Breaking from negotiations, Trumpā€™s tariff salvo was an attempt to address simmering tensions in the Indo-US relationship by leaning on Pakistan through an oil deal and tariff concessions. Was this sudden shift a product of Trumpā€™s ambitious economic agenda, or a mask for strategic signaling and transactional politics in this trade affair?

The latter seems likely, given Americaā€™s history of using deliberately exhaustive trade talks as a strategic tool to exert pressure on other nations, extract concessions or advance broader strategic objectives.

The deal

India was negotiating a Bilateral Trade Agreement () with the US, which began in February. By April, an had been drawn, reflecting US priorities of reducing Indiaā€™s trade barriers and addressing its $45.7 billion goods trade deficit. From February to July, negotiations grew tense as India refused to liberalize or open up its agricultural and dairy sectors to US markets. India also pressed for , including lower US duties on steel (50%) and aluminum (25%), and preferential access for labor-intensive exports such as textiles, gems, jewelry and IT services. In return, India signaled willingness to provide the US greater market access.

However, apart from these two sticking points, India also US demands for reduced tariffs on auto components and acceptance of US Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, prioritizing its domestic industry and the campaign. Similarly, regarding non-tariff barriers, the US Indiaā€™s Quality Control Orders (QCOs) and import regulations, which it viewed as barriers to market access for US goods. However, India defended them on the grounds of consumer and domestic industry safety.ĢżĢż

Trumpā€™s negotiation style

The negotiations thus offered potential gains for both sides, but the costs and contentions were high. It made them intense and rigorous, conditions ill-suited to Trumpā€™s negotiating style. The USā€™s negotiating approach under Trump, specific to trade and tariff issues, has been unconventional and rushed. 

A recent deal with Vietnam was concluded hastily under pressure. The US exploited Vietnamā€™s trade surplus and export dependence, using tariff threats and prolonged talks to secure concessions. Despite months of negotiation and goodwill gestures, such as liquified natural gas (LNG) deals, Vietnam ended up facing a and transshipment penalties ā€” far less favorable than its proposed 0% reciprocal tariff.Ģż

Similar tactics were seen with countries like Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and many more. These examples illustrate Washingtonā€™s tactics of achieving win-win trade deals, even with allies and partners, demonstrating how transactional diplomacy now colors their trade relations. 

However, a closer look suggests that economic or trade calculations do not solely drive these deals. The US is using these trade deals as geopolitical tools ā€” deliberately exhaustive negotiations to push countries toward aligning with its strategic objectives.

Economic attrition diplomacy

Economic attrition diplomacy involves leveraging prolonged trade negotiations to pressure a counterpart into aligning with geopolitical goals, often by creating economic uncertainty or exploiting asymmetric dependencies.

Vietnamā€™s case illustrates this. The US Hanoi to cut reliance on Chinese industrial goods and curb transshipments, directly serving its anti-China agenda. The negotiations were lengthy, with multiple rounds reflecting prolonged and exhaustive talks to force Vietnam to concur with the deal, leaving it little room to maneuver.

The cases of Indonesia and Japan are also noteworthy. The US pressured Indonesia to align its anti-China goals, primarily due to Indonesiaā€™s attempt to diversify trade with members, and a investment deal with China made in November 2024.Ģż

In the case of Japan, Trump their bilateral relations by escalating dramatically: threatening 25% tariffs, then actually imposing them on Japanese goods, including automobiles, effective August 1. This was an unprecedented move against a US ally. Japan, burdened by its trade surplus and alliance status, yielded partial concessions under tariff threats and geopolitical pressure.Ģż

South Korea, too, faced a tariff of 25% in July, and ended up with a 15% ā€œreciprocalā€ tariff, effective August 1. The US sought geopolitical advantages from Korea, pressuring it to increase dependency on US purchases, specifically F-35 fighter jets. Although no deal was finalized, South Korea greater market access for US goods, as well as defense commitments to avoid higher tariffs.Ģż

These tactics reveal that US trade negotiations often serve a larger purpose: pushing countries to align with its under the guise of economic bargaining. These echo Washingtonā€™s action from five years ago, when it used diplomacy against China. The US attempted to curb Chinaā€™s technological rise by targeting firms like Huawei, pressured China on issues like intellectual property theft and signaled strength to its own allies.Ģż

During trade negotiations, the US repeatedly escalated tariffs and introduced complex demands, including structural changes to Chinaā€™s economy, prolonging the uncertainty and pressuring China. Subsequently, China yielded partial concessions, providing the US with some limited success.

