When analyzing any form of public discourse, we need to realize that when something is revealed, something else, possibly more significant, may be concealed. The idea of coding has acquired special importance in the digital age. Only recently, just before the revelation of artificial intelligence, youngsters were told to learn to code if they wanted to get a job.

Language is a code of communication. Coding can be direct and simple. We call that kind of coding “informative.” Apparently, it’s also possible to code disinformation and misinformation. In the world of public discourse and legacy journalism, politicians, pundits and reporters sometimes twist the valuable information they provide to hide what they, their party leaders or their editors don’t want us to see.

The summit between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin that took place in Anchorage, Alaska, earlier this month inspired two seasoned journalists to use the expression “code for” (in one case a verb, in the other a noun) to reveal exactly how that process of concealing unwanted meaning works. The first example comes from author Mansur Mirovalev’s for the news publication Al Jazeera, bearing the title: “‘Feeding a narcissist:’ Ukraine reflects on Trump-Putin summit.” The author begins by citing what is an undeniable fact:

“Putin said the ‘root causes’ of the war should be addressed before any ceasefire or real steps towards a peace settlement are made.”

It’s a straightforward fact that shouldn’t be difficult for Al Jazeera’s readers to understand. We might even call it common sense. The Russians have repeatedly insisted on returning to the “root causes” or historical context of the conflict. Understanding the motivation of the parties involved is critical to conflict resolution. The website helpfully reminds us with this title of its article on the topic: “The First Step in Properly Understanding Conflict: Identifying the Sources.”

But journalists, their editors or employers may feel impelled to do the opposite. Depending on their intent, they may want to present historical reality as an unnecessary distraction. Here is Mirovalev’s gloss on ��ܲ�������’s demand:

“‘Root causes’ is Putin’s code for rejecting ����������Ա�’s existence outside Moscow’s political shadow and denying its very sovereignty.”

Now, this is manifestly misleading, if not patently dishonest. His claim that Putin is “rejecting ����������Ա�’s existence” is unfounded and undocumented; in other words, it is invented. It’s the journalist who’s using the ploy of “code for” to reject out of hand the idea that examining root causes has any validity.

Our second example is an by East and Central Europe Bureau Chief Andrew Higgins of The New York Times with the title: “Putin Sees Ukraine Through a Lens of Grievance Over Lost Glory.” Another example of assuming without evidence what’s on Putin’s mind.

“President Vladimir V. Putin made clear after his meeting in Alaska with President Trump that his deepest concern is not an end to three and a half years of bloodshed. Rather, it is with what he called the “situation around Ukraine,” code for his standard litany of grievances over ��ܲ�������’s lost glory.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Code for:

A journalistic trope designed to make readers forget what they know about the literal meaning of words and believe a meaning contrary to both the dictionary and common sense. 

Contextual note

Far be it from a Devil’s Dictionary to insist that people should trust dictionaries to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. At best, dictionaries list the usual denotative sense of words as they have occurred in both the literary and spoken tradition. Because dictionaries avoid speculating on the theoretically infinite number of contexts in which a word can be used, they cannot account for intentional distortion or rhetorical effects, such as sarcasm, that can quite simply invert the meaning of a word.

In the two cases cited above, we are witnessing a journalistic practice common in an era like our own that encourages and even requires exaggerated propaganda. The trick these two jouranlists have used is to mix with the facts they present a fabricated “insight” claimed to be the result of the journalists’ inside knowledge or superior intellectual authority. They then call this an act of “decoding” or interpreting for the sake of the ignorant.

Why should I criticize that practice? In some sense, that is precisely what a Devil’s Dictionary attempts to do. The difference is that when we assume the identity of the devil, we are announcing an act of studied cleverness, or even perversity. We expect no one will take it seriously or believe that it’s the “true” definition.��

But there is another important difference. A Devil’s Dictionary definition is a direct invitation to explore context, investigate ambiguity, dig more deeply into an issue than simply accepting either what the initial quote contained or what the devil’s new definition implies.

Historical note

Ambrose Bierce, the brilliant novelist and journalist who authored the Devil’s Dictionary, redefined words to satirize the popular political, institutional, social and economic culture of his time. Here is his reflection on the nuclear family in the United States of his era.

“MARRIAGE: The state or condition of a community consisting of a master, a mistress, and two slaves, making in all, two.”

Although this sounds contrary to common sense because of its contestable arithmetic, its absurdity reveals a perception that many married people might acknowledge: that the state of marriage deprives both the husband and wife of the glorious freedom they enjoyed before marriage. Were he writing in today’s age of woke, we can imagine that his editor might oblige him to revise the definition in the following cumbersome way:

“MARRIAGE: The state or condition of a community consisting of a master, a mistress (or two masters and two mistresses), and two slaves, making in all, two.”

After which, his truly woke editor might even tell him to change “two masters and two mistresses” to “two masters and two masteresses” on the grounds that the term mistress is in itself .

Here’s another of Bierce’s definitions, this time related to his profession of journalism:

“EDITOR: A person who combines the duties of a censor, a copy-reader, a news-gatherer, and a reporter. To the virtues of all these he adds the vices of none.”

I suspect that both journalists mentioned above — Mirovalev and Higgens — might be tempted to agree with Bierce’s definition of their boss. Bierce’s irony suggests that an editor, by combining these diverse and contradictory roles, is, to invert the proverb, the master of all trades and a jack of none, ready to compromise in the name of respecting “superior” constraints. Bierce’s contention that the editor lacks the corresponding vices has the wonderful ironic effect of defining the editor as a soulless, puritanical authority whose business as a censor ensures that the naked truth (God forbid!) will never appear, but rather a carefully sanitized version of it.

Had Mirovalev and Higgens taken seriously their role as journalists, they would at some point have alluded to the importance of understanding “root causes” might have in the context of negotiating the kind of peace treaty Trump and Putin agreed to promote. Rather than claiming to decode it (and change its meaning), they could have done what our Devil’s Dictionary has systematically done throughout its history since 2017. We examine the use not only in its contemporary context, but also further back in history.

The propaganda machine churning away at the core of our legacy media since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has labored at inventing ways to avoid or exclude historical context. The use of the expression “code for” is just one trivial example. Clearly, the best documented ploy has been the endlessly repetitive insistence on labeling the action Putin termed a “Special Military Operation” an “unprovoked full-scale invasion.” That is the official that then-US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s State Department provided, inviting every editor in the legacy media to repeat the adjective “unprovoked” whenever referring to the war in Ukraine. Abolishing history requires a concerted, well-managed effort.

��As many, including economist Jeffrey Sachs, Scott Horton (author of How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine) and many others have signaled, Blinken’s State Department categorically refused to discuss Putin’s formal request to analyze the root causes at a time when the war could have been avoided, in December 2021. Several months later, the Western allies of Ukraine instructed Ukraine to refuse an already negotiated and initial peace deal based on an examination of the root causes.

That would have left Ukraine intact, with the question of Crimea to be decided in an undefined future. But then, as now, our authorities and news services are seeking to uproot the very idea of root causes.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Our Devil Closes His Dictionary and Muses on Its Roots appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Ashutosh Lal: Thank you very much. Thanks, thank you so much.

Atul Singh: Alright, Ashutosh, you’ve been to Ukraine over a number of years. Walk us through how you saw — and I don’t mean as a story, because, of course, you’re a pilot, not a historian. But still, you’ve had your brush with history — how you saw the conflict (a) emerging and (b) developing.

Ashutosh Lal: Right. Just to debunk, I am knowledgeable, actually.

Atul Singh: Well, you were an instructor. All your formal students swear by you!

Ashutosh Lal: Many of us have been, and we all have our stories here and there. But trust me, I’m a very ordinary person who — God was kind — that I had a tryst with the Indian Air Force for a pretty long time. And God was kind to give me all the opportunities to fly the airplanes, to do whatever I was supposed to do. In that, there was a responsibility given to me to go to Ukraine as air attaché in the year of our Lord 2011, and I came back much later in 2014 after a little bit of extension.

Atul Singh: So you were there three years.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah. So from that point of view—

Atul Singh: That is when Crimea occurs.

Ashutosh Lal: I saw the first conflict, if you may call it so: the genesis of the entire fault line as to how it developed, what exactly happened, how Crimea was taken away…

Atul Singh: Or how Russians took Crimea. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: But let’s say how Ukrainians gave it up. For that matter, that’s also another way to look at it. But like I said, how green men, little green men, who sprung up and they took away everything. So I saw it from all up front, close. It was very clear to me as to how it was going to affect us, and since then on, I’ve been visiting, revisiting and trying to keep myself updated — not because I’m not a historian by profession, but the trigger which happened in me because of my boss over there. I must give credit to him for many understandings — our ambassador, Shri Rajiv Chandra, who was extremely kind to us and who taught us, who shaped us, mentored us. And under his tutelage, if I may say, we went on to do whatever work we could do with him. So I must duly construct, or he came in at the point when I landed up in Ukraine in 2011. Believe you me, Atul, it was perhaps one of the most beautiful countries in the world. To be very honest, I had traveled a fair amount of the world before that, so I could draw a comparison and say that there was a great amount of vibrance and there was a great amount of joy and happiness. There was a great amount of respect for Indian culture, and there was a great amount of likeness between our two cultures. Later on in the chat, we can point out a few for that matter. But the point here is that that was the phase: UEFA Euro 2012, which was co-hosted by Poland and Ukraine in 2012. I remember I saw that, and I was there. The first match was Sweden–Ukraine, both playing blue/yellow jerseys. And Ukraine was magnanimous to ask Sweden to choose their color so that Ukraine could choose their colors. Andriy Shevchenko, the legendary football player — I believe he’s turned pro golfer now—

Atul Singh: Oh, has he?

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, yeah.

Atul Singh: Okay.

Ashutosh Lal: He scored the first goal. It was a sight to be seen on the Maidan, which is the Independence Square, which turned later into dark and ugly pictures when the conflict broke through. See, I thought that was the apex of Ukraine, what I saw at that time as to how Ukraine was prospering. And it appeared to us very clearly that Ukraine is heading toward the European or EU way. Now, this was the belief which all my colleagues in the embassy, including my boss, had, that this is what’s going to happen. However, I was not convinced, because whatever little I dug up — and I lived on the streets over there, I spoke the language of the streets. (Chuckles) I was working the streets, so to speak. It was a very different time altogether. But in that particular—

Atul Singh: You weren’t just staying in your diplomatic bubble and kettle. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: The whole idea was to get a feel of the place. And because of my link with Russian machinery — half of which, I did not know, was built in Ukraine — it was totally Ukrainian in its pedigree. So when that happened to me, and I realized how my life was saved by many of these Ukrainian workmen working in the different zavod — the plants — I used to visit over there, that drew me to the entire thing to try and understand what exactly was happening on the ground. So in that, my belief was — I think I’m quite sure about it — that Ukraine, under the influence of who and who — we can talk about it — did not envisage this outcome, which it eventually turned out to be. And they thought that they could dissect themselves from the larger ecosystem of East Europe. I’m not talking in terms of the Russian Federation. I’m talking about that larger ecosystem of East Europe. They wanted to dissect themselves and get attached. Please, when I’m saying that, those of you interested should look up where the west of Ukraine, the cities of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk — which part of Europe they kept changing hands with, whose background — Khmelnytskyi, might as well look him up: the ruler and the horse rider who came winning and marauding. You need to see that, as to what they were doing: carrying the symbol of power, something like a gada, which they carry in their hand. So you need to see that, and how Ukraine went from one to the other side needs to be seen. Notwithstanding that, post-Second World War, post- that era when everything was developing, post-Germany, when the Wall fell, unification happened, perestroika — how things were moving forward. This particular aspiration of Ukraine to come to the West or the European side, and this game plan of the West to try and snatch Ukraine out of the close, tight embrace of the East European ecosystem — I think that was the conflict which led to what happened.

Historical claims and regional politics

Atul Singh: So if you go back to 300 years ago — and Vladimir Putin’s op-ed talks a lot about it — there is a sense that Ukraine is the ancestral kingdom of Rus. Ukraine was attacked and taken over by the Polish–Lithuanian empires, and therefore, it is inevitable that Ukraine should remain in the sphere of influence of Russia. That is the Moscow view of the world. At the same time, if you take the Polish view of the world, they say, “Well, Western Ukraine in particular is a land contiguous to ours, and therefore has a lot more in common with us. And therefore, it should come more to the West and give us a greater buffer against Russia.” And if you go back to Soviet times, what people forget is that the brunt of collectivization — and there are books and books and books one can read — was borne by the Ukrainian peasantry. The kulaks were mainly Ukrainians. And in fact, Joseph Stalin killed three and a half million of them. And I have friends who are historians, and I have friends who are in MI6 and the British Foreign Office, and they often joke that had the British invaded Ukraine, they wouldn’t have treated them with the racism Nazis did. They would have set up an independent Ukrainian state. They would have played divide and rule, as they did around the world — they were rather good at it — and they wouldn’t have killed three million Ukrainians like the Nazis. So the reason I’m giving this historical color — and of course, those of you who want to dig up more can read a piece that retired CIA officer Glenn Carle and I wrote just before the war begins in 2022. We wrote it on Christmas Eve, December 2021 — and the point is, it is a tortured land with a tortured past, with contending narratives of history and different geopolitical interests. Over to you: What did you see transpiring at that stage?

Ashutosh Lal: So business? What Atul said is what I’m going to stay totally off.

Atul Singh: Okay, fine. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: Academics and everything else you’ve heard about him, for that matter, you can go back and read. So this is where the ringside aspect comes in. And where did I pick up this issue and this feeling that Ukraine would not be able to be pulled out from the embers of East Europe, or whatever the big brother was. I picked it up from Romania. Let me narrate.

Atul Singh: Excellent.

Ashutosh Lal: So there was this seminar happening over there — a conference, perhaps — which was discussing—

Atul Singh: In the capital?

Ashutosh Lal: Romania, Bucharest.

Atul Singh: Bucharest?

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah.

Atul Singh: Okay.

Ashutosh Lal: Romania was also under my watch. I was there. So I was required to be there because a senior official from India was traveling over there, and he had to do a presentation on Prithvi missiles. There was a test done on an anti-ballistic missile of the three-stage model. So he had come to present a paper on that. And I was with him, and I was part of that seminar. And as always, my ears were out on the ground to try and figure out what’s happening. Why? Because the interesting part was in the front row, or perhaps just behind the front row, there was a row of ushankas — an ushanka is the P-cap which Russians wear — there was a row of ushankas. A senior, perhaps a general, on the right-hand side and a lieutenant down the line, age-wise, stacked up over there — and the presentation was going on. Please remember: Romania houses the active component of the missile defense, right? And that was a time when Deveselu base was being reactivated, because the earlier launch base which had been developed for Afghanistan was being denied, and they had no choice but to come back to this. And Deveselu was this Aegis Ashore site; radars were in Turkey. You know the whole idea. So in that context, to a speaker, I asked a question. I said, “Sir, the talks are on. Ukraine is likely to follow the EU very shortly. The handshake will take place very soon. And if you look at the European conundrum, you’ll realize that wherever in the East either the US has gone forward and NATO has caterpillared, or NATO has gone forward, the EU has caterpillared. So it’s just a foregone conclusion that today it is the EU, tomorrow it will be NATO, and Ukraine will turn into a NATO state. By which would I understand that these missiles here in Romania, or this site here in Romania, may shift to Donbas, Donetsk, Luhansk.” Those were my exact words. You know what the response was? Before anybody else on the stage could respond, the general with the ushanka passed an elbow down the line, and the elbow traveled all the way. Up sprang a young lieutenant, and in chaste English, he just spoke to the audience. He said, “Whatever the gentleman is talking about is in the realm of fiction. It can never happen.” And he sat.

Atul Singh: That is totally understandable.

Maidan and the fall of Yanukovych

Ashutosh Lal: Understandable. So that’s what my point is. That is the time that, from a ringside view, being on the ground, I understood and realized the fact that it is the dynamics of neighbors. Being on the ground in the streets and working over there, I knew that the economic ties of East Ukraine with Russia were very close.

Atul Singh: They had been for centuries.

Ashutosh Lal: There was travel, there were relationships — husband, wife, families, blah, blah, blah — whatever you call it. So it was absolutely unthinkable that you could draw a line there. And here was the West. The likes of — you know who — Victoria Nuland.

Atul Singh: I mean, our Chief Strategy Officer, Peter Isackson, despises her. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So that phone call is there on the net if you want to listen.

Atul Singh: (Laughs) I’ve heard it, yeah, yeah.

Ashutosh Lal: But the fact remains that here they were trying to call this out. When this happened — and I analyzed this comment, I dug deeper into it. Then comes out the next ringside exposé or understanding of mine. Dnipropetrovsk is a town where you have the usual — I may be getting on mixed up names here and there. Sometimes it happens.

Atul Singh: We won’t hold you to it. More important was the point rather than the detail.

Ashutosh Lal: I understand. But now, this base agency of Ukraine. Exceptionally brilliant products they had. In my scouting for trying to see that, imagine: You could have a Su-27 which carries a missile rocket under the belly, goes to the highest possible altitude in a particular direction and vector, launches that missile and that missile puts a LEO satellite into orbit. So it was the easiest possible way to give you coverage over a battleground if you want to put a LEO, which is persistent but finishes off sometime. A Low Earth Orbit satellite, right? So they had some wonderful systems, like the floating dock for the Zenit rocket, which launches a satellite into orbit. That means you didn’t have to have a Sriharikota. You could drag that platform on the ocean with the help of tugs to the appropriate place to have the rocket launching your satellite in the most economical manner. So that’s a wonderful, brilliant system. But also, the credit was that they were the father of all SS-series missiles of Russia. From SS-18 to SS-21, everything was being found there. It was their patent. And if you look at the books at that time, which I did, you realize that these missiles were approaching the end of life, and they would need extension. So just imagine: If this part of Ukraine was taken out of ��ܲ�������’s influence, that factory would not have been available. They would not have been able to life-extend the intercontinental basing of Russia. And in one masterstroke, the West would have utilized a large part of the arsenal on which Russia primes. Not much has been spoken about it. But like I said, the ringside views are this—

Atul Singh: It adds a great degree of detail, granular detail.

Ashutosh Lal: It’s very clear and very straightforward, that I came back to my boss. I told him, and we had a discussion, and he said, “No, I do not deal. You see what’s happening.”

Atul Singh: But, you know, the Indian Foreign Services often aren’t the truest foreign service! (Both laugh) I’ve had to deal with them for too many years!

Ashutosh Lal: Of course, that is what I’ve heard. Then what happened was the last 24 hours, when the Maidan turned and everything else started. Yanukovych had to take off in his helicopter. It was the second time it was happening in that part. In fact, in Romania also, there had been a dictator who was trying to get in a helicopter from a rooftop, who was pulled back.

Atul Singh: Nicolae Ceaușescu.

Ashutosh Lal: Absolutely.

Atul Singh: Yeah, a friend of mine, his father fled Ceaușescu, nearly died! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So I’ll stay to my point — that Yanukovych fled, and inside Ukraine, everything changed. And suddenly all that happened and the independent districts sprung.

Escalation and evacuations

Ashutosh Lal: To link it up to Euro 2012, the way I saw the development happening over there — the airports were built up, the hotels were built up, the infrastructure was done up — absolutely prime and very beautiful. All that was destroyed in the last seven to eight months in front of me. That’s how the tide turned.

Atul Singh: What you’re saying is that it was overreach on the part of the US? Political overreach?

