in economic growth and technological progress. A regional alliance among Turkey, Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia could create a new peace axis and weaken ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s grip on ideological leadership.

The Islamic Republic of Iran remains the greatest single barrier to sustainable peace. This is not merely because of its actions, but because of its doctrine. One cannot reach a lasting agreement with a state that must, by its very ideology, destroy its negotiating partner to remain legitimate. Any peace built upon negotiation with such a regime is a ceasefire with a time limit. We must replace the Islamic Republic not through foreign war, but through internal transformation.

Regime change imposed by foreign powers breeds dependency and resentment, as seen in Iraq. Instead, change must emerge from within Iranian civil society ā€” through education, economic empowerment and ideological detoxification. This requires long-term investment in civic literacy, especially among the youth. Only a population that understands the moral and civic basis of pluralism can dismantle a system built on sectarian fear. Empowered with economic agency and a desacralized worldview, Iranians themselves can ā€” and must ā€” be the agents of transformation.

A stable society must depoliticize religion without erasing it. Secularism is not atheism or cultural erasure ā€” it is a safeguard. By limiting the political misuse of faith, secularism protects mosques, churches and synagogues as spaces for moral reflection, not power. To end partisan abuse, sectarian violence and theocratic repression, states must build a legal firewall between belief and authority. In this separation, both faith and civic life can thrive.

To summarize the core prescriptions proposed throughout this work, the following principles outline a structural roadmap for achieving sustainable peace in the Middle East:

• Depoliticize religion by enforcing constitutional secularism that protects faith while preventing its weaponization.
• Embrace economic liberalism to dismantle tribal patronage and foster individual autonomy.
• Redefine conservatism as civil order, family cohesion and moral continuity ā€” not authoritarianism.
• Promote education reform rooted in critical reasoning, pluralism and civic ethics over sectarian indoctrination.
• Foster internal regime change in Iran and similar regimes through economic empowerment and ideological detoxification.
• Reject foreign invasions, supporting revolutions that emerge organically from educated and self-actualized societies.
• Integrate Turkey into the Abraham Accords to establish a strong axis of pragmatic, non-apocalyptic Islam.
• Normalize ties with Israel as a regional partner in trade, security and scientific advancement ā€” not as a messianic threat.
• Fuse Kemalism with Libertarianism to combine institutional reform with civil liberty and crush the tribal complex.
• Replace martyrdom cultures with economic liberalism that prioritizes life, dignity and opportunity.
• Establish conservative modernism as the only viable doctrine suited to Middle Eastern reform.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Conservative Modernism: A Roadmap for Sustainable Peace in the Middle East appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

In Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan, the war disrupted cross-border trade, triggered fuel shortages and intensified humanitarian and security concerns. These cascading effects prompted Pakistanā€™s National Security Committee (NSC) to convene on to assess not only the strategic and defense implications but also the broader humanitarian fallout threatening socio-economic stability and communal harmony in its most vulnerable western frontier.

Balochistan, Pakistanā€™s largest and geostrategically most sensitive province, shares a long and porous (562 miles) with Iran, making it acutely susceptible to the ripple effects of regional conflicts. The recent Israel-Iran war not only destabilized the Middle East but also cast a long shadow over Balochistan, intensifying existing sectarian sensitivities within Pakistanā€™s diverse social fabric.Ģż

As a predominantly Sunni nation with a significant Shiite minority (approximately of the population), Pakistan found itself grappling with the dangerous spillover of sectarian propaganda, targeted violence and renewed proxy activity. The deep-rooted religious and cultural bonds between Shiite communities on both sides of the border amplified these tensions, particularly as someone deliberately wove religious symbolism and sectarian rhetoric into the war narrative.Ģż

Security analysts warned that such polarization could provide fertile ground for militant outfits like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), potentially reviving separatist propaganda under the banner of a ā€œGreater Balochistan.ā€ In this highly combustible environment, the intersection of external conflict and internal fault lines poses a serious threat to Pakistanā€™s national cohesion and border stability.

Baloch activism in response to provocation

Throughout the military confrontation between Iran and Israel, reports have emerged of various activities conducted by Baloch militants in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Sistan-Balochistan province. During a at the University of Sistan and Baluchestan, students responded with backlash after Daneil Asadullah, a member of the universityā€™s Islamic Association and an agent of the security forces, made insulting statements against the Baloch people.Ģż

Maulvi Tayyeb Ismail Zahi, son of Maulvi Abdul Hamid, in response to the messages and requests of the people following the conflict between Israel and the Islamic Republic, a story on his Instagram page, emphasizing the dignity, unity and readiness of the Baloch people and called for strategic patience and prayers for the good and glory of the homeland. The anti-regime Baloch activist is campaigning to bring joy to the Baloch people of Giyeh (Nikshahr) and to convey their message to the rest of the world.

Following concerns about the expansion of Baloch activities, the checkpoint, deployment of Special Forces and increased have been implemented at the entrance to Zahedan. This city has been subject to increased security control due to the sensitive location of the main centres of the IRGC, intelligence and command of the forces. In continuation of the revolutionary movements, the Sarbaz-Mehristan axis was closed by Baloch militants.Ģż

The Baloch people are blocking the route of military forces and taking control of traffic in various areas. The Baloch Revolutionary Youth closed the Pahra Niskhahr, Chabahar road to control the entry and exit of military forces. According to reports, , Khameneiā€™s representative in Fahraj, was eliminated by the Baloch people while fleeing. Reports indicate that Baloch Insurgent groups are efforts to eliminate government officials in Balochistan. This was the fourth regional attack by the Baloch on government forces after the start of the Israel-Iran war.

Implications for Pakistanā€™s border security

The recent conflict between Israel and Iran in the Middle East has had profound implications for Pakistanā€™s border security, particularly in the restive province of Balochistan. Although a ceasefire has temporarily halted hostilities following US-led mediation, the escalation of tensions has renewed concerns over the security of the , a critical maritime chokepoint connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Had Iran proceeded with its threat to close the Strait, it would have severely disrupted global trade and oil supplies to the Western world, while also impacting Pakistan. Such a closure would have driven up global oil prices and exacerbated Pakistanā€™s inflation, currency depreciation and energy shortages.Ģż

The conflict particularly intensified in Balochistan, where a significant portion of the population relies on the informal trade of oil and other commodities. This situation highlights the regionā€™s vulnerability to regional instability.

The recent ceasefire between Israel and Iran offers a critical opportunity to halt the immediate conflict and prevent further destabilization across West Asia, South Asia and beyond. While this pause in hostilities provides much-needed relief, the underlying tensions and risks of escalation remain significant. It is imperative that global powers, including the US, Russia, China, Pakistan, the OIC and the EU, build on this moment of calm to pursue sustained diplomatic engagement and collective action. 

Establishing a neutral UN-led peace forum to facilitate dialogue, addressing root causes such as economic sanctions, religious extremism, proxy warfare and curbing sectarian rhetoric are essential to fostering lasting stability. Maintaining the ceasefire and providing humanitarian support will be crucial to preventing a return to conflict and safeguarding regional and global security. Failure to capitalize on this fragile peace could lead to renewed violence with far-reaching consequences for global stability.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Navigating Turbulence: Balochistanā€™s Security Amid Israel-Iran Tensions appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

This transformation has not emerged in isolation. This is not just the result of governance failures, but of historical grievances rooted in colonial legacies, the spread of jihadist ideology through regional conflicts, the repeated failure of external actors to adapt their strategies to local dynamics and of narrow geopolitical interests. The US, turning a blind eye to the security vacuum in Sahel, is making the same mistake it made in Afghanistan.

The colonial echoes

The Sahel region was colonized by France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, significantly shaping its development. The French solely on resource extraction and exploitation, neglecting its governance. When they drew the borders of the Sahel, they drew them arbitrarily, dividing ethnic groups across different countries and weakening national cohesion.Ģż

After independence in 1960, frustration grew among nomadic and tribal groups as the already limited governance began to fail, marking the start of extremism and rebellion. This rebellion and violent tendencies escalated when the Sahel was hit by famine and (especially the 1968-73 drought), and escalated further in the 1980s, with issues such as banditry, kidnapping, extortion and the killing of French citizens.

The beginning of jihad in the SahelĢż

The Sahel region practiced moderate Sufi Islam, but the North African region soon saw the first signs of jihadi conflict ā€” specifically the outbreak of the Algerian civil war in 1991, when the government out of fear that Islamist forces might gain power.Ģż

Islamist forces quickly capitalized on growing public disillusionment with the state, leading to the creation of radicalized armed groups. The military’s intervention and subsequent coup escalated the conflict into a civil war, creating a political vacuum that enabled Islamist groups to establish a foothold. 

Concurrently, in 1992, Osama Bin Laden relocated to Sudan, where he set up Al-Qaedaā€™s training camps and business operations. This move signaled Al-Qaedaā€™s growing interest in the region and its strategic potential. The of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania underscored how North and East Africa had become increasingly integrated into Al-Qaedaā€™s transnational agenda.

By 2007, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group had pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and rebranded itself as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (). From there, AQIM expanded southward into Mali and Niger, using smuggling and banditry to finance its terror activities. This southward shift gained further momentum after the 9/11 attacks, as the US-led war on terror displaced jihadist networks from the Middle East and South Asia, pushing them to seek new bases of operation in regions like the Sahel ā€” where porous borders and unstable governments offered strategic opportunity.

As the mid-2000s approached, a distinct jihadist landscape had begun to take shape in the Sahel, one that would be further reinforced after the of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011.

Expansion of the jihadi landscape

The fall of Gaddafi created a political and security vacuum that Al-Qaeda was quick to exploit, especially in Mali. With the collapse of Gaddafiā€™s regime, significant of weapons spilled into the region.Ģż

Among those freed were Tuareg who had served as mercenaries under Gaddafi. These fighters later aligned with AQIM, strengthening Al-Qaeda. Their alliance was further shaped by the Tuaregsā€™ separatist desire for autonomy in Maliā€™s Azawad region, sparking a rebellion in 2012 that quickly took on a militant Islamist character.Ģż

By April that year, Islamist forces had seized control of key northern cities in Mali, marking a fresh surge in jihadist activity across the region.

Consolidation ofĢż the jihadist waveĢż

By 2013, Western governments began acknowledging the growing terrorist threat in the Sahel. France launched to oust jihadist groups from northern Mali. The mission succeeded in dislodging militants from major urban areas ā€” but it pushed them deeper into the countryside and across national borders, allowing them to regroup and destabilize the region more.Ģż

France followed this with between 2014 and 2022, aimed at regional stabilization. But progress stalled. French troops encountered resistance not just from insurgents, but from local populations with deep-seated resentment linked to Franceā€™s . As these military interventions struggled to deliver long-term security, political instability, poverty and governance failures deepened, creating conditions that Islamist groups readily exploited to recruit and radicalize.

A dangerous convergence: jihadist unity and coups

ISIS made its into the Sahel in 2015, prompting a breakaway faction from AQIM to pledge allegiance and form the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Two years later, Al-Qaeda responded by consolidating its presence. AQIM merged with Ansar al-Dine and al-Mourabitoun to form Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a powerful group that is now the behind jihadist operations in the region.

The political environment further deteriorated from 2020 onwards, as swept through the Sahel, weakening already fragile governments. These conditions enabled ISGS and Al-Qaeda to entrench themselves further.Ģż

As criminal activities increased, these terror groups adopted banditry with jihadist motives, creating what is called ā€œā€, encouraging criminal groups to adopt jihadist ideologies and migrate into terrorism. This has significantly bolstered Al-Qaeda and ISIS’s presence in the Sahel in recent years.Ģż

The consequences have been staggering: in 2023, Sahel accounted for of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide, a number that grew to in 2024. Burkina Faso alone recorded fatalities in 2022, making it the worldā€™s most terror-affected country.

Narrow geopolitics and limited attentionĢż

Africa has steadily become central to global geopolitics and geoeconomics, particularly due to its of rare earth minerals and gold. Yet, in the Sahel, these resources remain largely untapped, overshadowed by an entrenched security crisis and volatile political environment.Ģż

After Franceā€™s military withdrawal, the region saw the arrival of Russiaā€™s , a private mercenary or paramilitary force. The Sahelā€™s military juntas welcomed Wagner for the short-term promise of security support and the political leverage it offered through alignment with Moscow. However, Wagnerā€™s presence has not translated into lasting stability. Its activities have remained largely focused on securing Russian interests and gold mining operations, rather than providing a serious or coordinated response to the regionā€™s security challenges.Ģż

Despite the presence of Russian forces and the persistence of jihadist activity, the United States has kept the Sahel at a strategic priority.

Washington has avoided deeper engagement, the absence of a direct or immediate national security threat. But a primary reason is that the US likely considers involvement in African conflicts risky, given its haunting past with the Somali crisis, where it faced one of its biggest failures: . But the operation failed due to overconfident and patterned operational planning with a lack of contingency and strong communication on the ground, none of which are unavoidable in future operations.ĢżĢż

During the 90s, Sahel did not emerge as a direct threat, and the US focus remained on security issues in East Africa and Al-Qaeda. 

However, the Sahel region has gradually become a direct threat to the US after the 2011 Libyan , and the threat increased greatly by 2017, when ISIS cadres in Africa gained strength. The 2017 Tongo Tongo in Niger, where ISGS fighters killed four US Special Forces soldiers, underscored the growing threat to US personnel in the region.Ģż

The apprehension was echoed by General , head of US Africa Command, who warned in 2024 that Sahel-based terrorist groups could develop the capacity to strike the US homeland if left unchecked.

While the US did maintain a surveillance and reconnaissance in Niger for some time, this was withdrawn in 2024, alongside Franceā€™s broader . The departure of Western forces, combined with Russiaā€™s limited effectiveness, has left a fragile security landscape in which terror groups are once again finding space to operate.

A recurring blind spot in US counterterrorism

The United Statesā€™ counterterrorism strategy has repeatedly failed to anticipate the evolution of jihadist networks, particularly when they have emerged from outside conventional theaters of war.

The 1998 embassy bombings were orchestrated from Afghanistan, exploiting a blind spot in US regional threat assessments; the US grossly underestimated Al-Qaedaā€™s transnational reach. Similarly, during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, the alignment between Algerian Islamist factions and Al-Qaeda to form a secret jihadist revolution in Africa went largely unacknowledged by US intelligence, despite clear that they were building contacts with the global terror network. In Somalia, the US once again the regional Islamist force, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, while focusing on humanitarian operations. This misjudgment contributed to the emergence of Al-Shabaab, now a dominant Al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa.Ģż

The list doesnā€™t end here; the US also failed to act when ideological convergence between jihadist groups and narcotics cartels grew in Colombia (a country with which it shares strong security cooperation on narcotics issues), which led to cartel bombings in 1998. A now sustains Al-Qaeda’s operations in the Sahel, with JNIM heavily depending on a drug smuggling network.Ģż

Yet, Washingtonā€™s strategic assessments have continued to downplay this growing narco-terror convergence.

The threat of resurgence is now common; the real danger is that terror groups are acquiring the capabilities necessary for transnational terror attacks. Without a shift in strategic posture ā€” one that moves beyond narrow geopolitical interests and accounts for the full complexity of threats ā€” another major wave of global jihadists may be inevitable.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The US Needs to Face the Rising Threat of Jihad in the Sahel Region appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Josef Olmert: Hello. Hi to my watchers, to my readers, to my followers. This is the fourth and last in my short series on USā€“Israel relations. And the idea is really to lead us to the current situation with US President Donald J. Trump, his second administration, with a brief review of his first and the in-between period of the US presidency of Joseph Biden ā€” Joe Biden Jr. ā€” as president. And then weā€™ll come to the current situation, with the exception that I have to make already now: that we are in a situation that is unfolding. And there might be people who say, ā€œOh, itā€™s too early even to talk about USā€“Israel relations under Donald Trump.ā€ So what Iā€™m going to do is, therefore, to talk about what I consider to be situations that already are fully now results, and maybe inevitable results, of what we already discussed, and how they are happening right now ā€” not talked about, but happening.

Therefore, if we make any predictions for the future, they will be based on what I would consider to be a more solid ground. Thatā€™s about the methodics of all that. And I need to say, because I do get reactions, comments, responses from people who watch, read, and they are asking questions that lead me to say what Iā€™m saying to you now.

The American Jewish community and ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s image problem

Josef Olmert: So today, very briefly, just to remind you: In our previous episode, we discussed more in-depth processes, mostly in the American Jewish community, that led to changes in attitudes towards Israel. And we touched upon, therefore, what was happening in Israel at the same time that might have led to these changes in American attitude towards Israel, but also the rise of new movements in the US that were either more or less supportive of Israel. Of course, the evangelical Christians on the one end being more supportive; the left-wing, the progressive movement on the other side, in the Democratic Party mainly, that has been much more negative, still is, and becoming more and more negative.

And that brings us, really, to the situation that we are going to delve into in great detail today in our episode.

Trumpā€™s first term: populism, promises and policy shifts

Josef Olmert: And I would say to you that when President Trump was running for president in 2015, 2016, he was not taken seriously, not just by Jews, but also by ordinary America, of course, the commentators. And I cautioned people at the time ā€” itā€™s not like an ā€œI told you so, periodā€ ā€” but I cautioned people, because I talked to people about the significance of the politics of identities and populist politics altogether, in the unfolding political climate in the US, as well as in other Western democracies.

And by the way, I gave the comparison with Israel. I analyzed the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Bibi Netanyahu, at that time was already in his sixth year as prime minister in his second term, after the one that he was in from 1996 to 1999 ā€” this one was from 2009; we talk about 2015, 2016 ā€” that Netanyahu also succeeded in Israel with the politics of populism and identities. And this is a successful political card.

And Trump made promises about Israel, and everybody said, ā€œNo, I mean, »å“Ē²Ōā€™t take them seriously.ā€ And he fulfilled, to a large extent, a great deal of his promises. For example, the moving of the embassy to Jerusalem, which was, by the way, the policy of every American president before him, with the exception that they didnā€™t fulfill their decision because of whatever reason that they gave. That was basically based on the idea, ā€œYes, we say to the Israelis and to the Jews and to the pro-Israel community, we want to move the embassy ā€” but we canā€™t do it now.ā€

Trump did it. Trump also withdrew out of the Iran nuclear deal, as was expected by the Netanyahu government in Israel.

Let me say something here: Netanyahu was not wrong in his opposition to the nuclear deal as was devised by President Obamaā€™s administration. Where were the problems that he had, and they have to do with whatā€™s happening now, so therefore Iā€™m saying them now:

He didnā€™t know the limits of, or the ways in which to express, his opposition to the Obama administration policy, and therefore he made a terrible mistake of showing in Congress and giving his speech ā€” that was in March of 2015. In January of 2015, that is to say, two months before, the speech was announced by then-Speaker John Boehner. (By the way, I have a picture with John Boehner in my study, because I met him before ā€” I met many other people.) And I then cautioned from getting biting gifts ā€” I cautioned Netanyahu not to do the speech. That was a big mistake.

It comes back to what we discussed before in the previous episode about bipartisanship, or lack thereof, under Netanyahu. It was a big mistake.

The other mistake, which might have even been bigger, was that while he said no to the deal as was devised by Obama ā€” with the support of other powers, as part of Obamaā€™s internationalist policy ā€” he did not offer any alternative. He basically created the impression from day one that all he wanted was to see an American military operation against Iran ā€” or else to justify an Israeli one. But even then, he was not preparing one.

In 2011, the Israeli military establishment was waiting for a word from Netanyahu that he was giving the green light for an attack on Iran. He asked for three days to make a decision. He then said no. And there still are reports to that effect that even today, he basically did not approve all kinds of plans that were supposed to finance projects that were designed to improve technological abilities that were to be connected with an attack on Iran and so on and so forth.

So Netanyahu basically said to Trump, ā€œCancel the agreement, period,ā€ without offering an alternative.

Why is this important? Because itā€™s the same mistake he has done since the beginning of the war in Gaza, on the 7th of October 2023, to this very moment. While he said, ā€œno, no, no, no, no,ā€ to everything offered by other people, to other countries, including the best friends of Israel, he does not provide any alternative.

Then Trump, for example, said something which is again interesting: that when the US, with Israeli support, decided to eliminate the arch-terrorist Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, Netanyahu said yes. And then he said no, he would not be part of it. Which, by the way, caused ongoing damage in the relationship between him and Trump, because Trump ā€” and that we know already ā€” doesnā€™t like what seems to be weak people, leaders, losers. For Trump, the fact that Netanyahu did not show up in the end, as opposed to what Trump did, was an indication of lack of stamina, resolve, real determination.

But there were also examples of how Israel was so helpful to the American administration. For example, in the war against ISIS, I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t know how many of my watchers and listeners and readers remember that Trump, in public, said something that compromised the invaluable, great support that Israel gave to American intelligence to locate ISIS targets in Syria. Israelis were furious. But Trump said, ā€œHeā€™s a great friend.ā€

MAGA and the limits of right-wing support

Josef Olmert: Trump gave a lot of support also in the UN, the national organizations. But Trump also was the leader of MAGA, and thatā€™s the point that I want to emphasize here. And we saw it after the incident in Charlottesville ā€” if I even call it an incident, I believe what happened there in 2017, referring to ā€œgood people on both sides.ā€ I immediately wrote an in which I said, ā€œThere are no ā€˜both sidesā€™ where there are swastikas.ā€

When Trump referred to ā€œgood people on both sides,ā€ he also referred to those that were marching with people that waved the swastikas. That led me into discussion with myself about MAGA.

First of all, it was ā€œAmerica First,ā€ which was a bad memory to me. For those who remember history ā€” I mean, I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t remember it from that time, but I know it ā€” there was Charles Lindbergh with his America First Committee. That was basically a pro-Nazi domestic American organization that didnā€™t want America to join the Second World War. You can argue, ā€œOkay, he just used the words; he didnā€™t mean very much.ā€

The MAGA movement is a nativist movement. The MAGA movement is isolationist. When you look at the roots of the MAGA movement, when you look at the terminology used, the symbols used, the organizations that were at the forefront of the movement, you have to come to the conclusion that this movement cannot be the pro-Israel movement that existed in the past under the great US President Ronald Reagan ā€” when the world was divided according to the Cold War, and Israel was on that side, the good side. Or under US President George W. Bush, let alone previous presidents from before. Because their opinion about how the world is divided is totally different.

And nativist movements in America or in Europe, by definition, have more than a nucleus of antisemitism, because any movement which is also based on xenophobic feelings is bound to be antisemitic. And no antisemitic movement can be good to Jews, can be good to Israel. Itā€™s as simple as that.

And it was very convenient to many Israelis to accept the better sides of Trumpā€™s policies, but to ignore the roots of it that were based on assumptions and ideologies and terminologies which, as I said, by definition are not good to Jews and Israel.

And how many more times can I say it? How, with more decibels, stronger volume, to say it in order to make the point? Because it is a point that is still debated, even among Jews: What makes you really anti-Israel?

The MAGA movement was on the right side. The alternative to the MAGA movement as a mass mobilization political movement is the ā€œwokeā€ movement, which is, again, anti-Israel. The two most important political movements ā€” and I say movements, not parties ā€” in terms of mobilizing public opinion in the US from right and left, as developed in the last ten to 15 years, are not pro-Israel. And itā€™s just a question of time when these movements affect the political parties that they try to influence from the outside or by infiltrating from the inside. They already did it in the Democratic Party, and they are doing it now ā€” and have done it ā€” in the Republican Party.

And it will bring me to the current situation momentarily.

Bidenā€™s presidency and the fracturing of democratic support

Josef Olmert: Joseph Biden Jr. ā€” interesting fellow. I, by the way, met him personally: I had dinner with him in Tel Aviv in December of 2002, ahead of the invasion of Iraq. He came to visit the Middle East with a colleague from the Republican Party, Senator Chuck Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska who later became the moderate Republican defense secretary under US President Barack Obama; a much more moderate Republican than the Republican Party already at that time.

And Biden gave a brilliant prediction and analysis of what would happen in Iraq after the war. Because everybody knew there was going to be a war, the Bush administration would do it at that time. Much later on, I wrote an article in The Huffington Post, where I blogged for seven, eight years, praising Biden for the fact that he read and understood the situation in Iraq very properly. I also talked about the ethnic and sectarian divisions in all this.

The problem really is ā€” and this is not something that we need to develop in this particular episode, because itā€™s much beyond the topic that we are discussing ā€” Biden, who came to be president, was not the Biden of earlier years. And we understand it, Now we know more truth about it.

The Biden administration, from the beginning of its term, in all kinds of subtle ways that became much more obvious during the early stages of the war in Gaza ā€” and much later on, as the war dragged on ā€” developed the sense that we have problems with Israel. Exactly on the main core point of what the Israeli lobby and pro-Israeli lobbies all the time emphasized: that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a beacon of freedom, of human rights, of civility and all that comes with it.

The attack on Israel with regard to that was already at the time of Jimmy Carter. But who remembers Jimmy Carter? He was way back.

Now, Biden, whether wittingly or not ā€” I would say intentionally ā€” slowly, gradually, systematically, consistently built up the case in all kinds of ways, undermining this Israeli argument or claim to fame, if you will.

The forefront of it was whatā€™s called ā€œThe Squadā€ in the Democratic Party. And it was much beyond it. It infiltrated and crept into the trade union movement, the labor movement that in the past was one of the beacons of support for Israel; minority communities ā€” African Americans, but also Asian Americans, which is very interesting; Latinos ā€” tolerating the infiltration of Qatar and other states into universities in America, Saudi Arabia and others ā€” relying on people that were clearly not in the pro-Israel camp anymore, but were at various levels of being anti-Israel.

And the fact is that while still a majority of the Democratic caucus in the House voted with Israel, there was a growing number of the progressives that were already taking their distance. So you could see the cracks in the bipartisan coalition for Israel.

The Netanyahu speech was, in that case, a gift he gave to these people. A stupid gift. Terrible mistake, as I said.

Trumpā€™s second term: strategic ambiguity

Josef Olmert: The Trump administration these days ā€” letā€™s move on now. First of all, in the last campaign that brought Trump again to the presidency ā€” he didnā€™t even talk about Israel. He talked about Israel or the Middle East, made very, very superficial, almost insignificant comments or references. The promises were not there, you know.

Everybody took for granted that Trump is pro-Israel and will continue to be. The person that completely misread all this was Benjamin Netanyahu, again, in Jerusalem, believing that somehow Trump is going to be the same Trump of the first administration. He ignored the fact that in second administrations, presidents do tend to change.

I would remind people here that even Ronald Reagan ā€” a great friend and supporter of Israel ā€” he is the president that gave the first kosher certificate to the PLO before he left his second term. He was the one who authorized the beginning of official contact between the US and the PLO in 1989, as an example. But I can give you other examples.

Then came the inauguration, and I noticed something very interesting: While the inauguration was taking place, immediately afterward, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff ā€” I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t get into too many details about him and his connections with Qatar, all this I leave to investigative journalism ā€” but I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t need to get into investigative journalism to analyze what he said on Inauguration Day, about what would be the four main pillars of American policy in the Middle East, the name ā€œIsraelā€ was not mentioned. The name ā€œIranā€ was not mentioned. The name ā€œHamasā€ was not mentioned.

Remember, it is in January of 2025, and the war was already raging from October of 2023. That was the first red light.

But forget about this. Maybe it was a ceremonial occasion. You »å“Ē²Ōā€™t get into details, you just give main, big points and so on and so forth.

Gulf-centric policy and ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s marginalization

Then, of course, letā€™s see what has happened since then.

Some of his appointments have definitely been very pro-Israel. For example, Elise Stefanik, a congresswoman from New York, to be ambassador in the UN ā€” and she made the point already, before: Sheā€™s going to fight hard about anti-Israelism in the UN as the first, if not the most important, but one of the main missions. This appointment, by the way, was canceled for all the obscure reasons. Why did he cancel her appointment, arguing that, ā€œwe need her in Congress,ā€ when he did not cancel other appointments of people that had to resign from Congress and lead to early elections? I mean elections like in Florida. Well, Iā€™m just leaving you with the question.

Ambassador Mike Huckabee ā€” great, great supporter of Israel, thereā€™s no question about it. But was he appointed as a policymaker? Or as the person that is supposed to say the good stuff to the Israelis, as opposed to the leaks coming consistently from the White House that are the bad stuff? Good cop, bad cop? Yeah ā€” I leave my audience with this question.

All kinds of other appointments ā€” I was skeptical about Pete Hegseth as defense secretary, for all kinds of reasons. I was skeptical about National Security Advisor Mike Waltz for all kinds of reasons. I did welcome the appointment, of course, of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, for all kinds of reasons.

But ā€” you know ā€” instead of getting into every little detail, like this appointment, that appointment, letā€™s try to talk about three or four particular issues that are typical of what has happened, and still is happening, and would lead me, therefore, to a conclusion at the end of this discussion.

Take, for example, the question of fighting terrorism. Proud American President Donald Trump surrendered. Yes, he surrendered to the Houthis in Yemen. He gave up to terrorists because he allows them, maybe even encourages them indirectly, to keep attacking Israel, but not attacking America. Sure, itā€™s a pro-American move: ā€œWe »å“Ē²Ōā€™t attack America.ā€ But is it a pillar of your foreign policy to abandon a friend and ally like that?

Cautionizing, legitimizing attacks on Israel by saying, ā€œYou can do that. What can I do?ā€

Donald Trump started the negotiations with Iran with changing views about what the demands from Iran are. And we still »å“Ē²Ōā€™t know the final outcome of all that. But if the final outcome would be that Iran is still allowed to maintain a nuclear program ā€” even for civilian purposes ā€” it means that he doesnā€™t do anything different than what the Obama administration did.

Donald Trump put pressure on Israel to stop the war in Lebanon, exactly at the time when Hezbollah was ready to get the final blow from Israel. Yes, in the Lebanese situation, after 11 months of relative inaction by Israel, finally, Netanyahu, under pressure, decided to take the initiative. And it paid off so well to Israel, because this was the area in which you can talk specifically about the total defeat, almost, of the terrorists. Why ā€œalmost?ā€ Because something else was needed to finalize the job. And then the American administration put a stop to it.

Donald Trump promised hell to Hamas in Gaza if they »å“Ē²Ōā€™t release all the hostages within a short period of time. Nothing of this happened, of course. Edan Alexander was released ā€” it is great news, fantastic news ā€” but he is one hostage and an American citizen, which is also raising questions about the division between Americans and Israelis. You fight terrorism, you fight terrorism ā€” it is one problem.

And I can go on with some more examples like this.

Where does it come from? Where was the Israeli reaction? And therefore, how do we put it all in perspective? Where it comes from is Trumpā€™s version of isolationism. And many people will say itā€™s great, itā€™s a good American interest. So if thatā€™s an American interest, not to get into war almost at all cost, I will be the last one to criticize it. But I need to mention it in the context of the Middle East. Because what does it mean? It means that we tolerate the terrorists, that we coexist with them. And for the sake of clarity, I will refer not just to people like the Houthis or Hezbollah or Hamas, but Iran.

Donald Trump doesnā€™t really care, apparently, about the fact that these systems will continue to exist. If he believes that by coming to some accommodation with them, he will be able to tame them, thatā€™s a terrible, terrible mistake. Taming the shrew ā€” ah! Impossible.

But if it falls into the basic tenets of how he views American isolationism and his supporters, then I can understand that there are implications.

Donald Trump wants political solutions that will be short-sighted ā€” short of one situation that he raised and then did nothing about, which I immediately criticized, arguing itā€™s not going to happen because itā€™s just not even a half-baked cake. This is the talk about removing all the people of Gaza. Itā€™s ā€” let me use a non-diplomatic word ā€” nonsensical.

But what helps him in that is that, yes, he has done already now some things that are very pro-Israel. He unfroze the embargo on arms to Israel that was basically imposed by Biden. He ordered his people in the UN organizations to continue to support Israel, even though it hasnā€™t yet come to any big test, like, say, a resolution in the Security Council about possible sanctions against Israel. That remains to be seen.

And at the same time, he makes it very clear that the focal countries of his new policy in the Middle East are the Gulf states: Saudi Arabia and Qatar, mainly, and the UAE, because they have something that Israel doesnā€™t have. They have the resources, the money.

And to give a kosher certificate, for example, to Qatar is the total opposite of anything which is like fighting terrorism. It is the greatest possible encouragement of terrorism because of what Qatar is and who the Qataris are. Itā€™s as simple as this.

±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s paralysis and the waning American umbrella

Josef Olmert: What helps him with all that is ā€” and that brings me back to what we already discussed ā€” the total paralysis of the government of Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu has no alternatives to anything, has no proposals to anything, has no initiatives ā€” because he cannot do anything if he wants to maintain his current coalition, which is based on some lunatic ā€” I would say lunatic ā€” extreme right-wing parties, led by Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Israeli Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich. And for Netanyahu, this is the number one interest.

So even if Netanyahu were to change a little bit on all kinds of issues, or even to a large extent, it may not have changed completely the overall perspective that Trump has about how he should do his own policies and conduct them. But when Netanyahu does nothing and offers nothing, it makes it so much easier.

And that is the same mistake that Netanyahu has done throughout his political career ā€” and definitely when it came also to the Obama administration: to say no with great, polished English is all very nice and easy. But to say yes requires courage, resolve, determination, leadership, which he lacks.

And what happens now is that because of the distance that is being created between Trump and Israel ā€” heā€™s in the Middle East, but not in Israel. Heā€™s praising Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, heā€™s meeting the terrorists like Mohammad al-Julani in Syria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the model countries for relations with the US. More and more countries are encouraged now to take more and more anti-Israel positions because they believe that the balance is changing. The umbrella of defense provided to Israel by the US is weakening, if not in the process of disappearing ā€” which is, again, something very bad to Israel.

A troubling future for USā€“Israel relations

Josef Olmert: I can go on and on. I think Iā€™ve said enough to lead me to interim conclusions.

Beware, Israel. The second administration of Donald J. Trump is going to be the greatest challenge to Israeli foreign policy in our memory, definitely in my memory. And Iā€™m not a young person.

Israel will have to understand that America is changing. And with it are changes in American foreign policy, also in the Middle East.

And I will sharpen the point here by saying: The changes about Israel between this administration of Trump and the first one ā€” in terms of the action but also the image, the perceptions ā€” are just so important. These changes will not be the ones that will lead to a rebellion against Trump in the Republican Party, even by the greatest supporters of Israel, short of maybe a few. If there will be a rebellion against him, but it will be over other issues: the effect of the tariffs, the economic situation, the index of living, inflation, success or failure on the southern border and so on and so forth.

And thatā€™s where we are standing, from the perspective of being in Israel now with less and less bipartisan support. If the Republican administration is the one that is changing the way I described, Israel cannot expect the Democrats to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Israel. That could not happen.

So I have to leave my audience with this perspective: that for those who care about Israel and for Israel ā€” and Iā€™m one of them, of course ā€” this is a very troubling, pessimistic, but I believe realistic assessment of the situation.

Thank you all.

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The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FOĀ° Talks: From MAGA to Gaza ā€” How Trump Changed USā€“Israel Relations Forever appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Nine days after ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s strikes, the US launched its own military operation, , targeting ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s key nuclear sites at Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz. The strikes, intended as both deterrence and containment, have allegedly caused significant damage to ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear infrastructure, though Iran has claimed there is only superficial damage.Ģż

Several Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) analysts have Iran shifted their uranium reserves before the strikes. Notably, US Vice President JD Vance has that 400 kg of uranium was unaccounted for post-strike, raising alarms about ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s next moves.

However, the real question is not about the strikeā€™s effectiveness. It’s about whether this will truly force Iran into a corner or if it is merely a symbolic victory.

±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s evolved counter-proliferation strategy

Israel has adopted a strategy of disruption and paralysis against adversaries who choose to go nuclear, posing a strategic threat to the country ā€” a plan that came to be called the in the 1970s.Ģż

The origins of this doctrine trace back to 1962 with , when ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s intelligence agency, the Mossad, targeted German scientists helping Egypt develop long-range missiles via letter bombs, abductions and threats to their families. Though covert and controversial, it successfully stalled Egyptā€™s rocket program.

In subsequent years, the doctrine evolved to preemptively target any hostile stateā€™s nuclear program, preventing them from acquiring nuclear weapons via counter-proliferation efforts. 

This doctrine was vividly demonstrated in 1981 with , when Israeli jets destroyed Iraqā€™s Osirak reactor, and again in the 2007 , which eliminated a nascent Syrian nuclear facility. Both Operations aimed at decisive, overt action to ensure adversaries never reached nuclear capability.

However, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear challenge forced Israel to recalibrate this doctrine. Unlike the degrading or paralyzing nuclear programs of Syria and Iraq, Israel has opted to delay and disrupt ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program without employing overt offensive measures. 

The reason is simple: geo-economic and strategic considerations. And the key historical factor in these considerations? The United States. 

The US factor between Israel and Iran Ģż

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s cannot be overlooked, as it has the worldā€™s second-largest natural gas and third-largest oil reserves. There are strong concerns that it could also block the , a narrow waterway that transports 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas, increasing the price of petrol to $100 per barrel. While blocking the Strait has the initial potential to spike oil prices, it has a limited capacity for consequences to the West and could harm its own interests, analysts.Ģż

The threat of Iran instead lies in its extensive proxy network and decades of sustained asymmetrical warfare. The October 7 attacks on Israel are an of its proxy war involvement.Ģż

Therefore, the US knows that balancing and moderating conflict with Iran must be part of its plans to ensure regional stability in the Middle East, as a weak Middle East would present economic and security challenges to the US’ geopolitical influence and economy. 

But this, historically, has not always been a successful venture for the US. 

The failures of the historic approach to Iran Ģż

The USā€™ long-standing strategy in the region began with offshore balancing and containment, seeking to prevent any one power from dominating the oil-rich Gulf. Its first major operation was organizing ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s in 1953, which overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was leaning toward the Soviets.

Through the 1960s and ā€˜70s, Washington helped Israel strengthen its regional presence while invoking the to justify military interventions against communist threats, such as the 1958 Lebanon deployment under . Post 1979, with the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the , there was a shift toward assertive containment that extended to the between 1982-84. This strategic assertiveness became central to US policy in the region.Ģż

The Iran-Iraq War was a power struggle for Gulf dominance, not just a territorial conflict. ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Islamic Revolution signaled the rise of the Shia crescent, alarming Saddam Hussein and threatening US regional influence. To counter ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s growing power and prevent any single actor from dominating the Gulf, the US-backed Saddam with military and economic support. The US overlooked Saddamā€™s , human rights violations and use of chemical weapons.

But when Saddam Kuwait in 1991, kicking off the Gulf War, the American gamble backfired. Washingtonā€™s attempt to balance Iran through Iraq had inadvertently empowered a regional threat and weakened its own position. This was perhaps the first US failure in the Middle East and the beginning of the long-term instability in the region. In response, the US introduced a broader policy of in 1993 to curb both Iraq and Iran.

Though tactically effective in coercing both Iran and Iraq, dual containment proved strategically flawed in the long term. It weakened Iraq but allowed Iran to expand its influence via Shia groups, even as proxy conflicts continued. Meanwhile, the rising US military presence, especially in Saudi Arabia, extremist and terror sentiments, culminating in Al-Qaedaā€™s 9/11 attack and the 2003 Riyadh bombings, where Westerners were targeted. Sanctions and regime change tactics yielded no significant impact on either country, revealing Washingtonā€™s faulty geopolitical assessments and superficial understanding of regional dynamics.Ģż

This fractured Middle East policy has undergone necessary makeovers in recent years, like weighing more on diplomacy and limiting itself to security issues, but it still hinges on limited strategic gains and therefore, risks.

To avoid a full-scale war with Iran, the US turned to covert means. In 2006, it launched a first-of-its-kindcyber offensive, , which targeted ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear infrastructure. While this move by the US sought to derail ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear ambitions without triggering direct conflict, many analysts that the core objective was to persuade Israel to use means other than the direct and conventional against Iran. The Operation significantly influenced ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s security apparatus, as barely a year later came the purported of Iranian nuclear scientist Ardeshir Hosseinpour, followed by a series of assassinations of key .Ģż

In 2016, the (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) sought to curtail ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. It was put forward to ease regional tensions, foster economic relationships and deepen US influence in the Middle East. Israel opposed it, fearing economic relief would empower Iran to upgrade its security systems and proxies, and importantly, clandestinely develop nuclear weapons, thus limiting covert options.Ģż

Despite this opposition, the JCPOA came into effect in January 2016. It did limit ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s opportunities to carry out covert offensives, as noted by a significant statistical post-2016.Ģż

In 2018, with Trumpā€™s withdrawal from the deal, the US reimposed sanctions and escalated pressure on Iran. Israel resumed its covert operations, such as its alleged June 2020 on ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear sites, and its most complex and significant operation ā€” the 2021 assassination of , the chief of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program.

Why Israel paralyzed Iran in Operation Rising Lion

Following the October 7 attacks on Israel and the collapse of the Assad regime, the Middle East entered a renewed phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the Trump administration shifted from maximum pressure to a more diplomatic approach towards Iran. The new strategy had two objectives: to push Iran to its nuclear program to ensure regional security and secure a diplomatic and media win by introducing a stronger alternative to the JCPOA.Ģż

However, Iran insisted on limiting ā€” not dismantling ā€” its nuclear program while demanding sanctions relief, creating a deadlock. Trump Iran, ā€œThere will be bombing,ā€ if a deal wasnā€™t reached, escalating tensions further.

This caused Israel great anxiety on two counts. One, it feared that the talks were buying Iran more time, as by March 2025, Iran had uranium enrichment. Within a few weeks, it could initiate the process to develop nuclear weapons, which would then take just a year to complete. Two, it feared that the US might rush a compromised or weak deal to claim diplomatic success. According to , the Mossad struggled to convince the US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steven Charles Witkoff, of the risks of re-negotiating with Iran. This contributed to its growing distrust in the negotiation process and prompted a reassessment of its military posture toward Iran.

Israel has now made a few things clear: it no longer aims to simply disrupt ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program but wants to paralyze it as it did with Iraq and Syria. 

While 2024ā€™s struck several of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s strategic and military sites, the operational scope was limited on the nuclear front, with one minor nuclear research facility in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Parchin being targeted.Ģż

However, in Operation Rising Lion, Israel aggressively struck key nuclear sites. While effectiveness was one startling difference, several reasons forced Israel not only to shift its operational scope but also to take strategic risks with regional stability. One: cut short ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s time-buying tactics. Two: force Iran back to the negotiating table under pressure. And three: weaken its strategic position to the point of conceding to US demands and surrendering its nuclear ambitions. 

While some tactical goals were achieved by Israel, broader strategic successes will only be possible if Iran fully abandons its nuclear ambitions. Although a regime change is an option, the US is likely to prioritize regional security and stability, for now. 

Operation Midnight Hammer has not deterred Iran

Following ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s lead, the US launched targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, intended as both deterrence and leverage in negotiations.

However, will the US actually transform this tactical success into strategic gains by pushing Iran to negotiate a new plan or by dropping its nuclear obsession? The answer is no. 

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s fixation on nuclear weapons is deeply linked to its identity and national pride, which can be reduced through coercion but not entirely abandoned. Trumpā€™s efforts to do so complicate new negotiations and ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s obsession is evident: it did not aim to import a nuclear bomb but to develop its own. 

With 400kg of uranium missing after US strikes, JD Vance has asked the burning question, ā€œCan Iran enrich the uranium to weapons-grade level and can they convert that fuel into a nuclear weapon?ā€ He raises genuine fears that Iran may pursue a nuclear weapon directly, bypassing diplomacy and brinkmanship entirely ā€” a move reminiscent of North Korea. 

The limited effectiveness of the US attacks, which reportedly set ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s program back by only a few months, underscores the folly of symbolic actions without long-term planning. Iran, undeterred from its nuclear ambitions, has since escalated threats, including moves to close the Strait of Hormuz, heightening global energy and security concerns. 

These security fears could threaten the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Iran, especially as the USā€“Israeli relationship remains far from its goals. 

In effect, the US military gamble may have exacerbated the Middle Eastā€™s tensions rather than neutralizing them, with ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear trajectory still firmly in motion.Ģż

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The speakers introduce the three primary actors: the US, Israel and Iran, framing the discussion around the American attack that occurred in the weeks preceding the conversation.

±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s perspective and objectives

The dominant political faction in Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is the right-wing, on whom Netanyahuā€™s political survival depends. Netanyahu is running a coalition government that includes hardline far-right figures like Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir. Netanyahu is keen to prolong his rule because he fears trial in court on corruption charges. Smotrich and Ben-Gvir have extreme objectives, including seizure and colonization of the West Bank and Gaza. This implies the expulsion of Palestinians and the destruction of the Iranian regime.

Israel assesses that Iran poses an existential threat because Tehran is developing a nuclear weapon. Israeli leaders deem this as ā€œabsolutely unacceptable,ā€ because this would put ā€œ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s and all Jewsā€™ survival ā€¦ on the brink of extermination.ā€ Therefore, Israelis consider regime change in Iran to be fundamental and necessary to alter the current strategic equation. This task is believed to be beyond ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s sole capabilities ā€” it requires US involvement.

Atul and Glenn highlight recent Israeli actions, including the decapitation of top Iranian leadership. This was a ā€œspectacular special ops Mossadā€ operation and ā€œone of the great intelligence operations in history.ā€ Israelis also hit a number of Iranian nuclear and missile sites and claimed control of Iranian airspace. Despite Iranian counterclaims, the Israelis experienced far fewer casualties (an order of magnitude less) than they had anticipated, which led to a less pessimistic reality than their initial fears. This suggested Iranian counter strike capabilities were less powerful than feared. However, the economic dislocation for Israel has been immense.

There is a strong belief among Israelis that the Iranian regime is a ā€œpaper tiger,ā€ which is utterly corrupt and infiltrated at all levels. Atul and Glenn cite the killing of the Palestinian leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in a VIP guest house ā€” equivalent to killing someone in Blair House that is next to the American White House ā€” as evidence of the deep Israeli infiltration into the Iranian regime. This suggests that this regime, despite its outward appearance, is not as cohesive, effective or united as it was after the 1979 revolution.

For Netanyahu, the timing of the attack on Iran was crucial: ā€œIf not now, when? If not us, who?ā€ He views himself as the ā€œsavior of Israelā€ and the ā€œguarantor of Israeli security.ā€ With Hamas weakened, Hezbollahā€™s top leadership dead and the Assad regime in Syria gone, Israelis perceive a significant opportunity to strike Iran. Netanyahu believes the Iranian proxies present minimal danger, giving Israel a historic opportunity to attack Iran.

The ultimate goal for Israelis is regime change in Iran. A new liberal, tolerant and friendly regime could potentially restore the pre-1979 amicable relationship between the two nations. Atul and Glenn believe that the 1979 revolution, which brought in a ā€œcrazy Islamic regimeā€ based on Shia ideology, fanaticism and opposition to the US, was an unnecessary development. The US was manipulated by the UK in 1953 to conduct a coup against a democratically elected Mohammad Mossadegh. In 2025, some even believe the best course of action would be to eliminate Ayatollah Khamenei. Israelis think they can exert pressure and squeeze Iran due to its declining birth rate and persecution of Sunni minorities.

Atul and Glenn also explain the Begin Doctrine, which underpins Israeli national security. Per this doctrine, ā€œnone of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s enemies or potential enemies should have or be able to have nuclear weapons.ā€ Israel followed this doctrine to destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007. Note that Netanyahu attempted to apply this doctrine against Iran twice between 2009 and 2013. 

Netanyahu champions a hardline national security strategy but not all of Israel supports it. Many Israeli politicians, as well as intelligence and special forces personnel, oppose Netanyahu and his right-wing allies. The former head of Shin Bet left after much controversy. Historically, a strong majority of the Israeli population has favored a two-state solution and a negotiated solution with Iran, but this group is not currently in power. Many Israeli politicians and security professionals view the far-rightā€™s desire for regime change as ā€œa bridge too far.ā€

The US perspective

The US intelligence communityā€™s assessment, as presented by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, differs from ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s dominant view: Iran is not manufacturing or possessing a nuclear weapon, and Ayatollah Khamenei has not reauthorized its manufacture. However, Iran has been ā€œsecretly developing weapons-grade fissile material,ā€ which has only one use: a nuclear weapon. Iran is estimated to be anywhere from ā€œdays,ā€ as Israelis assert, to ā€œa good number of monthsā€ away from manufacturing one.

US President Donald Trump faced a dilemma: He had vowed not to engage in ā€œforever warsā€ (precluding an invasion) but also stated he would not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. He ultimately aligned with the right-wing Israeli assessment that ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s capability to manufacture a weapon constituted an existential threat, irrespective of whether they currently possessed one. Faced with an ā€œimpossible dilemma,ā€ Trump chose a minimalist attack on ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear capabilities and declared victory. He came to realize that regime change in Iran was not feasible and attempting it would make the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq ā€œlook like a birthday party.ā€

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s perspective and resilience

The Iranian regimeā€™s top priority is survival. Many analysts view them as ā€œnot crazies at allā€ but ā€œvery subtle and astute,ā€ repeatedly signaling a desire for a resolution short of open war. In response to the US attack, Iran informed the Qatari government (and thus the US) in advance of their planned response, which involved a one-off missile attack on Americaā€™s largest base in the Middle East ā€” symbolizing a strike at the heart of the US presence ā€” before stopping.

