One of the most consequential of these developments is the weakening of Iran’s regional leverage. Mounting economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and security challenges across several fronts have constrained Tehran’s ability to sustain influence through its proxy networks. This has direct implications for Yemen, where the have benefited significantly from Iranian political and military support.Ěý

A by a UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has highlighted how Iranian support has enhanced the Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities, enabling the group to conduct attacks not only within Yemen but also against regional infrastructure and maritime shipping routes. Should Iran’s ability to maintain support for the group decline, the Houthis’ operational reach and political leverage will diminish, thereby creating space for new political arrangements to stabilize the country.Ěý

Gulf strategic realignment and opportunities for cooperation

For Saudi Arabia, the evolving regional context presents an opportunity to reassess its Yemen policy. Over the past decade, Riyadh’s approach to Yemen has largely been driven by security concerns, particularly the necessity to counter Houthi expansion and limit Iranian influence along Saudi Arabia’s southern border. While these priorities remain relevant, changing regional dynamics may enable Saudi Arabia to adopt a broader strategy that emphasizes long-term stability over short-term security considerations. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) could play a role in this expansive strategy.ĚýĚý

Although between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have intensified in recent years due to their competing visions over Yemen’s political future, especially regarding the role of the Emirati-backed southern separatists, the wider regional security environment is shifting rapidly. Escalating tensions following the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, which prompted an Iranian retaliation on and in the Gulf, have underscored the interconnected nature of Gulf security.

In this context, current regional instability may paradoxically create an opportunity for cooperation, as heightened security threats often encourage greater coordination among partners who share common security vulnerabilities. The issue of Southern Yemen could therefore transform from a point of divergence into a platform for renewed strategic cooperation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. 

Stabilization prospects in Southern YemenĚý

Despite years of conflict, Yemen’s southern regions have retained relatively security structures and administrative institutions. These local capacities provide a solid foundation for broader stabilization efforts in the region focused on governance reform, economic recovery and institutional development. Through coordinated Gulf support, strengthening such capacities could help create conditions conducive to sustainable stability.Ěý

The past decade of conflict has demonstrated that a military approach alone cannot deliver lasting peace in Yemen. Durable stability in the country will depend on , effective governance and partnerships rooted in local legitimacy. This is particularly important given South Yemen’s strategic geographic location. The region borders the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most vital , through which an estimated 10–12% of global seaborne trade passes via the Red Sea corridor. Ensuring security along these waterways is therefore both a regional priority and a matter of global economic significance.Ěý

Current regional dynamics offer Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the opportunity to expand their role in Yemen beyond short-term security objectives. Moreover, geopolitical developments provide an opportunity for Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to reconcile, thereby contributing to a more stable future for southern Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula.

However, it is vital for southern political actors to strengthen governance performance and demonstrate commitment to inclusive and accountable administration. Yemen’s long-term stability will ultimately depend on political arrangements that reflect realities on the ground and address the aspirations of the country’s diverse regions. 

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Josef Olmert, an Israeli academic and political commentator, dives into US President Donald Trump’s latest proposals for Gaza and the wider Middle East. Olmert lays out his sharp critiques and his alternative vision. The conversation ranges from the feasibility of mass resettlement of Gazans, to the imperative of destroying Hamas, to the overriding challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Olmert’s initial confusion

Olmert begins by admitting his confusion. For years, Trump positioned himself as an isolationist, pulling America out of international organizations and pushing to withdraw troops from conflict zones. Yet, in this instance, he called for US military involvement in the border region between Israel and Gaza, an area Olmert describes as “one of the most problematic, dangerous and volatile regions of the world.” To him, the contradiction is striking.

Olmert concedes that Trump possesses a certain originality and “out-of-the-box” vision for solving regional problems. Still, he sees fundamental flaws. Trump assumes a single event or plan can provide a sweeping solution to the Middle East’s problems. Olmert pushes back firmly: “It doesn’t work like that.” Countless grand plans, from peace conferences to international accords, have failed because the Middle East is too diverse, fractured and historically laden with conflict.

Olmert also highlights Trump’s reliance on economic logic. As a businessman, the president tends to see commercial fixes as the path to stability. Olmert acknowledges that raising living standards is desirable, but he stresses that economic growth cannot erase deep-rooted political and ideological struggles. In his words, “The entire foundation, therefore, of the approach is wrong.”

The Gaza population dilemma

Olmert then addresses Trump’s focus on Gaza’s demographic challenge. With over two million people packed into a small territory lacking sufficient infrastructure, the humanitarian strain is undeniable. Olmert agrees that the Gaza Strip “cannot cater for a population of over two million people.” Trump suggested emigration as a remedy, with other countries absorbing Gazans.

While Olmert admits some Gazans might want to leave voluntarily, he dismisses the idea. No country can realistically resettle such numbers, certainly not in a short timeframe. Even if partially successful, the region would destabilize in the transition. He draws on history, recalling how the Oslo Accords quickly unraveled under pressure from opponents. Any drawn-out evacuation, he insists, would invite chaos.

Hamas and security imperatives

Despite his skepticism, Olmert identifies actionable points in Trump’s rhetoric. Chief among them is the call to dismantle the Palestinian Sunni militant group Hamas, which governs Gaza. Olmert stresses his long-held conviction that “if you want to achieve peace along the border between Israel and Gaza, Hamas has to be totally destroyed.” He rejects the notion that peace is possible with actors who categorically oppose coexistence.

He also aligns with Trump on freeing Israeli hostages but asks the crucial question: how? Once again, the removal of two million Gazans is not the answer. Instead, the focus must remain squarely on neutralizing Hamas.

Regional players and fragile balances

Turning to neighboring states, Olmert briefly considers the potential roles of Egypt and Jordan. Egypt, he suggests, might absorb a limited number of people. Jordan, however, already has a fragile demographic balance, with up to 70% of its population being of Palestinian origin. Bringing more Gazans would, in his view, risk destabilizing the Hashemite Kingdom.

While critics of Jordan often highlight corruption or weak institutions, Olmert counters that the monarchy has endured for a century — dismantling it could open doors to even greater instability. “The devil you know sometimes is better than the devils you don’t know,” he says.

Olmert also raises cost concerns. Any plan would require massive financial incentives. Ultimately, he argues, the burden would fall on the US taxpayer.

Saudi Arabia enters the conversation as well. Trump publicly claimed that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had expressed opposition to a Palestinian state. Olmert considers this disclosure a blunder. Statements that might be tolerated in private, he warns, become problematic when voiced openly, forcing Saudi leaders to deny them.

Iran as the true challenge

For Olmert, the real strategic focus should remain on the Islamic Republic of Iran. He criticizes Trump’s vague comments about sanctions and his willingness to meet the Iranian president. What disturbed him most was the absence of even the boilerplate statement of “all the options on the table.”

He argues that Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional influence are “the key.” Destroying Iran’s nuclear program, he asserts, would have a far greater stabilizing impact than resettling Gazans. Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, live under constant fear of Iran’s expansionist ambitions. Curtailing the nation, he says, would also shift Palestinian attitudes.

Even so, Olmert does not present this as a cure-all. He admits that removing Iran’s nuclear capacity will not solve everything, but it has a higher chance of promoting stability than Trump’s Gaza proposals. Delays in dealing with Tehran, he warns, would allow Iran to accelerate its nuclear program, creating an existential threat for Israel that “Israel should not accept.”

The Israeli domestic reaction

Olmert also examines reactions inside Israel. Right-wing politicians in the ruling Likud party and ultranationalist ministers, such as Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, celebrated Trump’s words. Yet they overlooked one critical statement: Trump’s rejection of new settlements in Gaza. This could signal broader reservations about settlement policy, including in the West Bank.

Trump even promised an announcement regarding sovereignty in the West Bank, which Olmert interprets as an attempt to reconcile annexation of certain areas with a two-state framework. In his assessment, the Israeli right wing “doesn’t understand” that Trump operates within international constraints. Aligning too closely with his proposals, Olmert warns, risks global backlash and could isolate Israel.

Re-centering priorities

In closing, Olmert emphasizes what he sees as Israel’s true priority. While Trump shifts focus to Gaza, Olmert insists that “the main thing is still the Iranian problem.” For Israel, he says, the Gaza issue is secondary. Ensuring that the world’s attention remains on Iran — not on Trump’s impractical resettlement ideas — is the strategy Israel must pursue.

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51łÔąĎ Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch, a veteran of the Turkish capital of Ankara and the Middle East, explore Syria’s dramatic upheaval and its regional consequences. The conversation highlights the fall of the Assad dynasty, the ascent of new Sunni leadership and the recalibration of regional power involving Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Strategic shifts in the region

Ruch opens by stressing that Syria is undergoing profound strategic changes. He recalls predicting a decade ago that the old Syrian order would collapse, though he did not foresee such rapid change. He lists key developments: the collapse of Iran’s land corridor to the Lebanese Shiite military group Hezbollah, Turkey’s renewed influence, Russian and American hesitation and the re-emergence of energy projects such as a long-discussed Qatari pipeline through Turkey to Europe. These shifts, he argues, will shape not only the Middle East but also West Asia and Europe, especially regarding refugees.

The fall of the Assad regime

Singh summarizes the dramatic recent events: former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, ending 54 years of Ba’athist rule. The Alawite minority, dominant since 1970, has lost power, while Sunnis, led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the head of the former Islamist military group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), seized Damascus in a lightning ten-day offensive. Turkey’s intelligence chief prayed with Julani in the Umayyad Mosque, underscoring Ankara’s backing. Celebrations erupted across Sunni communities, from Pakistan to Bangladesh, marking the symbolic return of the Umayyad Mosque from Shia to Sunni hands.

Historical burdens and Turkish ambitions

Singh asks about Syria’s troubled past. Ruch traces its modern shape to the Sykes–Picot agreement and subsequent French mandate. He notes that outside powers have long dictated order in the region, from the Cold War to the Arab Spring. He emphasizes Turkey’s central role today, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, intelligence head İbrahim Kalın and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan projecting power rooted in Ottoman legacy. Turkey’s ambitions rest on military strength, economic reach and religious conviction. However, Ruch notes Arab mistrust persists, recalling how Egyptian women during the Arab Spring dismissed Turkish claims of returning.

New balances and fragile alliances

Ruch argues that Julani’s victory is significant but unstable. The challenge lies in power-sharing among Sunnis, Arabs, Kurds, Druze and Alawites, with mediation from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar. He cites the risk of fragmentation: Lebanon may split, Druze may seek Israeli protection, Kurds resist HTS and Alawites retreat to Russian-backed enclaves. Regional powers must negotiate a new balance, while outside actors such as Russia seek to preserve bases in Tartus and Latakia. The 2012 Geneva Communiqué, Ruch believes, still offers a guiding roadmap.

Turkish grooming of HTS and Western involvement

Ruch attributes Julani’s success to Turkish grooming over at least four years, with HTS supplied and trained through Turkey. He estimates HTS commands around 30,000 fighters and speculates that Gulf or even Western funding contributed to the group’s rise. Turkey also relies on the Syrian National Army, effectively an extension of its military, to pressure Kurdish forces.

Ankara’s strategic aim is to establish a 30-kilometer buffer zone free of Kurdish fighters, possibly with US President Donald Trump’s backing. Singh adds reports that Assad’s army collapsed partly because soldiers were unpaid, while Julani benefited from foreign funding. Ruch notes Western efforts to rebrand Julani, once hunted with a $10 million US bounty, into a suit-wearing political leader named Ahmed al-Sharaa, raising doubts over whether this transformation is cosmetic or substantive.

The wider geopolitical picture

The conversation turns to broader dynamics. Ruch highlights Christian minorities’ anxiety, Alawite resentment and the risk of revenge killings. He stresses that justice mechanisms will be essential to avoid cycles of violence. Regionally, he underscores rivalry among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt for Sunni leadership. Iraq, he suggests, could mediate despite its limitations, recalling its role in the 2023 Iran–Saudi rapprochement. Israel, meanwhile, destroyed Syrian air defenses and sought to prevent a hostile Sunni coalition.

While normalization with Gulf states advanced under the Abraham Accords, Ruch doubts lasting peace without a Palestinian state. He warns that, absent such a resolution, hostility will fester and could erupt in future crises as severe as the infamous October 7 attack on Israelis in 2023.

The broken map

Singh and Ruch agree that Syria, as once defined, will not return. The Humpty Dumpty metaphor looms over their discussion: the old order is shattered and cannot be rebuilt. Whether Julani and his Turkish patrons can forge an inclusive and durable framework remains uncertain. Regional rivalries, sectarian divides and unresolved grievances threaten renewed instability. Yet the stakes are immense: the future of Syria will ripple across West Asia, Europe and the balance of global power.

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Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Defense visit to the United States, his direct with Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi and the diplomatic visit of Saudi Foreign Minister to Moscow all reflect Saudi Arabia’s growing interest in regional conflict de-escalation and strategic diversification. These moves signal Riyadh’s willingness to engage with multiple actors to avoid further confrontation and to support a more stable regional balance.

Riyadh’s active diplomacy

The recent trip by Prince Khalid bin Salman to Washington, where he met with US President Donald Trump, marked one of Riyadh’s most significant diplomatic moves following the Iran-Israel hostilities. Reports byĚýandĚý indicate that the meeting focused on the regional security environment, the end of the Gaza hostilities and the issue of prisoner releases. In a public statement, Khalid bin Salman emphasized the importance of preserving regional stability and security. The timing of this meeting — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s own visit to the White House — underscored Saudi Arabia’s ambition to position itself as a constructive diplomatic actor.

From Tehran’s point of view, the meeting could be interpreted as a signal that Saudi Arabia seeks to avoid further escalation. The improvement in Iran–Saudi relations, especially following the China-brokered of March 2023, has created space for cautious diplomatic engagement. Riyadh increasingly recognizes that prolonged tensions with Iran could jeopardize not only regional stability but also its own ambitious economic transformation programs, such as (the set of goals released by the administration of President (then Prime Minister) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2010 and 2011). Trump’s remark that Iran may be open to negotiation — despite conflicting with the reality of the recent strikes — may partly reflect diplomatic pressure from Saudi Arabia to encourage dialogue over confrontation.

One of the most notable developments after the conflict was a direct phone conversation between Prince Khalid and Major General Mousavi. As reported by , the conversation addressed bilateral military issues and regional security concerns. This marked the first formal contact at this level between the two militaries in recent years and demonstrated Riyadh’s evolving willingness to open channels of communication with Tehran, even in the aftermath of heightened tensions.

While the missile strike by Iran on the in Qatar triggered condemnation by Gulf Arab states, there was notably no significant diplomatic fallout. Instead, diplomatic channels remained open. This suggests a regional preference — particularly in capitals like Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi — for crisis management rather than a return to prior confrontational policies. For Iran, this outreach signifies a shift in how Saudi Arabia is approaching regional diplomacy: one that includes Iran as a necessary interlocutor, not an adversary to be isolated.

Leveraging Moscow’s potential

In parallel with Khalid bin Salman’s visit to the US, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan traveled to Moscow to hold talks with Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. This move illustrates Riyadh’s effort to diversify its strategic partnerships and hedge against overdependence on the United States. According to Russian sources, the talks focused on enhancing bilateral ties and addressing Middle Eastern developments. A from President Vladimir Putin to the Saudi king earlier this year also reaffirmed the importance of Saudi-Russian cooperation.

The visit took place amid growing concerns in Riyadh over Israel’s unilateral military actions and perceived lack of restraint, which many Gulf states believe destabilize the region. Russia’s close relationship with Iran, particularly in the military and political domains, allows it to serve as a valuable intermediary. For Saudi Arabia, engaging Moscow is both a balancing act and a way to reinforce its own agency in shaping the post-conflict environment. From Tehran’s perspective, Riyadh’s outreach to Russia suggests a broader willingness to distance itself from US-led pressure strategies and consider multipolar solutions to regional challenges.

Regional anxiety over Israel’s conduct

To understand the current recalibration in Gulf foreign policy, one must consider shifting attitudes toward Israel’s role in the region. Following the recent conflict, many Gulf Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, have expressed unease over Israel’s aggressive posture in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and now Iran. There is a among Gulf states that Israel’s increasingly aggressive posture makes it an unpredictable actor capable of dragging the region into broader conflicts.

This growing discomfort stems in part from historical experiences, such as the from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its departure from Afghanistan, which have shaken confidence in Washington’s commitment to regional security. As a result, Gulf countries are exploring ways to reduce their strategic dependence on the US and seek a more balanced regional framework — one that includes Iran rather than excluding it.

These diplomatic developments present an opening for Iran to further stabilize its regional position. With its strategic geography, educated population and resilient infrastructure, Iran remains a key player in any future security architecture. The March 2023 agreement, brokered by China, has laid the groundwork for increased bilateral engagement, including military dialogue. The recent between Khalid bin Salman and General Mousavi illustrates this potential.

From Riyadh’s perspective, engaging Iran supports its broader goals of economic diversification and regional stability. Major development projects such as Vision 2030 depend on a stable Persian Gulf, unthreatened by escalation in areas like the Strait of Hormuz. For this reason, Saudi Arabia’s diplomacy increasingly emphasizes risk reduction, dialogue and pragmatic regionalism.

Iran, in turn, has an opportunity to present itself not only as a resilient actor but also as a cooperative one. The ability to rebuild damaged infrastructure and maintain deterrence, coupled with strategic outreach to neighbors, could reframe Iran’s image in the Gulf. Statements from and assessments from international bodies like the suggest that Iran’s nuclear capabilities remain intact and can be recalibrated within non-militarized frameworks, though the Trump administration that.

Toward a new Gulf equilibrium

Saudi Arabia’s active regional diplomacy and Iran’s strategic patience signal the potential for a new phase in Gulf relations. While mutual suspicions remain, both sides recognize the unsustainable nature of zero-sum competition. The inclusion of Russia and potentially China as diplomatic interlocutors further supports the move toward multipolar regional governance.

What emerges is the possibility of a Gulf security framework grounded in mutual interest, economic integration and strategic restraint. In this evolving context, Iran and Saudi Arabia could serve as pillars of a more balanced Middle East order — one defined not by rivalry, but by cooperative crisis management and long-term stability.

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FIFA’s response to past corruption scandals and willingness to award World Cup hosting rights to violators of the group’s human rights standards illustrate the organization’s rejection of meaningful change that would hold the group accountable. So do FIFA’s repeated, mostly cosmetic, reforms aimed at pacifying public and commercial clamouring for change.

The scandals and for FIFA’s Human Rights Policy and Code of Conduct are “only the of football’s problem iceberg. An extended troubleshooting list includes antiquated governance structures, growing financial imbalances, and inadequate safeguards for athletes, just to name some of the most pressing issues,” said law professor Jan Zglinski in a recent 26-page academic paper.

Mr. Zglinski argues that, potentially, Europe, a leader in regulating sports, and particularly soccer, as a sector of the economy, could emerge as the sport’s white knight.

Europe’s growing push for oversight

Should the EU force FIFA to reform? In doing so, Europe would deliver a body blow to FIFA and other international associations’ fictional assertion that sports and politics are separate rather than Siamese twins joined at the hip.

The European Commission would be in good company with multiple countries, including France, Spain, , , South Korea and Australia, seeking to regulate aspects of soccer governance in recent years, such as transparency, gender parity, athletes’ rights and sports integrity.

Britain, one of the world’s few countries to have rather than engage in public-private partnerships that outsource the management of the essential resource, may go the furthest with parliament debating a that would create an independent regulator with powers to oversee football finance, club ownership and fan engagement. The bill would likely model the regulator on the Water Services Regulation Authority, or Ofwat, Britain’s water supervisor.

The notion of a regulator goes to the core of the elephant in the room: the inseparable relationship between politics and sports that can only be overseen by an , and the adoption of a code of conduct.

While largely self-serving, international sports associations initially saw their refusal to acknowledge and police the relationship as a way of fending off government interference that would limit their autonomy.

Britain’s proposed regulator would institutionalize oversight of soccer associations but would stop short of explicitly empowering it to challenge their insistence on the fiction that sports and politics are separate.

Similarly, European debates on various ways to step up the regulation of sports associations, including FIFA, fall short of clearly addressing the elephant in the room that enables corruption, disregard of human and other rights and a lack of transparency and accountability.

Even so, various options under discussion would de facto, if not de jure, shatter the sports associations’ clinging to a fiction by imposing greater governmental scrutiny and/or regulation.

The options include greater scrutiny of FIFA and others’ conformity to EU market and competition rules, changing the nature of the European Union’s cooperation with soccer stakeholders or following Britain’s example by enacting a European Sports Act that would hold sports associations to minimum governance standards.

The standards, Mr. Zglinski suggests, could involve requirements for free, fair and regular elections, term limits for executives, representation of those stakeholders, who, at best, have a limited voice in decision-making such as women, players, clubs and fans, enhancing players’ and women’s rights and imposing adherence to adopted human rights standards, and rules to avoid conflicts of interest, possibly by in FIFA’s case, the group’s regulatory and commercial functions.

The myth of sports without politics

Any steps Europe may take would be applicable in the European Union only. Nevertheless, they would likely reverberate globally and strengthen critics who deplore the incestuous relationship between sports and politics, like in the case of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has spent billions of dollars to put the kingdom on the sports map, despite its abominable human rights record, and develop sports into a sustainable sector of the economy as part of a Saudi endeavour to wean the kingdom off its dependency on oil exports.

Saudi investments and lobbying have garnered the kingdom hosting rights for multiple Asian sports tournaments as well as the 2034 World Cup. “Allowing Saudi Arabia to make all these deals is a clear indication that there is human rights assessment,” said Abdullah Alaoudh, director for countering authoritarianism at the Middle East Democracy Center (MEDC).

Saudi Arabia has imprisoned since 2017 Mr. Aloudh’s father, Salman al-Ouda, a prominent, albeit controversial, religious scholar. FIFA’s evaluation of the Saudi World Cup bid classified the kingdom’s human rights record as a .

A global impact beyond Europe

Against the backdrop of a wave of European litigation challenging aspects of FIFA and European soccer body UEFA’s governance, European sports ministers last year the need for EU action. The ministers called on the Commission to protect solidarity and other principles of “values-based sport,” including democracy, equality, openness, sporting merit and social responsibility.

Recent litigation has challenged the legality of FIFA rules regarding premature contract termination, restrictions on free movement and competition, the implementation of sports arbitration, the status of transnational soccer leagues and the expansion of the Club World Cup, which risks compromising players’ health.

Mr. Zglinski advocates for European legislation as the most effective means of imposing reforms and democratizing sports governance. “Even if the prospect of the EU regulating football more extensively might not seem like the perfect solution, it may well be the least imperfect solution,” Mr. Zglinski said.

“The EU has the potential to positively influence sports governance at a global scale. This is important … in light of the fact that the most powerful federations governing the game, including FIFA and UEFA, are located outside the Union. EU action can be designed so that it applies to non-EU actors, as exemplified by the Digital Services and Markets Acts, which regulate the conduct of Big Tech companies regardless of where these are based,” Mr. Zglinski added.

Like many international sports associations, FIFA and UEFA are headquartered in Switzerland.

By adopting legislation, the EU would call a halt to FIFA and other associations’ failure to protect their most vulnerable stakeholders resulting in, for example, the displacement of communities in South Africa and Brazil to make space for the 2010 and 2014 World Cups, faulty labour practices involving workers constructing World Cup facilities and the Asian Football Confederation’s to honour a court’s condemnation of its disregard for a woman’s right.

“Change in sports governance rarely comes voluntarily—it requires external pressure… Football governing bodies have shown themselves to be incapable of governing the game in a democratic, fair, and socially responsive manner,” Mr. Zglinski said

“Their actions have harmed players, clubs, fans, as well as communities across the globe. Therefore, reform is imperative,” he added.

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Josef Olmert: Hello. Hi to my watchers, to my readers, to my followers. This is the fourth and last in my short series on US–Israel relations. And the idea is really to lead us to the current situation with US President Donald J. Trump, his second administration, with a brief review of his first and the in-between period of the US presidency of Joseph Biden — Joe Biden Jr. — as president. And then we’ll come to the current situation, with the exception that I have to make already now: that we are in a situation that is unfolding. And there might be people who say, “Oh, it’s too early even to talk about US–Israel relations under Donald Trump.” So what I’m going to do is, therefore, to talk about what I consider to be situations that already are fully now results, and maybe inevitable results, of what we already discussed, and how they are happening right now — not talked about, but happening.

Therefore, if we make any predictions for the future, they will be based on what I would consider to be a more solid ground. That’s about the methodics of all that. And I need to say, because I do get reactions, comments, responses from people who watch, read, and they are asking questions that lead me to say what I’m saying to you now.

The American Jewish community and Israel’s image problem

Josef Olmert: So today, very briefly, just to remind you: In our previous episode, we discussed more in-depth processes, mostly in the American Jewish community, that led to changes in attitudes towards Israel. And we touched upon, therefore, what was happening in Israel at the same time that might have led to these changes in American attitude towards Israel, but also the rise of new movements in the US that were either more or less supportive of Israel. Of course, the evangelical Christians on the one end being more supportive; the left-wing, the progressive movement on the other side, in the Democratic Party mainly, that has been much more negative, still is, and becoming more and more negative.

And that brings us, really, to the situation that we are going to delve into in great detail today in our episode.

Trump’s first term: populism, promises and policy shifts

Josef Olmert: And I would say to you that when President Trump was running for president in 2015, 2016, he was not taken seriously, not just by Jews, but also by ordinary America, of course, the commentators. And I cautioned people at the time — it’s not like an “I told you so, period” — but I cautioned people, because I talked to people about the significance of the politics of identities and populist politics altogether, in the unfolding political climate in the US, as well as in other Western democracies.

And by the way, I gave the comparison with Israel. I analyzed the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Bibi Netanyahu, at that time was already in his sixth year as prime minister in his second term, after the one that he was in from 1996 to 1999 — this one was from 2009; we talk about 2015, 2016 — that Netanyahu also succeeded in Israel with the politics of populism and identities. And this is a successful political card.

And Trump made promises about Israel, and everybody said, “No, I mean, don’t take them seriously.” And he fulfilled, to a large extent, a great deal of his promises. For example, the moving of the embassy to Jerusalem, which was, by the way, the policy of every American president before him, with the exception that they didn’t fulfill their decision because of whatever reason that they gave. That was basically based on the idea, “Yes, we say to the Israelis and to the Jews and to the pro-Israel community, we want to move the embassy — but we can’t do it now.”

Trump did it. Trump also withdrew out of the Iran nuclear deal, as was expected by the Netanyahu government in Israel.

Let me say something here: Netanyahu was not wrong in his opposition to the nuclear deal as was devised by President Obama’s administration. Where were the problems that he had, and they have to do with what’s happening now, so therefore I’m saying them now:

He didn’t know the limits of, or the ways in which to express, his opposition to the Obama administration policy, and therefore he made a terrible mistake of showing in Congress and giving his speech — that was in March of 2015. In January of 2015, that is to say, two months before, the speech was announced by then-Speaker John Boehner. (By the way, I have a picture with John Boehner in my study, because I met him before — I met many other people.) And I then cautioned from getting biting gifts — I cautioned Netanyahu not to do the speech. That was a big mistake.

It comes back to what we discussed before in the previous episode about bipartisanship, or lack thereof, under Netanyahu. It was a big mistake.

The other mistake, which might have even been bigger, was that while he said no to the deal as was devised by Obama — with the support of other powers, as part of Obama’s internationalist policy — he did not offer any alternative. He basically created the impression from day one that all he wanted was to see an American military operation against Iran — or else to justify an Israeli one. But even then, he was not preparing one.

In 2011, the Israeli military establishment was waiting for a word from Netanyahu that he was giving the green light for an attack on Iran. He asked for three days to make a decision. He then said no. And there still are reports to that effect that even today, he basically did not approve all kinds of plans that were supposed to finance projects that were designed to improve technological abilities that were to be connected with an attack on Iran and so on and so forth.

So Netanyahu basically said to Trump, “Cancel the agreement, period,” without offering an alternative.

Why is this important? Because it’s the same mistake he has done since the beginning of the war in Gaza, on the 7th of October 2023, to this very moment. While he said, “no, no, no, no, no,” to everything offered by other people, to other countries, including the best friends of Israel, he does not provide any alternative.

Then Trump, for example, said something which is again interesting: that when the US, with Israeli support, decided to eliminate the arch-terrorist Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, Netanyahu said yes. And then he said no, he would not be part of it. Which, by the way, caused ongoing damage in the relationship between him and Trump, because Trump — and that we know already — doesn’t like what seems to be weak people, leaders, losers. For Trump, the fact that Netanyahu did not show up in the end, as opposed to what Trump did, was an indication of lack of stamina, resolve, real determination.

But there were also examples of how Israel was so helpful to the American administration. For example, in the war against ISIS, I don’t know how many of my watchers and listeners and readers remember that Trump, in public, said something that compromised the invaluable, great support that Israel gave to American intelligence to locate ISIS targets in Syria. Israelis were furious. But Trump said, “He’s a great friend.”

MAGA and the limits of right-wing support

Josef Olmert: Trump gave a lot of support also in the UN, the national organizations. But Trump also was the leader of MAGA, and that’s the point that I want to emphasize here. And we saw it after the incident in Charlottesville — if I even call it an incident, I believe what happened there in 2017, referring to “good people on both sides.” I immediately wrote an in which I said, “There are no �both sides’ where there are swastikas.”

When Trump referred to “good people on both sides,” he also referred to those that were marching with people that waved the swastikas. That led me into discussion with myself about MAGA.

First of all, it was “America First,” which was a bad memory to me. For those who remember history — I mean, I don’t remember it from that time, but I know it — there was Charles Lindbergh with his America First Committee. That was basically a pro-Nazi domestic American organization that didn’t want America to join the Second World War. You can argue, “Okay, he just used the words; he didn’t mean very much.”

The MAGA movement is a nativist movement. The MAGA movement is isolationist. When you look at the roots of the MAGA movement, when you look at the terminology used, the symbols used, the organizations that were at the forefront of the movement, you have to come to the conclusion that this movement cannot be the pro-Israel movement that existed in the past under the great US President Ronald Reagan — when the world was divided according to the Cold War, and Israel was on that side, the good side. Or under US President George W. Bush, let alone previous presidents from before. Because their opinion about how the world is divided is totally different.

And nativist movements in America or in Europe, by definition, have more than a nucleus of antisemitism, because any movement which is also based on xenophobic feelings is bound to be antisemitic. And no antisemitic movement can be good to Jews, can be good to Israel. It’s as simple as that.

And it was very convenient to many Israelis to accept the better sides of Trump’s policies, but to ignore the roots of it that were based on assumptions and ideologies and terminologies which, as I said, by definition are not good to Jews and Israel.

And how many more times can I say it? How, with more decibels, stronger volume, to say it in order to make the point? Because it is a point that is still debated, even among Jews: What makes you really anti-Israel?

The MAGA movement was on the right side. The alternative to the MAGA movement as a mass mobilization political movement is the “woke” movement, which is, again, anti-Israel. The two most important political movements — and I say movements, not parties — in terms of mobilizing public opinion in the US from right and left, as developed in the last ten to 15 years, are not pro-Israel. And it’s just a question of time when these movements affect the political parties that they try to influence from the outside or by infiltrating from the inside. They already did it in the Democratic Party, and they are doing it now — and have done it — in the Republican Party.

And it will bring me to the current situation momentarily.

Biden’s presidency and the fracturing of democratic support

Josef Olmert: Joseph Biden Jr. — interesting fellow. I, by the way, met him personally: I had dinner with him in Tel Aviv in December of 2002, ahead of the invasion of Iraq. He came to visit the Middle East with a colleague from the Republican Party, Senator Chuck Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska who later became the moderate Republican defense secretary under US President Barack Obama; a much more moderate Republican than the Republican Party already at that time.

And Biden gave a brilliant prediction and analysis of what would happen in Iraq after the war. Because everybody knew there was going to be a war, the Bush administration would do it at that time. Much later on, I wrote an article in The Huffington Post, where I blogged for seven, eight years, praising Biden for the fact that he read and understood the situation in Iraq very properly. I also talked about the ethnic and sectarian divisions in all this.

The problem really is — and this is not something that we need to develop in this particular episode, because it’s much beyond the topic that we are discussing — Biden, who came to be president, was not the Biden of earlier years. And we understand it, Now we know more truth about it.

The Biden administration, from the beginning of its term, in all kinds of subtle ways that became much more obvious during the early stages of the war in Gaza — and much later on, as the war dragged on — developed the sense that we have problems with Israel. Exactly on the main core point of what the Israeli lobby and pro-Israeli lobbies all the time emphasized: that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a beacon of freedom, of human rights, of civility and all that comes with it.

The attack on Israel with regard to that was already at the time of Jimmy Carter. But who remembers Jimmy Carter? He was way back.

Now, Biden, whether wittingly or not — I would say intentionally — slowly, gradually, systematically, consistently built up the case in all kinds of ways, undermining this Israeli argument or claim to fame, if you will.

The forefront of it was what’s called “The Squad” in the Democratic Party. And it was much beyond it. It infiltrated and crept into the trade union movement, the labor movement that in the past was one of the beacons of support for Israel; minority communities — African Americans, but also Asian Americans, which is very interesting; Latinos — tolerating the infiltration of Qatar and other states into universities in America, Saudi Arabia and others — relying on people that were clearly not in the pro-Israel camp anymore, but were at various levels of being anti-Israel.

And the fact is that while still a majority of the Democratic caucus in the House voted with Israel, there was a growing number of the progressives that were already taking their distance. So you could see the cracks in the bipartisan coalition for Israel.

The Netanyahu speech was, in that case, a gift he gave to these people. A stupid gift. Terrible mistake, as I said.

Trump’s second term: strategic ambiguity

Josef Olmert: The Trump administration these days — let’s move on now. First of all, in the last campaign that brought Trump again to the presidency — he didn’t even talk about Israel. He talked about Israel or the Middle East, made very, very superficial, almost insignificant comments or references. The promises were not there, you know.

Everybody took for granted that Trump is pro-Israel and will continue to be. The person that completely misread all this was Benjamin Netanyahu, again, in Jerusalem, believing that somehow Trump is going to be the same Trump of the first administration. He ignored the fact that in second administrations, presidents do tend to change.

I would remind people here that even Ronald Reagan — a great friend and supporter of Israel — he is the president that gave the first kosher certificate to the PLO before he left his second term. He was the one who authorized the beginning of official contact between the US and the PLO in 1989, as an example. But I can give you other examples.

Then came the inauguration, and I noticed something very interesting: While the inauguration was taking place, immediately afterward, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff — I don’t get into too many details about him and his connections with Qatar, all this I leave to investigative journalism — but I don’t need to get into investigative journalism to analyze what he said on Inauguration Day, about what would be the four main pillars of American policy in the Middle East, the name “Israel” was not mentioned. The name “Iran” was not mentioned. The name “Hamas” was not mentioned.

Remember, it is in January of 2025, and the war was already raging from October of 2023. That was the first red light.

But forget about this. Maybe it was a ceremonial occasion. You don’t get into details, you just give main, big points and so on and so forth.

Gulf-centric policy and Israel’s marginalization

Then, of course, let’s see what has happened since then.

Some of his appointments have definitely been very pro-Israel. For example, Elise Stefanik, a congresswoman from New York, to be ambassador in the UN — and she made the point already, before: She’s going to fight hard about anti-Israelism in the UN as the first, if not the most important, but one of the main missions. This appointment, by the way, was canceled for all the obscure reasons. Why did he cancel her appointment, arguing that, “we need her in Congress,” when he did not cancel other appointments of people that had to resign from Congress and lead to early elections? I mean elections like in Florida. Well, I’m just leaving you with the question.

Ambassador Mike Huckabee — great, great supporter of Israel, there’s no question about it. But was he appointed as a policymaker? Or as the person that is supposed to say the good stuff to the Israelis, as opposed to the leaks coming consistently from the White House that are the bad stuff? Good cop, bad cop? Yeah — I leave my audience with this question.

All kinds of other appointments — I was skeptical about Pete Hegseth as defense secretary, for all kinds of reasons. I was skeptical about National Security Advisor Mike Waltz for all kinds of reasons. I did welcome the appointment, of course, of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, for all kinds of reasons.

But — you know — instead of getting into every little detail, like this appointment, that appointment, let’s try to talk about three or four particular issues that are typical of what has happened, and still is happening, and would lead me, therefore, to a conclusion at the end of this discussion.

Take, for example, the question of fighting terrorism. Proud American President Donald Trump surrendered. Yes, he surrendered to the Houthis in Yemen. He gave up to terrorists because he allows them, maybe even encourages them indirectly, to keep attacking Israel, but not attacking America. Sure, it’s a pro-American move: “We don’t attack America.” But is it a pillar of your foreign policy to abandon a friend and ally like that?

Cautionizing, legitimizing attacks on Israel by saying, “You can do that. What can I do?”

Donald Trump started the negotiations with Iran with changing views about what the demands from Iran are. And we still don’t know the final outcome of all that. But if the final outcome would be that Iran is still allowed to maintain a nuclear program — even for civilian purposes — it means that he doesn’t do anything different than what the Obama administration did.

Donald Trump put pressure on Israel to stop the war in Lebanon, exactly at the time when Hezbollah was ready to get the final blow from Israel. Yes, in the Lebanese situation, after 11 months of relative inaction by Israel, finally, Netanyahu, under pressure, decided to take the initiative. And it paid off so well to Israel, because this was the area in which you can talk specifically about the total defeat, almost, of the terrorists. Why “almost?” Because something else was needed to finalize the job. And then the American administration put a stop to it.

Donald Trump promised hell to Hamas in Gaza if they don’t release all the hostages within a short period of time. Nothing of this happened, of course. Edan Alexander was released — it is great news, fantastic news — but he is one hostage and an American citizen, which is also raising questions about the division between Americans and Israelis. You fight terrorism, you fight terrorism — it is one problem.

And I can go on with some more examples like this.

Where does it come from? Where was the Israeli reaction? And therefore, how do we put it all in perspective? Where it comes from is Trump’s version of isolationism. And many people will say it’s great, it’s a good American interest. So if that’s an American interest, not to get into war almost at all cost, I will be the last one to criticize it. But I need to mention it in the context of the Middle East. Because what does it mean? It means that we tolerate the terrorists, that we coexist with them. And for the sake of clarity, I will refer not just to people like the Houthis or Hezbollah or Hamas, but Iran.

Donald Trump doesn’t really care, apparently, about the fact that these systems will continue to exist. If he believes that by coming to some accommodation with them, he will be able to tame them, that’s a terrible, terrible mistake. Taming the shrew — ah! Impossible.