Ashutosh Lal: I would put it differently. One has to understand: That geographical neighborhood is a real fact of life.

Atul Singh: Of course. I mean, look, the US did not allow missiles in Cuba. There was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Ashutosh Lal: I was about to say the same thing. In fact, the cross-reference was made to my reply there. I said, “Look, you also have the same issue in Cuba.” The same issue was there? Quite possible there could be an issue happening in that particular conference when I was discussing with people. But be that as it may, it tells us very clearly, and in our own context. And we also have a very turbulent neighborhood that keeps shifting from one side to the other. So the neighborhood is a fact, and the neighborhood is required to be managed by the people who are involved directly. It cannot be managed remotely by someone sitting very far away. Because, for all these reasons, as it is very clear now, they would always have their vested interest deployed inside.

Atul Singh: That’s history, the law of history.

Ashutosh Lal: So, if that was so, it could have been seen, it should have been seen. It should be seen by us in managing our neighborhood issues — how we want to swing from one to the other side — because the neighborhood is something. There is another issue which I would just like to mention over here: Amongst the leadership of Ukraine I saw from that point in time, there was Tymoshenko.

Atul Singh: The braided lady who was put in jail by Yanukovych?

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, she was in jail when I reached her. And if you read that history as to who was on which side, there’s plenty of interesting things over there. But she was in jail when I reached there. People were doing dharna protests to try and get her out from detention at that point in time. But the fact remains that from there—

Atul Singh: Just for members of the global audience: You go, sit down and protest, and stop the streets, really.

Ashutosh Lal: Basically. Atul, thank you for that connection. But I’m just saying that from there, what I saw — the leaders, how they were fanning out to be — when I come to Mr. Zelenskyy, I often wonder: Could he have done something differently, so as not to ruin that beautiful country of Ukraine, which I call моя друга батьківщина — “my second homeland?” I just want to remind your viewers that if you’ve ever had any bit of sunflower oil, you have a little bit of Ukraine in you. And I’ve got my tooth also sorted out over there—a root canal. So I have it in my tooth as well! (Laughs) So the point is that being that affectionate to that land, and having seen the potential — imagine a country which is largely under snow for four to six months, yet is the largest grower of grain in Europe. So there is an immense amount of potential—

Atul Singh: Sunflowers, wheat, so many other agricultural products.

Ashutosh Lal: And I will come to the region a little later, when the conflict has already broken out. Because right now we’re talking about what could have happened. So, I’m talking with Zelenskyy. Could he have done something differently? Did the other side — Americans, mostly — realize that here is a person who is used — like what we are doing with a mic and a camera — and if he has a narrative, he will read that and he will enact that. Was that the thing in the initial phase, where he kept enacting what he was being told to say, and then took the entire conflict south? Now he was in a different mode; he changed clothes, and wore different things and came to the front end, trying to do what was required to be done? Was it too late by then? That question has to be asked. So how the neighborhood is to be managed and how the national interests — which are always a sacrosanct thing, not the friends and foes — that needs to be seen very clearly. This is my gathering of lessons from the ringside.

Atul Singh: Okay, so — 2014: You’re there, and the conflict really erupts. Because Russia simply cannot give away Crimea. After all, Potemkin, the great lover of Catherine the Great, conquered it for her, and that was Russian access to warm water. There’s no way the Russians were ever going to give Crimea away to Ukraine. And in 1954, it was none other than Nikita Khrushchev who gifted it to Ukraine. So in Russian minds, it was theirs. And then, of course, the conflict erupts in Donbas and Luhansk. The little green men you’ve already mentioned, walk us through that period. So what did you see?

Ashutosh Lal: Thank you very much. Trust me, in Crimea — right up to Alupka or Atakoy, where I traveled — I thought it was the most amazing place, and that Russian and Ukrainian existence was practically inseparable. Truly international. A couple of times, I was there on Victory Day — I was there at Crimea to see the wonderful parade, the Black Sea Fleet and whatnot. Yalta — you know what happened in the Second World War. The Yalta Conference is still a very important landmark, as you know.

Atul Singh: The contours of the post-war world.

Ashutosh Lal: So how did I come into this entire thing? And how did I get that inside view of this conflict brewing, apart from what was happening in Kyiv? Kyiv, of course, we knew. You remember those snipers on the Maidan and the people who came and occupied over there in the thick of winter. Somewhere, I have a picture in which I’m standing on Maidan with everything burnt out. I mean, I was yelled at — “Get back into the embassy!” — because I was out there in Maidan trying to see what exactly was happening, because of my own curiosity. And when the snipers were taking shots, everything was happening over there. So that was in Kyiv, but I got involved because there were our students who were studying in different cities. So the first place we got an SOS call from was Crimea. Our ambassador got a call from the parents of our children in Crimea — in Ukraine — now under Russian control. “What’s happening?” So the ambassador came and said, “Boys, we have this issue at hand.” So I said, “Let me go. I’ll go and be with them. I’ll comfort them and I’ll take care of what was required, and then I’ll come back to you.” He was apprehensive, of course, because we’d not changed sides yet, and there was the issue of passports and blah, blah, blah. I said, “Don’t worry, sir, because I’ve been working the streets. I will be able to go through that way.” I was given the go-ahead. I went across, and I stayed in Crimea at the same hotel where the group from BBC and World Service was staying, mind you. And they were staying in the same hotel, carrying out such coverage of the entire situation while the city was rather peaceful. Leninsky Square was where the main protest was happening. That is where the hands had changed and everybody went to dinner in the restaurants. Later that night, I asked those two, “Why are you raising this red flag?” But then there are dynamics, too. The point is that when I was there and I spoke to the students — this was the city of Simferopol, the capital of Crimea — I gathered them all together and then briefed them. “Now this is how we will do. This is what we will do.” But luckily, we did not have to evacuate them from there. The transition was rather peaceful. I went and saw their parliament building, as they call it, and there were these little green men standing there with balaclavas. And that’s about all. Because there, the narrative had been set, and that wonderfully intertwined Russian–Ukrainian presence had changed. Ukrainian soldiers and officers had joined the Russian Armed Forces. Then all of that happened and it just changed. Remember, that was the first change of nationality of a sizable portion of land after the Second World War in that area, and that would happen without firing a single bullet. So obviously, I can understand the West was feeling pretty let down that they let this happen. They didn’t have their ear to the ground, which was a failure on their part, and a lot happened. But in that, I understood that now the Russian mechanism — their so-called hybrid warfare, which we can speak about in a different interview altogether — was already deployed. It was happening. Crimea, of course, has a problem of freshwater shortage and access to the mainland, which they have now secured through this conflict. As you are aware, all of that has been secured. So it was very clear to us that—

Atul Singh: They have a landbridge now.

Ashutosh Lal: In fact, talking about bridges, we had a small problem at hand. While in Ukraine, I was handling Project 832 — modernization. It was a very big project of, what, 105 airplanes, but one got crashed, so 104 were left. The plot was: Five airplanes would come, get overhauled in this plant — which is contiguous to Zhuliany Airport, the smaller airport in Kyiv — and then they fly out to India and practice. We had to do 35 airplanes. The second-last batch was at my hand, and I was about to come back when this war happened. And the air route to Ankara — the first thought was to route over Crimea — and now we could not go over Crimea. So I had no choice but to take the airplanes all the way west to Bucharest, and then from Bucharest head to Istanbul because you could not make it to Ankara. You know, the whole planning had to be changed. So be that as it may, the fact remained that I realized that Crimea was gone for good, and that gave us an indication as to what was going to happen in the East. Because that mechanism of hybrid warfare had started to deploy over there, and it was very clear that if they didn’t get their acts together, then that would happen. This is where the West woke up in a significant manner, and they deployed a good number of boots on the ground under different guises. That gap was simple, but it was what we call “standard and recommended practices” — exercises between two forces. The radio phraseology to be used commonly, so that they can be used in some peacekeeping somewhere. How do you use radio? How do we use basic tactics that can be synchronized? So under that guard, the trainers who were there from the West — and NATO especially — became the custodians of now keeping their watch. And that had started. This is where the conflict started to happen, which basically brewed in the eastern part: Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, even down till Kherson later, you know. This is a tragic chapter. Sir, that’s where I thought, it’s very important to understand — just 30 seconds more — because this, again, happened in Lugansk. The city of Lugansk had a big medical college. By the way, I hope you’re aware that the cost of East European MBBS is sizably less than what is available here in India.

Atul Singh: That’s what I’ve been told.

Ashutosh Lal: That is the reason why many of our students go over there, which I suppose is a good thing. Of course, they have to come back and take an MCI exam before they can start practicing over here. But I found very bright young people over there from all parts of the country who were there. So I was sent to Lugansk again under a similar situation, where this thing was happening, and now it was live. Because the gunshots were being fired outside and everything was happening, I had to hire a train and move about 800, 900 students in the train, over buses, put them in the train, and the train came to Kyiv where the ambassador and all our setup was waiting for them to be received. I had to go there because of my connections with the plants over there, and I used the help from the people on the ground. And that is what I used to do. Whatever I could do, we managed it. But it again allowed me — and that was Holi at that point of time. I spent Holi with those boys and girls over there in that place. When I put them in a hall — I had gone along with my sister — I addressed them and I told them, I made groups. I made leaders. I said, “When this happens, this is how the message will go, this is what you will do.” So I built that quasi-operation, and I built them out in that place. This is where I again realized that now it is not coming back. The situation is such that it will not come back, it will not go to foster — it’s going to get worse from here, it’s only going to get more destructive from here, now both sides will suffer, whichever.

Atul Singh: So the train had been set in motion.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, and it was an irreversible train to my mind. And which unfortunately—

Atul Singh: That’s up for debate, sure.

Ashutosh Lal: After you make your point, then I will come back to what happened in the second conflict, because I was there again.

Russian hybrid warfare and the 2022 invasion

Atul Singh: Okay, so you mentioned hybrid warfare. Okay, what’s the Russian model of hybrid warfare, and how did the West respond?

Ashutosh Lal: Atul, hybrid warfare would be another episode.

Atul Singh: We’ll have to get you back! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So let’s keep that aside.

Atul Singh: Give us an outline, give us a teaser.

Ashutosh Lal: A good point, yeah. So the hybrid warfare spoken about by many authors and a lot of literature available over there, is ��ܲ�������’s war actually hybrid warfare? And some mechanics leave us asking the question. But leave the mechanics aside; look at the results. The result was, like I mentioned to you, that they managed to change the nationality of a large piece of land — a crucial warm sea port where the Black Sea Fleet was based — without firing a single bullet. Do I see any more moving? So this is what was the trajectory of the warfare, which was running out. Of course, the West jumped in, and the contest heated up, so to speak. People lost lives, and so much destruction took place subsequently. But that is the potential of hybrid war, because it’s a very important issue for our own armed forces. And it includes everything — lawfare, I don’t know what all — because the entire set of academia, the entire set of institutions of army, judiciary, administration, diplomacy, foreign services, economy, everything comes into it. So that is an amalgamation which is an ultimate binder of the national policy.

Atul Singh: Okay, well, you mentioned the second phase of the conflict: February 24, 2022. Alright, Russian troops move in, and you were there again.

Ashutosh Lal: Yep.

Atul Singh: So what transpires then for the Russian tanks to start rolling in?

Ashutosh Lal: Right. So, I was back in 2014. I came back to my job normally here. Whatever happened, I had a wonderful time in the Air Force. Early January 2020, I left the Air Force and I was trying to become a civil helicopter pilot, which I am right now. I was flying till very recently for a company in Mumbai, taking passengers from the point of dispersal to their ships and rigs and getting them back. But in that, my interest in trying to understand during this conflict — and this is a very, very important key point — the way I saw through the conflict, I am completely mesmerized by the Ukrainian ingenuity. That’s not only on the battlefield. People will tell you how males exited Ukraine, how their own population deserted, they don’t have boots on the ground, some people have gone away or whatever. But in that also, how common Ukrainians — leave politicians aside — held on to their nationality, held on to their spirit, held on to their ingenuity on the battlefield, off the battlefield, in the domain of military tech. For those of your viewers who are perhaps not very much aware, Ukrainian military tech is huge. It may surprise you that 40% of the Indian Navy’s frontline ships are powered by Zorya’s engine, which is made in Ukraine. It’s absolutely important for us that we have them with us. And mind you, unlike the airplanes, the ships are different. You have to first choose the engine, because Indian transmission has to be quiet, and then you build the ship around it, so then can’t change it. So you have to identify the engine provider first before you arrive at your ship. That is the kind of planning process. So Zorya powers more than 40% of the Indian Navy; it’s very important for us. Antonov — anything to do with Antonov — A-12 and A-22, what we flew in our Air Force, and the An-124 is what the US survives on.

Atul Singh: Which most people don’t know.

Ashutosh Lal: Antonov is thoroughbred — inside to out, including engines and everything else — Ukrainian. It’s got nothing to do with the honor of Russian women. So Ukraine MIC, or Military Industrial Complex, was itself huge at that point, alright. But in the war, how it transformed itself is a story that someday the world should document.

Atul Singh: I’m sure people are documenting it already.

Ashutosh Lal: I’m sure. But you look at it from my perspective as to how this tech… To give an example, in Kharkiv, I found out that some small company was making a very peculiar ammunition which could be mounted on the pylon of a low-flying airplane. It just dispenses very small transmitters over a swath of ground: GPS jammers. They would all transmit, they would noise-jam the GPS, and they would die down as the battery dies down. So in a period of time when you want to operate over there, you can deny GPS in assault. Selective non-availability of GPS you could achieve at that point of time. Their expertise in radio listening and eavesdropping is very well known. There was an incident which happened in an unknown army, and there was a unit which had some equipment from there — I’m sure your listeners know about it. So it was being brought from there. So you could do that. There were many things. They made passive radars. That means it’s just a receiver, not transmitting anything else. Poland has a solution, but this equipment of Ukraine was such that, using the normal transmission from the radio nav-ways of Europe, they were able to mimic and understand. Without opening up any transmitter, they can get comfortable with the surroundings. Wonderful technology. Of course, needs to be matured, needs to be tied up, needs to be inducted into the systems — that is where our ingenuity could have come. LWS-6 Żubr, perhaps the largest hovercraft, skims over any rocky stretch and the sea, carries tanks and has an amazing technology in which it can sidestep and turn around in a very small place, which is also there on the Zorya engines. Crazy, absolutely. So they were at that level already. From there, those boys and girls, those men and women — what unmanned aerial systems have done to this war — very soon people will be coming out. And I know for sure that people who built it then, during the conflict, tested it during the conflict, and used it to destroy very expensive equipment. Otherwise, a large country like Russia would not have—

Atul Singh: Tanks, for instance.

Ashutosh Lal: So specifics will take time. So I’m just trying to tell you indicators as to where you should research and try and transfer.

Atul Singh: I mean, we should get into specifics, because a lot of our viewers wouldn’t have the time. Some would, some would spend hours, but others wouldn’t.

Ashutosh Lal: Like I said, these very inexpensive unmanned aerial systems, which affected very large equipment on the ground, how they intercepted, they went into Kursk. Of course, there’s a lot of Western help that was available. But still, when they realized that the fighter planes were not coming through — Su-27 deploying — they applied the Internet to keep the conflict on, to keep the pressure. Now, I come back to February of 2022. That is when the tanks rolled across from Kharkiv and from the East. So my friend called me for something or other — I would go down there. I said, “Okay, I’ll come. But are you sure Mr. Putin is all lined up? That said, you’re not gonna come down? No, no, everything is okay, just — apparently — come, come.” I landed at Kharkiv, I took a car, and I was driving to his approach.

Atul Singh: You were not yet a civilian helicopter pilot?

Ashutosh Lal: No, I was.

Atul Singh: You were already?

Ashutosh Lal: I was. So in our academy, we had breaks. When you fly for six weeks, you have three weeks off. So I left the military for 15 days because I had the qualification. Of course, Covid also hit at that point of time, but that’s another story. The point here is that when I reached the provision, I had a good time with my friend, chatted and met old contacts and everybody else. And I was looking for the local beer, Natsu. Fifteen-seventeen is really old, even in beer. So we went to the bar and had that, came back, slept it off — only to be woken up by the phone ringing consistently, because Mr. Putin had dropped across. Now, this is the time to speak about the operation which Russia launched to quickly end this conflict on their own terms, and the fight back with the help of the people who are deployed on ground from the West, and Ukrainian beauty. I’m talking about a very audacious attempt by helicopters of Russian armed forces to carry out what, in typical terms in the Air Force, we call SHBO — Special Heli-Borne Operations — taking troops in the helicopters all the way from their secured bases, where? To a small airport outside Kyiv — home to Antonov. So when I was there in Bucha, I got stuck badly. And I take the car, and as I start driving back towards Kyiv, these helicopters are flying over. Su-25s, Su-27s flying over, and there was chaos, and there were roadblocks, but I was somehow managing and coming. Because the idea was to come close to Kyiv, because all the flights were canceled. I did not have a flight to come back home. I had to have a plan in my mind to get back, because remember, I had to come back to my job. (Atul laughs) And I don’t have any visa toward either place.

Atul Singh: You couldn’t have flown into Poland!

Ashutosh Lal: Minor issues actually fucked me! (Laughs)

Atul Singh: Minor issues! (Both laugh) You could’ve swum through the Black Sea, swum through the Suez Canal…

Ashutosh Lal: The Bosphorus was calling me, be that it may.

Atul Singh: You’re a fit man!

Ashutosh Lal: So the point I was trying to make was that when this was happening, I realized that this was something, it’s a very important moment in a helicopter pilot’s life. Unfortunately, I could not be part of that formation or that fight, but I was there to witness it from close quarters and to follow up later about—with the help of my other friends who were there — to follow their help, as to what exactly happened. So the long and short is that this train of helicopters — the Mils — “Mi version.” For them, everything is “Mi version,” Mils. Mi-17 is an export version — which, we’ll call it null patterns — for them — everything is “Mi version.” So Mi-8s are carrying these troops. Mi-35s, my own helicopter, which I live in and die by—

Atul Singh: You like it, clearly.

Ashutosh Lal: There is no match to it. That’s another story.

Atul Singh: We’ll cover it in another video! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So Ka-50s were escorting them. Great machine, for that matter. So they were escorting, and there was this battle. There are many videos. Missiles flying across, flares flying across, hits taking place — and animations available as to how they turned over here, there, and then took a hit and took a hit. It was crazy. So they reached this airport outside, and initial gains were being made. Because that night, I was in Kyiv, and I was staying on a highrise, where everybody else was inside the bunker. I was left in that flat alone, horizon, and I could hear the noises. So it is then when the system kicked on, and the reaction to make sure that the runway is not made available for a follow-on fixed-wing transport aircraft to land over there, with a fleet of Ilyushins or Antonovs or whatever the Russians had. Because this normally happens; it’s called the link-up. Initially, the SHBO force goes, secures the airport. Now the link-up happens on the fixed wing runway. So they made sure that this doesn’t happen. And although they had taken ground on that airport, the Ukrainians with the help of—

Atul Singh: With the help of other foreign troops.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, because there were instructors over there. And it is my understanding, which I’m very clear about, that they quickly stopped this entire plan. And then they said, “This is the counter.”

Atul Singh: Reports are that this was mainly Americans and British instructors. There must have been others because of NATO.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, NATO and the West always have a very good mix of things.

Atul Singh: Interoperability, as they say.

