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FO° Talks: An Indian Ringside View of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict

Air Commodore Ashutosh Lal offers a detailed view of the Russia–Ukraine war, drawing from his experiences as India’s air attache in Ukraine during the 2014 Crimea crisis. He explores the geopolitical miscalculations of the West, the enduring regional ties and the technical and cultural significance of Ukraine for India. Ashutosh emphasizes the necessity of managing neighborhood relations locally.

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Atul Singh: Welcome to FO° Talks. With me is one of the legends of the Indian Air Force, Air Commodore Ashutosh Lal. He did his schooling from Lucknow, a place where I did my university and where my father went to medical college. So he’s here because he was an air attaché in Ukraine. He speaks Russian, he’s flown Russian helicopters, he’s been to Ukraine regularly. So today, you will get an Indian Ringside View of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict. Welcome, Ashutosh.

Ashutosh Lal: Thank you very much. Thanks, thank you so much.

Atul Singh: Alright, Ashutosh, you’ve been to Ukraine over a number of years. Walk us through how you saw — and I don’t mean as a story, because, of course, you’re a pilot, not a historian. But still, you’ve had your brush with history — how you saw the conflict (a) emerging and (b) developing.

Ashutosh Lal: Right. Just to debunk, I am knowledgeable, actually.

Atul Singh: Well, you were an instructor. All your formal students swear by you!

Ashutosh Lal: Many of us have been, and we all have our stories here and there. But trust me, I’m a very ordinary person who — God was kind — that I had a tryst with the Indian Air Force for a pretty long time. And God was kind to give me all the opportunities to fly the airplanes, to do whatever I was supposed to do. In that, there was a responsibility given to me to go to Ukraine as air attaché in the year of our Lord 2011, and I came back much later in 2014 after a little bit of extension.

Atul Singh: So you were there three years.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah. So from that point of view—

Atul Singh: That is when Crimea occurs.

Ashutosh Lal: I saw the first conflict, if you may call it so: the genesis of the entire fault line as to how it developed, what exactly happened, how Crimea was taken away…

Atul Singh: Or how Russians took Crimea. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: But let’s say how Ukrainians gave it up. For that matter, that’s also another way to look at it. But like I said, how green men, little green men, who sprung up and they took away everything. So I saw it from all up front, close. It was very clear to me as to how it was going to affect us, and since then on, I’ve been visiting, revisiting and trying to keep myself updated — not because I’m not a historian by profession, but the trigger which happened in me because of my boss over there. I must give credit to him for many understandings — our ambassador, Shri Rajiv Chandra, who was extremely kind to us and who taught us, who shaped us, mentored us. And under his tutelage, if I may say, we went on to do whatever work we could do with him. So I must duly construct, or he came in at the point when I landed up in Ukraine in 2011. Believe you me, Atul, it was perhaps one of the most beautiful countries in the world. To be very honest, I had traveled a fair amount of the world before that, so I could draw a comparison and say that there was a great amount of vibrance and there was a great amount of joy and happiness. There was a great amount of respect for Indian culture, and there was a great amount of likeness between our two cultures. Later on in the chat, we can point out a few for that matter. But the point here is that that was the phase: UEFA Euro 2012, which was co-hosted by Poland and Ukraine in 2012. I remember I saw that, and I was there. The first match was Sweden–Ukraine, both playing blue/yellow jerseys. And Ukraine was magnanimous to ask Sweden to choose their color so that Ukraine could choose their colors. Andriy Shevchenko, the legendary football player — I believe he’s turned pro golfer now—

Atul Singh: Oh, has he?

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, yeah.

Atul Singh: Okay.

Ashutosh Lal: He scored the first goal. It was a sight to be seen on the Maidan, which is the Independence Square, which turned later into dark and ugly pictures when the conflict broke through. See, I thought that was the apex of Ukraine, what I saw at that time as to how Ukraine was prospering. And it appeared to us very clearly that Ukraine is heading toward the European or EU way. Now, this was the belief which all my colleagues in the embassy, including my boss, had, that this is what’s going to happen. However, I was not convinced, because whatever little I dug up — and I lived on the streets over there, I spoke the language of the streets. (Chuckles) I was working the streets, so to speak. It was a very different time altogether. But in that particular—

Atul Singh: You weren’t just staying in your diplomatic bubble and kettle. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: The whole idea was to get a feel of the place. And because of my link with Russian machinery — half of which, I did not know, was built in Ukraine — it was totally Ukrainian in its pedigree. So when that happened to me, and I realized how my life was saved by many of these Ukrainian workmen working in the different zavod — the plants — I used to visit over there, that drew me to the entire thing to try and understand what exactly was happening on the ground. So in that, my belief was — I think I’m quite sure about it — that Ukraine, under the influence of who and who — we can talk about it — did not envisage this outcome, which it eventually turned out to be. And they thought that they could dissect themselves from the larger ecosystem of East Europe. I’m not talking in terms of the Russian Federation. I’m talking about that larger ecosystem of East Europe. They wanted to dissect themselves and get attached. Please, when I’m saying that, those of you interested should look up where the west of Ukraine, the cities of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk — which part of Europe they kept changing hands with, whose background — Khmelnytskyi, might as well look him up: the ruler and the horse rider who came winning and marauding. You need to see that, as to what they were doing: carrying the symbol of power, something like a gada, which they carry in their hand. So you need to see that, and how Ukraine went from one to the other side needs to be seen. Notwithstanding that, post-Second World War, post- that era when everything was developing, post-Germany, when the Wall fell, unification happened, perestroika — how things were moving forward. This particular aspiration of Ukraine to come to the West or the European side, and this game plan of the West to try and snatch Ukraine out of the close, tight embrace of the East European ecosystem — I think that was the conflict which led to what happened.

Historical claims and regional politics

Atul Singh: So if you go back to 300 years ago — and Vladimir Putin’s op-ed talks a lot about it — there is a sense that Ukraine is the ancestral kingdom of Rus. Ukraine was attacked and taken over by the Polish–Lithuanian empires, and therefore, it is inevitable that Ukraine should remain in the sphere of influence of Russia. That is the Moscow view of the world. At the same time, if you take the Polish view of the world, they say, “Well, Western Ukraine in particular is a land contiguous to ours, and therefore has a lot more in common with us. And therefore, it should come more to the West and give us a greater buffer against Russia.” And if you go back to Soviet times, what people forget is that the brunt of collectivization — and there are books and books and books one can read — was borne by the Ukrainian peasantry. The kulaks were mainly Ukrainians. And in fact, Joseph Stalin killed three and a half million of them. And I have friends who are historians, and I have friends who are in MI6 and the British Foreign Office, and they often joke that had the British invaded Ukraine, they wouldn’t have treated them with the racism Nazis did. They would have set up an independent Ukrainian state. They would have played divide and rule, as they did around the world — they were rather good at it — and they wouldn’t have killed three million Ukrainians like the Nazis. So the reason I’m giving this historical color — and of course, those of you who want to dig up more can read a piece that retired CIA officer Glenn Carle and I wrote just before the war begins in 2022. We wrote it on Christmas Eve, December 2021 — and the point is, it is a tortured land with a tortured past, with contending narratives of history and different geopolitical interests. Over to you: What did you see transpiring at that stage?

Ashutosh Lal: So business? What Atul said is what I’m going to stay totally off.

Atul Singh: Okay, fine. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: Academics and everything else you’ve heard about him, for that matter, you can go back and read. So this is where the ringside aspect comes in. And where did I pick up this issue and this feeling that Ukraine would not be able to be pulled out from the embers of East Europe, or whatever the big brother was. I picked it up from Romania. Let me narrate.

Atul Singh: Excellent.

Ashutosh Lal: So there was this seminar happening over there — a conference, perhaps — which was discussing—

Atul Singh: In the capital?

Ashutosh Lal: Romania, Bucharest.

Atul Singh: Bucharest?

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah.

Atul Singh: Okay.

Ashutosh Lal: Romania was also under my watch. I was there. So I was required to be there because a senior official from India was traveling over there, and he had to do a presentation on Prithvi missiles. There was a test done on an anti-ballistic missile of the three-stage model. So he had come to present a paper on that. And I was with him, and I was part of that seminar. And as always, my ears were out on the ground to try and figure out what’s happening. Why? Because the interesting part was in the front row, or perhaps just behind the front row, there was a row of ushankas — an ushanka is the P-cap which Russians wear — there was a row of ushankas. A senior, perhaps a general, on the right-hand side and a lieutenant down the line, age-wise, stacked up over there — and the presentation was going on. Please remember: Romania houses the active component of the missile defense, right? And that was a time when Deveselu base was being reactivated, because the earlier launch base which had been developed for Afghanistan was being denied, and they had no choice but to come back to this. And Deveselu was this Aegis Ashore site; radars were in Turkey. You know the whole idea. So in that context, to a speaker, I asked a question. I said, “Sir, the talks are on. Ukraine is likely to follow the EU very shortly. The handshake will take place very soon. And if you look at the European conundrum, you’ll realize that wherever in the East either the US has gone forward and NATO has caterpillared, or NATO has gone forward, the EU has caterpillared. So it’s just a foregone conclusion that today it is the EU, tomorrow it will be NATO, and Ukraine will turn into a NATO state. By which would I understand that these missiles here in Romania, or this site here in Romania, may shift to Donbas, Donetsk, Luhansk.” Those were my exact words. You know what the response was? Before anybody else on the stage could respond, the general with the ushanka passed an elbow down the line, and the elbow traveled all the way. Up sprang a young lieutenant, and in chaste English, he just spoke to the audience. He said, “Whatever the gentleman is talking about is in the realm of fiction. It can never happen.” And he sat.

Atul Singh: That is totally understandable.

Maidan and the fall of Yanukovych

Ashutosh Lal: Understandable. So that’s what my point is. That is the time that, from a ringside view, being on the ground, I understood and realized the fact that it is the dynamics of neighbors. Being on the ground in the streets and working over there, I knew that the economic ties of East Ukraine with Russia were very close.

Atul Singh: They had been for centuries.

Ashutosh Lal: There was travel, there were relationships — husband, wife, families, blah, blah, blah — whatever you call it. So it was absolutely unthinkable that you could draw a line there. And here was the West. The likes of — you know who — Victoria Nuland.

Atul Singh: I mean, our Chief Strategy Officer, Peter Isackson, despises her. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So that phone call is there on the net if you want to listen.

Atul Singh: (Laughs) I’ve heard it, yeah, yeah.

Ashutosh Lal: But the fact remains that here they were trying to call this out. When this happened — and I analyzed this comment, I dug deeper into it. Then comes out the next ringside exposé or understanding of mine. Dnipropetrovsk is a town where you have the usual — I may be getting on mixed up names here and there. Sometimes it happens.

Atul Singh: We won’t hold you to it. More important was the point rather than the detail.

Ashutosh Lal: I understand. But now, this base agency of Ukraine. Exceptionally brilliant products they had. In my scouting for trying to see that, imagine: You could have a Su-27 which carries a missile rocket under the belly, goes to the highest possible altitude in a particular direction and vector, launches that missile and that missile puts a LEO satellite into orbit. So it was the easiest possible way to give you coverage over a battleground if you want to put a LEO, which is persistent but finishes off sometime. A Low Earth Orbit satellite, right? So they had some wonderful systems, like the floating dock for the Zenit rocket, which launches a satellite into orbit. That means you didn’t have to have a Sriharikota. You could drag that platform on the ocean with the help of tugs to the appropriate place to have the rocket launching your satellite in the most economical manner. So that’s a wonderful, brilliant system. But also, the credit was that they were the father of all SS-series missiles of Russia. From SS-18 to SS-21, everything was being found there. It was their patent. And if you look at the books at that time, which I did, you realize that these missiles were approaching the end of life, and they would need extension. So just imagine: If this part of Ukraine was taken out of Russia’s influence, that factory would not have been available. They would not have been able to life-extend the intercontinental basing of Russia. And in one masterstroke, the West would have utilized a large part of the arsenal on which Russia primes. Not much has been spoken about it. But like I said, the ringside views are this—

Atul Singh: It adds a great degree of detail, granular detail.

Ashutosh Lal: It’s very clear and very straightforward, that I came back to my boss. I told him, and we had a discussion, and he said, “No, I do not deal. You see what’s happening.”

Atul Singh: But, you know, the Indian Foreign Services often aren’t the truest foreign service! (Both laugh) I’ve had to deal with them for too many years!

Ashutosh Lal: Of course, that is what I’ve heard. Then what happened was the last 24 hours, when the Maidan turned and everything else started. Yanukovych had to take off in his helicopter. It was the second time it was happening in that part. In fact, in Romania also, there had been a dictator who was trying to get in a helicopter from a rooftop, who was pulled back.

Atul Singh: Nicolae Ceaușescu.

Ashutosh Lal: Absolutely.

Atul Singh: Yeah, a friend of mine, his father fled Ceaușescu, nearly died! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So I’ll stay to my point — that Yanukovych fled, and inside Ukraine, everything changed. And suddenly all that happened and the independent districts sprung.

Escalation and evacuations

Ashutosh Lal: To link it up to Euro 2012, the way I saw the development happening over there — the airports were built up, the hotels were built up, the infrastructure was done up — absolutely prime and very beautiful. All that was destroyed in the last seven to eight months in front of me. That’s how the tide turned.

Atul Singh: What you’re saying is that it was overreach on the part of the US? Political overreach?

Ashutosh Lal: I would put it differently. One has to understand: That geographical neighborhood is a real fact of life.

Atul Singh: Of course. I mean, look, the US did not allow missiles in Cuba. There was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Ashutosh Lal: I was about to say the same thing. In fact, the cross-reference was made to my reply there. I said, “Look, you also have the same issue in Cuba.” The same issue was there? Quite possible there could be an issue happening in that particular conference when I was discussing with people. But be that as it may, it tells us very clearly, and in our own context. And we also have a very turbulent neighborhood that keeps shifting from one side to the other. So the neighborhood is a fact, and the neighborhood is required to be managed by the people who are involved directly. It cannot be managed remotely by someone sitting very far away. Because, for all these reasons, as it is very clear now, they would always have their vested interest deployed inside.

Atul Singh: That’s history, the law of history.

Ashutosh Lal: So, if that was so, it could have been seen, it should have been seen. It should be seen by us in managing our neighborhood issues — how we want to swing from one to the other side — because the neighborhood is something. There is another issue which I would just like to mention over here: Amongst the leadership of Ukraine I saw from that point in time, there was Tymoshenko.

Atul Singh: The braided lady who was put in jail by Yanukovych?

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, she was in jail when I reached her. And if you read that history as to who was on which side, there’s plenty of interesting things over there. But she was in jail when I reached there. People were doing dharna protests to try and get her out from detention at that point in time. But the fact remains that from there—

Atul Singh: Just for members of the global audience: You go, sit down and protest, and stop the streets, really.

Ashutosh Lal: Basically. Atul, thank you for that connection. But I’m just saying that from there, what I saw — the leaders, how they were fanning out to be — when I come to Mr. Zelenskyy, I often wonder: Could he have done something differently, so as not to ruin that beautiful country of Ukraine, which I call моя друга батьківщина — “my second homeland?” I just want to remind your viewers that if you’ve ever had any bit of sunflower oil, you have a little bit of Ukraine in you. And I’ve got my tooth also sorted out over there—a root canal. So I have it in my tooth as well! (Laughs) So the point is that being that affectionate to that land, and having seen the potential — imagine a country which is largely under snow for four to six months, yet is the largest grower of grain in Europe. So there is an immense amount of potential—

Atul Singh: Sunflowers, wheat, so many other agricultural products.

Ashutosh Lal: And I will come to the region a little later, when the conflict has already broken out. Because right now we’re talking about what could have happened. So, I’m talking with Zelenskyy. Could he have done something differently? Did the other side — Americans, mostly — realize that here is a person who is used — like what we are doing with a mic and a camera — and if he has a narrative, he will read that and he will enact that. Was that the thing in the initial phase, where he kept enacting what he was being told to say, and then took the entire conflict south? Now he was in a different mode; he changed clothes, and wore different things and came to the front end, trying to do what was required to be done? Was it too late by then? That question has to be asked. So how the neighborhood is to be managed and how the national interests — which are always a sacrosanct thing, not the friends and foes — that needs to be seen very clearly. This is my gathering of lessons from the ringside.

Atul Singh: Okay, so — 2014: You’re there, and the conflict really erupts. Because Russia simply cannot give away Crimea. After all, Potemkin, the great lover of Catherine the Great, conquered it for her, and that was Russian access to warm water. There’s no way the Russians were ever going to give Crimea away to Ukraine. And in 1954, it was none other than Nikita Khrushchev who gifted it to Ukraine. So in Russian minds, it was theirs. And then, of course, the conflict erupts in Donbas and Luhansk. The little green men you’ve already mentioned, walk us through that period. So what did you see?

Ashutosh Lal: Thank you very much. Trust me, in Crimea — right up to Alupka or Atakoy, where I traveled — I thought it was the most amazing place, and that Russian and Ukrainian existence was practically inseparable. Truly international. A couple of times, I was there on Victory Day — I was there at Crimea to see the wonderful parade, the Black Sea Fleet and whatnot. Yalta — you know what happened in the Second World War. The Yalta Conference is still a very important landmark, as you know.

Atul Singh: The contours of the post-war world.

Ashutosh Lal: So how did I come into this entire thing? And how did I get that inside view of this conflict brewing, apart from what was happening in Kyiv? Kyiv, of course, we knew. You remember those snipers on the Maidan and the people who came and occupied over there in the thick of winter. Somewhere, I have a picture in which I’m standing on Maidan with everything burnt out. I mean, I was yelled at — “Get back into the embassy!” — because I was out there in Maidan trying to see what exactly was happening, because of my own curiosity. And when the snipers were taking shots, everything was happening over there. So that was in Kyiv, but I got involved because there were our students who were studying in different cities. So the first place we got an SOS call from was Crimea. Our ambassador got a call from the parents of our children in Crimea — in Ukraine — now under Russian control. “What’s happening?” So the ambassador came and said, “Boys, we have this issue at hand.” So I said, “Let me go. I’ll go and be with them. I’ll comfort them and I’ll take care of what was required, and then I’ll come back to you.” He was apprehensive, of course, because we’d not changed sides yet, and there was the issue of passports and blah, blah, blah. I said, “Don’t worry, sir, because I’ve been working the streets. I will be able to go through that way.” I was given the go-ahead. I went across, and I stayed in Crimea at the same hotel where the group from BBC and World Service was staying, mind you. And they were staying in the same hotel, carrying out such coverage of the entire situation while the city was rather peaceful. Leninsky Square was where the main protest was happening. That is where the hands had changed and everybody went to dinner in the restaurants. Later that night, I asked those two, “Why are you raising this red flag?” But then there are dynamics, too. The point is that when I was there and I spoke to the students — this was the city of Simferopol, the capital of Crimea — I gathered them all together and then briefed them. “Now this is how we will do. This is what we will do.” But luckily, we did not have to evacuate them from there. The transition was rather peaceful. I went and saw their parliament building, as they call it, and there were these little green men standing there with balaclavas. And that’s about all. Because there, the narrative had been set, and that wonderfully intertwined Russian–Ukrainian presence had changed. Ukrainian soldiers and officers had joined the Russian Armed Forces. Then all of that happened and it just changed. Remember, that was the first change of nationality of a sizable portion of land after the Second World War in that area, and that would happen without firing a single bullet. So obviously, I can understand the West was feeling pretty let down that they let this happen. They didn’t have their ear to the ground, which was a failure on their part, and a lot happened. But in that, I understood that now the Russian mechanism — their so-called hybrid warfare, which we can speak about in a different interview altogether — was already deployed. It was happening. Crimea, of course, has a problem of freshwater shortage and access to the mainland, which they have now secured through this conflict. As you are aware, all of that has been secured. So it was very clear to us that—

Atul Singh: They have a landbridge now.