Aggressive attrition driven by frustration

Unlike other countries that faced standard coercion from the US with only tariff threats, India was hit with multiple salvos ā€” tariffs, penalties and an embrace of Pakistan. The reasons were clear: the Russia factor, trade with Iran and Indiaā€™s non-compromising posture during trade negotiations.

This aggressive attrition behavior is motivated by geopolitical frustration, something the US is familiar with acting on. In the 1930s and 1940s, US economic attrition against Japan, driven by frustration, culminated in the of 1941, contributing to the escalation of World War II. Negotiations were prolonged. The US demanded Japan withdraw from China and Indo-China, while Japan sought recognition of its territorial gains, creating a deadlock with no progress.Ģż

A similar situation is unfolding between the US and India today, where the former harbours geopolitical suspicion over Indiaā€™s relationships with Iran and Russia, alongside deadlocked trade demands. These factors have likely fueled frustration and driven the US to send a strong strategic message by escalating risks and attrition, perhaps setting an example on the global stage.

Unconventional transactionalism: India must reassess its strategy

India must read the negotiating table more carefully and patiently, adopting measured and mixed negotiating styles instead of a confrontational approach, which at times frustrates the US. 

As India looks toward the prospect of a mini-deal by September-October, it should aim for strategic prolongation ā€” progress with limited concessions ā€” rather than dragging talks with no real progress. This will create more room for negotiations and reduce US frustration to some extent. 

India must also leverage its geopolitical value and diversify its trade relationships with Europe and other countries. This will strengthen Indiaā€™s bargaining position, soften US demands and deter extreme measures. 

A similar approach saved South Korea from higher tariffs despite having no deal with the US, as South Korea adopted strategic prolongation, used measured negotiation tactics offering room via concessions and resisted hasty or pressured deals. 

India must remember that Trump is a master at playing unconventional transactional cards, where deals are more important than relations. India should demonstrate that an agreement is in progress and that there is something on the table, rather than leaving it empty.

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Following this, the Monitoring Team of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Sanctions Committee explicitly TRF in its reports for the first time ā€” a move that India has been advocating for since the 2019 Pulwama Attacks. A member state in regards to the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack that it ā€œCould not have happened without Lashkar-e-Taiba support, and thereā€™s a relationship between LeT and TRF.ā€ A second member state noted that ā€œthe attack was carried out by TRF, which was synonymous with LeT.”

While these are major diplomatic wins for India and help corner Pakistan when it comes to denying its terror-sponsoring activities, it will essentially be business as usual for the latter. 

For India, a real win lies in on-ground efforts. As the pattern indicates, a terror designation does little to deter Pakistan-funded terror in Jammu and Kashmir (a northern state in India that shares a contested border with Pakistan). But intelligence-based counterterror operations have proven successful in eliminating groups like the Indian Mujahideen (IM) in the past.

Terror designations offer little immediate securityĢż

US designations of Pakistan-backed terrorist outfits have long been viewed as a diplomatic tool India can leverage in international forums, particularly in influencing outcomes such as listings on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is a global money laundering and terror financing watchdog. 

However, as takes center stage in the global order, these diplomatic maneuvers now hold little deterrent value. The case of the IM ā€” a group formed through the reorganization of the declining Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) cadre ā€” illustrates this trend.

The group was a nightmare for the Indian security landscape as IMā€™s operational behaviour was of maximum terror with minimum identification. The IMā€™s designation as an FTO by the US came in September 2011, two months after the July 13 Mumbai serial . Yet this did little to deter IM from striking Indian cities: three cases of limited intensity bombing were conducted by IM in eight months in 2013, from the Hyderabad to the Patna , resulting in and around 190 injuries.

The LeT was designated as an FTO in December 2001, but carried out the Akshardham Temple within nine months, followed by the 2003 Mumbai ā€” demonstrating continued operational capacity.Ģż

The US itself has faced serious threats and attacks after terror designations. Take the case of Al-Qaeda, which was designated an FTO by the US in October 1999, but less than two years later carried out one of the deadliest terror attacks of the decade: the September 11 (9/11). It was followed by continued strikes, including the USS Cole in 2000 and the Riyadh compound in 2003. Similarly, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the precursor to the Islamic State (ISIS), executed a series of hotel targeting Westerners in 2005, shortly after its own FTO designation in 2004.

