Christopher Roper Schell: Hi there, and thank you for joining us for the FO° Live titled, “Yemen, Houthis and the Yemeni Civil War.” I am the moderator, Christopher Roper Schell. I am a contributing editor at 51Թ, a long-time Hill rat — meaning I was a Capitol Hill staffer for a while — and I did a year at the Pentagon.
We have with us Fernando Carvajal, I think I got that right. He served on the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen from April 2017 to March 2019 as a Regions and Armed Groups Expert. He has nearly 20 years of experience conducting fieldwork in Yemen and is a specialist in Yemeni politics and tribal relations.
We also have Fatima Abo Alasrar. She is the Senior Policy Analyst at the Washington Center for Yemeni Studies and a board member of the Peace Track Initiative. Before that, she was a senior analyst at the Arabia Foundation in Washington, DC; MENA Director for Cure Violence; research associate at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, DC and from 2006 to 2012, she worked as an advisor for the Embassy of Yemen in Washington, DC.
Dr. Abdul Galil Shaif, author of South Yemen: Gateway to the World, is former Chairman of the Aden Free Zone Public Authority and Chairman of the Friends of South Yemen. He joins us, I assume, from Sheffield, England, where he has worked with British politicians on Yemeni issues.
Michael Rubin is perhaps, firstly, a historian. I’ll leave it to him to tell me if I’m right or wrong there, but he’s now a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey and the broader Middle East. He previously worked as an official at the Pentagon and has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen and both pre- and post-war Iraq.
I want to thank you, panelists, for being here, and want to say right off that everyone should feel free to jump in at any time. It’s a lot more interesting if we have a discussion rather than me just throwing questions at you. So thank you all.
I want to start off with a basic question: How did we end up here? Dr. Shaif, you’ve written in your book about the promise of Yemen after independence, and you have a master’s degree in economics, so perhaps you could shed light on how we arrived at the current situation. I also watched an interview you did for South24 on this subject. So if you’d like to take a stab at that.
Abdul Galil Shaif: Thank you, thank you for that. Just to add as well that I’m also the Representative for the Southern Transitional Council in Geneva. I think that’s relevant in terms of being honest about what I’m about to say and whom I represent.
Just to say that we’ve got to the stage that we have, in terms of the conflicts, because of the Houthi overthrow of the legitimate government and the legitimate president in 2014. That’s how this whole conflict started. The Houthis decided to take over Sana’a, the capital, overthrow the president and then try to invade South Yemen, which they failed to do. So that was in 2015. The resistance in South Yemen was able to kick the Houthis out of the South, mainly because the environment in South Yemen, politically, economically, culturally, wasn’t conducive for Houthi control over the South.
And I think it’s really important to recognize and understand that there are two distinct identities here. The South has a history of being a state on its own. The South has a history of having its own army, its own central bank and its own foreign policy. It was led by the Yemeni Socialist Party all the way until 1990. I think the project of unity in 1990 was welcomed by everyone in Yemen, both in the South and the North. But I think it’s really important that we look at the realities of how things are at the moment: that unity has failed miserably, economically, politically, socially and militarily. Now, the realities that we have on the ground are that the Houthis have taken over 70–80% of North Yemen, and they do have strong control politically and militarily over that period. But economically, they’re very weak indeed. Being designated as a terrorist group as well will make matters much worse for them as we go along.
So in terms of the realities on the ground: There is a sector in South Yemen embracing the legitimate government that was thrown out by the Houthis in 2014 as part of the Riyadh Agreement — particularly an agreement imposed by the Gulf States because of their own interest in that part of the world. But the military and security responsibility is that of the STC in the South. And I think the reality is that we have two very powerful groups: one in the North, led by the Houthis, who actually believe that they have a God-given right to rule Yemen; and one in the South, by the STC, supported by the Million Man March in Aden. So I think these are the political realities.
I think the problem that we have is that the UN is still working on the parameters and the policies and the resolutions of 2011, rather than looking and reviewing and looking at the things on the ground and changing the policy as it stands. So I think the UN is working on old resolutions that will not work, because unless you have a peaceful resolution that gives the South its aspired aim of becoming independent, you’re only working toward a potential conflict in the future between the South and the North — which is between the STC and the Houthis.
UN failures and international blind spots
Christopher Roper Schell: Yeah, and Fernando, I know you’ve had a few choice words for the UN, if I recall in your writings. I don’t know if you want to comment on that.
Fernando Carvajal: Definitely. I think some of us have been fairly blunt on addressing the role of the UN in its various offices since 2011, right, since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the beginning of the transition. The way that the UN envoy, particularly the four UN envoys, have handled this transition since the Arab Spring. I think a lot of observers have kind of moved on from the Stockholm Agreement narrative. But whenever we look at a conflict, we have to look at its origins.
So, just as Dr. Shaif has focused on the Houthi coup of 2014 and the start of the war in March 2015, I’ve also been one that has been focusing on how the UN has failed to really resolve this multifaceted conflict. It’s always — I think Michael and Fatima will agree — giving concessions to the Houthis in hope that this actor reacts in a positive way to engage in peace talks.
But the typical Houthi tactic is, “Let’s see how many concessions I can get today, and I only give a little in order to keep surviving, and keep expanding and keep consolidating my control.” I think ten years later, we’re at a point where the UN needs to think out of the box, needs to start realizing who the actor is that they’re dealing with and take a different approach if they’re really interested in bringing peace to nearly 30 million people who are really suffering from a humanitarian crisis.