Ashutosh Lal: In fact, talking about bridges, we had a small problem at hand. While in Ukraine, I was handling Project 832 — modernization. It was a very big project of, what, 105 airplanes, but one got crashed, so 104 were left. The plot was: Five airplanes would come, get overhauled in this plant — which is contiguous to Zhuliany Airport, the smaller airport in Kyiv — and then they fly out to India and practice. We had to do 35 airplanes. The second-last batch was at my hand, and I was about to come back when this war happened. And the air route to Ankara — the first thought was to route over Crimea — and now we could not go over Crimea. So I had no choice but to take the airplanes all the way west to Bucharest, and then from Bucharest head to Istanbul because you could not make it to Ankara. You know, the whole planning had to be changed. So be that as it may, the fact remained that I realized that Crimea was gone for good, and that gave us an indication as to what was going to happen in the East. Because that mechanism of hybrid warfare had started to deploy over there, and it was very clear that if they didn’t get their acts together, then that would happen. This is where the West woke up in a significant manner, and they deployed a good number of boots on the ground under different guises. That gap was simple, but it was what we call “standard and recommended practices” — exercises between two forces. The radio phraseology to be used commonly, so that they can be used in some peacekeeping somewhere. How do you use radio? How do we use basic tactics that can be synchronized? So under that guard, the trainers who were there from the West — and NATO especially — became the custodians of now keeping their watch. And that had started. This is where the conflict started to happen, which basically brewed in the eastern part: Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, even down till Kherson later, you know. This is a tragic chapter. Sir, that’s where I thought, it’s very important to understand — just 30 seconds more — because this, again, happened in Lugansk. The city of Lugansk had a big medical college. By the way, I hope you’re aware that the cost of East European MBBS is sizably less than what is available here in India.

Atul Singh: That’s what I’ve been told.

Ashutosh Lal: That is the reason why many of our students go over there, which I suppose is a good thing. Of course, they have to come back and take an MCI exam before they can start practicing over here. But I found very bright young people over there from all parts of the country who were there. So I was sent to Lugansk again under a similar situation, where this thing was happening, and now it was live. Because the gunshots were being fired outside and everything was happening, I had to hire a train and move about 800, 900 students in the train, over buses, put them in the train, and the train came to Kyiv where the ambassador and all our setup was waiting for them to be received. I had to go there because of my connections with the plants over there, and I used the help from the people on the ground. And that is what I used to do. Whatever I could do, we managed it. But it again allowed me — and that was Holi at that point of time. I spent Holi with those boys and girls over there in that place. When I put them in a hall — I had gone along with my sister — I addressed them and I told them, I made groups. I made leaders. I said, “When this happens, this is how the message will go, this is what you will do.” So I built that quasi-operation, and I built them out in that place. This is where I again realized that now it is not coming back. The situation is such that it will not come back, it will not go to foster — it’s going to get worse from here, it’s only going to get more destructive from here, now both sides will suffer, whichever.

Atul Singh: So the train had been set in motion.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, and it was an irreversible train to my mind. And which unfortunately—

Atul Singh: That’s up for debate, sure.

Ashutosh Lal: After you make your point, then I will come back to what happened in the second conflict, because I was there again.

Russian hybrid warfare and the 2022 invasion

Atul Singh: Okay, so you mentioned hybrid warfare. Okay, what’s the Russian model of hybrid warfare, and how did the West respond?

Ashutosh Lal: Atul, hybrid warfare would be another episode.

Atul Singh: We’ll have to get you back! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So let’s keep that aside.

Atul Singh: Give us an outline, give us a teaser.

Ashutosh Lal: A good point, yeah. So the hybrid warfare spoken about by many authors and a lot of literature available over there, is Russia’s war actually hybrid warfare? And some mechanics leave us asking the question. But leave the mechanics aside; look at the results. The result was, like I mentioned to you, that they managed to change the nationality of a large piece of land — a crucial warm sea port where the Black Sea Fleet was based — without firing a single bullet. Do I see any more moving? So this is what was the trajectory of the warfare, which was running out. Of course, the West jumped in, and the contest heated up, so to speak. People lost lives, and so much destruction took place subsequently. But that is the potential of hybrid war, because it’s a very important issue for our own armed forces. And it includes everything — lawfare, I don’t know what all — because the entire set of academia, the entire set of institutions of army, judiciary, administration, diplomacy, foreign services, economy, everything comes into it. So that is an amalgamation which is an ultimate binder of the national policy.

Atul Singh: Okay, well, you mentioned the second phase of the conflict: February 24, 2022. Alright, Russian troops move in, and you were there again.

Ashutosh Lal: Yep.

Atul Singh: So what transpires then for the Russian tanks to start rolling in?

Ashutosh Lal: Right. So, I was back in 2014. I came back to my job normally here. Whatever happened, I had a wonderful time in the Air Force. Early January 2020, I left the Air Force and I was trying to become a civil helicopter pilot, which I am right now. I was flying till very recently for a company in Mumbai, taking passengers from the point of dispersal to their ships and rigs and getting them back. But in that, my interest in trying to understand during this conflict — and this is a very, very important key point — the way I saw through the conflict, I am completely mesmerized by the Ukrainian ingenuity. That’s not only on the battlefield. People will tell you how males exited Ukraine, how their own population deserted, they don’t have boots on the ground, some people have gone away or whatever. But in that also, how common Ukrainians — leave politicians aside — held on to their nationality, held on to their spirit, held on to their ingenuity on the battlefield, off the battlefield, in the domain of military tech. For those of your viewers who are perhaps not very much aware, Ukrainian military tech is huge. It may surprise you that 40% of the Indian Navy’s frontline ships are powered by Zorya’s engine, which is made in Ukraine. It’s absolutely important for us that we have them with us. And mind you, unlike the airplanes, the ships are different. You have to first choose the engine, because Indian transmission has to be quiet, and then you build the ship around it, so then can’t change it. So you have to identify the engine provider first before you arrive at your ship. That is the kind of planning process. So Zorya powers more than 40% of the Indian Navy; it’s very important for us. Antonov — anything to do with Antonov — A-12 and A-22, what we flew in our Air Force, and the An-124 is what the US survives on.

Atul Singh: Which most people don’t know.

Ashutosh Lal: Antonov is thoroughbred — inside to out, including engines and everything else — Ukrainian. It’s got nothing to do with the honor of Russian women. So Ukraine MIC, or Military Industrial Complex, was itself huge at that point, alright. But in the war, how it transformed itself is a story that someday the world should document.

Atul Singh: I’m sure people are documenting it already.

Ashutosh Lal: I’m sure. But you look at it from my perspective as to how this tech… To give an example, in Kharkiv, I found out that some small company was making a very peculiar ammunition which could be mounted on the pylon of a low-flying airplane. It just dispenses very small transmitters over a swath of ground: GPS jammers. They would all transmit, they would noise-jam the GPS, and they would die down as the battery dies down. So in a period of time when you want to operate over there, you can deny GPS in assault. Selective non-availability of GPS you could achieve at that point of time. Their expertise in radio listening and eavesdropping is very well known. There was an incident which happened in an unknown army, and there was a unit which had some equipment from there — I’m sure your listeners know about it. So it was being brought from there. So you could do that. There were many things. They made passive radars. That means it’s just a receiver, not transmitting anything else. Poland has a solution, but this equipment of Ukraine was such that, using the normal transmission from the radio nav-ways of Europe, they were able to mimic and understand. Without opening up any transmitter, they can get comfortable with the surroundings. Wonderful technology. Of course, needs to be matured, needs to be tied up, needs to be inducted into the systems — that is where our ingenuity could have come. LWS-6 Żubr, perhaps the largest hovercraft, skims over any rocky stretch and the sea, carries tanks and has an amazing technology in which it can sidestep and turn around in a very small place, which is also there on the Zorya engines. Crazy, absolutely. So they were at that level already. From there, those boys and girls, those men and women — what unmanned aerial systems have done to this war — very soon people will be coming out. And I know for sure that people who built it then, during the conflict, tested it during the conflict, and used it to destroy very expensive equipment. Otherwise, a large country like Russia would not have—

Atul Singh: Tanks, for instance.

Ashutosh Lal: So specifics will take time. So I’m just trying to tell you indicators as to where you should research and try and transfer.

Atul Singh: I mean, we should get into specifics, because a lot of our viewers wouldn’t have the time. Some would, some would spend hours, but others wouldn’t.

Ashutosh Lal: Like I said, these very inexpensive unmanned aerial systems, which affected very large equipment on the ground, how they intercepted, they went into Kursk. Of course, there’s a lot of Western help that was available. But still, when they realized that the fighter planes were not coming through — Su-27 deploying — they applied the Internet to keep the conflict on, to keep the pressure. Now, I come back to February of 2022. That is when the tanks rolled across from Kharkiv and from the East. So my friend called me for something or other — I would go down there. I said, “Okay, I’ll come. But are you sure Mr. Putin is all lined up? That said, you’re not gonna come down? No, no, everything is okay, just — apparently — come, come.” I landed at Kharkiv, I took a car, and I was driving to his approach.

Atul Singh: You were not yet a civilian helicopter pilot?

Ashutosh Lal: No, I was.

Atul Singh: You were already?

Ashutosh Lal: I was. So in our academy, we had breaks. When you fly for six weeks, you have three weeks off. So I left the military for 15 days because I had the qualification. Of course, Covid also hit at that point of time, but that’s another story. The point here is that when I reached the provision, I had a good time with my friend, chatted and met old contacts and everybody else. And I was looking for the local beer, Natsu. Fifteen-seventeen is really old, even in beer. So we went to the bar and had that, came back, slept it off — only to be woken up by the phone ringing consistently, because Mr. Putin had dropped across. Now, this is the time to speak about the operation which Russia launched to quickly end this conflict on their own terms, and the fight back with the help of the people who are deployed on ground from the West, and Ukrainian beauty. I’m talking about a very audacious attempt by helicopters of Russian armed forces to carry out what, in typical terms in the Air Force, we call SHBO — Special Heli-Borne Operations — taking troops in the helicopters all the way from their secured bases, where? To a small airport outside Kyiv — home to Antonov. So when I was there in Bucha, I got stuck badly. And I take the car, and as I start driving back towards Kyiv, these helicopters are flying over. Su-25s, Su-27s flying over, and there was chaos, and there were roadblocks, but I was somehow managing and coming. Because the idea was to come close to Kyiv, because all the flights were canceled. I did not have a flight to come back home. I had to have a plan in my mind to get back, because remember, I had to come back to my job. (Atul laughs) And I don’t have any visa toward either place.

Atul Singh: You couldn’t have flown into Poland!

Ashutosh Lal: Minor issues actually fucked me! (Laughs)

Atul Singh: Minor issues! (Both laugh) You could’ve swum through the Black Sea, swum through the Suez Canal…

Ashutosh Lal: The Bosphorus was calling me, be that it may.

Atul Singh: You’re a fit man!

Ashutosh Lal: So the point I was trying to make was that when this was happening, I realized that this was something, it’s a very important moment in a helicopter pilot’s life. Unfortunately, I could not be part of that formation or that fight, but I was there to witness it from close quarters and to follow up later about—with the help of my other friends who were there — to follow their help, as to what exactly happened. So the long and short is that this train of helicopters — the Mils — “Mi version.” For them, everything is “Mi version,” Mils. Mi-17 is an export version — which, we’ll call it null patterns — for them — everything is “Mi version.” So Mi-8s are carrying these troops. Mi-35s, my own helicopter, which I live in and die by—

Atul Singh: You like it, clearly.

Ashutosh Lal: There is no match to it. That’s another story.

Atul Singh: We’ll cover it in another video! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So Ka-50s were escorting them. Great machine, for that matter. So they were escorting, and there was this battle. There are many videos. Missiles flying across, flares flying across, hits taking place — and animations available as to how they turned over here, there, and then took a hit and took a hit. It was crazy. So they reached this airport outside, and initial gains were being made. Because that night, I was in Kyiv, and I was staying on a highrise, where everybody else was inside the bunker. I was left in that flat alone, horizon, and I could hear the noises. So it is then when the system kicked on, and the reaction to make sure that the runway is not made available for a follow-on fixed-wing transport aircraft to land over there, with a fleet of Ilyushins or Antonovs or whatever the Russians had. Because this normally happens; it’s called the link-up. Initially, the SHBO force goes, secures the airport. Now the link-up happens on the fixed wing runway. So they made sure that this doesn’t happen. And although they had taken ground on that airport, the Ukrainians with the help of—

Atul Singh: With the help of other foreign troops.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, because there were instructors over there. And it is my understanding, which I’m very clear about, that they quickly stopped this entire plan. And then they said, “This is the counter.”

Atul Singh: Reports are that this was mainly Americans and British instructors. There must have been others because of NATO.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, NATO and the West always have a very good mix of things.

Atul Singh: Interoperability, as they say.

Ashutosh Lal: No, so the point I was trying to make was that this is where this fight started to turn dirty, and the link-up could not happen. And that became very messy. That was another very important turning point from the point of view of Russia. Russia had lost the initial momentum, because obviously—remember, the attacker always has the initiative. He chooses where to come in from. The defender has to jockey and adjust itself. So Russia had the initiative. It had the first move, and they came and they tried something out, which was very audacious —over that distance, over that range. Of course, we are at Sagar Chak. Reminds us of ‘71. But those distances were much smaller when it happened from one of—

Atul Singh: Just very quickly: Sagat Singh — we’ve had an on him. He was the great hero of the 1971 war. We’ve had his son interview with us, actually. So General Sagat Singh Rathore is a legend of the Indian military. And of course, he used helicopters and yada ya. You can read about him, learn more about him. But that was a much smaller distance.

Ashutosh Lal: So that’s a much more manageable distance, much less air defense—

Atul Singh: Dense.

Ashutosh Lal: Density against the — and it was all dark and night, and it was small hops against Maghna rivers and tributaries. Here, this was a large distance given out that you have entered now, and you could be tracked. See, the peculiar thing about helicopters — which we are all very aware of — is that once you spot a helicopter, visually or by radar or by the beam, you can put a pin on that location. And now, what is our speed? Two hundred forty kilometers an hour at the max, right? Four kilometers per minute. So you can start expanding it. So in that time, we cannot exit. We cannot just go away. We have to be there only. So if a faster-moving platform comes in, he will find us in that using a known area. So I’m just saying, that is the kind of—

Atul Singh: They’re sitting ducks, basically, once that happens. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: I would not accept at first, but be that as it may, it brings you—

Atul Singh: Flying ducks.

Ashutosh Lal: It brings in new challenges. So we had this interesting contest, which is what I saw, and that’s what happened. So that—

Atul Singh: It was massive casualties, wasn’t it?

Ashutosh Lal: That was one turning point. I’ll be very specific: There was one turning point where Russia lost. And then onwards, the entire conflict turned into a different manner. It became a war of attrition, not much of a war was taking place. And several issues — what kind of soldiers are coming in, what’s happening — given the ingenuity of the Ukrainian people, soldiers and people on the ground, the tech support on the ground, what they started doing… that’s another success story.

Turning points and military operations

Atul Singh: The use of drones.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes. If I’m not wrong, the last attack from Russia on the right front has come about two days, three days prior. That has happened now. You see what happened in Kursk? They went inside that deep and held it to that long, unless that Russian operation happened. And, you know, now they’ve been obstructed.

Atul Singh: They came through a pipeline.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, I mentioned to you that they came through a pipeline — Russian special forces. Please note, gentlemen, that they came through a pipeline. They came through a pipeline, and there were casualties, but they emerged on the other side. If this tussle happened—

Atul Singh: Just an extraordinary operation. On both sides, the troops have proven to be pretty innovative. I mean, the Russians have come up with glide bombs, the Russians have come up with innovations themselves.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, that is there, because in the first war, I saw how the helicopters were shot by machine guns. Planes were destroyed. You know how all that was done? Because I remember, in the first time when I was there — 2014 — and we were trying to work out, can we have a runway secure enough to land an airplane from India and pull the boys and girls out from there? So I was scouting for that, and I reached this airport, and I hitched a ride with the milkman to try and see what the runway is. But that was the place where the night before, an Il-76 was shot. And Il-76 was landing on the runway, and it was shot by a shoulder-fired missile on the idling Indian pilot who was landing, and the entire airplane was strewn up on the runway.

Atul Singh: Wow.

Ashutosh Lal: So it was very obvious and clear to me that no matter what you do in this part — of course, it was too close to the conflict — it can happen. Mind you, by then the other issue would also happen. You lost a civil airplane.

Atul Singh: Yes, indeed.

Ashutosh Lal: Tail color, red and blue.

Atul Singh: Yeah, yeah.

Ashutosh Lal: Being mixed up with an Il-96, and Mr. Putin is coming back and Mr. Modi was coming back as well behind him. We had to intervene and get his route altered away from the conflict. So all that was also happening. The times are very specific. That is when it was decided that it is best to go on the ground and try and pull them out by the train. We fixed up in Kyiv. We went there, we managed that — seven, eight coaches — and pulled everybody out. And that was our—

Geopolitical lessons and India’s opportunity

Atul Singh: So what now? What now? You’ve laid out a wonderful ringside view. And now, of course, we have a new president in the White House, and we have talk of a truce. In fact, some sort of truce, apparently. And it seems that now Zelenskyy will have to read from a new script.

Ashutosh Lal: So Atul, I’ll— (laughs) …Yeah, that’s one interesting way to put it across, actually. But let me just say this: Let me look at the idealistic view as to how this can resolve, actually. Okay, then we can say the best possible action, and then we can see how it can—

Atul Singh: The scenarios.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, that. Like I said, the neighborhood requires restoration. And a very important point which comes in — which links me up to this famous mythology of India, of Mahabharat — Kaurav, Pandav. When this issue was being discussed about EU being signed for Ukraine—

Atul Singh: Ukraine is a part of the EU.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, yes. So you’re aware that even Russia, as a federation, also has a—

Atul Singh: Of course, yeah.

Ashutosh Lal: —Something like an EU of their own. It’s called the Customs Union. So Russia offered that, “Okay, you want to be with the EU? No problems, go with them, no issues. But do not exit the Customs Union. Keep us included.” Because they wanted to have that tie, which was carrying on. They said, “Okay, doesn’t matter.” They had adjusted that much. So it reminds me of that — Kaurav, Pandav, who said, “Five villages. You give us just five villages — five Pandavs, five villages — not even of the…” What should I tell your viewers?

Atul Singh: Not even tipping the needle. (Laughs) So you seem to be holding Victoria Nuland and the hawks in Washington, D.C., responsible for this. The neoconservatives, in a way.

Ashutosh Lal: Look, Atul, history is fraught with examples when people who were not in that area, and they were sitting somewhere else in a much part of the world.

Atul Singh: That’s the history of the last 500 years. We are sitting in front of a map of the world. So you look at the map in the world — Latin America, Portuguese and Spanish all the way to Mexico. India — the British and the French East India companies had a bish, bash, bosh.

Ashutosh Lal: That is why I was talking about the idealistic solution. Why? Because I am not counting out that such new Newlands and Pyatts are still sitting in that setup. There are rare elements in Ukraine which are to be taken out. So there are people who are trying to anchor everything else to do what is required to be done. So I will leave that out right now, because that’s a dynamic switch — which is a different issue, but whatever. But I’m saying, ideally, the earnestness of maintaining a neighborhood needs to be considered.

Atul Singh: So what you’re saying is Russia and Ukraine have to learn to live together.

Ashutosh Lal: There is no choice.

Atul Singh: Got it.

Ashutosh Lal: There is no choice. Now, the flavor changes on the East. And what this bitterness will do over the years and how it can be managed is a different ballgame. Mind you, the people in the west of Ukraine — and very dear friends of mine, very interesting. I was traveling with my friend, and his son, a basketballer of 16, 17, 18 years, of which I spoke to in Russian, and he refused to speak to me for the whole duration. Talking Russian.

Atul Singh: I’ll only speak in Ukrainian. So that divide has cast a different line.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah. So all those divisions have come in already.

Atul Singh: The division is even there in the Church now.

Ashutosh Lal: Many things have happened. Church has changed. The oldest Orthodox monastery was in Ukraine. That was the Vatican of Orthodox Christianity in the east of Europe, which is Lavra the cave. It was the cave monastery — it was by the side of Dnipro. Now, I’ve taken our former chief there when he came down to visit. He was a Catholic himself, but he was kind enough to go there and accept that honor. So that changed. The old calendar went out. Stary Novy God has gone out. So many things have changed for them. So I’m saying those scars would remain. So how they manage this neighborhood — but I have a firm belief that only people who are there involved, they should have the biggest say. And if they have it right, then probably they can work out a constructive or a positive—

Atul Singh: So that’s the idealistic view. So what happens now?

Ashutosh Lal: This idealistic view, Atul, simply said, is not going to happen. We do not have one Angela Merkel, one European leader who was able to speak to both sides.

Atul Singh: Yeah, Angela Merkel. She was from East Germany, she spoke Russian.