In the long term, it can be seen that IM faced a strong impact from sanctions. However, despite being a weaker group, they still managed to survive (though in degraded strength) till 2017. With this in mind, it is easy to see how the impact of FTO designations on stronger and well-resourced terror groups like the LeT or Jaish-e-Mohammed remains limited.

Designations disrupt but donā€™t dismantle

These examples point to a fundamental limitation: the FTO mechanism aims primarily at disruption, not dismantlement. It is most effective against groups with limited resilience and financial dependency on formal networks, and can thus collapse due to disruption. Robust terror organizations tend to endure due to three key structural advantages:

1. Safe Havens and Porous Borders: Territories with weak governance, such as parts of Africa or , provide physical bases for training, recruitment, and planning. Designation efforts have little effect without the of local and national host governments. After 9/11, Al-Qaeda shifted its base to Pakistanā€™s tribal areas to remain off the radar of US military operations. LeT similarly went underground with the of Pakistanā€™s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) after the November 26, 2008, (26/11) in India.
2. Decentralized Operations: Decentralized and tight, cell-based networks help terror groups build multiple offshoots and use them as front organizations. This allows these groups to operate even if their leadership gets targeted by arrests or FTO sanctions. The LeT used IM and TRF, while Al-Qaeda used its regional branches such as AQI and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to bypass sanctions.Ģż
3. Alternative Funding Sources: Some non-traditional funding sources are immune to the USā€™s banking sanctions, allowing terror organizations to procure arms and explosives and send them to safe havens for training through various cross-border networks. The , charitable fronts, and non-traditional funding from sympathetic donors allow groups to circumvent asset freezes and FTO-sanctioned disruptions. After their designations, Al-Qaeda used hawala networks and Gulf-based donors to finance 9/11, while LeT sustained itself through the ā€œcharitable activitiesā€ of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), a front with ISI backing, leading to 26/11.

The benefits of network-centric counterterror strategiesĢż

Where designations fell short, coordinated multi-dimensional and intelligence-led strategies focused on dismantlement have yielded better results. This involves a : combining targeted strikes with intelligence-led efforts to degrade networks.

Targeted strikes help in eliminating leadership, and strong intelligence works to identify financial pathways, front organizations, and decentralized cells. This has driven major successes in Indiaā€™s counterterror landscape, starting with the collapse of the IM. 

Beginning in 2012, Indian intelligence worked in close with the US and other countries like Nepal, highlighting a multi-specter counter strategy. They conducted sustained operations that dismantled IMā€™s operational and financial networks.Ģż

in the Gulf were identified and sanctioned under the FTO, leading to a collapse of its funding streams. Some serious intelligence work led to the of key operatives, including IMā€™s leader Yasin Bhatkal, as well as Abdul Wahid Siddibapa, who was associated with their financial funding. With the of other key operatives in 2014, IMā€™s Azamgarh and Pune modules were also brought down. By 2017, the Indian Mujahideen had been effectively dismantled.

TRF and IM: Learning the right lessons

The key operational similarity between LeTā€™s IM and LeTā€™s TRF is the use of maximum terror with minimal identification, with a slight difference in operational advancement and method of engagement, which is direct but sophisticated in °Õøé¹óā€™s case. The IM overtly and aggressively executes attacks through bombings, but TRF relies more on covert work and sets a limited target with high symbolic value and psychological impact. 

The approach is also quite the same ā€” they young muslims by exploiting local grievances, communal coloring and political approaches. TRF has intensified this through via limited tech capabilities, focusing on Kashmiri youth.Ģż

Despite being a smaller organization, TRF’s efforts to develop and modernize its operational behavior make it harder to influence through designations and sanctions. Moreover, an additional difficulty with TRF lies in developing a strong and grounded counterterror strategy ā€” not at the operational level, but at the tactical level. Several key factors explain the limited progress so far:

First, network-centric operations have not been able to penetrate °Õøé¹óā€™s tight, decentralized cells, likely due to in human intelligence and limited visibility into ground-level dynamics in Jammu and Kashmir.

Second, the groupā€™s operational pattern relies heavily on and recently radicalized individuals who are not on law enforcement watchlists. This makes early detection and preemption difficult.

Third, TRF has demonstrated quick tactical adaptability. The satellite data, secure encrypted communication, coordinated hit-and-run strikes to exhaust and distract government forces, as well as the use of body-cameras and high-end weaponry, show that the outfit focuses not only on sustenance but on advancement ā€” and is actively evolving its methods.