But if it falls into the basic tenets of how he views American isolationism and his supporters, then I can understand that there are implications.

Donald Trump wants political solutions that will be short-sighted — short of one situation that he raised and then did nothing about, which I immediately criticized, arguing it’s not going to happen because it’s just not even a half-baked cake. This is the talk about removing all the people of Gaza. It’s — let me use a non-diplomatic word — nonsensical.

But what helps him in that is that, yes, he has done already now some things that are very pro-Israel. He unfroze the embargo on arms to Israel that was basically imposed by Biden. He ordered his people in the UN organizations to continue to support Israel, even though it hasn’t yet come to any big test, like, say, a resolution in the Security Council about possible sanctions against Israel. That remains to be seen.

And at the same time, he makes it very clear that the focal countries of his new policy in the Middle East are the Gulf states: Saudi Arabia and Qatar, mainly, and the UAE, because they have something that Israel doesn’t have. They have the resources, the money.

And to give a kosher certificate, for example, to Qatar is the total opposite of anything which is like fighting terrorism. It is the greatest possible encouragement of terrorism because of what Qatar is and who the Qataris are. It’s as simple as this.

Israel’s paralysis and the waning American umbrella

Josef Olmert: What helps him with all that is — and that brings me back to what we already discussed — the total paralysis of the government of Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu has no alternatives to anything, has no proposals to anything, has no initiatives — because he cannot do anything if he wants to maintain his current coalition, which is based on some lunatic — I would say lunatic — extreme right-wing parties, led by Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Israeli Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich. And for Netanyahu, this is the number one interest.

So even if Netanyahu were to change a little bit on all kinds of issues, or even to a large extent, it may not have changed completely the overall perspective that Trump has about how he should do his own policies and conduct them. But when Netanyahu does nothing and offers nothing, it makes it so much easier.

And that is the same mistake that Netanyahu has done throughout his political career — and definitely when it came also to the Obama administration: to say no with great, polished English is all very nice and easy. But to say yes requires courage, resolve, determination, leadership, which he lacks.

And what happens now is that because of the distance that is being created between Trump and Israel — he’s in the Middle East, but not in Israel. He’s praising Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, he’s meeting the terrorists like Mohammad al-Julani in Syria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the model countries for relations with the US. More and more countries are encouraged now to take more and more anti-Israel positions because they believe that the balance is changing. The umbrella of defense provided to Israel by the US is weakening, if not in the process of disappearing — which is, again, something very bad to Israel.

A troubling future for US–Israel relations

Josef Olmert: I can go on and on. I think I’ve said enough to lead me to interim conclusions.

Beware, Israel. The second administration of Donald J. Trump is going to be the greatest challenge to Israeli foreign policy in our memory, definitely in my memory. And I’m not a young person.

Israel will have to understand that America is changing. And with it are changes in American foreign policy, also in the Middle East.

And I will sharpen the point here by saying: The changes about Israel between this administration of Trump and the first one — in terms of the action but also the image, the perceptions — are just so important. These changes will not be the ones that will lead to a rebellion against Trump in the Republican Party, even by the greatest supporters of Israel, short of maybe a few. If there will be a rebellion against him, but it will be over other issues: the effect of the tariffs, the economic situation, the index of living, inflation, success or failure on the southern border and so on and so forth.

And that’s where we are standing, from the perspective of being in Israel now with less and less bipartisan support. If the Republican administration is the one that is changing the way I described, Israel cannot expect the Democrats to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Israel. That could not happen.

So I have to leave my audience with this perspective: that for those who care about Israel and for Israel — and I’m one of them, of course — this is a very troubling, pessimistic, but I believe realistic assessment of the situation.

Thank you all.

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: From MAGA to Gaza — How Trump Changed US–Israel Relations Forever appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

We have with us Fernando Carvajal, I think I got that right. He served on the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen from April 2017 to March 2019 as a Regions and Armed Groups Expert. He has nearly 20 years of experience conducting fieldwork in Yemen and is a specialist in Yemeni politics and tribal relations.

We also have Fatima Abo Alasrar. She is the Senior Policy Analyst at the Washington Center for Yemeni Studies and a board member of the Peace Track Initiative. Before that, she was a senior analyst at the Arabia Foundation in Washington, DC; MENA Director for Cure Violence; research associate at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, DC and from 2006 to 2012, she worked as an advisor for the Embassy of Yemen in Washington, DC.

Dr. Abdul Galil Shaif, author of South Yemen: Gateway to the World, is former Chairman of the Aden Free Zone Public Authority and Chairman of the Friends of South Yemen. He joins us, I assume, from Sheffield, England, where he has worked with British politicians on Yemeni issues.

Michael Rubin is perhaps, firstly, a historian. I’ll leave it to him to tell me if I’m right or wrong there, but he’s now a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey and the broader Middle East. He previously worked as an official at the Pentagon and has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen and both pre- and post-war Iraq.

I want to thank you, panelists, for being here, and want to say right off that everyone should feel free to jump in at any time. It’s a lot more interesting if we have a discussion rather than me just throwing questions at you. So thank you all.

I want to start off with a basic question: How did we end up here? Dr. Shaif, you’ve written in your book about the promise of Yemen after independence, and you have a master’s degree in economics, so perhaps you could shed light on how we arrived at the current situation. I also watched an interview you did for South24 on this subject. So if you’d like to take a stab at that.

Abdul Galil Shaif: Thank you, thank you for that. Just to add as well that I’m also the Representative for the Southern Transitional Council in Geneva. I think that’s relevant in terms of being honest about what I’m about to say and whom I represent.

Just to say that we’ve got to the stage that we have, in terms of the conflicts, because of the Houthi overthrow of the legitimate government and the legitimate president in 2014. That’s how this whole conflict started. The Houthis decided to take over Sana’a, the capital, overthrow the president and then try to invade South Yemen, which they failed to do. So that was in 2015. The resistance in South Yemen was able to kick the Houthis out of the South, mainly because the environment in South Yemen, politically, economically, culturally, wasn’t conducive for Houthi control over the South.

And I think it’s really important to recognize and understand that there are two distinct identities here. The South has a history of being a state on its own. The South has a history of having its own army, its own central bank and its own foreign policy. It was led by the Yemeni Socialist Party all the way until 1990. I think the project of unity in 1990 was welcomed by everyone in Yemen, both in the South and the North. But I think it’s really important that we look at the realities of how things are at the moment: that unity has failed miserably, economically, politically, socially and militarily. Now, the realities that we have on the ground are that the Houthis have taken over 70–80% of North Yemen, and they do have strong control politically and militarily over that period. But economically, they’re very weak indeed. Being designated as a terrorist group as well will make matters much worse for them as we go along.

So in terms of the realities on the ground: There is a sector in South Yemen embracing the legitimate government that was thrown out by the Houthis in 2014 as part of the Riyadh Agreement — particularly an agreement imposed by the Gulf States because of their own interest in that part of the world. But the military and security responsibility is that of the STC in the South. And I think the reality is that we have two very powerful groups: one in the North, led by the Houthis, who actually believe that they have a God-given right to rule Yemen; and one in the South, by the STC, supported by the Million Man March in Aden. So I think these are the political realities.

I think the problem that we have is that the UN is still working on the parameters and the policies and the resolutions of 2011, rather than looking and reviewing and looking at the things on the ground and changing the policy as it stands. So I think the UN is working on old resolutions that will not work, because unless you have a peaceful resolution that gives the South its aspired aim of becoming independent, you’re only working toward a potential conflict in the future between the South and the North — which is between the STC and the Houthis.

UN failures and international blind spots

Christopher Roper Schell: Yeah, and Fernando, I know you’ve had a few choice words for the UN, if I recall in your writings. I don’t know if you want to comment on that.

Fernando Carvajal: Definitely. I think some of us have been fairly blunt on addressing the role of the UN in its various offices since 2011, right, since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the beginning of the transition. The way that the UN envoy, particularly the four UN envoys, have handled this transition since the Arab Spring. I think a lot of observers have kind of moved on from the Stockholm Agreement narrative. But whenever we look at a conflict, we have to look at its origins.

So, just as Dr. Shaif has focused on the Houthi coup of 2014 and the start of the war in March 2015, I’ve also been one that has been focusing on how the UN has failed to really resolve this multifaceted conflict. It’s always — I think Michael and Fatima will agree — giving concessions to the Houthis in hope that this actor reacts in a positive way to engage in peace talks.

But the typical Houthi tactic is, “Let’s see how many concessions I can get today, and I only give a little in order to keep surviving, and keep expanding and keep consolidating my control.” I think ten years later, we’re at a point where the UN needs to think out of the box, needs to start realizing who the actor is that they’re dealing with and take a different approach if they’re really interested in bringing peace to nearly 30 million people who are really suffering from a humanitarian crisis.

Christopher Roper Schell: Fatima, do you want to jump in on that? I saw you were name-checked there.

Fatima Abo Alasrar: Yes, I do agree with what Fernando has expressed. So we’ve arrived at this dangerous situation. I mean, ten years ago, if you told anyone that the Houthis are a substantial threat — if you told anyone in Washington, DC that fact — they’d laugh at you. They saw them as just a local, isolated problem for Yemen and for Saudi Arabia.

And our question back then from a policy perspective was: Why should we interfere in supporting Saudi Arabia or the UAE in their war? Everybody saw it as a domestic problem, a regional problem, and failed to really grasp what happens when you have a strategic geographic location such as Yemen — overlooking Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea — what happens when that gets controlled by a violent militia that harbors deep resentment toward the United States and Israel? It’s in every part of their ethos.

So that’s a question that continuously got overlooked in policymaking. But also what got overlooked is not just that aspect of great power competition in the Red Sea, but also, as Fernando mentioned, the many people, what kind of life they want to live. Nobody wanted to live under this militia. That’s why it was the Yemeni people before any administration — whether the Biden or the Trump administration — that called the Houthis terrorists, because they were terrorizing Yemenis on the ground through a series of coercive measures.

And Yemenis were pointing to the fact that this is an illegitimate group that is using them for its war, but also to advance the influence of the regime in Tehran. And I think that has been a fundamental problem that the international community overplayed. So in none of the discussions with the UN, in none of the discussions with the US administration, including the former Trump administration, were the Houthis recognized as an actor that is moving with perfect choreography with the Islamic Republic in Iran, or that really has a disruptive role in the region.

And people who studied Yemen for years and understood the Houthis and understood the region were laughing at all of the sudden headlines that talk about, “The Houthis have suddenly become a regional or an international actor.” The writing was on the wall for all this time. So there’s been some kind of, I think, strategic missteps that have happened. We arrived here through a perfect storm of strategic neglect, of policy misfires and also shifting global alignments. Failing to address that complexity and just seeing everything from a domestic Yemen–Houthi lens is really what got us here.

Why Yemen matters globally

Christopher Roper Schell: And you can say that there are all these headlines, but for the average American — the average person, perhaps — they’re unfamiliar with Yemen. What would you say to Americans or others who say, “I get it. There are these people, they’re creating trouble for shipping. The US is over there fighting, but it’s a European problem.” That was JD Vance’s position in the Signal chat. He said, “I hate bailing out the Europeans again.”

The average American is thinking, We’ve got the Ukraine–Russia thing, we have to worry about Taiwan and China. Probably the average American is mostly thinking about tariffs and tax cuts. So how do you break through that? Why does it matter?

Fatima Abo Alasrar: I love this question, and I think it’s a really important question. But I am extremely disappointed. I can understand the reaction of the American public, but I’m absolutely disappointed with the reaction of senior officials in the administrations who are failing to grasp the bigger element and the great power competition.

If you want to undermine China, tariffs are not the only way. You can do it by focusing on the Red Sea and by cutting their links to the Houthis, right? And the US administration is actually actively doing that, but it’s important to remember why they’re doing that.

You know that it was Chinese companies linked to the regime that have been sanctioned recently for providing the Houthis with the tech to have better precision in striking our military and our Navy. If that’s not proxy warfare, and if there is no understanding of that at the higher level, that is just extremely disappointing.

So while I do agree it is a European problem, failing to grasp the broader element is really dangerous. Beyond economics, beyond the movement of what’s happening in the Red Sea — and I discussed this in my recent articles, both at the Atlantic Council, where I talked about how China really turned the Red Sea into a strategic trap for the United States. So they provided satellite imagery for the Houthis, and these enable the precise attacks. But also, they provide hydrogen cell technology that allows their Houthi drones to fly faster and undetected, and go longer.

Russia’s involvement at the same time cannot be overlooked. So Moscow has utilized the Houthis in a very strategic way. There is this Iran–Russia–China nexus that is becoming increasingly choreographed, and it’s playing out in the Red Sea. What they’re doing is, they’ve really focused on the role of the Houthis in terms of, how can they really prolong the conflict? How can they divert attention and resources from other critical areas, whether it’s in Europe? But also, how can they play this out in the Red Sea?

One component — and as we’re talking about the Russia–Ukraine war, do you know that Houthis have recruited Yemenis to fight in the Russian army? Basically, they’ve misled them and told them they’re going to work in Saudi Arabia, and then shipped them off to Russia without their consent.

Iran has also been increasingly providing increased targeting and drone activity to Russia. All of this choreography should be really concerning for policymakers and for the public alike.

So the US is going to be fighting tariffs with China; it might be an easier battlefield for it to do it in the Red Sea, but I know Michael has a lot of insight as well on this.

Christopher Roper Schell: Yeah, let’s follow up on your disappointment with the resonance within the administrations, both Republican and Democrat. Michael, are the isolationists the in-crowd? Michael Waltz, the now former National Security Advisor to the president, is out. And we can get into the whole Signal mess and whether that was the origin, but it seems like most of the other sort of Reaganite, classical Republicans who view concessions to Russia and Iran with skepticism, they’re gone. The America First, Tulsi Gabbard, JD Vance wing appears to be increasingly the only game in town. So how do you think those positions or the position of the administration resonates with the rest of the world?

Michael Rubin: Chris, the short answer — are those the guys who have the upper hand? The answer is yes. And of course, the rest of the world is watching. I largely agree with what Fatima said, but I want to actually tackle that question about why this matters and why, in this case, JD Vance is wrong, in a slightly different way.

First of all, simply put: Cancers metastasize. And so if you don’t treat them, they grow in ways that reverberate and can have second-order, third-order negative effects that most Americans right now may not realize. But it’s the job of leadership, whether you’re Democratic or Republican, to recognize and head those off.

So, for example, we see the impact that the rerouting of shipping has had on Egypt, to the tune of billions of dollars. And this can, of course, destabilize Egypt. One out of every five Arabs, I believe, lives in Egypt. So if that country goes south, then we’re in a world of trouble, not only in Syria.

Now, across administrations and decades, we have always defended freedom of navigation. We did it in the Taiwan Straits, both Democrats and Republicans. Ronald Reagan did it in the Gulf of Sidra, and both Democrats and Republicans have done it in the Strait of Hormuz.

If you simply see a strategic chokepoint and say, “We’re no longer going to be interested in the trade,” even though all Americans will pay for this at the store with increased insurance fees, increased prices of gasoline and so forth, increases on every good, then what you’re basically saying is: It’s open season on the Strait of Malacca. It’s open season, perhaps someday, in the Strait of Gibraltar. It’s open season in the Panama Canal, where Donald Trump has actually tried to reshift some emphasis. So the point is, what happens in Yemen doesn’t stay in Yemen.

We also know when it comes to oil that even if much of the petroleum trade that goes through the Bab al-Mandab goes to Europe, the fact of the matter is that the price of energy is linked. So if there’s instability in one part of the world, Americans are going to be paying for it, even if it’s our own domestic manufacturing.

Now, that last point I would make — and this goes directly to your question — where I think US policy goes wrong across administrations is:

Number one: We too often prioritize wishful thinking over reality, and we’ve got to calibrate our policies towards reality. The second is when we navel-gaze, when we prioritize Washington politics and posturing above the reality of the situation. I’ll be bipartisan in my criticism: Tony Blinken was wrong when he delisted the Houthis as a terror threat. Likewise, JD Vance is wrong when he says that this has nothing to do with us, it only has to do with Europe. The more Democrats or Republicans navel-gaze, the worse it is for ordinary Americans.

The difference now, just to round up to your question, is that the pendulum has swung so far in the direction of the isolationists that we really are exposing ourselves to a world of hurt if we don’t recognize the threat the Houthis pose not only to the world, but also, let’s face it — the way I look at it, the Houthis are a violation of Yemeni sovereignty. It’s not the people defending Yemen who are violating Yemeni sovereignty.

Ceasefire politics and proxy games

Christopher Roper Schell: Yeah, and thank you for reminding everybody that the Houthis were delisted. Then they had — you’ll know better than I — some obscure designation, I think at the end of 2024, and Trump came in and relisted them. Good points also on how to, from the American perspective, make it hit home — talking about those extra two weeks in shipping. JD Vance may be right that it’s only 3%, but it does act as a bit of a tariff.

While I’ve got you on the horn here, Michael, I know you spoke — and by the way, some of what you said was also on this program — in March, you spoke with Yemen Today News about the American strikes. March 16, it was. And you said you hoped the strikes would help the Yemenis get rid of the Houthis.

Do you have any further assessment? Is it too early to tell? You have, as you just did, advocated for a strong response to the Houthis. And I have a follow-up, I suppose: Are you disappointed in the ceasefire?

Michael Rubin: Again, short answer: I am disappointed in the ceasefire. When one side is pleading for a ceasefire, you press your advantage. You don’t go into a poker match when you have a full house and your opponent has a pair of twos and let your opponent out-bluff you.

And consistently, that’s also a problem across parties in US foreign policy, at least in my assessment. But here’s what I would say: There’s an old Russian joke about the difference between an optimist and a pessimist. The Russian pessimist is the one who says, “Things have never been so bad — war, health, economy, environment — they ł¦´ÇłÜ±ô»ĺ˛Ô’t possibly get worse.” And the Russian optimist is the one who says, “No, no, no, they can always get worse.”

So on one hand, I’m keeping that dynamic in mind. But on the other hand, just yesterday the Yemenis announced a new military division, if you will, as they prepare to really tighten the noose on Sana’a. Sana’a is having trouble resupplying because its airport has been removed from operation. And let’s also face it: The people of Sana’a aren’t supportive of the Houthis. They are terrorized by the Houthis. And so it’s quite possible we are going to see some movement in the very near future for the Houthis to be sent packing from Sana’a.

This is what worries me, and why I think Trump’s unilateral ceasefire is a mistake, and it isn’t worth the paper it’s written on. And I say that knowing it’s not written on any paper; it was just a Trump reaction.

When we look at the regional dynamics, there’s been a lot of criticism, for example, that Trump and this deal with the Houthis cut out the Israelis. Well, you know what? While I feel for the Israelis, let’s not forget that the Houthis have attacked the Emiratis and the Saudis more than a thousand times — civilian infrastructure. And so this is a broader regional problem. But one of the reasons why the Saudis have been perhaps not as proactive as I think many of us would like in really turning the screws on the Houthis is a sense that was accentuated during the Biden administration: that the United States no longer had the back of Saudi Arabia. That we were encouraging our regional allies to stick their necks out, but we weren’t going to do anything to protect them.

By creating this separate deal, the Trump administration is essentially signaling to the Saudis, “No, you can’t really trust us. You have to make your own separate deal. You have to appease the Houthis. You can’t go all-in on the Southern Transitional Council.” That’s the exact opposite message we should be sending. We should be encouraging the Saudis and the Emiratis to be working together and with the Southern Transitional Council to basically consolidate the areas of control, consolidate the areas of governance and turn the screws on the Houthis.

The last point I would make with regard to this is: When it comes to US policy, I’m critical not only of our tendency to make separate deals, but also, we need to start differentiating among the Yemenis — among those who control territory on the ground and actually govern, like the Southern Transitional Council, versus those whose political position is one of legacy, but who don’t really control anything outside of an Istanbul or Geneva boardroom.

So in that case, it’s time to work much more diligently with those who actually control things on the ground and govern territory, rather than those like Islah who might be much more popular in university seminar rooms, but don’t really have much to say in terms of the governance of Yemen itself.

Christopher Roper Schell: Well, let’s stick with this idea of side deals. The latest side deal was for Hamas to release the last American hostage, and that came after the surprise announcement by Trump that he was ending a seven-week air campaign against the Houthis without a requirement for the Houthis to stop attacking Israel. This stunned Israel, because just hours before, the Houthis had struck Israel’s main airport. Israel then retaliated against the Houthis — destroyed their main airport and their main link to Iranian weapons. Some estimated the damage at $500 million.

The Wall Street Journal has an , I think today, titled, “Trump Surprised and Sidelined Israel Ahead of Landmark Middle East Trip.” So, does the US decision to have a ceasefire with the Houthis and enter direct negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program strain US–Israel relations and put on the back burner Israeli hopes for a green light to strike Iran?

And anyone can jump in now.

Fernando Carvajal: If I may, really quick — I know Fatima has something to jump on the follow-up — but just really quick on your question, Christopher: I think somebody made a very smart comment when the ceasefire was announced on X, and basically they said, “America First.”

And this is really what frames Trump’s approach — not the US government’s, but Trump, JD Vance and his team’s approach — to this conflict. Number one: The armament, the mobilization of weapons, of B-2 fighters to Diego Garcia — all of this that we saw over the last two months — from my view, and others will agree, was more of a show of force for Iran. Not so much for the Houthis. This was a mobilization that sent the message to Iran itself.

Second, the Houthis, whether you see them as a proxy of Iran or an ally of Iran, as a member of the Axis of Resistance — remember, keep in mind that Hamas and Hezbollah were decimated by Israel. So who’s left? The Iraqi militias and the Houthis, right? And the focus shifted to the Houthis.

And basically Trump said, “I can deliver damage to the Houthis as a message to the Iranians.” This approach on the ceasefire — we really have to frame it within the language of Trump and the administration. And literally, it says: This ceasefire is for our benefit, not anybody else’s. Do keep in mind that, according to media sources, the US envoy in Muscat put a series of demands for the ceasefire, and one of them was: stop the missile launches to Israel and stop all the attacks around the Bab al-Mandab, not just against American ships.

And lastly, for the Houthis to rejoin the UN roadmap. But just like Michael pointed out, because the US administration failed to use the leverage that they had at the moment, they simply were happy with the Houthis saying, “Okay, we’ll stop. You stop bombing us; we’ll stop bombing your ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf.”

So again, the US administration — Trump — needed a win after seven weeks. Because in Trump’s mind, seven weeks is an eternity because of his base. So he needed a win. And for him, using his typical language, he framed this ceasefire as a win for the US when, in fact, we’re nowhere near a win.

If I may, really quick, to Michael’s point regarding the Houthis: Many of us have been making the point that this threat in Bab al-Mandab is not new. The Houthis have attacked Saudi, Emirati and other civilian ships since 2017. They’ve hijacked multiple military ships from the coalition after 2017. As long as the Houthis are in control in Sana’a, they’re allowed to grow, they’re allowed to consolidate. This is a permanent threat across the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. Now the Houthis have learned that they can turn on and off a switch and gain concessions that strengthen their position in Sana’a.

Lastly, with regards to Michael’s comment on cancer — because the Houthis have been in power for ten years and have been allowed to grow, they are now in the Horn of Africa. The smuggling, the profiteering is now to Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa. They are now in Sudan, along with Iran. This is a backdoor threat to the GCC and to the Arabian Peninsula.

So again, this cancer — if the UN and the US administration, and we have to say the US is still a hegemon, right, in the region, and the Arab monarchies still rely on the US for defense — if the US decides to be hands-off, the cancer will grow, and the threats to US interests will continue to grow.

Will the Houthis use the ceasefire?

Christopher Roper Schell: I want to touch on some of what you said, Fernando, but I don’t want to cut anyone off — you said Fatima had something on her mind.

Fatima Abo Alasrar: Yes, sure. I also see Dr. Abdul Galil’s point. So the idea is this wasn’t just a ceasefire. This was just a negotiated off-ramp. Everybody knows it. Everybody needed a face-saving exit. And both sides wanted it so badly.

The Houthis were hurting. I initially was skeptical of the language of “capitulation,” but the Houthis did put out — I’ve never ever thought I would see a Houthi loyalist, and one who’s designated as a foreign terrorist, say something along the lines of — he retweeted someone who said, “The US is a pragmatic superpower.”

Their language shifted as soon as that came in the news. So there was something to it. The Houthis capitulated. And I know that Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, for example, comes on TV and he says, “This is all fantasy. These are the words of the infidel Trump,” and so on and so forth. Our media takes him for granted, but the question is: Why is the ceasefire holding if Trump is not saying the truth? The Houthis did sustain some damage, they did absorb a lot of damage. The only problem is that it was not proportional to the amount of and the show of force that we’ve seen.

And The New York Times article that came out yesterday detailing how much we’ve lost — I’m thinking maybe it was — it’s true. But we’ve seen that. If you follow Houthi media, they’ll tell you exactly what they’ve targeted. What is missing is that the US just continues not to have a strategy in the region. Not a consistent one, not a long-term one. Whereas China, Russia and Iran, they do.

You’ve got the Axis of Aggressors knowing exactly what it is that they want in the Red Sea and from the region. Knowing how to play us against each other — if at one point they’ve even interfered in the elections, can you imagine what they’d do with things that have to do with great power competition? Chinese media, as soon as the Houthis started attacking Western shipping, they said, “Hail to the Houthis.” And that is something really important to understand. There’s another information warfare that is happening at very granular levels that we can’t keep up with. I don’t have to read The Wall Street Journal or The New York Times or any of these when I can actually go to the Houthi website every morning, find them, quote them and tally our losses.

We’ve lost the plot in the US with the lack of policy consistency. This cannot be a partisan issue. This is something where there has to be some kind of a bigger, broader agreement and a strategy that can set the tone for this.

But most importantly, when it comes to the issue of Israel that you mentioned before — and I do agree with most of what Michael and Fernando said; it’s just common sense — but I do fundamentally believe that one element that is missing in the discussion is how really Tehran is pulling the strings on the ceasefire. I think Tehran wanted to offer Trump a deal prior to the nuclear negotiations in Oman, the fourth round. And they wanted to demonstrate that they can really control the Red Sea via their proxies, so they’re able to turn the switch on and off with the Houthis by instructing them.

And of course we know that the Houthis negotiated in Oman, that the US negotiated with them in Oman. We know that already. But what we don’t know is what is behind the scenes, and it’s looking increasingly likely that they said so. Even the reporting in The New York Times alluded to the fact that there were Iranian officials in Iran that persuaded the Houthis to take this deal.

The second reason is, yes, this works well for them. But it’s also to save their most fundamental and important proxy in the region, as Fernando has said. You look at the influence of Hamas and Hezbollah that has been weakened by Israel, and Tehran cannot afford to lose the Houthis at this moment, especially with the show of force that the US was doing every day for the past 50 days.

But the third reason is also to drive a wedge between the US and Israel. And I think that’s also very important. Houthi media, again, has specific reports about how Trump is growing more dissatisfied with Netanyahu. And they’re playing on that in their media in a way that, for me, I can see this pattern. This is choreographed with their proxy in Iran, who are playing on the same issues.

So the more that they are able to do this and to interfere in our foreign policy in one way or another, the more successful they are, and the closer they are to getting to their goal.

Christopher Roper Schell: Well, you called it a “negotiated off-ramp.” Seems to suggest it’s a negotiated off-ramp for the Houthis, for the Iranians. Fernando suggests it’s an off-ramp for Trump. The Iranians like to have their cake and eat it too, claiming, “Oh, the Houthis are doing their own thing.”

But yet The New York Times reported two Iranian officials, one from the foreign ministry and one from the IRGC, said that Iran had persuaded the Houthis to stop their attacks to create “momentum” for the Omani mediation efforts in the 2025 nuclear agreements.

Now, this change of heart from the administration: If you go back and you look at the March 15, March 17 Truth Social posts from Trump — very, very strong language. The April 30 post from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth — very, very strong. So it’s a real turnabout.

But does this US deal with the Houthis mean that a deal with Iran is more likely? And I open it up to the whole panel.

Abdul Galil Shaif: Just to say that in terms of underestimating the ambitions that the Houthis have not just in Yemen, but in the Gulf world — I agree completely with Michael’s point that we fail to read the story in front of us. The Houthis are very ambitious, and they’ve learned huge survival skills throughout the ten years. I mean, they signed the Stockholm Agreement where the army from the South [inaudible] was already taken, and it stopped them. I think, repeatedly, we’ve been telling the world that the Houthis are a danger not just to Yemen, but a danger to the international community.

How much are the losses? Around $5 billion, I understand, from the director of the Suez Canal in Egypt. Prices in Yemen have skyrocketed. I mean, the economy is in complete downfall. The legitimate government in Aden is bankrupt. It has no money to pay salaries, [inaudible] on a daily basis. Someone who lived in Yemen in 2000 — and that’s when I was there — was earning almost $400 a month. They’re now earning $70 a month. That’s an example of how people are suffering inside Yemen. And you’ve got 30 million people.

If this economic downfall continues in Yemen, you have a vacuum in terms of security. Because then you have extremist groups like AQAP taking all swathes of parts of Yemen. That, again, is a major danger.

And I think that’s what the Houthis are hitting at. The Houthis are trying to survive. And the apology about hitting Israel — it’s not an apology to support the Palestinians. So I think it’s naive to think that the Houthis believe they’re supporting the Palestinians. The Houthis want to show internal support and external support. They’re a power player, and [inaudible] any peace in Yemen.

The Houthis have to be weakened — and they’re not weak from the air. Believe me, they’re not. The only way that you can weaken the Houthis significantly is by supporting the legitimate government in Aden and the STC to move forward properly and militarily to weaken the Houthis.

At the same time, talking about the income — making sure that they have very little income coming into their central bank — and giving the central bank in Aden more aid, more money, more support. Because if you can improve the economic situation in the South and create an example for people in the North to see that things are much better — I think the North Yemeni people will bring the Houthis down.

But I think, so far, there has been very little support for the legitimate government and the STC in the South to actually improve the economic situation. Hence, people in the North are looking at the South and saying, “Well, [inaudible].”

By developing the economy in the South, by supporting the STC to move forward, I think that way you could defeat the Houthis.

Christopher Roper Schell: So with this weakened economy, will the Houthis use the ceasefire as they did — and correct me if my history is wrong — they seemed to use it with the Peace and Partnership of 2014 and the Stockholm Agreement of 2018 to regroup and rearm?

So if they’re a little bit down on their knees — and I understand your point, Doctor — but will they use this breather to strengthen their grip on power? And anyone can answer. I know, Fernando, you wrote about this a little bit in 51łÔąĎ.

Fernando Carvajal: Thank you, Christopher. I think Michael had a comment about your question regarding the deal, and then I’ll go into that. Thank you.

Christopher Roper Schell: Oh, I’m sorry. By all means, yes.

Michael Rubin: No, but I can jump in at any point. Fernando, why don’t you keep the momentum going by answering Chris there.

Fernando Carvajal: Sure. The Houthis have used — I think when you mentioned the Peace and Partnership Initiative Agreement of September 2014, which really consolidated a Houthi coup in Sana’a… Can you hear me?

Christopher Roper Schell: Yes, yes.

Fernando Carvajal: Okay, sorry about that. Really, as Fatima has said, it begins to show the growth of the Houthis: the way that they’re learning, the learning curve for the Houthis, and how they’ve managed to manipulate the international community in order to strengthen themselves slowly over time. Today, they’re at a point where they are fairly strong inside because of their heavy-handed approach against the population.

One of the huge failures, again, of the Trump ceasefire and the UN envoy’s efforts has been that no one is focused on the dozens of Yemenis detained by the Houthis since last June, and former employees of the US Embassy who are being detained and tortured by the Houthis for months.

So again, when you have the leverage that Michael describes, and you fail to take advantage and demand that the Houthis give up detainees, etc., and you simply give them what they want in order for you to save face—

One of the things that’s very troublesome is — to your question about the deal, and then I’ll hand it over to Michael — from my opinion, I’ve been saying from the beginning: Read the Houthi line. Read the Houthi narrative. The Houthis are not interested in peace with the US or peace with their Yemeni rivals. Their priority is peace with Saudi Arabia. They want a deal with Saudi Arabia that builds on the historical deal between Yemen and Saudi Arabia during the previous regime’s time — meaning that Saudi Arabia is their patron. And they want continued economic support and a strengthened patronage network that keeps the Houthis in control.

The Houthis are not interested in sharing power with the South, or with the old ruling party, or with the Sunni Islamists, or with Salafis or what have you. They want to be the kingmakers, they want to be in full control, and they want Saudi Arabia to financially support this. Because without Saudi financial support, unfortunately, Yemen will always be broke. The oil production is not sufficient.

So their priority is always to maintain leverage in order to get a bigger deal from Saudi Arabia. And some people have said, “The Houthis will dump Iran if Saudi offers them the biggest deal of their life,” to use Trump’s language. But at the same time, Iran would minimize this.

It’s very interesting what Fatima mentioned: that Iranian officials mentioned they convinced the Houthis to sign on to the ceasefire. This is a big slap in the face to the Houthis, because the Houthis want to present themselves as autonomous, as sovereign, as doing this because of their interests. And then to have the Iranians say, “They did this because we told them to do it,” — it’s a pretty big slap in the Houthis’ face.

But they will take it because they need the weapons, they need the money, they need the oil.

Economic warfare and Southern stability

Fernando Carvajal: But I’m sure Michael has a better angle on how that affects the deal with the Iranians.

Christopher Roper Schell: Just briefly though — and either of you can answer, anyone can answer — doesn’t it slightly blow Iran’s cover, this facade, this fiction that they don’t have any control of the Houthis?

Fernando Carvajal: Sure. These are the narratives that we see playing out in the media for Iran, for Lebanon, for the Houthis, right? Where we on the outside, our mainstream media in the West have latched onto that line: “The Houthis are Iranian proxies.”

So then the Houthis respond with: “No, no, we’re autonomous. We’re independent. We’re doing this for us, for Yemen,” etc.

Also, the mainstream media fails to distinguish between the Houthis and Yemen. I think Fatima mentioned this and Dr. Shaif mentioned it. Whenever the Houthis are mentioned in our mainstream media, it’s: “Yemen attacked a US ship.” No, Yemen didn’t! The Houthis did.

Keep in mind, I wrote an article for 51łÔąĎ. We published an article where I mentioned that the Houthis attacking ships — the Iranian ships, the spy ships from Iran, from the Revolutionary Guard — have left the Horn of Africa, have left the Bab al-Mandab last year, and that began to diminish the Houthi capabilities to attack ships across the Bab al-Mandab.

So we have not had a Houthi strike in Bab al-Mandab since December of last year. It just so happens that the week before that last strike was when the Iranian ships left the region of Bab al-Mandab.

So this is a very reciprocal relationship. The Houthis can’t do without Iran. Iran needs the Houthis to gain leverage. And when it comes to the deal, I think Michael, again, would have a better perspective on how that affects the US–Iran deal.

Christopher Roper Schell: Yeah, sorry to ruin your toss with a follow-up question. Michael, go ahead.

Michael Rubin: No, no worries. There are two issues I didn’t want to fall through the cracks. Number one: You had asked, Chris, whether the Houthis are going to use the ceasefire to rebuild. And the answer to that is a simple yes. Fernando, yourself, others have talked about the history with regard to Stockholm and so forth.

But the fact of the matter is: Sana’a International Airport was the little cousin in terms of how the Houthis got their supplies. The big two are Hudaydah’s port and the Stockholm Agreement. The Stockholm Agreement was the primary example of prioritizing wishful thinking over reality. It still is a Houthi-controlled port for all intents and purposes.

The second is — and we really need to address this issue — the malign influence of the Sultanate of Oman, which would much rather have the Yemenis suffer under Houthi abuses than have any degree of meaningful South Yemeni representation in Oman. That’s the elephant in the room. It’s not going to go away. And so long as those two mechanisms of Houthi rearmament are there, the Houthis have no incentive to play ball.

Now, the other issue you asked about was the impact on the Iran negotiations. And here we have the fact that Trump has diplomatic Attention Deficit Disorder. Fatima had mentioned how, after seven weeks, I believe, Trump really needed to declare victory on something. And the fact of the matter is, the Iranian strategy has always been to run the clock out. They’ve just concluded their fourth round of negotiations, and it’s gone nowhere. And so then the question becomes: At what point does Trump flip on a dime again? You guys can count the number of metaphors I’m mixing in this whole talk. (Christopher laughs) At what point does he flip back?

Right now the Israelis are frustrated. The Saudis have every right to be frustrated and so forth — with regard to how Trump is privileging the Houthis and giving immunity, if you will, to Iran. But at the same time, if he loses his patience, then we could be in a whole different situation. And unfortunately, I’m not really sure the Iranians fully understand that they can’t simply use the same playbook they’ve used for every single administration, going back to George H.W. Bush, when it comes to running down the clock.

The last point I would make — and again, I don’t want to engage in what I’ve just criticized and do the Washington navel-gazing — but I don’t think we’ve seen the true repercussions yet of this alleged Qatar deal with regard to the aircraft and so forth. I spent a couple days ago talking to some friends of mine in the Make America Great Again sort of camp, and even they ł¦´ÇłÜ±ô»ĺ˛Ô’t rationalize what Trump had been doing with Qatar behind the scenes. This is going to blow up in a major way, for which Trump is going to look for a distraction. And that could actually lead to Trump shifting his position toward Iran, shifting his position toward Israel and the Houthis once again and returning to the status quo ante.

Christopher Roper Schell: So you mentioned Trump has “diplomatic ADD” — basically, Attention Deficit Disorder.

Michael Rubin: But Chris, he has the greatest case of it that anyone has ever had. No one could do it better than he does.

Christopher Roper Schell: Yeah, but others have suggested that Trump was merely worn down, that he needed a win. So did the Houthis succeed by imposing high costs? Could be through low-cost technology. Our stores of Tomahawk missiles have been an issue of concern. Procurement has been a concern. I think we procured zero last year. We can make about 100 a year, and we have been going through them pretty quickly.

Or did Trump have a change of heart for another reason? Or all of these reasons?

Michael Rubin: Just very quickly: I think it’s for another reason, or all those reasons. I don’t think Trump is a master of details on how many Tomahawks there are in any specific area of operations. And there’s been public reporting that he skipped all but 12 of his Presidential Daily Intelligence Briefings. Therefore, I suspect this is just Trump and his Attention Deficit Disorder rather than any sort of deeper logic governing his actions.

Christopher Roper Schell: Okay.

Fernando Carvajal: If I could just make a really quick comment…

Christopher Roper Schell: By all means.

