One of the most consequential of these developments is the weakening of Iran’s regional leverage. Mounting economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and security challenges across several fronts have constrained Tehran’s ability to sustain influence through its proxy networks. This has direct implications for Yemen, where the have benefited significantly from Iranian political and military support.Ěý

A by a UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has highlighted how Iranian support has enhanced the Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities, enabling the group to conduct attacks not only within Yemen but also against regional infrastructure and maritime shipping routes. Should Iran’s ability to maintain support for the group decline, the Houthis’ operational reach and political leverage will diminish, thereby creating space for new political arrangements to stabilize the country.Ěý

Gulf strategic realignment and opportunities for cooperation

For Saudi Arabia, the evolving regional context presents an opportunity to reassess its Yemen policy. Over the past decade, Riyadh’s approach to Yemen has largely been driven by security concerns, particularly the necessity to counter Houthi expansion and limit Iranian influence along Saudi Arabia’s southern border. While these priorities remain relevant, changing regional dynamics may enable Saudi Arabia to adopt a broader strategy that emphasizes long-term stability over short-term security considerations. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) could play a role in this expansive strategy.ĚýĚý

Although between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have intensified in recent years due to their competing visions over Yemen’s political future, especially regarding the role of the Emirati-backed southern separatists, the wider regional security environment is shifting rapidly. Escalating tensions following the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, which prompted an Iranian retaliation on and in the Gulf, have underscored the interconnected nature of Gulf security.

In this context, current regional instability may paradoxically create an opportunity for cooperation, as heightened security threats often encourage greater coordination among partners who share common security vulnerabilities. The issue of Southern Yemen could therefore transform from a point of divergence into a platform for renewed strategic cooperation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. 

Stabilization prospects in Southern YemenĚý

Despite years of conflict, Yemen’s southern regions have retained relatively security structures and administrative institutions. These local capacities provide a solid foundation for broader stabilization efforts in the region focused on governance reform, economic recovery and institutional development. Through coordinated Gulf support, strengthening such capacities could help create conditions conducive to sustainable stability.Ěý

The past decade of conflict has demonstrated that a military approach alone cannot deliver lasting peace in Yemen. Durable stability in the country will depend on , effective governance and partnerships rooted in local legitimacy. This is particularly important given South Yemen’s strategic geographic location. The region borders the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most vital , through which an estimated 10–12% of global seaborne trade passes via the Red Sea corridor. Ensuring security along these waterways is therefore both a regional priority and a matter of global economic significance.Ěý

Current regional dynamics offer Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the opportunity to expand their role in Yemen beyond short-term security objectives. Moreover, geopolitical developments provide an opportunity for Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to reconcile, thereby contributing to a more stable future for southern Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula.

However, it is vital for southern political actors to strengthen governance performance and demonstrate commitment to inclusive and accountable administration. Yemen’s long-term stability will ultimately depend on political arrangements that reflect realities on the ground and address the aspirations of the country’s diverse regions. 

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Building Bridges in Yemen: A Gulf Opportunity to Stabilize the South appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

These systems do not want peace because their survival depends on sustained conflict. This is why diplomatic summits, ceasefire deals and foreign interventions consistently fail: they target symptoms, not causes. If the problem is structural, then so must be the solution. Peace in the Middle East will not come through negotiation. It will come through a civilizational shift, and it demands three acts of moral courage.

The first is capitalist liberalization. Every individual must gain the right to produce, to trade and to own. No government has the right to command his labor, confiscate his earnings or dictate his future. Capitalism is not a system of greed. It is the only system that recognizes the moral right of a person to live for his own sake.

The second is cultural conservatism. A society cannot survive without roots. When families collapse, when traditions vanish, when morality fades into relativism, chaos follows. A rational culture does not erase its past. It protects what gives life meaning, not by coercion, but by conviction.

The third is institutional transformation. No regime that survives by crushing liberty, spreading violence and fueling sectarian hate can remain in power without destroying the future. People must not reform such systems. They must replace them. Political freedom requires new institutions built on justice, law and individual rights.

This is the foundation of what I call Conservative modernism. It rejects both Islamic totalitarianism and secular technocracy. It affirms that peace cannot exist without liberty, and liberty cannot exist without moral strength. This is not a policy. It is a philosophy.

Sectarian wars and the legacy of doctrinal politics

We cannot understand the Middle East’s political instability apart from the theological and sectarian divides embedded within Islam itself. The — originating from a dispute over the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad — has long outgrown its historical moment to become the structural backbone of regional conflict. This divide was never merely theological; it became during the first Islamic civil wars and later into full-fledged state ideologies during the rise of rival empires like the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate and the Shia Safavid dynasty.Ěý

These empires did not merely represent competing political centers — they embodied competing claims to spiritual authority. In modern terms, regimes seeking to legitimize their power through religious division have hardened, institutionalized and weaponized these doctrinal fault lines rather than letting them fade. 

The legacy of these doctrinal wars lives on in today’s proxy conflicts, from Yemen to Syria, Iraq to Lebanon. Iran, as the self-appointed guardian of the Shia cause, has instrumentalized this divide to its revolutionary ideology through paramilitary proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq and Syria.Ěý

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, while less overtly ideological, have with their versions of sectarian patronage and security alignments. The result is not simply a clash between states, but a doctrinal cold war that perpetually destabilizes the region through religious identity and existential fear.

Political Islam, once unleashed as the doctrine of the state, does not merely challenge liberty — it annihilates the very concept. Its metaphysical certainty surpasses even the most dogmatic ideologies of the West. It does not see disagreement as an error. It brands it as blasphemy. What follows is inevitable. The state becomes paranoid. It cannot rest. It must constantly search for new traitors to purge. Reform becomes a crime. Dialogue becomes apostasy. There can be no middle ground, no compromise — only absolute control.

In this system, truth belongs to the ruling sect alone. To think differently is not a mistake — it is treason. The state no longer governs; it sanctifies itself. Power fuses with theology. Rule becomes divine command. And from that moment, every act of dissent becomes a threat to the sacred order. No regime built on this logic can tolerate peace. Peace implies coexistence. It suggests that another version of truth might exist. But in sectarian totalitarianism, there is only one truth — and only one authority to speak it. The heretic becomes more dangerous than the foreign enemy, because he corrupts the system from within. That is why these regimes live in constant fear of internal betrayal. They do not govern citizens; they hunt them.

Colonial powers did not build the modern Middle East into nations. They it into fragments. They drew their borders without reason. National identities remained shallow. In this vacuum, sectarian ideology offered a seductive substitute. It gave rulers a way to seize power without earning it. They did not ask for the people’s consent. They claimed divine authority instead.

Theocrats wrapped themselves in clerical robes to escape accountability. In Iran, the doctrine of placed unchecked political power in the hands of a cleric. Ayatollah Khomeini did not rule as a man — he ruled as a voice of God. Sunni radicals followed the same path. Groups like ISIS declared caliphates not to govern, but to sanctify tyranny. These regimes do not fear criticism, because they do not answer to men. They answer to the metaphysical fiction they claim to represent.

Islamic regimes use a dangerous illusion. They raise the banner of anti-Zionism not to unify but to distract. They Judaism and Israel as the ultimate enemy, hoping to forge a sense of solidarity across sectarian lines. But the truth remains: no propaganda can erase centuries of hatred between Sunni and Shia, between Salafi and Sufi, between Arab and Persian, between Turkic and non-Turkic. The hatred runs deep, and it does not disappear when leaders shout slogans against Israel.

This is not unity. It is manipulation. Anti-Zionism becomes a tool to dissent at home. It channels public anger away from corruption, poverty and tyranny, and toward an invented external enemy. It does not heal division; it hides it. The regimes that use this tactic know they cannot survive on truth, so they survive on scapegoats. But lies do not last. The cracks widen. The rhetoric grows louder, while the people grow poorer.

This is the real engine of Middle Eastern conflict. Not just land. Not just oil. It is the battle for the right to define God’s will — and to use that claim as a weapon. No treaty will break this system. No ceasefire will fix it. If regimes like Iran continue to export sectarian revolution as a matter of policy, the region will remain trapped in endless war. Peace will never begin on a battlefield. It begins in the mind. We must name doctrinal tyranny, expose it and defeat it. Only then can the Middle East escape from the chains of sacred war and step into the realm of civil peace.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution

The 1979 was not simply a change of regime; it was a civilizational rupture that produced a theocratic state with an unprecedented mission: to restructure the Islamic world according to the vision of Shiite clerical rule. Iran’s revolution claimed divine authorization through the doctrine of Vilayat al-Faqih. This doctrine, enshrined in Iran’s constitution, granted religious elites not only domestic supremacy but also a global mandate.Ěý

Article 154 explicitly that the Islamic Republic was duty-bound to “support the just struggles of the oppressed” worldwide. This ideological euphemism laid the legal foundation for regional insurgencies, proxy warfare and transnational terror networks. This new paradigm made Iran’s foreign policy an extension of messianic doctrine.

The Islamic Republic institutionalized this transformation of ideology into action by creating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (), and specifically its external wing, the , which carried out the mission of exporting the revolution. These were not simply elite military units but ideological vanguards — armed missionaries designed to reshape the region in Tehran’s image.

The IRGC and funded Shia militant factions during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, inside Iraq, creating the blueprint for what would later evolve into militia-state fusion. As early as 1982, Iran establish Hezbollah in Lebanon, embedding its revolutionary DNA in a new Shia militia that would grow into the region’s most sophisticated paramilitary movement.Ěý

But Iran did not confine its ambitions to its sect. Tehran built connections with Sunni groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran and its allies bypassed doctrinal differences when they faced a shared strategic enemy in Israel and the West, proving that ideology would bend to power.

Of all Iran’s ideological exports, Hezbollah remains the most enduring and institutionally complete. Born in the rubble of Lebanon’s civil war, Hezbollah’s 1985 founding manifesto allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader and its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. As Massaab Al-Aloosy has, Hezbollah evolved into a uniquely hybrid entity — a terrorist organization, political party and social welfare provider. This model of Islamic fascism does not simply mimic the authoritarian features of 20th-century totalitarian regimes. Instead, it integrates them with theological absolutism.Ěý

In Hezbollah’s worldview, the enemy is not merely political dissent or a foreign occupier. It is ideological impurity. Its of martyrdom, strict sectarian loyalty and rejection of pluralism form the core of an authoritarian theocratic identity, where the sect and the imamate define the sacred political community.

Iran’s reach and pragmatism allowed it to overcome sectarian lines when necessary. Nowhere is this clearer than in its alliance with Hamas, a Sunni group originally rooted in ideology. Initially antagonistic due to theological differences, Hamas gradually embraced Iran’s vision of resistance as its conflict with Israel intensified. Iran financial aid, smuggled weapons, supplied tactical training and built tunnel infrastructure that allowed Hamas to survive and militarize Gaza.Ěý

By the mid-2000s, especially after the group’s electoral victory and its, Hamas began to mirror Iran’s revolutionary language, re-framing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a divine struggle, not a solvable territorial dispute. Its leaders visited Tehran, received IRGC guidance and adopted a media strategy aligned with the broader.

This model of revolutionary partnership extended to Yemen, where Iran found a new ideological canvas in the , also known as Ansar Allah. Originally a local revivalist faction rooted in, Iran helped morph the Houthis into a more radicalized, Twelver-aligned militia. The group’s , “Death to America, Death to Israel,” is lifted directly from Iran’s revolutionary chant. By the 2010s, Iran supplied or engineered sophisticated missile and drone capabilities for the Houthis. These weapons the group to strike deep into Saudi Arabia and threaten global commerce in the Red Sea.

The of Saddam Hussein in 2003 provided Iran with its greatest strategic opening since 1979. Iraq, long a bulwark against Iranian expansion, became a vacuum of fractured authority in which Iran could embed deeply rooted proxies. The US-led dismantling of the Iraqi state allowed Tehran to co-opt existing militias such as the and new ones like Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.Ěý

All these militias pledged spiritual allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader. These groups infiltrated Iraqi security institutions, won parliamentary seats and turned Iraq into what I call a militia democracy. What distinguishes them from conventional insurgents is their ideological DNA. Rather than acknowledging themselves as part of a civil war, they present their struggle as resistance to Sunnis and Western imperialism.

Syria’s civil war further deepened Iran’s ideological project. Though the ruling Alawite regime under Bashar al-Assad does not follow mainstream Shiism, its geopolitical vulnerability made it an ideal ally. As protests spiraled into war, Iran intervened with billions in military aid, deploying not just IRGC troops and Hezbollah fighters, but also recruiting tens of thousands of Afghan Shia fighters from the impoverished Hazara population into the.Ěý

These fighters, lured by salaries and promises of martyrdom, became part of Iran’s transnational jihad. Syria thus became the geopolitical artery of Iran’s vision: a corridor of power from Tehran through Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut to the Mediterranean. Iran entrenched what many call the by establishing an ideological, financial and logistical presence in Syria.

Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria are no longer just battlefields. They are proving grounds for a new form of tyranny. These lands have become ideological laboratories, where fanatics test how far they can bend reality to fit a totalitarian creed.

Islamic socialism

The ideological machinery of post-1979 Iran introduced a new hybrid: . While the term may appear contradictory at first glance, it captures the unique fusion of theological absolutism with populist redistributionism. Islamic socialism is an economic-political framework that retains the authoritarian hierarchy of religious fascism, complete with doctrinal obedience and paramilitary enforcement.Ěý

At the same time, it borrows heavily from socialist structures such as centralized welfare, state control over key industries and class-based grievance politics. Just as European fascists in the 20th century adopted socialism to win popular support while retaining autocratic control (e.g., the Nazi “Strength Through Joy” ), the Islamic Republic has developed a theology of resistance economy. Here, economic hardship is not only tolerated but sanctified as martyrdom against global injustice. In this model, people must endure poverty collectively, heroically and violently rather than overcome it through liberal development.Ěý

Shiite theology provides the foundation for this socialist-fascist hybrid, on concepts of suffering, resistance and collective martyrdom. Shiism glorifies the mustadĘżafÄ«n, a group that Islamic texts frame as the downtrodden destined for divine justice. Khomeini’s revolutionary rhetoric this religious concept into a political-economic category, portraying the global poor — and particularly the Shia masses — as victims of Western imperialism.Ěý

Economic disparity is not a result of governance failures or global markets, but of cosmic injustice. Similar to how Nazi ideology peasant sacrifice and national suffering as the price of destiny, the Islamic Republic elevates economic deprivation into a moral calling. It framed subsidy cuts, sanctions and austerity as acts of loyalty to a divine cause.

Crucially, leaders do not just impose the model of Islamic Socialism from above; they enforce it through tribal structures and sectarian identities. It replaces civic institutions with kinship loyalty and doctrinal submission. In the Iranian-led axis, traditional tribal instincts are not suppressed but weaponized. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shia militias in Iraq all demonstrate this structure. 

War footing as the foundation of economic life

These groups offer not only salaries and protection, but welfare, housing and education — all contingent upon ideological alignment and collective loyalty. They systematically erase individualism. One’s worth is not measured by merit or autonomy but by one’s allegiance to the sect, the tribe and ultimately, the martyrdom cause. This mirrors how Italian fascism and German Nazism pre-modern collectivism to erase individuality and convert citizens into functionaries of myth, soldiers of a destiny beyond themselves.

In these theocratic-socialist regimes, the individual disappears as a political subject. Rather than a bearer of rights, the person becomes a vessel of duty — primarily to the sect, then to the Supreme Leader. Ideological training begins early, often in religious schools controlled by paramilitary arms of the state or proxy groups. These institutions teach loyalty not just to God but to the revolutionary cause. 

The regime trains the youth, like those in Nazi Germany’s, not to think but to serve and sacrifice. Hezbollah’s and Iran’s indoctrination programs illustrate this well. Here, Islamic Socialism becomes a mechanism for total identity control: dictating what to believe, what to fear, who to love and who to kill. Welfare is no longer a civic right — it is a weaponized privilege, allocated according to sectarian discipline and revolutionary usefulness.Ěý

Moreover, this system depends on a dual moral economy: one inward-facing, promoting solidarity, and one outward-facing, glorifying hostility. Internally, Islamic Socialist leaders teach their communities to see themselves as pure, righteous and chosen. Externally, however, the world is divided into oppressors and enemies — whether they be the West, secular liberals, Sunni rivals or Zionists. 

The state’s leaders direct the economic and military engines toward this perpetual war footing. Iran’s leaders speak not of GDP growth but of jihad of production and economic resistance as if commerce itself were warfare. People allocate resources not to produce prosperity but to sustain ideological conflict. They Nazi Germany’s approach by fusing industry, propaganda and violence into a single war-making machine.

The myth of the Promised Land

Islamist regimes have spent decades weaponizing one of their most enduring myths: the belief that Israel seeks to fulfill a biblical prophecy by expanding its territory. According to this myth, Israel aims to restore the so-called Promised Land, stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates. Islamist leaders and propagandists frequently this claim in Friday sermons, regime media and militant manifestos.Ěý

The narrative serves both psychological and strategic purposes by fostering a sense of perpetual victimhood among Muslim populations and justifying preemptive violence. However, no formal Israeli policy — past or present — has ever such a fantasy. This contradiction between perception and reality is not an accident. It is the product of Islamic fascism.

Arab and Islamic leaders never admit that the biblical Promised Land in the Old Testament covers far less territory than Islamist propaganda claims. While and do reference land covenants, these verses are highly symbolic, varied in interpretation and not presented as a modern political blueprint. The more expansive version — suggesting Israeli claims over half the Arab world — is a misreading or deliberate distortion.Ěý

Even within Jewish religious scholarship, there is no consensus on whether the land covenant is literal, spiritual or eschatological. More importantly, Israel, as a modern state, has never built policy around these verses. The secular Zionist movement that founded Israel drove its actions with political pragmatism, not theological maximalism. The Declaration of Independence, for instance, contains no reference to religious prophecy as a legal or territorial foundation for the state.

Prominent biblical scholars have repeatedly argued that the Promised Land verses do not apply to modern statecraft. Walter Brueggemann, a leading Old Testament theologian, that the land promises in Genesis and Ezekiel symbolize divine fidelity and human obligation. Ezekiel 47:13–23 outlines a limited, region-specific territory tied to historical tribes, not a universal conquest map. Jewish exegetes widely the Nile to Euphrates phrasing in Genesis 15:18 as covenantal poetry, not a literal border plan. Contemporary Jewish religious institutions and Israel’s Chief Rabbinate have never endorsed any policy derived from these verses.

Oslo Accords and the recognition of a two-state framework

Israel’s territorial policy shows a consistent pattern of contraction and compromise, not expansion, contrary to the myth of expansionism. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Israel accepted the1949 rather than pressing beyond. In 1967, during the , Israel captured territory (including Sinai and the West Bank) but returned the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1982 under the.The (1993–1995) and subsequent negotiations all recognized the concept of a two-state solution, even with territorial compromises. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza, dismantling settlements without a peace agreement.Ěý

These historical milestones disprove the idea of a consistent theological or messianic territorial agenda. Even in contentious areas like the West Bank, Israeli officials and lawmakers debate expansion according to legal and political frameworks rather than divine mandate.

Regimes like Iran and ideological movements like Hezbollah and Hamas the Abraham Accords as an existential crisis. The accords, signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, were a public rejection of the expansionist myth. They demonstrated that Arab nations — particularly those with strategic awareness — do not believe Israel is seeking to fulfill some ancient prophecy. These are not naïve regimes; they signed normalization agreements based on economic cooperation, technological exchange and geopolitical calculations.

The path forward

Real peace in the Middle East requires structural change. This approach rejects the shallow cycle of summit diplomacy and short-term ceasefires. Structural change demands a civilizational shift: leaders must dismantle sacralized politics and stop using religious narratives to justify power. This isn’t Western-style secularism but a deliberate separation of divine claims from state rule. Only through this shift can the region build lasting peace — rooted not in utopias or despair, but in economic freedom, cultural cohesion and strong institutions.

offers a clear alternative to ideological extremes. It doesn’t fuse them. It escapes them. Unlike secular technocracy, which often alienates traditional societies, conservative modernism respects the cultural depth of the Middle East and promotes practical reform. It builds on Enlightenment ideals like individual liberty and economic autonomy while honoring civilizational continuity.Ěý

Its foundation rests on three pillars: economic liberalism, cultural conservatism and institutional reform. It doesn’t force secularism, nor does it permit theocracy. Instead, it preserves spiritual identity while disarming messianic violence. It respects tradition without falling into tribalism, and religion without surrendering to religious absolutism.

offers a powerful historical model within this framework. Mustafa Kemal AtatĂĽrk launched it in the early 20th century as a bold top-down effort to secularize Turkey. He abolished the Ottoman Caliphate, replaced Islamic law with Western legal codes and built a civic nationalism rooted in republican values. Kemalism stands as one of the few successful cases in the Islamic world where state institutions stripped religion of political power without erasing faith itself. Yet, the project also imposed authoritarian control, censorship and bureaucratic rigidity.Ěý

Today, the Middle East can draw lessons from Kemalism — not as a complete solution, but as a foundational blueprint. It shows how nations can curb clerical authority without destroying religious life and how civic nationalism can overcome tribal and sectarian divides by building loyalty to the state.

Kemalism needs a complement. Its authoritarian legacy demands correction through the principles of libertarianism, which counters centralized coercion. Many in the Middle East misinterpret libertarianism as a Western indulgence or a form of moral anarchy. In truth, it is a philosophy of restraint — placing clear limits on state power. 

Within conservative modernism, libertarianism protects individual dignity from being sacrificed for national unity. It upholds free association, freedom of speech, private enterprise and personal conscience as essential pillars of post-sectarian societies. When paired with Kemalist reforms, libertarianism softens the state’s edges and makes room for civil liberties to thrive where ideological control once prevailed.

This fusion directly targets what I call the tribal complex — the web of kinship, patronage and sectarian loyalty that cripples modern statehood across the Middle East. In tribal systems, the individual never stands alone; he serves as a proxy for his group, bound by blood ties and religious allegiance. Tribal logic dictates political loyalty, economic access and legal protection, leaving little room for citizenship or merit. 

This is the real enemy of peace: the absence of a civic concept of the individual. Kemalism dismantles tribal structures through land reform, education and militia disarmament. Libertarianism then builds the culture of self-ownership and economic agency needed to prevent tribalism’s return.  

Conservative modernism demands a profound psychological transformation. Middle Eastern societies must abandon the mythology of martyrdom and embrace the everyday heroism of building families, businesses, schools and institutions. Peace begins when people stop seeking symbolic sacrifice and start pursuing tangible contribution. The new citizen must become a rational actor — focused on dignity through property ownership, child-rearing and value creation. Economic liberalism, in this vision, goes beyond material systems; it launches a moral revolt against fatalism.

Turkey’s potential role in reshaping the Abrahamic framework

Turkey holds the key to securing lasting peace in the Middle East through its integration into the Abrahamic framework. Turkey is a historic power. Unlike the Gulf monarchies that are dependent on petroleum dollars and foreign support, Turkey possesses the internal civilizational strength to lead. Its NATO membership, industrial capacity and nuanced relationship with Islam give it a unique ability to balance religious heritage with strategic logic. Including Turkey in the Abraham Accords would shift the regional balance. It would show that Iran’s ideological barriers are not only penetrable but also collapsing. 

Turkey’s participation would also redefine Muslim solidarity, moving it away from perpetual hostility toward Israel and shared goals in economic growth and technological progress. A regional alliance among Turkey, Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia could create a new peace axis and weaken Iran’s grip on ideological leadership.

The Islamic Republic of Iran remains the greatest single barrier to sustainable peace. This is not merely because of its actions, but because of its doctrine. One cannot reach a lasting agreement with a state that must, by its very ideology, destroy its negotiating partner to remain legitimate. Any peace built upon negotiation with such a regime is a ceasefire with a time limit. We must replace the Islamic Republic not through foreign war, but through internal transformation.

Regime change imposed by foreign powers breeds dependency and resentment, as seen in Iraq. Instead, change must emerge from within Iranian civil society — through education, economic empowerment and ideological detoxification. This requires long-term investment in civic literacy, especially among the youth. Only a population that understands the moral and civic basis of pluralism can dismantle a system built on sectarian fear. Empowered with economic agency and a desacralized worldview, Iranians themselves can — and must — be the agents of transformation.

A stable society must depoliticize religion without erasing it. Secularism is not atheism or cultural erasure — it is a safeguard. By limiting the political misuse of faith, secularism protects mosques, churches and synagogues as spaces for moral reflection, not power. To end partisan abuse, sectarian violence and theocratic repression, states must build a legal firewall between belief and authority. In this separation, both faith and civic life can thrive.

To summarize the core prescriptions proposed throughout this work, the following principles outline a structural roadmap for achieving sustainable peace in the Middle East:

• Depoliticize religion by enforcing constitutional secularism that protects faith while preventing its weaponization.
• Embrace economic liberalism to dismantle tribal patronage and foster individual autonomy.
• Redefine conservatism as civil order, family cohesion and moral continuity — not authoritarianism.
• Promote education reform rooted in critical reasoning, pluralism and civic ethics over sectarian indoctrination.
• Foster internal regime change in Iran and similar regimes through economic empowerment and ideological detoxification.
• Reject foreign invasions, supporting revolutions that emerge organically from educated and self-actualized societies.
• Integrate Turkey into the Abraham Accords to establish a strong axis of pragmatic, non-apocalyptic Islam.
• Normalize ties with Israel as a regional partner in trade, security and scientific advancement — not as a messianic threat.
• Fuse Kemalism with Libertarianism to combine institutional reform with civil liberty and crush the tribal complex.
• Replace martyrdom cultures with economic liberalism that prioritizes life, dignity and opportunity.
• Establish conservative modernism as the only viable doctrine suited to Middle Eastern reform.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Conservative Modernism: A Roadmap for Sustainable Peace in the Middle East appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Khosrow Isfahani: I always mix it up myself as well. 

Atul Singh: (Laughs) Came from Isfahan. So, Khosrow, what a pleasure. What an honor. Welcome.

Khosrow Isfahani: Thank you, Atul, for your kind introduction. That was just beyond and above. Thank you very much. Happy to be with you.

Atul Singh: Happy to introduce an Iranian, ha! Farsi was the official language of India for 800 years. And today, we will be discussing Iran’s Axis of Resistance. I repeat: yes, Iran’s Axis of Resistance. And the topic of the podcast is “Iran’s Axis of Resistance Is in Shambles: What Next?” So, without further ado, Khosrow, tell us: What is this Axis of Resistance?

Khosrow Isfahani: So, the ayatollahs in Tehran who run this rogue state — that from the get-go of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 has gone head-to-head with neighboring countries and international powers — have constantly found themselves in a jam, constantly fearing for the continuation of their rule over this nation of 90 million people. One of the pillars of their security doctrine, their response to outside threats as they perceive it, has been the Axis of Resistance. What is Axis of Resistance? It is a network of terrorist groups — and sometimes they are called militant groups — and allied states that, most of the time, are allied against the United States as well. Who are the members of this Axis of Resistance? Let’s start with Iran’s neighbors. In Iraq, you have the Hashd al-Shaabi — the Popular Mobilization Units, the PMU, or sometimes PMF. You have Houthi rebels in Yemen. You have smaller militia groups that are highly controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC. The small militant groups under its banner are Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun. The first one is made up of Afghan refugees that the IRGC forced into submission and into serving its wars abroad with the promise of citizenship. And Zainabiyoun is made up of Pakistanis.

Atul Singh: Are both of these populations Shia? Are the Afghans Hazaras?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Atul Singh: Or are the Afghans Hazaras, and the Pakistanis Shia refugees from Pakistan?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And in both cases, these are marginalized people who try to find refuge or some pocket of safety in Iran. And when they arrive in Iran, they face persecution from the state. They are barred from using banking services, accessing education, healthcare services. And this sinister state that the Islamic Republic is uses this fertile ground for recruiting these poor souls, to make them into soldiers for its adventurism around the region.

Atul Singh: Now, as I understand it, Bashar al-Assad — who’s now deposed, he has fled — he was an Alawi, an Alawite. He was Shia. The Houthis are Ismailis, if I’m correct — they are also Shia. So in a way, this is Iran’s Shia Crescent, extending all the way from Israel’s border to Hazara territory in Afghanistan.

Khosrow Isfahani: So yes, there is an ideological element to the creation of the Axis of Resistance, but—

Atul Singh: Religious, I would say, even more than ideological.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, yes, that would be a fair framing of it. But when you look at the Palestinian groups that have aligned themselves with the Islamic Republic, you would find groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the General Command — that was a leftist group with leftist agendas, not at all religious, that literally has been one of the linchpins of Iran’s network of terror near the Israeli border.

Atul Singh: So it’s not just religion — it’s broader than that. But in the Palestinian case, that’s perhaps because Israel has backed them firmly, and no other Arab state is doing so right now.

Khosrow Isfahani: In the case of Iran and its relations with Palestinian groups, it’s not about the Palestinian people or religion. It’s just that the Islamic Republic sees Israel as its eternal enemy. As a mortal enemy that’s either the Islamic Republic or Israel should not exist for this war between them to end. That’s constantly present in the propaganda of the Islamic Republic. So anyone who is fighting against Israel the Islamic Republic sees it as an ally.

Atul Singh: And they join the Axis of Resistance.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Ideology vs. realpolitik: Iran’s security doctrine

Atul Singh: So, alright, I understand now what is the Axis of Resistance. But what purpose does it serve? What is Iran’s security doctrine?

Khosrow Isfahani: So let me just add two points about what the Axis of Resistance is, and I promise I will answer that question as well. In addition to these groups, Syria under Bashar al-Assad was one of the main pillars of the Axis of Resistance. And the crown jewel of the Axis of Resistance used to be Hezbollah in Lebanon. These two main elements in the Axis have been reduced to rubble over the past couple of months, as well as Hamas, as well as the ouster of Assad from Syria, which has changed the whole region’s face. But back to your question: What purpose did the Axis of Resistance serve? It is a combination of, again, ideology and the realpolitik of this ideologically-driven authoritarian state that we have in Iran. So after the Islamic Revolution, we had an extended eight-year war between Iran and its neighboring country, Iraq. It was a brutal war. Hundreds of thousands of people on both sides were killed.

Atul Singh: 1980 to 1988 — Saddam Hussein on one side, Ayatollah Khomeini on the other side.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And during this period, Iran and its leaders found themselves isolated. The war comes at the heels of the hostage situation — forces allied with the Ayatollah Khomeini taking American diplomats in Tehran hostage for over a year. It comes at the same time that Khomeini is exporting the Islamic Revolution around the world. So when there is a war, when Iran is under attack, no one is willing to sell weapons to Tehran. So in response, the Islamic Republic has developed a multi-pronged defense strategy. A core element of it — they took a page out of the Soviet book — they have moved the periphery of the war away from mainland Iran. They describe it as “strategic depth” in Iranian defense language.

Atul Singh: Well, Pakistan also obsesses about strategic depth, and that is why it has funded and supported first the Mujahideen and then the Taliban: to have security in its backyard and an ally against India. So that seems to be a common obsession.

Khosrow Isfahani: And to a great extent, it has been effective for a rogue state like the Islamic Republic that has constantly, over the past four decades, sought WMDs. It has kept this regime in power and safe from outside aggression, to a great extent. So one is this Axis of Resistance, that was one of the main pillars of the Islamic Republic’s security doctrine. The other two is self-sufficiency through development of conventional weapons. What are the examples of that? The ballistic missile projects, the drone projects. These have been ongoing since the inception of the Islamic Republic.

Atul Singh: And these are conventional weapons?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And over the past couple of years, we have seen the Islamic Republic exporting these weapons to other countries, including Russia, which has used the Iran-made weapons for war crimes against the Ukrainians. So when you look at the wider map of the world, you see the footprint of Iran whenever there is death and destruction. Let’s get back to our main topic.

Missiles, drones and nuclear threats

Atul Singh: There’s also the WMD program. That’s also part of the security doctrine.

Khosrow Isfahani: Exactly. Since the days—

Atul Singh: And that basically means the nuclear program?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Atul Singh: Also, I suspect chemical, too?

Khosrow Isfahani: There have been aspirations of acquiring chemical weapons. At some point during the Iran–Iraq War, one of the senior IRGC commanders even was looking into making a laser weapon that can shoot laser beams from space at adversaries and destroy countries. So they have looked at every possible scenario.

Atul Singh: Did they succeed?

Khosrow Isfahani: No. That was very cartoonish of him.

Atul Singh: Was he reading too many science fiction novels?

Khosrow Isfahani: I am assuming that’s where the root of that idea was. But on a more serious note, the Islamic Republic has sought weapons of mass destruction. There has been concerted efforts within the Islamic Republic’s establishment to create nuclear weapons. Over the years, there have been periods that this program has been put on pause, but it has always been at least on the back burner. And in recent weeks, with the collapse of the Axis of Resistance, the Islamic Republic has been left with two options when it comes to maintaining its security: One is expansion of its conventional weapons programs. Over the past couple of months, they have seen multiple tests and drills inside Iran where new drones were unveiled. Allegedly, ballistic missiles were tested. These are all signaling to the world that “we are still in the game, we are not bowing out and we are pursuing all these options.” At the same time, a couple of weeks ago, in negotiations with European counterparts, Iranian diplomats for the first time — I emphasize, for the first time — threatened their counterparts that Iran might change its nuclear doctrine. Over the years, they have stuck to this talking point that Iran doesn’t seek a nuclear weapon. But now they are openly saying that they might make their leap. So we are facing this new reality.

Collapse of the Axis and economic strain

Atul Singh: I see. So that’s the security doctrine: Basically, have deterrents in the form of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, move the locus of conflict away from the Iranian heartland, have a strong periphery which acts as the outer wall — the outer wall of a fort — to defend Iran and secure the great Islamic Revolution of 1979. Now, all of that makes sense. However, as you yourself pointed out earlier, the Axis of Resistance has collapsed. Hamas is weak.

Khosrow Isfahani: Its operational capabilities have been reduced.

Atul Singh: Yeah, Hezbollah has been decapitated. The leadership at least has been decapitated. And Bashar al-Assad is cooling his fine derrière in icy Moscow. So how is Iran coping with the new reality?

Khosrow Isfahani: It’s doubling down on the two programs. One: the expansion of the conventional weapons program.

Atul Singh: Such as drones, missiles and now, of course, a greater show of force.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. We have had multiple drills inside Iran that they are trying to project an image of power and control, that nothing has changed and Iran is still capable of sending off if there is war. Literally not a single week passes without a senior Iranian military official telling the press that if there is aggression against Iran, it will face a decisive response. So that’s one element. And on the other hand, there is the threat of acquiring a nuclear weapon. As I mentioned earlier, they are constantly buzzing about making the leap for a nuclear weapon. And I just want to remind you: A senior Iranian official a couple of years ago described that Iran might act like a cornered cat. “It doesn’t want a nuclear weapon, but if you corner a cat, you cannot predict what it does next.” As broken as that rationale is, and as somber as that image would be for the world, this is the mindset of the ayatollahs ruling Iran.