Despite Israeli beliefs, Iran is more cohesive than its enemies imagine. It has demonstrated an ability to survive chaos, notably during the eight-year war with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. Note that Western powers and the CIA backed Saddam. After the attacks, Iran could experience zeereh parcham ā€” ā€œrally to the flagā€ ā€” and nationalism could make regime change far more difficult.

Atul and Glenn emphasize that Iran retains the potential to manufacture a nuclear weapon because ā€œknowledgeā€ cannot be killed, even if all involved scientists were assassinated. Iran is a ā€œsophisticated society with millions of brilliant people who can study science.ā€ They also note that ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program was initiated by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, not the mullahs. The Iranian moral police have reportedly ā€œdialed downā€ because of protests. There is little likelihood of an imminent revolution. Significantly, 20% of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s population still lives in villages and largely supports the current regime. The Iranians want ā€œnuclear insurance.ā€ They note that poorer neighboring Pakistan has managed to avoid foreign interference for all its faults because it has the nuclear weapon.

Note that the Iranian counter strike was not ā€œpainless for Israel.ā€ It hit business districts and apartment buildings, causing immense economic strain.

Broader implications and strategic changes

Atul and Glenn highlight profound strategic and structural changes to the power dynamics in the Middle East since October 7, 2023. ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s ā€œbrilliant decimationā€ (more than decimation because that means a tenth) of Hezbollah and Hamas has forced them into a defensive posture. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen as well. Israel has achieved lasting structural change.

However, the deeper issue of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear potential remains unaddressed. While the Iranian regime may be weakened and subject to collapse in the long run (ā€œstable until the day itā€™s not,ā€ ā€œthings last until they »å“Ē²Ōā€™tā€), it has survived to fight another day. If the mullahs fall, they are unlikely to be replaced by women protestors in the streets. Rather, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) might replace the mullahs unless the women can convince a section of the military to side with them.

The British, drawing on a longer historical memory, express skepticism about swift regime change. They recognize ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ā€œimperial memoryā€ and argue the nation is more cohesive than its enemies imagine. The Brits also point out that killing top military officers, while providing short-term tactical advantage, might lead to their replacement by younger, more competent and potentially more aggressive higher-testosterone individuals (ā€œproper nuttersā€ who are happy to have bullets with their names on them).

The most recent conflict has broader implications:

• The US is now back in the Middle East, leading to lower attention and lesser support for Ukraine.
• China will have a freer hand in the Far East. It can now increase pressure on Taiwanā€™s sovereignty through more incursions into international and Taiwanese waters. The Chinese will shift the status quo of what is acceptable before military intervention.
• Pakistan will feel less constrained and controlled by the US, potentially leading to increased assertiveness against India and ā€œfireworks by September.ā€

The current situation is a ā€œfragile truce,ā€ with both Israelis and Iranians believing there is ā€œunfinished business.ā€ While there may be no immediate large-scale flare-up, Iran will ā€œlick its woundsā€ and strive to obtain nuclear weapons for ā€œinsuranceā€ against foreign intervention and regime change.

The ā€œmost likely happy solutionā€ from a Western perspective is proposed as an ā€œMohammed bin Salman (MBS) evolution,ā€ where the Iranian regime evolves without collapsing. The current doctrinaire mullahs who are in their 70s and 80s are replaced by more educated and internationalist successors.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FOĀ° Exclusive: What Will the Middle East Look Like if ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Islamic Regime Falls? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The proposed legislation marks a pivotal moment in Iraqā€™s post-ISIS political trajectory, one that raises serious questions about the country’s sovereignty and the future of its security institutions. Crafted under the shadow of Iranian influence, the bill seeks to cloak the PMF, a network of heavily armed militias, some designated as terrorist groups, with the full legal authority of the Iraqi state.

What does it mean for Iraqā€™s fragile democracy when someone elevates a force operating with sectarian motives and external loyalties to the status of a national institution? How will this affect Iraqā€™s already strained relations with Western allies and Gulf Arab partners, who view the PMF as an extension of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Revolutionary Guard Corps?

If passed, the law could entrench a parallel chain of command within Iraqā€™s armed forces, making future reform virtually impossible and deepening the sectarian divide. It signals a shift away from state-building toward factional entrenchment, one that may come at the cost of Iraqā€™s long-term stability, international credibility, and independence. The real question, then, is not just how long Iraq will remain under ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s shadow, but whether this bill will mark the point of no return.

The roots of a crisis: unpacking the real threat

The PMF, also known as Hashd al-Sha’abi, constitutes a predominantly Iran-aligned Shi’a paramilitary conglomerate whose ambiguous legal and institutional status continues to pose a to the coherence of the Iraqi state. Simultaneously portrayed as a national defense force and criticized as a proxy for foreign influence, the PMF occupies a liminal space between legitimacy and lawlessness, an entity some view as a terrorist organization due to its opaque operations, sectarian affiliations, and alleged human rights violations.

The PMF has consistently undermined Iraqā€™s efforts to normalize relations with Western powers and Gulf Arab states, or to chart a course independent of Iranian hegemony. This obstructionism has manifested in repeated attacks on U.S. and military personnel, as well as in the sabotage of Gulf-led investment initiatives in Iraqā€™s central and southern provinces.Ģż

Over the past two years, the PMF has not only consolidated its political leverage, positioning itself as a dominant institutional force, but has also strengthened its economic networks, extending its influence across various sectors. This confluence of paramilitary capacity, economic reach and political ascendancy is transforming the PMF from a wartime auxiliary into a parallel state apparatus, one that increasingly blurs the line between national defense and factional hegemony.

PMF today: shifts in strategy and influence

Though formally recognized as part of the Iraqi state, the PMF has leveraged this official status not to serve national interests, but to tighten its grip on Iraqā€™s political, economic and security architecture. Under the guise of legitimacy, the PMF has obstructed foreign investment, particularly from Gulf states and operated with near impunity across state institutions, cultivating deep patronage networks and influencing electoral outcomes.

Facing growing pressure from the United States and Israel, the PMF has its strategy. Rather than provoking confrontation abroad, the group has turned inward, consolidating its domestic power base and recasting its public image. Today, it positions itself not as an Iranian proxy, but as the indispensable guardian of Iraqā€™s Shiā€™a population against the specter of Sunni extremism. Yet this strategic rebranding raises troubling questions: Is the PMF moderating its behavior, or merely entrenching itself more deeply, under a more palatable narrative?

What the PMF bill means for Iraq

By capitalizing on its formal status as a state-sanctioned entity, complete with government salaries and budgetary allocations, the PMF has steadily transformed into one of Iraqā€™s most formidable politico-military actors. Far from being a neutral component of national defense, the PMFā€™s various factions have weaponized their institutional legitimacy to block any political or economic initiative that might weaken ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s influence, effectively casting themselves as the arbiters of Iraqā€™s foreign policy direction and regional alignments.

The proposed Authority Law only deepens this trajectory. If passed, it would grant the PMF and its estimated the legal and structural authority to operate as a parallel military force, autonomous, deeply politicized, and loyal to its leadership rather than the state. It would enshrine within Iraqā€™s security sector an entity reminiscent of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), not as a temporary emergency force created during the ISIS war, but as a permanent, quasi-ministerial institution shielded from reform and insulated from oversight. The implications are stark: this legislation could fundamentally alter the balance of power in Iraq, institutionalizing a force with regional ambitions and foreign loyalties at the very heart of the state.

If this legislation passes, Iraq won’t just see the legitimization of a controversial militia; it will face the quiet dismantling of the state itself, brick by brick, from within.

Embedding an ideologically driven, Iran-aligned force into the very architecture of Iraqā€™s security sector risks transforming the republic into a garrison state, where military loyalty is no longer to the people or the constitution, but to foreign-aligned commanders and opaque political agendas. This is not simply a policy misstep; it is a historic gamble with Iraqā€™s sovereignty, one that could ignite future civil strife, paralyze reform, and permanently fracture the state’s already tenuous legitimacy. Suppose this is the new definition of national unity. In that case, Iraq may soon wake to find its republic replaced by a shadow state, militarized, sectarian and beholden to powers beyond its borders.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post From Paramilitary to Powerbroker: The High Cost of Legalizing the PMF in Iraq appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

During a recent visit to the Gulf, Trump promoted this new approach. He the Abraham Accords, initially brokered by his administration in 2020 to normalize relations between Israel and several Arab states, at the US-Saudi Investment Forum in Riyadh. In his speech, he framed the Accords as a potential foundation for deeper regional cooperation. Shortly after, he to ease sanctions on Syria and ā€œgive them a chanceā€ to rebuild, signaling a shift from punishment to conditional engagement. By promoting trade-based incentives, Trump positioned tariffs as tools to influence behavior without resorting to military force. This remodeling of US diplomacy through trade could usher in a new era of American foreign policy.Ģż

The cost of military overreach

US reliance on military power in the Middle East has yielded . The war in Iraq led to an estimated civilian deaths. In Syria, sweeping sanctions contributed to widespread while failing to produce meaningful political reform. Attempts to impose regime change and democratic systems from the outside only instability and weakened American credibility in the region.

Rather than abandoning the region, the United States can adopt a more restrained, interest-based diplomacy. Trumpā€™s proposed use of tariff relief fits this model. He has voluntary cooperation over coercion and offered clear, economic incentives in exchange for tangible steps toward peace and reform. This method could help stabilize Gaza, contain ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear ambitions and curb Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoganā€™s increasingly in the eastern Mediterranean.

Trade for stability

Conditional tariff relief encourages governments to adopt more through mutually beneficial economic deals. The United States could offer such relief to Middle Eastern governments that meet specific benchmarks, including:

• Documented efforts to resolve internal or cross-border conflicts
  
• Participation in bilateral or multilateral peace initiatives
  
• Tangible improvements in governance

The Abraham Accords provide a precedent. Now in their fifth year, the agreements demonstrate how voluntary cooperation and shared economic interests can advance . Israel and the United Arab Emirates have signed trade deals worth of dollars. In 2023 alone, over Israelis visited the UAE, reflecting the normalization of ties.

Moroccoā€™s High Atlas Foundation partnered with Israeli firms during the 2020 regional resource , focusing on sustainable agriculture and climate technologies. Bahrain also agreements in the fintech and cybersecurity sectors to promote cross-border cooperation. In 2023, all four participating countries the Accords to include defensive collaboration on cybersecurity.

Trumpā€™s decision to revive the Abraham Accords at the US-Saudi forum marked a symbolic return to this strategy. He that Saudi Arabia would join ā€œon their own time,ā€ signaling a preference for voluntary alignment rather than coercion.

Trade as leverage, not charity

Tariff diplomacy because it trades tangible benefits for concrete actions. This approach gives Washington leverage. It can reward diplomatic overtures from adversarial states like Iran or authoritarian-leaning allies like Turkey without endorsing their broader political agendas.

Consider the case of Israel and its Arab neighbors. While trade alone cannot resolve the Gaza conflict, robust economic ties may motivate Israel to reduce military escalation to protect those partnerships. The continued of Israeli-Arab commerce indicates mutual interest in avoiding renewed violence.

Reducing regional tensions would also save for the US. Military interventions cost billions annually, whereas tariff-based diplomacy requires fewer commitments while maintaining influence.

Tariff diplomacy also challenges Chinaā€™s growing presence in the Middle East. In the late 1990s, the United States launched the (QIZ) initiative in Jordan and Egypt. Under QIZ, goods by Israel entered the US market tariff-free. This policy boosted exports to over by 2004. It also promoted regional integration, offering a to Chinaā€™s (an initiative to develop two trade routes connecting China to the rest of the world). Such market-oriented incentives earned trust by delivering measurable gains. If Trump continues to adhere to this approach, it could enhance the American credibility from the previous administration.

Critiques and obstacles

Some critics that offering economic incentives to adversaries rewards bad behavior, but cutting off negotiation carries greater risks. Keeping talks open preserves leverage and creates opportunities for progress that isolation cannot achieve. For example, thanks to US-imposed , Iran has continued to its currency and adjust economically, but it is still refusing to make significant policy concessions. However, between US and Iranian officials began in Oman last month, with sanction relief being a crucial in securing a nuclear agreement.Ģż

Turkey, by contrast, has drifted further from democratic norms. President Erdoganā€™s government recently Istanbulā€™s opposition mayor, Ekrem Ä°mamoğlu, sparking widespread protests and international outrage. Security forces detained more than , and the state continues to deport journalists covering the uprisings. Erdoganā€™s to acknowledge international condemnation reveals the limits of external pressure. However, could offer a pathway to reward genuine reform if Ankara reconsiders its current course.

In Israel, for a ceasefire in Gaza have gained . According to recent polling, of the Israeli public rejects American demands to reduce airstrikes, signaling a divergence in Israeli public opinion and US policy preferences. Additionally, Trumpā€™s recent overtures in the suggest a in the relationship between the US and Israel, despite his earlier support for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That shift reflects a recognition that diplomatic leverage now depends more on economic ties than on blanket political alignment. By focusing on trade, Trump signals that the United States can support Israel while also advocating de-escalation through incentives.

A realist path forward

Tariff diplomacy does not promise quick fixes. It offers a tool to encourage reform through voluntary and mutually beneficial engagement. Conditional rewards like market access and industry cooperation can nudge governments toward dialogue and away from confrontation. These incentives could pressure Israel to ease its campaign in Gaza, encourage Turkey to realign with NATO principles and give Iran a clear path toward reintegration.

This strategy does not equate to appeasement. It insists on reciprocal action. Governments must meet defined benchmarks to access benefits. Trumpā€™s approach highlights a broader shift in US policy: peace and influence do not require domination but rather smart bargaining.

Lasting peace in the Middle East will not come cheaply, but if the United States can trade wisely, it may not have to pay in blood or billions.

[Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorialĢżpolicy.

The post Trumpā€™s New Diplomacy: How Tariffs Can Reshape US Foreign Policy appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

In civil society spaces, limited discussions on the intersection of gender and nuclear weapons exist. The few discussions that do take place on the disproportionate harm caused to women and girls from nuclear weapons use and testing, as well as the persistent of women in decision-making processes regarding nuclear weapons. Moreover, conversations around nuclear weapons remain highly gendered, with socially constructed framing the willingness to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons as inherently . This male-centric narrative has not only marginalized diverse voices and reinforced gender stereotypes but also impeded progress toward broader nonproliferation and disarmament goals, overlooking how nuclear proliferation reinforces power dynamics that deepen inequalities.Ģż

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s repression of womenā€™s rights

On September 16, 2022, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ā€œā€ police stopped and arrested 22-year-old Mahsa Amini for not complying with the regimeā€™s harsh hijab laws, and she later died in custody. In response to Aminiā€™s unlawful death, protests led by women against the Iranian regimeā€™s repressive laws in Tehran. Two years after Aminiā€™s death, the Iranian regime continues to on womenā€™s fundamental rights. In September 2024, a UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission increased crackdowns on womenā€™s rights activism in 2024. Specifically, even as mass protests subsided, the regimeā€™s authorities enacted harsher measures, such as the death penalty, to eliminate activism that advocates for fundamental human rights. In 2024, Iran reportedly 901 individuals, including activists protesting the regimeā€™s repressive hijab laws and death penalties.Ģż

Iranian authorities also implemented even harsher measures to crack down on women who refuse to comply with the regimeā€™s hijab mandates. In April 2024, Tehranā€™s police force implemented the ā€œā€ (meaning light in Persian) plan, which allows the state to deploy police officers throughout Iran to arrest women who the police deem as not abiding by the veiling laws. State officials also sought to expand measures to increase surveillance to monitor hijab compliance. For instance, according to the UN Fact-Finding Report, the regime the use ofdrones to surveil compliance with the veiling laws.

What would it mean for Iranian women if Iran becomes a nuclear-armed state?

A central premise of this discussion is that, when a state acquires nuclear weapon capabilities, it can alter its domestic politics. One of the drivers behind a state pursuing nuclear weapons is using such weapons as ā€œ to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests.ā€ This motivation suggests that nuclear weapons can provide the regimeā€™s leadership with greater political grasp and legitimacy. In ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s case, this may mean that the state might use the rhetoric that it acquired the bomb to protect Iranian citizens from its adversary Israel ā€“ as the Supreme Leader of Iran had claimed back in ā€” thereby suppressing dissent among state officials and giving the state a tighter grip on all aspects of domestic governance. This would give the Iranian state greater power to enforce its repressive measures more effectively.

Because Iran is a to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its acquisition of enough fissile material to produce nuclear weapons would be a violation of the treaty. As a result, the international community could potentially additional sanctions, isolate the state diplomatically or even subject it to military action ā€” all measures that would the marginalized communities of Iran, particularly Iranian women and girls, as they are more vulnerable to the impacts of economic sanctions and forced displacement.

Furthermore, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it could wield increased leverage over the international community, using its nuclear capabilities as a shield against external pressure. The regime could implement further restrictions on international development agencies and aid workers who aim to provide Iranian women and girls access to education and healthcare. Pakistan is an of how nuclear weapons can empower regimes and cover up human rights violations and development. Since acquiring nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan has used its status as a to bolster its international legitimacy and shield itself from external scrutiny. Pakistan’s military has used its nuclear arsenal, initially justified as a against India, to consolidate power byĢż leveraging the threat of external enemies to maintain control.Ģż

, a region divided between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, has particularly manifested the abuse of nuclear weapons through its nuclear testing. Balochistan has also been marked by extreme poverty and human rights abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention and the suppression of nationalist movements. The military has justified these actions as critical to national security, thus evading both domestic and global accountability. Due to military resistance to reconciliation and development efforts, Balochistan remains underdeveloped. This case suggests that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it could similarly use them to suppress development initiatives and human rights efforts, making it even harder for the international community to intervene effectively.Ģż

Policy implications for the international community

The ultimate goal for groups such as the (UN permanent members) should be to establish an agreement like the (JCPOA), a landmark between Iran and the P5+1, which includes the United States. Under the agreement, Iran agreed to deconstruct much of its nuclear program and allow international inspectors increased access to its nuclear facilities. The significant deal forced Iran to halt the development of weapons-grade fissile materials. In 2018, the US from the agreement. Unfortunately, in the backdrop of the current conflict in the Middle East, of which Iran is a key actor as it backs groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, a formal diplomatic agreement like the JCPOA is unlikely to come to fruition.Ģż

Nevertheless, the international community should aim to seek informal deals in the interim, not only focusing on limiting ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear capacity but also on protecting human rights. Thus far, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, met with officials in Tehran and reported that Iran has agreed to uranium enrichment at 60%. Though this doesnā€™t ease the broader concern of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program, as once enrichment reaches 20%, it becomes to continue enriching it to the weapons-grade level of 90%, Grossiā€™s meeting was still a step in a positive direction.

Similarly, another step in the right direction was when officials from the UK, Germany and France engaged in with Iran; the parties agreed to diplomatic dialogue in the future. More recently, at the 2025 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Tehran ā€œdelivered a conciliatory message to Western leaders,ā€ suggesting that it is nuclear weapons; the West should hold Iran accountable for this declaration.

The international community must seize every opportunity to integrate human rights, particularly the treatment of women and girls, into discussions on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. By incorporating these issues into informal agreements and confidence-building measures, states can address the immediate threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program and lay the groundwork for broader dialogue and agreements that prioritize the protection of fundamental rights. Of course, the international community would need to provide Iran incentives to halt its nuclear program and alter its domestic policies. Such incentives could include sanctions relief, which might be attractive to Iran as it currently faces a economy. Furthermore, the international community must reiterate to Iran that if the country adheres to the NPT, its rights as a signatory of the treaty will be respected, which includes providing the state with the necessary support for civilian nuclear programs.

The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to repress the fundamental rights of its citizens. As this treatment continues, the international community, including individuals and groups in both the policy and civil society spheres, must integrate conversations about Iranian womenā€™s rights into broader security issues. Furthermore, when conceptualizing gender and nuclear weapons, it is not enough to focus solely on the disproportionate harm caused to women and girls by nuclear weapons use or the gendered narratives in policy spaces. It is key to examine how nuclear proliferation enables repressive regimes to consolidate power further and deepen gender inequalities. Integrating a human rights framework into the discourse on ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program is essential to addressing both the immediate security threats posed by Iran and the long-term impacts on Iranian womenā€™s fundamental freedoms.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorialĢżpolicy.

The post Gender, Nuclear Weapons and Repression: The Complex Case of Iran appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Khosrow Isfahani: I always mix it up myself as well. 

Atul Singh: (Laughs) Came from Isfahan. So, Khosrow, what a pleasure. What an honor. Welcome.

Khosrow Isfahani: Thank you, Atul, for your kind introduction. That was just beyond and above. Thank you very much. Happy to be with you.

Atul Singh: Happy to introduce an Iranian, ha! Farsi was the official language of India for 800 years. And today, we will be discussing ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Axis of Resistance. I repeat: yes, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Axis of Resistance. And the topic of the podcast is ā€œ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Axis of Resistance Is in Shambles: What Next?ā€ So, without further ado, Khosrow, tell us: What is this Axis of Resistance?

Khosrow Isfahani: So, the ayatollahs in Tehran who run this rogue state ā€” that from the get-go of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 has gone head-to-head with neighboring countries and international powers ā€” have constantly found themselves in a jam, constantly fearing for the continuation of their rule over this nation of 90 million people. One of the pillars of their security doctrine, their response to outside threats as they perceive it, has been the Axis of Resistance. What is Axis of Resistance? It is a network of terrorist groups ā€” and sometimes they are called militant groups ā€” and allied states that, most of the time, are allied against the United States as well. Who are the members of this Axis of Resistance? Letā€™s start with ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s neighbors. In Iraq, you have the Hashd al-Shaabi ā€” the Popular Mobilization Units, the PMU, or sometimes PMF. You have Houthi rebels in Yemen. You have smaller militia groups that are highly controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC. The small militant groups under its banner are Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun. The first one is made up of Afghan refugees that the IRGC forced into submission and into serving its wars abroad with the promise of citizenship. And Zainabiyoun is made up of Pakistanis.

Atul Singh: Are both of these populations Shia? Are the Afghans Hazaras?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Atul Singh: Or are the Afghans Hazaras, and the Pakistanis Shia refugees from Pakistan?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And in both cases, these are marginalized people who try to find refuge or some pocket of safety in Iran. And when they arrive in Iran, they face persecution from the state. They are barred from using banking services, accessing education, healthcare services. And this sinister state that the Islamic Republic is uses this fertile ground for recruiting these poor souls, to make them into soldiers for its adventurism around the region.

Atul Singh: Now, as I understand it, Bashar al-Assad ā€” whoā€™s now deposed, he has fled ā€” he was an Alawi, an Alawite. He was Shia. The Houthis are Ismailis, if Iā€™m correct ā€” they are also Shia. So in a way, this is ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Shia Crescent, extending all the way from ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s border to Hazara territory in Afghanistan.

Khosrow Isfahani: So yes, there is an ideological element to the creation of the Axis of Resistance, butā€”

Atul Singh: Religious, I would say, even more than ideological.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, yes, that would be a fair framing of it. But when you look at the Palestinian groups that have aligned themselves with the Islamic Republic, you would find groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the General Command ā€” that was a leftist group with leftist agendas, not at all religious, that literally has been one of the linchpins of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s network of terror near the Israeli border.

Atul Singh: So itā€™s not just religion ā€” itā€™s broader than that. But in the Palestinian case, thatā€™s perhaps because Israel has backed them firmly, and no other Arab state is doing so right now.

Khosrow Isfahani: In the case of Iran and its relations with Palestinian groups, itā€™s not about the Palestinian people or religion. Itā€™s just that the Islamic Republic sees Israel as its eternal enemy. As a mortal enemy thatā€™s either the Islamic Republic or Israel should not exist for this war between them to end. Thatā€™s constantly present in the propaganda of the Islamic Republic. So anyone who is fighting against Israel the Islamic Republic sees it as an ally.

Atul Singh: And they join the Axis of Resistance.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Ideology vs. realpolitik: ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s security doctrine

Atul Singh: So, alright, I understand now what is the Axis of Resistance. But what purpose does it serve? What is ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s security doctrine?

Khosrow Isfahani: So let me just add two points about what the Axis of Resistance is, and I promise I will answer that question as well. In addition to these groups, Syria under Bashar al-Assad was one of the main pillars of the Axis of Resistance. And the crown jewel of the Axis of Resistance used to be Hezbollah in Lebanon. These two main elements in the Axis have been reduced to rubble over the past couple of months, as well as Hamas, as well as the ouster of Assad from Syria, which has changed the whole regionā€™s face. But back to your question: What purpose did the Axis of Resistance serve? It is a combination of, again, ideology and the realpolitik of this ideologically-driven authoritarian state that we have in Iran. So after the Islamic Revolution, we had an extended eight-year war between Iran and its neighboring country, Iraq. It was a brutal war. Hundreds of thousands of people on both sides were killed.

Atul Singh: 1980 to 1988 ā€” Saddam Hussein on one side, Ayatollah Khomeini on the other side.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And during this period, Iran and its leaders found themselves isolated. The war comes at the heels of the hostage situation ā€” forces allied with the Ayatollah Khomeini taking American diplomats in Tehran hostage for over a year. It comes at the same time that Khomeini is exporting the Islamic Revolution around the world. So when there is a war, when Iran is under attack, no one is willing to sell weapons to Tehran. So in response, the Islamic Republic has developed a multi-pronged defense strategy. A core element of it ā€” they took a page out of the Soviet book ā€” they have moved the periphery of the war away from mainland Iran. They describe it as ā€œstrategic depthā€ in Iranian defense language.

Atul Singh: Well, Pakistan also obsesses about strategic depth, and that is why it has funded and supported first the Mujahideen and then the Taliban: to have security in its backyard and an ally against India. So that seems to be a common obsession.

Khosrow Isfahani: And to a great extent, it has been effective for a rogue state like the Islamic Republic that has constantly, over the past four decades, sought WMDs. It has kept this regime in power and safe from outside aggression, to a great extent. So one is this Axis of Resistance, that was one of the main pillars of the Islamic Republicā€™s security doctrine. The other two is self-sufficiency through development of conventional weapons. What are the examples of that? The ballistic missile projects, the drone projects. These have been ongoing since the inception of the Islamic Republic.

Atul Singh: And these are conventional weapons?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And over the past couple of years, we have seen the Islamic Republic exporting these weapons to other countries, including Russia, which has used the Iran-made weapons for war crimes against the Ukrainians. So when you look at the wider map of the world, you see the footprint of Iran whenever there is death and destruction. Letā€™s get back to our main topic.

Missiles, drones and nuclear threats

Atul Singh: Thereā€™s also the WMD program. Thatā€™s also part of the security doctrine.

Khosrow Isfahani: Exactly. Since the daysā€”

Atul Singh: And that basically means the nuclear program?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Atul Singh: Also, I suspect chemical, too?

Khosrow Isfahani: There have been aspirations of acquiring chemical weapons. At some point during the Iranā€“Iraq War, one of the senior IRGC commanders even was looking into making a laser weapon that can shoot laser beams from space at adversaries and destroy countries. So they have looked at every possible scenario.

Atul Singh: Did they succeed?

Khosrow Isfahani: No. That was very cartoonish of him.

Atul Singh: Was he reading too many science fiction novels?

Khosrow Isfahani: I am assuming thatā€™s where the root of that idea was. But on a more serious note, the Islamic Republic has sought weapons of mass destruction. There has been concerted efforts within the Islamic Republicā€™s establishment to create nuclear weapons. Over the years, there have been periods that this program has been put on pause, but it has always been at least on the back burner. And in recent weeks, with the collapse of the Axis of Resistance, the Islamic Republic has been left with two options when it comes to maintaining its security: One is expansion of its conventional weapons programs. Over the past couple of months, they have seen multiple tests and drills inside Iran where new drones were unveiled. Allegedly, ballistic missiles were tested. These are all signaling to the world that ā€œwe are still in the game, we are not bowing out and we are pursuing all these options.ā€ At the same time, a couple of weeks ago, in negotiations with European counterparts, Iranian diplomats for the first time ā€” I emphasize, for the first time ā€” threatened their counterparts that Iran might change its nuclear doctrine. Over the years, they have stuck to this talking point that Iran doesnā€™t seek a nuclear weapon. But now they are openly saying that they might make their leap. So we are facing this new reality.

Collapse of the Axis and economic strain

Atul Singh: I see. So thatā€™s the security doctrine: Basically, have deterrents in the form of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, move the locus of conflict away from the Iranian heartland, have a strong periphery which acts as the outer wall ā€” the outer wall of a fort ā€” to defend Iran and secure the great Islamic Revolution of 1979. Now, all of that makes sense. However, as you yourself pointed out earlier, the Axis of Resistance has collapsed. Hamas is weak.

Khosrow Isfahani: Its operational capabilities have been reduced.

Atul Singh: Yeah, Hezbollah has been decapitated. The leadership at least has been decapitated. And Bashar al-Assad is cooling his fine derriĆØre in icy Moscow. So how is Iran coping with the new reality?

Khosrow Isfahani: Itā€™s doubling down on the two programs. One: the expansion of the conventional weapons program.

Atul Singh: Such as drones, missiles and now, of course, a greater show of force.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. We have had multiple drills inside Iran that they are trying to project an image of power and control, that nothing has changed and Iran is still capable of sending off if there is war. Literally not a single week passes without a senior Iranian military official telling the press that if there is aggression against Iran, it will face a decisive response. So thatā€™s one element. And on the other hand, there is the threat of acquiring a nuclear weapon. As I mentioned earlier, they are constantly buzzing about making the leap for a nuclear weapon. And I just want to remind you: A senior Iranian official a couple of years ago described that Iran might act like a cornered cat. ā€œIt doesnā€™t want a nuclear weapon, but if you corner a cat, you cannot predict what it does next.ā€ As broken as that rationale is, and as somber as that image would be for the world, this is the mindset of the ayatollahs ruling Iran.

Atul Singh: Right. So the ayatollahs might be cornered cats and might want to spend a lot of money on programs and defense, but the big question arises: Where is the money coming from?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the main source of the money that Iran has for its military expenditure is its revenue from oil and gas exports. The main customers of that: China. Syria used to be a customer, but the payments werenā€™t on time. Same with Iraq. So thatā€™s where the money is coming from.

Atul Singh: So China is sending the money that is keeping aloft Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. But the issue is, a large portion of this money is not being spent on anything. The ayatollahs are constantly in fear of a protracted war, of a foreign attack, so they are saving this money for that possible attack ā€” and at the same time, lavishly spending it on weapons development. And at the same time, a lot of them ā€” and their children ā€” are living lavish lives in Iran, while the rest of the country is suffering in absolute poverty.

Atul Singh: So in a way, the ayatollahs have become the new Shah of Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: I wouldnā€™t go down that road, and I wouldnā€™t make that comparison.

Atul Singh: They did throw a huge party in Persepolis ā€” $800 million on god knows what.

Khosrow Isfahani: Again, different time, different context. So I wouldnā€™t compare these two rulers with each other in any form or shape.

Atul Singh: You know, I mean, I come from India. The Taj Mahal was built for an Iranian woman, and it caused famine and arguably death of thousands if not millions. So we are used to Iranian opulence!

Khosrow Isfahani: If I were to compare the approach of the ayatollahs to the economy and how they are wasting the resources of a very proud nation, it would be what the North Korean dictators are doing. Nothing trickles down to the people. People suffer, they stay in power.

Civil unrest and the war on women

Atul Singh: Excellent. And I guess it is that suffering that is causing increased frequency of civil unrest in Iran? Weā€™ve had news about women protesting, weā€™ve had news about young people protesting. If Iran is using its scarce cash on military expenditure and in corruption, then will this lead to an intensification of this unrest?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the thing is, over the past couple of years ā€” mostly, we can mark from 2016, 2017 ā€” we have seen a shift in Iranian society. In the past, we have had multiple cycles of protests, but they were happening in cycles that there were gaps between them ā€” around 10 years. When you look at the years after 2016, the gap is not even a year. So, people are on the streets over water shortage, fuel shortage, food shortage, food crisis.

Atul Singh: Wasnā€™t there a big protest over fuel prices in 2019?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. In 2019, the government of so-called reformist President Hassan Rouhani increased fuel prices three times overnight.

Atul Singh: Why?

Khosrow Isfahani: Because they argued they cannot subsidize fuel anymore. Some economistsā€”

Atul Singh: They were subsidizing their own RMs.

Khosrow Isfahani: There you go. And spending the riches of this country on their adventurism abroad. So in 2019, when they tripled fuel prices, people took to the streets. And in response, they killed 1,500 people. Thatā€™s a lot.

Atul Singh: Not by the standards of Joseph Stalin, or even Saddam Hussein.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, but that was the longest period of time. And again, they were in an olden age. In 2019, if you kill 1,500 people in less than a week in the darkness of an absolute nationwide Internet shutdown, thatā€™s a nightmare. I lived through that. I was on the ground in Iran reporting those events.

Atul Singh: And you were under a huge threat of life and limb, I suppose?

Khosrow Isfahani: Absolutely, like every other journalist who is doing their job. And after 2019, we have seen a reoccurrence of these types of protests in Iran. After that, we had protests against water shortage, which again was brutally suppressed. And recently, in 2022ā€“2023, we had the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which was triggered by police killing this young woman from ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s persecuted Kurdish minority over showing too much hair. Over 500 were killed.

Atul Singh: She wasnā€™t even wearing a bikini.

Khosrow Isfahani: She was very ā€” if you see the photos of her before this incident, everyone would describe it as very modestly covered. So it shocked the whole nation.

Atul Singh: Some Iranians I know have called it ā€” and you as well have called it ā€” a war on women.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And it didnā€™t start with the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini. It has been a war that has been ongoing since 1979, with the inception of the Islamic Republic. This regime has a three-pillar ideological system. One of them is animosity toward the West, specifically the US; hatred of Israel ā€” itā€™s irreconcilable ā€” and this unending war against women. It started with oppressing women into wearing very, very conservative clothing ā€” forcing them to wear the hijab, firing people from their jobs, arresting them, sentencing them to lashing, denying them access to services, and itā€™s continuing. And to mark that continuation, despite the lies that ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s chief propagandist, Zarif, would likeā€”

Atul Singh: Javad Zarif.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, the former foreign minister and current aide to the president.

Atul Singh: He went to school with the father of a friend. And my friendā€™s father ā€” whoā€™s passed away ā€” didnā€™t have very many pleasant things to say about him.

Khosrow Isfahani: Not any. I cannot think of a single person with a shred of dignity who would have anything nice to say about Javad Zarif. This man has whitewashed crimes of the Islamic Republic ā€” crimes against humanity, war crimes of this regime ā€” over the past four decades, nonstop.

Atul Singh: Heā€™s a smooth operator, to give the devil his due.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. That makes him a more dangerous actor compared to his predecessor who died in a helicopter crash recently.

Trump, deterrence and future scenarios

Atul Singh: I see. So letā€™s discuss the new world we live in, you and I are sitting in Washington, DC. Donald Trump is back in the White House. As of today, he has issued 37 executive orders, and things are extremely uncertain. The Pentagon jargon: Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous ā€” VUCA. We very much are in the VUCA world. So what lies ahead for Iran now?

Khosrow Isfahani: So, on one end, we have an Iranian establishment in its entirety swearing absolute revenge against President Trump after the killing of IRGC Quds Force Commander, the Islamic Republicā€™s chief terror operator, Qasem Soleimani. The Islamic Republic, its Supreme Leader and the civilian government have sworn that they are going to kill the president. The official website of the Supreme Leader has published posters saying that President Trump should be killed and assassinated.

Atul Singh: As revenge for killing Qasem Soleimani who was killed in Baghdad, and in the eyes of many Iranians, was a hero.

Khosrow Isfahani: And in the eyes of many, a murderous war criminal who had the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent people on his hands ā€” people in especially Syria. He was the commander that led the bloody crackdown that the Islamic Republic, Russia and the deposed Bashar al-Assad led against the uprising of the Syrian people for justice and liberty in their country.

Atul Singh: So in particular, a lot of Sunnis ā€” who form the majority of Syria ā€” were targeted and tortured and killed.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And he was responsible for a lot of that.

Atul Singh: Okay. So letā€™s come back to Trump. Yes, so on the one hand, they want Donald Trump dead.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. But at the same time, they are extremely afraid of a second-term President Trump in office. The first term didnā€™t end well for the Islamic Republic. It was marked with the maximum pressure campaign.

Atul Singh: Well, he threw out Obamaā€™s nuclear deal with Iran.

Khosrow Isfahani: Which many experts believe was a flawed agreement that didnā€™t include ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s regional activities and missile program under the JCPOA, the nuclear deal.

Atul Singh: Yes, JCPOA is the full form, yeah.

Khosrow Isfahani: ā€”expanded its missile and drone program. It enriched its militants ā€” the network of militant groups across the region. So yes, in his first term, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, reimposed strict sanctions against the Islamic Republic. And as one very knowledgeable economist back in Iran at the time told me, President Trump was like a lion having Iran by its back, biting the back of the neck of the ayatollahs, rendering them incapacitated, unable to make any moves.

Atul Singh: Well, I think Donald Trump would love that image. Heā€™s got blonde hair and he fancies himself as a lion. The ayatollahs would be, you know, the bisons or the wildebeests, or whatever you want to call them.

Khosrow Isfahani: Thatā€™s the analysis of this very senior, experienced economist at the time I knew.

Atul Singh: Excellent. I mean, he will certainly be appointed in the Trump White House. You should send his name over to the Donald.

Khosrow Isfahani: So thatā€™s one thing that the ayatollahs are afraid of. But more importantly is that over the years, the clerical establishment in Iran has almost successfully gamed all presidents in the US. The two parties had become predictable for the ayatollahs in Tehran. They knew how they can play their cards to remain in this sphere of safety without being too limited. But with President Trump, they »å“Ē²Ōā€™t know what would be the consequences of their actions. So right now, literally today, the Iranian Supreme Leader delivered a speech about the possibility of negotiations with ā€œthe enemy.ā€ He said that ā€œwhen you negotiate with the enemy, you should remember who you are negotiating with ā€” but you may proceed.ā€ Some have seen this as a signal from the Ayatollah for negotiations with the US. But the issue is: With a regime like the Islamic Republic, whatever negotiation you clinch, whatever deal you achieve, it would amount to nothing but kicking the can down the road. Itā€™s not going to change the behavior or the ideology of this regime that has been the largest state sponsor of terrorism around the world. Itā€™s not going to change the behavior of a regime that has been responsible for death and destruction around the Middle East. And itā€™s not going to change the behavior of a regime that constantly kills and oppresses the people under its rule.

Khosrow Isfahani: So what youā€™re saying is, Donald Trump would be unwise to negotiate with the Iranian regime, and what youā€™re implying is that he should kill the beast he has by his jaws.

Khosrow Isfahani: So, Iā€™m going to quote, actually, the two-term president Hassan Rouhani in the book The Secret War with Iran. Ronen Bergman, when heā€™s talking about the McFarlane affair ā€” Iran purchasing weapons from Israel with the US being in the middle and a lot else going on in the background ā€” there is a specific chapter in this whole affair that I believe has remained true: During these negotiations, Hassan Rouhani was a senior security official within the Islamic Republicā€™s structure. He travels to France to meet with different stakeholders in the McFarlane affair. And sitting down with one of the officers negotiating the deal, he tells them that, ā€œYou »å“Ē²Ōā€™t understand the ayatollahs in Tehran. You show weakness, and they exploit it. If you show strength, they would abide.ā€ There is a direct quote ā€” the conversation has actually been recorded by an intelligence officer who was in the room ā€” and he says: ā€œYou should tell them that if you cross this red line, this specific military target can be hit and will be hit. And if you do that, the ayatollahs would change their behavior.ā€

Atul Singh: Youā€™re sounding like Bibi Netanyahu.

Khosrow Isfahani: Iā€™m quoting a two-term president within the Islamic Republic.

Atul Singh: (Laughs) Rouhani is sounding like Bibi Netanyahu. So what youā€™re saying is, paradoxically, Trumpā€™s hardball tactics might yield some results with Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the thing is, a very wise friend a couple of months ago told me that there is connective tissue between diplomacy, military action and sanctions. These »å“Ē²Ōā€™t exist in the void. And any administration in the US would be wise to use the wide array of ā€” and all the tools at its disposal ā€” for containing a rogue state like the Islamic Republic and re-establishing deterrence in the Middle East.

Atul Singh: On that note, great to have you, Khosrow. We learned a few things. Obviously, weā€™d love to have you back on a vast area of issues ā€” not just on the Middle East, because you have much broader interests ā€” but also civil society, journalism, how geopolitics is shaping up worldwide. And we look forward to seeing you very soon.

Khosrow Isfahani: Thank you, Atul. Thanks for having me.

Atul Singh: Thank you.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FOĀ° Podcasts: ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Axis of Resistance Is Now in Shambles. What Next? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

March 18ā€™s United Nations Security Council spotlighted that divide. US Interim Ambassador Dorothy Shea was the only representative to accuse Hamas rather than Israel of breaking the ceasefire, reigniting hostilities and worsening an already catastrophic humanitarian disaster in Gaza. Similarly, Israel and the US stand alone at first glance in supporting US President Donald Trumpā€™s vision of Gaza as a high-end beachfront real estate void of much of its indigenous population.

The rest of the international community supports the Arab worldā€™s alternative plan that calls for an end to the war, an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the creation of a Palestinian interim administration of the Gaza Strip and the temporary resettlement of Gazans in safe zones in Gaza. Meanwhile, the war-ravaged territory is reconstructed to the tune of $53 billion.

So far, it all seems straightforward. But dig a little deeper, and the fault lines begin to blur.

UAEā€“Israeli alignment

A series of persistent but unconfirmed reports suggest that the United Arab Emirates may be privately more in sync with Israel than with its Arab brethren regarding Hamas and Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not the only Middle Eastern leader infuriated by a last month between a senior US negotiator and Hamas. It was the first ever face-to-face US engagement with the group, which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and a terrorist organization by US designation. So was UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed, a staunch opponent of Islamist groups.

UAE ambassador to the US, Yousef al-Otaiba, a close associate of Bin Zayed, US President Donald Trumpā€™s administration to reject the Arab plan for Gaza drafted by Egypt and adopted unanimously at a March 4 Arab summit in Cairo. Privately, UAE officials have complained that the plan failed to call for the disarming of Hamas and its removal from Gaza. Bin Zayed did not attend the conference, sending his deputy prime minister instead.

In February, al-Otaiba described Trumpā€™s call for the resettlement of Gazaā€™s 2.3 million Palestinians as ā€œdifficultā€ and ā€œchallenging.ā€ But when asked whether the UAE was working on a plan for Gaza, al-Otaiba responded, despite Egyptā€™s draft of the Arab plan already having been circulated, ā€œNot yet. I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t see an alternative to whatā€™s being proposed. I really .ā€

Meanwhile, Emirates Leaks, a mysterious website critical of the Emirati government, asserted that the UAE had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade South Africa to withdraw or at least weaken the genocide case against Israel it filed in the International Court of Justice. The report could not be independently confirmed.

Lines blur further

In an even greater blurring of the fault lines, the UAE, alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is the largest shareholder in an investment firm headed by Jared Kushner, Trumpā€™s son-in-law, with stakes in Israeli financial services group Phoenix Holding. The Holding is in businesses listed by the United Nations Human Rights Council as operating in West Bank settlements deemed illegal under international law.

In a seemingly bizarre muddying of the lines, Netanyahu has kicked up a political storm with his firing of Ronen Bar, the head of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s domestic Shin Bet security service. He did this in part for Barā€™s members of the prime ministerā€™s staff for their dealings with Qatar.

Netanyahuā€™s former spokesperson, Eli Feldstein, allegedly worked for a Doha-based firm that recruited Israeli journalists to write pro-Qatar stories. Two other Netanyahu staffers, Jonatan Urich and Yisrael Einhorn, allegedly helped Qatar bolster its image ahead of the Gulf stateā€™s hosting of the 2022 World Cup.

In late March, Israeli police two suspects in the case accused of bribery, fraud, breach of trust, money laundering and illegal contact with a foreign agent. The suspects were not identified under a gag order placed on investigation details.

The staffersā€™ activities countered Netanyahuā€™s long-standing efforts to tarnish Qatarā€™s reputation and undermine its mediation role. The staffers Qatar to fund the Hamas government in Gaza to weaken the Palestinian polity by perpetuating the rift between the group and the West Bank-based, internationally recognized Palestine Authority.

The blurred lines contribute to ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s ability to do what it wants with the Trump administrationā€™s backing, even if its actions violate agreements. One such agreement is the Gaza ceasefire, negotiated with the help of the US, Qatar and Egypt, and accepted by Israel. The blur also enhances Israel and the USā€™s ability to blame Hamas for the ceasefireā€™s collapse.

Extending the ceasefire

In the latest iteration of efforts to get the ceasefire back on track, Hamas agreed to an Egyptian to reinstate the Gaza ceasefire. Per the proposal, Hamas must swap up to six Israeli hostages and the remains of an unspecified number killed during the war. In exchange, Israeli officials will release Palestinians incarcerated in Israel, initiate negotiations on ending the war and lift the Israeli blockade. This blockade has prevented humanitarian aid from entering Gaza and cut off the supply of electricity in recent weeks.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Hamas Political Bureau member Bassem Naim said the groupā€™s acceptance of a 50-day extension of the ceasefireā€™s first phase was dependent on the mediators, the US, Qatar and Egypt, guaranteeing that all parties would engage in serious second-phase negotiations that would bring an end to the war and ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s withdrawal from the Strip.

The problem is that whatever guarantee the mediators may give is unlikely to be worth the paper it would be written on. The US is the only country capable of pressuring Israel to comply.

ā€œThere is no force on the planet prepared to give Hamas assurances that if they give up their only card ā€” the dead and living hostages ā€” Israel would agree to all of its obligations. Hamas understands what Trump and Netanyahu are doing with the phases. Theyā€™re Hamas of the cards it has left,ā€ said veteran Middle East peace negotiator Aaron David Miller, who worked for both Democratic and Republican administrations.

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorialĢżpolicy.

The post Gazaā€™s Fault Lines Are Less Linear Than Meets the Eye appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Gary Grappo: Thank you very much, Atul, and for your flattering introduction. And itā€™s always a pleasure to be with you and to talk about whatā€™s happening in the world as we speak. And in todayā€™s interview, weā€™ll be obviously talking about the Middle East, where the situation remains quite fluid and very dynamic.

Atul Singh: What is this new geopolitical landscape we are talking about? How is it different to the old one? And when does this new era begin?

Gary Grappo: Well, the fundamental problems of the Middle East are unchanged. We have governments that are largely, widely unpopular. We have an extensive amount of oppression, particularly in the Arab countries; we have continuing instability in several of the countries, with militia groups quite active, terrorist organizations quite active; and we still have the ongoing problem, of course, of the Israeliā€“Palestinian conflict, although the tenor of that has changed considerably as well. But what has changed is the dynamic. Over the course of the last several months, of course, we have seen significant diminishing of the capabilities of Hamas in Gaza. We had a ceasefire that lasted almost two months and is now finished, and Israel has relaunched both its ground and air campaign against Hamas in Gaza. We can get into the details of that and what that may portend. Further to the north, we have a largely decimated Hezbollah. Israel, by dint of cleverness and truly impressive technological innovation and then massive air attacks, was able to eliminate at least the top two, if not top three, levels of the Hezbollah organization in southern Lebanon, while at the same time decimating its arsenal of weapons, although not entirely destroying it. And so it presents much less threat to the people of Israel. At the same time, we finally ā€” after waiting almost two years ā€” we have an actual government in place with a president and a prime minister in Lebanon. The Lebanese people, for the first time, will have a government that appears committed to addressing the real challenges that that country is facing, both on the political front and most especially on the economic front. We can get into what to anticipate as that moves forward. Probably one of the most significant developments has been the fall of the Assad regime. Father and son lasted some 53ā€“54 years and ruled with an iron fist, including over the last ten or 12 years during the Syrian civil war. They saw the complete devastation of the Syrian economy, deaths that ran into the hundreds of thousands, and huge numbers of Syrian refugees fleeing to Jordan, Turkey, even to Europe and Lebanon. It was then replaced with a government which initially showed some positive signs of moving forward, despite its jihadist heritage ā€” actually quite steeped in jihadism. But weā€™re now seeing what I refer to as a default position in the Middle East. And that is, you see a change in government, hopes and expectations are high, and then cracks begin to appear. In this particular case, we are seeing an increase in the number of Assadists ā€” that is, remnants of pro-Assad forces ā€” attacking Syrian government forces, and those are leading to some actually quite pitched battles and to the exacting of revenge against the Alawite minority in the western and northwestern parts of Syria, with fairly large numbers of fatalities. There were also reports of some Christians being killed as well ā€” not, at least from my perspective, unanticipated at all. And then finally ā€” and we can get into other elements ā€” but the situation in Iran has dramatically changed as a result of two Israeli attacks: in April of last year and then in October. That has greatly diminished the capability of the Iranian regime to protect itself from future attacks, providing Donald Trump with a potential, perhaps, of maybe reaching some kind of a negotiated solution with respect to ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear weapons program. So thatā€™s the lineup. We can talk also, if youā€™d like, about whatā€™s happening in Yemen right now. Thereā€™s certainly been an uptick in the last five days of activity there as well.