These challenges, while significant, are not insurmountable. Addressing them requires a shift toward more advanced network-centric operations ā€” anchored in the integration of intelligence across domains. This means building intelligence fusion models that combine human intelligence (HUMINT) and open-source intelligence (OSINT) with technical assets such as drone surveillance, cyber forensics, and satellite imaging. Such capabilities must be embedded within a broader multi-spectrum counterterrorism strategy: one that combines targeted operations, search-and-destroy missions, and financial disruption. 

°Õøé¹óā€™s ā€” particularly its financing through hawala networks and front organizations ā€” can still be targeted in the same manner as the IM was in the early 2010s, ideally in coordination with international partners such as the US.

The dismantling of TRF will depend not on designations or sanctions, but on sustained operational and intelligence recalibration. That will require clear strategic direction ā€” and political will ā€” from the highest echelon in New Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir.

Perhaps the recent , which resulted in the elimination of the Pahalgam terror mastermind, is one indication of a gradual movement towards a multi-specter counterterror strategy.

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A war that ā€œshould not have beenā€

Singh opens with the assertion that the Ukraine war was avoidable. He blames ā€œinternational centers of compellenceā€ ā€” namely, US neoconservatives and a compliant EU/NATO bloc on one side, and Russia on the other. Ukraine, he argues, is the real victim: a ā€œmeansā€ caught in the middle and devastated. He criticizes Western media for shaping public perception and pressuring social media platforms to take sides. He questions the Westā€™s moral consistency, citing the unequal outrage over civilian deaths in Ukraine versus Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria or Libya.

In terms of economic warfare, Singh calls sanctions a ā€œdouble-edgedā€ tool that is ineffective against øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s resilient ā€œfortress economy.ā€ He points out that India has drawn lessons from the conflict, bolstering its defense self-reliance and maintaining a pragmatic foreign policy. Isackson agrees that the war could have been avoided and faults Western media for ignoring the historical buildup.

Red lines and long-range risks

The discussion turns to a crucial question: Should the West authorize long-range strikes into Russian territory? Isackson asks what this would mean for the war. Singh calls it a ā€œcritical juncture.ā€ European countries may support the move, but the US remains cautious due to øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s vast nuclear arsenal and doctrine that allows using ā€œall meansā€ if the state is threatened. He warns that such attacks could corner Russia, potentially triggering a drastic response. Still, he expresses hope that cooler heads will prevail.

Politics and the path to escalation

Isackson raises the role of US politics in shaping the warā€™s trajectory, especially in the face of the USā€™s 2024 elections. He suggests efforts may be underway to prolong the conflict until November. Singh agrees, calling the presidential election an ā€œoverbearing influence.ā€ He notes internal US divisions, with the Pentagon and Department of Defense reportedly opposed to escalation, while the State Department and intelligence agencies push for it. He expresses concern over CIA Director William Burnsā€™s support for risky decisions, despite his understanding of Russian red lines.

Singh emphasizes that Ukraineā€™s fate is tethered to US decisions, not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyyā€™s leadership, which he calls ā€œdelusionā€ in the eyes of the Global South. He doubts the strategic value of delivering F-16 fighter aircraft or launching operations like the Kursk incursion, asserting that ā€œeverybody understands that Russia cannot be defeated.ā€ The key question is how much Russia will gain ā€” especially securing Ukraineā€™s Donbas region and halting NATO expansion ā€” before the war ends.

Propaganda, publics and power

Isackson challenges the disconnect between Singhā€™s assessment and official Western rhetoric that insists on Ukrainian victory. Singh points to internal Russian unity, comparing current public support for Putin to wartime solidarity in World War II. He urges the West to stop chasing illusions and instead pursue backchannel diplomacy ā€” especially between the US and Russia. He criticizes Western narratives that paint negotiation as ā€œappeasement,ā€ stifling chances for real peace.

Singh stresses that basic trust between Russia and the US has eroded. Citing retired German Chancellor Angela Merkelā€™s remarks that the Minsk Accords merely ā€œbought time,ā€ he argues Russia will not fall for such tricks again. He anticipates a turning point within months, as Ukraineā€™s capacity to sustain the war continues to weaken.

Kursk: tactical gain, strategic mistake

Isackson and Singh sharply analyze the Kursk operation. Singh doubts Ukraine could have launched it without Western backing. Though Ukraine gained territory, he sees no strategic benefit. With no coherent defensive line and mounting casualties, Ukraine faces a dire choice: entrench and risk losing supply lines, fall back to a shallower position or try to rescue troops from Donbas. He highlights the importance of the Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk as a logistical hub.