Atul Singh: Right. So the ayatollahs might be cornered cats and might want to spend a lot of money on programs and defense, but the big question arises: Where is the money coming from?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the main source of the money that Iran has for its military expenditure is its revenue from oil and gas exports. The main customers of that: China. Syria used to be a customer, but the payments weren’t on time. Same with Iraq. So that’s where the money is coming from.

Atul Singh: So China is sending the money that is keeping aloft Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. But the issue is, a large portion of this money is not being spent on anything. The ayatollahs are constantly in fear of a protracted war, of a foreign attack, so they are saving this money for that possible attack — and at the same time, lavishly spending it on weapons development. And at the same time, a lot of them — and their children — are living lavish lives in Iran, while the rest of the country is suffering in absolute poverty.

Atul Singh: So in a way, the ayatollahs have become the new Shah of Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: I wouldn’t go down that road, and I wouldn’t make that comparison.

Atul Singh: They did throw a huge party in Persepolis — $800 million on god knows what.

Khosrow Isfahani: Again, different time, different context. So I wouldn’t compare these two rulers with each other in any form or shape.

Atul Singh: You know, I mean, I come from India. The Taj Mahal was built for an Iranian woman, and it caused famine and arguably death of thousands if not millions. So we are used to Iranian opulence!

Khosrow Isfahani: If I were to compare the approach of the ayatollahs to the economy and how they are wasting the resources of a very proud nation, it would be what the North Korean dictators are doing. Nothing trickles down to the people. People suffer, they stay in power.

Civil unrest and the war on women

Atul Singh: Excellent. And I guess it is that suffering that is causing increased frequency of civil unrest in Iran? We’ve had news about women protesting, we’ve had news about young people protesting. If Iran is using its scarce cash on military expenditure and in corruption, then will this lead to an intensification of this unrest?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the thing is, over the past couple of years — mostly, we can mark from 2016, 2017 — we have seen a shift in Iranian society. In the past, we have had multiple cycles of protests, but they were happening in cycles that there were gaps between them — around 10 years. When you look at the years after 2016, the gap is not even a year. So, people are on the streets over water shortage, fuel shortage, food shortage, food crisis.

Atul Singh: Wasn’t there a big protest over fuel prices in 2019?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. In 2019, the government of so-called reformist President Hassan Rouhani increased fuel prices three times overnight.

Atul Singh: Why?

Khosrow Isfahani: Because they argued they cannot subsidize fuel anymore. Some economists—

Atul Singh: They were subsidizing their own RMs.

Khosrow Isfahani: There you go. And spending the riches of this country on their adventurism abroad. So in 2019, when they tripled fuel prices, people took to the streets. And in response, they killed 1,500 people. That’s a lot.

Atul Singh: Not by the standards of Joseph Stalin, or even Saddam Hussein.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, but that was the longest period of time. And again, they were in an olden age. In 2019, if you kill 1,500 people in less than a week in the darkness of an absolute nationwide Internet shutdown, that’s a nightmare. I lived through that. I was on the ground in Iran reporting those events.

Atul Singh: And you were under a huge threat of life and limb, I suppose?

Khosrow Isfahani: Absolutely, like every other journalist who is doing their job. And after 2019, we have seen a reoccurrence of these types of protests in Iran. After that, we had protests against water shortage, which again was brutally suppressed. And recently, in 2022–2023, we had the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which was triggered by police killing this young woman from Iran’s persecuted Kurdish minority over showing too much hair. Over 500 were killed.

Atul Singh: She wasn’t even wearing a bikini.

Khosrow Isfahani: She was very — if you see the photos of her before this incident, everyone would describe it as very modestly covered. So it shocked the whole nation.

Atul Singh: Some Iranians I know have called it — and you as well have called it — a war on women.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And it didn’t start with the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini. It has been a war that has been ongoing since 1979, with the inception of the Islamic Republic. This regime has a three-pillar ideological system. One of them is animosity toward the West, specifically the US; hatred of Israel — it’s irreconcilable — and this unending war against women. It started with oppressing women into wearing very, very conservative clothing — forcing them to wear the hijab, firing people from their jobs, arresting them, sentencing them to lashing, denying them access to services, and it’s continuing. And to mark that continuation, despite the lies that Iran’s chief propagandist, Zarif, would like—

Atul Singh: Javad Zarif.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, the former foreign minister and current aide to the president.

Atul Singh: He went to school with the father of a friend. And my friend’s father — who’s passed away — didn’t have very many pleasant things to say about him.

Khosrow Isfahani: Not any. I cannot think of a single person with a shred of dignity who would have anything nice to say about Javad Zarif. This man has whitewashed crimes of the Islamic Republic — crimes against humanity, war crimes of this regime — over the past four decades, nonstop.

Atul Singh: He’s a smooth operator, to give the devil his due.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. That makes him a more dangerous actor compared to his predecessor who died in a helicopter crash recently.

Trump, deterrence and future scenarios

Atul Singh: I see. So let’s discuss the new world we live in, you and I are sitting in Washington, DC. Donald Trump is back in the White House. As of today, he has issued 37 executive orders, and things are extremely uncertain. The Pentagon jargon: Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous — VUCA. We very much are in the VUCA world. So what lies ahead for Iran now?

Khosrow Isfahani: So, on one end, we have an Iranian establishment in its entirety swearing absolute revenge against President Trump after the killing of IRGC Quds Force Commander, the Islamic Republic’s chief terror operator, Qasem Soleimani. The Islamic Republic, its Supreme Leader and the civilian government have sworn that they are going to kill the president. The official website of the Supreme Leader has published posters saying that President Trump should be killed and assassinated.

Atul Singh: As revenge for killing Qasem Soleimani who was killed in Baghdad, and in the eyes of many Iranians, was a hero.

Khosrow Isfahani: And in the eyes of many, a murderous war criminal who had the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent people on his hands — people in especially Syria. He was the commander that led the bloody crackdown that the Islamic Republic, Russia and the deposed Bashar al-Assad led against the uprising of the Syrian people for justice and liberty in their country.

Atul Singh: So in particular, a lot of Sunnis — who form the majority of Syria — were targeted and tortured and killed.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And he was responsible for a lot of that.

Atul Singh: Okay. So let’s come back to Trump. Yes, so on the one hand, they want Donald Trump dead.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. But at the same time, they are extremely afraid of a second-term President Trump in office. The first term didn’t end well for the Islamic Republic. It was marked with the maximum pressure campaign.

Atul Singh: Well, he threw out Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran.

Khosrow Isfahani: Which many experts believe was a flawed agreement that didn’t include Iran’s regional activities and missile program under the JCPOA, the nuclear deal.

Atul Singh: Yes, JCPOA is the full form, yeah.

Khosrow Isfahani: —expanded its missile and drone program. It enriched its militants — the network of militant groups across the region. So yes, in his first term, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, reimposed strict sanctions against the Islamic Republic. And as one very knowledgeable economist back in Iran at the time told me, President Trump was like a lion having Iran by its back, biting the back of the neck of the ayatollahs, rendering them incapacitated, unable to make any moves.

Atul Singh: Well, I think Donald Trump would love that image. He’s got blonde hair and he fancies himself as a lion. The ayatollahs would be, you know, the bisons or the wildebeests, or whatever you want to call them.

Khosrow Isfahani: That’s the analysis of this very senior, experienced economist at the time I knew.

Atul Singh: Excellent. I mean, he will certainly be appointed in the Trump White House. You should send his name over to the Donald.

Khosrow Isfahani: So that’s one thing that the ayatollahs are afraid of. But more importantly is that over the years, the clerical establishment in Iran has almost successfully gamed all presidents in the US. The two parties had become predictable for the ayatollahs in Tehran. They knew how they can play their cards to remain in this sphere of safety without being too limited. But with President Trump, they don’t know what would be the consequences of their actions. So right now, literally today, the Iranian Supreme Leader delivered a speech about the possibility of negotiations with “the enemy.” He said that “when you negotiate with the enemy, you should remember who you are negotiating with — but you may proceed.” Some have seen this as a signal from the Ayatollah for negotiations with the US. But the issue is: With a regime like the Islamic Republic, whatever negotiation you clinch, whatever deal you achieve, it would amount to nothing but kicking the can down the road. It’s not going to change the behavior or the ideology of this regime that has been the largest state sponsor of terrorism around the world. It’s not going to change the behavior of a regime that has been responsible for death and destruction around the Middle East. And it’s not going to change the behavior of a regime that constantly kills and oppresses the people under its rule.

Khosrow Isfahani: So what you’re saying is, Donald Trump would be unwise to negotiate with the Iranian regime, and what you’re implying is that he should kill the beast he has by his jaws.

Khosrow Isfahani: So, I’m going to quote, actually, the two-term president Hassan Rouhani in the book The Secret War with Iran. Ronen Bergman, when he’s talking about the McFarlane affair — Iran purchasing weapons from Israel with the US being in the middle and a lot else going on in the background — there is a specific chapter in this whole affair that I believe has remained true: During these negotiations, Hassan Rouhani was a senior security official within the Islamic Republic’s structure. He travels to France to meet with different stakeholders in the McFarlane affair. And sitting down with one of the officers negotiating the deal, he tells them that, “You don’t understand the ayatollahs in Tehran. You show weakness, and they exploit it. If you show strength, they would abide.” There is a direct quote — the conversation has actually been recorded by an intelligence officer who was in the room — and he says: “You should tell them that if you cross this red line, this specific military target can be hit and will be hit. And if you do that, the ayatollahs would change their behavior.”

Atul Singh: You’re sounding like Bibi Netanyahu.

Khosrow Isfahani: I’m quoting a two-term president within the Islamic Republic.

Atul Singh: (Laughs) Rouhani is sounding like Bibi Netanyahu. So what you’re saying is, paradoxically, Trump’s hardball tactics might yield some results with Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the thing is, a very wise friend a couple of months ago told me that there is connective tissue between diplomacy, military action and sanctions. These don’t exist in the void. And any administration in the US would be wise to use the wide array of — and all the tools at its disposal — for containing a rogue state like the Islamic Republic and re-establishing deterrence in the Middle East.

Atul Singh: On that note, great to have you, Khosrow. We learned a few things. Obviously, we’d love to have you back on a vast area of issues — not just on the Middle East, because you have much broader interests — but also civil society, journalism, how geopolitics is shaping up worldwide. And we look forward to seeing you very soon.

Khosrow Isfahani: Thank you, Atul. Thanks for having me.

Atul Singh: Thank you.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Podcasts: Iran’s Axis of Resistance Is Now in Shambles. What Next? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The failed diplomatic approach in 2018 produced two major consequences: Houthi aggression along the Red Sea and Arabian Sea and the crimes against Yemenis working for humanitarian organizations. Accounts of the for Hodeidah city from June to December 2018 depict how anti-Houthi forces were to their advance. Humanitarian and analysts warned against “destructive” military against Houthis and advocated for a diplomatic approach to prevent dire consequences for the civilian population. By the time Griffiths called for a in Stockholm, southern forces and units under Commander Tareq Saleh had reached the and advanced to a position within east of the city.

The summit concluded with a photo-op and handshake between the Legitimate Government’s Foreign Minister, Khaled al-Yamani, and Houthi chief negotiator Muhammad Abd al-Salam. What weeks and months later was a classic Houthi manipulation of the Stockholm Agreement — they retained full control over the city, port facilities in Hodeidah and Salif and the oil terminal at Ras Isa. Houthis also neutralized the created by the UN Security Council to oversee implementation of the agreement.

Victory postponed

Criticism of the UN approach to conflict in Yemen is not new. Yemenis have attacked every UN Special Envoy since (who served from 2011 to 2015), each blamed for further empowering Houthis since they joined the popular against politician and military officer Ali Abdullah Saleh. Benomar was replaced soon after Houthis launched their invasion of the city of in March 2015. Houthis went on to control 25% more territory than they did when Griffiths was appointed as the third UN Envoy to Yemen in 2018. This prompted Griffiths’s replacement.

Reality is far more complicated than a collection of events to justify criticism. However, one can’t ignore failure sustained by insisting on the same approach for a decade expecting different results. of Yemenis have suffered the of war since 2011, and there is still no end in sight for this crisis. Yemenis critical of UN officials are aware Houthi rivals also bear responsibility for a decade of armed conflict, but it is abundantly clear that actions by the UN and others directly empowered Houthis and postponed victories to dislodge the rebels from the cities of Hodeidah, Sanaa and .

While Saleh’s stepping down in November 2011 was hailed as a major diplomatic achievement, Yemenis highlight the failure of the National Dialogue and the Peace and Partnership Agreement of as preludes to the catastrophe in December 2018. Houthis learned that the UN, regional powers and the West were unable to counter their manipulation of agreements that merely granted the rebels time to regroup and . The handshake at Stockholm once again served Houthi interests, as it increased operations at ’s Red Sea port, allowed troop mobilization east of Saada city and the western province and enabled a strangle-hold over Taiz.

Crimes as consequences

Houthis and their progressive allies in the West present aggression against civilian commercial as operations supporting Palestinians in . In reality, these attacks have been an extension of Iran’s strategy and Houthi tactics to gain leverage in Yemen.

As members of Iran’s of Resistance, Houthis continue to represent a vital instrument for Iran in the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula. While they have independent goals in their fight against Yemeni rivals, they are vital to Iran’s encirclement of Saudi Arabia. Iraqi from the north, Houthis from the south and new in East Africa grant Iran indispensable advantages over Gulf monarchies, not just Saudi Arabia.

The attacks along across the Bab al-Mandab strait managed to disrupt the global economy, short of expected damage, but failed to accomplish anything in support of Gaza. The attacks on ships, including the hijacking of the and sinking of the and M/V , were not new tactics. Houthis have vessels since the start of the war. Training and weapons facilitated their new capabilities and efficiency employed from October 2023. This shows the international community that as long as they are in power and present along the Red Sea coast, they represent an enduring threat to maritime commerce.

Their strategy, as that of Iran, failed to produce expected results vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the UN. Houthis expected the Coalition to acquiesce on for a formal security agreement, and the UN to submit under pressure and increase the flow of aid to northern Yemen. Saudi Arabia remains hesitant to finalize the agreement with Houthis beyond the of April 2022, and lack of funds from donors decreased the of aid to Houthi controlled territory. In response, Houthis raised the stakes and engaged in so-called “hostage diplomacy;” they launched a criminal campaign last summer that dozens of Yemenis who worked for agencies and non-governmental organizations.

There is no clear path to a return to peace talks between Houthis and the Legitimate Government. The UN lacks any leverage over Houthis and has simply abandoned Yemeni nationals, which leaves their fate up to willing mediators who in turn have their own demands from the international community. Saudi Arabia faces increasing unpredictability from the US administration, risking further derailment of its . A major challenge for Houthis this time around is that the structure of the PLC serves to prevent the next Stockholm fiasco. Southern factions within the Legitimate Government will not submit to pressure for a deal that further empowers Houthis once again.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorialĚýpolicy.

The post International Community Bears Responsibility for Red Sea Crisis and Houthi Crimes appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The agreement is based on the terms of United Nations Security Council , which ended the previous Israeli assault on Lebanon in 2006. The truce will be enforced by 5,000 to 10,000 Lebanese troops and the UN’s 10,000-strong United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon () peacekeeping force, which has operated in that area since 1978 and includes troops from 46 countries.

The truce has broad international support, including from Iran and Gaza’s Hamas leaders. Israel and Hezbollah were apparently glad to take a break from a war that had become counterproductive for them both. Effective resistance prevented Israeli forces from advancing far into Lebanon, and they were inflicting mostly senseless death and destruction on civilians, as in Gaza, but without the genocidal motivation of that campaign.

People all over Lebanon have welcomed the relief from Israeli bombing, the destruction of their towns and neighborhoods and thousands of casualties. In the Lebanese capital of Beirut, people have started returning to their homes.

In the south, the Israeli military has warned residents on both sides of the border not to return yet. It has declared a new (which was not part of the truce agreement) that includes 60 villages north of the border, and has warned that it will attack Lebanese civilians who return to that area. Despite these warnings, thousands of displaced people have been returning to south Lebanon, often to find their homes and villages in ruins.

Many people returning to the south still proudly display the yellow flags of Hezbollah. A flying over the ruins of the Lebanese city of Tyre has the words, “Made in the USA,” written across it. This is a reminder that the Lebanese people know very well who made the bombs that have killed and maimed thousands of them.

The truce’s success seems unlikely

There are already many reports of ceasefire violations. Israel shot and two journalists soon after the truce went into effect. Then two days after the ceasefire began, Israel attacked five towns near the border with tanks, fired artillery across the border and conducted on southern Lebanon. On December 2, as a UN peacekeeper told CNN that Israel had the truce “roughly a hundred times,” Hezbollah finally with mortar fire in the disputed Shebaa Farms area. Israel responded with heavier strikes on two villages, killing 11 people.

An addendum to the truce agreement granted Israel the right to strike at will whenever it believes Hezbollah is violating the truce, giving it what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “complete military freedom of action,” which makes this a precarious and one-sided peace at best.

The prospect for a full withdrawal of both Israeli and Hezbollah forces in 60 days seems slim. Hezbollah has built large weapons stockpiles in the south that it will not want to abandon. Netanyahu himself has warned that the truce “can be short.”

Then there is the danger of confrontation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese military, raising the specter of Lebanon’s bloody civil war, which killed an estimated 150,000 people between 1975 and 1990. 

So violence could flare up into full-scale war again at any time, making it unlikely that many Israelis will return to homes near the border with Lebanon, Israel’s original publicly stated purpose for the war.

The truce was brokered by the United States and France, and signed by the European Union, Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. France was a colonial power in Lebanon and still plays a leading role in UNIFIL, yet Israel initially rejected France as a negotiating partner. It seems to have France’s role only when French President Emmanuel Macron’s government agreed not to enforce the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against Netanyahu if he comes to France.

The United Kingdom also signed the original truce proposal on November 25, but doesn’t appear to have signed the final agreement. The UK seems to have withdrawn from the negotiations under US and Israeli pressure because, unlike France, its new Labour government has publicly that it will comply with the ICC arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant. However, it has not explicitly said it would arrest them.

Netanyahu justified the truce to his own people by saying that it will allow Israeli forces to focus on Gaza and Iran, and only die-hard “Security” Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir voted the truce in the Israeli cabinet.

While there were hopes that the truce in Lebanon might set the stage for a ceasefire in Gaza, Israel’s actions on the ground tell a different story. Satellite images show Israel carrying out new mass demolitions of hundreds of buildings in northern Gaza to build a new road or between Gaza City and North Gaza. This may be a new border to separate the northernmost 17% of Gaza from the rest of the Gaza Strip, so Israel can expel its people and prevent them from returning, hand North Gaza over to Israeli settlers and squeeze the desperate, survivors into an even smaller area than before.

Syria complicates the conflict

And for all who had hopes that the ceasefire in Lebanon might lead to a regional de-escalation, those hopes were dashed in Syria when, on the very day of the truce, the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a surprise offensive. HTS was formerly the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front. It itself and severed its formal link to al-Qaeda in 2016 to avoid becoming a prime target in the US war in Syria, but the US still brands it a terrorist group.

By December 1, HTS managed to seize control of Syria’s second largest city, Aleppo, forcing the Syrian Arab Army and its Russian allies onto the defensive. With Russian and Syrian jets bombing rebel-held territory, the surge in fighting has raised the prospect of another violent, destabilizing front reopening in the Middle East.

This may also be a prelude to an escalation of attacks on Syria by Israel, which has already Syria more than 220 times since October 2023, with Israeli airstrikes and artillery bombardments killing at least 296 people.

The new HTS offensive most likely has covert US support, and may impact US President-elect Donald Trump’s reported to withdraw the 900 US troops still based in Syria. It may also impact his nomination of Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence. Gabbard is a longtime critic of US for al-Qaeda-linked factions in Syria, so the new HTS offensive sets the stage for an explosive confirmation hearing, which may backfire on Syria hawks in Washington if Gabbard is allowed to make her case.

Arab and Muslim state strategies

Elsewhere in the region, Israel’s genocide in Gaza and war on its neighbors have led to widespread anti-Israel and anti-US resistance.

Where the US was once able to buy off Arab rulers with weapons deals and military alliances, the Arab and Muslim world is coalescing around a position that sees Israel’s behavior as unacceptable and Iran as a threatened neighbor rather than an enemy. Unconditional US support for Israel risks permanently downgrading US relations with former allies, from Iraq, Jordan and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Yemen’s Ansar Allah (or Houthi) government has maintained a blockade of the Red Sea, using missiles and drones against Israeli-linked ships heading for the Israeli port of Eilat or the Suez Canal. The Yemenis have a US-led naval task force sent to break the blockade and have shipping through the Suez Canal by at least two-thirds, forcing shipping companies to reroute most ships all the way around Africa. The port of Eilat filed for in July, after only one ship docked there in several months.

Other resistance forces have conducted attacks on US military bases in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, and US forces have retaliated in a low-grade tit-for-tat war. The Iraqi government has strongly condemned U.S. and Israeli attacks on its soil as violations of its sovereignty. Attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria have flared up again in recent months, while Iraqi resistance forces have also launched drone attacks on Israel.

An emergency of the Arab League in Cairo, Egypt on November 26 voted unanimously to support Iraq and condemn Israeli threats. US–Iraqi talks in September drew up a for hundreds of US troops to leave Iraq in 2025 and for all 2,500 to be gone within two years. The US has outmaneuvered previous withdrawal plans, but the days of these very unwelcome US bases must surely be numbered.

Recent of Arab and Muslim states have forged a growing sense of unity around a rejection of US proposals for normalization of relations with Israel and a new solidarity with Palestine and Iran. At a meeting of Islamic nations in Riyadh on November 11, Saudi crown prince Mohammed Bin-Salman publicly called the Israeli massacre in Gaza a for the first time.

Arab and Muslim countries know that Trump may act unpredictably and that they need a stable common position to avoid becoming pawns to him or Netanyahu. They recognize that previous divisions left them vulnerable to US and Israeli exploitation, which contributed to the current crisis in Palestine and the risk of a major regional war that now looms over them.

On November 29, Saudi and Western officials told Reuters that Saudi Arabia has on a new military alliance with the US, which would include normalizing relations with Israel. It is opting for a more limited US weapons deal.

The Saudis had hoped for a treaty that included a US commitment to defend them, like treaties with Japan and South Korea. That would require confirmation by the US Senate, which would demand Saudi recognition of Israel in return. But the Saudis can no longer consider recognizing Israel without a viable plan for Palestinian statehood, which Israel rejects.

On the other hand, Saudi relations with Iran are steadily improving since they restored relations 18 months ago with diplomatic help from China and Iraq. At a meeting with new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Qatar on October 3, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan, “We seek to close the page of differences between the two countries forever and work towards the resolution of our issues and expansion of our relations like two friendly and brotherly states.”

Prince Faisal highlighted the “very sensitive and critical” situation in the region due to Israel’s “aggressions” against Gaza and Lebanon and its attempts to expand the conflict. He said Saudi Arabia trusted Iran’s “wisdom and discernment” in managing the situation to restore calm and peace.

The ball is in Trump’s court

If Saudi Arabia and its neighbors can make peace with Iran, what will the consequences be for Israel’s illegal, genocidal occupation of Palestine, which has been enabled and encouraged by decades of unconditional US military and diplomatic support?

On December 2, Trump on Truth Social that if the hostages were not released by the time of his inauguration, there would be “ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East.” “Those responsible,” he warned, “will be hit harder than anybody has been hit in the long and storied History of the United States of America.”

Trump and many of his acolytes exemplify the Western arrogance and lust for imperial power that lies at the root of this crisis. More threats and more destruction are not the answer. Trump has had good relations with the dictatorial rulers of the Gulf states, with whom he shares much in common. If he is willing to listen, he will realize, as they do, that there is no solution to this crisis without freedom, self-determination and sovereignty in their own land for the people of Palestine. That is the path to peace, if he will take it.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Despite the ongoing strife, world leaders at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly () in September merely reiterated the same sentiments that they have been repeating over the past six months. They condemned Houthi terrorism, but they did not put forward a coherent strategy to halt the strikes and force the Sana’a rebels back to negotiations.

Tensions grow amid broken promises

The people of South Yemen, in particular, cannot wait another year for solutions. Conditions on the ground are ripe for instability. The areas under the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council (), the Yemeni institution officially recognized by the international community, remain fragile across South Yemen. The PLC and its Saudi-led international allies cannot afford distractions from the fight against Houthis. Neither can the Southern Transitional Council (), the secessionist organization backed by the United Arab Emirates. While the PLC and the STC signed the in April 2022, joining forces against the Houthis, the STC still advocates for the South’s secession. As discontent against both leaderships grows, leaders must advance the interests of the marginalized population to sustain momentum against the Houthis.

Via Borysk5 on Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).

The Riyadh Agreement not only from former president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to the newly established PLC, but it also served to recognize the STC as the representative of the people of South Yemen. STC chief Aidarus al-Zubaidi that the agreement would pave the way “to develop a negotiating framework” wherein “determining the future, the solution of the issue of the people of the South [should come] naturally.” However, more than two years since the STC joined with the PLC, South Yemenis remain marginalized.

Initially, the didn’t aim to resolve the political conflict in the South, but rather to unite ranks with the STC against the Houthis. However, the PLC has not made much progress on this front. Lack of trust between the parties prevented military unity. While the lack of success undoubtedly affects the STC, the PLC became the main focus of criticism when it proved unable to counter Houthi strikes that halted all oil and gas production.

The government has made no progress regarding the issue of southern independence. When al-Zubaidi joined the talks in 2022, he to situate the southern issue front and center. However, a year later, PLC leader Rashad al-Alimi that “now is not the right time to discuss southern independence.” STC officials immediately shot back at al-Alimi, claiming he “showed a lack of seriousness.”

Alimi’s comments inflamed feelings across the South, not only among pro-STC elements but also among the tribes of eastern Yemen, an area that is formally under PLC control. The PLC has to meet basic demands for public services in areas like the eastern region of Hadhramaut. When al-Alimi visited Hadhramaut in July, he was met by . Then, on October 14, thousands in Seiyun, Hadhramaut sent a clear message to al-Alimi. During a celebration commemorating the 61st anniversary of independence from Britain, citizens of Hadhramaut expressed their support for the STC. On October 19, another event in al-Ghaydah, al-Mahra promoted “” as a symbol against PLC leadership.Ěý

A deepening economic crisis stokes tensions in the South

South Yemenis are . The PLC has failed to eliminate security threats, public services are diminishing, and an economic crisis is deepening. Over the last year, the Houthis have been commercial transiting through the Red and Arabian Seas. Their tactics and have evolved with potency and efficiency. Al-Zubaidi that failures to deal with Houthis are “no longer acceptable.” He maintains that “it is in the interest of our people to end the conflict and find a permanent solution.”

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FO° Exclusive: Houthis Cause Chaos in the Red Sea

Not only have the Houthis interfered with international shipping lanes, they have also southern Yemeni ports. This dramatically increases the difficulty of getting imports into South Yemen, exacerbating and choking supplies of international food aid.

According to the OCHA, food imports in the southern ports of Aden and Mukalla declined by 13%. The UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs () notes that shortages in incoming aid left “around 3.6 million [Yemenis] with reduced .” More funding crises could affect a further 2.5 million. The Yemeni rial also slid “to an all-time low of YER1,681/USD by the end of April 2024.”

The failure to stop Houthi attacks has also prevented Yemen from exporting oil, a potential source of much-needed cash. In mid-2021, the Houthis to take over oil facilities across Shabwa. After they failed to do so, in October 2022 their strategy shifted to using missiles and drones against factories, ports and oil tankers, effectively .

Just prior to al-Alimi’s arrival in New York for the UNGA 79, reports surfaced claiming the PLC had failed to produce a new budget. held meetings with a number of UN officials and representatives of Western donor countries but failed to gain a public commitment for financial support. Until the PLC is able to put forth a cohesive plan to unite the country of Yemen against Houthi threats, Yemen will not receive international support. In the meantime, public unrest will only grow.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Additionally, rooted in , Iran’s self-perception as the defender of oppressed Muslims globally is fueled by the anticipation of the twelfth Imam’s messianic return. This often translates into support for proxy groups and regional interventions.

Iranian ideology is deeply rooted in the nation’s historical and cultural identity. Iran sees itself as the inheritor of the longstanding Persian civilization, a proud nation with a rich heritage and a history of resisting foreign domination. This fosters a sense of exceptionalism, a conviction that Iran’s path is unique and its interests paramount, often leading to tension with other regional powers and the West. Furthermore, Anti-Zionism is deeply within the ideology, viewing Israel as an illegitimate entity occupying Palestinian land. This translates into strong support for Palestinian groups.Ěý

In the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world Iran’s revolutionary ideology presents a destabilizing order and a direct threat to the existence of Israel.

Iran’s pivot and the shifting balance of power

The in Iran, spearheaded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, marked a watershed moment in the nation’s history. Though predominantly in its initial stages, the revolution involved protests, strikes, and civil disobedience. However, the Shah’s regime responded with harsh repression, leading to a significant rise in casualties among protesters. This ultimately contributed to the gradual disintegration of the Shah’s government.

The revolution culminated in the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic republic based on the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih. This ideological foundation, enshrined in the 1979 (amended in 1989), emphasizes principles such as justice, independence, self-reliance, resistance, and martyrdom.

Iran’s claim to legitimacy transcends the 1979 revolution, drawing its from millennia-long influential civilizations and empires. This rich history, encompassing the Elamites, the Achaemenids, Parthians, Sassanids, and Safavids, has indelibly shaped Iran’s cultural identity and instilled a profound sense of national pride. As the historical seat of power for empires stretching across the Fertile Crescent and into Central Asia, Iran’s past serves as a cornerstone for its aspirations for regional leadership, both historically and in the contemporary era.

This sense of historical grandeur further shapes Iran’s foreign policy, which has often clashed with that of Western powers and their regional allies. This has led Iran to pursue a strategy, aimed at countering western pressure and sanctions imposed due to its nuclear program and regional activities. This policy gained momentum following the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal () and the perceived failure of European signatories to uphold their commitments, leaving Iran economically isolated.

Iran’s deep-seated opposition to in the Middle East stems from a perception that such policies destabilize the region and threaten its security and interests. Consequently, a key objective of the Pivot to the East strategy is to bolster Iran’s regional influence and establish itself as a leading power in the Islamic world, a position it believes reflects its historical legacy and rightful place.

While Iran promotes a transnational Islamist model, its influence is largely confined to Shia communities, which are minorities in most Muslim-majority countries. Nonetheless, Iran’s assertive foreign policy, including its support for specific regional groups, has been a factor in destabilizing the Middle East. Former Iranian foreign minister, M. Javad Zarif this policy ‘sacrificing diplomacy for the military field’ in an interview with Saeed Leylaz.Ěý

The eastward gaze: Iran’s Pivot and the rise of an authoritarian Axis

Recent years have witnessed a growing convergence between Iran and other authoritarian regimes sharing a common opposition to Western influence. It describes what I call the Axis of Totalitarianism: a coalition of authoritarian regimes that challenge the democratic world order, encompassing Iran, China, and Russia. While not constituting a formal alliance, these countries exhibit strategic convergence and a shared desire to challenge the US-led unipolar world order.

This convergence manifests in various forms of cooperation. Notably, Iran and China have a significant 25-year strategic partnership agreement, facilitating substantial economic investment in Iran’s energy, infrastructure, and transportation sectors. This agreement underscores China’s growing economic influence in the region and its potential to provide much-needed economic support to Iran. Similarly, Iran and Russia have their existing 20-year cooperation agreement and engaged in joint military exercises, demonstrating their strategic coordination and willingness to collaborate on security matters. Notably, Iran has supplied Russia with ballistic missiles, further deepening their military cooperation in defiance of international sanctions.

A key driver of this convergence is the shared opposition to U.S. dominance and perceived Western interference in the region and globally. These countries view the current US-led world order as unfair and unjust, advocating for a multipolar world order that would redistribute power and influence. This shared objective fosters cooperation and strengthens their collective stance against perceived Western interventionism.

Beyond the core trio of Iran, China, and Russia, other actors with authoritarian tendencies have displayed varying degrees of alignment with this emerging axis. Notably, an Iranian official recently to the Taliban as part of an axis of resistance, suggesting a potential for cautious rapprochement between the two entities.Ěý

Similarly, Iran has been a staunch supporter of the Assad regime in Syria, providing both military and financial assistance that has been crucial in helping the regime regain control of territory from rebel groups. While not directly involved in the Middle East, North Korea’s aggressive stance towards the West has fostered diplomatic ties with Iran. North Korea maintains close alliances with Russia and China. Pyongyang has vocally supported Russia’s war in Ukraine, the annexed regions and parts of Georgia. In recent years, North Korea has in joint naval exercises with Russia and China in the Indo-Pacific region, suggesting a trilateral partnership aimed against the US and its allies.

Historically, North Korea and Iran have in the military and nuclear fields. This alliance dates back to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s when North Korea supplied Iran with weapons and technology. Since then, North Korea has aided Iran’s ballistic missile program development. Reports suggest joint missile development projects and technology transfers between the two countries.ĚýĚý

The destabilizing messianic mission

Iran’s foreign policy is heavily influenced by its adherence to Twelver Shi’ism. This branch of Islam anticipates the of the twelfth Imam, the Mahdi, to establish a global Islamic order. This eschatological belief imbues Iran with a sense of responsibility as the custodian of the Shia faith and champion of the oppressed, translating into a perceived mission to propagate Islam, defend the downtrodden, and pave the way for the Mahdi’s emergence. Furthermore, Iran views itself as the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad and his , the Prophet’s family, and claims to uphold the authentic interpretation of Islam embodied in their teachings and practices.

One prominent manifestation of Iran’s Islamic ideology in its foreign policy is the concept of against perceived enemies of Islam and Iran. Iran positions itself as the leader of the , a network of state and non-state actors united in their opposition to the United States, Israel, and their regional allies. , sharing Iran’s ideological and strategic objectives of challenging the status quo and defending Shia interests, form a crucial component of this network.

These groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Palestine, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, Iranian support in the form of arms, training, financial aid, and political guidance. In return, they serve as force multipliers and instruments of deterrence for Iran, expanding its influence and leverage in the region. Often wielding significant political and social influence alongside their military capabilities, these groups maintain close ties to Iran’s Supreme Leader. They frequently coordinate their activities with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Quds Force, responsible for the country’s external security affairs.

The activities of Iran’s proxy groups have had a cascading and devastating impact on the stability and well-being of the Middle East. Their presence and involvement in regional conflicts have directly fueled humanitarian crises, such as:

— A 2021 by the International Crisis Group documented how Hezbollah’s growing influence in Lebanon has hampered the formation of a stable government and hindered efforts to address the country’s economic crisis. In Yemen, the Houthi conflict has over 4 million people internally, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and plunged the country into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

— OCHA over 306,887 civilian deaths in the Syrian civil war, a conflict fueled in part by Iranian support for the Assad regime. Amnesty International has also various Iran-backed militias in Iraq of extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary detention, further eroding respect for human rights and exacerbating sectarian divisions.