Ashutosh Lal: No, so the point I was trying to make was that this is where this fight started to turn dirty, and the link-up could not happen. And that became very messy. That was another very important turning point from the point of view of Russia. Russia had lost the initial momentum, because obviously—remember, the attacker always has the initiative. He chooses where to come in from. The defender has to jockey and adjust itself. So Russia had the initiative. It had the first move, and they came and they tried something out, which was very audacious —over that distance, over that range. Of course, we are at Sagar Chak. Reminds us of ‘71. But those distances were much smaller when it happened from one of—

Atul Singh: Just very quickly: Sagat Singh — we’ve had an on him. He was the great hero of the 1971 war. We’ve had his son interview with us, actually. So General Sagat Singh Rathore is a legend of the Indian military. And of course, he used helicopters and yada ya. You can read about him, learn more about him. But that was a much smaller distance.

Ashutosh Lal: So that’s a much more manageable distance, much less air defense—

Atul Singh: Dense.

Ashutosh Lal: Density against the — and it was all dark and night, and it was small hops against Maghna rivers and tributaries. Here, this was a large distance given out that you have entered now, and you could be tracked. See, the peculiar thing about helicopters — which we are all very aware of — is that once you spot a helicopter, visually or by radar or by the beam, you can put a pin on that location. And now, what is our speed? Two hundred forty kilometers an hour at the max, right? Four kilometers per minute. So you can start expanding it. So in that time, we cannot exit. We cannot just go away. We have to be there only. So if a faster-moving platform comes in, he will find us in that using a known area. So I’m just saying, that is the kind of—

Atul Singh: They’re sitting ducks, basically, once that happens. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: I would not accept at first, but be that as it may, it brings you—

Atul Singh: Flying ducks.

Ashutosh Lal: It brings in new challenges. So we had this interesting contest, which is what I saw, and that’s what happened. So that—

Atul Singh: It was massive casualties, wasn’t it?

Ashutosh Lal: That was one turning point. I’ll be very specific: There was one turning point where Russia lost. And then onwards, the entire conflict turned into a different manner. It became a war of attrition, not much of a war was taking place. And several issues — what kind of soldiers are coming in, what’s happening — given the ingenuity of the Ukrainian people, soldiers and people on the ground, the tech support on the ground, what they started doing… that’s another success story.

Turning points and military operations

Atul Singh: The use of drones.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes. If I’m not wrong, the last attack from Russia on the right front has come about two days, three days prior. That has happened now. You see what happened in Kursk? They went inside that deep and held it to that long, unless that Russian operation happened. And, you know, now they’ve been obstructed.

Atul Singh: They came through a pipeline.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, I mentioned to you that they came through a pipeline — Russian special forces. Please note, gentlemen, that they came through a pipeline. They came through a pipeline, and there were casualties, but they emerged on the other side. If this tussle happened—

Atul Singh: Just an extraordinary operation. On both sides, the troops have proven to be pretty innovative. I mean, the Russians have come up with glide bombs, the Russians have come up with innovations themselves.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, that is there, because in the first war, I saw how the helicopters were shot by machine guns. Planes were destroyed. You know how all that was done? Because I remember, in the first time when I was there — 2014 — and we were trying to work out, can we have a runway secure enough to land an airplane from India and pull the boys and girls out from there? So I was scouting for that, and I reached this airport, and I hitched a ride with the milkman to try and see what the runway is. But that was the place where the night before, an Il-76 was shot. And Il-76 was landing on the runway, and it was shot by a shoulder-fired missile on the idling Indian pilot who was landing, and the entire airplane was strewn up on the runway.

Atul Singh: Wow.

Ashutosh Lal: So it was very obvious and clear to me that no matter what you do in this part — of course, it was too close to the conflict — it can happen. Mind you, by then the other issue would also happen. You lost a civil airplane.

Atul Singh: Yes, indeed.

Ashutosh Lal: Tail color, red and blue.

Atul Singh: Yeah, yeah.

Ashutosh Lal: Being mixed up with an Il-96, and Mr. Putin is coming back and Mr. Modi was coming back as well behind him. We had to intervene and get his route altered away from the conflict. So all that was also happening. The times are very specific. That is when it was decided that it is best to go on the ground and try and pull them out by the train. We fixed up in Kyiv. We went there, we managed that — seven, eight coaches — and pulled everybody out. And that was our—

Geopolitical lessons and India’s opportunity

Atul Singh: So what now? What now? You’ve laid out a wonderful ringside view. And now, of course, we have a new president in the White House, and we have talk of a truce. In fact, some sort of truce, apparently. And it seems that now Zelenskyy will have to read from a new script.

Ashutosh Lal: So Atul, I’ll— (laughs) …Yeah, that’s one interesting way to put it across, actually. But let me just say this: Let me look at the idealistic view as to how this can resolve, actually. Okay, then we can say the best possible action, and then we can see how it can—

Atul Singh: The scenarios.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, that. Like I said, the neighborhood requires restoration. And a very important point which comes in — which links me up to this famous mythology of India, of Mahabharat — Kaurav, Pandav. When this issue was being discussed about EU being signed for Ukraine—

Atul Singh: Ukraine is a part of the EU.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, yes. So you’re aware that even Russia, as a federation, also has a—

Atul Singh: Of course, yeah.

Ashutosh Lal: —Something like an EU of their own. It’s called the Customs Union. So Russia offered that, “Okay, you want to be with the EU? No problems, go with them, no issues. But do not exit the Customs Union. Keep us included.” Because they wanted to have that tie, which was carrying on. They said, “Okay, doesn’t matter.” They had adjusted that much. So it reminds me of that — Kaurav, Pandav, who said, “Five villages. You give us just five villages — five Pandavs, five villages — not even of the…” What should I tell your viewers?

Atul Singh: Not even tipping the needle. (Laughs) So you seem to be holding Victoria Nuland and the hawks in Washington, D.C., responsible for this. The neoconservatives, in a way.

Ashutosh Lal: Look, Atul, history is fraught with examples when people who were not in that area, and they were sitting somewhere else in a much part of the world.

Atul Singh: That’s the history of the last 500 years. We are sitting in front of a map of the world. So you look at the map in the world — Latin America, Portuguese and Spanish all the way to Mexico. India — the British and the French East India companies had a bish, bash, bosh.

Ashutosh Lal: That is why I was talking about the idealistic solution. Why? Because I am not counting out that such new Newlands and Pyatts are still sitting in that setup. There are rare elements in Ukraine which are to be taken out. So there are people who are trying to anchor everything else to do what is required to be done. So I will leave that out right now, because that’s a dynamic switch — which is a different issue, but whatever. But I’m saying, ideally, the earnestness of maintaining a neighborhood needs to be considered.

Atul Singh: So what you’re saying is Russia and Ukraine have to learn to live together.

Ashutosh Lal: There is no choice.

Atul Singh: Got it.

Ashutosh Lal: There is no choice. Now, the flavor changes on the East. And what this bitterness will do over the years and how it can be managed is a different ballgame. Mind you, the people in the west of Ukraine — and very dear friends of mine, very interesting. I was traveling with my friend, and his son, a basketballer of 16, 17, 18 years, of which I spoke to in Russian, and he refused to speak to me for the whole duration. Talking Russian.

Atul Singh: I’ll only speak in Ukrainian. So that divide has cast a different line.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah. So all those divisions have come in already.

Atul Singh: The division is even there in the Church now.

Ashutosh Lal: Many things have happened. Church has changed. The oldest Orthodox monastery was in Ukraine. That was the Vatican of Orthodox Christianity in the east of Europe, which is Lavra the cave. It was the cave monastery — it was by the side of Dnipro. Now, I’ve taken our former chief there when he came down to visit. He was a Catholic himself, but he was kind enough to go there and accept that honor. So that changed. The old calendar went out. Stary Novy God has gone out. So many things have changed for them. So I’m saying those scars would remain. So how they manage this neighborhood — but I have a firm belief that only people who are there involved, they should have the biggest say. And if they have it right, then probably they can work out a constructive or a positive—

Atul Singh: So that’s the idealistic view. So what happens now?

Ashutosh Lal: This idealistic view, Atul, simply said, is not going to happen. We do not have one Angela Merkel, one European leader who was able to speak to both sides.

Atul Singh: Yeah, Angela Merkel. She was from East Germany, she spoke Russian.

Ashutosh Lal: This conflict went down the drain because she was not in the office, to my belief. Perhaps, if there was somebody who could speak on both sides and can do that. I thought our prime minister went on the train all the way. He also had that latitude to do that.

Atul Singh: But we don’t have the heft yet.

Ashutosh: Yeah. Be that it may, I mean, we’ll have to try whichever way you look at it right now. So my belief is this idyllic, idealistic solution is not going to be fructifying. It is going to get meddled and dirtied by many such power factions. What’s happening across the Atlantic — the government changing and everything else happening — they have their own issues. The people who were before them, they had their own issues. So they will drive it this way. But this ideation will not happen.

Atul Singh: Got it.

Ashutosh Lal: Poland is emerging as a very strong pull in this entire game.

Atul Singh: Of course. They already said they’ll go nuclear.

Ashutosh Lal: So please understand, this idealization is not going to happen. Now, how badly it gets muddled, how much time it takes, and what all is taken out of there — and what is taken out of Ukraine is my last point, which you will have to give me two minutes.

Atul Singh: Yeah, sure, take all the time you want. Actually, go ahead. Take the two minutes now.

Ashutosh Lal: Okay. So let’s put this conflict aside. I just want to tell you that what I look at — from our country’s interest.

Atul Singh: From India’s interests.

Ashutosh Lal: And I’m a military man. I was a military man in my head, in mind. I’m still one. So I would talk about that.

Atul Singh: I would love to see you as air chief marshal. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: Aw, thank you. I never had that caliber. I could not have been there. But let me still make a point here. So now we are not talking about Russia–Ukraine. I’m talking about national interest. When the regions in which you have some penetration are at conflict, and those regions have a technical, or economical, or a geographical or a mineral-wise edge over you — world over, history over — that is the time for the national interest to be kicked in and try and to get things to cut that delta and get your own system up. Right? You should not have had an issue to ask Indians from somewhere else to build your own ships. By now, we should have become quite omniversal, so to speak. Self-reliant, for your audience. So this is where I thought our eastern neighbor played a very good card.

Atul Singh: China.

Ashutosh Lal: In my only tenure over there — ’11 to ‘14 — what I kept seeing is what they were at. Singularly, very focused, very sharp, very quick. And they were able to execute things and take it. Technologies, expertise… So the story of Liaoning is the most interesting impact. And your viewers might have read it. I’ll just narrate it very shortly.

Atul Singh: No, please, go on ahead. Not all of them have, so it’s an education.

Ashutosh Lal: So what happens is that when you hear the story, it will tell you what was the level they were operating at. Well, surprise to some of you that our Vikramaditya and their Liaoning are actually brothers. They both were born in a city called Mykolaiv, which is—

Atul Singh: Just tell them what both these vessels do.

Ashutosh Lal: Okay, I’m sorry. My apologies. So Vikramaditya is our aircraft carrier. Liaoning is the Chinese aircraft carrier, which is floating in the South China Sea, and it has led the development of their subsequent aircraft carrier. Vikramaditya has come to us from Russia. It has come from the city of St. Petersburg, where it was a Russian aircraft carrier earlier. It has been now refitted to take our aircraft on board — MiG-29s — and that’s what is now flying its last service. So I’m saying — Vikramaditya and Liaoning, yeah — are both brothers. They were the same model, displacement, design of aircraft carriers, born in a dockyard which is in the city of Mykolaiv. Ukrainians will call it Mykolaiv, Russians will say Nikolayev. So in the city of Nikolayev they were born. Vikramaditya went to Russia and was in St. Petersburg, where we contracted it from. And finally our team went there and refitted for a long period. So the story of Liaoning is that Liaoning was a lining, just like a shell. The news came that there was a company in Macau which wanted to buy this Liaoning and make a floating casino out of it in Macau.

Atul Singh: By the way, Liaoning is the northern state, right next to North Korea. (Laughs) So they claimed it was going to Macau.

Ashutosh Lal: The claim was it will go to Macau as a floating casino. Immediately west, everybody’s ears went up. “No, it’s not them, it’s something deeper, actually.” Now Liaoning was bought by this company. It was being dragged through the Bosphorus Strait. And the environmentalists put up a big fight and said, “No more. You can’t take it through Bosphorus.” They tried to stall, delay what was required. But of course, deep pockets, focus, everything else — it went. Now, God intervened. In the Sea of Greece, there was a massive storm. And this hull got decoupled from the tug. They almost lost it.

Atul Singh: Wow.

Ashutosh Lal: But then the storm subsided. And again, it was caught on. And by the time this combination was turning around Cape and heading towards our part of the world, that company in Macau merged with Liaoning, as you say. My pronunciation is wrong.

Atul Singh: I’ve traveled a bit around China. That’s the only reason. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So please help me with that.

Atul Singh: I also had a Chinese girlfriend. That also helps! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So that company got merged with that shipyard over there: Dalian. And in this period, there were hordes of experts from the city of Mykolaiv, which were relocated over there. And now, when this hull reached over there, the work started. By the time we were refitting and trying to get our ship back, and after huge overruns of time and cost and whatnot, Liaoning was out roving the sea, the trials in the South China Sea. And the rest is known to your viewers focused not only on the military part, but on the food security part. It was surprising that China leased an area of land as more or as much as Belgium in size. Built a deep-sea port right next to it. Now obviously, the south doesn’t have snow, so it can grow the year long. So year-round, they would grow grains over there and ship it. Call it food security. When you are having a region under pressure, under conflict, and they’re looking for help and what they have not. The people who are involved in diplomacy, they are looking after their own national interest. And that is why geopolitics is a blood sport. So that is what I was understanding that this should have happened. There were many such places and some such cases where we could have really scored well, because we have a very good emotional connection.

Atul Singh: Yeah. I mean, they watch Raj Kapoor. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: No, sir. Raj Kapoor is history. Only babushka will respond to you about Raj Kapoor. By the way, do you know who is the most famous actor in that part of the world? You’d be surprised: Mithun Chakraborty.

Atul Singh: Oh, okay. Yes, I would have—

Ashutosh Lal: If the song plays, “Jimmy Jimmy,” there is not a single Ukrainian woman or girl who will not dance in that hall. That is a fact. I’ve witnessed the funeral of a young girl who went to her grave wearing a saree and holding a Mithun portrait in hand. And we had to get a letter from him, the ambassador, to speak to him. I told him, “No, sir, you must speak to him.” And he has to write back. And he wrote back; the letter was given to the father as a closure on that. So that is the kind of emotional connection. Family is one important cultural connection within us. The religion is another important—

Atul Singh: Religion? In what way?

Ashutosh Lal: The allegiance to our religion. You know, here also, we are — whichever way we tell — we are spiritual people, deep inside. And, there also, whatever happens, you would find them born from the Church, and they would be God-fearing before the food and everything else. You will see that. So they’re—

Atul Singh: Religiosity.

Ashutosh Lal: Absolutely. So there are these two strong pillars. And third is friendship, which I am a living example. So that’s how I realized that we are so much in common, and we could have leveraged much more. But I think we must have done it. I’m sure people who are responsible — they are doing it right now.

Atul Singh: Well, one can live in hope. I can tell you they are not doing so in Washington, DC, where I live. (Ashutosh laughs) Anyway, Ashutosh, lovely to have you. We’ll continue this discussion. We’ll have you for other episodes, and we have a lot to discuss.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, all in all, I want to just say from my side, a big thank you to you and your viewers. I hope I’ve been able to do justice to the ringside view. (Both laugh) And thank you very much.

Atul Singh: Thank you.

[, Aaditya Sengupta Dhar and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: An Indian Ringside View of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Anna Hryniv: Thank you. Thank you for having me.

Atul Singh: Anna, we are hearing a lot about Ukraine. We’ve been reading that the US has been negotiating with Ukraine. In fact, there was a time negotiations were occurring in Saudi Arabia. We heard Russian President Vladimir Putin calling for direct talks with Ukraine. Now Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says he’s ready to meet Putin personally in Istanbul. What is going on? What do people in Ukraine think about the negotiations?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you for this question — it’s a great, great question. And before this interview, I spoke with my friend at the front line as I decided that their opinion is the best answer for this question, because they know what is going on. And I asked what they think about negotiation, about Russian opinion, about everything. And I even put it on my paper about what they taught me about it. So they tell me that it doesn’t matter what will be after this negotiation. They’re pretty sure Russia will come back just in the months, or in the year, or in two. So they are prepared for another war, because it just doesn’t work for Russia and it just doesn’t work for Putin.

Atul Singh: I see. So why doesn’t it work? What does Russia really want? What’s the view of your friend?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, it’s a great question, and we ask this question a lot of times over a lot of years, actually, hundreds of years — what Russia wants from Ukraine. But they don’t want Ukraine to change something, to change their policy, or to change the president. They want Ukraine to be part of the Russian world, and it’s never happened. That’s why this war is so long, and that’s why it’s gonna be so long if we’re gonna think that it’s so easy to negotiate with Russia. And the other reason, the other thing I want to explain that my friend told me is that it’s pretty hard for Ukraine to be part of this war, but nobody wants peace more than Ukraine now. Nobody.

����������Ա�’s Western dream vs. ��ܲ�������’s empire

Atul Singh:��Hmm. So tell me something and tell me if what I’m hearing is true. I hear from a number of American friends that when they speak to Ukrainians, they say that Ukraine wants to be part of the Western world. It wants to be part of the EU, it wants to be part of NATO, it wants to be part of the freer economies of the West. And they see the West as historically expanding east. After all, Poland was part of the Communist Bloc, but Poland now is a very dynamic economy, and a very important member of the EU and a very important member of NATO. So the American view is Ukrainians want pretty much what the Poles want, and what the Russians want is to retain Ukraine as part of the Russian world, of their sphere of influence, because they see Ukraine as home to the kingdom of Rus. They also see Ukraine as part of the former Soviet Union, and they have their fleet in Crimea. Do you think these two views are hitting each other, are colliding? Is that what’s at stake?

Anna Hryniv:��So yeah, you’re absolutely right about the Ukrainians wanting to be part of the West part of the world. And from what I see, Ukraine is a pretty Western country now. It’s a part of the world’s democracy. Ukraine changed. It’s a young country, but it’s changed. It’s modern, it’s brave, on the one side. On the other side, what are Ukrainians fighting for? It’s not only about wanting to be part of the European Union, or for the West part, or the US part. It’s not about this. It’s about: You cannot just change borders by force. That’s the main idea. Because it started with Ukraine, but it could be any other country, and it’s really a bad future to understand that any other country can change the borders of any other country just by force. That’s what we are fighting for.��

Atul Singh: I see. But the truth is that over history, most borders have changed thanks to force. Germany has its current borders because they lost in World War II. Austria, the same. And you could say the same about so many countries. I mean, India has its borders today because the British left us with those borders. So I agree with the principle, but reality and history are different, right, Anna?

Anna Hryniv: It’s a great point. But we can tell about a lot of things that were like that: women’s rights, human rights, different countries. And we cannot always say it was like that every time. No, we live in a modern and different world when you cannot just change the border if you want. You cannot just do a deportation of 20,000 kids from your country just because you want to do it. You cannot just murder a whole city as in Mariupol just because you want to do it, because someone did it before. It’s not how it works. We have some rules and world order, and we should respect it.