Ashutosh Lal: This conflict went down the drain because she was not in the office, to my belief. Perhaps, if there was somebody who could speak on both sides and can do that. I thought our prime minister went on the train all the way. He also had that latitude to do that.

Atul Singh: But we don’t have the heft yet.

Ashutosh: Yeah. Be that it may, I mean, we’ll have to try whichever way you look at it right now. So my belief is this idyllic, idealistic solution is not going to be fructifying. It is going to get meddled and dirtied by many such power factions. What’s happening across the Atlantic — the government changing and everything else happening — they have their own issues. The people who were before them, they had their own issues. So they will drive it this way. But this ideation will not happen.

Atul Singh: Got it.

Ashutosh Lal: Poland is emerging as a very strong pull in this entire game.

Atul Singh: Of course. They already said they’ll go nuclear.

Ashutosh Lal: So please understand, this idealization is not going to happen. Now, how badly it gets muddled, how much time it takes, and what all is taken out of there — and what is taken out of Ukraine is my last point, which you will have to give me two minutes.

Atul Singh: Yeah, sure, take all the time you want. Actually, go ahead. Take the two minutes now.

Ashutosh Lal: Okay. So let’s put this conflict aside. I just want to tell you that what I look at — from our country’s interest.

Atul Singh: From India’s interests.

Ashutosh Lal: And I’m a military man. I was a military man in my head, in mind. I’m still one. So I would talk about that.

Atul Singh: I would love to see you as air chief marshal. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: Aw, thank you. I never had that caliber. I could not have been there. But let me still make a point here. So now we are not talking about Russia–Ukraine. I’m talking about national interest. When the regions in which you have some penetration are at conflict, and those regions have a technical, or economical, or a geographical or a mineral-wise edge over you — world over, history over — that is the time for the national interest to be kicked in and try and to get things to cut that delta and get your own system up. Right? You should not have had an issue to ask Indians from somewhere else to build your own ships. By now, we should have become quite omniversal, so to speak. Self-reliant, for your audience. So this is where I thought our eastern neighbor played a very good card.

Atul Singh: China.

Ashutosh Lal: In my only tenure over there — ’11 to ‘14 — what I kept seeing is what they were at. Singularly, very focused, very sharp, very quick. And they were able to execute things and take it. Technologies, expertise… So the story of Liaoning is the most interesting impact. And your viewers might have read it. I’ll just narrate it very shortly.

Atul Singh: No, please, go on ahead. Not all of them have, so it’s an education.

Ashutosh Lal: So what happens is that when you hear the story, it will tell you what was the level they were operating at. Well, surprise to some of you that our Vikramaditya and their Liaoning are actually brothers. They both were born in a city called Mykolaiv, which is—

Atul Singh: Just tell them what both these vessels do.

Ashutosh Lal: Okay, I’m sorry. My apologies. So Vikramaditya is our aircraft carrier. Liaoning is the Chinese aircraft carrier, which is floating in the South China Sea, and it has led the development of their subsequent aircraft carrier. Vikramaditya has come to us from Russia. It has come from the city of St. Petersburg, where it was a Russian aircraft carrier earlier. It has been now refitted to take our aircraft on board — MiG-29s — and that’s what is now flying its last service. So I’m saying — Vikramaditya and Liaoning, yeah — are both brothers. They were the same model, displacement, design of aircraft carriers, born in a dockyard which is in the city of Mykolaiv. Ukrainians will call it Mykolaiv, Russians will say Nikolayev. So in the city of Nikolayev they were born. Vikramaditya went to Russia and was in St. Petersburg, where we contracted it from. And finally our team went there and refitted for a long period. So the story of Liaoning is that Liaoning was a lining, just like a shell. The news came that there was a company in Macau which wanted to buy this Liaoning and make a floating casino out of it in Macau.

Atul Singh: By the way, Liaoning is the northern state, right next to North Korea. (Laughs) So they claimed it was going to Macau.

Ashutosh Lal: The claim was it will go to Macau as a floating casino. Immediately west, everybody’s ears went up. “No, it’s not them, it’s something deeper, actually.” Now Liaoning was bought by this company. It was being dragged through the Bosphorus Strait. And the environmentalists put up a big fight and said, “No more. You can’t take it through Bosphorus.” They tried to stall, delay what was required. But of course, deep pockets, focus, everything else — it went. Now, God intervened. In the Sea of Greece, there was a massive storm. And this hull got decoupled from the tug. They almost lost it.

Atul Singh: Wow.

Ashutosh Lal: But then the storm subsided. And again, it was caught on. And by the time this combination was turning around Cape and heading towards our part of the world, that company in Macau merged with Liaoning, as you say. My pronunciation is wrong.

Atul Singh: I’ve traveled a bit around China. That’s the only reason. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So please help me with that.

Atul Singh: I also had a Chinese girlfriend. That also helps! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So that company got merged with that shipyard over there: Dalian. And in this period, there were hordes of experts from the city of Mykolaiv, which were relocated over there. And now, when this hull reached over there, the work started. By the time we were refitting and trying to get our ship back, and after huge overruns of time and cost and whatnot, Liaoning was out roving the sea, the trials in the South China Sea. And the rest is known to your viewers focused not only on the military part, but on the food security part. It was surprising that China leased an area of land as more or as much as Belgium in size. Built a deep-sea port right next to it. Now obviously, the south doesn’t have snow, so it can grow the year long. So year-round, they would grow grains over there and ship it. Call it food security. When you are having a region under pressure, under conflict, and they’re looking for help and what they have not. The people who are involved in diplomacy, they are looking after their own national interest. And that is why geopolitics is a blood sport. So that is what I was understanding that this should have happened. There were many such places and some such cases where we could have really scored well, because we have a very good emotional connection.

Atul Singh: Yeah. I mean, they watch Raj Kapoor. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: No, sir. Raj Kapoor is history. Only babushka will respond to you about Raj Kapoor. By the way, do you know who is the most famous actor in that part of the world? You’d be surprised: Mithun Chakraborty.

Atul Singh: Oh, okay. Yes, I would have—

Ashutosh Lal: If the song plays, “Jimmy Jimmy,” there is not a single Ukrainian woman or girl who will not dance in that hall. That is a fact. I’ve witnessed the funeral of a young girl who went to her grave wearing a saree and holding a Mithun portrait in hand. And we had to get a letter from him, the ambassador, to speak to him. I told him, “No, sir, you must speak to him.” And he has to write back. And he wrote back; the letter was given to the father as a closure on that. So that is the kind of emotional connection. Family is one important cultural connection within us. The religion is another important—

Atul Singh: Religion? In what way?

Ashutosh Lal: The allegiance to our religion. You know, here also, we are — whichever way we tell — we are spiritual people, deep inside. And, there also, whatever happens, you would find them born from the Church, and they would be God-fearing before the food and everything else. You will see that. So they’re—

Atul Singh: Religiosity.

Ashutosh Lal: Absolutely. So there are these two strong pillars. And third is friendship, which I am a living example. So that’s how I realized that we are so much in common, and we could have leveraged much more. But I think we must have done it. I’m sure people who are responsible — they are doing it right now.

Atul Singh: Well, one can live in hope. I can tell you they are not doing so in Washington, DC, where I live. (Ashutosh laughs) Anyway, Ashutosh, lovely to have you. We’ll continue this discussion. We’ll have you for other episodes, and we have a lot to discuss.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, all in all, I want to just say from my side, a big thank you to you and your viewers. I hope I’ve been able to do justice to the ringside view. (Both laugh) And thank you very much.

Atul Singh: Thank you.

[, Aaditya Sengupta Dhar and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.

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Matthew Cavedon" post_date="April 20, 2026 07:08" pUrl="/politics/fo-talks-the-american-jury-system-explained-democracy-or-illusion/" pid="162021" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and speaks with legal scholar Matthew Cavedon of the Cato Institute about the evolution and erosion of the American jury system. What began as a cornerstone of democratic participation has, they argue, become a marginal feature of a highly bureaucratized legal process. They trace how juries once embodied community judgment and ask whether that role can still be reclaimed in a system dominated by prosecutors, plea deals and legal complexity.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">From citizen judgment to constitutional right</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Cavedon traces the jury’s origins to ancient Athens, where ordinary citizens collectively judged disputes as part of direct democracy. That tradition carried into medieval England, culminating in Magna Carta’s guarantee that no free person could lose liberty or property except “by a jury of their peers.” Over time, this principle hardened into a defining feature of common law.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>By the 18th century, legal scholar William Blackstone had formalized the idea that a criminal conviction required the agreement of 12 peers. This tradition crossed the Atlantic, where American colonists embraced jury trials not only as a legal safeguard but as a political right. The Constitution enshrined this protection twice, in Article III and the Sixth Amendment, reflecting its centrality to the new republic.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Cavedon emphasizes that juries were never meant to be passive fact-checkers. Historically, they evaluated both facts and the justice of the law itself, exercising what some have termed “jury nullification.”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Revolution, resistance and jury autonomy</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The American Revolution reinforced the importance of juries. Singh and Cavedon note that British attempts to bypass colonial juries — by shifting trials to admiralty courts or even to London — provoked widespread alarm. Cavedon describes this as an “absolute panic,” as colonists feared the loss of local accountability and community judgment.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Two landmark cases illustrate the power juries once wielded. In 1670, a jury acquitted Quaker leader William Penn despite judicial pressure; their case established that jurors could not be punished for their verdicts. In 1735, a New York jury acquitted publisher John Peter Zenger of seditious libel, even though the law offered no defense for truthful criticism of the government. In both cases, juries asserted their authority to interpret justice beyond strict legal instructions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh contrasts this tradition with civil law systems, where judges and legal professionals dominate decision-making. In the Anglo-American system, by contrast, juries historically acted as a democratic check on state power.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The rise of the modern “assembly line”</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Cavedon states that over the past century, the criminal justice system has transformed into what he calls a “utilitarian… assembly line to produce convictions.” He traces this shift to Prohibition in the 1920s and 1930s, which expanded federal enforcement mechanisms that persisted long after alcohol bans ended.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Today, the overwhelming majority of cases never reach a jury. Roughly 97% of federal convictions and 94–95% of state convictions result from plea deals. Prosecutors wield significant leverage through what is often called the “trial penalty” — the threat of much harsher sentences if defendants refuse a plea and lose at trial.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Cavedon also points to structural incentives that reinforce this system. Many judges are former prosecutors, and law enforcement funding can be tied to arrest and conviction rates. Grand juries, once intended as a safeguard, have largely become procedural formalities. As Cavedon notes, they are often seen as “rubber stamps” for prosecutorial decisions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The cumulative effect, he says, is a system that sidelines ordinary citizens and concentrates power in legal institutions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Blinding juries to context</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Even when jury trials occur, Singh and Cavedon argue that jurors are often constrained in ways that limit meaningful judgment. Courts typically instruct juries to focus narrowly on factual questions while ignoring broader context, legal interpretation and consequences.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Cavedon highlights cases where this restriction leads to troubling outcomes. In one federal trial in California, jurors convicted a man for growing marijuana without being told he was part of a city-authorized medical program. In another case, a juror later learned that a defendant he helped convict received a 40-year mandatory sentence, prompting deep regret.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For Cavedon, such examples illustrate a broader problem: Jurors are excluded from considering the full moral and social implications of their decisions. He believes that this undermines both fairness and the democratic purpose of the jury system. “If people do not have confidence that ultimately it will be their neighbors and their peers who will make judgments,” he says, “then I think we have lost a significant amount of personal liberty.”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Can the jury system be reclaimed?</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh and Cavedon conclude with a question: Can the jury’s original role be restored? Cavedon believes it can, but only through a cultural and educational shift. He describes the forthcoming Cato Institute initiative, “Your Verdict Counts,” as an effort to reframe jury duty as an active form of citizenship rather than a burdensome obligation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He feels that jurors should see themselves as participants in a democratic process, bringing “their conscience and their values” into deliberations. This could revive the jury’s function as a check on state power and a protector of individual liberty.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh closes by considering the stakes. If juries no longer serve as a meaningful counterbalance within the justice system, then a key pillar of democratic accountability may already be eroding. The question is not just how the system functions today, but whether citizens are willing to reclaim the role it once gave them.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and speaks with legal scholar Matthew Cavedon of the Cato Institute about the evolution and erosion of the American jury system. What began as a cornerstone of democratic participation has, they argue, become a marginal feature of a highly bureaucratized legal process...." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Matthew Cavedon argue the American jury system has shifted from a core democratic safeguard to a sidelined institution dominated by plea deals. They trace its historic role as a check on authority and warn that modern practices limit citizen participation in justice. Reclaiming jury duty is essential to democratic accountability." post-date="Apr 20, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: The American Jury System Explained: Democracy or Illusion?" slug-data="fo-talks-the-american-jury-system-explained-democracy-or-illusion">

FO Talks: The American Jury System Explained: Democracy or Illusion?

April 20, 2026
Manu Sharma" post_date="April 19, 2026 06:14" pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-talks-war-in-iran-does-the-future-of-the-middle-east-look-bleak/" pid="161977" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with <a href="https://fointell.com/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">FOI</a> Partner and geopolitical analyst Manu Sharma about how the Iran war is evolving beyond a military confrontation into a systemic economic crisis. What began as a conflict shaped by assumptions about regime weakness and rapid victory now reveals a far more complex situation. As the war drags on, its most consequential effects are spreading through global energy markets, financial systems and industrial supply chains.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A war built on flawed assumptions</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Atul opens by asking Manu to frame the conflict. Manu describes it starkly as “a royal fight between… two thoroughly different military ideologies,” highlighting the clash between Western shock-and-awe doctrine and Iran’s long-prepared defensive model. The United States and Israel entered the war believing Iran was weakened by sanctions, internal unrest and economic decline. That assessment shaped a strategy centered on rapid decapitation strikes designed to collapse the regime within days.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or projecting power through regional proxies was a central objective. If left unchecked, Iran could potentially dominate Gulf energy flows, reshaping the balance of power in one of the world’s most critical regions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Yet the early premise — that Iran would quickly crumble — has not held. Despite economic strain and political tensions, the regime has endured. Atul and Manu suggest that Israeli and American planners underestimated the depth of Iran’s institutional and ideological structures, as well as its ability to absorb and respond to sustained military pressure.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Iran’s resilience and asymmetric strategy</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Iran’s response rests on preparation rather than improvisation. Instead of relying on centralized command structures vulnerable to decapitation, it has implemented what a decentralized “mosaic defense.” This system distributes authority across 31 independent military commands, making it difficult to disable the state through targeted strikes.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The same logic extends to governance. Iran’s layered redundancy ensures continuity even under extreme conditions. Leadership positions are backed by multiple successors, while the broader theocratic system provides an additional reservoir of authority. As Atul notes, this creates a depth that is not easily dismantled through conventional military means.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Manu explains that Iran has effectively built a different “operating system” for political survival. This system combines ideological commitment with military capability, allowing the state to withstand pressure that might destabilize more centralized regimes. The result is a conflict that has settled into a form of strategic stalemate, where none of the principal actors have achieved decisive political collapse.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Diverging political realities</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>While the battlefield remains contested, political responses differ sharply across countries. Atul says the war is highly popular in Israel, where even critics of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu broadly support the campaign. In contrast, public opinion in the US is far more divided, creating what Atul calls a “tale of two countries.”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Iran, meanwhile, has focused on building support beyond its borders. Its diplomatic outreach across Asia, particularly among Shia Muslim communities, has generated both political sympathy and material support. There are visible signs of this mobilization, including donations and grassroots support, suggesting that Iran’s messaging resonates in parts of the Global South. Women are even donating gold, considered family treasure in Asia, to the Iranian war effort.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>These dynamics reinforce a key point: The war is not producing uniform political outcomes. Rather, it is deepening fragmentation, both within societies and across the international system.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Economic warfare and Gulf vulnerability</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Unable to match Israeli or American firepower, Iran has resorted to economic warfare. Iranian forces have targeted the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and shaken their economic foundations. Iran has also blocked the Strait of Hormuz and reduced the ships going through this chokepoint to a trickle. This strategy exploits structural vulnerabilities in a region that, despite decades of diversification, remains heavily dependent on energy exports and food imports as well as consumer goods and machines for critical infrastructure such as desalination plants.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>By threatening shipping routes and energy facilities, Iran is effectively weaponizing geography. By blocking the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is driving up oil and gas prices, while attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf states create long-term supply constraints. In our globalized world, Arab states generating wealth through energy exports are diversifying their economies by pumping money into frontier economic activities. Iran has interrupted this flow of capital, which will have cascading effects far beyond the region.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Gulf’s role as a hub for trade, finance and transportation amplifies these risks. Cities like Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and Doha in Qatar, built as global hubs with international airports, high-end shopping and luxury tourism, now face the possibility that their greatest strengths — connectivity and openness — could become liabilities in a prolonged conflict.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Global spillovers and systemic risk</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The economic consequences extend well beyond energy markets. Gulf capital has played a crucial role in funding innovation and investment across Western economies, from real estate to cutting-edge technologies. If the war constrains the flow of this capital, the effects will ripple through sectors such as venture capital, artificial intelligence and infrastructure development.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Simultaneously, physical disruptions to energy production threaten the supply of critical industrial inputs. Helium shortages could affect semiconductor manufacturing, sulfur constraints could disrupt metal refining and reduced fertilizer production could reduce global agricultural output. These are not isolated shocks but interconnected pressures that strain the foundations of the global economy.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Manu captures the scale of the challenge with a warning: “This is a world that nobody is prepared for.” The conflict is no longer simply about territory or regime change. It is about the stability of systems that underpin modern economic life.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As Atul concludes, the war has entered a new phase. Iran has survived the initial assault, the US and Israel remain engaged, but the Gulf economies — central to global energy and finance — are under growing strain. The longer the conflict continues, the more likely it is to trigger cascading crises that reach far beyond the Middle East.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with FOI Partner and geopolitical analyst Manu Sharma about how the Iran war is evolving beyond a military confrontation into a systemic economic crisis. What began as a conflict shaped by assumptions about regime weakness and rapid victory now reveals a far more..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Manu Sharma examine how the Iran war poses huge risks to the global economy. Iran has withstood US and Israeli efforts to engineer regime change, and resorted to asymmetric warfare, which includes hitting targets in the Persian Gulf as well blockading the Strait of Hormuz. The ensuing disruptions to energy, shipping, finance and industrial inputs will trigger consequences far beyond the Middle East." post-date="Apr 19, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: War in Iran: Does the Future of the Middle East Look Bleak?" slug-data="fo-talks-war-in-iran-does-the-future-of-the-middle-east-look-bleak">

FO Talks: War in Iran: Does the Future of the Middle East Look Bleak?