Christopher Roper Schell: Fatima, do you want to jump in on that? I saw you were name-checked there.
Fatima Abo Alasrar: Yes, I do agree with what Fernando has expressed. So we’ve arrived at this dangerous situation. I mean, ten years ago, if you told anyone that the Houthis are a substantial threat — if you told anyone in Washington, DC that fact — they’d laugh at you. They saw them as just a local, isolated problem for Yemen and for Saudi Arabia.
And our question back then from a policy perspective was: Why should we interfere in supporting Saudi Arabia or the UAE in their war? Everybody saw it as a domestic problem, a regional problem, and failed to really grasp what happens when you have a strategic geographic location such as Yemen — overlooking Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea — what happens when that gets controlled by a violent militia that harbors deep resentment toward the United States and Israel? It’s in every part of their ethos.
So that’s a question that continuously got overlooked in policymaking. But also what got overlooked is not just that aspect of great power competition in the Red Sea, but also, as Fernando mentioned, the many people, what kind of life they want to live. Nobody wanted to live under this militia. That’s why it was the Yemeni people before any administration — whether the Biden or the Trump administration — that called the Houthis terrorists, because they were terrorizing Yemenis on the ground through a series of coercive measures.
And Yemenis were pointing to the fact that this is an illegitimate group that is using them for its war, but also to advance the influence of the regime in Tehran. And I think that has been a fundamental problem that the international community overplayed. So in none of the discussions with the UN, in none of the discussions with the US administration, including the former Trump administration, were the Houthis recognized as an actor that is moving with perfect choreography with the Islamic Republic in Iran, or that really has a disruptive role in the region.
And people who studied Yemen for years and understood the Houthis and understood the region were laughing at all of the sudden headlines that talk about, “The Houthis have suddenly become a regional or an international actor.” The writing was on the wall for all this time. So there’s been some kind of, I think, strategic missteps that have happened. We arrived here through a perfect storm of strategic neglect, of policy misfires and also shifting global alignments. Failing to address that complexity and just seeing everything from a domestic Yemen–Houthi lens is really what got us here.
Why Yemen matters globally
Christopher Roper Schell: And you can say that there are all these headlines, but for the average American — the average person, perhaps — they’re unfamiliar with Yemen. What would you say to Americans or others who say, “I get it. There are these people, they’re creating trouble for shipping. The US is over there fighting, but it’s a European problem.” That was JD Vance’s position in the Signal chat. He said, “I hate bailing out the Europeans again.”
The average American is thinking, We’ve got the Ukraine–Russia thing, we have to worry about Taiwan and China. Probably the average American is mostly thinking about tariffs and tax cuts. So how do you break through that? Why does it matter?
Fatima Abo Alasrar: I love this question, and I think it’s a really important question. But I am extremely disappointed. I can understand the reaction of the American public, but I’m absolutely disappointed with the reaction of senior officials in the administrations who are failing to grasp the bigger element and the great power competition.
If you want to undermine China, tariffs are not the only way. You can do it by focusing on the Red Sea and by cutting their links to the Houthis, right? And the US administration is actually actively doing that, but it’s important to remember why they’re doing that.
You know that it was Chinese companies linked to the regime that have been sanctioned recently for providing the Houthis with the tech to have better precision in striking our military and our Navy. If that’s not proxy warfare, and if there is no understanding of that at the higher level, that is just extremely disappointing.
So while I do agree it is a European problem, failing to grasp the broader element is really dangerous. Beyond economics, beyond the movement of what’s happening in the Red Sea — and I discussed this in my recent articles, both at the Atlantic Council, where I talked about how China really turned the Red Sea into a strategic trap for the United States. So they provided satellite imagery for the Houthis, and these enable the precise attacks. But also, they provide hydrogen cell technology that allows their Houthi drones to fly faster and undetected, and go longer.
Russia’s involvement at the same time cannot be overlooked. So Moscow has utilized the Houthis in a very strategic way. There is this Iran–Russia–China nexus that is becoming increasingly choreographed, and it’s playing out in the Red Sea. What they’re doing is, they’ve really focused on the role of the Houthis in terms of, how can they really prolong the conflict? How can they divert attention and resources from other critical areas, whether it’s in Europe? But also, how can they play this out in the Red Sea?
One component — and as we’re talking about the Russia–Ukraine war, do you know that Houthis have recruited Yemenis to fight in the Russian army? Basically, they’ve misled them and told them they’re going to work in Saudi Arabia, and then shipped them off to Russia without their consent.
Iran has also been increasingly providing increased targeting and drone activity to Russia. All of this choreography should be really concerning for policymakers and for the public alike.
So the US is going to be fighting tariffs with China; it might be an easier battlefield for it to do it in the Red Sea, but I know Michael has a lot of insight as well on this.
Christopher Roper Schell: Yeah, let’s follow up on your disappointment with the resonance within the administrations, both Republican and Democrat. Michael, are the isolationists the in-crowd? Michael Waltz, the now former National Security Advisor to the president, is out. And we can get into the whole Signal mess and whether that was the origin, but it seems like most of the other sort of Reaganite, classical Republicans who view concessions to Russia and Iran with skepticism, they’re gone. The America First, Tulsi Gabbard, JD Vance wing appears to be increasingly the only game in town. So how do you think those positions or the position of the administration resonates with the rest of the world?