Instability in Israel

Atul Singh: So what youā€™re saying is part of the warp and woof of the Middle East. The Middle East has been unstable. You can argue that after , once the Ottoman Empire was replaced by the British and French empires, and after they unraveled and left behind nation-states in largely ethnic and tribal territories, the instability has never ended. Whatā€™s new? Whatā€™s new about this, Gary? How is it different to what transpired earlier?

Gary Grappo: Well, certainly what is new is the character of the conflict between Israel and some of its neighbors. And when I say that, we have to be cautious, because the states that border Israel »å“Ē²Ōā€™t necessarily present a threat to Israel at all. Certainly not Egypt, not Jordan, not Lebanon and not even Syria, to be quite frank, although Israel is keeping its powder dry with respect to the future of Syria. But we still have the security threats to the State of Israel emanating from Hamas in Gaza and still from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. And then the Iranian regime has not changed at all. There is certainly the realization on the part of the leadership, including that of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, that they do not have the defense mechanisms that they thought they once had, with their so-called Axis of Resistance now as a result of conflicts with Israel. But the fundamental lay of the land, so to speak, in terms of the unpopularity of governments, inability of governments to respond to the needs of their peoples ā€” probably, with the exception, obviously, of the monarchies, which do a much better job in that regard and therefore enjoy a measure of legitimacy that other governments do not have ā€” that all remains the same. And the fear that governments have of their populations, that at any moment streets could erupt over whatever the issue du jour happens to be ā€” whether itā€™s the Israeliā€“Palestinian issue, whether itā€™s the economic situation, whether itā€™s oppressive government security forces, whether itā€™s the inability to hold the governments accountable to their people ā€” all of those things still register quite prominently among the peoples of the Middle East.

Atul Singh: Alright, so Gary, what youā€™re painting is a fundamentally unstable situation. Letā€™s begin with Israelā€“Palestine, since you mentioned that is an issue that animates the Arab street, and thereā€™s a tension between the Arab street and the Arab palace on that issue. And of course, we can talk about whether Israel has been just or unjust, whether in its response to the terrorist attacks of October 7, whether theyā€™ve been proportionate or disproportionate. But for me, our deeper concern is the inherent instability we see in Israel itself now. We are speaking just after Bibi Netanyahu and his cabinet have the head of Shin Bet, the internal intelligence agency of Israel. Now, this sort of politicization of intelligence agencies ā€” and indeed the military ā€” has not happened in Israel. Israel has had a fantastic military, a fantastic intelligence and a really cohesive state until quite recently. And now that internal cohesion in Israel seems to be breaking, and that for me perhaps is even more worrying than the usual fault lines everyone talks about.

Gary Grappo: Thereā€™s no question that Israel is facing some rather difficult internal political challenges. The specific one that you mentioned on the firing of the head of Shin Bet is overlaid with the quite emotional upheaval over the situation of Israeli hostages who remain in Gaza. Of course, there are some 59ā€“60 of those. How many of them are still alive? I guess the Israelis perhaps may know, but there are most definitely some of them who are not alive today. And so thatā€™s a fault line. 

Atul Singh: Sorry to interject, but I think even the Israelis cannot know for sure, because as of now, we know that they have not quite managed to break Hamas completely. Theyā€™ve done a lot of damage, but Hamas has proved more resilient than anyone could have estimated given the disparity in force.

Gary Grappo: Yes. No, Hamas is, despite the devastating losses theyā€™ve suffered in manpower and in weapons and in overall structural cohesiveness of the organization, theyā€™re still standing. And we saw that during the ceasefire, when they made a show of their continued presence in the territory. And Israel knows that, and I think thatā€™s why Israel finally decided that since the ceasefire was obviously not going to move into a phase two ā€” I will just say quite bluntly ā€” there was never any possibility of that happening. It looked good on paper ā€” the phase one, the phase two and the phase three. There was never any chance of moving into phase two. There really wasnā€™t. And so Hamas still exists as an organization. They are attempting to rearm. Itā€™s going to be difficult because their supply lines have suffered rather dramatic deterioration. They canā€™t get the supplies in they previously had received, for example, say, from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon or from Iran. So theyā€™re going to be hard-pressed to replace their stockpile of weapons and other material. But they are recruiting quite strongly, as a matter of fact. And I think we have to acknowledge the fact that itā€™s pretty fertile territory for the recruitment of fighters, given what has transpired since October 7. So their strength is probably back up to at least 20,000 fighters ā€” not nearly with the capabilities that they might have had post-October 7. Theyā€™ve lost those veteran fighters ā€” many, many of them. But theyā€™ll get there. And I think thatā€™s why Israel decided to capitalize while it could, in going after this still-less-than-previously-very-capable Hamas fighting force. But to get back to Israel, the issue over the firing of the Shin Bet chief is overlaid with the dissension in the Israeli public over the state of the hostages and whether the government is doing enough or not to secure their release. And then underpinning all of that, if you recall, before October 7, there was quite a bit of attention devoted to what Bibi was trying to do to undermine the authority of the Israeli judiciary, and that still remains so. So we do see a lot of political cracks within Israel internally. And Iā€™ll make the final point ā€” and I know Bibi Netanyahu is very mindful of this ā€” and that is: Israel must decide on its state budget by the end of this month. If they finish the month without a state budget, it effectively means the collapse of the government. They will have to call for new elections, which would take ā€” in Israel, given its election laws ā€” three months. So all of this internal churn is having an impact. And then, of course, thereā€™s all the back and forth over the person Bibi Netanyahu himself and how Israelis view him, how much or not it can be debated. Netanyahu needs war to maintain his position as prime minister. All of that is being debated today in Israel. So yeah, Israel faces its problems within itself, in addition to the external threats.

Lebanonā€™s prospects

Atul Singh: And so letā€™s move on from Israel to Lebanon. Lebanon, you mentioned, seems to have greater hope now. But Lebanon still has a fractious, multi-ethnic society, which in the past even struggled to collect rubbish, leave aside deliver other elements of governance. Hezbollah ran a parallel state, which was arguably more powerful than the state itself, at least in the areas it dominated. Is there hope for Lebanon as a state, or are we going to see Lebanon limp along as a failed state?

Gary Grappo: I think thereā€™s more hope today in Lebanon than there has been ā€” most certainly in the last 10 years, maybe in the last 25 years. There genuinely is an opportunity here. Now, Lebanon has been put nearly on its back. Its economy, which was considered a middle-income country at one point, has now been reduced to almost . Most of the country is living at or below that today. The infrastructure has suffered considerably, particularly the neighborhoods in Beirut and in southern Lebanon and in the Beqaa Valley, which is on the east near the border with Syria. So a lot of work needs to be done on the Lebanese economy. But the Lebanese people are some of the most industrious ā€” in fact, I would argue the most industrious people in the Middle East after Israel. And there can be a natural affinity between Lebanon and Israel in terms of how they approach innovation, how they approach business, how they approach development, if they can overcome some of these problems. Now, this is where Lebanon is going to need some help. And I would argue, if I were sitting before Donald Trump, that if you really want to do some good not only for the people of Lebanon and for our interest in Lebanon, but also for Israel, we need to invest in Lebanon. We need to invest in their armed forces. We need to work with the armed forces as closely as we can to ensure they are able to disarm Hezbollah, which is not going to willingly lay down all of its arms. Itā€™s obliged to do that going back to a UN Security Council following the 2006 war. And the terms of the latest ceasefire called for the enforcement of that, as well as the of all Lebanese armed forces north of the Litani River, which is around 20 miles north of the Israeli border. And Lebanon is supposed to ā€” the Lebanese armed forces are supposed to have that responsibility and that authority. Itā€™s uncertain how effectively they can carry that out. They are going to need some help ā€” in fact, considerable help. And this is where I think the West, particularly the United States ā€” I would also argue France and other countries ā€” could help Lebanon. One of the good things is they were finally able to name a , and they have a , both of whom are opposed to Hezbollah. They want to see the ceasefire terms fully enforced. They have taken on that responsibility. Itā€™s just the ability to do that is a bit constrained at the moment. And then finally, I will say that Hezbollah is greatly weakened within Lebanon today. They do not have anywhere near the political stature they once had. Even though they still maintain a sizable presence ā€” not a majority, but a sizable presence ā€” in the Lebanese parliament. There are going to be elections for the parliament, I want to say, in two years. And the hope is that if Lebanon can show some genuine progress, that the Hezbollah presence in the parliament can be even further reduced. Just as an indication, weā€™re seeing that the level of popularity of Hezbollah, even among Lebanese Shia, is reduced from what it has historically been. So these are important points to consider and offer a genuine opportunity for hope and progress in Lebanon. And we should take stock of that and try to capitalize on that in the interest of Lebanon and overall stability in the Middle East.

Atul Singh: Donald Trump has, I believe, two daughters ā€” or three, probably two, if I remember correctly ā€” and one of them is married to a Lebanese gentleman, and her father-in-law is apparently now mediating. Heā€™s Maronite, and hopefully, if heā€™s involved, do you think there will be US investment and attention to Lebanon?

Gary Grappo: If he has the ear of Donald Trump, then there is a possibility. Now, I havenā€™t heard much about what heā€™s actually doing at the moment in Lebanon. Heā€™s been given some other responsibilities, too, so I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t know how heā€™s dividing his time and efforts. Nevertheless, yeah, if you have the ear of Donald Trump, obviously youā€™re going to be an influential person, and youā€™re going to be viewed as someone with influence and people will pay attention to you. We havenā€™t yet seen his influence demonstrated clearly in terms of his relationship with the president ±¹¾±²õ-Ć -±¹¾±²õ the presidentā€™s daughter. You would think he would. So that remains to be seen.

Rising pressure in Jordan

Atul Singh: Moving on from Lebanon to Jordan, we know that the monarchy feels the heat. The King of Jordan has not been terribly enthused about Donald Trumpā€™s plan for Gaza, turning it into a . We know that the majority of Jordan is now Palestinian. We know that Palestinians in Jordan are increasingly in solidarity with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. So from a geopolitical point of view, it seems that Jordan seems to be quite unstable. The king is not getting any younger either. So what lies ahead there?

Gary Grappo: There hasnā€™t been much attention given to Jordan, and thatā€™s unfortunate, because Jordan is facing some challenges. There is this very restive Palestinian population within Jordan. Estimates vary ā€” anywhere between 60 and 80% of the population of the country. It seems to be in a perpetual economic crisis. They »å“Ē²Ōā€™t have the natural resource wealth that other countries in the region have, and they are dependent to a great extent on American largesse. The American aid program, if it continues, is quite substantial, and the king needs that, which is why the king ā€” after Donald Trumpā€™s statement about his ambitions for Gaza ā€” was anxious to fly to Washington and meet with the president in order to maybe talk him down from this grandiose plan for Gaza. But he was quite diplomatic about it. It was not confrontational, but also made it clear that this was not something that Jordan would be able to accept. But he knows how to be deferential when he has to be to the United States ā€” and specifically to Donald Trump, who likes that. And so he ended up leaving, having made his point, but not losing Jordanā€™s status in terms of how itā€™s viewed in Washington. But it faces continuing economic challenges, which are quite dire ā€” whether itā€™s unemployment, whether itā€™s the level of business activity, economic growth, development and so forth. The other problem that many folks have not focused on is the security challenges that Jordan faces, coming not only from the West Bank, where you have the appearance now of these small militia groups that are causing a great deal of instability in the West Bank ā€” confronting settlers, confronting the IDF. Thereā€™s some of that also present in Jordan. The Jordanian security forces are quite competent.

Atul Singh: [Are these groups directly tied to Hamas? Or are they more independent, acting on their own?]

Gary Grappo: Both. Some will have some kind of tie to Hamas but »å“Ē²Ōā€™t take guidance from Hamas. Others may take some guidance from Hamas, and some are entirely independent and are operating on their own. In fact, itā€™s uncertain the extent to which some of them actually even coordinate their activities with one another, which is why they havenā€™t been all that effective. And the Israelis have been able to tamp them down as they appear but not eliminate them. The suspicion is that the Iranians may be behind some of this in terms of provoking them, maybe providing them with funds, even weapons that are smuggled in via Syria and Jordan. So itā€™s all kind of opaque at this point, but it presents problems for Jordan. And there are some interesting reports coming out of Iran that the Iranians view Jordan as a particularly weak point, and that if their efforts to re-establish a link between Iran and Hezbollah through Syria ā€” and thatā€™s not working out so well up to this point ā€” that they may attempt to use Jordan. Now, theyā€™ll find very stiff challenge in Jordan. The Jordanian forces are not to be trifled with. Theyā€™re very effective, very capable. They have an excellent intelligence service. They cooperate very closely with both the Americans and the Israelis. So theyā€™ll find the going very tough, butā€” 

Atul Singh: [Did King Abdullah himself serve in the Jordanian Armed Forces or receive military training?]

Gary Grappo: Hm, I want to say he did, but I canā€™t be sure. I know his father did, but I canā€™t be sure about Abdullah. But I think so, be that as itā€”

Atul Singh: [Well, regardless, the king seems to command deep loyalty from the armed forces. Thatā€™s a critical pillar of stability in a region where rulers often take great care to ensure military loyalty.]

Gary Grappo: Absolutely. And the king enjoys their loyalty 100%, which is very important in the Middle East. And they are indeed very loyal to the king and will remain so. And so I have every reason to believe that with the continued cooperation with the Americans and the Israelis, that theyā€™ll be able to thwart any effort on the part of the Iranians. But itā€™s still a challenge that the Jordanians now have to confront. But I am worried about the internal political stability because of the large Palestinian presence there. I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t think itā€™ll turn terribly violent, other than maybe potential pockets in some areas. But nevertheless, itā€™s something Iā€™m sure the king is very much aware of, and the Israeli and American intelligence services are also quite aware of and trying to provide the king with whatever support he may need. So itā€™s worth keeping an eye on developments in Jordan.

Can the country of Syria survive?

Atul Singh: Letā€™s talk about Syria. Youā€™ve already mentioned that it has followed a familiar pattern. And youā€™ve mentioned the killings of Alawites. Youā€™ve also mentioned the former Assad regime soldiers mounting attacks on the new regime. Of course, we know that Turkish intelligence, MIT, did support the current rulers of Syria. So what happens now with the Kurds, who represent one area and one ethnicity of Syria? The Sunnis ā€” also not just Sunnis who are in the plains in that road going all the way from Damascus to Istanbul, formerly Constantinople ā€” but also the Arabs living by the Tigris and Euphrates. They are different. Those peasants are different to the more urban population. And in fact, arguably, a led to their migration to the cities and triggered the Arab uprisings in Syria. And then, of course, we have the issue of the Alawites, who are along the coasts and who were by the Sunnis under none other than Selim I. And of course, when they ruled, they werenā€™t particularly kind and loving and peaceful either. So there is a whole cycle of violence there. Can Syria even survive as a country de jure?

Gary Grappo: That may be the ultimate question, and that question has been posed more than once. Itā€™s not coincidence that the centrifugal sectarian forces of Lebanon mirror those almost, in some cases, identically to those in Syria. You have a multiplicity of sectarian groups ā€” whether religious or ethnic ā€” and it makes it very, very difficult to have a unifying identity for Syria, despite efforts by previous regimes to create one. Assad tried to create one, and it ultimately came down to oppression. If you opposed Assad, you ended up either dead or in jail. And thatā€™s how it was enforced. I think al-Sharaa, who is the interim president ā€” weā€™ll see how long the interim period is ā€” former head of the Hayā€™at Tahrir al-Sham, the jihadist group that emerged victorious after the fall of Assad, he said all the right things, which new Arab leaders often do, with all these wonderful aspirations of Syrian unity and respect for its multi-identities within the country. But the default position is these groups go at one another, and certainly they go after the government. And you mentioned a few of these. But there are Druze down in the south. There are Ismailis who are closer to being Shia, actually, than the Alawites, who were represented in the person of Assad and his father. You had Turkmen up in the very northern part of the country ā€” the remnants of the Turkish population after the fall of the Ottomans. You have the Kurds up in the northeast. And you mentioned a very good point: that the Arabs who typically settle in some of the cities stretching from Damascus in the south to Aleppo in the north have a very different perspective on things than the desert Arabs who live to the east. And also their views on Islam ā€” Sunni Islam. Theyā€™re all Sunni, but how they view it, how strongly they adhere to it, where they tend to be more conservative or not, all of that. There are many complexions. And even in the western areas on that main highway that goes from Damascus to Hama, Homs and Aleppo, from city to city, it changes. And those are four very big cities in Syria. That all changes. You have several Christian groups that inhabit the country. And so all of these are pulling at one another. All of these are vying for influence, power, and wealth in a country which ā€” we have to remember ā€” has been destroyed. 80% of its economy has been effectively destroyed as a result of that 12-year civil war. And then you have another six million or so Syrians residing outside the country, who are forming actually a new identity of themselves and of Syria, whether they reside in Jordan or Turkey or Lebanon, or even in Europe. So all of these are pushing and pulling against one another, presenting enormous challenges to the government and the governmentā€™s ability to actually govern. And the default position ā€” and thatā€™s kind of a situation where you have the sectarian strains pulling at one another ā€” the government brings down the hammer. Thatā€™s what Assad did. And thatā€™s what the predecessors of the Assads did. Although they have had brief experiences with democracy, they didnā€™t last. They didnā€™t last.

Atul Singh: [So even when Syria flirted with democracy, it ³¦“Ē³Ü±ō»å²Ōā€™t overcome those deep sectarian divisions, could it?]

Gary Grappo: Yes, they even tried that! But thatā€™s another point, because letā€™s bear in mind there are external players in all of that mix. This is not just Syria alone. Thereā€™s Lebanon, of course, to the west. Thereā€™s Turkey, which is probably the most significant influence today to the north. Iran has not given up on Syria and will try to re-establish its pipeline of weapons of war material and money into Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. There are folks who were greatly affected by the fall of the Assad regime and the collapse of the huge Captagon industry that was resident in Syria. Basically, thatā€™s how the Syrian regime made money. They sell ā€” which is the Middle Eastern equivalent almost of meth ā€” and were making billions. And thatā€™s how the army earned whatever funds it could to support itself. It wasnā€™t nearly enough, and obviously collapsed very easily. And there are others in the mix. The Iraqis are watching very, very closely what happens. This may present some opportunities for the western Arabs of Iraq to influence Syria as well. And then you have the Americans, the Europeans and the Israelis exerting their influence. The Israelis, by the way, have moved beyond the neutral territory between their borders and have now settled on ā€” Iā€™m talking about military forces ā€” on actual Syrian territory. And theyā€™re going to wait and see how things play out to ensure that whatever result does not present a threat to Israel. And so they have that new buffer zone that they have established.

Atul Singh: Yes, some of the Israelis say that thereā€™s no way they can give it up. And they say that the Druze actually in Syria want Israeli protection. And the Druze are a great buffer zone against a potential fundamentalist Sunni regime in Damascus.

Gary Grappo: Thatā€™s 100% correct. Of course, there is a significant, relatively speaking, Druze population in Israel, which does quite well. They do not experience many of the problems that the Israeli Arabs have in Israel, and theyā€™re quite pleased, for the most part, with their status in Israel. And of course, they have their contacts with their brothers in Syria. And itā€™s a natural affinity that the Druze would have toward Israel. Theyā€™re far more trusting of Israel than this new government. And theyā€™re trying to figure it out. Theyā€™re trying to feel their way through this new government. Theyā€™re not sure exactly how much authority, how much power they will be given. And so itā€™s not surprising that theyā€™re maintaining pretty close ties with Israel and will find a way to cooperate with Israel if they feel that their interests may be threatened by this new government in Damascus.

Atul Singh: Alright, you havenā€™t mentioned the Russians. They have Latakia and they have Tartus still, and Iā€™m sure they are not going to disappear quietly into the sun.

Gary Grappo: Youā€™re right. And they »å“Ē²Ōā€™t have quite the presence they had before the fall of the Assad regime. There are supposedly ongoing negotiations to both their air base at Hmeimim and their naval base at Tartus. The naval base in particular is vitally important for the Russians, and they desperately want to hold on to that. Theyā€™ve lost all other influence in Syria today, not only because of the fall of Assad, but of course having to overextend itself in Ukraine, in that misbegotten war. And so theyā€™re struggling. And itā€™s not clear that the government may necessarily want them, particularly given the close relationship between Russia today and Iran. One thing you can say about the regime in Damascus now is they »å“Ē²Ōā€™t want the Iranians back. They most definitely »å“Ē²Ōā€™t want Hezbollah back. And weā€™re already seeing fighting take place between the government forces of Syria and Hezbollah, which is a very interesting development ā€” and from the purely selfish perspective of the Americans and Israelis ā€” not bad at all. Now, Hezbollah is probably also allying with these pro-Assad factions in the western part of the country, which is something to be watched. And again, Atul, I just come back to all the centrifugal forces at play in Syria, which argue against, unfortunately, the best hopes of the Syrian people after the regime fell.

Egypt: the ticking time bomb

Atul Singh: Alright, letā€™s move on from Syria, and letā€™s talk about Egypt, the other neighbor of Israel. One ex-MI6 officer told me that he believes that Egypt could be the ticking time bomb in the region because of its population, because of the of the Nile Delta, and because of persistent youth unemployment and resentment against the regime. He also said that as of now, Sisi is a pretty effective ruler. The military has managed to clamp down pretty hard on the Muslim Brotherhood. And as of now, there is no immediate risk. But the structural problems persist in the economy, and the political problem exists in society, and there is such democratic deficit and a demographic time bomb that Egypt will ultimately implode. What do you say to that, Gary?

Gary Grappo: Egypt is a perfect illustration of the essential problem of the Middle East that I outlined at the outset. And that is the fact that you have unpopular governments, unaccountable to their people and fearful of their people, and maintaining authority through their security forces ā€” essentially oppression ā€” while at the same time the economic and social needs are not being met adequately. And thereā€™s no recourse. And in the case of Egypt, you have very effective internal security forces. They have almost eradicated the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt ā€” ruthlessly, too. And they packed up and left while they could. And those who ³¦“Ē³Ü±ō»å²Ōā€™t ended up either dead or in jail. And there are a number of jails that are chock-a-block full of former Muslim Brotherhood members. So for the time being, as you mentioned, the problem is contained. But the challenge remains: how do you reconcile a country ā€” itā€™s the largest population by far in the Middle East ā€” that is unable at the present time to meet the needs of those people? Education, health care, employment and so forth. The government was able to attract money to build this mammoth new capital, which by all accounts is quite impressive, outside of Cairo. Most people cannot afford to live there, only probably the top 10ā€“15%. Even some Egyptians who work there in the government canā€™t afford to live there. And so thatā€™s presenting problems for the people of Cairo especially, which is the largest city by far in Egypt, if not in the entire Middle East. And then the environmental problems that you mentioned are not going away. They are not going away. If you look at coastal Egypt, which extends considerably south up the Nile, one can foresee in 20 years and in 40 years ā€” Iā€™ve looked at these projections ā€” how the salinization effectively takes over the Nile Delta and even flooding, including in the second-largest city of Alexandria. If you look at the population ā€” Alexandria, Cairo, the Nile Delta ā€” that is a significant percentage of the population of Egypt. I want to say at least a third, it could be even more than that. When they lose their ability to live somewhere thatā€™s livable and also earn an income, what happens? Well, you can have internal unrest. You can have massive refugee flows. And we have seen in the example of the Syrian civil war what happens when that occurs. And my guess is many of those refugees would seek to go to either Turkey ā€” maybe Lebanon, although thereā€™s not much space for them there ā€” but more than likely the southern Mediterranean countries of Europe. And so all of that certainly bears watching, and it further underscores the importance of the Sisi regime to find a way to deflate these growing pressures within his society ā€” outside of the use of his security forces. It also argues for greater investment on the part of the Gulf countries in development in Egypt ā€” particularly creating economic opportunity. You create economic opportunity, and then the options begin to open up. And that hasnā€™t materialized yet. So thatā€™s the pressure cooker of Egypt today. The pressure is manageable, as you indicated ā€” for now. What will it be like in 10 years? I canā€™t predict, and I wouldnā€™t even try to.

The Gulf: A regional ray of hope

Atul Singh: Alright, youā€™ve mentioned the Gulf countries. So letā€™s now talk about the Gulf. And the Gulf includes, of course, small countries like Qatar, that punch way above their weight. They have created . Dubai, which is the financial center now of the Middle East, where you now have the in some kind of entente with Israel. You also have countries like Bahrain and Oman, where you were ambassador. And then, of course, the big boys ā€” Saudi Arabia. Now Yemen doesnā€™t quite come. It is an important place, because the Houthis have proved that they can de facto the Suez Canal. The Bab al-Mandab Strait is de facto unusable, and ships are going around the Cape of Good Hope, just like pre-Henry the Navigator times or Henry the Navigator times. So talk about the Gulf, now that youā€™ve mentioned the Gulf ā€” and itā€™s a diverse picture, as listeners can already divine.

Gary Grappo: Yes. Setting aside the case of Yemen, because itā€™s just ā€” yes, it occupies the same Arabian Peninsula, but itā€™s not like any of the other Gulf countries. The Gulf countries, unlike the rest of the region, are actually doing rather well economically and even socially. You have cradle-to-grave healthcare systems. You have respectable education systems. The level of extremism and jihadism is very, very low, if it exists at all. And to the extent that it might exist, the security forces are very effective in tamping them down. And most of them are quite active on the regional and international diplomatic scene. You mentioned the case of Qatar, but I think the two major players are Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

Atul Singh: [Yes. They really are the powerhouses of the Gulf now, especially when it comes to diplomacy.]

Gary Grappo: Exactly. Both of them are extraordinarily wealthy countries. On a per capita basis, Iā€™d say the Emirates is probably much wealthier and Qatar wealthier than them all, and are doing lots of things on the international scene to raise their profile. I mean, just take the example of these negotiations over Ukraine. Theyā€™re taking place in Saudi Arabia! Who could have imagined such a thing five years ago? 

Atul Singh: Yeah, thatā€™s unbelievable! The Europeans are turning and tossing in complete indignation.

Gary Grappo: Yes. So, back in the day ā€” certainly my day, and up to maybe about five or ten years ago ā€” when you had to do these kinds of negotiations, everyone flocked to Geneva. Now theyā€™re going to Jeddah or to Riyadh, perhaps Doha or even Abu Dhabi. So the Gulf states are doing quite well, and we should all wish that we would find that kind of stability. Obviously, none of them is a democracy, and in all likelihood, theyā€™re not going to be for a very, very long time. But theyā€™re quite stable.

Atul Singh: Including, if I may interject, Saudi Arabia, because some people fear for Saudi Arabia, because Mohammed bin Salman has ruled it with a very strong hand, an iron fist, and there is fear that there might be factions brewing within his own family that might turn against him, lead even to assassination. So there is that fear, as you know, amongst intelligence circles. This is what I hear, both from the Israelis and the British.

Gary Grappo: Yes. And itā€™s varied from king to king. And I will say itā€™s certainly present now. But I think one thing that makes this situation in Saudi Arabia different today is that socially, the country is in a much better position. Saudis do not face the kind of restrictions in social interaction and activity that they used to face. When I was there, you had this very distinct segregation of the sexes and there were very few opportunities for people to engage in social activity outside of the home. That has changed! You have Americaā€™s Cup regional competition. You have had major tennis tournaments, golf tournaments ā€” even, God help them ā€” American professional wrestling. Youā€™ve had rock concerts. Movie theaters are starting to proliferate. 

Atul Singh: They even have Cristiano Ronaldo with his girlfriend and many children from many different women! (laughs)

Gary Grappo: Yeah, yeah. So theyā€™ve opened the floodgates socially, and thatā€™s reduced a lot of the tension. And that was a brilliant move on the part of Mohammed bin Salman. On the economic side, theyā€™ve created new opportunities. Now, Iā€™ve been reading recently that because of the low price of oil that maybe their coffers will not be as enriched this year as in earlier years. Theyā€™re used to that. Theyā€™ve faced those times before, and they know how to deal with that. Theyā€™ll have to ratchet back their ambitions on the NEOM project in western Saudi Arabia, and theyā€™ll manage to do that. Having said all of that, I will say that despite some concerns that I have on his positions on human rights, Mohammed bin Salman has done a good job of managing that country. The only thing now theyā€™re waiting on is what happens to his father, King Salman. I mean, heā€™s probably not long for this world. Well, none of us is, but he in particular. And when he becomes the king ā€” heā€™s effectively behaving like the king now, with some limits ā€” I think we could see even more changes that will be occurring in his country. He seems to have forged respectable relations ā€” sometimes close relations ā€” with other countries, including in the region. He faces this nemesis down in the south, Yemen. Heā€™s managed to extricate his forces from the actual conflict, but the conflict still continues. So heā€™s done, I have to say, a credible job, first and foremost in maintaining stability and mollifying the population of Saudi Arabia, as have all the other Gulf countries. Oman was facing some economic problems because of oil prices and so forth a few years ago. Thatā€™s begun to change. And weā€™re now seeing some impressive growth figures in Oman. The new sultan has now kind of asserted himself, and weā€™re seeing his unique imprint in the governance of the Sultanate. All of the Gulf countries seem to be doing very well, or at least respectably, not facing any of the challenges that the other countries in the region are. In fact, theyā€™re seen as a potential solution, including in the conflict in Gaza, with future investment to redevelop, rebuild Gaza, if and when that conflict ends.

Iraq, Kuwait and the shadow of empires

Atul Singh: Alright, so the Gulf is a ray of hope in the region. Weā€™ve covered a number of countries. Weā€™ve got two big former empires left ā€” correct me if Iā€™m wrong, and please chime in and add if Iā€™m missing any major country. Of course, some may say youā€™ve missed out Kuwait, youā€™ve missed out Iraq. And weā€™ve mentioned Iraq. We can talk about Kuwait and Iraq briefly. Perhaps you begin with them. But the two countries that come to my mind are the descendants of the Ottomans and the Safavids, the two great empires of the region. But over to you. Letā€™s cover Kuwait and Iraq lest we offend anyone. Iraq is very similar to Syria. Both Syria and Iraq were run by Baā€™athists. Both were bloody regimes run by minorities. Syria was run by an Alawite family. And of course, we know that Iraq was run by a Sunni family from Tikrit, the Saddam Hussein . He and his boys were terrors, to say the least. Iraq is also multi-ethnic. And few people know Iraq better than Gary. So we have Kuwait and Iraq. Kuwait presumably is doing all right. Iraq ā€” you can tell us more. And then letā€™s move on. Please move on to Turkey and Iran.

Gary Grappo: Iā€™m not sure Iā€™ll have much to contribute with respect to Turkey. I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t follow Turkey as closely as I do the Arab countries. But with respect to Iraq, I will say, because of the weakened state of affairs in Iran, that it does present some opportunities to Iraq. It is worth noting that the Iraqi leadership has indicated fairly clearly that it wants the very limited American presence in that country to remain. Now, the various Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq have indicated that if American forces have not withdrawn by the end of this year, they will resume against that American presence, and perhaps an American presence elsewhere, including in the very eastern part of Syria. They certainly have some ability to do that. Itā€™s going to be limited. And I think they understand that, were they to do that, they would find overwhelming response certainly from the Americans and maybe from the Iraqi government itself. Itā€™s unclear how strongly the Iraqi leadership wants to assert its independence from Iran. The Iranians have had so much influence in that country since the departure of the Americans. But the card deck has been reshuffled, and not all the cards are held by Iran today. The Iraqis have a few more than they have had in the past. And so there is some opportunity. Weā€™re seeing new oil investment, for example, in the country. They have resolved some of the problems that they have had previously with their own Kurds up in the north. And so Iraq has something to look forward to, some potential. But again, they are riven by the sectarian problems that have been there ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Very similar to Shia, Sunni, Kurds and to a lesser extent, Christians and other minority groups. And so that remains a very significant challenge for them, particularly given the fact that the way the Iraqi Council of Representatives is established, where seats are apportioned according to sect, various groups are locked in. And that creates a bit of a road jam in terms of maybe getting things done. And weā€™ve seen in the past demonstrations of younger Iraqis wanting to do away with this system of preferences ā€” to just open it up completely and let Iraqi citizens vote for those they believe best able to serve the interest of the State of Iraq and the Iraqi people. So I would say that Iraq is still a bit of a question mark ā€” potentially in a somewhat better position, but unclear how they might capitalize on that, particularly given some of the internal problems that they have. They are going to need significant foreign investment if theyā€™re truly going to be able to develop their oil potential. We should also mention, given our brief discussion about the problem in Egypt ā€” environmental problems, in the fact that the water flow in the two main rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, has been diminishing over the years. Climate change, one cause. The other is the dams that Turkey has built, and to a lesser extent, Syria. Itā€™s mostly Turkey which has reduced the water flow that reaches Iraq. And itā€™s something to be aware of because agriculture was a major factor in the Iraqi economy and in the Iraqi employment scene. So all of these are challenges that the government is going to have to face. With respect to Iran, this is the real challenge ā€” certainly for Israel, for the United States and for the West in general. The Iranian government has suffered, over the course of the past year, a series of setbacks they could never have anticipated. They overestimated their own power and influence and they grossly underestimated the capabilities of the Israelis, particularly with the support of the United States. The current state of affairs: They are not able to effectively defend themselves against an Israeli air attack. The one that occurred last October ā€” two waves of the most advanced fighters built by the United States, the F-35, the stealth fighters ā€” their radar systems completely failed to detect them. And as a result, the Israelis were able to carry out their attacks without restraint. They delivered all of their ordnance and on the air defenses that Iran had. And theyā€™re not going to be replaced anytime soon. They were Russian-made, and the Russians are not going to be shipping any military equipment outside Russia.

Atul Singh: Very quick question: There is also the matter of the regimeā€™s popularity at home, which seems to be the biggest risk. Add to that an economic crisis which is worsening, and Donald Trump has been no friend to Iran. In fact, he threw out the that Barack Obama negotiated. So the noose around Iran is likely to tighten. Speaking of internal stability, the other imperial power, Turkey, isnā€™t doing that well either. There are as we speak in Turkey because Ekrem Ä°mamoğlu, the secular Republican Peopleā€™s Partyā€™s candidate, was locked up by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğanā€™s regime. Erdoğan has been in power forever, but still, thatā€™s a far more democratic country than a country ruled by mullahs. And in Iran, thereā€™s also the specter of the different minorities resenting Farsi or Fars dominance. The Baluchs »å“Ē²Ōā€™t like it, the Azeris »å“Ē²Ōā€™t like it, the Kurds »å“Ē²Ōā€™t like it and so on and so forth ā€” not to mention the Chinese Sunni minority left. So William Butler Yeatsā€™ ā€” ā€œThings fall apart; the centre cannot holdā€ ā€” certainly seems to be the fear for the Iranian regime.

Gary Grappo: Thatā€™s the major challenge of this current regime. And that is, in addition to the external threat that they face from Israel. By the way, in those attacks that occurred in April, Israel took out one of the main factories for the manufacture of ballistic missiles. So ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s vaunted ballistic missile capability has been significantly diminished as well. And this was their final defense. This was intended to be the defense that would protect the Islamic Republic. And those defenses have been greatly weakened ±¹¾±²õ-Ć -±¹¾±²õ any potential attack from Israel. But most especially, if the Americans were to join the Israelis, thereā€™s no way to repel it. And they would suffer devastating losses. And you can be sure that in addition to going after whatā€™s left of the missile forces and other defense areas, they would be going after IRGC camps and doing maximumā€” 

Atul Singh: Very quickly, explain IRGC to our viewers and listeners.

Gary Grappo: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is basically a military force apart from the Artesh, which is the standard military force: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. Thatā€™s the Iranian defense forces under the Ministry of Defense. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reports to the Supreme Leader. And as the name implies, they protect the Islamic Revolution, which is basically the regime. Thatā€™s their job. And they do this in many ways. They probably attract more resources on a per capita basis than does the regular military. And they certainly have the ear of the Supreme Leader the way the military forces do not, and so they are given preeminence. And they are seen as a much greater threat to Israel or even to ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s neighbors than the Iranian armed forces.

Atul Singh: So think of them like the of the Roman Empire.

Gary Grappo: Thatā€™s a good way to put it, except much larger and very ideologically committed.

Atul Singh: More fanatically. 

Gary Grappo: Yes. And itā€™s not just them. They have militia groups that work for them, and these are the ones who enforce domestic law in Iran, particularly with respect to religious law ā€” and most especially when it comes to ensuring, for example, that women are covered. These are the guys going around on black motorbikes with baseball bats and nailing women who are not properly covered, enforcing Islamic law.

Atul Singh: Isnā€™t the use of baseball bats very American? The irony!

Gary Grappo: Yeah, we pretend not to use baseball bats as weapons, but it can be a very effective one!

Atul Singh: Al Capone used it.

Gary Grappo: Yes, yes. Itā€™s not unknown as a very effective, bloody weapon. So these are some of the external threats that Iran is facing. And then one cannot overestimate the challenge they face internally. There is a lot of dissension there. I read some of these various polls that are taken ā€” you »å“Ē²Ōā€™t know how much to attribute to them ā€” but where popularity now is at or below even 20%. They are almost universally despised ā€” the Iranian leadership in that country ā€” for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the appalling economic situation.

Atul Singh: And no jobs for the youth.

Gary Grappo: No jobs. The Iranian rial continues to fall and explore new depths, and thereā€™s no way that they can shore it up. And add now Donald Trump to the mix. He has now doubled down if not tripled on his maximum pressure campaign and is really exploiting every opportunity in terms of secondary sanctions. And for those who »å“Ē²Ōā€™t quite understand the nature of US economic sanctions: When the US sanctions a particular nation, organization, business, entity or person directly, thatā€™s primary sanctions. A secondary sanction is going after someone who does business with any of those. So for example, Iranian exports: Iran is putting its oil onto ghost ships. They load them onto tankers in a port in Iran. Theyā€™re taken out somewhere not far offshore, out of sight. The transponders are turned off. A ghost tanker shows up ā€” itā€™s not registered in any country ā€” and they transfer the oil to the ghost tanker, sometimes mixing it with oil from a legitimate oil exporter, maybe Saudi Arabia, maybe the Emirates, maybe Oman, Kuwait, whatever. And then it goes to its final destination, where itā€™s offloaded. The United States has begun sanctioning the ghost ships when they find them and sanctioning the ports and the refineries who take on that illicit oil from Iran. This has made everybody involved in the illicit import and export of oil very, very wary. And for the first time, the United States is going after ports and businesses in India and in China who are not particularly excited about getting on the wrong side of the law when it comes to the Americans. They do not want to be sanctioned. Itā€™s a death sentence. You canā€™t do business in dollars. And if you canā€™t do business in dollars ā€” and itā€™ll effectively mean euros, too ā€” what are you left with? So those sanctions are going to be very effective. In fact, Joe Biden started toward the end of his administration ā€” I would say October, November, certainly December ā€” and Donald Trump has screwed it down even more tightly. And weā€™re going to see declining exports of oil from Iran, which is a principal hard currency earner.

Atul Singh: So let me tell you a story. I ran into a former British Special Forces soldier, and he was in the smuggling business. He was earning $20,000 per night for captaining a tanker. And he would take the tanker and he would go to one of these ghost tankers ā€” Iranian tankers ā€” transfer the oil from the ghost tanker into whatever tanker he was captaining, and then sail and offload that oil. And basically, that earned him $20,000 per night for this high-risk operation, shall we say. (laughs) Shall we say, he has a very nice house in England right now!

Gary Grappo: And heā€™s exactly the kind of people that the Americans are looking for now. These are the kind of people they want to go after.

Atul Singh: So maybe heā€™s one of the lucky ones who got away!

Gary Grappo: Well, he got out of the business just at the right time, because I think this administration really wants to screw down the lid as tightly as possible. Now, on the positive side ā€” as we all know, itā€™s been prominently reported in the news ā€” Donald Trump has communicated to the Supreme Leader heā€™s willing to sit down and begin to end ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear weapons program. The Iranians would be well advised to accept that. Iā€™m not sure theyā€™re going to, to their detriment. This is going to greatly disappoint the people of Iran, who are only going to become more frustrated and more angry with their government. And itā€™s going to increase the pressure internally on that government. So here you have rising dissent in Iran. You have a growing, acute economic situation in that country which shows no signs of being able to improve itself. And then these external threats that the country faces, without the defenses it previously had expected to rely on. And so the lineup of factors against the current regime in Iran is all very negative. Youā€™d be pretty hard-pressed to find a bright spot. Maybe Yemen. And I tell you, youā€™ve got to be pretty desperate to look at Yemen as a bright spot. So now they have their relationships with Russia and with China. I will say that China is not going to jeopardize its trade relationship ā€” which is already facing difficulties with the United States ā€” for Iran. Theyā€™re not going to do it. They will cut the rope if they have to, when it comes to Iran. Russia, on the other hand, needs Iran, and Iran needs Russia. And so that relationship will probably remain in place and likely even strengthen. But still, the various challenges facing that regime are all bad to abominable, which is why it would be a good idea to negotiate with the Americans and get this out of the way. Remove sanctions. It would change everything. And for what? All they would have to do is cease their nuclear weapons program. I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t know whether the leadership is willing to concede that.

Atul Singh: The Ayatollah is now aging dramatically and may not last very long. So we have no idea what comes next.

Donald Trump has a real opportunity

Atul Singh: So, letā€™s talk about Donald Trump. Youā€™ve mentioned him a few times. What is the new Middle East policy of his administration? And what can we expect in the next three and a half years or four years of his presidency? A little less than four years, of course. Now we are in March.

Gary Grappo: Yeah, yeah. I would say that Donald Trump inherited, with respect to the Middle East, probably the most opportunistic set of circumstances that any American president has ever had coming into office. I mean, weā€™ve covered the various areas of the Middle East, and in almost every respect, itā€™s an opportunity for the United States. I will say, however, that the Middle East is the place where American ambition goes to die. And weā€™ve seen that time after time after time. The last genuinely successful American adventure ā€” Iā€™m not sure thatā€™s the proper word for it ā€” in the Middle East was brokering the peace accord between Egypt and Israel. Just going back to Bill Clinton, the collapse of the Camp David in 2000, weā€™ve seen the efforts on the part of George Bush in Iraq that turned out to be disastrous not only for the region but for the United States. Barack Obama started out nobly, seeking to address the Israeliā€“Palestinian conflict, also fell on very bad times and he eventually just gave up his hands. His new Secretary of State after Hillary Clinton left, John Kerry, wanted to pick up the ball and thought, ā€œNo, he could deliver the goods,ā€ ā€” collapsed, frustrated again both by the Israelis and the Palestinians. And of course, Obama tried to negotiate the , which looked pretty good on paper. It wasnā€™t certainly a perfect agreement. He was succeeded by Donald Trump, who proceeded to tear it up about a year into his first term as president. And the situation progressed to the point where, at the end of his administration, the situation in Iran had worsened, despite his promises that by tearing up the agreement, it would improve. Donā€™t forget, we had maximum pressure back then, too. And it did not work to the extent that he had promised. Joe Biden seemed to be doing okay until October 7. And it just exploded ā€” and this was not his fault, obviously. And thatā€™s the whole problem of the Middle East; you canā€™t control events as President of the United States. And that situation exploded, he cast his lot with Israel, which you had to expect the United States would do. And that only worsened. But on the other hand, it allowed Israel to address other problems, namely Hezbollah. And just lucky with the collapse of the government in Syria and the weakening of Iranā€”

Atul Singh: Maybe it was related, because they ³¦“Ē³Ü±ō»å²Ōā€™t rely on Hezbollah this time around. It has been weakened. It was a great opportunity. And with, of course, Turkish backing ā€” MIT backed ā€” you have this group which is now ruling Damascus. So I think it is related to a great degree.

Gary Grappo: Oh, oh, most definitely, the collapse of Hezbollah presented a real opportunity for HTS to go after Assad. And I think there was also the recognition that the Assad regime was a house of cards, that it was not capable of defending itself. And thatā€™s just apparent from how quickly HTS moved from the northwestern part of the country ā€” up in Idlib ā€” all the way down to Damascus in a matter of what, two and a half weeks? And took control of the government. And its previous backers, Hezbollah, quiet, nothing. Syria or Iran, nothing. Russia, nothing. It was Assad ā€” all of them. And he did not have the forces. It wouldnā€™t have taken much, but he didnā€™t have that. So Donald Trump comes in as president, and all these problems that earlier presidents have had to contend with are either gone or much diminished. So he has a real opportunity here. Iā€™m pleased that he does not want confrontation with Iran and has offered this opportunity to negotiate. But on the other hand, I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t think heā€™s going to shy from a confrontation. Just as in the case of his dealing with Hamas, United States broke protocol, broke precedent, and actually had an official meeting between Americans and Hamas. Never done before, ever! ā€¦That we know of. Maybe on the intelligence side, there may have been some. But this was policy people, and they laid all the cards out for Hamas and gave them an opportunity: ā€œDo this, itā€™s in your interest.ā€ Hamas refused to do it. And now we see Israel going in without constraints and Donald Trump fully behind them, 100%. I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t think itā€™ll reach the intensity that we saw perhaps a year or so ago in Gaza, simply because Hamas is not the threat that it was at that time. But itā€™s going to be long, itā€™s going to be bloody. Weā€™ll see more loss of life, tragically, innocent life in Gaza. But I think Israel is attempting to go in for the real kill this time. I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t think theyā€™re going to be successful, but they will wreak havoc, certainly within Hamas and whatā€™s left of Gaza. So you would hope that the Iranian leadership will learn something from that example. That Donald Trump tried to work with Hamas, tried to show them, thereā€™s a way out of this, ā€œYou just got to take it.ā€ They refused. And now they will pay a very heavy price. If Iran is listening, paying attention and can set aside some of its ideology and fanaticism, they could find a way out of their predicament. Iā€™m not sureā€”

Atul Singh: So you expect the Iranian regime to fall, as a number of people do? A number of people are now predicting the end of the Iranian regime by the end of Donald Trumpā€™s term?

Gary Grappo: Well, that would be a wonderful thing, of course. We would certainly like to see that.

Atul Singh: So youā€™re happy with Donald Trump on at least one thing?

Gary Grappo: No, Iā€¦ but the mechanism for that downfall is unclear yet. If someone is going to make the case that there will be an internal collapse ā€” that the internal dynamic will force the collapse ā€” Iā€™m very suspicious. That I think would take longer than the next four years. It could happen. And the principal argument against it is because of the commitment and dedication and power of the IRGC. They will defend it to the bitter end, and it will be a very bloody, bitter end. Not the kind of end that happened with the Shah, with the Grand Ayatollah taking off in an airplane and going somewhere, although God knows where he could go. Maybe Moscow. That seems to be the new refuge of tyrants. But that, I think, is a bit far-fetched at the time being. However, I think the clock is ticking on an eventual Israeli attack against Iran, if Iran continues to show that itā€™s unwilling to negotiate and moves its nuclear development program further down the road toward possible weaponization. It hasnā€™t done it yet, but itā€™s building all the infrastructure it could possibly need for it. I think the Israelis will want to capitalize before itā€™s too late on the vulnerability of the regime, and they will attack. And the only question that remains is: Will the Americans join them? If the Americans join them, it will be a devastating attack on the complete defense structure of Iran. And that could spell the end of the regime in Iran. So what rules after that? Because weā€™re not sending ground troops. Nor are the Israelis sending ground troops. So the regime collapses. Who takes over? Iā€™ll just throw out one possibility: the IRGC. It becomes a military regime, something like we see in Egypt. They do away with a lot of the religious nonsense that was imposed by the Ayatollahs or the mullahs. They reach some kind of an understanding on their nuclear program, simply because they will have no choice. And you have a military regime, and if they can reach an agreement with the various powers with respect to their nuclear program, maybe the sanctions will be dropped and they can prosper. I think any grand ambitions for a democracy in Iran or anywhere else in the Middle East have to be dismissed, just completely. What do we want most? We want stability. Thatā€™s what we want. We want regimes to clamp down on extremist organizations, with the various militias in Iraq and in Syria and elsewhere. And with that, I think everybody ā€” including in the Middle East ā€” will be very, very happy, even if they »å“Ē²Ōā€™t get to choose who governs them.

Atul Singh: On that note, Gary, weā€™ve spent a lot of time going over so many countries and coming up with various scenarios. Itā€™s been a pleasure, as always, and weā€™ll have you back before too long.

Gary Grappo: I look forward to that, Atul. Weā€™ll have to discuss Yemen at this time. I think itā€™s an interesting case study. Itā€™s a bit of an outlier, but nevertheless is becoming a significant problem area in the Middle East. So perhaps next time we can address the challenge of Yemen.