April 19, 2026
Atul Singh" post_date="April 18, 2026 05:04" pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-live-how-the-us-israel-war-in-iran-could-redraw-middle-east-borders/" pid="161959" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh leads an FO Live editorial workshop on the escalating US–Israel war on Iran. The war is not an isolated crisis, but a conflict preceded by a long history. Joined by Katilyn Diana, Cheyenne Torres, Casey Herrman, Zania Morgan and Lucy Golish, Atul argues that the confrontation cannot be understood without revisiting the 1948 creation of Israel, the 1953 CIA-backed coup in Iran and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Atul moves between history, military strategy and economics, asking not only how the war began but also what kind of regional and global disorder it may yet unleash.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The three dates that shape the conflict</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Atul begins by identifying three decisive turning points: 1948, 1953 and 1979. In 1948, the UN established the state of Israel. It immediately had to fight the invading Arab states. For Israelis, that moment remains inseparable from the trauma of the Holocaust and the fear that the state could be destroyed at birth. Palestinians remember this moment as the Nakba, the mass displacement that accompanied Israel’s creation. Atul suggests these two memories still shape how the region understands security and injustice.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He then turns to 1953, when Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh faced an overthrow after nationalizing oil. Atul presents the coup as a foundational rupture in modern Iranian political memory. Britain and the US, he argues, removed a nationalist leader and restored a monarchy that ruled through repression. He says that the intervention weakened secular opposition and unintentionally strengthened the clerical networks that later filled the vacuum. By 1979, those clerical forces were organized enough to take power during the Iranian Revolution and build a theocratic state deeply suspicious of both Washington and domestic dissent.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Revolution, paranoia and the proxy strategy</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion portrays the Islamic Republic as a regime shaped by insecurity from the start. Atul explains that after the revolution, the new leadership distrusted the regular military and built Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a parallel force. The Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 then hardened the regime further, reinforcing a political culture built around sacrifice, siege and martyrdom.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>From that position, Iran gradually extended influence through allied armed groups across the region. Hezbollah, Hamas and later the Houthis became central as instruments of an Iranian strategy designed to offset conventional weakness. Atul argues that the regime sought legitimacy by presenting itself as the one power willing to resist both Israel and the US, while many Arab governments moved toward accommodation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Simultaneously, he makes clear that opposition to Western power did not make the Iranian system admirable. He repeatedly stresses its repression of women, students and dissidents, as well as its economic failures and political brutality.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A decisive moment for Israel and the US</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Atul argues that Israel and the US believe Iran is now weaker than it has been in years. From the Israeli perspective, the danger is existential. A small state with limited strategic depth cannot easily tolerate the possibility of a hostile regional power gaining stronger missile and nuclear capabilities. As Atul puts it, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has built his career around the doctrine that “peace through strength is the way forward.” In that framework, confrontation appears necessary.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Atul also highlights Israel’s confidence in its intelligence reach and military effectiveness. Atul describes a country that believes it has penetrated Iran deeply and can strike key personnel and infrastructure with precision. Yet he does not present victory as automatic.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Casey raises the possibility of Iran’s “Balkanization.” Atul explores the idea, noting that some American and Israeli thinkers see advantage in a looser, weaker or fragmented Iran. But he also warns that this could produce unintended consequences, including nationalist backlash, prolonged instability and deeper hostility toward outside powers.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Uncertainty inside Iran</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Iranian society is fractured and complex. Atul notes widespread discontent with the regime, especially among younger and educated Iranians. Protest movements, secular aspirations and anger at repression all suggest that the Islamic Republic has lost legitimacy among many citizens. Yet he cautions against assuming that foreign bombing will automatically translate into regime collapse.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>External attack can strengthen nationalism even where a government is unpopular. Atul remarks that “nationalism is the last refuge of a scoundrel,” but he also considers it a real political force. The killing of senior leaders, especially the Ayatollah, may not weaken the regime in the way outsiders expect. Martyrdom carries powerful weight in Shia political culture, and the failing oppressive late ruler has now become a symbol of resistance after being killed by a foreign enemy.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Kaitlyn and others push the conversation toward possible futures, including a democratic Iran. Atul sees some hope there, especially in a decentralized federal model that protects minorities and devolves power. But he also emphasizes that opposition groups remain divided among monarchists, republicans, federalists and competing ethnic movements. That makes any clean transition unlikely.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The war’s economic danger</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>When Zania asks about stagflation, Atul shifts from battlefield dynamics to global markets. He warns that a prolonged conflict could disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, drive up energy prices and trigger a supply shock across the world economy. Oil above $90 per barrel is not just a regional problem; it hits transport, industry, fertilizers, food production and financial confidence all at once.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The risk is not merely higher inflation but the toxic combination of inflation and stagnation that defined the 1970s oil shocks. The Gulf’s importance extends beyond crude exports. Capital from Arab states is deeply embedded in global finance, technology, property and sport. If war erodes confidence, both trade and investment could suffer.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This discussion ends with a broader warning: This is not only a Middle Eastern war. It may become a global economic and geopolitical turning point whose consequences reach far beyond the region.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh leads an FO Live editorial workshop on the escalating US–Israel war on Iran. The war is not an isolated crisis, but a conflict preceded by a long history. Joined by Katilyn Diana, Cheyenne Torres, Casey Herrman, Zania Morgan and Lucy Golish, Atul argues that the..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Atul Singh and several 51Թ editors trace the US–Israel war on Iran back to 1948, 1953 and 1979. The conflict reflects historic grievances and present-day fears about Iranian power, Israeli security and American strategy. Even if Iran appears weakened, a prolonged war could be destabilizing and economically disastrous, posing risks for global energy." post-date="Apr 18, 2026" post-title="FO Live: How the US–Israel War in Iran Could Redraw Middle East Borders" slug-data="fo-live-how-the-us-israel-war-in-iran-could-redraw-middle-east-borders">

FO Live: How the US–Israel War in Iran Could Redraw Middle East Borders

Paul Chambers" post_date="April 17, 2026 07:06" pUrl="/politics/fo-talks-how-nationalism-the-monarchy-and-cambodia-shaped-thailands-2026-election/" pid="161941" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Professor Paul Chambers about Thailand’s general election, held February 8, 2026. It delivered a decisive victory for conservative forces led by Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and his Bhumjaithai Party. The result now reshapes the country’s political landscape, as nationalism, rural mobilization and institutional power outweigh strong urban support for the progressive People’s Party. Thailand now stands at a crossroads, where demands for democratic reform collide with entrenched elite authority.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Nationalism, strategy and electoral muscle</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Chambers describes the vote as “a landslide victory for the forces of the right,” marking a sharp setback for progressive reformists. Early polling had favored the social democratic People’s Party, successor to the dissolved Move Forward and Future Forward parties. Yet a convergence of political forces shifts the outcome.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A border clash between Thailand and Cambodia in July 2025, which resulted in Thai casualties, fuels nationalist sentiment. A leaked phone call between then-Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and former Cambodian strongman Hun Sen, in which she spoke negatively about the Thai army, further intensifies public anger. Chambers argues that Anutin capitalized on the moment and used “nationalism to glide towards a victory.”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>But nationalism alone does not explain the result. Chambers points to allegations of vote buying in several provinces, coordination among conservative parties to avoid splitting the vote and the strategic use of local power brokers. Bhumjaithai also benefits from access to bureaucratic networks while in office, helping channel resources through provincial structures. Legal and questionable tactics combine to produce a commanding win.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Urban–rural divide, not an ideological earthquake</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The election reveals a stark geographic split. The People’s Party wins every district in Thailand’s capital of Bangkok and nearly all seats in the northern city of Chiang Mai. Rural provinces, particularly those near the Cambodian border, tilt heavily toward Anutin.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This pattern seems to reflect structural differences rather than a sweeping ideological realignment. Urban voters gravitate toward progressive platforms, while rural constituencies respond more strongly to nationalism and patronage networks. Chambers does not see the result as evidence of a permanent conservative turn, however. Instead, he calls it the “temper of the times,” shaped by border tensions and political mood.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He also criticizes the People’s Party’s internal weaknesses. Compared to its predecessors, it fails to organize effectively at the grassroots level and struggles to resonate beyond urban centers. The loss, then, stems not only from repression or manipulation but from strategic shortcomings within the reform movement itself.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Monarchy, military and managed democracy</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The structure of Thai power serves as a major talking point. Chambers explains that King Rama X, the king of Thailand, stands above politics and democracy. He says Thailand operates through a partnership between the monarchy and the military, with the armed forces acting as guardian and junior partner.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Senate, appointed rather than elected under the 2017 constitution, plays a decisive role in selecting the prime minister alongside the lower house. Parliament functions, but within strict boundaries. The lower chamber can debate budgets and investigate issues, yet it operates under the shadow of potential military intervention. Any serious challenge to royal prerogatives risks triggering a coup.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This framework shapes electoral politics. Even when progressive parties perform well, institutional levers remain firmly in conservative hands. Courts, oversight bodies and security forces collectively reinforce elite dominance.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Section 112 and the cost of dissent</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion turns personal when Chambers recounts his own prosecution under Section 112 of Thailand’s criminal code, the lèse-majesté law. The statute prohibits insulting the monarchy and carries severe penalties. He describes it as “a very ambiguous law,” one that allows broad interpretation and political weaponization.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In April 2025, Chambers was sentenced to 15 years in prison over a conference flyer stating that the king holds more power than the prime minister. Although he did not write or post the material, his name appears in connection with the event. He spent two nights in a rural prison before being released on bail. Charges were eventually dropped by the attorney general, but immigration authorities retained his passport until he boarded a flight out of Bangkok. “Yes, I had to flee,” he tells Khattar Singh.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>His case is not isolated. More than 280 individuals face Section 112-related cases. Anti-monarchy protests between 2020 and 2023 drew thousands of young demonstrators. The state responds not only with arrests but with subtler tactics: visits to families, legal pressure and selective prosecutions. Prominent activist Arnon Nampa remains imprisoned. Such measures weaken the reform movement incrementally rather than through dramatic mass repression.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Constitutional reform at a crossroads</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Alongside the election, voters support a referendum to begin drafting a new constitution to replace the military-backed 2017 charter. Reformers hope to curtail the appointed Senate’s power and restore a more democratic framework akin to the 1997 constitution.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Yet the path forward is steep. Three separate referendums are required to amend the charter. Chambers doubts the new government will push aggressively for further votes. With a fresh electoral mandate, Anutin can argue that voters have rejected sweeping change.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Meanwhile, judicial pressure intensifies. The National Anti-Corruption Commission forwards a case against 44 People’s Party members to the Supreme Court. If upheld, the ruling could strip them of political rights and potentially dissolve the party altogether. Chambers sees this as part of a broader strategy to erode progressive reformism bit by bit.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Thailand’s election thus reflects more than a partisan shift. It exposes the tension between popular demands for democratic change and a resilient alliance of monarchy, military and judiciary. Whether reformers can overcome institutional barriers or whether conservative dominance hardens further will shape the country’s political future and reverberate across Southeast Asia.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Professor Paul Chambers about Thailand’s general election, held February 8, 2026. It delivered a decisive victory for conservative forces led by Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and his Bhumjaithai Party. The result now..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Paul Chambers discuss Thailand’s 2026 general election, which reelected conservative Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul amid rising nationalism. Despite urban support for the People’s Party, rural mobilization and institutional advantages favor the right. They also explore the monarchy–military alliance, Section 112 prosecutions and the uncertain path of constitutional reform." post-date="Apr 17, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: How Nationalism, the Monarchy and Cambodia Shaped Thailand’s 2026 Election" slug-data="fo-talks-how-nationalism-the-monarchy-and-cambodia-shaped-thailands-2026-election">

FO Talks: How Nationalism, the Monarchy and Cambodia Shaped Thailand’s 2026 Election

April 17, 2026
Hugh Dugan" post_date="April 17, 2026 06:22" pUrl="/world-news/fo-live-wars-rage-in-iran-and-ukraine-where-is-the-united-nations/" pid="161937" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Hugh Dugan, a former UN insider and president of Multilateral Accountability Associates, and Daniel Wagner, the organization’s managing director and a political risk expert, about whether multilateralism can still function in a world shaped by war, rivalry and institutional fatigue. Global problems are increasingly interconnected, yet the institutions meant to manage them appear weaker, slower and less credible. Rather than declaring the system dead, Dugan and Wagner argue that multilateralism is changing form. The challenge now is to make it more accountable, more flexible and more relevant.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A fractured order without a clear replacement</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Khattar Singh begins by asking whether today’s world is the most fractured it has ever been. Dugan resists that conclusion. He says the current moment feels unusually heavy because crises move faster, news travels instantly and everyone can now consume and comment on world events in real time. Even so, he cautions against assuming that the present is uniquely catastrophic.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Dugan points to one paradox in the current order. While internal conflicts remain widespread, wars between states are relatively rare by historical standards. He also argues that countries are now more likely than before to see distant crises as shared concerns rather than someone else’s problem.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Wagner takes a more skeptical stance. The real difficulty lies in the absence of an agreed successor to the liberal order that followed the Cold War. In his view, power has become too diffuse for any stable framework to hold. He describes this condition as “diffuse multipolarity,” which he says is “collapsing our normative architecture.” For him, the problem is not simply that the world is changing, but that no accepted structure has emerged to manage that change.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">From old multilateralism to a more crowded system</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion then turns to what Wagner and Dugan call the “new multilateralism.” Dugan defines the old model as a system dominated by governments and intergovernmental bodies, where civil society, academics and ordinary citizens remain outside the room. That structure, he suggests, no longer reflects how influence actually works.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In its place, Dugan sees a more crowded environment. Social media, digital communication, corporations and wealthy private actors now shape global affairs alongside states. Issue-based networks can form quickly, operate across borders and exert real pressure on governments and institutions. He believes multilateralism is no longer just about formal diplomacy among states — it is also about how these newer actors enter spaces once reserved for governments alone.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This is one reason he believes institutions like the United Nations have struggled to keep pace. They still operate through older structures even as the world around them has changed. Dugan says that many of these bodies have become too bureaucratic and too inward-looking. In his telling, they have focused more on preserving themselves than on adapting to new realities.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Accountability, outcomes and the limits of reform</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A central theme of the conversation is accountability. Dugan argues that international institutions have long measured the wrong things. Too often, they highlight outputs such as meetings, reports or programs rather than outcomes that show whether real progress has been made. For him, that distinction is critical. The question is not how active an institution appears, but whether it actually solves problems.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Wagner agrees and states that many countries have already responded to institutional weakness by shifting toward bilateral arrangements. They still need trade, security and cooperation, but they no longer trust the multilateral system to deliver. His preferred answer is not to abolish existing institutions, but to supplement them with more flexible coalitions built around specific issues.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He also sees a role for new tools. Wagner believes that digital governance, including blockchain and AI, could improve transparency and strengthen accountability across institutions that now rely too heavily on slow and opaque processes. Simultaneously, he doubts that major international bodies will change on their own. These organizations, he suggests, are too entrenched for wholesale reform unless governments and outside actors apply sustained pressure.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The UN Security Council and the problem of power</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Wagner and Dugan disagree strongly about the UN Security Council. Wagner feels the current structure no longer reflects our modern world. He points to the five permanent members as a relic of World War II and says countries such as India remain unjustifiably excluded from the top table. He considers the arrangement outdated and increasingly hard to defend.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Dugan takes a different stance: that the Security Council still performs its core function because it forces the most dangerous powers to remain engaged with one another. “It works and it works well,” he says, not because it is democratic, but because it keeps major powers in the same room. Dugan finds the veto frustrating but useful. It gives powerful states an incentive to stay inside the system rather than act wholly outside it.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He is also doubtful that formal reform will happen soon. Instead of expanding the permanent membership, he proposes a more modest change: elected members should act as true representatives of their regions rather than merely advancing their own national interests. That would not solve the legitimacy problem, but it could make the Council more representative in practice.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Norms, middle powers and the future of the UN</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Khattar Singh presses both guests on whether international rules now apply mainly to weaker states while great powers ignore them when convenient. Wagner largely agrees, though he feels that reputational costs still matter at the margins. Dugan answers with more optimism. He says the UN’s greatest achievement may not be enforcement, but the accumulation of norms that define acceptable conduct. From human rights to humanitarian principles, these standards still shape expectations even when they are violated.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion ends by considering middle powers and the United States. Wagner sees countries such as India, Canada and Australia as increasingly important bridge-builders in a world where many states do not want to align fully with either Washington or Beijing. Dugan makes a similar point in more institutional terms: smaller and mid-sized states often value multilateral platforms more than great powers do because they need them more.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On the US, both reject the idea that Washington is simply abandoning multilateralism. Wagner sees recent funding cuts as a way of pressuring institutions to change. Dugan frames the Trump approach in more transactional terms, arguing that the UN is being treated like an underperforming property that powerful actors still believe could yield value if restructured.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The crisis of multilateralism is real, but it does not mean global cooperation is over. It means the old system no longer fits the world it claims to govern.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Hugh Dugan, a former UN insider and president of Multilateral Accountability Associates, and Daniel Wagner, the organization’s managing director and a political risk expert, about whether multilateralism can still function in a..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Rohan Khattar Singh, Hugh Dugan and Daniel Wagner examine whether multilateralism is failing or evolving in a fragmented global order. While institutions like the United Nations struggle with relevance, accountability and outdated structures, new actors are reshaping global governance. The future of multilateralism depends on adapting institutions to deliver outcomes, not just process." post-date="Apr 17, 2026" post-title="FO Live: Wars Rage in Iran and Ukraine, Where is the United Nations?" slug-data="fo-live-wars-rage-in-iran-and-ukraine-where-is-the-united-nations">

FO Live: Wars Rage in Iran and Ukraine, Where is the United Nations?

Bryn Barnard" post_date="April 14, 2026 05:48" pUrl="/business/technology/fo-talks-from-minneapolis-to-kuwait-welfare-model-under-pressure-in-the-ai-era/" pid="161879" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and author Bryn Barnard discuss whether universal basic income can really solve the social dislocation promised by artificial intelligence. Their conversation moves far beyond abstract theory. Using Kuwait as a real-world example of a society sustained by oil wealth, Barnard argues that the country already offers something close to a universal basic income (UBI) system. In doing so, it reveals the political, economic and moral complications that come with paying citizens while relying on others to do much of the work.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">AI, redundancy and the UBI question</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion begins with the larger technological fear driving renewed interest in UBI. Singh asks Barnard to assess predictions that AI could replace both cognitive and manual labor, leaving millions economically unnecessary. Barnard notes that some thinkers, including Yuval Noah Harari, imagine AI not merely as a tool but as an autonomous force that may eventually outperform humans across most forms of work.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Barnard highlights the critics. He points to figures such as cognitive scientist Gary Marcus and author Ed Zitron, who argue that current large language models remain deeply flawed, whether because of hallucinations, financial unsustainability or the poor quality of synthetic training data. Even so, the uncertainty does not remove the policy problem. If AI does eliminate vast numbers of jobs, governments will still have to decide how displaced populations are meant to live.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That is where UBI reenters the debate. Rather than treating it as a futuristic abstraction, Barnard turns to a country that already approximates it in practice.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Kuwait as a living model</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Barnard presents Kuwait as an oil-funded welfare state where citizens receive extensive benefits that together amount to a substantial annual social transfer. As he explains, “It’s about [$33,000] to $60,000 a year, depending on how you do your counting.” Free healthcare, free education, subsidized housing, child-related benefits and guaranteed public-sector jobs combine to create a system in which many citizens enjoy economic security without participating fully in a competitive labor market.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This model rests on a sharp hierarchy. Kuwait has roughly 1.5 million citizens, alongside a far larger population of migrant workers who carry out much of the country’s manual and professional labor. Barnard explains that this arrangement emerged when Kuwait lacked the domestic skills needed to build a modern state. Migrants became teachers, engineers, administrators and laborers, while the state used oil wealth to distribute benefits to citizens.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For Barnard, Kuwait shows what can happen when income is detached from productive pressure over generations. A large share of citizens work in protected government positions, where advancement is often weakly tied to performance or innovation. This, he argues, creates long-term deskilling.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Migrant labor and the human cost</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The conversation then turns to the structure that makes this system function. Singh presses Barnard on the treatment of migrants across the Gulf. Barnard describes the Kafala system, under which workers’ legal status is tied to employers who may hold their passports and control their mobility. He agrees with Singh that this resembles bonded labor, even if the comparison is not exact.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Barnard also recounts the cruelty that can emerge when a society views migrant labor as disposable. During Covid-19, a Kuwaiti influencer suggested that migrants be sent into the desert to die so they would not spread disease. Unfortunately, a wider dehumanization is built into the system.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Kuwait’s dependence on migrants, then, is not just an economic fact. It is a moral contradiction within a welfare order that protects one population by exposing another to precarity and abuse.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Citizenship, denaturalization and shrinking the welfare pool</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Barnard argues that Kuwait’s real warning for UBI advocates lies not only in deskilling, but in what happens when the money tightens. As oil revenues fluctuate and long-term fiscal pressures mount, the state has looked for ways to reduce the number of people entitled to benefits. That has taken the form of citizenship revocation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Barnard describes how thousands have been denaturalized, including dual nationals and others whose family claims have come under state scrutiny. “The campaign is not over,” he warns, underscoring that citizenship itself is becoming a fiscal instrument. In effect, reducing the citizen pool becomes a way of reducing obligations.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This is where the conversation becomes especially relevant beyond Kuwait. Singh draws comparisons to debates in the United States over immigration, denaturalization and welfare burdens. Barnard suggests that once a state promises cradle-to-grave security, political pressure may grow to decide who fully belongs and who does not.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The deeper problem of meaning</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>By the end of the discussion, Barnard argues that Kuwait exposes more than a budgetary problem. It reveals a human one. “Kuwaitis have been deskilled,” he says. In Kuwaiti society, guaranteed support can weaken incentives to build capability, purpose and resilience.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That insight gives the conversation its wider force. UBI may cushion economic disruption, but Kuwait suggests that it can also generate dependency, distort citizenship and leave unresolved the question Singh repeatedly returns to: If work disappears, what gives life structure and meaning? Barnard’s answer is not that welfare should be abolished, but that any society considering UBI must reckon with its unintended consequences before treating it as a simple solution to the age of AI.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and author Bryn Barnard discuss whether universal basic income can really solve the social dislocation promised by artificial intelligence. Their conversation moves far beyond abstract theory. Using Kuwait as a real-world example of a society sustained by oil wealth,..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Bryn Barnard consider Kuwait as a test case for universal basic income in an age of AI-driven job loss. Kuwait’s welfare state shows how generous benefits can create deskilling, dependence on migrant labor and rising pressure to narrow citizenship when fiscal strains grow. UBI can bring deep political and social consequences." post-date="Apr 14, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: From Minneapolis to Kuwait — Welfare Model Under Pressure in the AI Era" slug-data="fo-talks-from-minneapolis-to-kuwait-welfare-model-under-pressure-in-the-ai-era">

