51³Ô¹Ï

Hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Houthi rebels have been on pause since April 2022, but the pathway to peace is unclear. As the fragile détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran-backed Houthi rebels enters its 19th month, a diplomatic impasse is leading to . between the parties in April. A month later, in the South, a group of secessionist parties belonging to the Southern Transitional Council (STC) the Southern National Pact (SNP). The parties demanded a greater voice for the South in the Yemeni peace process and their commitment to establishing an independent state there.

The announcement sent shockwaves throughout Yemen. The Houthis and Muslim Brotherhood affiliate al-Islah immediately complained, but Saudi authorities and fellow members of the Saudi-led coalition — formally on the same side of the war as the STC — also expressed concerns about the strengthening of the southern parties. Saudi Arabia fears it could lose influence over parties within the Political Leadership Council (PLC), the internationally recognized Yemeni government’s executive body.

The first step taken by Saudi Arabia following the STC announcement was to convene a series of meetings in Riaydh with rivals of the STC that represent Hadhramaut, in the country’s east. The meetings in the establishment of a National Hadhrami Council (NHC), in an apparent move to counter the STC’s Southern National Pact.

Other parties formed the People’s High Council of Resistance, based in the center of the country, for similar purposes.

Some observers these developments as progress among the opponents of the Houthi in preparation for a break in the Saudi–Houthi détente. On the ground, however, it is obvious the new council is a reaction to growing STC momentum. Yemeni political factions seem to be more concerned about southern secessionism than about the threat the Houthis pose.

What has the STC decided, and why now?

PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi had exacerbated North–South tensions in February when he the southern issue as a priority. This angered southerners and put pressure on the STC to act.

Undoubtedly, this hastened the organization of the Aden dialogue hosted by the STC in early May. Southern factions were quick to exploit the optics of the week-long conference through well-coordinated media campaigns. They a general audience access to the participants. Longtime political rivals in Aden. With over 30 factions the SNP, the STC now serves as the umbrella organization for southerners. This is a significant development following recognition under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement as the representative of the southern peoples.

The STC also announced a major of its executive leadership. It expanded its membership by including some former rivals, including PLC members Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani and Abd al-Rahman al-Mahrami (aka Abu Zaraa’a) as co-vice presidents along with Ahmed Saeed bin Breik. and bin Breik are former governors of Hadhramaut and former commanders of the Second Region Command there. This move not only cemented the strategic importance of Hadhramaut, Yemen’s largest province, but it also placed of the South within the PLC itself — three of them within the eight-member council.

The accession of Bahsani, a Hadhrami, and Abu Zaraa’a, a Salafi leader from Lahj, as vice presidents could highlight two goals of the STC. The first is to cement the influence of the South within the PLC with regard to Saudi Arabia. The members of the PLC are seen as hand-picked by Saudi Arabia, so their legitimacy and influence cannot be questioned. Second, the vice presidents are military leaders with a history of opposition to al-Islah’s influence in the South. As former commanders of the Second Region, based in Mukalla in southern Hadhramaut, bin Breik and Bahsani represent the southerners’ to the al-Islah-affiliated First Region Command, based in Sayyun in northern Hadhramaut. Further, Abu Zaraa’a served as commander of the STC-affiliated Amalaqa Brigades, which act as the tip of the southern forces’ spear from the Red Sea coast to Shabwah. In an environment of constant rebalancing acts, the message is abundantly clear.

Saudi overreach derails Riyadh Agreement

The success of the STC-led dialogue among southern factions has undoubtedly raised fears of southern secessionist ambitions. among Yemeni parties have grown since the signing of the , which legitimized the STC, in November 2019. Now, nearly four years since the agreement and a year and a half after the establishment of the PLC, all efforts to stabilize the liberated areas and unite the Houthi’s rivals have failed.