Atul Singh: Alright, everybody, stay tuned for Yemen next time. Until then, thank you very much, Gary. See you soon.

Gary Grappo: My pleasure, Atul.

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The legislative process requires the amendment to undergo two additional readings and a parliamentary debate before a final vote determines its adoption. However, with a parliamentary majority supporting these amendments, the law is at risk of passing despite significant protests and warnings about its societal impacts. Without decisive action, this trend of escalated civil rights violations will deepen societal inequality and compromise Iraqā€™s standing as a responsible member of the international community.

Basic human rights are at stake

The ramifications of this amendment on Iraq’s social fabric are profound and far-reaching. If enacted, the law threatens to dismantle safeguards for the vulnerable populations of young girls and exacerbate gender inequality. Child marriage, already a persistent issue in the ecosystem of Iraqi society, could become even more pervasive under the proposed system. The psychological and physical toll of child marriage on young girls is well-documented, ranging from disrupted education to heightened risks of domestic violence, sexual abuse, early pregnancy and maternal mortality.

The law would effectively remove the current nationwide legal framework that sets the minimum marriage age at 18ā€‹. These changes could also legalize unregistered marriages and eliminate penalties for clerics or adults involved in such problematic underage marriage cases. Human Rights warns that the normalization of child marriage could have a ripple effect, undermining related rights such as inheritance and custody arrangements. Furthermore, the legislation undermines existing protections for divorced women regarding housing and .

While existing violations have been happening already, particularly in conservative communities where the practice is culturally normalized, the uniform state law that requires a minimum age of 18 for marriage has at least ensured a consistent legal framework. By allowing sectarian and religious councils to apply more restrictive interpretations without oversight, the proposed amendment threatens to exacerbate existing disparities. Inheritance laws and other legal systems will also undoubtedly be skewed under sectarian governance.

A legal system under threat

The ramifications of this legislative change extend beyond cases of children’s rights violations. By weakening the stateā€™s role in safeguarding personal rights, the amendment signals a retreat from secular state governance and an embrace of sectarianism, further fracturing a society already grappling with deep .Ģż

Since the 2003 of Iraq, the ascendancy of Shia clerical dominance in Iraqi governance has gradually replaced the secular frameworks that once underpinned certain legal protections, particularly those enshrined in the Personal Status Law of 1959. While the previous dictatorship regime that preceded the 2003 war was defined by its authoritarianism and destructive wars, it paradoxically preserved a degree of equity for women. Its centralized legal system safeguarded womenā€™s rights in marriage, inheritance and family law. In stark contrast, the growing influence of sectarian ideologies has systematically eroded these protections, threatening to undo decades of progress.

For the past seven decades, Iraqā€™s Personal Status Law has stood as a critical bulwark against gender discrimination and child exploitation. When first enacted in 1959, the law was considered one of the family codes in the Middle East. The law also incorporates a provision enabling religious authorities to officiate marriages for individuals as young as 15, provided the girl’s father grants consent. Despite its loopholes, the Personal Status Law consolidates legal authority over marriage, divorce, custody and inheritance within a unified framework. This is what helped reduce the dominance of sectarian interpretations, fostering greater equity for women across diverse religious and ethnic communities.

The recently proposed amendment threatens to dismantle these achievements by male guardians and authorities to operate within their own doctrinal principles. Opponents to this bill argue that such fragmentation opens the door to practices that contravene Iraqā€™s obligations under international human rights treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ().Ģż

Furthermore, the amendment risks tarnishing Iraqā€™s international standing and exacerbates the violations of human rights in the region. As a to numerous human rights conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (), Iraq has supposedly committed to upholding the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Passing this amendment would place Iraq in direct violation of these commitments, inviting rage and condemnation from the international community and potentially jeopardizing foreign aid.

The path forward

As the amendment moves through the legislative process, the likelihood of approval is high. The amendment, spearheaded by the Shiite Coordination Framework (CF), reflects a strategic political maneuver aimed at resonating with conservative constituents. As the parliamentary majority holder, the CF wields significant influence over the legislative process. This enables it to champion the establishment of religious authority favored by .

However, we should not ignore those who are speaking out against the proposal. The amendment has received resistance from a broad coalition of civil society groups, human rights organizations and activists. Grassroots organizations, both within and outside Iraq, amplify the voices of those most affected, ensuring that the amendmentā€™s implications remain in the public eye. Womenā€™s rights advocates have been particularly , organizing protests and launching awareness campaigns to draw attention to the amendmentā€™s regressive nature. Prominent Iraqi activists, such as of the Organization of Womenā€™s Freedom in Iraq, have denounced the bill as a betrayal of the nationā€™s most vulnerable citizens.

International organizations have also joined the ensemble of condemnation. Human rights activists and organizations must continue to express their opposition to such a grave violation. In a strongly worded statement, Human Rights Watch urged Iraqi lawmakers to reject the amendment, calling it a ā€œdangerous precedentā€ that could erode decades of progress in women’s rights. Meanwhile, global human rights advocacy networks are mobilizing to apply pressure on Iraqā€™s government, emphasizing the need for legislative reforms that strengthen, rather than undermine, human rights protections.

Iraq stands at a pivotal juncture. The proposed amendment represents more than a legal change; it is a failure of the nationā€™s justice system and human rights. To pass this amendment is to abandon Iraqā€™s most vulnerable populations to the whims of sectarian governance. 

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The ISIS terror group took responsibility for the latter. However, in 2025, the terror dynamics have changed. This recent attack perhaps has indicated a dangerous shift in ISISā€™s striking patterns. 

ISIS lone wolf attacksĢż

ISIS has a classic pair of striking patterns: Suicide bombings and lone-wolf attacks. The former has been the most frequent type since January 2024, as it was used in the January 3 in Kerman, Iran, and the March 22 Crocus City Hall in Moscow, Russia. ISIS has used high-intensity bombings ever since their capabilities began dwindling.

The last reported lone wolf attack in a metropolitan city took place last year in Solingen, Germany, where a Syrian ISIS member stabbed three men during a festival. Similarly, two lone wolf attacks took place on October 16 and December 2, 2023 in and , respectively. The assessment shows ISIS was not able to execute a deadly lone wolf in the West as it did in Nice, France on July 14, 2016, when a truck rammed a crowd celebrating Bastille Day, killing 86 people and injuring 434 more.

Most ISIS strikes have been recorded in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East; these have mostly been suicide bombings or coordinated mass shootings. ISIS attacks in Western countries were fewer and limited to stabbing incidents; these can be viewed as multiple attempts to execute a lone wolf attack or coordinated lone wolf attacks on a large scale, like they did in Paris in the November 13, 2015 and Nice in the aforementioned 2016 attack.

Capabilities are limited, but resurgence is possible

Since 2017, ISISā€™s capabilities started declining after the US intensified its counterterror operations. The nationā€™s ongoing has led to some notable success against ISIS, causing the groupā€™s terrorist presence to dip substantially from 2017 to 2019. In 2019, ISIS was defeated in Syria and Libya. That October, US forces ISIS Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in . In 2023, the US killed senior leaders of ISIS and detained around 79 of its terrorists.

The greatest blow came when US forces Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the head of ISISā€™s intelligence/foreign branch, Emni, on August 30, 2016. Adnaniā€™s death crippled ISISā€™s striking and recruitment capabilities. The terror group is now scrambled, with its capability to strike the West destroyed. ISISā€™s presence is now limited to Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. For the past two years, high-intensity attacks have only been recorded in those regions.

ISIS is weakened, but perhaps its potential for resurgence has not been meaningfully considered. The patterns also suggest that whenever its influence is seen to be dwindling, it tries to send a message to the West by carrying out major attacks in West African or Middle Eastern countries.

The US-led coalition has intensified its operations against ISISā€™s limited and fragmented presence for one year, leading to against the group since January 2024. According to reports, the US-led forces have killed 44 terrorists and detained around 166 others.

Despite an intensified operation, the outfit still holds a tight grip over its fragmented network and has attempted to capitalize on various opportunities to make a comeback. There are arguably three primary reasons why ISIS could see a strong revival: The first is the USā€™s shifting focus on Iran due to the Israelā€“Hamas conflict. The second is the increased destabilization in Syria and West Africa, and now the of the Syrian government. The third is the increasing freedom ISISā€™s Khorāsānis ā€” residents of the area of the Iranian Plateau ā€” are finding to operate in South and Central Asia, especially in Afghanistan.

These have facilitated ISISā€™s regrouping at the regional level, which has given the outfit occasional opportunities to carry out low-intensity terror strikes across the globe. The fall of Syriaā€™s Bashar al-Assad government and the mobilization of various Islamic coalitions there have given ISIS, especially Khorāsānis, a to further resurge and increase their striking capabilities.

However, the resurgence factor is not the only thing to worry about; a possible shift in the ISIS striking pattern could help ISIS showcase its capabilities as well.

A shift in striking pattern

ISIS terror strikes can be classified into three patterns. The first is direct: ISIS directly carries out its strikes. The second is indirect: ISIS enables an attack and indirectly carries out its strikes by connecting to attackers through the Internet. An example of this was the Curtis Culwell Center attack in Garland, Texas on May 3, 2015 ā€” one of the attackers who opened fire at the community center was in contact with ISIS through encrypted texts.

The third pattern is : Using online propaganda, ISIS inspires self-radicalized individuals to carry out lone wolf attacks on their own. An example is the 2016 Nice attack. Though the perpetrator, , acted on his own, ISIS later took credit for his actions. Conversely, there is the April 7, 2017 truck in Stockholm, Sweden, where a similar vehicle ramming incident took place. In this case, ISIS did not take credit for the self-radicalized manā€™s attack. The organization was under intense pressure at that time, and its presence and capabilities had been significantly damaged by US-led coalition forces; by the end of the year, ISIS was defeated in Iraq.

ISIS is once again , this time in Syria, thanks to US airstrikes. As it weaves an opportunity to resurge, some believe the group has resorted to enhancing online propaganda and carrying out inspired attacks without direct involvement. The reason for this possible change to its striking pattern is to ensure resurgence and keep limited striking capabilities intact without exposing itself. Additionally, it seeks to avoid instant retaliatory and offensive responses from the US, which could severely damage ISISā€™s chances of resurgence in Syria and elsewhere.

If left unchecked, a new, lethal wave of inspired ISIS terror could emerge.

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±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s actions are part of a longstanding pattern. Since the 1979 Revolution, its government has targeted dissidents overseas. Notable cases include the 1991 of the Shahā€™s last prime minister in Paris and the 1992 of four Iranian-Kurdish dissidents at a Berlin restaurant. These operations appear to have escalated again, with an Iranian journalist in Iraq in 2019, an opposition leader kidnapped in in 2020, and a thwarted to kidnap an Iranian journalist in the US that year as well.

Functioning governments exercise a monopoly on violence and detention within their borders, including lawful imprisonment and capital punishment. In conflict zones, these powers sometimes extend into contested areas, blurring legal distinctions. However, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s extraterritorial operations mark a trend of smaller nations increasingly adopting tactics reserved for major powers, bypassing international protocols to punish citizens overseas.

Covert operations targeting your own citizens in other countries require substantial resources and intelligence to track individuals, orchestrate a hit, and avoid detection. The modern era of such operations was shaped in part by the of political assassinations by militant and terrorist groups in the early 1970s. Governments responded with their own covert actions, both domestically and internationally, broadening their targets to include political activists and opposition figures.

Globalization, interconnected diaspora networks, and advances in surveillance technologies have further enabled these activities. As diplomatic repercussions wane and global enforcement diminishesā€”particularly from the US, which has faced its own criticism for extraordinary rendition and drone strikes on US citizens abroadā€”states act with growing impunity and plausible deniability. Civilians unaffiliated with political disputes are occasionally caught in the crossfire, diminishing the sanctity of national sovereignty further.

Few countries are as brazen as Iran has been for decades, but other countries are also demonstrating their reach. In neighboring Pakistan, national forces recently a Pakistani citizen in Myanmar in October 2024. Turkey, however, has its extraterritorial operations the most in recent years in response to the 2016 . Turkish authorities claim to have over 80 individuals from 18 countries between 2016 and 2018 alone. One incident in 2018 saw six Turkish nationals in Kosovo and sent back to Turkey, prompting a diplomatic rift between the two nations.

Turkeyā€™s assertiveness in targeting its citizens abroad has not stopped other governments from using it as a stage for their own actions. In , Saudi Arabia orchestrated the killing of US/Saudi citizen journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside its consulate in Istanbul. The killing drew global outrage and strong condemnation from the Turkish government. However, Washingtonā€™s reluctance to impose significant consequences on Saudi Arabia emboldened other states.

Algeria abducted a dissident in neighboring Tunisia in , continuing a practice that has become common in parts of Africa. South Sudan, for instance, kidnapped two of its citizens from Kenya . In another high-profile case, three Rwandan diplomats were from South Africa in 2014 after being implicated in the murder of a former Rwandan intelligence chief and attacks on two other Rwandan exiles.

In Eastern Europe, assassinations of government officials became a grim reality amid the political and social of . Governments often responded in kind, targeting individuals beyond their borders. Russiaā€™s approach has been particularly notable for its persistence and evolving methods.

Dozens of Chechen separatist supporters and others with links to organized crime have been killed in other countries, with operations often executed by Chechens to obscure Moscowā€™s direct involvement. These include killings in Turkey and Germany .

Russiaā€™s political killings in the UK have also drawn international attention. , former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko was fatally poisoned with a radioactive substance in London. , another former Russian intelligence agent, Sergei Skripal, survived a poisoning attempt, though a local civilian was killed. These high-profile attacks conveyed to other Russians seeking to flee the country that even in the intelligence capital of Europe, no one is beyond Russiaā€™s reach.

Further afield, Russian authorities are believed to have been involved in the of three Russian journalists in the Central African Republic, investigating Russian private military companies. And since the start of the Ukraine War, Russian authorities are suspected to be behind of prominent Russian citizens in other countries, as well as of at least one defector in Spain .

Russiaā€™s actions have set a precedent for other post-Soviet states. Uzbekistan has a history of targeting dissidents overseas, starting with the of Uzbek human rights activist Muzafar Avazov from Kyrgyzstan. have since included a 2012 attempted assassination of an Uzbek citizen in Sweden and suspected involvement in the 2014 murder of an Uzbek Islamic cleric in Turkey.

, Belarus forced a Ryanair flight traveling through its airspace to land in Minsk so authorities could board the plane and detain a journalist. Although technically in Belarusian airspace, it violated international norms regarding the sanctity of civil aviation.

China has also adopted sophisticated measures to suppress dissent in other countries. Its growing power allows it to enforce cooperation with some governments to repatriate wanted Chinese nationals, including the increasing use of ā€œā€ to intimidate expatriates into complianceā€”a practice unmatched in its scope, though other nations have similar tactics to convince citizens to return home. But Chinaā€™s history of abductions, in one of the largest expat populations in the world, spans decades.

A pro-democracy activist was seized in Vietnam , for example, while a former Chinese diplomat who had sought asylum in Australia was allegedly drugged and transported via ship back to China . Its actions have become more visible in recent years, particularly in Southeast Asia. , a book publisher was kidnapped from his apartment in Thailand, followed by a pro-democracy activist in Thailand the next year.

Thailand itself has been implicated in targeting dissidents abroad. , the killing of government critic Ko Tee in Laos raised suspicions of Thai involvement, as did the targeting of other critics, including an activist in Cambodia .

North Korea demonstrated its willingness to use foreign agents to silence critics when Kim Jong Nam, the estranged half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, was assassinated in Malaysia . A Vietnamese and Indonesian citizen were accused of acting on Pyongyangā€™s behalf. Later that year, Vietnam faced backlash after its agents were accused of a Vietnamese oil company executive in Berlin and forcibly returning him to Vietnam, sparking a diplomatic conflict with Germany.

India has also stepped up its efforts against individuals it accuses of supporting the Khalistan independence movement, which seeks an independent Sikh state within India. , tensions flared between India and Canada when evidence surfaced linking India to the assassination of a Sikh separatist leader in British Columbia, as well as a foiled plot to kill another leader in New York. The incidents triggered a major diplomatic row, while additional reports revealed India was intensifying its surveillance of diaspora communities in the UK and Australia.

Indiaā€™s actions in particular pose a risk to normalizing this behavior further. Countries like China, Russia, and Iran already engage in extraterritorial operations, but Indiaā€™s status as a growing partner to the West raises the stakes. If a nation with close ties to Western democracies can act with relative impunity, what might other states feel emboldened to do? Indiaā€™s actions will potentially pressure Western states to crack down on Khalistan independence advocates to maintain diplomatic balance, and these concessions could inspire others to act in a similar manner to get the same results.

The increasing willingness of countries like India to test these boundaries has been preceded by decades of US intelligence agencies kidnapping and assassinating US citizens abroad. But after 9/11, the US intensified and officialized such practices under the banner of ā€œ,ā€ detaining hundreds of foreign nationals and US citizens accused of terrorism, many of which were later sent to third countries and often tortured.

The increasing use of drone technology has transformed government operations abroad, including the targeting of their own citizens. In 2011, US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni American cleric linked to Islamic extremism, was killed in Yemen by a US drone strike. Despite his ties to extremist groups, his killing raised serious concerns about the erosion of due process, though the strike encountered limited domestic pushback.

The operation reflected a broader policy shift by the US in the 21st century, justified under the premise that military action is permissible in areas where states are ā€œunwilling or unableā€ to address terrorism. , the Obama administration publicly acknowledged that four US citizens had been killed by similar drone strikes overseas.

Advancements in technology are making it steadily more difficult for individual citizens to evade governments seeking to track them abroad. States are showing a growing boldness in crossing borders, encouraged by Washingtonā€™s targeting of its own citizens and its leniency toward allies engaging in similar actions.

Concerns are also linked to the increasing involvement of dual citizens in these situations. Many countries refuse to recognize dual citizenship, complicating their treatment under international law and further straining diplomatic norms. This escalation of targeting oneā€™s own citizens in other countries risks evolving into broader attacks on foreign nationals. In November 2024, Israeli citizen Zvi Kogan was in the United Arab Emirates, reportedly by three Uzbek nationals. While the motives remain unclear, the incident follows a year of heightened tensions between Iran and Israel, as well as years of Israeli operations Iranian citizens within Iran and elsewhere.

sabotage and covert operations in the West and Russia since the Ukraine war have shown the ease with which foreign powers infiltrate other nations. Alongside the increasing trend of governments targeting their own citizens abroad, the possibility of citizens being attacked by external actors within their own countries is becoming alarmingly real.

A world where sovereignty is routinely underminedā€”where states deny asylum, target their citizens, and strike foreign nationalsā€”threatens to further erode trust, security, and the rule of law in an already fragile global order. Perhaps if these practices can occur anywhere, confirming that no state is immune to the consequences of unchecked impunity, then even powerful nations may find themselves incentivized to curtail them.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ominously suggested on that an unnamed ā€œneighboring state of Syriaā€ had been instrumental in the downfall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, it was obvious to everyone whom he meant.

The biggest winner in the region right now appears to be Turkey. Remember the Arab Spring? It may feel like a distant memory, but in many ways, its effects have recently resurfaced. What happened in Syria is almost exactly what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hoped would unfold in 2011.

He had to wait and endure a great deal of humiliation in the intervening years. His bet on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt went wrong. Turkey may have supported the wrong side in , which remains an unstable and messy stalemate. And in the Syrian civil war that followed the early democracy protests, Turkey took on the burden of hosting of Syrian refugees ā€” more than any other state.

Turkey has long since had to scale back its ambitions in the region. Not only has it made friendly overtures to the Sisi regime in and to ā€” despite the brazen in Istanbul of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by the regime of Mohammed bin Salman ā€” but also to itself.

ā€‹ā€‹In a final humiliation, Ankara had even begun to accept that it must try to be friendly with Assad once more, despite pushing so hard to remove him. The pressure to support Assad again came from the need to send back Syrian refugees, whose presence had caused electoral issues in Turkey.

Turkeyā€™s victory

Turkey can, with some vindication, claim a great deal of credit for events in Syria. It was the deal they struck with Russia that allowed ā€” the last desperate rump of rebel territory in Syria ā€” to remain unconquered. It is clear that without Turkey, whose troops have been stationed in Idlib since 2017 as a ā€œde-escalationā€ force, Assad and the Russians might well have finished off the rebellion years ago.

It is unclear to what extent the Russian leadership decided to keep Assad slightly for strategic reasons. This policy made Assad more dependent on Russia by deliberately ceding Syrian territory that remained beyond Assadā€™s control.

If Russia did try to fool Assad, it backfired. However, as with everything in the Syrian conflict, it is not as simple as ā€œTurkey takes all.ā€ In fact, Turkish influence over Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ā€” the rebel group that led the lightning raid on Aleppo and turned into a stampede toward Damascus ā€” is limited.

Turkish-backed rebels have established a presence in two pockets of territory north of Aleppo. While these groups have played a significant role in the Syrian conflict, their primary focus has been on combating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led militia that received US support and helped expel the Salafist self-declared caliphate Islamic State from northern Syria in 2019.

This situation may be a dream come true for President Erdoğan, but it could also fail to go Turkeyā€™s way. Turkey is a major obstacle to the ambitions of international actors who want a new Syrian government that is genuinely inclusive of all Syrians.

Turkeyā€™s Kurdish problem

A major ethnic group in Syria is the significant Kurdish minority, concentrated along the northern border region next to Turkey and Iraq. Their political leadership is dominated by parties associated with the Kurdistan Workersā€™ Party (PKK), which has been in with the Turkish state since the 1980s.

The People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a Kurdish militia that forms the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and controls al-Hasaka, a triangle of land sandwiched between Turkey and Iraq in the far northeast. They also control a strip of the northern border with Turkey, including the border town of , which was made infamous after the Kurds, backed by the US, led a successful assault to recapture it from the Islamic State.

While not actively supporting the Islamic State, Turkey appeared to it over Kurdish militias in the region. Turkey routinely describes these groups as ‘terrorists’ due to their connection with the PKK, which is designated as a terrorist group by many international organizations.

Many that Turkeyā€™s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its roots in political Islam, was more comfortable with Islamist jihadists than with either the Kurdish groups in Syria or the Alawite regime of the Assad family.

This preference is also evident in the aftermath of the war now that HTS ā€” with roots in al-Qaeda ā€” has led the of Aleppo. Many HTS received some support from Ankara. Clearly, a successful outcome for Turkey would be a new Syrian government dominated by Sunni Muslims who subscribe to a mild form of Islamism. Ideally, Turkey would maintain good relations with outside actors while appealing to the new Syrian government to impose its rule over the Kurds in northern Syria. It would also be ideal for Turkey if the leaders of Syria suppressed the SDF, which is the de facto authority in much of the north.

Trouble ahead for Syria

Turkeyā€™s vision for Syria is unrealistic and is likely to result in a future where many parties are excluded from the table. If Ankara promotes and encourages actors in Syria who aim to suppress Kurdish power and representation, it risks undermining the countryā€™s quest for democracy. This could lead to a new regime that represses non-Arabs in the same way the Assad regime did. The Syrian Arab Republic held ethnic exclusivity as a fundamental aspect of its society. This type of exclusion is also the root of Turkeyā€™s intractable issue with its Kurdish minority.

Until the states of the Middle East can begin to move beyond narrow ethnic nationalism and recognize the multi-ethnic nature of their polities, we are likely to see continued repression and instability. In this grim future, each state will feed off the weaknesses of its neighbors to gain influence and leverage in their affairs.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The Assad regime recently collapsed after opposition groups like (HTS) and (SNF), by Turkey, launched a military push. At the same time, Russia and Iran this support for Assad. This shift offers a glimmer of hope for a nation scarred by war and oppression.Ģż

With the fall of the Assad regime, Syria has effectively come under the de facto influence of Turkey and Israel. The October 7 events, when Hamas launched a large-scale attack on Israel, further weakened Iran’s and its strategic project aimed at undermining Israel, delivering a significant blow to Iran. The attack triggered a full-scale war, leading to devastating Israeli retaliatory strikes on Gaza and escalating regional tensions.

Additionally, Russia anchored its foothold in the Middle East through a close alliance with the Assad regime and a naval base in Latakia, which gave it access to the Mediterranean. This allowed Russia to project power in the region and counter Western influence directly. The loss of this strategic leverage has diminished Russiaā€™s ability to maintain a strong presence and shape events in the Middle East. 

Turkey and Israel stand to benefit from this new dynamic. They will use their influence to combat terrorist organizations within Syrian borders.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: savior or threat?

Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, established the Assad regime in 1971 and entrenched a model of authoritarian rule centered on the and the military security apparatus. Hafez consolidated power through ruthless suppression. He favored sectarian divisions and had an extensive patronage network. Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000. He initially offered hope for reform but quickly reverted to autocracy. The authorities brutally cracked down on the 2011 Arab Spring protests. The war plunged Syria into a devastating civil war. Assadā€™s regime, backed by Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, clung to power through scorched-earth tactics. They massively chemical weapons and a campaign of mass terror.

At the forefront of the opposition is HTS. It traces back to al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate that emerged in 2012 during the early years of the Syrian conflict. Initially committed to global jihad, the group rebranded itself as HTS in 2017 under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. It declared a break from al-Qaeda and positioned itself as a nationalist force focused on Syriaā€™s liberation.

Over the years, HTS has transitioned from a shadowy jihadist group to the dominant force in Syriaā€™s northwest. It achieved a level of military and administrative control unmatched by other opposition factions. Its leadership a commitment to inclusive governance and minority rights, but its history of draconian social policies and sectarian leanings undermines these assertions.

Despite its pivotal role in Assadā€™s ouster, HTS faces challenges in gaining legitimacy. Turkey, the United States and other international actors still designate it as a terrorist organization. This limits HTSā€™s ability to secure external support. Allegations of corruption, intimidation and arbitrary detention have marred its governance in areas under its control. Moreover, its Islamist orientation raises alarms about the safety of Syriaā€™s minority communities, particularly Alawites and Christians.

The fall of Assad is a blow to Iran and Russia’s regional ambitions

Iran’s intervention in Syria’s civil war after the Arab Spring was critical in sustaining the Assad regime. Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s (IRGC), was instrumental in Iran’s involvement. Soleimani a network of militias, including Hezbollah from Lebanon and other Shiite paramilitary groups from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, to bolster Assadā€™s forces. His maneuvers in battles, such as the recapture of Aleppo in 2016, not only saved Assadā€™s government but also cemented ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s influence in Syria.

Iran billions of dollars in Syria, financing military operations and rebuilding infrastructure in areas under Assadā€™s control. This financial and material backing was coupled with an extensive military presence, including IRGC forces, advisors and bases across Syria. Syria became a conduit for Iranian support to Hezbollah, enabling Tehran to advanced weaponry, including missiles and drones, to its Lebanese proxy. Establishing weapons factories and logistical hubs in Syrian territory allowed Iran to bypass international sanctions and enhance Hezbollahā€™s military capabilities.

The fall of Assadā€™s regime dismantled the axis of resistance that Tehran painstakingly built. Following the October 7 escalation and the broader war with Israel, Hamas suffered devastating losses, and its leadership, including and , was eliminated. Hezbollah, already stretched thin from years of engagement in Syria, faced intensified Israeli retaliation that crippled its command structure. During this period, Israel Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, dealing a symbolic and operational blow to the group.

Moqtada-al Sadr, a Shiite cleric and leader of the in Iraq, to stand by Assad during his downfall, underscoring Tehranā€™s waning influence, even among its Shiite allies. Among ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s loyal partners, only the in Yemen remains severely curtailing ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ability to project power in the region.

Now, Iran faces the prospect of direct confrontation with Israel, which has set its on Tehranā€™s nuclear infrastructure. The fall of Assad underscores ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s growing vulnerability. Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, may confront the possibility that it could be the next target in a reshaped Middle East dominated by Israeli and Turkish influence.

Russiaā€™s intervention in Syria, beginning in 2015, was a for the Assad regime. Vladimir Putin aimed to stabilize Assadā€™s rule and preserve Moscowā€™s influence in the Middle East by deploying airpower and special forces. Russian military support, including the bombing campaigns in Aleppo and Idlib, turned the tide of the war in Assadā€™s favor. Putin also leveraged diplomatic efforts, such as the Astana peace talks, to secure Russiaā€™s position as a key power broker in the conflict.

Syria was more than an ally for Russia ā€” it was a . The naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Hmeimim allowed Moscow to project power into the Mediterranean to counterbalance NATOā€™s presence.

Syria represented a symbolic victory for Putinā€™s broader geopolitical strategy. It demonstrated Russiaā€™s resurgence as a global power capable of challenging the West, especially after the annexation of Crimea and tensions in Ukraine.

The collapse of Assadā€™s regime undermines Russiaā€™s ambitions in the region. The loss of its military bases jeopardizes Moscowā€™s ability to counterbalance NATO and maintain a foothold in the Mediterranean.

Alexander Dugin, known as Putinā€™s ā€œbrain,ā€ has that the fall of Assad symbolizes a collapse of Moscowā€™s ability to shape outcomes in the Middle East. This failure, he argues, is a profound setback for Putinā€™s vision of a multipolar world where Russia stands as a counterweight to Western dominance.

Moreover, the downfall of the Assad regime questions Russia’s reliability as an ally. It parallels the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Talibanā€™s subsequent rise to power. Just as the chaotic exit from Kabul signaled a blow to American credibility, Assadā€™s fall marks a significant setback for Russiaā€™s regional strategy. For Putin, the challenge now is twofold: to salvage Russiaā€™s position in the Middle East and to manage the domestic fallout from another costly foreign venture that failed.

Turkey and Israel as Syriaā€™s de facto decision-makers

Before Bashar al-Assad came to power, ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s relationship with Syria was full of hostility and conflict. Syria, under Hafez al-Assad, Hezbollah in Lebanon and harbored Palestinian militant organizations. Israel captured the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War in 1967, and it has remained a focal point of tension. Syria demands its return, while Israel prioritizes its strategic importance for security.

The 1990s saw limited attempts at peace negotiations, including the and subsequent talks mediated by the US. However, these efforts failed to yield a breakthrough due to mutual distrust and irreconcilable differences over the Golan Heights.

When Bashar al-Assad assumed power, hopes for reform and improved relations with Israel were quickly dashed. Assadā€™s regime deepened its alliance with Iran. He continued providing support to Hezbollah. Then, the Syrian Civil War entrenched hostility as Assadā€™s government accused Israel of backing rebel factions.

Israel primarily focused its involvement in the Syrian conflict on countering Iranian influence and preventing the transfer of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) targeted Iranian bases, arms depots, and convoys. IDF has to hundreds of strikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah positions to prevent arms transfers and deter threats near its borders.Ģż

With the fall of the Asad regime, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has it as a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics. It marks a continuation of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s strategic policies aimed at dismantling terrorist organizations and curbing ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s influence in the region. Netanyahuā€™s celebration is not merely symbolic; it underscores ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s proactive stance in shaping the Middle East. Israel sends a clear message that it will not tolerate any actor that threatens its sovereignty or regional stability.

Netanyahu explicitly the new leaders of Syria that they must not emulate Assadā€™s policies, cautioning that they would face the same fate if they did. ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s post-Assad policies should include:

• Preventing the Iranian regimeā€™s entrenchment.
• Securing the Golan Heights to prevent cross-border attacks.
• Collaborating with international partners, especially Turkey, to support a political solution that prioritizes regional security and limits the resurgence of extremist factions.

Turkey has experienced shifting dynamics in its relationship with the Assad regime. Initially, Ankara and Damascus shared a pragmatic relationship during the late 1990s and early 2000s, as both countries sought to resolve border disputes and enhance economic ties. , which led to Syria expelling the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) ā€” designated as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, Turkey and Israel ā€” leader Abdullah Ɩcalan exemplified this period of cooperation. However, the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 caused a significant rift. President Erdoğan openly opposed Assadā€™s brutal crackdown on protesters and began supporting opposition groups.

Turkey became a key supporter of SNF to bolster their fight against Assad. Turkeyā€™s military operations, such as , and , were aimed at establishing a buffer zone along its southern border. These operations targeted ISIS and Kurdish terrorist organizations. They also indirectly benefited factions such as HTS, which capitalized on the chaos to expand their influence in northern Syria.

In the post-Assad era, Turkeyā€™s ambition to expand its regional influence is evident in its efforts to position itself as a key power broker in Syria. Alongside Israel to shape the postwar order, Turkey has established de facto Turkish-administered zones in northern Syria, complete with Turkish schools, hospitals, and currency.

As a NATO member, Turkeyā€™s active role in Syria enhances the allianceā€™s presence in the Middle East as it counters Russian and Iranian influence. Ankaraā€™s strategic location and military capabilities make it a pivotal regional player. Turkey aligns its interests with those of NATO while pursuing its national objectives.

Neutralizing Kurdish threats and managing the refugee crisis are central to Ankaraā€™s agenda. Turkey has committed to continued operations aimed at dismantling Kurdish terrorist organizations to ensure that they do not exploit the post-Assad vacuum to establish a foothold near its borders. 

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Israel won that war and at least 750,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled from the new Israel and became refugees in surrounding and other countries. That enforced diaspora, including their descendants, now approximately 6 million registered refugees plus a further 2.5 million unregistered.

Of the Palestinians who remained in Israel, and their descendants, approximately 2 million live in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, with a further 2.3 million in Gaza. Some Palestinians in the West Bank have Israeli citizenship while the majority have residency papers. Although many areas are officially designated as under administration by the independent Palestinian Authority, , the entire West Bank is under Israeli military law.

Israel also won subsequent wars declared by a variety of Arab neighbors, in 1956, 1967 and 1973. Territorial gains for Israel included: part of Golan Heights (from Syria), part of Sinai (from Egypt, returned in a peace accord), Gaza (from Egypt, relinquished to autonomous Palestinian administration in another peace accord), and the West Bank and East Jerusalem (from Jordan).

In September 2024, the UN General Assembly a resolution condemning ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s continued occupation of Palestine and demanding it cease and desist. However, given ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s notorious decades-old contempt for the United Nations, and its ultimate rejection of all previous resolutions and internationally brokered attempts to secure Palestinian rights and nationhood (examples include the 1947 UN Resolution 181 (II), the 1993 and 1995 , and the ), it is highly unlikely that Israel will comply.

Over two decades, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has never been more than equivocal about a two-state solution. Since 2015, he has rejected the idea and since 2023 has outright rejected any possibility of Palestinian statehood at all. By June 2024, despite ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s best efforts to deny Palestinians any claim to statehood, 146 out of the 193 nations of the UN had recognized Palestine as an independent state.

Intermittent Israeli military attacks and temporary occupation of large parts of Lebanon have also occurred on numerous occasions over decades. Many feared that the latest, from October 1 to November 26, 2024, ostensibly to eradicate Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel, was also a ā€œdry runā€ for an indefinite annexation of the southern half, if not the whole, of Lebanon.

Israel’s response to Hamas terror attack of October 7, 2023

Hamasā€™s savage cross-border terror attack from inside Gaza on Israeli settlements on October 7, 2023 inevitably provoked a justifiable Israeli military response. Israel sought to capture or kill the perpetrators, and then to eliminate the terrorist organization. Varying official estimates from different sources that at least 1,139 were killed by the October 7 attack, plus some 3,400 wounded and 251 (75% Israelis) captured and taken into Gaza. Of those and held as hostages, many have been confirmed dead, 105 were released by negotiation, and 2 were released by Israeli special forces, leaving 97 plus 4 others from earlier Hamas abductions currently still in captivity.Ģż

±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s steadfast rejection over decades of a two-state solution, coupled with its demonstrable disregard for mass civilian casualties in its war on Gaza since October 7, 2023, has perplexed and infuriated long-standing allies of Israel. The gross disproportionality of the Gazan casualty numbers and the fanatical destruction of almost all infrastructure belie ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s stated objectives and strongly suggest a deliberate mass punishment of the population, contrary to the laws of war. Israel rejects this evaluation.

However, the initial ā€œsearch and destroyā€ Israeli mission to eradicate an estimated 30,000 armed Hamas operatives quickly turned into what looked like an indiscriminate assault against the entire population, using sophisticated weaponry and brutal tactics to destroy entire neighborhoods and life sustainability. That relentless daily assault has gone on for over a year, with no sign that the Israelis intend to stop. By mid-November 2024, over 43,000 Gazans ( some 11,500 women and 16,800 children) had been killed, according to their identity and death certificates held by the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry, plus at least 10,000 missing, presumed dead under rubble, and over 103,000 wounded. The UN Human Rights report of November 2024 that 70% of deaths have been women and children.

Over the past 12 months, the Israelis have been of systematically blocking food, medical and other humanitarian supplies, carrying out targeted daily bombardment of hospitals, schools, residential areas, food depots and refugee camps (including so-called ā€œsafe placesā€ designated by the Israelis themselves), and conducting repetitive enforced mass displacements of the population throughout Gaza. By the end of May 2024, the UN officially estimated that 1.7 million (or 75%) of the Gazan population had been internally displaced. That estimate had to 1.9 million (or 90% of the population) by early September 2024.Ģż

In late October 2024, UN and WHO chiefs that ā€œthe entire population of north Gazaā€ was now at serious risk of death from starvation, privation and lack of health care, and castigated ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s ā€œblatant disregard for basic humanity and the laws of war.ā€ In May 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s recent in Gaza was not genocidal (proto rather than actually achieved so far), but did state, quoting the Genocide Convention, that Israel ā€œmust immediately halt its military offensiveā€ and warned against harming civilians. The International Criminal Court (ICC) followed this by seeking arrest warrants for Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for crimes against humanity. These cast ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s political leaders and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as culpable villains. The arrest warrants were issued on November 21, 2024.

The Nation-State Law and land grabs

There are multiple well-documented of violent attacks and against Palestinians and other (for example, Armenians) in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem by so-called ā€œIsraeli .ā€ These reflect the apparent determination of Netanyahuā€™s government and the judiciary to sanctify de facto ethnic cleansing and accelerate the practical of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s 2018 . The latter stipulates that Israel is a Jewish state in which only Jews have full rights. Article 7 specifically prioritizes Jewish settlements as ā€œa national valueā€ and for which the state will ā€œact to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation,ā€ i.e. ethno-religious segregation and usurpation of non-Jewish land as the desirable norm.

By mid-2024, some 380,000 Israeli settlers had already occupied Palestinian land in the and East Jerusalem, with a 500,000 planned for the short term by ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who that Palestinians are a nation or have ever had land rights. Former Israeli generals are a similar plan for a settler takeover of Gaza after the Palestinian population has finally been removed.

More recently, Article 7 intent has been pursued through a new Israeli law the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) from operating inside Israel, including Gaza and the occupied Palestinian territories. Israel accused UNRWA of being infested with Hamas agents. Apart from removing the majority of international aid that would normally barely keep the Palestinian population fed, medicated and educated, the new law also has the effect of falsely declassifying Palestinians as UN refugees and removing any Israeli judicial recognition of their prior title rights to land the Israelis confiscated.Ģż

Self-defense or neo-imperialism?

There is no question that Israel is surrounded by states that, to varying degrees, are hostile. Some of them also harbor anti-Israeli extremists who have engaged in terrorist attacks, both cross-border and inside Israel. The Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, and the ongoing rocket barrages from Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon into Israel are high-profile examples. Some of these extremists call for the total annihilation of Israel and all Jews. The majority of neighboring Arab and Muslim states have, however, opted for a more ā€œtolerated differenceā€ approach whereby a modus vivendi has emerged, such as Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, UAE, Dubai, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and even Lebanon. Others, such as Syria, Iraq, Iran and Yemen, have not.

In such a historically hostile and turbulent context, Israel has created an extensive, sophisticated and multi-faceted ā€œfortressā€ to prevent, deter or neutralize any kind or scale of attack from any source, external or internal. ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s population is minuscule compared to hostile states in total and, even if including its full citizen reservist capacity, its numbers of military personnel are dwarfed by theirs. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s weapon systems, firepower, electronic warfare capacity, sophisticated electronic surveillance and intelligence systems, espionage agencies, motivation and training are vastly superior.

With ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s small population and modest GDP, all this has only been possible as a result of decades of financial, political and defense systems support from the United States. According to Reuters (September 26, 2024), scheduled US military aid over the next 10 years to Israel comprises $35 billion for essential wartime defense plus a further $52 billion for air defense systems, At an annual average of $8.7 billion, the US aid to Palestinians pales in comparison, at a mere $300 million.

Many independent observers have become increasingly reluctant to accept ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s stated justifications for its relentless response to the October 7 massacre. Their Gaza campaign, Lebanon campaign and violent from non-Jews in the West Bank no longer appear to be just about ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s ā€œright to exist,ā€ ā€œright to self-defense,ā€ and ā€œright to pursue implacable and murderous enemies.ā€ The daily video footage of mass civilian carnage in the immediate aftermath of Israeli bombardments of all kinds in Gaza contradicts Israeli official denials.

Beyond ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s stated military objectives, the elephant in the room now exposed is that the Gaza campaign also appears to be part of an aggressive nationalist territorial expansion project (or land grab), involving cleansing the ground of all opposition (actual and potential), as well as Palestinian population masses and infrastructure. ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s apparent ulterior motives in Gaza surface in the following examples:

Extra land and commercial development

Groups of settlers have been setting up along the Israeli side of the Gaza border, waiting for the IDF to confirm that it is safe for them to cross over and mark out their desired settlements. These settlers firmly believe that God, through a proclamation of Abraham, granted all Jews the unchallengeable jus divinum right to exclusively occupy the ā€œwhole landā€ of Israel. They assert that it stretches from the west bank of the River Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates in Iraq, as implied in the Bible (as in Genesis 15:18-21) and other ancient tracts.

A separate style of land grab in Gaza involves Israeli property developers, some of whom appear to have already moved in. Such developers are offering Israelis beachfront, new-build properties on Palestinian land, which employees wearing IDF military reservist apparel are now clearing of war-damaged, abandoned homes. According to one developerā€™s own , its employees are already erecting these new buildings.

Lawyers point out that all such land grabs are in of international law and may also constitute a war crime. In all such citizen actions, the Israeli perpetrators believe that, in addition to the claim of jus divinum, they can also now rely on Article 7 of the Nation-State Law 2018 to legitimize their conduct.

The Ben Gurion Canal Project

Originating in the 1960s, the Ben Gurion Canal centered on a plan to cut a deep-water canal from the Mediterranean, from Ashkelon near Gaza, into and across Israel and down to the port of Eilat and access to the Red Sea. This canal would thus bypass the Suez Canal and greatly reduce international shippingā€™s reliance on it. The planā€™s bold vision might well have transformed ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s economy, but for some 50 years, it remained dormant, primarily because its unilateral implementation and annexation of Palestinian land would doubtless have inflamed the Arab world, rendered the canal vulnerable to Hamas attacks and sabotage, and probably provoked war again.

Over the past 20 years however, with the inexorable rise of militant ultra-Zionist groups in Israel and their increasing influence on government, serious discussion of the Canal Project has restarted. Some right-wing interests in Israel are now advocating that the route of the canal should go directly through central Gaza. The suspicion is that under the current wartime regime of Netanyahu, with several aggressive ultra-Zionists in his Cabinet, the Gaza campaign provides an ideal to clear central Gaza of all Palestinians under the guise of military necessity. This may partly explain the IDFā€™s extensive scorched earth actions in Gaza.

The ā€œwhole landā€ justification and its scope

Both the Ben Gurion Canal project and the annexation of Gaza for ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s economic growth are consistent with the Greater Israel concept and its operationalization as it has evolved over a century or more. Numerous papers and articles on the subject of annexation of Palestinian land, Greater Israel and ā€œthe whole landā€ have appeared over the past twenty years, for example: The Guardian (), the , Migration Policy (), The Week ().

Recent independent research (MEPEI ) notes that the acknowledged founder of Zionism in the 19th century, Theodor Herzl, recorded in his own diaries that Eretz Yisrael included not only the traditional Jewish areas within Palestine but also the Sinai, Egyptian Palestine, and Cyprus, with the totality stretching from ā€œthe brook of Egypt to the Euphratesā€.

This view is rooted in a dogmatic belief that around 2000 BC, Abraham declared that God had revealed to him that he had granted him and all his descendants the exclusive right to the ā€œwhole landā€ of Israel, as later loosely defined in various verses of the Book of Genesis in the Bible, the Judaic Torah and other related ancient tracts. of the claimed Greater Israel show it encompassing not only the territories cited above, but also approximately 30% of Egypt, most of Iraq, a large area of Saudi Arabia, the whole of Kuwait (1,300 kilometers from Tel Aviv), Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, and parts of southern Turkey.

As noted above, Herzl clearly an extended geographical scope for the ā€œwhole land,ā€ once a national Jewish homeland had been secured in Palestine. However, in his overtures to and negotiations with European leaders to seek support, such a subsequent ā€œultimate phaseā€ appears to have gone unmentioned. The proposed homeland was presented as a benign, multi-ethnic, multi-religious polity with equal rights for all and in which none of the rights of the pre-existing Palestinians would be jeopardized.

Herzlā€™s colleague Chaim Weizmann very effectively championed the Zionist movement, before and after Herzlā€™s death in 1904. He successfully persuaded Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary during the onset of the British Mandate, to support the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. The shortĢżBalfour DeclarationĢżcrucially : ā€œIt being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.ā€ Clearly, a coach-and-horses have been driven through that ā€œunderstandingā€ long ago.

The erudite paper by Professor Chaim Gans in 2007 on historical rights to the ā€œLand of Israelā€ between historical rights and sovereignty, rights and ā€œtaking account of,ā€ and between the concept and geography of the ā€œwhole land.ā€ Others have argued that the ā€œwhole landā€ was always a spiritual concept that was never meant to be interpreted literally in objective, geographical terms.

Gans further notes the self-defining and self-serving nature of ultra-Zionistsā€™ arguments, which are ā€œvalid only for those who believe themā€ and observes that ā€œā€¦they do not make the slightest attempt to provide moral or universally valid arguments, only reinforcing the prejudices of the already persuaded.ā€ He continues that one nationā€™s extreme quest for self-determination may expunge anotherā€™s legitimate quest and may involve a criminal land grab. The jus divinum justification for wholesale repression, land grabs, massacres and expulsions presents as being holy, righteous and praiseworthy. However, many regard it as a primitive expression of assumed a priori ethno-religious superiority and selfish entitlement at the expense of ā€œthe others.ā€

Neo-imperialist motives?

Why is ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s Gaza campaign against an enemy that is vastly inferior in all respects (now extended to its Lebanon campaign) so relentless and ruthless over such a long period and over so much foreign territory? Why is their firepower targeted so heavily on the civilian population and civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, food supplies and utilities? 

The official Israeli justification is military necessity in the face of terror attacks. Yet, far-right Israeli cabinet ministers, such as , , Avigdor Lieberman and Amihai Eliyahu, have been pushing extreme nationalist Zionist justifications and policies way beyond national defense. On January 3, 2023, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich publiclyĢżĢżtheir desire to expel Palestinians from Gaza.ĢżThe Times of IsraelĢż the policies and stance of the ultra-Zionist Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party, to which Ben-Gvir and Eliyahu belong, as ā€œneo-fascist.ā€Ģż

Cabinet Minister Ben-Gvir, leader of the Otzma Yehudit Party, joined other senior far-right politicians from the Religious Zionism Party and the Likud Party at a Preparing to Settle Gaza Conference on October 21, 2024. While there, he that the Palestinian population of Gaza should be ā€œencouragedā€ to leave Gaza forever. Likud MP May Golan opined that ā€œtaking territoryā€ and re-establishing Jewish settlements in Gaza would be a lesson that ā€œthe Arabsā€ would never forget. The conference organizer Daniella Weiss advocated an ethnic cleansing of Gaza since the Palestinians had ā€œlost their right to liveā€ there. Weissā€™s Nachala organization claimed so far to have already marshaled 700 settler families prepared to move into Gaza once the Palestinians had been removed.

Eliyahu in an interview on November 5, 2023, that Israel should take back control of Gaza and move in Israeli settlers, a position he has since repeated, and said that the Palestinian population ā€œcan go to Ireland or desertsā€¦the monsters in Gaza should find a solution themselves.ā€ Asked if Israel should drop aĢżnuclear bombĢżon Gaza to flatten it and kill all the inhabitants, he , ā€œThat is one of the options.ā€ He further stated in January 2024 that the entire Palestinian population of Gaza (not just the Hamas militants) should be to painful retribution as a means to break their morale and destroy any thoughts of independence.