Michael Rubin: Chris, the short answer — are those the guys who have the upper hand? The answer is yes. And of course, the rest of the world is watching. I largely agree with what Fatima said, but I want to actually tackle that question about why this matters and why, in this case, JD Vance is wrong, in a slightly different way.
First of all, simply put: Cancers metastasize. And so if you don’t treat them, they grow in ways that reverberate and can have second-order, third-order negative effects that most Americans right now may not realize. But it’s the job of leadership, whether you’re Democratic or Republican, to recognize and head those off.
So, for example, we see the impact that the rerouting of shipping has had on Egypt, to the tune of billions of dollars. And this can, of course, destabilize Egypt. One out of every five Arabs, I believe, lives in Egypt. So if that country goes south, then we’re in a world of trouble, not only in Syria.
Now, across administrations and decades, we have always defended freedom of navigation. We did it in the Taiwan Straits, both Democrats and Republicans. Ronald Reagan did it in the Gulf of Sidra, and both Democrats and Republicans have done it in the Strait of Hormuz.
If you simply see a strategic chokepoint and say, “We’re no longer going to be interested in the trade,” even though all Americans will pay for this at the store with increased insurance fees, increased prices of gasoline and so forth, increases on every good, then what you’re basically saying is: It’s open season on the Strait of Malacca. It’s open season, perhaps someday, in the Strait of Gibraltar. It’s open season in the Panama Canal, where Donald Trump has actually tried to reshift some emphasis. So the point is, what happens in Yemen doesn’t stay in Yemen.
We also know when it comes to oil that even if much of the petroleum trade that goes through the Bab al-Mandab goes to Europe, the fact of the matter is that the price of energy is linked. So if there’s instability in one part of the world, Americans are going to be paying for it, even if it’s our own domestic manufacturing.
Now, that last point I would make — and this goes directly to your question — where I think US policy goes wrong across administrations is:
Number one: We too often prioritize wishful thinking over reality, and we’ve got to calibrate our policies towards reality. The second is when we navel-gaze, when we prioritize Washington politics and posturing above the reality of the situation. I’ll be bipartisan in my criticism: Tony Blinken was wrong when he delisted the Houthis as a terror threat. Likewise, JD Vance is wrong when he says that this has nothing to do with us, it only has to do with Europe. The more Democrats or Republicans navel-gaze, the worse it is for ordinary Americans.
The difference now, just to round up to your question, is that the pendulum has swung so far in the direction of the isolationists that we really are exposing ourselves to a world of hurt if we don’t recognize the threat the Houthis pose not only to the world, but also, let’s face it — the way I look at it, the Houthis are a violation of Yemeni sovereignty. It’s not the people defending Yemen who are violating Yemeni sovereignty.
Ceasefire politics and proxy games
Christopher Roper Schell: Yeah, and thank you for reminding everybody that the Houthis were delisted. Then they had — you’ll know better than I — some obscure designation, I think at the end of 2024, and Trump came in and relisted them. Good points also on how to, from the American perspective, make it hit home — talking about those extra two weeks in shipping. JD Vance may be right that it’s only 3%, but it does act as a bit of a tariff.
While I’ve got you on the horn here, Michael, I know you spoke — and by the way, some of what you said was also on this program — in March, you spoke with Yemen Today News about the American strikes. March 16, it was. And you said you hoped the strikes would help the Yemenis get rid of the Houthis.
Do you have any further assessment? Is it too early to tell? You have, as you just did, advocated for a strong response to the Houthis. And I have a follow-up, I suppose: Are you disappointed in the ceasefire?
Michael Rubin: Again, short answer: I am disappointed in the ceasefire. When one side is pleading for a ceasefire, you press your advantage. You don’t go into a poker match when you have a full house and your opponent has a pair of twos and let your opponent out-bluff you.
And consistently, that’s also a problem across parties in US foreign policy, at least in my assessment. But here’s what I would say: There’s an old Russian joke about the difference between an optimist and a pessimist. The Russian pessimist is the one who says, “Things have never been so bad — war, health, economy, environment — they couldn’t possibly get worse.” And the Russian optimist is the one who says, “No, no, no, they can always get worse.”
So on one hand, I’m keeping that dynamic in mind. But on the other hand, just yesterday the Yemenis announced a new military division, if you will, as they prepare to really tighten the noose on Sana’a. Sana’a is having trouble resupplying because its airport has been removed from operation. And let’s also face it: The people of Sana’a aren’t supportive of the Houthis. They are terrorized by the Houthis. And so it’s quite possible we are going to see some movement in the very near future for the Houthis to be sent packing from Sana’a.
This is what worries me, and why I think Trump’s unilateral ceasefire is a mistake, and it isn’t worth the paper it’s written on. And I say that knowing it’s not written on any paper; it was just a Trump reaction.
When we look at the regional dynamics, there’s been a lot of criticism, for example, that Trump and this deal with the Houthis cut out the Israelis. Well, you know what? While I feel for the Israelis, let’s not forget that the Houthis have attacked the Emiratis and the Saudis more than a thousand times — civilian infrastructure. And so this is a broader regional problem. But one of the reasons why the Saudis have been perhaps not as proactive as I think many of us would like in really turning the screws on the Houthis is a sense that was accentuated during the Biden administration: that the United States no longer had the back of Saudi Arabia. That we were encouraging our regional allies to stick their necks out, but we weren’t going to do anything to protect them.