— The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) that over 12.4 million people are displaced across the Middle East and North Africa due to ongoing conflicts. The destruction of infrastructure and disruption of essential services, often a consequence of proxy group activity, further compound the humanitarian suffering in the region. OCHA that over 2.4Ěý million children in Yemen lack access to safe water, sanitation, and hygiene due to the ongoing conflict.

The legacy of revolution: how Iran’s anti-Zionism threatens Israel

At the core of Iran’s anti-Zionism the fundamental rejection of Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state. This perspective views Israel’s establishment as a colonial project infringing upon Palestinian land and rights. Iran’s with the Palestinian cause, intertwined with both religious and moral imperatives as well as strategic and political interests, fuels its anti-Zionist stance. This manifests in Iran’s support for various Palestinian factions, particularly those advocating armed resistance against Israel, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.Ěý

Furthermore, Iran envisions a single, democratic state encompassing historical Palestine, where diverse communities coexist, effectively calling for Israel’s dissolution. This aspiration is further emphasized through Iran’s participation in the annual International , a symbolic display of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle.

Iran’s anti-Zionism translates into tangible security challenges for Israel. Firstly, it underpins the formation of the Axis of Resistance alliance with Syria and Hezbollah. This alliance as a conduit for projecting Iranian power in the Levant region, posing a direct military threat to Israel’s northern border. Iran bolsters this alliance through extensive financial, military, and political support, enabling the development of missile and rocket capabilities, intelligence networks, and military infrastructure.Ěý

Iran’s military presence in Syria, including bases and personnel stationed near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, further intensifies the potential for confrontation. This alliance has demonstrably materialized in several instances, including the 2006 Lebanon War, the ongoing Syrian Civil War with its spillover effects, and the 2024 Golan Heights incident.

Secondly, Iran’s anti-Zionist ideology drives its efforts to expand its influence and presence in other regional areas, including Iraq, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip. In these regions, Iran and arms various groups who actively attack Israel and its strategic allies. Iran has provided the Houthis in Yemen with missiles and drones used against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both considered strategic partners of Israel. Similarly, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip receive Iranian assistance in the form of rockets and funding, enabling them to engage in repeated cycles of violence with Israel, as exemplified by the 2024 Gaza War. Furthermore, Iran cultivates ties with various Shia militias and political parties in Iraq, some harboring animosity towards Israel and threatening potential attacks.

Thirdly, Iran’s anti-Zionism is intricately linked to its pursuit of a nuclear and missile program, concerns about the potential development and delivery of nuclear weapons. This program has been a focal point of intense international scrutiny. It led to negotiations, sanctions, and even sabotage attempts. Despite these pressures, Iran uranium enrichment beyond the limits set by the now-abandoned 2015 nuclear deal.

Furthermore, in their missile program, encompassing the testing and development of various ballistic and cruise missiles with the potential to reach Israel and other regional countries, further escalate anxieties. This pursuit of nuclear capabilities, coupled with the possibility of transfer to proxies or allies, fuels fears of regional proliferation and potential military confrontations. Israel, viewing a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, has repeatedly threatened strikes to prevent such an outcome and has reportedly carried out covert and overt attacks on Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure.

Iran’s Islamic revolution and its ambition to stand against the unipolar order, centering itself as the leader of the Islamic pillar of the multipolar world is a destabilizing order and an existential threat to Israel.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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the US-Israeli war on the Middle East, centered on the Israeli genocide in Gaza, but already also including in the West Bank, Israeli on Lebanon and Syria, and the US and UK’s of Yemen.

This latest US attack followed the US bombing of seven targets on February 2, three in Iraq and four in Syria, with 125 bombs and missiles, killing at least , which Iran “a strategic mistake” that would bring “disastrous consequences” for the Middle East.

At the same time, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been touring the shrinking number of capitals in the region where leaders will still talk to him, playing the United States’ traditional role as a dishonest broker between Israel and its neighbors, in reality partnering with Israel to offer the Palestinians impossible, virtually suicidal terms for a ceasefire in Gaza.

What Israel and the United States have , but not made public, appears to be a second temporary ceasefire, during which prisoners or hostages would be exchanged, possibly leading to the release of all the Israeli security prisoners held in Gaza, but in no way leading to the final end of the genocide. If the Palestinians in fact freed all their Israeli hostages as part of a prisoner swap, it would remove the only obstacle to a catastrophic escalation of the genocide.

When Hamas responded with a serious counter-proposal for a full ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, US President Biden dismissed it out of hand as “over the top,” and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called it “bizarre” and “delusional.” 

The position of the United States and Israel today is that ending a massacre that has already killed more than people is not a serious option, even after the International Court of Justice has ruled it a case of genocide under the Genocide Convention. Raphael Lemkin, the Polish Holocaust survivor who coined the term “genocide” and drafted the Genocide Convention from his adopted home in New York City, must be turning in his grave in Mount Hebron Cemetery.

A fraught situation in Iraq

The United States’ support for Israel’s genocidal policies now goes way beyond Palestine, with the US expansion of the war to Iraq, Syria and Yemen to punish other countries and forces in the region for intervening to defend or support the Palestinians. US officials claimed the February 2 attacks were intended to stop Iraqi resistance attacks on US bases. But the leading Iraqi resistance force had already attacks against US targets on January 30 after they killed three US troops, declaring a truce at the urging of the Iranian and Iraqi governments.

A senior Iraqi military officer BBC Persian that at least one of the Iraqi military units the US bombed on February 2nd had nothing to do with attacks on US bases. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani negotiated an agreement a year ago to clearly differentiate between Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) units that were part of the “Axis of Resistance” fighting a low-grade war with U.S. occupation forces, and other PMF units that were not involved in attacks on US bases.Ěý

Tragically, because the US failed to coordinate its attacks with the Iraqi government, al-Sudani’s agreement failed to prevent the US from attacking the wrong Iraqi forces. It is no wonder that some analysts have dubbed al-Sudani’s valiant efforts to prevent all-out war between US forces and the Islamic resistance in his country “.”Ěý

Following the elaborately staged but carelessly misdirected US attacks, resistance forces in Iraq began launching new strikes on US bases, including a that killed six Kurdish troops at the largest US base in Syria. So the predictable effect of the US bombing was in fact to rebuff Iran and Iraq’s efforts to rein in resistance forces and to escalate a war that US officials keep claiming they want to deter.ĚýĚý

From experienced journalists and analysts to Middle Eastern governments, voices of caution are warning the United States in increasingly stark language of the dangers of its escalating bombing campaigns. “While the war rages in Gaza,” BBC’s wrote on February 4, “one false move could set the region alight.”Ěý

Three days later, Guerin would be surrounded by protesters chanting “America is the greatest devil,” as she from the site of the US drone assassination of Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Baqir al-Saadi in Baghdad – which could prove to be exactly the false move she feared.Ěý

But what Americans should be asking their government is this: Why are there still US troops in Iraq? It is 21 years since the United States invaded Iraq and plunged the nation into seemingly endless violence, chaos and ; 12 years since Iraq forced US occupation forces to from Iraq at the end of 2011; and 7 years since the defeat of ISIS, which served as justification for the United States to send forces back into Iraq in 2014, and then to most of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, in 2017.

Successive Iraqi governments and parliaments have asked the United States to withdraw its forces from Iraq, and previously scheduled talks are about to begin. But the Iraqis and Americans have issued contradictory statements about the goal of the . Al-Sudani and most Iraqis hope they will bring about the immediate withdrawal of US forces, while US officials that troops may remain for another two to five years, kicking this explosive can further down the road despite the obvious dangers it poses to the lives of US troops and to peace in the region.

The US is losing its grip

Behind these contradictory statements, the real value of Iraqi bases to the US military does not seem to be about ISIS at all but about Iran. Although the United States has more than stationed in 14 countries across the Middle East, and another 20,000 on warships in the seas surrounding them, the bases it uses in Iraq are its closest bases and airfields to Tehran and much of Iran. If the Pentagon loses these forward operating bases in Iraq, the closest bases from which it can attack Tehran will be Camp Arifjan and five other bases in , where 13,500 US troops would be vulnerable to Iranian counter-attacks — unless, of course, the US withdraws them, too.

Toward the end of the Cold War, historian Gabriel Kolko observed in his book Confronting the Third World that the United States’ “endemic incapacity to avoid entangling, costly commitments in areas of the world that are of intrinsically secondary importance to [its] priorities has caused US foreign policy and resources to whipsaw virtually arbitrarily from one problem and region to the other. The result has been the United States’ increasing loss of control over its political priorities, budget, military strategy and tactics, and, ultimately, its original economic goals.”

After the end of the Cold War, instead of restoring realistic goals and priorities, the neocons who gained control of US foreign policy fooled themselves into believing that US military and economic power could finally triumph over the frustratingly diverse social and political evolution of hundreds of countries and cultures all over the world. In addition to wreaking mass destruction on country after country, this has turned the United States into the global enemy of the principles of democracy and self-determination that most Americans believe in.

The Americans feel at the plight of people in Gaza and the US’s role in it is a shocking new low in this disconnect between the humanity of ordinary Americans and the insatiable ambitions of their undemocratic leaders.Ěý

While working for an end to the US government’s support for Israel’s oppression of the Palestinian people, Americans should also be working for the long-overdue withdrawal of US occupying forces from Iraq, Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The US Chooses Genocide Over Diplomacy in the Middle East appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Increasingly, the Houthis seem to be attacking indiscriminately. They carried out at least a dozen strikes on merchant ships and captured two of them. The Houthis have taken both these ships to the principal Yemeni Red Sea port of Hudaydah, which they control.

Why is the Red Sea route so important?

The Red Sea connects the Mediterranean, via the Suez Canal, with the Indian Ocean, via the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. It is the shortest sea route between Asia and Europe. Because of this, it carries a massive amount of global trade, including as much as 30% of container shipping. About seven million barrels of oil pass through the sea every day. The Red Sea also contains Israeli and Jordanian ports on its other branch, the Gulf of Aqaba. Any shipping trying to reach Europe or Israel from Asia must pass through the Bab-el-Mandeb and therefore close to Houthi-controlled territory.

The only other way to transit between Asia and Europe is to sail down all the way around Africa and past the Cape of Good Hope. This adds thousands of miles of extra travel. A modern cargo ship might make the trip from East Asia to Europe in two weeks. The Cape route can take an entire month, adding huge amounts of extra cost in terms of fuel, insurance and payroll.

This means higher prices for end consumers. Since not only finished goods but basic inputs like oil and gas go through the Red Sea, this means that the prices of everything will go up. Costlier fuel means costlier transport and manufacture. Inflation will increase, interest rates will rise and economic growth will slow.

The US relies less on international trade and does not need the Red Sea route to reach either Asia or Europe. So, the US will be the least affected. Europe, South Asia and East Asia will feel the most pain. So too will the oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, since much of the oil that leaves their ports must pass through the Suez to reach key markets.

Who’s backing the Houthis?

This relatively small militant group in southern Arabia is causing disproportionately large damage. The reason they can do so is simple. Iran backs them. The Houthis are not making ballistic missiles on their own but getting these missiles from Iran.

Iran, like the Houthis, follows the Shia version of Islam. For the past nine years, the Houthis have been engaged in a civil war for control of Yemen with their mostly Sunni rivals to the east. Saudi Arabia, a Sunni nation, leads a coalition that opposes Yemen in the war. Iran has a vested interest in not letting a fellow Shia power fall to their religious rivals. But it’s not just religion that makes Iran act. By supporting the Houthis, Iran is keeping its regional rival, Saudi Arabia, occupied with a chronic military threat to its south.

The Iranians have already done their damage. The war has become an endless quagmire for Saudi Arabia. At least 400,000 people have died so far. The Saudis are now trying to back out and have negotiated an unofficial truce. They were unable to dislodge the Houthis despite the indiscriminate bombing of Yemen, for which they received international condemnation. The failure is due in no small part to mismanagement, corruption and incompetence in the Saudi officer corps. The Saudis even used mercenaries, at one point fielding 12,000 Sudanese troops in Yemen. Yet, Saudi-backed forces made precious little progress.

One might wonder how Iran is able to support an ally on the other side of Arabia. Between Iran and Yemen stand Saudi Arabia, several other Sunni kingdoms, Oman and the part of Yemen controlled by Houthis’ rivals. Yet Iranians are masters at avoiding sanctions, and they know how to create supply routes, which their enemies cannot interdict. With some exceptions, Iran has been able to ship weapons to Yemen by sea without being intercepted by Western or Arab warships.

Iranians have also been able to train the Houthis to jury-rig simpler weapons, including drones, from locally available supplies. But ballistic missiles are too complicated to build in this way and are doubtlessly being shipped from Iran. Iranians are not only shipping these missiles but also most certainly training the Houthis to operate such high-tech machinery.

The Iranian factor explains why the Houthis are attacking shipping lanes. This gives Iran the chance to put pressure on the West and claim leadership in the Muslim world, which is enraged about the massive Israeli attack on Gaza. Note that the Iranians might not be planning each individual Houthi attack, but they are certainly encouraging the Houthis and most likely providing them with intelligence. It’s not just gallant Islamic solidarity with Gaza that motivates the Houthis. Their assault is part of a much larger effort by Iran and all of its proxy groups throughout the Middle East to put pressure on Israel and its largest backer, the US. Iran hopes to dislodge the Great Satan from the Islamic world and to extend its own influence.

The West tried to fight Iran using economic sanctions to stop its sponsorship of terrorism and nuclear weapons programs. Now Iran is showing that it, too, can hit the West in their pockets by interfering with global trade.

What will be the economic and political impact of the attacks?

And hit them it has. Shipping and oil giants such as Hapag-Lloyd, Maersk and BP are halting operations in the Red Sea. Using futures contracts, many consumers are still purchasing oil at pre-conflict prices. But those contracts will eventually expire, and costs will then rise significantly.

In response to the Houthi attacks, the US formed a coalition of ten nations, including the UK, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, to police the shipping lanes. Bahrain is the sole Arab country publicly acknowledging membership. Other Arab powers, though, are engaging in an unofficial manner due to the political sensitivities of the Gaza conflict. Saudi Arabia is facing disruptions in its Red Sea ports. Yet it must tread carefully, lest it be seen as siding with the infidel against Islamic interests in Palestine.

The political and economic ramifications extend far beyond the Middle East. The Suez, after all, was initially created to link Europe and Asia, specifically Britain and India. China relies heavily on exporting manufactured goods to Europe via the Suez route. Yet, even though it maintains a naval base near the Bab-el-Mandeb in Djibouti, it is not participating in the US-led coalition. Should things get worse, China may perhaps join the coalition, as may other powers like Germany or Japan.

The conflict may extend still further. The Houthis have shown themselves to be a much greater threat than previously thought. They threaten Saudi Arabia and Israel with their ballistic missiles. If Iran provides them some of their longest-range missiles, the Houthis could threaten NATO members like Greece, Turkey and even Italy. It may not be long before the Western alliance decides it would be better off bombing Houthi missile sites and command centers rather than continue to bear the assault. If that happened, Iranian warships could become targets too, sparking a regional war.

Iran would do well to tell its allies to back down. No one — not the Saudis, nor the Chinese, nor the Americans, nor the Iranians themselves — wants a regional war. Yet the Iranians may decide that pursuing their interests is worth it despite the risk. For their part, the Houthis have no reason to back off. They are proving themselves as a credible military force that can do real damage. If and when a shooting war breaks out, the Houthis and their Iranian backers will have to reassess their options. There is no telling now whether they would back down or dig in.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Daring Houthi Assaults in the Red Sea Threaten World Trade appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

But if Israel persists in this genocidal war, US threats may be impotent to prevent others from intervening. From Lebanon to Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Iran, the possibilities of the conflict spreading are enormous. Even says it is ready to fight for a free Palestine, based on a unanimous vote in its parliament on November 1.

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The US is facing a credibility crisis in the Middle East

Middle Eastern governments and their people already see the United States as a party to Israel’s massacre in Gaza. So any direct US military action will be seen as an escalation on the side of Israel. It would be more likely to provoke further escalation than to deter it.

The US already faces this predicament in Iraq. Despite of Iraqi demands for the removal of US forces, at least 2,500 American troops remain at in western Anbar province, , north of Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, and another small base at the airport in Erbil. There are also “” NATO troops, including Americans, advising Iraqi forces in , based near Baghdad.

For many years, US forces in Iraq have been mired in a low-grade war against the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that Iraq formed to fight ISIS, mainly from Shia militias. Despite their links to Iran, the armed groups Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and other PMFs have often ignored Iranian calls to de-escalate attacks on US forces. These Iraqi groups do not respect Iran Quds Force leader General Esmail Qaani as highly as they did General Soleimani, so Soleimani’s assassination by the United States in 2020 has further Iran’s ability to restrain the militias in Iraq.

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After a year-long truce between US and Iraqi forces, the Israeli war on Gaza has triggered a new escalation of this conflict in both Iraq and Syria. Some militias rebranded themselves as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and began attacking US bases on October 17. After 32 attacks on US bases in Iraq, 34 more in Syria and three US airstrikes in Syria, US forces conducted on November 21 against two Kata’ib Hezbollah bases in Iraq, one in Anbar province and one in Jurf Al-Nasr, south of Baghdad, killing at least nine militiamen.

The US airstrikes prompted a from the Iraqi government spokesman Bassam al-Awadi. “We vehemently condemn the attack on , executed without the knowledge of government agencies,” al-Awadi said. “This action is a blatant violation of sovereignty and an attempt to destabilize the security situation … The recent incident represents a clear violation of the coalition’s mission to combat Daesh [ISIS] on Iraqi soil. We call on all parties to avoid unilateral actions and to respect Iraq’s sovereignty.”

As the Iraqi government feared, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq responded to the US airstrikes with two attacks on Al-Harir airbase on November 22 and on November 23. They attacked Al-Asad airbase with several drones and launched another drone attack on the US base at Erbil airport. Their Syrian allies attacked two US bases across the border in northeastern Syria.

Short of a ceasefire in Gaza or a full US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria, there is no decisive action the US can take that would put a stop to these attacks. So, the level of violence in Iraq and Syria is likely to keep rising as long as the war on Gaza continues.

Regional actors in Yemen, Turkey, Lebanon and Iran contemplate intervening in Gaza

Another formidable and experienced military force opposing Israel and the United States is the Houthi army in Yemen. On November 14, Abdul-Malek al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi government in Yemen, neighboring countries to open a corridor through their territory for his army to go and fight Israel in Gaza.

The Houthi Deputy Information Secretary Nasreddin Amer told Newsweek that, if they had a way to enter Palestine, they would not hesitate to join the fight against Israel, ”We have fighters numbering hundreds of thousands who are brave, tough, trained and experienced in fighting,” Amer said. “They have a very strong belief, and their dream in life is to fight the Zionists and the Americans.”

Transporting hundreds of thousands of Yemeni soldiers to fight in Gaza would be nearly impossible unless Saudi Arabia opened the way. That seems highly unlikely, but Iran or another ally could help to transport a smaller number by air or sea to join the fight.

The Houthis have been waging an asymmetric war against Saudi-led invaders and the internationally recognized Yemeni government for many years, and they have developed weapons and tactics that they could bring to bear against Israel. Soon after al-Houthi’s statement, Houthi forces in the Red Sea a ship owned, via shell companies, by Israeli billionaire Abraham Ungar. The ship, which was on its way from Istanbul to India, was detained in a Yemeni port.

The Houthis have also launched a series of drones and missiles towards Israel. While many Western politicians and journalists try to portray the Houthis as simply puppets of Iran, the Houthis are actually an independent, unpredictable force that other actors in the region cannot control.

Even NATO member Turkey is finding it difficult to remain a bystander, given the widespread public support for Palestine. Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄźan was among the first international leaders to speak out strongly against the Israeli war on Gaza, explicitly calling it a and saying that it amounted to .

Turkish civil society groups are spearheading a to send humanitarian aid to Gaza on cargo ships, braving a possible confrontation like the one that occurred in 2010 when the Israelis attacked the Freedom Flotilla, people aboard the Mavi Marmara.

On the Lebanese border, Hezbollah and Israel have daily exchanges of fire since October 7, killing 107 combatants and 24 civilians in Lebanon and 9 soldiers and 4 civilians in Israel. Some 55,000 Lebanese civilians and 65,000 Israelis have been displaced from the border area. On November 11, Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant , “What we’re doing in Gaza, we can also do in Beirut.”

How will Hezbollah react as Israel resumes its brutal massacre in Gaza after the brief pause or if Israel expands the massacre to the West Bank, where it has already at least 237 more Palestinians since October 7? 

In a speech on November 3, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah held back from declaring a new war on Israel, but warned that “all options are on the table” if Israel does not end its war on Gaza.

On November 23, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian , “If Israel’s war crimes and genocide continue, a tougher and more complicated scenario of the resistance will be implemented.”

Amirabdollahian had already , on October 16, that “the leaders of the resistance will not allow the Zionist regime to do whatever it wants in Gaza and then go to other fronts of the resistance.” In other words, if Iran and its allies believe that Israel really intends to continue its war on Gaza until it has removed Hamas from power, and then turn its war machine loose on Lebanon or its other neighbors, they would prefer to fight a wider war now, forcing Israel to fight the Palestinians, Hezbollah and their allies at the same time, rather than waiting for Israel to attack them one by one.

The US is ignoring the warning signs

Tragically, the White House is not listening. On November 24, the day after Amirabdollahian’s speech, US President Joe Biden continued to back Israel’s vow to resume the destruction of Gaza after its “humanitarian pause,” attempting to eliminate Hamas is “a legitimate objective.” On December 7, he for the breakdown of the pause.

America’s unconditional support for Israel and endless supply of weapons have succeeded only in turning Israel into an out-of-control, genocidal, destabilizing force at the heart of a fragile region already shattered and traumatized by decades of US warmaking. The result is a country that refuses to recognize its own borders or those of its neighbors and rejects any and all limits on its territorial ambitions and war crimes.

If Israel’s actions lead to a wider war, the US will find itself with few allies ready to jump into the fray. Even if a regional conflict is avoided, the US support for Israel has already created tremendous damage to its reputation in the region and beyond, and direct American involvement in the war would leave it more isolated and impotent than its previous misadventures in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq did. 

The US can still avoid this fate by insisting on an immediate and permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. If Israel will not agree to that, the US must back up this position with an immediate suspension of arms deliveries, military aid, to US weapons stockpiles in Israel and diplomatic support for Israel’s war on Palestine. 

The priority of US officials must be to stop Israel’s massacre, avoid a regional war and get out of the way so that the UN and other nations can help negotiate a real solution to the occupation of Palestine.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post US Threats Aren’t Creating Peace in the Middle East appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Answer: Very bad. Mostly because of the risk of miscalculation. Emotions are at their peak, judgment is suspended, and the sides are operating on hair-trigger responses. Nonetheless, there are mitigating factors that could potentially mean less involvement of forces outside the immediate conflict.

The proximate cause for this concern is Iran. In addition to Hamas itself, Iran’s proxies in the region include Hizballah in Southern Lebanon, a collection of some half dozen Syrian and Iraqi militias, and the Houthis of Yemen, all of which currently view both Israel and the United States as enemies. Ironically, all, including Hamas, are Arab but variously take orders from and are armed, supplied, funded, trained, advised and often directed by Iran, which is not Arab but Persian. At present, no Iranian forces, save for a handful advising and directing ground forces in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Iraq, are seriously threatened by this conflict. Iran is using its Arab proxies, aka pawns, to pursue its decades-long war against Israel.

The Hizballah gamble

Of all the proxies/pawns confronting Israel, none is as threatening as Hizballah. Armed with an 150,000 rockets and missiles, 2,000 drones, and a military force of some 100,000 (per, but fewer than 50,000 according to by Jane’s Information Group), it is a potent military force. In 2006, when it last battled Israel, it was armed with 15,000 rockets, or about what Hamas had at the start of the current conflict. And while Hizballah was able to stand its ground and remain in Southern Lebanon, it took a severe beating, brutally devastating Lebanon in the process. Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hizballah, subsequently his regret for having started that war, given its horrendous toll on Hizballah and Lebanon.

Nevertheless, Hizballah’s engagement in the present war would tax Israel’s forces and resources, likely obliging it to redirect forces and assets from Gaza to its northern border. Were Hizballah to launch even a fraction of its missile arsenal against Israeli cities, tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Israelis could perish. Israel would respond with the full force of its much more potent military apparatus. Recently, it to “return Lebanon to the stone age” in the event of a major Hizballah military attack on Israel. Given the level of destruction in the 2006 war, this isn’t an idle threat. To add further grist to the argument, unlike in 2006, Hizballah faces the power of two US aircraft carrier battle groups off the Lebanese coast and two air force fighter squadrons deployed to the region, which adds a massively powerful punch in aircraft and cruise missiles to the Israeli onslaught. US President Joe Biden’s cautionary to Hizballah, “Don’t!”, also is no bluff.

Nasrallah’s aforementioned admission is important. Would he risk repeating his mistake of 2006, with a much worse ending? It is also worth noting that Lebanon has been in an economic and financial spiral over the last several years propelled in part by continuing political disarray and dysfunction. Hizballah’s political stock in the country is at an all-time low. A war in Lebanon, which would be the inevitable consequence of a Hizballah conflict with Israel, would be vehemently opposed by Lebanon’s tattered political leadership, the Lebanese army and most of all by the Lebanese people, including a likely majority of the sizeable Shi’a population from whom Hizballah draws its political support.

For Iran, is Hamas worth the risk?

How hard would Iran push Hizballah to enter the fray in the event of a potential Israeli defeat of another important asset, Hamas? Only Tehran can answer. However, Iran likely places the highest priority on the health and survival of Hizballah. It is viewed as an indispensable strategic asset in the event Iran itself is faced with an attack or war. Risking Hizballah and potentially Iran’s own defensive capabilities doesn’t appear a smart bet.

Iran’s outright entry into the war also appears unlikely. Perhaps for Hizballah, Iran might respond, but not Hamas. And pushing Hizballah into a war it would very likely lose would almost certainly prompt Iranian involvement. With all sorts of political, economic and environmental problems at home and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in declining health, Iran would not want a war with Israel and most especially with the United States.

Ultimately, the decision lies with Tehran. Is it willing to risk a truly regional conflagration in its irrational, perverse pursuit of destroying Israel? Is it willing to stand by as Israel destroys Hamas, an Iranian ally and proxy in Gaza, and lose a major pressure point on Israel directly on its border? A defeat of Hamas would be a humiliating defeat for Iran, almost comparable to the Soviet Union’s in when Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal, surrounded the elite Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai and were headed for Cairo. However, Hamas’ defeat, but without Hizballah’s destruction, would still leave Iran as a formidable foe. Without Hizballah, Iran is measurably weaker.

Even without overt intervention, Hizballah has the ability to menace and tie down Israeli forces in northern Israel. Importantly, both sides seem to know how far they can push their forces without crossing some unspecific line, which would then require full-scale retaliation by one side. The Hizballah attacks at the current level demonstrate solidarity with Hamas, prove to Iran’s other proxies that it supports them in their efforts, but avoid a drawn-out war that risks severely crippling Hizballah and devastating Lebanon.

The major problem with that scenario is unpredictability. War is inherently unpredictable. A slight miscalculation by Iran, Hizballah or Israel could trigger conflict that might quickly spiral out of control. If a Hizballah rocket, for example, were mistakenly to land in a populated Israeli area, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would be obliged to respond with significant force, to which Hizballah would likely respond in kind. The Middle East’s nightmare scenario will have begun.

And then the risk next door

The other Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen present a threat of a significantly lesser degree. They lack the power and numbers to do consequential harm to Israel. Those Syrian and Iraqi militias and the Houthis are a greater threat to American forces in (or near in the case of Yemen) those countries, though here too the threat risk is minimal. Nevertheless, the Americans will want to avoid the loss of American lives.

Still, Syrian militias elsewhere, several of which are directly advised by Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers, already threaten the Golan and northeastern Israel and cannot be ignored. They present a menacing drain on Israeli forces and resources. Although the risk is lower, an errant rocket on an Israeli town would undoubtedly trigger a strong Israeli response against Syria as well as the militia force that fired it. Bashar al-Assad, who has finally established himself as the leader without peer in Syria, will not be anxious to have Syrian groups of any stripe drag his war-devastated nation into a conflict with Israel, or by extension the US.

One final front that was already heating up is the West Bank. More than 100 Palestinians have been killed since the start of the year, making this the year there since the Second Intifada (2000–2005). Iran possesses less influence there than elsewhere, but it has managed to insinuate it of late with the help of Hizballah, funneling weapons and perhaps even operatives to support Palestinian resistance movements, e.g., the, and aid a West Bank revival of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The major threat posed there is its proximity to Israel’s major population centers: Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

Despair and hopelessness are as intensely felt in the West Bank as in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority, led by an aging Mahmoud Abbas and a corrupt and inept coterie of Fatah elites and fat cats, nominally governs the West Bank but lacks credibility and is thoroughly distrusted by the Palestinians living there. Palestinian Security Forces are reluctant to insert themselves for fear of doing Israel’s bidding. Right-wing Israeli settlers have stepped up their violence against Palestinian towns and villages, sometimes with the willing participation of IDF soldiers. That is further fueling Palestinian animus and rage. The area is ripe for Iranian mischief and rabble-rousing and is a dagger aimed at the heart of Israel.

A full-on uprising on the West Bank would require significant Israeli forces to quell over an extended period of time. The toll on military personnel of such an occurrence, along with the ground campaign in Gaza, would represent a major taxing of IDF forces and assets. And it is in that scenario that others, especially Hizballah, may incorrectly perceive an advantage. That in turn precipitates an expansion of the Israel-Hamas conflict that so many fear.

Armed uprisings in both Gaza and the West Bank present another problem. Such an uprising will undoubtedly attract massive support in the Arab world. Think of the Arab Uprisings on steroids, except this time it will revolve around an issue that Arab governments will have to support. If it lasted for any length of time, as seasoned Middle East journalist Robin Wright has pointed out, it could potentially jeopardize the relationships Israel has painstakingly negotiated over decades with its neighbors Egypt and Jordan, as well as with Abraham Accord members the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. It would also destroy the ongoing talks over normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

What’s in it for Iran?

Given the hesitation to see the Israel-Hamas war escalate to involve outside forces or expand to additional fronts, why does Iran take the risk?

First, the Islamic Republic likely sees this moment as a chance to prove its mettle on the regional and even global stages. Its deployment of proxies on Israel’s southern, northern and northeastern borders demonstrates its ability to project, if not power, then at least effective resistance, and threaten Israel. Success in war is greater with allies, and Iran has proven it has them. As such, it cannot be ignored.

Secondly, Iran seeks to destabilize the Arab Middle East, fragment its centers of power, and, in the ideal scenario, separate it from the United States. Iran would then stand as the unchallenged power in the region, which it frankly believes it is already. Therefore, the aforementioned West Bank nightmare scenario bears watching carefully.

If Israel is successful in ridding Gaza of Hamas — regardless of how that is defined — look for Iran to immediately rally its proxies, including whatever remnant of Hamas that may survive. Iran will continue fighting Israel to the last Arab, all the while protecting and advancing its Islamic Revolution.

Israeli victory over Hamas is the worst case for Iran. The regime of mullahs is playing for much higher gains and sees its odds too attractive to ignore. This makes it an extremely dangerous time for the Middle East.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post How the New Israel-Hamas War Threatens the Middle East appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The announcement sent shockwaves throughout Yemen. The Houthis and Muslim Brotherhood affiliate al-Islah immediately complained, but Saudi authorities and fellow members of the Saudi-led coalition — formally on the same side of the war as the STC — also expressed concerns about the strengthening of the southern parties. Saudi Arabia fears it could lose influence over parties within the Political Leadership Council (PLC), the internationally recognized Yemeni government’s executive body.

The first step taken by Saudi Arabia following the STC announcement was to convene a series of meetings in Riaydh with rivals of the STC that represent Hadhramaut, in the country’s east. The meetings in the establishment of a National Hadhrami Council (NHC), in an apparent move to counter the STC’s Southern National Pact.

Other parties formed the People’s High Council of Resistance, based in the center of the country, for similar purposes.

Some observers these developments as progress among the opponents of the Houthi in preparation for a break in the Saudi–Houthi »ĺĂ©łŮ±đ˛ÔłŮ±đ. On the ground, however, it is obvious the new council is a reaction to growing STC momentum. Yemeni political factions seem to be more concerned about southern secessionism than about the threat the Houthis pose.

What has the STC decided, and why now?

PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi had exacerbated North–South tensions in February when he the southern issue as a priority. This angered southerners and put pressure on the STC to act.

Undoubtedly, this hastened the organization of the Aden dialogue hosted by the STC in early May. Southern factions were quick to exploit the optics of the week-long conference through well-coordinated media campaigns. They a general audience access to the participants. Longtime political rivals in Aden. With over 30 factions the SNP, the STC now serves as the umbrella organization for southerners. This is a significant development following recognition under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement as the representative of the southern peoples.

The STC also announced a major of its executive leadership. It expanded its membership by including some former rivals, including PLC members Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani and Abd al-Rahman al-Mahrami (aka Abu Zaraa’a) as co-vice presidents along with Ahmed Saeed bin Breik. and bin Breik are former governors of Hadhramaut and former commanders of the Second Region Command there. This move not only cemented the strategic importance of Hadhramaut, Yemen’s largest province, but it also placed of the South within the PLC itself — three of them within the eight-member council.

The accession of Bahsani, a Hadhrami, and Abu Zaraa’a, a Salafi leader from Lahj, as vice presidents could highlight two goals of the STC. The first is to cement the influence of the South within the PLC with regard to Saudi Arabia. The members of the PLC are seen as hand-picked by Saudi Arabia, so their legitimacy and influence cannot be questioned. Second, the vice presidents are military leaders with a history of opposition to al-Islah’s influence in the South. As former commanders of the Second Region, based in Mukalla in southern Hadhramaut, bin Breik and Bahsani represent the southerners’ to the al-Islah-affiliated First Region Command, based in Sayyun in northern Hadhramaut. Further, Abu Zaraa’a served as commander of the STC-affiliated Amalaqa Brigades, which act as the tip of the southern forces’ spear from the Red Sea coast to Shabwah. In an environment of constant rebalancing acts, the message is abundantly clear.

Saudi overreach derails Riyadh Agreement

The success of the STC-led dialogue among southern factions has undoubtedly raised fears of southern secessionist ambitions. among Yemeni parties have grown since the signing of the , which legitimized the STC, in November 2019. Now, nearly four years since the agreement and a year and a half after the establishment of the PLC, all efforts to stabilize the liberated areas and unite the Houthi’s rivals have failed.

The STC has gained tremendous momentum since former president Hadi the al-Islah-affiliated governor of Shabwah with an ally of the STC in December 2021. The conflict between al-Islah and the STC then shifted to northern , with the STC the ouster of the al-Islah-affiliated leadership of the First Regional Command. These developments have raised concerns in Riyadh over the extent of influence by the STC beyond its core in Aden, possibly consolidating in northern Hadhramaut along the Yemen-Saudi border.