Fernando Carvajal: To finish up on Michael’s and your question about Israel and the approach, let’s keep in mind that when Netanyahu was at the White House, the media focused on his reaction to Trump announcing the talks with Iran, right? Apparently, Netanyahu and Israel wanted that to remain secret and wanted it to remain in the background and were not ready to make that public.

The combined strikes by Israel and the US that led to the ceasefire were definitely something that Israel pushed for and had to give a big show of force. Again, from my perspective, it’s a show of force to the Iranians more so than to the Houthis. The Houthis can continue to claim these strikes. But let’s keep in mind again, everybody’s ignoring the Iraqi militias, who have a shorter range to Tel Aviv than do the Houthis and could sustain a bigger threat long-term to the Houthis.

But this issue with Iran and Israel — again, it’s come up over and over, because Trump, in public, is undermining the Israeli plans. But behind the scenes, we don’t know still how in line they are in order to avoid that catastrophe that Michael just mentioned — with Trump’s own political base here in the US.

Christopher Roper Schell: We only have about a minute left or so, but I — yeah, go ahead.

Abdul Galil Shaif: Yeah, just very quickly, indeed: I think looking at the Houthis under a microscope and how we deal with them in the future — as an economist, I believe that the best way to fight the Houthis is to develop the South. That’s one area.

The second area, I believe, is the mismanagement of the economy — let’s restrict their access to international markets, wherever it is. Let’s make sure that Houthi leaders are restricted from traveling and investing in other parts of the world.

I think it’s very important that we fight them with their own weapons. Because they’ve used their weapon — they’ve stopped the sale of oil and gas from the South. They’ve actually said — they’ve threatened — that we cannot sell, and we’ve not been able to sell for two years. Leave it as completely bankrupt, because that’s $90 million a month that would come into the central bank.

I think that it’s not about military aggression here. It’s about: How do we attack them in every possible sense to make them weaker? And the way to attack them to make them weaker is to speak to the STC. It’s to build relations between the US — and I hope Trump does that — and the STC in the South. Because in that way, you’re allowing the Yemenis to resolve the problem in Yemen, rather than getting outside actors to do that. So I think a relationship with the STC could stabilize things. And also, the UN playing its role much more practically and looking at the situation as it is now in 2025 and not as it was in 2011 — I think these are ways of fighting off the Houthis.

Christopher Roper Schell: In a previous interview I saw of yours, you said that the economy, the military, the central banks are already effectively bifurcated. So that may make that a little bit easier.

And I don’t want to mischaracterize your words, but before I add — you said anyone who didn’t see that, they were a bunch of idiots. (Laughs)

Abdul Galil Shaif: Yeah, yeah.

Christopher Roper Schell: (Laughs) You were quite pointed! I was hoping to really get some of that flash, because you were fired up in that interview I saw.

Abdul Galil Shaif: Yeah, the economy is on the verge of collapse now. And I think we’re not looking ahead to see what that could do in terms of extremism and terrorism in areas in the South — because people don’t have a daily meal at the moment. They eat once every two days. There’s hardly any electricity.

So if you get an uprising, the alternative could be much, much worse. So I think it’s important that international aid is cut off from the Houthis and taken to the central bank in Aden. That could be one way of weakening them continuously through economic weapons.

We’ve not used that. Every time the Houthis have done something, we’ve sort of paid them back. We need to make sure that we challenge them much more, because the ramifications for the economy are huge. And that’s my main worry at the moment. I worry that extremist groups will get the upper hand eventually. And people like the STC who are putting a moderate hand, working with the Arab coalition, working with the US here, are losing out.

And I think it’s really important, because they’re the only ones that have defeated the Houthis. The people in the South — they defeated the Houthis in 2015. We need to build on that.

Hope, indoctrination and next steps

Christopher Roper Schell: Yes, I will beg the indulgence of our audience for just one last question. I think it’s a short one: Fatima, I saw your interview with the Foreign Policy Association, where you were asked in 2019 how much hope you had in a future democratic Yemen. You said you had very little. Have the last couple of years affected your position one way or the other? And that would be my last question.

Fatima Abo Alasrar: Thanks, Chris. The future for Yemen is very messy, and part of it is just the ideological component that the Houthis are pushing. It is my belief that this group is building an army to expand in the region, because their focus on children is really scary. It’s pathological.

When you indoctrinate kids to hate others, when you say, “Israel, US — bad. China, Russia — good,” and then you put all of the state apparatus that’s available in your hand to push that narrative and give it to millions of kids in summer camps — they’re hollowing out the society.

This ideological component is the most frustrating for me. The inability to fight that ideological component… If we can’t push the Houthis out, these stories are going to remain forever. So that’s the kind of warning that I wanted to give.

But you know what? In terms of the Houthis and the relationship, just to simplify things, the Houthis are a hybrid actor. They rule like a state, they fight like a militia and they escalate like a proxy. This is the picture of the Houthi threat. They don’t need Tehran on a day-to-day basis to tell them what to do, because they already do it for them, right? So when it comes to regional escalation, they’re on their speed dial.

And that dual role is why our diplomacy keeps failing over and over — because we’re unable to recognize it. So that’s the first thing I wanted to say.

The second is that Mike encouraged me to think about this idea of navel-gazing. It happens in Yemen, too. It happens when we say, “The Houthis can be easily defeated.” That’s a fantasy. That’s a slogan. When we say, “The Houthis can be easily defeated,” because we’ve had a decade of Saudi and Emirati intervention — where did that go? We’ve had 50 days of continuous bombing. We’ve had Biden also take a crack at it in different ways — where did that go?

We don’t have a strategy. Give me a strategy. Give me a plan, and I can show you how the Houthis can be defeated. It has to be sustained pressure. It has to address their ideological component. It has to work with people from within. You can’t just say, “Give support to the army and it’s all going to be great.” Something the Trump administration, with the conventional power that it had, could have just crossed every ethical and legal boundary to destroy the Houthis.

They embed themselves in populations. We have the capability to create chaos at high cost. And the Houthis want the US to do that. They really kept baiting the US to do this because that’s how their propaganda thrives.

So it’s convoluted. The answer is not from point A to point B. So there is a bit of navel-gazing from Yemen and from the international community when they say, “Yes, we can defeat the Houthis. It’s easy if you arm and…” We need to have serious conversations about that. Because, as Dr. Abdul Galil just mentioned, there are serious economic challenges. How are you going to defeat them when you can’t provide electricity in the South of Yemen? When people are dying because of the heat?

So we peddle in fantasy every now and then. I’ve made these points not to say that the Houthis are invincible, or that they can’t be defeated. They can be, but not easily. I just want to clarify that. We just need a plan. And that needs to be coordinated, it has to be sustained in the long term. It can’t just disappear when the next administration comes in and has different priorities. And our cabinet or our members of the administration need to be on the same page. If they don’t know why they’re doing this, it’s problematic. That’s the first signal failure, no pun intended, (Abdul chuckles) but that’s the first failure.

Christopher Roper Schell: Well, thank you all. You all made this really easy on me when you had a conversation with each other and jumped in. I want to say to our audience: Thank you, and thank you for indulging me one last question. Do like and subscribe. Anything you see on 51łÔąĎ, share it. Keep reading, and thanks again.

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After the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Sunni militant group Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, all eyes have been on the Middle East. Other nations have been vying for influence during this period of instability, in particular the United States and Turkey. Former US President Joe Biden removed the bounty on Abu Muhammad (now Ahmed al-Sharaa), interim president and leader of HTS. Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄźan Syria in order to help with the political transition. Since HTS is a Turkish proxy, Turkey is looking to Iran’s leadership position in Syria.Ěý

However, not much attention is placed on Israel in regards to Syria’s future. While there are Israeli in southern Syria, offense isn’t in Israel’s interest, only defense. Their stake in the region comes from two things: one, Iran’s past on Syria as the proclaimed number one enemy of Israel; and two, Israel’s history with Syria, especially regarding the 1991 Madrid .

The Madrid Peace Conference was the US’s hope for a stable region

Almost exactly eight months after the first Gulf War ended, the US intended to facilitate peace between their ally Israel and Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. The Conference comprised three big meetings, all of which involved Israel and another Middle Eastern country. The third meeting, between Israel and Syria, was the most anticipated. Relations between Syria and Israel were strained at best.

The only reason Syria agreed to attend was to give a gesture of goodwill to the US. During the first Gulf War, then-Syrian President Hafez al-Assad cooperated with the Coalition spearheaded by the US, the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. This came as a , as Syria had previously opposed US involvement during the 1980 . Their sudden alignment with the US was done to make up for their involvement in the Iranian coalition against the Arab world during that war. As such, they had agreed to come to the peace talks.

The peace talks were fruitless

The first thing Israel requested was the release of the 4,000 Jews still living in Syria. In their situation, their travel, emigration and human rights were . Syria was unprepared for this request and denied allegations. Eventually, US pressure forced Syria to meet the demand.

The talks yielded no results beyond the release of Syrian Jews. Neither side had any interest in achieving peace. Assad only agreed because he sensed the changing environment of the Middle East due to the collapsing Soviet Union, and to show goodwill toward the US. Additionally, the Israeli government was not ready to make territorial concessions. Both of these reasons doomed the talks from the very beginning.

However, this does not mean the peace talks were for naught. The readiness of Syria to enter the talks, despite having positioned itself as Israel’s primary enemy, marked a shift in regional relations. The Madrid Peace Conference can still be considered a turning point even if the results were not immediately felt.

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But you want to know a dirty, little secret? In back alleys, encrypted group chats and off-the-record conversations, liberals will still support Trump on a case-by-case basis. Of course, they’d never vote for the guy, but they’ll give two cheers for some of his policies.

I discovered this ugly truth during Trump’s last term while writing an article on the shift in US policy toward China from lukewarm engagement to hostile decoupling. The general consensus among the foreign policy elite was that, at least in terms of relations with Beijing, Trump was a useful idiot for slowing China’s roll with harsh rhetoric and tariffs.

“Trump is a madman, but I want to give him and his administration their due,” one prominent liberal intellectual me. “We can’t keep playing on an unlevel playing field and take promises that are never delivered on. It’s really China’s turn to respond, and it’s long overdue.”

It wasn’t just China. For years, liberals and conservatives alike were, for instance, the concept of burden-sharing: getting US allies to cover more of the bill for their security needs. But it was only Trump who really made it happen by blackmailing NATO members and other US partners into doing so.

Sure, few warmed to the idea of the US actually pulling out of NATO, but even many of our European allies, though they publicly grumbled, were secretly happy about The Donald’s gaiatsu. That’s the Japanese word for outside pressure that enables a leader to force through unpopular changes by blaming it all on foreigners. The self-described liberal leader of NATO, Dutch politician Mark Rutte, even came out in the open after Trump’s re-election to the US president for making European countries more militarily self-sufficient.

It wasn’t just liberals who were thrilled about Trump’s unorthodox foreign policy during his first term, either. Some of those further to the left also embraced Trump the engager (with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un), Trump the isolationist (and his threats to close US military bases globally) and Trump the putative peacemaker (for concluding a deal with the Taliban to end the US military presence in Afghanistan).

Trump, in other words, was not just an unanticipated crisis; he was also an opportunity. Deep in their hearts, anyone unhappy with the status quo will support a disrupter. Quite a few Democrats disgusted with this country’s border policies, inflation and its coastal elites even to vote for Trump in November because they wanted change, regardless of the consequences.

Trump 2.0 is going to be the same but worse, like a strong cheese voted out of the refrigerator only to grow ever more pungent as it molded in a dark corner of Florida. The latest version of Trump has promised more violence and destruction the second time around, from mass deportations to mass tariffs. And he’s planning to avoid appointing anyone to his administration who might have a contrary thought, a backbone to resist him or the least qualification to enact sensible policy.

In the face of such a vengeful and truculent force returning to the White House, surely, you might think, it will be impossible to find any liberals embracing such anarchy the second time around.

Think again. This is how US politics works, if only for liberals. The modern Republican Party routinely boycotts Democratic administrations: blocking Merrick Garland’s Supreme Court nomination, working overtime to shut down the federal government, voting en masse against legislation it would have supported if introduced by a Republican administration. The MAGA crowd has, in fact, turned noncooperation into something of an art form.

Liberals, on the other hand, pride themselves on bipartisanship, on getting things done no matter who’s in power. So, inevitably, there will be cooperation with the Trump team as it sets about the “deconstruction of the administrative state” (as Trump cheerleader Steve Bannon once it). Worse, there will even be some silver-lining liberals (and a few leftists) who pull up a seat to applaud the wrecking ball — not perhaps for its wholesale destruction of neighborhoods, but at least for its demolition of a select number of buildings that they deem irreparable.

Each time such destruction takes place, the self-exculpatory comment from such silver-liners will be: “Well, somebody had to come along and do something!” If Trump is the only tool in the governing toolbox, some liberals will indeed try to use him to pound in a few nails they think need hammering.

Burning bridges with China

In his 2024 State of the Union address, President Joe Biden argued that he did a better job than Trump of standing up to China. He certainly devoted more to containing China. And not only did he not roll back Trump’s tariffs on Chinese products, but he added some of his own, including a 100% tax on Chinese electric vehicles. Biden also made concrete moves to decouple the US economy from China’s, especially when it came to the supply chains for critical raw materials that Beijing has sought to control. “I’ve made sure that the most advanced American technologies can’t be used in China,” he insisted, , “Frankly for all his tough talk on China, it never occurred to my predecessor to do any of that.”

Biden’s moves on China, from export controls and subsidies for chip manufacturers to closer with Pacific partners like Australia and India, received the enthusiastic support of his party. No surprise there: It’s hard to find anyone in Washington these days who has a good word to say about engaging more with China.

So when Trump takes office in January, he won’t actually be reversing course. He’ll simply be taking the baton-like stick from Biden while leaving all the carrots in the ground.

That said, Trump’s proposed further spike in tariffs against China (and Canada and Mexico and potentially the rest of the world) does give many liberals pause. It threatens to unleash an economically devastating global trade war while boosting prices radically at home. But trade unions backed by such liberals support such measures as a way to protect jobs, while the European Union only recently imposed of their own on Chinese electrical vehicles.

So, yes, neoliberals who embrace free trade are going to push back against Trump’s economic policies, but more traditional liberals who backed protectionist measures in the past will secretly (or not so secretly) applaud Trump’s moves.

Back to the wall

On taking office, Biden rolled back his predecessor’s harsh immigration policies. The rate of border-crossings then spiked for a variety of reasons — not just the repeal of those Trump-era laws — from an average of half a million to about annually. However, in 2024, those numbers despite Trump’s campaign claims — but no matter. By then, many Democrats had already been reborn as border hawks.

That new, tougher attitude was on display in Biden took in 2024 as well as the border security that Democrats tried to push through Congress earlier this year. Forget about finding a path to citizenship for the millions of undocumented immigrants who keep the US economy humming, Biden’s immigration policy focused on limiting asylum petitions, increasing detention facilities and even more money to build Trump’s infamous wall.

As Elora Mukherjee, director of the Immigrants’ Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School, on the eve of the November election, “What we are seeing is that the center of the Democratic Party is now adopting the same policies, the same postures, that MAGA Republicans were fighting for about six years ago.”

And yet such punitive policies still weren’t harsh enough for MAGA Republicans and their America First followers. The bottom line was that immigration-averse voters didn’t want to support Democrats pretending to be MAGA Republicans. When it came to the White House, they wanted the real thing.

As politics change hands in Washington next January, it’s going to be difficult to find any Democrats who will support the mass detentions and deportations Trump is promising. Yet many liberals, like the of Latinos who pulled the lever for Trump in 2024, do want major changes at the border with Mexico. In Arizona, Democrat Ruben Gallego won a squeaker of a Senate election by emphasizing and even backing a border wall in certain areas. Such liberal border hawks will be happy when the Republican president does the dirty work so that Democrats don’t suffer the political fallout that is sure to follow.

Remapping the Middle East

On the face of it, the Abrahamic Accords were a liberal nightmare. The brainchild of Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, they to repair relations between Israel and the major authoritarian regimes in the region: Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Morocco and Sudan. The deal was a reward for illiberal leaders, particularly Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu. The primary losers would, of course, be the Palestinians, who would have to their hopes for a separate state in exchange for some Saudi handouts and the Sahrawi people who lost their claim to the Western Sahara when the US and Israel Moroccan sovereignty over the entire region.

Instead of shelving the Accords, however, the Biden administration pushed ahead with them. After roundly criticizing Saudi autocrat Mohammed bin Salman for, among other things, ordering the of a US-based Saudi journalist, Biden mended ties, fist-bumping that rogue leader and continuing to discuss how and when the Kingdom would normalize relations with Israel. Nor did his administration restrict Washington’s staggering weapons deliveries to Israel after its invasion and utter devastation of Gaza. Yes, Biden and crew made some statements about Palestinian suffering and tried to push more humanitarian aid into the conflict zone, but they did next to nothing to pressure Israel to stop its killing machine, nor would they the Trump administration’s decision on the Western Sahara.

The liberals who support Israel (come what may) like Pennsylvania Senator , New York Congressman and the in the House of Representatives are, of course, going to be enthusiastic about Trump’s ever tighter embrace of Netanyahu next year. But there are also likely to be quiet cheers from other corners of the liberal-left about the Trump is likely to take against Tehran. (Remember Kamala Harris’s during her presidential run that Iran was the main adversary of the US?)

The Arab Spring is long gone and a strong man in the White House needs to both schmooze with and go toe to toe with the strong men of the Middle East — or so many liberals will believe, even as they rationalize away their relief over Trump’s handling of a thoroughly illiberal region.

Looking ahead (or do I mean behind?)

Anyone to the left of Tucker Carlson will certainly think twice about showing public enthusiasm for whatever Trump does. Indeed, most liberals will be appalled by the new administration’s likely suspension of aid to Ukraine and withdrawal from the Paris climate accord, not to mention other possible hare-brained maneuvers like sending US troops to narcotraffickers in Mexico.

Trump will attract liberal support, however quietly or even secretively, not because of his bridge-building genius — in reality, he even get a bridge-building infrastructure bill through Congress in his first term — but because all too many liberals have already moved inexorably rightward on issues ranging from China and the Middle East to immigration. The MAGA minority has seized the machinery of power by weaponizing mendacity and ruthlessly breaking rules, in the process transforming politics much the way the Bolshevik minority did in Russia more than a century ago. In the pot that those Republicans put on the stove, the water has been boiling for more than a decade and yet the left-of-center frogs barely seem to recognize just how altered our circumstances have become.

In normal times, finding overlapping interests with your political adversaries makes sense. Such bedrock bipartisanship stabilizes fractious countries that swing politically from center left to center right every few years.

These are, however, anything but normal times and the second-term Trump team is anything but center-rightists. They are extremists bent on dismantling the federal government, unstitching the fabric of international law and turning up the heat drastically on an already dangerously overcooking planet.

In 2020, I raised the possibility of a boycott, divestment and sanction (BDS) movement against the US if Trump won the elections that year. “People of the world, you’d better build your BDS box, paint �Break Glass in Case of Emergency’ on the front, and stand next to it on November 3,” I then. “If Trump wins on Election Day, it will be mourning in America. But let’s hope that the world doesn’t mourn: it organizes.”

Four years later, Trump has won again. Do I hear the sound of breaking glass?

Here in the US, a stance of strict non-engagement with Trump 2.0, even where interests overlap, would not only be a good moral policy but even make political sense. When things go disastrously south, laws are broken and the government begins to truly come apart at the seams, it’s vitally important that no left-of-center fingerprints be found at the crime scene.

Let’s be clear: The Trump administration will not be playing by the rules of normal politics. So forget about bipartisanship. Forget about preserving access to power by visiting Mar-a-Lago, hat in hand, like Facebook’s or the of MSNBC’s Morning Joe show. “Fascism can be defeated,” historian Timothy Snyder immediately after the November elections, “but not when we are on its side.”

So, my dear liberal-left, which side are you on?

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Stereotypes actively ignore the reality of the Gulf region

The central flaw of the movie lies in its reliance on negative stereotypes. Saudi citizens are depicted in a manner that ignores the core values of hospitality, respect and cultural diversity that define much of Saudi society. This reductive representation not only mischaracterizes the Saudi people but also risks straining the diplomatic and economic ties between Saudi Arabia and India. For decades, Saudi Arabia has been a key partner to India, especially in providing employment opportunities for millions of Indian expatriates. However, Goat Life largely overlooks the positive contributions these expatriates offer Saudi society and the mutually beneficial relationships both countries have enjoyed in the Gulf.

The focus on negative experiences within Saudi Arabia is further complicated by the omission of success stories from the region. Many Indian professionals have built thriving careers in industries such as healthcare, technology and construction. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 initiative, which has specifically invited Indian professionals to contribute to the Kingdom’s ambitious development projects, is completely disregarded in the film. Initiatives like the program, which safeguards the rights of domestic workers, are also ignored, painting an incomplete picture of life for Indian expatriates in the Gulf.

Important social issues continue to be ignored

This misrepresentation in the movie reflects a broader trend in Indian foreign policy in which flaws in allied nations are highlighted while domestic issues are underplayed. Indian cinema, in this case, seems to follow suit. The film’s exaggerated depiction of life in Saudi Arabia diverts attention from pressing societal challenges in India, such as exploitation, gender-based violence and systemic inequality. Notable cases like the Nirbhaya gang rape or the Kathua incident are stark reminders of real, tragic stories that exist within India’s borders — stories that deserve more attention in Indian cinema.

This selective narrative raises further questions when considering recent developments such as the Canadian government’s allegations against the state of India. Canada accused India of being involved in the killing of Canadian nationals on Canadian soil. Such serious accusations, which have significant geopolitical implications, are conspicuously absent from Indian cinema’s focus. Why are these pressing international issues not addressed with the same vigor in Indian films? 

The selective focus on external flaws while overlooking internal issues mirrors a pattern often observed in India’s diplomatic stance. By critiquing its allies through international platforms, India risks eroding the goodwill that has long defined its relationships with key partners like Saudi Arabia. At a time when global interconnectedness is essential, the portrayal of nations in films like Goat Life should aim for greater nuance and fairness. Similarly, Indian cinema has an opportunity to shed light on the real struggles faced within its own borders, amplifying voices that demand justice and reform.

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Iran isn’t the only nation advancing its nuclear capabilities in recent years. In 2019, the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range land-based missiles, citing alleged Russian violations and China’s non-involvement. The US is also its nuclear arsenal, with to deploy nuclear weapons in more NATO states and proposals to extend its to Taiwan.

Russia, too, has intensified its nuclear posture, expanding nuclear and updating its on first use. In 2023, the nation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limited US and Russian-deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In 2024, it stationed in Belarus. Russia and China have also deepened their , setting China on a path to rapidly expand its arsenal, as nuclear security collaboration with the US has steadily over the past decade.

The breakdown of diplomacy and rising nuclear brinkmanship among major powers are heightening nuclear insecurity among themselves, but also risk spurring a new nuclear arms race. Alongside Iran, numerous countries maintain the technological infrastructure to quickly build nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation would require significant collaboration among major powers, a prospect currently out of reach.

The US detonated the first nuclear weapon in 1945, followed by the Soviet Union in , the United Kingdom in , France in and China in . It became evident that with access to uranium and enrichment technology, nations were increasingly capable of producing nuclear weapons. Though mass production and delivery capabilities were additional hurdles, it was widely expected in the early Cold War that many states would soon join the nuclear club. Israel developed nuclear capabilities in the , India detonated its first bomb in and South Africa built its first by . Other countries, including , , , , and , pursued their own programs.

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968 to curb nuclear spread, led many countries to abandon or dismantle their programs. After the end of the Cold War and under Western pressure, Iraq its nuclear program in 1991. In a historic move, South Africa voluntarily its arsenal in 1994. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1996, securing international security assurances in exchange.

Nuclear proliferation appeared to be a waning concern, but cracks soon appeared in the non-proliferation framework. Pakistan conducted its first in 1998, followed by North Korea in , bringing the count of nuclear-armed states to nine. Since then, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, initiated in the 1980s, has been a major target of Western non-proliferation efforts.

Nuclear ambitions in the Middle East, Asia and Europe

Iran has a strong reason to persist. Ukraine’s former nuclear arsenal might have deterred Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022. Elsewhere, revolutionary Muammar Gaddafi, who Libya’s nuclear program in 2003, was overthrown by a NATO-led coalition and local forces in 2011. If Iran achieves a functional nuclear weapon, it will lose the ability to leverage its nuclear program as a to extract concessions in negotiations. While a nuclear weapon will represent a new form of leverage, it would also intensify pressure from the US and Israel, both of whom have engaged in a cycle of escalating sometimes deadly confrontations with Iran and its proxies over the past few years.

An Iranian nuclear arsenal could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Its relations with Saudi Arabia remain delicate, despite the brokered by China. Saudi officials have they would obtain their own nuclear weapon if Iran acquired them. Saudi Arabia gave significant to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, or even the latter with one upon request.

Turkey, which hosts US nuclear weapons through NATO’s , signaled a policy shift in 2019 when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so.

Middle Eastern tensions are not the only force threatening non-proliferation. Japan’s renewed friction with China, North Korea and Russia over the past decade has intensified Tokyo’s focus on nuclear readiness. Although Japan a nuclear program in the 1940s, it was dismantled after World War II. Japan’s , however, remains measured in months. Despite this, for nuclear weapons remains low, given the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nuclear bombings in 1945 killed more than 200,000 people.

In contrast, around of South Koreans support developing nuclear weapons. South Korea’s nuclear program began in the 1970s but was under US pressure. However, North Korea’s successful test in 2006 and its severance of , and to the South in the past decade, coupled with the of peaceful reunification in early 2024, have again raised the issue in South Korea.

Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, which similarly under US pressure. Any sign of wavering US commitment to Taiwan, together with China’s growing nuclear capabilities, could prompt Taiwan to revive its efforts. Though less likely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea could also motivate countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to consider developing nuclear capabilities.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also had significant nuclear implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently to the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraine’s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered. Zelenskyy later his comments after they ignited a firestorm of controversy. Yet if Ukraine feels betrayed by its Western partners — particularly if it is forced to concede territory to Russia — it could spur some factions within Ukraine to attempt to secure nuclear capabilities.

The war has also spurred nuclear considerations across Europe. In December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer a European nuclear deterrent. Donald Trump’s re-election in the 2024 US presidential election could amplify European concerns over US commitments to NATO, with France having increasingly an independent European nuclear force in recent years.

Nuclear collaboration

Established nuclear powers are unlikely to welcome more countries into their ranks. But while China and Russia don’t necessarily desire this outcome, they recognize the West’s concerns are greater, with Russia doing in the 1990s to prevent its unemployed nuclear scientists from aiding North Korea’s program.

The US has also previously been blindsided by its allies’ nuclear aspirations. US policymakers underestimated Australia’s determination to pursue a nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, including covert attempts to obtain a weapon from the UK. Similarly, the US was initially of France’s extensive support for Israel’s nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

Smaller countries are also capable of aiding one another’s nuclear ambitions. Argentina offered considerable to Israel’s program, while Israel assisted . Saudi Arabia financed Pakistan’s nuclear development and Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist is of having aided Iran, Libya and North Korea with their programs in the 1980s.

The slippery slope to nuclear conflict

Conflicts involving nuclear weapons states are not without precedent. Egypt and Syria attacked nuclear-armed Israel in 1973 and Argentina faced a nuclear-armed UK in 1982. India and China have clashed over their border on several occasions. Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression. But conflicts featuring nuclear countries invite dangerous escalation, and the risk grows if a nation with limited conventional military power gains nuclear capabilities; lacking other means of defense or retaliation, it may be more tempted to resort to nuclear weapons as its only viable option.

The costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals are already steep. In 2023, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states spent an estimated managing their programs. But what incentive do smaller countries have to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely, especially when they observe the protection nuclear weapons offer and witness the major powers intensifying their nuclear strategies?

Obtaining the world’s most powerful weapons may be a natural ambition of military and intelligence sectors, but it hinges on the political forces in power as well. In Iran, moderates could counterbalance hardliners, while continued support for Ukraine might prevent more nationalist forces from coming to power there.

Yet an additional country obtaining a nuclear weapon could set off a cascade of others. While larger powers are currently leading the nuclear posturing, smaller countries may see an opportunity amid the disorder. The limited support for the , in effect since 2021, coupled with the collapse of other international treaties, reinforces the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states. With major powers in open contention, the barriers to nuclear ambitions are already weakening, making it ever harder to dissuade smaller nations from pursuing the ultimate deterrent.

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Despite the ongoing strife, world leaders at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly () in September merely reiterated the same sentiments that they have been repeating over the past six months. They condemned Houthi terrorism, but they did not put forward a coherent strategy to halt the strikes and force the Sana’a rebels back to negotiations.

Tensions grow amid broken promises

The people of South Yemen, in particular, cannot wait another year for solutions. Conditions on the ground are ripe for instability. The areas under the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council (), the Yemeni institution officially recognized by the international community, remain fragile across South Yemen. The PLC and its Saudi-led international allies cannot afford distractions from the fight against Houthis. Neither can the Southern Transitional Council (), the secessionist organization backed by the United Arab Emirates. While the PLC and the STC signed the in April 2022, joining forces against the Houthis, the STC still advocates for the South’s secession. As discontent against both leaderships grows, leaders must advance the interests of the marginalized population to sustain momentum against the Houthis.

Via Borysk5 on Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).

The Riyadh Agreement not only from former president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to the newly established PLC, but it also served to recognize the STC as the representative of the people of South Yemen. STC chief Aidarus al-Zubaidi that the agreement would pave the way “to develop a negotiating framework” wherein “determining the future, the solution of the issue of the people of the South [should come] naturally.” However, more than two years since the STC joined with the PLC, South Yemenis remain marginalized.

Initially, the didn’t aim to resolve the political conflict in the South, but rather to unite ranks with the STC against the Houthis. However, the PLC has not made much progress on this front. Lack of trust between the parties prevented military unity. While the lack of success undoubtedly affects the STC, the PLC became the main focus of criticism when it proved unable to counter Houthi strikes that halted all oil and gas production.

The government has made no progress regarding the issue of southern independence. When al-Zubaidi joined the talks in 2022, he to situate the southern issue front and center. However, a year later, PLC leader Rashad al-Alimi that “now is not the right time to discuss southern independence.” STC officials immediately shot back at al-Alimi, claiming he “showed a lack of seriousness.”

Alimi’s comments inflamed feelings across the South, not only among pro-STC elements but also among the tribes of eastern Yemen, an area that is formally under PLC control. The PLC has to meet basic demands for public services in areas like the eastern region of Hadhramaut. When al-Alimi visited Hadhramaut in July, he was met by . Then, on October 14, thousands in Seiyun, Hadhramaut sent a clear message to al-Alimi. During a celebration commemorating the 61st anniversary of independence from Britain, citizens of Hadhramaut expressed their support for the STC. On October 19, another event in al-Ghaydah, al-Mahra promoted “” as a symbol against PLC leadership.Ěý

A deepening economic crisis stokes tensions in the South

South Yemenis are . The PLC has failed to eliminate security threats, public services are diminishing, and an economic crisis is deepening. Over the last year, the Houthis have been commercial transiting through the Red and Arabian Seas. Their tactics and have evolved with potency and efficiency. Al-Zubaidi that failures to deal with Houthis are “no longer acceptable.” He maintains that “it is in the interest of our people to end the conflict and find a permanent solution.”

Related Reading

FO° Exclusive: Houthis Cause Chaos in the Red Sea

Not only have the Houthis interfered with international shipping lanes, they have also southern Yemeni ports. This dramatically increases the difficulty of getting imports into South Yemen, exacerbating and choking supplies of international food aid.

According to the OCHA, food imports in the southern ports of Aden and Mukalla declined by 13%. The UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs () notes that shortages in incoming aid left “around 3.6 million [Yemenis] with reduced .” More funding crises could affect a further 2.5 million. The Yemeni rial also slid “to an all-time low of YER1,681/USD by the end of April 2024.”

The failure to stop Houthi attacks has also prevented Yemen from exporting oil, a potential source of much-needed cash. In mid-2021, the Houthis to take over oil facilities across Shabwa. After they failed to do so, in October 2022 their strategy shifted to using missiles and drones against factories, ports and oil tankers, effectively .

Just prior to al-Alimi’s arrival in New York for the UNGA 79, reports surfaced claiming the PLC had failed to produce a new budget. held meetings with a number of UN officials and representatives of Western donor countries but failed to gain a public commitment for financial support. Until the PLC is able to put forth a cohesive plan to unite the country of Yemen against Houthi threats, Yemen will not receive international support. In the meantime, public unrest will only grow.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Yemen’s Government Cannot Ignore Looming Unrest appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

A nation in transformation

Saudi Arabia, long overshadowed by outdated perceptions, is emerging with a renewed vigour, redefining its identity on the world stage. The Crown Prince’s , unveiled in 2016, is not merely a document; it is a beacon of aspiration that illuminates the path forward, guiding the nation toward unprecedented economic growth, social reform and cultural openness. The very air is thick with energy, a palpable sense of anticipation and possibility that invigorates both Saudis and expatriates alike.

As a lawyer who has recently relocated to this enchanting land, I find myself enveloped in a wave of warmth and camaraderie. The close bonds between Saudi Arabia and my homeland, Pakistan, resonate deeply within me, making this country feel like a second home. The hospitality I have encountered here is extraordinary, shattering the preconceived notions that often cloud the Western perspective. It is a kindness that transcends borders, a gesture of friendship that welcomes all who seek to embrace this remarkable transformation.

One of the most striking aspects of this new Saudi Arabia is its progressive approach toward and inviting foreign investment. The kingdom has rolled out a red carpet for international businesses, showcasing its commitment to creating a dynamic economy. The recent landmark exemplifies this shift — a comprehensive piece of legislation that not only outlines the regulations but also provides a roadmap for investors, answering their queries with clarity and precision. The Saudi Ministry of Investment has crafted a detailed guide, ensuring that the path to doing business in the kingdom is as seamless as possible.

This endeavor is not merely about economic growth; it reflects a profound commitment to creating an environment where innovation thrives and opportunities abound. The kingdom is , encouraging startups and investing in industries that will shape the future. As I navigate this landscape, I see a burgeoning entrepreneurial spirit that echoes the dreams and aspirations of a youthful population eager to carve their niche in a rapidly evolving world.

Beyond the realm of economics, Saudi Arabia is undergoing a renaissance in terms of . The bustling streets of Riyadh and Jeddah pulse with a vibrant energy, offering rich culture, entertainment and recreation. The government is investing in infrastructure, education and healthcare, ensuring that the people of Saudi Arabia can enjoy a higher standard of living.

Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman’s vision for the future encompasses not only economic prosperity but also . The once-restrictive societal norms are giving way to a more inclusive environment where women are stepping into roles traditionally dominated by men. The winds of change are , allowing them to participate actively in various sectors — from entrepreneurship to leadership positions — ushering in a new era of gender equality.

As an expatriate, I have witnessed firsthand the remarkable strides being made in this area. Women are , shattering glass ceilings, and contributing to the kingdom’s development in profound ways. The enthusiasm and determination of Saudi women are inspiring, creating a ripple effect that is felt across the nation.

A hospitable, warm and optimistic people

While certain have long painted Saudi Arabia in hues of conservatism and restriction, the reality on the ground is a kaleidoscope of progress and openness. The kingdom is cultivating a global identity, one that embraces cultural exchange and fosters international partnerships. The Vision 2030 initiative encompasses not only economic aspirations but also a commitment to cultural heritage, education and tourism.

The energy of the youth is infectious; students are pursuing higher education both locally and abroad, eager to acquire the skills that will propel them into the future. Universities and institutions are collaborating with global partners, creating knowledge and innovation that is the educational landscape. The kingdom is no longer a passive participant in the global discourse but an active contributor, eager to share its story with the world.

At the heart of this transformation is the innate hospitality of the Saudi people — a trait that has long been woven into the fabric of their culture. The warmth with which expatriates are embraced is a testament to the kingdom’s desire to foster understanding and camaraderie. From the bustling markets filled with vibrant colors to the tranquil evenings spent sharing stories over cups of Arabic coffee, there is a profound sense of belonging that permeates the air.

The love and generosity I have experienced resonate deeply within me, inviting me to delve deeper into the rich traditions and customs of this beautiful land. The Saudi Arabian transcends mere politeness; it is an invitation to connect, to share and to grow together. As an expatriate, I find myself swept up in this current of goodwill, fostering friendships that bridge cultures and build understanding.

As the sands of time shift in Saudi Arabia, I invite readers to embark on their own journey of discovery. It is a land brimming with potential, a nation on the cusp of greatness and an experience that promises to be nothing short of transformative. Whether you seek adventure in the majestic landscapes, cultural enrichment in its museums, or connection with its warm-hearted people, Saudi Arabia has much to offer.

The implementation of Vision 2030 is just around the corner, and the kingdom is poised to become a global hub of trade, culture and . For those who may harbor doubts or preconceptions, I urge you to take that leap of faith. Immerse yourself in the beauty of this land, the richness of its culture and the kindness of its people. You may find, as I have, that Saudi Arabia isn’t merely a destination — it’s a place that will beckon you to call it home.

As the sun sets over the dunes, painting the sky in shades of orange and purple, I am filled with hope for what lies ahead. Saudi Arabia is not just shifting; it is , embracing its destiny with open arms and a heart full of love. From Saudi Arabia with love, I invite you to discover a nation transformed, a people united and a future bright with promise.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Shifting Sands in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

US President Joe Biden’s Achilles’ heel has been his “” of Netanyahu, who allied himself with the Israeli equivalent of neo-Nazis and launched a ruinous total war on the people of Gaza. He did this in the wake of the horrific October 7 Hamas terrorist attack Israel suffered in 2023.

Biden also signed on to the Abraham Accords, a project initiated in 2020 by Jared Kushner, the son-in-law and special Middle East envoy of then-President Donald Trump. Through them the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco all agreed to recognize Israel’s statehood. In return, Israel granted them investment and trade opportunities, as well as access to American weaponry and a US security umbrella.

Washington, however, failed to incorporate Saudi Arabia into that framework. It has also faced increasing difficulty keeping the accords themselves in place, given the region’s increasing anger and revulsion over the ongoing civilian death toll in Gaza. Typically, just the docking of an Israeli ship at the Moroccan port of Tangier this summer set off popular that spread to dozens of cities in that country. And that was just a taste of what could be coming.

Breathtaking hypocrisy

Washington’s efforts in the Middle East have been profoundly undermined by its breathtaking hypocrisy. After all, the Biden team has gone blue in the face decrying the Russian occupation of parts of Ukraine and its violations of international humanitarian law in killing so many innocent civilians there. In contrast, the administration let Netanyahu’s government completely disregard international law when it comes to its treatment of the Palestinians.