FO Talks: From Minneapolis to Kuwait — Welfare Model Under Pressure in the AI Era

April 14, 2026
Vinay Singh" post_date="April 13, 2026 05:47" pUrl="/business/fo-talks-the-9-trillion-crisis-ai-burnout-and-the-collapse-of-white-collar-jobs/" pid="161853" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>51Թ</em>’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and Global Civilization Dynamics Founder Vinay Singh to examine a silent breakdown in the modern white-collar economy. They begin with a striking anecdote: a software engineer claiming experience at Meta sends hundreds of applications and reaches out to more than a thousand recruiters without receiving a single offer. For Singh, the episode raises a disturbing possibility about today’s labor market. “When this top-tier engineer sends 1,000 signals into the market and gets back nothing but silence,” he says, “we have to ask: Is the hiring system broken or is it working exactly as designed?”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Their discussion widens from this example to a broader diagnosis of technological change, economic transformation and mounting worker burnout. Both speakers argue that artificial intelligence, financialized markets and decades of economic restructuring may be redefining the value of human labor itself.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The “black hole” of hiring</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh frames the engineer’s experience as evidence of what he calls the “black hole of human meritocracy.” Highly qualified candidates increasingly encounter opaque hiring systems dominated by automated screening tools. Resumes disappear into applicant-tracking systems, while recruiters struggle to distinguish genuine candidates from automated applications generated by AI tools.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The phenomenon, Singh suggests, echoes earlier labor shocks. He points to similarities with the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, when job seekers reported submitting hundreds of applications with little response. The difference today is the scale and persistence of the problem, which now spans multiple economic cycles.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The result may be a profound misallocation of human effort. Millions of workers spend vast amounts of time tailoring resumes and applications that are processed almost entirely by algorithms. Singh characterizes this as a massive extraction of human productivity from the economy without producing meaningful output.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">From postwar inclusion to financialized capitalism</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Isackson situates the present moment within a longer historical arc. In the decades following World War II, Western economies cultivated a strong sense of social participation. Programs such as the US GI Bill and New Deal institutions created relatively stable employment and reinforced the idea that society needed the contributions of ordinary citizens.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That sense of belonging, he argues, gradually eroded over the past half-century. Economic thinking increasingly prioritized shareholder returns and financial markets over employment and social stability. This has resulted in a system that measures value almost exclusively through financial outcomes.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>“We’ve seen a long trend going in the direction of devaluing human presence,” he says. Human worth, once embedded in institutions and communities, is now assessed primarily through economic productivity.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The rise of agentic AI</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>They then turn to the accelerating development of artificial intelligence. Singh distinguishes between the generative AI that became widely visible in recent years and a newer phase known as agentic AI — systems capable of performing complex tasks autonomously.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Recent partnerships between technology companies and research organizations illustrate the shift. AI systems are now being deployed to analyze biological data, design pharmaceutical compounds and carry out tasks that once required large teams of human specialists.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh describes a rapidly emerging “bot-versus-bot” economy in which automated systems apply for jobs while other algorithms evaluate applications. “Human beings’ souls are being lost,” he warns, arguing that the decoupling of labor from value creation threatens the foundations of the modern workforce.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Isackson agrees that the economic logic driving automation is powerful. Yet he stresses that production alone cannot define human activity within an economy. Businesses and institutions, he argues, are not merely technical systems but social environments shaped by human interpretation and meaning.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Burnout in the global workforce</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Evidence is mounting of global worker burnout. Singh cites workforce surveys reporting that more than 80% of employees experience some level of exhaustion or disengagement. Younger workers appear particularly affected, with high levels of reported stress and declining engagement.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The phenomenon extends beyond white-collar sectors. Labor unrest across Europe, including widespread strikes in Italy’s transportation sector, reflects similar frustrations among blue-collar workers facing stagnant wages and rising costs of living.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Isackson believes burnout reflects more than excessive workloads. Many workers are experiencing a deeper loss of purpose within economic systems that no longer recognize their broader human value. When individuals feel interchangeable or invisible within automated systems, they can experience severe psychological consequences.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A civilizational turning point</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh points to the growing recognition among global economic leaders that technological change may be reshaping capitalism itself. Some figures within finance and industry have warned that AI-driven productivity gains could deepen inequality and destabilize consumer economies.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Isackson sees these concerns as signs of a larger historical transition. The transformation now underway may force societies to rethink the relationship between technology, labor and human identity.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>“We’re in a great transformation,” he says. Whether political and business leaders can adapt to that transformation remains uncertain. Yet both speakers agree that the scale of the changes now unfolding suggests that the future of work, and perhaps the meaning of human contribution within modern economies, is entering a decisive new phase.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and Global Civilization Dynamics Founder Vinay Singh to examine a silent breakdown in the modern white-collar economy. They begin with a striking anecdote: a software engineer claiming experience at Meta sends hundreds of applications and..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Peter Isackson and Vinay Singh examine a growing crisis in white-collar employment as automation, opaque hiring systems and financialized capitalism reshape the labor market. Agentic AI and algorithmic hiring may be decoupling human work from economic value. The discussion frames rising burnout and disengagement as signs of a deeper civilizational transition." post-date="Apr 13, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: The $9 Trillion Crisis — AI, Burnout and the Collapse of White Collar Jobs" slug-data="fo-talks-the-9-trillion-crisis-ai-burnout-and-the-collapse-of-white-collar-jobs">

FO Talks: The $9 Trillion Crisis — AI, Burnout and the Collapse of White Collar Jobs

April 13, 2026
Kanwal Sibal" post_date="April 12, 2026 05:56" pUrl="/world-news/fo-live-kanwal-sibal-explains-why-india-is-europes-strategic-alternative-to-china/" pid="161831" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>51Թ</em>’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson, former Foreign Secretary of India Kanwal Sibal and Assistant Editor Luna Rovira discuss the landmark January 27 trade agreement between India and the European Union. Sibal frames it in striking terms, calling it the “mother of all deals” because of the scale involved: India’s 1.4 billion-strong market linking with the EU’s 27-nation bloc, whose economy rivals that of the United States.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>India is already the world’s fourth-largest economy and is projected to become the third within a few years. Europe, meanwhile, remains a high-consumption, technologically advanced export power but faces demographic decline and slow growth. Sibal sees the agreement as more than commercial; once economic linkages deepen, political cooperation on international issues becomes easier. Trade, investment and technology transfer create strategic ballast.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The deal also reflects Europe’s recalibration away from China. Sibal argues that Beijing’s “excessive manufacturing capacities” and dominance in rare earths, renewables and key industrial processes have generated structural imbalances. Europe seeks resilient supply chains and alternatives to overdependence. In this context, he describes India as “a very attractive partner,” citing democratic governance, market openness and greater predictability compared to China.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Trump, tariffs and strategic diversification</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>US President Donald Trump serves as the catalyst here. The US imposed 15% tariffs on Europe while extracting major energy purchase and investment commitments. This has shaken European confidence in the transatlantic relationship.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Sibal argues that Trump has “humiliated Europe,” not only through trade pressure but through the broader disruption of NATO structures and Ukraine diplomacy. Isackson probes whether Europe’s long-standing subordinate alignment with Washington has reached a breaking point. Sibal identifies that India and Europe now seek to “expand [their] options” and reduce exposure to American unpredictability.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For India, the calculus is similar. It faces some of the highest US tariffs, and the future direction of American trade policy remains uncertain. The India–EU agreement thus reflects mutual hedging. It is an attempt to widen strategic autonomy in an era of volatile American leadership.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Europe, Ukraine and the question of sovereignty</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion broadens to Europe’s geopolitical standing, especially in the Ukraine war. Sibal observes that both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin have sidelined Europe in negotiations. For him, this exclusion signals that Washington does not assign Europe decisive weight in matters of continental security.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He also argues that Europe weakened its own credibility. Admissions by former French President François Hollande and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel that the Minsk agreements served as temporary arrangements undermined trust in Moscow. Meanwhile, Baltic states and Poland exert disproportionate influence within EU consensus politics, amplifying a moralized anti-Russian narrative.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Isackson raises the internal fragmentation of Europe itself: weak parliamentary authority at the EU level, rising populist parties such as Germany’s Alternative for Germany, and declining public trust in national governments. Sibal agrees that the Belgian capital of Brussels has accumulated authority in areas that blur the boundaries of member-state sovereignty, though he cautions against dismissing Europe as strategically irrelevant. If Washington and Brussels coordinate effectively, Europe could still shape outcomes. But at present, he sees a continent struggling to define a coherent geopolitical voice.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Regulation, reform and economic complementarity</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On the mechanics of the deal, Sibal pushes back against concerns about India’s bureaucratic readiness. He believes Europe’s regulatory ecosystem poses a greater challenge. The EU’s strict health, digital and environmental standards — including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism — may limit practical market access even after tariff reductions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Agriculture, notably contentious in the agreement between the EU and the Southern Common Market trade bloc, is excluded from the India deal, reducing the likelihood of domestic backlash. The deal also includes a mobility framework for skilled workers, which Sibal distinguishes from immigration.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He stresses economic complementarity. Indian exports in textiles, leather, gems and jewelry could benefit significantly as duties fall to zero. Europe supplies advanced industrial goods and technology. India, meanwhile, is consciously reducing protectionism, having concluded or pursued agreements with Australia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and others. Integration into global supply chains is now a strategic priority, not an afterthought.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Russia, sanctions and India’s strategic balance</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The final segment addresses India’s continued purchase of Russian oil and its role within BRICS. Sibal insists India has violated no international law. Purchases were made at discounted price caps set by the US, and Indian refiners operated within sanction parameters. Recent US tariff penalties have already reduced Indian offtake.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>European leaders have voiced concern, and some Indian firms have faced EU sanctions. Still, Sibal rejects accusations of hypocrisy as “ridiculous,” especially given Europe’s own substantial energy purchases from Russia in the early years of the war.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>India, he emphasizes, will not sever ties with Moscow or its BRICS partners. Rather, it is a moderating force within BRICS — a country that prevents the grouping from hardening into a purely anti-Western bloc. In his formulation, India’s presence serves Western interests by keeping channels open between democratic and authoritarian systems. A multipolar world, in his view, should not be anti-Western but more balanced, giving emerging powers a greater voice in global governance.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson, former Foreign Secretary of India Kanwal Sibal and Assistant Editor Luna Rovira discuss the landmark January 27 trade agreement between India and the European Union. Sibal frames it in striking terms, calling it the “mother of all deals”..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Peter Isackson, Luna Rovira and Kanwal Sibal discuss the January 27 India–EU trade agreement. They argue that US unpredictability, alongside Europe’s frictions with China and its Ukraine-era strategic confusion, helped accelerate Europe’s turn toward India. The conversation examines regulatory hurdles, economic complementarity and India’s positioning as a balancing power in a multipolar order." post-date="Apr 12, 2026" post-title="FO Live: Kanwal Sibal Explains Why India Is Europe’s Strategic Alternative to China" slug-data="fo-live-kanwal-sibal-explains-why-india-is-europes-strategic-alternative-to-china">

FO Live: Kanwal Sibal Explains Why India Is Europe’s Strategic Alternative to China

April 12, 2026
Ben Freeman" post_date="April 11, 2026 05:20" pUrl="/world-news/fo-talks-is-america-building-a-1-5-trillion-war-machine-to-fight-china/" pid="161815" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Ben Freeman, co-author of <em>The Trillion Dollar </em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Trillion-Dollar-War-Machine-Bankrupts/dp/1645030636/ref=sr_1_1?adgrpid=185684971425&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.jafOgukmgeSmUSncETHF_Lo1cFnjBvM8ftOxD9bOVWdN3RzDl3iXXCJQLj9bgp4nRygUS7xzquT4hvjisJr8OvAKFLfLJQG_YN3QnxdAIdE.oF213-8XFTSe-M6PAyVXO0Sr34cYuPPlPiR8zraVPLc&dib_tag=se&hvadid=779674212947&hvdev=c&hvexpln=0&hvlocphy=1019250&hvnetw=g&hvocijid=5232793906792822668--&hvqmt=e&hvrand=5232793906792822668&hvtargid=kwd-2430239029883&hydadcr=22592_13821282_8484&keywords=the+trillion+dollar+war+machine&mcid=6f8dcee94c29396ebb3ceb5073b0af3b&qid=1771560465&sr=8-1" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow"><em>War Machine</em></a><em>: How Runaway Military Spending Drives America into Foreign Wars and Bankrupts Us at Home</em>, discuss US President Donald Trump’s proposed $1.5 trillion defense budget. Their conversation moves beyond headline numbers to examine threat inflation, the power of defense contractors and the mounting risks posed by America’s nearly $39 trillion national debt. At stake is military posture toward China and the long-term sustainability of the American state.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The 1.5 trillion-dollar question</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh opens by noting that Trump has called for a $1.5 trillion military budget for fiscal year 2027, a figure endorsed by <em>The Washington Post</em>’s editorial board. Supporters argue that as a percentage of GDP, defense spending is historically low, and that China’s rapid military buildup demands urgent investment.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>“I don’t think much of it,” Freeman says bluntly. He points out that the current US military budget is already roughly three times larger than China’s. The United States maintains more than 700 overseas bases, effectively surrounding China, while Beijing operates only a handful abroad. Ignoring that accumulated infrastructure distorts the debate.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>When Singh raises concerns about China’s 22 shipyards, drone production and expanding industrial capacity, Freeman stresses the difference between quantity and quality. “The Chinese Navy pales in comparison to the US Navy,” he states, insisting that technological sophistication and global reach matter more than raw output. For him, tripling China’s spending has already secured a qualitative advantage. Raising it to five times China’s level requires a clearer strategic rationale than simply invoking Beijing’s rise.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Threat inflation and the iron triangle</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The conversation then turns to “threat inflation,” a concept central to Freeman’s work. The military-industrial complex requires a persistent adversary to justify its scale. Without an external foe, Americans might begin asking why resources are not directed toward healthcare, education or infrastructure.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Freeman describes the “iron triangle” linking Congress, the Pentagon and defense contractors. Roughly 54% of the Department of Defense budget flows to private contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics. These firms then invest heavily in lobbying, campaign contributions and hiring former officials, reinforcing a cycle that sustains high spending.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The result, he says, is a self-perpetuating system that has expanded beyond what President Dwight Eisenhower warned about in 1961. Today, the ecosystem includes think tanks, universities, media organizations and even local institutions, all reinforcing the normalization of American militarism.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The defense tech disruption</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Yet the system is not static. Singh asks whether the “Big Five” will simply continue vacuuming up taxpayer money indefinitely. Freeman points to the rise of defense tech firms such as SpaceX, Anduril and Palantir as a disruptive force.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>These companies, often backed by Silicon Valley capital and closely connected to the Trump administration, are competing with legacy contractors for Pentagon contracts. Freeman characterizes the moment as a pivotal transition, with tech-driven firms potentially supplanting parts of the old guard.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>But he tempers expectations. “A rising tide is lifting all defense contractors right now,” he notes. Even if the composition of contractors changes, the overall budget trajectory shows little sign of decline.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Debt, deficits and the limits of expansion</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The most sobering portion of the discussion concerns the national debt. With US debt nearing $39 trillion and annual deficits exceeding $1 trillion, Freeman warns that any increase in defense spending will be entirely debt financed. According to projections, a $1.5 trillion annual budget could add nearly $6 trillion to the debt over a decade.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For the first time, US debt servicing costs now exceed the Pentagon budget. Interest payments alone are approaching $1 trillion annually. Freeman cautions that borrowing to pay interest risks triggering a vicious debt spiral. The US has not run a budget surplus since 1999, making this a bipartisan problem decades in the making.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If defense spending remains politically sacrosanct and debt servicing unavoidable, the remaining pressure points are the long-untouchable Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. Cutting them, Freeman observes, would be “political suicide.” That leaves Washington with few painless options.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A new cold war?</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As the US–Russia New START treaty expires and nuclear arms control weakens, Singh raises the prospect of an accelerating arms race. Freeman questions the strategic logic of expanding nuclear arsenals beyond already overwhelming levels, arguing that such expansions chiefly benefit contractors.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Still, he concedes that a technological cold war with China is real. Competition in artificial intelligence, robotics, drones and hypersonics is intensifying. Here, Freeman does not oppose investment per se. Instead, he criticizes what he sees as misallocation. The problem, he suggests, is not insufficient funding but inefficient spending on legacy platforms at the expense of emerging technologies.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Ultimately, the debate is about how the US will prepare to face Chinese competition. Singh and Freeman leave viewers with a dilemma: expand the war machine and risk fiscal crisis, or reform it before the debt itself becomes the greatest national security threat of all.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Ben Freeman, co-author of The Trillion Dollar War Machine: How Runaway Military Spending Drives America into Foreign Wars and Bankrupts Us at Home, discuss US President Donald Trump’s proposed $1.5 trillion defense budget. Their conversation moves beyond headline..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Ben Freeman examine US President Donald Trump’s proposed $1.5 trillion defense budget, questioning whether China’s rise justifies such expansion. Freeman critiques threat inflation, the entrenched “iron triangle” and growing influence of defense contractors. He warns that rising debt and interest payments may pose a greater long-term threat than Beijing." post-date="Apr 11, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: Is America Building a $1.5 Trillion War Machine to Fight China?" slug-data="fo-talks-is-america-building-a-1-5-trillion-war-machine-to-fight-china">

FO Talks: Is America Building a $1.5 Trillion War Machine to Fight China?