Saudi Arabia has attempted to solidify its influence in Hadhramaut. Observers in south Yemen remain unsettled by Saudi Arabia’s decision to host tribal leaders from soon after the STC dialogue conference in Aden. The gathering of Hadhrami was made public from the first flight from Sayyun to Riyadh aboard a Saudi aircraft. Meetings in were also broadcasted by media outlets, and on the group the establishment of the Hadhramaut National Council (HNC). The charter, yet to be made public, was then on July 27. Al-Islah was the first political party to signing the charter.

Further antagonizing the STC and its base across southern Yemen, members of the new council met with Saudi officials and Alimi. The composition of the council, with a number of leaders from the , makes it appear to be a direct rival to the STC. Among the notable of the council are Bader Basalama, Mohsen Basura, Adel Bahamid and Abdullah Saleh Al Kathiri. Other high-profile leaders on the council include members of the General People’s Congress (GPC), the former ruling party under deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alimi is also a member of the GPC.

Tension further escalated in early July when the STC organized a outside the and gunmen affiliated with members of the new council met unarmed demonstrators. In neighboring Shabwah, another group of tribal leaders announced the Alliance of Sons and Tribes of , another attempt to challenge the STC.

The latest move exacerbating tensions among competing parties was the announcement of the Supreme for al-Jawf and Mareb under Hamoud , a sheik from Taiz. Sheik Hamoud, an al-Islah affiliate, resides in Turkey but remains highly influential in the city of Taiz. This new council has met even within Mareb City, a stronghold of al-Islah. It is undetermined if Saudi Arabia knows about or supports this group.

The factional lines are being drawn. As Saudi Arabia draws together its anti-STC allies, it puts the unity established by the Riyadh Agreement at risk.

Imminent escalation on two fronts

Meanwhile, optimism remains among UN officials who view the lopsided of April 2023 as a step forward. The completion of the oil from the off the Red Sea of Hodeida is also touted as a major diplomatic victory by the UN. This has led the mainstream consensus to share the UN’s optimism about their efforts to restart the peace process. However, the Safer operation’s costs now surpass the current potential revenue from the oil. The wreck, in any case, remains under Houthi control and is still vulnerable to floating released by them.

UN Diplomatic Success in a Potential Oil Disaster

Despite UN positivity, the fragile »ĺĂ©łŮ±đ˛ÔłŮ±đ is on the brink of collapse. Houthis continue to clash with southern forces in al-Dhale and Yafa’, and new clashes have been reported across Taiz. The Saudi–Houthi »ĺĂ©łŮ±đ˛ÔłŮ±đ has merely eliminated cross-border while the rebels have reinforced their positions across all fronts. Furthermore, the Houthi head of the Supreme Political Council (SPC), Mahdi al-Mashat, recently new cross-border missile strikes.

Saudi Arabia evidently expects an imminent escalation by the rebels. Houthi tactics always involve escalating rhetoric or increasing to extract maximum concessions from Saudi Arabia or the UN. The period since October 2022 has seen any changes in Houthi behavior. They only adhered to Saudi Arabia’s agreement on halting cross-border strikes because it has allowed them to , train and redeploy militia across their territory.

With crisis looming, US Special Envoy Tim is once again in the following a visit by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg to in August.

Saudi Arabia’s move to support the establishment of new subregional councils in Hadhramaut and Shabwah, in particular, may prove highly counterproductive. As the Houthis prepare for a renewal of hostilities within Yemen and across the border, the emergence of competing councils will exacerbate the fragmentation of the Houthi’s rivals. Saudi Arabia hopes to unify anti-Houthi factions under the Riyadh Agreement, but its mismanagement of rivalries across southern Yemen and within the PLC has paved the ground for potentially larger losses in Hodeida and Taiz. Ultimately, Houthis may choose to re-engage southern forces, a move which could drag the United Arab Emirates — which the Houthis have — back into the conflict and further destabilize the region.

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Southern and Northern Allies Now Vie for Influence in Volatile Yemen appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

That’s what a young Pakistani boy named Zubair members of Congress at a hearing on drones in October 2013. The hearing was during the Obama years at a time when the government had barely even acknowledged that an American drone warfare program existed.

Two years earlier, Anwar al-Awlaki, a Muslim cleric, and Abdulrahman, his 16-year-old son — both American citizens — were killed by U.S. drone strikes in Yemen just weeks apart. Asked to comment on Abdulrahman’s killing, Obama campaign senior adviser Robert Gibbs : “I would suggest that you should have a far more responsible father if they are truly concerned about the well-being of their children. I don’t think becoming an al-Qaeda jihadist terrorist is the best way to go about doing your business.”

Those are two of all too many grim tales of the brutality with which the United States has carried out its drone warfare program. Post-9/11 government rhetoric has made the collective blaming of Muslims for terrorism and the callous dismissal of their deaths in drone strikes a regular occurrence.

The United States’ drone warfare program is now entering its third decade, with no end in sight. Despite the fact that the 22nd anniversary of 9/11 is approaching, policymakers have demonstrated no evidence of reflecting on the failures of drone warfare or how to stop it. Instead, they continue to focus on simply shifting drone policy in minor ways within an ongoing, violent system.

The dehumanization inherent in drone warfare

In February 2013, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney drone strikes as a key tool of American foreign policy this way: 

“We have acknowledged, the United States, that sometimes we use remotely piloted aircraft to conduct targeted strikes against specific al-Qaeda terrorists in order to prevent attacks on the United States and to save American lives. We conduct those strikes because they are necessary to mitigate ongoing actual threats, to stop plots, prevent future attacks, and, again, save American lives… The US government takes great care in deciding to pursue an al-Qaeda terrorist, to ensure precision and to avoid loss of innocent life.

More aggressively endorsing the use of such drones, Georgetown Professor Daniel Byman, who on the 9/11 Commission, the necessity of such warfare to protect American lives. “Drones,” he wrote, “have done their job remarkably well … And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.”

In reality, however, Washington’s War on Terror has inflicted disproportionate violence on communities across the globe, while using this form of asymmetrical warfare to further expand the space between the value placed on American lives and those of Muslims. As the rhetoric on drone warfare suggests, the value of life and the need to protect it are, as far as Washington is concerned, reserved for Americans and their allies.

Consequences of the War on Terror and the Iraq War

The London-based watchdog group has estimated that American air strikes killed at least 22,679 civilians and possibly as many as 48,308 since the War on Terror began. Such killings have been carried out for the most part by desensitized killers who have been primed towards the dehumanization of the targets of those murderous machines. In the words of critic , “The detached nature of drone warfare has anonymized and dehumanized the enemy, greatly diminishing the necessary psychological barriers of killing.” 

In his On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, retired Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman focuses on the “mechanical distancing” of modern warfare, thanks to “the sterile Nintendo-game unreality of killing through a TV screen, a thermal sight, a sniper sight, or some other kind of mechanical bugger that permits the killer to deny the humanity of his victim.”

Scholar Grégoire Chamayou in even starker terms. Thanks to the distance between the drone operator and the victim, “one is never spattered by the adversary’s blood. No doubt the absence of any physical soiling corresponds to less of a sense of moral soiling … Above all, it ensures that the operator will never see his victim seeing him doing what he does to him.”

Needless to say, drone technology has rendered those in distant lands so much more disposable in the name of American national security. This is because long-range techno-targeting has brought dehumanization to the point that, ironically enough, killing, or (not to mince words) slaughter, has become remarkably banal.

In these years of the War on Terror, the legalities of drone warfare, coupled with the way that the technology capitalizes on this unfortunate aspect of human psychology, has made the dehumanization of Muslims and violence against them that much easier to carry out. It’s taken for granted that Muslims in “target sites” or conflict zones must be terrorists whose removal should be beyond questioning — even after a posthumous determination of their civilian status.

Responsibility, but not accountability

At a 2016 press conference, President Barack Obama finally responded to a question about the by admitting: “There’s no doubt that civilians were killed that shouldn’t have been.” Then he added, “In situations of war, you know, we have to take responsibility when we’re not acting appropriately.”

Rare as such admissions of “responsibility” have been, however, they remain quite different from accountability. In Obama’s case, all that was offered to the survivors among those who “shouldn’t have been” killed in such drone strikes was an utterly minimal acknowledgment that it was even happening.

While the use of drones in the War on Terror began under President George W. Bush, it escalated dramatically under Obama. Then, in the Trump years, it rose yet again. Halfway through , drone strikes had already exceeded the total number in the Obama era. Though the in Joe Biden’s first year in office was lower than Trump’s, what has remained consistent is the lack of the slightest accountability for the slaughter of civilians.

In 2021, as the US was withdrawing chaotically from its 20-year disaster in Afghanistan, its military surveilled a white car driving around Kabul. Believing it to be carrying explosives, they launched the of that conflict, slaughtering 10 Afghans. Two weeks later, after reporting by The New York Times revealed what really happened, the Pentagon that only civilians had been killed, seven of them children. No one was penalized.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin later apologized to the families of those killed and offered compensation — one of the few times American officials had even bothered to acknowledge wrongdoing in Afghanistan in the last 20 years. True to form, however, the government’s pledge to compensate the impacted families has .

A few weeks ago, , the Biden administration was forced to release a redacted version of a presidential policy memorandum, signed in October 2022, that detailed the administration’s latest approach to drone warfare globally. At least some details about it were known prior to its release, however, thanks to an anonymous senior administration . 

The Washington Post’s editorial board, among others, , arguing that the restrictions in place are “smart rules of engagement” and a significant improvement over the Trump years when it comes to limiting civilian damage from drones. In reality, however, Biden’s memo is likely to do little to stem future drone warfare nightmares. In essence, the memo represents a return to Obama-era rules, including the supposed need to have “near-certainty” that the target of a drone strike is a terrorist and “near-certainty” that non-combatants won’t be injured or killed. The memo also includes other criteria that (at least theoretically) must be met before an individual is targeted, including an assessment that capture is not feasible.

In the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, the US claimed his capture wasn’t possible, but members of his family dispute this. In an with Democracy Now, al-Awlaki’s uncle Saleh bin Fareed stated, “I am sure I could have handed him over — me and my family — but they never, ever asked us to do that.” Needless to say, the lack of transparency has made it impossible to know if such standards are being met before a strike takes place and, worse yet, there’s no method of accountability if they aren’t.

That Biden administration does ban signature strikes that target individuals whose identities are unknown based on behavior suggesting they might be involved in terrorist activity. Still, we shouldn’t mistake a modestly better policy for a truly lawful, moral or ethical one, especially since the drone strike “mistakes” of the past haven’t led to any genuinely meaningful overhauls of the program.

Minimizing civilian deaths?

On September 20, 2001, nine days after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush delivered a speech to a joint session of Congress in which he first used the phrase “War on Terror,” while announcing a domestic and global campaign to be fought without borders or time constraints. Previewing what, years later, would become known as this country’s “forever wars,” he that they “should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert operations secret even in success.”

Cameroonian political theorist Achille Mbembe’s definition of necropolitics — the politics of death — catches the essence of the War on Terror Bush launched as a way of life (and death): “the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not.”

With the invasion of Afghanistan and the designation of entire largely Muslim parts of the planet as the enemy, the Bush administration began a “war” in which Muslim deaths were necessary for the protection and preservation of American ones. This set a precedent for the value of Muslim life when the act of killing them could be equated with the security of Americans and the protection of “the homeland.”

22 years later, drones continue to be instruments of civilian slaughter and the language deployed by successive administrations to describe such slaughter has served to sanitize that fact. Whether it’s the use of “target” or “collateral damage,” both minimize the reality that human beings are being murdered. Taken together with a larger War-on-Terror narrative in which Muslims have been demonized and criminalized, the result has been the production of killable bodies whose deaths elicit no guilt, remorse or accountability.

In his 2014 State of the Union address, President Obama why he put “prudent limits” on drone warfare, pointing out that Americans “will not be safer if people abroad believe we strike within their countries without regard for the consequence.” And how right he was.

As yet, however, there have been zero consequences for the air-strike deaths of tens of thousands of civilians globally and, as Obama’s statement suggests, the only real concern this caused American officials was the fear that too many such killings might, in the end, harm Americans.

Grieving Muslim lives

In Sana’a, Yemen, a shows a US drone under which someone has written in blood-red paint, “Why did you kill my family?” in English and Arabic. The relentless American drone campaign has indeed left all too many civilians in Muslim-majority countries asking the same question. The only answer offered in Washington over all these years is that such killings were unavoidable collateral damage.

But imagine, for a moment, what Americans might do if their family members were regularly being killed by drones because another government claimed “near certainty” that they were terrorists? You know the answer, of course, given the response to the 9/11 attacks: this country would undoubtedly launch a catastrophic war of epic proportions with no conceivable end in sight. In contrast, Muslims targeted by American drones have been left to pick up the all-too-literal pieces of their loved ones, while risking the possibility of also being killed in a double- or triple-tap — a level of violence that could never be justified.  

We should all reject a War on Terror committed to the disposability of Muslims, because no one should have to mourn the killing of civilians the US has targeted for far too long. Muslim lives have inherent value and their deaths are worth grieving, mourning and above all valuing. Drone warfare will never change that fact.

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The UN’s Resident Coordinator in Yemen coordinated the fundraising and the acquisition of the necessary agreements from the Huthis as well as the internationally recognized government (IRG), an undertaking that took years of effort and attention. Western nations contributed significant amounts, and the Netherlands in particular took a leading role in funding and mobilizing efforts.

Immediate neighbors who would have been most deeply affected by the disaster of a spill, such as Saudi Arabia, contributed only $10 million, less than might be expected considering both the risk to the Saudi coast and the financial capacity of that state—much of which comes from the production and export of hydrocarbons. The UAE doesn’t even figure in the list of funders. The major international oil companies were also less than generous, though the few still involved in Yemen did contribute. The Yemeni private sector also contributed significantly, as it needs the Red Sea ports for imports of basic commodities.

The shortage of funding from states and major institutions led the UN to launch a crowdfunding operation that had limited support. The United Nations Development Programme on August 11 when the first phase of the operation was completed.

A technically and politically delicate recovery operation

Earlier this year, the UN finally successfully purchased a very large crude carrier-class tanker to replace the Safer and had it modified to ensure it could be used as an FSO. The Dutch company carrying out the operation specializes in this type of complex technical challenge. In late May, its technical support vessel and staff arrived on site with the equipment needed and prepared the Safer. The Dutch team first ensured that there were no toxic gases on and around the vessel that would worsen the risks, conducted technical inspections of the Safer’s hull and machinery and then organized easy access between the two vessels. They also brought the generators necessary to load inert gases to protect the tanks during the transfer of the oil. Two other smaller ships containing emergency response equipment, such as dispersant sprays, were anchored nearby.

In mid-July, the replacement tanker arrived and anchored alongside the Safer. In a major organized by the Huthis, the UN Representative who had been the focal point for the operation, David Gressly, publicly signed the document handing over this new ship to the Sana’a-based chief executive of the Safer Oil company Edris al Shami. Given the controversy over ownership of the ship, the oil and most other aspects of the Yemeni crisis, the Huthis used this opportunity to invite international film crews and journalists to witness their takeover of the tanker, which was formally renamed Yemen. This rare cooperation with international media was clearly designed to strengthen their claim over ownership of these assets following years of successful lobbying that ensured that they contributed nothing to the cost of the operation while strengthening their claim to ownership of any income from the sale of the oil and of the decaying Safer.

The operation to transfer the oil started promptly, and on August 11 the Secretary-General of the UN that the transfer of the 1.1 million barrels of crude oil had been completed.

This first phase has successfully and thankfully avoided a major environmental disaster; it is really good news for Yemenis and other residents along the Red Sea coasts, as well as for the fish, corals, water and all coastal and sea life in the region—let alone shipping, who would have suffered immensely for years, even decades, had the disaster happened. This preventive operation is costing $140 million, whereas cleaning up an oil spill on that scale would have cost up to $20 billion! Given the rarity of good news in UN interventions, the publicity surrounding this success is not surprising.

However, much remains to be done. The new FSO needs to be secured in position and the wreck removed to finalize the clearing of the remaining 22,000 barrels of sludge remaining on the Safer. On the legal front, the IRG has unsurprisingly asserted its own sole authority over the company’s assets, warning international companies against dealing with any parties “impersonating” it. Meetings are taking place between the Yemeni parties involved and the UN to address the next phase of the process. Competition between the Huthis and the IRG for control over the income from the disposal of the Safer and its oil is likely to intensify in the coming months. On top of this, the next phase will require an additional $20 million or so of fundraising.

Although the UN-negotiated truce expired last October, full-scale fighting has not resumed, although clashes are frequent. Hostilities have largely shifted to the economic front in the past year. The oil from the Safer is currently estimated to be worth something in the region of $80 million, while that of the ship’s scrap is $33 million. By comparison, since August last year, the IRG lost about $1.5 billion due to its inability to export oil following the Huthi attacks on two export sites on the Arabian Sea last November. The IRG thus lost its main source of national income, leaving it more dependent than ever on its international supporters, whether the Saudis and Emiratis or beyond via humanitarian and other international assistance.

Despite this rare triumph of UN diplomacy and negotiations, underfunding of the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan and the continued weakness of the economy mean that living conditions continue to deteriorate for Yemenis. But surely everyone aware of the risks of a catastrophe from the Safer must be relieved that this disaster, at least, has been avoided

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Throughout the war, international policymakers have overemphasized the role of the private sector in addressing Yemen’s severe food crisis, insofar as they have tirelessly insisted since the late 1960s that opening the local market to unrestricted food imports would feed a growing population and drive economic growth. Commercial staple food imports — as well as food assistance — are vital during the war.

Indian Farmer Protests Explained (Interactive)

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However, be that as it may, the role of commercial food importers in postwar, post-neoliberalism Yemen must not be blown out of proportion. Reducing Yemen’s deep agrarian and rural social crisis to wartime and postwar commercial food import issues shows that the root causes of the country’s severe food crisis continue to be gravely misunderstood or deliberately overlooked.

To begin with, Yemen’s absurd, inordinate dependence on staple food imports is but a consequence of . Regrettably, it was a policy that failed to preserve the rural sector’s productivity, let alone stimulating it and accumulating wealth. Rehashing past failed agricultural development policies is evidence of two distributing realities.

The first is Yemeni elites’ lack of capacity to imagine alternative paths of development in Yemen. The second is international policymakers’ position that developed countries  can adopt national agricultural policy frameworks that avowedly control food supply through production and import controls and pricing mechanisms, whereas developing countries cannot do the same to support their agriculture sector.

Inspiration and Lessons

To end this long deadlock between Yemen’s autonomy and global capitalism, perhaps one ought to draw attention to India’s  for inspiration and lessons.

It is not in Yemen’s national interest to continue ignoring its small and marginalized farmers. In a rural society like Yemen, they are the engine of a healthy economy. The vast majority of the population continues to live in rural Yemen. Current official  put Yemen’s rural population at about 70%. This reality limits the role of the private sector in sustaining rural livelihoods. While some might argue that Yemen’s private sector should not be viewed as a monolith, consisting only of large conglomerates, to lump smallholding agriculture and agricultural commercialization together under the umbrella of the private sector is fundamentally flawed.

Small farmers in Yemen are subsistence households, each representing a domestic unit of agricultural production that is economically self-sufficient and combines production and consumption functions. This rural social organization is not the same as one where farmers are reduced to landless, wage earners. Thus, small and marginalized farmers cannot be pigeonholed as private sector actors. Worse is to drop them from the economic equation altogether, especially in so-called developing countries.

Without making this fundamental distinction between smallholding agriculture in Yemen and private sector activity, and without understanding why domestic food production is a matter of national priority to Yemeni citizens, Yemeni elites and international policymakers alike will continue to bungle the task of putting the country on the right path to development.

Food Sovereignty and Security

Many seem to think of Yemen as a big chicken farm that only needs to be fed somehow. They do not understand, or do not want to understand, that at issue is food sovereignty as well as food security. Yemen is a sovereign nation. Yemenis are a people who have the right, needless to say, to choose what to farm, how to farm and how to define the relationship between their local market and the international market. Choosing whether to eat homegrown sorghum or imported wheat is a fundamental national question of utmost importance, not a trade finance problem.

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Private sector activity is not an economic activity that occurs in an empty space; it occurs within social spheres. It impacts domestic production, changes the modes of production within a society and, consequently, remolds all social formations and economic relations. Agrarian changes are . One cannot discuss private sector activity and commercial food imports in isolation from their long-term social impacts. This is lesson number one from five decades of steady economic decline and social regress. It is Yemen’s rural population that has marched down the road to impoverishment and starvation, and they know exactly how — but not why — they got there in the first place. In rural Yemen, lives and land are at stake.

Millions of people in Yemen are famished neither because of the war nor because the private sector is unable to import enough staple foods, in spite of significant and critical wartime challenges. Yemenis are starving because the country has systematically lost its long-standing ability to produce food, particularly staple grains. The magnitude of production losses in Yemen’s agriculture sector has fundamentally limited the economy’s resilience to shocks. Economic  is the ability of the country’s main productive forces to cope, recover and reconstruct. How can you cripple a country’s most tangible, corporeal and immediate branch of production and, at the same time, foster resilience? Speaking of resilience of an incapacitated agriculture sector is a logical fallacy and is, therefore, meaningless and a distraction from the real problem.

Causing Alarm

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT), Yemen on its domestic soil on average 98% of its grains during 1961-65; namely, sorghum, millet, barley, maize and wheat, in this order. Sorghum production in Yemen peaked at 921,000 tons in 1975. In sharp contrast, the country domestically produced on average only 18% of its total supply of the same grains during 2011-15 and imported the rest. By 2015, the production of  had plummeted to 221,510 tons. To make an already alarming situation unmanageable, the ongoing war more than halved Yemen’s total domestic grain production. Most notably, sorghum production reached a record low of 162,277 tons in 2016, followed by another record low of 155,722 tons in 2018. Yet, some still argue that this decline is due to population growth, not policy.

In a country that primarily produces and consumes sorghum — the traditional staple of man and beast in Yemen — millet and barley, an over 80% dependency on imported wheat is evidently catastrophic during war and peace. This is a well-documented socioeconomic problem. In its 2004  of “The State of Food and Agriculture,” the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) noted that the long-term damaging impact of the loss of domestic food production and exposure to price volatility on individual countries outweigh the plausible short-lived collective benefits: “Lower international prices have moderated the food import bills of developing countries, which, as a group, are now net food importers. However, although lower basic food prices on international markets bring short-term benefits to net food-importing developing countries, lower international prices can also have negative impacts on domestic production in developing countries that might have lingering effects on their food security.”

The heart of the matter is that the agriculture sector is the country’s main productive force. Unchecked private internationally integrated capital has destroyed Yemen’s rural capital and silenced the interests of the country’s sizable rural population. Further, the malintegration of Yemen’s local food market with global markets has jeopardized the country’s economic independence and prevented any real development in Yemen.

The Issue

There is great, non-monetary economic and social value in reclaiming and revalorizing Yemen’s domestic food production and rebuilding its basic rural infrastructure. Domestic food production is too important to Yemenis to be addressed as an afterthought. At issue is not how to procure wheat from international markets, but how to stop the hemorrhage of surpluses out of the agriculture sector.

What serves Yemen’s national interest is to refrain from calling for increasing the country’s dependency on speculative, volatile international food markets; imposing in the guise of development and economic resilience policies that undermine the country’s ability to domestically produce adequate food for local consumption; overstating the benefits of export-oriented agriculture and cash cropping more broadly; and overlooking or downplaying the role of smallholders in generating abundant jobs and sustaining rural infrastructure. In a nutshell, any serious discussion of Yemen’s food security crisis must take into account ecological sustainability, rural livelihoods and both food security and sovereignty in the long term.

Yemeni farmers do not yet fully understand why policymakers and development practitioners insist on promoting imports and more broadly large commercial activity, at a time when the whole world is prioritizing the opposite of these dictates: strengthening self-reliance, planning and regulating limited resources, and minimizing local markets’ exposure. Yemeni struggle has not yet reached the level of political awareness seen in India during its 2020-21 farmers’ protests. To get there, we must understand one point: tying the rural sector’s destiny to large commercial organizations cannot lead to any real growth and prosperity of the entire population.

Indian farmers inspire us to rethink development paradigms in Yemen, for there is more to farming than exporting bananas and onions to Saudi Arabia, and there is more to the role of the private sector in national development than flooding local markets with wheat from Australia, Russia, the United States, France and other international source markets, or even import substitution.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Biden’s New Culture of Brinkmanship

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Carter considers his time in office to be peaceful, but his says otherwise. Under his one term as president from 1977 to 1981, the US was still instigating conflicts across the world. The most notable was the Iran-Iraq War, which the US, the Soviet Union and their allies were heavily involved in by supporting the Iraqis.

Causing Trouble

The , a publication of the Peace Worldwide Organization, labels the US the world’s worst troublemaker. The evidence for this is clear.

First, the US at least 750 military bases in around 80 countries. It also has more than 170,000 troops stationed in 159 countries. Second, in 2016, The Washington Post that the US has tried 72 times to overthrow governments of sovereign nations between 1947 and 1989. These actions were in clear violation of the UN Charter. Third, the US continues using economic against numerous countries to force their leadership to bow to Washington’s demands.

The worst example is Iran, which the US has sought to use a policy of “maximum pressure” against. Sanctions are also in clear violation of the UN Charter and affect civilians more than the political leaders they seek to squeeze. These unwarranted interventions in Iran have brought pain and suffering to people in a country that is not known for its human rights.

The US, meanwhile, is known well as a country that pays lip service to human rights, democracy and peace. It talks about a lack of democracy in some nations but favors tyrannical rulers in others. This includes countries like Bahrain, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The US today is the world’s only superpower, and with such power comes great responsibility. If the US is truly interested in human rights, democracy and peace, then it too must change its actions. It must begin by complying with the UN Charter and respecting international law. Washington must right its many wrongs — particularly in the Middle East — not because it is forced to do so, but because it is the right thing for a world in which peace can prosper. For this to become a reality, there are a number of areas for the US to consider.

Never Forgotten

The first area is addressing the US relationship with Iran. In the 1980s, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the United States and its European provided assistance to Iraq when it leader, Saddam Hussein, ordered the of chemical weapons against Iranian troops. Most victims of that attack in 1988 died instantly, while many others are still from the consequences. Some survivors of the chemical warfare now struggle to find inhalers in Iran, which is scarred by sanctions. The US should acknowledge the role it played in the war and provide reparations for the injuries and damage it caused. 

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Today, the draconian sanctions the US has placed on Iran has deepened a rift with the European Union, Russia and China, all of which signed a nuclear agreement with Tehran in 2015. The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 under US President Donald Trump led to the reintroduction of crippling sanctions that have hurt the Iranian middle class and the poor, causing hardship and death.

Washington must lift its unlawful sanctions, which Trump introduced to bring Iran to its knees. The US thinks that Iran is meddling in the affairs of countries like Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and that a policy of “maximum pressure” will force it to rethink its foreign policy. The Trump administration used this as an excuse to pull out of the nuclear deal, despite the Iranians complying with all of its obligations under the JCPOA. The US under President Joe Biden should also comply with the JCPOA by rejoining the agreement and lifting sanctions.

In the long term, a »ĺĂ©łŮ±đ˛ÔłŮ±đ between the US and Iran could pave the way for the Iranians to forgive the 1953 coup d’état against the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh. During the Cold War, a US-orchestrated led to the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh. He was replaced with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the brutal last shah of Iran, who himself was overthrown in the 1979 Revolution. In a country struggling under US sanctions, memories of the coup have never been forgotten.

Lies Over Iraq

Iraq is another country where US actions have not been forgotten. If you attack anyone without being provoked, any court with an ounce of justice would require you to repair the inflicted damage. Relations between nations work in the same way. If a nation harms another without provocation, the aggressor is expected to repair the damage caused.

In 2003, under the false pretext that the Iraqis had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ties with al-Qaeda, the US under President George W. Bush invaded Iraq. The result was the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his government, the destruction of infrastructure, the death of hundreds of thousands in the years to come and the displacement of 9.2 million Iraqis.

The US invasion inevitably led to the rise of radical groups like the Islamic State (IS), which in 2014 seized territory in Iraq and Syria. The that American taxpayers paid for the Iraq War could have been well spent in the US on addressing poverty, building high-speed rail networks or repairing infrastructure. Instead, the dollars were spent on bombs and bullets to counter insurgents like IS.

When Iraqis led by Iranian General Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Mahdi al-Muhandis formed a resistance against IS militants and expelled them from Iraq, many people were jubilant that their country was freed. Instead of congratulating Soleimani and Muhandis for the role they played, the US violated Iraq’s territorial integrity. In a US drone strike at Baghdad airport in January 2020, both men were assassinated in violation of international law. The US action was not only , but it also puts all foreign diplomats in danger by setting a precedent for other countries to assassinate enemies.

There are two ways the US can make up for its illegal actions of 2003. First, holding those responsible to account for the invasion and human rights violations would show the world that the US is serious about the rule of law. That includes the likes of Bush and his accomplices, who lied and betrayed the trust of the American people, as well as security and military personnel who went beyond the rules of war. Holding such persons to account would restore respect for the US across the world by demonstrating that no one, not even the president or American soldiers, is above the law. Second, providing reparations for the loss of Iraqi and American lives, the injuries caused, the people displaced and the property destroyed is essential.

Famine in Yemen

Yemen is another place where bombs have destroyed the country under the watchful eye of the Americans. In 2015, a Saudi-led coalition supported and armed by the United States, Britain and France began indiscriminatingly bombing Yemen in response to a takeover by Iran-backed Houthi rebels. The destruction of Yemen has led to accusations of war crimes by all parties involved. It has also resulted in 5 million people being on the brink of and millions more facing starvation.

The US must promptly stop all military and intelligence support to the coalition. As the one nation with such political power, the US must work on bringing the combatants together by implementing the that calls for respecting “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”

As citizens in a free world, we must assume responsibility for our political leaders’ actions. First, as a bare minimum, we should realize that the problems we cause for others, sooner or later, will come back to haunt us. The example of US support for the mujahideen during the 1980s in Afghanistan is well known. Second, electing the right political leaders who strive for freedom and peace will not only benefit people in faraway lands, but also in the US itself. Instead of taxpayer dollars being spent on weapons, cash can be reinvested into our society to educate children, improve access to health care and do much more.  

United, we can put “maximum pressure” on the US to become a leader in creating a world free from war, oppression and persecution.

*[The author is the founder and president of , a non-religious, non-partisan and charitable organization in the United States that promotes freedom and peace for all. It recently released its Civility Report 2021, which can be downloaded .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything?

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But times have changed. Three recent presidents — Barack Obama, Donald Trump and now Joe Biden — have made efforts to distance the US from its endless, exasperating entanglements in the Middle East. Those efforts had distracted the United States from its principal challenges in the world — China and Russia — and sapped it of its military, economic and political might and influence. America received very little in return on its investment. Furthermore, years of US involvement in the region had also fractured the American public’s support for the more critically important role it must play in anchoring the international order.

Enter the Others

Downgrading America’s involvement in the Middle East isn’t necessarily a bad thing. For decades, many in the Middle East and in the US had argued that the region’s problems must be tackled by the governments and people of the region. Outsiders can play a supporting role, but the tough decisions can only be made by the governments themselves. That may now be happening.

But handing off the task of addressing the region’s manifold challenges got off to a poor start. Neither the US, nor the international community, nor the states of the Middle East seemed able to solve the conundrum of the region’s three failed states.

Then, starting around 2015, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman started ordering others around — imposing a blockade on Qatar, detaining the Lebanese prime minister, jailing courageous dissidents and largely harmless millionaires, ordering a hit job on journalist Jamal Khashoggi and jumping into the Yemeni Civil War. And it all went bad, very bad in fact. Additionally, it provoked other would-be movers and shakers to get in the act, including the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, China, Russia and even Israel. And not always with good intent or positive results.

After years of misdirection, however, governments now seem to be taking a more sober and responsible approach that could prove genuinely beneficial for the region. For starters, they have embarked on a simple approach: dialog. They are talking about their problems, especially those between and among one another. Dialog leads to understanding, which can lead to shared interests. Ultimately, to be effective, dialog must lead to compromise. That involves the inevitable give-and-take that allows nations, especially those close to one another, to live and thrive in peace and prosperity.

It’s a Start

One of the most encouraging initiatives may be the most unexpected: dialog between the Middle East’s two major powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and hosted by perhaps the most unlikely state, Iraq, unquestionably the region’s most conflict-ridden for decades. The issues are many between these two historic rivals, separated by a narrow gulf on whose name neither seems able to agree. But the larger gulf lies in their differing views of the other, their competing religious sects — the Saudi uber-conservative Wahhabi Sunni Islam vs. Iran’s clerically-led, conservative Shia Islam — perceptions of the other’s role and intentions in the region, their wealth, and relations with and ties to the broader international community, almost non-existent in the case of Iran.

One especially neuralgic issue for both is their respective roles in the Yemen War. It is now abundantly clear that the Saudis’ overwhelming military power, bolstered by the US and some European nations, cannot defeat the Houthi rebels. Nor can it end either the war or even its costly intervention in it. The Saudis need help. Enter the Iranians, who have been supporting the Shia-affiliated Zaydi Houthis in this war since 2013. With ideology and much-needed weapons and funding, though much less than what Saudi Arabia has expended, the Iranians have empowered the rebels to the point where they are now an established power in a future Yemen, whether unified or bifurcated.

So, the two regional powers are talking it out. The Saudis want out of the war, but they also want reliable security along their southwestern border. The Iranians want a Shia power on the Arabian Peninsula, but preferably one at peace.

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Yemen may be the most immediate challenge for the two states. But there are others. More broadly, Saudi Arabia and Iran need to reach a modus vivendi in the region. On-again, off-again formal relations, menacing behavior toward each other’s oil and shipping interests, and verbal assaults do little more than increase the temperature in a region plagued by heat, literally and figuratively.

Brothers Reconcile?

Saudi Arabia has also launched a campaign to repair the frayed relations among its Arab neighbors. Last week, Mohammed bin Salman week began a PR  to demonstrate a new and improved political environment. In a swing through the neighboring Gulf states of Oman, the UAE, Bahrain and, most importantly, Qatar, he seems to be trying to rebuild what once had been the region’s preeminent multilateral organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Mohammed bin Salman single-handedly fractured the Gulf alliance when he imposed his 2017 blockade on Qatar, joined by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. It backfired. Qatar remained in the good graces of the US, drew the political and military support of peripheral power Turkey and earned the support of Iran. Consider it the young prince’s on-the-job training in global as well as regional politics. He is now devoting particular attention to Doha in the hope of what yet we aren’t quite certain. But this repair work and goodwill tour cannot help but create progress.

And not to be outdone, the Gulf’s other power, the UAE, has  on its own diplomatic repair mission. Like the Saudis, the Emiratis want to lower the temperature in the Gulf, and their position as the region’s prime economic entrepĂ´t gives them special heft. The UAE’s ties to the US, still the unquestioned but now quiescent power in the Gulf, also lend special weight.

Could It All Be for Naught?