Ideals collide with the new world order

Atul Singh:��Yeah, but here’s the thing: A lot of people are saying that world order has taken a beating. We are now living in a new order, particularly now when you look at what’s happening in the Middle East, look at what’s happening in Gaza, look at what’s happening in South Sudan. India and Pakistan just had a major fight, and that was to change borders in some ways, especially on the part of Pakistan. So we are again back to a more violent era. And the classic example, perhaps, is Syria, where Turkey and Israel — Turkey, which used to have the Ottoman Empire — now is the dominant player in Syria, and Israel has taken some of southern Syria’s territory. So yes, you are saying we cannot do that — that’s a great principle — but we are living in a different world. Does that worry you?��

Anna Hryniv: So, I have a question for you as a journalist: Do you think it’s okay to change the border by force?

Atul Singh: I don’t think it is alright. But at the same time, what I’m saying is, this is the world we live in. So what can we do about it? Does that worry you? It worries me.

Anna Hryniv: It’s a great point, and yeah, what can we do about it? We can have an impact. We can save our country, help our countries, if we understand it’s right. This is what all my friends say. Actually, all my friends are from a media background; they are journalists, they are camera operators, they are producers, and they are all now at the front line in Ukraine. And this is the answer for your question: What can you do? Because they are right there. This is their home country, and they cannot—

Atul Singh: So they are fighting for what they believe is right, they are fighting for their territory and sovereignty?

Anna Hryniv: They are fighting for their home. It’s just right. And it’s the same with the Ukrainian community here in the US. What can we do with all our right principles? Not just principles, but do a lot of protests, meetings, rallies and different events, action summits. So just be proactive.

The fight for global support

Atul Singh: Excellent. Now, that brings me on to my next question. You’re obviously very active. You’re working very hard for the Ukrainian cause. So what do you and your friends, and what do other Ukrainians think about the international support Ukraine is receiving? Do you feel that the US and the EU have your back?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you for this question, and I’ll refer to my friend. I asked him, what does Ukraine need? If somebody asked me, “Okay, guys, we are helping you, we support you. What do you need?” And they answer: “So what does Ukraine want for this question? To be armed, to be able to push Russia back.”

Atul Singh: From whom? From the US and EU mainly, correct?

Anna Hryniv:��Yeah, just because it’s really important. Because if Ukraine loses, it’s not just only a Ukraine loss. It’s a loss for the whole democratic world. Just because every country can be Ukraine next. So if we’re not helping Ukraine, we can forget about the peaceful world that was before 2022. So about the community here in the US: From one side, I want to say thank you to all the people who were really supporting us, because I’m — it’s not correct to say refugee, but we’ll say refugee, because the US is protecting Ukrainians. But I really appreciate all the support to Ukrainian people, because you can feel the support when you move from Ukraine, as a human — it’s my personal side — and from the community. So I had a chance to meet people from different states with different political sides, and all of them tell me that they have some supporting project that they help with to move Ukrainians from Ukraine. Then they help host Ukrainians here in the US. They send money to the Ukrainian army. So in every state, with every different idea, political things, every American person I met tells me, “I support Ukraine.” And it was a pretty big surprise for me. So yeah, I think this helps.

Atul Singh: So you think the Americans have your back?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, I think so, because we can feel it. It’s a bit different from the first year of the war, but I think it’s—

Atul Singh: What’s a bit different? Is there now a little bit of donor fatigue? Is there now a little more uncertainty?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah. I can explain. It’s not as chaotic as it was before, because when this shocking war started, everyone started to say, “How can I help? Where can I send money? Who can live in my apartment?” Now, I feel it’s not that huge, but it’s more focused. So we still feel this help. Of course, we want more, but I mean, anyone trying to protect their countries and home wants more, but we appreciate this help.

Atul Singh: So, question for you, different question. There was a White House meeting which was very controversial. And that White House meeting between the Ukrainian president and the American president and the American vice president didn’t go down very well. Did that affect the morale of Ukrainian-Americans? Did that affect the morale of Americans supporting Ukraine? How did that play out?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, I can say, from my personal view. So that day, I received, like, hundreds of messages with support from my Ukrainian friends, from my American friends. So, I mean, yeah, we had a lot of questions from this meeting, but from what I see, I received a lot of messages that say, “We support you, we still support you. It’s really important for us to help Ukraine.” It’s not easy to be very diplomatic and be nice when your country is under attack every day. It’s just not that easy when you see hundreds of people killed by Russia. It just doesn’t work like that. I understand this whole world of diplomacy and rules, but it’s not that easy, especially after you spend a week or two in Ukraine. You understand why Ukrainians are acting like that or this really quickly.

Ukraine Action Summit

Atul Singh: I see. So, let’s now talk about the Ukraine Action Summit. You were involved in it. Explain to us: What is it, when did it happen, why is it important, what kind of people attend the summit? Is it mostly Ukrainian Americans, or is it also people from other backgrounds?

Anna Hryniv: Yes, it’s a great question. I really loved this event. So, it was the sixth Ukrainian Action Summit, and the idea of this summit is to bring all people who want from all the states to go to their representatives and talk about Ukraine. Super easy, but really productive. And from what I see working with different communication activities, this is the best way to support Ukrainian ideas. So not only do some protests and rallies, but go to your representative and tell him about Ukraine. Tell him to support some decision about Ukraine. Tell him to support some, I don’t know, laws with refugees, some support of arming Ukraine. Representatives are the key to Ukrainian support. So we decided to do that project with the Coalition for Ukraine, and we brought together 600 Americans. Part of them were American with Ukrainian roots, part of them not — just, like, no connection with Ukraine. They just feel they want to support Ukraine. So it was a really, really productive and great meeting.

Atul Singh: I see. And does this lead to more support on Capitol Hill, more support from the American media, more support from American civil society? Is that the long game?

Anna Hryniv: Yes, exactly. This was the idea. It’s not only about this event. It’s not enough to do just one Action Summit. That’s why it’s not the first and not the second. We understand we’re gonna do more. But it really changed minds. It really helps. And I used to work with members of the Parliament, so I know how it works. It’s impossible to know everything about what’s going on in your county, for example. You listen to people that live there. So it’s the best idea to just be connected with your representative. And if they hear about Ukraine 100 times per day, maybe they’re gonna change their mind.

Atul Singh: I see, I see. Good old electoral politics, eh? (Chuckles) So, let’s talk about Ukrainian refugees in the US. You are a refugee yourself of sorts — you are in New York. What has been your experience in New York and in the US so far?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you so much. It’s like my third year in the US. Time flies. But it was hard to leave my home.

Atul Singh: Yeah, and by the way, just so that viewers know, you’re from Odessa — that ordinarily beautiful city.

Anna Hryniv: Right, thank you for that.

Atul Singh: If anyone has seen Battleship Potemkin, an early movie, they can see the steps of Odessa. Anna Hryniv is from Odessa, and she told me there are 30 media channels and 300 social media channels in Odessa itself?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, you’re right, it’s only about the city’s.

Atul Singh: Exactly. So quite a culturally rich city on the Black Sea.

Anna Hryniv: Oh, yeah. Right.

Atul Singh: So, carry on. Tell us, how do you find life here as compared to such an idyllic place?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, you’re absolutely right. Odessa is beautiful. I hope that everyone who will read or see this interview, you can visit Odessa. I promise I can’t show the city to all Americans who want to see this city. It’s pretty diverse and beautiful. It’s really, really, like, a mix of everything. So yeah, it was pretty hard to leave this city and leave Ukraine. And it wasn’t our choice — it wasn’t the choice of Ukrainians, because we were really happy in our country. I know there are a lot of stereotypes and thoughts about life in Eastern Europe, but from my side, Ukraine is a pretty modern, super cool country that’s beautiful. So it wasn’t our choice to leave. But from another side, I am really grateful to all American people for how easy it was for me to become a part of New York or the country, because everyone who spoke with me when I only moved asked me, “How can I help you? What advice can I give you? Maybe I can help you with this connection. Maybe I can help you with everything.” So it was really easy, if I can say that (laughs) in this story, to become a part of the new country for me.

Atul Singh: I see. And I mean, America is the land of immigrants, and there’s more than an element of truth there. So the experience has been very positive. Now let’s talk about the activities of other people who’ve come from Ukraine — your community. What are the activities you’ve engaged in for the past three years, and what are you planning now?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you for this question. From what I see, the Ukrainian community here, especially in New York, it’s pretty big and diverse. It’s proactive. It’s different because there’s parts of communities that have been here for, like, years and years, and there’s—

Atul Singh: Some have been there a hundred years or even more.

Anna Hryniv: Exactly. We have the Ukrainian Village. It’s a part of Manhattan. It’s like East Village. It’s a really famous place there. So we have this part of the community, and we have different new Ukrainians that only moved. It’s interesting to see how they connected with each other, because it’s two different worlds. But still—

Atul Singh: Is the older community more religious?

Anna Hryniv: I can tell this, maybe, but not super conservative, I’ll say, yeah. But it’s still different, every generation is different. But this generation grew up here in the US. This generation grew up in modern, different Ukraine. There were different rules with different everything. So yeah, it was pretty interesting to see how this generation and community connected just because we have one goal and one idea. And I can say it connected really well. We did, like, hundreds of events, from something with art to something with protests and rallies and a lot of things. What we do, we do now in DC, just because I see it works better. Just because, from what I see and what I talked about before, it’s not enough now just to be seen on the streets or just speak with journalists. You need to push your opinion to officials, because they can change something in the White House and Congress. So that’s why we moved a little bit of our activities to DC and focused on that part. This is one part of your question, and the other part — what we are preparing for — it’s really important things. And I want to show some statistics, some numbers. So, like, 669 kids were killed by Russia—

Atul Singh: When?

Anna Hryniv: From February [2022], from starting this war.

Atul Singh: Over three years?

Anna Hryniv: Over three years. And 20,000 were deported to Russia. Two thousand were injured by Russia. Millions have to leave their countries. So now we’re preparing them an event. It’s going to be the first of June. It’s called Children Praying for Children. We’re going to do a big, big event in every state, including DC as well, to bring these numbers, to talk about this and to pray for Ukrainian kids.

Fading attention and enduring resolve

Atul Singh: I see. So all very good, and good luck with your future activities. I have a difficult question for you now, and it may be difficult personally for you. We have a lot of conflicts going around the world. We know about Israel–Gaza, that is attracting a lot of media attention. You move to the south, you have the Houthis in Yemen. You move to Africa, there’s South Sudan. Lots of people have been displaced, a lot have died. You move east, you get to Iran. Iran–US tensions are high, there are negotiations going on. You move further east, you’ve had Pakistan and India, two nuclear powers, almost go to war. They’ve just had a ceasefire, but things are tense. So with all of this going on, and with so many different tragedies, with so many children in so many countries dying, do you think that global attention for the Russia–Ukraine war is going down? And if so, how do you feel about this? What do you plan to do about this? And what are, in your view, the likely consequences?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, it’s a great question. Thank you for that. You’re absolutely right. And as a media person — you’re from the media, you have a huge media background — we understand that this is how it works in psychology. So it’s okay to focus on something else, but—

Atul Singh: I’m also a historian by training, so I’m not your typical media person.

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, so you understand how—

Atul Singh: I’m just saying that there are huge trends, long-term trends, and so sadly, sometimes because of that, human nature gets overwhelmed. So it’s a difficult question.

Anna Hryniv: You’re right. It’s human nature. And from what I understand, working as a volunteer, helping with all these Ukrainian fields and projects — it’s okay to understand that people cannot be focused on Ukraine 100% of their time. It’s okay to understand this information and then work with that, not trying to be rude and say, “Oh no, you need to read about Ukraine every day. You need to know about Ukraine. You have to know, you have to.” It’s not how it works. It’s war going on in my home, so—

Atul Singh: It matters to you, of course.

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, it’s necessary for me to talk about it. It’s necessary for me to do some action with this. I understand it’s going to be like this. It’s hurtful, it’s hard, because that’s my own city, Odessa, is under attack every day. And when we say it’s under attack with drones, we don’t mean small drones; it’s the big machines. So my own family had lost in this war. It’s just super heartbreaking. But on another side, I understand this is how it works, and we should know how to deal with this. And that’s why we’re creating every day something new — some events, some topics, something to do with this. Just because this is the only way we can change it and help, of course, our army to fight back.

Atul Singh: Got it. So you recognize that global attention has indeed gone down, but you’re trying to stay current, stay relevant, and fight for your cause, correct?

Anna Hryniv: Absolutely. Absolutely.

Atul Singh: Great. Anna Hryniv, thank you for your time. It’s been a real pleasure. We’ll have you back. It’s great to have a Ukrainian perspective on the war. All the very best with your work, and we’ll see you soon.

Anna Hryniv: Thank you very much.

[ edited this piece.]

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The post FO° Talks: A Ukrainian Refugee Reflects on the Russia–Ukraine War appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The mass slaughter on both sides in this long battle was a measure of the strategic value of the city to both sides, but it is also emblematic of the shocking human cost of this conflict. The war has degenerated into a brutal and bloody war of attrition along a nearly static front line. Neither side made significant territorial gains in the entire 2023 year of fighting, with a net gain to Russia of a mere square miles, or 0.1% of Ukraine.

And while it is the Ukrainians and Russians fighting and dying in this war of attrition with over casualties, it is the United States, with some its Western allies, that has stood in the way of peace talks. This was true of talks between Russia and Ukraine that took place in March 2022, one month after the Russian invasion, and it is true of talks that Russia tried to initiate with the United States as recently as January 2024.

The US and the UK pushed for a long war

In March 2022, Russia and Ukraine met in Turkey and a settlement that should have ended the war. Ukraine agreed to become a neutral country between East and West, on the model of Austria or Switzerland, giving up its controversial ambition for NATO membership. Territorial questions over Crimea and the self-declared republics of Donetsk and Luhansk would be resolved peacefully, based on self-determination for the people of those regions.

But then the US and UK intervened to persuade Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy to abandon neutrality in favor of a long war to militarily drive Russia out of Ukraine and recover Crimea and the Donbas by force. American and British leaders have never admitted to their own people what they did, nor did they try to explain why they did it.

So it has been left to everyone else involved to reveal details of the agreement and the US and UK’s roles in torpedoing it: President Zelenskyy’s and Ukrainian ; Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt and Turkish ; Israeli Prime Minister Naftali who was another mediator; and former German Chancellor Gerhard , who mediated with Russian President Vladimir Putin for Ukraine.

The US sabotage of peace talks should come as no surprise. So much of US foreign policy follows what should by now be an easily recognizable and predictable pattern, in which our leaders systematically lie to us about their decisions and actions in crisis situations, and, by the time the truth is widely known, it is too late to reverse the catastrophic effects of those decisions. By then, thousands of people have paid with their lives, nobody is held accountable, and the world’s attention has moved on to the next crisis, the of lies and the next bloodbath — which in this case is Gaza.

But the war grinds on in Ukraine, whether we pay attention to it or not. Once the US and UK succeeded in killing peace talks and prolonging the war, it fell into an intractable pattern common to many wars. Ukraine, the United States and the leading members of the NATO military alliance were encouraged, or we might say deluded, by limited successes at different times into continually prolonging and escalating the war and rejecting diplomacy, in spite of ever-mounting, appalling human costs for the people of Ukraine.

US and NATO leaders have repeated ad nauseam that they are arming Ukraine to put it in a stronger position at the “negotiating table,” even as they keep rejecting negotiations. After Ukraine gained ground with its much-celebrated offensives in the fall of 2022, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley went public with a to “seize the moment” and get back to the negotiating table from the position of strength that NATO leaders said they were waiting for. French and German military leaders were even more adamant that that moment would be short-lived if they failed to seize it.��

They were right. US President Joe Biden rejected his military advisers’ calls for renewed diplomacy, and ����������Ա�’s failed 2023 offensive wasted its chance to negotiate from a position of strength, sacrificing many more lives to leave it weaker than before.

On February 13, 2024, the Reuters Moscow bureau broke the story that the United States had recently a new Russian proposal to reopen peace negotiations. Multiple Russian sources involved in the initiative told Reuters that Russia proposed direct talks with the United States to call a ceasefire along the current front lines of the war.��

Instead of negotiating something with Ukraine that the US might later veto, this time Russia approached the United States directly before involving Ukraine. There was a meeting of intermediaries in Turkey, and a meeting between Secretary of State Blinken, CIA Director Burns and National Security Adviser Sullivan in Washington, but the result was a message from Sullivan that the US was willing to discuss other aspects of US–Russian relations, but not peace in Ukraine.

Russia was better prepared than the West to fight a long war

And so the war grinds on. Russia is still firing artillery shells per day along the front line, while Ukraine can only fire 2,000. In a microcosm of the larger war, some Ukrainian gunners told reporters they were only allowed to fire 3 shells per night. As Sam Cranny-Evans of the UK’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a military think-tank, told the Guardian, “What that means is that Ukrainians can’t suppress Russian artillery any more, and if the Ukrainians can’t fire back, all they can do is try to survive.”

A March 2023 European initiative to produce a million shells for Ukraine in a year fell far short, only producing about 600,000. US monthly shell production in October 2023 was 28,000 shells, with a target of 37,000 per month by April 2024. The United States plans to increase production to 100,000 shells per month, but that will take until October 2025. Meanwhile, Russia is already producing artillery shells per year.

After spending less than one-tenth of the Pentagon budget over the past 20 years, how is Russia able to produce 5 times more artillery shells than the United States and its NATO allies combined?  

RUSI’s Richard Connolly to the Guardian that, while Western countries privatized their weapons production and dismantled “surplus” productive capacity after the end of the Cold War in the interest of corporate profits, “The Russians have been…subsidizing the defense industry, and many would have said wasting money for the event that one day they need to be able to scale it up. So it was economically inefficient until 2022, and then suddenly it looks like a very shrewd bit of planning.”

Biden has been anxious to send more money to Ukraine — a whopping $61 billion — but disagreements in the US Congress between bipartisan Ukraine supporters and a Republican faction opposed to US involvement have held up the funds. But even if Ukraine had endless infusions of Western weapons, it has a more serious problem: Many of the troops it recruited to fight this war in 2022 have been killed, wounded or captured, and its recruitment system has been plagued by corruption and a lack of enthusiasm for the war among most of its people.

In August 2023, the government fired the heads of military recruitment in all 24 regions of the country after it became widely known that they were systematically to allow men to avoid recruitment and gain safe passage out of the country. The Open Ukraine Telegram channel , “The military registration and enlistment offices have never seen such money before, and the revenues are being evenly distributed vertically to the top.”

The Ukrainian parliament is debating a new law with an online registration system that includes people living abroad and penalties for failure to register or enlist. Parliament already voted down a previous bill that members found too draconian, and many fear that forced conscription will lead to more widespread draft resistance, or even bring down the government.

Oleksiy Arestovych, Zelenskyy’s former spokesman, Unherd that the root of ����������Ա�’s recruitment problem is that only 20% of Ukrainians believe in the anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism that has controlled Ukrainian governments since the overthrow of the Yanukovych government in 2014. “What about the remaining 80%?” the interviewer asked.��

“I think for most of them, their idea is of a multinational and poly-cultural country,” Arestovych replied. “And when Zelenskyy came into power in 2019, they voted for this idea. He did not articulate it specifically but it was what he meant when he said, ‘I don’t see a difference in the Ukrainian-Russian language conflict, we are all Ukrainians even if we speak different languages.’”