This summer, the International Court of Justice that the entire Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories is illegal in international law. In response, the US and Israel both thumbed their noses at the finding. In part as a response to Washington’s Israeli policy, no country in the Middle East and very few nations in the global South have joined its attempt to ostracize President Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

Worse yet for the Biden administration, the most significant divide in the Arab world between secular nationalist governments and those that favor political Islam has begun to heal in the face of the perceived Israeli threat. Turkey and Egypt have long had their daggers over their differing views of the , the fundamentalist movement that briefly came to power in Cairo in 2012–2013. Now they have begun repairing their relationship, specifically citing the menace posed by Israeli expansionism.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been persistently pressing Saudi Arabia, a key US security partner, to recognize Israel’s statehood at a moment when the Arab public is boiling over what they see as a genocide campaign in Gaza. This is the closest thing since the Trump administration to pure idiocracy. Washington’s pressure on Riyadh elicited the pitiful plea from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman that he fears being were he to normalize relations with Tel Aviv now. And consider that ironic given his own past role in the assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

In short, the ongoing inside-the-Beltway ambition to secure further Arab recognition of Israel amid the annihilation of Gaza has the US’s security partners wondering if Washington is trying to get them killed. This is anything but a promising basis for a long-term alliance.

Global delegitimization

The science-fiction-style nature of US policy in the Middle East is starkly revealed when you consider the position of Jordan, which has a peace treaty with Israel. In early September, its foreign minister, Ayman Safadi, issued a warning: Any attempt by the Israeli military or its squatter-settlers to expel indigenous West Bank Palestinians to Jordan would be an “act of war.” Such anxieties might once have seemed overblown, but the recent stunning (and stunningly destructive) Israeli military campaign on the Palestinian West Bank, bombings of populated areas by fighter jets, has tactically begun to resemble the campaign in Gaza. And keep in mind that, as August ended, Foreign Minister Israel Katz even the Israeli army to compel Palestinians to engage in a “voluntary evacuation” of the northern West Bank.

Not only is the expulsion of Palestinians now the stated policy of cabinet members like Jewish Power extremist Itamar Ben-Gvir; it’s the of 65% of Israelis polled. When Israel and Jordan begin talking about war, you know something serious is going on — the last time those two countries actively fought was in the 1973 October War, during the administration of US President Richard Nixon.

In short, Netanyahu and his extremist companions are in the process of undoing all the diplomatic progress their country achieved in the past half-century. Ronen Bar, head of Israel’s domestic Shin Bet intelligence agency, in August that the brutal policies the extremists in the government were pursuing are “a stain on Judaism” and will lead to “global delegitimization, even among our greatest allies.”

Turkey, a NATO ally with which the US has mutual defense obligations, has become vociferous in its discontent with Biden’s Middle Eastern policy. Although Turkey recognized Israel in 1949, under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of the pro-Islam Justice and Development Party, interactions had grown rocky even before the Gaza nightmare. Until then, their trade and military ties had survived occasional shouting matches between their politicians. The Gaza genocide, however, has changed all that. Erdogan even Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler and then went further still, that, in the Rafah offensive in southern Gaza in May, “Netanyahu has reached a level with his genocidal methods that would make Hitler jealous.”

Worse yet, the Turkish president, referred to by friend and foe as the “” because of his vast power, has now gone beyond angry words. Since last October, he’s used Turkey’s position in NATO to that organization from cooperating in any way with Israel. This is on the grounds that it’s violating the NATO principle that harm to civilians in war must be carefully minimized. The Justice and Development Party leader also imposed an economic on Israel. It has interrupted bilateral trade that previously reached $7 billion a year and sent the price of produce in Israel soaring, while leading to a shortage of automobiles on the Israeli market.

Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party represents the country’s small towns, rural areas, Muslim businesses and entrepreneurs, constituencies that care deeply about the fate of Muslim Palestinians in Gaza. And while Erdogan’s high dudgeon has undoubtedly been sincere, he’s also pleasing his party’s stalwarts in the face of an increasing domestic challenge from the secular Republican People’s Party. Additionally, he’s long played to a larger Arab public, which is apoplectic over the unending carnage in Gaza.

The alliance of Muslim countries

Although it was undoubtedly mere bluster, Erdogan even threatened a direct on behalf of the beleaguered Palestinians. In early August, he said, “Just as we intervened in Karabakh [disputed territory between Azerbaijan and Armenia], just as we intervened in Libya, we will do the same to them.” In early September, the Turkish president for an Islamic alliance in the region to counter what he characterized as Israeli expansionism:

“Yesterday, one of our own children, [Turkish-American human rights ] Ayşenur Ezgi Eygi, was vilely slaughtered [on the West Bank]. Israel will not stop in Gaza. After occupying Ramallah [the de facto capital of that territory], they will look around elsewhere. They’ll fix their eyes on our homeland. They openly proclaim it with a map. We say Hamas is resisting for the Muslims. Standing against Israel’s state terror is an issue of importance to the nation and the country. Islamic countries must wake up as soon as possible and increase their cooperation. The only step that can be taken against Israel’s genocide is the alliance of Muslim countries.”

In fact, the present nightmare in Gaza and the West Bank may indeed be changing political relationships in the region. After all, the Turkish president pointed to his rapprochement with Egypt as a building block in a new security edifice he envisions. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made his first to Ankara on September 4, following an Erdogan trip to Cairo in February. And those visits represented the end of a more than decade-long cold war in the Sunni Muslim world over al-Sisi’s 2013 coup against elected Muslim Brotherhood Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, whom Erdogan had backed.

Despite its apparent embrace of democratic norms in 2012–2013, some Middle Eastern rulers charged the Brotherhood with having covert autocratic ambitions throughout the region and sought to crush it. For the moment, the Muslim Brotherhood and other forms of Sunni political Islam have been roundly defeated in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and the Persian Gulf region. Erdogan, a pragmatist despite his support for the Brotherhood and its offshoot Hamas, had been in the process of getting his country the best possible deal, given such a regional defeat, even before the Israelis struck Gaza.

Netanyahu’s forever war in Gaza

For his part, Egypt’s al-Sisi is eager for greater leverage against Netanyahu’s apparent plan for a forever war in Gaza. The Gaza campaign has already inflicted substantial on Egypt’s economy, since Yemen’s Houthis have supported the Gazans with on container ships and oil tankers in the Red Sea. In turn, that has diverted traffic away from it and from the Suez Canal, whose tolls normally earn significant foreign exchange for Egypt. In the first half of 2024, however, it took in only half the canal receipts of the previous year. Although tourism has held up reasonably well, any widening of the war could devastate that industry, too.

Egyptians are also reportedly over Netanyahu’s occupation of the south of the city of Rafah in Gaza. They also despise his blithe disregard of Cairo’s prerogatives to patrol that corridor, granted under the Camp David agreement. The al-Sisi government, along with Qatar’s rulers and the Biden administration, has been heavily involved in hosting (so far fruitless) peace negotiations between Hamas and Israel. The Egyptian government seems to be at the end of its tether, increasingly angered at the way the Israeli prime minister has constantly new conditions onto any agreements being discussed, which have caused the talks to fail.

For months, Cairo has also been seething over Netanyahu’s charge that Egypt allowed tunnels to be built under that corridor to supply Hamas with weaponry. Cairo that the Egyptian army had diligently destroyed 1,500 such tunnels over the past decade. Egypt’s position was recently supported by Nadav Argaman, a former head of the Israeli Shin Bet intelligence agency, who , “There is no connection between the weaponry found in Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor.” Of Netanyahu, he added, “He knows very well that no smuggling takes place over the Philadelphi Corridor. So, we are now relegated to living with this imaginary figment.”

In the Turkish capital of Ankara, al-Sisi that he wanted to work with Erdogan to address “the humanitarian tragedy that our Palestinian brothers in Gaza are facing in an unprecedented disaster that has been going on for nearly a year.” He underscored that there was no daylight between Egypt and Turkey “regarding the demand for an immediate ceasefire, the rejection of the current Israeli escalation in the West Bank, and the call to start down a path that achieves the aspirations of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state on the borders of June 4, 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital.” He also pointed out that such positions are in accord with United Nations Security Council resolutions. Al-Sisi pledged to work with Turkey to ensure that humanitarian aid was delivered to Gaza despite “the ongoing obstacles imposed by Israel.”

To sum up, the ligaments of US influence in the Middle East are now dissolving before our very eyes. Washington’s closest allies, like the Jordanian and Saudi royal families, are terrified that Biden’s bear hug of Netanyahu’s war crimes, coupled with the fury of their own people, could destabilize their rule. Countries that not so long ago had correct, if not warm, relations with Israel like Egypt and Turkey are increasingly denouncing that country and its policies.

The alliance of US partners in the region with Israel against Iran that Washington has long worked for seems to be coming apart at the seams. Countries like Egypt and Turkey are instead exploring the possibility of forming a regional Sunni Muslim alliance against Netanyahu’s geopolitics of Jewish power that might, in the end, actually reduce tensions with Tehran.

That things have come to such a pass in the Middle East is distinctly the fault of the Biden administration and its position — or lack thereof — on Israel’s nightmare in Gaza (and now the West Bank). Today, sadly, that administration is wearing the same kind of blinkers regarding the war in Gaza that US President Lyndon B. Johnson and his top officials once sported when it came to the Vietnam War.

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Reasons Supporting Netanyahu Is the US’s Big Middle Eastern Mistake appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In the early 2000s, the United States’ hegemonic position in the Middle East changed. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the need to contain communist influence and decreased the urgency of refereeing regional disagreements or addressing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

However, the Middle East came sharply into focus when the Sunni extremist group al-Qaeda orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US soil, killing 2,977. The George W. Bush administration declared a “War on Terror,” training its guns not only on groups like al-Qaeda but also states like Baathist dictator Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Claiming that Saddam was hiding weapons of mass destruction, the US invaded Iraq in 2003 and toppled his regime.

With the invasion, the generally successful half-century of US foreign policy in the Middle East that had begun with the 1953 Iranian coup d’Ă©tat came to a close. The US found itself mired in a destabilized Iraq, unable to pull out as the newly installed democratic government could not combat Islamist insurgencies on its own.

Disengagement and reengagement

The Barack Obama administration attempt to reduce Middle East involvement and “pivot towards Asia.” The rise of the brutal and initially successful Sunni terrorist group ISIS, the 2011 Arab Spring and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War prevented the US from disengaging. Obama did make progress by striking a deal with Iran, agreeing to lift financial sanctions in exchange for the cessation of the Islamic republic’s nuclear program. However, Obama’s successor Donald Trump later scrapped the deal.

Despite these setbacks, the US succeeded in protecting its interests while attempting to resolve regional wars and the enduring Arab–Israeli conflict. The Trump administration brokered the Abraham Accords, in which Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) normalized ties with Israel. Morocco soon followed suit. Saudi Arabia also entered negotiations with Israel, but the prospect of normalization stalled following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli invasion of Gaza. Since the war broke out, the US has seen decreased popularity among Arab populations as they blamed the hegemonic power for backing up what they saw as Zionist aggression in Palestine. However, a bilateral security agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia remains possible.

In recent years, the US reduced its dependency on imported fuels by exploiting its own fossil fuel reserves. The US is rich in oil and natural gas, but they are usually in a form that requires more effort to extract than in the Middle East. Fracking and other technological advancements have helped close this gap. However, Saudi Arabia continues to be the biggest figure in oil production.

The region continues to evolve. Gone is the binary US–Soviet dynamic, and gone, too, is unipolar US preponderance. More independent actors like China, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE now shape the region. China, heavily reliant on Middle Eastern oil, is increasing its economic and political presence.

Domestically, American attitudes toward the Middle East are also in flux. Younger Americans are growing more critical of Israel. Having grown up during the Iraq War, this generation is leery of US involvement in the region. For now, though, the US continues to prioritize regional stability, oil price stability and containment of Iranian influence in its Middle East policy.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: America’s New Fast-Changing Role in the Middle East Part 2 appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

To understand the role the US plays in the Middle East today, we need to look at history. In the aftermath of World War II, America turned to the region mainly due to its strategic interest in the Middle East’s vast energy resources, particularly oil. On February 19, 1945, President Roosevelt met with King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman al Saud (better known in the West as Ibn Saud) aboard the USS Quincy on the Great Bitter Lake in Egypt. Despite the colorful pageantry, including the slaughtering of goats for a feast, the central focus of the talks was disposition of the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees following World War II and the future relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, with a notable absence of direct discussions about oil.

Britain’s losing gamble in Iran

Meanwhile, the British, previously dominant in the Middle East, made a critical miscalculation regarding Saudi Arabia’s mineral potential. The British underestimated Saudi oil reserves. The Americans, adopting a more persistent approach, eventually struck oil in the eastern part of the country. This discovery solidified the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States and US oil interests, marking the beginning of an enduring alliance. This partnership involved US oil companies drilling for oil in Saudi Arabia, with an even split in profits.

The British, with a historical interest in preserving its global empire, particularly in India and the Middle East, had a vested interest in maintaining its strong influence in the region, most notably Egypt and Iran. However, their misjudgment of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves created a strategic setback, contributing to the evolution of the Middle East’s power dynamics.

As a result, the British focused on the oil in Iran; however, they had a different relationship with the Iranians. The British attempted to maintain control in Egypt and Iran but faced setbacks. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., (today known as BP), stood at the center of international tension. Under Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadegh, the Iranians sought to nationalize the oil company, which Britain vigorously opposed. The US encouraged the two parties to look to the US–Saudi partnership as a model. Yet both sides stubbornly refused and held on inflexibly. Along with Mossadegh’s obstinance, British and later American concerns about the direction of the Mossadegh government in its relationship with the Soviet Union led to the deposition of the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran and the reinstatement of the absolute monarchy. Years later, the CIA admitted to America’s part in backing the coup to rid Iran of its Prime Minister.

Discontentment with the new regime and anti-Western sentiment eventually led to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Islamists expelled Western interests from the country and set Iran as the foremost anti-Western power in the region, which it remains to this day.

Washington takes up the banner from London

As the 1950s wore on, US influence on the world stage and participation in Middle East politics continued to grow, taking on the role of peacekeeper. When Israel, France and the UK attempted to invade Egypt in 1956 to gain canal control, the US publicly condemned the plan, leading to the breakdown of the attempted attack. This marked a break between the European colonial powers with the US, which paradoxically found itself on the same side of the dispute as the Soviet Union, which that same year had invaded Hungary..

Yet the stage had been set. 1956 marked a turning point in the global balance of power. No longer would Paris and London dictate the terms of engagement, but two new and formally anti-colonial superpowers — the US and the Soviet Union — would shape the international system. For the succeeding three and a half decades, the Middle East, like the rest of the world, would become a Cold War chessboard.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: America’s New Fast-Changing Role in the Middle East, Part 1 appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

How significant is from , which could look to some people like a turning point? “After Pausing BRICS, Saudi Arabia Starts Issuing US Dollar Bonds.”

The article concludes with this: “However, Saudi Arabia has not officially confirmed if it wants to join BRICS or reject the invitation. We have to wait and watch for an official statement from the Kingdom on its decision to join the alliance.”

The fundamentals don’t change, but I’m sure they don’t tell the whole story. Is it even possible even to begin speculating sanely, let alone draw conclusions about which laws produce which effects?

Still, I find nothing astonishing or revealing when I read that “these bonds are solely aimed at institutional investors. The issuance is managed by leading US banks such as Citi, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, HSBC, Morgan Stanley, and SNB Capital, among others. Therefore, Saudi Arabia is working closely with the US institutional banks for the dollar-denominated bonds.”

Does this simply reflect the current strong position of the dollar or is it a significant bet on the future?

Edward promptly offered his own strategically ambiguous take on the question of Saudi intentions by posting of Dr. Ali Rashid Al Nuami, Saudi Arabia’s representative at the 10th BRICS Parliamentary Forum in St. Petersburg. He was present, but with something of a scowl on his face (at least at the moment the photo was taken).

Alex contributed a more detailed response that offered much needed clarity without resolving a question that both Saudis and Americans, as Alex explains, prefer to keep shrouded in mystery. Here, on the question of the Saudis’ use of dollars, are what Alex calls his “two cents.”

Saudi Arabia has already $279 billion in government outstanding.

The local currency is too small and not fungible in international markets, hence not suited for issuing debt.

Due to oil exports, a large part of revenue is in United States dollars (USD); hence, issuing debt in USD makes sense.

Issuing USD debt also serves as a “hedge” against USD debasement (devaluation). If the USD falls, USD-denominated debt also shrinks (if measured in another currency; the Saudi riyal is pegged to USD, so not much there is reprieve from falling USD if measured in riyal, but you get the idea).

A broader question: Why does Saudi Arabia have to issue debt at all? Saudi Arabia has a current account surplus of 6% of GDP and only a slight government deficit of 2% of GDP. However, this is very much dependent on oil prices. In 1987, for example, when oil prices fell to $8 a barrel, the government had a deficit of 25% of GDP. In 2008, when oil prices reached $140 a barrel, a surplus of 30% resulted. Being an established issuer of debt, with long-standing credit ratings (currently “A”), helps when one is forced to issue debt in times of budget problems.

Saudi Arabia is very aware that the “oil age” will eventually come to an end. Former oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani famously said, “The stone age didn’t end for lack of stones,” implying that the oil age will not end for lack of oil. Saudi Arabia is hence trying to diversify away from oil (airline, luxury accommodation, tourism etc).

Saudi Arabia has experienced rapid population growth from 4 million people in 1961 to 34 million last year. In order to prevent locals from revolting against an unelected royal family, they have to be kept happy. Additional government spending can be useful in this regard. Locals already enjoy a personal income tax rate of 0%, while corporate taxes are low, too (20%).

Government spending is also necessary for large purchases of US-made military equipment. Pre-9/11, military spending averaged around $20 billion annually. After 9/11, military spending increased to $60–$90 billion, which can be seen as “protection money” to be paid to the US in exchange for not instigating a palace coup. During his term, US President Donald Trump about the amount of arms sold to Saudi Arabia.

The 2017 detention and torture of 400 of “Saudi’s most powerful people” at the Riyadh Ritz Carlton might have been a counter-coup or simply a shake-down of people who were thought to have excessively enriched themselves to the detriment of the state (estimated $28 to $107 billion were recovered).

The headline is therefore not only wrong (Saudi Arabia didn’t “start” issuing USD bonds), but also wrongly suggest the Saudis were in the BRICS camp.

Each time the Saudis mention the possibility of selling Treasury bonds, the US mentions the “Saudi passports found on the sidewalk in Manhattan” after the 9/11 attacks (in clear terms: “We will tell the American public who really was behind 9/11, instigate a palace coup and have the Yemeni Houthis lob a bunch of rockets into your refineries/oil installations).”

Journalism and the question of context

Everything Alex cites is public information. Vinod Dsouza, the journalist who produced the story for Watcher.guru, obviously had access to that information. He could have put together the data as Alex has done and provided a truly enlightening analysis that takes into account the rich complexity of the trio of actors whose complex relationships are at play: Saudi Arabia, BRICS and the US. But as often in this type of journalism, rather than seeking to stimulate the public’s reflection, Dsouza pushed a simplified message. In this case, as Alex shows, this message was simply wrong.

In fairness, however, to Dsouza, he did make this point in the article: “The move suggests that Saudi Arabia might reject the BRICS invitation as it wants the US dollar to flow into its economy.” But even in that acknowledgement of the fact that Saudi Arabia has not joined BRICS, the message that its hesitation is based on its desire to keep USD flowing “into its economy” is so simplistic as to be wrong. As Alex explains, it isn’t about what the nation “wants,” but the convenience of using the existing components of the international system as works today in the most efficient way.

Watcher.guru describes itself as “a leading source in finance, with a focus on cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, Ethereum, Blockchain, DeFi, and more. Our goal is to build a trusted and influential media platform for a worldwide community involved in rebuilding the current financial state to a decentralized system.”

Perhaps it would be better “trusted” and more “influential” if it offered some authentic analysis, such as Alex has provided in our ongoing dialogue. Instead, Watcher.guru appears content with publishing articles highlighting random observations followed by partial and misleading conclusions. I am not suggesting that the website is spreading disinformation or even misinformation (the less intentional form of dupery). But like much of the press, its journalism appears to privilege simplistic, shocking headlines and facile conclusions over solid insight.

Again, to be fair, the website describes its philosophy thus: “Unlike other news sources, we focus on speed as a main priority. Watcher Guru is known for its speed when it comes to news, thus we publish headline-like alert reports first, as our editorial team works on an article to provide context to those who need it.”

The problem may lie in the understanding of context. Alex has provided multiple elements of context. Dsouza’s article is, at best, minimalist. I highlight this contrast to demonstrate the principle we at 51łÔąĎ are following in our “Crucible of Collaboration.” For any serious question — and most people would acknowledge that Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical alignment is a serioius question — context is more than a few random facts and statistics. Our “crucible” is a place of exchange in which the confrontation of contrasting interpretations can lead to greater clarity.

At 51łÔąĎ, we intend to continue developing our Crucible of Collaboration with “Money Matters…” and extend the principle to other topics in the news. We invite readers with their own insights or interrogations to join and enrich the debate. One of our aims is to help all of us to make sense of the headlines we see elsewhere!

Join the debate

“Money Matters…” is dedicated to developing this discussion and involving all interested parties.

We invite all of you who have something to contribute to send us your reflections at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We will integrate your insights into the ongoing debate. We will publish them as articles or as part of the ongoing dialogue.

*[51łÔąĎ’s “Crucible of Collaboration” is meant to be a space in which multiple voices can be heard, comparing and contrasting their opinions and insights in the interest of deepening and broadening our understanding of complex topics.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Crucible: Money Matters in a Multipolar World, Part 10 appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Concerned that the war could mobilize segments of civil society, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where any form of public protest is banned, have cracked down on expressions of solidarity with Gaza, including the sporting of the keffiyeh, a checkered scarf that symbolizes Palestinian nationalism.

In December, pro-Palestinian activists at the COP28 climate summit in Dubai unprecedented restrictions, including prohibitions on flags and explicitly naming a country in news conferences, and scrutiny of their slogans. In January, the Red Sea Film Festival in Jeddah, the biggest film event in the Middle East and North Africa, welcomed Palestinian cinema but the donning of keffiyehs by attendees.

Egypt is feeling the economic pinch

Like in the second half of the 20th century, protests in the Middle East beyond the Gulf in support of Palestinians and against Israel’s assault on Gaza are as much about anger at governments’ faltering economic performance as they are about the war itself.

Nowhere is the anger more acute than in Egypt, where the country’s currency slipped this week sharply against the US dollar after the central bank raised its main interest rate by 600 basis points to 27.75% and said it would allow the currency’s exchange rate to be set by market forces. It was the Egyptian pound’s fifth devaluation in two years. Hard hit by the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, the government the measures to stymie Egypt’s 31% inflation rate, attract desperately needed foreign investment, and tackle its staggering shortage of foreign currency.

Egypt has suffered from a loss of tourism, significantly reduced Suez Canal shipping revenues because of Yemeni Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, rising wheat prices in the wake of the Ukraine war and economic mismanagement, including investment in megaprojects such as a $58 billion new desert capital, as well as granting military-owned enterprises preferential treatment and an oversized stake in the economy.

The floating of the Egyptian pound an expansion from $3 billion to $8 billion of Egypt’s International Monetary Fund bailout loan, making the North African country one of the IMF’s highest borrowers.

The IMF agreement cemented a recent deal with the United Arab Emirates to develop a prime stretch of Egypt’s Mediterranean coast with a investment over the next two months. Egypt will retain a 35% stake in the development with the Talaat Moustafa Group, a construction conglomerate involved in building the new capital as one of the beneficiaries. While not officially announced, well-placed sources said It was understood that the deal was contingent on Egypt reaching an agreement with the IMF.

Gulf states, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have in recent years backed away from pumping funds into black holes. Instead, they increasingly investments in countries like Egypt and Pakistan to economic reforms and prospects for a return on investment.

The UAE pioneered the approach when it based a government minister in Cairo immediately after general-turned-president Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s 2013 UAE-backed coup that toppled Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president. The UAE official attempted to nudge Al-Sisi towards economic reform.

In a similar vein, Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed al-Jadaan an investment conference last year, “We work with the International Monetary Fund and according to its rules. The days of unconditional assistance are over.”

Egypt walks a political tightrope

Last week, 45-year-old policeman Abdel-Gawad Muhammad al-Sahlamy was alone when he a one-man protest waving a Palestinian flag atop an advertisement billboard in the port city of Alexandria, but many Egyptians were likely to have been with him in spirit. Many are angry that Egypt’s Refah border crossing into Gaza remains closed despite the images of thousands of Gazans dying and imminent famine.

In October, the government sought to pre-empt potential protests by pro-Palestinian demonstrations of its own.

Al-Sisi believes that pro-Palestinian activists who were allowed to stage protests under former president Hosni Mubarak shifted their focus in 2011 to his regime and ultimately toppled him during the popular Arab uprisings. The revolts also led to the demise of autocratic rulers in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen and sparked mass anti-government demonstrations elsewhere in the Middle East.

To be sure, Egypt is worried that Israel’s destruction of Gaza is an effort to rid the Strip of its population by inducing Gazans to flee to Egypt. Officials in Cairo also fear that Hamas operatives could infiltrate the Sinai Peninsula where the military has been countering a low-level insurgency. Al-Sisi’s government is wary of Hamas because of its links to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Even so, many Egyptians resent the government’s close security ties with Israel and its support for a 17-year-long Israeli blockade of Gaza that has been tightened since the war. Egyptian resentment is compounded by that corrupt Egyptian government officials linked to the country’s intelligence service and a well-connected businessman who hails from the Sinai charge up to per person for travel permits from Gaza to Egypt.

Al-Sahlamy shouted “God is Great” and denounced Al-Sisi as a “traitor and an agent” before being arrested by security forces. The Egyptian Network for Human Rights (ENHR) Al-Sahlamy has not been heard from since.

The network quoted a friend of Al-Sahlamy as saying he was “breaking down” because of the war, which he described as “injustice.” Al-Sahlamy demanded that “the [Egyptian] borders [with Gaza] should be opened” to allow Gazans to escape the carnage, ENHR quoted the policeman’s friend as saying.

The IMF’s austerity program could push struggling Egyptians to a level of destitution not seen since the bread riots of 1977, despite the government’s insistence that it will put in place social protection measures to shield the most vulnerable.

The rising cost of basic goods has deepened the hardships faced by lower-class Egyptians. They have suffered from price hikes since the government embarked on an ambitious reform program in 2016 to overhaul the battered economy. Nearly of Egyptians live in poverty, according to official figures.

For now, Egyptians, like others elsewhere in the Arab world, fear that uprisings would only enhance the chaos already gripping their part of the world. In Egypt’s case, “the question of Sisi’s future will arise when Egyptian citizens decide that they have nothing more to lose,” Israeli journalist and Middle East analyst Zvi Bar’el. The same is true for much of the Middle East beyond the Gulf, with widespread public frustration at Arab states’ inability or unwillingness to alleviate Palestinian suffering as the joker in the pack.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Gaza Is Now a Powder Keg in Egypt and Beyond appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

A large business partner for Germany

Over the years, Qatar and Germany have considerable bilateral ties. Germany ships billions of euros’ worth of civilian and military equipment to Qatar, and Qatar sends Germany a huge amount of gas in return. In addition, Qatari funds flood the German economy.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU a huge list of sanctions against Russia. About 27% of Germany’s energy from natural gas, of which 55% came from Russia before the invasion. It is clear why Germany began to scramble to find a new supply of gas.

New energy supply mean Qatar will up to 2 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas per year to Germany for 15 years starting in 2026. Because of this, the Qatari–German relationship has jumped from considerable to strategic. It has also enabled Germany to break free of Russian gas supplies. The completion of the Qatari deal led German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to : “These are long-term contracts. This is also a good statement for the security of Germany’s energy supply.” They slash German dependency on Russian energy by a factor of four.

Speaking to Qatar News Agency, Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry Chairman Khalifa bin Jassim Al Thani that Germany is one of Qatar’s largest trading partners, as the volume of trade exchange between the two countries increased last year to 6.8 billion Qatari riyals ($1.87 billion), compared to 6.4 billion riyals ($1.76 billion) in 2020. Khalifa bin Jassim also mentioned the increasing mutual investments between the two countries. The immense income generated by the trade enables this small, autocratic Middle Eastern country to finance itself comfortably. The new energy supply agreement is bound to this trade exchange considerably.

With the Qatar energy deals and financial investments, Germany has taken another step towards securing its economy, but at the cost of placing itself under Qatari influence. This risks Germany being associated with ongoing investigations and tarnishing its image.

Not as peace-oriented and compliant as it may claim

Since the emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, came to power in 2013, he has put major efforts into brushing up the image of Qatar. He aims to present the picture of a modern, moderate and reputable international partner. Ranging from infrastructure to sports, Qatar has spared no effort in connecting with Western powers. Al Jazeera Media Network, which receives funding from the Qatari government, is also a massive influence asset, with its global presence.

This quest for respectability, of course, included changing domestic policies. Following the UN Human Rights committee in 2014, Qatar two major international treaties guaranteeing basic rights for workers, namely foreign ones, after years of blatant abuse. Western partners and the UN unanimously these progressive developments, but they are showing their limits today.

These reforms also afforded Qatar a level of influence that is disconnected from its actual demographic, economic and military power. (An exception is in the case of gas exports to Germany, where Qatar actually does yield considerable power.) Qatar’s public relations efforts were overall successful. Politico editor Jamie Dettmer : “For a small Gulf emirate located on a spit of desert jutting into the Persian Gulf, Qatar has long punched way above its weight in the corridors of Western power.”

These efforts have successfully gone beyond classic public relations campaigns. In 2022, the EU underwent a . It became apparent that Qatari corruption efforts had penetrated all the way to the heart of democratic institutions. Timo Lange, an expert with LobbyControl, : “Several MPs and a former EU commissioner were supposed to exert influence on behalf of the governments of Qatar and Morocco and receive large sums of money in return.” As more and more news outlets began to investigate the matter, Qatar’s practices came to light.

Der Spiegel an investigation in June 2023 about suspicions of corruption surrounding German electronics and defense subcontractor Hensoldt. It described how several German companies, with Hensoldt as the subcontractor to Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), discreetly worked with several intermediaries for Qatar. The main one that KMW and Hensoldt worked with was Multi Services Company (MSC) — a Qatari company providing various services to aid businesses in expanding their operations.

MSC is 70% owned by a relative of a military general who is part of the Al Thani family and 30% owned by an investment fund for Qatar’s armed forces. This goes against Hensoldt’s own policy of not working with companies who are “directly or indirectly owned or otherwise controlled or managed by Public Officials or politically exposed persons.” There were also questions of whether bribes were made to military personnel involved in the transactions between the businesses, but Hensoldt vehemently denies this.

Finally, Qatar’s support to Islamic fundamentalist movements is to all. They have provided financial support to extremist and terrorist groups, harbored their exiled leaders and supported them diplomatically. They have done this with Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Bahraini Shia opposition groups. Qatar also still funds a large number of media outlets that support the Brotherhood’s ideologies.

On October 7, 2023, the military arm of Hamas launched an attack on Israel, killing almost people and taking roughly 250 people as hostages. Israel responded with an invasion, intent on rescuing the hostages and destroying the Hamas military. Qatar seized the diplomatic opportunity to act as a “” in the region, given its numerous pre-existing ties with Hamas.

Scholz accepted this position of respectability, but it does not well with many other German officials. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, a representative of the Free Democratic Party, which is often in coalition with the CDU, the relationship with Qatar acceptable only to increase the chance of hostage release, and demands it be readjusted in the long run: “Nevertheless, this conversation with the Chancellor is unfortunately necessary in order to hopefully free as many hostages as possible from the clutches of the terrorist group.”

These oppositions could snowball and reignite critical voices, which were heard during the and following the gas supply . “Following the preventable human rights catastrophes of the Sochi Olympics, Russia’s World Cup, the Beijing Winter Olympics and the Qatar World Cup, Germany should step up and tie funding to transparency and adopting and implementing human rights policies,” Wenzel Michalski, Germany director at Human Rights Watch. Large international events, such as the Olympics, have systematically highlighted that human rights were not universally upheld and stressed how democratic nations such as Germany should use their economic and diplomatic power to protect minorities and the rule of law.

Will Qatar go down the same road as Saudi Arabia and Turkey?

Saudi Arabia, Qatar’s neighbor, has already been down this road. For decades, the West created and maintained close ties with that Arabian kingdom, which it saw as a key partner in the region. There were many collaborations ranging from strategic to infrastructural and military. In 2019, Germany, along with many other nations, an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia following the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

As time went by, Germany revealed itself as even more strict and demanding with Saudi Arabia than other European nations. Others, such as the , did not impose full embargos. Germany based its position, among other reasons, on alleged human rights violations in the Yemen war. The German Bundestag made the decision to military supplies to Saudi Arabia. Although this has in recent times, no doubt it could do the same with Qatar.

At a more moderate but comparable level, Germany has been Turkey to act more in accordance with international standards and has embargos to enforce its policy in the past.

In 2013, Qatar 62 Leopard 2 tanks, one of the world’s most advanced models produced by German firm KMW. As the operator, Qatar is highly dependent upon maintenance and supplies from Germany, in order to keep its military potential intact. Any further violations of international law, corruption practices and complacent attitudes towards minority discriminations from Qatar could lead Germany to limit interactions.

This could go as far as severing contractual ties, thus reducing Qatar’s military power for the duration of a military program. A military program, which spans from the political initiation to acquire or develop a new weapons system to the retirement of said equipment, can last over 40 years, making military potential highly vulnerable to momentum breakdown.

As a major defense equipment exporter, Germany has the ability to influence partners towards respecting human rights. In cases of violence and injustice, silence amounts to complicity, something the German foreign policy has pledged not to do. This is in no small part due to Germany’s painful past and responsibility for the Holocaust, a mass psychological feature named Kollektivschuld (collective guilt).

Qatar is putting less effort into its disguise as it gains power and self-confidence. That said, its true nature never changed. The small Gulf state is still a monarchical dictatorship, with no intention to align itself with international standards and respect basic human rights, save a few cosmetic reforms, designed to play along with Western diplomacy. Europe of this — Germany most of all — when confronted with the dubious respect for minority rights Qatar displayed during the FIFA World Cup. The above-mentioned EU corruption scandal, dubbed Qatargate or the Qatarstrophe, also considerably damaged the Gulf nation’s image and put the German government under pressure.

In 2023, Der Spiegel economy minister Robert Habeck in a way that reflected the German public’s incomprehension of the gap between their nation’s stance and practices: “Mr. Habeck, in 2022, you had to beg the emir of Qatar to sell Germany natural gas, coal-fired power plants had to be brought back online and you were forced to extend the lifespans of nuclear power plants in the country. As a member of the Green Party and as German economics and climate minister, it must have been an awful year for you.”

Germany is attached to its influential image and will need to protect it, even as it seeks to replace formerly necessary Russian relations. The new strategy places Germany at the center of international attention, making it crucial for Berlin to align its values and its factual choices.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Qatar’s Wealth and Resources May Be Unwelcome in Germany appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The trend of Arab–Israeli normalization pushed both Palestine and Iran to the sidelines. Hamas, backed by Iran, sought to change that. Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. The attack and the subsequent war not only brought the Palestinian issue to the front and center of discourse once again but also re-injected Iran into the fight for regional power.

The Israel–Hamas war created a crack in regional power dynamics

Iran now has an opening where it didn’t have one before. Of course, it is as they say in the business world: Never invest with your own money. Iran used Hamas to break into the fight for regional power, and it will continue with that tactic. Terrorist groups such as the Houthis and Hezbollah offer Iran the chance to upend the fragile regional dynamics. Not only this, but Iran can also threaten increasingly brittle global trade.

It is no secret that non-geographically centered power wins over geographically-centered states. Iran can strike from many places at once, stretching the US capacity to respond thin. As in the US–Vietnam War, asymmetric warfare has proven to be wildly successful in upsetting what seemed to be a one-sided power dynamic.  In backing and funding groups such as Hamas and the Houthis, Iran is now broading the focus of attention. No longer is the world only focused on the Israel–Hamas war; the focus is increasingly on Iran as a player with growing influence.

The big powers of the Middle East find themselves, much like Odysseus’ crew, caught between Scylla and Charybdis. Saudi Arabia in particular is feeling the strain. On one hand, war with Israel is the last thing Saudi Arabia wants. But on the other, its majority Sunni Muslim population views Saudi leaders as ignoring the sentiments of their citizens. The hearts of the Arab street, of course, are with their fellow Muslims in Palestine. Thus, regional leaders risk being viewed as either spineless or corrupt. Iran has thus thrown a wrench in the Arab monarchy’s plans. 

The ripples Iran is making spread far beyond the geographical confines of the Middle East, too. The Iran-sponsored Houthis are attacking shipping vessels in the Red Sea from their base in Yemen. Through them, Iran is doing damage to intercontinental trade and thus to the entire global economy.

The US is beginning to feel the strain. Iran and its allies are carrying out strikes in the Red Sea, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Russia and China may seize the opportunity to move into the area as the US has its back turned. Even India has sensed the rising tension. While it knows it must maintain connections with Iran, it must also uphold the principle of free trade on the high seas that Iran is attacking. So, India and other nations outside the region are beginning to stress.

From a unipolar world to multiple spheres of influence

The Israel–Hamas war may have lasting consequences globally. Ukraine, in particular, has lost much from the aftermath of October 7. As the US diverts its aid to Israel and the Red Sea, aid cannot make its way to Ukraine. The Biden administration is finding it harder and harder to divide its support between Israel and Ukraine. 

The unrest in the Middle East affects the US domestically too. The US public is divided between supporting Israel or Palestine. The Left criticizes the administration for refusing to call a ceasefire. The Right accuses the administration of being complicit with Hamas. Once again, the two-party divide seems to have weakened US coherence, actions and influence. 

Weakened influence isn’t the only danger that comes with a divided US public. The public struggles to understand why the US should be involved in any conflicts in the Middle East. This raises the temptation for US leaders to disengage from the region or even from the world at large. Disengagement will guarantee chaos. De facto spheres of influence will shape international transactions rather than a Western-backed, unipolar system.

In other words, what we know of the normative order is collapsing right in front of our eyes. 

This impending chaos will change everything from the price of pencils to how a war is waged. The Israel-Hamas war is a chip off the world order. We will no longer be facing a unipolar world order with the US on top. Rather, we face a multipolar one. 

Decentralization of power has already begun. US influence in the Middle East, which is the successor to European colonialism in the region, is losing its rationale in the eyes of American citizens and of the world. The Israel–Hamas war is the straw that broke the camel’s back. The domino effect has now cascaded from the region onto the global stage.