Nations threatened by the Greater Israel plan

Few citizens of the nine sovereign nations (excluding Palestine) are aware of the predatory threat of Israeli annexation. These nations include:

Syria

Although a frontline Arab state that fought Israel in the 1948, 1967 and 1973 wars, Syria has tried to avoid any major confrontation with Israel for some years. Since 2011, the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad had been largely preoccupied with a bloody civil war against pro-democracy groups, as well as an Islamic State (ISIS) insurgency from 2013 to 2017. Israel captured two-thirds of the Golan Heights from Syria in the 1967 war and it remains an occupied territory that is a de facto annexation by Israel. Since October 2024, Israel has launched a series of air strikes on Syria and reports of the IDF creating a fortified buffer zone within the separation corridor between the Israeli and Syrian-held areas of the Golan Heights.Ģż

The sudden overthrow of the Assad regime in early December 2024 by a variety of Syrian opposition forces, led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group, great uncertainty over Syria’s future governance and national security. The interim government has made clear that foreign military forces and their proxies in Syria must leave.Ģż

Russia, Iran and Hezbollah appear to be complying, but the US and Israeli compliance intentions are unclear. Israel has, however, taken the opportunity to pre-emptively much of Syria’s naval fleet and air force assets, and bomb military targets in and around the capital Damascus. IDF forces have also crossed the Golan Heights buffer zone and some 25 kilometers from Damascus to create a ā€œsterile defense zone.ā€ How temporary or limited this incursion will be remains to be seen.

The whole of Syria is marked on the Greater Israel map as being part of Eretz Yisrael.

Lebanon

In addition to its ongoing Gaza campaign, Israel opened up a new war front in Lebanon in October 2024 against Hezbollah. The military tactics employed by Israel during this invasion of Lebanon, including seemingly indiscriminate bombardment of Beirut and other population centers and short notice mass evacuation orders to hundreds of thousands of civilians, all the of their Gaza campaign. Despite a ceasefire agreed on November 26, 2024, is the Israeli seek-and-destroy self-defense operation against terror groups masking a much bigger long-term objective of depopulating much, if not all, of Lebanon so as to facilitate its annexation into Greater Israel? The whole of Lebanon is also marked on the Greater Israel map as being part of Eretz Yisrael.

Cyprus

Since the Republic of Cyprus was formed in 1960, it has had a cordial relationship with Israel. The two countries share common interests in many matters. Israeli tourists and wedding parties are common sights in the southern Greek Cypriot-controlled area where I lived for many years. Greek Cypriot police officers often receive training in Israel. Israeli gamblers frequent the numerous casinos in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

In the past few years, both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot areas have also enjoyed an influx of investment by mainland Turks, Russians, Lebanese, Iranians, Gulf Arabs and Israelis. In the Turkish Cypriot northern third of the island, Israeli investors have become predominant, especially large property developers and entrepreneurs attracted by the real estate boom. The TRNC has welcomed foreign direct investment with few restrictions and relaxed anti-money laundering controls. However, such investment has caused property price inflation to such an extent that ordinary Turkish Cypriots can no longer afford to buy even a modest home. Such economic distortion has resulted in the TRNC administration legislation in September 2024 to restrict residential property purchases to TRNC and Turkish citizens only and to one per person.

Turkish Cypriots are also concerned that Israeli investors and landowners are becoming so in the TRNC economy that there is a risk that some of them are, or could become, fifth-columnist agents for the Israeli government against Turkish Cypriot interests. Such concern received added piquancy when, in October 2024, President Erdogan of Turkey (TRNCā€™s political and financial guarantor) issued a stark warning about ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s alleged Greater Israel territorial ambitions against Turkey.

Israeli investment in the Greek Cypriot controlled southern Cyprus has seen involvement of fewer large Israeli property developers and entrepreneurs than in the TRNC area. This may reflect the much tighter EU regulation and anti-money laundering controls in the south. Smaller Israeli operators are in evidence in the south, plus a large number of individuals buying a property for their own use (such as a holiday home). Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack in Israel, the number of individual Israelis and families buying or long-term renting properties in the south has rocketed, presumably as an ā€œinsuranceā€ bolt-hole in case things go badly in Israel. Affluent Lebanese have also flooded the Greek Cypriot property market to escape the Israeli military onslaught.

As in the TRNC area, the rapid influx of large numbers of Israelis in 2024 has distorted the property market in the Greek Cypriot south to the extent that ordinary citizens can no longer afford to buy and traditional tourists from northern Europe can no longer easily find holiday properties to rent. However, unlike the TRNC administration, the Republic government in the south has yet to take any action on this.

Although Herzl included Cyprus as a potential Jewish homeland in his original scope of Greater Israel, he later dropped it in favor of Palestine. However, some ultra-Zionists today still regard Cyprus as being part of Eretz Yisrael.

Turkey

Turkey has had good relations with Israel since 1948. However, in recent years, Turkeyā€™s President Erdogan has been increasingly critical of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s treatment of the Palestinians and his anti-Israel rhetoric has become increasingly harsh. In early October 2024, Erdogan bluntly of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s alleged long-term plan to annex parts of Anatolia into Eretz Yisrael. He also threatened to defend Lebanon militarily should Israel try to annex it. Certainly, any move by Israel to annex or even temporarily occupy north Lebanon or Syria would threaten Turkeyā€™s national security.

It should be noted that Turkey has large and well-equipped armed forces, 8th out of 145 countries in the Global Firepower review, and is the second largest military force in NATO after the US. Erdoganā€™s anti-Israel rhetoric and accusations have caused much discussion and debate.

Parts of Anatolia in south-eastern Turkey are marked on the Greater Israel map as being part of Eretz Yisrael.

Likely success of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s expansionist plan

In a limited sense, some of the Greater Israel Planā€™s objectives have already been achieved. Some territorial gains were made in previous wars, and subsequent imposition of Israeli laws, decrees and policies in the occupied Palestinian territories have dispossessed large numbers of remaining Palestinians. ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s military, administrative and armed settler actions against the Palestinian populations of Gaza and the occupied West Bank before and since October 7, 2023, and repeated statements by its government ministers about permanently removing all Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank, are consistent with the Plan and Article 7 of the Nation State Law.

There is, however, a need to consider:

1. The apparent existence of a Greater Israel Plan, which in its various elements is being openly promoted by ultra-Zionist Israeli government ministers and extremists.
2. The practical viability of executing the Plan beyond annexation of currently occupied territories, given ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s very small population and therefore inability to field long-term occupation personnel in other territories.
3. The current high level of support (risen from in May 2024 to an estimated 45-60%) among the Israeli population for Netanyahuā€™s ruthless Gaza and Lebanon campaigns and his hard-line rejection of any ceasefire, two-state solution or other peace deal brokered by the international community, but which may collapse if the government fails to produce its promised concrete, permanent safety results for citizens.
4. Netanyahuā€™s steadfast and dismissive refusal to listen to US and other alliesā€™ entreaties to agree to a two-state solution for Palestine.
5. ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s growing international isolation resulting from its intolerable treatment of the Palestinians and a determination even by friendly nations to make Israel accountable to international laws and standards.
6. Uncertainty over whether the US will continue its unswerving and undiluted financial and military support for Israel.
7. The Netanyahu regime increasingly imposing sanctions against ā€œordinaryā€ Israeli Jews and news media who dare to challenge its apparent proto-genocide campaign in Gaza, or who call for a two-state solution and peace accord with the Palestinians, such as the attacks on .

It is clear that the current Israeli regime ideologically supports the Greater Israel Plan, and several Cabinet Ministers are actively promoting its execution as far as the occupied Palestinian territories are concerned. Less clear is how Israel views Lebanon and whether its recent bombardment and invasion was limited to a short-term ā€œsearch and destroyā€ mission against Hezbollah, or whether it will be later resurrected by more gung-ho IDF and ultra-Zionist leaders as an opportunity for a partial or total permanent annexation of Lebanon into Eretz Yisrael. Hopefully, cooler heads will prevail.

Israel may be assumed to conduct desktop ā€œwar gamingā€ exercises covering all its known and likely enemies and even others within the 1,300-kilometer reach from Tel Aviv on the Greater Israel map and beyond, but actual military invasion of the vast majority is highly unlikely. Vast numbers of trained military personnel are required for ā€œboots on the groundā€ invasions and then occupation, often against much resistance, and ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s tiny forces make most invasions not viable. Then there is the problem of supply lines, communications and control over great distances, the environment, and the weather. Napoleon learned the hard way, as did Hitler, in their respective invasions of Russia and retreats from Moscow.

Given Donald Trumpā€™s unconditional support for Israel and his encouraging their uninhibited military aggression against all enemies, his second US presidency heralds an even less restrained Israel. Territorial expansion Ć  la Greater Israel is now more . Even the threat of a war with Iran (beyond the Greater Israel map), led by Israel as Washingtonā€™s ā€œlocal Rottweilers,ā€ may convert to action.

However, it is not feasible for Israel (or any country with only 3 million combatants) to subdue ā€” much less conquer, annex and control ā€” surrounding territories whose antagonistic populations far exceed 150 million (and that’s excluding Iran’s 90 million). Nor can they rely on superior technology and weaponry to close the ā€œstrategic gap.ā€ The US has still failed to grasp the latter weakness despite effectively losing in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan to low-tech peasantry. Even if achieved, subjugation of the region, including regime change in Iran, would not and could not impose a Pax Americana/Pax Judaica on the region. It would simply alter the systemic topography of endless power struggles and conflict.

Finally, beware hubris. Most ā€œgrand planā€ empires emanating from megalomaniacs and extremist zealots fail because these involve narcissistic delusions of grandeur, supreme power, invincibility, glory, and of righteousness, which do not recognize their own limitations and feet of clay.

[ edited this piece.]

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But you want to know a dirty, little secret? In back alleys, encrypted group chats and off-the-record conversations, liberals will still support Trump on a case-by-case basis. Of course, theyā€™d never vote for the guy, but theyā€™ll give two cheers for some of his policies.

I discovered this ugly truth during Trumpā€™s last term while writing an article on the shift in US policy toward China from lukewarm engagement to hostile decoupling. The general consensus among the foreign policy elite was that, at least in terms of relations with Beijing, Trump was a useful idiot for slowing Chinaā€™s roll with harsh rhetoric and tariffs.

ā€œTrump is a madman, but I want to give him and his administration their due,ā€ one prominent liberal intellectual me. ā€œWe canā€™t keep playing on an unlevel playing field and take promises that are never delivered on. Itā€™s really Chinaā€™s turn to respond, and itā€™s long overdue.ā€

It wasnā€™t just China. For years, liberals and conservatives alike were, for instance, the concept of burden-sharing: getting US allies to cover more of the bill for their security needs. But it was only Trump who really made it happen by blackmailing NATO members and other US partners into doing so.

Sure, few warmed to the idea of the US actually pulling out of NATO, but even many of our European allies, though they publicly grumbled, were secretly happy about The Donaldā€™s gaiatsu. Thatā€™s the Japanese word for outside pressure that enables a leader to force through unpopular changes by blaming it all on foreigners. The self-described liberal leader of NATO, Dutch politician Mark Rutte, even came out in the open after Trumpā€™s re-election to the US president for making European countries more militarily self-sufficient.

It wasnā€™t just liberals who were thrilled about Trumpā€™s unorthodox foreign policy during his first term, either. Some of those further to the left also embraced Trump the engager (with North Koreaā€™s Kim Jong Un), Trump the isolationist (and his threats to close US military bases globally) and Trump the putative peacemaker (for concluding a deal with the Taliban to end the US military presence in Afghanistan).

Trump, in other words, was not just an unanticipated crisis; he was also an opportunity. Deep in their hearts, anyone unhappy with the status quo will support a disrupter. Quite a few Democrats disgusted with this countryā€™s border policies, inflation and its coastal elites even to vote for Trump in November because they wanted change, regardless of the consequences.

Trump 2.0 is going to be the same but worse, like a strong cheese voted out of the refrigerator only to grow ever more pungent as it molded in a dark corner of Florida. The latest version of Trump has promised more violence and destruction the second time around, from mass deportations to mass tariffs. And heā€™s planning to avoid appointing anyone to his administration who might have a contrary thought, a backbone to resist him or the least qualification to enact sensible policy.

In the face of such a vengeful and truculent force returning to the White House, surely, you might think, it will be impossible to find any liberals embracing such anarchy the second time around.

Think again. This is how US politics works, if only for liberals. The modern Republican Party routinely boycotts Democratic administrations: blocking Merrick Garlandā€™s Supreme Court nomination, working overtime to shut down the federal government, voting en masse against legislation it would have supported if introduced by a Republican administration. The MAGA crowd has, in fact, turned noncooperation into something of an art form.

Liberals, on the other hand, pride themselves on bipartisanship, on getting things done no matter whoā€™s in power. So, inevitably, there will be cooperation with the Trump team as it sets about the ā€œdeconstruction of the administrative stateā€ (as Trump cheerleader Steve Bannon once it). Worse, there will even be some silver-lining liberals (and a few leftists) who pull up a seat to applaud the wrecking ball ā€” not perhaps for its wholesale destruction of neighborhoods, but at least for its demolition of a select number of buildings that they deem irreparable.

Each time such destruction takes place, the self-exculpatory comment from such silver-liners will be: ā€œWell, somebody had to come along and do something!ā€ If Trump is the only tool in the governing toolbox, some liberals will indeed try to use him to pound in a few nails they think need hammering.

Burning bridges with China

In his 2024 State of the Union address, President Joe Biden argued that he did a better job than Trump of standing up to China. He certainly devoted more to containing China. And not only did he not roll back Trumpā€™s tariffs on Chinese products, but he added some of his own, including a 100% tax on Chinese electric vehicles. Biden also made concrete moves to decouple the US economy from Chinaā€™s, especially when it came to the supply chains for critical raw materials that Beijing has sought to control. ā€œIā€™ve made sure that the most advanced American technologies canā€™t be used in China,ā€ he insisted, , ā€œFrankly for all his tough talk on China, it never occurred to my predecessor to do any of that.ā€

Bidenā€™s moves on China, from export controls and subsidies for chip manufacturers to closer with Pacific partners like Australia and India, received the enthusiastic support of his party. No surprise there: Itā€™s hard to find anyone in Washington these days who has a good word to say about engaging more with China.

So when Trump takes office in January, he wonā€™t actually be reversing course. Heā€™ll simply be taking the baton-like stick from Biden while leaving all the carrots in the ground.

That said, Trumpā€™s proposed further spike in tariffs against China (and Canada and Mexico and potentially the rest of the world) does give many liberals pause. It threatens to unleash an economically devastating global trade war while boosting prices radically at home. But trade unions backed by such liberals support such measures as a way to protect jobs, while the European Union only recently imposed of their own on Chinese electrical vehicles.

So, yes, neoliberals who embrace free trade are going to push back against Trumpā€™s economic policies, but more traditional liberals who backed protectionist measures in the past will secretly (or not so secretly) applaud Trumpā€™s moves.

Back to the wall

On taking office, Biden rolled back his predecessorā€™s harsh immigration policies. The rate of border-crossings then spiked for a variety of reasons ā€” not just the repeal of those Trump-era laws ā€” from an average of half a million to about annually. However, in 2024, those numbers despite Trumpā€™s campaign claims ā€” but no matter. By then, many Democrats had already been reborn as border hawks.

That new, tougher attitude was on display in Biden took in 2024 as well as the border security that Democrats tried to push through Congress earlier this year. Forget about finding a path to citizenship for the millions of undocumented immigrants who keep the US economy humming, Bidenā€™s immigration policy focused on limiting asylum petitions, increasing detention facilities and even more money to build Trumpā€™s infamous wall.

As Elora Mukherjee, director of the Immigrantsā€™ Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School, on the eve of the November election, ā€œWhat we are seeing is that the center of the Democratic Party is now adopting the same policies, the same postures, that MAGA Republicans were fighting for about six years ago.ā€

And yet such punitive policies still werenā€™t harsh enough for MAGA Republicans and their America First followers. The bottom line was that immigration-averse voters didnā€™t want to support Democrats pretending to be MAGA Republicans. When it came to the White House, they wanted the real thing.

As politics change hands in Washington next January, itā€™s going to be difficult to find any Democrats who will support the mass detentions and deportations Trump is promising. Yet many liberals, like the of Latinos who pulled the lever for Trump in 2024, do want major changes at the border with Mexico. In Arizona, Democrat Ruben Gallego won a squeaker of a Senate election by emphasizing and even backing a border wall in certain areas. Such liberal border hawks will be happy when the Republican president does the dirty work so that Democrats »å“Ē²Ōā€™t suffer the political fallout that is sure to follow.

Remapping the Middle East

On the face of it, the Abrahamic Accords were a liberal nightmare. The brainchild of Trumpā€™s son-in-law Jared Kushner, they to repair relations between Israel and the major authoritarian regimes in the region: Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Morocco and Sudan. The deal was a reward for illiberal leaders, particularly ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s Benjamin Netanyahu. The primary losers would, of course, be the Palestinians, who would have to their hopes for a separate state in exchange for some Saudi handouts and the Sahrawi people who lost their claim to the Western Sahara when the US and Israel Moroccan sovereignty over the entire region.

Instead of shelving the Accords, however, the Biden administration pushed ahead with them. After roundly criticizing Saudi autocrat Mohammed bin Salman for, among other things, ordering the of a US-based Saudi journalist, Biden mended ties, fist-bumping that rogue leader and continuing to discuss how and when the Kingdom would normalize relations with Israel. Nor did his administration restrict Washingtonā€™s staggering weapons deliveries to Israel after its invasion and utter devastation of Gaza. Yes, Biden and crew made some statements about Palestinian suffering and tried to push more humanitarian aid into the conflict zone, but they did next to nothing to pressure Israel to stop its killing machine, nor would they the Trump administrationā€™s decision on the Western Sahara.

The liberals who support Israel (come what may) like Pennsylvania Senator , New York Congressman and the in the House of Representatives are, of course, going to be enthusiastic about Trumpā€™s ever tighter embrace of Netanyahu next year. But there are also likely to be quiet cheers from other corners of the liberal-left about the Trump is likely to take against Tehran. (Remember Kamala Harrisā€™s during her presidential run that Iran was the main adversary of the US?)

The Arab Spring is long gone and a strong man in the White House needs to both schmooze with and go toe to toe with the strong men of the Middle East ā€” or so many liberals will believe, even as they rationalize away their relief over Trumpā€™s handling of a thoroughly illiberal region.

Looking ahead (or do I mean behind?)

Anyone to the left of Tucker Carlson will certainly think twice about showing public enthusiasm for whatever Trump does. Indeed, most liberals will be appalled by the new administrationā€™s likely suspension of aid to Ukraine and withdrawal from the Paris climate accord, not to mention other possible hare-brained maneuvers like sending US troops to narcotraffickers in Mexico.

Trump will attract liberal support, however quietly or even secretively, not because of his bridge-building genius ā€” in reality, he even get a bridge-building infrastructure bill through Congress in his first term ā€” but because all too many liberals have already moved inexorably rightward on issues ranging from China and the Middle East to immigration. The MAGA minority has seized the machinery of power by weaponizing mendacity and ruthlessly breaking rules, in the process transforming politics much the way the Bolshevik minority did in Russia more than a century ago. In the pot that those Republicans put on the stove, the water has been boiling for more than a decade and yet the left-of-center frogs barely seem to recognize just how altered our circumstances have become.

In normal times, finding overlapping interests with your political adversaries makes sense. Such bedrock bipartisanship stabilizes fractious countries that swing politically from center left to center right every few years.

These are, however, anything but normal times and the second-term Trump team is anything but center-rightists. They are extremists bent on dismantling the federal government, unstitching the fabric of international law and turning up the heat drastically on an already dangerously overcooking planet.

In 2020, I raised the possibility of a boycott, divestment and sanction (BDS) movement against the US if Trump won the elections that year. ā€œPeople of the world, youā€™d better build your BDS box, paint ā€˜Break Glass in Case of Emergencyā€™ on the front, and stand next to it on November 3,ā€ I then. ā€œIf Trump wins on Election Day, it will be mourning in America. But letā€™s hope that the world doesnā€™t mourn: it organizes.ā€

Four years later, Trump has won again. Do I hear the sound of breaking glass?

Here in the US, a stance of strict non-engagement with Trump 2.0, even where interests overlap, would not only be a good moral policy but even make political sense. When things go disastrously south, laws are broken and the government begins to truly come apart at the seams, itā€™s vitally important that no left-of-center fingerprints be found at the crime scene.

Letā€™s be clear: The Trump administration will not be playing by the rules of normal politics. So forget about bipartisanship. Forget about preserving access to power by visiting Mar-a-Lago, hat in hand, like Facebookā€™s or the of MSNBCā€™s Morning Joe show. ā€œFascism can be defeated,ā€ historian Timothy Snyder immediately after the November elections, ā€œbut not when we are on its side.ā€

So, my dear liberal-left, which side are you on?

[ first published this piece.]

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However, this is not the first time that a lethal terror group has faced such a threat. The present situation recalls the history of the Black September Organization (BSO), a Palestinian militant organization that caused chaos in Jordan in the 1970s. With ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s recent assassinations, history may well repeat itself.

The formation and function of the Black September Organization

A little history is needed to understand where the BSO came from. The Third Arab-Israeli War in 1967 saw hundreds of thousands of people displaced from their homes, fleeing the fighting. Many Palestinians living in the West Bank region fled to Jordan. Israel continued to occupy the West Bank afterwards, leading to Palestinian fedayeen (guerilla fighters; a more literal meaning being ā€œthose willing to sacrifice themselvesā€) setting up a new base in Jordan and launching attacks against Israel from there.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) gained further Arab support when Israel retaliated against the fedayeen strikes. Groups within the organization began calling for the toppling of the Jordanian monarchy. Eventually, after further disagreements and violent confrontations, King Hussein of Jordan decided to go on the offensive. This led to Black September, where the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) surrounded cities with significant PLO presence and attacked them. The latter half of September 1970, had the most concentration of fighting in the entire conflict.

In the end, leaders on both sides signed many ceasefires and agreements, but none were upheld in their entirety. The PLO and Palestinian people moved to Syria in droves. However, some fedayeen remained, angered by Jordanā€™s actions. They continued to fight back, but the JAF eventually drove the last of them out by July, 1971. A small group of men from Fatah, the biggest faction of the PLO at the time, formed the BSO in September, 1970. They rallied around Abu Ali Iyad, a commander who had remained in Jordan after the PLO withdrew. There was only one goal in mind: revenge against King Hussein and the JAF.

The BSO operated very differently to typical militant terrorist organizations of the time. John K. Cooley was a notable journalist of the period, specializing in Islamist terrorism. In his book, Green March, Black September, he stated that, ā€œBlack September represented a total break with the old operational and organizational methods of the fedayeen. Its members operated in ā€˜air-tightā€™ cells of four or more men and women. Each cellā€™s members were kept ignorant of other cells. Leadership was exercised from outside by intermediaries and ā€˜cut-offsā€™.ā€

By operating in this manner, every detail of their movements and the members of the organization itself could be kept secret. This drastic change in structure and operation showed a strong intent to succeed in their goals. Everything was on a need-to-know basis, with their leaders hidden. The BSO could easily cut off any cell that failed a mission and disassociate from any actions carried out, as could Fatah. One cellā€™s failure did not affect the rest. 

The Black September Organizationā€™s attacks

The BSO managed to carry out multiple, successful terrorist attacks across the globe. The most tragic was the 1972 Munich massacre, where the BSO murdered 11 Israeli Olympic athletes and one German police officer. The BSO planned and carried out assassinations, hijackings and bombings over the course of four years, from 1970 to 1973. Apart from the Munich massacre, these operations were covert, like the 1973 letter bombing incident. The BSO sent dozens of letter bombs from Amsterdam to various Israeli diplomatic places around the world. Many were intercepted on the way, but one managed to make its way to Ami Shachori, the agricultural counselor at the Israeli Embassy to the UK. He mistakenly believed it contained seeds he had ordered and the resulting blast fatally wounded him.

The BSO even managed to somewhat fulfill their original goal of revenge. They assassinated Wasfi Tal, the Jordanian prime minister at the time, for his role in the events of Black September. Aside from Jordan, Arab nations widely denounced Tal, as they had supported the Palestinian fedayeen. However, his loyalty to his king and country was rewarded with his popularity among the people. He was elected prime minister three times: in 1962, in 1965 and again in 1970.

±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s wrath and the fall of the Black September Organization

After the Munich massacre, ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s Mossad launched a long, covert operation to assassinate key members of the BSO, known as ā€œWrath of God.ā€ Mossad got to work quickly, taking out various senior BSO members and those involved in the Munich massacre specifically. Many of these operations happened between the events of Munich and September 1973. Mossadā€™s success and ruthlessness likely played a major factor in the PLO decision to shut down the BSO. The exact date is contested, with Israeli historian Benny Morris saying September 1973, and other sources that it was December 1974. Either way, there was only one more attack BSO claimed to have carried out after 1973, which was the Antwerp synagogue bombing in 1981.

Mossadā€™s actions led to an existential crisis for the BSO. With senior members and leaders out of commission, being either dead or constantly in hiding, running the organization became exceedingly difficult. There were also disagreements internally on how to continue operations and what direction the BSO should go in. Furthermore, Fatah had begun to engage Israel in diplomacy, shifting away from the use of violence to further the Palestinian cause.

The dissolution of the BSO potentially occurred for three reasons. Firstly, the ideological fervor that drove the BSO, and possibly even Fatah, forward in the first place was running out. Secondly, anti-Zionist sentiment was weakening. Thirdly, Fatah and the BSO did not have the necessary resources to maintain an armed struggle.

While the existence of Israel was a thorn in the side of the Arab Middle East, it was clear that Israel would not fall easily. They survived attack after attack, held their ground and even claimed other countriesā€™s territories at times. Israel was there to stay. The Middle Eastern countries were not united in their desires either. They often fought with each other as well, like how the PLO fought with Jordan and how the Lebanese civil war broke out. Terrorist attacks outside of the region surely didnā€™t please other countries as well, whose opinions may have changed from such events, leading to less interest in the Arab struggle.

Within the PLO, there were, and still are, many factions and opinions. General sentiment leaned away from continuing the armed struggle. It ate up their funds and only had limited success. It was not achieving what they had hoped. Given that the Palestinian people had no guaranteed home and no land to call their own anymore, resources were always limited. Mossadā€™s offensive operations against the BSO were also burning through Fatahā€™s and the BSOā€™s resources, as well as personnel. The BSO was practically backed into a corner.

±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s actions werenā€™t without its dissenters and mistakes however. While ruthless, the operations were more about revenge than trying to stop terrorism. Israeli author and journalist Aaron J. Klein quoted a Mossad senior intelligence source, saying, ā€œOur blood was boiling. When there was information implicating someone, we didnā€™t inspect it with a magnifying glass.ā€ Given that the BSO was shut down within a year or two of the Munich massacre, it shows Mossadā€™s effectiveness. But in terms of stopping terrorism entirely, it was a complete failure.

As Fatah falls, Hamas rises

In December 1974, PLO chairman and Fatah leader Yasser Arafat called for his followers to cease violence outside of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242 and 338 in 1967 and 1973 respectively, which shows that the PLO had managed to bring the Palestinian plight to the attention of the West. Attacks continued through the 1970s, but once the Lebanese Civil War began in 1975, the PLOā€™s attention shifted. Given that they mostly operated out of southern Lebanon at the time, itā€™s no wonder. 

In time, those Resolutions led to the Oslo Accords, a pair of agreements signed by Israel and the PLO, in an attempt to bring about a long-lasting peace. One of the most important outcomes of the Accords was the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which is an elected body of representatives for the Palestinian people, allowing them some level of self-governance.

Unfortunately, this did not create the desired effect. A large number of Palestinian people and organizations vehemently opposed the Accords, with various terrorist attacks occurring afterwards in retaliation. Even some Israelis werenā€™t happy about it. A far-right Israeli extremist carried out an assassination on the Israeli prime minister at the time, Yitzhak Rabin, who was the one to sign the Accords.

In 1996, Palestine held its first general elections. Fatah dominated these elections, with their leader Arafat becoming President with 89.82% of the vote. He was incredibly popular at the time and the Palestinian people believed he would lead them to peace. However, the negotiations between Palestine and Israel never led to a true peace agreement. As the years went on, the Palestinian people grew weary. Their struggle was never ending and unchanging.

During this time, Hamas, the only other potential rival to Fatah, began to grow in popularity. Hamas had never agreed to the Oslo Accords and still continued to bombard Israel with attacks in any way they could. Disagreements between Fatah and Hamas caused continuous postponements of the elections. The passing of Arafat in 2004 left Fatah without its charismatic leader. Finally, in January 2006, Palestinian elections were held. Hamas won a majority of the seats, to the shock of the world. Most Western countries expected a re-election of Fatah. Hamas now controlled 74 of the 132 seats in the PNA. The two factionsā€™s disagreements escalated, and they were unable to form a government that held together for the sake of the Palestinian people.

It only took until June 2007 for the tensions to come to a head. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas-affiliated and Fatah-affiliated forces came to blows. After a series of violent clashes, Hamas took full control of the Gaza Strip and that has been the situation up until now. Hamas controlled Gaza and the PNA controlled the West Bank.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched their largest attack ever against Israel, killing around 1,200 people and taking around 250 as hostages. Israeli forces mounted an aggressive counter-attack, announcing their intent to eradicate Hamas entirely. Since then, itā€™s been a war between the two. Allegedly, over 40,000 Palestinians have been killed in the fighting. Israel has also assassinated many Hamas leaders across the world, including the aforementioned Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar.

Is this a dead end for terror proxies?

Hamas had clearly been preparing for the October 7 attacks for a long time. They built up their forces, their funds and their ammunition. What they didn’t seem prepared for though was the Israeli retaliation. While the war is still ongoing at the time of writing, Hamas is certainly not in a winning position. Their people are suffering and their leaders are dead. If Hamas even survives as an organization once Israel is done, it will be a miracle. But will the idea of armed struggle live on?

There are many parallels between Hamas and the BSO. Both were born of strong ideals and strong condemnation of their enemies. Their enemies retaliated ruthlessly as well. The BSO was shut down and Hamas looks to be on the same path. Hamas is not the only terror proxy fighting against Israel. Hezbollah, from their territories in southern Lebanon, have been firing missiles into Israel. The Houthis in Yemen have been attacking sea routes in the waters around their territory, ones that would reach the south Israeli port of Eilat, in an attempt to curb their supplies. Whether their Iranian backers incited them or if they all did this of their own accord is up for debate, but the results are the same. Israel brought their might down upon their adversaries.

As an outsider looking in, it may seem futile to repeat the same actions as those who came before, when the results are always the same. Maybe they believe it will be different with them or maybe they simply have no choice. There is a constant struggle between the Israeli people and the Palestinian people. However, there is no change without action. The Palestinian people believe that they cannot continue without doing something. The deadlock must be broken.

Despite this drive, armed struggle has only proven, time and again, to be ineffective. The only area which it succeeds is bringing their cause to the attention of the globe. This never lasts in the long run though. In the end, nothing changes. There are only two options left: to drop the idea of armed struggle, perhaps taking the diplomatic route as Fatah has, or find a solution with Israel to put an end to things once and for all. Hamas has already shown signs of changing course. They have talks periodically with Fatah since July, with the latest being in Cairo in October 2024, hoping to resolve their differences. When the US general election results announced Donald Trump as the victor, Hamas quickly a statement saying that they were ā€œready for a ceasefire.ā€

Proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah are in a standoff with Israel over the Palestinian issue, but itā€™s clear that their current methods are unsuccessful. Like the BSO and other proxies before them, Israel is pushing these organizations into existential crises. History may repeat itself and we will see this endless cycle repeat once more.

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Republics have suffered total collapses throughout history. Thereā€™s no reason why the US should be immune. The fear of that often prompts a superficial reference to the final fall of the Roman Republic or the end of Greek democracy. But thereā€™s a deeper history: Republics came into being far earlier in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations. And we can draw from a much wider range of examples to learn from as we try to understand the challenges and the opportunities.

A true republic is a political system without monarchy or concentrated political power in any office, branch or individual. Elected officials represent citizens to make decisions on their behalf, with separate branches of government providing checks and balances. While many associate republics with direct democracy in our times, thereā€™s a much wider array of power structures that developed in the formative era of republics.

The 20th century established republics as the global standard. Monarchies declined after World War I and most former European colonies declared independence as republics following World War II. Fascist and communist countries, which centralized power in individuals or ruling parties, also reduced in number.

Despite their concentration of power, however, many fascist and communist states claimed the title of republics. While countries out of 193 identify as republics today, far less uphold republican principles and blend them effectively with democracy. Examining the historical evolution of republics highlights those best positioned to serve as the most resilient modern examples.

Republics require regular gatherings and assemblies, making them difficult to establish in sparsely populated agrarian societies, while empires generally concentrate power too heavily for self-rule to gain traction. It was in smaller city-states, particularly trade-focused ones, where citizens could form factions, exchange ideas and influence government decisions and rules for commerce.

The invention of republican ideals

Some of the earliest experiments with republican governance appeared in ancient Sumerian city-states (4500ā€“2000 BC), centered in modern-day Iraq. Kings acted more as neutral rather than rulers, sharing power with aristocratic families and groups, as well as common citizens. In Kish, citizens could a new king during crises. In Uruk, assemblies of townsmen and elders had to ratify major military decisions.

The Sumerian city-states fell to the Akkadian and Babylonian Empires by 1750 BC. Phoenician city-states, emerging about 250 years later in what is now Lebanon, revived republican ideals. Here, monarchical power was often with a merchant class and citizen council. Egyptian records dating to the mid-14th century BC describe Phoenician cities sending delegates to represent citizens rather than monarchs, with mentions of and aid requests by the ā€œmen of Arwadā€ and ā€œelders of Irqata.ā€

By the 6th century BC, the Phoenician city of Tyre had functioned for seven years without a monarch, governed instead under suffetes, or judges, elected for short terms. In Chios, a ā€œpeopleā€™s councilā€ allowed citizens to debate laws and hold officials accountable. However, beginning in the 9th century BC and continuing over the next few centuries, Phoenician city-states were successively conquered or subjugated by the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian and Macedonian Empires.

Like other civilizations, Phoenicians established colonies and trading posts. Carthage, founded by Tyre in 814 BC in modern Tunisia, grew into a powerful city-state with its own . By the early 7th century BC, two elected suffetes from aristocratic families replaced the monarchy. They governed alongside an aristocratic Senate, while newer merchants could gain influence and a popular assembly allowed citizensā€™ input on major decisions. Military and religious leaders also held considerable power.

Republican ideals werenā€™t confined to Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Buddhist texts like the Maha Parinibbana Sutta mention Indian republics called in the 6th century BC. Some adopted republican styles of government, while others formed republican confederations, like Sumerian and Phoenician city-states, to make decisions collectively and protect against larger threats. The Indian republics were gradually absorbed by the Maurya Empire (321ā€“185 BC) and other entities.

Greece and Rome evolved republics

Ancient Greek city-states also developed republican ideals. Sparta was governed by a constitution and popular assembly as early as 600 BC, though it remained largely monarchical. Athens established a direct democracy in 507 BC, known as demokratia, meaning ā€œpeopleā€ and ā€œrule.ā€ Greeceā€™s slave-based economy allowed some citizens time to participate in politics, though this limited political fairness. In 431 BC, Attica, the region surrounding Athens, had an estimated population of 315,000, of which only 172,000 were citizens, and just 40,000 male citizens could vote.

Still, Athensā€™s allowed these citizens to frequently debate, deliberate and vote. They were overseen by the Council of Five Hundred, which was chosen annually by lot to draft laws and manage administration. However, following Athensā€™s Golden Age, 4th century BC Greek like Plato and Aristotle, and later 2nd century BC historians like Polybius, criticized the system for inefficiency and vulnerability to charismatic leaders to sway public opinion, leading to volatile policy shifts.

They emphasized balancing public, aristocracy, and monarchical roles to avoid the typical of chaos and order: First, a strong leader unites a restive society under a monarchy, which evolves into tyranny. It is overthrown and replaced by an aristocracy, which reduces into oligarchy. Democracy eventually replaces it but deteriorates into mob rule, restarting the cycle.

Invasions further weakened Greeceā€™s republican and democratic systems. In 338 BC, Greece fell under the control of the Macedonian Empire, ending the independence of many city-states. Despite this, Greek states formed republican confederations to protect against threats, including the neighboring Roman Republic. The term republic derives from the Roman res publica, meaning ā€œpublic affairsā€ ā€” this emphasizes shared governance, civic participation and checks and balances. Since its founding in 509 BC, the Roman Republicā€™s political structure had evolved considerably. Polybius expressed for Romeā€™s system; two tribunes were elected annually to represent the common citizens, while two consuls were elected and held executive power, checked by an aristocratic senate.

Romans were skeptical of Greek democracy, especially in Athens, due to its instability, infighting and mob rule. Carthageā€™s republic seemed overly commercial and lacked the civic loyalty the Romans valued. This loyalty was central to Romeā€™s military, staffed by a citizen army motivated by . In contrast, Carthageā€™s strong, citizen-led navy protected trade routes, but its reliance on mercenaries for land campaigns made them costly and unpredictable.

These factors reduced the ability to push back against Roman rule. By 146 BC, Rome defeated both Greece and Carthage, cementing its dominance and expanding political system. Polybius suggests that Romeā€™s success over Carthage was partially due to its powerful, aristocratic Senate, while Carthageā€™s policies were increasingly shaped by popular influence. He believed that Romeā€™s decisions were made by elites versus the influence of the masses in Carthage.

Yet by this time, Rome was approaching its Late Republic phase. Scholar Harriet Flowerā€™s argues that the Roman Republic wasnā€™t a single entity but a series of six republics, each with unique political characteristics. Others have also challenged the notion of a single Roman Republic, placing Republican Rome into three main periods characterized by changing centers of power.

The Early Republic (509ā€“367 BC) was marked by tensions between patricians (aristocratic elites) and plebeians (common citizens). The struggle for plebeian rights led to significant reforms, including the establishment of tribunes, elected by the to represent common interests and often from the plebeian class.

During the Middle Republic (367ā€“133 BC), the Licinian-Sextian laws of 367 BC were passed to again alleviate tensions between patricians and plebeians, limiting patrician land ownership, providing debt relief for plebeians and ensuring that at least one of the two consuls was a plebeian. However, political power increasingly concentrated in the Senate, undermining these reforms.

During the Late Republic (133ā€“31 BC), Romeā€™s military success over rivals coincided with the growing influence of ordinary citizens in the judicial system, especially as jurors. Yet the republic was plagued by social conflict, corruption and civil unrest. Sullaā€™s march on Rome in 88 BC and his curtailing of the tribunesā€™ power exemplified rising instability. Afterwards, figures like in the ā€™70s BC and Julius Caesar in 59 BC began consolidating power, further undermining republican values. In 27 BC, Augustus formally transitioned Rome into an empire, while maintaining the of republican traditions.

Roman orator Cicero, a prominent defender of the Republic, inadvertently its demise through his support for Augustus, endorsement of dictatorial powers and willingness to suspend legal norms during crises, showing the dangers of sacrificing republican ideals to manage turmoil. For the next few centuries, republican ideals were largely sidelined.

The rise of modern republics

The collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD saw and monarchies spread across its former territories and peripheral regions. This instability nonetheless allowed new republics to emerge, such as Venice, founded in 697 AD. It maintained a 1,100-year run as a through a political system that encouraged merchant participation and representation, shrewd diplomacy, social mobility, community cohesion and an extensive trade network. France eventually conquered it in 1797.

During the Italian Renaissance (14th to 17th centuries), urbanization, advancements in communication and Enlightenment ideals enabled the rise of new city-states. Merchant classes and other groups established republican systems as alternatives to European monarchies elsewhere as well. However, they were ultimately absorbed by empires, partly due to their inability to exploit the expanding Atlantic trade routes that reduced the importance of the Mediterranean.

Republics were not confined to Europe. The in modern-day Malaysia, particularly the Lanfang Republic declared in 1777, arose when Chinese settlers recruited by local sultans for mining formed companies to safeguard their interests. Over time, they evolved into self-governing territories with elected leaders and various levels of democratic governance. The Lanfang Republic was eventually defeated by Dutch colonial forces in 1884, with the rest absorbed through treaty or militarily defeated by the centuryā€™s end.

The establishment of the US marked the reemergence of the large-scale republican state. In 1787, after the American Revolution, the nation formally became a constitutional republic, aiming to eliminate monarchy while avoiding a chaotic direct democracy. The Founding Fathers created a , balancing public participation with safeguards against aristocracy and emphasizing consent of the governed (though limited to white male landowners). The debates over constitutional amendments and expanding democracy for decades, paralleling similar discussions in post-Revolutionary France after 1789.

Today, many republics exist, but their authenticity and stability can be compromised. Being conquered imposes outside authority, while others pursue foreign expansion themselves, centralizing control and subjugating other territories. Republics such as those in 16th century Netherlands, 17th century England and 18th century US and France grew into empires or reverted to monarchies, adapting in ways whose lessons are still relevant today. These expansionist policies, often justified as essential for wealth and security, led to the abandonment of certain republican and democratic principles.

Risks of devolution

Republics can shift toward authoritarianism, with modern policymakers perceiving more open democratic systems as unstable and vulnerable to manipulation. In recent years, China and Russia have seen reductions in public accountability, civil liberties, meaningful political participation and concentrations of power behind Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively. In North Korea, power has been concentrated in the leaderā€™s office since its founding, with leadership passed within the Kim family. Similarly, a dynasty has developed under the Aliyev family in since the 1990s, with concerns that may follow.

Countries with strong presidential systems, common in the Americas, risk in the executive branch. Fixed terms limit the removal of unpopular leaders, since, unlike in parliamentary democracies, no ā€œconfidence voteā€ mechanism exists for crisis situations. can also weaken checks and balances; coups can be common.

Alliances and federations of Greek city-states like the and , as well as the Native American , formed assemblies and councils for representation and collective decision-making, influencing models like the and European Union (EU). The statement that the US is ā€œa republic, not a democracyā€ reflects the original aim to keep political power within the states rather than the federal government. However, authority has increasingly centralized in Washington, DC, reducing state sovereignty, tensions in the EU between individual states and Brussels.

Political apathy and extremism can also stem from the influence of billionaires and corporations over the political process, government corruption and the erosion of social mobility. Social media platforms offer the chance for heightened political participation, but are increasingly vulnerable to disinformation spread by big tech and political actors. This reveals new ways in which democracies can veer toward .

The diversity of republics today reflects their historical variety, with countries still navigating the governance structures in their own contexts. Kazakhstan, initially authoritarian, has seen some toward a more balanced system with a more powerful parliament following popular protests in 2022, though it remains less democratic. Similarly, Singapore, often described as authoritarian, is still considered a republic due to some , maintaining a blend of controlled leadership and political structure.

The future of republic governance

An informed and engaged citizenry, supported by a strong economic base, is essential for a successful republic. Citizens must feel the benefits of their system, and these must endure through fair elections, the rule of law and due process. Effective foreign policy also relies on wide-ranging trade networks and adaptable alliances, while maintaining a strong military and avoiding military overreach or falling into the trap of foreign conquest.

Historically, empire and monarchy have been more common than republics, shaping world order through hierarchical and anarchic systems. Within the global United Nations framework, which is designed to support the sovereignty and equality of nations ā€” a principle rooted in republican ideals ā€” republics can govern more democratically by collaborating in a way similar to ancient confederations. The Achaean League and Lycian League consisted of states with varying political systems cooperating within a loose, republican-style confederation. Modern blocs like the EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and African Union allow countries to work together under common principles and boost their voice in the international system.

Changes in domestic politics have seen the growth of in the 2010s, as more referendums and popular votes of legislative and constitutional issues emerged globally, but especially in Europe. While larger republics like the US, Germany and India still avoid national-level votes on major issues, direct democracy is increasingly apparent at regional and local levels. Challenges remain in terms of deliberation and integration, as states like California and Arizona have seen ballot initiatives rushed, leaving limited time for meaningful debate.

Modern , based on those originating thousands of years ago, have also elevated these referendums in recent years and provided an alternative to traditional political processes. They have influenced major policy changes, from climate policies in France to abortion laws in Ireland, with assemblies, typically convened by legislative bodies in partnership with nonprofits, designed to reflect demographics. While they have led to concrete policy shifts, some recommendations have not been adopted as lawmakers cite the importance of expert-led decision-making.

With the US election behind us, reassessing republican ideals, both domestically and globally, is crucial. As the Grand Old Party potentially gains control over all three branches of government in a divided nation, how it implements policies will either ease concerns or amplify them. The future of republicanism depends on the US shaping its domestic agenda for the common good and using its influence on the global stage in line with democratic principles.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

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The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Among the things Trump got right during his first residency in the White House was slapping Congress and the American public upside the head with a two-by-four to finally wake them up and realize that the Communist Party of China (CCP) is not a benign force in the world. This time around, Trump has the advantage of a Congress and an American public nearly unified in their opposition to the CCP, which should make it easier to ramp up the pressure on Beijing, particularly given the Republicansā€™ clean sweep of the Executive and Legislative branches.

Trumpā€™s ā€œsubtlety of a Mack truckā€-driven approach to foreign policy stands a good chance of backfiring ±¹¾±²õ-Ć -±¹¾±²õ American businesses, however, as many of them continue to feed from the Chinese teat. Tens of thousands of American businesses continue to manufacture, import from and/or export to China despite the many hardships associated with COVID-19, the downturn in the Chinese economy and the crackdown on foreign businesses in recent years. Their voices will undoubtedly be heard at the White House as Trump attempts to tighten the noose on Beijing.

Trumpā€™s cabinet and other nominations to date provide ample evidence that he is intent on burning the place down ā€” so why stop at Americaā€™s borders? The foreign policy patch-up job Biden attempted to complete over the last four years ā€” during which, many European governments, in particular, silently wondered whether an agreement with Washington was worth the paper it is printed upon ā€” will be quickly eviscerated. An unvarnished foreign policy whose core is nationalism, protectionism and a zero-sum approach to engagement is sure to delight friend and foe alike.

Is China ready for four more years of Trump?

Beijing is certainly ready, with a list of countermeasures aimed at the American government and American businesses. US businesses in China are going to find operating there even more unpleasant for the next four years. The CCP may also be expected to attempt to strengthen its bilateral relationships around the world as America retreats and will undoubtedly find heightened levels of interest, especially in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The newly inaugurated mega-port in Peru is emblematic of how Beijing continues to use its Belt-and-Road infrastructure projects to strengthen its economic and diplomatic relationships. Trumpā€™s re-election meshes nicely, also, with Beijingā€™s policy of self-reliance and the Made in China 2025 policy.

But the degree of economic, political and diplomatic malaise in China will also be impacted by Trumpā€™s second term. The Chinese economy could be significantly smaller than official statistics suggest. It is spending more and more to produce less and less. Most of its natural resources are in decline, its workforce is shrinking, Xiā€™s dictatorial rule has prompted increasing domestic uneasiness, its economy is under growing pressure, and its Asian neighbors are ever ore alarmed by Chinaā€™s aggressive actions in the region ā€” and they are reacting to it. 

China is exhibiting classic signs of a peaking power. Xiā€™s crackdowns at home and increasing aggression abroad. The military buildup during peacetime is unprecedented. And China is much more willing to extend its security perimeter and to strengthen its alliances with some of the worldā€™s most detestable regimes.

The Chinese word for crisis (·Éŧ¾±ĀįÄ«) contains characters that signify danger (危) and opportunity (ęœŗ), and Trump 2.0 represents both. Xi will want to use the next four years to de-emphasize Chinaā€™s many domestic challenges and re-emphasize its growing stature in the world. If one envisions a cessation of the Ukraine and Israel/Gaza/Lebanon/Iran wars in 2025, Xi will feel he has more latitude to further strengthen Chinaā€™s relationships with Russia, Iran, and Israel. Similarly, he is likely to feel more emboldened to introduce new initiatives to ingratiate China with a broader array of governments in areas where progress has been less pronounced, such as regarding climate change and natural disaster relief.

It seems doubtful that Trump will choose to embrace areas of possible collaboration with China, but we can expect a heightened degree of generalized competition, with an increased potential for conflict. Trumpā€™s presidency will coincide with 2027 ā€” the year Xi has targeted for the Chinese military to be ready to invade Taiwan. Trump will likely be tempted to cut some sort of deal with Xi (as he is so transaction-oriented) to essentially cede Taiwan to Beijing in return for something of substance for America. One can only speculate what that might be, but what seemed impossible only a few years ago seems increasingly possible, if not likely, now.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Iran isnā€™t the only nation advancing its nuclear capabilities in recent years. In 2019, the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range land-based missiles, citing alleged Russian violations and Chinaā€™s non-involvement. The US is also its nuclear arsenal, with to deploy nuclear weapons in more NATO states and proposals to extend its to Taiwan.

Russia, too, has intensified its nuclear posture, expanding nuclear and updating its on first use. In 2023, the nation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limited US and Russian-deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In 2024, it stationed in Belarus. Russia and China have also deepened their , setting China on a path to rapidly expand its arsenal, as nuclear security collaboration with the US has steadily over the past decade.

The breakdown of diplomacy and rising nuclear brinkmanship among major powers are heightening nuclear insecurity among themselves, but also risk spurring a new nuclear arms race. Alongside Iran, numerous countries maintain the technological infrastructure to quickly build nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation would require significant collaboration among major powers, a prospect currently out of reach.

The US detonated the first nuclear weapon in 1945, followed by the Soviet Union in , the United Kingdom in , France in and China in . It became evident that with access to uranium and enrichment technology, nations were increasingly capable of producing nuclear weapons. Though mass production and delivery capabilities were additional hurdles, it was widely expected in the early Cold War that many states would soon join the nuclear club. Israel developed nuclear capabilities in the , India detonated its first bomb in and South Africa built its first by . Other countries, including , , , , and , pursued their own programs.