“And you know,” Arestovych continued, “my great criticism of what has happened in Ukraine over the last years, during the emotional trauma of the war, is this idea of Ukrainian nationalism which has divided Ukraine into different people: the Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers as a second class of people. It’s the main dangerous idea and a worse danger than Russian military aggression, because nobody from this 80% of people wants to die for a system in which they are people of a second class.”

If Ukrainians are reluctant to fight, imagine how Americans would resist being shipped off to fight in Ukraine. A 2023 US Army War College study of “Lessons from Ukraine” that the US ground war with Russia that the United States is to fight would involve an estimated 3,600 US casualties per day, killing and maiming as many US troops every two weeks as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did in twenty years. Echoing ����������Ա�’s military recruitment crisis, the authors concluded, “Large-scale combat operations troop requirements may well require a reconceptualization of the 1970s and 1980s volunteer force and a move toward partial conscription.”

US war policy in Ukraine is predicated on just such a gradual escalation from proxy war to full-scale war between Russia and the United States, which is unavoidably overshadowed by the risk of nuclear war. This has not changed in two years, and it will not change unless and until our leaders take a radically different approach. That would involve serious diplomacy to end the war on terms on which Russia and Ukraine can agree, as they attempted to do in March 2022.

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Although it is not yet certain, it is beginning to appear that ����������Ա�’s much-anticipated spring offensive has become bogged down. If the coming weeks bear out the same results, the war may become a stalemate. Why would Russia keep fighting a war that seems ready to drag on forever, with neither side able to vanquish the other? For this, we must take a look at ��ܲ�������’s wider strategic outlook.

What motivates Russia?

To discern what long-term objectives Russian President Vladimir Putin might have in Ukraine, we need to begin in 2014. Then, a series of clashes between protestors and government forces resulted in the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. The events became known as the Maidan Revolution. If we can understand why Russia considered Maidan a threat, we can understand ��ܲ�������’s fundamental objectives in its subsequent relations with Ukraine.

From the Russian point of view, the first problem with Maidan was that the movement threatened to result in an eventual accession to NATO. While the primary goal of the protestors was the integration of Ukraine into the EU, not NATO, Russia saw this as a slippery slope. Moscow—whether during the Empire, the Soviet Union, or the Federation—has always considered threats from the territory of modern Ukraine, and particularly from the part of it east of the Dnieper River, to be absolutely unacceptable. It will strive to remove hostile forces from the area at almost any cost. The thought of NATO forces east of the Dnieper, especially in Crimea, is absolutely unthinkable in Moscow. Moscow thus perceives NATO enlargement as a threat of the most existential kind.

Secondly, Russia has a positive interest in Crimea, since the Russian coast of the Black Sea has no good sites for year-round naval ports. The Russian Black Sea fleet must thus rely on the Crimean port of Sevastopol to stage its operations. Retaining the use of Crimea for the navy is a condition for the maintenance of ��ܲ�������’s status as a Black Sea power. Strategically, Crimea is the only part of ����������Ա�’s territory that holds positive value for Moscow (as opposed to negative value, i.e. the deterrence of possible threats). However, ��ܲ�������’s experience after the annexation of Crimea in 2014—particularly ����������Ա�’s economic siege of the peninsula and cutting of its water supply—has suggested that control of the territory immediately opposite Crimea on the Ukrainian mainland is key to the support of Crimea itself.

Finally, Russia has sought to avoid the loss of face that would result if the pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were comprehensively defeated. This is not only a matter of vanity for Russia, but an important strategic objective to maintain its influence in the post-Soviet space. Russia exercises influence by playing the role of protector of ethnic Russians and other pro-Russian ethnic groups, such as the Ossetes and Abkhaz in Georgia. To be seen as weak and ineffective in this role would be a serious hindrance to ��ܲ�������’s continued influence in its neighborhood.

Russia still has much to gain from fighting on

In spite of its heavy physical and reputational losses in the Ukraine War, these three goals provide Russia ample reason to cling tenaciously to its current position. Holding on to the land bridge between Crimea and the Donbas addresses Crimea’s post-2014 strategic vulnerabilities, and the expansion of Russian territory to a significantly increased portion of Donetsk and virtually all of Luhansk demonstrates effective support of the rebels. As long as things do not change, two of ��ܲ�������’s main assets in the region—the port of Sevastopol and its reputation as protector—remain substantially intact.

If battle lines do remain mostly fixed, the main downside for Russia will be the significant areas east of the Dnieper that remain in Ukrainian hands. As international relations scholar John Mearsheimer has , ��ܲ�������’s second-best alternative to controlling strategic territory is to “wreck Ukraine as a functioning state”, and this Russia has been doing very effectively.

Compared to Russia, Ukraine is older, poorer, more demographically unstable—with lower birthrates and negative net migration, and vastly smaller. The war has greatly aggravated these problems, as young men die in battle and young women and children become refugees. What’s more, ����������Ա�’s infrastructure has been systematically destroyed. A country with a like that of Ukraine needs to develop its economy quickly and maximize its resources to deal with an aging and shrinking population. This war has instead severely damaged ����������Ա�’s economy, and every month that passes is a crucial month in which Ukraine fails to get on the road to recovery, while the likelihood of refugees returning falls.

Simply by holding the current lines, Russia is making good on its protection of its friends, securing the long-term viability of its outpost in Crimea, and bleeding Ukraine further, making it increasingly likely that Ukraine will become a dysfunctional, impoverished state over the long term, without the capacity to be an effective base for NATO assets. Meanwhile, sanctions have not had on ��ܲ�������’s economy that was hoped, and ��ܲ�������’s large population, bolstered by from Ukraine, means that any demographic effects of the war on Russia are likely to be minuscule.

Putin is well aware that Russia can bear the losses of the war longer than Ukraine can. Even a costly victory is still a victory if Russia can keep its foothold. Eventually, the West may find its resolve wavering before ��ܲ�������’s. On the present trajectory, Russia may end up holding onto its gains in spite of everything.

If the current offensive fails, and it begins to appear that a long-term stalemate is developing, Western countries will have to rethink their willingness to underwrite a war whose continuation is destroying the viability of Ukraine, while only helping Russia to cement the achievement of its strategic goals.

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Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have one thing in common: they are both unburdened by principles. Trump’s election threatens to bring America down to Putin’s level where only self interest counts. They both know the price of everything but the value of nothing.

Russia gave up its only principled attempt at policy-making after the death of Vladimir Lenin. Since then its dictators have pursued solely Russian national interests. This worked more or less until 1991. After that Russia lost its empire and its way, but Putin is turning the tide and again leading with the doctrine that Russian national interests come first—justice, democracy, human rights, rule of law, fair trading—and the rest all come second or not at all.

From its inception until the election of Trump, America put liberty, democracy and free trade at the forefront of its foreign policy. It did this in the belief that not only was this what the Founding Fathers intended and but also that democratic, free nations would be natural allies, lucrative markets and not a threat to the US.

Putin calculated that Russian interests would not be served by Hillary Clinton as president. Clinton’s belief in the rule of law, free elections and human rights would be a continuing obstacle to the Russian annexation of Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine and the persecution of Russian democrats. Clinton would have continued American opposition to Russian intimidation of the Baltic States and—Putin’s ultimate ambition—the re-absorption of Kazakhstan into the Russian Federation.

So no wonder Putin authorized his special services to do all they could to sway the election toward Trump. Putin reasoned that if his actions could be framed as being in the American national interest, Trump, unlike Clinton, would not stand on principle but seek to close a deal. Trump boasts about his negotiating ability, so all Putin had to do is offer him something tempting to start bargaining.

Let’s Shake on It

Imagine a scenario where Putin offers Trump a free hand for America to overturn the failing regimes in Cuba and Venezuela. In return Putin wanted recognition of Russian annexation of Crimea, dropping of sanctions and a free hand to “guide” Kazakhstan back into the Russian Federation. Putin might even offer to reconcile Russia to the Baltics’ membership of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

As Putin might put it: “My dear Donald—this is a win-win. It is in your interests:��You get Cuba’s market, its strategic location and a wonderful place to build hotels. You get Venezuela’s oil. We get only what is naturally ours anyway, and we guarantee that China doesn’t get to dominate Kazakhstan. Let’s shake on it.”

The incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson would like it too: Venezuela owes Exxon billions and is causing problems for Exxon’s giant discovery off the coast of Guyana. What is good for Exxon is good for America, as the argument would go. Providing Exxon’s stake in the Kazakh oil fields was preserved, Exxon would also much prefer to deal with their friend Vladimir than the aggressive and unreliable regime of Nursultan Nazarbayev.

But before such big transactions are done, Putin will want to test Trump to see if what he has invested so much in is really what Putin thinks it is. Putin will try first with a minor issue to gauge Trump’s nerve and judgment.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey provides an opportunity. Suppose Putin proposes setting up a joint Turkish-Russian peacekeeping force to stabilize Syria and parts of Iraq after the Islamic State (IS)��has been driven out. The headquarters of this joint force could be in Turkey and jointly staffed and equipped by the Russian and Turkish military. What could be better? Some real muscle to ensure IS does not creep back, no American boots on the ground, all the risks and costs borne by someone else, threats to Israel reduced.

In return Russia becomes a force for peace in the region. Will Trump sign up? It’s a deal! That would make Putin smile.

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When the Cold War hatchet was buried following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, it appeared that Russia and the United States may have found a way to peacefully coexist. However, in recent years, relations between Moscow and Washington have deteriorated, with conflicts over Ukraine and Syria seeing the two countries on opposing sides yet again.

Most recently, with the spat of allegations of ��ܲ�������’s hacking of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) servers that may have influenced the outcome of the US election, Moscow has been keeping the US on its toes to say the least. In early 2016, the outgoing Secretary of Defense Ash Carter went as far as to identify Russia as the number one threat facing the US.

But are ��ܲ�������’s motives really as sinister as many suggest?

Looking at the chessboard of international politics from the Kremlin’s window yields a rather different view. Trying to defend its borders against NATO expansion in Ukraine and protect its foothold in the Middle East through cooperation with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, ��ܲ�������’s pursuit of its national interest irks the West—whether intentionally or not.

Yet branding Russia as an enemy and resurrecting historic rivalries may be a problem of America’s own creation.

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One year on from the start of the revolutionary protests in Kiev that led to the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych and the subsequent annexation of Crimea, is still between a rock and a hard place. In spite of the Minsk II ceasefire agreement signed on February 12, fighting raged on in the east until pro- separatists captured the strategic railway hub of Debaltseve on February 18. Absurdly, the rebels argued that since the town was not included in the agreement, it should be exempted from the Minsk conditions.

With the ceasefire looking increasingly shaky, some US military hawks have started looking toward more drastic measures to deal with the Russian threat. US Secretary of State and Republican Senator ��have become�� vocal��in their support for supplying the Ukrainian army with lethal weapons to defend their territory and resist Russian aggression. Russia, meanwhile, is doubling down. It appears the stakes in this geopolitical game have just got higher.

But while US officials analyze their ability to force a change in ��ܲ�������’s Ukraine strategy, the debate within Britain and Europe has tilted in the other direction.

Although former British Defense Minister Liam Fox has sided with his counterparts across the pond, claiming that we must arm Ukraine in light of the waning credibility of NATO in the crisis, William Hague, the ex-foreign secretary and close confidante of Prime Minister David Cameron, has ruled out sending any weapons to Kiev.��Clearly considering the devastating effects of an ever-escalating proxy war between the West and Russia in Ukraine,��Hague ��that it had never been “our approach in any of the conflicts in recent years to send arms into those conflicts,” stressing the need for a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

Putin Won’t Cave

The fact of the matter is that arming Kiev will be unlikely to change Russian President ’s heavy-handed strategy in Ukraine, and poses the risk of escalating the situation to the point of no return.

Proponents of aggressive tactics have obsessively pointed to Putin’s 2005 state of the nation address in which he declared that “the fall of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” and have assumed that the Russian president will stop at nothing to undo this historic wrong, one former satellite state at a time.

Indeed, in such a case, the only logical course of action remains to deploy a deterrence strategy — i.e. arm Ukraine and increase the costs of the conflict for Russia — in hope that Moscow can be coerced into folding its hand.

However, this simplistic view misses the alternative – a more compelling “spiral model,” applied when a country’s perceived aggressive tactics are driven by insecurity or fear, and not by territorial revisionism.

Petro Poroshenko © Shutterstock

As Stephen Walt rightly����out, given Putin’s increasing concern over ��ܲ�������’s core strategic interests in the neighborhood and the menacing feeling created by ’s expansion and the US interventionist policy in the Middle East, escalating the situation in Ukraine by providing the government with weapons will do more harm than good.

Similarly to the current sanctions regime, raising the costs of military involvement is unlikely to make Putin retreat from his current position, given the strategic importance of Ukraine and his willingness to pay a much higher price than the West to maintain its grip on Kiev.

By attempting to fight ��ܲ�������’s fear and insecurity over its borders with further aggressive behavior, the West����“triggering an action-reaction spiral of growing hostility,” prolonging a war that will continue to result in deaths, deteriorate Kiev’s economic standing and result in ever more painful conditions for Ukrainians themselves. So far, over 80% of Russians view the United States negatively, and 42% consider it “hostile,”��according to a ��by the independent Levada Center – a rebuke to the idea that Putin can be toppled by an upset population.

Putin’s goal is to keep Ukraine out of NATO and transform it into a buffer state — a bridgehead between the West and East. And since the Kremlin has approached this crisis with a mallet, all future problems will look like nails. No, the solution is not pumping millions in Western equipment to a clearly incapable Ukrainian army, but to revive and implement the Minsk II ceasefire.

A Ukrainian Buffer State��

Under the current agreement, Kiev����to grant the separatist regions autonomy and special territorial status, provide amnesty for the separatists, while also restoring the region’s currently frozen social and financial benefits. Should these conditions be met, and a new Ukrainian constitution passed by the end of the year, Kiev should regain control over its eastern provinces. But as the Debaltseve debacle showed, the road to peace will be hard to tread.

While this second attempt at reconciliation hardly appears to be the enticing path to victory Ukrainians had been hoping for, President has himself expressed similar solutions to the crisis in the past. The Ukrainian president has quietly toyed with the idea of giving Donbass the status of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as a long-term solution to the country’s declining economic and security situation.

to��Oleksandr Klymenko, ����������Ա�’s former tax and revenues minister, such an initiative would “leave intact the territorial integrity of the state while recognizing the east’s traditionally distinct regional identity, and give Donbass a genuine strategic importance as a bridge between Europe and Russia.” Indeed, the region has enormous economic potential and is the country’s traditional industrial heartland that could lift Ukraine from its economic quagmire, were it transformed into a magnet for investment.

Just like , Ukraine cannot depend forever on the largesse of foreign aid and, therefore, all help must be doled out with the final goal of restoring the country’s ability to grow on its own. The Minsk II agreement offers a clear roadmap with a fixed timeframe – Ukrainian policymakers should take the long view here and propose sensible solutions that would give Donbass a renewed sense of purpose. Guns are not the way out, and it won’t be guns that will finally give Ukraine its sovereignty back.

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In recent weeks, eastern ’s Russian-backed rebels have won several military victories on the battlefield in the Ukrainian Donbas. First, they����the virtually destroyed Donetsk airport, then they�� back the front lines, taking more territory. Now, they look set to secure��, strategically located between the rebel-held cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.

The warfare has taken a terrible toll on Ukrainians on both sides of the “demarcation line.” More than����people have now been killed and��over 1 million . The��Minsk Agreement��of 2014 has obviously failed.

It is clear the Russian-backed rebels want to fight Ukrainian forces to carve out a viable statelet in the east of the country. The prime minster of the Donetsk Peoples’ Republic (DNR), Aleksandr Zakharchenko, has for months declared his intention to retake cities overrun by Ukrainian forces in July 2015, such as Slavyansk and Kramatorsk.

But ’s real interest in the conflict appears to be quite different. Had Russia wanted, it could have taken Donbas in a matter of hours in March 2014. The fact that it didn’t indicates that Russia is really only interested in the Donbas insofar as it offers leverage over the authorities in Kiev.

This explains why Russia still periodically�� troops and equipment over the border��into rebel-held territory, escalating or de-escalating the conflict at will. After all, it’s simply not in ��ܲ�������’s interest to have a major war raging on its border.

Meanwhile, the drum beat for war on the Western side is getting louder and louder. Western����writers,����and����have argued the West should go beyond non-lethal aid and arm Ukraine. Timothy Garton Ash even writes longingly about “military kit” and likens to Slobodan Milosevic,��as if it is actually conceivable for NATO to Russia.

All this talk is based on a willful misunderstanding of the Ukraine crisis. The dominant Western narrative is increasingly being steered by both left- and right-wing liberal universalists, who want to impose their values on the rest of the world. They see the situation as the struggle of a downtrodden Ukrainian population, who discovered their inner Western values and toppled a neo-Soviet dictator. Then, as if completely unprovoked, Russia — with an unreconstructed leader�� to Adolf Hitler��— opportunistically annexed and invaded eastern Ukraine.

© Shutterstock

The reality is altogether more complicated.

In the run-up to the Euromaidan uprising, the United States and its closest allies systematically undermined the legitimacy of a weak but democratically-elected European government, which was sympathetic to Russian interests. They then experimented to see whether it could stoke a potentially violent popular uprising to topple the authorities and diminish Russia.

When Russia reacted to its loss of influence in Kiev by securing its warm water naval base in Crimea and destabilizing East Ukraine, the West imposed sanctions on Moscow and rejected a far-reaching East-West compromise that would have entailed Ukraine�� not to apply to join NATO.

The universalists want us to believe that an anti-Western, neo-imperial Russia has aggressively projected its power in Ukraine and is intent on a new Cold War with the West. In fact,��nothing could be from the truth. The reality is that Russia has suffered a strategic defeat in Ukraine; it is merely fighting for a consolation prize against a West whose power now extends all the way to ��ܲ�������’s southern Black Sea underbelly.

But even if the universalists are content to deliberately misunderstand the Ukraine crisis, they should know to balk at the practical consequences of arming the country. Arming Ukraine would partition the country for the foreseeable future, and could rip its economic heart out for good.

That said, the West clearly cannot expect a “frozen conflict” in the short- to medium-term. As the continued hostilities since the Minsk Agreement have shown, both sides want to fight; each ill-disciplined side is testing the military capabilities of the other. That could easily lead to an arms race, one that Ukraine could not win even with Western support, because Russia will simply increase its military support in response. And all this assumes that Western lethal military aid does not fall into the wrong hands.

The biggest losers, of course, will be the residents of Donbas, who are already facing an impending humanitarian crisis and who simply long for peace and a steady income.

Footing the Bill

On top of the $3 billion of US military aid that has been��, the costs of the West’s Ukraine policy will only increase. Even after the $27 billion -led bailout agreed after the Euromaidan uprising, the Ukrainian government still requires at least another $15 billion of official external finance to avoid a sovereign default in the next month or so.

While the US has conditionally offered an additional $2 billion and the European Union (EU) a��similar , it’s ominous to see Western institutions and countries already��squabbling over who should the remaining finance. Even in the best case scenario, Ukraine will be�� on IMF-led financing��for a political generation. Moreover, a proportion of this financing will go straight to Russia to repay a $3 billion bond Ukraine that owes the , as well as disputed debts to .

But even if America still wants a fully fledged standoff between the West and Russia, it’s hard to see how that could be in ����������Ա�’s��national .

Kiev’s policy has so far been incoherent. It claims rebel-held territory as part of Ukraine and continues to supply it with electricity and gas, while simultaneously isolating the area’s remaining residents. Sometimes Kiev’s forces openly fight the rebels, while at others the guns fall silent.