The STC has gained tremendous momentum since former president Hadi the al-Islah-affiliated governor of Shabwah with an ally of the STC in December 2021. The conflict between al-Islah and the STC then shifted to northern , with the STC the ouster of the al-Islah-affiliated leadership of the First Regional Command. These developments have raised concerns in Riyadh over the extent of influence by the STC beyond its core in Aden, possibly consolidating in northern Hadhramaut along the Yemen-Saudi border.

Saudi Arabia has attempted to solidify its influence in Hadhramaut. Observers in south Yemen remain unsettled by Saudi Arabia’s decision to host tribal leaders from soon after the STC dialogue conference in Aden. The gathering of Hadhrami was made public from the first flight from Sayyun to Riyadh aboard a Saudi aircraft. Meetings in were also broadcasted by media outlets, and on the group the establishment of the Hadhramaut National Council (HNC). The charter, yet to be made public, was then on July 27. Al-Islah was the first political party to signing the charter.

Further antagonizing the STC and its base across southern Yemen, members of the new council met with Saudi officials and Alimi. The composition of the council, with a number of leaders from the , makes it appear to be a direct rival to the STC. Among the notable of the council are Bader Basalama, Mohsen Basura, Adel Bahamid and Abdullah Saleh Al Kathiri. Other high-profile leaders on the council include members of the General People’s Congress (GPC), the former ruling party under deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alimi is also a member of the GPC.

Tension further escalated in early July when the STC organized a outside the and gunmen affiliated with members of the new council met unarmed demonstrators. In neighboring Shabwah, another group of tribal leaders announced the Alliance of Sons and Tribes of , another attempt to challenge the STC.

The latest move exacerbating tensions among competing parties was the announcement of the Supreme for al-Jawf and Mareb under Hamoud , a sheik from Taiz. Sheik Hamoud, an al-Islah affiliate, resides in Turkey but remains highly influential in the city of Taiz. This new council has met even within Mareb City, a stronghold of al-Islah. It is undetermined if Saudi Arabia knows about or supports this group.

The factional lines are being drawn. As Saudi Arabia draws together its anti-STC allies, it puts the unity established by the Riyadh Agreement at risk.

Imminent escalation on two fronts

Meanwhile, optimism remains among UN officials who view the lopsided of April 2023 as a step forward. The completion of the oil from the off the Red Sea of Hodeida is also touted as a major diplomatic victory by the UN. This has led the mainstream consensus to share the UN’s optimism about their efforts to restart the peace process. However, the Safer operation’s costs now surpass the current potential revenue from the oil. The wreck, in any case, remains under Houthi control and is still vulnerable to floating released by them.

UN Diplomatic Success in a Potential Oil Disaster

Despite UN positivity, the fragile détente is on the brink of collapse. Houthis continue to clash with southern forces in al-Dhale and Yafa’, and new clashes have been reported across Taiz. The Saudi–Houthi détente has merely eliminated cross-border while the rebels have reinforced their positions across all fronts. Furthermore, the Houthi head of the Supreme Political Council (SPC), Mahdi al-Mashat, recently new cross-border missile strikes.

Saudi Arabia evidently expects an imminent escalation by the rebels. Houthi tactics always involve escalating rhetoric or increasing to extract maximum concessions from Saudi Arabia or the UN. The period since October 2022 has seen any changes in Houthi behavior. They only adhered to Saudi Arabia’s agreement on halting cross-border strikes because it has allowed them to , train and redeploy militia across their territory.

With crisis looming, US Special Envoy Tim is once again in the following a visit by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg to in August.

Saudi Arabia’s move to support the establishment of new subregional councils in Hadhramaut and Shabwah, in particular, may prove highly counterproductive. As the Houthis prepare for a renewal of hostilities within Yemen and across the border, the emergence of competing councils will exacerbate the fragmentation of the Houthi’s rivals. Saudi Arabia hopes to unify anti-Houthi factions under the Riyadh Agreement, but its mismanagement of rivalries across southern Yemen and within the PLC has paved the ground for potentially larger losses in Hodeida and Taiz. Ultimately, Houthis may choose to re-engage southern forces, a move which could drag the United Arab Emirates — which the Houthis have — back into the conflict and further destabilize the region.

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.