Looming over all of these laudable efforts, however, is Iranian behavior in the region. All eyes are now on the recently restarted talks over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna, Austria. Following a near-six-month hiatus at Iran’s request, the P5+1 group and Iran renewed negotiations to reinstate the JCPOA — aka the Iran nuclear deal.

But it is the critical non-dialog between the US and Iran — the two countries are still not meeting face-to-face but rather communicating through the intermediation of the other P5+1 countries — that bears the most serious watching. Unless they can agree on a way forward that puts Iran’s nuclear weapons potential well into the very distant future while also lifting America’s onerous and inescapably crippling sanctions on the Islamic Republic, the heat in the Middle East will become white hot.

Judging from the US State Department’s uncharacteristically downcast semi-official  of the first round of the negotiation restart, there is cause for concern. Iran’s counterproductive, albeit predictable, maximalist opening gambit soured the P5+1, even China and Russia. Negotiators met again last week. Unless there is a greater attitude toward compromise, however, pessimism will win out. Positions will harden. And more extreme (and dangerous) measures will become viable.

President Biden has reiterated the US pledge that Iran will not get nuclear weapons. But neither he nor his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, will state what the consequences of failed talks might be.

Israel, however, is not so coy. Recent Israeli  confirm that the military option is very much in play. As if to put an even finer point on the matter, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin  Jerusalem late last week for meetings with his Israeli counterpart, Defense Minister Benny Gantz. Both men are retired top generals of their respective armed forces and will have discussed military and other options.

Military action would be an unspeakable disaster for the Middle East. But so would a nuclear-armed or even nuclear-capable Iran. Even an approach that stops short of armed conflict will impose extraordinary hardship on the region, certainly prompting other states to consider acquiring nuclear weapons and further isolate Iran.

It would be unfair to place the entirety of the burden for the success of these talks on Tehran. However, unless Iran understands the futility of its mindless pursuit of nuclear weapons, no effort at fostering understanding elsewhere can temper the region’s mercury-popping political heat.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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How Date Farming Helps Yemenis on Soqotra

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Until now, the negotiations have reportedly revolved around two main issues. The first is the restoration of diplomatic relations between both countries. Bilateral ties were cut off in 2016 when Saudi Arabia executed Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, a Saudi dissident who was a Shia cleric, and protesters in Tehran stormed the Saudi Embassy in retaliation. The second topic of discussion is the Yemen War, which entered a new phase with the 2015 Saudi-led intervention against Houthi rebels who had taken over the Yemeni capital, Sanaa.

For more than one year, the Saudis have been looking for a way out of Yemen. The enormous economic costs of the conflict became more when oil prices fell as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdowns.

Even after the recovery of the hydrocarbon market, the fact remains that six years of war have not brought Saudi Arabia any closer to its two major goals in Yemen: reestablishing Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and constraining the Houthis’ influence. Furthermore, US President Joe Biden, while not as tough on the kingdom as promised in his election campaign, has been less with Saudi Arabia than his predecessor, Donald Trump.

Who Are the Houthis?

The Saudis often present the Houthis as little more than Iranian puppets. Iran’s official is that the Houthi movement only receives ideological support from Tehran. Both narratives are inaccurate, to say the least.

The Houthis are a homegrown movement that successfully the Yemeni government’s military offensives from 2004 to 2010 without any external assistance. Hussein al-Houthi, the movement’s early leader and from whom its name is derived, was an of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and was influenced by its symbolism and ideology. His brother and current leader of the movement, Abdel-Malek al-Houthi, has also his admiration for the Islamic Republic.

The first credible of Iranian military support for the Houthis date back to 2013. Until 2016, weapons transfers were largely restricted to light arsenal. In the following years, Tehran started to supply the Houthis with increasingly sophisticated missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components. Furthermore, a contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards on the ground has been Houthi fighters. The Yemeni movement’s capacity to key strategical interests within Saudi Arabia, such as oil extraction facilities, pipelines and airports, cannot be understood without accounting for Iran’s role in the conflict.

At the same time, and contrary to Saudi claims, the Houthis are largely independent from Iran. Their territorial expansion in 2014 was politically built on its Faustian bargain with the former Yemeni president and arch-rival, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the unpopularity of the Hadi government, which was backed by Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, most of the Houthis’ current arsenal has not been sourced from Iran. It has rather been acquired in the local — which is well-connected to the Horn of Africa’s smuggling routes — in battle or as a result of the of governmental military units to the Houthis. Before the war began, Yemen was already a country with small weaponry, coming only to the US in terms of weapons per capita.

According to the official Saudi narrative, the Houthis necessitate Iranian help to maintain their military effort. While this is most likely the case when it comes to the group’s capability to strike targets within Saudi territory, an abrupt end of Iranian military assistance to the Houthis would make little difference in Yemen’s internal balance of power.

What Saudi Arabia and Iran Need to Do

Saudi Arabia needs to come to terms with the fact that its attempt to impose a military solution in Yemen has failed. It has done so because of counterproductive airstrikes, support for unpopular local actors and a misunderstanding of internal dynamics. If Yemen has become Saudi Arabia’s quagmire, this has little to do with Iran’s limited support for the Houthis.

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Iran, for its part, should understand that its claims of non-interference in the Yemen War have gained a farcical nature over the years, as growing evidence has piled up on Iranian–Houthi ties. Iranian leaders cannot impose on the Houthis an end to attacks against Saudi territory. However, they can decisively constrain them by stopping the flow of UAV and missile technology to the Houthis, as well as ending their military training on the ground. In conjunction with this, Iran can support the direct Houthi–Saudi talks that began in late 2019.

For Saudi–Iranian negotiations to bear fruits in relation to the Yemen conflict, both sides need to show a realistic appraisal of Iran’s role in the war. It comes down to acknowledging two key facts. On the one hand, Iran has leverage over the Houthis because of its military support for the group. On the other hand, this leverage is inherently limited and cannot be used to grant Saudi Arabia a military victory in Yemen.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Chaos Makes a Comeback in Southern Yemen

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As the economy continues to in war-torn Yemen, with widespread protests from to Shebwa and Hadhramawt, there has been little to no hope. of the Yemeni rial is a prominent issue driving protests across southern provinces, while the mass of civilians from northern provinces is driven by violence and unpaid salaries by authorities. The humanitarian crisis deepens as unemployment grows and donor funds are insufficient to meet demand by international nongovernmental organizations. Opportunities for job creation are minimal, but small initiatives led by local actors, with direct assistance from state donors, have made progress as economic activity contributes to local stability.

In a micro-environment like Soqotra, political stability over the past seven years of conflict has come at a high price. While fighting at a scale similar to the Yemeni mainland has not reached the Soqotra archipelago, the managed to disrupt life until a degree of order was over a year ago. Humanitarian assistance has flowed into Soqotra for years following devastating cyclones, but with recent political stability on the island, assistance has shifted to more permanent projects — from hospitals and a power station to the island’s first factory.

Small Steps Forward

While industries struggle through a moribund economy, the agriculture sector has received much-needed investment, mostly from aid agencies. Challenges remain, like annual storms, drought, pests and shortage of labor. From Hodeida to Hadhramawt, agriculture has . Date farming is a particular example. This sector has suffered across the mainland, but it is being resurrected on Soqotra.

In August 2020, a group of women led now by Wafa Mohammed was hired to operate the first factory on Soqotra island. Built in the outskirts of Hadibu, with funds provided by the UAE’s Khalifa Bin Zayed Foundation, the date factory became the first major project of its kind on the island. The factory can deliver nearly three tons of dates per day from a harvest of around half a million palm trees. According to Mohammed, this factory collects produce from around 500 farmers and has a direct impact on the economy of nearly 2,000 families on the island.

Prior to the construction of the factory, production was only for local consumption. Saeed Othman, a date farmer in Soqotra, said that in the past, “production was very weak because it was just for daily consumption.” The island also lacked other agricultural products and dates were often used as feed for livestock. Production at the factory has also created a competitive environment among local farmers as demand for higher quality increased for export, said Othman.

The factory project instantly provided unexpected opportunities to a group of college graduates, who simply had no hopes beyond the usual “routine at home, cooking, cleaning, doing the other home chores,” said Mohammed. Farmers across the island also highlight the opportunities created by the factory, primarily through an increase in income impacting their daily life. Farmers and factory workers alike enjoy the benefits from a stable environment that allows economic activity outside a war economy that prolongs the armed conflict on the mainland.

Conflict and Aid

As local, regional and international organizations jockey for their share of available funds since the on March 1, the debate continues over alternative approaches. UN organizations nearly $4 billion this year, only to receive pledges for $1.7 billion, of which an undisclosed amount has been so far.

, low-impact and reduced funding have all contributed to wide-ranging in recent months over alternatives to the current process. The multilateral approach has failed to deliver sufficient funds to meet demand, while warring parties continue to aid and obstruct delivery. In an environment like Soqotra, isolated from the armed conflict on the Yemeni mainland, direct delivery of aid by a state actor has proved efficient, delivering long-term impact on the ground.

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The date factory project came as the political in Soqotra settled. Under the current circumstances, the situation in Soqotra could offer an alternative. For example, in contrast to affected areas in Hadhramawt or Mahra, soon after Cyclone struck the Soqotra in 2015 and following Cyclone in 2018, the United Arab Emirates delivered life-saving assistance directly to the people on the island. During the length of the conflict, the UAE has delivered over $110 million in aid to the Soqotra archipelago. The aid has targeted areas in public and health services, transport and storage, fishing sector, construction, public education, energy and potable water.

Aid provided over the years also targeted farmers, who not only benefit from the funds provided for their crops, but also from projects like the date factory. The factory, for example, has provided an outlet for farmers to export goods rather than relying on local consumption alone. The aid provided has allowed the farmers to expand and stabilize harvests, improve the quality of products and increase revenue. In addition, the power plant in Hadibu, with a capacity of 2.2 megawatts, provides facilities like the date factory with a sustainable power supply that contributes to local economic security. The UAE also provided the Qalansiya area with 800 kilowatts. Other projects include a distribution network for more than 30 sites and solar-powered street lighting.

Development projects in Soqotra account for a fraction of funds requested by aid agencies every year, but the impact so far is wide and sustainable. Other environments could emulate the process in Soqotra, but deeply rooted political conflicts remain an obstacle. Aden, the interim capital, continues to suffer from a lack of sustainable power source, unemployment is high despite efforts by Aden authorities and the political conflict easily escalates to armed clashes. On the mainland, it is more difficult, but opportunities abound across southern provinces.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Youth activism and empowerment have a rich history in Yemen. Youth activism became a bustling part of civil society during the Arab Spring of 2011. At that time, demonstrations at change squares and protest camps gave young Yemenis a place to meet and discuss their hopes and demands for human rights. A number of youth-led organizations were founded, carrying out advocacy, media reporting and monitoring. 

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As the regime led by Ali Abdullah Saleh came to an end in 2012, the transitional government that took over Yemen made incredible steps to engage youth populations in the national dialogue. A technocratic  was formed in 2014 that “drew heavily from youth leaders,” many of whom were given a generous amount of access to decision-makers. The institutional progress made during this time has since been abandoned. However, the spirit of Yemeni youth activists lives on in the actions of youth leaders today. 

Yemen’s war has spared no one, not even its children. The in the country worsens as fighting continues between the internationally recognized, Saudi-backed Yemeni government and Houthi rebels. The war has resulted in the complete breakdown of government services and the destruction of critical infrastructures, such as hospitals, schools and roads. 

What Are Youth Doing?

Although the war is not over, Yemeni youth activists are building support for their number one : peace. They are combining humanitarian initiatives with development components to create a sustainable approach to peacebuilding. This advocating for small businesses like food carts and home-delivery kitchens, using skills in social media to raise awareness for public health and safety issues, and designing graphics to show how to avoid contaminated water or where landmines may be located. 

Youth activists are creating a culture of trust and community, especially among vulnerable populations where networks of support might have otherwise collapsed during the conflict. In the event that funding no longer sustains humanitarian aid, these programs and businesses will continue to support Yemenis. Through the creation of opportunity and family support, Yemeni youth are keeping alive the fabric of society necessary to achieve long-term stability. 

The youth empowerment initiatives that Yemeni activists organize similarly seek peace. The most immediate goal of these initiatives is to offer an alternative to fighting in the conflict. These initiatives champion the of youth empowerment: for young people to develop skills, awareness and opportunities that will positively impact their lives toward a future they have chosen. 

Yemeni youth activists are combating unemployment and providing livelihood , protecting young people from conflict and further polarization and also maintaining security. These activists have shown great adaptability and  in presenting an alternative future to young people where they are able to have agency over their lives. 

Involving Young Yemenis

Those in positions of power should not wait until the conflict is over to integrate young Yemeni leaders into the peacebuilding process. Integral work is being done by young activists every day. Not involving this group in the political process further marginalizes and silences the voices of community members suffering from the conflict. Yemeni youth are the future of the country and should have consistent access to decision-making. 

Engaging youth in peacebuilding  â€śserves to address their feelings of fear, isolation, hopelessness, stigmatization, and in turn, contributes to the overall security of the community.” Young leaders will not only be able to feel a sense of agency over their own lives but over the peace process as well. They become active players in their nation’s history rather than passive victims of war. When they become the leaders of Yemen, they will have developed the necessary skills to care for the people of Yemen. 

The war has blocked all forms of for Yemeni youth, a critical space to share their ideas. It is essential that leaders and international actors do not silence them altogether. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Houthi rebels based in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, have made advances against pro-government forces in al-Baydha province. They have also pushed southern forces, Salafi factions and al-Islah affiliates out of southern districts. Houthis also claim to have defeated militants belonging to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), who fought alongside tribes, Salafis and pro-government forces.

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These claims come a year after the Houthis said they had cleared northeast al-Baydha of AQAP and Islamic State (IS) militants. These fighters are said to have moved into Abyan and Shebwa provinces. This has increased instability in areas where government troops allied with President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah face fierce opposition from southern security forces.

Southern Concerns

It has been nearly a year and a half of fighting in the oil-rich province of Mareb between Houthis and pro-government forces. Southerners fear that civilian officials and troops affiliated with al-Islah, a Sunni Islamist party, will withdraw and seek refuge in areas like Shebwa province. In addition, southerners have expressed concern over by AQAP-affiliated from al-Baydha into places like Mudiyah in northern Abyan province, as well as the southwest of Shebwa.

These militants claimed operations against Houthis in and southwest areas of al-Baydha, which border Abyan. The fighting there has subsided, with Houthis claiming control of territory around Homaiqan and areas near Bayhan. Claims of territorial gains by Houthis and have raised the alarm for southern forces, including the Security Belt Units (SBU) in Abyan that fought with pro-government troops. This was particularly the case following the arrest of linked to attacks on the SBU in and Aden.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of Hadi’s government today, and other southern allies believe the movement of forces from al-Baydha and Mareb into Abyan or Shebwa violate the and the 2020 for a coalition government. The build-up of troops without coordination under these agreements is a threat to a more comprehensive deal negotiated by Saudi Arabia to focus on the fight against Houthis across northern territories.

The influx of militants into areas like Mudiya, Abyan and new attacks on in places like Bureiqa in Aden worry southerners. The latter see the conflict expanding beyond clashes with military and tribal forces in Abyan loyal to President Hadi and troops under the direction of Vice-President Ali Muhsin and affiliated with al-Islah. Instead, they believe, the fight is now against a growing number of AQAP militants in the area.

Chaos and Refuge

For southerners, an influx of militants and al-Islah’s ambition to control the oil-rich Shebwa province bring back memories of radicalization and recruitment of Yemenis for the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s and the occupation of southern Yemen by northerners after the 1994 civil war. Islah-affiliated forces have increased their presence around the oil fields of Usaylan in northern Shebwa. They are also pushing to take control of the Belhaf LNG Terminal, which is currently protected by Shebwani Elite Forces that are pro-STC.

While the for autonomy remains excluded from UN-led peace talks, the STC is recognized by the Saudi-led coalition as a legitimate representative of southerners and allied forces charged with securing southern territory “under supervision of the coalition.” Since the Riyadh Agreement was signed, operations to stabilize southern provinces like Aden, Abyan and Shebwa have been obstructed by the and the amassment of Islah-affiliated troops east of Shoqra in Abyan.   

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The build-up of government forces in Abyan and Shebwa is a result of both a retreat from al-Baydha and and efforts to reinforce troops inside Abyan province. The movement of forces into Abyan in 2020 violated the Riyadh Agreement. Government reinforcements have also escalated tensions with the SBU, further destabilizing this fragile environment.

Now, the retreat of troops from Mareb into northern Shebwa — some deployed to protect oil infrastructure — is seen as aiming to strengthen the presence of Islah and secure refuge in case Mareb City falls to Houthis. Southern forces have asked why government troops are retreating to Shebwa while Houthis advance through Murad and now .

In Abyan, the province is divided into three. First, the STC holds territory west of Shoqra along the coast to Lower Yafa, the border with al-Baydha and Lahj. Second, tribal forces and military units loyal to Hadi, who hails from Abyan, hold areas in northern Abyan bordering al-Baydha. Third, government troops, led by commanders affiliated with al-Islah and Ali Muhsin, hold territory east of Shoqra and along the border with Shebwa.

Official AQAP wires have claimed a number of operations against . Al-Qaeda has reportedly targeted government troops in , but it has yet to claim operations along the coast west of Shoqra. Without confirming specific links between AQAP militants and government forces, southerners are asking how militants can bypass security checkpoints and travel from western al-Baydha to Mudiya and then western Shebwa.

Misdirection and Refuge

Reports of a resurgence of AQAP in southern Yemen have been met with skepticism. As a consequence of escalating media wars, some observers claim labeling individuals as al-Qaeda militants is merely part of the demonization game between rivals. Yet confirmation via official online wires claimed by AQAP not only allows observers to navigate the media wars, but it also points to asymmetric tactics utilized by rivals to create chaos on the ground.

In recent months, AQAP has claimed a number of operations against Houthis in al-Baydha and southern forces in Abyan and Aden. Some operations have only been claimed or assigned to AQAP via social media and news outlets. Dr. Elizabeth Kendall of Oxford University has the current manifestations of AQAP as active, committed, pragmatic and fake. The origin and intent of the “fake” faction are what worries southerners, who view this as an instrument of misdirection in a battle to secure refuge for groups like al-Islah. This is primarily because many of the operations not claimed by AQAP target southern forces in areas of confrontation with government forces affiliated with al-Islah.

The timing of movement by AQAP militants across Abyan and Shebwa, coupled with increasing operations since the death of SBU counterterrorism chief in 2019, adds credibility to claims that the aim is to create chaos and cause the collapse of the Riyadh Agreement. In doing so, the story goes, confrontation would ensue between al-Islah-affiliated forces and southern factions over control of strategic territory in the south. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In southern provinces, political rivalries present major obstacles to the coordination and delivery of aid. Another problem has been a failure by the international community to meet funding requests, often falling short by up to 50%. Where available, the more direct, government-driven humanitarian funding might prove to be a more effective approach, especially when it comes to long-term solutions.

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Nearly seven years into the Yemeni conflict, no party is closer to a military victory, and the main tactic by all sides has been to dilute local authority to foment chaos. The current situation along southern provinces is clear evidence of these tactics — from Abyan to Mahra. Economic development remains stagnant, while infighting and turf wars obstruct operations by humanitarian agencies.

In Aden, for example, UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are constrained by conflict over access to ports and collection of tariffs, checkpoints, corruption and fighting at the village level outside the province. Abyan is now divided into three spheres as a result of fighting among the Southern Transitional Council (STC), pro-Islah forces and elements loyal to President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The conflict in Shebwa has carved space for aid agencies from Turkey and Qatar working through al-Islah affiliates. Yet failure to stabilize these local environments has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, while some profit from the war economy.

Stabilization of local environments, eliminating obstacles such as checkpoints and corruption have proved key to the effective delivery of aid and social cohesion. While political rivalries prolong conflict across Yemen, instances of political victory over rivals provide isolated models of stability.

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In the case of the Soqotra archipelago off the coast of Yemen, the end of the political conflict between al-Islah affiliates and southern elements has led to an increase in the flow of aid, the absence of political strife and a gradual restart of economic activity. International organizations have had limited access to the island, but direct government assistance from coalition members has bolstered the pace of development.

A Direct Model

During the conflict, donors have failed to meet funding requests from humanitarian agencies. As demand has increased, donor contributions have dropped. It is estimated that over 3.5 million civilians have been displaced from their homes, while 24 million “are in need of humanitarian assistance.” The funding gap has grown between 40% and 60% from 2019 to the present. The capture of humanitarian assistance by Houthis since 2019, amounting to an $1.8 billion, has also created problems for UN agencies and NGOs when donors have lost confidence and perceive their contributions will end up funding the war.

Direct funding of small projects — in the health sector or for economic actors — by donor governments could relieve political tension and contribute to local stability. The case of Soqotra again allows for potential modeling under current circumstances. Since 2015, as the armed conflict expanded, the Yemeni island in the Indian Ocean has received direct humanitarian assistance from the United Arab Emirates. Soon after cyclone struck Soqotra in 2015, the UAE delivered life-saving aid. It also supported the population after the cyclone in 2018.

Over the past six years, the UAE has delivered over $110 million in assistance to the population on Soqotra and neighboring islands. The aid has reached areas of social and health services, transport and storage, fishing sector, construction, public education, energy and potable water.

While millions have been displaced by the war on the mainland, rapid response assistance following Chapala and Makunu prevented the displacement of hundreds of families. With help from the UAE military, organizations such as the Abu Dhabi Development Fund (ADFD), the Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation and the Emirates Red Crescent (ERC) helped build 161 residential units in Zayed City, 21 in Dafarh, 51 in Arshani, and other units in Zaheq and Dixam since the cyclones hit the islands. Assistance has also provided four power plants, a distribution network for more than 30 sites, installed solar-powered street lighting and established two solar power plants in Hadibo with a capacity of 2.2 megawatts and Qalansiya at 800 kilowatts.

Direct aid from the UAE has also reached Soqotra’s health sector. By specifically targeting the needs of the local population, after natural disasters or ordinary health requirements, the assistance has fully equipped one emergency facility and two surgery rooms. It has also added 13 beds and an intensive-care unit (ICU) in line with international standards and expanded the Sheikh Khalifa Hospital. The facility’s bed capacity has increased to 42, including four at the ICU unit, and 16 CT scan machines have been installed.

Assistance for economic actors has also focused on the Fishing Cooperative Union and 27 fishermen’s associations, helped renovate a fish market and built a fish factory with a production capacity of 500 tons per month, employing 500 local people. Financial assistance has also reached farmers, converting over 31 hectares into farmland.

Stability as a Model

Civilian organizations continue to face challenges while delivering aid in remote areas of Yemen. Obstacles include funding gaps, import logistics and costs, and access to ports and roads. In the case of Soqotra, NGOs have been unable to respond to natural disasters and growing needs in the health and energy sectors.

The end of the armed conflict may be further than expected at this time, but where possible, the extinguishing of political rivalries has produced wider access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Soqotra stands as a potential model, at the micro-level, in hands of a party within the prescribed by the , a power-sharing deal for Yemen.

As a legitimate party representing the southern people according to the Riyadh Agreement, the STC is a partner in Yemen’s internationally recognized government under President Hadi. The progress achieved in securing order and promoting could provide a model for other areas throughout liberated provinces. An essential component of success remains direct access to sustainable funding from donors.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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These actors’ shared mandate to defeat the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, who have controlled most of northern Yemen since March 2015, has faced challenges for years. Tactical disagreements sparked in January 2018, but strategic divergence now abounds. The main driver of conflict is the incompatibility of their respective sovereignties. While President Hadi maintains juridical sovereignty in the halls of the United Nations as the head of the Republic of Yemen, the STC is building empirical sovereignty in Aden and surrounding southern governorates.

Aden has witnessed a turbulent month. On August 1, a Houthi missile strike killed 36 members of the STC-affiliated Security Belt Forces, including the revered commander, . Following an investigation, STC Vice President Hani bin Brik on August 6 that the attack was carried out in collusion with Islah, a Sunni Islamist political party that comprises a portion of Hadi’s cabinet. The latest series of clashes sparked on August 7 when a gunfight broke out during a funeral procession as it passed near the Ma’ashiq Palace housing Hadi’s administrative footprint in Aden.

Bin Brik the “overthrow [of] the government of terrorism and corruption that is allied with the Islah terrorist party.” Anwar Gargash, the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs, implored for calm. In response, bin Brik , “affirming the preservation of President Hadi’s legitimacy” while “ridding it of the dominance of the terroristic Islah party.” Skirmishes continued and, on August 10, STC forces seized Ma’ashiq Palace and other Hadi government sites. On August 17, STC of a withdrawal of pro-STC forces from Hadi government infrastructure. The Hadi-STC intra-coalition tension stems from innate differences in the concept and practice of sovereignty in southern Yemen.

Sovereignty in Yemen

In international law, sovereignty is the exercise of power by a ruling authority. Of the , two forms clash in southern Yemen. President Hadi maintains the juridical sovereignty inherent in recognition from the UN and its member states. However, in light of both the Houthi coup in the north and separatism in the south, Hadi’s forces maintain a light presence in Yemen itself. Beyond Marib governorate and portions of central Hadramawt, Hadi and Yemeni patronage. In fact, Hadi has spent nearly all of the past four and a half years in Saudi Arabia, having only returned on April 13 for a in Seyoun, central Hadramawt.

Although the STC lacks juridical sovereignty, it is carving out empirical sovereignty. This is what scholar a governing entity’s “degree of legitimacy and control over their society and within their borders.” Separatists entities may be more effective maintainers of security and promoters of civic affinity than “legitimate” governments cloistered in far-off capitals. By assessing political legitimacy through the two facets of security provision and ideological affinity, it is clear that the empirical sovereignty of the STC supersedes the juridical sovereignty of Hadi’s in most of southern Yemen.

Security provision is the clearest indicator of the STC’s growing empirical sovereignty vis-à-vis the Hadi government. Security Belt, Southern Resistance Forces and other pro-STC militias seized the bases of the third and fourth presidential guard brigades. These victories induced Major General Fadl Abdullah Ba’ash, a commander in the special security forces of Hadi’s Ministry of Interior, to support for southern forces. It is likely that more Hadi security personnel will pledge their support to the STC as it consolidates security gains. On August 19, Information Minister Moammar al-Eryani decried Security Belt to seize the Hadi government’s special security forces camp in Zinjabar, Abyan. Acquiring the camp would further facilitate the STC’s control over Yemen’s Gulf of Aden littoral.

As stability returns to Aden, the security situation in other southern governorates is tenuous. The UAE, the key international benefactor of the STC, has prioritized counterterrorism in southern Yemen against the jihadi organizations al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State (IS) in Yemen. The UAE the aforementioned Security Belt, Hadrami Elite Forces, Shabwah Elite Forces and thousands of militiamen to secure southern governorates. While optimistic of UAE-supported forces and their ability to “stand on their own” are warranted, AQAP and IS have with increased attacks in Aden and Abyan. The STC’s main security challenge is ridding portions of Abyan, Shabwah and Hadramawt governorates of jihadi presence.

Ideological affinity is the second element of legitimacy where the STC surpasses Hadi. While Hadi is originally from Abyan, his long-held allegiance to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh spurs disdain. The STC has tapped into a popular desire for southern self-determination, which has persisted since Yemen’s unification in May 1990. The STC flies the sky-blue chevron and red star flag of the former South Yemen, though it eschews the Marxist ethos of the historic state.

The STC has mobilized numerous since its establishment in May 2017. On August 15, 2019, the STC organized a that drew hundreds of thousands of southerners.

The STC still has work to do to entrench its influence throughout southern governorates. A pro-Hadi — a collective of southern groups formed in 2007 to promote autonomy — condemned the recent Aden clashes. Several areas in central Hadramawt are either loyal to Hadi and a unified Yemen or have separatist ambitions distinct from the STC. Additionally, , eastern Yemen have demurred over STC authority.

For the STC to solidify its influence beyond Aden, it must demonstrate that it upholds the interests of all southerners and is not just an implement of Emirati interests. On August 15 the STC released a that deemed all southerners “partners in the victory” in Aden, stressed its commitment to liberate “southern territories still suffering from terrorism and occupation,” and endorsed economic and education reforms throughout southern Yemen.

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Members of Hadi’s government and southern officials wage a war of words. The Yemeni Embassy in Washington, DC, for “the coup perpetrated against the state.” A journalist associated with Hadi’s presidency has called for an from the anti-Houthi coalition and severance of diplomatic ties. Official STC releases have been more reserved, though advocates of southern independence “liberation of all southern territory from any northern presence” and scorn the Hadi government for its absence in the south.

The juridical sovereignty afforded to President Hadi as leader of the Republic of Yemen is void of legitimacy. His forces are folding and his popularity has long been flagging. He must now rest his staying power on the efforts of his vice president, Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, to retain Marib as his base. The STC’s empirical sovereignty, on the other hand, is coming into focus. It directs a competent security apparatus and demonstrates its to “fill the vacuum left by a [Hadi] government deemed illegitimate by Southerners.”

Where Is Southern Yemen Headed?

The circumstances of recent weeks confirm the need for a frank discussion over the future of southern Yemen. While direct Hadi-STC negotiations lie over the horizon, Saudi Arabia the STC for threatening Yemen’s “unity, safety and stability.” The STC continues to voice support of the Saudis, but its actions demonstrate a willingness to defy Saudi wishes. The most pressing issue remains how the Saudi-initiated coalition maintains a united front against the Houthis. Also important is discussion over the future of President Hadi. For all of his conferred legitimacy, he has been conspicuously absent from recent events, and his reliance on Islah members remains the main source of tension with the STC.

Finally, there must be a firm understanding of the STC’s role in administering portions of southern Yemen. The STC continues to to allow southern voices a seat at the negotiation table. Its ability to stabilize southern governorates over the coming months will be a litmus test for its future as an autonomous governing entity.  

All of these considerations must contribute to solving the lingering “.” The security and wellbeing of southerners, and by extension all Yemenis, hangs in the balance.

*[ is a partner institution of 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Fighting for Legitimacy: The Dueling Sovereignties in Southern Yemen appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

President Donald Trump offered this extraordinarily reasoned a Congress resolution to end the US military engagement in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen: “This resolution is an unnecessary, dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities, endangering the lives of American citizens and brave service members, both today and in the future.”

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Unnecessary:

Not required, from the perspective of a person who has everything (possessions or power) and therefore needs nothing, and who believes he or she has the right to everythingĚý

Contextual note

Saudi Arabia’s role in turning a civil conflict into an aggressive war five years ago became a major issue in the US only after the more sensational headline-grabbing scandal emerged of journalist ’s murder at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. According to the CIA and other observers, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) ordered that assassination, though he continues to deny it. In 2014, as defense minister, it was MBS who promoted the Saudi military campaign in Yemen that has resulted in the world’s worst ongoing humanitarian disaster. The media have come to know MBS as Jared Kushner’s “” and Donald Trump’s favorite dictator, although some establishment Democrats and MSNBC continue to prefer believing that it’s .

Trump’s language in this brief statement merits some close reading. He calls an act of the legislative body exercising its constitutionally mandated right to declare (or not declare) war “an unnecessary, dangerous attempt.” It raises the question of what would constitute a “necessary attempt.” What Trump means is that he is the sole judge of necessity. This becomes clearer when he calls the resolution an “attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities.” As the Cornell Law School on the issue of war powers: “In general, scholars express various views on the amount of power that the President actually has and the amount of power that the Constitution promises to the holder of that position.”

Not content with a single attribution of “authority,” Trump invokes the curiously plural noun, “authorities.” Does he imagine that authority is a kind of string that someone in power pulls, and the more strings they have to pull, the more powerful they become?

He then invokes danger to “the lives of American citizens and brave service members,” which may reveal what the government otherwise denies: that American personnel are actively participating in the Saudi war on Yemen. Or it may simply be an appeal to the reflex of “” that has become a feature of US culture in recent decades, presented in many contexts (including professional sports) as a basic civic obligation.

The final thought in the statement concerns time: “both today and in the future.” This appears to be what we might call an unnecessary and dangerous attempt to assign the authority to declare war and manage military aggression to the executive instead of Congress, deciding once and for all on the amount of power the president has.

Historical note

The United States owes its existence to the refusal of the British colonists to be subjected to the will of what they saw as a capricious king in a faraway land. Once independence was achieved, they set down to draft a constitution that reflected their concern with the kind of abuse of authority they associated with the king of England. The famous and still revered Constitution clearly authorizes Congress alone — which represents the people — and not the chief executive, elected by an electoral college, to authorize war. But recent trends in history have progressively transferred war powers to presidents, without amending the constitution.

This trend has contributed to a cultural split in the population and a gradual weakening of the authority of government itself. This first became apparent during the undeclared war in Vietnam that traumatized the nation, creating a permanent undertow of revolt within the US against an increasingly militarized federal government.

Although kept in check by a new wave of pseudo-moral patriotism during the Ronald Reagan years as the Cold War was drawing to a close, the Vietnam War had the long-term effect of dividing the population into those who endorse and embrace an aggressively militaristic stance (the majority) and those who see it as the sign of an increasingly insecure empire — an intellectual minority who nevertheless, by failing to adhere to the dominant ideology, have effectively undermined the force of its rhetoric, both at home and abroad. The United States has appeared consistently less united.

The obsession with executive privilege in the conduct of foreign policy that now stands on two pillars — war and sanctions, violence and threats — has established the US as a blind and deaf, but powerful bully, an empire with no purpose other than to fulfill the desires of whoever happens to be in charge. This became clear when George W. Bush ran the country and launched its wars to fulfill the desires of the clan of neocons, who considered themselves the apostles of American capitalism in its mission to realize the cultural takeover of a world without communism.

It continued with in the name of the slightly more enlightened oligarchy that bankrolled the Democratic Party. It nevertheless adhered to the notion that it was all about making the world safe for global business. And it continues again, but on a different register, with Trump’s America First ethos, which means that instead of being the enforcer of world order (Bush) or policeman of the global economy (Obama), the US is now the CEO whose job is get everyone on board to make the profits its shareholders are expecting.

Everything else — like international cooperation, understanding and morality — has become unnecessary.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, , in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Trump’s Commitment to the Status Quo in the Middle East appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

A recent editorial in British newspaper reassures us that: “The US proposal, backed by Britain, for a �cessation of hostilities’ in Yemen, to be followed by UN-led peace talks, is welcome.” The author of the editorial nevertheless wonders, given the humanitarian catastrophe that is still going on, why it has “taken so long.”

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Hostilities (plural noun):

A series of events, sometimes referred to as a war, in which groups of people with different worldviews manifest their disagreement through violence, sometimes attaining spectacular results, “57,000 people killed, 14 million at risk of famine, 10,000 new cholera cases each week” and “85,000 under-fives starved to death”

Contextual note

The initiative for a cease-fire initially came from US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. As the editorialist points out, the sudden concern expressed by the Trump administration may be linked to its unease with the ever-unfolding drama of the Saudi assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

US President Donald Trump and Secretary Pompeo continue to deny the conclusions shared by the CIA and most of the outside world that Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), ordered that brutal murder. Among the latest evidence revealed by the CIA and reported by is this: “Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sent at least 11 messages to his closest adviser, who oversaw the team that killed journalist Jamal Khashoggi, in the hours before and after the journalist’s death in October.”