Time to Compromise

Still, there is hope. Even at this late stage, negotiations between the rebels and Kiev and between Russia and the West could still form the foundation of a viable united Ukraine. A sensible negotiated outcome demands three core elements. There must be internationally supervised plebiscites in Donbas to decide the region’s future; ����������Ա�’s constitution must be reformed to give Donbas special status, should it vote to remain in Ukraine; and a formal agreement over ����������Ա�’s future relationship with NATO, the EU and the Eurasian Union must be struck between the West and Russia.

Even if this might not seem likely to benefit the West’s apparent interests, it would surely be in the interest of Ukraine and Donbas. If the West continues to refuse to compromise with Russia over Ukraine and decides instead to arm Kiev’s troops, then it must do so with its eyes wide open.

Ramping up a response to Russia could have terrible unintended consequences. Russia will escalate the crisis until such a time when��the West eventually compromises over Ukraine. A compromise must be struck now before Kiev feels emboldened by Western arms supplies, only to be painfully betrayed by the West at a later date — and before even more lives are destroyed.

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Betrayal is poison for any relationship, especially when it is used by those in the relationship to win over a third party. Thus, the crisis between and the West was sparked by both sides’ willingness to violate international law, treaties, and agreements in pursuit of a geopolitical upper hand in , regardless of the risks such pursuit posed for Kiev. Illegality and betrayal, in turn, deepened mutual distrust and paranoia between Moscow and the Western capitols.

Although the September Minsk Protocol temporarily de-escalated matters, its pre-history closed many of the potential exit ramps from the crisis. The West made much of ��ܲ�������’s violation of international law and agreements, ignoring its own violations. In condemning ��ܲ�������’s illegal military intervention in , the 1994 Budapest Memorandum signed by��Russian Federation, UK, and US is often recalled, whereby the signatories “affirm their commitment to��Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on��Security and Cooperation in Europe, to respect the independence and sovereignty��and the existing borders of Ukraine.”

We also cite Section VI of the CSCE or Helsinki Final Act upon which the Budapest Memorandum’s authority rests: “The participating States … in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.” In this light, Russia clearly violated ����������Ա�’s sovereignty, the memorandum, and the Final Act’s Section VI.

© Shutterstock

However, recalling the cookie stroll of US Deputy Secretary of State and US Ambassador to Ukraine Jeffrey Pyatt, and Senator ’s speech on the Maidan in February, we might consider the following from the same Final Act’s Section VI: “The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.”

Within the Jurisdiction

It would seem that politics, in particular crisis politics on the in those days, would constitute the “internal affairs falling within the jurisdiction” of Ukraine and not that of the US or its officials. Nuland, Pyatt, and McCain clearly failed to “refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective,” in ����������Ա�’s internal affairs. One would reasonably deem their intervention as rather direct.

Furthermore, Western governments clearly violated their pledge as guarantors of the February 20^th��agreement between then Ukrainian President and the leaders of ����������Ա�’s opposition parties. The governments of the Polish, German, and French foreign ministers, who signed on as guarantors of the agreement, remained silent when and elements of the Ukrainian opposition illegally seized power on February 21^st��rather than honoring the transition process the Kiev pact established. Instead of guaranteeing the agreement, in support of which Russian President personally intervened to secure Yanukovich’s signature, the Western powers celebrated the illegal takeover as a democratic and legitimate revolution in pursuit of “European values.”

In sum, both Russia and the West intervened in Ukrainian politics directly and indirectly. Russia deviated form the legal, political norm surrounding the Maidan crisis only after the West’s betrayal. Moscow’s asymmetric military intervention in Crimea was an escalation but not the cause of the crisis, and there was less violence used by Putin’s “polite little green men” in Crimea than that meted out by the Ukrainian revolutionaries in seizing power in Kiev.

Fear and Paranoia

In both Russia and the West, and Washington in particular, the other side’s violations of treaties and agreements aggravated mutual antagonism and distrust, “confirming” some of their worst fears. For Russia, the revolution in Kiev is seen as proof that American interference in territories along ��ܲ�������’s border is intended not to spread democracy but to expand , fuelling the fears of many Russians and the warnings of the country’s most paranoid and virulent hardliners.

Vladimir Putin © Shutterstock

Fear and paranoia, in turn, are driving miscalculation. In Moscow, the perceived Western threat required seizing Crimea and lending some support to the Donbas rebels. Beyond their use as a geopolitical strategic countermoves to the West’s actions vis-à-vis Kiev, seizing Crimea corrected a historical wrong in Russian eyes. The peninsula has been a Russian territory since the 18^th century, becoming part of Ukraine on a whim of Soviet communism’s affirmative action empire, as one scholar has called it, in 1954.

From the Russian side, the violation of treaties and law pales in significance when compared to the historical justice of Crimea’s reunification with Russia, not to mention preserving the Black Sea Fleet’s naval base in Sevastopol and countering the threat to the Russian economy and national security posed by rump ����������Ա�’s “integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions,” especially NATO.

But by annexing Crimea, President Putin both escalated and miscalculated. He provoked a surge in tensions with Kiev and the West, sparked a rise of separatism in Donbass, and thus created a situation that is far more problematic for Russian interests. ����������Ա�’s loss of Crimea and Donbass separatist movements essentially removed from Ukraine the pro-Russian territories and populations which are opposed to western ����������Ա�’s ultra-nationalism and Ukrainian NATO membership. As now show, Ukraine now includes an ultra-nationalist, anti-Russian majority that backs ����������Ա�’s entry not just into the but also NATO.

In the West, ��ܲ�������’s Crimea annexation seemed to many to confirm hawkish claims about the growing threat of traditional Russian autocracy and imperialism, including supposed Kremlin plans to recreate the Tsarist – or even Soviet – empire.

This misperception prompted further Western miscalculations. First, the West Kiev to carry out a military offensive against counter-revolutionaries in Donbas and elsewhere in eastern and southern Ukraine, rather than negotiate. This was followed by calls for a new Cold War, containment 2.0, a NATO build up along ��ܲ�������’s border, economic sanctions so severe that they might topple the Putin regime, and a new US law institutionalizing America’s alliance with and military assistance to Kiev.

All this support comes despite Kiev’s dependence on neo-fascists in both the army and parliament, as well as on their corrupt, sponsoring oligarchs. Western policy has encouraged ultra-nationalism in Kiev and provoked it in both Donbas and Moscow.

This, in turn, is prompting further Russian paranoia. For Russian ultra-nationalists, it is that the Ukrainian crisis has shattered the two most important Slavic economies. The more paranoid are bound to see this as a goal of US policy. Many Russians now see Western designs to install a puppet regime in Moscow and dismember Russia.

© Shutterstock

A Way Out

Yet the way out of the crisis has been obvious from the start: negotiations between Kiev and the Donbass, a federative Ukraine, special language rights for ����������Ա�’s minority groups, Russo-Ukrainian negotiations on a special status for Crimea, a militarily neutral Ukraine, and EU-Russian-Ukrainian talks on trilateral trade and economic relations.

Unfortunately, as the crisis escalates, elements of this settlement package become obsolete or unrealistic. Most pivotally, the re-assignment of Crimea from Russia to an autonomous status under a mutual defense guarantee by Moscow and Kiev now seems impossible. Putin has simply invested too much in Crimea’s annexation, and the rise of patriotic feeling plays into the hands of radical nationalists, like Alexander Dugin, who would like to topple Putin, especially if he dared to de-annex Crimea.

Putin may have re-thought support for Donbass separatists he at one time may have rendered. The shift is informed by the unwanted economic burden of reconstructing Donbass and the useful political wedge that a Donbass left in Ukraine can drive between western Ukraine and Kiev’s entry into NATO. Moscow is already saddled with an economic crisis (in part, a result of sanctions) and maintaining Crimea, and failing an agreement on Kiev’s neutrality the only obstacle to block ����������Ա�’s entry into NATO is the pro-Russian Donbass.

But only Moscow is willing to undertake the reconstruction of the Donbass and the larger Ukraine, with their battered economy and collapsing infrastructure. Given the West’s own inability or unwillingness to bail out ����������Ա�’s economy, the isolation of Russia from the West and the weakening of ��ܲ�������’s economy is depleting Kiev’s only realistic source of substantial bailout money. Thus, ��ܲ�������’s politics and economics are closing off-ramps for both Putin and .

Similarly, the rise in anti-Russian rhetoric in the West and anti-Western rhetoric in Moscow is making it difficult to climb down from the moral high ground each side claims for itself. As a result, negotiations on the remaining elements of a Ukrainian peace package are proceeding slowly and may not succeed in pre-empting the next unexpected turn of events.

The bitterly cold “General Frost” and economic collapse are staying Kiev’s hand from another offensive against the Donbass. But both sides are using the intermission to reinforce their troops, presaging a hot spring. Another MH17-like black swan event could close all the exits for good, leaving all the parties no choice but to engage the armaments and fight it out in a hell of their own making.

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The Third that broke out in September 2014 was not the result of a criminal conspiracy by and his oligarchs. The trials held in in October 2021, which��saw the conviction of Putin’s oligarchs, hid the victors’ share of the blame for the war, let -speakers avoid any responsibility, and created a situation whereby the new West Russia was rehabilitated as a respectable New ally against .

Typical Leader, Typical Policy

Putin was not the moral monster the tabloids would have you believe but, in the history of foreign affairs, a typical Russian leader. Under Putin, foreign policy didn’t differ from that of the and the tsar’s Russia before it. As a nationalist, Putin was no better or worse than or . He merely wished to make Russia a strong and respected power in , but he did not want or plan war. The outbreak of war in 2014 was an unfortunate accident caused by mistakes on all sides.

Putin was a simple opportunist, with few strong beliefs other than the pursuit of power and a hatred of . His foreign policy was one of seizing chances as they offered themselves. His homophobia was not unique: Millions of people around the world were just as ferociously homophobic as Putin and there was no reason to single him out for sharing their beliefs.

The basic problem with Europe between the Cold and Third World Wars was a flawed plan for the breakup of the Soviet empire that was sufficiently onerous to ensure the overwhelming majority of Russians would always hate it, but insufficiently onerous in that it failed to destroy Russia’s potential to be a great power once more.

After a generation, ��ܲ�������’s latent power that could not destroy during the non-shooting Cold War inevitably reasserted itself against the Western bankers and the international system, which Russians regarded as unjust and thus had no interest in preserving. Though the Third World War was not inevitable and the Soviet empire’s demise was nowhere near as harsh as contemporaries like Yegor Gaidar argued in his 2007 Collapse of an Empire, what he regarded as a flawed “too far, too fast” austerity plan for the new Russia made the war more likely than not.

Nationalist Fervour

After the ousting of ��president,��, Russian-speakers supported by Russia moved quickly in , using the protection of Russian speakers’ right to national self-determination and the plebiscite as justification. The same happened in eastern Ukraine. As in Crimea, it was not clear whether the protests of Russian-speaking eastern were instigated by Russia. Again, the West did little, both because it simply could not project its military power quickly enough to react to the pace of events, nor was it willing to.

On the third day of the Russian campaign, a special��BBC��outside broadcast relayed to the world live at 11:15am these words of the British prime minister: “I am speaking to you from the Cabinet room at 10 Downing Street. This morning the British ambassador in��Moscow��handed the Russian government a final note stating that, unless we heard from them by 11 o’clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Ukraine, a state of war would exist between us. I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Russia.”

Russian-speakers in the Baltics, inspired by their brethren, began agitating for independence. , and NATO military promises to the Baltic States were ignored by the Baltic Russian-speakers in their nationalist fervor for reunification with the motherland, nor did the Russian government and its armed forces see them by this late stage as anything other than empty gestures. Putin had tried to deescalate the crisis, though noted commentators pointed out that national sentiments and cultural and linguistic sensitivities were too strong for him to control.

Western Wavering and Prevarication

After the annexation of Crimea, British Prime Minister Cameron resisted calls to put industry on a war footing, convinced that such an action would persuade Putin that his counterpart��had decided to discard diplomacy.

Despite Putin’s relative quietness as Russia absorbed Crimea, Cameron made trips to Paris and Berlin hoping to incite the French and Germans to stronger sanctions, while also attempting to relaunch negotiations, to which Russia agreed to be held during April 2014 in Geneva. However, public revulsion over the “Pogrom Night” against in Russia during these negotiations, at a time when the Western world was celebrating numerous gay pride events, made any attempt at a rapprochement with Putin unacceptable.

This was followed soon after by Russia intervening in the eastern provinces of Ukraine to quell the violence that had broken out between pro- and anti-Russian Ukrainians from Zaporizhzhya in the southeast, up through Donetsk and Luhansk, and to Kharkiv in the northeast. The British prime minister wondered publicly whether this move into eastern Ukraine was “the end of an old adventure, or the beginning of a new.”

Cameron then reasserted the interlocking series of defense pacts, both of NATO with the Baltic States as well as with Kiev, as a means of deterring Putin from war. The prime minister��informed an approving House of Commons of British and French guarantees that they would lend Ukraine all possible aid, in the event of any action that��threatened Kiev’s independence. He went as far as to double the size of the Territorial Army.

The British government even accepted an offer of negotiations with Sergei Aksenov, the new Crimean strongman, who offered not to aid Russia in any further annexation of Ukraine. The Liberal and Conservative coalition, despite many in the Cabinet leaking that they wanted peace at any price, distrusted Aksenov on his human rights record. Talks with Crimea, therefore, dragged on and eventually foundered on August 14, 2014.

A week after the failure of these talks, Crimea and Russia signed the Lavrov-Aksenov Pact, which publicly committed the countries to non-aggression toward each other. A secret element to their agreement divided up western Ukraine and the Baltics in the event of war. Cameron had dismissed rumors of such a deal, and belittled the significance of the publicly-announced pact, stating that it in no way affected British obligations toward the rump of Ukraine and the Baltics.

To this end, on August 23, Cameron had Foreign Secretary William Hague deliver a letter to Putin telling him that was fully prepared to live up to its obligations to what was left of Ukraine. Putin instructed his generals to prepare for an assault on Kiev, telling them: “Our enemies are small worms. I saw them at Geneva.”

In the early hours of September 1, 2014, Russia marched into western Ukraine and the Baltics. By nightfall, T-90 tanks were seen trundling down the tree-lined avenues of Talinn, Riga and Vilnius, and had the outskirts of Kiev in their scopes.

On the third day of the Russian campaign, a special outside broadcast relayed to the world live at 11:15am these words of the British prime minister: “I am speaking to you from the Cabinet room at 10 Downing Street. This morning the British ambassador in handed the Russian government a final note stating that, unless we heard from them by 11 o’clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Ukraine, a state of war would exist between us. I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Russia.”

*[Read the final part .]

The views expressed��in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect��51�Թ�’s��editorial policy.

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In the wake of ��ܲ�������’s annexation of Crimea, for NATO — the venerable transatlantic military alliance — it is the best of times and the worst of times. The good news is there is an alliance around which the West has rallied and to which its members, especially the eastern European ones, can look for protection. The bad news is the��promise��of protection is about all the alliance will be able to deliver and, if push comes to shove, there will be a lot of bluster and little substance.

Engaging NATO

Most people are unaware that NATO has no military forces of its own and, for it to get involved in a conflict, there is a two-step process to follow. First of all, NATO must get��unanimous��approval from its 28 member states — 25 European countries, the United States, Canada and Turkey. Then the alliance must ask each of its members to contribute troops and equipment in sufficient quantity to meet the needs of the conflict.

After the agreement to go to war is adopted — itself an arduous process as the decision to go to war against Libya showed — NATO has to put together an army, navy and air force for its mission. It does this by passing a hat around the NATO table to ask for military contributions from its members. Members put into the kitty what military assets they can afford.

Afford��is the operative word here, for each member country’s taxpayers must pay the costs of transporting and maintaining the military forces the country has decided to contribute to the mission. For instance, Poland’s taxpayers contributed over a billion dollars a year to support its alliance share of the Afghanistan War, almost 10% of the nation’s budget.

Does anyone really believe the 25 European members of NATO, the US, Canada and Turkey will all agree to go to war with Russia over Ukraine? This is hardly likely, given that NATO allies have not even been able to agree to slam Russia with hard-hitting sanctions. The US, some thousands of miles from Ukraine, has pushed for more powerful sanctions, but the Europeans, who live next door to Ukraine, have fragmented over the decision, with eastern European countries siding with America. But it is the western Europeans who own over 70% of European military assets and want little to do with antagonizing Russia.

Irrespective of what the spin from NATO’s Brussels headquarters is, clearly the vital national interests of NATO members no longer converge.��

National Interests of NATO Members

Irrespective of what the spin from NATO’s Brussels headquarters is, clearly the vital national interests of NATO members no longer converge. And without this convergence, NATO can do little if anything as an alliance. The reality is that an alliance which��was created to defend Europe from aggression is now no longer able to do so. That is the real tragedy of NATO.

Is there a way out of this political conundrum? I believe there is and it lies in returning NATO’s mission to what it used to be — the defense of Europe — and placing the alliance’s leadership in the European Union’s (EU) hands.

My suggestion is economically feasible because the EU already spends over $280 billion collectively on its defense, which is what the US defense budget used prior to 9/11. This is a lot of money for countries that have little interest in policing the world, as America does. And my suggestion also leverages what has been NATO’s real achievement in its 64-year existence: the standardization of equipment and procedures to permit its members to operate together.

To implement this strategy, the US has to ask itself whether it needs to continue being the leader of NATO forever. I do not think so. The US will always be there in case of a big bang, for which America’s vast defense resources are needed. But for America to remain involved in making political decisions for Europeans in matters that concern their vital interests but not America’s, as the situation in Ukraine does, is a disservice to Washington’s European allies, and to the US itself.

There is still time to take the tragedy that has overtaken NATO and instead reshape the alliance into a transatlantic asset. But it will take bold leadership from Americans and Europeans. The alternative is to continue on the present course of portraying NATO as the invincible knight that will ride to the rescue — when, in reality, the knight is without a mount and sallies with a dented lance.

*[A version of this article was originally published by��.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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No one has any illusions regarding ��ܲ�������’s frequent intrusions into its neighbors’ affairs. The Kremlin considers all post-Soviet states — with the possible exception of NATO member Baltic states — to be within its sphere of influence.

Therefore, when first Georgia, and now Ukraine, began cozying up to the West, Moscow found it within its national interest to meddle, destabilize and weaken its neighbors enough to maintain its dominance.

This is all part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambition to create a rejuvenated “Eurasian Union” of post-Soviet states, led by Russia, meant to counter the European Union’s (EU) influence in eastern Europe and act as a bloc that is powerful enough to rival the US, EU or China on the global stage.

But what is happening in the Crimea, beyond bald-faced Russian bellicosity, is also emblematic of a broader shift toward the empowerment of local identities and subsequent drives for independence. Following decolonization in Asia and Africa and, later, the end of the Cold War, a bevy of secessionist movements emerged around the globe, from Kurdistan to Kosovo. Many groups that self-identified as distinct from a larger sociopolitical identity or a central government began to demand independence on the basis of self-determination, underpinned by shared injustice, history or unique cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic factors.

A people’s will to self-govern, or tribalism in another age, has existed as long as people have taken upon themselves to organize, but until recently independence was simply not viable for most separatist groups. With the dramatic decline in bilateral conflict in the post-Cold War era and the expansion of democracy, many social groups that had before been too small to defend themselves if independent, have renewed calls for self-governance. This was done with the knowledge that their sovereignty is protected, in theory, by international law and the great powers who wish to uphold such laws and the borders which are treated as sacrosanct.

