51吃瓜

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched , a bold move aimed at crippling 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear capabilities and strategic infrastructure. Israel鈥檚 strikes significantly hit the Natanz nuclear site, damaged Isfahan鈥檚 uranium conversion facility, and hit the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) missile complex, killing a key IRGC Chief. Unlike earlier limited operations, Rising Lion marked a shift towards high-risk preemptive strikes designed not merely to delay or impede, but to paralyze 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear program, bringing the two nations to the edge of full-scale war.

Nine days after Israel鈥檚 strikes, the US launched its own military operation, , targeting 滨谤补苍鈥檚 key nuclear sites at Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz. The strikes, intended as both deterrence and containment, have allegedly caused significant damage to 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear infrastructure, though Iran has claimed there is only superficial damage.听

Several Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) analysts have Iran shifted their uranium reserves before the strikes. Notably, US Vice President JD Vance has that 400 kg of uranium was unaccounted for post-strike, raising alarms about 滨谤补苍鈥檚 next moves.

However, the real question is not about the strike鈥檚 effectiveness. It’s about whether this will truly force Iran into a corner or if it is merely a symbolic victory.

Israel鈥檚 evolved counter-proliferation strategy

Israel has adopted a strategy of disruption and paralysis against adversaries who choose to go nuclear, posing a strategic threat to the country 鈥� a plan that came to be called the in the 1970s.听

The origins of this doctrine trace back to 1962 with , when Israel鈥檚 intelligence agency, the Mossad, targeted German scientists helping Egypt develop long-range missiles via letter bombs, abductions and threats to their families. Though covert and controversial, it successfully stalled Egypt鈥檚 rocket program.

In subsequent years, the doctrine evolved to preemptively target any hostile state鈥檚 nuclear program, preventing them from acquiring nuclear weapons via counter-proliferation efforts. 

This doctrine was vividly demonstrated in 1981 with , when Israeli jets destroyed Iraq鈥檚 Osirak reactor, and again in the 2007 , which eliminated a nascent Syrian nuclear facility. Both Operations aimed at decisive, overt action to ensure adversaries never reached nuclear capability.

However, 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear challenge forced Israel to recalibrate this doctrine. Unlike the degrading or paralyzing nuclear programs of Syria and Iraq, Israel has opted to delay and disrupt 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear program without employing overt offensive measures. 

The reason is simple: geo-economic and strategic considerations. And the key historical factor in these considerations? The United States. 

The US factor between Israel and Iran 听

滨谤补苍鈥檚 cannot be overlooked, as it has the world鈥檚 second-largest natural gas and third-largest oil reserves. There are strong concerns that it could also block the , a narrow waterway that transports 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas, increasing the price of petrol to $100 per barrel. While blocking the Strait has the initial potential to spike oil prices, it has a limited capacity for consequences to the West and could harm its own interests, analysts.听

The threat of Iran instead lies in its extensive proxy network and decades of sustained asymmetrical warfare. The October 7 attacks on Israel are an of its proxy war involvement.听

Therefore, the US knows that balancing and moderating conflict with Iran must be part of its plans to ensure regional stability in the Middle East, as a weak Middle East would present economic and security challenges to the US’ geopolitical influence and economy. 

But this, historically, has not always been a successful venture for the US. 

The failures of the historic approach to Iran 听

The US鈥� long-standing strategy in the region began with offshore balancing and containment, seeking to prevent any one power from dominating the oil-rich Gulf. Its first major operation was organizing 滨谤补苍鈥檚 in 1953, which overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was leaning toward the Soviets.

Through the 1960s and 鈥�70s, Washington helped Israel strengthen its regional presence while invoking the to justify military interventions against communist threats, such as the 1958 Lebanon deployment under . Post 1979, with the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the , there was a shift toward assertive containment that extended to the between 1982-84. This strategic assertiveness became central to US policy in the region.听

The Iran-Iraq War was a power struggle for Gulf dominance, not just a territorial conflict. 滨谤补苍鈥檚 Islamic Revolution signaled the rise of the Shia crescent, alarming Saddam Hussein and threatening US regional influence. To counter 滨谤补苍鈥檚 growing power and prevent any single actor from dominating the Gulf, the US-backed Saddam with military and economic support. The US overlooked Saddam鈥檚 , human rights violations and use of chemical weapons.

But when Saddam Kuwait in 1991, kicking off the Gulf War, the American gamble backfired. Washington鈥檚 attempt to balance Iran through Iraq had inadvertently empowered a regional threat and weakened its own position. This was perhaps the first US failure in the Middle East and the beginning of the long-term instability in the region. In response, the US introduced a broader policy of in 1993 to curb both Iraq and Iran.

Though tactically effective in coercing both Iran and Iraq, dual containment proved strategically flawed in the long term. It weakened Iraq but allowed Iran to expand its influence via Shia groups, even as proxy conflicts continued. Meanwhile, the rising US military presence, especially in Saudi Arabia, extremist and terror sentiments, culminating in Al-Qaeda鈥檚 9/11 attack and the 2003 Riyadh bombings, where Westerners were targeted. Sanctions and regime change tactics yielded no significant impact on either country, revealing Washington鈥檚 faulty geopolitical assessments and superficial understanding of regional dynamics.听

This fractured Middle East policy has undergone necessary makeovers in recent years, like weighing more on diplomacy and limiting itself to security issues, but it still hinges on limited strategic gains and therefore, risks.