The normative system is now being replaced, and no one knows what the coming multipolar order will be like.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Iran: an enduring pillar of hegemony in the Middle East

Iran’s claim to legitimacy is deeply rooted in a history that spans millennia. The land known today as Iran has been home to a succession of influential civilizations and empires, each leaving its mark on the country’s cultural and intellectual makeup. From the Elamites, who rival the Sumerians as one of the oldest civilizations in world history, to the Achaemenids, Parthians, Sassanids and Safavids, Iran’s rich history fosters a profound sense of pride and identity in its people. Iran has often been the seat of power for empires stretching across the Fertile Crescent and into Central Asia, a heritage which serves as a foundation for Iran’s claim to leadership. 

Furthermore, Iran draws strength from its religious legitimacy as the epicenter of the Shia branch of Islam. Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution toppled the pro-Western monarchy and founded a theocratic republic. This gave Iran religious authority as the hub of Shia Islam, which has many adherents in nations such as Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen.Ěý

Beginning with the Islamic Revolution, Iran has exported its revolutionary ideology to fellow Shia communities. It has created a network of allied non-state military actors like in Lebanon, the in Yemen and various groups in Iraq and Palestine, strategically extending its influence. The Quds Force, which was led by the late General Qasem Soleimani, plays a pivotal role in these proxy militias. This force solidified Iran’s ideological foothold beyond its borders.

In addition, Iran has been a major supporter of Hamas, the Palestinian armed group that controls Gaza. Hamas carried out a sudden attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, killing people and capturing more than 200 hostages. Iran Hamas with money, arms and training, as well as operational and strategic guidance for the operation.

Iran is also a substantial military power in its own right. The Islamic Republic approximately 610,000 active-duty personnel, 350,000 reserve personnel and 150,000 paramilitary personnel. The military structure comprises two main branches: the regular armed forces, encompassing the army, navy and air force, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a parallel force directly accountable to the Supreme Leader. The IRGC possesses ground, naval and aerospace units, in addition to the Quds Force and the Basij, a volunteer militia.

Iran’s military arsenal includes a spectrum of ballistic and cruise missiles, with some boasting a range of up to . Drones, submarines and cyber-warfare capabilities further enhance Iran’s military capabilities.

Notably, Iran adopts a strategic approach relying on asymmetric and unconventional warfare tactics, employing swarm tactics, proxy forces, and sabotage to counterbalance adversaries’ conventional superiority. Illustrating this strategy, Iran has recently employed missile and drone attacks to US bases in Iraq, as well as targeting Israel-linked. Meanwhile, Iran’s proxy forces like Hamas and Hezbollah serve to harass and deter these adversaries.

Saudi Arabia: the conservative powerhouse

If Iran is the revolutionary force in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is the conservative one.

Saudi Arabia is the cradle of Islam. It was here that the Prophet Muhammad was born and received his revelations in the 7th century CE. The two holiest sites in Islam, the Great Mosque of Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, are both in Saudi Arabia. For this reason, the Saudi monarch styles himself as “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” This historical and religious connection grants the nation a profound moral legitimacy to exert influence over the Middle East.

The two mosques serve as focal points of the annual pilgrimage, known as . Making the pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime is a religious duty for Muslims. By hosting millions of pilgrims yearly, Saudi Arabia strategically deploys its religious influence to further its political objectives and propagate its ideological stance.

During the formative period of Islamic civilization, Saudi Arabia was the center of the Caliphate. It as the seat of the first four caliphs who governed the expanding Muslim empire from 632 to 661 CE. Following the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the last Islamic caliphate after World War I, Saudi Arabia again asserted itself as the heart of Islam, without laying claim to the title of caliph. Saudi Arabia championed — a strict and conservative interpretation of Sunni Islamic teachings. This ideology, considered by its adherents the pure and authentic form of Islam, underpins Saudi Arabia’s historical and religious claims.

Saudi Arabia also enjoys the support of a major non-Islamic power, the United States. The US has emerges as Saudi Arabia’s foremost , providing robust military support. The roots of this alliance trace back to 1945 when the nations signed a pivotal agreement granting the US access to Saudi oil in exchange for military and economic aid. This agreement, known as the, was forged by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz Al Saud aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal. It marked the beginning of a long-lasting and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

Over the years, this strategic partnership has deepened, encompassing cooperation on counter-terrorism, regional security and energy. The United States has supported Saudi Arabia in various conflicts, such as the Iran–Iraq War, the Persian Gulf War and the ongoing Yemen Civil War, as well as in confronting the threats posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS.

As the primary arms supplier to Saudi Arabia, the United States furnishes military training, intelligence, and logistical support, aligning its interests with Saudi policies in the region. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States accounted for 79% of the total by Saudi Arabia from 2016 to 2020. This alliance positions Saudi Arabia as a key American ally and a counterbalance to Iran’s influence in the Middle East.

Turkey: Ottoman Heritage and a unique foreign policy

The third factor in the Middle East is Turkey, a powerhouse boasting the largest economy in the region and the second-largest population.

Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East is anchored in its Ottoman heritage. The Ottoman Empire, centered in Turkey, was the dominant Islamic power and caliphate — both the religious and political leader of the Muslim world until its dissolution in 1924, following Turkey’s defeat in World War I.

The Ottoman Empire ruled the Muslim world from North Africa to Iraq and extended deep into Europe. It was a diverse and multicultural society. This environment promoted coexistence among various ethnic and religious groups through a system of relative tolerance and autonomy.

Turkey’s historical legacy not only gives its people a sense of pride and identity but a perceived right to leadership and influence in the Middle East. itself as the rightful successor of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey sees itself as having a special responsibility and role within the region, encapsulated in its foreign policy vision of , tempering Turkish nationalism with a pan-Islamic focus.Ěý

Like Iran, Turkey is a sizeable military power with a large population. Turkey approximately 510,000 active-duty personnel, complemented by 380,000 reserve personnel and an additional 150,000 paramilitary personnel. Turkey is also a member of NATO, which affords the nation access to the collective defense and security mechanisms of the West.

Employing its hard power, Turkey has intervened militarily involvement in various countries, notably Syria, Libya and Iraq. In these theaters, Turkey has lent support to various factions in order to counter adversaries such as the, the and This military intervention serves as a tangible expression of Turkey’s commitment to shaping regional dynamics.

Turkey strategically deploys proxy forces to bolster its alliances and extend its influence. Entities like the , the in Libya and the in Egypt serve as instrumental proxies, trained and supported by Turkey to align with its strategic objectives.

The spirit of cold war unmistakanly pervades the current geopolitical landscape. The outcome of the struggle between Iran Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will shape the future of a new Middle East.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The New Middle East: A Triangular Struggle for Hegemony appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

It glosses over human rights , especially those concerning . This raises questions about the authenticity of the reforms. A notable number of people seem to unquestionably embrace the image Saudi Arabia has meticulously curated for Western media consumption. Outlined and elaborated below are several reasons why the purported changes seem questionable.

Saudi Vision 2030

Launched by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2016, the Saudi government embarks on an ambitious modernization odyssey with . Saudi Arabia developed the plan on recommendations from the consulting firm McKinsey & Company. This vision aims, among many things, at gender reform. While I perceive it as a marketing gambit, the stated goal is to amplify women’s influence in the Saudi socio-economic landscape. This places women as crucial catalysts for economic and societal transformation.Ěý

In 2018, women were only of the Saudi workforce. The agenda makes bold pronouncements about women’s empowerment. It is aiming to women’s labor market participation from 22% to 30% by 2030. In line with these promises, the labor participation of Saudi women has indeed dramatically. At face value, these strides seem commendable. However, dig a tad deeper, and the narrative shifts.

An insightful dissection of the labor market data highlights the increase of Saudi women in historically male-dominated sectors like retail, food and manufacturing. However, a recent of this trend reveals a troubling detail: Numerous women are shoehorned into roles with ambiguous parameters, grueling hours and low pay. Quite frequently, they’re merely stepping into the shoes of unskilled migrant workers in tenuous positions. Is this the empowerment we laud?

Are typical Saudi women genuinely represented?

Certainly, the nation has witnessed a series of unprecedented moves. Women are ascending to higher government positions. This includes the recent of a female Deputy Minister of Labor, the first Saudi being dispatched to the US and a cadre of assuming pivotal roles at the General Presidency for the Affairs of the Two Holy Mosques. While the nation has witnessed a series of unprecedented developments, it is crucial to question whether these women genuinely represent the typical Saudi female.Ěý

Frequently, these appointments emerge from privileged and affluent circles. For instance, take Princess Reema bint Bandar, the ambassador appointee. She is a member of the Saudi Arabian royal family; the daughter of a former ambassador to the US who held the position for an extended period. Often, members of the royal family have unique opportunities and responsibilities that set them apart from others. Her status and background automatically distinguish her from average Saudi women. 

Riding into freedom

Additionally, noteworthy reforms such as the ending of the female and the revision of male have undeniably captured global admiration. Saudi women have fought since the 1990s to get the driving ban lifted. In 2017, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman presented the lifting of the ban as an effort to improve and diversify the economy. Then, the driving ban was finally lifted on June 24, 2018, granting licenses to as many as women in the first seven months.

The recalibration of the guardianship laws allows women over 21 amplified autonomies in areas like education, healthcare, employment and travel. However, they do still need a male relative’s permission when it comes to significant life choices such as marriage and getting a passport to leave the country.

These changes appear to signify increased freedoms for Saudi women, shaping a new societal framework and, importantly, enhancing Saudi Arabia’s global image–particularly in the eyes of Western beholders. However, a discerning eye might view many of these reforms as artful, yet superficial public maneuvers. The widely praised granting of driving rights to women can be interpreted as institutionalized tokenism, especially when the broader political and civil rights landscape for Saudi women remains lacking in progress. The irony is palpable, several women who championed the driving ban continue to languish behind bars.

Saudi Arabia’s overarching control

The state’s authoritarian influence significantly limits collective resistance. Journalists and activists face imprisonment. In some cases, they also face execution for sharing opposing views on online platforms. Nourah bint Saeed al-Qahtani, a Saudi citizen whose details are barely known, was given a sentence for social media posts. Following that is Salma al-Shehab, a Leeds University scholar who received in prison for Twitter activism. These are chilling reminders that challenging the prevailing authorities risks one’s freedom and stresses the severe consequences women may face.

Loujain al-Hathlou, a Saudi women’s rights activist, is also a poignant example. Saudi authorities held her for . Her ostensible transgression? Advocating against the prohibition on women drivers and the male guardianship system. She faces a series of charges that include non-violent acts of dissent, ranging from peaceful protests to engaging in social media activism. All these are perceived as seditious in the eyes of the kingdom. The kingdom’s stance resonates with stark clarity: We dictate the changes; you don’t demand them.

True empowerment

The contrast between external perceptions and local realities underscores the importance of telling the difference between the polished facade presented by the state-led initiatives and the genuine struggles and triumphs of Saudi women striving for empowerment. All too often, Saudi women are depicted in binary extremes, either as victims awaiting rescue or as exceptional individuals breaking barriers with governmental anointing as the �first’ in their field. Real empowerment for Saudi women is rooted in their intrinsic agency and tenacity, not granted as a mere favor from the state.

Faced with such adversity, the response of many Saudi women diverges. Some people contemplate an expatriate life to freely express critiques on the gender dynamics of Saudi Arabia. Others, fueled by an indomitable spirit, tirelessly champion gender transformation from within their society, shaping the concept of empowerment on their own terms. In Saudi Arabia’s socio-political landscape, the true measure of women’s empowerment will not lie in orchestrated changes but in the organic evolution of women’s rights and roles, as championed by the women themselves.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Truth About Women’s Empowerment In Saudi Arabia appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

On March 10, in Beijing, Iran and Saudi Arabia an agreement restoring their diplomatic relations. This will have ramifications for the : That action was not in line with US policy, which sees China as a competitor and adversary. The Saudi action surprised the US since Saudi Arabia has been a client of the US since 1945. The Saudi move could have only happened in the changing world. 

The US can get clues from Saudi Arabia’s choice and face reality by adjusting its foreign policy. The US could stop interferences, coups and invasions in other countries, particularly Iran. It could give up on “regime change” in Iran and apologize for the 1953 coup that overthrew Iran’s first-ever democratic government. It must stop supporting ethnic cleansing and genocide against other people, especially the native Palestinians. By taking those vital steps, the US would improve relations with Iran and decrease tensions in the world. 

Iran’s mullahs, or religious leaders, can also take crucial steps to restore the economy and pacify the country’s young generation. Presently, the mullahs do not walk the talk. The father of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, purportedly the mullahs: “Clergy, wake up; now, it is not time to talk … think about people’s problems! Discussion by itself is of no use.” Mullahs have a responsibility within the state of Iran: to listen to the people and adjust their policies accordingly.

Mullahs live in a fantasy world

In my recent visit to Iran, I noticed that the mullahs keep ignoring the advice from the Islamic Revolution’s father. They continue competing with one another for high political positions while the country faces serious economic issues. They claim that the main culprit for poverty is the US’ brutal economic sanctions against the nation that violate the UN Charter. Although that is partially true, the real threats to the regime are the mullahs who have failed to do what they say, listen to the people and address domestic issues. 

During my visit, Iranians kept saying that they get paid in local currency, rials, but buy in dollars. At the time, I could not understand their complaints after seeing perishable foods at low prices. 

However, when I returned to the US and looked further into the matter, I recognized the reasons why the youth are protesting in Iran. I that the government privatized most national industries, including refineries, petrochemicals and steel. It is still subsidizing them and providing them with cheap crude oil and other raw materials, expecting the finished products to include reasonable profit for sale in the country. However, those outfits have been exporting their products and selling them in dollar values in a country where the wages are low and labor is very cheap. The companies have no regulatory oversight. Their shareholders are profiting incredibly while contributing immensely to the nation’s inflation and poverty.

Despite the arduous efforts of the new President Ibrahim Raisi, the of Iran is still in shambles with an inflation rate below . Corruption and nepotism are widespread, the country 147 among 180 countries in transparency. Women are still widely discriminated against by the government despite great women’s strides in law, medicine, journalism, engineering and other scientific fields. Ethnic groups such as the Baluchis and Kurds remain among the least educated. Thus, indigenous groups like them are easy prey to terrorist groups like and , armed and financed by the US and allies.

How could Iran’s religious leaders let this issue grow so large? Due to their lack of knowledge of the modern world, the mullahs have entrusted running the government chiefly on their staff, ministers and supporting personnel, mostly educated in the West. The staff have pushed for free enterprise in a laissez-faire way without regulatory oversight. They have pressed to privatize the national industries, particularly oil and steel. Once these industries are , they and their relatives and friends buy large shares, aiming for low production costs and maximal profits. They have formed Iran’s oligarchs. Like in Russia, the oligarchs manipulate the market. Consequently, Iran’s inflation has hit the roof and poverty is fast expanding!

On the surface, Iranians think that the mullahs are ruling the country. In reality, the oligarchs are running the nation. In the 1950s, Mohammad Mosaddegh fought with Britain for Iran’s oil nationalization. For that effort, he lost his power and was forced into exile in his house until his death. Sadly, the mullahs have foolishly given away the national treasures to a selected group who have emerged as Iran’s oligarchs. 

The oligarchs convert much of their profits into gold and foreign currencies. Those actions have further devalued the local currency, causing public panic. With the money made in Iran, they buy properties in Istanbul, London, Montreal, Los Angeles and other popular foreign cities. In those foreign cities, their children whose mere existence and liberal lifestyle are indebted to the mullahs, are often among the instigators against the mullahs. 

The oligarchs own private banks that invest and operate commercial facilities across the country, unavailable for sale or rent, counting on higher profits in the future. This is when millions of families are looking for residence. 

Under the mullahs, it never occurred to the oligarchs that the investments were not earned by them or their parents but entrusted to them by the nation. Thus, they should make their products affordable to buy by Iranians. 

Seven simple steps for mullahs to save Iran

The for Iran’s future is gloomy. Execution and imprisonment are not the answers to domestic issues. For Iran to survive in its present form, drastic actions must be taken. As Mosaddeq brought the oil back to Iran from the British, the mullahs must bring back the economy to Iranians from the oligarchs. To start, they could take these seven steps. 

First, stop vying for power. Clean up corruption and nepotism. Choose qualified personnel who are clean from bribery, embezzlement, peddling, or any other activity financially benefiting them or people close to them. Learn how Singapore corruption under control.

Second, implement effective management, accountability and transparency programs. Train managers on how to use the resources effectively to meet the targets before deadlines. Learn how Switzerland affairs.

Third, address inflation by tightening government spending, overseeing banks and controlling trade. ownership of foreign currency and precious metals like gold. Require the use of only national currency in domestic dealings. Ensure banks are involved in only banking (accepting deposits from the people with a guarantee that the funds will be there when needed and making loans available to them, based on certain reasonable conditions). Learn from Russia on how to manage the inflation rate. Despite facing tough sanctions, Russia managed an inflation rate of , and even Afghanistan under the Taliban controlled an inflation rate of in December 2022. 

Fourth, temporarily take over imports and exports for all essential goods and services. When the products are sold to distributors, define the profit margin clearly. Increase trade with neighboring countries. Implement regulatory oversight on at least all oil and steel industry production. Give to China’s trade regulations.

Fifth, attend to women’s issues and include more in decision-making processes. Remove all barriers that prevent women from rising to power. On , learn from Sweden.

Sixth, help the ethnic groups such as Baluchis and Kurds and address their economic and other issues. Promote ethnic diversity in all workplaces with an objective of ethnic equality. Sweden provides a good .

Seventh, get away from depending on oil revenues for the budget. Promote investments and increase domestic production for exports. Look into the world’s top exporters.

Despite the benefits of these necessary steps, they are merely bandages on wounds. Above all, culture must be changed. Until the 1979 fall of the monarchy, the Shah made law at his will. He was accountable to no one. People adopted sycophancy to get royal attention. Powerful families practiced nepotism to strengthen their hold on power and demanded bribes to keep their living status. People lied to safeguard their lives and honors. Although Iranians finally got a constitution about 100 years ago, the monarch gave that little attention. Naturally, people followed the king, giving little attention to law and order. The long-term solution is to change the thoughts and false beliefs. From an early age in school, pupils must be taught to practice honesty and respect law and order. Overcoming poor habits takes a generation.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Iran has multiple political parties. They come together to form factions. Two of them are most . The reformist (Islah-talab) and fundamentalist (Usool-gar) vie for political power. Since 1989, the reformists have controlled the government. After the Iran-Iraq War ended, reformists were largely dominant. In 2021, President unseated the reformists, winning a landslide victory at the polls. Even before Raisi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was president for eight years from 2005 to 2013. Like Raisi, he is conservative but, unlike Raisi, he did not have the same control over the government.

The rich in Iran support reformists. Like their US counterparts, rich Iranians exercise immense control over the country’s economy. Unlike the narrative in Western media, Iranian oligarchs have more power than the supreme leader, presidents or mullahs. Many Iranians call these oligarchs Iran’s mafia.

The Dirty Secrets About How Reza Shah Destroyed Iran

The US consistently ignores the complexities of Iran. For Washington, Tehran is a convenient whipping boy. American policymakers berate Iran for human rights violations but ignore ’s arbitrary executions, torture and even potential involvement in the 9/11 attacks.

Similarly, the US supports the apartheid state of Israel. The Jewish state was formed after pushing out Palestinians from their ancestral lands, causing nakba — the Palestinian catastrophe in which millions of people fled from their homes. Even today, Israel oppresses and persecutes the native Palestinians. Over two million live in Gaza, which is an open-air prison. In the latest war, Israel has ordered over a million to leave their homes as its tanks and troops move into northern Gaza. Israeli air strikes have killed thousands already.

Iran’s reformists look up to the US

Iran’s reformists have followed the path of , who was president from 1989 to 1997. His focus was on the economy. said, “Germany and Japan have the strongest economy these days because they were banned from having a military force after World War.” He suggested that Iran should follow Germany and Japan with no military power and depend on the US for protection. He advocated total dependence on the US and its Western allies. 

Like Rafsanjani, the reformists look to the West, especially the US. They openly criticize closer relations with China, Russia and neighboring countries to avoid offending the US. They opposed Iran joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS).

Reformists ignore the fact that the US pressured Germany and Japan to participate in Syria and Ukraine. Thanks to the US, both economies are now in shambles. Among the reformists are many Western-educated individuals, such as Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former president and foreign minister respectively. Like Rafsanjani, they look up to the West for answers. In particular, they pushed the country to emulate the US capitalist system. Reformists have privatized major national industries, imports, exports and banks, benefiting themselves, and their relatives, and friends. These have emerged as Iran’s new oligarchs in a system of crony capitalism.

Now, the oligarchs get their free or cheap raw materials from the government and sell their finished products at dollar prices. They manipulate profits and enjoy special privileges. Oligarchs taxes, cheat on profits, bypass regulations, and deposit their huge funds overseas. They own villas in Europe, Canada, and the US. Among them have emerged numerous. One of them charged with embezzlement made in Canada. 

In Tehran, I saw many residential high-rise towers, nearly all of them empty. The rich owned six million empty units as investment properties because they aimed to make money from rising property prices. At the same time, over six million families were searching for residence. 

I was shocked when visiting malls in Tehran. I noticed that nearly all the products on sale were foreign-made. Oligarchs make money off imports. That is why they oppose domestic production and pursue better relations with the US. In Iran, the rich have followed their US counterparts. They keep the poor busy with alcohol, drugs, social media, pop culture and soap operas. 

In Iran, people are poor but educated. Literacy is now . Women have progressed remarkably. Most university students, physicians and academic professors are now women. However, in the country’s poor economy, women are disadvantaged against men who are legally held responsible for their family finances. Jobs are scarce for everyone, especially women, and this causes discontent.

Why Are Young People Protesting in Iran?

Reformists paint a misleading picture of the US. I met people who genuinely think everyone in the US enjoys ample free time, a good life, and sufficient income. Iranians believe that every American owns a nice car and a house. Most young Iranians dream of living in the US. When I tell them that at least of Americans live in poverty and 60% of them “live pay-check-to-paycheck,” they are shocked. Culturally, the young Iranian mind is often colonized and too many Iranians live in fantasy.

Iran’s reformists have made many mistakes 

The reformists claim their most notable accomplishment to be the 2015 Iran-US Nuclear Agreement, AKA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (). Iran fully complied with the JCPOA despite heavy losses but the US, UK and France threw this agreement in the bin. Under pressure from the Israeli lobby in 2018,  Donald Trump it when he was president. 

In hindsight, the JCPOA was a mistake. Zarif and his associates signed off on the agreement without reading it closely or understanding it thoroughly. Reformists used their influence in the majlis, the Iranian Parliament to get MPS to approve the JCPOA in less than 30 minutes without any discussion. In particular, they crossed some redlines set by Khamenei, Iran’s supposedly all-powerful supreme leader.

President Joe Biden has been trying to the JCPOA with little success because the Iranians no longer trust the US. After assassinating Iran’s top general , it is doubtful if Iran would have normal relations with the US in the near future. Many Iranians think of the US as their worst enemy but their worst enemies are Iranian oligarchs, who really are rich reformists.

Raisi is a fundamentalist. Since 2021, fundamentalists have been in power. They inherited an economy in shambles with large debts and an annual inflation rate of around. So far, they have been busy restoring the economy and cleaning up the system. Note that the inflation rate has fallen to below .

Unlike reformists, Raisi wants to be even-handed towards both the West and the East. He has improved relations with the neighboring nations. In particular, Iran has joined the SCO and is supposed to join the BRICS in January 2024. Raisi has also negotiated with the US to release some of Iran’s funds. Iran’s increases in oil exports imply that the US may have eased sanctions on Iran.

Raisi works long hours and is busy meeting with citizens or diplomats nearly every day. In his short time, he has accomplished notably. Unlike reformists, Raisi does not publicize his successes and improve his public relations. Therefore, many Iranians still blame him for a slow economy.

Raisi’s greatest enemies are the rich reformists. These oligarchs are determined to make Raisi fail. Reportedly, reformists have supported protests over to increase their influence. As usual, the Western media is acting as cheerleaders for the reformists.

Today, Iran has the world’s second-largest gas reserves and fourth-largest oil reserves. In the pursuit of cheap energy, the US and the UK want access to those resources. This is not new. In the early 1950s, the UK controlled Iran’s oil production. When Mosaddegh asked for a greater share of oil revenue, the UK and the US launched a coup. Both countries still want a subservient Iran, which they can exploit for cheap energy.

Why Do You Need to Know About Mohammad Mosaddegh?

Note that Iran is still traumatized by the 1953 coup. Then, the MI6 and the were able to bribe, manipulate and coerce unscrupulous Iranians to oust Mosaddegh. That coup remains the postwar of the US in the Middle East. Washington sowed the wind then and the world is reaping the whirlwind today. After the Islamic Revolution, the US and its Western allies have been unable to access Iran’s resources cheaply. Thus, the US continues using tremendous pressure, threats and sanctions against the country. 

Raisi’s big challenge lies not only in taking on the US but also in taming Iran’s oligarchs.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post How Do You See Iran, Dictatorship or Multiparty? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Their arrest, interrogation, hearings, sentencing and execution all took place in complete secrecy, but Saudi reported that their crime was treason in three forms — high, national and military. Given that both men came from Sunni tribes that are traditional opponents of the Houthis, the suggestion that they actually committed treason in the sense of collaborating with the enemy seems unlikely.

“High treason” as a legal concept does not exist in Saudi Arabia anyway, because there is no such thing in Sharia law, which — despite massive in Islamic institutions in recent years — remains fundamental to the kingdom’s judicial process. While the concept of treason does exist in Sharia, it usually refers to collaborating with the enemy in terms of espionage, but it is carefully qualified and does not automatically lead to execution.

Opposition sources say al-Balawi and Hassan were executed after refusing to bomb civilian targets in Yemen. They may also have been recorded criticizing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). No Sharia court could justify sentencing someone to death for refusing to bomb civilians in Yemen, hence the unspecific treason charges. But as everyone in the kingdom understands, the courts are highly politicized and serve the wishes of the crown prince’s regime.

Old Game, New Gold: What Is Saudi Arabia Planning With Golf?

The point is to send a strong message of deterrence to other would-be dissenters and prevent al-Balawi and Hassan from becoming the crystal in the saturated solution — catalysts for an armed rebellion against MbS.

Saudi Arabia has faced dissension in the military before

There have been several attempts by members of the Saudi armed forces to overthrow the regime in the past. The most famous was in 1969, when members of the Royal Saudi Air Force plotted a against King Faisal. Their plan had been to bomb the Royal Palace in Riyadh, killing the king and other high-ranking princes, before announcing the formation of a “Republic of the Arabian Peninsula.” In the aftermath of the failed plot, around 2000 people, including 28 lieutenant colonels, 30 majors, and around 200 other officers.

Another less spectacular case was in 1990, when a Saudi defected and flew his brand-new F-15 to Sudan. He returned a short time later following negotiations with the Sudanese, supposedly to be pardoned. He was instead imprisoned.

As Arab Digest has in the past, the Saudi army of today is seething with discontent. Dozens of officers and pilots are currently being held in detention. A trickle of military defectors keeps emerging.

In May 2023, despite being subject to a travel ban, former Saudi National Guardsman Muhannad al-Subiani defected and made his way to the UK where he a human rights organization that, while serving in the National Guard, he had witnessed numerous horrific violations of detainees’ and migrants’ human rights, in addition to the smuggling of drugs and weapons.

Even more concerning for the regime was the defection of Colonel Tarek al-Zahrani, who was part of the Royal Guard. The Royal Guard’s job is to protect the King and his close relatives, so MbS is fortunate that al-Zahrani did not try to take more direct action.

The Saudi army is tired, underpaid and unhappy

Some defectors go to the UK, like al-Subiani. Others go to Yemen to fight with the Houthis against Saudi Arabia in a war intended by MbS to last for just a few weeks after it was launched in March 2015. The war has been largely on pause for the past year, but Saudi Arabia still finds itself unable to extricate itself from the situation.

After more than 8 years of fighting, the government has not yet revealed its military losses. (In 2019, the Houthis that 500 Saudi soldiers were killed and another 2000 captured in an operation inside the kingdom. The Houthi claim was not independently verified, and the Saudis declined to comment.)

The war in Yemen does not account for all of the discontent in the army. Saudi soldiers, especially at the lower levels, are generally not treated well. Their salary is much less than elsewhere in the Gulf. It starts at the equivalent of per month, compared to a Kuwaiti soldier’s starting monthly salary of around and a Qatari soldier’s , and the Saudi rank and file receive no special allowances.

Before the public prosecutor decreed that anyone who complained publicly would be punished, on several occasions Saudi soldiers broadcast appealing to the king for financial help. They said that while they were away fighting, their families were facing eviction or repossessions for non-payment of debts.

History shows that a disorganized army and a complete breakdown of discipline have been the conditions for every victorious revolution. However, there are several obstacles preventing the army in Saudi Arabia from becoming the spear tip of the revolution.

Firstly, the military police are extremely active inside the armed forces, looking for any signs of dissent and arresting people like al-Balawi and Hassan.

Secondly, the Saudi army is very small compared to the size of the rest of the internal security forces, which since 2017 has included special forces, the Mabahith secret police and counterterrorism and anti-terror financing units. State security forces are also much better-resourced, with the latest kit and training. Soldiers, on the other hand, complain they have to buy their own boots and food.

Thirdly, although the Saudi army is still nominally arranged hierarchically, in practice all communications between ground forces and senior commanders have to go via the Royal Court. This deliberately makes it impossible to coordinate any large-scale opposition involving multiple units.

[ first published this piece.]

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The announcement sent shockwaves throughout Yemen. The Houthis and Muslim Brotherhood affiliate al-Islah immediately complained, but Saudi authorities and fellow members of the Saudi-led coalition — formally on the same side of the war as the STC — also expressed concerns about the strengthening of the southern parties. Saudi Arabia fears it could lose influence over parties within the Political Leadership Council (PLC), the internationally recognized Yemeni government’s executive body.

The first step taken by Saudi Arabia following the STC announcement was to convene a series of meetings in Riaydh with rivals of the STC that represent Hadhramaut, in the country’s east. The meetings in the establishment of a National Hadhrami Council (NHC), in an apparent move to counter the STC’s Southern National Pact.

Other parties formed the People’s High Council of Resistance, based in the center of the country, for similar purposes.

Some observers these developments as progress among the opponents of the Houthi in preparation for a break in the Saudi–Houthi détente. On the ground, however, it is obvious the new council is a reaction to growing STC momentum. Yemeni political factions seem to be more concerned about southern secessionism than about the threat the Houthis pose.

What has the STC decided, and why now?

PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi had exacerbated North–South tensions in February when he the southern issue as a priority. This angered southerners and put pressure on the STC to act.

Undoubtedly, this hastened the organization of the Aden dialogue hosted by the STC in early May. Southern factions were quick to exploit the optics of the week-long conference through well-coordinated media campaigns. They a general audience access to the participants. Longtime political rivals in Aden. With over 30 factions the SNP, the STC now serves as the umbrella organization for southerners. This is a significant development following recognition under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement as the representative of the southern peoples.

The STC also announced a major of its executive leadership. It expanded its membership by including some former rivals, including PLC members Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani and Abd al-Rahman al-Mahrami (aka Abu Zaraa’a) as co-vice presidents along with Ahmed Saeed bin Breik. and bin Breik are former governors of Hadhramaut and former commanders of the Second Region Command there. This move not only cemented the strategic importance of Hadhramaut, Yemen’s largest province, but it also placed of the South within the PLC itself — three of them within the eight-member council.

The accession of Bahsani, a Hadhrami, and Abu Zaraa’a, a Salafi leader from Lahj, as vice presidents could highlight two goals of the STC. The first is to cement the influence of the South within the PLC with regard to Saudi Arabia. The members of the PLC are seen as hand-picked by Saudi Arabia, so their legitimacy and influence cannot be questioned. Second, the vice presidents are military leaders with a history of opposition to al-Islah’s influence in the South. As former commanders of the Second Region, based in Mukalla in southern Hadhramaut, bin Breik and Bahsani represent the southerners’ to the al-Islah-affiliated First Region Command, based in Sayyun in northern Hadhramaut. Further, Abu Zaraa’a served as commander of the STC-affiliated Amalaqa Brigades, which act as the tip of the southern forces’ spear from the Red Sea coast to Shabwah. In an environment of constant rebalancing acts, the message is abundantly clear.

Saudi overreach derails Riyadh Agreement

The success of the STC-led dialogue among southern factions has undoubtedly raised fears of southern secessionist ambitions. among Yemeni parties have grown since the signing of the , which legitimized the STC, in November 2019. Now, nearly four years since the agreement and a year and a half after the establishment of the PLC, all efforts to stabilize the liberated areas and unite the Houthi’s rivals have failed.

The STC has gained tremendous momentum since former president Hadi the al-Islah-affiliated governor of Shabwah with an ally of the STC in December 2021. The conflict between al-Islah and the STC then shifted to northern , with the STC the ouster of the al-Islah-affiliated leadership of the First Regional Command. These developments have raised concerns in Riyadh over the extent of influence by the STC beyond its core in Aden, possibly consolidating in northern Hadhramaut along the Yemen-Saudi border.

Saudi Arabia has attempted to solidify its influence in Hadhramaut. Observers in south Yemen remain unsettled by Saudi Arabia’s decision to host tribal leaders from soon after the STC dialogue conference in Aden. The gathering of Hadhrami was made public from the first flight from Sayyun to Riyadh aboard a Saudi aircraft. Meetings in were also broadcasted by media outlets, and on the group the establishment of the Hadhramaut National Council (HNC). The charter, yet to be made public, was then on July 27. Al-Islah was the first political party to signing the charter.

Further antagonizing the STC and its base across southern Yemen, members of the new council met with Saudi officials and Alimi. The composition of the council, with a number of leaders from the , makes it appear to be a direct rival to the STC. Among the notable of the council are Bader Basalama, Mohsen Basura, Adel Bahamid and Abdullah Saleh Al Kathiri. Other high-profile leaders on the council include members of the General People’s Congress (GPC), the former ruling party under deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alimi is also a member of the GPC.

Tension further escalated in early July when the STC organized a outside the and gunmen affiliated with members of the new council met unarmed demonstrators. In neighboring Shabwah, another group of tribal leaders announced the Alliance of Sons and Tribes of , another attempt to challenge the STC.

The latest move exacerbating tensions among competing parties was the announcement of the Supreme for al-Jawf and Mareb under Hamoud , a sheik from Taiz. Sheik Hamoud, an al-Islah affiliate, resides in Turkey but remains highly influential in the city of Taiz. This new council has met even within Mareb City, a stronghold of al-Islah. It is undetermined if Saudi Arabia knows about or supports this group.

The factional lines are being drawn. As Saudi Arabia draws together its anti-STC allies, it puts the unity established by the Riyadh Agreement at risk.

Imminent escalation on two fronts

Meanwhile, optimism remains among UN officials who view the lopsided of April 2023 as a step forward. The completion of the oil from the off the Red Sea of Hodeida is also touted as a major diplomatic victory by the UN. This has led the mainstream consensus to share the UN’s optimism about their efforts to restart the peace process. However, the Safer operation’s costs now surpass the current potential revenue from the oil. The wreck, in any case, remains under Houthi control and is still vulnerable to floating released by them.

UN Diplomatic Success in a Potential Oil Disaster

Despite UN positivity, the fragile détente is on the brink of collapse. Houthis continue to clash with southern forces in al-Dhale and Yafa’, and new clashes have been reported across Taiz. The Saudi–Houthi détente has merely eliminated cross-border while the rebels have reinforced their positions across all fronts. Furthermore, the Houthi head of the Supreme Political Council (SPC), Mahdi al-Mashat, recently new cross-border missile strikes.

Saudi Arabia evidently expects an imminent escalation by the rebels. Houthi tactics always involve escalating rhetoric or increasing to extract maximum concessions from Saudi Arabia or the UN. The period since October 2022 has seen any changes in Houthi behavior. They only adhered to Saudi Arabia’s agreement on halting cross-border strikes because it has allowed them to , train and redeploy militia across their territory.

With crisis looming, US Special Envoy Tim is once again in the following a visit by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg to in August.

Saudi Arabia’s move to support the establishment of new subregional councils in Hadhramaut and Shabwah, in particular, may prove highly counterproductive. As the Houthis prepare for a renewal of hostilities within Yemen and across the border, the emergence of competing councils will exacerbate the fragmentation of the Houthi’s rivals. Saudi Arabia hopes to unify anti-Houthi factions under the Riyadh Agreement, but its mismanagement of rivalries across southern Yemen and within the PLC has paved the ground for potentially larger losses in Hodeida and Taiz. Ultimately, Houthis may choose to re-engage southern forces, a move which could drag the United Arab Emirates — which the Houthis have — back into the conflict and further destabilize the region.

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Southern and Northern Allies Now Vie for Influence in Volatile Yemen appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The United States usually gravitates toward focusing on a “process” in the Middle East — often involving Arab–Israeli peace efforts of some stripe. The Bush administration focused on democratization (once it had moved past the initial military strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan) and the Obama administration on Iran ties. The Biden team has settled on Israeli–Saudi ties. Even so, the administration is determined not to let the Middle East become its focus, and it hopes the region will not become a distraction.

Despite the pivot to China, the Middle East continues to demand US attention

Globally, the Biden administration is focused on great power competition. Unlike the Trump administration, however, the Biden team emphasizes the importance of working with allies and partners on shared challenges with the goal of creating a more predictable, rules-based global environment. In the Middle East in particular, the administration has been intent to diminish the emphasis placed on military operations, partly through diplomacy and other aspects of statecraft and partly through efforts to boost partner capacity and partner integration. Notably, counterterrorism plays a much smaller role in Biden administration rhetoric on the region, and a US desire to help improve regional governance has remained muted.

In practice, the biggest problem the administration has had is persuading its partners of its commitment. A narrative that Biden was seeking to abandon the Middle East set in early, and this saw allies and partners scurrying to hedge against an impending power vacuum. China in particular has benefitted from this perception, a development that has fed into Washington’s global emphasis on China’s changing role. Perhaps inadvertently, a US focus on China creates tension between a desire to focus America’s attention on the Western Pacific and a desire to focus on a key area of Chinese attention, the Middle East.