Isackson mentions that Western officials justify Kursk as a ā€œmorale boost,ā€ but Singh sees it as a mistake without a defined ā€œend state.ā€ He contrasts MI6ā€™s more cautious tone with Burnsā€™s more hawkish stance. While the US offers rhetorical support, he argues that Ukraine bears the actual costs ā€” ā€œhalf a million dead,ā€ mass displacement and destruction ā€” while the US risks little.

Regime change fantasies and geopolitical blindness

Talk of regime change in Russia is brushed aside. Singh sees strong support for Putin and no viable challengers. Isackson compares this to Vietnam, where the US prolonged an unwinnable war. Singh says the US elite isnā€™t being honest with the public and that sanctions have failed to hurt the average Russian. He laments a lost opportunity for post-Cold War reconciliation with Russia, which instead ā€œwas pokedā€ into closer Chinese ties.

He argues that US foreign policy is captive to the military-industrial complex, which profits from prolonged conflict. He contrasts this with Indiaā€™s emphasis on peace and diplomatic flexibility. Drawing on his experience with both Soviet and NATO forces, Singh finds it surprising that so few retired US military officials publicly challenge prevailing policy.

The rise of BRICS and a multipolar order

Isackson brings up BRICS and its growing appeal. Singh says the Global South no longer wants to be pulled into superpower rivalries. BRICS, representing a large share of the global population and GDP, offers an alternative where their interests are better safeguarded. He predicts that US unilateralism will recede and sanctions will push countries toward a new parallel economic system.

Indiaā€™s decision to buy Russian oil is cited as pragmatic and in its national interest. Isackson notes BRICSā€™s challenge to the dominance of the US dollar. Singh adds that the outdated structure of institutions like the UN Security Council must change. Itā€™s ā€œscandalous,ā€ he says, that India still lacks a permanent seat.

A final warning: eyes on the Middle East

In closing, Singh argues that Ukraine is unlikely to cause a global catastrophe, but the Middle East might. He warns that one incident involving Israel and surrounding powers could escalate uncontrollably. Isackson says that todayā€™s youth seem desensitized to nuclear threats ā€” unlike his generation, which was shaped by events like the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Singh praises Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor OrbƔn for bluntly acknowledging the risks and criticizes other European leaders for underestimating the dangers. Isackson agrees and sees leaders like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as more volatile than Zelenskyy. He warns that both are trying to draw the US deeper into their wars.

Singh closes by noting Putinā€™s restraint ā€” seen by some as fear, but which he views as a deliberate effort to avoid crossing a dangerous line. Isackson recalls that Putin once proposed a security framework to avoid war, which the West has largely ignored.

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Nine days after Israelā€™s strikes, the US launched its own military operation, , targeting ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s key nuclear sites at Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz. The strikes, intended as both deterrence and containment, have allegedly caused significant damage to ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear infrastructure, though Iran has claimed there is only superficial damage.Ģż

Several Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) analysts have Iran shifted their uranium reserves before the strikes. Notably, US Vice President JD Vance has that 400 kg of uranium was unaccounted for post-strike, raising alarms about ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s next moves.

However, the real question is not about the strikeā€™s effectiveness. It’s about whether this will truly force Iran into a corner or if it is merely a symbolic victory.

Israelā€™s evolved counter-proliferation strategy

Israel has adopted a strategy of disruption and paralysis against adversaries who choose to go nuclear, posing a strategic threat to the country ā€” a plan that came to be called the in the 1970s.Ģż

The origins of this doctrine trace back to 1962 with , when Israelā€™s intelligence agency, the Mossad, targeted German scientists helping Egypt develop long-range missiles via letter bombs, abductions and threats to their families. Though covert and controversial, it successfully stalled Egyptā€™s rocket program.

In subsequent years, the doctrine evolved to preemptively target any hostile stateā€™s nuclear program, preventing them from acquiring nuclear weapons via counter-proliferation efforts. 

This doctrine was vividly demonstrated in 1981 with , when Israeli jets destroyed Iraqā€™s Osirak reactor, and again in the 2007 , which eliminated a nascent Syrian nuclear facility. Both Operations aimed at decisive, overt action to ensure adversaries never reached nuclear capability.

However, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear challenge forced Israel to recalibrate this doctrine. Unlike the degrading or paralyzing nuclear programs of Syria and Iraq, Israel has opted to delay and disrupt ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program without employing overt offensive measures. 