Today, Kurds remains the largest distinct ethnic group of people without their own state. China disavows separatism for fear that Tibetans or Uyghur will take heart. Western Sahara, in what the UN describes as a non-self governing territory, remains cut off from the rest of Morocco, while many people in resource-rich Balochistan want independence from Islamabad.��

It remains to be seen what happens in Ukraine, whether intermittent calls for reunion in the predominately Russian-speaking eastern areas will be heeded by Moscow or not. Nevertheless, it is a fitting time to explore the rise in identity politics and the upsurge in secessionist tendencies around the globe — many of which may be looking to the Crimea as a precedent for their cause.

Woodrow Wilson’s Determination

Woodrow Wilson is often credited with extending self-determination to Europe’s marginalized peoples after the close of World War I. Following the disintegration of the Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, a variegated patchwork of ethnic groups emerged from the folds of empire. Wilson was resolved to allow people to freely determine their own political status, ideally by referendum.

Six new European nations were formed from the carcass of empire. Unfortunately, President Wilson’s generosity did not extend to Ukrainian nationhood, nor did it extend to the Asian or African colonies of his allies. In 1919, the architects of the new European territorial arrangements were more concerned with the threat of Bolshevism in the east and of German, Austrian and Hungarian revanchism than with strictly following the doctrine of self-determination.

This was reflected in their decision-making as many communities never got a chance to choose where they thought they belonged. In the case of Ukraine, buoyed by his continental allies, Wilson believed a unified Russia would be more likely to reverse the tide of Bolshevism — it didn’t, and the Soviet Union was founded in 1922.

Disregarding Wilson’s selective application of self-determination, peacemakers in Paris unwittingly laid the seeds for future independence movements through their endorsement of a people’s right to self-rule, including one that would haunt three of the US president’s successors many years later in the jungles of Southeast Asia.

After World War II, the splintering of the old European colonial empires led to an explosion of new countries. This transition was enshrined in the United Nation’s “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” intended to smooth the transition to self-governance.

However, due to the arbitrary nature of colonial cartography, many of the new nations were formed with latent divisions. When these cleavages became too deep, secession or independence movements became the next logical solution. This eventually led to a number of “territorial adjustments” to compensate for the capricious borders formed by colonial enterprises. This occurred, for example, in Bangladesh in 1971, East Timor in 2002 and South Sudan in 2011. This trend looks to be far from complete.

Kukes, Albania. Copyright © Shutterstock. All Rights Reserved

The Post-Cold War Era

When the Cold War ended, two of Wilson’s states of convenience quickly disintegrated when Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia lost the glue that had bound them together: communism. Yugoslavia, which means the Land of Southern Slavs (a cruel irony for the embattled ethnic Albanian population who are not Slavic), dissolved in a series of bloody civil wars that led to the creation of seven successor states as well as the term “Balkanization” to describe such events.

The most recent independent state to emerge from the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, once an autonomous Serbian province, declared independence in 2008 after suffering years of violence at the hands of Serbs under Slobodan Milosevic. Putin now uses Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence as a precedent for the independence of several post-Soviet breakaway republics locked in frozen conflicts.

After the ideologically-fueled Cold War ended, identity politics, through the consolidation of nations of distinct peoples, were able to take root in common culture, language and history. The map of the world was no longer frozen by superpower conflict, and sub-national identities were able to come to the fore.

Today, the United Nations (UN) has 193 member states. As context, 51 countries joined the UN when it was founded in 1945. The surge in the number of independent nation states, now in the UN, was largely the result of decolonization and subsequent nationalist movements that arose in the wake of World War II.

The vast majority of these countries are democracies that have embraced political pluralism and have found some form of accommodation for regional minority groups. Usually this can be achieved through federalism, greater local autonomy or other power-sharing agreements. However, when accommodation fails, be it due to outright discrimination, historical sociopolitical differences or economic grievances, secession has become a commonly touted solution. Even in the United States, Texas has threatened secession over the way it perceived the federal government was running the country.

Secessionist Tendencies

Today, two parallel counterintuitive phenomena are taking place. One is the increasing self-realization of independence for small nations of people, in a world where conventional war between nation-states now rarely takes place and where borders can be protected by international law rather than solely a powerful central government. Secondly, states are binding themselves together in supranational organizations like the EU or Mercosur.

Therein lies the paradox: the demand for self-rule whilst recognizing that, if achieved, sovereignty will quickly be surrendered to supranational or global institutions via globalization and free trade. But culture, religion and history do matter and, as such, sub-nationalization is finally achievable in an age where threats are fewer (externally as well as internally) and these distinct identities are able to flourish, even as economic ties become stronger than ever.

Scotland, which will be voting on independence from the United Kingdom this September, wishes to still keep a common currency while binding itself to its former partner through the EU. Likewise, if Parti Québécois had gained a majority in the National Assembly of Québec, the province’s premier, Pauline Marois, would have liked to call for an independence referendum.

Calls for secession can be heard in , and northern (Padania), as nationalists in these rich communities wish to sever ties with their mother states, whom they are tired of subsidizing, and break out on their own. Similar sentiments are found throughout Europe: in the Basque Country, , , Corsica, , Sardinia and even .

Devolution has granted many of these regions the autonomy that is meant to provide greater self-rule and cultural preservation. However, autonomy is being used to set the stage for potential divorces across the globe. Identity may be a social construction, but shared history, politics, language and cultural ties to a strip of land, no matter how small — just ask Palestinians — are genuine to those who share them.

While this is taking place today in the Western world where peace and relative prosperity is fairly ensured, more contentious movements have emerged as disenfranchised peoples across the globe struggle for their independence. Both Somaliland and Puntland wish to separate from the fractured central government in Mogadishu. , once an independent socialist state, is again the site of a burgeoning independence movement.

Today, Kurds remains the largest distinct ethnic group of people without their own state. China disavows separatism for fear that Tibetans or Uyghur will take heart. Western Sahara, in what the UN describes as a non-self governing territory, remains cut off from the rest of Morocco, while many people in resource-rich Balochistan want independence from Islamabad.

As national governments decline in importance due to shifting economic realities, the rise of identity politics, along with the spread of post-national institutions and peaceful coexistence, separatist movements will only become more frequent — as evidenced by the rise of regional independence movements.

Ultimately, and hopefully, it will be up to the people to decide their future (pending ad hoc international recognition based on the circumstances surrounding the case or mutual severing of ties approved by the parent state), whether they break out on their own.

This is a complex question beyond identity or economics, but it boils down to whether people feel part of a broader social community or if they feel the strongest ties at local levels. It should be noted, the number of countries in the global community has only had one trajectory since the end of colonization: up. For now, the trend toward secession looks to continue, but one rarely hears the phrase “amicable secession” used to describe such movements. One just needs to look at the Crimea, where there was never much doubt which way the people would vote, to see how divisive secessionism can become.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The erroneous rationalization offered for Russia's annexation of Crimea proceeds along one or more of the following lines:

1: The US, NATO and other Western governments left Vladimir Putin and Russia no choice. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO aggressively sought expansion, extending its reach very near or up to the borders of Russia with the membership of many former East Bloc nations. Russia could not allow Ukraine, hosting a sizeable Russian minority and sharing a long border with Russia, to become the next NATO member and complete near encirclement of Russia's western borders. What's next, Kazakhstan? To make matters worse, the European Union (EU) also expanded into the former Soviet Bloc, threatening Russian economic interests.

2: The US and other Western governments actively supported one or more of the various Ukrainian opposition movements responsible for the eventual fall of Ukraine's democratically elected, pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych. Moreover, ultra-nationalists in Ukraine have threatened violence against the Russian and Russian Orthodox minorities. This Western support for Ukrainian opposition groups and appearance of ultra-nationalists threaten the security and economic interests of Russia.

3: There is a patently sanctimonious ring to the West's cries of Russian foul in Crimea in light of the US invasion of Iraq and NATO's interventions in Kosovo and Libya. Big and powerful nations like Russia must be expected to protect their interests, even if their actions run afoul of rules. Others have done it. Why can't Russia?

These fallacies do not stand up to reasoned scrutiny. Accepting them is tantamount to capitulation to either reinstatement of "big power spheres of influence" or to Putin and Russia's paranoia. Here's why.

Fallacy #1

On the question of eastern and central European membership to NATO and the EU, these countries and perhaps Ukraine as well, all want to be a part of the West — as democratic, market-oriented states allied with the EU and other Western institutions. Well familiar with the historic predatory proclivity of Russia and the Soviet Union (USSR), they sought to arrest historic precedent by their voluntary and willful decision to seek and acquire membership in these Western institutions. Sharing security, economic, cultural and historical ties to Europe and the West, why wouldn't NATO and the EU welcome them?

To suggest that NATO aggressively expanded into these nations is to conflate the entirely voluntary act of these governments to seek membership with their forced imprisonment in the old Warsaw Pact. These governments, as well as Ukraine's, should and must be free to choose security and economic alliances, a right denied to them before the fall of the USSR. Having freely sought formal Western affiliations, why wouldn't NATO and EU members support them?

Certainly, current members have to decide for themselves whether any new member serves their interests. However, it would have been morally unconscionable to deny these nations membership merely on the grounds that they belong in some post-Soviet era orbit, especially after what they endured first under Nazi, and then Soviet, occupation and oppression.

Moreover, given Russia's history of dealings with these states and as familiar as they were with past treatment at the hands of the Russians/Soviets, they were wise to seek Western security ties. It's perfectly logical and strategically sound. Election after election in every one of those former East Bloc and Soviet states has proven that this is what the people of those states want. So, why wouldn't the US, EU and NATO support them? Good for peace, good for stability, good for the people of these countries, and good for markets.

Russia was given every opportunity to be a part of this effort. It chose to go its own way. All one needs to do to see how successful this policy has been is to look at these newly free nations. They are all better off aligned with Western economies.

Caving into Russian nationalist paranoia and refusing to support these nations would have been to repeat the tragedy of Yalta in 1945, which effectively condemned the citizens of these countries to oppression under their Soviet masters for more than 45 years. (It is worth noting that Joseph Stalin and his successors violated much of the agreement reached at Yalta, including allowing free and fair elections in these countries.)

Fallacy #2

Western governments promote democracy all over the world. They have much to show that it has worked, not everywhere but most places. And it isn't just the US. Governments of the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Japan and Australia as well as the EU — and even the UN — also support democratic institutions wherever assistance is requested and needed.

Such support strengthens the rule of law, nurtures respect for human rights, enables often neglected women and minorities, and ultimately advances the most stabilizing force in the world today: democracy. They should neither apologize, nor be ashamed of it.

Apologists conflate this support for democracy with the unfortunate rise of ultra-nationalists in Ukraine. It's a convenient, but hardly clever argument. Ultra-nationalist and neo-fascist movements are present elsewhere in Europe, thankfully in small numbers, and are strongly opposed by both governments and the majority of citizens in the countries where they are present. They are a sad, yet sometimes inevitable occurrence in free nations.

The fact that ultra-nationalists in Ukraine chose to lend their unwelcome violent opposition to the Yanukovych government does not diminish the otherwise sincere, peaceful effort of the majority of opposition groups to rid themselves of a corrupt, undemocratic regime.

President Putin and Russian nationalists failed to learn the lesson of the Soviet Union's collapse: that democracy, market-oriented economies, rule of law, respect for human rights and liberty are the natural desire of most human beings and are what account for stable, peaceful and prosperous nations. They are swimming not only against the tide of history, but the inexorable current of human will.

In Ukraine, there may indeed have been actions that could have been taken tactically to mitigate events — such as the removal/resignation of its corrupt president. But democracy is often messy. Revolutions always are. Given the heightened state of passions after nearly four months of often violent confrontations, it is unclear that any outsider could have altered the current of Ukrainian will.

Fallacy #3

This is the ultimate rationalization. It preys on America's and NATO’s lingering guilt over questionable and regrettable actions taken under extraordinary and less-than ideal circumstances. Regardless of the question of legitimacy over actions in Iraq, Kosovo and Libya, there is no comparison to what Russia has done in Ukraine.

If the US invasion of Iraq was wrong — as most people agree today — how much more wrong is Russia's invasion of Ukraine? In Iraq, the US and the 39 others participating nations secured UN Security Resolution 1441 to justify their action.

Moreover, Saddam Hussein had a long and well-known history of gross human rights abuses and had expressed interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction dating back to the 1980s; although subsequent investigations proved no such weapons existed at the time of the 2003 invasion. Additionally, Hussein had previously invaded Kuwait and was widely viewed as a threat within the region.

Does this sound at all familiar in Ukraine? Russia has acted unilaterally against Ukraine, without even the attempt to secure a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution and with not one allied nation. Human rights abuses in Ukraine were well-documented under its Russian-backed former president.

Ukraine willingly surrendered its nuclear weapons in 1994 in the Budapest Memorandum, signed by the US, the UK and Russia in exchange for recognition of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Unlike Hussein's Iraq, Ukraine threatens none of its neighbors.

Russia's claims of abuses and threats against Russian minorities in Ukraine as a justification for its invasion of Crimea sound as disturbingly familiar and hollow as the now proven false claims of the Bush administration regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq.

In Kosovo, every NATO and EU member, as well as Yugoslavia's neighbors, supported NATO's actions. Moreover, prior to initiation of action in March 1999, efforts had been made through NATO, the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and at the Rambouillet Conference (January-March 1999) to defuse and resolve the crisis in Kosovo diplomatically. UNSC Resolution 1199 expressed the council's "grave concern" at reports that over 230,000 persons had been displaced from their homes by "excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army."

The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, convened in August 1999 in the aftermath of the intervention to assess NATO's action, found in its that:

"[Yugoslav] forces were engaged in a well-planned campaign of terror and expulsion of the Kosovar Albanians… most frequently described as one of 'ethnic cleansing,' intended to drive many, if not all, Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo, destroy the foundations of their society, and prevent them from returning."

The report concluded that NATO's actions were "illegal but legitimate."

Russia's actions in Ukraine are neither legal nor legitimate. NATO can be forgiven for acting decisively, if illegally, to quell a looming humanitarian catastrophe on its very doorstep in Kosovo where hundreds of thousands of lives were threatened. While perhaps politically unstable, Ukraine posed no such humanitarian crisis before Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea. Crimea of 2014 bears no resemblance to Kosovo of 1999.

In fact, Russia's objections to NATO's intervention in 1999 likely stemmed from the same motivation for its invasion of Crimea in 2014 — perceived entitlement to the former USSR's "sphere of influence."

After the apologists' woeful analogies to Iraq and Kosovo, it is hardly surprising that references to NATO's intervention in Libya ring just as hollow. NATO acted on UNSC Resolution 1973, also supported by a number of Arab League states. While NATO forces provided the primary muscle for the campaign, governments from the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and others also lent military support to the effort to curb Muammar Qadhafi's violations of UNSC Resolution 1973.

Those who opposed NATO's intervention besides Russia, which abstained on the UNSC vote, included Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Venezuela and Nicaragua. Their unsurprising claims of neocolonialism subsequently and predictably proved to be unfounded.

Like Iraq and Kosovo, Libya offers a weak and altogether ineffective comparison, much less justification, for Russia's actions in Ukraine. Russia's apologists are grasping at slim straws in using any of these.

Indeed, there is simply no justification for Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea or for ongoing threatening actions on Ukraine's eastern border. These actions are patently illegal and condemned by most governments around the world.

It is telling that Russia has no — not one — ally or governmental defender on its position. The UNSC voted 13 to one (Russia) to condemn Moscow's annexation of Crimea. China abstained but it is clear that Russia's hiving off of Crimea undercuts China's "One-China" policy and wish to reincorporate Taiwan.

It is time that apologists accept there can be no justification for Russia's actions.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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This has been a historic month with ramifications that will reverberate throughout the rest of the century.

Russia has annexed Crimea. That was to be expected. Russia spent blood and treasure to secure access to warm waters in the 19^th century. It fought a war in Crimea against the Ottomans, French and British in 1853 to secure access to warm waters. Only in 1954 did Nikita Khrushchev gift Crimea to Ukraine — and that was to celebrate 300 years of Ukraine’s union with Russia.

Furthermore, Russia’s fleet is based in the peninsula and control over Crimea is fundamental to Russian strategic interests. Thanks to Joseph Stalin’s deportation of Tatars to other parts of the Soviet Empire, Russians form a majority in Crimea. No Russian president could have let Crimea go and certainly not Vladimir Putin, who is a former KGB colonel still mourning the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Putin is a de facto dictator who is increasing repression in Russia and many choose to blame him exclusively. However, the United States and the European Union have both been naïve and unwise in dealing with Russia. For years, they have provoked Moscow and expanded east, threatening what our deputy managing editor, , calls the dark mysterious Russian soul. If France can have pretensions to despite being broke, Russian desire for greatness should surprise no one.

The Ukrainian parliament gave an excuse to Russia to intervene by asininely removing Russian as one of the country’s languages. The population of Crimea has gone on to vote for a modern day Anschluss with Russia.

The situation is messy because the principle of state sovereignty is clashing with that of self-determination. The US has been opportunistic in Israel, Iraq, Syria and much of the Middle East in selecting which principle to apply. Russia has chosen one principle for Chechnya and one for Crimea. The result is a very fluid world, where the only operating principle is a preponderance of power.

Crimea marks the end of an era for largely stable borders. After the Cold War, the big change in borders occurred due to the collapse of communist multi-ethnic states such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Some new countries came into being such as East Timor and South Sudan.

In a world of over 7 billion people, there are new interests and identities that are straining against the status quo. Iraqi is a de facto independent state, causing consternation in Turkey and Iran. The Sykes-Picot paradigm that defined the Middle East after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire has been dealt a death blow by the Syrian Civil War. The conflict has spread beyond borders into Lebanon and Iraq. It shows no sign of abating and all the king’s horses and all the king’s men will not be able to put .

Meanwhile, the situation in Egypt has worsened further. The military-backed regime sentenced over 500 members of the Muslim Brotherhood without a fair trial. is certainly flourishing. Arguably, the state is more repressive than ever and its rivals are being liquidated via kangaroo courts, creating an atmosphere of terror in Egypt.

India is witnessing a tumultuous election. The ruling Congress Party is continuing its policy of patronage and cronyism. It is promising to extend the failed policy of job reservations on the basis of caste and religion into the private sector. The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is led by the controversial Gujarat chief minister, Narendra Modi.

Modi’s supporters admire his reputation as a no-nonsense administrator and hope for Gujarat’s high growth rates for the rest of India. His opponents that include India’s Muslim and Christian minorities worry about Gujarat-style riots breaking out across the country.

The Congress is fanning such insecurity and one of its leaders has been arrested for threatening to chop Modi into many pieces. Despite the terrible track record and obvious weakness of the Congress, the BJP has its own challenges and its chances of victory are uncertain. Three key reasons account for this.

First, the BJP has selected some truly awful candidates. Unlike the US, India does not have a primary system. This means the “high command” decides who fights the election and which constituency they get. This does not matter if you are the Congress Party because people are voting for the ruling Nehru family. For challengers like the BJP, candidate selection is critical. The BJP has selected candidates who are certain to lose because they are either corrupt or lack a local base. Modi himself is contesting in the Varanasi constituency, the ancient holy city of India, which he has barely visited in the past.