Why Saudi Arabia and Iran Are Making Out Now

For the Biden administration, getting the “China piece” right has been a challenge with two key partners, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Biden of the Saudis during his presidential campaign, and many Democratic Party activists think his criticism of the Saudis was right. The Saudis’ commitment to sustained oil production cuts, the ongoing war in Yemen and political repression at home all discomfort many Democrats. Yet Biden and his team have found the Saudis to be essential partners on everything from energy pricing to regional security to counterterrorism, and the rapid liberalization of some aspects of Saudi life is a sign that the kingdom is changing, at least in part in ways the Biden team finds constructive.

President Biden’s awkward to Saudi Arabia in July 2022 and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s much smoother in December 2022 created a visible contrast. Since then, the Biden administration seems to have found its footing with Saudi Arabia, with a series of high-level visits to help advance ties with Israel and open discussion about the possibility of normalization.

While the US-Saudi relationship has been improving in the last nine months, the US–UAE relationship has been growing more tense. Not only have the two parties failed to agree on terms to sell the F-35 to the UAE — after the to do so was the foundation for Israel’s official recognition by the UAE and three other Arab governments — but tensions over the UAE’s ties to Russia, amidst the war in Ukraine, and to China have raised the temperature in both capitals. Billions of dollars in Russian assets and thousands of Russian citizens have into the UAE, and there are widespread reports that the UAE is Russian economic activity. Complaints that the Emiratis were allowing China to construct a in Abu Dhabi, and disbelief at their denials, raised tensions further.

The UAE had grown accustomed to being Washington’s favorite and most trusted Arab government, but much of that shine has worn off. The perception among Democrats that the UAE was too closely aligned with Trump and with Republican politics has lingered. Meanwhile, the Qatari decision to make every effort to help with the withdrawal from Afghanistan created a debt of US in stark contrast to lingering UAE–Qatar dating from the 2017  blockade that other UAE allies have since abandoned.

Qatar: America’s Best Friend in the Gulf?

Iran remains a Biden administration focus, but movement is slow. The administration was never able to resume direct nuclear talks with the Iranians (it came into office in January 2021; President Raisi came into office in August 2022, and the timing was never right). Resuming compliance with the nuclear accord was an initial objective of some in the administration, but this has been abandoned. The Biden administration appears to be pursuing a “less for less” strategy of something short of an agreement in return for something short of sanctions relief, built on private understandings rather than public agreements. With the Iranian economy under pressure, and with the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in diminishing health, the Biden team seems to have decided that Iran remains important but is not urgent and the time to negotiate heavily is not now.

Is There a US–Iran “Non-Agreement”?

Saudi–Israeli relations may be Biden’s chief focus

Some of the administration’s stickiest problems are in Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu is the favorite of few in the Biden White House, but he is far more palatable than many members of his ruling right-wing coalition. Biden has trodden lightly in Israel’s ongoing political crisis, although his sympathies are clear. It is unclear whether Netanyahu has any wiggle room — to push off a reckoning with the Israeli public, to sustain his coalition, to tack toward the center and build a different coalition, or any other course. Meanwhile, violence is growing in Israel (both between Arabs and Jews and within the Arab community), the economy is weakening, politics are polarizing and Palestinian politics are dissolving. Israel could have a crisis on many fronts.

For Biden, putting an Israeli–Saudi peace deal front and center meets a number of needs. On the Israeli side, the prospect of a deal with Saudi Arabia, which is widely popular in Israel, allows the United States to press Israel while saying it is merely advancing Saudi normalization. For the US–Saudi relationship, serious strategic discussions have put to rest all of the discourse about the United States abandoning the Middle East. Like many processes, this one is likely to unfold over years, and the Saudi aspirations are far above what any US administration is likely to deliver or be able to deliver. For the Saudi side that’s fine.

In fact, the Saudis feel less urgency than the other parties by far. First, they are not committed to the principle of making an agreement, whereas both Israel and the United States have long talked about the importance of normalization between Israel and its neighbors. Netanyahu and Biden also face difficult political straits, and each could use a win right now. On the Saudi side, the economy is strong and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman believes he will be in power for decades. He can make this deal today, in five years or in ten. For such a major move, he will want major rewards. And from a purely political perspective, it is hard to imagine that he is eager to deliver a political victory to either Biden or Netanyahu; in any case, he may doubt their ability to deliver.

Last Saturday, the Saudi online newspaper Elaph that Saudi Arabia had frozen talks over normalization because Israel had been refusing any gesture to the Palestinians. Then, on Tuesday, The New York Times that the White House was exploring a formal defense treaty with Saudi Arabia. It remains unclear whether the contradictory reports of stagnation and progress are related, or what either might have to do with the shape of any future agreement. Regardless, we are likely many steps away from a comprehensive deal.

The US–Saudi–Israeli triangle is likely to be an important, and perhaps even the dominant line of effort for the United States in the Middle East in the years to come. Crises will emerge, and some are likely to displace the talks for a time. The logic of greater cooperation seems clear to all sides, however, and in the absence of other US-led processes, this one is likely to be a central dynamic over many years.

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Despite the addition of South Africa in 2010 and the establishment of the in 2014 and the in 2015, BRICS lay becalmed for years. It has only really been energized by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The way in which the war has bolstered relations between the US and its allies in Europe and Asia has spurred Beijing to see BRICS as the best available vehicle to pull some more firmly into its orbit. As Steve Tsang of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, has :

What the Chinese are offering is an alternative world order for which autocrats can feel safe and secure in their own countries. They can find an alternative direction of development without having to accept the conditionalities imposed by the democratic Americans and European powers.

In its summit this August, BRICS invited six states to join the grouping on January 1, 2024. Among these are three Arab states: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.

What’s motivating the Arab states?

By any reasonable definition, all three countries qualify as autocracies. However, beyond this and the shared objective of closer economic ties with China as a counterweight to the US, they exhibit important differences in their motives.

For Egypt, it is a case of “cleft stick.” On the one hand, it has long been a top recipient of US aid. On the other, its on the dollar has exacerbated the dire of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, thanks to its dependency on imported energy and food. Foreign investors have withdrawn billions of dollars as the currency has , the Gulf countries that provided support in the early days of the Sisi coup have lately imposed tougher conditions and a $3 billion from the IMF comes with stringent reform requirements. BRICS membership would facilitate trading with other members in local currencies and should help to attract more investment from them.

In contrast, although the UAE has benefitted enormously from and has burgeoning trade relations with , and (with which it has just finalized a deal to trade in ), the main driver behind its BRICS application is political. It remains close with the US as far as security guarantees are concerned; but its confidence in US bankability has declined to the point where, as Vivian Nereim in The New York Times last month, “Emirati leaders … fear a decline in American interest in the region — and the military defense that comes with it — and argue that Washington has not done enough to deter threats from Iran.” This dates back at least a decade, so joining BRICS would arguably be no more than the latest example of how, as Nereim notes, “a Middle Eastern leader viewed by the US government as an important partner,” Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, “is increasingly striking out on his own path.”

Saudi Arabia is, perhaps, the most interesting of the three. As has been well documented, relations between Washington and Riyadh have been rocky during the Biden presidency. Although they would improve significantly were Donald Trump to win the 2024 election, even this would be unlikely to reassure the Saudis over US security guarantees, particularly given Trump’s failure to act on the on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. Hence, Riyadh’s openness to Beijing-brokered earlier this year which has helped open the BRICS door for both the kingdom and Iran.

Nevertheless, in the margins of the BRICS summit the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, claimed that his country was not committed to joining BRICS before it had had time to consider the terms. As there are no laid-down criteria for membership beyond unanimous agreement among existing members, this is, in itself, sensible. However, it may also mean that Riyadh is using the prospect of BRICS membership as leverage to try to extract more concessions from Washington in their talks over a grand bargain sweeping in the kingdom’s civil nuclear aspirations, arms sales and relations with Israel.

Middle East expert Bruce Riedel ( in The Guardian on July 27) is correct that Riyadh is unlikely to want to give Biden an election boost if he could get both the Netanyahu government and the US Senate on board too. However, from a Saudi perspective, there is no downside to testing the waters. Especially since, as Gideon Rachman in Financial Times on September 4 (and Jon Hoffman made the same point even more forcefully in Arab Digest’s September 6 ), even if a grand bargain were to be struck, it would likely “turn out to be a grand illusion” for Washington.

China is not as available as it seems

All this being said, the biggest illusion of all may be the belief among BRICS candidates that membership would be a major boon to economic ties with China. As I wrote in the Arab Digest’s April 20 , Beijing is struggling with its own economic headwinds. Furthermore, its dominant role at the BRICS summit notwithstanding, China has been turning increasingly inwards since Xi Jinping first started his drive for in the overarching quest to sustain in perpetuity the CCP’s grip on power. Beijing’s principal aim in its promotion of BRICS is therefore to work with other autocracies in promoting its governance model internationally, the better to defend it domestically.

None of this is to say that BRICS is doomed to fail. As opined in a in The Economist, “the BRICS grouping is here to stay.” Nevertheless:

BRICS expansion … would not be a sign of the group’s growing diplomatic clout — quite the opposite, in fact, since finding a common denominator would become more difficult. Expansion would, rather, be a reflection of China’s growing influence when defining the future of the bloc.

From the perspective of the three Arab aspirants, it is therefore worth reflecting carefully if membership could all too easily turn out to be a Faustian pact.

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In response, Arab autocrats are scrambling to squash what they fear could evolve into a third wave of protests in little more than a decade. The autocrats have deployed tools ranging from cracking down on street protests to increased repression to engaging in perfunctory dialogue. They’ve made concessions and economic aid to defuse exploding and potential future powder kegs.

The third wave of protests since the Arab Spring

The latest protests erupted after street agitation across the Middle East bookended the last decade.

In the early 2010s, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt relied on security force violence, military interventions and support for conservatives and rebel militias to roll back the achievements of the 2011 popular revolts that toppled the long-standing autocratic leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

Uprisings erupted again in 2019 and 2020 in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan. A combination of autocratic political maneuvering and the Covid pandemic defanged them, often with devastating consequences.

Analysts, journalists and academics argued that counterrevolutionary measures had replaced the 2011 Arab Spring with a prolonged Arab Winter. The latest protests, however, suggest the winter’s snow may be melting.

This month, Iran braces for the September 16 first anniversary of Masha Amini’s death. Amini died under suspicious circumstances in the custody of Iran’s religious police, who detained her for allegedly wearing her headscarf loosely. Amini’s death sparked months of street protests in which killed 530 people and arrested more than 22,000. Since then, popular defiance has turned , cultural , courthouses and into protest and civil disobedience venues. “Wrong decisions may have painful consequences for the establishment. People cannot take more pressure. If it continues, we will witness street protests again,” a former government official .

Syria has seen almost two weeks of sustained mass anti-government protests in the Druze-populated southwest province of Suwayda, long a pro-government stronghold. The demands for the fall of President Bashar al-Assad are resonating in the neighboring Sunni region of Daraa and even Assad’s Alawite stronghold of Latakia. “Initially, Assad probably thought, �I have won and we can let this happen; we can let the Druze let off some steam.’ It turned out to be a mistake from the Assad point of view, and Assad’s military will have to keep him in power,” Syria expert Joshua Landis.

Authorities in Bahrain have so far failed to end a widening, more than three-week-long by 800 prisoners, or at least 20% of the Gulf state’s prison population, by acceding to some demands for improved incarceration conditions.

Libyan security forces were this week on the streets of the capital, Tripoli, to prevent renewed protests against a meeting between since dismissed Foreign Minister Najla al-Mangoush and her Israeli counterpart, Eli Cohen. The protests heaped pressure on Libya’s internationally recognized interim national unity government to step down and make way for a new administration.

Similarly to Iran, has been rocked by nine months of protests — even if Israeli pro-democracy demonstrations have focused on opposition to Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s judicial reforms, with no reference to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands.

In Iraq, Arab and Turkmen protesters opposed to a Kurdish political presence in the disputed multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk clashed with Kurds this weekend, suggesting could rejoin the list of Middle Eastern countries experiencing social unrest. Authorities initially imposed a curfew in Kirkuk after four people were killed in the protests.

Could Egypt be next?

Supporters of President Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, including the UAE, worry Egypt could be the next to witness a renewed wave of protests.

“There’s a feeling people aren’t comfortable with anything right now. There’s a debt crisis, prices of everything and inflation have gone up dramatically. People’s lives and situations go from bad to worse. Their willingness to stay quiet has disappeared. You’re more likely to hear about the discontent openly in the streets,” Egyptian-Canadian journalist Karim Zidan said to me days after he arrived in Cairo for a visit last month.

In an entitled “Egypt’s Sisi Rules by Fear—and Is Ruled by It,” Egypt expert Steven A. Cook added, “There is a large, growing, and noticeable divergence between what the government promises Egyptians and how they experience everyday life.”

Fear of renewed protests in Egypt, set to become the world’s largest importer of wheat for the fiscal year 2023–2024, was likely one reason why the Abu Dhabi Export Office and UAE-based agribusiness Al Dahra last month to provide Egypt for the next five years with $100 million a year worth of imported milled wheat “at competitive prices.”

Fear of unrest drives harsh repression

The fear of protests, even in countries like Saudi Arabia with a low risk of discontent spilling into the streets, may also explain out-of-proportion repressive measures like the kingdom’s recent of Muhammad al-Ghamdi, a 54-year-old teacher and brother of a dissident Islamist scholar, for his activity on X, formerly known as Twitter.

Human Rights Watch said the two X accounts associated with al-Ghamdi and cited in court documents had only ten followers between them. Al-Ghamdi generally retweeted tweets by known critics of the Saudi government.

In a just-published , author Robert D. Kaplan noted that Vladimir Lenin, a founder of the Soviet Union, understood “that it was necessary to murder and incarcerate the innocent. For how else could a dictator inculcate total fear in the population? To punish only the guilty would provide the innocent, who constitute most of the population, with peace of mind. And that, of course, would undermine the sort of control that Lenin believed was necessary.“

Kaplan’s analysis bears out in Iran’s response to protests and Israel’s West Bank and Gaza-related policies. Moreover, it doesn’t bode well for Syrian protesters. Even so, the analysis provides an explanation for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s unnecessarily harsh repression of any sign of dissent.

However, what protests in countries like Iran and Syria and powder kegs such as Egypt suggest, as did the 1989 anti-government demonstrations that sparked the demise of the Leninist empire, is that repression at best buys autocrats and authoritarians time. In the end, it doesn’t remove the risk of mounting discontent with social and economic policies spilling onto the streets.

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This first wave of BRICS enlargement was riven with tensions. While China favored the diffusion of its influence through the enlargement of the group, Brazil and India had against enlargement. They were more interested in deepening coordination between the existing members.

Although diplomatic coordination was never easy within BRICS, the group’s founding members used to share the objective of counterbalancing Western dominance. However, this shared objective has been shattered with the recent group’s enlargement.

China in charge

The manner and selection of countries for the enlargement of BRICS made clear China’s unchallenged ability to transform the group as an agent of an increasingly Chinese-led emerging global order. The selection of several autocracies as new members is telling of China’s view of how the global order should be shaped: an ad-hoc multilateralism that aids its own global ambitions.

With this autocratic turn of BRICS, the group’s previous rhetoric of reformism of global institutions is now replaced by a new narrative. China sees BRICS as a way to promote a global governance model that downplays liberal-democratic values and weakens the global rules-based order. As BRICS turns autocratic, the bloc is likely to start opposing US influence more emphatically, and Brazil and India will be isolated within the group.

Brazil and India’s acquiescence to the enlargement of BRICS has been possible with China’s support to the permanent membership of both countries in the . Brazil and India were never shy about their dream to permanently sit in the UN Security Council. However, neither country had imagined that China’s support for their entry into the UN’s selective club would result in their diminished influence in BRICS.

Two democracies in an authoritarian club

Unlike their autocratic fellow members of BRICS (both old and new), Brazil and India have a natural inclination to embrace the principles of equality and liberty both domestically and internationally. These principles, or the lack thereof, determine how democratic or autocratic regimes govern their countries, and, as a result, how they shape their foreign policies.

BRICS until now lacked an ideological or political orientation. What seemed to hold these countries together, apart from being large and prosperous emerging economies, was the shared experience (except for Russia) of colonialism and economic dependence. This experience is no longer enough to keep BRICS united. Brazil and India have made democratic governance part of their development as nation-states. The road towards democratic development has been tortuous, but Brazil and India have both succeeded in embracing democratic methods to guide their domestic governance and their international behavior.

Under democracy, Brazil and India have prospered greatly, achieving of economic development. These countries increased their human capital with more educated populations and reduced poverty and inequality, although slowly, over the past decades. Indeed, democracy has given these countries the opportunity to shine globally.

The World Should Learn From Poverty Alleviation in India

As democratic reformers of the fragile liberal order, Brazil and India will continue their efforts to become more influential in international multilateral institutions. And if these institutions welcome both countries by giving them more relevance, Brazil and India’s level of commitment to the now-autocratic BRICS will wane. In the meantime, BRICS will become the dream group of autocrats who want to find political and economic support in an increasingly chaotic international arena.

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Whatever one thinks about its stability or fragility, the summit clearly marked a bold step in a new direction. It should go without saying that any media claiming to report international news should be focused on elaborating the historical significance of this event. Not in the West, it seems.

Given the regional impact of the summit, Al Jazeera predictably devoted multiple articles and interviews to the event. The Guardian it, but in a way that seemed to insist that the expansion was “more symbolic than anything.” The New York Times decided simply to ignore it.

The Washington Post dared to acknowledge the summit, but avoided engaging its own reporting. Instead it reprinted a Bloomberg by Pankaj Mishra bearing the title: “BRICS Shows It’s Little More Than a Meaningless Acronym.” The title alone invites the potential reader to ignore the article’s contents.

Mishra is an Indian working for Western media who is married to former British prime minister David Cameron’s cousin. His take reflects the Westernized Indian media’s anguished reaction to the entire BRICS phenomenon, equally reflected in Palki Sharma’s dismissive on the event for billionaire Mukesh Ambani’s news website, Firstpost. Even though India is a major player in BRICS and has expressed its commitment to the defined path, Westernized Indians are embarrassed by what they see as an implicit alignment with China. They also do not want to provoke the ire of the US and prefer to avoid even thinking about BRICS’s growing influence.

The Financial Times tried a slightly different , assuming the tone of a bored consultant in the City of London. “The Brics may grow,” it acknowledged, “but it is unlikely to achieve much. Plenty of talk, little action. Not too different, then, from some business meetings.” 

With its expansion, BRICS has announced the equivalent of opening of a boulevard through which the economic actors of the future will be invited to move. But because the roadworks are currently being carried out and no vehicles are traveling over it, FT dismisses it as nothing but talk. In contrast Al Jazeera Professor Karin Costa Vasquez, a specialist of Diplomatic Practice, who understands that it’s about getting to places that previously were not accessible. Vasquez pointed to the most obvious and significant outcome: the expansion of BRICS quite simply “opens up new avenues for trade.”  

°Ő´Ç»ĺ˛ą˛â’s 51łÔąĎ Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Avenues for trade:

Channels of international exchange that can be opened for the profit of all or controlled and even shut down by some powerful nations who design and run them as selectively managed toll roads.

Contextual note

This reference to avenues is no trivial point. The US and its post-World War II allies defined what can be described as a metaphorical roadmap of the global economy at Bretton Woods in 1944. The tree-lined “avenues of trade” in a new world order featured the World Bank on one side of the street and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the other. Traffic was governed by a police force monitoring the rules of the road. It was called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that later morphed into the WPO.

The new roadmap was designed to accommodate the types of vehicles the US economy would literally be “driven” to produce in the following years. These included brightly chromed, elongated Cadillacs with razor-sharp tail fins, heavy-duty pickup trucks and gas-guzzlers in general. Metaphorically, the new avenues of trade were designed to feed a hegemonic monetary monopoly by injecting dollars into the global economy. The dollars, in the form of Treasury bonds, held by exporting countries served to augment the wealth of the US, allowing the Fed to print more money for domestic consumption and lavish military expenditure. A world composed of impoverished former colonies and developed nations heavily indebted by their recent history of war found itself in a state of permanent dependency on both the dollar and the global US military framework.

This BRICS summit stands, first of all, as a declaration, by an expanding community of nations, of their desire to reconfigure the geopolitical balance of power and establish their autonomy. To achieve that, the tools and practices of trade within the global economy must evolve. Investment manager and prominent author Willem Middelkoop has the idea expressed by esteemed financial strategist, Zoltan Pozsar, that the world is headed towards a regime he calls Bretton Woods 3.0.

Most commentators agree that BRICS was not about the illusory goal of dedollarization, but the more modest one of finding ways to maximize trade among its members in local currencies. Thinkers like Pozsar believe that the end of the hegemonic reign of the dollar is a that has already begun. Middelkoop sees the expansion of BRICS as a major step in that direction.

The Bretton Woods conference in 1944 established the dollar as the global basis for trade. The IMF became the world’s exclusive broker of dollars for the developing world. The real significance of BRICS lies not just in finding new ways of brokering trade. More profoundly, it intends to eliminate the neo-liberal ideology behind the IMF’s decision-making.

BRICS has created an alternative funding institution, the New Development Bank (NDB), headed by former Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff. She has stated NDB’s in these terms: “We repudiate any kind of conditionality. Often a loan is given [by the World Bank or IMF] that certain policies are carried out. We don’t do that. We respect the policies of each country.” She nevertheless admits that the current international financial system exists and humbly admits, “you have to live with it.”

The new, improved BRICS is not a revolution. It is an acceleration of an already existing evolution.

Historical note

Despite the indifference of Western media, this BRICS summit marks a true historical moment. It hasn’t directly affected the global balance of power. But our perception of how the balance of power is likely evolving has clearly changed.

Western media long ago decoded that its role was not to inform the public about geopolitical reality but to shape the perception of it. It is rather attached to the shape of the past. It doesn’t seem to have noticed that the BRICS+ will control upwards of 42% of the world’s oil production. That statistic alone signifies that the iron grip of the petrodollar on the global economy has been loosened and may soon be broken. Nations that can buy oil with their respective currencies  will no longer have to hoard US treasury bonds just to be sure of meeting their energy needs.

In the background of the Johannesburg conference lurks another question. Has Africa finally found the formula that will permit it to emerge from the colonial yoke? South Africa has begun promoting a pan-African settlement system that could threaten both the dollar and the dominant role the IMF and World Bank have played in the management of the African economy. They managed a system devoted to ensuring extraction of resources for global industrial needs. It was little more than a subtle variation on the cynically predatory colonial policies of the past.

So, what does the expanded BRICS tell us about geopolitical trends? Though its coherence as a long-term project has become even murkier with the addition of new members, BRICS is on a path that should permit it to exercise considerably greater geopolitical influence than in the past.

Reconciling many obviously conflicting interests will not be an easy task, but the challenge will likely motivate both the old and new members. With more than one hundred nations expressing an interest in joining the coalition, BRICS+ has become the institution best capable of establishing and amplifying the voice of the Global South on the world stage. This implies challenging the existing world order dominated by the West. That alone may explain the embarrassed silence of Western media, increasingly self-obsessed and more than ever intent on ignoring humanity’s history, past, present and future.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51łÔąĎ Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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This year’s BRICS summit took place in South Africa from August 22–24. The most important outcome of the summit was the decision to expand the group. will join on January 1, 2024: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Argentina, Iran and Ethiopia. The original membership has just been doubled and this is a transformative outcome.

Originally, the RIC group was a response to the emergence of a unipolar world following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Then, the BRIC nations, four economically rising powers from three continents, shared an agenda. All four wanted to make the global order more democratic and equitable. When BRICS emerged, these powers wanted a greater role of developing countries in the new world order. At least three of the powers—India, Brazil and South Africa—sought to reform the postwar UN system, including its political and financial institutions. These emerging powers wanted to make the UN the centerpiece of a reinvigorated multilateralism.

End of the unipolar moment

This multilateral approach is becoming all the more important as the world exits its unipolar moment. Although the US remains the world’s leading political, military and economic power, it is no longer able to unilaterally dictate the rules of the international system. It failed to change the Middle Eastern balance of power in its favor by military intervention in the Iraq War or by indirect means during the Arab Spring. The disastrous end of its War on Terror, exemplified by the retreat from Afghanistan, has reduced its international primacy.

The US now sees the need to strengthen its alliances in Europe and Asia to retain its global preeminence. This includes the reinvigoration of NATO in Europe, as well as the alliances with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines in Asia.

The US is pulling the team together as new tensions—with potentially dire consequences for global peace and security—have pitted it against both Russia and China. It has succeeded in getting its European partners to throw their into a common effort against Russia and that China is a systemic threat as well.

Furthermore, the US has used its to the hilt to isolate Russia and cause its economic collapse. Washington has also openly subscribed to the idea of regime change in Russia, a peer nuclear power. It is not only Russia but also China that lies in American crosshairs. The US now sees China as its principal longer-term adversary and is taking aggressive steps to thwart China’s technological rise.

Tensions between great powers are straining the international system. Western sanctions on Russia have been draconian. In particular, the US has weaponized the dollar-based global financial system. The war in Ukraine has also had deeply disruptive effects on the supply of , and to developing countries. The equity of a global order based on rules set by the powerful is now in serious question. This order does not emanate from the collective will of the international community but is defined and determined by the West.

RIC, BRIC and then BRICS were all about multipolarity. These non-Western powers wanted a seat at the top table. Yet the dominant Western powers who champion human rights and democracy are not ready to cede control. In fact, the West imposes its agenda on these powers through championing supposedly “universal values” and does not want to give up its traditional hegemony. Naturally, the BRICS nations oppose this hegemony and want a redistribution of global power.

The West has been locked in a confrontation with Russia and China. Both these powers are responding by expanding BRICS. Hence, they have added six new members to the group. Some of them, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Argentina have historic links with the US. Yet their joining BRICS demonstrates that they are willing to reduce their dependence on the West. These nations want a counterbalance to the US and seek a rebalancing of the global political and economic system, which does not have such punitive costs for transgression.

The inclusion of new members into the BRICS club is telling. Iran is already a of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and close not only to China but also Russia. Iran has long been at loggerheads with the US and is subject to strong . Ethiopia is wracked by and prolonged . Yet the country has made it to the club on the basis of its increasingly close relationship with China.

Clearly, the BRICS expansion sends a loud and clear signal. BRICS has welcomed powers that challenge the US and are close to China and Russia.

What were the criteria and what does BRICS expansion mean?

The entry of new members to the BRICS club raises a key question. What were the criteria?

Were they GDP size or growth prospects or population size or geographic location or regional influence or some combination of these factors? It turns out that, except for energy exporters Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the other new countries face serious economic problems. Egypt is the most populous Arab nation with the largest military in the region. Yet its economy is in an acute crisis. Argentina, the second-largest Latin American country, is in yet another . Their addition does not exactly strengthen the BRICS club economically.

Importantly, no East or South Asian country joined the BRICS club. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE lie in Asia but are part of the Middle East. Indonesia its candidacy at the last moment. It seems to be betting instead on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). BRICS is a geographically dispersed club while ASEAN is a cohesive organization with shared interests. External pressure by the US might also have played a role in Indonesia staying away from BRICS.

When it comes to African countries, Nigeria would have been a more credible addition than Ethiopia. However, the country did not apply for membership. Neither did Mexico. Algeria applied for membership but to have gotten in.

Clearly, the expansion of BRICS has been lopsided. Ethiopia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran are clustered together geographically. Only Argentina seems to stand out.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa : “We have tasked our Foreign Ministers to further develop the BRICS partner country model and a list of prospective partner countries and report by the next Summit.” Yet it is unclear what are the criteria for the expansion. It seems that new members have been admitted to the BRICS club on an ad hoc basis.

While expansion may boost multipolarity, it risks making the new BRICS+ club less cohesive. India and China have deep differences. Their militaries are in a at the border. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran are not exactly the best of friends. Brazil and Argentina are rivals.

Furthermore, the commitment of various countries to BRICS+ is far from solid. Under Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil had less commitment to BRICS than current president Lula da Silva. Tellingly, South Africa Russian President Vladimir Putin because of its obligations to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Ramaphosa might wax lyrical about BRICS+, but his government is still constrained by Western-made law of The Hague-based ICC.

It remains to be seen how BRICS+ shapes up but it is clear that the addition of new members and prospects of further expansion are an indication of a growing, if inchoate, trend towards multipolarity.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer, a confidant of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this week for talks with senior officials, including US President Joe Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan. In a phone call last month, Netanyahu told Biden that, as part of normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. he wanted a with the United States that would be focused on deterring Iran 

US and Israeli officials may not want to admit it, but there is little doubt that the Israeli demand complicates Biden’s to persuade the two nations to formalize their substantial informal ties.

Saudi Arabia has likewise asked for that cater to its security and geopolitical interests. It is demanding security arrangements with the United States, US support for its peaceful nuclear program and greater access to sophisticated US . Like Israel, the kingdom wants a formalized security agreement, even if that accord may not target Iran as explicitly as Israel’s request does.

Saudi Arabia has also made Israeli moves to with the Palestinians a pre-condition for a rapprochement.

The Iranian factor weighs on considerations

Saudi Arabia will likely be more circumspect following the China-mediated agreement in March reestablishing relations with Iran. Relations had in 2016 when mobs stormed Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran in protest against the execution of a prominent Saudi Shiite cleric. So far, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement has only partially paid off.

To be sure, the agreement, alongside recent rapprochements between other Middle Eastern states, including Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Syria and the United Arab Emirates, has dialed down regional tensions. The kingdom and Iran have exchanged ministerial visits, reopened diplomatic missions, spoken about security and economic and invited each other’s leaders to visit. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian Saudi Arabia last week for the first time since diplomatic relations resumed.

Most importantly, from Riyadh’s point of view, Iranian recent aggressive moves in Gulf waters target US and Israel-related vessels rather than Gulf state ships and exclude attacks on Saudi and Emirati oil and other infrastructure.

An between the United States and Iran, involving a prisoner swap and a release of frozen Iranian funds, could lead to Iran refraining from attacking US shipping. The deal does not signal a possible return to the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program, even though Iran has slowed the pace at which it accumulates near-weapons-grade enriched uranium and diluted some of its stockpiles.

However, Netanyahu has made clear that nothing short of the of Iran’s program is good enough, as far as he is concerned. “Arrangements that do not dismantle Iran’s nuclear infrastructure do not stop its nuclear program and will only provide it with funds that will go to terrorist elements sponsored by Iran,” Netanyahu’s office said.

The statement contrasts starkly with a US position articulated in March by Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Mark Milley. General Milley the US would not allow Iran to “have a fielded nuclear weapon.” The key word here is “fielded.” This leaves a lot more wiggle room than Israel is comfortable with.

Saudi Arabia and Israel may be closer than meets the eye when it comes to Iran, but they strike different tones. Moreover, Israel is less inclined to deal with the current Iranian regime than Saudi Arabia is.

Addressing a closed meeting in Europe with Middle East experts, a senior Saudi official it was the kingdom’s “hope” to resolve issues with Iran but cautioned that “it is too simple to think in that way—and also dangerous, because if you don’t see results you will think that de-escalation is in vain or has no results.” He likened Saudi-Iranian relations to Europe’s relations with Russia. Europe has “diplomatic relations with Russia, but you’re at war with Russia,” the official said.

The official conceded that, because of US sanctions, prospects for economic cooperation with Iran remained limited without reviving the Iranian nuclear deal. Phrased differently, Saudi-Iranian relations depend as much on policies crafted in Riyadh and Tehran as on policies pursued in Washington.

What is Netanyahu planning?

All this casts a different light on Netanyahu’s demand for an Iran-focused security agreement with the United States.

Mr. Netanyahu has made establishing diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia a crown jewel of his foreign policy. To achieve that, Israel has to Saudi Arabia enriching uranium for research purposes as part of a US-Saudi deal.

Netanyahu has also indicated he would be willing to if a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia depended on it. He suggested he would not let ultra-conservative religious and ultranationalist coalition members block an agreement.

It’s not clear that the prime minister could make gestures that would be minimally acceptable to the Saudis and avoid breaking up his coalition, the most hardline in Israeli history. This month’s of Saudi Arabia’s first ambassador to the Palestinians illustrated the gap that Netanyahu would have to bridge. Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen did not object to the move but asserted Israel would not permit the opening of diplomatic representations for the Palestinians in Jerusalem. Israel views united Jerusalem as its capital, while the Palestinians see the east of the city, captured by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War, as the capital of a future Palestinian state.

As the custodian of Islam’s holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia would be hard-pressed to make concessions on Jerusalem, the faith’s third holiest city.

As a result, the question is what Netanyahu wants to achieve with his demand for an anti-Iran security deal with the United States. Certainly, the deal would ensure Israel’s seat at the table and bolster Israel’s position ±ąľ±˛ő-Ă -±ąľ±˛ő Iran. Netanyahu may also want to complicate US-Saudi talks about security arrangements in the belief that, without a solid agreement with the United States, the kingdom would have a greater interest in formalizing relations with Israel sooner than later.

Either way, Israel remains a player with the potential to be disruptive rather than constructive, depending on how Mr. Netanyahu defines Israel and his political interests.

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The UN’s Resident Coordinator in Yemen coordinated the fundraising and the acquisition of the necessary agreements from the Huthis as well as the internationally recognized government (IRG), an undertaking that took years of effort and attention. Western nations contributed significant amounts, and the Netherlands in particular took a leading role in funding and mobilizing efforts.

Immediate neighbors who would have been most deeply affected by the disaster of a spill, such as Saudi Arabia, contributed only $10 million, less than might be expected considering both the risk to the Saudi coast and the financial capacity of that state—much of which comes from the production and export of hydrocarbons. The UAE doesn’t even figure in the list of funders. The major international oil companies were also less than generous, though the few still involved in Yemen did contribute. The Yemeni private sector also contributed significantly, as it needs the Red Sea ports for imports of basic commodities.

The shortage of funding from states and major institutions led the UN to launch a crowdfunding operation that had limited support. The United Nations Development Programme on August 11 when the first phase of the operation was completed.

A technically and politically delicate recovery operation

Earlier this year, the UN finally successfully purchased a very large crude carrier-class tanker to replace the Safer and had it modified to ensure it could be used as an FSO. The Dutch company carrying out the operation specializes in this type of complex technical challenge. In late May, its technical support vessel and staff arrived on site with the equipment needed and prepared the Safer. The Dutch team first ensured that there were no toxic gases on and around the vessel that would worsen the risks, conducted technical inspections of the Safer’s hull and machinery and then organized easy access between the two vessels. They also brought the generators necessary to load inert gases to protect the tanks during the transfer of the oil. Two other smaller ships containing emergency response equipment, such as dispersant sprays, were anchored nearby.

In mid-July, the replacement tanker arrived and anchored alongside the Safer. In a major organized by the Huthis, the UN Representative who had been the focal point for the operation, David Gressly, publicly signed the document handing over this new ship to the Sana’a-based chief executive of the Safer Oil company Edris al Shami. Given the controversy over ownership of the ship, the oil and most other aspects of the Yemeni crisis, the Huthis used this opportunity to invite international film crews and journalists to witness their takeover of the tanker, which was formally renamed Yemen. This rare cooperation with international media was clearly designed to strengthen their claim over ownership of these assets following years of successful lobbying that ensured that they contributed nothing to the cost of the operation while strengthening their claim to ownership of any income from the sale of the oil and of the decaying Safer.

The operation to transfer the oil started promptly, and on August 11 the Secretary-General of the UN that the transfer of the 1.1 million barrels of crude oil had been completed.

This first phase has successfully and thankfully avoided a major environmental disaster; it is really good news for Yemenis and other residents along the Red Sea coasts, as well as for the fish, corals, water and all coastal and sea life in the region—let alone shipping, who would have suffered immensely for years, even decades, had the disaster happened. This preventive operation is costing $140 million, whereas cleaning up an oil spill on that scale would have cost up to $20 billion! Given the rarity of good news in UN interventions, the publicity surrounding this success is not surprising.

However, much remains to be done. The new FSO needs to be secured in position and the wreck removed to finalize the clearing of the remaining 22,000 barrels of sludge remaining on the Safer. On the legal front, the IRG has unsurprisingly asserted its own sole authority over the company’s assets, warning international companies against dealing with any parties “impersonating” it. Meetings are taking place between the Yemeni parties involved and the UN to address the next phase of the process. Competition between the Huthis and the IRG for control over the income from the disposal of the Safer and its oil is likely to intensify in the coming months. On top of this, the next phase will require an additional $20 million or so of fundraising.

Although the UN-negotiated truce expired last October, full-scale fighting has not resumed, although clashes are frequent. Hostilities have largely shifted to the economic front in the past year. The oil from the Safer is currently estimated to be worth something in the region of $80 million, while that of the ship’s scrap is $33 million. By comparison, since August last year, the IRG lost about $1.5 billion due to its inability to export oil following the Huthi attacks on two export sites on the Arabian Sea last November. The IRG thus lost its main source of national income, leaving it more dependent than ever on its international supporters, whether the Saudis and Emiratis or beyond via humanitarian and other international assistance.

Despite this rare triumph of UN diplomacy and negotiations, underfunding of the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan and the continued weakness of the economy mean that living conditions continue to deteriorate for Yemenis. But surely everyone aware of the risks of a catastrophe from the Safer must be relieved that this disaster, at least, has been avoided

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The film features a bevy of architects, including Peter Cook, who eloquently and at length expatiate on just how extraordinary and visionary bin Salman’s city of the future is. It prominently features the crown prince himself interjecting pithy insights such as, “Since we have an empty place, and we want to have a place for 10 million people, then let’s think from scratch.”

“Scratch” starts with an initial budget of $500 billion for NEOM, of which has been earmarked thus far for The Line, a futuristic “linear city.” The money is coming from the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund, which bin Salman runs. According to NEOM’s head of , “the first substantial population living on the LINE will be in 2030.” The project’s CEO claims that 20% of NEOM’s infrastructure has already been completed.

Who pays the piper calls the tune

Unsurprisingly, the crown prince’s gigaproject has served as the proverbial honey to flies for Western talent, offering large fees and the challenge of engaging in what the film asserts is “the biggest infrastructure project in history.” As one of the lead architects puts it, “every 40 or 50 years there is this great surgence where state, culture, politics, technology all converge into this singular, amazing unity of form.”

In Mohammed bin Salman’s kingdom, what has emphatically converged is an accumulation of power, previously unseen in Saudi Arabia, in the person of a ruthlessly ambitious prince. Bin Salman has control of virtually all the financial levers and has eliminated any potential challenges from within the ruling family, stripped the religious authorities of influence and imprisoned and executed critics who had dared to challenge him. There is only one client, one voice that the West’s leading architects and city designers have to win over to capture a share of the biggest and most expensive urban project the world has ever seen.

