51吃瓜

Arming pro-Kiev forces would be a huge mistake, argues Adam Swain.

In recent weeks, eastern 鈥檚 Russian-backed rebels have won several military victories on the battlefield in the Ukrainian Donbas. First, they聽聽the virtually destroyed Donetsk airport, then they聽 back the front lines, taking more territory. Now, they look set to secure聽, strategically located between the rebel-held cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.

The warfare has taken a terrible toll on Ukrainians on both sides of the 鈥渄emarcation line.鈥� More than聽聽people have now been killed and聽over 1 million . The聽Minsk Agreement聽of 2014 has obviously failed.

It is clear the Russian-backed rebels want to fight Ukrainian forces to carve out a viable statelet in the east of the country. The prime minster of the Donetsk Peoples鈥� Republic (DNR), Aleksandr Zakharchenko, has for months declared his intention to retake cities overrun by Ukrainian forces in July 2015, such as Slavyansk and Kramatorsk.

But 鈥檚 real interest in the conflict appears to be quite different. Had Russia wanted, it could have taken Donbas in a matter of hours in March 2014. The fact that it didn鈥檛 indicates that Russia is really only interested in the Donbas insofar as it offers leverage over the authorities in Kiev.

This explains why Russia still periodically聽 troops and equipment over the border聽into rebel-held territory, escalating or de-escalating the conflict at will. After all, it鈥檚 simply not in Russia鈥檚 interest to have a major war raging on its border.

Meanwhile, the drum beat for war on the Western side is getting louder and louder. Western聽听飞谤颈迟别谤蝉,听听补苍诲听聽have argued the West should go beyond non-lethal aid and arm Ukraine. Timothy Garton Ash even writes longingly about 鈥渕ilitary kit鈥� and likens to Slobodan Milosevic,聽as if it is actually conceivable for NATO to Russia.

All this talk is based on a willful misunderstanding of the Ukraine crisis. The dominant Western narrative is increasingly being steered by both left- and right-wing liberal universalists, who want to impose their values on the rest of the world. They see the situation as the struggle of a downtrodden Ukrainian population, who discovered their inner Western values and toppled a neo-Soviet dictator. Then, as if completely unprovoked, Russia 鈥� with an unreconstructed leader聽 to Adolf Hitler聽鈥� opportunistically annexed and invaded eastern Ukraine.

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The reality is altogether more complicated.

In the run-up to the Euromaidan uprising, the United States and its closest allies systematically undermined the legitimacy of a weak but democratically-elected European government, which was sympathetic to Russian interests. They then experimented to see whether it could stoke a potentially violent popular uprising to topple the authorities and diminish Russia.

When Russia reacted to its loss of influence in Kiev by securing its warm water naval base in Crimea and destabilizing East Ukraine, the West imposed sanctions on Moscow and rejected a far-reaching East-West compromise that would have entailed Ukraine聽 not to apply to join NATO.

The universalists want us to believe that an anti-Western, neo-imperial Russia has aggressively projected its power in Ukraine and is intent on a new Cold War with the West. In fact,聽nothing could be from the truth. The reality is that Russia has suffered a strategic defeat in Ukraine; it is merely fighting for a consolation prize against a West whose power now extends all the way to Russia鈥檚 southern Black Sea underbelly.

But even if the universalists are content to deliberately misunderstand the Ukraine crisis, they should know to balk at the practical consequences of arming the country. Arming Ukraine would partition the country for the foreseeable future, and could rip its economic heart out for good.

That said, the West clearly cannot expect a 鈥渇rozen conflict鈥� in the short- to medium-term. As the continued hostilities since the Minsk Agreement have shown, both sides want to fight; each ill-disciplined side is testing the military capabilities of the other. That could easily lead to an arms race, one that Ukraine could not win even with Western support, because Russia will simply increase its military support in response. And all this assumes that Western lethal military aid does not fall into the wrong hands.

The biggest losers, of course, will be the residents of Donbas, who are already facing an impending humanitarian crisis and who simply long for peace and a steady income.

Footing the Bill

On top of the $3 billion of US military aid that has been聽, the costs of the West鈥檚 Ukraine policy will only increase. Even after the $27 billion -led bailout agreed after the Euromaidan uprising, the Ukrainian government still requires at least another $15 billion of official external finance to avoid a sovereign default in the next month or so.

While the US has conditionally offered an additional $2 billion and the European Union (EU) a聽similar , it鈥檚 ominous to see Western institutions and countries already聽squabbling over who should the remaining finance. Even in the best case scenario, Ukraine will be聽 on IMF-led financing聽for a political generation. Moreover, a proportion of this financing will go straight to Russia to repay a $3 billion bond Ukraine that owes the , as well as disputed debts to .

But even if America still wants a fully fledged standoff between the West and Russia, it鈥檚 hard to see how that could be in Ukraine鈥檚聽national .

Kiev鈥檚 policy has so far been incoherent. It claims rebel-held territory as part of Ukraine and continues to supply it with electricity and gas, while simultaneously isolating the area鈥檚 remaining residents. Sometimes Kiev鈥檚 forces openly fight the rebels, while at others the guns fall silent.

Time to Compromise

Still, there is hope. Even at this late stage, negotiations between the rebels and Kiev and between Russia and the West could still form the foundation of a viable united Ukraine. A sensible negotiated outcome demands three core elements. There must be internationally supervised plebiscites in Donbas to decide the region鈥檚 future; Ukraine鈥檚 constitution must be reformed to give Donbas special status, should it vote to remain in Ukraine; and a formal agreement over Ukraine鈥檚 future relationship with NATO, the EU and the Eurasian Union must be struck between the West and Russia.

Even if this might not seem likely to benefit the West鈥檚 apparent interests, it would surely be in the interest of Ukraine and Donbas. If the West continues to refuse to compromise with Russia over Ukraine and decides instead to arm Kiev鈥檚 troops, then it must do so with its eyes wide open.

Ramping up a response to Russia could have terrible unintended consequences. Russia will escalate the crisis until such a time when聽the West eventually compromises over Ukraine. A compromise must be struck now before Kiev feels emboldened by Western arms supplies, only to be painfully betrayed by the West at a later date 鈥� and before even more lives are destroyed.

*[This article was originally published by .]

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