April 11, 2026
Kuber Chalise" post_date="April 10, 2026 05:35" pUrl="/politics/fo-talks-nepals-political-earthquake-as-gen-z-elevates-a-rapper-to-power/" pid="161799" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><em>[Editor’s note: This interview was conducted on March 13, prior to Nepali Prime Minister Balen Shah’s inauguration on March 27, 2026.]</em></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Rohan Khattar Singh, 51Թ’s Video Producer & Social Media Manager, speaks with Kuber Chalise, a journalist for <em>Nepal Khabar</em>, about the election that has upended Nepal’s political order. At the center of the discussion is the rise of Balen Shah, a 35-year-old engineer, former rapper and former mayor of Kathmandu, who has become prime minister after the Rashtriya Swatantra Party’s sweeping victory. Khattar Singh and Chalise explore why traditional parties collapsed so quickly, why young voters turned so sharply against the old guard and why Nepal’s new leaders now face a harder test in government than they did at the ballot box.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A revolt against the old parties</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Chalise presents the result as a long time coming. Nepal’s established parties, including the Nepali Congress and major communist factions, lost public trust over years of corruption, nepotism and poor governance. These parties had once expanded rights and shaped the post-monarchy political system, but they failed to adapt after the 2015 constitution.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That failure created a widening gap between political elites and the public, especially younger voters. Chalise says the old parties behaved as though politics could continue as usual even after their original mission had ended. Public frustration deepened over stagnant leadership, weak performance and a closed political class dominated by insiders.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Khattar Singh places the election in the context of the September 2025 Generation Z protests, which erupted over these frustrations and forced the resignation of then-Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. Despite the unrest, the subsequent vote was peaceful. Chalise calls the election’s conduct “a miracle,” given the violence that preceded it.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The scale of the political shift</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The results show how decisively voters turned away from the traditional order. Chalise explains that the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) dominated the lower-house contest and is expected to hold 182 of 275 seats. By contrast, the Nepali Congress fell sharply. The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), led by Oli, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre), associated with former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (or Prachanda), were reduced to minor roles.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For Chalise, the message is clear. The public has handed the RSP a workable majority and the chance to govern for five years, but not a mandate to rewrite the constitution. Because the party lacks upper-house representation, it cannot change the constitutional framework alone.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The result also breaks a longstanding assumption that no single party could secure a stable majority. Khattar Singh notes that Nepal has seen 32 governments in 35 years. Still, Chalise warns that a majority alone is not enough. The real question, he suggests, is majority versus maturity.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why Shah rose so fast</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion then turns to Shah. His rise began with his victory as mayor of Kathmandu, which gave voters a chance to judge his performance. His reputation rests largely on contrast. In a system associated with financial scandals, Shah emerged without a personal corruption case.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That clean image becomes his main political asset. Chalise describes it as Shah’s “USP,” the unique selling point that distinguished him from many local leaders facing corruption allegations. He also notes Shah’s unusual style. Unlike many senior leaders, Shah speaks sparingly. Chalise calls him “a very mysterious character,” and Khattar Singh notes that this unpredictability can appear both as strength and weakness.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The youth dimension is equally important. Chalise argues that for decades, Nepal’s young people drove political movements but were sidelined once power was distributed. This election reflects a democratic revolt against that pattern, with younger voters choosing to take power through the ballot.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A party with power but no identity</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Even after its landslide, the RSP remains politically unsettled. Chalise says the party lacks a clear ideological identity and has not yet held its first convention. Its elected members come from varied backgrounds, including democrats, leftists and some with monarchist leanings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Its appeal rests on delivery rather than doctrine. Khattar Singh suggests that voters increasingly prioritize jobs, prosperity and competence over ideology. Chalise agrees, noting that the party’s commitment paper points toward liberal economic instincts and a role for the private sector, though he stops short of calling it ideologically defined.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That ambiguity creates risk. If the new government performs, it may dominate Nepal for years. If it fails, support could collapse quickly. From a political science perspective, Chalise says, the RSP is “not yet a party.” It must evolve while governing.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The real test starts now</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The conversation concludes with the challenge ahead. Khattar Singh points to Nepal’s difficult geography, limited state capacity and dependence on India and China for trade and energy. Nepal cannot insulate itself from regional instability or global shocks.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Chalise agrees that foreign policy may prove decisive. Nepal’s next government must navigate shifting regional dynamics and domestic expectations simultaneously. Shah’s nationalist symbolism, including the “Greater Nepal” map seen in his office, adds uncertainty. Chalise returns to the same point: Shah is unpredictable, and whether that becomes an asset or liability depends on how he governs.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For now, voters have rejected the old political class and chosen youth, anti-corruption politics and the promise of delivery. But protest energy and electoral success are only the beginning. The real test starts with governing.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short="Rohan Khattar Singh, 51Թ’s Video Producer & Social Media Manager, speaks with Kuber Chalise, a journalist for Nepal Khabar, about the..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Kuber Chalise analyze Nepal’s 2026 election, where Gen Z protests and anti-corruption sentiment propelled Balen Shah and the Rashtriya Swatantra Party to victory. They highlight the collapse of traditional parties and the movement away from ideology toward delivery. Governance, stability and geopolitics will determine whether this political earthquake endures." post-date="Apr 10, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: Nepal’s Political Earthquake as Gen Z Elevates a Rapper to Power" slug-data="fo-talks-nepals-political-earthquake-as-gen-z-elevates-a-rapper-to-power">

FO Talks: Nepal’s Political Earthquake as Gen Z Elevates a Rapper to Power

April 10, 2026
Evan Munsing" post_date="April 09, 2026 06:02" pUrl="/world-news/us-news/fo-talks-america-first-to-iran-war-making-sense-of-donald-trumps-foreign-policy/" pid="161785" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Evan Munsing, candidate for Colorado’s competitive 8th Congressional District, Marine Corps veteran and entrepreneur, examine the United States’s sudden entry into war with Iran under President Donald Trump. Contradictorily, a president who campaigned on avoiding foreign entanglements has launched a new conflict in the Middle East. As Singh and Munsing explore the implications, they situate the war within a broader pattern of strategic ambiguity, institutional decline and growing public distrust. The result is not just a geopolitical crisis, but a test of American democracy itself.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Shock, contradiction and shifting goals</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Munsing describes a political landscape caught off guard. Across party lines, Americans are struggling to reconcile Trump’s long-standing “America First” rhetoric with a decision to initiate war. Drawing on conversations from the campaign trail, he notes that voters are not only surprised but deeply confused about the rationale behind the conflict. “I think the first thing is just shock across the political spectrum,” he observes.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The absence of clear objectives compounds that confusion. Singh presses Munsing on what the administration is trying to achieve, and the answer remains elusive. From regime change to nuclear containment to vague notions of victory, the stated goals appear to shift constantly. Munsing points to statements from the White House suggesting that Trump alone will determine when Iran has “unconditionally surrendered,” dismissing the idea as “ridiculous.” Without a stable definition of success, the war risks replicating the strategic drift seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the endgame remained perpetually undefined.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Miscalculation and the risk of escalation</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion then turns to how the conflict began. Munsing argues that Trump’s decision-making reflects a pattern of boundary-testing behavior. Early military successes, particularly a high-risk operation in Venezuela, may have created a false sense of confidence. According to this view, the administration expected a rapid, decisive outcome in Iran — perhaps even regime collapse — without fully accounting for the complexity of the region.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This miscalculation now presents a dangerous dilemma. If the US withdraws quickly, it risks signaling failure. If it escalates, it may become trapped in a prolonged and costly conflict. Singh raises the possibility of deploying ground troops, a scenario that would dramatically raise the stakes. Munsing considers such a move unlikely but politically catastrophic, arguing that it would face overwhelming public opposition and significantly increase casualties and financial costs.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The broader concern is that the administration lacks a coherent strategy. Without clear objectives or limits, the conflict could expand in unpredictable ways, drawing the US deeper into a region already defined by volatility and competing interests.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Domestic repercussions and the terrorism calculus</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Beyond the battlefield, Singh and Munsing examine how the war could reshape domestic politics. Recent lone-wolf attacks in the US complicate public sentiment. While such incidents may initially push Americans toward disengagement, a confirmed state-sponsored attack linked to Iran could have the opposite effect.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Munsing explains that a direct threat to the homeland would likely trigger a “rally around the flag” response, increasing support for the war despite broader skepticism. This distinction underscores how fragile public opinion remains. Americans may oppose the conflict in principle, but their stance could shift rapidly under the pressure of perceived national danger.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Simultaneously, the lack of a clear initial justification for the war weakens the administration’s position. Without a compelling narrative, it becomes harder to sustain public support over time, especially if the conflict drags on or casualties mount.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Congress, executive power and institutional decline</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh highlights the constitutional role of Congress in declaring war. Munsing argues that lawmakers have increasingly ceded this power to the executive branch. “It certainly feels like we’re moving to a Cesarean presidency,” he says, pointing to a long-term trend that has accelerated in recent years.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This shift reflects deeper institutional problems. Congress, once protective of its prerogatives, now appears reluctant to assert itself. Munsing criticizes a culture of performative politics in which legislators prioritize media presence over substantive lawmaking. With approval ratings hovering around 17%, public confidence in the institution has reached strikingly low levels.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Iran war exposes these weaknesses. Despite the absence of formal authorization, Congress has struggled to respond decisively. For Munsing, this moment represents both a failure and an opportunity: a failure to uphold constitutional responsibilities, but also a chance to reassert them, if lawmakers choose to act.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Distrust, disillusionment and fragile hope</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh and Munsing close with a broader reflection on declining trust in American institutions. From prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to economic crises and elite scandals, many citizens now see a system that operates by different rules for the powerful and the public. Some have even labeled the conflict the “Epstein war,” viewing it as a distraction from unresolved controversies involving political and economic elites.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Munsing warns that this perception could lead to two dangerous outcomes: widespread disengagement from civic life or a turn toward more extreme political solutions. Both, he suggests, would undermine the foundations of American democracy.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Yet he also identifies tentative signs of renewal. Public frustration is driving greater political engagement, from town hall participation to grassroots campaigning. On the campaign trail, he finds that a majority of voters are willing to engage seriously, even across party lines. This rising involvement, combined with pressure on elected officials, could create an opening for institutional reform.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Whether those “green shoots” take root will depend on whether political leaders respond to public demand for accountability and clarity. As Singh and Munsing make clear, the stakes extend far beyond the Iran war itself, touching on the future of American governance in an increasingly unstable world.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Evan Munsing, candidate for Colorado’s competitive 8th Congressional District, Marine Corps veteran and entrepreneur, examine the United States’s sudden entry into war with Iran under President Donald Trump. Contradictorily, a president who campaigned on avoiding..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Evan Munsing discuss why US President Donald Trump waged war on Iran despite campaigning against foreign entanglements. The administration’s aims keep shifting, risking escalation and a repeat of the strategic failures seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. This conflict is part of a wider American crisis of collapsing public trust." post-date="Apr 09, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: America First to Iran War — Making Sense of Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy" slug-data="fo-talks-america-first-to-iran-war-making-sense-of-donald-trumps-foreign-policy">

FO Talks: America First to Iran War — Making Sense of Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy

April 09, 2026
Devina Mehra" post_date="April 09, 2026 05:45" pUrl="/economics/fo-talks-will-ai-gold-and-dedollarization-reshape-global-markets-in-2026/" pid="161782" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Devina Mehra, Founder and Chairperson of First Global, about the forces shaping global markets in 2026. After a volatile 2025 marked by wars, inflation and US President Donald Trump’s disruptive economic policies, how should investors make sense of an increasingly fragmented world? Mehra’s answer is strikingly unsentimental: geopolitics matters, but markets operate on their own logic.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Markets, Trump and the limits of geopolitics</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Mehra identifies Trump as the common thread running through much of the recent turbulence. In her words, he is “dismantling the old order without your knowing what comes next.” Yet she draws a clear distinction between macro-level disruption and market behavior.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Looking at 50 years of data, from the Gulf Wars to September 11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, she argues that stock markets tend to recover from geopolitical shocks within six to 12 months. Unless a country is directly involved in conflict, markets historically “shrug it off.” The notable exception is when major commodity producers are involved, as in the Russia–Ukraine war, where energy and commodity prices experience sustained impact.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In 2025, another dynamic was at play: extreme market concentration. The so-called Magnificent Seven US tech stocks once again drove the bulk of S&P 500 gains. In 2025, roughly 43% of the index’s performance came from this narrow group, down from more than 60% in 2023 and 2024 — but still highly concentrated. Even within that group, only three or four stocks accounted for most of the gains. The average stock, Mehra cautions, has underperformed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The AI boom and the profitability question</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Much of the recent market enthusiasm centers on artificial intelligence. Mehra remains cautious. History, she argues, shows that transformative technologies do not automatically translate into investor profits.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Automobiles and aviation reshaped the 20th century but were “a graveyard of companies” from an investor’s standpoint. The early Internet era followed a similar pattern. Infrastructure firms such as Global Crossing laid undersea cables that still carry global data traffic today — yet the company itself went bankrupt.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Mehra’s concern with AI is less about its transformative potential and more about capital intensity and monetization. Massive data centers, rapidly depreciating hardware and soaring talent costs create enormous upfront investment. Meanwhile, she points to data suggesting that usage of some AI platforms fell 60–70% during school holidays. This implies that student adoption, not high-margin enterprise demand, drives a significant portion of current traffic.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Even more worrying, she notes, is financial engineering. Some large technology firms avoid placing AI-related debt directly on their balance sheets by routing it through smaller entities that build and finance infrastructure separately. The result is systemic leverage that may be underappreciated.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">India’s growth versus market reality</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Turning to India, Khattar Singh challenges the dominant narrative that India is rising while the West stagnates. Mehra acknowledges that India’s headline GDP growth remains among the highest globally. Yet the composition of that growth raises questions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Manufacturing as a share of GDP has fallen to roughly 12–13.5%, near its lowest level since the 1960s. Tourism has not yet surpassed pre-pandemic levels. Foreign direct investment and foreign institutional flows have slowed, and India recently recorded a capital account deficit for the first time in two decades.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Most importantly, Mehra stresses that macroeconomic growth does not guarantee market performance. China offers a stark example: Between 2007 and 2023, Chinese GDP expanded more than sixfold, yet its equity market only recently surpassed its 2007 peak. High growth does not automatically translate into shareholder returns or sufficient job creation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Dedollarization, crypto and the myth of safe havens</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On dedollarization, Mehra has revised her earlier skepticism. While reserve currencies rarely change quickly, she believes the pace of diversification has accelerated as confidence in US institutions comes “under question.” Even so, she doubts that China’s renminbi will replace the dollar outright. Instead, she anticipates gradual diversification toward a basket of currencies — euro, Swiss franc, Japanese yen — alongside gold.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Cryptocurrencies, in her view, are legitimate assets but not true currencies. Extreme volatility makes them impractical for pricing goods or serving as stable stores of value. With drawdowns of 70–85% occurring multiple times, she recommends limited exposure — 2% to 5% of a portfolio at most.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Gold fares no better under scrutiny. Over a 50-year period, gold has been more volatile than equities. After peaking in 1980, it took 27 years to reclaim that high. Its steady rise in Indian rupee terms, she explains, reflects currency depreciation rather than intrinsic stability.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Machines, bias and the discipline of data</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>At First Global, Mehra has adapted to what she sees as a structural shift in markets. In the 1990s, the edge lay in privileged information. Today, regulation ensures simultaneous disclosure. The advantage now lies in analysis.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Her firm uses machine learning systems to screen more than 20,000 securities globally, examining numerous factors without human emotional bias. Machines reduce randomness and cognitive error — insights drawn in part from behavioral economist Daniel Kahneman’s work on decision-making. Yet she insists on a “human overlay” to design models and interpret outputs. Technology is a tool, not an oracle.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Mehra will not speculate on what single trend could make or break markets in 2026. “Risk is always something you didn’t see coming,” she says, recalling how <em>The Economist</em> failed to flag Russia–Ukraine as a major geopolitical risk just weeks before war erupted in 2022. For her, disciplined data checks matter more than bold predictions. In an age of narrative excess, humility may be the most valuable asset of all.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Devina Mehra, Founder and Chairperson of First Global, about the forces shaping global markets in 2026. After a volatile 2025 marked by wars, inflation and US President Donald Trump’s disruptive economic policies, how should..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Devina Mehra discuss why markets often detach from geopolitics, even amid Trump-era disruption and global conflict. She questions the profitability of the AI boom, highlights extreme market concentration and warns against overinterpreting India’s growth narrative. Mehra urges diversification, limited crypto exposure and disciplined, data-driven investing over seductive market stories." post-date="Apr 09, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: Will AI, Gold and Dedollarization Reshape Global Markets in 2026?" slug-data="fo-talks-will-ai-gold-and-dedollarization-reshape-global-markets-in-2026">

FO Talks: Will AI, Gold and Dedollarization Reshape Global Markets in 2026?

April 09, 2026
Fernando Carvajal" post_date="April 08, 2026 06:58" pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-live-when-will-the-houthis-join-the-war-to-support-iran/" pid="161762" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh moderates an FO Live discussion on the US–Israel war with Iran. He is joined by Fernando Carvajal, executive director of The American Center for South Yemen Studies; Eric Jeunot, a professor at Abu Dhabi University; and Heena Lotus, a geopolitical analyst. Khattar Singh pushes the panel to assess whether Yemen’s Houthis will enter the conflict, how Iran is calibrating its proxy network and why Gulf states are working to contain escalation. What emerges is a picture of a war no longer defined by direct strikes alone, but by chokepoints, indirect leverage and long-term strategic positioning.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Houthi dilemma</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Jeunot frames the discussion around a fundamental tension shaping Houthi decision-making. The movement is strengthening itself amid fragmentation in South Yemen, using the lull to consolidate territory, recruit fighters and rebuild capacity. Yet it faces a strategic choice between ideological alignment with Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and its own domestic priorities.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That tension is not abstract. The Houthis must decide whether to demonstrate commitment to Iran by joining the war or instead focus on expanding control toward resource-rich areas such as Marib in Yemen. Jeunot states, “The Houthi are for the moment at a crossroads in terms of objectives.” Entering the war may reinforce their ideological legitimacy, but it could also undermine their long-term economic and political stability.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Fighting capacity and ideological momentum</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Lotus shifts the focus from strategy to motivation. While previous US and Israeli strikes degraded Houthi military infrastructure, she argues that capability alone does not determine action. The group’s ideological drive remains intact and may even outweigh material constraints.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>She emphasizes that the Houthis are deeply embedded in the broader narrative of resistance aligned with Iran and Palestine. As she puts it, “They’re very passionate about being part of the Axis of Resistance.” That passion, however, exists alongside practical constraints, particularly the risk of reigniting conflict with Saudi Arabia.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Jeunot reinforces this point by describing the Houthis as a system sustained by conflict. War is not simply an activity, but a mechanism of governance and legitimacy. A prolonged peace could weaken the movement internally, making the presence of an external enemy central to its survival.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Geography, Saudi Arabia and strategic restraint</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Carvajal grounds the discussion in geography and political reality. Yemen remains divided, with the Houthis controlling a smaller share of territory but the majority of the population. Meanwhile, South Yemen has shifted into Saudi-managed security control following the displacement of UAE-backed forces in late 2025.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This balance helps explain the Houthis’ current restraint. Despite their alignment with Iran, they have not targeted Saudi positions or escalated attacks in the Red Sea. For Carvajal, the key lies in their relationship with Riyadh, the Saudi capital. The Houthis may see more value in securing a stable arrangement with Saudi Arabia than in immediate participation in a regional war.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This creates a paradox. The group maintains ties with Iran while preserving flexibility to negotiate with Gulf powers. The result is a calibrated ambiguity that allows the Houthis to remain relevant without overcommitting.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Chokepoints and the global economy</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Khattar Singh introduces the broader strategic stakes by focusing on the Bab el-Mandeb strait. If the Houthis were to disrupt this maritime corridor, the consequences would extend far beyond the Middle East, affecting global trade, energy flows and major economies such as China and India.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This raises the possibility that Iran itself may be exercising restraint. Rather than encouraging escalation, Tehran may prefer to keep the Bab el-Mandeb as a latent threat. A simultaneous disruption of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea would approach systemic economic shock.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The panel also considers whether Israel might attempt preemptive strikes on Houthi positions. Lotus warns that such a move could trigger a domino effect, pulling Yemen fully into the conflict. Jeunot, however, questions the strategic logic of opening another front, noting that escalation in the Red Sea would draw in a far wider set of international actors.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Yemen as a long-term battleground</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion closes with a broader reflection on Yemen’s enduring strategic importance. Carvajal situates the country as a historic crossroads, long contested by regional and global powers. Its position along critical trade routes and its complex internal divisions make it both valuable and volatile.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Looking ahead, the panel diverges on whether the war could redraw borders. Lotus sees a shifting geopolitical landscape in which rapid changes in alliances could produce unexpected outcomes. Jeunot is more cautious, arguing that sovereignty remains deeply entrenched and that meaningful territorial change would require large-scale ground operations rather than air campaigns.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>What the panel agrees on is the scale of the conflict’s potential trajectory. Yemen is not yet the central battlefield, but it is no longer peripheral. If the Houthis enter the war, the consequences will not be contained locally. They will reverberate across trade routes, regional alliances and the global economy, transforming an already dangerous conflict into something far harder to control.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh moderates an FO Live discussion on the US–Israel war with Iran. He is joined by Fernando Carvajal, executive director of The American Center for South Yemen Studies; Eric Jeunot, a professor at Abu Dhabi University; and Heena Lotus, a..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Rohan Khattar Singh moderates a discussion on Yemen’s potential role in the US–Israel war on Iran, joined by Fernando Carvajal, Eric Jeunot and Heena Lotus. They examine the Houthis’ strategic dilemma and risks tied to Red Sea chokepoints. Yemen could shift from the periphery to a pivotal front with far-reaching economic consequences." post-date="Apr 08, 2026" post-title="FO Live: When Will the Houthis Join the War to Support Iran?" slug-data="fo-live-when-will-the-houthis-join-the-war-to-support-iran">

FO Live: When Will the Houthis Join the War to Support Iran?