Peter Cook, who argues that much contemporary architecture is bland and boring and sees himself as an iconoclast, has embraced the opportunity with apparently little concern about the outcome: “If it succeeds, it will be the new Babylon, so to speak, and if it doesn’t succeed it will be an interesting phenomenon.”

Cook was asked at a NEOM-sponsored in Venice in May if The Line would be built. He replied, “I’m going to give a very English answer. It’s an interesting possibility. You know, I think they’ll get a bit of it done.” He then went on to say, in reference to the proposed height of buildings designed to parallel each other along a 170 km-long line, “I think—I’m going to speak honestly now, as long as you don’t cut me off—I think higher than 500 meters is a bit stupid and unreasonable. and all our engineer friends will tell you this.”

He opined that 150 meters in height was “quite agreeable.”

Cook subsequently rowed back from the comments, telling the Architects’ Journal, “The discussion of ideas was informal, exploring the different height variables of The Line. After the is built, I may eat my hat and say 500 meters is even more fun!”

Not everyone is so enthusiastic

The former British diplomat Arthur Snell offers a scathing corrective to the narrative of the  Discovery Channel documentary in his . “The Line,” he writes, “remains happily fictitious, no more than an architectural fever dream.”

Snell, the author of How Britain Broke the World availed himself of Google Earth and imagery taken between 27–30 April this year to buttress his argument:

Zoom a bit closer to the ground and you’ll find that there is very little actual Neom in existence. A few isolated resorts and a golf course. No evidence of human habitation, or economic activity. Certainly not what could be called a city.

He notes that a photo posted online, taken in January,

shows a lonely filling station and a couple of fast-food joints, near to an encampment of shipping containers, a familiar sight to anyone who has visited the Gulf, used to house mostly South Asian migrant workers. The existence of the small camp shows that some construction work may be underway, but there is no evidence of a city being built.

Snell decries the indifference of Western governments and business to the egregious human rights abuses of the bin Salman regime, but he reserves his deepest contempt for what he sardonically calls “star architects” who, having

bravely rationalised their dislike of feeding bodies into incinerators, public beheadings and mass starvation in Yemen, along with other inbuilt features of MbS’s Saudi Arabia, don’t need to worry if their crazy designs will ever be built. They can earn astronomical fees dreaming up improbable cities, indifferent to whether a team of mistreated Asian migrant workers may at some future point be killed in their construction.

And there is another inconvenient truth that Peter Cook and his colleagues working on The Line have chosen to ignore. Contrary to bin Salman’s assertion that the space that NEOM and The Line are being built on is “empty,” some of it is in reality occupied by members of the Huwaitat tribe. When the tribe attempted to resist the arbitrary confiscation of the land, the response of the authorities was swift and brutal.

As reported by the London-based Saudi human rights organization , security forces shot Abdul Rahim al-Huwaiti dead in April 2020. He was killed in his home in Al-Khariba in a region of Tabuk province earmarked for NEOM after using social media to protest the eviction of local residents.

Three other members of the tribe were convicted in a specialized terrorist court and sentenced to death. Their appeal was rejected in January of this year. Other Huwaitat have been convicted in the same court and given lengthy jail sentences.

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Meanwhile, the cartel collectively stuck to its guns on its above-consensus forecast that would increase this year with what is an abnormally high—by historical standards—2.35 million barrels per day (bpd), and it hinted that its forecast for demand growth in 2024 would be around double the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) forecast of 860,000 bpd. Indeed, the only negative note among OPEC member country delegates was concern over what some see as underinvestment in new output.

Yet all is not well, as the following two, in my view related, points should make clear.

Oil demand will not support prices

First, between October and June, the thirteen-member cartel, in conjunction with the 11 non-members that are also in the , agreed to cut output in three instances, for a total of over 4 million bpd. At the start of last week, Saudi Arabia announced that it would extend through August the of one million bpd it announced in early June; this was quickly followed by Russia’s announcement that it would trim its output too, by 500,000 bpd next month. In principle, at least, this means that total OPEC+ output next month will stand over five million bpd below its output this time last year, i.e. around five percent of total world consumption.

However, the headline consequence of these cuts is that sat at $78.47 per barrel when markets closed for the weekend on 7 July, as against $91.80 per barrel immediately before OPEC+ announced its first cut on 5 October (and $107 per barrel a year ago!). As things stand, both Russia and Saudi Arabia could decide not to persist with these latest cuts beyond August. But further extensions currently look, to me, to be much more likely. Besides, the remaining four million bpd reduction is due to remain in place until 2024 in any case.

To an extent at least, one can continue to dismiss this as a consequence of what I have been describing since last October as “OPEC vs central banks,” as the latter continue to struggle to bring inflation under control. Inflation is coupled with a decidedly below-expectations economic recovery in China, to date at least, following the relaxation of Covid-related restrictions at the end of last year. However, writing in the Financial Times’s “Energy Source” newsletter on 4 July, David Sheppard flags a second, and important, point as follows:

The group’s recent struggle may reveal a difficult underlying truth. Few investors buy the cartel’s message that we’re simply no longer investing enough in oil production, and therefore the price needs to rise to avoid shortages. The market believes, to put it simply, that there will be enough oil around for the foreseeable future.

Sheppard acknowledges that OPEC has been sharply critical of the (clearly related) of the International Energy Agency (IEA) that “growth in world oil demand is set to slow markedly during the 2022-28 forecast period as the energy transition advances” and its view that we shall likely reach “peak oil” before the end of this decade. He goes on to say that, in stark contrast to the market anxieties of “the $100 a barrel era of … 2005-2014,” investors simply do not see a serious risk of there being a structural (as opposed to shock-driven, short-term) shortfall in supply. This, he argues, “inevitably filters through to prices today.”

Noting, but largely marginalizing, short-term factors currently in play such as inflation-related concerns, Sheppard concludes that “underpinning oil’s rather flat 2023 [there is an] almost complete lack of fear about the long term. That’s a big shift that should worry OPEC+ even more.”

Can the cartel keep its unity if prices drop?

Second, if the IEA and, it seems, a clear majority of investors are correct, it is well worth asking whether OPEC can survive as we approach, seemingly rapidly now, an era where demand for oil is set to fall dramatically and irrevocably. We may indeed already be very close to the point where at least one major producer, deeply concerned about stranded assets, could be cut and run and, in so doing, fire the starting pistol for a free-for-all.

The producer in question is, of course, the United Arab Emirates. In a with Arab Digest, William Law debated with the Baker Institute’s Jim Krane on whether the Emiratis should “go or stay” and, if the latter, whether they would quit imminently or bide their time for now.

There is nothing new about this. In mid-2021 when a major dispute blew up between the Saudis and the UAE over the latter’s (from which its OPEC quota is calculated) CNBC’s Sam Meredith was one of many commentators (among whom I was not numbered!) who wondered whether the dispute could trigger the immediate demise of OPEC.

As I wrote for Arab Digest at the time, that the crisis was defused owed more to the cracks than it did to reaching a sustainable accord. Even last month’s in the UAE’s baseline is no more than a temporary reprieve, in my view, as was underlined by the last week to join in with �voluntary’ cuts.

Of course, OPEC has been written off on more than one occasion in the past; and it has survived more than one departure. However, for a minor producer such as Ecuador (500,000 bpd) to quit is one thing—especially at a time when global demand for oil was rising sharply. For the UAE to do so at the start of an era when demand is set to fall in perpetuity would be quite another.

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Widely seen as giving China a grip on Qatari gas, the deal is as much a commercial agreement as it is a security arrangement. It acknowledges China as the Gulf state’s foremost export market and gives China a stake in protecting Qatar.

Qatar is not alone in giving China preferential access to its energy reserves. So do other major Gulf exporters, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for whom China has become their foremost market.

Qatar has close ties with the US

The difference is that Qatar’s energy dealings with China are embedded in a policy that broadly aligns the Gulf state with the United States, emphasizes the Gulf state’s utility as a go-between, and avoids ruffling feathers.

In contrast, Saudi Arabia and the UAE stress their independence, on occasion counter or distance themselves from the policies of the United States, the region’s security guarantor, and sometimes poke the US in the eye.

Last month, the contrast was on full display. While UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed raised eyebrows as the only to attend the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani flew under the radar a week later when he Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

Bin Zayed “has made a sport out of the Biden administration’s efforts to repair the relationship” between the United States and the UAE. “Of course, from his own perspective, Bin Zayed has proved himself a loyal partner to the United States time and again, but of late has had little to show for it,” said scholars Jonathan Lord and Airona Baigal.

In a further illustration of the contrast, Qatar arranged a between a senior Venezuelan and US official last month to improve strained relations resulting from the United States’ recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s legitimate president and US sanctions against the South American state.

Officials said the talks could lead to a prisoner swap.

“Getting involved in Venezuela is a high-reward/low-risk . By offering its services, Doha is consolidating its emerging reputation as a global diplomatic go-between, helping Washington in several particularly politically sensitive areas,” said Eldar Mamedov, a Brussels-based foreign policy expert.

A seemingly unlikely candidate to mediate in a region with which it has no ethnic or religious affinity, Qatar was well-positioned because it had neither joined a large number of governments recognizing Guaido nor adhered to the sanctions. Qatar’s refusal failed to upset Washington.

Similarly, Qatar hosts a Taliban office at the United States’ request. Hosting facilitated the 2021 negotiated US withdrawal from Afghanistan and since then. With the withdrawal underway, Qatar, like the UAE, provided significant logistical assistance.

Furthermore, Qatar, at times, between the United States and Iran and serves as a postman relaying messages between the two countries.

At the same time, Qatar, unlike the UAE, has not emerged as a for Russians seeking to circumvent US and European sanctions, including Russia’s Wagner Group, or suspected criminals and corrupt officials.

As a result, the US has sanctioned Emirati rather than Qatari companies for violating US sanctions on and Iran. Moreover, Emirati freewheeling has landed the UAE on the of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering watchdog.

Furthermore, Qatar has ensured that it is less dependent on Chinese telecommunications technology that the United States fears could give China access to US technology embedded in American weapons systems and other security projects.

Last year, the US rewarded Qatar, home to the largest US military base in the Middle East, by awarding major non-NATO ally .

UAE and Saudi Arabia do not love the US the same way

To be sure, the and have been helpful, most recently negotiating prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine. In the past, the UAE contributed troops to support the United States in Afghanistan.

The different Gulf state approaches are rooted in Qatar’s response to the failed 3.5-year-long UAE-Saudi-led economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state. The embargo was lifted in early 2021 without the Gulf state caving in to demands that would have put Qatar under Emirati and Saudi tutelage.

During the boycott, Qatar significantly tightened its security relationship and cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism finance.

As a result, Qatari perceptions of relations with the United States differ from the Saudi and Emirati experience.

Ali Shihabi, a Saudi commentator with close ties to the Saudi ruling elite, noted that the kingdom “has over the years, from its infancy before the Second World War to a more self-confident G-20 country secure in its place in the world today.”

Saudi attitudes have been compounded by perceptions that “the US security umbrella has been weakened as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned… (That) convinced Saudi leaders that they had to look elsewhere to guarantee their security,” Shihabi said. He was referring to a US refusal to come to the kingdom’s aid when Iran in 2019 attacked Saudi oil facilities. He was also referring to a US cutoff of arms and ammunition sales because of the Saudi intervention in Yemen.

Emirati officials similar complaints about US reluctance to respond to Iranian-inspired attacks.

In the same vein, Karen Elliot House, an expert on the kingdom, quoted a Saudi minister as saying in March in a closed-door conference: “You tell us not to talk to Russia, your opponent, but you are talking to Iran, our opponent. You say don’t buy Chinese weapons. ‘Do you have an alternative,’ we ask? ‘Yes,’ you say, ‘but we can’t sell it to you.'”

Another minister told the gathering, “You said you were behind us in our war in Yemen, but you proved a no-show.”

House, referring to Bin Salman by his initials, added, “The Crown Prince is making a virtue of relying less on a reluctant US to protect his nation… MBS is skillfully playing a t of great power poker to benefit Saudi Arabia.”

Even so, North America remains a primary investment target of Emirati and Saudi sovereign wealth funds. Last year, the US$829 billion Abu Dhabi Investment Authority between 45 and 60% of its investments to North America.

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In the Middle East, however, the metaverse continues to be embraced by governments with enthusiasm. Israel has opened its first metaverse in South Korea. Saudi Arabia has been engaged with companies such as The Sandbox, for long-term collaboration. Saudi Arabia has even opened the region’s first metaverse to provide training in the new technology. Scholars that NEOM, the planned smart city in Tabuk Province,  is building “the first metaverse that actually is a metaverse.” 

In February 2023, global professional services firm KPMG announced that it would establish a Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Saudia Arabia with the aim of speeding up the application of the metaverse in the country as well as the wider Middle East and North Africa region. 

KPMG will be collaborating with a broad collection of including Microsoft, Ericsson and Metakey. Microsoft will be responsible for providing the gaming platform and infrastructure; Ericsson will utilize its 5G technology and network; Metakey will be in charge of creating 3D objects.

Virtual tourism, services and more

The metaverse technology is set to transform the global competitiveness of companies, and Saudi Arabia is embracing this vision. Spearheading the initiative is the Royal Commission for AlUla, which has a captivating metaverse experience. Users can now virtually explore and interact with the Tomb of Lihyan, Hegra’s largest tomb, providing a unique glimpse into the country’s rich history.

Egypt has also embraced the metaverse revolution, its first city called , inspired by its ancient civilization that continues to attract numerous tourists each year. The virtual city combines elements of ancient Egyptian culture with a futuristic touch, commemorating the 100-year anniversary of the discovery of King Tutankhamun’s tomb.

Notably, the Metaverse Tunisian Summit took place in 2022, emphasizing the region’s growing interest in this technology.

Countries like the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar have shown serious interest, with Dubai and Abu Dhabi being selected as the first global cities to launch within by Metaverse Holdings.

Various sectors are jumping into the metaverse bandwagon. Qatar Airways introduced the platform, offering customers a virtual reality experience. Users can now explore the airline’s premium check-in area and even tour the interior of their aircraft cabins, enhancing the travel experience.

Virgin Mobile Kuwait emerged as the first telecommunications company to its position in The Sandbox, a virtual game environment. 

The UAE’s Thumbay Group aims to bring innovative healthcare solutions to the virtual realm, while the Ministry of Health and Prevention has established a customer happiness service center within the metaverse. Furthermore, the UAE’s Ministry of Economy has opened its third office in the metaverse, offering services such as consumer protection, trademark and patent services, and industrial designs.

In with Multiverse Labs and the Sharjah Commerce & Tourism Development Authority, the UAE has launched Sharjaverse, the world’s first government-backed metaverse city. This ambitious project features a “” for official document processing and aims to boost the country’s digital economy and local tourism. The minister even announced that the UAE’s economic progress will now be measured using the Gross Metaverse Product (GMP) metric, replacing the traditional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) metric.

Digital authoritarianism on the horizon

The rest of the Middle East has seen a surge in the adoption of digital technology despite disparities in access. While countries like Yemen struggle with slow internet and limited smartphone usage, wealthier Gulf Cooperation Council nations pioneer the adoption of advanced tech like 5G. Gulf states have rapidly acquired the status of premier digital superpowers in the region.  

However, during the World Economic Forum, the UAE’s Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence warned about the concept of “” in the metaverse. He called for international standards to prohibit such acts. However, human rights activists have criticized the proposal as a veiled attempt at censorship.

The emergence of digital totalitarianism appears increasingly likely as well. We may see countries such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and the UAE themselves strategically with other formidable digital authoritarian superpowers, including China and Russia.

The stage is set for a high-stakes power play in the digital realm, where the rules for global dynamics are being written in the Middle East. The debate surrounding international standards for the metaverse will likely intensify as more countries and organizations grapple with the ethical and social implications of this emerging digital frontier.

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Motivations for Normalization Now

Former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Robert Jordan assumed his duties in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. At the time, Jordan was to question the governor of Riyadh, Prince Salman, now King of Saudi Arabia, on how Saudi nationals constituted 15 of the 19 hijackers. Salman denied Saudi involvement and shifted blame to the Israelis, in what he considered a conspiracy to drive a wedge between the US and the kingdom. A meeting with the minister of interior, Prince Nayef, produced similar results. Both meetings illustrated that in the Saudi mind: everything wrong with the world in those days was the fault of Israel.

Marking a sharp turn in Saudi opinion, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (commonly known as MbS) in 2022, “we don’t look at Israel as an enemy, we look to them as a potential ally, with many interests that we can pursue together.” Saudi businessman and Prince, Alwaleed bin Talal, also how both countries are now intertwined and on the potential path for normalization; “for the first time, Saudi Arabian interests and Israel are almost parallel…It’s incredible.’

The crown prince calculates that the parallel interests that are driven by domestic projects and the economic, commercial, and financial benefits acquired through normalization will be beneficial for the kingdom. Tel Aviv is a natural ally for Saudi Arabia. It is a in environmental advances and the energy sector, which could be an aid in the Saudi project . The Saudis therefore acknowledge that a relationship with Israel is mutually beneficial and could aid in transforming their economy into a high-tech financial center.

Israel’s economy is complementary to Saudi Arabia, not competitive with it like the energy-based economies of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, whose own oil diversification and modernization strategies are very similar to Saudi Arabia’s. Normalization will also serve the wider goal of establishing a more integrated, regionally focused economy, while at the same time enhancing security. Tel Aviv can assist Riyadh in countering perceived internal terrorist security issues and the perceived Iranian threat. This can also foster closer security relations and enable a regional security complex to emerge that can rival the declining thirty-year-old US-dominated role. Politically, the Saudis also recognize the prospects of normalization as a substantial bargaining chip with any new presidential administration.

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested in a speech at a Washington think tank that negotiations towards normalization were underway, but declined to further. He said he did not want to “upset the efforts we are undertaking on this issue.” Tellingly, Sullivan stressed that “getting to full normalization is a declared national security interest of the United States. We have been clear about that.” The appointment of former U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Shapiro, by Secretary of State Tony Blinken, as an envoy for the Abraham Accords also highlights the administrations ambitious desire to implement an Israeli-Saudi deal.

Joe Biden’s Saudi Arabia Visit to Meet Mohammad bin Salman

For President Biden, foreign policy and domestic politics motivate Washington’s drive towards normalization. A success could help to counter criticism of US diplomatic decline in the Middle East after the peace deal between Saudi and Iran. 

The Biden administration calculates the prospect of Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia might be enough to convince Netanyahu to abandon some of Israel’s more policies towards the West Bank. The administration the Abraham Accords and realized they are keen on broadening the circle of Arab Israeli normalization.

The Israeli prime minister perceives Saudi Arabia as the paramount outreach to the Arab world and a cornerstone of the Abraham Accords. A normalization deal would cement Israeli standing in the Arab world and reap the benefits of bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia.

Compromise is the Necessary Answer

Concessions from both parties are necessary for normalization to materialize, but each one needs to be viewed individually, not just considered as a package. The major problem rests in the multilateral nature of the negotiations: Netanyahu’s right-wing government must be willing to make concessions concerning the Palestinians. In a with the Israeli prime minister, MbS iterated the demands necessary for normalization. This included strengthening the Palestinian security apparatus at the expense of the Israeli Defense Forces in Judea and Samaria, while requesting Palestinian security forces assume control over al-Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, leaving the Western Wall under full Israeli control.

The Biden Administration also similar conditions to broker normalization. The White House stipulated the need for progression on the Palestinian issue regarding the restoration of peace talks with the Palestinian Authority. They also demanded Israel halt its judicial overhaul.

An EU diplomat that the Americans are unsure what price Netanyahu is willing to pay for normalization on the substantive issues. This includes allowing Riyadh a civilian nuclear program and access to more advanced weapons systems similar to those sold to Tel Aviv. The diplomat also questioned whether Netanyahu is politically capable to initiate conductive outreach to Palestine and the Palestinian Authority, “in order to make it easier for Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman to risk open agreement with Israel.”

From Upstart to Start-Up Nation, Israel at 75 Faces New Challenges

Netanyahu is constrained based on the political configuration of his government ministers. Zionist of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Bezalel Smotrich wanted to be compensated for agreeing to the pause in judicial reform which the prime minister, at least temporarily, agreed to accept.

Equally, both Saudi and American leadership are possibly discontented with the current Palestinian Authority leadership. This coupled with Netanyahu’s unwillingness to consider a two-state solution decreases the probability of a resolution to the Palestinian issue. The Saudis will probably be less of Mahmoud Abbas than they have been in the past until there is new direction in the Palestinian government and the transition stabilizes. This is another area that will potentially allow Israel-Saudi relations to develop. 

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan iterates the kingdom’s adherence to the Arab Peace Initiative which would lead to the creation of a Palestinian state on the basis of the two-state solution before . However, MbS is more regarding Palestine, holding a close circle of advisors known for sympathetic positions towards Israel. 

Saudi Arabia will be constrained on making peace with Israel, absent some major for the Palestinians. The crown prince exercises tremendous power within the kingdom, but it is unclear how King Salman’s opinions shape the decision-making process in respect to Palestine. The crown prince must delicately balance normalizing relations with the issue of Palestine because unlike the , turning their back to the Palestnians would hinder their goal of becoming a leader in the Arab World. 

The long-term of Saudi Arabia will likely accelerate normalization once MbS ascends the throne. However, there is a likelihood that the crown prince might wait until King Salman has passed, unless the US acquiesces to all his demands.

Saudi Arabia has much more ambition regarding the nature of desired in return for normalization with the Biden Administration. MbS is demanding American assistance to establish a civilian nuclear program, a formal alliance with the US to include security guarantees perhaps similar to those offered to the UAE and the status of procuring US weapons similar to NATO member states or major non-NATO allies.

The sale of weapons, negotiation of a formal alliance/security agreement, and transfer of civilian nuclear technology will all require the active buy-in of Congress. But it won’t be easy.

A Future Perspective on Saudi-Israeli Relations

There is tentative that relations are warming between Tel Aviv and Riyadh, given that the latter has permitted Israeli airplanes to overfly Saudi airspace. There have also been rumors of communication between their security services. Mossad and the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency have cooperated on addressing , including on the Iranian nuclear program, Sunni extremism and other security issues.

Additionally, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen, accompanied by other Israeli officials and then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, had an exchange in Neom with the crown prince in late 2020. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reportedly with the Israeli Minister for Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer, to further discuss Saudi Arabia. 

Importantly, the direct overflight permission granted to Israeli airlines and the development of special visas for Israeli businesspeople are significant steps with the prospects to further facilitate business transactions already taking place. Tel Aviv has been both overtly and covertly in commercial and business activities with Saudi Arabia for years. 

Publicly, a number of high-profile Israeli businessmen attended the Future Investment Initiative in Riyadh last year signaling Tel Aviv’s growing acceptance in Saudi Arabia. It was reported during the conference that Saudi Arabia and Israel signed two multi-million dollar deals concerning water and agricultural technology.

MbS is focused on domestic issues where Israeli commercial and economic relations can assist in making Vision 2030 a reality. Israeli companies, investors and businessmen are playing a role in the Vision 2030 development agenda. Growing commercial ties can support the kingdom’s transformation from an oil-dependent to successfully diversified economy. 

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel are at a high point, perhaps the best they have ever been. Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen remains , reportedly stating that “he believes some kind of breakthrough in normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia could well occur by the end of the year.”

While it is clear that the Saudis are interested in normalization, the process will manifest incrementally at this moment in time and more precipitously once MbS becomes king.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The merger is likely to have significant implications for the game of golf and the way it’s played. More importantly, the merger says much more about Saudi Arabia itself and its rising profile in today’s increasingly money-driven world.

Always about the money

Firstly: what about golf? To be sure, money has always been a big factor in professional golf. Purses in the major tournaments have grown steadily as the sport garnered increasing public interest and more followers. Much of that can be attributed to rising television and streaming audiences around the world. Today, those purses can top $20 million, with the winner taking home as much as $4 million in some tournaments. Saudi Arabia saw the opportunity to get in on the action. Armed with more than $700 billion in investable assets and seizing the opportunity to help remake its image in the world (more on that later), Saudi Arabia had its PIF assemble some of the sports’ greatest names to organize a competitor to the PGA, dubbed , in 2021. The PGA and its members, including such luminaries as Tiger Woods, fulminated over the new league and the generous use of its funds—it allegedly paid golfing great Phil Mickelson $200 million to join LIV—to disrupt and corrupt the legendary game.

But really, how generous could the Saudis be? PIF and the other LIV stakeholders will invest an estimated $3 billion in the new merged entity.

The PGA leadership and those golfers who had stuck with the PGA out of loyalty were left dumbfounded and marginalized after the announcement. Following LIV’s entry into professional golf, they had gone on media and even before Congress and the golfing public to rail against the upstart golf league. After all, LIV’s principal backer, Saudi Arabia, figures prominently on just about everyone’s list of worst human rights offenders, including in the US State Department’s . The latter’s executive summary lists over 15 areas in which major abuses have occurred. And that’s just the executive summary, which doesn’t list the 2018 gangland-style of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The hit was likely ordered by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS).

The PGA banned from its tournaments those players who defected to the new league. It increased the purses of its major tournaments and stepped up its lobbying campaign wherever and whenever it could. In the end, though, it wasn’t going to be able to compete with the deep pockets of the Saudis. Their PIF, rumored to be the world’s second-largest, is fueled by the kingdom’s massive oil reserves and uber-efficient Saudi Aramco’s ability to manage their exploitation well into the next century. The PIF is rich and will only get richer. 

What are they going to do with all that money?

They’re looking to diversify. Sports offer the perfect opportunity. They are popular everywhere and earn lots of money in many different ways. The potential to earn even more is obvious. Enthusiasts around the world have stood by and watched money take over and run—some would argue, ruin—sports. FIFA (the global governing body for association football), automobile racing, tennis, America’s “big four” sports (football, baseball, basketball and hockey), cricket, and even the Olympics are synonymous with big—no, make that astronomically immense—amounts of money.

Is Football a Force for Good or Evil?

Why should golf be any different? There has, after all, always been big money in golf. But the PGA and its European counterpart, DP World, ran a monopoly on professional tournaments. As a member, a golfer could compete. Refuse membership and be prepared to wander in golfing obscurity; otherwise capable golfers were relegated to duffer status. Busting up a monopoly is tough. It requires impossibly large sums of money. Thanks to the Saudis’ PIF and an aggressive investment strategy, the impossible became merely difficult and then, this month, very possible.

Congress may now be inserting itself into the matter. That’s predictable; the US legislature seems to fly into outrage over almost anything Saudi Arabia. Members are calling for investigations and hearings over fears of undue Saudi influence in a “.” Never mind the game was invented in Scotland and is played all over the world, though most of the big-prize tournaments take place in the US. And even though many a past American president has enjoyed the game, it would take a colossal leap in logic to assert that the Saudi-backed merger threatens US national security. Look, however, for the PGA in its new guise to lose its . American taxpayers would be happy with that.

The game of golf at the professional level is forever changed. For that, players, fans, gear manufacturers, advertisers, broadcasters and thousands of golfing clubs around the world can thank Mohammed bin Sultan.

MBS still blazing his own path

MBS, as bin Salman is commonly known, is unlike any Saudi ruler since the kingdom’s legendary founder, King Abdul Aziz al Saud. To be precise, he isn’t yet the kingdom’s de jure ruler, only de facto, while his father, King Salman, still sits on the throne. Setting aside his nation’s incontrovertibly abysmal human rights record, the youthful crown prince launched his rule by first consolidating his power throughout the kingdom. The military, the security and intelligence services, and all its economic arms, including Saudi Aramco, the central bank, et al. are now headed by him or his loyalists. He severely reined in the power of Saudi Arabia’s previously powerful clerical class, including significantly reducing the authority and presence of the muttawa, or religious police. Distribution of power among the senior royals, as had been done ever since Abdul Aziz, ended with MBS. He is now the undisputed and effectively omnipotent ruler of the kingdom.

Having consolidated his rule, the crown prince quickly set out to make his nation a significant player in the world. He is doing so by leveraging the one asset it possesses in abundance, oil, and the steady flow of income it produces. His Vision 2030 plan set a high bar for the kingdom with investment expanding into high tech, solar power, finance and banking, entertainment and sports. He is even building a multi-billion-dollar megacity of the future, NEOM, in the kingdom’s northwest along the Red Sea.

Uber, SoftBank, BlackRock, English Premier League and LIV Golf are all testimony to his success. Additionally, the kingdom will host the FIFA Club World Cup later this year and the Asian Winter Olympic Games in 2029. Last month, the city of Jeddah was announced as one of the preliminary racing venues for the America’s Cup Race, scheduled for Barcelona next year. The kingdom is doubtlessly setting its sights on hosting the World Cup and Summer Olympics at some point in the next 20–25 years. The PGA-DP World-LIV Golf merger now ensures the kingdom’s leadership role in a major international sport. 

Investing in ever-popular sports also enables the kingdom to repair its much-damaged reputation from MBS’s early years of serial human rights abuses, though many of those existed well before he came into prominence and still continue. It’s called sportswashing. The PGA, which had frequently called attention to that record in the two years it went head-to-head with LIV Golf, now has adopted a much quieter and more collaborative tone. Sportswashing, i.e. buying off one’s critics by buying sports teams and leagues, works.

Striking while the wells still pump

Why this investment onslaught? For starters, the kingdom is well aware it sits on a resource of finite utility as the world, and especially the developed world, advances expeditiously toward clean energy. Diversification makes sound financial sense. Perhaps equally important is MBS’s ambition to make his nation a true global power, not a military power but an economic power. It’s already a member of the exclusive G-20, but the crown prince may be setting his sights even higher. The kingdom’s exorbitant wealth provides it with influence even the US and China must envy. If there is any question of that, consider the parade of major foreign leaders to the country in just the last few years: US President Joe Biden (2022), Chinese President Xi Jinping (2022), Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (2022), German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (2022), Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (2019), and Russian President Vladimir Putin (2019). Saudi Arabia is on the map of the great and rising powers (and perhaps the declining ones, too).

So, say the kingdom rises to some major global status. Then what? It is already one of the two most influential countries of the Middle East, along with Iran. Lacking both population and military might, it faces insurmountable obstacles to attain power status equal, say, to America or China. In fact, it must rely on unwritten security assurances from the US—now on shaky grounds, by the way—for its defense.

One might have thought that it would seek to hitch itself to US power both in the region and around the world. MBS, however, seems determined to blaze his own path. Moreover, the decline in US influence in the region as it focuses on great power rivalries with China and Russia bears his reasoning out.

China Hangs Washington Out to Dry in the Middle East

The Saudi-led PGA-LIV merger presents an interesting case study, however, of how the kingdom might make itself a unique global player. Its extraordinary wealth provides it with an inestimable opportunity for insinuating itself into just about any human economic or commercial endeavor. Golf is but one such endeavor in a largely geostrategically insignificant area, though it does command a considerable following around the world. There is no business or nation that does not covet the kingdom’s considerable investment funds in one respect or another. So, in one sense, then, the kingdom already has genuine power.

If money indeed makes the world go round, then count on Saudi Arabia to be one of the globe’s spinners for a long time.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The visit is a sign that China intends to become a new power player in the region, with Saudi Arabia, one of China’s largest suppliers of oil, by its side. On the other hand, it also illustrated the strained nature of China’s relationship with Iran. According to John Calabrese, Director of the Middle East-Asia Project at the Middle East Institute, Xi’s attendance served as a clear reminder “of the frustrating reality that, in substantive terms, China-Iran relations have stagnated.” The visit only served to further exacerbate what “has long been an asymmetrical, limited partnership” continued Calabrese. 

However, the visit “should not be regarded as China no longer being interested in Iran,” Dr. Manochehr Dorraj of Texas Christian University said. “But that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) not only rank as the number one and number two trade partners for China, but they also have the financial capability to invest in the Chinese economy, something that Iran is currently lacking. This is among several factors why the Chinese leadership may prioritize bilateral ties with the Arab World as more significant.” 

Changing times and changing priorities

China’s engagement in the Middle East has steadily grown over years, building alliances with countries that are strong economically and stable politically. Before, the region occupied only a secondary role in China’s foreign policy. 

The two countries released a 4,000-word joint statement that outlined their alignment on everything from security to oil-related issues. The statement will likely worsen Sino-Iranian relations as the language painted Iran as a malignant actor in the region. This makes it appear to be more the work of the kingdom than China.  

Jacopo Scita, a Bourse and Bazar Foundation Policy Fellow concurs, noting it is striking and unexpected that the joint statement “does not reflect the usual, carefully choreographed balancing typical of China’s public discourse on Iran-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations.”

Barbara Slavin, a Stimson Center Distinguished Fellow, agreed that “Xi definitely seemed to be tilting toward the Saudi/Emirati point of view on a number of issues”. 

Dr. Dorraj deemed that China likely agreed to the “wording because Saudi Arabia is a top oil exporter to China and they want Saudi business. At the same time, China is very reluctant to become entangled in domestic affairs or meddle in regional conflicts and prefers stability in the region.” This perhaps explains why they were willing to spend the political capital to mediate a reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia which was announced on 10th.

Where does Iran now fit?

The statement was a message of dissatisfaction that China wanted to convey to Iran, according to Scita. Naturally, Iran was not pleased by the visit or the statement. According to Scita, the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi perceived both “as a detriment to relations and in particular to its “” policy, of which the partnership with China is one of the main pillars.” 

“Raisi understood the reasons for President Xi’s visit but was clearly unhappy because the language of the statement aligned more with Saudi Arabia,” Slavin said. This was evidenced in articles published by hardline Iranian media news outlets that expressed outrage over the visit and the language of the statement, according to Dr. Dorraj.

During the visit, China ensured that it will sell arms to Saudi Arabia without any human rights stipulations. Beijing has been assisting the kingdom with building drone factories and selling long-range missiles to Riyadh, which Iran is already aware of. 

According to Slavin, Tehran is worried about “Chinese willingness to assist Saudi nuclear development and efforts to acquire a full nuclear fuel cycle.” Iran, “is irrelevant in the Saudi Arabia-China relationship and has other partners to rely on for weapons sales,” Dr. Dorraj continued. 

Old country seeks new friends

To add insult to injury, Beijing sent former Vice Premier Hu Chunhua’s visit to Tehran on December 13th. Despite having been recently removed from his post, Chunhua led the delegation to meet with President Ebrahim Raisi.

Dr. Dooraj believes that too much has been made about Chunhua’s involvement. On the other hand, Scita believes that this “implicitly conveys the message that China-Iran relations are subordinated to China-Arab relations.” Slavin agrees, that it’s “clear that Saudi Arabia is much more important to Beijing than Iran.” Despite cuts in oil prices, Iran remains a junior partner compared to Saudi Arabia and the GCC.

Examining China’s foreign policy in the region helps in understanding the subordinate role of Iran. For Scita, it’s classic strategic hedging with a focus on establishing ties with strong economies and stable political systems. 

Calabrese sees “China focused more on Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states in the near term, with an eye towards building its relationship with Iran in the long term if/when conditions allow”. 

Calabrese doesn’t foresee the status quo changing in the near future. Improving relations would require lifting Western sanctions and reopening negotiations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran is unwilling to do. Therefore, China will continue to sideline Iran as it reorients its regional diplomatic strategy.  

Tehran’s place within the Belt and Road Initiative

Tehran still remains valuable for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Calabrese noted that Iran’s location remains “a very important potential node along the BRI.” Dr. Dorraj agrees, adding that Iran is situated along the largest coast in the Persian Gulf with many ports to facilitate the movement of Chinese goods, while also possessing a large consumer base of around 85 million people.

Scita adds that “Iran’s prominent place in the BRI is an unfulfilled potential and it’s preventing Tehran from fully integrating into China’s westward infrastructural and investment projects.” Tehran has yet to fully integrate into the BRI primarily because “sanctions have made it more difficult for China to invest in Iran and there are no signs that Tehran is ready to accept a deal reviving the JCPOA that would provide sanctions relief.” 

In comparison, Chinese investment in Saudi Arabia and the UAE faces no such impediments. This is because “China formally states they are in favor of partnering with â€�Strong States,’” Dr. Dorraj said. In other words, China prefers countries that enjoy political stability and are able to safeguard their relations. 

As China’s vested interests grow in the Middle East, so will the need to protect them. The recent wave of protests in Iran has posed a serious challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. In contrast, Saudi Arabia (and the GCC more broadly) is politically stable, is largely free of domestic unrest, and has a relatively robust economy. All of this is important for Beijing, Dr. Dooraj said. 

Looming questions for the future

On February 14, President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Beijing on an invitation from President Xi Jinping. While some analysts the visit as an that “China-Iran relations are warming,” other experts contended that it was more symbolism than substance. 

For example, Slavin believes that the visit “seemed more like a way for Raisi to get away from his mounting domestic problems, including the protests over the enforced hijab and the sinking Iranian currency.” 

Raisi did not exactly return empty-handed. The Iranian president signed more than 20 cooperation agreements and memorandums of understanding but according to Calabrese, “the documents contained pledges, and nothing more.” “Even the Iranians realize they are junior partners,” Calabrese added.

Jason Brodsky, Policy Director of United Against Nuclear Iran, believes that China will still continue to balance its interests with Saudi Arabia and Iran, former regional rivals. In March, as previously mentioned, Iran and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement in Beijing to restore diplomatic ties after a 7-year rift.

Dr. Dooraj disagrees with the alarmism from many experts who argue that Beijing has essentially moved on from Iran. “China spent political capital to mediate and reconcile ties between both states and demonstrates how effective Chinese diplomacy has been in comparison to the United States,” Dr. Dooraj said. 

Calabrese adds that the Chinese-brokered deal also illustrates “the advantage that Beijing has over Washington in leading on this particular issue, namely a constructive relationship with and positive leverage over Tehran.”   

Let’s not forget, Calabrese said, that “There are six GCC states. There is only one Iran. Of those six Gulf Arab states, the energy and other ties with China have become far more extensive and promising than with Iran, especially because of the latter’s economic and political isolation.” 

For now, Slavin asserts that “Iran is losing ground to the Arabs in terms of Chinese foreign relations.” Beijing’s interests align with Saudi Arabia and the GCC. Nevertheless, China sees no reason to alienate Iran. Therefore, China will continue to maintain ties with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, even it prioritizes one over the other.

[Naveed Ahsan edited this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post President Xi Meets with MBS: What Does This Mean for Iran? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Riyadh seemed to look for opportunities to pass the buck: get its more powerful ally to do the heavy lifting in order to contain the threat from Tehran. But the US did not “cut off the head of the [Iranian] snake” and Saudis were largely alone in their unfriendly business with Iran. Until they decided otherwise in March 2023. The subject of recent Saudi-Iranian détente as well as the likely prospects for their bilateral ties has attracted increasing attention lately. However, most policy experts rarely analyze their earlier rapprochements, why each friendly period in nearly 100 years of their diplomatic history lasted for so long, and when and why things changed. This article addresses this lacuna.