Second, the fragmentation of Indian politics means that regional parties are on the rise and have strong support bases. The BJP is primarily a party of the north and west, and has not been able to expand.

Third, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), a new anticorruption party, is the joker in the pack. The AAP combines some great Gandhian ideas about grassroots democracy along with an economic populism reminiscent of Hugo Chavez. Those disillusioned with the status quo and India’s political establishment are turning to the AAP; although it remains to be seen if the party has any appeal outside Delhi.

The is as yet an unsolved mystery. Aircrafts do not generally go missing and, therefore, there are all kinds of theories explaining the phenomenon. The incident demonstrates a few things about modern day aviation.

First, countries are not programmed to cooperate. China was justifiably miffed at Malaysia’s lack of transparency regarding information vital to the search and rescue. Second, it is a reminder that while flying is safer than driving a car, when things go wrong, they do so in a spectacular fashion. Third, it demonstrates that the media is obsessed with stories about planes to an unhealthy degree. Day after day, headlines about the plane were given top billing even by prestigious organizations such as the BBC. Other important stories were neglected on a routine basis. The media has to do a better job about making sense of the world.

1: — Victoria Livingstone

Duolingo’s push to “translate the web” is not as straightforward as it seems.

2: — Polina Popova

The Crimean referendum highlights the differences in strategy between the West and Russia.

3: — Nishtha Chugh

Bungling with Russia over Crimea will send the West knocked out with a bloody nose.

4: — Christos Kyrou & Kaade Wallace

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea could dwarf everything the world has seen in Somalia.

5: — Matteo Figus

Who will succeed Robert Mugabe?

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This past week has presented us with a new reality — a strong and assertive Russia confronting a weak and divided West in what some observers have already labeled “Cold War II.”

Cold it is, but for how long? There is a clear and ever-increasing risk of military confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian military.

Unquestionably, the recent so-called “revolution” in Kiev has an element of the armed revolt, coup d’état, putsch – you name it. The revolt, according to the Russian government, received a great deal of support and encouragement from the West.

This, however, was not as substantial as support provided by Russia for the ousted Ukrainian government. On December 17, days after the first pro-European manifestations began, Russian President Vladimir Putin promised to buy $15 billion worth of Ukrainian government bonds and sharply cut the price of natural gas for its economically struggling neighbor.

Antagonistic Interests?

��ܲ�������’s attempts to support the troubled presidency of Viktor Yanukovich is understandable. Then, as now, it tried to safeguard its legitimate “national interests.” “Soft” interests, such as the right for Russian-speaking citizens to use their language in official correspondence, and “hard” interests, like using the Russian navy base in Crimea, or preventing any other major power from exerting economic or military dominance in the region.

However, to assume that Western and Russian interests are always and necessarily antagonistic would be a mistake. 

For Russia, as well as for the West, trying to prevent Ukraine’s territorial integrity is a priority. If divided, both western Ukraine as well as its more economically developed eastern part will require political, military and, most importantly, economic assistance. In the current post-crisis environment, neither Russia nor the European Union (EU) is prepared for such an outcome.

Partitioning Ukraine will also not improve, but instead fatally compromise ��ܲ�������’s security as it will split the state into two, one of which will inevitably be admitted into NATO. Kiev is less than a thousand kilometers from Moscow and the last time a foreign military came so close to ��ܲ�������’s capital was in September 1941, when the Soviet Union was crumbling under the pressure of the German military.

Pipelines and Nationalism

And that is even before bringing up the issue of Russian oil and gas pipelines. Six of these run through Ukrainian soil, delivering more than 30% of ��ܲ�������’s energy exports to western Europe. Divided and polarized, Ukraine will still be of strategic importance for Putin and anyone who comes after him, as it occupies one of the most important transport corridors from Russia to central, western and southern Europe. 

There is no doubt that the Ukrainian Revolution had a lot to do with a number of the so-called “legitimate grievances” of the people. Epic corruption has paralyzed Ukraine, as did the rule of one of the most  in modern European history. Even Putin sees no reason to hide his disdain for the person who “deserted his people and betrayed those who entrusted him with the responsibility to govern.”

Yet the revolution has brought to light one of Europe’s most disturbing trends; namely the growing and strengthening neo-Nazi sentiments across the continent.

Though not invited into the new government coalition, the Ukrainian far-right takes credit for being the most determined and disciplined force of the Maidan. Its paramilitary muscle played a leading role in the Kiev street battles, storming and occupying administrative buildings in western Ukraine, setting up armed patrols, and detaining and questioning supposed Yanukovich loyalists and alleged Putin “spies.”

While in France and Austria the far-right speak out against immigration and multiculturalism, it is in the countries of the former Soviet Union that Russophobia has become their trademark.

Surviving members of the  who fought alongside the German Waffen SS during World War II, as well as the neighboring  factions, have been trotting the streets of these Baltic states for nearly two decades, demanding total alienation from all things Russian. Political parties were formed around the idea of repelling the Russian threat and uncovering Russian conspiracies at every possible turn of events.

Ukrainian nationalists, however, take a step further by presenting themselves as supreme guardians not only of ����������Ա�’s independence, but of the European “race” in general. They want nothing less than to impose their grand, ultra-nationalist narrative over the whole of Ukrainian politics.

Right Sector — a conglomerate of far-right groups across Ukraine that is a European version of the Taliban — aspires to be in charge of the spirit of the nation, its zeitgeist, capable of founding a new, pan-European “White Caliphate.” In a recently published book, Nation and Revolution, its leader  states: “Great Ukraine sees itself not as a tyrant of the world, but as its international arbiter, its helmsman, the leader of the white race.”

Such a possibility, however remote, alarms Russia, which builds its own narrative of spiritual supremacy based on Russian orthodoxy, Putin’s autocracy and the form of controlled nationalism. It should alarm the EU, as further radicalization of anti-immigrant sentiments across the continent spells trouble for many European governments.

It also makes a civil war between the pro-Western nationalists and the Russian-speaking east almost inevitable, as the latter would never agree to live in a state that glorifies racist brutality and ethnic purges, while the former would choose to fight rather than accept ��ܲ�������’s patronage over Ukraine. A protracted period of civil unrest in this strategically important part of the world means a humanitarian catastrophe for Europe and a real and palpable threat to its stability.

Anschluss

Clearly, the Ukrainian crisis cannot be allowed to spread any further. Paradoxically, the shortest way to achieve this would be to allow Putin to have his way, namely to guarantee that the country will not be seeking NATO membership any time soon. This can be done against ��ܲ�������’s guarantee of non-interference in ����������Ա�’s internal affairs.

Further, it would be wiser to recognize the fact that, while ����������Ա�’s EU membership is distant, it’s membership in the Russian-led Customs Union is immediately beneficial: Russia remains — and will remain in the foreseeable future — ����������Ա�’s biggest economic partner. Finally, the new Ukrainian government should guarantee ��ܲ�������’s oil and gas transit to Europe, making Ukraine an important partner for both Russia and the EU.

The Crimean crisis also shows that Russia neither can nor should be pushed further out of Europe. This policy has reached its limits, beyond which lies military confrontation. Squeezing Russia out of Europe by absorbing its former Soviet republics into EU and NATO increases the risk of destabilization of Russia, making it more susceptible to nationalistic sentiments and policies.

Pretending Russia is finally confined to the limits of our understanding caused the West to lose the initiative, as well as its ability, to predict and influence Russian policy in the “near-abroad.” Europe needs to fundamentally reassess its relationships with Russia, and make Moscow its strategic partner, not its enemy.

Should the West regain consciousness, what can be done to preserve the Ukrainian state? The answers to this question can be found in analyzing the history of federal and confederate states, such as Germany and Switzerland. A Ukrainian Federation can and will be the only way of balancing not only the interests of its neighbors, but also cultural and economic diversity of its own. It would also provide for the two opposing cultural narratives to be contextualized in what must appear as a story of a nation, in which diversity becomes an asset rather than a liability.

This can become a much-needed example of a multilingual and multinational, post-Soviet society accepted as a rightful member of an increasingly diverse European family. An example that may inspire people far beyond the continent.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Last weekend, as Ukrainians commemorated over a hundred dead protesters, Russian troops entered the Crimean Peninsula in the Black Sea, taking advantage of the country's mourning.

The international community, including the United States and the European Union (EU), are holding their breath as one wrong move could lead to war. Ukraine's acting-president, Oleksandr Turchynov, has the country's armed forces to be on standby. However, with Ukraine's military, it will be difficult to resist a Russian offensive.

Across the Atlantic, US President Barack Obama has warned of possible sanctions in a bid to isolate Russia, as the standoff continues.

Meanwhile, Moscow's United Nations envoy, Vitaly Churkin, has claimed that former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych asked the Russian government for support. While the US and EU member states back Ukraine's interim government, with US Secretary of State John Kerry due in Kiev on Tuesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin has dubbed Yanukovych's ouster an "unconstitutional coup."

51�Թ�'s  talks to , vice president of the International Advisory Council of the Institute of Peace and Development. Of Ukrainian origin, Korobko is currently in Kiev and explains Russia's move.

Marian Manni: What is happening on the streets of Kiev?

Yana Korobko: I can feel the sadness. Everyone, including children, are going to Maidan with flowers to show their gratitude to those who were killed — those who gave their lives for the future of Ukraine. Everyone is doing what they can: doctors are working for free, giving medicine if someone is injured; there are free psychologists and psychotherapists for those suffering from post-traumatic syndrome; free food; and facilities to sleep for those who come from other cities and countries.

Manni: How have people in Kiev reacted to the news that Russian soldiers have entered Crimea?

Korobko: There are protests against the Russian invasion everywhere. Some people are carrying banners stating: "Boycott to Russian Products" or "This is an Invasion into Domestic Affairs." They are very frustrated about the Kremlin taking advantage of Ukraine's calamity and the actions of its sister country. I am seeing a big change in the Ukrainian people's attitude toward Russia.

Manni: Why did Russia send its troops to Crimea?

Korobko: The main pretext for this was the rotation of troops that had already been located in Ukraine in accordance with the Kharkiv Accords, signed on April 21, 2010, which extended the Russian lease on naval facilities in Crimea. Russia had not confirmed that its troops were somehow linked to the Ukrainian crisis until now.

Manni: But even the Ukrainian prime minister has said that this isn't just a red alert, it’s a declaration of war.

Korobko: Absolutely! No country has the right to invade the territory of another country just like that in modern times. There will be severe repercussions if Russia continues to interfere with force in Ukrainian domestic affairs. We are already witnessing declarations from the West in possibly isolating the Russian government, like withdrawing from global conferences or the freezing of funds.

Manni: Do you think this crisis will lead to a full-blown conflict?

Korobko: This is a very delicate diplomatic game between the West and Russia. Even if the Ukrainians wanted to, they wouldn't have the power to influence the outcome of events that are occurring in their territory. This depends on the delicacy with which the West will be handling Vladimir Putin's mentality, tactics and diplomacy.

The situation reminds me of the Cold War. If one side starts a military offensive, it could lead to not even a regional conflict but instead a world war. To prevent such an outcome, the West would have to find a common language with Putin, which isn't very easy at all.

Manni: What can we expect Russia to do next?

Korobko: Russia is waiting for Ukraine to attack first, in order to make Kiev accountable for the war. That’s why it’s so important for Ukraine to keep calm and to ignore all this provocation. There will be thousands of them coming from the Russian side. Putin uses provocations to achieve what he wants.

Manni: And what does Putin want?

Korobko: All of this has to do with Russia’s obsession with power and its ambition to become the next world superpower. Without Ukraine — with its strategic geopolitical location — Russia would never be able to fulfill this historic ambition.

Manni: Is Ukraine the first step in Russia's plan to gain power in the whole of eastern Europe once again?

Korobko: For a country intending to become the superpower, the question is when will be the appropriate moment to start implementing such a plan. It seems the moment has come for Russia.

Of course, there are hidden agendas and tactics. Russia has been carrying plans for its revival as an empire since the collapse of its monarch regime, and now Ukraine has somehow become the starting point for Russia's realization of its supremacy ambitions.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Russian intervention in Crimea is more direct and dramatic than the one in Syria, with actual troops deployed. But there are similarities.

One of the little-noted rationales of Russian support for the Ba'ath government in Damascus is that it is seen as more favorable, being secular and minority-dominated, toward Syria's roughly 2-3 million Christians — the bulk of whom are Eastern Orthodox (the same branch of Christianity that predominates in Russia and among ethnic Russians in Ukraine).

Indeed, there are more Eastern Orthodox Christians in Syria than in Crimea. Russian President Vladimir Putin is giving as a rationale for troop deployments in Crimea that the ethnic Russian population there is in danger from Ukrainian nationalists.

In both cases, Russia is exaggerating. The vast majority of Syrians who rose up against the Ba'ath were moderates. Only when the Bashar al-Assad regime responded to peaceful protests with massive military force did the opposition militarize, at which point Sunni extremists and al-Qaeda affiliates came to the fore as seasoned fighters with substantial Gulf money.

Most oppositionists are still moderates and most Syrians want more freedoms, not a Taliban state on the Euphrates. The Russian official press often slams those who oppose Russia's provision of huge amounts of money and arms to al-Assad as backing "al-Qaeda," but that is propaganda.

Likewise the popular movement in Ukraine against President Viktor Yanukovych was not primarily led or fueled by nationalist extremists. Most who went to the streets in Kiev were disturbed at Yanukovych's neo-authoritarian tendencies, his acquiescence in Moscow's demand that he move away from the European Union (EU), and his jailing of his opponent in the 2010 elections (Yulia Tymoshenko) on what seems likely to have been trumped up charges.

There is zero evidence of ethnic Russians in Crimea being menaced by Ukrainian nationalists, but plenty of evidence of foreign Russian forces intervening there. Of course, now that Putin has violated Ukrainian sovereignty so blatantly, there could be a backlash against Ukrainian Russians; Putin might even secretly hope for such polarization as a pretext for further intervention.

Turkey and Iran’s Stake in the Ukrainian Crisis

Those in the Middle East opposed to Russian backing for the Ba'ath regime in Syria are also unhappy about Moscow's intervention in Crimea.

Turkey is the country with most at stake. In essence, it is surrounded by countries in which Russia has intervened, with Syria to its south and Crimea just across the Black Sea to its north.

Ankara has a special interest in Crimea. Today, 12% of the 2 million residents on the peninsular are Tatars (Turkic-speaking Muslims); though before Russia's annexation of the territory from the Ottoman Empire in 1784, it was all Tatar. Russians immigrated in — they are now almost 60% of the population, with a quarter being ethnically Ukrainian. Joseph Stalin ethnically cleansed the Crimean Tatars during World War II; but after the fall of the Soviet Union, some 300,000 have gradually returned. Turkey is as interested in the fate of the Crimean Tatars as Russia is in that of the Crimean Russians.

Moreover, Turkey is opposed to Russian policy in Syria. So it is no surprise that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was in , consulting with the new Ukrainian interim government.

Turkey is the world’s 17th largest economy (by nominal GDP), but it cannot really offer Ukraine much beyond moral support itself. Still, Turkey is part of NATO and the Crimea crisis will increase its worth in the eyes of that organization. Because the Turkish navy is on the Black Sea, NATO is on the Black Sea.

Iran is likely to side strongly with Moscow in this crisis, and may benefit from it substantially. Of course, Iran is also concerned about the welfare of the Crimean Muslim community. But it should be remembered that Tehran has backed Christian Armenia against Muslim-majority Azerbaijan, so you can't read off its foreign policy from its supposed Islamic commitments.

The conservative Iranian daily Hemayat editorialized on Sunday:

"Many consider Ukraine as the new battleground between the West and Russia. Now that Russia is mulling military action against Ukraine, there are a few points that Russia is taking into consideration with regards to Ukraine.

"First, Ukraine's economy, especially its energy sector, is dependent on Russia. Half of Europe's gas supplies are imported from Russia via Ukraine's soil. Therefore, Ukraine cannot ignore Moscow and the West cannot exclude Moscow from Ukraine's equations either.

"The West will try to use the new Ukrainian government to enhance its bargaining leverage against Moscow. Being aware of this, Moscow will try to maintain its interests in Ukraine, especially since the economic crisis in the West has made it unable to provide considerable assistance to Ukraine. [Western officials'] current remarks are just aimed at helping the self-declared rulers of Ukraine establish their power." 

The US, China and Russia

Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama is threatening Russia with the same kinds of international sanctions that Washington has applied to Iran over the latter's pro-Palestinian stance and its civilian nuclear enrichment program.

China more or less defies the US on those Treasury Department sanctions. However, Russia had in the past been willing to allow United Nations Security Council (UNSC) votes against Iran, which involved sanctions.

If Putin now faces the same techniques from the Treasury as Tehran has suffered from, he may well start protecting Iran at the UNSC and allow Russian banks to do more open business there. (Before, Moscow had to worry about being sanctioned by the US, but if they are already sanctioned, they may as well make some money in Iran.) Russian firms like Gazprom may also decide to go in to develop Iranian natural gas, if they are under sanctions anyway.

Moreover, an attempt by President Obama to sanction the world's ninth largest economy could permanently blunt US financial power. Who would want the dollar as a reserve currency and who would want a US-dominated international currency exchange regime, if you knew at any moment it could be weaponized against you?

Russia and possibly China together could begin working on an alternative to an American stranglehold over global finance.

Russia, China and Central Asia have formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an implicit challenge to the Bretton Woods institutions. Iran applied for membership but was only given observer status. If Putin feels that SCO has to up its game in response to US sanctions on the Russian Federation, perhaps he would push to admit Iran.

The Ukraine Crisis as an Impetus Toward Iranian Assertion?

With rumors flying around that Iraq may break US sanctions by purchasing Iranian weaponry, the current crisis could be another impetus toward Iranian reassertion, with Russian backing.

Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Gulf oil monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are already at odds with Russia over its Syria policy. They are also upset about the Obama administration's negotiations with Iran. The Gulf States are from the region and "weakness" — although the US has never intervened directly in eastern Europe and cannot be expected to.

The GCC's quiet support for the US invasion and occupation of Iraq demonstrates where they want to take US policy. In fact, they seem unrepentant about that disaster, desiring a repeat in Syria.

Egypt's interim government is miffed at US criticisms of the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi last July. It has declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization and has mobilized against Sunni extremists in the Sinai.

Cairo has swung its support to al-Assad, who is struggling in Syria against the Muslim Brotherhood and Sunni extremists. This is an awkward situation, since Egypt's major financial patron is Saudi Arabia, which wants the Ba'ath government in Syria gone. However, Riyadh does not want to see the Brotherhood come to power in Damascus, since Saudi conservative monarchism is challenged by the group's republican populism.

Egypt has sent delegations to Moscow in search of Russian weapons and support, and as a way of diversifying from its mainly American and Gulf patrons.

The Egyptian foreign minister, Nabil Fahmy (kept over in the  that has just been formed) has not said anything about Crimea. It is likely that Cairo will try to avoid annoying Putin, whose may be seen as a model for Egypt by its current elites.

Still, if the US does sanction Russia, Egypt may be forced to reconsider buying arms from the latter.

If Russia is pushed further into Tehran's arms by US sanctions, then ironically al-Assad and Sayyid Ali Khamenei may be the biggest winners of the Crimean crisis.

At the same time, Turkey could also be a winner in the sense that its value to NATO, the US and the EU will be much enhanced because of its Black Sea presence and its own historical interests in Crimea.

*[This article was originally published by Juan Cole’s .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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