Nabeel Khoury" post_date="April 07, 2026 06:51" pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-live-did-trump-and-netanyahu-miscalculate-irans-resolve/" pid="161746" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh moderates a fast-moving FO Live discussion on the widening war between the United States, Israel and Iran. He is joined by Dr. Nabeel Khoury, a former US diplomat; Fernando Carvajal, executive director of The American Center for South Yemen Studies; Mohammad Basha, founder of the Basha Report; and Heena Lotus, a geopolitical analyst. Khattar Singh asks whether Washington and Tel Aviv fundamentally misread Iran’s capacity to absorb a leadership decapitation strike and still fight back. Whatever military damage Iran has suffered, the war has already exposed the limits of coercion, deepened regional instability and raised the risk of a broader conflict that no side can fully control.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A war with shifting goals</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Khoury begins by questioning the coherence of the American and Israeli approach. He notes that the stated goals keep changing, especially on the US side. US President Donald Trump’s rhetoric moves from promises of a quick end to talk of an open-ended campaign, making it difficult to know what Washington is actually trying to achieve. For Khoury, that inconsistency matters because it suggests that the war is not being driven by a stable strategic framework.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He argues that Israel’s goals are clearer and more expansive. The conflict is not really about an immediate Iranian nuclear threat, but about weakening any force capable of resisting Israeli regional dominance. He links the current war to the broader trajectory of Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, arguing that force is being used not simply to deter Iran but to reorder the region. From that perspective, he warns, military escalation may temporarily damage adversaries but will not remove the political anger that generates future resistance. Violence keeps reproducing new forms of militancy rather than ending them.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Iran’s response and the failure of expectations</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Khattar Singh presses the panel on the central question: Did Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expect a much faster collapse of Iranian resolve? The group suggests they did. Instead of mass unrest toppling the system after the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and senior figures in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Iranian state continues to retaliate with drones and missiles across multiple theaters.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Carvajal argues that this is now a regime-survival war for Tehran, Iran’s capital. Iran appears to have prepared for exactly this kind of confrontation and is responding in calibrated ways, including strikes on infrastructure and military targets across the Gulf. He also raises the possibility that some apparently irrational moves make more sense if Iran’s leadership believes its neighbors are also part of the threat environment. If Iran is being pushed backward, it may seek to ensure that the states around it do not emerge untouched or stronger.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Lotus goes further, arguing that Iran was underestimated during the months between the earlier 12-day war and the present crisis. She believes many regional actors assumed the US security umbrella would protect them, only to discover that alignment with Washington now carries serious liabilities. As civilian infrastructure, shipping and energy systems come under pressure, Gulf states must reckon with the costs of being drawn into a confrontation they did not choose.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why the Houthis are holding back</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A major theme in the discussion is the relative silence of the Houthis. Khattar Singh asks why Yemen’s Houthis, who had previously attacked Israel and maritime targets, have not yet entered this round of fighting with the same intensity as Hezbollah.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Al-Basha offers the most detailed explanation. He argues that the movement’s restraint reflects a combination of political calculation, financial weakness and operational vulnerability. The Houthis, he says, are cash-strapped, under pressure and eager to preserve the fragile truce with Saudi Arabia. They also do not want to hand their enemies a pretext for a renewed US–Israeli strike package while anti-Houthi forces are more coordinated than before.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Just as important, Basha says, the group wants to preserve its own agency. “The Houthi don’t want to be seen as an Iranian proxy,” he explains. They want to appear capable of choosing their own timing rather than acting automatically on Tehran’s behalf. Even so, Basha and Khoury caution that this restraint may not last. If the war drags on and Iran faces a more existential threat, the Houthis may decide they can no longer remain on the sidelines.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Khoury adds another strategic point: The Houthis know that closing major waterways would damage their own access routes as well. For now, that creates an incentive to hold back. But if the conflict becomes all-or-nothing, those calculations could change quickly.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Gulf anxiety, Pakistan’s balancing act and the risk of widening war</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Lotus describes a Gulf region increasingly anxious about the consequences of a war fought in its airspace and across its infrastructure. Gulf monarchies historically aligned with the Western bloc for security, she says, but now find themselves paying the price for that alignment. If the US cannot shield them from economic and military blowback, the value of that partnership comes into question.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion then turns to Pakistan. Lotus sees its capital of Islamabad as trying to maintain relations with everyone at once: Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the US. Carvajal agrees that Pakistan is walking a narrow line, constrained by its own regional rivalries and unwilling to overcommit to any one side. Both suggest that this balancing act may work only for so long if the war expands.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Carvajal also highlights a growing divergence between Trump and Netanyahu. Trump, he argues, is transactional, while Netanyahu’s confrontation with Iran is ideological and long-running. That difference could matter if Washington seeks an exit while Israel wants escalation. He also warns that even if the US steps back, the conflict may continue through proxy networks, sleeper cells and asymmetric retaliation far beyond the immediate battlefield.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Can diplomacy still work?</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Khattar Singh closes by asking the question only Khoury can answer as the diplomat on the panel: How does this end? Khoury insists that diplomacy remains possible because all wars eventually end in negotiation, however bitter the path there may be. Oman and Qatar, he says, are still the most plausible mediators when the fighting subsides.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>But he also argues that diplomacy cannot succeed if the underlying injustices driving regional anger remain untouched. He rejects the idea that every armed actor in the region simply takes orders from Tehran, stressing that local groups often act from their own grievances, especially over Palestine, Gaza and repeated occupation. “There is always room for diplomacy,” he concludes, but diplomacy without justice will only postpone the next war.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh moderates a fast-moving FO Live discussion on the widening war between the United States, Israel and Iran. He is joined by Dr. Nabeel Khoury, a former US diplomat; Fernando Carvajal, executive director of The American Center for South Yemen..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Rohan Khattar Singh moderates a discussion on the US–Israel war on Iran with Nabeel Khoury, Fernando Carvajal, Mohammad Basha and Heena Lotus. Washington and Tel Aviv may have misread Iran’s ability to absorb leadership losses, retaliate and deepen insecurity for Gulf allies. If the conflict continues, more regional actors may be drawn in." post-date="Apr 07, 2026" post-title="FO Live: Did Trump and Netanyahu Miscalculate Iran’s Resolve?" slug-data="fo-live-did-trump-and-netanyahu-miscalculate-irans-resolve">

FO Live: Did Trump and Netanyahu Miscalculate Iran’s Resolve?

Natalie Halla" post_date="April 07, 2026 06:37" pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-live-afghanistans-last-woman-ambassador-defies-taliban-rule-from-exile/" pid="161743" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>51Թ Contributing Editor Laura Pavon Aramburú speaks with Afghanistan’s last serving woman ambassador, Manizha Bakhtari, and director and producer Natalie Halla about her 2025 <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt35598071/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">documentary</a>, <em>The Last Ambassador</em>. The film follows Bakhtari’s decision to keep Afghanistan’s embassy in Vienna, Austria, open after the Taliban return to power, even as the Afghan state’s institutions collapse and formal diplomatic support evaporates. Across the conversation, Aramburú, Bakhtari and Halla link diplomacy in exile to Afghan women’s lived reality under Taliban rule, and to the question many outsiders avoid: What does meaningful solidarity look like when girls are barred from school and women are pushed out of public life?</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">An embassy left in limbo</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Aramburú opens by asking how the Afghan embassy in Vienna reached a point of financial and logistical isolation. Bakhtari situates the break not as a single moment but as a process that accelerates into rupture in August 2021. After the withdrawal of US and NATO forces, the Afghan government collapsed quickly. Bakhtari describes “the complete institutional disappearance of a state overnight,” where ministries stopped functioning, parliament broke down and the banking system collapsed. For embassies abroad, the consequences were immediate. Vienna lost salaries, operational funding and the basic infrastructure that normally keeps a mission alive.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Bakhtari also draws a line the embassy refuses to cross. She does not recognize the Taliban, arguing it is impossible to work with a regime that excludes women from education and public life. Yet she also insists the embassy’s obligations to citizens do not vanish with the government. The Vienna mission became, in her telling, a moral outpost for human rights and a place to preserve a country’s dignity when its political voice was forcibly muted. She stays because she believes diplomacy must be accountable to people, not only to regimes. As she puts it, “diplomacy is not only about governments; it’s about people.”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Making a film under threat</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Aramburú then turns to the documentary’s origins and the practical constraints of filming a story shaped by censorship, danger and funding shortages. Halla describes her first hurdle as persuading Bakhtari to participate. The ambassador was “exposed” and “fragile,” still holding office while being persecuted by the Taliban. Halla began with what she had, filming alone without financing, because she did not want to lose time. Only later did she bring on a Vienna production company, Golden Girls Filmproduktion & Filmservices, and expand the project’s capacity.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Halla spent four years completing the film, making it her longest project to date, with an especially complex edit. She constructed an 80-minute narrative from a “mosaic” of footage, including filmed material, family archives and documentation from Afghanistan gathered through other sources. She avoided traveling to Afghanistan during production, fearing that filming there would endanger local people and her team. Her core aim was to build a film that does more than inform. She wanted viewers to leave feeling personally implicated, saying audiences often walk out thinking, <em>“I cannot stay silent.”</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Gender apartheid and the collapse of justice</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>From filmmaking, Aramburú moves into the reality the film documents. Bakhtari describes women’s lives under Taliban rule as a coordinated system designed to erase them from society. Women and girls are banned from higher education, restricted from work, barred from public gatherings and denied basic freedoms of movement and participation. Compounding the crisis is the breakdown of constitutional order. Afghanistan is now the only country in the world ruled without a constitution or a functioning legal system. Democratic institutions are dismantled, and what remains serves the Taliban’s purposes rather than the public’s rights.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Aramburú asks about justice and the heightened risks women face, including sexual violence. Bakhtari answers that without functioning legal protections, women have no system to defend themselves. The violence is not incidental but structural, backed by those who hold coercive power. Bakhtari names that structure using the term “gender apartheid,” emphasizing that legal codification lags behind lived reality. Language is part of the struggle because naming the system clarifies accountability, and neutrality becomes complicity. “Silence is never neutral; silence always sides with power,” she says. As long as the world fails to act, the Taliban will continue to rule Afghanistan.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Resistance that stays local</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Aramburú asks what resistance looks like when public protest is met with imprisonment, torture and intimidation. Bakhtari stresses that Afghanistan’s situation is not easily comparable to other cases, including Iran, even when women’s aspirations converge. She argues that Afghan women do not need to be “rescued” through a Western lens. They need to be heard and supported in ways that respect local realities.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Bakhtari describes an early wave of street protests after the Taliban takeover that was violently suppressed. Over time, resistance shifted into quieter forms, which remain today. Women continue organizing through clandestine gatherings, social media and educational initiatives that operate outside formal public space. Internet access still exists for many, though not for all, given poverty and uneven infrastructure. Even so, networks form through pseudonymous online activity and decentralized support. As Bakhtari says, the fight is global, but resistance is local, shaped by what is possible under dictatorship.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Daughters Programme and what solidarity can become</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Aramburú closes by asking about “bright moments” and practical ways to help. Bakhtari describes the Daughters Programme, a small, decentralized, volunteer-led initiative. It supports school-age girls inside Afghanistan through a package that can include financial help, emotional support, mentorship and leadership guidance. The design is intentionally simple, minimizing administrative barriers so that individuals abroad can directly support one girl.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Both guests also reflect on the film’s reception. Halla says screenings across continents produce overwhelmingly positive responses, often well beyond the Afghan diaspora. Bakhtari notes some criticism of her chosen title, <em>The Last Ambassador</em>, but she insists it is symbolic. It marks a historical turn from a recent period with several women ambassadors to the present, where she is the only one still serving.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Looking ahead, Halla states that the film will continue to appear at festival screenings. She intends to travel to Berlin, Germany, for a Cinema for Peace nomination. It will be screened in London for diplomats linked to the “gender apartheid” campaign. She is also developing a new project on threats to the International Criminal Court.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For Bakhtari, the central question remains urgent. Condemnation is easy; action is harder. <em>The Last Ambassador</em> and the Daughters Programme are her answer to what can be done now, even if the work is incremental. Planting seeds is a resistance effort.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ Contributing Editor Laura Pavon Aramburú speaks with Afghanistan’s last serving woman ambassador, Manizha Bakhtari, and director and producer Natalie Halla about her 2025 documentary, The Last Ambassador. The film follows Bakhtari’s decision to keep Afghanistan’s embassy in..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Laura Pavón Aramburú, Natalie Halla and Manizha Bakhtari discuss The Last Ambassador, Halla’s 2025 documentary on keeping Afghanistan’s Vienna embassy open after the Taliban takeover. They describe the collapse of institutions, “gender apartheid” and injustice for Afghan women. The conversation highlights quiet resistance, diaspora solidarity and the Daughters Programme supporting Afghan girls’ education." post-date="Apr 07, 2026" post-title="FO Live: Afghanistan’s Last Woman Ambassador Defies Taliban Rule From Exile" slug-data="fo-live-afghanistans-last-woman-ambassador-defies-taliban-rule-from-exile">

FO Live: Afghanistan’s Last Woman Ambassador Defies Taliban Rule From Exile

Simon Cleobury" post_date="April 06, 2026 06:30" pUrl="/world-news/fo-talks-the-collapse-of-new-start-treaty-raises-global-nuclear-risks/" pid="161707" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Simon Cleobury, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, discuss the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and what its disappearance means for global nuclear stability. With the last major US–Russia arms control agreement gone, are the world’s nuclear guardrails disappearing? Singh and Cleobury examine how New START functioned, why it mattered and why rebuilding trust among nuclear powers will now be far more difficult. They also explore the roles of China, France and the United Kingdom in a shifting nuclear landscape shaped by geopolitical rivalry and declining cooperation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">What New START achieved</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Cleobury begins by explaining that New START placed limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads, missiles and launchers held by the United States and Russia. These “strategic” weapons are designed to target infrastructure and population centers, making them central to deterrence. By capping these arsenals, the treaty helped maintain balance and prevented either side from seeking overwhelming superiority.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Equally important were the treaty’s verification mechanisms. These included data exchanges, notifications, inspections and regular consultations. These measures are essential for reducing uncertainty. “It gave an element of predictability and certainty,” Cleobury explains; transparency lowered the risk of miscalculation. Without such mechanisms, each side must rely more heavily on assumptions about the other’s capabilities, increasing the chance of suspicion and escalation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The treaty’s structure also reflected practical constraints. Reducing nuclear arsenals takes time, technical effort and financial resources. The seven-year implementation period ensured neither side gained a temporary advantage while reductions were underway. This gradual process reinforced stability and maintained deterrence while cuts were completed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A world without constraints</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>With New START’s expiration, those formal limits are gone. Cleobury cautions that this does not automatically trigger an arms race. Building new nuclear capabilities requires time and investment. Yet the psychological shift may be more consequential than immediate force expansion. “The guardrails are off,” he warns, noting that uncertainty can alter planning even before weapons numbers change.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Without inspections or data exchanges, military planners may assume the worst. If leaders believe the other side is secretly expanding its arsenal, they may respond by strengthening their own. This dynamic creates a classic security dilemma. Even absent hostile intent, fear and suspicion can drive competitive buildup.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh places this development in the context of today’s geopolitical tensions, highlighting the Russia–Ukraine war and conflict in the Middle East. Cleobury agrees that the current environment differs sharply from the one in which New START was negotiated. Trust between Washington and Moscow has deteriorated, making future agreements more difficult to achieve.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Trust collapse and negotiation barriers</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Both sides now question the reliability of the other. In Washington, Russia is widely viewed as an aggressive power that violated international norms in Ukraine. In Moscow, US military support for Kyiv fuels suspicion that Washington is engaged in a proxy conflict. This mutual distrust complicates arms control discussions that once proceeded despite broader disagreements.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Cleobury notes that US policymakers also seek a broader agreement covering tactical nuclear weapons and emerging technologies, such as hypersonic missiles. In addition, Washington wants China included in any future arrangement. These expanded goals increase complexity and reduce the likelihood of quick progress.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Despite these obstacles, leadership at the highest level could still make a difference. Cleobury argues that political will is essential, especially from US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. “If any progress is to be made here, then Putin and Trump are absolutely key,” he says, pointing to the importance of top-level engagement in nuclear decision-making.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">China, France and a changing nuclear landscape</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>China’s role further complicates the picture. Beijing maintains that its arsenal is far smaller than those of the US and Russia and therefore sees bilateral reductions between the two superpowers as the priority. China also lacks the long tradition of arms control negotiations that shaped Cold War diplomacy, making engagement more challenging.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Meanwhile, France’s recent signals about increasing its nuclear stockpile and reducing transparency add another layer of complexity. Such moves reinforce perceptions of competition among nuclear powers and strengthen calls for broader multilateral discussions. Yet expanding negotiations to include multiple states makes agreement harder to reach.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Cleobury suggests that a leaders summit of the five nuclear-armed permanent members of the UN Security Council could help restart dialogue. Even limited discussions on transparency or risk reduction might rebuild some confidence. He emphasizes that arms control can function not only as a reward for improved relations, but also as a tool to reduce tensions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">An uncertain future for arms control</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Singh and Cleobury conclude that the world is entering a period with fewer formal constraints on nuclear competition. The absence of New START removes a key mechanism for managing rivalry between the largest nuclear powers. Replacing it will require political leadership, renewed trust and willingness to engage despite ongoing conflicts.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Cleobury warns that without such efforts, the world may face a prolonged gap in arms control agreements. “Without that political direction … we’re in for quite a long period without any arms control agreements,” he says.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>While the risks are growing, dialogue remains possible if leaders choose to pursue it.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Simon Cleobury, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, discuss the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and what its disappearance means for global nuclear stability. With the last major US–Russia..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Simon Cleobury examine what the expiration of the New START Treaty means for global nuclear stability. Its value lies in verification, transparency and predictability, which reduced US–Russian mistrust. Without them, arms control will be harder to rebuild, especially with ongoing wars and pressure to include China in any new framework." post-date="Apr 06, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: The Collapse of New START Treaty Raises Global Nuclear Risks" slug-data="fo-talks-the-collapse-of-new-start-treaty-raises-global-nuclear-risks">

FO Talks: The Collapse of New START Treaty Raises Global Nuclear Risks

April 06, 2026
Peter Isackson" post_date="April 05, 2026 06:54" pUrl="/world-news/us-news/fo-talks-the-epstein-files-redactions-and-the-deep-state-question/" pid="161691" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with 51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson about the political and structural implications of the newly released Jeffrey Epstein files. With millions of pages of documents now public and millions more still pending, the scandal has reignited scrutiny of figures across the political spectrum. Their conversation moves beyond individual allegations to examine elite networks, media hesitation and what the unfolding revelations could mean for US President Donald Trump and the approaching midterm elections.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A mountain of evidence, a moving target</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Rohan opens with the scale of the release. Roughly 3.5 million pages have been made public, with an estimated three million more still to come. The files include emails sent to more than 1,000 individuals, images, video material and victim testimonies provided to the FBI. Independent media outlets are combing through the material daily.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Peter cautions that the story is far from settled. “We know more and more every day,” he says, emphasizing that the volume of material makes reaching definitive conclusions difficult. The disclosures are less a single revelation than an evolving mosaic. As he describes it, observers are assembling a “jigsaw puzzle,” starting with the frame before gradually filling in the center. The real significance may lie in the structural patterns emerging from the whole.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The files were released under the Epstein Files Transparency Act, which Trump signed after bipartisan pressure from US Representatives Thomas Massie and Ro Khanna. The law permits limited redactions, but only in narrowly defined circumstances. Yet many names and details remain obscured, fueling suspicion that something larger is being protected.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Trump, transparency and political blowback</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Rohan presses Peter on Trump’s role. During his 2024 campaign, Trump promised transparency on unresolved national controversies, including the infamous assassination of US President John F. Kennedy and the Epstein trafficking case. Peter argues that this pledge helped consolidate Trump’s image as a leader willing to challenge entrenched power structures.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>But the release has placed Trump in a precarious position. In a now-notorious cabinet meeting exchange, Trump reportedly dismissed the files as “old business,” angering parts of his own electorate. The very transparency he championed has generated political turbulence.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Peter suggests Trump miscalculated. By aligning himself with disclosure, he raised expectations he could not fully control. Now that millions of pages are public with more pending, the administration faces an unpredictable political environment in which allegations touch figures across party lines, including both Trump and former US President Bill Clinton.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">A club of the compromised</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Moving beyond partisan politics, Peter adopts what he calls a sociological lens. Drawing on analyst Simon Dixon’s framework, he proposes that the Epstein network reflects not a simple blackmail ring but a broader culture of elite mutual compromise.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In his formulation, influence operates through belonging to an exclusive circle. “To get into the club, you have to be compromised,” Peter explains. Rather than classic blackmail, the logic is reciprocal vulnerability. The more compromised individuals are, the more securely they are bound into a system of shared silence and protection.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He likens it to organized crime structures in which mutual exposure ensures loyalty. Within such a system, power is distributed across finance, politics, intelligence and business, with occasional sacrifices when exposure becomes too costly. Whether or not one accepts the full thesis, the files appear to expose dense interconnections among influential actors across sectors and continents.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Media silence and editorial risk</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Rohan highlights a striking disparity in coverage. British outlets such as <em>The Guardian</em> and the BBC prominently feature the story, while major US newspapers appear comparatively restrained. In India and parts of East Asia, coverage is also limited.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Peter attributes this to institutional caution. Large outlets operate within established editorial frameworks and may hesitate to amplify allegations that could disrupt long-standing narratives or implicate powerful interests. The sheer scale of the data also poses practical challenges: responsible verification takes time.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He describes mainstream media as “diffident” and at times “cowardly,” suggesting that some organizations may hope public attention fades before deeper scrutiny becomes unavoidable. Independent platforms, less constrained by legacy structures, have moved more aggressively.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Atomized America and the midterm test</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Why, Rohan asks, are Americans not protesting en masse if the files implicate their political class? Peter offers a bleak assessment of civic cohesion: “There is no ordinary American.”  He describes a society fragmented into individualized identities. In his view, cultural and ideological shifts have weakened the capacity for unified moral movements.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As for Trump’s future, Peter is cautious but skeptical. Impeachment appears unlikely, given bipartisan embarrassment and prior failed attempts. However, he predicts political damage. “Most people think he will be humiliated in the midterms,” he says, though what that humiliation would mean in practice remains uncertain.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>With both major parties potentially implicated and media institutions hesitant, the Epstein saga may continue to unfold primarily through independent journalism and social media. The files, Peter suggests, are a mirror held up to the structure of power — and the reflection is still coming into focus.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with 51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson about the political and structural implications of the newly released Jeffrey Epstein files. With millions of pages of documents now public and millions more still pending, the..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Peter Isackson examine the political and structural implications of the newly released Jeffrey Epstein files. They explored elite compromise, media hesitation and US President Donald Trump’s electoral vulnerability. As millions of documents surface, the scandal exposes deeper questions about how power, protection and public trust operate in the United States." post-date="Apr 05, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: The Epstein Files, Redactions and the Deep State Question" slug-data="fo-talks-the-epstein-files-redactions-and-the-deep-state-question">