By creating this separate deal, the Trump administration is essentially signaling to the Saudis, “No, you can’t really trust us. You have to make your own separate deal. You have to appease the Houthis. You can’t go all-in on the Southern Transitional Council.” That’s the exact opposite message we should be sending. We should be encouraging the Saudis and the Emiratis to be working together and with the Southern Transitional Council to basically consolidate the areas of control, consolidate the areas of governance and turn the screws on the Houthis.
The last point I would make with regard to this is: When it comes to US policy, I’m critical not only of our tendency to make separate deals, but also, we need to start differentiating among the Yemenis — among those who control territory on the ground and actually govern, like the Southern Transitional Council, versus those whose political position is one of legacy, but who don’t really control anything outside of an Istanbul or Geneva boardroom.
So in that case, it’s time to work much more diligently with those who actually control things on the ground and govern territory, rather than those like Islah who might be much more popular in university seminar rooms, but don’t really have much to say in terms of the governance of Yemen itself.
Christopher Roper Schell: Well, let’s stick with this idea of side deals. The latest side deal was for Hamas to release the last American hostage, and that came after the surprise announcement by Trump that he was ending a seven-week air campaign against the Houthis without a requirement for the Houthis to stop attacking Israel. This stunned Israel, because just hours before, the Houthis had struck Israel’s main airport. Israel then retaliated against the Houthis — destroyed their main airport and their main link to Iranian weapons. Some estimated the damage at $500 million.
The Wall Street Journal has an , I think today, titled, “Trump Surprised and Sidelined Israel Ahead of Landmark Middle East Trip.” So, does the US decision to have a ceasefire with the Houthis and enter direct negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program strain US–Israel relations and put on the back burner Israeli hopes for a green light to strike Iran?
And anyone can jump in now.
Fernando Carvajal: If I may, really quick — I know Fatima has something to jump on the follow-up — but just really quick on your question, Christopher: I think somebody made a very smart comment when the ceasefire was announced on X, and basically they said, “America First.”
And this is really what frames Trump’s approach — not the US government’s, but Trump, JD Vance and his team’s approach — to this conflict. Number one: The armament, the mobilization of weapons, of B-2 fighters to Diego Garcia — all of this that we saw over the last two months — from my view, and others will agree, was more of a show of force for Iran. Not so much for the Houthis. This was a mobilization that sent the message to Iran itself.
Second, the Houthis, whether you see them as a proxy of Iran or an ally of Iran, as a member of the Axis of Resistance — remember, keep in mind that Hamas and Hezbollah were decimated by Israel. So who’s left? The Iraqi militias and the Houthis, right? And the focus shifted to the Houthis.
And basically Trump said, “I can deliver damage to the Houthis as a message to the Iranians.” This approach on the ceasefire — we really have to frame it within the language of Trump and the administration. And literally, it says: This ceasefire is for our benefit, not anybody else’s. Do keep in mind that, according to media sources, the US envoy in Muscat put a series of demands for the ceasefire, and one of them was: stop the missile launches to Israel and stop all the attacks around the Bab al-Mandab, not just against American ships.
And lastly, for the Houthis to rejoin the UN roadmap. But just like Michael pointed out, because the US administration failed to use the leverage that they had at the moment, they simply were happy with the Houthis saying, “Okay, we’ll stop. You stop bombing us; we’ll stop bombing your ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf.”
So again, the US administration — Trump — needed a win after seven weeks. Because in Trump’s mind, seven weeks is an eternity because of his base. So he needed a win. And for him, using his typical language, he framed this ceasefire as a win for the US when, in fact, we’re nowhere near a win.
If I may, really quick, to Michael’s point regarding the Houthis: Many of us have been making the point that this threat in Bab al-Mandab is not new. The Houthis have attacked Saudi, Emirati and other civilian ships since 2017. They’ve hijacked multiple military ships from the coalition after 2017. As long as the Houthis are in control in Sana’a, they’re allowed to grow, they’re allowed to consolidate. This is a permanent threat across the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. Now the Houthis have learned that they can turn on and off a switch and gain concessions that strengthen their position in Sana’a.
Lastly, with regards to Michael’s comment on cancer — because the Houthis have been in power for ten years and have been allowed to grow, they are now in the Horn of Africa. The smuggling, the profiteering is now to Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa. They are now in Sudan, along with Iran. This is a backdoor threat to the GCC and to the Arabian Peninsula.
So again, this cancer — if the UN and the US administration, and we have to say the US is still a hegemon, right, in the region, and the Arab monarchies still rely on the US for defense — if the US decides to be hands-off, the cancer will grow, and the threats to US interests will continue to grow.
Will the Houthis use the ceasefire?
Christopher Roper Schell: I want to touch on some of what you said, Fernando, but I don’t want to cut anyone off — you said Fatima had something on her mind.
Fatima Abo Alasrar: Yes, sure. I also see Dr. Abdul Galil’s point. So the idea is this wasn’t just a ceasefire. This was just a negotiated off-ramp. Everybody knows it. Everybody needed a face-saving exit. And both sides wanted it so badly.
The Houthis were hurting. I initially was skeptical of the language of “capitulation,” but the Houthis did put out — I’ve never ever thought I would see a Houthi loyalist, and one who’s designated as a foreign terrorist, say something along the lines of — he retweeted someone who said, “The US is a pragmatic superpower.”
Their language shifted as soon as that came in the news. So there was something to it. The Houthis capitulated. And I know that Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, for example, comes on TV and he says, “This is all fantasy. These are the words of the infidel Trump,” and so on and so forth. Our media takes him for granted, but the question is: Why is the ceasefire holding if Trump is not saying the truth? The Houthis did sustain some damage, they did absorb a lot of damage. The only problem is that it was not proportional to the amount of and the show of force that we’ve seen.