On the very same day as The WSJ article, Pompeo is as saying of MBS, “When it is done, when you complete that analysis, there’s no direct evidence linking him to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. That is an accurate statement, an important statement and it is a statement that we are making publicly today.” Trump and Pompeo, a jury of two, have reached a verdict: O.J. … er, MBS… is categorically innocent!

Pompeo and Trump seem to believe that if some kind of peace initiative — even an unconvincing one — is implemented in Yemen, the pressure to accuse MBS of the wanton murder of a journalist will abate. It may be an appeal to our sense of proportion. The millions of threatened lives in Yemen will outweigh the loss of one journalist. Rather than adding one to the tens or hundreds of thousands already killed and charging the complete list to MBS — who started the war and continues to produce the world’s worst humanitarian disaster — Trump seems to believe that people look kindly enough on war, especially when there is a vague gesture toward peace, but are unforgiving about the premeditated and gruesomely executed murder of a single person.

Historical note

The public’s largely indifferent and unconcerned attitude to the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which the US continues to be involved, proves that the massive killing of people of another race, religion, culture or color — people who cannot be perceived as individuals — has no impact on Americans’ sensibility. The media, including Trump’s declared “enemies,” have played into his hands by underreporting, if not altogether neglecting to report on any of the conflicts in the Middle East. As Yemen has no oil reserves, unlike Saudi Arabia, there can be no compelling reason for an American television audience to be bothered by the fate of the people of that nation.

As The Observer’s editorialist points out, it’s thanks to the Khashoggi affair that the war in Yemen, after nearly four years of inhuman violence, has emerged as a topic in the news and in political debate, mobilizing governments and threatening Trump’s commitment to every policy MBS has promoted.

But while US media consciously and continually neglected the tragedy in Yemen, members of Congress, reacting to the dire reports from the United Nations earlier this year, had begun expressing their of the war. A group of Democrats, later joined by some Republicans, began to mount a challenge to US policy a the Khashoggi affair put the spotlight on Saudi Arabia’s — and, more particularly, Mohammed bin Salman’s — taste for solving all problems by unbridled violence.

The idea of a “cessation of hostilities” will be seen by many as a positive step. We may still wonder about the vocabulary itself. “Hostilities” and “conflict” are technocratic euphemisms that allow us to avoid calling the event referred to as a “war.” Those words could describe anything from a heated argument, at one extreme, to a nuclear holocaust, at the other. Should we therefore be reassured by the fact that all we are witnessing in Yemen is an asymmetric battle, like Vietnam and Afghanistan, that has become an enduring humanitarian disaster?

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, , in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The War in Yemen Is a Humanitarian Disaster appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In recent weeks and months, no two people in the world have taught us more about how high-level politics works than US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). The lesson they have so insisted on having us learn is very simple: Anything can be purchased, if the price is right. Reflection on the morality of a transaction can only be a useless diversion.

They are not alone in putting this wisdom into practice. They simply appear to have the mission of teaching us that this is the way the world works. Trump made it clear that if a murderous, oil-producing nation pays you good money (preferably measured in billions) to increase its capacity for murder, it’s the billions that count, not the thousands who will be murdered or maimed (in Yemen) or the random individuals (e.g. journalists) who will be jailed — or, even better, tortured and murdered (in Turkey, for example).

The Saudis have perfected the art of applying the now incontrovertible business “logic” of demanding (and receiving) “benefits” and “favors” in exchange for money. Citing a leaked document, the terms of a Saudi donation contract with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): “Future grants distributed by [OCHA] to agencies should be tied to the amount of beneficial publicity given to Saudi Arabia.”

Here are today’s two 3D definitions:Ěý

Beneficial:

Favoring or offering an advantage, traditionally understood as a natural effect, but increasingly the result of the transfer of significant amounts of money Ěý

Grant:

Traditionally, the allocation by a government of a sum of money for a project deemed to benefit society, with no stings attached. More recently, the allocation by a government of a sum of money to benefit itself, with powerful strings attached.

Contextual note

The article mentions — but doesn’t directly comment on — the most striking and repulsive irony in the document: “It also calls for [OCHA] to seek favourable publicity for the Saudi humanitarian effort in Yemen,” followed by, “We consider it very important to ensure that our dear fellow Yemenis are all aware of our donations.”

The inclusion of “dear” to describe a population the Saudis have been massacring and terrorizing for more than two years is beyond irony. The misuse of the word “fellow,” which, if taken literally, implies that the Saudis consider themselves to be Yemenis can be read as an example of extreme presumption. The Saudis have created the world’s in Yemen. Do the Saudis seriously consider those they have slaughtered or left to the ravages of cholera their “dear fellow Yemenis”?

In a certain sense, the Saudis are doing what every business person does: making hay while the sun shines, to quote an ancient English proverb. Always make sure to get something in return for whatever you do. It’s called ROI (return on investment). As keepers of the faith, the Saudis have no problem insulting the tradition of generosity () featured in the Qur’an as one of the five pillars of Islam. Western capitalism has taught the Saudis a higher form of wisdom: Don’t give anything without getting an equal or superior amount in return.

The Saudis’ investment strategy focuses on exploiting the reputations of various prestigious institutions deemed to be furthering the good of humanity. As , the University of New Haven enthusiastically embraced its partnership with King Fahd Security College in Riyadh, which was sealed by the Saudis “generous” donations.

One of the designated partners is Salah al-Tubaigy, the forensic expert who supervised the murder and dismembering of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Yale, Harvard, MIT and other elite universities regularly accept Saudi money on the understanding that their role is to boost the Saudi image.

Historical note

Few people realize how recently the idea that “everything has a price” has become the unique and absolute foundation of our global commercial culture. Once upon a time, some things belonged to the collective environment and were not for sale. It was only a few decades ago that the corporate began. For most of the 20th century, the names of stadiums were linked to local history and geography, as local sports teams were seen as emanations of the community. Then someone discovered that a corporation could “make billions of positive brand impressions” by affixing their corporate brand on the stadium. That has become a basic law of success in the .

In the 1950s, advertising was known as the domain of “.” Our commercial culture seems to have moved on to the idea of “upfront persuaders,” based on the enduring presence of the brand in people’s minds. What remains hidden is the money that feeds the opportunities to make the brand known.

More recently governments, and especially militarily aggressive governments, have developed a new marketing science of brand association or . To sell the always aggressive mission of its military, the Pentagon has created a deep branding association with American football and basketball, with powerful subliminal effect. To soften their image, the Saudis have gone to Western universities and even the humanitarian side of the UN to airbrush their obviously despotic and murderous behavior.

The saddest part of this is that respectable institutions play the game because, well, they can always use the money, while wishing to believe it won’t distort their mission.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book,, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Saudi Arabia Wants Publicity in Exchange for Money appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Feminism has got its work cut out for it when it comes to Arab countries. are still used in Libya, Jordan and , where a member of parliament provoked an outcry in 2016 after calling for girls to be screened before being admitted to university. In , women are not allowed to drive a car, travel or marry without permission from a , or even read an uncensored fashion magazine.

is still widespread , with some 200 million girls and women alive today who have been subjected to the procedure in 30 countries worldwide. In Iraq, less that in Egypt and 44% in Morocco.  has no minimum age for marriage, with nearly 10% of girls married by the age of 15. In Egypt, nearly , usually blamed on the victim’s behavior or attire. Many countries have only recently criminalized marital rape and domestic abuse, whereas some still don’t consider these a crime.

This is what a 19-year-old Palestinian-Jordanian blogger, Laila Hzaineh, has set out to combat. When she spoke out against sexual harassment on social media, the vitriolic response she received—including threats—only made her more determined. With every ugly message she got angrier, feeling empowered to speak out for so many women who cannot.

Raised in a liberal Muslim family, Laila realizes that her path is not for everyone, but her aim is to give women the freedom to choose their own way in life without fear or persecution.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: 

The post This Woman Takes on Sexism in the Arab World appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

It was not uncommon to see news of the Arab Spring accompanied by photos of women on the frontline. Women participated, organized and even led many of the uprisings throughout the region. In some countries, it was women who became the face of the revolution, including Tawakkol Karman in Yemen and Zainab al-Khawaja in Bahrain, to name a few.

Even for the average woman, squares where protests took place became liberating spaces with few social boundaries. Men, realizing the integral role that women would play in the revolutions, welcomed and accepted them into what traditionally was their space. The promise of freer and democratic societies would presumably facilitate greater women’s rights. As it would turn out, women had the most to gain—and lose—from the Arab Spring.

Aftermath of the Arab Spring

For many of the countries that saw an end to their despotic regimes, the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring was positive for women. In Yemen, women played a tremendous role in the political transition after the ouster of Ali Abdullah Saleh from his presidential throne in 2012. The international community hailed the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which lasted around a year from early 2013, for its inclusion of women. Women occupied 30% of seats at the conference, and headed three out of the nine committees within it. The other six committees? They served as deputy presidents.

Women organizations rallied together as the NDC convened its constitution drafting committee, and called for a 30% quota of seats in government to be allocated to women. Their tenacity, months of rigorous lobbying both to members of the committee and their own communities, were rewarded. Not only was a 30% quota of seats in the legislative, judicial and executive branches reserved for women, but the minimum age of marriage was also set to 18. (In some places in the United States, girls can still marryĚý.)

Women saw an increase in political representation even in countries whose political vacuum was filled by Islamist political parties. In Libya, the Justice and Development Party, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, comprised the second largest number of women of all political parties represented in the General National Congress (GNC) before it was disbanded in 2014. Overall, women occupied 33 out of the 200 seats in the GNC. Similarly in Tunisia, by 2014 women had won 49 out of the 217 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Out of all of the women representatives, 42—a vast majority of them—are members of the Islamist Ennahda party.

Egypt, however, is another story. The premature elections held after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak ushered in an Islamist government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood that saw a reversal of women’s rights, rather than an advancement. Had the Morsi government remained in power before its overthrow in 2013, patriarchy would have been codified by the new constitution.

Not only were provisions guaranteeing equality between men and women left out from the old constitution, but the constitution no longer forbade discrimination on the basis of gender. For many, the new constitution marked the breaking point for their tolerance of the Morsi government, and it provided the green light for a military coup d’état led by the current president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

In the latest , women won 75 out of the 568 seats in the House of Representatives. Sisi appointed an additional 14 female representatives, which meant that Egyptian women now comprise almost 15% of seats—a record high for Egypt. In 2012, the first election after Mubarak’s fall, and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood government, women made up only 2% of the total representatives, which was a drastic drop from 13% in 2010, before the Arab Spring.

There is relative progress in Egypt. However, women continue to be subject to sexual harassment in public and violence in private spaces, not least of which is domestic violence at home, and torture and rape in prison.

Hitting the Ceiling

Egypt may offer some hope for the status of women today, but the future in Yemen and Libya looks grim. The government has all but collapsed in Yemen after the Houthi takeover of the capital, Sanaa, the re-emergence of al-Qaeda and the rise of the Islamic State (IS) to fill the power vacuum, and the war between the Houthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition that has left destruction, food, water and refugee crises, and an alarmingly high civilian death toll in its wake. Libya continues to suffer from a civil war between different tribal groups vying for control over its land that has rendered its political process all but obsolete, and fragmented at best.

While women continue to be active on the ground in Syria in documenting the crimes of the Assad regime and engaging in hands-on work on the ground as teachers, doctors and other civic positions, they are poorly represented among the opposition leadership. Indeed, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) has persistently failed to bring any women to peace talks with foreign states. This begs the question of whether or not a political transition—be it after the fall of the Assad regime or the federation of Syria—will continue to be male-dominant, despite the integral role women have played in Syrian civil society.

However, for the states that have avoided collapse and continue to rebuild and pursue a democratic transition after their Arab Spring, what does the future of women look like?

51łÔąĎ provides you deep and diverse insights for free. Remember that we still have to pay for servers, website maintenance and much more. So, to keep us free, fair and independent.

Historically, agency of women is egregiously reduced in a time of war. Even in stable countries like Tunisia and Egypt, women pursuing the advancement and codification of their political, social and economic rights are hindered by deeply conservative societies and dominant Islamist political parties. Unless these realities change, will women eventually hit a ceiling in their pursuit of equality?

Feminism in the Muslim World

Today, discourse on feminism in the Muslim-world has largely revolved around whether or not women’s rights are compatible with Islam. Can women achieve equal rights under an Islamic government? To what extent can they campaign for women’s rights in a conservative society?

Ěýargues that there are only two trajectories feminist discourse can take: either deny that Islamic practices are oppressive, or claim that oppressive practices are not Islamic.

Both trajectories fail to address the limitations and shortcomings of feminism that operates within an Islamic framework. For one, any form of Islamic governance or jurisprudence is incompatible with pluralism, because the imposition of any religion will inherently restrict individual choice. It is difficult to deny that women’s rights are best progressed in environments that promote pluralism, such as a secular democracy.

However, publicly criticizing Islam or promoting secularism could be more problematic than beneficial for women’s-rights activists. For one, it could delegitimize these campaigns, especially if they are operating in conservative societies. Government authorities themselves could accuse them of being funded by the West, and outright ban them. Inversely, these new governments also realize they cannot belittle women’s-rights movements, especially after the role they played in the Arab Spring.

Islam can not only define the work of some women in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but can also help enable them to become agents of change in their communities. This is especially helpful for women in conservative societies that require time to open up and undergo an organic process so that rights codified in law also become norms on the ground.

Iranian women are also changing society by dominating professions that most strongly influence civil society and culture overall—publishing and the arts. Through cinema, literature and the press, these women are slowly prying society open and exposing it to new ideas.

In Egypt, for example, the hijab (headscarf) can provide women with agency to navigate male-dominated public spaces. As Leila Ahmed writes in her book,ĚýThe Quiet Revolution, the hijab gives religious authority to women who feel confined to their home. In instances like this, the hijab can be liberating.

However, in countries where it is mandatory for women to wear the hijab, it can be oppressive. The pursuit of women’s rights in Iran, which includes re-imagining the hijab as an accessory rather than part of the Islamic dress code, serves as an interesting case study of how women can be agents of change in the Muslim world.

Lipstick Jihad

Although not a part of the Arab Spring or the Arab world, the movement inside Iran to advance women’s rights is multifaceted and can potentially serve as a model to emulate for women in MENA. In Iran, women are at the frontline and behind-the-scenes in the struggle for women’s rights. During the 2009 Green Movement, women adorned green veils and marched beside men to protest the speculated fraudulent election results that brought President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power. It was Neda Agha-Soltan, a young philosophy student, who became the symbol of the movement after she was shot dead during a protest—her death caught on camera and seen around the world.

Iranian women continue to play a pivotal role in the reform movement, which advocates for the expansion of women’s rights in addition to a variety of other political and social rights. In the 2016Ěýparliamentary elections, women made where they now hold a record number of seats. Their greater political representation will provide a louder voice for women in Iran, and encourage political parties to appeal to the demands of women now that they have proved that they are a crucial voting bloc.

However, it is not only on the frontline, like in the Green Movement, or in government that women are serving as agents of change. It is also—and arguably most effectively—through everyday acts of resistance. Women will wear their mandated hijab far back on their head, allowing their hair to escape in the front, bold make-up and body-hugging overcoats. Journalist Azadeh Moaveni describes this act of resistance, even if it is carried out passively by some, as “.” Iranian women push the boundaries of the Islamic dress code by re-imagining it into a unique fashion that has influenced the style of Muslim women around the world.

Iranian women are also changing society by dominating professions that most strongly influence civil society and culture overall—publishing and the arts. Through cinema, literature and the press, these women are slowly prying society open and exposing it to new ideas. If society can begin to open, which it has been, and undergo gradual cultural reformation, then this will usher pressure for the government to eventually follow suit.

Progress in Iran is slow. However, its diverse and creative approaches to advocate for women’s rights could serve as a model worth emulating for conservative societies and states governed, or influenced, by Islamic law. Lipstick jihad is unique to Iran, and irrelevant for women in countries where the hijab is not imposed. But what can be learned from Iran is that these individual acts of resistance that occur parallel to more organized efforts by women’s rights organizations and reformist political parties that help penetrate every echelon of Iranian society.

What the Future Holds

While Iran experiences slow cultural reformation that quietly resists the Islamic Republic, women in countries that are actually beginning the slow process of democratization have a tremendous opportunity to shape the future of the state—one that is more inclusive of women in its political process and a guarantor of their rights—while simultaneously leading grassroots efforts to carve more public spaces for women in civil society.

The future for Arab states like Syria, Yemen and Libya paints a grimmer picture. Women historically bear the brunt of war and conflict. Rape is commonly used as a weapon of war against women to terrorize societies. Women also typically make up the largest number of civilian casualties. In Libya and Yemen, the hope is that an eventual transition process will incorporate women like it did in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, and that Syria will follow suit. If not, women will continue to challenge patriarchy as they always have in these countries by other means.

There is a long road ahead for the region as a whole to achieve full social, political and economic rights of women. Women will still need to challenge patriarchy, whether it be by electing more female candidates to political office, utilizing the arts and press—cultural conduits to spread their message and transform society—or taking to the streets to protest and demand change. Or, perhaps, all of the above.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:Ěý

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When Saudi Arabia and a coalition of its regional partners embarked on a against Yemen in March 2015, it was hardly predictable that the war would drag on for more than a year and morph into a humanitarian crisis. The emergency is characterized by massive civilian casualties, displacement of citizens, nationwide s and deepening in the already-impoverished country.

Saudi military engagement was a response to an by the in northern Yemen trying to push the government of from power.

In late March, that some 320,000 Yemeni children faced the risk of life-threatening malnutrition, while 82% of the country’s 27 million citizens required humanitarian assistance. As noted by the UN’s children fund in a report marking the anniversary of the Saudi-led offensive in Yemen, six children have been killed or injured every day since the intervention started on March 26, 2015. It is reported that some , about half of them civilians, have been killed during the airstrikes so far.

The UN Security Council hasn’t passed any binding resolutions that could potentially contain the flames of conflict in Yemen. It has had several Ěýand issued statements supporting the peace talks, but hasn’t come up with a practical solution yet.

In this edition of The Interview, 51łÔąĎ talks to Professor —a noted Middle East expert specializing in Yemeni affairs—to explore the motives behind the Houthi insurgency, the public perception of this movement and humanitarian damages induced by year-long fighting in Yemen.

Kourosh Ziabari: There are often mixed public characterizations of the Houthi insurgency. What do you consider to be the main motives behind the uprising of Zaidi Shiite Houthis in Yemen?

Charles Schmitz: First, the Houthi movement is evolving. The Houthi movement that began building a Zaydi revival movement among the youths of northern Yemen is not the same military insurgency that fought the Yemeni government between 2004 and 2010, and the Houthi movement that managed to take over government institutions in Sanaa is a different organization again. The movement has evolved.

When it was a Zaydi revival movement providing summer camps to young people, it was popular in Yemen, and when the Houthi insurgency fought the Yemeni government it had wide support among all of those that felt that ’s regime was corrupt and repressive—that is, most of the country. And when Saleh resigned and Yemenis convened the National Dialogue Conference, the Houthi movement was welcomed and included, and the Houthi representatives at the National Dialogue Conference very much agreed with the liberal, human rights agenda at the conference.

However, when the Houthi leadership made an alliance with its former enemy, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and took over the capital Sanaa, Yemenis began to have doubts about the Houthi leadership. It is true that when the Houthis took Sanaa, people supported theirĚýagenda for reform. The interim government of Hadi was very incompetent and the economic situation was deteriorating rapidly. But the Houthi leadership is politically immature. It could support a reform government but not govern. When Hadi and the government resigned, the Houthi leadership tried to govern the country, and it failed. The Houthi regime is similar to Saleh’s repressive regime. The Houthi militias have rounded up political opponents and held them captive for months. The Houthis destroyed the property of political opponents. The Houthi leadership is not sophisticated and is making many political errors.

The Saudi characterization of the Houthis is simply wartime propaganda. What the Saudis don’t understand is that the Houthis are Yemeni—an important part of Yemen—and not something foreign to Yemen. The Saudis want to control Yemen and they cannot tolerate an independent Yemeni regime that they have no influence over. Now that the Houthi leadership is negotiating with the Saudis, the Saudis are happy. The Saudis don’t care about Zaydism, they care about Saudi influence on the Yemeni government.

Ziabari: Yemen has an indispensable , as it sits on , which is a major passageway forĚýmuch of the world’s oil shipments. Do the Houthis have plans for suffocating Bab al-Mandab, which will jeopardize the interests of the Red Sea countries?

Schmitz: Usually people say it is the Iranians that threaten the Bab al-Mandab, but the Iranian military already overlooks the through which a greater amount of oil travels and nothing has happened. Why should Iranian missiles near a smaller sea lane be different? If the Houthis or Iranians really threatened the Bab al-Mandab, the US military in the region could easily destroy those weapons that threatened the sea lanes.

Ziabari: So why then did Saudi Arabia launch a military expedition in Yemen? Do you see any peaceful settlement on the horizon?

Schmitz: The Saudi military campaign has many motives. First, the Saudi regime has long been vulnerable to the accusation that it spends a lot of money on defense but is so incompetent that the Saudi military is ineffective. This was the criticism of the Saudi regime during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Saudi regime also fears the accusation that it is dependent upon the United States for its defense. So this campaign is an attempt to chart an independent Saudi military strategy for its defense that does not depend upon the US.

Unfortunately, the crisis in Yemen is largely a domestic crisis and foreign powers can do little at this point. The domestic sides must come to an agreement before anything else.Ěý

The Saudi campaign is also a result of an internal struggle within Saudi Arabia for succession. King Salman is clearly positioning his son to lead the kingdom. The Saudis also feared Iranian successes in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and in Yemen, though in Yemen the Iranians did very little. The Houthis are really a domestic group, not a creation of Iran. Salman and his young son wanted to draw a line in the sand and say that Saudi Arabia can defend itself against the Iranians.

The war is a humanitarian disaster. Yemen was on the verge of economic collapse before the war, and now it is subjected to a halt of oil production and a trade blockade. The basic infrastructure of the country has been destroyed.

There are no clear winners in the war. The two sides have reached a military stalemate that is bleeding the country to death. There is no clear settlement on the horizon. The issue is how to create a political authority to oversee the re-establishment of a new Yemeni state. The Hadi government claims it is the legitimate government of Yemen, but Hadi and his government have little legitimacy in Yemen and they are very incompetent. On the other side, the Houthi leadership does not trust the Hadi people and is not willing to relinquish its military advantage to a new state authority yet. The problem is how to create a new political authority that encompasses both sides.

Ziabari: Some experts believe the Saudi aerial attacks on Yemen have weakened the Yemeni military and security forces, and they are unable to effectively fight the (AQAP) mercenaries. Why has the AQAP been able to grow so strongly in Yemen? Is there really a fertile ground for it to consolidate its base unchallenged?

Schmitz: Al-Qaeda took advantage of the chaos of the war to take over , the major port of eastern Yemen. It stole a lot of money from the banks and a lot of weapons from the Yemeni military. At first, the Saudi military said that it was not concerned with al-Qaeda—the primary enemy was the Houthis. Al-Qaeda, the Saudis said, would be dealt with when a stable government was established in Sanaa. But the chaos in the areas controlled by the Saudis and the Hadi government showed that al-Qaeda was a bigger problem than the Saudis thought. When the Houthis agreed to a ceasefire with the Saudis along the border in the north, the Saudis started attacking al-Qaeda in the south. The Emirati forces retook Mukalla and now are hunting al-Qaeda in the interior. The United States has been very successful in targeting al-Qaeda’s top leadership. Over the last year, US drones have killed much of the top leadership. So al-Qaeda benefited from the war, but it has also suffered greatly. The war has been a mixed experience for al-Qaeda.

Ziabari: Is it possible to tackle the crisis in Yemen effectively and sustainably? What steps should be planned and taken to settle the disputes, bring peace back to the war-wrecked country and ensure that humanitarian assistance is widely distributed across the region?

Schmitz: Unfortunately, the crisis in Yemen is largely a domestic crisis and foreign powers can do little at this point. The domestic sides must come to an agreement before anything else. Foreign powers can help rebuild Yemen, but only when the war stops.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Ěý/ Ěý

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In the period after the Korean War, when North and South Korea were engaged in a bout of diplomatic one-upmanship to see which could gain the most embassies around the world, Pyongyang largely steered clear of the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia and the other sheikhdoms were US allies and fiercely anti-communist. North Korea’s flirtation with the Non-Aligned Movement brought it closer to Egypt and Yemen, which extended diplomatic recognition in 1963. The independence of South Yemen in 1967 and its gradual consolidation as a Marxist regime pushed the country even closer to North Korea. But even as Pyongyang secured the recognition of dozens of additional states in the 1970s, it remained aloof from the other countries around the Persian Gulf.

After the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the cooling of relations with China, North Korea cast around for new friends with deep pockets. It began to establish official relations with GCC members, first Oman in 1992 and then Qatar in 1993. Kuwait and Bahrain followed in 2001, and the UAE in 2007. North Korea and Saudi Arabia still do not maintain official relations.

As it did on the diplomatic front, South Korea had a head start in the Gulf on trade and investment. During the country’s first flush of globalization, South Korean firms were involved in a number of high-profile infrastructure development projects in the GCC. By the time North Korea began to interact economically with Gulf countries in any serious way, it was already experiencing a serious industrial downturn, followed by a famine in the mid-1990s. Because hard currency was scarce for North Korea, it didn’t have sufficient funds to import energy from the Gulf—as South Korea continues to do—but relied instead on nearby China for its energy needs.

Despite the lack of an energy relationship, North Korea does interact with the GCC in three realms. It maintains an official diplomatic relationship with five of the six countries, primarily through its embassy in Kuwait. It sends laborers to work in many of the GCC countries. And it is involved, somewhat tangentially, in military affairs in the region as well.

Diplomacy

North Korea maintains an embassy in Kuwait where its representative, So Chang Sik, also serves as the ambassador to Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE. The envoy to Egypt, Pak Chun Il, represents his country in Oman (though he may be on the verge of deportation for alleged involvement in arms trafficking and evasion of international sanctions).

The Kuwait connection has been, at least officially, the most effective conduit between North Korea and the Persian Gulf. According to a 2013 article in , the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has provided loans for several infrastructure projects in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK):

“In 2005, the Fund financed the rehabilitation of three water treatment plants in Pyongyang City, through repairs and replacement of pumps and pipelines, as well as the rehabilitation of Onha Canal and Botong River. Three years later, the Fund provided financing for the development and expansion of sewage pumping stations in the Capital. Last year, the Ministry of Land and Environment Protection entered into a contract with the Fund to provide for the construction of a new two-lane highway from Pyongyang to Pyongsong.”

In March 2016, two North Korean workers in Qatar escaped from their barracks to find refuge in a nearby police station. They complained about grueling working conditions and no paychecks.

North Korea has reciprocated, though primarily in the field of culture. As in other countries, most notably Cambodia, North Korean artists have deployed their skills in diorama construction built models, in this case building models for a museum in Kuwait that depicts “atrocities committed during the invasion of Kuwait and the effects of the aftermath of Gulf War.”

Another DPRK economic strategy to attract hard currency has been to establish overseas restaurants serving traditional North Korean food. In 2010, an outpost of the famous cold noodle restaurant in Pyongyang, Okryugwan, opened in a nondescript business park in Dubai. These overseas restaurants often cater to a South Korean and Chinese clientele.

Most North Korean workers in the GCC countries, however, are in the construction industries.

Labor Force

To accumulate hard currency, North Korea has been sending its labor force to other countries on a contract basis for some years. With the closure this year of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which had employed over 50,000 North Korean workers in South Korean-run enterprises in a factory just north of the Demilitarized Zone, Pyongyang might be expected to send out more such workers to various parts of the world.

Thousands of North Koreans currently work in the Gulf, with over 3,000 in Kuwait, as many as 3,000 in Qatar, 1,300 in the UAE, and 300 in Oman. Most of these laborers are construction workers. In Qatar, for instance, they have joined South Asians and others to get the country ready for the 2022 World Cup.

As it has done with all of its contract laborers around the world—including in Kaesong—the North Korean government takes a large cut of the wages of its workers. According to an Abu Dhabi source quoted in Chosun Ilbo, “North Korean workers make between USD 300 and USD 500 a month, but the North Korean government confiscates USD 150 and even USD 250 as loyalty payments, leading to a lot of conflict.” Even if the workers receive only 10% of their wages, however, the assignment yields considerably more than virtually any official job inside North Korea. Despite the long hours, and rather difficult and dangerous work, the overseas assignments are much sought after among North Korean workers.

Kaesong, North Korea © Shutterstock

The drop in energy prices, and the associated downturn in the construction industry, has put a strain on this model of labor exploitation. For instance, some unemployed North Koreans chose to earn money a different way: by bootlegging. Several reports circulated in 2014 of North Koreans detained on charges of distributing liquor, an offense in the tea-totaling Gulf. “A probe by the Kuwaiti police in November 2008 saw 10 North Korean workers arrested for their role in an alcohol distribution ring,” according to the DailyNK.

Because of fewer job opportunities and the regime’s perennial need for more hard currency, the North Korean government might also be squeezing its workers who still have jobs even harder. In March 2016, two North Korean workers in Qatar escaped from their barracks to find refuge in a nearby police station. They complained about grueling working conditions and no paychecks. But they were also unemployed, so it is not clear what they feared most: being sent back to North Korea or staying and working in difficult and dangerous jobs.

Military

North Korea is well known for its military relationships, primarily the arms sales it negotiates with various countries around the world. The Middle East has been a major source of imports and a major destination for exports. In the past, North Korea has sold missiles to Iran, Egypt and Syria, and acquired technology from Pakistan to expand its uranium enrichment capacities. Gulf purchasers of North Korean ballistic missiles have included both Yemen (in the early 2000s) and the UAE (in the late 1990s). International sanctions, however, have led to a significant contraction in this network of military relationships.

During the current war conducted by Saudi Arabia and its allies in Yemen, however, evidence surfaced of North Korean SCUD missiles used by the Houthi rebels. These are not part of new shipments, but rather date back to earlier purchases by the Yemeni government. “Back in 2002, Yemen purchased around 20 Scuds from the North Koreans,” . “So it’s likely the Scuds being used in the conflict did come from North Korea originally.”

Then there is the nuclear issue. In an article in The National Interest, Zachary Keck suggested that Saudi Arabia, in response to Iran’s nuclear program, might acquire a bomb of its own from North Korea. His argument boils down to this: North Korea needs a wealth patron to replace an increasingly ambivalent China, and Saudi Arabia has plenty of money, so the two countries might very well come to some modus vivendi.

It is rather far-fetched, however, for the simple reasons that North Korea and Saudi Arabia have never gotten along. Unlike Iran or Syria, Saudi Arabia is a close US ally. And although North Korea has been mercenary in its economic transactions in the past, it has not in fact crossed the red line of selling nuclear material. In any case, as long as the Iran nuclear agreement holds, Saudi Arabia will likely remain outside the nuclear club and keep its distance from North Korea as well.

The future of North Korea-GCC relations will likely proceed in a similar vein: formal but not very close official relations, little if any military cooperation, and an economic partnership based largely on North Korea’s provision of skilled but relatively low-wage labor.

*[This article was originally published by .]Ěý

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: ĚýĚý/ Ěý

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The Constitutional Drafting Committee finalized a proposal for a post-war Yemeni state in January 2015, which established a six-region federalized state. The Houthi rebels immediately rejected this document. In particular, the Houthis opposed the six-way federal division, favoring instead a two-region, north-south divide that would cement their wartime gains. This is an unlikely solution, seeing as it could lead to the ultimate secession of south Yemen. Beyond the issue of regional division, the draft constitution creates an unstable institutional structure that does not establish enough power-sharing mechanisms to ensure viability.

As negotiators gather in Kuwait for renewed talks, it is important to look at an alternative system of post-conflict institution building. Instead of the presidential system proposed in the draft document, framers of a new constitution should propose a semi-presidential, consociational model that adopts aspects of other post-conflict constitutional structures in deeply-divided societies.

Consociatoinalism in Deeply-Divided Societies

Consociationalism has been a prominent, yet controversial, theory of post-conflict institution building for nearly half a century. First proposed by Arend Lijphart in his 1969 work Consociational Democracy, the theory has been applied to states as diverse as Northern Ireland, Lebanon and Iraq. Consociationalists “a Democratic solution to societies confronted with durable ethnic division and political conflict.” To do so, institutions are built to ensure both regional self-governance and executive power-sharing, often in a federal state. Consociationalists espouse four key principles: executive power-sharing, autonomy/self-government, proportionality and veto-rights.

Consociationalism is not without its critics. Many believe that consociational systems entrench sectarian divisions, privilege sectarian elites, appease radical factions and fail to lead to a cohesive, integrated state. Despite these criticisms, consociational structures ensure confidence building between factions that are unlikely to integrate in the short term and ensure that radicals are brought into the system, instead of remaining on the outside where they can be a destabilizing force. Ensuring proportionality and veto-rights also guarantees fairness and builds confidence in the system.

Executive Power-Sharing

There is no one consociational prescription for a deeply divided society and states that have implemented consociational structures have done so in different ways. A consociational structure in Yemen would differ significantly from the structure presented in the draft constitution and could establish a better prospect for peace. First, there would certainly be a shift from a presidential system to a semi-presidential system and a re-evaluation of the six-region federal structure in light of the Houthis’ significant opposition.

Executive power-sharing is a crucial aspect of consociational systems and ensures an equal voice in the governance of a deeply-divided state. The current draft constitution calls for a president and vice president who must be from different regions (Article 180). However, a semi-presidential system with a weak president is a more structure for post-conflict situations, especially in states with a history of abuse by the central authority. Thus, the executive model employed by Northern Ireland could be more effective. This model provides equal powers for a prime minister and a deputy prime minister, one from the north and one from the south. They should be elected on a joint ticket subject to a cross-community vote requiring either parallel consent, a majority of representatives from both the north and the south, or a weighted majority, 40% of representatives from both the north and the south and 60% of the entire Parliament.

So too, the resignation of one would automatically trigger the resignation of the other. To ensure adequate representation in the executive, the d’Hondt method should be used to allocate ministerial posts, when the largest parties are awarded posts proportionally based on their share of the vote without the need for coalition negotiations. The president should have limited, ceremonial powers, serve one six-year term, be chosen by the Parliament by a cross-community vote, and the position should alternate each term between the north and the south.

Autonomy

Autonomy or self-government played a critical role in the draft constitution. However, the current method of regional division has been roundly rejected. In light of this rejection, the Iraqi federal model may be a better alternative. In this model, the nation could retain its current twenty-one governorates that would be granted certain powers. These governorates would then be given the option to join together to form regions, which would be given additional powers, by holding referendums.