FO Talks: The Epstein Files, Redactions and the Deep State Question

April 05, 2026
Thomas Barfield" post_date="April 05, 2026 06:45" pUrl="/region/central_south_asia/fo-talks-why-pakistans-taliban-strategy-backfired-and-triggered-war-on-its-own-border/" pid="161688" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh and Professor Thomas Barfield explore why escalating clashes between the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Pakistani army reflect far more than a border dispute. Along the Durand Line, a frontier that has long defied stable governance, Pakistan now faces the consequences of a strategy that once seemed to serve its interests. What once appeared to be strategic depth has evolved into a security dilemma, as cross-border militancy, ethnic ties and historical grievances converge.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Khattar Singh and Barfield examine deeper structural forces shaping the conflict, including Pashtun identity, contested borders and regional rivalries. Together, Barfield and Khattar Singh explore whether Pakistan now faces a prolonged insurgency rooted in choices it helped create.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Taliban victory and Pakistan’s strategic miscalculation</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Barfield explains that the escalation stems largely from the Taliban’s relationship with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, an insurgent movement targeting the Pakistani capital of Islamabad. The Taliban, he notes, see the group as ideological and ethnic allies, which complicates Pakistan’s expectations of cooperation. “They see them as brothers in arms,” Barfield says, emphasizing the shared Pashtun identity that transcends state boundaries.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This dynamic represents a reversal of Pakistan’s earlier strategy. For decades, Islamabad supported the Taliban to secure influence in the Afghan capital of Kabul and limit Indian involvement in Afghanistan. Yet once the Taliban gained power in 2021, they no longer depended on Pakistan. According to Barfield, the Taliban “made good clients as long as they needed Pakistan,” but independence allowed them to revert to longstanding Afghan positions. These included rejecting the Durand Line and tolerating anti-Pakistan militants.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As a result, Pakistan achieved its objective of a Taliban-led Afghanistan, only to discover that the new government does not share Islamabad’s priorities. Instead, ethnic solidarity and historical grievances now outweigh past patronage, leaving Pakistan confronted by insurgent violence emanating from territory once expected to be friendly.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Durand Line and Pashtunistan</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A central theme of the conversation is the Durand Line, the 1893 boundary drawn between British India and Afghanistan. Barfield stresses that every Afghan government, regardless of ideology, has refused to recognize the border as legitimate. The dispute persists because the line divides Pashtun communities, many of whom maintain cross-border family ties and social networks.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For Barfield, the issue is both historical and emotional. Peshawar, once linked to Afghan political life, is a symbolic loss. Barfield notes that it remains “a phantom limb” in Afghan memory. Territorial divisions imposed during colonial rule continue to shape modern politics.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Pashtun dimension complicates any settlement. While Afghanistan includes multiple ethnic groups, Pashtuns have historically dominated political leadership, ensuring that cross-border identity remains central to national policy. Barfield suggests that governments led by Tajiks or Uzbeks might have been more open to compromise, but the Taliban’s overwhelmingly Pashtun composition reinforces resistance to recognizing the border. The dispute therefore persists as a reflection of enduring ethnic solidarity.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Pakistan’s military dilemma</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Khattar Singh presses Barfield on whether Pakistan might escalate to a ground offensive. Barfield argues that Islamabad faces a strategic trap. Conventional military superiority offers limited advantage against insurgent tactics, particularly in terrain historically resistant to external control. “Fighting an insurgency, as the Americans saw, is expensive and long-term,” he observes, highlighting lessons from previous conflicts in Afghanistan.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Even if Pakistan could seize major cities, the challenge of governance would remain unresolved. Barfield notes that Pakistan lacks a clear alternative leadership in Afghanistan and risks becoming entangled in another prolonged conflict. At the same time, Islamabad faces domestic instability, tensions with Iran and broader regional pressures, creating what Barfield calls a “monsoon season for troubles.”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>These constraints limit Pakistan’s options. Airstrikes and border operations may continue, but a decisive solution appears elusive. The Taliban, meanwhile, rely on insurgent warfare and cross-border networks, prolonging instability along the frontier.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">India, economics and regional competition</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The discussion also turns to India’s role, which Pakistan views with suspicion. Barfield explains that India has historically cultivated ties with Afghanistan and invested in infrastructure projects designed to bypass Pakistan, including routes linking Afghanistan to Iran’s Chabahar port. These initiatives reduced Islamabad’s leverage over Afghan trade and provided Kabul with alternative partnerships.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Economic realities further complicate the situation. Afghanistan’s economy contracted sharply after the withdrawal of foreign aid, yet the Taliban have sought to maintain governance through taxation and limited revenue sources. Despite financial constraints, the movement continues to assert sovereignty and pursue diplomatic engagement with multiple regional actors, including India.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Barfield concludes that Afghanistan is returning to familiar geopolitical patterns: balancing regional powers while resisting external control. Pakistan’s attempt to shape Afghan politics through proxy influence has instead empowered a neighbor that pursues its own interests. The Durand Line conflict reflects deeper structural forces that are unlikely to disappear quickly. The Afghanistan–Pakistan frontier thus remains a volatile flashpoint, where historical grievances, ethnic politics and strategic miscalculations converge, raising the risk of a prolonged and destabilizing confrontation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><br><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh and Professor Thomas Barfield explore why escalating clashes between the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Pakistani army reflect far more than a border dispute. Along the Durand Line, a frontier that has long defied stable governance,..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Thomas Barfield discuss why Pakistan’s long-standing Taliban support has backfired, producing insurgent pressure along the Durand Line. They highlight the unresolved Pashtun question, the Taliban’s TTP connections and the limits of Pakistan’s military options in Afghanistan’s terrain. This frontier now emerges as a volatile flashpoint in South Asian geopolitics." post-date="Apr 05, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: Why Pakistan’s Taliban Strategy Backfired and Triggered War on Its Own Border" slug-data="fo-talks-why-pakistans-taliban-strategy-backfired-and-triggered-war-on-its-own-border">

FO Talks: Why Pakistan’s Taliban Strategy Backfired and Triggered War on Its Own Border

April 05, 2026
Glenn Carle" post_date="April 04, 2026 05:37" pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-exclusive-big-trouble-in-the-us-private-credit-market/" pid="161665" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and <a href="https://fointell.com/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">FOI</a> Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, conclude the March 2026 edition of FO Exclusive by analyzing the US private credit market, a $2 trillion sector that experienced serious trouble this month.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Warning signs flashing red</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The US private credit is facing the greatest stress since the 2007–08 financial crisis, following years of rapid growth. Signs of major trouble emerged this month.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Kunal Shah, the co-chief executive of Goldman Sachs International and global co-head of fixed income, currencies and commodities, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9232dbce-0255-4949-8c4c-ea58d86a4166?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">said</a> that some of his iconic bank’s clients were “just glad there’s something to talk about that isn’t software exposures and private credit.” Blackstone Private Credit <a href="http://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-20/blackstone-private-credit-fund-has-first-monthly-loss-since-2022" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">reported</a> its first monthly loss since 2022. Ares Management has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9a1b60c5-7015-4314-9608-d02c00c3a574?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">limited</a> withdrawals from one of its marquee private credit funds pitched to wealthy individuals, as redemptions surged to 11.6% in the first quarter amid a broad flight from the asset class. Apollo Global Management <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d315cb1c-1e1e-479c-a6d4-b3a817fead3e?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">limited</a> redemptions from one of its flagship private credit vehicles, becoming the latest investment manager seeking to staunch outflows as wealthy investors retreat from the industry.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Investors are increasingly ditching private credit funds on <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/346815bb-7dff-4c97-9568-7ab2432c661d?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">rising</a> worries over bad loans — Publicly traded vehicles are trading at steep discounts in a gloomy sign for the broader industry. Last month, Blue Owl permanently restricted investors from withdrawing their cash from its inaugural private retail debt fund. Investors are no longer able to redeem their investments in quarterly intervals voluntarily. In September 2025, twin bankruptcies of Tricolor Holdings and First Brands Group shook private credit markets. Fraud allegations shook investor confidence, which has not recovered since.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>These developments, Atul suggests, should be treated as early indicators rather than isolated incidents. The private credit market grew rapidly during years of cheap liquidity, but now faces a more challenging environment of higher rates and slowing growth. Investors appear increasingly concerned about bad loans and liquidity mismatches. Glenn reinforces this interpretation by noting that stress in one corner of finance often signals broader fragility. Like JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon, “cockroach theory,” explaining that “if you see one cockroach, there’s a likelihood there are many others,” implying that the visible problems may only hint at deeper systemic risks.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">How private credit works, advantages and risks</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>To explain the stakes, Atul outlines the structure of private credit. Unlike traditional bank lending, private credit involves non-bank institutions — private equity firms, hedge funds and specialized lenders — providing loans directly to companies. Borrowers are often mid-sized firms that struggle to access public bond markets or face stricter bank regulations introduced after the 2008 crisis.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The model offers advantages. Companies benefit from faster deal-making, flexible terms and confidentiality. Investors, including pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, are attracted by higher yields and floating interest rates that rise with inflation. In an era of low returns, private credit became a major destination for capital.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Yet these same features create vulnerabilities. Loans are illiquid, meaning investors cannot easily exit positions during downturns. Borrowers are typically more sensitive to economic stress, increasing default risk. Limited transparency reduces regulatory oversight. As conditions tighten, these weaknesses become more visible.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The structure of private credit creates a mismatch between investor expectations and underlying assets. Many funds offer periodic redemption windows for investors, but they cannot sell the loans on their books quickly. If investors withdraw simultaneously, funds may face liquidity troubles similar to bank runs.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Atul and Glenn highlight additional warning signs. Some borrowers are paying interest with additional debt rather than cash, a practice known as payment-in-kind. This can mask deteriorating financial health. Covenant-lite deals — contracts with weaker lender protections — have also become widespread, leaving fewer tools to manage distress. Sources say that years of low rates reduced risk premiums and encouraged aggressive lending.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Glenn links private credit stress to wider economic vulnerabilities. Rising interest rates, slowing growth and technological disruption — particularly from artificial intelligence — are putting pressure on mid-sized companies that depend on this financing. If defaults increase, refinancing options may narrow, potentially triggering layoffs and bankruptcies.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Investor warnings and the threat of systemic risk</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Atul and Glenn note that prominent investors and policymakers are already raising alarms. Dimon has also cautioned that risks may be “hiding in plain sight.”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Mohamed El-Erian, a legendary investor and the former CEO of investment manager PIMCO, has unequivocally sounded the alarm:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:html --> <p style="padding-left: 50px;"> <em>Is this a “canary-in-the-coalmine” moment, similar to August 2007? This question will be on the mind of some investors and policymakers this morning as they assess the news that, quoting the FT, the “private credit group Blue Owl will permanently restrict investors from withdrawing their cash from its inaugural private retail debt fund.” There’s plenty to think about here, starting with the risks of an investing phenomenon in advanced (not developing) markets that has gone too far overall (short answer: yes), to the approaches being taken by specific firms (lots of differences, yet subject to the “market for lemons” risk). There’s also the “elephant in the room” question regarding much larger systemic risks (nowhere near the magnitude of those which fueled the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, but a significant – and necessary – valuation hit is looming for specific assets).</em></p> <!-- /wp:html --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Others are more optimistic than El-Erian and argue that financial markets will be able to shrug off private credit market risk. They think that the Federal Reserve will keep interest rates low, avoiding excessive tightening of credit markets. Also, although software companies face terminal value risk, this does not impact their debt in most cases. They can cut costs rapidly and generate significant cash.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Atul argues that banks withdrew from riskier lending after the financial crisis, allowing private credit firms to fill the gap. This shift moved risk into less-regulated areas. Complex structures, limited transparency and overlapping exposures now complicate assessment of true valuations. If stress spreads, mid-sized companies that rely on private credit may struggle to refinance operations, amplifying the economic slowdown.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Glenn concludes by placing private credit within a larger narrative of structural fragility. He links the sector’s vulnerabilities to rising US debt, weakening demand for US Treasuries, delayed effects of the Trump administration’s tariffs and broader economic imbalances. Together, these factors suggest that financial markets may be underestimating downside risks. Atul echoes the concern, warning of “flashing warning signs” that point to a sustained downturn rather than a temporary correction.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, conclude the March 2026 edition of FO Exclusive by analyzing the US private credit market, a $2 trillion sector that experienced..." post_summery="In this section of the March 2026 episode of FO Exclusive, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle warn that the $2 trillion US private credit market is under growing stress, highlighted by losses and redemption gates at major funds. Like cockroaches, private credit troubles may signal deeper structural risks in American markets." post-date="Apr 04, 2026" post-title="FO Exclusive: Big Trouble in the US Private Credit Market" slug-data="fo-exclusive-big-trouble-in-the-us-private-credit-market">

FO Exclusive: Big Trouble in the US Private Credit Market

April 04, 2026
Fernando Carvajal" post_date="April 04, 2026 05:22" pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-talks-is-the-gulf-splitting-saudi-arabia-uae-power-struggle-intensifies/" pid="161662" post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Fernando Carvajal, the executive director at The American Center for South Yemen Studies, about the deepening but carefully managed rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Once close partners across the Gulf, the two states now pursue divergent strategies in Yemen, East Africa and South Asia, as US engagement in the region becomes less predictable.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Yemen and the limits of proxy conflict</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Carvajal explains that the roots of today’s tensions lie in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia and the UAE cooperated for nearly a decade after forming a coalition in March 2015. Saudi Arabia managed operations in the north, while the UAE focused on the south, cultivating close ties with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) through financial and political support. This arrangement helped stabilize the southern provinces after Houthi militants were expelled in 2015.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That balance unraveled in December 2025, when a local dispute in Yemen’s southern Hadramaut region escalated. A deputy governor seized control of a government oil facility, prompting UAE-aligned STC forces to intervene. Saudi Arabia responded by declaring instability near its border a national security threat and deploying its newly trained National Shield Forces into northern Hadramaut and the eastern governorate of Mahra.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>While media narratives framed the episode as a proxy war, Carvajal argues it was “a natural consequence” of rival factions competing for territory and influence. Crucially, the crisis exposed an unspoken rule within the Gulf: Despite rivalry, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE will directly confront the other militarily. As Carvajal notes, this restraint reflects “basic tribalism” and an enduring awareness that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remains inseparable and indivisible geographically and historically.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">East Africa: Sudan as the new battleground</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The rivalry now extends beyond the peninsula, particularly into Sudan. Carvajal points out that in late 2025, the United States delegated peace efforts in Sudan to Saudi Arabia after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington. With US engagement increasingly hands-off, Saudi Arabia moved from mediation to direct involvement.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Over recent weeks, Saudi Arabia announced it would purchase all of Sudan’s gold. This effectively underwrote the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and marginalized Iran’s role in the process. Carvajal observes that Iran has “taken a back seat” as Saudi Arabia stepped forward financially and politically. At the same time, the SAF signed a major arms deal with Pakistan, a move Carvajal links indirectly to Saudi funding.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>These developments, he argues, are not isolated. They reflect Saudi Arabia’s effort to counter Emirati influence in East Africa while filling a vacuum left by the US. Sudan, in this sense, has become a testing ground for a more assertive Saudi regional posture.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Nuclear signaling and strategic optics</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A major theme of the discussion is the emergence of new defense alignments involving nuclear powers. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a strategic defense agreement declaring that an attack on one would be treated as an attack on both. Turkey has since expressed interest in joining the pact.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Carvajal is blunt about the military realities. It is, he says, “highly unlikely” that Saudi, Turkish or Pakistani soldiers would fight and die for one another. Instead, these agreements function as geopolitical signaling. They give Saudi Arabia what Carvajal calls “the optic of going nuclear,” without crossing that threshold itself.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This signaling is aimed squarely at Iran and shaped by frustration with Washington. Saudi Arabia, Carvajal says, has been “begging” the US for a formal defense pact since the administration of US President Joe Biden, unsuccessfully. In parallel, the UAE has pursued its own balancing strategy, announcing negotiations with India over defense cooperation and nuclear sharing. Carvajal frames the UAE’s outreach as “showing the flag” rather than a literal expectation of Indian military protection.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">China waits in the wings</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Underlying all of these shifts is the perceived retreat of the US. Carvajal argues that Washington is gradually pulling away from the region under US President Donald Trump, creating uncertainty for Gulf monarchies accustomed to US security guarantees. Trump’s unpredictability, combined with looming US midterm elections, makes long-term planning difficult.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Carvajal sees Chinese caution rather than commitment. Gulf states are in a wait-and-see mode until the political direction of the US becomes clearer. Still, a shift toward Chinese weapons systems would be easy, especially as cheap, effective drones reduce reliance on expensive Western aircraft in conflicts like Yemen.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading --> <h2 class="wp-block-heading">Rivalry without rupture</h2> <!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Despite escalating competition, Carvajal remains confident that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will reconcile. Yemen places such a heavy burden on Saudi Arabia that Saudi leaders will eventually ask the UAE to reengage under a new framework. The UAE has already signaled it is handing full responsibility for Yemen back to Saudi Arabia.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In the longer term, Carvajal envisions the two states acting as co-hegemons within the GCC, potentially positioning themselves as mediators beyond the peninsula, including in South Asia. The rivalry is real but temporary, a phase shaped by uncertainty rather than a permanent fracture.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->" post-content-short=" 51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Fernando Carvajal, the executive director at The American Center for South Yemen Studies, about the deepening but carefully managed rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Once close partners across the Gulf, the..." post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Fernando Carvajal discuss the emerging rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE as their cooperation in Yemen gives way to broader regional competition. From Sudan to nuclear signaling with Pakistan and India, both states are recalibrating amid growing US unpredictability. Despite tensions, Carvajal expects eventual Gulf reconciliation." post-date="Apr 04, 2026" post-title="FO Talks: Is the Gulf Splitting? Saudi Arabia–UAE Power Struggle Intensifies" slug-data="fo-talks-is-the-gulf-splitting-saudi-arabia-uae-power-struggle-intensifies">

FO Talks: Is the Gulf Splitting? Saudi Arabia–UAE Power Struggle Intensifies

 

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