And The New York Times article that came out yesterday detailing how much we’ve lost — I’m thinking maybe it was — it’s true. But we’ve seen that. If you follow Houthi media, they’ll tell you exactly what they’ve targeted. What is missing is that the US just continues not to have a strategy in the region. Not a consistent one, not a long-term one. Whereas China, Russia and Iran, they do.
You’ve got the Axis of Aggressors knowing exactly what it is that they want in the Red Sea and from the region. Knowing how to play us against each other — if at one point they’ve even interfered in the elections, can you imagine what they’d do with things that have to do with great power competition? Chinese media, as soon as the Houthis started attacking Western shipping, they said, “Hail to the Houthis.” And that is something really important to understand. There’s another information warfare that is happening at very granular levels that we can’t keep up with. I don’t have to read The Wall Street Journal or The New York Times or any of these when I can actually go to the Houthi website every morning, find them, quote them and tally our losses.
We’ve lost the plot in the US with the lack of policy consistency. This cannot be a partisan issue. This is something where there has to be some kind of a bigger, broader agreement and a strategy that can set the tone for this.
But most importantly, when it comes to the issue of Israel that you mentioned before — and I do agree with most of what Michael and Fernando said; it’s just common sense — but I do fundamentally believe that one element that is missing in the discussion is how really Tehran is pulling the strings on the ceasefire. I think Tehran wanted to offer Trump a deal prior to the nuclear negotiations in Oman, the fourth round. And they wanted to demonstrate that they can really control the Red Sea via their proxies, so they’re able to turn the switch on and off with the Houthis by instructing them.
And of course we know that the Houthis negotiated in Oman, that the US negotiated with them in Oman. We know that already. But what we don’t know is what is behind the scenes, and it’s looking increasingly likely that they said so. Even the reporting in The New York Times alluded to the fact that there were Iranian officials in Iran that persuaded the Houthis to take this deal.
The second reason is, yes, this works well for them. But it’s also to save their most fundamental and important proxy in the region, as Fernando has said. You look at the influence of Hamas and Hezbollah that has been weakened by Israel, and Tehran cannot afford to lose the Houthis at this moment, especially with the show of force that the US was doing every day for the past 50 days.
But the third reason is also to drive a wedge between the US and Israel. And I think that’s also very important. Houthi media, again, has specific reports about how Trump is growing more dissatisfied with Netanyahu. And they’re playing on that in their media in a way that, for me, I can see this pattern. This is choreographed with their proxy in Iran, who are playing on the same issues.
So the more that they are able to do this and to interfere in our foreign policy in one way or another, the more successful they are, and the closer they are to getting to their goal.
Christopher Roper Schell: Well, you called it a “negotiated off-ramp.” Seems to suggest it’s a negotiated off-ramp for the Houthis, for the Iranians. Fernando suggests it’s an off-ramp for Trump. The Iranians like to have their cake and eat it too, claiming, “Oh, the Houthis are doing their own thing.”
But yet The New York Times reported two Iranian officials, one from the foreign ministry and one from the IRGC, said that Iran had persuaded the Houthis to stop their attacks to create “momentum” for the Omani mediation efforts in the 2025 nuclear agreements.
Now, this change of heart from the administration: If you go back and you look at the March 15, March 17 Truth Social posts from Trump — very, very strong language. The April 30 post from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth — very, very strong. So it’s a real turnabout.
But does this US deal with the Houthis mean that a deal with Iran is more likely? And I open it up to the whole panel.
Abdul Galil Shaif: Just to say that in terms of underestimating the ambitions that the Houthis have not just in Yemen, but in the Gulf world — I agree completely with Michael’s point that we fail to read the story in front of us. The Houthis are very ambitious, and they’ve learned huge survival skills throughout the ten years. I mean, they signed the Stockholm Agreement where the army from the South [inaudible] was already taken, and it stopped them. I think, repeatedly, we’ve been telling the world that the Houthis are a danger not just to Yemen, but a danger to the international community.
How much are the losses? Around $5 billion, I understand, from the director of the Suez Canal in Egypt. Prices in Yemen have skyrocketed. I mean, the economy is in complete downfall. The legitimate government in Aden is bankrupt. It has no money to pay salaries, [inaudible] on a daily basis. Someone who lived in Yemen in 2000 — and that’s when I was there — was earning almost $400 a month. They’re now earning $70 a month. That’s an example of how people are suffering inside Yemen. And you’ve got 30 million people.
If this economic downfall continues in Yemen, you have a vacuum in terms of security. Because then you have extremist groups like AQAP taking all swathes of parts of Yemen. That, again, is a major danger.
And I think that’s what the Houthis are hitting at. The Houthis are trying to survive. And the apology about hitting Israel — it’s not an apology to support the Palestinians. So I think it’s naive to think that the Houthis believe they’re supporting the Palestinians. The Houthis want to show internal support and external support. They’re a power player, and [inaudible] any peace in Yemen.
The Houthis have to be weakened — and they’re not weak from the air. Believe me, they’re not. The only way that you can weaken the Houthis significantly is by supporting the legitimate government in Aden and the STC to move forward properly and militarily to weaken the Houthis.