To avoid a full-scale war with Iran, the US turned to covert means. In 2006, it launched a first-of-its-kindcyber offensive, , which targeted 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear infrastructure. While this move by the US sought to derail 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear ambitions without triggering direct conflict, many analysts that the core objective was to persuade Israel to use means other than the direct and conventional against Iran. The Operation significantly influenced Israel鈥檚 security apparatus, as barely a year later came the purported of Iranian nuclear scientist Ardeshir Hosseinpour, followed by a series of assassinations of key .听

In 2016, the (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) sought to curtail 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. It was put forward to ease regional tensions, foster economic relationships and deepen US influence in the Middle East. Israel opposed it, fearing economic relief would empower Iran to upgrade its security systems and proxies, and importantly, clandestinely develop nuclear weapons, thus limiting covert options.听

Despite this opposition, the JCPOA came into effect in January 2016. It did limit Israel鈥檚 opportunities to carry out covert offensives, as noted by a significant statistical post-2016.听

In 2018, with Trump鈥檚 withdrawal from the deal, the US reimposed sanctions and escalated pressure on Iran. Israel resumed its covert operations, such as its alleged June 2020 on 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear sites, and its most complex and significant operation 鈥� the 2021 assassination of , the chief of 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear program.

Why Israel paralyzed Iran in Operation Rising Lion

Following the October 7 attacks on Israel and the collapse of the Assad regime, the Middle East entered a renewed phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the Trump administration shifted from maximum pressure to a more diplomatic approach towards Iran. The new strategy had two objectives: to push Iran to its nuclear program to ensure regional security and secure a diplomatic and media win by introducing a stronger alternative to the JCPOA.听

However, Iran insisted on limiting 鈥� not dismantling 鈥� its nuclear program while demanding sanctions relief, creating a deadlock. Trump Iran, 鈥淭here will be bombing,鈥� if a deal wasn鈥檛 reached, escalating tensions further.

This caused Israel great anxiety on two counts. One, it feared that the talks were buying Iran more time, as by March 2025, Iran had uranium enrichment. Within a few weeks, it could initiate the process to develop nuclear weapons, which would then take just a year to complete. Two, it feared that the US might rush a compromised or weak deal to claim diplomatic success. According to , the Mossad struggled to convince the US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steven Charles Witkoff, of the risks of re-negotiating with Iran. This contributed to its growing distrust in the negotiation process and prompted a reassessment of its military posture toward Iran.

Israel has now made a few things clear: it no longer aims to simply disrupt 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear program but wants to paralyze it as it did with Iraq and Syria. 

While 2024鈥檚 struck several of 滨谤补苍鈥檚 strategic and military sites, the operational scope was limited on the nuclear front, with one minor nuclear research facility in 滨谤补苍鈥檚 Parchin being targeted.听

However, in Operation Rising Lion, Israel aggressively struck key nuclear sites. While effectiveness was one startling difference, several reasons forced Israel not only to shift its operational scope but also to take strategic risks with regional stability. One: cut short 滨谤补苍鈥檚 time-buying tactics. Two: force Iran back to the negotiating table under pressure. And three: weaken its strategic position to the point of conceding to US demands and surrendering its nuclear ambitions. 

While some tactical goals were achieved by Israel, broader strategic successes will only be possible if Iran fully abandons its nuclear ambitions. Although a regime change is an option, the US is likely to prioritize regional security and stability, for now. 

Operation Midnight Hammer has not deterred Iran

Following Israel鈥檚 lead, the US launched targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, intended as both deterrence and leverage in negotiations.

However, will the US actually transform this tactical success into strategic gains by pushing Iran to negotiate a new plan or by dropping its nuclear obsession? The answer is no. 

滨谤补苍鈥檚 fixation on nuclear weapons is deeply linked to its identity and national pride, which can be reduced through coercion but not entirely abandoned. Trump鈥檚 efforts to do so complicate new negotiations and 滨谤补苍鈥檚 obsession is evident: it did not aim to import a nuclear bomb but to develop its own. 

With 400kg of uranium missing after US strikes, JD Vance has asked the burning question, 鈥淐an Iran enrich the uranium to weapons-grade level and can they convert that fuel into a nuclear weapon?鈥� He raises genuine fears that Iran may pursue a nuclear weapon directly, bypassing diplomacy and brinkmanship entirely 鈥� a move reminiscent of North Korea. 

The limited effectiveness of the US attacks, which reportedly set 滨谤补苍鈥檚 program back by only a few months, underscores the folly of symbolic actions without long-term planning. Iran, undeterred from its nuclear ambitions, has since escalated threats, including moves to close the Strait of Hormuz, heightening global energy and security concerns. 

These security fears could threaten the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Iran, especially as the US鈥揑sraeli relationship remains far from its goals. 

In effect, the US military gamble may have exacerbated the Middle East鈥檚 tensions rather than neutralizing them, with 滨谤补苍鈥檚 nuclear trajectory still firmly in motion.听

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.