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968 to curb nuclear spread, led many countries to abandon or dismantle their programs. After the end of the Cold War and under Western pressure, Iraq its nuclear program in 1991. In a historic move, South Africa voluntarily its arsenal in 1994. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1996, securing international security assurances in exchange.

Nuclear proliferation appeared to be a waning concern, but cracks soon appeared in the non-proliferation framework. Pakistan conducted its first in 1998, followed by North Korea in , bringing the count of nuclear-armed states to nine. Since then, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear weapons program, initiated in the 1980s, has been a major target of Western non-proliferation efforts.

Nuclear ambitions in the Middle East, Asia and Europe

Iran has a strong reason to persist. Ukraineā€™s former nuclear arsenal might have deterred Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022. Elsewhere, revolutionary Muammar Gaddafi, who Libyaā€™s nuclear program in 2003, was overthrown by a NATO-led coalition and local forces in 2011. If Iran achieves a functional nuclear weapon, it will lose the ability to leverage its nuclear program as a to extract concessions in negotiations. While a nuclear weapon will represent a new form of leverage, it would also intensify pressure from the US and Israel, both of whom have engaged in a cycle of escalating sometimes deadly confrontations with Iran and its proxies over the past few years.

An Iranian nuclear arsenal could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Its relations with Saudi Arabia remain delicate, despite the brokered by China. Saudi officials have they would obtain their own nuclear weapon if Iran acquired them. Saudi Arabia gave significant to Pakistanā€™s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, or even the latter with one upon request.

Turkey, which hosts US nuclear weapons through NATOā€™s , signaled a policy shift in 2019 when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan foreign powers for dictating Turkeyā€™s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkeyā€™s growing partnership with Russia in could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so.

Middle Eastern tensions are not the only force threatening non-proliferation. Japanā€™s renewed friction with China, North Korea and Russia over the past decade has intensified Tokyoā€™s focus on nuclear readiness. Although Japan a nuclear program in the 1940s, it was dismantled after World War II. Japanā€™s , however, remains measured in months. Despite this, for nuclear weapons remains low, given the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nuclear bombings in 1945 killed more than 200,000 people.

In contrast, around of South Koreans support developing nuclear weapons. South Koreaā€™s nuclear program began in the 1970s but was under US pressure. However, North Koreaā€™s successful test in 2006 and its severance of , and to the South in the past decade, coupled with the of peaceful reunification in early 2024, have again raised the issue in South Korea.

Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, which similarly under US pressure. Any sign of wavering US commitment to Taiwan, together with Chinaā€™s growing nuclear capabilities, could prompt Taiwan to revive its efforts. Though less likely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea could also motivate countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to consider developing nuclear capabilities.

Russiaā€™s war in Ukraine has also had significant nuclear implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently to the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraineā€™s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered. Zelenskyy later his comments after they ignited a firestorm of controversy. Yet if Ukraine feels betrayed by its Western partners ā€” particularly if it is forced to concede territory to Russia ā€” it could spur some factions within Ukraine to attempt to secure nuclear capabilities.

The war has also spurred nuclear considerations across Europe. In December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer a European nuclear deterrent. Donald Trumpā€™s re-election in the 2024 US presidential election could amplify European concerns over US commitments to NATO, with France having increasingly an independent European nuclear force in recent years.

Nuclear collaboration

Established nuclear powers are unlikely to welcome more countries into their ranks. But while China and Russia »å“Ē²Ōā€™t necessarily desire this outcome, they recognize the Westā€™s concerns are greater, with Russia doing in the 1990s to prevent its unemployed nuclear scientists from aiding North Koreaā€™s program.

The US has also previously been blindsided by its alliesā€™ nuclear aspirations. US policymakers underestimated Australiaā€™s determination to pursue a nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, including covert attempts to obtain a weapon from the UK. Similarly, the US was initially of Franceā€™s extensive support for ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

Smaller countries are also capable of aiding one anotherā€™s nuclear ambitions. Argentina offered considerable to ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s program, while Israel assisted . Saudi Arabia financed Pakistanā€™s nuclear development and Pakistanā€™s top nuclear scientist is of having aided Iran, Libya and North Korea with their programs in the 1980s.

The slippery slope to nuclear conflict

Conflicts involving nuclear weapons states are not without precedent. Egypt and Syria attacked nuclear-armed Israel in 1973 and Argentina faced a nuclear-armed UK in 1982. India and China have clashed over their border on several occasions. Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression. But conflicts featuring nuclear countries invite dangerous escalation, and the risk grows if a nation with limited conventional military power gains nuclear capabilities; lacking other means of defense or retaliation, it may be more tempted to resort to nuclear weapons as its only viable option.

The costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals are already steep. In 2023, the worldā€™s nine nuclear-armed states spent an estimated managing their programs. But what incentive do smaller countries have to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely, especially when they observe the protection nuclear weapons offer and witness the major powers intensifying their nuclear strategies?

Obtaining the worldā€™s most powerful weapons may be a natural ambition of military and intelligence sectors, but it hinges on the political forces in power as well. In Iran, moderates could counterbalance hardliners, while continued support for Ukraine might prevent more nationalist forces from coming to power there.

Yet an additional country obtaining a nuclear weapon could set off a cascade of others. While larger powers are currently leading the nuclear posturing, smaller countries may see an opportunity amid the disorder. The limited support for the , in effect since 2021, coupled with the collapse of other international treaties, reinforces the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states. With major powers in open contention, the barriers to nuclear ambitions are already weakening, making it ever harder to dissuade smaller nations from pursuing the ultimate deterrent.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Which Countries Are on the Brink of Going Nuclear? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Although they belong to different sects of Islam, Hezbollah has solidarity with fellow-Iranian-backed Islamist militant group Hamas. In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel and the subsequent Israeli invasion of Gaza, Hezbollah has targeted Israel with rocket strikes. They succeeded in displacing 60,000 Israelis from their homes. Since Israel is small and much of it is uninhabitable desert, this interdiction of a significant part of the north is a serious threat.

On September 17 and 18, Israel upped the ante and conducted a stunning operation blowing up thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah. At least 37 people died and thousands were wounded. One of the wounded was the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon. When Hezbollah called a clandestine meeting of 15 elite officers on September 21, an Israeli air strike killed off all of them.

The attacks demonstrated just how pervasive Israeli intelligenceā€™s penetration into Hezbollahā€™s command control and communications is. Israel appears to have disrupted Hezbollahā€™s ability to coordinate itself. The militant group has so far failed to mount an effective response. Hezbollah operatives have launched many missiles, but theyā€™ve been uniformly unable to penetrate ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s Iron Dome air defense system.

The devastating strike has called into question Hezbollahā€™s legitimacy as the most powerful force in Lebanon. Will Hezbollah risk total destruction by fighting a full-scale war with Israel, or will they decide to take the strikes on the chin?

What is the way forward for Jerusalem?

The Israeli strikes were a historic tactical victory. But will Israel achieve strategic victory? The present situation recalls ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s devastating 1982 air assault on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), then based in southern Lebanon. Israel succeeded in demolishing the PLO. But, in so doing, it created a power vacuum within a destabilized Lebanon that enabled Hezbollah to rise to dominance. Israel had replaced one Islamist group with another more radical one.

If history repeats itself, Jerusalem may not want to see what replaces Hezbollah. There is no telling what that would look like, but a post-Hezbollah Lebanese militia would likely be less technologically sophisticated and thus harder to infiltrate, as well as more desperate and thus potentially willing to use chemical weapons.

For Iran, the strikes are a wake-up call. Hezbollah was ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s insurance against Israel ā€” the constant threat on ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s northern border deterred the Jewish state from being too aggressive against Iran. Now, Israel has shown this safety to be illusory and demonstrated that it is willing and able to kill Iranian leaders wherever they are, including in Iran itself.

If a hot war between Israel and Iran broke out, the Islamic Republic, which is already tottering due to internal strife, would probably topple. Still, victory might prove to be Pyrrhic for Israel. Since the start of its current engagement with Hamas, Israel has already seen its economy shrink by 20%. A larger war might leave Israel alive but just barely, impoverished and dependent on foreign protection.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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These events have been alarming, and there is a legitimate fear that they could spark a wider war in the region. However, all parties have expressed a desire to avoid full-scale war. While tensions are high, a regional conflict involving Hezbollah, Israel and Iran ā€” potentially drawing in the US and other nations ā€” may be less imminent than it appears. These offensive actions might be part of a calculated strategy to signal boundaries and demonstrate power without crossing the line to broader conflict.

Perhaps the greater issue Israel faces is its growing internal tensions, particularly the widening rift between the far right and more moderate elements of the government. An of 10 Israeli soldiers on July 29 for sexually assaulting Palestinian prisoners ignited heated protests. This has heightened concerns that Israel could be on the brink of internal conflict and destabilization.

Who did Israel assassinate, and why?Ģż

±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s assassination of Fouad was reportedly in retaliation for a Hezbollah rocket attack that struck the occupied Golan Heights, tragically killing 12 children. Shukur was allegedly behind this attack. He had also been wanted in the US for decades due to his involvement in the 1983 bombing of a Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon, which killed 241 American service members.Ģż

Assasinating the Hezbollah commander thus appears to be a more or less rational move. However, the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh seems less logical from a strategic perspective.

was killed when an Israeli rocket hit his official residence in Tehran while he was attending the swearing-in ceremony of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s new president. Iran has long used Hezbollah as a proxy in its broader strategy against Israel. Haniyeh was the the head of Hamasā€™s political wing and widely known for his more moderate and cosmopolitan approach, compared to his counterparts. He was a central figure in the ongoing efforts to broker a ceasefire in Gaza. The killing of Haniyeh likely silenced a moderating voice within Hamas and could push his successor toward a harder, less compromising stance against Israel.Ģż

Domestic political pressures, rather than military necessity, may have driven the assassination. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may have felt the need to strike Iran in order to assuage the far right and maintain domestic stability. 

There is a concern that events could into a broader conflict in the Middle East, all parties have continuously expressed a desire to avoid full-scale war. Each side appears to be carefully navigating the situation, using targeted strikes and other “tit for tat” tactics to communicate their limits while avoiding escalation. For instance, when Iran launched 300 missiles and drones at Israel, they made it clear through backchannels that they were not seeking war. Israel responded in a similar manner, signaling its intent to avoid a broader conflict.Ģż

±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s growing internal tensions

While external threats are significant, the growing rift between the far right and more moderate elements of the Israeli government poses a greater risk to the country’s stability. 

On July 29, Israel 10 soldiers for the sexual assault and abuse of Palestinian prisoners. Following their arrest, far-right protesters stormed two military bases in Southern and Central Israel. Protests have continued into this month, with right-wing demonstrators effectively rallying for the right to rape and mistreat Palestinian detainees as they see fit.Ģż

In this situation, Netanyahu has positioned himself as a moderate figure, and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant called for peace, emphasizing that no one is above the law. However, the far right remains defiant, rejecting these calls. The growing schism within Israel is becoming increasingly serious, raising concerns that the country could be on the verge of internal conflict ā€” potentially even civil war.

The big issue for Israel may be the internal struggle between its more secular, democratic heritage and the rise of ultra-Orthodox factions. This internal struggle is harder to see than the immediate external conflicts but potentially even more destabilizing in the long run.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece]Ģż

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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ā€œFears of Wider Mideast Conflict Deepen, With U.S. Seen as ā€˜Not in Controlā€™ā€

The articleā€™s author, London bureau chief Mark Landler, develops a quote he gleaned from a veteran of the Obama State Department. ā€œThis is going to make the region extremely nervous. Itā€™s never good for the United States to be seen as not in control.ā€

°Õ“Ē»å²¹²āā€™s Weekly Devilā€™s Dictionary definition:

In control:

1. An often fleeting and frequently unstable feeling of mastery felt by people who find themselves in situations they are familiar with which leads them to believe they understand all the parameters of the situation.
2. An increasingly unjustified feeling of mastery of other people and nations by politicians in Washington, DC, the effect of decades of blindness to cultural differences and the deceitful impression that fear of a dominant power is an indicator of admiration, respect and even love.

Contextual note

Analysts of cultural differences have often pointed out that in US political and media culture, one of the core values is control, the idea that things should never be left to unknown influences. It links with another core value: self-reliance. Most of the worldā€™s cultures leave considerable room for chance or fatality in the way events play out. ±õ²Ō³¦³óā€™A±ō±ō²¹³ó is often evoked outside the Muslim world. 

In the US, citizens learn from an early age that they are on their own in their quest to control the environment and the events they may be involved in. Even if team effort is encouraged, the focus of groups is not camaraderie but to work together to ensure their collective control.

Landersā€™s article provides some context for the helplessness expressed in its headline. ā€œFor President Biden, who expended time and prestige trying to broker a deal between Israel and Hamas to release hostages in Gaza, the back-to-back assassinations of the Hezbollah commander, Fuad Shukr, and the Hamas political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, could signal the futility of his diplomatic efforts, at least for now.ā€

Without being disrespectful, I canā€™t fail to find this laughable for two reasons. The first is Landersā€™s assumption that there ever was any hope of being ā€œin controlā€ of a situation that has been consistently controlled by one voice alone, that of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The second is his phrase, ā€œdiplomatic efforts.ā€ Many of us have noticed that diplomacy is now a long-forgotten art in the US. The US no longer ā€œengagesā€ in diplomacy. It imposes what it calls diplomacy. What that means is that it states a position, usually framing it as an inviolable principle, and then expects others to fall into line. But when someone like Netanyahu refuses to fall into line, Washington prefers looking helpless.

The fact that an NYT bureau chief can express surprise and disappointment at Bidenā€™s loss of control is quite simply comic. I wonā€™t even begin to cite the impressive number of perfectly sane people who refused to believe that a policy characterized by sending messages of mild disagreement to an increasingly violent and visibly unhinged regime had any chance of producing a different result. They all pointed out that a simple phone call informing his good friend Bibi that the US would be obliged to cut off support for a war that was clearly already out of anyoneā€™s control has been possible for months, but never attempted.

A pattern emerged even in the early days of the conflict. Washington offers warnings about not going too far or not attempting particular acts, such as the bombing of Rafah. US media then proudly trumpets the warnings to show that the Biden administration was capable of taking a moral position, at least rhetorically. But when those warnings produced no result other than new atrocities, the White House and the media would express their disappointment and hope that such crimes would not be repeated. The Biden administration projected to the world the simple message that it was never in control.

Historical note

Since its founding less than 250 years ago, the new American democracy has enjoyed the privilege of sensing that it is in control of most of the things it has had to deal with. As the sole Europeans inhabiting a stretch of continent that extended westward to the Pacific, the British colonists in control of their towns, farms, plantations and waterways along the east coast of the US understood the opportunity that awaited them. It was based, paradoxically, on their belief, formally stated, that ā€œall men are created equal,ā€ but completed by the sentiment that some groups of those men are destined to dominate others. Before obtaining their independence, the discomfort they felt with the fact that the government in London was constraining their ambition turned out to be a major factor fueling their desire to revolt and break the bonds of dependence on Britain.

The local populations that inhabited the continent before the arrival of Europeans clearly lacked the advanced level of economic and technological culture that had already begun to define modern Europe, and England in particular. The indigenous tribes simply could not compete with the ever more resourceful Anglo-Saxons, who had mastered the science of ā€œprosperityā€ through organization, industry, technology and personal ambition. The European Americans were paragons of what historian Jan de Vries the ā€œindustrious revolutionā€ that preceded and continued to accompany the industrial revolution that was already underway in England.

Once they had achieved independence, westward expansion began. It later took on its own separate historical status when the population viewed it as ā€œmanifest destiny.ā€ By the middle of the 20th century, some began expressing their concern with the ā€œclosing of the frontier,ā€ which of course provoked President John F Kennedyā€™s youthful administration in 1961 to evoke a ā€œNew Frontier.ā€ The spirit of expansion with a view to control, validated by a Calvinist God who instituted manifest destiny has been a permanent feature of the US political mindset. This should help observers today to understand why the eastward expansion of NATO, though initially resisted by many European leaders and dramatically opposed by Russia, seems to everyone in Washington totally natural and probably predestined.

The Strategy Bridge, a foreign policy think tank, in a 2021 paper a commission of former government officials who, in 1996, ā€œconducted a study of American vital interestsā€ that listed five goals:

ā€œ(1) prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States; (2) prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia; (3) prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S. borders or in control of the seas; (4) prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems; and (5) ensure the survival of U.S. allies.ā€

The breadth of those goals expressed the view of the hegemon feeling alone on the stage in what is now referred to as ā€œthe unipolar moment.ā€ With the Soviet empire gone, Washington finally felt in total control. The ultimate promise of the culture was fulfilled. All would be well in the world. Francis Fukuyama even it the ā€œend of history.ā€ĢżĢż

For two decades, an attempt to control the politics and economy of the Middle East led to slowly unfolding disappointment, when US leaders failed to manage the controls. Subsequent events in eastern Europe and the Middle East are demonstrating today that, despite constant resolutions and promises to regain control of declining military and economic fortunes, the capacity of the US to influence other regions of the world in any other way than provoking conflicts that inevitably go out of control has disappeared. We see this in the erosion of the once effective arsenal of soft power that instilled a positive perception of the US and its culture across the globe. Now it becomes visible with every act that announces to the world that the combined force of Washingtonā€™s armies, spies, financial domination, technology, media and social networks cannot even ā€œensure the survival of U.S. allies.ā€

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devilā€™s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51³Ō¹Ļ Devilā€™s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post A Gray Lady Now Wonders, ā€œWhoā€™s at the Controls?ā€ appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Already the alacrity of US presidents to impose sanctions on anyone who fails to conform with US policies has persuaded many nations to seek an escape route from the tyranny of the US dollar in global trade. Are American politicians and their media not aware of the damage US foreign policy has wrought on American soft power, which has in the past played an important role in promoting a positive image of the US?ā€

Your observations highlight several important and interconnected issues regarding the perception of US foreign policy and its impact on international relations and American soft power. Hereā€™s a detailed examination of these points:

1. **Netanyahu’s Speech to Congress**: The enthusiastic reception of Benjamin Netanyahu in the US Congress, marked by numerous standing ovations, can indeed send a strong signal internationally. For many observers, particularly in regions like the Middle East and South Asia, it might reinforce the perception of the US being unconditionally supportive of Israeli policies, including those that are controversial or widely condemned, such as the treatment of Palestinians.
2. **US Wars in the Middle East**: The US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have left deep scars and a legacy of instability in the region. The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 further damaged the USā€™s reputation, showing perceived failures in strategic planning and execution. These military actions have significantly influenced global perceptions, fostering skepticism and resentment towards American interventions.
3. **Support for Israel**: The strong and often unconditional support for Israel, particularly in the context of actions in Gaza and the West Bank, is a contentious issue. Many international bodies and observers have criticized ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s actions as human rights violations or even as potential war crimes. This unwavering US support can alienate other nations and peoples, contributing to a perception of bias and double standards in American foreign policy.
4. **Sanctions and International Reactions**: The USā€™s frequent use of economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy has prompted a backlash. Countries targeted by these sanctions often see them as coercive and unjust, leading to efforts to create alternatives to the US-dominated financial system. The BRICS nationsā€™ move towards creating mechanisms independent of the US dollar is a significant step in this direction, reflecting a desire to reduce dependency on US economic influence.
5. **Decline of American Soft Power**: Soft power, the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce, has been a cornerstone of American influence since the Cold War. Cultural appeal, democratic values, and the promise of economic opportunity have traditionally garnered international goodwill. However, recent foreign policy decisions, perceived as aggressive or unilateral, have eroded this soft power. Global opinion has been increasingly critical of US policies, from military interventions to economic sanctions and support for contentious allies.
6. **Media and Political Awareness**: Within the US, there is often a disconnect between domestic political narratives and international perceptions. American politicians and media might focus on domestic approval and political gain, sometimes at the expense of understanding or addressing the broader implications of their policies. This inward focus can lead to a lack of awareness or acknowledgment of the negative impact on global perceptions and relations.

In conclusion, the convergence of these factors indicates a significant challenge for US foreign policy. Restoring and maintaining American soft power requires a nuanced and empathetic approach, acknowledging global perspectives, and fostering international cooperation. Awareness and adjustment of strategies in response to these criticisms could help mitigate the damage and rebuild the trust and influence that the US has traditionally enjoyed.

ā€œMay I point out that of the six points you develop, the first five are simple reformulations of the points I made? The sixth is the only one that even acknowledges my question, but instead of seeking to provide an answer ā€“ for example in the form of insightful analysis of what motivates the politicians and media to persist in this blindness ā€“ you simply echo my own observations. You identify the problem as one of ā€˜inward focus.ā€™ That seems obvious. My question seeks to go further, to understand what in the composition of the US political and media system and the culture contributes to preventing open discussion about this basic problem of perception. By not broaching the question, it is impossible to find answers. Worse, the degree of alienation this produces across the globe appears to be reaching a tipping point that could presage open conflict. No one ā€“ except maybe the media ā€“ have anything to gain from open conflict. And yet the conditions that may spawn it are becoming aggravated by the day, as the Netanyahu episode illustrates. So, do you have any insight into why the political institutions, including Congress, and the media resist facing a truth that can only work to the detriment of the American people?ā€

Your concerns about the deeper structural and cultural reasons behind the US political and media systemsā€™ apparent resistance to addressing global perceptions of American foreign policy are valid and complex. Letā€™s delve into some possible factors that contribute to this issue:

1. **Political Incentives and Domestic Focus**:

• **Electoral Dynamics**: US politicians are primarily motivated by the need to secure votes and maintain political power. This often means catering to domestic audiences and interest groups that have significant influence on elections. Foreign policy decisions that might be unpopular domestically, even if they improve international relations, are often avoided.
• **Lobbying and Interest Groups**: Powerful lobbying groups, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), exert considerable influence over US foreign policy. Their ability to mobilize political and financial support means that many politicians align with their positions, sometimes at the expense of broader international considerations.

2. **Media Ecosystem**:

• **Corporate Ownership and Profit Motives**: Major media outlets in the US are often owned by large corporations with vested interests. Sensationalism, conflict, and stories that appeal to partisan audiences drive viewership and advertising revenue. This can lead to a narrow focus on issues that resonate with domestic audiences rather than nuanced international perspectives.
• **Echo Chambers and Partisan Divides**: The rise of social media and partisan news outlets has created echo chambers where audiences are exposed primarily to information that reinforces their existing beliefs. This limits the scope for critical discussion and understanding of complex international issues.

3. **Cultural and Historical Factors**:

• **Exceptionalism**: There is a deeply ingrained belief in American exceptionalism, the idea that the US has a unique role and moral duty to lead the world. This can foster a dismissive attitude towards international criticism and a reluctance to engage with perspectives that challenge this narrative.
• **Historical Context**: The legacy of the Cold War and the subsequent unipolar moment in the 1990s reinforced a sense of American dominance. Adjusting to a multipolar world where US actions are scrutinized and challenged is a difficult transition for both political leaders and the public.

4. **Structural and Institutional Constraints**:

• **Bureaucratic Inertia**: Institutions like the Department of State and Department of Defense have established ways of operating that can be resistant to change. Policies and attitudes formed during previous administrations can persist, limiting the flexibility to adapt to new international realities.
• **Checks and Balances**: The US political system, with its multiple layers of checks and balances, can slow down policy changes. Even when there is recognition of the need for a shift in foreign policy, implementing these changes can be a protracted process.

5. **Educational and Informational Gaps**:

• **Lack of Global Awareness**: The American education system and media often do not prioritize international education or perspectives, leading to a populace that may be less informed about global issues and the impact of US foreign policy.
• **Narrative Control**: Government and media narratives can shape public understanding and discourse. When these narratives focus on national security and patriotic themes, critical discussions about foreign policy are sidelined.

Understanding these factors helps to illuminate why there is resistance to facing certain truths about US foreign policy and its global repercussions. Addressing these issues would require a concerted effort to reform political incentives, diversify media ownership and content, promote global awareness, and foster a culture of critical engagement with international perspectives. Without such changes, the conditions that exacerbate global alienation and potential conflict are likely to persist.

If I were grading a student, Iā€™d give ChatGPT an A+ for this answer. This should demonstrate that to get anything substantial and formally reasoned from AI requires two things: precision and patience. It means asking the right questions, not once but multiple times by patiently reformulating them. We need to understand that if AI has a strategy as the participant in a dialogue, its goal isnā€™t accuracy. Instead, it aims at creating the impression of being well-informed.

To coax ChatGPT to the point that it can prove genuinely helpful in producing an answer to a question, the interrogator must repeat and reformulate that question, possibly multiple times. More often than not, AI will tell you what you already know, while adding a few facts and complementary arguments. Now, that might sound like a trivial outcome, but it points to a way in which AI can be a wonderfully constructive aid to education.

Thatā€™s a topic of major importance we intend to address in future columns.

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.

*[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyoneā€™s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51³Ō¹Ļ, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Outside the Box: The Hardening Truth About Soft Power appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

There is no indication of foul play at work here. It seems the crash was caused by a combination of bad decision-making by the pilot, dismal weather conditions and a poorly maintained helicopter. The craft was a Bell 212 from the 1960s, so it needed to be well maintained to operate for all these years, which US sanctions have made difficult.

Raisiā€™s sudden death raises pertinent questions about ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s future. He was set to succeed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the top dog in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s theocratic state. Raisiā€™s premature demise raises the question of succession. Who will be Khameneiā€™s successor now, and who will succeed Raisi as president? There is another follow-up question: How will these new leaders shape Iran, the Middle East and the rest of the world?

More repression in store ahead

Raisi was a murderous leader. In 1988, at the end of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s war with Iraq, he over 5,000 people ā€” political prisoners, militants and more ā€” to death. In 2022, massive protests broke out over Kurdish Iranian Mahsa Aminiā€™s death in custody. This young woman was arrested and fatally beaten for failing to observe Islamic headscarf laws. The former president authorized security to use to quash the outcry, killing over 500 protesters. Raisiā€™s propensity for bloodshed made many Iranians loathe him.

Though he was colorless and uncreative, Raisi was ruthless. Furthermore, he was a doctrinaire upholder of Islamic theology and a faithful servant of the regime. Thus, he was a good fit to be the next Supreme Leader. Khamenei is now 85 years old, and the question of succession is in the air. A few plausible successors have emerged. They are theologians or political figures. Importantly, Khameneiā€™s son, , is also in the fray.

Despite his violent past, Raisi was a bulwark against the total dominance of the increasingly aggressive Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is the praetorian guard of the revolutionary regime and is now the most powerful institution in Iran. Dangerously, the IRGC is demanding a more assertive policy in the Middle East. Without Raisi to hold the organization back, the IRGC is likely to claim more power ā€” probably all of it ā€” in the state and the economy.

The next generation of potential leaders holds more conservative and anti-Western views than Raisiā€™s generation, which rose to power in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s 1979 . Raisi, the ruling ayatollahs and the IRGC recognized that most of Iranian society repudiates the regimeā€™s conservative theological tenets and repressive restrictions. To keep the regimeā€™s hold on power, the next Iranian president will probably tighten these restrictions, crushing any form of dissent and engaging in foreign aggression to appeal to Iranian patriotism.

An Iran more hostile to the West

In his international political career, Raisi pursued ā€œresistance diplomacy.ā€ While Iran was hostile to the West, particularly the US, it sought the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear and rapprochement. US President Donald Trump undid this by withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018 and imposing further sanctions.

This development led Raisi to conclude that rapprochement would not be beneficial for Iran. He the Iranian nuclear weapons program in 2021, bringing the countryā€™s first nuclear weapon closer to reality. Yet his government still signaled to the US and Israel that Iran did not want regional war.

Tensions flared up from time to time with sporadic attacks and assassinations. These further increased on October 7, 2023 when Hamas, the militant Islamist Palestinian group, a devastating attack on Israelis. On April 1, 2024, an Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, the capital of Syria, killed top IRGC officers. In retaliation, Iran officially Israeli territory for the first time in history, deploying 300 missiles and drones. Though Israeli forces intercepted and destroyed most of these weapons, Iran proved it could strike Israel. Intercepting the Iranian weapons also cost Israel and the US billions of dollars, while it only cost Iran millions to launch them.

Before his death, Raisi closer relations with Russia and China, two of the USā€™s greatest adversaries. His coming successor is likely to continue this outreach. This is a strategic disaster for the West and creates a more dangerous Middle East.

What governmental changes lie in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s future?

The Iranian president is a figurehead and the Supreme Leader holds all real power. So, it barely matters who is elected the next president. Further, the IRGC will increase its already determinative power. In the near future, it may ascend the throne openly and rule Iran directly as a thugocracy. This control will bring forth a leader who will likely be worse for the world than Raisi and Khamenei. The only countries that will not be negatively impacted by such a development are Russia, China and North Korea.

As stated earlier, the new Iranian government will probably become more oppressive. It is likely to enforce an even stricter interpretation of Islamic law on Iranian society. This will make the country more miserable and the Middle East more menacing. The government is also likely to continue the policies of ā€œdeath to Israelā€ and ā€œdeath to America.ā€ This would involve more aggressive actions to expand Iranian influence in the Middle East via ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s regional surrogates: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen as well as various Shia groups in Iraq and Syria. Finally, the new Iranian government will move closer to developing a nuclear weapon.

Raisi was cruel, but the next generation of leaders are more merciless. Raisiā€™s generation is slowly dying out, ushering in a younger, even more radical set of leaders. No matter how bad things are, they can always get worse. It looks like they will soon.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FOĀ° Exclusive: ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s President Falls Out of the Sky appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

To Scarboroughā€™s surprise, the conversation quickly turned out to be slightly embarrassing. You can watch ithere:

The discussion began with what even today every mainstream media commentator takes to be codified wisdom about ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s sacred right to self-defense when he solemnly asked his interlocutor, ā€œWhat do we do the next time Israel is attacked from an outside force? What do we do at that point?ā€

Brzezinski brutally responded that it was ā€œthe wrong question.ā€ Scarborough seemed shocked by his guestā€™s impertinence. Speaking from the position of regal authority that hosting a news show on MSNBC confers on him, Scarborough shot back by denying it was the wrong question before explaining what he believed to be the real problem: ā€œWe never get the condemnation of Hamas or Hezbollah. Itā€™s always after Israel responds to defending itself.ā€

Brzezinski calmly responded, explaining that the conflict had ā€œlasted for years and the United States has been largely passive, so the right question is not: ā€˜What do we do when things break down?ā€™ The right question is: ā€˜What do we do to avoid a breakdown by being engaged seriously in the peace process.ā€™ā€

Brzezinski then went on to explain that the failure to do so led to ā€œthe messā€ that had become visible in 2009. This was too much for Scarborough, who had served as a Republican member of Congress from 1995 to 2001. Taking offense at the suggestion that Republicans had created the mess, he set the rules on what was and was not permitted. ā€œYou cannot blame what’s going on in Israel on the Bush administration.”

Unperturbed, the knowledgeable expert remained calm but ³¦“Ē³Ü±ō»å²Ōā€™t hold back. ā€œYou know, you have such a stunningly superficial knowledge of what went on that it’s almost embarrassing to listen to you.ā€

°Õ“Ē»å²¹²āā€™s Weekly Devilā€™s Dictionary definition:

Stunningly superficial knowledge:

The entire set of talking points adopted and enforced by members of the corporate media in the United States, who consider it their duty to repeat those talking points endlessly, even in the face of visible facts on the ground or the honest discourse of truly informed observers that incontrovertibly reveal them to be false.

Contextual note

This interview contains a curious tragi-comic twist that could not have been apparent at the time. In early 2017, eight years later, Scarborough became secretly engaged to his co-host Mika Brzezinski, the diplomatā€™s daughter. In that same month of May, Zbigniew died. Six months later, the marriage took place. At the time of the interview, Mikaā€™s father could not have guessed that he was insulting the man destined to become his future son-in-law. At the time, Joe was happily married, at least until his divorce in 2013.

This interview took place in the transitional period between Obamaā€™s election and his inauguration. The ā€œGaza warā€ of 2008 had begun three days earlier, a three-week war that resulted in the death of 1,400 Gazans, 13 Israelis and the destruction of 46,000 homes, leaving 100,000 homeless.

The media at the time treated the exchange between Joe and Zbigniew as at best an amusing anecdote. It takes on vastly more significance today with a new war in Gaza threatens to trigger a new world war. Fifteen years on, it tells us more about how the media has evolved, or rather failed to evolve since then. This time, Joeā€™s father-in-law cannot be present to highlight the mediaā€™s ā€” and not just Joeā€™s ā€” stunning superficiality.

Half a century ago, in the age of Walter Cronkite on CBS and Huntley and Brinkley on NBC, a news media figure lecturing an expert would have been unthinkable. Those journalists treated the news with humility. They sought to hear what the experts they interviewed would say. They refrained from spouting the governmentā€™s slogans at them.

°Õ“Ē»å²¹²āā€™s news hosts and interviewers tend to be eponymous stars of shows highlighting their names. Whether its Morning Joe, Piers Morgan, Rachel Maddow or Tucker Carlson, these personalities see their mission as converting the audience to their position on politics, which generally represents somebodyā€™s party line. Brzezinski was right to call Scarboroughā€™s lazy thinking the repetition of ā€œslogans.ā€

Fifteen years later, Scarborough continues to demonstrate his allergy to any form of critical thinking. On May 12, he on X a piece of obvious fake news that was quickly. Scarborough has still not retracted it. The tweet reads: ā€œUN halves estimates of women and children killed in Gaza. Apparently, the Hamas figures repeatedly cited are false.ā€

Scarboroughā€™s figures, not the UNā€™s, are false. ā€œSuperficialā€ would be too kind an epithet to use today.

Historical note

Zbigniew Brzezinski counseled President Lyndon Johnson on foreign policy between 1966 and 1968. He earned his media stripes and became known to the public eight years later when Jimmy Carter made him the his foreign policy wizard. He thus replaced Richard Nixonā€™s and then Gerald Fordā€™s Henry Kissinger as the ā€œinternational brainā€ of the White House. The 1970s were that curious decade in which presidents felt obliged to feature a powerful thinker in their team to justify their foreign policy. Nixon had Kissinger; Carter chose Brzezinski.

Both achieved stardom thanks to their deep knowledge and strategic thinking. That doesnā€™t mean the policies they promoted were destined to prove more effective. They were simply better thought-out.

As a number of his obituaries last November revealed, many serious commentators today consider Kissinger an unmitigated war criminal. Brzezinski famously promoted the idea of the ā€œAfghan trapā€ that pushed the US to support Afghan mujahideen fighters against the Soviets after their invasion. In retrospect, he was playing the sorcererā€™s apprentice. That policy spawned the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as a powerful and uncontrollable political force throughout the Middle East that also spilled into Europe.

Kissingerā€™s promotion of the ā€œpeace processā€ in the Middle East may have had similar effects, leading to todayā€™s genocidal campaign and existential crisis. ā€œThe genius of [Kissingerā€™s] peace process,ā€ according to US diplomat,, ā€œis that it wasnā€™t designed to produce peace, but it was designed to produce order.ā€ The order it produced ā€œmade it possible for Israel to buy time,ā€ which ultimately nourished the hegemonic obsession of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s leaders.

Our civilization has shown a talent for letting local problems, deemed to require hegemonic leadership, spin out of control. We see it in Ukraine. We see it again in Gaza. Itā€™s time to begin asking itself a deeply embarrassing question about how we frame the problems we seek to address. Are subtle thinkers like Brzezinski and Kissinger more dangerous than stunningly superficial media figures like Joe Scarborough? If Morning Joe, Rachel Maddow and Piers Morgan were the voices guiding our leaders, would the outcomes be better?

In reality, the ā€œgreat strategistsā€ and the media people are playing out their respective roles in a spectacle that not only has room for both but has found subtle ways of getting them to work side by side within the same dysfunctional system, even when they disagree. Thatā€™s because politicians manage the space between the two. Brzezinskiā€™s explanation of the peace talks should have definitively settled the question of Yasser Arafatā€™s supposed ā€œrefusalā€ of the two-state solutions. And yet Hillary Clinton gets mountains of airtime making the same as Scarborough even today.

At the end of the 2008 interview, Scarborough sarcastically ā€œadmittedā€ that he was ā€œlistening to the mainstream media too much.ā€ He had cited The New York Times, The Washington Post and Foreign Affairs as his sources that he would now have to abandon.

Would he had actually done so 15 years ago!

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devilā€™s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51³Ō¹Ļ Devilā€™s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Dr. Brzezinskiā€™s Stunning Revelation About the Peace Process appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s hit Natanz, in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s central Esfahan province. However, both sides seem to be dialing down the rhetoric for now. Iran declared ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s strikes as ineffective and said it saw no reason for a second retaliation. While the tit-for-tat exchange between Iran and Israel may have let off enough steam to prevent an all-out war, the situation remains dangerous. Deep undercurrents drive the current turmoil and have heavy ramifications.

Regional politics are on a dangerous precipice

After suffering negative headlines for months, Israel has won back some international sympathy due to the Iranian attack. However, the Israeli political system is now fundamentally unstable. Prime Minister Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahuā€™s war leadership has proved ineffective, and his political position is precarious. 

Though the administration is in paralysis, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are still the top dogs in the region. Their attack on Damascus almost eliminated the entire leadership of the IRGC. In addition, the Arab Sunni states surrounding Israel helped shoot down ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s missiles and drones.

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s attack shows both their strengths and limitations. They have indeed hit Israel. Though international media were quick to report that 99% of the missiles and drones were destroyed, most of these were outdated tech that Iran used as decoys. The 1% that made it through included serious missiles that successfully struck their targets. However, this capability alone will do Iran little good. The Islamic Republic has no allies in the region except for non-state entities like Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas. Not one Arab state supported their attack on Israel.

However, the attack is useful for domestic purposes. ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s mullahs use the Israelā€“Hamas war as a tool to increase their public support. Handily, this saber-rattling against Israel also wins Iran greater popularity on the Arab street and boosts its power in the Middle East.

This anti-Israel sentiment makes the region more volatile. It comes at a time when the Israeli political system is weak and the IDF, their much-vaunted prowess, have been unable to achieve either of their war goals: rescuing the hostages and destroying Hamas. 

Although support for Bibi has dipped, the majority of Israelis is still in favor of the current military operation. At the same time, brutality by IDF soldiers in the West Bank has actually increased the popularity of Hamas in that moth-eaten Palestinian territory. In Gaza, Hamas is still in charge. Thereā€™s no sign the violence that began thanks to the terrible terrorist attacks of October 7 will decrease any time soon.

Things could very easily get a lot worse

The ramifications of the regionā€™s political unrest have reached the US. Mass protests have erupted in college campuses over President Joe Bidenā€™s support for Israel. Young people believe that Israel is conducting genocide and the US is complicit in this crime. So, they are up in arms against Biden.

Related Reading

Do You Think the Startling Columbia Protests Were Peaceful?

If public opinion has turned against Israel in American college campuses, imagine what it must be like in Arab countries. Many Western observers rejoice at the fact that Arab countries oppose Iran and tacitly, though not overtly, support Israel. Yet there is a fly in the ointment. The Arab palace and the Arab street do not see eye to eye on Israel.

In fact, many Arabs see their rulers as traitors who are selling out like Judas for the proverbial thirty pieces of silver. There is a real risk of a second Arab uprising. Should Arab mullahs gain power like their Iranian counterparts in the not-too-distant future, Israel would find governments arguably even more hostile than ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s in their near neighborhood. It goes without saying that this would inflame tensions in the Middle East even further.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FOĀ° Exclusive: Conflict in the Middle East Is Now Dangerous appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

New rules in the Iranā€“Israel war

The unprecedented Iranian attack marks a significant escalation from the two countriesā€™ ongoing shadow war. Previously, the Iranians directed their attacks on Israel through their proxies, such as the Shia terrorist group Hezbollah in southern Lebanon or other militia groups in Syria and Iraq. For its part, Israel limited its operations against Iran to attacks on those proxy groups, cyberattacks against various Iranian computer networks, including the famous in the Natanz nuclear weapons development complex, and assassinations of key Iranian nuclear scientists and IRGC commanders.

It was just such an elimination operation in Damascus against the IRGCā€™s senior commander for the Levant on April 1, 2024, that led to ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s decision to launch its 320-plus missile and drone barrage against Israel. Israel responded with its own on an Iranian air base in Esfahan. While that attack avoided nearby Iranian nuclear facilities, it sent a clear message to Tehran that Israel can strike Iran anywhere it desires with destructive effect. Meanwhile, Israel shot down nearly all of the Iranian missiles and drones launched its way with minimal damage and no loss of life, thanks to considerable help from the Americans, Jordanians and others.

For now, the two sides have decided to stand down. However, few believe that this most recent exchange is the end of it all. Iran will continue to employ its IRGC-supplied and directed proxies to attack Israel, including, since October 7, the Houthis in Yemen. And Israel will take measures to protect itself, not only targeting these various proxies themselves but also the IRGC commanders who advise them. The gloves are off for both; their respective territories are now fair game under the new rules of the game after April 13.

IRGC power is now increasingly assertive in Tehran

Why did Iran, whose IRGC officers have been targets in the past of Israeli and American attacks, decide to respond with a direct attack on Israel? Previously, Iran had been careful about directly targeting Israel or US facilities in the region. The one clear exception was ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s January 2020 missile attack against a US base in Iraq that injured more than 100 US soldiers. The attack was in response to the US of IRGC commanding general Qassim Soleimani only days before during a visit to Iraq. Then-President Donald Trump had ordered the assassination. Like the April 2024 attack against Israel, the 2020 attack against a US facility was the first direct Iranian attack against its adversary launched from inside Iran. The Americans did not respond to the missile attack against their base, and the tit-for-tat stopped.

It is more than a coincidence that these direct attacks occurred in response to the killings of very senior IRGC officers. One was the senior-most commander, while the other was the second senior-most IRGC officer in the Levant. Soleimani, in particular, was an immensely powerful and popular figure in Iran with almost superman status. So, it wouldnā€™t be presumptuous to infer that the IRGC that the political leadership in Tehran, namely Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, approve direct reprisal attacks to redeem the IRGCā€™s honor and establish a red line on eliminating its senior leaders.

Younger IRGC officers, who are much less risk-averse than their senior leaders, must have been furiously overwrought that their senior leaders could be removed in this way without compensating losses among senior leaders of Israel and the US. To maintain the loyalty and commitment of the IRGC ā€” ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s most ideologically committed, dedicated and likely best-trained military force ā€” the political leadership had no alternative but to bow to their demands. Why else would the Islamic Republic of Iran risk a war with a vastly militarily superior Israel backed by the most powerful superpower on Earth, the United States?

The day after the Iranian attack on Israel, the Swiss ambassador in Tehran was summoned to the IRGC headquarters. (As there is no US embassy in Tehran, the Swiss officially represent US interests in Iran.) The ostensible reason was to deliver a message for the ambassador to pass to the US: Do not involve yourselves in an Israeli retaliatory attack on Iran. The surprise is not the content of the message, which is entirely predictable, but that it came from the IRGC as opposed to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, which is typically tasked with communicating with foreign missions in the Iranian capital. The real message is that the Iranian Foreign Ministry has been sidelined for all but the most routine diplomatic functions. The IRGC is in charge.

The IRGC are not the only nationalist hawks in Iran

But there was a second group of voices insisting on a reprisal attack against Israel. In a nation where ā€œhardlinerā€ is hardly a specific enough descriptive of political leaning, there is one group that occupies the most extreme right wing: the , or Front for the Stability of the Islamic Revolution. These are uber-extremist Shia who eschew any and all forms of compromise with external or internal groups. It was the Paydari Front that argued for stronger enforcement of hijab laws in Iran in spite of mass uprisings opposing the hijab rule. This extremist organization maintains an almost apocalyptic view of conflict, believing that it will hasten the coming of Imam al-Mahdi, aka Imam al-Zaman, the mystical twelfth imam of Shia Islam. This is the Shia Muslim version of the end of days.

While the Paydari Front occupies only 24 of the Iranian parliamentā€™s 290 seats, their uncompromising views hold considerable sway in a country almost under siege from the West. The organizationā€™s summer camps and youth education programs have trained many of the IRGCā€™s up-and-coming officers, who share the Paydari Frontā€™s monochromatic view of the world, its intense religious beliefs and its fanatically fearless approach to challenging Israel and America. 

So, to the IRGC voices clamoring for a direct attack against ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ā€œ,ā€ we must also add the Paydari Front. In the irrefutable logic of religious zealots, to do anything less would be treasonous and even godless. These are arguments not easily or honestly debated among ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s already closeted leadership, who are trapped in an echo chamber of ever-more rash, radical and dangerous ideas.

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s growing extremism implies a fraught future

What does this mean for Israel, the West and moderate Middle Eastern governments? The Islamic Republic is reportedly only weeks ā€” or months, depending on which ominous report you consult ā€” from producing the necessary highly enriched (90%) uranium for one or even more bombs. So, the US and its allies cannot disregard the real threat that Iranian extremist hardliners will insist on a mad rush to produce a nuclear bomb and weaponize its delivery by land or by sea. Any such possibility, of course, will likely precipitate a direct Israeli attack against major nuclear sites at Natanz and even Fordow, perhaps with the help of the US. Both US and Israeli leaders have said repeatedly that they will not allow Iran to build a nuclear weapon.

As ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s isolated leadership and its IRGC praetorian guard take increasingly hardline stances, the countryā€™s population seeks a more secular, less militarized state and greater ties with the West. The former oppresses the latter, making revolution effectively impossible. So, change from within seems unlikely for the foreseeable future, barring a major uprising on par with the 1979 revolution. The IRGC knows full well how that was done and, therefore, how to shut down any whiff of revolution.

The West and moderate Arab regimes have largely written off regime change in Iran for now. Therefore, they must seek a regional alliance to make it plain to Tehran that any aggression will be met with united and overwhelming force. To be more effective, that alliance must include Israel, whose inclusion can only be possible if its leaders recognize the necessity of working toward a two-state solution with Palestinians. Unfortunately, ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s own uncompromising current political trajectory under Prime Minister Benjamin ā€œBibiā€ Netanyahu is undermining the nationā€™s security against its true existential threat, Iran.

Only a united regional alliance capable of inflicting enormous destruction on Iran could persuade the moderate and conservative hardliners that itā€™s time to shut down the saber-rattling mob on the far right. These hardliners might do a cost-benefit analysis of their reckless aggression and decide to reopen negotiations on both its nuclear program as well as ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s troublemaking activities throughout the Middle East. Such negotiations seem to be the best shot for peace.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post How to Contain ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Dangerous Warmongers appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

In November, of course, American voters get to choose which of the two theyā€™d trust with handling ongoing explosive tensions with Tehran across a Middle East now in crisis. The war in Gaza has already intensified the danger of an Iran-Israel conflict ā€” with the recent devastating Israeli on an Iranian consulate in Syria and the Iranian of drones and missiles dispatched against Israel only upping the odds. In addition, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ā€œaxis of resistanceā€ ā€” including Hamas, Lebanonā€™s Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq and Syria ā€” has been challenging American hegemony throughout the Middle East, while drawing lethal US counterstrikes in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

It was President Donald Trump, of course, who condemned the USā€“Iran agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive of Action (JCPOA) while running in 2016. With his team of fervent anti-Iran hawks, including Secretary of State and National Security Advisor , he took a wrecking ball to relations with Iran. Six years ago, Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA and, in what he called a campaign of ā€œmaximum pressure,ā€ reinstituted, then redoubled political and economic sanctions against Tehran. Characteristically, he maintained a consistently belligerent policy toward the Islamic Republic, its very existence and warning that he could ā€œā€ Iran.

Joe Biden had been a supporter of the accord, negotiated while he was Obamaā€™s vice president. During his 2020 presidential campaign, he promised to rejoin it. In the end, though, he kept Trumpā€™s onerous sanctions in place and months of negotiations went nowhere. While he put out to Tehran, crises erupting in 2022 and 2023, including the invasion of Israel by Hamas, placed huge obstacles in the way of tangible progress toward rebooting the JCPOA.

Worse yet, still reeling from the collapse of the 2015 agreement and ruled by a hardline government deeply suspicious of Washington, Iran is in no mood to trust another American diplomatic venture. In fact, during the earlier talks, it distinctly its hand, demanding far more than Biden could conceivably offer.

Meanwhile, Iran has accelerated its nuclear research and its potential production facilities, amassing large stockpiles of uranium that, as The Washington Post , ā€œcould be converted to weapons-grade fuel for at least three bombs in a time frame ranging from a few days to a few weeks.ā€

Trumpā€™s anti-Iran jihad

While the US and Iran werenā€™t exactly at peace when Trump took office in January 2017, the JCPOA had at least created the foundation for what many hoped would be a new era in their relations.