Ibb, Yemen © Shutterstock

Thus, regions can form organically and would be based on popular will. Though it does not preclude the possibility of a two-region state, it does create barriers to that outcome. In Iraq, some feared that this model would lead to large Sunni and Shi’ite regions. However, this never occurred. Each governorate would be given representatives in a Federal Council and each region formed would be allocated additional representatives. In keeping with the current draft constitution, the Sana’a and Aden governorates would be given a special status and would not be permitted to join regions.

Proportionality in the electoral system ensures fair representation of citizen preferences. The ideal model is proportional representation with a single transferable vote (PR-STV) in multiple member districts. This would allow for the growth of several parties and for the expression of multiple preferences at the voting booth. Implementing a PR-STV electoral system locally and nationally would also provide greater representation for Yemen’s tribes, allowing them to compete against larger parties for lower order preferences. As stated in the draft constitution, the south should be represented at a share of 40% (Article 139).

Veto-rights ensure that neither the north nor the south can dominate the legislative process. The two voting methods mentioned above, parallel consent and weighted majority, should be required for key pieces of legislation that would have a major impact on the state or would disparately impact either the north or the south. The Federal Council should also retain the provision requiring the support of at least one-third of representatives from the south for a piece of legislation to pass (Article 143).

Yemen First

To combat the external pressure asserted by Saudi Arabia and Iran, a provision similar to that in Lebanon should be considered, agreeing to forgo regional affiliations and instead peruse a “Yemen first” policy. Additionally, assurances must be made for the complete demilitarization of rebel forces and for equal representation of both regions in the military.

Freedom of religion and minority rights must also be guaranteed and customary law and traditions should be respected for Yemen’s various tribes. So too, a consent principle should be considered, ensuring that any breakup of Yemen would be subject to a nation-wide referendum. A new constitution would also need to provide greater clarity on the division of powers between the various levels of government and the allocation of natural resource revenues.

As the parties gather in Kuwait for a fresh round of negotiations, there is renewed optimism for peace. For a new peace to last, however, proper institutions must be built to ensure stability and trust through power-sharing. A consociational structure could provide the best means of resolving the conflict, building confidence between the north and the south and ensuring self-governance in a federal, semi-presidential system.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:ĚýĚý/ Ěý

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The hopes and aspirations of ’s youth have dissipated into a near permanent state of war. Five years on from the electrifying momentum toward change sweeping through the Arab world’s poorest nation, an entrenched stalemate has completely derailed the political transition process. The year-long civil war, now sponsored by an Arab coalition, feeds a regional war by proxy and serves as breeding grounds for the (IS) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The current situation has truly vaporized any sense of an , and instead has magnified a cycle of revenge among elite political actors.

The United Nations (UN), increasingly critical of the Saudi-led military coalition, has raised alarms over the devastating impact of the ongoing war. While armed clashes continue between Zaydi-Shia Houthi rebels, allied with military forces loyal to deposed President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and resistance militias, allied with military loyalists of President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and injuries from aerial bombardments have been civilians. The war has caused a throughout rebel- and resistance-held areas. that, as of August 2015, nearly 1.5 million people have been displaced by the current civil war. Prior to the conflict, there were . The Arab coalition also enforces an air and sea blockade, which is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis affecting over 80% of the population.

One year into the war, Houthi rebels and forces loyal to Saleh remain unaffected and committed to multiple fronts, some of which include clashes with militants affiliated with AQAP and affiliates of IS. Local media estimate that more than 160,000 airstrikes have taken place since March 2015 in Yemen by the Saudi-led coalition. Targets include military bases in northern Yemen, Houthi positions in multiple provinces, and houses of pro-Houthi leaders or associates, as well as the residence of former President Saleh and his relatives. Yet forces aligned with President Hadi have been unable to repel Houthis and Saleh’s forces from areas other than the coastal province of Aden. Fighting in Ibb, al-Jawf, Mareb and Taiz provinces remains intense and in constant flux. A number of ceasefires negotiated by UN Special Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh have failed to deliver any relief since mid-2015.

Hope for opportunities to reengage peace talks among Yemeni actors, and the Arab coalition, remain faint as the option for total war appears to sustain the stubbornness on both sides. The of General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar as the new deputy chief of staff implies that Hadi and the Arab coalition are committed to a military victory. But Ali Muhsin’s resurrection since September 2014 may backfire and strengthen the their tribal pillars.

© Shutterstock

War crimes have undoubtedly been committed throughout the war, and reaching a lasting ceasefire long enough to engage peace talks remains a top priority amid growing fragmenting alliances. Reconstruction is simply beyond priorities held by warring parties at present.

Elite Bargaining

that erupted in December 2010 has clearly eliminated the illusion of any populist movement, and provided overwhelming evidence of an intra-regime conflict responsible for today’s devastating war. The Arab Spring-inspired protests of 2011 across the Middle East and North Africa were all unique events, yet most observers fail to understand the origins and unique trajectory of Yemen’s own political infighting. It remains that an unresolved elite conflict perpetuates instability and is a principle reason for the breakdown of the transition process that was initiated in November 2011.

When Saleh stepped down after 33 years—the first phase of the transition plan—economically marginalized youth were neither empowered nor responsible for the autocrat’s downfall. The first indication of such marginalization was the fact that signatories to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) transition agreement only included the ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), and the official opposition members of the (JMP).

In theory, the GCC-sponsored agreement negotiated by then-UN Special Envoy Jamal Benomar simply inked a temporary solution to a political crisis, which erupted in December 2010 when the GPC moved to unilaterally amend the constitution. Protests organized by would-be 2011 Nobel Laureate Tawakkol Karman and independent Member of Parliament (MP) Ahmed Saif Hashid coincided with . The situation escalated in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, when the National Solidarity Council (NSC), led by Hussain Abdullah al-Ahmar, joined protests against Saleh’s move to reform the electoral commission and extend his term in office to make way for his oldest son, Ahmed Ali. Karman and Ahmar were seen as proxies for the Sunni Islamist party, al-Islah, which is the senior partner in the JMP.

The crisis leading to the Day of Rage, scheduled for February 3, 2011, was meant as political positioning rather than Saleh’s outright overthrow. The Islah party aimed at negotiating the parliamentary elections of April 2011, gaining further concessions from Saleh through a restructuring of economic resources and political posts, even if it meant marginalizing Sheikh Hamid Abdullah al-Ahmar’s Ahmed Ali’s ascent to the presidency in 2013.

Instead, the tsunami spreading from President Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow in Egypt , Sheikh Hamid, an MP for the Islah party. For Sheikh Hamid, there would be no negotiations on Ahmed Ali’s grasp on power. His support for the mass gatherings at Change Square undoubtedly represented a continuation of his fiery public criticism of Saleh since 2006. The stage was set for an escalation and the perfect storm gathered against Saleh—youth outside patronage networks, Sunni Islamists, Nasserists, socialists, Baathists, Houthis, GCC monarchies and even a US administration that believed time had come for democracy in the Arab world.

Failed reconciliation and backroom deals

The second phase of the agreed-upon transition from Saleh’s rule involved the electoral ritual to elect Hadi as president. In a one-man election, under the mantra of consensus, Hadi was elected in February 2012. The process was mandated under the GCC agreement, which was meant to contain the crisis and avert a civil war rather than initiate an era of change.

Hadi served as Saleh’s vice president from 1994 to 2011, and while of southern origin, people saw him as a continuation of the regime. Another source of contention for independent protesters was the by the GCC deal, where half the cabinet posts were given to the GPC, half to the JMP with Islah taking the largest share, and the appointment of Mohammed Salem Basindwa as prime minister. Each faction picked the ministry appointees, while President Hadi was allowed to appoint the minister of defense; Basindwa was chosen as a nonpartisan candidate. No posts were reserved for independents or for representatives of marginalized youth protesting against the regime.

The hopes and aspirations of Yemen’s youth have dissipated into a near permanent state of war. Five years on from the electrifying momentum toward change sweeping through the Arab world’s poorest nation, an entrenched stalemate has completely derailed the political transition process.

This 35-member cabinet was to oversee the by the GCC. The first order of business was to restructure the national armed forces and security organizations, meant to gradually remove Saleh’s grip on vital national resources, but also targeted influence wielded by General Ali Muhsin, Saleh’s former close ally who defected in March 2011 and pledged to protect the “revolution.” The ultimate goal was to reform the armed forces in order to expand Hadi’s authority as commander in chief. The process not only bred further conflict among the elite, but eventually fragmented the military along patronage networks and further eroded President Hadi’s own power, rendering him nearly incapable of mobilizing sufficient resources to address the expanding security vacuum.

Breakdown of Dialogue

The third phase of the transition plan was the launching of a National Dialogue Conference (NDC). Delayed by a year, the NDC was in March 2013. Again, ordinary Yemenis expressed their dissatisfaction with the equation used to select delegates, and later complained of further marginalization within negotiations by President Hadi, Jamal Benomar and the political elite, who bargained away aspirations of independents behind closed doors in order to produce a final agreement. Youth voices, in particular, were merely relegated to the occasional photo-op with the UN envoy and other diplomats.

The dialogue process began to disintegrate soon after Ramadan 2013, when war broke out in Amran province between Houthi rebels and tribes loyal to Sheikh Hamid al-Ahmar, and it into Damaj, Sadah. This has been presented as the start of the transition’s failure. The by NDC southern delegates aligned with Mohammed Ali Ahmed, who was initially allied with President Hadi to represent the southern contingent along with Yassin Makawi and then-NDC Secretary-General Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, who is now the Yemeni ambassador to the United States.

While a number of observers have fixated their analysis on the January 2015 Houthi-led coup, a trajectory of events identifies the Amran conflict as the start of both a historic realignment of the structure of power in northern Yemen, and the chaos that would ensue from August 2014. When the NDC , it further exacerbated the conflict as protests erupted from the GPC, Houthis and independents. Although it had been discussed in committees, the newly announced plan to establish a six-region in Yemen intensified tensions among political parties, as it had not been part of the official NDC outcomes, but rather a plan forged behind closed doors and sponsored by President Hadi.

The Cause

Based on this author’s conversations with people inside the country, Yemeni analysts see the failure of Hadi’s government to contain the lingering elite conflict as being responsible for events that followed the NDC conclusion up until the Houthi takeover of Amran province. Houthi militia managed to capture Amran province from the 310^th Brigade under , a staunch ally of General Ali Muhsin and the Islah party. Islah officials were enraged at Hadi’s second failure to aid their cohorts—the war in Damaj was the first instance. Ali Muhsin, who also attempted to safeguard his position vis-à-vis Hadi, was attacked publicly by the party for his failure to deploy forces to Amran.

As events were mismanaged and the Hadi government overwhelmed, the government itself may have sealed its own fate and directly paved the way for a Houthi ascendency.

In July 2014, Prime Minister Basindwa’s cabinet agreed to , handing Houthi rebels the opportunity to revive their revolutionary narrative on behalf of the masses. Houthis undoubtedly capitalized on the anger among Yemenis and reclaimed the banner of revolution from 2011. Thousands across the political spectrum answered the call to demonstrate, including GPC loyalists, who organized social media campaigns and neighborhood protests often blocking streets around Sanaa. It was an opportunity to capitalize on renewed popular discontent that neither Houthis nor Saleh could waste. A new alliance between former enemies was forged in the oddest revolutionary narratives.

Bleak prospects beyond the stalemate

The stage was set for a final blow on the “” and a downward spin into chaos. Hadi’s position was in peril, as early reports indicated that Houthis and Saleh forged their alliance of convenience outside Yemen with help from .

© Shutterstock

Events leading to a Houthi takeover of the Yemeni capital in September 2014 were a product of overconfidence on the part of President Hadi, and Houthi collusion with Saleh’s military and tribal loyalists. Hadi is said to have opened the gates of Sanaa for Houthis in efforts to shift the balance of power away from General Ali Muhsin and the Islah party. But President Hadi, Benomar and bin Mubarak were unaware of the Houthi-Saleh alliance that ensured a military defeat of Ali Muhsin and the political downfall of Islah.

Hadi was forced to accept Houthi interpretation of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) signed on September 22, 2014, including a new power sharing equation abrogating the entire text of the GCC initiative, especially since the president had originally been granted only a two-year term. Houthis were not signatories to the GCC agreement, therefore, the PNAP gave the rebels a seat at the table otherwise not granted by the NDC.

The period between Houthi calls to protest against the lifting of fuel subsidies and the coup d’état of January 2015 undoubtedly took President Hadi by surprise, along with the international community. It is clear the transition was mismanaged, and that regional and international powers underestimated a number of political actors, such as the Islah party, Ali Muhsin, Saleh and Houthis.

This view is indeed Sanaa-centric, and does neglect the role of southern secessionists, but this group remained on the sidelines of the northern power struggle until President Hadi in Aden in February 2015. The relevance of southern actors has surged as Yemen faces a historic possibility of fragmentation. At this time, underestimating political actors, especially , left the international community unable to deal with strong challenges to Hadi’s legitimacy, leaving only the use of force as an option against Houthis and Saleh over the past year.

Today, the situation in Yemen is far beyond a “crossroads.” It is beyond “the brink.” The conflict faces a dangerous impasse as low intensity clashes expand, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and widening the security vacuum across the country. It is no longer a conflict between traditional elite actors, as southern and northern Salafists have joined the fight against Houthis and Saleh’s loyalists. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula no longer holds a monopoly on Yemen as Islamic State-affiliates have established a presence in various provinces. This makes it even more difficult to coordinate peace talks.

Furthermore, President Hadi has been unable to sustain support from various resistance groups fighting Houthis, as tension rises over financial and material resources provided by and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudis hope that General Ali Muhsin can serve as a uniting figure among northern tribes in order to overcome current obstacles along the military front.

After one year of airstrikes on the capital Sanaa, Amran, Hajja and Sadah provinces, observers see a , at times using the Vietnam analogy. It is clear that no actor is in a position to make concessions. There is no confidence among warring parties due to weak, fragmented alliances, and UN efforts are hindered by a lack of resources.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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This year could have been a turning point for the . Prospects of peace were exceptionally hopeful at the end of 2015, with a United Nations-brokered ceasefire in , renewal of negotiations on Syria, and a historical nuclear deal struck between Iran and the international community.

Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia marked the beginning of 2016 with , including the beheading of a prominent Saudi Shia cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. Saudi authorities detained Nimr in the midst of the Arab Spring, after he rocked the Shia community in the country’s Eastern Province with his powerful sermons calling for their empowerment and an end to autocratic rule. He was a thorn in Saudi Arabia’s side for stirring unrest among the marginalized. Consequently, he was executed on January 2, along with 46 other prisoners, most of whom were members of al-Qaeda.

Nimr was not a terrorist. On the contrary, he reached notoriety for his sermons that eschewed violence and espoused a tone of peace, while still encouraging Shias to demand for political rights. Nimr served as a symbolic leader for the Shias, which is why his death sparked protests throughout the world—from the Middle East to South Asia and even Europe. The most notable of these protests took place in Tehran, where enraged Iranians stormed and firebombed the Saudi Embassy, which provided Riyadh with a long-awaited excuse to end diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic.

It is no secret that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia vehemently opposes the recent rapprochement between Iran and the United States as a result of the nuclear deal. The agreement not only undermines Riyadh’s hegemonic role in the Middle East, but also weakens its relationship with Washington, especially as its oil reserves declines and the US becomes increasingly energy-independent.

Nimr’s execution was a calculated decision by Riyadh. King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud hopes to reawaken sectarian strife between the two regional powerhouses, and prove to its Western allies that Iran cannot be trusted. However, what may have been a calculated decision by Saudi Arabia could have catastrophic consequences if Iran does not play its cards rights. On the other hand, if it does, it could also serve as a critical opportunity for Tehran to prove its role as a regional leader.

A Calculated Decision

King Salman’s decision to execute Nimr demonstrates his perseverance in reversing the power trajectory of Saudi Arabia. Under his predecessor, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, the kingdom took a turn for the worse. Saudi Arabia, in the past, had been able to use its wealth to force other states to submit to its demands. However, it is now losing clout, which renders it as an ineffectual regional power and Western ally. It failed to prevent the rise of Houthi rebels in Yemen and overthrow the Assad regime in Syria. Instead, it has not only played a role in escalating both crises, but has lost immense legitimacy among the rest of the Arab world as a result.

Saudi influence in the Middle East is waning. Under pressure of this new reality, King Salman sought to flex his muscles and make a statement with the execution of Nimr that Saudi Arabia will continue to be a leader of the Arab and Muslim world. This, however, would require bringing down its top nemesis: Iran.

The nuclear deal between the international community and the Islamic Republic has driven a wedge between Saudi Arabia and the US. Despite fierce Saudi opposition to the deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was adopted in 2015 and will largely take effect early this year. In exchange for Iran curbing uranium enrichment, the international community has promised to lift crippling economic sanctions. The opening of its economy will undoubtedly help the country to prosper, especially as it reenters the oil market. Iran contains the fourth largest crude oil reserves, and the second largest natural gas reserves in the world.

However, Iran’s new-found wealth could also translate into more regional power, which Saudi Arabia resents. Similarly, as Iran slowly integrates into the international community, it will become increasingly evident that it is a reliable partner and less of an adversary. Considering that the nuclear deal is still in its early phases of implementation, Riyadh likely feels a sense of urgency to take action now before it becomes too late. By executing Nimr, it hopes to elicit a retaliatory response from Tehran that could lead to the reenactment of economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic, and ultimately a reversal of the progress made from the nuclear deal.

Riyadh’s conscious move to reignite sectarian strife in the Persian Gulf is also a calculated decision by King Salman to harden his image as a merciless leader, as well as amass government support among his citizenry. His actions suggest that he hopes to compensate for the House of Saud’s decline under King Abdullah’s rule by exerting ruthless aggression toward his adversaries.

Before the execution of the Shia cleric, it was Salman who ordered the formation of an international coalition to fight Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Houthis, a Shia political movement, had seized the capital Sanaa and overthrown the government toward the end of 2014.

Hassan Rouhani / Flickr

At first, the Houthis only intended to hold onto power until it was guaranteed they would be represented in the future government, since Shias in the small Arab state have been politically marginalized throughout history. By March 2015, however, the Yemenis were close to a political solution when Saudi Arabia launched a war against the Houthis.

Riyadh feared that a power-sharing government in Yemen could set a precedence in not only its own country, but also its protectorates like Bahrain, which suffered a severe Shia uprising during the Arab Spring against its Sunni monarchy. The message King Salman sought to send was clear: Saudi Arabia would not tolerate the rise of Shias, who Riyadh—along with radical Islamist groups like the —believes are heretics of Islam. The recent execution of Nimr echoed that same message.

Salman hopes his firm stance against Shias in the region will make him a leader among Sunnis who share his resentment toward them. However, Nimr’s death was also intended to rally support among Saudis, many of whom had grown frustrated with the monarchy in recent weeks. Salman can no longer afford the concessions that King Abdullah had made to Saudi nationals in order to buy their support for the monarchy. His predecessor bought loyalty in the midst of the Arab Spring by announcing a $130 billion economic package that he spent on thousands of new jobs, greater housing loans and increased salaries. The kingdom had since retained generous subsidies for the public, including fuel, water and electricity among other resources.

As Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh points out in atĚý51łÔąĎ,Ěýit was only days before Nimr’s execution when the Saudis were forced to cut these subsidies in order to mitigate the kingdom’s budget deficit.

It was not long before King Salman discovered that his country’s historical policy of buying loyalty with its oil revenues was no longer sustainable. While it felt that it was pertinent to keep the price of oil low in order to compete with Iran, Saudi Arabia can no longer afford to buy government support from its people. Instead, Salman used the threat of a Shia uprising in the Persian Gulf and possible retaliation from Iran for the execution of Nimr to garner support among his majority Sunni population. The mass support he received for the execution suggests it may be working—at least for now.

Consequences

Saudi Arabia’s calculated decision to execute Sheikh al-Nimr could, however, have adverse effects. The greatest threat is the potential impact it could have on the prospects of peace in Syria and Yemen.

Saudi Arabia’s hawkish behavior is merely a power play to reclaim what it believes is its rightful regional hegemony. The execution of Sheikh al-Nimr is intended to ignite sectarian tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and adversely jeopardize the nuclear deal.

The Saudi-led coalition has already announced that it will no longer observe the ceasefire in Yemen that was established on December 15, 2015, at the start of the UN-brokered peace talks in Switzerland. The talks are slated to pick up on January 14. However, if Saudi Arabia continues to show disinterest in a political solution and expand its ruthless air campaign, as it has been doing, and if Iran bolsters support for the Houthis, the peace process could not only be stalled, but the crisis could escalate to new heights.

Yemen has become a stage for a proxy war between the two powerhouses, and it could worsen as a result of the new tension created by Nimr’s execution.

Around 6,000 civilians are estimated to have been killed in the conflict, with over a million internally displaced according to theĚý. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State have already taken advantage of the power vacuum, further complicating the prospects of a political solution and an end to the conflict.

Recent events could also significantly hinder the Syrian peace process. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran serve as instrumental players in the Vienna Talks, which is the international roundtable discussion on the Syrian conflict. It was Riyadh that managed to put together a delegation of members from different Syrian opposition groups to attend the next round of negotiations. Similarly, Iran is the closest link to the Assad regime, and it could use its leverage over the government to force concessions. If either country refuses to attend future talks, or if they use Syria to further the proxy war, like Yemen, the prospects for peace could be severely limited.

Flickr

The greatest consequence that could come from Nimr’s execution is one that would encompass Yemen, Syria and more: a sectarian Cold War in the Middle East. While Saudi Arabia would try to corral the Sunni Arab world, Iran would elicit the support of Shia Muslims around the region. Proxy wars like those in Yemen and Syria would be exacerbated, and tensions would undoubtedly ignite new conflicts in other divided nations such as Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain, to name a few.

This would not only further destabilize the Middle East, but also draw in Western countries and potentially create an actual Cold War-esque confrontation between the US and Russia over rivaling spheres of influences. The outcome would be catastrophic. Although Saudi Arabia may be hoping to ignite some level of sectarian strife to force Iran to lapse from its progress, Nimr’s death has the potential to spark something far more egregious. It all rests on the Islamic Republic.

A Way Out

Saudi Arabia’s hawkish behavior is merely a power play to reclaim what it believes is its rightful regional hegemony. The execution of Sheikh al-Nimr is intended to ignite sectarian tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and adversely jeopardize the nuclear deal.

Although top political leaders in Iran have already condemned Riyadh’s actions, and even promised revenge, Tehran’s most effective course of action is no action. It can continue to deliver fiery rhetoric in order to appease its own public, but it is imperative for the stability of the region that it does not actually carry out its threats. Retaliation by Iran or vis–à–vis one of its proxies would force the international community to rethink the nuclear deal and reverse the decades of work it took to reach this monumental agreement.

Iran can prove to the world that it can serve the role as a regional leader by acting out of the best interest for the Middle East, and not reciprocating Saudi Arabia’s belligerent behavior. Not only would this improve Iran’s reputation to the international community, but also tarnish Saudi Arabia’s. This would force the US and other Western allies to reevaluate their relationship with Riyadh.

King Salman’s desperate attempt to salvage Saudi Arabia by reigniting a sectarian war will be a fruitless effort if Iran does not fall into its trap. The Islamic Republic must find the perfect balance between satisfying public opinion at home and abroad. This was the exact struggle it faced during the nuclear negotiations. Iran won that battle and it can do it again.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The unique response of the Horn of Africa region to Yemeni refugees could offer lessons to countries and regions dealing with similar influxes elsewhere.

Escalating internal fighting and Saudi-led air strikes in Yemen have led to an estimatedĚý—more than 80% of its population—being in need of humanitarian protection or assistance. More than 1 million people have beenĚýforcedĚýfrom their homes. Of these,Ěý, both Yemenis and foreign nationals, have fled to seek safety elsewhere. The majority—about 70,000—haveĚý, seeking refuge in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Access to territory and protection has been swift for Yemeni refugees arriving in the Horn of Africa. This provides a lesson in hospitality that would be well-heeded elsewhere.

Yemeni displacement to the Horn of Africa is in some respects unique. Africa is a continent familiar with large-scale refugee crises. However, it is uncommon for those seeking protection in the region to arrive from elsewhere.

With the possible exception of South Africa—which receives a small number of applications for asylum from persons outside theĚý—those seeking refuge in African states tend to come from within the region itself. What is even more striking is that the countries of asylum themselves—including Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia—are among the chief refugee-producing countries in the region. Prior to the outbreak of conflict, Yemen was itself host to someĚý, mainly from Somalia.

The Horn of Africa is a region beset with poverty and insecurity. So, how has it responded to this influx of refugees from outside? The Yemeni crisis provides a unique perspective on refugee protection in a region where refugee policies and practices have largely not been analyzed.

The protection afforded to Yemenis arriving on African shores is far from perfect. However, several features of the African response would be worth highlighting to those in charge of refugee reception and protection elsewhere.

Sound foundation for generosity

The legal framework for refugee protection in Africa is one of the most advanced in the world. The vast majority of African states are party to theĚý. In addition, Africa’s 1969ĚýĚýprovides even more generous protections to those displaced from their homes.

The African Refugee Convention has been widely praised for its liberal approach to protection. It expands the definition of a refugee, broadens the principle of non-refoulement and endorses the principles of voluntary repatriation and international burden-sharing.

Implementation of the African Refugee Convention has been far from comprehensive. A lack of resources, legal capacity and political will continue to severely undermine protection in many parts of the region. Nevertheless, the convention’s humanitarian spirit reflects the often inclusive and welcoming approach of African states in times of crisis.

The Horn of Africa response to Yemeni refugees has been open—even welcoming—when compared with the reception of refugees elsewhere. Access to territory has not been an issue. Horn of Africa countries have kept their borders open to those arriving across the Gulf. A representative of the government of Somaliland, himself hosting two refugee families, has expressed sympathy and messages ofĚý.

This reception of refugees stands in stark contrast to the blatantlyĚýĚýto migration of some European governments.

Regions such as Europe have crafted specific and detailed mechanisms for dealing with refugee protection in situations of mass influx. In contrast, African states by and large have adopted a more pragmatic approach. Recognizing the need for protection, many African states simply confer refugee status on a group basis to all those fleeing the affected zone.

Rather than closing their borders until a regional agreement on protection can be found, the governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan have all grantedĚýprima facieĚýrefugee status to Yemeni asylum seekers. This facilitates quick registration and the provision of assistance to those arriving with nothing.

Role of customary norms

State-based laws and policies are only one aspect of African regional responses to displaced persons in need. In practice, customary norms of hospitality and the generous responses of host communities may have even more of an impact on refugees’ safety.

A large proportion of Yemenis displaced to the Horn of Africa are living with local communities, relying on their generosity and hospitality to survive. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, AntĂłnio Guterres, acknowledged this in a recentĚý: “In a world where more than two-thirds of all refugees are Muslim, it is important to recognize that there is nothing in the 1951 Convention that is not already present in ancient Islamic traditions and legal texts.”

Displacement crises in Africa are generally considered less newsworthy than those in Europe. But they are no less devastating. In some cases, they provide an opportunity to reflect on how we might better manage such crises at the regional level.

Protection for Yemeni refugees arriving in the Horn of Africa is far from exemplary. Profound challenges remain. The lack of safe legal avenues means the vast majority of those fleeing conflict in Yemen face perilous journeys.

Once they arrive, instability within many host countries means security is far from guaranteed. The lack of appropriate reception arrangements and a fear of removal or detention mean many refugees do not access formal protection channels. The shortfall of funding for protection and assistance in the region remains chronic. In countries where humanitarian resources are stretched beyond their limits, the regional response to the Yemen crisis remains only one-fifth funded.

Despite this complex and challenging protection environment, the response of many African states has been swift, generous and practical. The sense of solidarity expressed by governments and local communities stands in stark contrast to the responses to refugee crises being witnessed elsewhere.

Perhaps it is time to recognize Africa not just as a source of refugees, but also as a (tentative) champion of principles of humanity and hospitality. These are principles frequently lacking when those forced to flee their homes and lives come looking for protection.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Six months after a Saudi-led coalition launched an offensive against Shiite Houthi rebels, it is difficult to conceive how the situation on the ground in Yemen has improved. The collateral damage caused by the onslaught has been colossal and potentially irreversible.

Yemeni civilians have never been as vulnerable as they are now. The war has created a humanitarian crisis that has not only left them terrorized in the crossfire, but also vulnerable to the rise of radical Islamist actors who have taken advantage of the ensuing power vacuum. If the war continues, there is little prospect of a peaceful end to the conflict.

After the Iran-aligned rebels seized the capital Sanaa in November 2014, the Saudis feared a total Shiite takeover of Yemen. In the first month-long military campaign dubbed “Operation Decisive Storm,” Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Houthi targets primarily in their strongholds of Sanaa and Aden, in hope of forcing their complete withdrawal and restoring the ousted President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi to power.

The coalition has continued to bombard Yemen vis-á-vis airstrikes, and now an Emirati and Qatari ground invasion has followed in what was supposed to be a “limited” military operation. The outcome has been catastrophic for the stability of Yemen and its people.

Water CrisisĚýin Yemen

The humanitarian crisis created by the war is staggering in even the tumultuous history of the small Arab state. According to the (UN), the conflict has left nearly 2,000 Yemeni civilians dead—half of the total death toll.

This should not come as a surprise. In the first month of Operation Decisive Storm, the included a village, market, multiple schools, a mosque, health facility and dairy factory. The coalition has showed an extreme disregard toward civilian life, especially Shiites. It has purposely targeted Shiite Yemenis—the Zaydis—for simply belonging to the same Islamic sect of the Houthis. The concentration of airstrikes have taken place in the Zaydi-dominated Saada province in the north, far removed from the Houthi-occupied Sanaa and Aden, which evidences the coalition’s malicious intent to punish the entire Zaydi population for the Houthis’ actions.

The UN also claims that the area with the most egregious access constraints for humanitarian assistance is in Saada, whose residents have essentially been put in a chokehold by Riyadh. Although the Saudi-led, Sunni Arab-dominated coalition claims the goal is to transfer power from the Houthis to the former government, its actions have demonstrated a clear desire to weaken the Shiite population in order to guarantee that Yemen remains in the hands of its Sunni allies.

Yemeni civilians have not only been caught in-between the clashes. They also suffer from a water crisis that preceded the conflict long ago. Before the Saudi-led “intervention” against the Houthis, 13 million Yemenis lacked access to clean water. Now, that in the past few months alone, a further 3 million Yemenis are without water as a direct result of the war. That leaves a total of two-thirds of the population, or 16 million, without access to clean water.

Consequently, Yemenis have been forced to rely primarily on trucks to transport water. However, the control of maritime traffic by the Saudi-led coalition has prevented commercial goods from entering the country, which has adversely led to fuel shortages. As a result, the price of water has quadrupled in some areas. Not only did Yemen face a shortage of natural water, but now Yemenis struggle to have safe access to water or even afford it.

Here Comes the Islamic State

The humanitarian crisis sparked by the war is, and will continue to be, disastrous for the Yemeni people. However, equally a threat for the future stability of the country is the rise of radical Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the even more draconian Islamic State (IS).

The latest conflict has rendered years of US drone strikes on AQAP strongholds useless and has ultimately reinvigorated the terrorist group. One month after the Saudi-led offensive began, AQAP took advantage of the deteriorating security situation and freed hundreds of its members in a mass jailbreak in the northeast.

AQAP, however, is less interested in bringing down the Houthis than it is in gathering support. One strategy it has taken is by sharing power with those it has either liberated or protected from the Houthis. In the city of al-Mukalla, from The New York Times reports, AQAP only maintained control of one police station after chasing Houthi rebels out. It fostered the creation of a civilian council and provided it with a budget to run the city instead of capitalizing on the opportunity to expand its power. Locals consequently began to view AQAP as a savior, not an enemy.

The Islamic State has similarly capitalized on the Saudi-led war against the Houthis. Prior the Houthi takeover, IS was virtually nonexistent in Yemen. The group paved the road of sectarianism when four of its members burst into two Shiite mosques strapped with explosives in Sanaa and blew themselves up, leaving 137 worshippers dead.

IS continues to launch attacks throughout the country that target Zaydi Shiites, not just Houthi rebels, in hope of exasperating the sectarian divide. While the resurgence of AQAP has predominantly taken place in the south, IS has begun to grow in the north. The Islamic State has resorted to arming and recruiting local tribesmen to join its fight against Shiites.

Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi / Flickr

A new crisis could emerge as the two terrorist organizations expand into central Yemen and compete for support among the locals, which would not only jeopardize the country’s security even further, but also make the conflict that much more complicated and difficult to resolve. Additionally, what is significant about the rise of these Islamist actors is how it posits the United States and the Saudi-led coalition on the same side of its traditional adversaries: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

Tribal Warfare

Another consequence that has been relatively overlooked and could shatter Yemen’s historical tribal system is the arming of Yemeni tribesmen by the Saudi-led coalition. After the launch of Operation Renewal of Hope—the ground operation—Riyadh began flying in hundreds of tribesmen from southern Yemen to Saudi Arabia to train and provide them with light arms.

These Yemenis have proved to be a formidable force against the Houthis because of their familiarity with the terrain and support among locals—many of whom are skeptical of the foreign coalition. Arming them could have dire consequences.

First, considering both IS and AQAP’s growing support from these groups, it would be unlikely that some of these weapons provided by Saudi Arabia would not end up in the hands of these radical Islamist groups—whether voluntarily handed over, coerced or forced.

Second, these tribes, which have historically practiced nonviolent methods of mediating disputes, will now have weapons that they could use as leverage against weaker and unarmed tribes. The southern tribesmen could potentially use their arms to launch a stronger military campaign to secede from Yemen, which they have wanted for decades. Their training and armament could be a game-changer in their movement for secession.

Yemen has struggled under decades of turmoil. The latest war launched by the Saudi-led coalition has only deepened the fragile state’s preexisting struggles and could leave behind irreversible damage. The rise of the Islamic State and the resurrection of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will continue to pose a major threat to Yemen’s security even after the inevitable ouster of the Houthis from power.

However, the likely destruction of past, present and future peace talks between the rival political groups could have an even more disastrous outcome: the lack of a unified government to resolve these issues in a post-war Yemen. Now that the Houthis have grown power-hungry as they slowly expand their territory and that sectarianism has peaked, there is little prospect of any power-sharing arrangement being made.

The current conflict could have been entirely avoided, and Yemen could have been facing a transitional period of a new unified government instead of being dragged through yet another war. According to Jamal Benomar, the , a peace deal between the Houthis and warring factions was near to being reached before the Saudi airstrikes began. It is difficult to imagine one being made under the current circumstances, especially with the shadow of Yemen’s overpowering neighbor: Saudi Arabia.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The war by Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies against Houthi rebels in Yemen has become a debilitating sectarian conflict that has reduced large parts of the impoverished country to rubble, potentially destabilizing the region. The kingdom has framed its approach in stark sectarian terms that has sparked intolerance toward minorities, first and foremost Shiites, who are depicted as pawns of an expansionary Iran.

Saudi Arabia fears that its influence, based on its oil reserves and the administration of Islam’s most holy cities, constitutes but a window of opportunity. Its greater assertiveness and sectarianism amount to a determined effort to exploit that opportunity to cement its place in the Middle East and North Africa’s geopolitics.