At the same time, talking about the income — making sure that they have very little income coming into their central bank — and giving the central bank in Aden more aid, more money, more support. Because if you can improve the economic situation in the South and create an example for people in the North to see that things are much better — I think the North Yemeni people will bring the Houthis down.
But I think, so far, there has been very little support for the legitimate government and the STC in the South to actually improve the economic situation. Hence, people in the North are looking at the South and saying, “Well, [inaudible].”
By developing the economy in the South, by supporting the STC to move forward, I think that way you could defeat the Houthis.
Christopher Roper Schell: So with this weakened economy, will the Houthis use the ceasefire as they did — and correct me if my history is wrong — they seemed to use it with the Peace and Partnership of 2014 and the Stockholm Agreement of 2018 to regroup and rearm?
So if they’re a little bit down on their knees — and I understand your point, Doctor — but will they use this breather to strengthen their grip on power? And anyone can answer. I know, Fernando, you wrote about this a little bit in 51Թ.
Fernando Carvajal: Thank you, Christopher. I think Michael had a comment about your question regarding the deal, and then I’ll go into that. Thank you.
Christopher Roper Schell: Oh, I’m sorry. By all means, yes.
Michael Rubin: No, but I can jump in at any point. Fernando, why don’t you keep the momentum going by answering Chris there.
Fernando Carvajal: Sure. The Houthis have used — I think when you mentioned the Peace and Partnership Initiative Agreement of September 2014, which really consolidated a Houthi coup in Sana’a… Can you hear me?
Christopher Roper Schell: Yes, yes.
Fernando Carvajal: Okay, sorry about that. Really, as Fatima has said, it begins to show the growth of the Houthis: the way that they’re learning, the learning curve for the Houthis, and how they’ve managed to manipulate the international community in order to strengthen themselves slowly over time. Today, they’re at a point where they are fairly strong inside because of their heavy-handed approach against the population.
One of the huge failures, again, of the Trump ceasefire and the UN envoy’s efforts has been that no one is focused on the dozens of Yemenis detained by the Houthis since last June, and former employees of the US Embassy who are being detained and tortured by the Houthis for months.
So again, when you have the leverage that Michael describes, and you fail to take advantage and demand that the Houthis give up detainees, etc., and you simply give them what they want in order for you to save face—
One of the things that’s very troublesome is — to your question about the deal, and then I’ll hand it over to Michael — from my opinion, I’ve been saying from the beginning: Read the Houthi line. Read the Houthi narrative. The Houthis are not interested in peace with the US or peace with their Yemeni rivals. Their priority is peace with Saudi Arabia. They want a deal with Saudi Arabia that builds on the historical deal between Yemen and Saudi Arabia during the previous regime’s time — meaning that Saudi Arabia is their patron. And they want continued economic support and a strengthened patronage network that keeps the Houthis in control.
The Houthis are not interested in sharing power with the South, or with the old ruling party, or with the Sunni Islamists, or with Salafis or what have you. They want to be the kingmakers, they want to be in full control, and they want Saudi Arabia to financially support this. Because without Saudi financial support, unfortunately, Yemen will always be broke. The oil production is not sufficient.
So their priority is always to maintain leverage in order to get a bigger deal from Saudi Arabia. And some people have said, “The Houthis will dump Iran if Saudi offers them the biggest deal of their life,” to use Trump’s language. But at the same time, Iran would minimize this.
It’s very interesting what Fatima mentioned: that Iranian officials mentioned they convinced the Houthis to sign on to the ceasefire. This is a big slap in the face to the Houthis, because the Houthis want to present themselves as autonomous, as sovereign, as doing this because of their interests. And then to have the Iranians say, “They did this because we told them to do it,” — it’s a pretty big slap in the Houthis’ face.
But they will take it because they need the weapons, they need the money, they need the oil.
Economic warfare and Southern stability
Fernando Carvajal: But I’m sure Michael has a better angle on how that affects the deal with the Iranians.
Christopher Roper Schell: Just briefly though — and either of you can answer, anyone can answer — doesn’t it slightly blow Iran’s cover, this facade, this fiction that they don’t have any control of the Houthis?
Fernando Carvajal: Sure. These are the narratives that we see playing out in the media for Iran, for Lebanon, for the Houthis, right? Where we on the outside, our mainstream media in the West have latched onto that line: “The Houthis are Iranian proxies.”
So then the Houthis respond with: “No, no, we’re autonomous. We’re independent. We’re doing this for us, for Yemen,” etc.
Also, the mainstream media fails to distinguish between the Houthis and Yemen. I think Fatima mentioned this and Dr. Shaif mentioned it. Whenever the Houthis are mentioned in our mainstream media, it’s: “Yemen attacked a US ship.” No, Yemen didn’t! The Houthis did.
Keep in mind, I wrote an article for 51Թ. We published an article where I mentioned that the Houthis attacking ships — the Iranian ships, the spy ships from Iran, from the Revolutionary Guard — have left the Horn of Africa, have left the Bab al-Mandab last year, and that began to diminish the Houthi capabilities to attack ships across the Bab al-Mandab.
So we have not had a Houthi strike in Bab al-Mandab since December of last year. It just so happens that the week before that last strike was when the Iranian ships left the region of Bab al-Mandab.
So this is a very reciprocal relationship. The Houthis can’t do without Iran. Iran needs the Houthis to gain leverage. And when it comes to the deal, I think Michael, again, would have a better perspective on how that affects the US–Iran deal.
Christopher Roper Schell: Yeah, sorry to ruin your toss with a follow-up question. Michael, go ahead.