Iran had to drastically limit the scale and scope of its uranium enrichment program, reduce the number of centrifuges it could operate, curtail its production of low-enriched uranium suitable for fueling a power plant and ship nearly all of its enriched uranium stockpile out of the country. It closed and disabled its Arak plutonium reactor while agreeing to a stringent regime in which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would monitor every aspect of its nuclear program.

In exchange, the US, the EU and the UN agreed to remove an array of economic sanctions, which, until then, had arguably made Iran the sanctioned country in the world.

Free of some of them, its economy began to recover, while its oil exports, its economic lifeblood, nearly . According to How Sanctions Work, a new from Stanford University Press, Iran absorbed a windfall of $11 billion in foreign investment, gained access to $55 billion in assets frozen in Western banks and saw its inflation rate fall from 45% to 8%.

But Trump acted forcefully to undermine it all. In October 2017, he ā€œā€ ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s compliance with the accord, amid false charges that it had violated the agreement. (Both the EU and the IAEA agreed that it .)

Many observers feared that Trump was creating an environment in which Washington could launch an Iraq-style war of aggression. In a New York Times , Larry Wilkerson, chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell at the time of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, suggested that Trump was repeating the pattern of unproven allegations that President George W. Bush had relied on: ā€œThe Trump administration is using much the same playbook to create a false impression that war is the only way to address the threats posed by Iran.ā€

Finally, on May 8, 2018, Trump the JCPOA, and sanctions on Iran were back in place. Relentlessly, he and Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin piled on ever more of them in what they called a campaign of ā€œ.ā€ The administration reactivated old sanctions were reactivated and added hundreds of new ones targeting ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s banking and oil industries, its shipping industry, its metal and petrochemical firms and, finally, its construction, mining, manufacturing and textile sectors. The administration also targeted countless individual officials and businessmen, along with dozens of companies worldwide that dealt, however tangentially, with ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s sanctioned firms.

It was, Mnuchin Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, ā€œa maximum pressure campaign for sanctions ā€¦ We will continue to ramp up, more, more, more.ā€ At one point, in a gesture both meaningless and insulting, the Trump administration even sanctioned Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s supreme leader, a move moderate President Hassan Rouhani ā€œoutrageous and idiotic,ā€ adding that Trump was ā€œafflicted by mental retardation.ā€

Then, in 2019, Trump took the unprecedented of labeling the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s chief military arm, a ā€œforeign terrorist organization.ā€ He put a violent exclamation point on that when he ordered the of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s premier military leader, General , during his visit to Baghdad.

Administration officials made it clear that the goal was the regime and that they hoped the sanctions would provoke an uprising to overthrow the government. Iranians did, in fact, rise up in , including most recently 2023ā€™s ā€œā€ movement, partly thanks to tougher economic times due to the sanctions. The governmentā€™s response, however, was a brutal crackdown. Meanwhile, on the nuclear front, having painstakingly complied with the JCPOA until 2018, instead of being even more conciliatory, Iran its program, enriching far more uranium than was necessary to fuel a power plant. And militarily, it initiated a series of with US naval forces in the Persian Gulf, or foreign-operated oil tankers, a US drone in the Straits of Hormuz and launched drones meant to Saudi Arabiaā€™s huge oil industry.

ā€œThe American withdrawal from the JCPOA and the severity of the sanctions that followed were seen by Iran as an attempt to break the back of the Islamic Republic or, worse, to completely destroy it,ā€ , a veteran analyst at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and one of the authors of How Sanctions Work, told me. ā€œSo, they circled the wagons. Iran became far more securitized, and it handed more and more power to the IRGC and the security forces.ā€

Bidenā€™s reign of (unforced) error

Having long supported a deal with Iran ā€”Ģż in , as of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, in , in a speech to Jewish leaders ā€” Joe Biden Trumpā€™s decision to quit the JCPOA a ā€œself-inflicted disaster.ā€ But on entering the Oval Office, Biden failed to simply rejoin it.

Instead, he let months go by, while in a quest to somehow improve it. Even though the JCPOA had been working quite well, the Biden team insisted it a ā€œlonger and stronger agreementā€ and that Iran first had to return to compliance with the agreement, even though it was the US that had pulled out of the deal.

Consider that an unforced error. ā€œEarly in 2021 there was one last chance to restore the agreement,ā€ , an expert on Iran and executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told me. ā€œHe could have just come back to the JCPOA by issuing an executive order, but he didnā€™t do anything for what turned out to be the ten most critical weeks.ā€

It was critical because the Iranian administration of President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, responsible for negotiating the original accord, was expiring and new elections were scheduled for June 2021. ā€œOne of the major mistakes Biden made is that he delayed the nuclear talks into April,ā€ Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Princeton University scholar and a former top Iranian official who was part of its nuclear negotiating team from 2005 to 2007. ā€œThis was a golden opportunity to negotiate with the Rouhani team, but he delayed until a month before the Iranian elections. He could have finished the deal by May.ā€

When the talks finally did resume in April ā€” ā€œgingerly,ā€ to The New York Times ā€” they were further complicated because, just days earlier, a covert Israeli operation had devastated one of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s top nuclear research facilities with an enormous . Iran responded by pledging to take the purity of its enriched uranium from , which didnā€™t exactly help the talks, nor did Bidenā€™s unwillingness to condemn Israel for a provocation clearly designed to wreck them.

That June, Iranians a new president, Ebrahim Raisi, a hardline cleric and militant supporter of the ā€œaxis of resistance.ā€ He took office in August, spent months assembling his administration and appointed a new team to lead the nuclear talks. By July, according to American officials, those talks on a new version of the JCPOA had ā€œnear complete agreement,ā€ only to fall apart when the Iranian side backed out.

It was also clear that the Biden administration didnā€™t prioritize the Iran talks, being less than eager to deal with bitter opposition from Israel and its allies on Capitol Hill. ā€œBidenā€™s view was that heā€™d go along with reviving the JCPOA only if he felt it was absolutely necessary and to do it at the least political cost,ā€ Parsi points out. ā€œAnd it looked like heā€™d only do it if it were acceptable to Israel.ā€

Over the next two years, the US and Iran engaged in an unproductive series of negotiations that seemed to come tantalizingly close to an agreement only to stop short. By the summer of 2022, the nuclear talks once again appeared to be making progress, only to fail yet again.Ģż ā€œAfter 15 months of intense, constructive negotiations in Vienna and countless interactions with the JCPOA participants and the US, I have concluded that the space for additional significant compromises has been exhausted,ā€ Josep Borrell Fontelles, the foreign policy chief for the EU.

By the end of 2022, Biden declared the Iran deal ā€œdeadā€ and his chief negotiator insisted he wouldnā€™t ā€œwaste timeā€ trying to revive it. As Mousavian told me, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s crackdown on the Woman, Life, Freedom revolt in the wake of its ā€œmorality policeā€ torturing and killing a young woman, , arrested on the streets of Tehran without a veil and increased concern about Iranian being delivered to Russia for its war in Ukraine soured Biden on even talking to Iran.

Nonetheless, in 2023, yet another round of talks ā€” helped, perhaps, by a between the US and Iran, including an agreement to $6 billion in Iranian oil revenues ā€“ resulted in a tentative, informal accord that Iranian officials as a ā€œpolitical ceasefire.ā€ to The Times of Israel, ā€œthe understandings would see Tehran pledge not to enrich uranium beyond its current level of 60 percent purity, to better cooperate with U.N. nuclear inspectors, to stop its proxy terror groups from attacking U.S. contractors in Iraq and Syria, to avoid providing Russia with ballistic missiles and to release three American-Iranians held in the Islamic Republic.ā€

But even that informal agreement was consigned to the dustbin of history after Hamasā€™s October 7 doomed any rapprochement between the US and Iran.

The question remains: Could some version of the JCPOA be salvaged in 2025?

Certainly not if, as now seems increasingly possible, a shooting war breaks out involving the US, Iran and Israel, a catastrophic crisis with unforeseeable consequences. And certainly not if Trump is reelected, which would plunge the US and Iran deeper into their cold (if not a devastatingly hot) war.

What do the experts say? Against the possibility of a revived accord, according to Vali Nasr, Iran has concluded that Washington is an utterly untrustworthy negotiating partner whose word is worthless. ā€œIran has decided that there is no difference between Democrats and Republicans and they decided to escalate tensions further in order to gain what they hope is additional leverage ±¹¾±²õ-Ć -±¹¾±²õ °Ā²¹²õ³ó¾±²Ō²µ³Ł“Ē²Ō.ā€

ā€œBidenā€™s intention was to revive the deal,ā€ says Hossein Mousavian. ā€œHe did take some practical steps to do so and at least he tried to deescalate the situation.ā€ Iran was, however, less willing to move forward because Biden insisted on maintaining the sanctions Trump had imposed.

The Quincy Instituteā€™s Trita Parsi, however, catches the full pessimism of a moment in which Iran and Israel (backed remarkably fully by Washington) are at the edge of actual war. Given the rising tensions in the region, not to speak of actual clashes, he says gloomily, ā€œThe best that we can hope for is that nothing happens. There is no hope for anything more.ā€

And thatā€™s where hope is today in a Middle East that seems to be heading for hell in a handbasket. 

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Iran sought to reassure the rest of the world by defining the entire exercise, not as an act of war, but as a calculated response to ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s provocation. Iran the following message to the United Nations.

In the statement posted on social media platform X, Iran’s UN mission argued that the attack was conducted under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which pertains to legitimate defense, and that the matter could be ā€œdeemed concluded.ā€

°Õ“Ē»å²¹²āā€™s Weekly Devilā€™s Dictionary definition:

Deemed concluded:

Paid in full, in the interest of allowing life to carry on as usual, though in todayā€™s Middle East a debt paid in full appears to have the curious characteristic of continuing to accrue interest.

Contextual note

The reigning equilibrium in the Middle East was already a murderous game in which Israel has conducted a wide range of isolated covert operations, including targeted assassinations of government officials and scientists. The events of April that began with the of the Iranian consulate in Damascus have changed the nature of that game. For the moment, the contest resembles a 19th-century duel rather than, say, a boxing match. But that may change in the coming days.

The world is now left to speculate nervously about ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s next move. Governments that most enthusiastically support Israel ā€” notably the US and Germany ā€” have already begun taking what appear to be serious steps to restrain Netanyahuā€™s right wing government from succumbing to the same spirit of vengeance against Iran that it so enthusiastically manifested against the population of Gaza following Hamasā€™s assault on October 7.

In other words, Israel refuses to deem the game concluded. In contrast, the rest of the world appears ready to align with US President Joe Biden, who recommended to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin ā€œBibiā€ Netanyahu to ā€œtake the winā€ and get back to his principal business: completing his campaign of genocide.

There remains nevertheless a nagging problem. Even if Israel could decide to do something purely symbolic designed to avoid provoking a more lethal response from Iran, many informed observers, such as Al Jazeeraā€™s senior political analyst Marwan Bishara, that Bibiā€™s goal ā€” whether for personal or political reasons ā€” is to provoke a regional war in which the US will become fatally involved. Bibiā€™s first concern is to remain at the helm and avoid being cast into prison as a common criminal.

Consequently, the world is on the brink and everyoneā€™s nerves are on edge. Since all that is left to us at this point is creative speculation, letā€™s try to understand how the US might react if Israel does opt for serious provocation. We know Biden has his ā€œironcladā€ commitment to ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s defense. He has also insisted on his ā€œdevotionā€ to the Israeli cause. ā€œDevotionā€ is a religious term that indicates faith in a superior power and submission to that power. That language alone should give us pause.

Hedging his bets, Biden has also refused to participate in any offensive move Israel may make against Iran. But this is potentially contradictory. Does his ā€œironcladā€ commitment to ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s defense leave him any room to wiggle out of a commitment to supporting Israel if effectively provokes a war with Iran?

Given the recent history of ā€œforever warsā€ in the Middle East, many of us are left wondering whether this isnā€™t the sign of an addiction. The behavior of the US increasingly resembles that of an addict with a dealer. There are only two standard solutions to heroin addiction: a managed methodone treatment ā€” relief without the kick ā€” or what junkies call ā€œcold turkey.ā€ Bidenā€™s problem is that turkey day in the US ā€” Thanksgiving ā€” will occur three weeks after this yearā€™s presidential election in which he is hoping against hope to defeat his nemesis, Donald Trump.

Historical note

Most of the media have chosen to grace ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s assault with the epithet ā€œunprecedented.ā€ This is, after all, the first time in at least two millennia that Persians have attacked an independent Jewish nation. Something like this has not occurred since the geopolitical predecessor of the Persian Empire, Assyria, took the kingdom of Israel into all the way back in 732 BC.

Iran clearly designed its attack to appear as a forceful but essentially symbolic retaliation for the murder of two of its leading military commanders and eleven other people in ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s attack on its consulate in Damascus. Given the fact that Iran had neighboring countries some 72 hours in advance that its retaliatory strike in response to ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s April 1 attack was imminent, there was no legitimate reason to revert to the habit of calling it ā€œunprovoked.ā€ This had become the standard epithet used by the media and politicians to describe Russiaā€™s invasion of Ukraine and Hamasā€™s October 7 assault. Instead, everyone seemed to agree that ā€œunprecedentedā€ was a reasonable substitute that, like ā€œunprovoked,ā€ suggested the innocence of the victim.

House Majority Leader Steve Scalise nevertheless diverged from the consensus. He maintained what has now become the conditioned Pavlovian reflex of dismissing the facts of history as irrelevant. NPR his assertion that, ā€œThe House of Representatives stands strongly with Israel, and there must be consequences for this unprovoked attack.”

To any other than the obtusely ignorant, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s attack was obviously not ā€œunprovoked.ā€ And yet, not only did Scalise use this term, NPR in its reporting neglected to highlight the absurdity of Scaliseā€™s claim, which should be recognized as a clear case of disinformation. The media appears increasingly intent on proving its incapacity to notice the obvious and to comment on it.

An by Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Grim that appeared this week on The Intercept may help us to understand how todayā€™s media can fail to notice or react to the obvious. The title of the article is: ā€œLEAKED NYT GAZA MEMO TELLS JOURNALISTS TO AVOID WORDS ā€œGENOCIDE,ā€ ā€œETHNIC CLEANSING,ā€ AND ā€œOCCUPIED TERRITORY.ā€

The article confirms that The New York Times uses language not to inform, but to create a system of belief for its readers. That means cultivating their readersā€™ indifference to how language is used. This may seem odd in an era in which everyone seems obsessed with rooting out ā€œdisinformation.ā€

Mainstream media now identifies with the mission of ā€œfact-checking.ā€ If the facts cited in an article are verifiable, the article is deemed trustworthy. But for NYT some facts are better not mentioned. In January, the International Court of Justice deemed plausible case the description of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s behavior in Gaza as genocide. That does not mean genocide is a fact. But it does mean that the accusation of genocide by South Africa and others is a fact not contradicted by any other facts. But NYT has identified some facts as too inconvenient to be ā€œfit for print.ā€ Such facts might have the disturbing characteristic of inciting people to think critically about the events the paper reports.

After citing Scalise, NPR sees no reason to critique this obviously false claim. In the websiteā€™s defense, it is sticking to the facts by simply quoting what Scalise actually said. It might, however, have noted that what he says is not factual. The second reason is that American politicians and the media have been conditioned to call any aggressive action by a party considered to be an adversary ā€œunprovoked.ā€

This is all part of a ā€œmoral systemā€ shared in the West. Evil people (e.g., Russians, Iranians, Hamas) exist to commit evil acts. Good people are incapable of provoking those evil acts. Consequently, whenever an evil act occurs, by definition it must be unprovoked.

NPRā€™s article concludes by quoting a series of quotes by legislators insisting on the importance of providing financial support to the victims of all the unprovoked evil acts by parties identified as evil enemies. In such circumstances, no conflict will ever be deemed concluded, until we achieve the total annihilation of those who provoke without ever being provoked. That helps to explain why negotiation will always be rejected as an inadequate and inappropriate solution.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devilā€™s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51³Ō¹Ļ Devilā€™s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Additionally, rooted in , Iran’s self-perception as the defender of oppressed Muslims globally is fueled by the anticipation of the twelfth Imam’s messianic return. This often translates into support for proxy groups and regional interventions.

Iranian ideology is deeply rooted in the nation’s historical and cultural identity. Iran sees itself as the inheritor of the longstanding Persian civilization, a proud nation with a rich heritage and a history of resisting foreign domination. This fosters a sense of exceptionalism, a conviction that Iran’s path is unique and its interests paramount, often leading to tension with other regional powers and the West. Furthermore, Anti-Zionism is deeply within the ideology, viewing Israel as an illegitimate entity occupying Palestinian land. This translates into strong support for Palestinian groups.Ģż

In the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world Iran’s revolutionary ideology presents a destabilizing order and a direct threat to the existence of Israel.

Iran’s pivot and the shifting balance of power

The in Iran, spearheaded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, marked a watershed moment in the nation’s history. Though predominantly in its initial stages, the revolution involved protests, strikes, and civil disobedience. However, the Shah’s regime responded with harsh repression, leading to a significant rise in casualties among protesters. This ultimately contributed to the gradual disintegration of the Shah’s government.

The revolution culminated in the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic republic based on the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih. This ideological foundation, enshrined in the 1979 (amended in 1989), emphasizes principles such as justice, independence, self-reliance, resistance, and martyrdom.

Iran’s claim to legitimacy transcends the 1979 revolution, drawing its from millennia-long influential civilizations and empires. This rich history, encompassing the Elamites, the Achaemenids, Parthians, Sassanids, and Safavids, has indelibly shaped Iran’s cultural identity and instilled a profound sense of national pride. As the historical seat of power for empires stretching across the Fertile Crescent and into Central Asia, Iran’s past serves as a cornerstone for its aspirations for regional leadership, both historically and in the contemporary era.

This sense of historical grandeur further shapes Iran’s foreign policy, which has often clashed with that of Western powers and their regional allies. This has led Iran to pursue a strategy, aimed at countering western pressure and sanctions imposed due to its nuclear program and regional activities. This policy gained momentum following the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal () and the perceived failure of European signatories to uphold their commitments, leaving Iran economically isolated.

Iran’s deep-seated opposition to in the Middle East stems from a perception that such policies destabilize the region and threaten its security and interests. Consequently, a key objective of the Pivot to the East strategy is to bolster Iran’s regional influence and establish itself as a leading power in the Islamic world, a position it believes reflects its historical legacy and rightful place.

While Iran promotes a transnational Islamist model, its influence is largely confined to Shia communities, which are minorities in most Muslim-majority countries. Nonetheless, Iran’s assertive foreign policy, including its support for specific regional groups, has been a factor in destabilizing the Middle East. Former Iranian foreign minister, M. Javad Zarif this policy ‘sacrificing diplomacy for the military field’ in an interview with Saeed Leylaz.Ģż

The eastward gaze: Iran’s Pivot and the rise of an authoritarian Axis

Recent years have witnessed a growing convergence between Iran and other authoritarian regimes sharing a common opposition to Western influence. It describes what I call the Axis of Totalitarianism: a coalition of authoritarian regimes that challenge the democratic world order, encompassing Iran, China, and Russia. While not constituting a formal alliance, these countries exhibit strategic convergence and a shared desire to challenge the US-led unipolar world order.

This convergence manifests in various forms of cooperation. Notably, Iran and China have a significant 25-year strategic partnership agreement, facilitating substantial economic investment in Iran’s energy, infrastructure, and transportation sectors. This agreement underscores China’s growing economic influence in the region and its potential to provide much-needed economic support to Iran. Similarly, Iran and Russia have their existing 20-year cooperation agreement and engaged in joint military exercises, demonstrating their strategic coordination and willingness to collaborate on security matters. Notably, Iran has supplied Russia with ballistic missiles, further deepening their military cooperation in defiance of international sanctions.

A key driver of this convergence is the shared opposition to U.S. dominance and perceived Western interference in the region and globally. These countries view the current US-led world order as unfair and unjust, advocating for a multipolar world order that would redistribute power and influence. This shared objective fosters cooperation and strengthens their collective stance against perceived Western interventionism.

Beyond the core trio of Iran, China, and Russia, other actors with authoritarian tendencies have displayed varying degrees of alignment with this emerging axis. Notably, an Iranian official recently to the Taliban as part of an axis of resistance, suggesting a potential for cautious rapprochement between the two entities.Ģż

Similarly, Iran has been a staunch supporter of the Assad regime in Syria, providing both military and financial assistance that has been crucial in helping the regime regain control of territory from rebel groups. While not directly involved in the Middle East, North Korea’s aggressive stance towards the West has fostered diplomatic ties with Iran. North Korea maintains close alliances with Russia and China. Pyongyang has vocally supported Russia’s war in Ukraine, the annexed regions and parts of Georgia. In recent years, North Korea has in joint naval exercises with Russia and China in the Indo-Pacific region, suggesting a trilateral partnership aimed against the US and its allies.

Historically, North Korea and Iran have in the military and nuclear fields. This alliance dates back to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s when North Korea supplied Iran with weapons and technology. Since then, North Korea has aided Iran’s ballistic missile program development. Reports suggest joint missile development projects and technology transfers between the two countries.ĢżĢż

The destabilizing messianic mission

Iran’s foreign policy is heavily influenced by its adherence to Twelver Shi’ism. This branch of Islam anticipates the of the twelfth Imam, the Mahdi, to establish a global Islamic order. This eschatological belief imbues Iran with a sense of responsibility as the custodian of the Shia faith and champion of the oppressed, translating into a perceived mission to propagate Islam, defend the downtrodden, and pave the way for the Mahdi’s emergence. Furthermore, Iran views itself as the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad and his , the Prophet’s family, and claims to uphold the authentic interpretation of Islam embodied in their teachings and practices.

One prominent manifestation of Iran’s Islamic ideology in its foreign policy is the concept of against perceived enemies of Islam and Iran. Iran positions itself as the leader of the , a network of state and non-state actors united in their opposition to the United States, Israel, and their regional allies. , sharing Iran’s ideological and strategic objectives of challenging the status quo and defending Shia interests, form a crucial component of this network.

These groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Palestine, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, Iranian support in the form of arms, training, financial aid, and political guidance. In return, they serve as force multipliers and instruments of deterrence for Iran, expanding its influence and leverage in the region. Often wielding significant political and social influence alongside their military capabilities, these groups maintain close ties to Iran’s Supreme Leader. They frequently coordinate their activities with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Quds Force, responsible for the country’s external security affairs.

The activities of Iran’s proxy groups have had a cascading and devastating impact on the stability and well-being of the Middle East. Their presence and involvement in regional conflicts have directly fueled humanitarian crises, such as:

ā€” A 2021 by the International Crisis Group documented how Hezbollah’s growing influence in Lebanon has hampered the formation of a stable government and hindered efforts to address the country’s economic crisis. In Yemen, the Houthi conflict has over 4 million people internally, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and plunged the country into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

ā€” OCHA over 306,887 civilian deaths in the Syrian civil war, a conflict fueled in part by Iranian support for the Assad regime. Amnesty International has also various Iran-backed militias in Iraq of extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary detention, further eroding respect for human rights and exacerbating sectarian divisions.

ā€” The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) that over 12.4 million people are displaced across the Middle East and North Africa due to ongoing conflicts. The destruction of infrastructure and disruption of essential services, often a consequence of proxy group activity, further compound the humanitarian suffering in the region. OCHA that over 2.4Ģż million children in Yemen lack access to safe water, sanitation, and hygiene due to the ongoing conflict.

The legacy of revolution: how Iran’s anti-Zionism threatens Israel

At the core of Iran’s anti-Zionism the fundamental rejection of Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state. This perspective views Israel’s establishment as a colonial project infringing upon Palestinian land and rights. Iran’s with the Palestinian cause, intertwined with both religious and moral imperatives as well as strategic and political interests, fuels its anti-Zionist stance. This manifests in Iran’s support for various Palestinian factions, particularly those advocating armed resistance against Israel, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.Ģż

Furthermore, Iran envisions a single, democratic state encompassing historical Palestine, where diverse communities coexist, effectively calling for Israel’s dissolution. This aspiration is further emphasized through Iran’s participation in the annual International , a symbolic display of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle.

Iran’s anti-Zionism translates into tangible security challenges for Israel. Firstly, it underpins the formation of the Axis of Resistance alliance with Syria and Hezbollah. This alliance as a conduit for projecting Iranian power in the Levant region, posing a direct military threat to Israel’s northern border. Iran bolsters this alliance through extensive financial, military, and political support, enabling the development of missile and rocket capabilities, intelligence networks, and military infrastructure.Ģż

Iran’s military presence in Syria, including bases and personnel stationed near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, further intensifies the potential for confrontation. This alliance has demonstrably materialized in several instances, including the 2006 Lebanon War, the ongoing Syrian Civil War with its spillover effects, and the 2024 Golan Heights incident.

Secondly, Iran’s anti-Zionist ideology drives its efforts to expand its influence and presence in other regional areas, including Iraq, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip. In these regions, Iran and arms various groups who actively attack Israel and its strategic allies. Iran has provided the Houthis in Yemen with missiles and drones used against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both considered strategic partners of Israel. Similarly, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip receive Iranian assistance in the form of rockets and funding, enabling them to engage in repeated cycles of violence with Israel, as exemplified by the 2024 Gaza War. Furthermore, Iran cultivates ties with various Shia militias and political parties in Iraq, some harboring animosity towards Israel and threatening potential attacks.

Thirdly, Iran’s anti-Zionism is intricately linked to its pursuit of a nuclear and missile program, concerns about the potential development and delivery of nuclear weapons. This program has been a focal point of intense international scrutiny. It led to negotiations, sanctions, and even sabotage attempts. Despite these pressures, Iran uranium enrichment beyond the limits set by the now-abandoned 2015 nuclear deal.

Furthermore, in their missile program, encompassing the testing and development of various ballistic and cruise missiles with the potential to reach Israel and other regional countries, further escalate anxieties. This pursuit of nuclear capabilities, coupled with the possibility of transfer to proxies or allies, fuels fears of regional proliferation and potential military confrontations. Israel, viewing a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, has repeatedly threatened strikes to prevent such an outcome and has reportedly carried out covert and overt attacks on Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure.

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Islamic revolution and its ambition to stand against the unipolar order, centering itself as the leader of the Islamic pillar of the multipolar world is a destabilizing order and an existential threat to Israel.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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ā€œHit Iran now. Hit them hardā€ was typical offered by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham after a drone flown by an Iran-aligned Iraqi Shiite militia killed three American servicemen in northern Jordan on January 28th. The well-heeled Iran War Lobby in Washington has, in fact, been stridently calling for nothing short of a US invasion of that country, accusing Tehran of complicity in Hamasā€™s October 7th terrorist attack on Israel.

No matter that the official Iranian press has vehemently the allegation, while American intelligence officials swiftly that the attack on Israel had taken top Iranian leaders by surprise. In mid-November, Reuters that Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei informed a key Hamas figure, Ismail Haniya, that his country wouldnā€™t intervene directly in the Gaza war, since Tehran hadnā€™t been warned about the October 7th attack before it was launched. He actually seemed annoyed that the leadership of the Hamas paramilitary group, the Qassam Brigades, thought they could draw Tehran and its allies willy-nilly into a major conflict without the slightest consultation. Although initially caught off-guard, as the Israeli counterattack grew increasingly brutal and disproportionate, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s leaders clearly began to see ways they could turn the war to their regional benefit ā€” and theyā€™ve done so skillfully, even as the Biden administration in its full-scale embrace of the most extreme government in Israeli history tossed democracy and international law under the bus.

The gut-wrenching Hamas attacks on civilians at a music festival and those living in left-wing, peacenik Kibbutzim near the Israeli border with Gaza on October 7th initially left Iran in an uncomfortable position. It had allegedly been slipping some a year to Hamas ā€” though Egypt and Qatar had provided major funding to Gaza at ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s through sanctioned Israeli government bank accounts. And after decades of championing the Palestinian cause, Tehran could hardly stand by and do nothing as Israel razed Gaza to the ground. On the other hand, the ayatollahs ³¦“Ē³Ü±ō»å²Ōā€™t afford to gain a reputation for being played like a fiddle by the regionā€™s young radicals and so drawn into conventional wars their country can ill afford.

The adults in the room?

Despite their fiery rhetoric, their undeniable backing of fundamentalist militias in the region, and their depiction by inside-the-Beltway war hawks as the root of all evil in the Middle East, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s leaders have long acted more like a status quo power than a force for genuine change. They have shored up the rule of the autocratic al-Assad family in Syria, while helping the Iraqi government that emerged after President George W. Bushā€™s invasion of that country fight off the terrorist threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In truth, not Iran but the US and Israel are the countries that have most strikingly tried to use their power to reshape the region in a Napoleonic manner. The disastrous US invasion and occupation of Iraq, and ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s wars on Egypt (1956, 1967), Lebanon (1982ā€“2000, 2006) and Gaza (2008, 2012, 2014, 2024), along with its steady encouragement of large-scale squatting on the Palestinian West Bank, were clearly intended to alter the geopolitics of the region permanently through the use of military force on a massive scale.

Only recently, Ayatollah Khamenei bitterly , ā€œWhy »å“Ē²Ōā€™t the leaders of Islamic countries publicly cut off their relationship with the murderous Zionist regime and stop helping this regime?ā€ Pointing to the staggering death toll in ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s present campaign against Gaza, he was focusing on the Arab countries ā€” Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates ā€” that, as part of Trump son-in-law Jared Kushnerā€™s ā€œAbraham Accords,ā€ had officially recognized Israel and established relations with it. (Egypt and Jordan had, of course, recognized Israel long before that.)

Given the anti-Israel sentiment in the region, had it, in fact, been rife with democracies, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s position might have been widely implemented. Still, it was a distinct sign of terminal tone deafness on the part of Biden administration officials that they to use the Gaza crisis to extend the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia, while sidelining the Palestinians and creating a joint Israeliā€“Arab front against Iran.

The region had already been moving in a somewhat different direction. Last March, after all, Iran and Saudi Arabia had begun a new relationship by restoring the diplomatic relations that had been suspended in 2016 and working to expand trade between their countries. And that relationship has only to improve as the nightmare in Israel and Gaza developed. In fact, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi first visited the Saudi capital, Riyadh, in November and, since the Gaza conflict began, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian has met twice with his Saudi counterpart. Frustrated by a markedly polarizing American policy in the region, de facto Saudi ruler Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to the good offices of Beijing to sidestep Washington and strengthen their relations further.

Although Iran is far more hostile to Israel than Saudi Arabia, their leaderships do agree that the days of marginalizing the Palestinians are over. In a remarkably unambiguous issued in early February, the Saudis offered the following: ā€œThe Kingdom has communicated its firm position to the US administration that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, and that the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip stops and all the Israeli occupation forces withdraw from the Gaza Strip.ā€ Significantly, the Saudis even refused to join a US-led naval task force created to halt attacks on Red Sea shipping by the Houthis of Yemen (no friends of theirs) in support of the Palestinians. Its leaders are clearly all too aware that the carnage still being wreaked on Gaza has most Saudis.

In late January, President Raisi also surprised regional diplomats by to Ankara for talks on trade and geopolitics with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, another sign of his countryā€™s changing role in the region. At the end of the visit, while signing various agreements to increase trade and cooperation, he : ā€œWe agreed to support the Palestinian cause, the axis of resistance, and to give the Palestinian people their rightful rights.ā€ Thatā€™s no small thing. Remember that Turkey is a NATO member and considered a close ally of the United States. To have Erdoğan suddenly cozy up to Iran, while denouncing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahuā€™s war on Gaza as a Hitlerian-style , was an unmistakable slap in Washingtonā€™s face.

Meanwhile, Iran, Turkey and Russia recently issued a that ā€œexpressed deep concern over the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and stressed the need to end the Israeli brutal onslaught against the Palestinians, [while] sending humanitarian aid to Gaza.ā€ From the Biden administrationā€™s point of view, Moscowā€™s bombing of civilian sites in Ukraine and ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s role in crushing Sunni Arab rebels in Syria had been the atrocities that needed attention until Netanyahu suddenly pulled the rug out from under them by upping the ante from mere atrocities to what the International Court of Justice has can plausibly be labeled a genocide. One thing was clear: Washingtonā€™s long struggle to exclude Iran from regional influence has now visibly failed.

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s rising popularity

At the Gulf International Forum (GIF) last November, Abdullah Baaboud, a prominent Omani academic, that there had been a ā€œvery strong condemnation of Israel from Iran and Turkey, embarrassing some Arab countries that are not using the same language. My worry is that this conflict is leading to the empowerment of Turkey and Iran among the Arab public.ā€ GIFā€™s executive director, Dania Thafer, . Of that public, she said, ā€œGrief and anger have reached unprecedented levels,ā€ and added, ā€œwith each photo out of Gaza, Iran gains more influence across the region.ā€ In short, at remarkably little cost, Iran is unexpectedly winning the battle for regional public opinion and its standing in the Arab world has risen strikingly. Meanwhile, the reputation of the United States has been indelibly tarnished by Washingtonā€™s full-throated support for what most in the region do indeed see as a merciless slaughter of thousands of children and other innocent civilians.

A recent opinion of Arabs in 16 countries, conducted jointly by the Arab Center in Washington, DC, and the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar, found that 94% of them considered the American position on ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s war ā€œbad.ā€ In contrast, a surprising 48% of them considered the Iranian position positive. To grasp just how remarkable such a finding was, consider that a poll conducted in 2022 found that Shiite ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s name was mud in most Sunni Arab countries and approval of its leadership fell somewhere between 10% and 20%.

In recent months, Iran has made striking use of the weakness of Washingtonā€™s case in the region. While the State Department likes to contrast ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ā€œdictatorshipā€ with ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s ā€œdemocratic character,ā€ only recently foreign ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanaani , ā€œThe disaster in Gaza removed the mask from the face of the so-called advocates of human rights and showed the extent of vileness, brutality, and lies hidden within the nature of the Israeli regime, whose supporters used to refer to [it] as a symbol of democracy.ā€ Although Iran has among the worldā€™s worst human-rights records, Netanyahu has even managed to take the focus off of that.

Losing the Middle East, Washington-style

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s allies in the region include Iraqi Shiite militias like the (Kataā€™ib Hizbullah), which first gained prominence in the struggle against the ISIL terrorist group from 2014 to 2018. Those were years when the regular Iraqi army had essentially collapsed and was only gradually being rebuilt. Washington was also focused on destroying ISIL then and so developed a wary de facto alliance with them in its campaign to crush that ā€œcaliphate.ā€ In January 2020, however, President Trump was responsible for the drone assassination of the groupā€™s leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, along with Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, just after their arrival by plane at Baghdad International Airport in what was evidently an attempt to prevent them, through the Iraqis, from an agreement with Saudi Arabia to reduce tensions with Iran.

That assassination led to a long-running, low-intensity conflict between the Shiite militias of Iraq and the 2,500 remaining American troops stationed there. With the onset of the Gaza conflict last October, the Party of God Brigades began launching mortars and drones against Iraqi military bases hosting American soldiers, as well as against small forward operating bases in southeast Syria where some 900 US military personnel are stationed, ostensibly to support the Syrian Kurds in mopping up operations against ISIL. After more than 150 such attacks, on January 28th one of their drones hit Tower 22, a support base where US troops were stationed in northern Jordan, three American soldiers, while wounding dozens more.

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s leaders generally back those Shiite militias, but whether they had anything to do with the attack on Tower 22 remains unknown. Officials in Tehran did, however, immediately recognize the danger of escalation once American troops had actually been killed. And indeed, the Biden administration responded with dozens of air strikes on bases and facilities of the Party of God Brigades in Iraq and Syria. Iraqi and Lebanese officials reporters for The Washington Post that Iran had actually urged caution on the militias with clear effect. Their attacks on bases hosting US troops ceased. At the same time, the Iraqi parliament and government bitterly about Washingtonā€™s violation of the countryā€™s sovereignty, while heightening preparations to force the withdrawal of the last US troops from their land. In other words, President Bidenā€™s fierce backing of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s war, his decision to weapons shipments to that country, and his bombing of pro-Palestinian militias may have led to the achievement of a longstanding Iranian aim: seeing American troops finally leave Iraq.

Meanwhile, in southern Lebanon, where the militant group Hezbollah has been exchanging occasional fire with Israeli forces in support of Gaza, according to the reporters, one Hezbollah figure told them that ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s message was: ā€œWe are not keen on giving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu any reason to launch a wider war on Lebanon or anywhere else.ā€ Wars are unpredictable, and the Lebanon-Israeli border could still erupt dramatically. Moreover, Iranian pleas for restraint appear to have had far less effect on the Houthi leadership in Yemenā€™s capital Sanaa, leading to an ongoing American and British bombing campaign on that city and elsewhere in that country that has so far done little to stop Houthi missile and drone attacks against ships in the Red Sea.

So far, however, despite the Republican urge to devastate Iran, that countryā€™s leaders have taken deft advantage of the butchery in Gaza (in which the Israeli military has more civilian noncombatants each day than belligerents have in any other conflict in this century). The ayatollahs have significantly increased their popularity even among Arab and Muslim publics that had not previously shown them much favor. They have strengthened their relationship with the Shiites of Iraq and may be on the verge of finally achieving their goal of ending the US military missions in Iraq and Syria.

They have also achieved closer ties with Turkey, while improving relations with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab oil states. In doing so, they have distinctly blunted the Biden administrationā€™s aim of isolating Iran while tying the wealthier Arab states ever more firmly to Israel through arms and high-tech deals.

In addition, through its backing of and weaponizing of Israel in these last grim months, Washington has made a mockery of the human rights talking points that the US has long deployed against Iran. In the process, Joe Biden has done more than any recent president to undermine both international humanitarian law and democratic principles globally. With of Arab poll respondents viewing American policy in the region as ā€œbad,ā€ one thing is clear: for the moment at least, Iran has won the Middle East.

[ first published this piece.]

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Hamas is battered but not defeated, having suffered extraordinary losses. Though real figures are unknown, Israel estimates that it has killed and captured half of Hamasā€™ population. It also confirms it has 75% of Hamasā€™ fighting force: 18 of 24 battalions. Casualties in Gaza, meanwhile, exceed 30,000.

Israel has heavily targeted Gazaā€™s underground tunnel system. Hamas uses this structure to house its fighters, command and control systems, leadership and hostages. The network is vulnerable but vast; Israel estimates it has destroyed half the tunnels. Nevertheless, Hamas can still use the remaining ones to shuttle its fighters from one end of the Gaza Strip to the other.

The diplomatic front has been active recently as well. Progress between the US, Qatar, Egypt and Israel looked promising early this month. Hamas proposed a promising counteroffer, one that would have provided a three-month suspension of fighting, a phased release of hostages and a move toward settlement. The countries agreed, sending US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Jerusalem to present the offer to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He rejected Blinkenā€™s plan on February 7, 2024. Hamas was asking too much, he decided, and Israel was not interested in negotiating a ceasefire. So the carnage continues.

Since October 7, 2023, the international community has been deeply concerned that the Israelā€“Hamas War could escalate, dragging more nations into the battle. This would see Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant group, threatening northern Israel and the West Bank with rocket fire. It would also prompt the involvement of the Houthi fighters in Yemen, as well as militia groups in eastern Syria and western Iraq.

Sporadic attacks have increased in number and lethality. One prominent example is the recent January 29 on the US outpost in northeastern Jordan, which killed three US soldiers. The US response has been vigorous, especially against militia groups in Iraq. A US strike a Kata’ib Hezbollah leader in Baghdad, infuriating the Iraqi Government.

So the war has indeed escalated. Fortunately, the combatants have been able to avoid the gravest worry most parties have: all-out war between Israeli and Hezbollah troops in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Though they have had their skirmishes, neither side wants to cross the line and trigger a conflagration on par with the brutal .

Strategic goals

The Axis of Resistance, comprising Iran and its militant allies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere, is unified by an overriding desire to remove the US from the Middle East. These actors also want to eliminate the State of Israel, which is more likely to happen if the US abandons it.

Excluding Iran, the Axis parties are ruthless fighting organizations, not governing bodies. They care little about human rights or their peopleā€™s needs. This is especially true of Hamas ā€” they ruled Gaza for 17 years. During their tenure, they pilfered public resources to build their Israel-fighting force while the Gazans suffered. These groups may also be sustaining the violence so they can continue living off the spoils of war.

The disparate groups have not coordinated their military actions, as demonstrated on October 7. It would make sense for Hamas to take Israel by surprise and have the others act simultaneously, but they did not. None of the parties, including Iran, knew the attackā€™s timing. This delivered a heavy message: If Hamas does not keep the Axis parties informed, they will not assist in Hamasā€™ time of need. Perhaps this is why Hezbollah has not wholeheartedly engaged.

Geopolitical and economic risks

Yemenā€™s Houthi militia has accidentally globalized the conflict, specifically by expanding it to the Red Sea. It has attacked shipping vessels traveling through the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb, two major shipping routes. Striking a cargo ship with a drone is cheap and easy for Houthi fighters, but has a serious effect on the world economy.

When these attacks occur, shipping companies have to reroute ships. Cargo that would normally travel through Bab-el-Mandeb must now be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds fuel, labor and insurance costs to the process. Increasing the shipping cost consequently increases the consumer cost, resulting in inflation. The marketplace cannot correct this.

Several populations in Europe and Asia, especially China, rely on Red Sea trading. This has seriously disrupted trade in Europe and Asia. North and Latin America can trade with Europe and Asia without the Suez Canal, but they are experiencing another problem: a drought in the Panama Canal. With the canalā€™s level lowered, operators must lessen the traffic passing through it, thus reducing trade. While the economic impact is currently minor, it will increase the longer this crisis lasts.

Europe will have a tough decade. Russian energy is now expensive, China is suffering from deflation, and the US has turned protectionist. On top of that, the Russoā€“Ukrainian War marches on with no end in sight. When conflicts increase costs to Europeā€™s economy and bottleneck the trade there, international confidence in that trade drops.

Instability in the face of the Israelā€“Hamas War is a growing concern around the globe. As these fears grip world leaders, conservative or autocratic figures often rise to ā€œfix things.ā€ When a countryā€™s economy is deprived of critical inputs (ie oil or microchips), that country becomes aggressive, as seen with the two World Wars. Protectionism prompts this response, which can be destabilizing.

Is another great conflict on the way?

It is frightening to imagine the possibility of a new all-out war. Fortunately, the major parties know the consequences of another global war and will work to prevent it. Widescale nuclear bombardments would make Earth uninhabitable.

However, chaotic non-state actors like Hezbollah do not care about governance. They fight for the sake of causing destruction and lack the guard rails that established governments (e.g., the US, China and Russia) have.

Barring the US and its allies, all the adversaries here are ruled by autocrats. Rulers with absolute power are unpredictable and opportunistic. How can the US deal with autocrats, especially when it feels compelled to use its powers for its own interests?

What happens in our world is determined and exacerbated by the information space. An information war rages as every major player fights to spin a narrative. No one can control the space; anyone with Internet access can enter and spread all manner of disinformation. It is easy to fabricate the truth with AI. When people cannot decide what is correct, they fall back on their biases instead of doing due research. Social media exacerbates this, as the algorithms and filters there create echo chambers.

We must hope that the US can bring the Israelā€“Hamas War to an end, for the security needs of Israel and the humanitarian needs of Gaza. If left unabated, this bloodshed will breed unrest and further wound the world stage.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

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This content fosters an insatiable demand for information, yet the desire for unbiased perspectives often faces a significant obstacle. Much of the readily available alternative content online merely recycles the dominant narratives established by the mainstream media, highlighting the media’s substantial influence on public discourse and the challenge of readily accessing diverse and objective viewpoints.

In relation to Iran, the media has consistently adhered to a particular narrative. It has neglected to critically examine US claims, choosing instead to echo US propaganda. This has resulted in Iran being depicted as a pariah state, ruled by a dictatorship and involved in supporting terrorism. These portrayals are often accepted without the necessary critical scrutiny.

Nonetheless, a discernible shift is occurring. A growing number of Americans are becoming aware of the interconnectedness of their government and media, recognizing the presence of biases and the influence of, often linked to the so-called ā€œdeep state.ā€ This newfound consciousness was evident in a recent in which Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking with Tucker Carlson, described the US ā€œdeep stateā€ as the American ā€˜eliteā€™ with the power to overrule the US president and dictate the countryā€™s policies.

DĆ©jĆ  Vu in the Middle East: is the US destined to repeat history?

The January 3 in Kerman, Iran, targeting a gathering at the burial site of Qasem Soleimani, resulted in a significant loss of life (84 reported dead) and injuries (284). This tragedy raises the specter of another potential conflict in the Middle East, with concerns escalating about Iran’s potential against Israel, given the Islamic State’s of responsibility and the possibility of Israeli involvement.

As a staunch ally of Israel, the United States faces a delicate decision. Historically, US involvement in wars has often resulted in widespread casualties and destruction. Examining interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Vietnam reveals a pattern of initial engagement followed by gradual withdrawal due to unforeseen challenges, potentially eroding US global credibility.

Furthermore, concerns exist regarding the dissemination of misinformation by the US government and media.The echo chamber , where media narratives align with government pronouncements, is particularly concerning. Historical examples, such as the Vietnam War, highlight the devastating consequences of such deceit, costing over lives, including approximately Americans. The media’s complacency in events like the Cambodian Genocide and the Iraq War, where questioning of US actions often lagged behind public opposition, further underscores its role in facilitating government actions.

The post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan aimed to remove the Taliban, resulting in substantial casualties and destruction. However, the Taliban’s to power after a staggering and human cost exposes the futility of such interventions. Similarly, the Iraq War, based on false claims of weapons of mass destruction and with al-Qaeda, resulted in hundreds of thousands of and immensefinancial . The lack of accountability for those responsible, such as US President George W. Bush and his administration, remains a troubling aspect.

Iraq is not alone in bearing the brunt of US intervention. Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen have all witnessed the repercussions of US involvement in various conflicts. The instigation of regime changes and interventions in democratic governments, exemplified by the overthrowals of Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran and Salvadore Allende in Chile, have proven to be costly and destabilizing endeavors.

The global cost of war, two decades after the US invasion of Afghanistan, has reached an estimated , with approximately one million lives lost. This contributes to heightened anxiety and poverty, particularly among Americans.

In the case of Israel, media support predates the nation’s inception, marked by the and associated violence. The media’s historical alignment with the US and its recent support for Israeli actions, resulting in nearly Palestinian casualties, raises ethical questions. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s examination of South Africa v. Israel has globally exposed the potential crime of genocide in Gaza, implicating Western powers, especially the US. The ICJ’s, acknowledging Israel’s actions as potentially falling under the Genocide Convention, places a moral imperative on the US and its media to critically examine their positions and align with international standards.

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A historical paradigm of misrepresentation

Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, a recurring motif in US foreign policy has been an inclination towards with Iran. This approach has been driven by a narrative, often amplified by media portrayals, Iran as on the precipice of acquiring nuclear weapons, harboring terrorists and colluding with al-Qaeda. However, this narrative stands in stark contrast to demonstrable evidence: Iran has actively participated in combating terrorism, as evidenced by its crucial role in ISIS in Iraq. Furthermore, while the US and media often label Iran as an authoritarian regime under the Mullahs, a closer examination reveals a system remarkably similar to the US itself and one that actively promotes regional democracy.

While historical timelines do diverge, with Iran’s civilization boasting a legacy exceeding 2,500 years, compared to the US’s 250 years, their differences cannot justify misconstruing realities. Notably, the US has historically engaged in acts of against numerous nations, with the oppression of Native Americans serving as a stark example. Further, the US, alongside Britain and Russia, has participated in suppressing Iranian aspirations for over a century, exemplified by the recently imposed draconian.

In stark contrast to US backing Arab monarchies, Iran’s foreign policy demonstrably favors alignment with the downtrodden. This principle, enshrined in Article 154 of its, directly guides its active support for oppressed nations like Iraq and Syria in their fight against terrorism. While the US actively Israel, whose treatment of Palestinians remains a concern, Iran stands firmly in support of the oppressed Palestinian people. Notably, Iran Hamas as legitimate and raises concerns regarding Israel’s disproportionate retaliatory measures, not only in response to the October 7 incident but also in previous instances.

On the critical issue of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), while significant global powers, led by the US, maintain stockpiles of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, Iran adheres to a demonstrably higher moral ground. It explicitly prohibits the production of WMDs, citing their indiscriminate and unacceptable impact on human life. Iran’s commitment to this ethical principle is further underlined by its restraint from utilizing chemical weapons in retaliation against Iraqi forces during the 1980ā€“88 Iranā€“Iraq War, despite facing the of such weapons.

The October 7 Hamas attack on Israeli citizens incited a response from Israel. The US-backed Israeli state, which a UN human rights expert of apartheid policies, has waged a war that has resulted in significant casualties, predominantly among Palestinians. While the US and mainstream media have focused on the objective of neutralizing Hamas, concerns regarding civilian casualties and potential human rights violations have received less attention, potentially reflecting.

Furthermore, media narratives align with the US in attributing the Hamas attack to Iranian training, a claim Iran acknowledges but does not explicitly endorse as pre-planned. This framing could serve to strategically prepare the public for potential US involvement in a broader conflict with Iran. It potentially diverts attention away from concerns regarding Israeli actions in Gaza.