History that projects their trajectory

The in-depth historical account of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia since the 1920s points to a systemic recurrence of friendlier behavior. In my earlier writings on the subject, separate and relatively friendly periods were identified, the first of which evolved in the multipolar world in late 1920s and early 1930s, the second in the bipolar world from 1946 to 1979, and a third which recurred during the unipolar moment – more specifically their dĂ©tente from 1991 to 1997, and subsequent rapprochement from 1997 to 2007.

In the first friendly phase, Iran and Saudi Arabia were largely associated with a single great power in a multipolar world, the United Kingdom. Their threat environment and corresponding threat perception limited their rivalry. After their initial contacts were established in the mid-1920s two states (at that time, the Kingdom of Persia and the Kingdom of Hejaz, Najd and its Dependencies) concluded and signed the Friendship Treaty in Tehran in 1929. In the aftermath of the treaty, their diplomatic envoys also accorded reciprocal treatment in accordance with the rules of international law. Historians of Saudi-Iranian relations also documented that the Saudi government and city residents warmly welcomed a naval ship from Persia that docked at Jeddah port.  

Throughout this phase, the British regional dominance and common identity of Iran and Saudi Arabia with the British pole reduced the phenomenon of cross-cutting relationships among different axes of conflict that usually exist in the multipolar system. As other great powers played a secondary role in the Persian Gulf, the number of great-great power dyads was reduced, which generally represented a more stable situation for Iran and Saudi Arabia. Any attempt to break this continuity would have resulted in serious trouble. The case of Nazi Germany is illustrative in this regard. Berlin made limited but successful attempts to increase power projection in Iran in the late 1930s and early 1940s. As expected, this gave rise to security tensions, which resulted in the forced abdication of Reza Shah, the swift occupation of Iran by British and Russian troops, and inactive relations with Riyadh.

In the second friendly phase, Iran and Saudi Arabia shared their alliance with a common great power in a bipolar system, the United States, and the tightness of the system made it difficult for them to oppose each other. The in-depth historical account of their diplomatic relations since the 1950s points to a systemic recurrence of friendlier behavior for three subsequent decades. The strength of their collaboration in 1950s was expressed in different arenas, such as converging Saudi-Iranian interests in Egypt after Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew King Farouk in the socialist-republican coup; joint support for Jordan when revolts threatened the continuity of the Hashemite monarchy; and preventing a socialist coup in Lebanon. 

In the 1960s, Iran supported Saudi Arabia in a proxy war against Egypt in Northern Yemen. Two friendly states also signed the Agreement over the Islands of al-â€�Arabiya and Farsi, while in the 1970s, Iran and Saudi Arabia were twin pillars of the US axis and were the closest of allies. That relationship was so close that Iran declared a week of mourning when King Faisal was assassinated in 1975.The dominant structural force that prevailed through the three decades or so of close bilateral ties is the bipolar world order of the time, and the fact that both sides allied themselves with the United States. It also explains why Iran and Saudi Arabia feared other revolutionary states that identified themselves with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 

This fear was great enough that it not only drew Saudi Arabia, a Wahhabi Islamist state, and Iran, then a nationalist and pro-secular Shia state, together, but also made them more receptive to Islamic political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Tehran’s departure from the US-led pole in 1979. generated an enormous amount of pressure on both states to significantly alter their behavior. Iran abandoned friendly connections with Saudi Arabia, which maintained an active and strategic relationship with the US, while the Saudis limited friendly connections with Iran because of its messianic refusal to abide by the existing order. New structural realities led to the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in January 1981 and Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s.

Shared threat perception from American unipolarity

In the third friendly phase, a sole superpower in a unipolar world was not restrained from the Middle East and Persian Gulf region in the 1990s and early 2000s. Spreading democracy abroad was a high-priority goal for two successive US administrations since the end of the Cold War. In his 1992 campaign Bill Clinton frequently insisted that the promotion of democracy would be a top priority of his foreign policy. His assistant for national security defined the central theme of Clinton foreign policy as the “enlargement of democracy”. President George W. Bush used military might to try to turn Afghanistan and Iraq to begin with, and later even other states across the Middle East into liberal democracies. He said: “By the resolve and purpose of America, and of our friends and allies, we will make this an age of progress and liberty. Free people will set the course of history, and free people will keep the peace of the world.”

However, political elites in Iran and Saudi Arabia generally disliked what John Mearsheimer calls “a liberal unipole” in which the United States pursues a policy of “liberal hegemony” – making Muslim-majority states in the image of liberal elites in the US. Indeed, there is a problem in Iran and Saudi Arabia with accepting the universality and superiority of liberal ideology that is pursued by the political liberal elite in the West. Additional systemic reason for their relatively constructive relations during this period was unrivaled US hegemony. Iran and Saudi Arabia were fearful and resistant to this pressure from the US in different ways. Not surprisingly, they have pursued a policy of dĂ©tente from 1991 to 1997 and closer diplomatic ties from late 1990s to mid-2000s.

It is not difficult to find historical validation for this argument. Riyadh and Tehran were exceptionally close between 1997 and 2001. This was the most constructive period of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, during which the Cooperation Agreement and Security Accord were concluded in 1998 and 2001, respectively. At the peak of their collaboration in 2000, the Iranian Minister of Defense, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, new arrangements for collective security in the Persian Gulf that excluded the United States, including the creation of a joint army “for the defense of the Muslim world”. “The sky’s the limit for Iranian–Saudi Arabian relations and co-operation, as the whole of Islamic Iran’s military might is in the service of our Saudi and Muslim brothers,” he said. 

Unsurprisingly, the Saudis balked. They were not ready to sacrifice a long-term security arrangement with the US. Doing so would be akin to Japan entering into a security pact with China while exiting its defense treaty with the US. This also explains why Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with Iran on internal security matters in 2001 that excluded military collaboration. The massive American military presence in the region essentially acted as a stabilizer for Saudi–Iran ties. That it took a scant three weeks for the US to pummel the Iraqi army and overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime did not go unnoticed in Tehran. 

With one side cowed and the other reassured by American military might, Iran and Saudi Arabia pursued cautious policies and preserved dialogue at a high-level. Ali Larijani alone paid four official visits to Saudi Arabia for consultations with Prince Bandar and King Abdullah. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was accorded red carpet treatment and was greeted by the Saudi King at the airport when he arrived in Riyadh in March 2007. The Saudi press hailed Ahmadinejad’s visit as another sign of deepening ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and referred to the two countries as “brotherly nations.”

However, Saudi Arabia was getting more fearful from the new American posture in the Middle East than from its promotion of liberal democracy. With a pending American exit from Iraq by 2011., Tehran was assured of having more space to expand its influence and growing proxy network. Iraq was no longer an occupied, neutral or buffer state between Riyadh and Tehran. Instead, it tilted towards Iran on all major regional issues. Iraqi Shia militia groups also grew bolder, and were free to carry out mortar attacks across the border with Saudi Arabia. 

Hence, the exit of Saudi Arabia’s security blanket left them worried about American commitment to maintaining the regional order. That worry amplified when President Barack Obama announced a new East Asia Strategy—also known as the Asia Pivot—in 2012. With this shift, the central role of the US in the Middle East was additionally marginalized. Iran and Saudi Arabia were left to fill the vacuum. While Saudi Arabia felt more vulnerable with the Arab Spring in Bahrain and Yemen, Iranian interests in Syria were under threat. It was a perfect setting for them to return to hostile relations.

Shared preference of pluralization and multipolarity

With changing international order, two regional rivals found themselves in matching mode again in the 2020s. In addition to what they commonly opposed in late 1990s and early 2000s, there is an alternative order for Iran and Saudi Arabia that better fits their international ambitions today. It is about their shared preference for polarization and multipolarity of the international system where their voices can be heard or where they can move from the “periphery” of international politics to the “center”. 

Iran has decided to pursue more independent foreign policy more than four decades ago. Saudi Arabia has chosen a similar path only recently. Although Riyad has long been a US ally, its neutral stance on the crisis in Ukraine, strategic partnership with China, close relations with Russia, exposure to BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, underlines an important shift to new balancing behavior in a new world order where Russia—and China—are equally important. 

Moreover, beyond a neutral stance on the war in Ukraine or a closer partnership with Beijing and Moscow, there emerge other assertive foreign policy paradigms with broader regional implications. Among others, Saudi special relations with the US have grown colder. Iran’s long-held official view that collaboration with Saudi Arabia is subject to new arrangements in the Persian Gulf that exclude the US or reduce Saudi dependency on Washington have not changed. This gives Tehran a reason to engage with Riyadh. Given their newly born mutual preference for multipolarity, including their common objection to liberal international order in previous phases, conditions for a Saudi-Iran rapprochement were already set.

Their matching polarity with great power(s) has accurately foreshadowed the friendly course of Iran–Saudi ties over the past 100 years. The nature of this relationship is likely to follow the same pattern in the future as well.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Saudi-Iranian Rapprochements Are Not New: Here’s a History appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

So far, the US has counted on its position of domination in the Middle East. Its military bases dot the region and oil is still denominated in dollars. Money from this region has long flowed into American stock markets, startups, universities and foundations. In particular, the US-Saudi relationship has been special. This deal signals that this relationship has soured. China might just have seduced the Saudis from US arms.

The US-Saudi Back Story

Appropriately, the US-Saudi romance began on Valentine’s Day (February 14) in 1945. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt King Abdul Aziz Al Saud on the battleship USS Quincy and the rest is history. Since then, Americans have provided the Saudi royal family with protection in return for access to their oil.

The fabled US-Saudi romance has been fading in recent years. The US is now and the Middle Kingdom has Uncle Sam as the biggest importer of Saudi oil. It is only natural that the economic center of gravity for the Saudis has moved east. Note that Chinese President Xi Jinping in Saudi Arabia on a historic visit three months ago. For the Saudis, is now their “number one trade partner, a major tech supplier, a long-term energy customer, and a comprehensive strategic partner with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.” Both economically and geopolitically, Saudi Arabia no longer finds the US reliable.

Since 2018, a number of Americans have turned against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) when his operatives allegedly killed journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. To add insult to injury, this killing took place in the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul, scandalizing international opinion. On his campaign trail, US President Joe Biden promised to make Saudi Arabia a “” state. This infuriated MBS. When Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine and sent oil prices skyrocketing, Biden humiliatingly ate his words and visited Saudi Arabia for a famous fist bump. MBS turned a deaf ear to the president’s requests to increase oil production. Instead, he cut production, much to Biden’s chagrin.

There were earlier pinpricks that irked MBS. He did not like Barack Obama’s 2016 Iran Deal—Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—or the president’s support for the so-called 2010 Arab Spring (it kicked off in December). For MBS, the US could no longer be relied upon to protect the House of Saud (meaning, he himself) any longer. As it would to many an absolute monarch or all-controlling autocrat, Biden’s also sounds dangerous to MBS’s ears.

The Saudi-Iran Back Story

Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran have a checkered past. They have both jockeyed for influence in the Islamic world. The Saudis are the custodian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. They have used their oil money to fund Wahhabi Islam around the world from Bosnia to Indonesia.  In contrast, Iran is a revolutionary power run by mullahs. They have won brownie points for standing up to imperial Uncle Sam and remained steadfast in their support of the Palestinian cause. Israel’s constant fist-shaking at Iran boosts their street cred among Muslims around the world.

As long as Iran was a monarchy, both Saudi Arabia and Iran were American allies. They exported oil to the West and made vast fortunes. In 1979, revolution erupted in Iran. Few remember that that same year gunmen took over the Grand Mosque at Mecca in Saudi Arabia, an event that has come to be known as “the siege of Mecca.” Several hundred armed —Arabs as well as American and Canadian converts—overpowered the guards, shut down the gates, took 100,000 hostage and proclaimed that the savior Mahdi had arrived to cleanse the Muslim world from the corruption of the West. Troops overpowered the jihadis but the specter of an Iran-style Islamic revolution has haunted the House of Saud since.

Saudi Arabia backed the Sunni-ruled Iraq under Saddam Hussein against Iran in their 1980-88 war. Relations remained tense until 1998. The reformist Mohammad Khatami became president.  Both countries signed a general cooperation agreement in 1998 and a security cooperation agreement in 2001.

Al Jazeera us that Saudi security chief Ali Shamkhani signed a significant agreement with Iran. In 2001, he was defense minister and played a major role in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia closer. The Saudis awarded him “the Order of Abdulaziz medal, the highest award offered by the kingdom, in the early 2000s.”

In 2016, all these efforts were washed away. Saudi-Iran relations were already strained because of a that killed thousands. Then, the Saudis executed Ayatollah Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a towering Shia leader. Mobs attacked Saudi diplomatic missions. In response, Saudi Arabia broke off relations with Iran.

Note that Saudi-Iran interests clash in many theaters. Both countries have been at loggerheads in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq for many years. There is also visceral mutual dislike. With its memory of an empire, Iran sneers at the Saudis as uncouth upstarts. With its suspicion of revolution, the Saudis see Iranian mullahs as scheming plotters. 

Economically, Saudi-Iran interests clash as well. Saudi oil giant Aramco a record profits of $161.1 billion for 2022. Iran has the world’s fourth-largest oil reserves but sanctions prevent it from selling on the global market. If sanctions ended, Iranian oil would depress prices and reduce earnings for Saudi Arabia. No Saudi leader would like that to happen, especially MBS.

Enter the Dragon

Yet heightened tensions are not in the interests of either country, so the Saudis and Iranians have made up for now. They are both increasingly aligned to China, which relies on its energy on the Persian Gulf. In case of any war, the US will be fine but Xi’s “ of steel” would rust quite quickly. With no energy resources, the Chinese military might simply not have the fuel to sustain a major war. Hence, China is keen to calm the waters in this part of the world.

Under Xi, China is keen to play a bigger role in the world. It sees the US-led postwar order as unjust and against its interests. Therefore, it has the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Unlike the US postwar order, Chinese ideas are inchoate. Beijing relies on cliches far too much but they are certainly playing the realpolitik game.

The Russia-Ukraine War has demonstrated that US interests are not aligned with either Saudi or Iranian interests. The Saudis want to keep the price of oil high and are nervous about Biden’s talk of democracy. The Iranians feel scorned after Donald Trump scuppered JCPOA and Biden’s lack of ability to reinstate it. They are supplying drones to the Russians and rumors persist that some of these flying machines are really made in China but smuggled through Iran. Both the Saudis and Iranians now need the Chinese, giving them leverage. Xi’s diplomats have exercised that leverage and emerged as the biggest winners from the Saudi-Iran deal. The US is still top dog by a long way, but there is a new dog in the Persian Gulf and it is likely to stay.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Why Saudi Arabia and Iran Are Making Out Now appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Fans were even more enraged in 2005 when the American Glazer family bought the club. Some even started a rival club and transferred their support. They’ve never been satisfied the Glazers are suitable custodians of a club fans believe is rightfully theirs. Now, they’re concerned the Glazers will sup with the devil and sell to the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, who already owns the club Paris Saint-Germain via a company called Qatar Sports Investments.

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Mighty Presence

The objections are now familiar to anyone vaguely familiar with sports. Gulf States, enriched by their reserves of oil and gas, have, over the past decade established a Middle Eastern control over many sports. The sovereign wealth fund of Saudi Arabia underwrites the LIV golf tour. Bahrain hosts a Formula1 grand prix. The International Cricket Council has moved its headquarters to Dubai, the most populous city in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). And, as if anyone hadn’t noticed, Qatar has recently staged football’s most prestigious event, the FIFA World Cup—and done so successfully. will host football’s Club World Cup later this year.

In England’s Premier League, both of Manchester United’s local rivals— and—have been bought. The former is owned by City Football Group whose majority shares are owned by Mansour bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the deputy prime minister of the United Arab Emirates and a member of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi.  Newcastle United was recently purchased by the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia. The Newcastle buy-out was challenged by many fans, though the opposition appears to have softened now that the club’s on-field fortunes are improving.

The objection to the encroachment of Middle East interests on sports that have traditionally been dominated by the West is not based on xenophobia. Well, not totally. Territories in that part of the world are not so vigilant in observing what many other parts of the world regard as fundamental human rights, particularly when it comes to groups. Homosexuality is outlawed and, in some parts, an imprisonable offense. There are places where it is punishable by death. Women’s status differs from country-to-country, but nowhere is there equality of access or opportunity comparable with the West’s.

Sports Fans Say Qatar Has Now Politicized the World Cup

Where’s The Harm?  

Now, a cynic might ask: since when did football fans become so self-righteous? Or did they always secretly harbor a strong sense of right-and-wrong, and were just not enraged enough to express their sense of morality? Until those Gulf States, with their “medieval” cultures started muscling in on that pure, unsullied and wholesome pursuit once the preserve of English gentlemen and, more recently, the proud property of the masses. Sports is too virtuous, too honorable, too undefiled by the sins of the world to be corrupted by those primitive Arab states where being able to quote the Quran counts as enlightenment.

But wait: let me offer a counterweight. Think about the meaning of sports: a pernicious biosphere where human effort is squandered in the futile pursuit of artificial objectives that have no benefit, material or otherwise, in the real world. Sports competitions are as trivial as they are purposeless. Sports’ only point is to satisfy individuals’ self-serving desire to surpass others. The more successful sportsmen and sportswomen are egotistical plutocrats whose money derives from the financial reserves of media behemoths. OK, sports events might once have been innocent tests of physical proficiency in a number of set challenges, but now they have morphed into an industry analogous to, if not contiguous with, showbusiness.

Fine, you might reply: So, where’s the harm? Again, I have an answer. Obviously, the physical injuries are commonplace and an expected byproduct of intense training and competition. And the long-term damage to the health of athletes and fans alike is an unfortunate, if inevitable, consequence of rivalries that might once have been friendly but are now warlike. Concussion and other forms of brain injury, sometimes permanent, are now seen as collateral damage in many sports. 

The End of the Extraordinary Abramovich Era

Activities that were designed to test the limits of human capability have become the means by which to extend those limits. Cyclists, swimmers, and track and field athletes habitually ingest substances in their efforts to enhance their competitive performance and break boundaries. Athletes from practically every other known sport, to some degree, use licit or illicit pharmaceuticals in their efforts to maximize their physical potential.  Sport’s injunction to give one’s best appears quaint and unworldly: win-at-any-costs is more congruent with today’s ethos.

Hypocrisy

Sport’s harmful effects extend beyond the physical: at a cultural level, its fierce and destructive onslaught on traditional citadels has been unsparing. Here the less visible, yet arguably more profound consequences of sport have turned every one of us into sports fans of some hue. Racism surfaced in sports in the late 1970s and, while it has diminished in the West, it flourishes in the sports of countries like Hungary, and other Eastern European democracies. Women have been pushed out of sports for most of its history and have only in recent years managed to compete in most major sports.

Unbelievable as it sounds, child abuse is an ungovernable wrongdoing in a variety of sports. Making the practice more pernicious is the fact that perpetrators are always the people charged with the responsibility for the welfare of young athletes.

What of the beautiful game itself? For decades, mired in corruption, bribery and miscellaneous other forms of venality, the world’s governing organization has operated like a private feudal fiefdom dispensing preferential treatment to anyone with sufficient funds and insufficient scruples to grease the right palms.

Qatar Will Change the World Cup Forever

And remind yourself: this is the same sport, indeed the same institution, that voices objections on grounds of morality whenever Middle Eastern interest in a club or a tournament surfaces. There’s a word that describes the practice of upholding high moral standards but having standards of one’s own that fall some way below: hypocrisy. It is endemic in western sports.

Sports were once thought to serve as a source of moral inspiration and maybe they were. But only a fool would ignore the deeply malevolent effects of their presence today. Over the next week or so, we’ll witness dutiful devotees of football protesting the growing influence of the Gulf States in their sport. They will almost certainly be genuine in their disapproval. But even a moment’s self-reflection will remind them that the sport they hold in such reverence is not only futile, arbitrary and wasteful, but a vile, unprincipled, rapacious, fraudulent and hopelessly corrupted environment in which decency is in short supply. How can Middle-Eastern owners possibly make it worse? Ellis Cashmore’s latest book is “.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Why Don’t Football Fans and Arab Sheikhs Love Each Other? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The Texas shale phenomenon brought a huge surge in oil production in the US. We were producing about 6-7 million barrels per day (bpd) in the early 2000s. That jumped up really quickly and reached 13 million bpd by 2021. That’s the most oil any country has ever produced. I think the highest the Saudis have ever gotten was 12.4 bpd in 2020. 

OPEC, of course, watched this development. It first dismissed increased American oil production as a flash in the pan. Increasingly, over the years, OPEC became alarmed. Shale was basically stealing their market share. Shale captured almost 5 million barrels a day of OPEC’s market share. 

Shale and European Energy Security

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To be fair, OPEC was not necessarily losing market share. The oil market was growing thanks to Chinese demand but OPEC was not capturing the growth. The OPEC nations were holding their production steady. And, at times, they were actually cutting production to prop up prices. Every time OPEC did that, US shale would swoop in and grab more market share as the ultimate free rider. This shale monster was growing and growing and OPEC didn’t really have an answer. 

Shale was basically undercutting OPEC, no matter what it did. If OPEC would cut production, the US would ramp up shale production and dampen the price increase OPEC was chasing. And then if OPEC tried to punish the market and punish producers with a big price war by flooding the market with extra production, shale investors would stop investing, those oil wells would decline naturally. And then the price wouldn’t drop as far.

Saudi Arabia Hugs Russia to Take Back Control

The shale sector was difficult for OPEC to cope with. It was making OPEC a lot less effective. And the Saudis found themselves largely alone. Their market power seemed to be evaporating. They needed another big producer to try and regain their influence over the market. Russia was the obvious choice. It was the world’s number two producer and exporter. By 2016, after various discussions and overtures, Russia began cooperating with Saudi Arabia and OPEC. Russia also brought along a couple of other allies with Kazakhstan being the most important one.

It was US shale that led to the formation of OPEC+ and this organization has since been going strong. The OPEC+ countries cut oil production by over two million barrels just before this year’s US midterm elections. This October cut was really extraordinary. Saudi Arabia has never pushed OPEC to cut production when the incumbent US president did not want it to. This time, US President Joe Biden wanted an increase in oil production. He wanted lower gasoline prices at the pump because American consumers believe that the president controls them.

Joe Biden’s Saudi Arabia Visit to Meet Mohammad bin Salman

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Instead, it is the Saudis who have the most influence over gasoline prices. They can increase production and lower gasoline prices, making them a non-issue for an American president. In the past, the Saudis obliged Barack Obama and Donald Trump. When the Saudis obliged Obama, the late King Abdullah was in charge. Under King Salman, equations with the Democrats have changed. The Saudis were willing to oblige Trump but decided to hurt Biden by cutting production and increasing prices.

It is clear that Saudi Arabia and OPEC value their oil market cooperation with Russia. The cartel has become more disciplined with Russia on board. Under Saudi-Russian dual leadership, OPEC+ has become stronger. Before the invasion of Ukraine, the Saudis had more to gain from this partnership. After the invasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin is really the big winner. OPEC+ provides him the best stage for geopolitical influence. He seems to revel in the fact that he’s managed to shoehorn himself into this tight US-Saudi relationship.

The US and Saudi Arabia Drift Apart

The Saudis are unlikely to jettison Putin despite US pressure. They are making a point of making diplomatic visits and taking the Russian president’s calls. In contrast, they made a show of rejecting Biden’s calls last year. The Saudis seem to be signaling to Washington that there are consequences for spurning their Gulf Arab partners. Disagreements between the US and the Gulf states date back at least to the Arab Spring.

As shale production went up, the US did not worry too much about such disagreements. There was a feeling that we’re self-sufficient in oil. That gives us a free pass on not having to cater to our Middle East allies, at least to some of their demands. It turns out that the US motorist is just as exposed to global oil prices as ever. The Gulf oil exporters still remain the global price makers.

Oil Realpolitik Has Returned With a Vengeance

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Saudi Arabia has spare capacity. That is the gap between how much a country actually produces and how much it could potentially produce if it went flat out and opened all the taps. Spare capacity makes Saudi Arabia special. It gives the Saudis their swagger on the geopolitical stage. They can always tap spare capacity in case of a natural disaster such as a hurricane or an earthquake. They can also do so in case of a political upheaval such as an invasion or an embargo. 

In the past, the Saudis leveraged spare capacity in concert with the US. When Washington wanted to invade Iraq or sanction Iran, Saudi Arabia unlocked its spare capacity to release extra oil into the global market. So in my classes here at Rice University, I used to say that the Saudis protect the US motorist from US foreign policy. After this October that might not be true anymore.

Saudi Arabia is now behaving differently. Biden campaigned on making the Saudis a pariah. Well, once he was elected, Saudi spare capacity was less available to the US. We had a really fast post-COVID recovery in oil demand and we had this big oil price shock. And we had OPEC+ basically saying that we’re just going to stick to our plan of drip-feeding oil to the global market by increases of 400,000 barrels a day. As a result, oil prices rose all the way up to $130 a barrel.

Unlike in the past, Saudi Arabia did not bring its spare capacity into play. Not only Biden but also Emmanuel Macron and Boris Johnson asked the Saudis to pump more oil. They refused. They claimed that the market was well supplied and that the price spikes were due to geopolitical risks or under-investment by producers afraid of climate action or some kind of a boomeranging pandemic. So they held that spare capacity in abeyance. 

Here in the US, Biden had to deal with high prices in an election year by releasing supplies from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (), the world’s largest supply of emergency crude oil. The US consumes nearly 20 million barrels per day and the SPR is estimated to be over 700 million barrels. This is not how things are meant to work. In the past, the US was always able to tap Saudi spare capacity. This time, Biden went to Saudi Arabia but the Saudis refused to help.

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Saudi Arabia and Russia Have Now Teamed Up in OPEC+ appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In the context of the Arab Spring, where popular uprisings brought down various regimes in the Middle East, the fall of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was the most spectacular in the region.

Muhammad Mursi, from the Muslim Brotherhood party, was elected as the first civilian president of Egypt in June 2012. Yet his short year in office did not bring about a radical in Egypt’s foreign policy, due to the effort to avoid provoking counterproductive reactions under the new government. Despite this, certain nuances Mursi introduced revealed a moderate commitment to reshaping some features of Egyptian foreign policy. In contrast to the close ties between Hosni Mubarak’s regime and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey became preferred allies, as they supported the revolution and the subsequent political transition, with Doha providing $8 billion in economic aid.

On the one hand, the new post-revolutionary government was keen to show its to play a responsible role in international affairs, maintaining the peace agreements with Israel, and thus securing its annual $1.5 billion in aid from Washington. In addition to this, Mursi was the first Egyptian president to travel to Tehran after 33 years, to participate in the 16th Non-Aligned Summit in August 2012, signaling a moderate to balance the relationship with Iran. On the other hand, one of his first steps was to open Egypt’s border with Gaza to bring relief to its inhabitants, showing the usefulness of his good communication with Hamas in Gaza, in stark contrast with  the Mubarak regime. It helped the US achieve a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in November 2012.

Al-Sisi’s arrival and the reconfiguration of Egyptian foreign policy

The reforms undertaken by the new government, coupled with various internal disputes concerning the new constitution put forward by the Muslim Brotherhood, led to a coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Under the new headed by al-Sisi, the link with Saudi Arabia was not only re-established but was intended to create a huge political and economic dependency.

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE and Kuwait, provided Cairo with $12 billion in economic aid, rising to $42 billion in the following years. Among the reasons why these Petro monarchies were interested in supporting the new al-Sisi government, it is relevant to mention the fact that they shared a common interest in putting an end to Arab Spring governments in the region and opposing the Muslim Brotherhood, declared to be a terrorist movement. In payment for their support, Riyadh demanded unwavering subservience to Saudi leadership and its regional objectives.

Egypt under al-Sisi has shown its to Saudi Arabia by joining the boycott of Qatar initiated in June 2017, as well as by transferring sovereignty over the islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia. Likewise, concerning Libya, which has been without a stable unified government since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, Egypt is one of the main supporters of General Khalifa Haftar, who has installed a self-proclaimed government in Tobruk against the government in Tripoli, which is supported by Qatar and includes the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. For Cairo, along with the UAE, the elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood is a priority governing both its domestic and foreign policy.

Egypt’s growing dependence on Riyadh and its impact on its quest for regional leadership

The heavy dependence of Egypt’s  current foreign policy on Arab financial help constrains the nation’s in the region. Besides, there is a need to maintain unwavering US support for Egypt, which remains strongly dependent on his alliance and cooperation with the two main allies of the US in the Middle East: Israel and Saudi Arabia. This is also coupled with the cooperation between Riyadh and Cairo on the Palestinian dossier, of great value to Israel, as well as the common interest in curbing Iran’s growing influence in Sudan and Eritrea.

Nonetheless, the points of friction are multiplying. Egypt supported maintaining the , who was subjected to an intense wave of protests calling for his ouster in December 2018, whereas Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed the idea of resolving the crisis by seeking a reliable successor to al-Bashir, such as Sudanese intelligence chief Salah Gosh. That solution would allow Riyadh to continue to peacefully deploy its influence in the Horn of Africa.In conclusion, Egypt’s in its vacillating foreign policy lies in its aspiration for leadership and its limited capacity to develop it. Egypt has lost its historical potential for leadership, but it has also lost the capacity to come up with the kind of  initiative that could restore it. This is a source of  frustration widely felt in a nation with a strong nationalist sentiment. The current regime under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, while trying to maintain an image of leadership in an instrumental sense, with a view to confirming its legitimacy, is too afflicted by its evident weakness and dependence to be able to decisively influence events in the Arabian region.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Egypt’s Foreign Policy Under Al-Sisi and Its Relationship with Saudi Arabia appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The Tragic Tales of the Father and the Son

London-based this week published a of the arrest and disappearance of the son of a prominent conservative cleric, who himself was arrested in 2016 and subsequently disappeared.

The organization had this to say: 

“ALQST has learned of the arrest on 14 August 2021 of , son of the preacher who has been forcibly disappeared since 2016. Abdulwahhab, who was arrested previously in June 2017, had received a phone call from the Saudi authorities asking him to go to the Naif College for NationalĚý Security in Riyadh, supposedly to have the electronic tag removed from his ankle. However, as soon as he arrived he was informed that he had to spend the remainder of his sentence, amounting to eight months, in prison.”

Abdulwahhab al-Dowaish was originally arrested in 2017 after an argument with an official at the Interior Ministry to whom he had gone to seek the release of his father. In the course of the argument Abdulwahhab told the official: “We love our father dearly; either release him or put us in prison with him.” The following day, a number of civilian cars surrounded Sulaiman al-Dowaish’s family home, where all his children lived. Abdulwahhab was then arrested and forcibly disappeared for three months, after which his family were able to visit him in prison and saw he had clearly been tortured. A source told ALQST that Abdulwahhab was tortured and forced under duress to make confessions, and because he was in such poor physical condition he was moved to the prison hospital for treatment before being returned once again to the main prison.

Abdulwahhab was subsequently put on trial on charges including support for Islamic State (IS) and holding extremist ideas, although the Public Prosecution failed to produce any evidence for this. He was released before his trial began in March 2018, and was sentenced in September 2020 by the Specialised Criminal Court, Saudi Arabia’s terrorism court, to three and a half years in prison with eighteen months suspension, to be followed by a travel ban of similar duration.”

ALQST notes it still does not know where Abdulwahhab is currently being held.

The World This Week: Something is Rotten in Saudi Arabia

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Abdulwahhab’s father was allegedly brought before MBS in chains and beaten by the crown prince. The cleric was a staunch supporter of the ruling family but fell spectacularly out of favor in 2016 after he published a series of tweets. Ramzi Kaiss writing for the Washington-based human rights organization Democracy for the Arab World Now () describes what to Sulaiman al-Dowaish in detail:

“In the tweets that apparently provoked his abduction, Dowaish about the dangers of individuals providing “their spoiled sons” with “excessive powers and responsibilities without accountability and oversight.” It was, perhaps, a not-so-subtle reference to King Salman and his son, MBS, who at the time was amassing newfound political power after being by his father, a year earlier, as the minister of defense and deputy crown prince. By 2017, MBS was crown prince.

After being detained in Mecca, Dowaish disappeared. According to an eyewitness, he was soon flown to Riyadh, where he was taken, handcuffed and chained, to the office of MBS himself. According to MENA Rights Group’s sources, Mohammed bin Salman forced Dowaish onto his knees and began to personally assault him—punching him in the chest and throat, and berating him about his tweets. Dowaish, bleeding excessively from his mouth, lost consciousness.

Dowaish was then kept in an unofficial detention facility located in the basement of a royal palace in Riyadh. According to ALQST’s , the basement of this palace had been used to imprison and torture high-ranking Saudi officials and rival members of the royal family, by MBS’s own entourage. Maher al-Mutreb and Saud al-Qahtani, two members of the notorious “” hit team responsible for the murder of journalist and other Saudi dissidents, were in charge of running the secret prison and personally oversaw the torture of Dowaish.”

The Spoiled Son with a Taste for Blood

ALQST, while continuing to demand answers on the fate of Sulaiman, has called on the Saudi authorities to release his son immediately and unconditionally and drop all charges against him.

But as with other cases, MBS and the supine judicial system that answers to him will pay no heed to the call, particularly as Western governments themselves have chosen to largely ignore his multiple abuses, the most widely publicized of which was to order the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.

Although the Biden administration that the president raised the Khashoggi case and other human rights violations with the crown prince, human rights activists have argued that all that Biden achieved with his meeting with MBS was to further embolden the crown prince.

Indeed a Saudi doctoral studying at Leeds University had a previous sentence of three years dramatically increased.Ěý Her crime was posting comments critical of the regime on a website on the internet. Salma al-Shehab had returned to the kingdom on a holiday when she was arrested. On 9 August, the appeals court sentenced the 34-year-old mother of two young children to 34 years in prison. As if this was not enough, the court ordered that, after her release, this lady would face a 34-year travel ban.

On August 15, numbers that executions in the first six months of 2022 hit 120. A record 81 were executed in a . This is the largest number in the history of the kingdom. That number is greater than the total number of executions of the last two years, making a mockery of Saudi promises to limit executions. It raises questions about what exactly did Biden’s meeting with MBS actually achieve.

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This aggressive response of MBS is unprecedented in US-Saudi relations. It demonstrates that MBS has consolidated his power within the kingdom. It also reveals how high oil prices have given MBS much economic clout. He now clearly believes that Saudi Arabia doesn’t need the US in the same way his predecessors did.  If anything the shoe is on the other foot. Biden is heading into midterms that his party is likely to heavily because of surging inflation driven by high energy costs. The American president needs MBS to pump more oil.

Rising Oil Prices Boost Saudi Economy

The latest economic forecasts have put more wind in MBS’s already expansive sails. London-based Capital Economics estimated that Saudi Arabia’s GDP might have grown by 10% in the first half of 2022 thanks to high oil prices. In their words:

“The oil sector has sustained its strong momentum. Production rose from 10.36mn bpd in April to 10.42mn bpd in May, translating into growth of 22.9% y/y….  Looking ahead, the prospects for the oil sector look very bright. The decision by OPEC+ to raise its output quotas by 50% in July and August will provide an additional boost to Saudi production. And if, as we expect, OPEC+ removes the shackles of quotas beyond September, Saudi Arabia is one of the few members that will be able to capitalise and we think that output will reach a record high by late-2023.

Capital Economics says the economy, and particularly the private sector, will be further boosted by the loosening of fiscal policies now underway and the distinct possibility of a  The VAT tax rate was tripled in 2020 to 15%. This increase was to shore up government finances under strain because of the then low oil prices.

Biden and MBS hit an impasse on the issue of human rights. That is immaterial. In truth, human rights was not a for the US president. What is significant is that Biden and BMS issued a  shared communique on the economic quagmire in which Lebanon is currently stuck.

As reported by :

In a joint statement, the two men “noted the importance of forming a government and implementing structural and global reforms in politics and economy so that Lebanon can overcome its crisis and not constitute a launchpad for terrorists, drug trafficking and criminal activities which threaten its stability (and) the region’s security.”

Using the King Salman Relief Center the kingdom $36 million in humanitarian aid to Lebanon in March. That was followed in April by the full restoration of that had ruptured over critical comments by Lebanese politicians over the Yemen war.

The Lebanese Economic Crisis

Since 2019, Lebanon has endured a complex economic and financial crisis, deepened by political deadlock, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the Beirut Port explosions in August 2020 and now the global food and fuel crisis. As the has highlighted, the ongoing political paralysis is destroying “key pillars of Lebanon’s post-civil war political economy.”  It cites the collapse of most basic public services and the flight of young Lebanese from a failed country in a colossal brain drain.  Both these phenomena will inflict further damage going forward. “Meanwhile,” the report acidly notes: “the poor and the middle class, who were never well served under this model in the first place, are carrying the main burden of the crisis.”

The comic Keystone Cops quality of the current situation emerged yet again on in a farcical judicial matter. Ghada Aoun is the presiding judge in a case against Riad Salameh, the governor of Lebanon’s central bank Banque de Liban (BDL). Aoun attempted to haul BDL’s big boss Salameh in front of court. Aoun first sent state security officers to storm Salameh’s residence in El Metn, a posh neighborhood in Rabieh, an upscale northern suburb of Beirut. When the officers did not find the governor at home, Aoun packed them off to the BDL offices in central Beirut. Again, they did not find Salameh.

The Aoun gambit did accomplish a couple of things. First, it rebuked the current caretaker prime minister Najib Mikati who called the incident a “raid for show.” Second, it led to a three-day strike by outraged BDL employees. The head of the BDL union declared: “We refuse to be treated with militia-like methods. We are not defending Riad Salameh but rather this institution, and these methods are unacceptable to us.”

The bank employees join several other strikers, among them university lecturers and public sector employees. In a broken country, gallows humor is now the order of the day. L’Orient Today summed up the current situation brilliantly:

“Do you need an “Ikhraj Eid” (extract of civil registry)? Sorry, it’s not possible. Do you need a passport? Sorry, it’s not possible. The public sector is collapsing as employees continue in their fifth week of an open-ended strike. Everyone is striking… The problem is that they are still being paid in lira. It is the government’s cowardly strategy of reducing the sector’s headcount through attrition. Expenses will definitely drop, but so will revenues. Where are the thinking heads? And they say they want to approve the 2022 budget! With what numbers? More made up ones.”

Lebanon is hurtling to disaster and time is running out.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51łÔąĎ.]

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