Michael Rubin: No, no worries. There are two issues I didn’t want to fall through the cracks. Number one: You had asked, Chris, whether the Houthis are going to use the ceasefire to rebuild. And the answer to that is a simple yes. Fernando, yourself, others have talked about the history with regard to Stockholm and so forth.
But the fact of the matter is: Sana’a International Airport was the little cousin in terms of how the Houthis got their supplies. The big two are Hudaydah’s port and the Stockholm Agreement. The Stockholm Agreement was the primary example of prioritizing wishful thinking over reality. It still is a Houthi-controlled port for all intents and purposes.
The second is — and we really need to address this issue — the malign influence of the Sultanate of Oman, which would much rather have the Yemenis suffer under Houthi abuses than have any degree of meaningful South Yemeni representation in Oman. That’s the elephant in the room. It’s not going to go away. And so long as those two mechanisms of Houthi rearmament are there, the Houthis have no incentive to play ball.
Now, the other issue you asked about was the impact on the Iran negotiations. And here we have the fact that Trump has diplomatic Attention Deficit Disorder. Fatima had mentioned how, after seven weeks, I believe, Trump really needed to declare victory on something. And the fact of the matter is, the Iranian strategy has always been to run the clock out. They’ve just concluded their fourth round of negotiations, and it’s gone nowhere. And so then the question becomes: At what point does Trump flip on a dime again? You guys can count the number of metaphors I’m mixing in this whole talk. (Christopher laughs) At what point does he flip back?
Right now the Israelis are frustrated. The Saudis have every right to be frustrated and so forth — with regard to how Trump is privileging the Houthis and giving immunity, if you will, to Iran. But at the same time, if he loses his patience, then we could be in a whole different situation. And unfortunately, I’m not really sure the Iranians fully understand that they can’t simply use the same playbook they’ve used for every single administration, going back to George H.W. Bush, when it comes to running down the clock.
The last point I would make — and again, I don’t want to engage in what I’ve just criticized and do the Washington navel-gazing — but I don’t think we’ve seen the true repercussions yet of this alleged Qatar deal with regard to the aircraft and so forth. I spent a couple days ago talking to some friends of mine in the Make America Great Again sort of camp, and even they couldn’t rationalize what Trump had been doing with Qatar behind the scenes. This is going to blow up in a major way, for which Trump is going to look for a distraction. And that could actually lead to Trump shifting his position toward Iran, shifting his position toward Israel and the Houthis once again and returning to the status quo ante.
Christopher Roper Schell: So you mentioned Trump has “diplomatic ADD” — basically, Attention Deficit Disorder.
Michael Rubin: But Chris, he has the greatest case of it that anyone has ever had. No one could do it better than he does.
Christopher Roper Schell: Yeah, but others have suggested that Trump was merely worn down, that he needed a win. So did the Houthis succeed by imposing high costs? Could be through low-cost technology. Our stores of Tomahawk missiles have been an issue of concern. Procurement has been a concern. I think we procured zero last year. We can make about 100 a year, and we have been going through them pretty quickly.
Or did Trump have a change of heart for another reason? Or all of these reasons?
Michael Rubin: Just very quickly: I think it’s for another reason, or all those reasons. I don’t think Trump is a master of details on how many Tomahawks there are in any specific area of operations. And there’s been public reporting that he skipped all but 12 of his Presidential Daily Intelligence Briefings. Therefore, I suspect this is just Trump and his Attention Deficit Disorder rather than any sort of deeper logic governing his actions.
Christopher Roper Schell: Okay.
Fernando Carvajal: If I could just make a really quick comment…
Christopher Roper Schell: By all means.
Fernando Carvajal: To finish up on Michael’s and your question about Israel and the approach, let’s keep in mind that when Netanyahu was at the White House, the media focused on his reaction to Trump announcing the talks with Iran, right? Apparently, Netanyahu and Israel wanted that to remain secret and wanted it to remain in the background and were not ready to make that public.
The combined strikes by Israel and the US that led to the ceasefire were definitely something that Israel pushed for and had to give a big show of force. Again, from my perspective, it’s a show of force to the Iranians more so than to the Houthis. The Houthis can continue to claim these strikes. But let’s keep in mind again, everybody’s ignoring the Iraqi militias, who have a shorter range to Tel Aviv than do the Houthis and could sustain a bigger threat long-term to the Houthis.
But this issue with Iran and Israel — again, it’s come up over and over, because Trump, in public, is undermining the Israeli plans. But behind the scenes, we don’t know still how in line they are in order to avoid that catastrophe that Michael just mentioned — with Trump’s own political base here in the US.
Christopher Roper Schell: We only have about a minute left or so, but I — yeah, go ahead.
Abdul Galil Shaif: Yeah, just very quickly, indeed: I think looking at the Houthis under a microscope and how we deal with them in the future — as an economist, I believe that the best way to fight the Houthis is to develop the South. That’s one area.
The second area, I believe, is the mismanagement of the economy — let’s restrict their access to international markets, wherever it is. Let’s make sure that Houthi leaders are restricted from traveling and investing in other parts of the world.
I think it’s very important that we fight them with their own weapons. Because they’ve used their weapon — they’ve stopped the sale of oil and gas from the South. They’ve actually said — they’ve threatened — that we cannot sell, and we’ve not been able to sell for two years. Leave it as completely bankrupt, because that’s $90 million a month that would come into the central bank.