Saudi Arabia’s unprecedented military assertiveness is a key pillar of its defense doctrine as described by Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi scholar with close ties to the kingdom’s political elite. The doctrine aims to counter, in Obaid’s words, the three foremost threats to the kingdom: “regional instability, a revanchist and/or nuclear Iran, and terrorism.”

In a recent article in Al Monitor, Obaid argued that the doctrine was evident in the crushing by Saudi and other Gulf troops of a popular revolt in Bahrain, which he defined as “an Iran-backed insurgency,” and recent successes of the Saudi-led Ěýalliance in pushing Houthi rebels and forces loyal to ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh out of southern Yemen.

The Saudis and their Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are currently engaged in finishing the job by pushing north with the objective of ridding the entire country of any groups that are affiliated with Iran. Once Yemen is secure, the Saudis will begin to plan utilizing their increasing strategic alliances and formidable military infrastructure to address the Syrian Civil War, Obaid asserted.

He said Saudi military planners have already started looking at potential scenarios, where Riyadh could use air power to provide cover for anti-Assad forces not linked to terrorist groups. Sooner or later, a Saudi coalition will get involved in Syria, and it will become the largest and most dangerous front in the conflict between the kingdom, its Arab allies and Iran, Obaid added.

Sustainable political achievement difficult

The more aggressive stance of Saudi Arabia is part of an attempt by the kingdom to avert the force of nature by using its financial muscle to counter the revolutionary ideology of Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It has done so by globally propagating its austere, intolerant vision of Islam that generated more extreme, violent interpretations adopted by groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda that challenge absolute monarchical rule cloaked in an Islamic veneer.

Notwithstanding its kinetic campaign, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be the foremost player once the dust has settled from the current bloody conflict, which has sparked the largest wave of refugees since World War Two.

Military victory in southern Yemen may prove difficult to translate into sustainable political achievement. Long-standing Saudi interference in Yemeni politics is a key ingredient in Yemen’s mix of complex problems and is complicated by widespread Yemeni resentment of the humanitarian and civilian cost of the Saudi military campaign. The battle for northern Yemen may prove to be more difficult than the one for the south, given its complicated topography as well as greater popular support for the rebels.

Discontent in Bahrain continues to simmer at the surface, even though the Saudi intervention and continued repression have largely stymied mass protests. Bahrain’s Saudi and UAE-backed refusal to address root causes risks fueling radicalization and potentially offers Iran opportunities to exploit what is fundamentally a domestic Bahraini problem.

Underlying all of this, however, is a reality that Saudi Arabia is unwilling to entertain. Its financial and energy muscle, together with its claim to moral authority derived from its status as the custodian of the two holy cities, is likely to prove insufficient in the struggle for regional predominance with countries like Iran, Turkey and Egypt.

Despite having to sort out problems of their own, these three countries ultimately bring assets to the table that Saudi Arabia does not have or that match those of the kingdom: a legacy of either empire or identity that is rooted in thousands of years of history; large populations and huge domestic markets; significant industrial bases; powerful militaries; and energy resources that in the case of Iran and most recently in Egypt, which over time will reduce if not neutralize the kingdom’s competitive edge.

To be sure, Saudi Arabia has an advantage in the Arab world from the fact that neither Turkey, nor Iran is Arab. Being Arab, however, is unlikely to compete with rival economic and military power despite Saudi projections that its military expenditure is cementing its regional role.

It is a matter of time before Iran can match Obaid’s assertion that with over $100 billion already spent on conventional military expansion in the past five years and another $50 billion allocated over the next two years, the Saudis are fully committed to and capable of out-powering the Iranians.

For Saudi Arabia, the question is whether assertiveness, money, military expenditure and a moral claim are enough to turn a window of opportunity into a permanent reality, given the looming prospect of a nuclear agreement that will gradually return Iran to the international fold; a nationalist Egypt having the eastern Mediterranean’s largest gas field; and Turkey as a military and industrial powerhouse.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may find that a less intolerant, more inclusive approach, coupled with greater sensitivity to popular political, social and economic aspirations, apart from a greater willingness to cooperate with regional rivals, offers better hope for stability and security. It is a tall order in a world in which the name of the game is attempting to shape the Middle East and North Africa in ways that ignore facts on the ground and are geared toward regime survival at whatever cost.

*[This article was originally published by ’s partner, .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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For over three months, a military alliance has been bombing in an attempt to weaken the , a predominantly Zaidi Shiite group, and their ally, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

After the Houthis completed a coup d’état in the capital Sana’a earlier this year, and after Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi and parts of his government fled to Riyadh, the Saudis began a military campaign in order to prevent the fall of the southern port city of Aden, to make the Houthis retreat and to pave the way for Hadi’s comeback.

Until now, the military operation has proved extremely short-sighted and largely failed to deliver. Despite the massive airstrikes, the Houthis have managed to hold their territorial control and extend the conflict to the Saudi-Yemeni border region. The only tangible result is large-scale destruction of Yemeni infrastructure, as well as a society being ripped apart by a multi-layered conflict.

Short-sightedness and miscalculation are terms equally applicable to the initiative of the (GCC), which in 2011 put an end to a months-long elite battle between then-President Saleh and his rivals. Many international observers described the GCC deal back then as an effective mechanism that succeeded in preventing a prolonged civil war, as well as a suitable model for other countries in transition—notably Syria.

Momentarily, the GCC initiative stopped large-scale violence and set a transition process in motion, with the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) at its heart.

However, nearly four years after Saleh stepped down and handed over power to Hadi, his long-time vice president, it appears that Yemen has finally fallen down the brink and into the abyss of a protracted civil and regional proxy war. The GCC initiative can no longer be heralded as a model for other countries in transition, but merely as a better ceasefire that allowed the different groups to regain strength or to make their entry into Yemeni power politics.

The NDC aimed at renegotiating the social contract between the Yemeni people and the state. However, from the outset, this process was undermined by the continuation of the elite power struggle that started to emerge in the 2000s, and it eventually led to the violent elite conflict in 2011.

The continuation of this elite infighting was facilitated by—among other factors—granting Saleh immunity and allowing him to stay in Yemen. The GCC deal did not take out the central pillar around which Yemen’s political economy was constructed for over 30 years. Instead, it gave Saleh ample opportunity to plot for his revenge and comeback.

Formed after the handover of the presidency, the national unity government also facilitated the continuation of political infighting. The 50-50 distribution of government posts between the former ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), and the former opposition coalition, the Joint Meeting of Parties (JMP), meant that most of the time government members were busy with blocking the implementation of each other’s decisions, thereby contributing to the massive standstill over introducing vital reforms.

Although having helped to set in motion Yemen’s transition, the GCC did little to consolidate the process through economic aid and investment. Instead, in 2013, Saudi Arabia took the decision to revise its visa requirements. This resulted in large numbers of Yemeni workers having to leave the country and return to impoverished Yemen because they could not meet the new regulations, putting further pressure on the country’s strained labor market.

Choosing Hadi as a successor to political fox Saleh proved to be a bet on a dead horse, given the former’s lack of power and legitimacy. As he struggled to eliminate Saleh’s influence in the armed forces, Hadi resorted to similar cooptation strategies as his predecessor but miscalculated the strength of groups such as the Houthis who, along with the secessionist Southern Movement (al-Hirak), were excluded from the negotiation process preceding the GCC initiative.

The Way Forward

Four years after the ink has dried on the paper of the GCC initiative, the deal’s short-sightedness has backfired on its initiators—the forefront of which is Saudi Arabia. The GCC deal mainly served short-term stability and security interests of Yemen’s neighbors by keeping most of the country’s elite powerbrokers largely untouched and in place. Meanwhile, during the four year “ceasefire,” frustration over the disastrous socioeconomic situation reached new heights and was exploited by groups such as the Houthis, in order to build and consolidate their popular support base and strike a powerful alliance with Saleh.

Equally, the last four years bore witness to the strengthening of the Sunni-Shiite narrative through the evolving dynamics of both the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts.

With the Saudi-led military intervention against the Shiite Houthis and the regionalization of the Yemeni conflict, this narrative is now being forced onto the Yemeni context and threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In order to avoid such a scenario from taking deeper roots and to prevent the impending destruction of Yemeni society, the international community should accelerate efforts to bring the conflict parties back to the negotiating table. For this, the parties to the conflict must be pressured to halt all violence. What is then needed is a comprehensive peace and transition process not only serving the stability and security interests of Yemen’s neighbors, but also aiming at a substantial renegotiation of the social contract to be supported by a concrete socioeconomic reform plan.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Aitzaz Ahsan, a prominent member of ’s opposition, once : “We [Pakistan] are, and very much remain, a South Asian Muslim country: sharing aspirations and history with India—due process, habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari. We are not a Middle Eastern Arab Muslim country.”

Such words have some bearing on the April 10 resolution— by the Pakistani parliament and endorsed by Prime Minister —to avoid taking sides in the Yemeni conflict.

For all intents and purposes, it appears highly unlikely that Pakistan’s army will enter the fray in . Pakistan’s somewhat neutral position vis-à-vis the Yemeni crisis has confounded “Pakistani watchers” in the West. Islamabad’s stance is understood as a means of Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia and neighboring Iran, while countering the risk of heightening sectarian tension, given the staunch opposition to Riyadh’s war in Yemen on the part of Pakistan’s Shiite minority and the government’s efforts to combat terrorism. In its more blatant interpretations, the Pakistani government’s position is viewed as a betrayal, given Islamabad’s on Saudi Arabia and other (GCC) members for economic and energy .

Nonetheless, many analysts and commentators who are surprised by the Pakistani parliament’s resolution ignore Pakistan’s historical ties with non-Arab Muslim countries—most notably Iran and Turkey—that transcend (or at least stand on par with) the religious affinity toward the Sunni Arab countries. A reflection on the history of Pakistan’s post-war foreign policy sheds light on Islamabad’s decision to avoid contributing ground troops to the Saudi Arabian-led military campaign in Yemen.

The Baghdad Pact to the OIC

After Pakistan championed pan-Islamic causes for a decade, by 1955, the country’s foreign policy shifted to a more openly pro-Western position in the evolving Cold War. This shift was most underscored by Pakistan’s of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The Suez crisis of 1956, in which Pakistan was also a member of the Commonwealth, led to the estrangement of Pakistani-Egyptian ties, as well as Pakistan being denied membership within the Afro-Asian Community.

In 1964, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey signed the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which was a multinational organization at fostering socioeconomic development in each member state. This growing economic and cultural exchange between the three nations persisted until it was weakened by certain developments—Ankara’s aspirations to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s, the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 and Iran’s oil boom in the 1970s.

The ascent of Pakistan’s Peoples Party (PPP) in 1971, under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a new Islamic Socialist narrative: “Islam is our Religion; Democracy is our Politics; Socialism is our Economy; Power Lies with the People.” Concerted efforts were thenceforth made to mend fences with the causes espoused by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), beginning with the Lahore Conference in 1974 and culminating in admission to the NAM at the Havana Summit in 1979.

Nonetheless, the interregnum had witnessed increased official cash flows from Saudi Arabia to Islamist parties in Pakistan. Not lost in the equation were increasing remittances from unskilled Pakistani laborers in the Persian Gulf’s Arab monarchies. The first casualty of this growing pressure from the religious parties was the Ahmadiyya community, which after a series of riots was “non-Muslim” in 1974.

Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s military takeover of Pakistan and declaration of martial law in 1977 had a clear ideological bias with support from Muslim fundamentalists. Three subsequent developments contributed to growing Saudi Arabian influence in the upper echelons of Pakistan’s government.

First, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 posed a credible threat to inspire similar Shiite uprisings against the Gulf Arab sheikdoms and their regional surrogates, including Pakistan. Second, the Soviet Union’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89) precipitated the nurturing of the mujahedeen (the present-day Taliban), in which Riyadh played a pivotal role as a political, moral and financial backer. Third, the transformation of rural mosques into Islamic educational institutions (madrasas) heralded an era of brainwashed street power and produced an army of “freedom fighters” who operated under the banner of Islam. Additionally, the current leadership of Prime Minister Sharif and his personal ties with the House of Saud—having been provided asylum during the ouster of the Sharif family by the military government of Gen. Pervez Musharraf from 1999 to 2008—further emboldened Riyadh’s influence in Pakistan.

Pakistan and Yemen: The Arab Sheikdoms to China and Central Asia

The resolution passed by the Pakistani parliament indeed sends a message to the Saudi Arabian leadership that Islamabad has other priorities on the international stage and must contend with unmet economic challenges. This shift in Pakistani priorities was underscored by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan, which came on the heels of the Yemen resolution’s passage in the Pakistani parliament.

The purpose of Xi’s visit was to deliver an of $46 billion in an economic corridor that will stretch from western China to the Persian Gulf. In turn, Pakistan promised China 10,000 troops commanded by a two star general—half of them coming from Pakistan’s elite force (aka the “Special Services Group”). The force, which will have its own air support, will be for protecting Chinese workers in Pakistan.

Also, on April 22, Pakistani and Iranian officials met in Tehran, where the seventh Pakistan-Iran Joint Committee meeting was held, with both countries to increase bilateral trade to $5 billion over five years. Part of the deal Islamabad arranging the construction of a gas pipeline connecting the port of Gwadar to Iran. On April 7, when Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited Islamabad to discuss the Yemen crisis, Prime Minister Sharif on the Islamic Republic to contribute to efforts aimed at bringing the various Yemeni factions to the negotiating table.

Today, Pakistan stands at the crossroads of defining its identity and clarifying its priorities on the international stage. Not facetiously, nearly half of the nation’s population perpetrates terrorism while the other half is victimized by it. Practically anyone who does not practice Sunni Islam, which includes one-quarter of all Pakistanis, is considered an “infidel” by the Saudi Arabian-inspired fundamentalists brainwashed in the madrasas. Many Pakistanis term their country as “al-Bakistan,” or a Saudi Arabian colony with the attendant mannerisms and connotations.

It is in this context that there are now belated calls from Pakistan’s intelligentsia, political establishment and civil society for Islamabad to re-cultivate its alliances with Asian powers that date back to the birth of the Indus civilization. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, such a development undermines the kingdom’s regional clout. Despite Pakistan and Saudi Arabia sharing a “special relationship,” Islamabad is—at least for now—determined to avoid joining Riyadh’s pan-Sunni coalition in Yemen. Rather than sending troops into the Yemen quagmire, Pakistan is sending a message to Saudi Arabia that it is more interested in strengthening ties with other countries—China, Iran, Oman and Turkey—that either outwardly oppose Riyadh’s war in Yemen or have at least avoided backing it.

Indeed, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s endorsement of the parliament’s resolution on Yemen served to remind Islamabad’s GCC partners that Pakistan is a South Asian Muslim power, not an Arab one.

*[This article was originally published byĚý’s content partner,Ěý.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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On June 15, UN-brokered talks will begin in Geneva to bring an end to the conflict in . But many Yemenis know that with the increasingly hostile armed factions, a destroyed economy and the Saudi-Iran rivalry playing itself out in their country, peace will be hard to come by.

With the Houthi rebels in the north and (AQAP) in the south, Yemen has long been a hotbed of strife. But when the Houthi rebels made a daring military move in February 2015 and managed to take over the capital Sana’a, forcing President to flee, the Saudi government decided to intervene to restore Hadi to power.

On March 26, the Saudis, under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), launched a vicious airstrike campaign against the Houthis.

Instead of unseating the Houthis, Saudi interference only escalated the conflict, over 2,000 Yemenis and creating a humanitarian crisis that has left 80% of the population in dire need of aid. The heavy military intervention has destroyed homes, businesses, schools, hospitals and entire villages. Civilians lack basic supplies such as food, water, medicine and adequate shelter. Doctors Without Borders reports that many people living in frontline areas are to travel to clinics or hospitals for medical care because of the fighting and the lack of fuel. Even those who are able to make it to health facilities often find that they are not functioning.

The Houthis

Officially as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), the Houthi movement began in the 1990s, initially advocating for sectarian tolerance and peace. But motivated by unemployment, poverty and opposition to what they perceived as a corrupt and inept government, they took up armed rebellion.

President Hadi, who requested help from the Saudis to crush the Houthis, came to power in February 2012 after an “Arab Spring” uprising against 33-year ruler . Hadi got his position through an election where he was the only candidate, and it was only supposed to be a two-year term ending in February 2014, when new elections were to be held.

Hadi resigned from his post in January 2015. So for many Yemenis, Hadi is no longer a legitimate president, and he had no legal right to ask the Saudis to intervene.

Even Yemenis who supported the Saudi intervention, thinking it would quickly bring an end to the fighting, changed their minds when they witnessed the civilian deaths, the destruction of the nation’s infrastructure, the blocking of the airports and seaports, and the general chaos that has ensued. Part of the chaos is that in order to fight the Saudis, the Houthis made an alliance of convenience with former President Saleh—the very man who used to bomb them—and fighters loyal to him, while other parts of the military and local militias have joined the side of Hadi.

Most devastating has been the relentless Saudi bombing. When a temporary ceasefire agreement was reached in early May, the Saudis deliberately as much violence as possible before the ceasefire began, and once the ceasefire ended, they promptly reengaged in their strikes.

According toĚý recent Human Rights WatchĚý, among the weapons being used by the Saudis are cluster bombs, which were banned by the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions because they kill civilians long after the fighting has stopped. Of the three types of cluster munitions identified recently in Yemen, two were manufactured in the United States and supplied by the US government. “The Saudi-led coalition and other warring parties in Yemen need to recognize that using banned cluster munitions is harming civilians,” Human Rights Watch researcher Ole Solvang. “These weapons can’t distinguish military targets from civilians, and their unexploded submunitions threaten civilians, especially children, even long after the fighting.”

The fighting in Yemen is not just destroying the fabric of that nation; it has broader implications for the Middle East. While Iran denies direct involvement, it gives military aid to the Houthis, supports them politically and strongly condemns the Saudi intervention in Yemen.

The United States and the European Union have weighed in on the side of the Saudis, helping with intelligence sharing, targeted assistance and advisory and logistical support. This may have a negative influence on the Iran nuclear talks, with hard-liners in Iran using Yemen as an example of why it is impossible to have a rapprochement with the West.

Another negative side-effect of the conflict is that it has strengthened the radical al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP considers the Houthis—who are Shiites—to be heretics, and the Houthis have been fighting AQAP for years. The present situation gives AQAP more breathing space, and effectively—in this battle—it puts the Saudis and the US on the same side as AQAP, the very force that has been the target of US drone strikes. To make matters even worse, the present constellation of forces has opened the doors for new radical players to emerge: the Islamic State (IS). In fact, IS made its bloody debut in Yemen on March 20, when it attacked a Shiite mosque in a pro-Houthi area, killing about 130 people.

The UN-brokered peace talks are a long shot, but they are a critical effort to quell the violence. Initially, the Houthis had called for a ceasefire as a precondition to the talks, while Hadi’s precondition was the withdrawal of the Houthis from the areas they seized. UN negotiators convinced both sides to come to the table without preconditions. They hope the talks will result in a ceasefire, increased delivery of humanitarian aid and a withdrawal plan for the Houthis. But it is unclear as to whether the Saudis—who will not be at the talks—will agree to stop their intervention.

Meanwhile, for ordinary Yemenis, they can only hope for a miracle in Geneva so they can start to rebuild their shattered lives.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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On March 26, a -led military coalition—composed of ten Sunni Muslim states, including all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members except Oman—launched “Operation Decisive Storm” in . The coalition’s objectives were three-fold: roll back the gains made by Ansar Allah (Yemen’s dominant militia), restore President ’s government, and bring security and stability to the country.

Although the Saudis have since declared their mission accomplished, military operations have resumed under the re-branded moniker “Operation Restoring Hope.” It is, however, difficult to imagine how a military campaign, especially one limited to airstrikes, could achieve these objectives.

The coalition’s strikes, albeit aggressive in nature, have thus far had little effect on Ansar Allah’s advances. One of the original goals was to prevent the Houthis from seizing Aden. WhileĚýthe city remains heavily contested, the Houthis were able to seize portions large enough to force President Hadi to flee to safety in Riyadh. Currently, the city remains captured by pitched fights between Houthi cadres and local militias—known as popular resistance committees—backed by Saudi air power. Despite the destruction being meted out in the city from the Saudi strikes, the Houthis show no signs of relenting.

The Houthis have advanced far outside their northwestern province of Saada, beyond the capital city of Sana’a, and are now fighting local groups for control in several southern provinces, including Abyan and Shabwa. Interestingly, the strikes led by the Saudi military coalition are not focused on the critical southern front. Although coalition bombs have struck hotspots in Aden and Taiz, they have also pummeled Houthi strongholds in northern Saada province, in Sana’a and in the coastal cities of Hodeidah and Haradh.

If the coalition strikes are aimed at immobilizing the Houthis, their mission has patently failed. While there have been notable raids into Saudi territory, Houthi manpower remains focused on the local resistance in Yemen’s southern provinces where the outcome of the war will be decided.

The Fall of Yemen’s “Legitimate” President

Hadi’s legitimacy has been the primary justification for the Saudi Arabian campaign, but his supposed legitimacy had always been tenuous; and for the past year, it has declined in the eyes of a growing number of Yemenis.

The president-in-exile began as former President ’sĚýunassuming vice-president, selected as the result of a GCC-sponsored bargain that saw Saleh’s resignation and the ratification of Hadi, the only candidate on the ballot. As a cautious yet somewhat incompetent caretaker, Hadi prolonged the transition process when decisiveness was needed, and he moved precipitously at times when consensus was critical. Hadi all but ignored the many conflicts that raged around Yemen—the Houthis’ feud with al-Ahmar tribes, the recurring clashes involving al-Hirak (the Southern Separatist Movement), as well as tribal conflicts in Hadramawt and Marib—hoping that the document agreed upon at the January 2014 National Dialogue Conference would solely define Yemen’s future.

Since August 2014, Yemen’s limping economy has become altogether paralyzed, and widespread insecurity has devolved into outright war. Currently, the Yemeni president calls for the coalition to continue bombing Houthi targets. What remains of his support comes from those who view him as the most viable agent for resisting the Houthis. The same is true of Hadi’s legitimacy.

The Coalition’s Destabilizing Impact on Yemen

Paradoxically, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir has announced that the bombing campaign will continue until “Yemen is back to security, stability and unity.” As a neighboring country, Saudi Arabia has a vested interest in Yemen’s stability, yet the coalition’s ongoing military campaign is destroying the vestiges of that very stability.

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The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that the violence has claimed nearly 2,000 lives, with the caveat that this figure is most likely grossly underestimated. Prior to the conflict, Yemen imported over 90% of its food. Currently, 12 million Yemenis are believed to be food insecure; 16 million lack access to clean water. The Saudi Arabian-imposed blockade will cause this figure to skyrocket as the campaign continues. The resulting persistent power outages and the lack of access to fuel, clean water and medical supplies have created a level of instability that a Houthi government could not remotely imitate.

Amid the tumult, the immediate threat of (AQAP) looms larger than ever. On April 16, the group seized control of Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt province. Yet the coalition’s strikes have completely avoided AQAP.

Washington’s role in Operation Decisive Storm has been largely logistical, but nonetheless supportive. In spite of this support, US military officials have appeared confused about the goals of the Saudi-led bombing campaign. The day after the operation was launched, Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of the US Central Command, told reporters: “I don’t currently know the specific goals and objectives of the Saudi campaign, and I would have to know that to be able to assess the likelihood of success.”

Despite a professed ignorance of operational goals, the US is on board as a junior partner. Other US officials have stated that the goal of the bombing campaign is to coerce a political solution. However, this contradicts the statements of Hadi and his backers in Riyadh. Hadi himself has called for the coalition to continue bombing his country until the Houthis are defeated. The Saudis have similarly stated that the terms for a ceasefire must be Houthi disarmament and the restoration of Hadi’s presidency. These are not terms characteristic of political solutions, but rather of military defeat. Despite White House statements, Washington and its Sunni Arab allies are simply not on the same page in Operation Decisive Storm.

The , if it can muster the will, may be able to halt the onslaught by pressuring its Arab allies to agree to a ceasefire. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia remains deeply committed to the unrealistic goal of reinstalling the Hadi government. Hadi’s newly appointed vice president, Khaled Bahah, is well-liked by a wide range of political factions, but what support he enjoys is certain to diminish as long as he remains in Riyadh.

There are many ways for Bahah to right the course and revive political negotiations, yet the politics surrounding the current calamity remain beside the point as the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. Stability in Yemen will require Saudi Arabia and the coalition to cease bombing the Arab world’s poorest country. If the military campaign persists, a greater number of Yemenis, who have thus far refused to choose between an array of bad options, will feel greater pressure to commit to one side or another.

*[A version of this article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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DespiteĚý declaring an end to Operation Decisive Storm, victory still seems elusive for either side in as the Saudi-led coalition continues to bomb targets and exerts efforts to coordinate local ground forces. The air campaign has eliminated a number of Houthi and high value military targets, but it has come at a cost in civilian casualties, mainly in the YemeniĚýcapital, Sana’a.

Amid talk of a ceasefire and new dialogue, as Saudi Arabia Operation Renewal of Hope on April 21, Houthi leaders remain resilient as militias hold ground in Sana’a and besiege the southern port city of Aden and Taiz in central Yemen. Recent developments point to a protracted ground war to be led by a number of military and tribal leaders loyal to Yemeni PresidentĚý against the Houthis and thoseĚýloyal to former President .

In the political arena, President Hadi, who remains in Riyadh after fleeing Yemen earlier this year, appointed former Prime Minister Khaled Mahfoudh Bahah as his new vice-president to ensure continuity of the government in exile. With assistance from Saudi Arabia, providing weapons and munitions to pro-Hadi militias since the start of the military campaign in March, financial support has led to a number of military and tribal leaders across Yemen’s southern provinces joining the fight on the president’s side.

But a defiant speech by Houthi rebel leader on April 19 underscored the Saudi-led coalition’s mounting challenges. Ongoing airstrikes causing civilian casualties, and gains made by (AQAP) in eastern Yemen,Ěýsimply fuel the Houthis’ resolve to remain on the offensive. In his speech, al-Houthi called upon Yemenis to remain steadfast against the Saudi aggression, and he warned parties and individuals of dire consequences for supporting foreign intervention.

Former President Saleh and his party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), have responded to mounting international pressure by reaching out to neighboring Gulf states in order to start a new round of talks.ĚýIn a speech after al-Houthi’sĚýtelevised address, Saleh agreed to work toward a ceasefire as recommended by United Nations Security Council Resolution of April 14. His words caused an instant reaction from the Houthi camp, threatening to abandon their fragile alliance with the deposed president.

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A Fight Over Legitimacy

Every side involved in the ongoing conflict has created its own narrative of legitimacy: Houthis regard themselves as the legitimate representatives of the popular revolution in 2011; southern factions claim a legitimate right to self-determination; deposed President Saleh claims the legitimacy of constitutional continuity; the Sunni Islamist party al-Islah and its allies claim legitimacy through popular support against Saleh’s 33-year rule; President Hadi clings onto legitimacy through having been elected in a one-man election; while Saudi Arabia claims a right to restore order at its southern flank under the (GCC) agreement of 2011.

Saudi Arabia’s primary concern has been to prevent a protracted civil war in Yemen that could spill across its southern border.ĚýMany critics have claimed Operation Decisive Storm actually hastened this scenario, which local observers felt was preventable through ongoing UN-mediated talks between all political parties, which had stalled rather than collapsed.ĚýSaudi Arabia’s newly appointed foreign minister and former ambassador in Washington, Adel al-Jabeir, claimed the kingdom “would do anything necessary [to restore] the legitimate government in Yemen,” meaning President Hadi.

A top objective for the military campaign was to restore order and force the “Iranian proxy” to abandon all government institutions and give up its weapons. The order of concern to Yemen’s northern neighbor and long-time financial supporter is rooted in the 2011 GCC agreement and the stability required to prevent dissent within its own borders.ĚýThe six Gulf monarchies composing the GCC were not about to allow a Shiite-aligned militia to inspire revolt within fragile societies in a post-Arab Spring era.

Shaping Yemen’s Future?

A more difficult task, the Saudi-led military campaign aims to reestablish Saudi Arabia’s ability to shape Yemen’s future. Saudi ties to a whole range of actors in Yemen reach back decades. But the breakdown of order in 2011 damaged Saudi Arabia’s relations with Yemeni political and tribal actors. The uprising ignited a conflict Saudi Arabia had worked arduously to prevent since 1967.

At the end of the revolution against the last Zaydi imam — who Saudi Arabia supported — in northern Yemen, Saudi Arabia established itself as the patron of numerous military, political and tribal leaders, a role later re-enforced following the short civil war between north and south in 1994.

The order created under the ruling triumvirate of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Gen. Ali Muhsin and prominent Shaykh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar broke in March 2011 when Muhsin joined the uprising sponsored by Hamid bin Abdullah al-Ahmar. Relations between the three camps had already begun to strain following the death of Shaykh Abdullah in 2007 and were exacerbated by Saleh’s alleged attempt to eliminate Muhsin in order to install his eldest son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, as his successor. The 2011 uprising weakened Saleh politically and hurt his relations with Saudi Arabia, the sponsor of the GCC agreement replacing him.

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Furthermore, while Muhsin and Shaykh Abdullah’s clan jockeyed for control of the state under Hadi, the Houthi rebels delivered a historic death blow to the Ahmar family and their military and tribal allies in Amran in July 2014, and then moved against the latter’s political ally, al-Islah, later in September.

Saudi Arabia appears to fear the rise of a new order in Yemen challenging its position as the hegemon in the Arabian Peninsula. The kingdom was not completely comfortable with the outcome of Yemen’s nine-month long National Dialogue Conference, in particular the proposal to establish a six-region federal system. The emergence of unfamiliar new centers of power, especially following the breakup of the Bakil and Hashid tribal confederations in northern Yemen, laid the foundations for an unpredictable future along Saudi Arabia’s southern flank.

Hashid tribes, controlled by the Ahmar family throughout theĚý20^thĚýcentury, were pillars of the republican regime. After the conflict in Amran — Ahmar territory —Ěýtribal members like Khalid Ahmed al-Radhi say: “Hashid is no longer the same as [we knew] it, one solid tribe following one leader … Hashid was divided in 2011, [and it] will be that way until someone steps up and takes the lead.”

Bakil, which lacked Hashid’s cohesion under Ahmar, is also divided among Saleh’s supporters, allies of the Islah party and some supporting the Houthi rebels. This fracturing of the established order, particularly in north Yemen, worries Saudi Arabia as the battle over control of the state may bring years of instability at the kingdom’s doorstep.

The Ground Offensive: Who’s Who?

The Saudi-led military campaign planned for a ground assault following an extensive air campaign. Saudi Arabia believed allies like Egypt, Pakistan and Sudan would supply troops for an incursion to secure physical territory in Yemen. In an unexpected turn of events, two weeks into Operation Decisive Storm, Pakistan’s parliament issued a resolution preventing the government from sending troops into Yemen.ĚýSuch developments led to a change in strategy, increasing delivery of weapons and money to elements in south Yemen pledging to fight Houthi rebels.

Adding to new challenges faced by the Saudi-led coalition is the fact President Hadi already lacked significant support among military officers prior to leaving for Saudi Arabia.ĚýOthman BaBoukhan, a London-based southern activist, told this author: “Hadi completely lost any influence over any trained army [units] to take back Aden” from Houthi rebels.

Lacking an exit strategy, and refusing to engage in talks until Houthis lay down their weapons, hopes now rest on Commander Thabet Muthana Jawas from the southern Lahj governorate bordering Aden, who leads a small unit trying to take back al-Anad air base located in the governorate. Jawas was initially rejected as commander of the Special Security Forces (SSF) in Aden by the Houthis, accusing him of being one of those responsible for killing Hussein al-Houthi, the founder of the Zaydi-Shiite rebel group, in 2004.

Thabet Jawas, Gen. Abdulrahaman al-Halili and individuals likeĚýSaleh bin Farid and Awadh al-Thawsli in Shebwa province represent Hadi’s primary ground forces, along with elements of the Hadhramawt Tribal Confederacy (HTC). Tribal elements in central Mareb province are far from pledging allegiance to Hadi, but they are suspected of receiving aid coordinated from Riyadh.

Some tribal camps in Mareb have been pictured displaying Saudi Arabia’s flag on tents and vehicles. But Jawas, Halili and the HTC are highly fragmented elements tasked with recruiting men to fight Houthis on the ground. By dropping weapons, munitions, communications equipment and cash, Saudi Arabia hopes to encourage elements to pledge allegiance to Hadi and facilitate coordination between groups across southern provinces, from Aden to Shebwa and Hadhramawt. The problem, as media outlets have reported, is that Saudi Arabia lacks a plan to secure Hadi’s legitimacy and that of his office, meaning continuity of the transition process.

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A recent Reuters , citing an official Yemeni source, said that 300 tribal fighters were trained in Saudi Arabia and then sent back to their home area in the Sirwah district of Mareb province. The same report also noted that heads of tribes were invited to a meeting in Riyadh in an effort to build a united front against the Houthis.

Saudi Arabia’s efforts to shape the conflict on the ground, by mainly dropping military supplies and cash, are having mixed results. Houthi rebels have been quick to post pictures of Saudi weapons captured nearly after every drop in the area of Aden. Others post pictures of weapons with Saudi Arabia’s logos being sold in the black market. Aside from logistical errors, the air drops, particularly in Aden, have played a major role in shaping the conflict. Adenis, previously dedicated to a peaceful revolution and simply employing civil disobedience to protest Sana’a’s grip, have now prevented the Houthi militia from taking full control of the province with weapons provided by Saudi Arabia.

With the announcement of Operation Renewal of Hope, a second phase said to involve talks about a political solution as well as troop mobilization at the Saudi-Yemen border, observers remain concerned over the nature of the coming ground operation. Concerns over the start of a ground offensive have increased, even as an initiative by the Sultanate of Oman aims to de-escalate the conflict and restart talks. The urgency to restart peace talks was also highlighted by Omani diplomat Abdullah al-Ba’dy, who was quoted during an event hosted by the Arab Center as saying the conflict of today may produce a Yemen beyond control.

The fear of a protracted among a number of observers in Sana’a is that the Saudi-led coalition is empowering local actors that will challenge central authority for years to come. This also reflects the observation that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be able to launch its own independent ground offensive. Members of the southern secessionist movement have yet to pledge support for Hadi as the legitimate president, especially since heĚýcontinues to support Yemen’s unity, which southerners reject outright.

Each side merely sees the other as an instrument of resistance against Houthis. At the moment, military and tribal leaders have one target: defeating the Houthi militias. But the big question is: How will this translate into support for Hadi’s return? In a protracted armed conflict with Houthis these military officers and tribal leaders may simply become a type ofĚýproconsul, well-funded and armed regional administrators of battle-fronts for Saudi Arabia, in the absence of an organized ground offensive that brings about an end to hostilities.

Such a move would expand the authority and security vacuum across Yemen. The window of opportunity to avert this scenario is small, but it still exists. Only a comprehensive dialogue can empower the role of state institutions and restore legitimacy to central authority.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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