In support of Israel, media often cite a statement by an Iranian Revolutionary Guard official linking the October 7 attack to the assassination of Qasem Soleimani. This suggests a potential retaliatory motive, but the extent of Iranian involvement remains unclear.

A new approach to USā€“Iran relations

The current state of USā€“Iran relations is characterized by a pervasive climate of mistrust and hostility. This atmosphere, shaped by governmental pronouncements and media narratives, has profound anxieties and insecurities within the American public. To ensure a more stable and equitable global order, a paradigm shift is required. This necessitates a concerted effort from both the US government and its media apparatus to engage in open and transparent communication with the American people.

Firstly, there is a pressing need for the US to abandon its reliance on demonizing narratives directed towards Iran. The persistent rhetoric of has demonstrably yielded counterproductive outcomes, furthering tensions and fostering animosity. Instead, the US should consider pursuing a diplomatic approach based on mutual respect and understanding.

Some analysts argue that Iran is currently the most influential in the Middle East. Recognizing Iran’s regional influence presents an opportunity for the US to engage in strategic collaboration. A crucial step in this process involves acknowledging and apologizing for the, an event that undeniably shaped the trajectory of USā€“Iran relations.

A promising avenue for diplomatic progress lies in recognizing and endorsing Iran’s stated to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Collaborative efforts with other WMD-possessing nations, focusing on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, could prove highly beneficial.

Transitioning from belligerent postures to collaborative frameworks is essential for safeguarding US interests. Exploring possibilities for peaceful partnerships with other nations, potentially aligning with Iran on issues of global concern, offers a more sustainable path forward.

However, this transformation cannot be achieved solely by governmental actions. The active participation of the American public is crucial. This necessitates the cultivation of critical thinking skills, demands for transparency from governmental institutions and selective engagement with media sources. By doing so, American citizens can empower themselves to shape a narrative that prioritizes justice, collaboration and global well-being.

[ edited this piece.]

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the US-Israeli war on the Middle East, centered on the Israeli genocide in Gaza, but already also including in the West Bank, Israeli on Lebanon and Syria, and the US and UKā€™s of Yemen.

This latest US attack followed the US bombing of seven targets on February 2, three in Iraq and four in Syria, with 125 bombs and missiles, killing at least , which Iran ā€œa strategic mistakeā€ that would bring ā€œdisastrous consequencesā€ for the Middle East.

At the same time, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been touring the shrinking number of capitals in the region where leaders will still talk to him, playing the United Statesā€™ traditional role as a dishonest broker between Israel and its neighbors, in reality partnering with Israel to offer the Palestinians impossible, virtually suicidal terms for a ceasefire in Gaza.

What Israel and the United States have , but not made public, appears to be a second temporary ceasefire, during which prisoners or hostages would be exchanged, possibly leading to the release of all the Israeli security prisoners held in Gaza, but in no way leading to the final end of the genocide. If the Palestinians in fact freed all their Israeli hostages as part of a prisoner swap, it would remove the only obstacle to a catastrophic escalation of the genocide.

When Hamas responded with a serious counter-proposal for a full ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, US President Biden dismissed it out of hand as ā€œover the top,ā€ and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called it ā€œbizarreā€ and ā€œdelusional.ā€ 

The position of the United States and Israel today is that ending a massacre that has already killed more than people is not a serious option, even after the International Court of Justice has ruled it a case of genocide under the Genocide Convention. Raphael Lemkin, the Polish Holocaust survivor who coined the term ā€œgenocideā€ and drafted the Genocide Convention from his adopted home in New York City, must be turning in his grave in Mount Hebron Cemetery.

A fraught situation in Iraq

The United Statesā€™ support for ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s genocidal policies now goes way beyond Palestine, with the US expansion of the war to Iraq, Syria and Yemen to punish other countries and forces in the region for intervening to defend or support the Palestinians. US officials claimed the February 2 attacks were intended to stop Iraqi resistance attacks on US bases. But the leading Iraqi resistance force had already attacks against US targets on January 30 after they killed three US troops, declaring a truce at the urging of the Iranian and Iraqi governments.

A senior Iraqi military officer BBC Persian that at least one of the Iraqi military units the US bombed on February 2nd had nothing to do with attacks on US bases. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani negotiated an agreement a year ago to clearly differentiate between Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) units that were part of the ā€œAxis of Resistanceā€ fighting a low-grade war with U.S. occupation forces, and other PMF units that were not involved in attacks on US bases.Ģż

Tragically, because the US failed to coordinate its attacks with the Iraqi government, al-Sudaniā€™s agreement failed to prevent the US from attacking the wrong Iraqi forces. It is no wonder that some analysts have dubbed al-Sudaniā€™s valiant efforts to prevent all-out war between US forces and the Islamic resistance in his country ā€œ.ā€Ģż

Following the elaborately staged but carelessly misdirected US attacks, resistance forces in Iraq began launching new strikes on US bases, including a that killed six Kurdish troops at the largest US base in Syria. So the predictable effect of the US bombing was in fact to rebuff Iran and Iraqā€™s efforts to rein in resistance forces and to escalate a war that US officials keep claiming they want to deter.ĢżĢż

From experienced journalists and analysts to Middle Eastern governments, voices of caution are warning the United States in increasingly stark language of the dangers of its escalating bombing campaigns. ā€œWhile the war rages in Gaza,ā€ BBCā€™s wrote on February 4, ā€œone false move could set the region alight.ā€Ģż

Three days later, Guerin would be surrounded by protesters chanting ā€œAmerica is the greatest devil,ā€ as she from the site of the US drone assassination of Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Baqir al-Saadi in Baghdad – which could prove to be exactly the false move she feared.Ģż

But what Americans should be asking their government is this: Why are there still US troops in Iraq? It is 21 years since the United States invaded Iraq and plunged the nation into seemingly endless violence, chaos and ; 12 years since Iraq forced US occupation forces to from Iraq at the end of 2011; and 7 years since the defeat of ISIS, which served as justification for the United States to send forces back into Iraq in 2014, and then to most of Mosul, Iraqā€™s second-largest city, in 2017.

Successive Iraqi governments and parliaments have asked the United States to withdraw its forces from Iraq, and previously scheduled talks are about to begin. But the Iraqis and Americans have issued contradictory statements about the goal of the . Al-Sudani and most Iraqis hope they will bring about the immediate withdrawal of US forces, while US officials that troops may remain for another two to five years, kicking this explosive can further down the road despite the obvious dangers it poses to the lives of US troops and to peace in the region.

The US is losing its grip

Behind these contradictory statements, the real value of Iraqi bases to the US military does not seem to be about ISIS at all but about Iran. Although the United States has more than stationed in 14 countries across the Middle East, and another 20,000 on warships in the seas surrounding them, the bases it uses in Iraq are its closest bases and airfields to Tehran and much of Iran. If the Pentagon loses these forward operating bases in Iraq, the closest bases from which it can attack Tehran will be Camp Arifjan and five other bases in , where 13,500 US troops would be vulnerable to Iranian counter-attacks ā€” unless, of course, the US withdraws them, too.

Toward the end of the Cold War, historian Gabriel Kolko observed in his book Confronting the Third World that the United Statesā€™ ā€œendemic incapacity to avoid entangling, costly commitments in areas of the world that are of intrinsically secondary importance to [its] priorities has caused US foreign policy and resources to whipsaw virtually arbitrarily from one problem and region to the other. The result has been the United Statesā€™ increasing loss of control over its political priorities, budget, military strategy and tactics, and, ultimately, its original economic goals.ā€

After the end of the Cold War, instead of restoring realistic goals and priorities, the neocons who gained control of US foreign policy fooled themselves into believing that US military and economic power could finally triumph over the frustratingly diverse social and political evolution of hundreds of countries and cultures all over the world. In addition to wreaking mass destruction on country after country, this has turned the United States into the global enemy of the principles of democracy and self-determination that most Americans believe in.

The Americans feel at the plight of people in Gaza and the USā€™s role in it is a shocking new low in this disconnect between the humanity of ordinary Americans and the insatiable ambitions of their undemocratic leaders.Ģż

While working for an end to the US governmentā€™s support for ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s oppression of the Palestinian people, Americans should also be working for the long-overdue withdrawal of US occupying forces from Iraq, Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The attack has prompted strong demands in Washington and elsewhere for a powerful US response. Instead of targeting the various groups in Iraq sponsored to one degree or another by the regime in Tehran, advocates for striking at Iran directly. Such a response might involve disrupting ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s petroleum industry by bombarding the relevant facilities.

The demands for a strong kinetic response are countered by warnings about the US being drawn into a wider regional war in the Middle East. The unsuccessful American military effort to stop the Talibanā€™s control of Afghanistan and a less ambitious but equally unsuccessful intervention in the Lebanese civil war in the mid-1980s provide reasons for caution.

So, the alternatives ā€” at least those discussed in public ā€” are either continued tit-for-tat responses to attacks by Iranian-sponsored bands in Syria and Iraq or direct measures against Tehran with the accompanying danger of an escalatory spiral leading to a large-scale regional war. The latter would lead to a growing number of American military casualties, which would have to be absorbed in a presidential election year.

There is a third way, one well worth consideration by policy-makers and members of the American public.

How the US can exploit ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s weaknesses and avoid bloodshed

The Islamic Republic is a formidable adversary. Its political and military leaders, from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, to President Ebrahim Raisi, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) head Hossein Salami and Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani, have shown themselves to be quite ruthless and adept in maintaining their grip on power. To this end, they are aided by the IRGC, an organization of some fighters or potential fighters. The IRGC is, in turn, divided into the Quods Force, whose tasks include foreign terrorist operations in the Middle East and beyond, and the Basij an organization devoted to the maintenance of internal security ā€” by all means necessary, including .

Despite a political culture of religious repression and the weapons available to a modern police state, the Islamic Republic is not invulnerable. By many accounts, the regime is highly unpopular, especially among the educated middle classes of Tehran and the other major cities. Also, whether deserved or not, the regime has acquired a reputation for corruption, particularly among leaders of the IRGC.

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s population is close to , a significant proportion of whom are young people under the age of 20. At last count, the countryā€™s unemployment rate was around of the workforce. These figures suggest a less than contented population.

Public protests against the Islamic Republic are hardly out of the question. The most spectacular of these manifestations so far was the sustained protests by Iranian women following the death in custody of a young woman, Masha Amini, arrested for not wearing her hijab appropriately. Beginning in September 2022 and continuing into 2023, the forces of repression had to be employed throughout much of the country.

Furthermore, the Iranian population is less than homogenous; aside from the majority Persian ethnicity, there are Azeris, Kurds, Balochis and Arabs. In past decades, leaders of these communities have sought to achieve greater autonomy from Tehran, sometimes by the use of violence, albeit short-lived.

This combination of demographic and political characteristics point to some of the Islamic Republicā€™s vulnerabilities, ones that might be exploited by the United States, at least in the long-run. Subversion appears to be a sensible means of weakening the regime of the ayatollahs. The Central Intelligence Agency has extensive experience in weakening various hostile regimes in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, not to mention the successful 1953 coup it promoted against the nationalist regime of Muhammad Mosaddegh that brought the Shah back to power.Ģż

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The trend of Arabā€“Israeli normalization pushed both Palestine and Iran to the sidelines. Hamas, backed by Iran, sought to change that. Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. The attack and the subsequent war not only brought the Palestinian issue to the front and center of discourse once again but also re-injected Iran into the fight for regional power.

The Israelā€“Hamas war created a crack in regional power dynamics

Iran now has an opening where it didnā€™t have one before. Of course, it is as they say in the business world: Never invest with your own money. Iran used Hamas to break into the fight for regional power, and it will continue with that tactic. Terrorist groups such as the Houthis and Hezbollah offer Iran the chance to upend the fragile regional dynamics. Not only this, but Iran can also threaten increasingly brittle global trade.

It is no secret that non-geographically centered power wins over geographically-centered states. Iran can strike from many places at once, stretching the US capacity to respond thin. As in the USā€“Vietnam War, asymmetric warfare has proven to be wildly successful in upsetting what seemed to be a one-sided power dynamic.  In backing and funding groups such as Hamas and the Houthis, Iran is now broading the focus of attention. No longer is the world only focused on the Israelā€“Hamas war; the focus is increasingly on Iran as a player with growing influence.

The big powers of the Middle East find themselves, much like Odysseusā€™ crew, caught between Scylla and Charybdis. Saudi Arabia in particular is feeling the strain. On one hand, war with Israel is the last thing Saudi Arabia wants. But on the other, its majority Sunni Muslim population views Saudi leaders as ignoring the sentiments of their citizens. The hearts of the Arab street, of course, are with their fellow Muslims in Palestine. Thus, regional leaders risk being viewed as either spineless or corrupt. Iran has thus thrown a wrench in the Arab monarchyā€™s plans. 

The ripples Iran is making spread far beyond the geographical confines of the Middle East, too. The Iran-sponsored Houthis are attacking shipping vessels in the Red Sea from their base in Yemen. Through them, Iran is doing damage to intercontinental trade and thus to the entire global economy.

The US is beginning to feel the strain. Iran and its allies are carrying out strikes in the Red Sea, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Russia and China may seize the opportunity to move into the area as the US has its back turned. Even India has sensed the rising tension. While it knows it must maintain connections with Iran, it must also uphold the principle of free trade on the high seas that Iran is attacking. So, India and other nations outside the region are beginning to stress.

From a unipolar world to multiple spheres of influence

The Israelā€“Hamas war may have lasting consequences globally. Ukraine, in particular, has lost much from the aftermath of October 7. As the US diverts its aid to Israel and the Red Sea, aid cannot make its way to Ukraine. The Biden administration is finding it harder and harder to divide its support between Israel and Ukraine. 

The unrest in the Middle East affects the US domestically too. The US public is divided between supporting Israel or Palestine. The Left criticizes the administration for refusing to call a ceasefire. The Right accuses the administration of being complicit with Hamas. Once again, the two-party divide seems to have weakened US coherence, actions and influence. 

Weakened influence isnā€™t the only danger that comes with a divided US public. The public struggles to understand why the US should be involved in any conflicts in the Middle East. This raises the temptation for US leaders to disengage from the region or even from the world at large. Disengagement will guarantee chaos. De facto spheres of influence will shape international transactions rather than a Western-backed, unipolar system.

In other words, what we know of the normative order is collapsing right in front of our eyes. 

This impending chaos will change everything from the price of pencils to how a war is waged. The Israel-Hamas war is a chip off the world order. We will no longer be facing a unipolar world order with the US on top. Rather, we face a multipolar one. 

Decentralization of power has already begun. US influence in the Middle East, which is the successor to European colonialism in the region, is losing its rationale in the eyes of American citizens and of the world. The Israelā€“Hamas war is the straw that broke the camelā€™s back. The domino effect has now cascaded from the region onto the global stage.

The normative system is now being replaced, and no one knows what the coming multipolar order will be like.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post How the Israelā€“Hamas War Is Now Changing the World appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The poll are significant with Hezbollah and Israel engaged in tit-for-tat cross-border attacks that both parties have sought to contain but could spin out of control at any moment. Hezbollah has wanted to contain the hostilities because a majority of Lebanese oppose their country becoming embroiled in a war, particularly with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel could turn Beirut into another Gaza.

In the final analysis, the poll, conducted in late November and early December 2023 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, suggested that public support for Iranian-backed militants was on the rise. The poll further indicated that the majority of Lebanese opposed to increased military engagement in support of Gaza is fragile.

Various factors could upset the apple cart. These include an unintended escalation of the border hostilities sparked by a large number of civilian casualties, repeated Israeli targeted killings on Lebanese soil of prominent Hezbollah and Hamas figures, a potential International Court of Justice ruling asserting that ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s military campaign in Gaza risks genocide in a case submitted by South Africa and the fallout of Netanyahu the creation of an independent Palestinian state and insisting that Israel would maintain control of territory conquered in the 1967 Middle East war.

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“This is a necessary condition, and it conflicts with the idea of [Palestinian] sovereignty. What to do? I tell this truth to our American friends, and I also stopped the attempt to impose a reality on us that would harm Israel’s security,” Netanyahu . ā€œ[In] every area that we evacuate we receive terrible terror against us. It happened in South Lebanon, in Gaza, and also in Judea and Samaria,ā€ i.e., the West Bank. ā€œAnd therefore I clarify that in any other arrangement, in the future, the state of Israel has to control the entire area from the river to the sea,ā€ he .

Lebanese support for Hezbollah and for war is rising

The poll showed that only a slim majority of Lebanese, 53%, prioritized addressing their countryā€™s political and economic crisis above becoming embroiled in a ā€œforeign war.ā€ An identical majority believed resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict required negotiations rather than a military solution. Even so, a vast majority postulated that Israeli weakness and internal divisions meant that Israel ultimately can be defeated.

At the same time, Lebanese were unanimous (99%) in wanting Arab states to break all ties to Israel because of the Gaza war.

Hezbollah is likely to take heart from significant increases in its popularity across denominations. Shia Muslims, Sunni Muslims and Christians each account for roughly one-third of Lebanonā€™s population.

89% of Shiites had a ā€œvery positiveā€ view of Hezbollah, up from 66% in 2020. The number of Sunnis who had at least a ā€œsomewhat positiveā€ attitude towards the group jumped from 6% in 2020 to 34%. Among Christians, this number rose from 16% to 29%.

Similarly, 79% of Lebanese viewed Hamas favorably.

Netanyahuā€™s hardline stance

Netanyahuā€™s public rejection of a Palestinian state fit a long-standing pattern of Middle Eastern politics in which hardliners on both sides of various divides reinforce one another. That may be only the icing on his cake. Netanyahu did not say anything he had not suggested over the years, which puts the emphasis on the timing of the prime ministerā€™s comments.

His reiterated rejection of a Palestinian state was designed to pacify his ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative coalition partners as well as stymie US efforts to persuade Saudi Arabia to establish diplomatic relations with Israel that emphasize a two-state solution to the Israeliā€“Palestinian conflict.

ā€œThere is a profound opportunity for regionalization in the Middle East, in the greater Middle East, that we have not had before. The challenge is realizing it,ā€ US Secretary of State Antony Blinken this weekā€™s World Economic Forum gathering of leaders in Davos.

The United States needs regionalization for Arab buy-in to postwar arrangements in Gaza and the West Bank. This is unlikely to be forthcoming without the prospect of a credible peace process.

Speaking at the Davos forum, Israeli President Isaac Herzog relations with Saudi Arabia as a gamechanger and a key to ending the Gaza war. However, that remains a pipedream with the current Israeli government. Moreover, the problem is that a new Israeli government may not have the sharp edges of Netanyahuā€™s ultra-nationalists and ultra-conservatives but may be equally unwilling to make the kind of concessions required for a credible peace process.

Former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to the US and UK Turki al Faisal, who is believed to be close to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, appeared to that sentiment and take it a step further. ā€œThe present leadership of Hamas, of the [Palestine Liberation Organization] and of Israel should be excluded from any participation in any future political role. They have to pay for what they have done ā€¦ All of them are failures,ā€ Al Faisal told CNNā€™s Christiane Amanpour.

Responding to Netanyahuā€™s rejection, US President Joe Biden, wittingly or unwittingly, noted that a two-state solution means different things to different people. Biden a two-state solution could involve a demilitarized Palestinian state that would be more palatable for Israeli hardliners.

That has long been ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s often unspoken definition of the term across the countryā€™s political spectrum, with few exceptions. Hamasā€™ October 7 attack in which people, mostly civilians, were killed reinforced this perspective. The problem is that Israeli security concerns about Palestinians are a mirror-image of Palestinian security concerns about Israel after more than half a century of occupation and the current Gaza carnage, likely making demilitarization a non-starter for Palestinians.

For his part, Netanyahu feels emboldened by Bidenā€™s poor in an election year, Republican support for Israel and his past ability to a US president domestically in the United States.

Iran is emboldened

At the same time, Netanyahu bolstered with his comments the credibility of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s opposition to Arab states normalizing relations with Israel. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei days before Hamasā€™ October 7 attack on Israel that normalization of relations with Israel amounted to “gambling” that was “doomed to failure.” He warned that countries establishing relations with the Jewish state would be “in harm’s way.”

Events since October 7 have reinforced ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s sense that the winds of Middle Eastern geopolitics are blowing in its favor. ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s conduct in the Gaza war has drawn from much of the international community, except for the United States and several European countries. A potential international court ruling would deepen the dent in ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s moral standing inflicted by the war. In Switzerland, prosecutors they were investigating unspecified criminal complaints against Herzog as he attended the World Economic Forum. It was unclear whether the complaint was related to his remarks at the Forum or to past remarks or actions. Herzog was also cited in South Africaā€™s international court case as suggesting that all Gazans were responsible for Hamasā€™ October 7 attack on Israel.

In addition, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s non-state allies complicate affairs for Israel and the United States. More than three months into the war, Israel has yet to achieve its goals of destroying Hamas and liberating the remaining 139 Hamas-held hostages abducted during the October 7 fighting, including the bodies of those since killed in Gaza.

While not directly involving Iranian non-state allies, mounting in the West Bank, where Israeli raids and clashes with Palestinian fighters threaten to mushroom into an insurgency, strengthen ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s hardline position. Meanwhile, Hezbollah, backed by Iran, has 100,000 Israelis to evacuate northern Israel and has tied down a substantial number of Israeli forces along the border.

Simultaneously, Iran-supported Houthi rebels in Yemen have the United States in a catch-22 with attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.

Finally, Iranian missile strikes earlier in January in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan reflect ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s sense of having the upper hand rather than an intention to escalate regional tensions. They signal ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s willingness to defend itself, even if it does not want to see Gaza escalate into a regional conflagration. The strikes were in response to attacks on Iranian targets, including Islamic State in the city of Kerman that killed 94 people, the in Syria of a senior Revolutionary Guard commander and an on an Iranian police station by a Pakistan-based jihadist group.

Overall, the different hot spots suggest that hardliners are calling the shots for now.

Without a halt to the fighting in Gaza, containing the various flashpoints and preventing them from spinning out of control increasingly is becoming mission impossible.

US foreign policy scholar Christopher S Chivvis: ā€œIn a situation where emotions are running high thanks to the appalling violence in Gaza, with hawks in Washington eager to dole out hellfire and brimstone on Tehran, and the global economy at stake, it will be even harder to exercise restraint and avoid a broader regional war ā€“ the worst-case outcome for American interests.ā€

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Hardline Outlooks Are Mainstream Now in Israel, Lebanon and Iran appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Iran: an enduring pillar of hegemony in the Middle East

Iran’s claim to legitimacy is deeply rooted in a history that spans millennia. The land known today as Iran has been home to a succession of influential civilizations and empires, each leaving its mark on the countryā€™s cultural and intellectual makeup. From the Elamites, who rival the Sumerians as one of the oldest civilizations in world history, to the Achaemenids, Parthians, Sassanids and Safavids, Iran’s rich history fosters a profound sense of pride and identity in its people. Iran has often been the seat of power for empires stretching across the Fertile Crescent and into Central Asia, a heritage which serves as a foundation for Iran’s claim to leadership. 

Furthermore, Iran draws strength from its religious legitimacy as the epicenter of the Shia branch of Islam. ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s 1979 Islamic Revolution toppled the pro-Western monarchy and founded a theocratic republic. This gave Iran religious authority as the hub of Shia Islam, which has many adherents in nations such as Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen.Ģż

Beginning with the Islamic Revolution, Iran has exported its revolutionary ideology to fellow Shia communities. It has created a network of allied non-state military actors like in Lebanon, the in Yemen and various groups in Iraq and Palestine, strategically extending its influence. The Quds Force, which was led by the late General Qasem Soleimani, plays a pivotal role in these proxy militias. This force solidified Iran’s ideological foothold beyond its borders.

In addition, Iran has been a major supporter of Hamas, the Palestinian armed group that controls Gaza. Hamas carried out a sudden attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, killing people and capturing more than 200 hostages. Iran Hamas with money, arms and training, as well as operational and strategic guidance for the operation.

Iran is also a substantial military power in its own right. The Islamic Republic approximately 610,000 active-duty personnel, 350,000 reserve personnel and 150,000 paramilitary personnel. The military structure comprises two main branches: the regular armed forces, encompassing the army, navy and air force, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a parallel force directly accountable to the Supreme Leader. The IRGC possesses ground, naval and aerospace units, in addition to the Quds Force and the Basij, a volunteer militia.

Iran’s military arsenal includes a spectrum of ballistic and cruise missiles, with some boasting a range of up to . Drones, submarines and cyber-warfare capabilities further enhance Iran’s military capabilities.

Notably, Iran adopts a strategic approach relying on asymmetric and unconventional warfare tactics, employing swarm tactics, proxy forces, and sabotage to counterbalance adversaries’ conventional superiority. Illustrating this strategy, Iran has recently employed missile and drone attacks to US bases in Iraq, as well as targeting Israel-linked. Meanwhile, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s proxy forces like Hamas and Hezbollah serve to harass and deter these adversaries.

Saudi Arabia: the conservative powerhouse

If Iran is the revolutionary force in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is the conservative one.

Saudi Arabia is the cradle of Islam. It was here that the Prophet Muhammad was born and received his revelations in the 7th century CE. The two holiest sites in Islam, the Great Mosque of Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, are both in Saudi Arabia. For this reason, the Saudi monarch styles himself as ā€œCustodian of the Two Holy Mosques.ā€ This historical and religious connection grants the nation a profound moral legitimacy to exert influence over the Middle East.

The two mosques serve as focal points of the annual pilgrimage, known as . Making the pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime is a religious duty for Muslims. By hosting millions of pilgrims yearly, Saudi Arabia strategically deploys its religious influence to further its political objectives and propagate its ideological stance.

During the formative period of Islamic civilization, Saudi Arabia was the center of the Caliphate. It as the seat of the first four caliphs who governed the expanding Muslim empire from 632 to 661 CE. Following the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the last Islamic caliphate after World War I, Saudi Arabia again asserted itself as the heart of Islam, without laying claim to the title of caliph. Saudi Arabia championed ā€” a strict and conservative interpretation of Sunni Islamic teachings. This ideology, considered by its adherents the pure and authentic form of Islam, underpins Saudi Arabiaā€™s historical and religious claims.

Saudi Arabia also enjoys the support of a major non-Islamic power, the United States. The US has emerges as Saudi Arabiaā€™s foremost , providing robust military support. The roots of this alliance trace back to 1945 when the nations signed a pivotal agreement granting the US access to Saudi oil in exchange for military and economic aid. This agreement, known as the, was forged by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz Al Saud aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal. It marked the beginning of a long-lasting and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

Over the years, this strategic partnership has deepened, encompassing cooperation on counter-terrorism, regional security and energy. The United States has supported Saudi Arabia in various conflicts, such as the Iranā€“Iraq War, the Persian Gulf War and the ongoing Yemen Civil War, as well as in confronting the threats posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS.

As the primary arms supplier to Saudi Arabia, the United States furnishes military training, intelligence, and logistical support, aligning its interests with Saudi policies in the region. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States accounted for 79% of the total by Saudi Arabia from 2016 to 2020. This alliance positions Saudi Arabia as a key American ally and a counterbalance to ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s influence in the Middle East.

Turkey: Ottoman Heritage and a unique foreign policy

The third factor in the Middle East is Turkey, a powerhouse boasting the largest economy in the region and the second-largest population.

Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East is anchored in its Ottoman heritage. The Ottoman Empire, centered in Turkey, was the dominant Islamic power and caliphate ā€” both the religious and political leader of the Muslim world until its dissolution in 1924, following Turkeyā€™s defeat in World War I.

The Ottoman Empire ruled the Muslim world from North Africa to Iraq and extended deep into Europe. It was a diverse and multicultural society. This environment promoted coexistence among various ethnic and religious groups through a system of relative tolerance and autonomy.

Turkey’s historical legacy not only gives its people a sense of pride and identity but a perceived right to leadership and influence in the Middle East. itself as the rightful successor of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey sees itself as having a special responsibility and role within the region, encapsulated in its foreign policy vision of , tempering Turkish nationalism with a pan-Islamic focus.Ģż

Like Iran, Turkey is a sizeable military power with a large population. Turkey approximately 510,000 active-duty personnel, complemented by 380,000 reserve personnel and an additional 150,000 paramilitary personnel. Turkey is also a member of NATO, which affords the nation access to the collective defense and security mechanisms of the West.

Employing its hard power, Turkey has intervened militarily involvement in various countries, notably Syria, Libya and Iraq. In these theaters, Turkey has lent support to various factions in order to counter adversaries such as the, the and This military intervention serves as a tangible expression of Turkey’s commitment to shaping regional dynamics.

Turkey strategically deploys proxy forces to bolster its alliances and extend its influence. Entities like the , the in Libya and the in Egypt serve as instrumental proxies, trained and supported by Turkey to align with its strategic objectives.

The spirit of cold war unmistakanly pervades the current geopolitical landscape. The outcome of the struggle between Iran Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will shape the future of a new Middle East.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The New Middle East: A Triangular Struggle for Hegemony appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

But Israel is also achieving excellence on two other fronts. The first is ethnic cleansing, thanks to a aiming at the removal of an existing population from a land it has occupied for millennia. The second is revealed in an that appeared in The Israel Times on December 31, 2023, with the title: ā€œIsrael said set to replace all Palestinian workers with tens of thousands of foreigners.ā€ In other words, a nation so successful at export needs to achieve balance with its imports.

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And it makes a lot of economic sense. When you export an ethnic group that has played the role of productive second-class citizens within your high-powered economy, at some point you need to fill the gap. ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s leadership pertinently reframes the question. Why permit Palestinians to survive in Greater Israel, if the younger of the tribe ā€” the most qualified for essential manual work ā€” insist on being undisciplined, disobedient and disruptive?

Not only is it a no-brainer to seek ways of cleansing the landscape of their presence, the obvious solution to the loss of their manpower is to look to import the kind of third-class population that has consistently demonstrated its utility for wonderfully successful economies such as those of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s neighboring Gulf states. and the United Arab , whose native and religiously homogeneous indigenous communities constitutes only a little over 10% of the total population, have proved that small privileged minority can harmoniously manage a civilization and earn the worldā€™s admiration.

The government is now asserting its intention not to allow Palestinian workers back even after the current war ends. The logic is crystal clear. According to The Israel Times, ā€œIsrael plans to permanently replace all Palestinian laborers with foreign workers, in a major, ambitious initiative aimed at ridding the country of a perceived security threat, the Kan public broadcaster reports.ā€

°Õ“Ē»å²¹²āā€™s Weekly Devilā€™s Dictionary definition:

Security threat:

People unlike oneā€™s own.

Contextual note

This should not be confused with a randomly suggested ā€œreplacement theory.ā€ Itā€™s the real thing, a well-articulated plan resulting from serious interministerial collaboration, worked out in precise numerical detail. ā€œThe reported plan by the finance, interior and labor ministries would see Israel bring in 25,500 workers from Sri Lanka, 20,000 from China, 17,000 from India, 13,000 from Thailand and 6,000 from Moldova,ā€ says the Times.

Unlike most European countries and the US, who have seen powerful political movements growing to repel and reject any form of immigration, Israel is demonstrating its commitment to tolerance, diversity and its own brand of inclusion. These thousands of people from a variety of other provenances will provide a model for whatever portion of the Palestinian population is permitted to continue to reside in Greater Israel. Once the Palestinians observe, it is hoped, how peaceful it can be to simply show up for a job and earn a living without being obsessed by oneā€™s identity, history or ancestral memory, there may come a time when they can be reintegrated into the Israeli economy.

The resourceful Israeli leadership doesnā€™t stop with that simple idea of importing docile populations. ā€œAdditionally, the government intends to incentivize Israelis to work in construction and agriculture, as well promoting technologies that could cut the number of employees needed in these fields.ā€

Now this is really insightful. There must surely be a small minority among the privileged ethnicity in Israel that will accept the kind of menial work God created darker-skinned populations to execute. Why not get them involved to pick up some of the slack? Somewhere in ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s hypermodern culture, the memory exists of the heroic period of Israel when people arrived in droves to work on kibbutzim and realize the romantic dream of rural socialism.

That actually seems unlikely, at least on any significant scale, as the Jewish Agency for Israel. ā€œSomewhat romanticized in the past, the Kibbutz of today has evolved dramatically and the focus of Kibbutz life on society has substantially diminished.ā€ The modern kibbutz is better adapted to organizing rave parties than promoting an idealized form of hard-working collective prosperity based on apparently discredited socialistic principles.

The second hypothesis is far more likely: that ā€œtechnologiesā€ ā€” obviously meaning AI ā€” will ā€œcut the number of employees needed in these fields. That makes a lot of sense, since the focus of Israeli productivity long ago moved beyond oranges and avocadoes to producing the worldā€™s most sophisticated software. Israel’s best-selling philosopher, Yuval Noah Harari, has been for a long time on the question of AIā€™s capacity to transform the job market. Undoubtedly, the Israeli government will seek to benefit from his wisdom.

Historical note

Commentators have noticed for decades ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s focus on a particular theme that has inspired political decisions made by previous generations of Israeli governments. It is with US history and especially US expansion in the 19th century ā€” in fact, Israeli leaders have frequented resonated with the idea of ā€œmanifest destiny.ā€ Back in 1956, Moshe Dayan notably the dominant vision of ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s future. ā€œWe are a generation of settlers, and without the steel helmet and the cannon we cannot plant a tree and build a home ā€¦ This is the fate of our generation, the choice of our life ā€” to be prepared and armed, strong and tough ā€” or otherwise the sword will slip from our fist, and our life will be snuffed out.ā€

The similarities with US history »å“Ē²Ōā€™t end there. Before the American Civil War and the emancipation of the slaves, many white people, including sitting and future presidents, sought to solve the problem of slavery by ā€œfree Black Americans to Africa through ā€˜colonizationā€™,ā€ as History describes it. In their eyes, if slavery were abolished, all the freed slaves could then return to Africa. Thanks to the ability of European and white North American nations to colonize regions of the ā€œuncivilizedā€ world, the American Colonization Society created a region in Africa that became known as Liberia, the destination of freed American slaves.

The Times of Israel now us that ā€œPrime Minister Benjamin Netanyahuā€™s coalition is conducting secret contacts for accepting thousands of immigrants from Gaza with Congo, in addition to other nations.ā€ Exporting the troublemakers to Africa seems like the right idea. If the US had done the same after the Civil War, we might never have seen the unseemly events that followed the deaths of Martin Luther King and George Floyd. Tucker Carlsonā€™s ā€œlegacy Americansā€ would feel much more in control today as the nationā€™s political and interracial culture becomes increasingly polarized and conflictual. Life in the US might be much more harmonious.

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Of course, there is one notable difference, despite the obvious parallel. The North American slaves were Africans, and though not many if any at all hailed from the region of Liberia, they would at least be returning to the native continent. The Palestinians are not only natives to the land from which they are to be exported. Those exporting them are in a large part from other lands.

One further irony, in November by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, is worth noticing. ā€œDr. Arthur Rupin, the Zionist colonization expert, made the startling assertion that the Arabs of Palestine were descendants of old Palestine Jews who had been converted to Mohammedism.ā€ So the Palestinians could be, even in their majority, the true descendants of ā€œthe people of the Bibleā€ in whose name the state of Israel was created.

As ChatGPT would typically conclude, if asked to weigh in on this question: History is ā€œcomplex and multifaceted.ā€

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devilā€™s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51³Ō¹Ļ Devilā€™s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Macgregor can be forgiven for misremembering a foreign word that happens to be exotic in its spelling as well as pronunciation. He is absolutely right about the source of the concept behind the word: the influential 14^th century Arabic philosopher, Ibn Khaldun, remembered as the pioneer of a non-religious philosophy of history.

Macgregor tells us that the term proposed by Khaldun is ā€œa word you »å“Ē²Ōā€™t hear much anymore.ā€ Iā€™m not sure it has often been heard in the past. The erudite colonel is probably thinking about an unfortunate trend among modern theorists of international relations, especially those active in making and enforcing policy in the geopolitical sphere. Even among intellectuals, history ā€“ its lessons and its deepest insights ā€“ has suffered from serious neglect. The thinking of political thought leaders today is shaped by principles drawn from the fields of engineering, statistics and contemporary management strategies.

Col. Macgregor defines Ibn Khaldunā€™s 600-year-old concept as signifying ā€œsocial cohesion, group solidarity or unity of action.ā€ In English there is no single word to encompass its meaning. Stepping away from an idea that is so foreign to Western thinking that we need a string of concepts to account for its range of meanings, our definition of the day offers a slightly different take.

°Õ“Ē»å²¹²āā€™s Weekly Devilā€™s Dictionary definition:

Asabiyya:

A word that does not exist in the English language and therefore a concept that does not exist in the language, but which, if it did, would explain what English speakers fail to understand about much of the world.

Contextual note

In Edward T Hallā€™s seminal book Beyond Culture (1976), the American anthropologist and founding father of the area of study we call intercultural communication explains that ā€œthe future depends on man’s being able to transcend the limits of individual cultures. To do so, however, he must first recognise and accept the multiple hidden dimensions of unconscious culture, because every culture has its own hidden, unique form of unconscious culture.ā€

Hall theorizes a distinction between what he calls high and low context cultures. High context cultures embrace values that emerge from relationships. Low context cultures give priority to formal rules and laws. For anthropologists such as Hall, the US appears as a model of low context culture in which rules and the strictures of law dominate, clearly superseding the effect of relationships.

Most of the rest of the world, from Latin America to Africa and Asia, sees rules of behavior as useful guidelines, but clearly subordinate to the quality and consistency of relationships. That very fact may clarify the phenomenon so visible in todayā€™s geopolitics: the failure of the US to convince the rest of the world to respect what it promotes as the ā€œrules-based international order.ā€ Rules are fine but they can lead to the kind of endless and fruitless bickering that now characterizes all public political debate in the US.

Ibn Khadunā€™s concept of asabiyya derives from the tribal psychology that exists locally in all human societies. Tribal reality is almost always high context, though more complex groupings emerge that may tend in one direction or the other. In their book Dawn of Everything David Graeber and David Wengrow describe the relationship between two neighboring North American societies ā€“ the Kwakiutl and the Yuroks ā€“ whose cultures were in sharp contrast, the first high context (hierarchical) and second low context (egalitarian). In Europe, following the Reformation, Catholic countries retained their high context culture, rooted in historical tradition, compared to Protestant countries that evolved towards cultural (though not necessarily political) egalitarianism. Protestant cultures increasingly substituted the force of law for the bond of relationships as an overriding principle of government.

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Khaldun understood that the geographical reach of Islam established over the previous seven centuries had created the conditions for a widely shared high context culture. The philosopher and historian realized that the force of asabiyya required a referential framework, in this case the Islamic teachings, but it took its meaning from the act of shared experience rather than from any set of doctrines. Christian Europe during the Middle Ages had its own asabiyya, a factor that contributed to the sense of mission underpinning the Crusades. The prolonged conflict between the two in the Middle East led to the weakening of both and eventually the evolution of Western Christian culture into its modern low context version.

Historical note

When Edward Hall invoked ā€œunconscious culture,ā€ he was referring to the complex heritage embodied in the historical memory of a particular group of people. When he speaks of the need to transcend individual cultures, he does not mean abolishing or ignoring them. Instead, he sees the anthropologistā€™s need to seek universals that are not inconsistent with the experience and accumulated worldview of those groups. Khaldunā€™s asabiyya stands as an example of this effort of transcending to understand how cultures function, despite the differences in their traditions, narratives and scriptures.

One of the major errors great and even lesser powers have always made has been neglecting the force of asabiyya and the way it may contradict and undermine even the most seemingly rational rules. The error consists in believing that transcending individual cultures means overcoming and abolishing their existing traditions and replacing them with something else, or in some cases nothing at all. This sums up the reasoning of Europeans during the Crusades that reemerged in the race for colonial conquest driven by the ā€œcivilizing missionā€ of enlightened Westerners. It reappeared more recently with the post World War II ā€œrules-based order.ā€

Those three periods, which saw Western cultures seeking to transform entire regions of the world, reflected three different types of assault on the cultures they targeted. The Crusaders found their justification  in religious doctrine; the colonialists in economic interest combined with a ā€œcivilizingā€ religious pretext; and the ā€œrules enforcersā€ through a combination of economic interest and the ideology of progress.

Today, in the 21^st century, the trend of dismissing what some appear to think of as the excess weight of history has produced a trend highly visible in the US: the dismissal of history itself as an uncomprehending intellectual eliteā€™s unproductive obsession with the past.

Many thinkers and commentators want us to believe that we live in a world that is fundamentally different from anything that existed in the past. Our acceptance of globalization as a new historical norm means that we see the world defined not by the people who inhabit it, but by the economy of the nations those people live in. Technology defines the environment that sustains us.

We measure the health of the economy itself by one criterion: growth. Technology encapsulates and symbolizes the enshrinement of ā€œprogressā€ as a dominant cultural value, redefining ethics as the study of the means of achieving comfort and convenience.

For cognitive scientist Steven Pinker, the meaning of history is summed up in the measurable statistical progress visible in the trends that have liberated individuals from the material constraints. A younger generation of futurist ā€œthinkersā€ such as Ray Kurzweil, Nick Bolstrom or Elon Musk, predict, with an air of omniscient authority, how humans will live in the coming decades and centuries.

For these thinkers, history is a collection of failed practices that can provide no guidance on that question. Only those brilliant minds, who infallibly understand technology, can help us to understand what they see as an established truth: that human nature now must align with technological progress.

Douglas Macgregor reminds us that Ibn Khaldunā€™s understanding of historical processes may still be at work even in the age of AI. This should help us reflect on who we were in the past, who we are now, and who we should try to become. 

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devilā€™s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51³Ō¹Ļ Devilā€™s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Do Words Literally Fail Us in Middle East Politics? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

But if Israel persists in this genocidal war, US threats may be impotent to prevent others from intervening. From Lebanon to Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Iran, the possibilities of the conflict spreading are enormous. Even says it is ready to fight for a free Palestine, based on a unanimous vote in its parliament on November 1.

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Middle Eastern governments and their people already see the United States as a party to ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s massacre in Gaza. So any direct US military action will be seen as an escalation on the side of Israel. It would be more likely to provoke further escalation than to deter it.

The US already faces this predicament in Iraq. Despite of Iraqi demands for the removal of US forces, at least 2,500 American troops remain at in western Anbar province, , north of Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, and another small base at the airport in Erbil. There are also ā€œā€ NATO troops, including Americans, advising Iraqi forces in , based near Baghdad.

For many years, US forces in Iraq have been mired in a low-grade war against the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that Iraq formed to fight ISIS, mainly from Shia militias. Despite their links to Iran, the armed groups Kataā€™ib Hezbollah, Asaā€™ib Ahl al-Haq and other PMFs have often ignored Iranian calls to de-escalate attacks on US forces. These Iraqi groups do not respect Iran Quds Force leader General Esmail Qaani as highly as they did General Soleimani, so Soleimaniā€™s assassination by the United States in 2020 has further ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ability to restrain the militias in Iraq.

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After a year-long truce between US and Iraqi forces, the Israeli war on Gaza has triggered a new escalation of this conflict in both Iraq and Syria. Some militias rebranded themselves as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and began attacking US bases on October 17. After 32 attacks on US bases in Iraq, 34 more in Syria and three US airstrikes in Syria, US forces conducted on November 21 against two Kataā€™ib Hezbollah bases in Iraq, one in Anbar province and one in Jurf Al-Nasr, south of Baghdad, killing at least nine militiamen.

The US airstrikes prompted a from the Iraqi government spokesman Bassam al-Awadi. ā€œWe vehemently condemn the attack on , executed without the knowledge of government agencies,ā€ al-Awadi said. ā€œThis action is a blatant violation of sovereignty and an attempt to destabilize the security situation ā€¦ The recent incident represents a clear violation of the coalitionā€™s mission to combat Daesh [ISIS] on Iraqi soil. We call on all parties to avoid unilateral actions and to respect Iraqā€™s sovereignty.ā€

As the Iraqi government feared, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq responded to the US airstrikes with two attacks on Al-Harir airbase on November 22 and on November 23. They attacked Al-Asad airbase with several drones and launched another drone attack on the US base at Erbil airport. Their Syrian allies attacked two US bases across the border in northeastern Syria.

Short of a ceasefire in Gaza or a full US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria, there is no decisive action the US can take that would put a stop to these attacks. So, the level of violence in Iraq and Syria is likely to keep rising as long as the war on Gaza continues.

Regional actors in Yemen, Turkey, Lebanon and Iran contemplate intervening in Gaza

Another formidable and experienced military force opposing Israel and the United States is the Houthi army in Yemen. On November 14, Abdul-Malek al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi government in Yemen, neighboring countries to open a corridor through their territory for his army to go and fight Israel in Gaza.

The Houthi Deputy Information Secretary Nasreddin Amer told Newsweek that, if they had a way to enter Palestine, they would not hesitate to join the fight against Israel, ā€We have fighters numbering hundreds of thousands who are brave, tough, trained and experienced in fighting,” Amer said. “They have a very strong belief, and their dream in life is to fight the Zionists and the Americans.ā€

Transporting hundreds of thousands of Yemeni soldiers to fight in Gaza would be nearly impossible unless Saudi Arabia opened the way. That seems highly unlikely, but Iran or another ally could help to transport a smaller number by air or sea to join the fight.

The Houthis have been waging an asymmetric war against Saudi-led invaders and the internationally recognized Yemeni government for many years, and they have developed weapons and tactics that they could bring to bear against Israel. Soon after al-Houthiā€™s statement, Houthi forces in the Red Sea a ship owned, via shell companies, by Israeli billionaire Abraham Ungar. The ship, which was on its way from Istanbul to India, was detained in a Yemeni port.

The Houthis have also launched a series of drones and missiles towards Israel. While many Western politicians and journalists try to portray the Houthis as simply puppets of Iran, the Houthis are actually an independent, unpredictable force that other actors in the region cannot control.

Even NATO member Turkey is finding it difficult to remain a bystander, given the widespread public support for Palestine. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was among the first international leaders to speak out strongly against the Israeli war on Gaza, explicitly calling it a and saying that it amounted to .

Turkish civil society groups are spearheading a to send humanitarian aid to Gaza on cargo ships, braving a possible confrontation like the one that occurred in 2010 when the Israelis attacked the Freedom Flotilla, people aboard the Mavi Marmara.

On the Lebanese border, Hezbollah and Israel have daily exchanges of fire since October 7, killing 107 combatants and 24 civilians in Lebanon and 9 soldiers and 4 civilians in Israel. Some 55,000 Lebanese civilians and 65,000 Israelis have been displaced from the border area. On November 11, Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant , ā€œWhat weā€™re doing in Gaza, we can also do in Beirut.ā€

How will Hezbollah react as Israel resumes its brutal massacre in Gaza after the brief pause or if Israel expands the massacre to the West Bank, where it has already at least 237 more Palestinians since October 7? 

In a speech on November 3, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah held back from declaring a new war on Israel, but warned that ā€œall options are on the tableā€ if Israel does not end its war on Gaza.

On November 23, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian , ā€œIf ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s war crimes and genocide continue, a tougher and more complicated scenario of the resistance will be implemented.ā€

Amirabdollahian had already , on October 16, that ā€œthe leaders of the resistance will not allow the Zionist regime to do whatever it wants in Gaza and then go to other fronts of the resistance.ā€ In other words, if Iran and its allies believe that Israel really intends to continue its war on Gaza until it has removed Hamas from power, and then turn its war machine loose on Lebanon or its other neighbors, they would prefer to fight a wider war now, forcing Israel to fight the Palestinians, Hezbollah and their allies at the same time, rather than waiting for Israel to attack them one by one.

The US is ignoring the warning signs

Tragically, the White House is not listening. On November 24, the day after Amirabdollahianā€™s speech, US President Joe Biden continued to back ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s vow to resume the destruction of Gaza after its ā€œhumanitarian pause,ā€ attempting to eliminate Hamas is ā€œa legitimate objective.ā€ On December 7, he for the breakdown of the pause.

Americaā€™s unconditional support for Israel and endless supply of weapons have succeeded only in turning Israel into an out-of-control, genocidal, destabilizing force at the heart of a fragile region already shattered and traumatized by decades of US warmaking. The result is a country that refuses to recognize its own borders or those of its neighbors and rejects any and all limits on its territorial ambitions and war crimes.

If ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s actions lead to a wider war, the US will find itself with few allies ready to jump into the fray. Even if a regional conflict is avoided, the US support for Israel has already created tremendous damage to its reputation in the region and beyond, and direct American involvement in the war would leave it more isolated and impotent than its previous misadventures in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq did. 

The US can still avoid this fate by insisting on an immediate and permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. If Israel will not agree to that, the US must back up this position with an immediate suspension of arms deliveries, military aid, to US weapons stockpiles in Israel and diplomatic support for ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s war on Palestine. 

The priority of US officials must be to stop ±õ²õ°ł²¹±š±ōā€™s massacre, avoid a regional war and get out of the way so that the UN and other nations can help negotiate a real solution to the occupation of Palestine.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post US Threats Aren’t Creating Peace in the Middle East appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.