I think that it’s not about military aggression here. It’s about: How do we attack them in every possible sense to make them weaker? And the way to attack them to make them weaker is to speak to the STC. It’s to build relations between the US — and I hope Trump does that — and the STC in the South. Because in that way, you’re allowing the Yemenis to resolve the problem in Yemen, rather than getting outside actors to do that. So I think a relationship with the STC could stabilize things. And also, the UN playing its role much more practically and looking at the situation as it is now in 2025 and not as it was in 2011 — I think these are ways of fighting off the Houthis.
Christopher Roper Schell: In a previous interview I saw of yours, you said that the economy, the military, the central banks are already effectively bifurcated. So that may make that a little bit easier.
And I don’t want to mischaracterize your words, but before I add — you said anyone who didn’t see that, they were a bunch of idiots. (Laughs)
Abdul Galil Shaif: Yeah, yeah.
Christopher Roper Schell: (Laughs) You were quite pointed! I was hoping to really get some of that flash, because you were fired up in that interview I saw.
Abdul Galil Shaif: Yeah, the economy is on the verge of collapse now. And I think we’re not looking ahead to see what that could do in terms of extremism and terrorism in areas in the South — because people don’t have a daily meal at the moment. They eat once every two days. There’s hardly any electricity.
So if you get an uprising, the alternative could be much, much worse. So I think it’s important that international aid is cut off from the Houthis and taken to the central bank in Aden. That could be one way of weakening them continuously through economic weapons.
We’ve not used that. Every time the Houthis have done something, we’ve sort of paid them back. We need to make sure that we challenge them much more, because the ramifications for the economy are huge. And that’s my main worry at the moment. I worry that extremist groups will get the upper hand eventually. And people like the STC who are putting a moderate hand, working with the Arab coalition, working with the US here, are losing out.
And I think it’s really important, because they’re the only ones that have defeated the Houthis. The people in the South — they defeated the Houthis in 2015. We need to build on that.
Hope, indoctrination and next steps
Christopher Roper Schell: Yes, I will beg the indulgence of our audience for just one last question. I think it’s a short one: Fatima, I saw your interview with the Foreign Policy Association, where you were asked in 2019 how much hope you had in a future democratic Yemen. You said you had very little. Have the last couple of years affected your position one way or the other? And that would be my last question.
Fatima Abo Alasrar: Thanks, Chris. The future for Yemen is very messy, and part of it is just the ideological component that the Houthis are pushing. It is my belief that this group is building an army to expand in the region, because their focus on children is really scary. It’s pathological.
When you indoctrinate kids to hate others, when you say, “Israel, US — bad. China, Russia — good,” and then you put all of the state apparatus that’s available in your hand to push that narrative and give it to millions of kids in summer camps — they’re hollowing out the society.
This ideological component is the most frustrating for me. The inability to fight that ideological component… If we can’t push the Houthis out, these stories are going to remain forever. So that’s the kind of warning that I wanted to give.
But you know what? In terms of the Houthis and the relationship, just to simplify things, the Houthis are a hybrid actor. They rule like a state, they fight like a militia and they escalate like a proxy. This is the picture of the Houthi threat. They don’t need Tehran on a day-to-day basis to tell them what to do, because they already do it for them, right? So when it comes to regional escalation, they’re on their speed dial.
And that dual role is why our diplomacy keeps failing over and over — because we’re unable to recognize it. So that’s the first thing I wanted to say.
The second is that Mike encouraged me to think about this idea of navel-gazing. It happens in Yemen, too. It happens when we say, “The Houthis can be easily defeated.” That’s a fantasy. That’s a slogan. When we say, “The Houthis can be easily defeated,” because we’ve had a decade of Saudi and Emirati intervention — where did that go? We’ve had 50 days of continuous bombing. We’ve had Biden also take a crack at it in different ways — where did that go?
We don’t have a strategy. Give me a strategy. Give me a plan, and I can show you how the Houthis can be defeated. It has to be sustained pressure. It has to address their ideological component. It has to work with people from within. You can’t just say, “Give support to the army and it’s all going to be great.” Something the Trump administration, with the conventional power that it had, could have just crossed every ethical and legal boundary to destroy the Houthis.
They embed themselves in populations. We have the capability to create chaos at high cost. And the Houthis want the US to do that. They really kept baiting the US to do this because that’s how their propaganda thrives.
So it’s convoluted. The answer is not from point A to point B. So there is a bit of navel-gazing from Yemen and from the international community when they say, “Yes, we can defeat the Houthis. It’s easy if you arm and…” We need to have serious conversations about that. Because, as Dr. Abdul Galil just mentioned, there are serious economic challenges. How are you going to defeat them when you can’t provide electricity in the South of Yemen? When people are dying because of the heat?
So we peddle in fantasy every now and then. I’ve made these points not to say that the Houthis are invincible, or that they can’t be defeated. They can be, but not easily. I just want to clarify that. We just need a plan. And that needs to be coordinated, it has to be sustained in the long term. It can’t just disappear when the next administration comes in and has different priorities. And our cabinet or our members of the administration need to be on the same page. If they don’t know why they’re doing this, it’s problematic. That’s the first signal failure, no pun intended, (Abdul chuckles) but that’s the first failure.
Christopher Roper Schell: Well, thank you all. You all made this really easy on me when you had a conversation with each other and jumped in. I want to say to our audience: Thank you, and thank you for indulging me one last question. Do like and subscribe. Anything you see on 51Թ, share it. Keep reading, and thanks again.
[ edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.
Comment