The reason is simple: geo-economic and strategic considerations. And the key historical factor in these considerations? The United States. 

The US factor between Israel and Iran Ģż

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s cannot be overlooked, as it has the worldā€™s second-largest natural gas and third-largest oil reserves. There are strong concerns that it could also block the , a narrow waterway that transports 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas, increasing the price of petrol to $100 per barrel. While blocking the Strait has the initial potential to spike oil prices, it has a limited capacity for consequences to the West and could harm its own interests, analysts.Ģż

The threat of Iran instead lies in its extensive proxy network and decades of sustained asymmetrical warfare. The October 7 attacks on Israel are an of its proxy war involvement.Ģż

Therefore, the US knows that balancing and moderating conflict with Iran must be part of its plans to ensure regional stability in the Middle East, as a weak Middle East would present economic and security challenges to the US’ geopolitical influence and economy. 

But this, historically, has not always been a successful venture for the US. 

The failures of the historic approach to Iran Ģż

The USā€™ long-standing strategy in the region began with offshore balancing and containment, seeking to prevent any one power from dominating the oil-rich Gulf. Its first major operation was organizing ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s in 1953, which overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was leaning toward the Soviets.

Through the 1960s and ā€˜70s, Washington helped Israel strengthen its regional presence while invoking the to justify military interventions against communist threats, such as the 1958 Lebanon deployment under . Post 1979, with the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the , there was a shift toward assertive containment that extended to the between 1982-84. This strategic assertiveness became central to US policy in the region.Ģż

The Iran-Iraq War was a power struggle for Gulf dominance, not just a territorial conflict. ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Islamic Revolution signaled the rise of the Shia crescent, alarming Saddam Hussein and threatening US regional influence. To counter ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s growing power and prevent any single actor from dominating the Gulf, the US-backed Saddam with military and economic support. The US overlooked Saddamā€™s , human rights violations and use of chemical weapons.

But when Saddam Kuwait in 1991, kicking off the Gulf War, the American gamble backfired. Washingtonā€™s attempt to balance Iran through Iraq had inadvertently empowered a regional threat and weakened its own position. This was perhaps the first US failure in the Middle East and the beginning of the long-term instability in the region. In response, the US introduced a broader policy of in 1993 to curb both Iraq and Iran.

Though tactically effective in coercing both Iran and Iraq, dual containment proved strategically flawed in the long term. It weakened Iraq but allowed Iran to expand its influence via Shia groups, even as proxy conflicts continued. Meanwhile, the rising US military presence, especially in Saudi Arabia, extremist and terror sentiments, culminating in Al-Qaedaā€™s 9/11 attack and the 2003 Riyadh bombings, where Westerners were targeted. Sanctions and regime change tactics yielded no significant impact on either country, revealing Washingtonā€™s faulty geopolitical assessments and superficial understanding of regional dynamics.Ģż

This fractured Middle East policy has undergone necessary makeovers in recent years, like weighing more on diplomacy and limiting itself to security issues, but it still hinges on limited strategic gains and therefore, risks.

To avoid a full-scale war with Iran, the US turned to covert means. In 2006, it launched a first-of-its-kindcyber offensive, , which targeted ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear infrastructure. While this move by the US sought to derail ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear ambitions without triggering direct conflict, many analysts that the core objective was to persuade Israel to use means other than the direct and conventional against Iran. The Operation significantly influenced Israelā€™s security apparatus, as barely a year later came the purported of Iranian nuclear scientist Ardeshir Hosseinpour, followed by a series of assassinations of key .Ģż

In 2016, the (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) sought to curtail ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. It was put forward to ease regional tensions, foster economic relationships and deepen US influence in the Middle East. Israel opposed it, fearing economic relief would empower Iran to upgrade its security systems and proxies, and importantly, clandestinely develop nuclear weapons, thus limiting covert options.Ģż

Despite this opposition, the JCPOA came into effect in January 2016. It did limit Israelā€™s opportunities to carry out covert offensives, as noted by a significant statistical post-2016.Ģż

In 2018, with Trumpā€™s withdrawal from the deal, the US reimposed sanctions and escalated pressure on Iran. Israel resumed its covert operations, such as its alleged June 2020 on ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear sites, and its most complex and significant operation ā€” the 2021 assassination of , the chief of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program.

Why Israel paralyzed Iran in Operation Rising Lion

Following the October 7 attacks on Israel and the collapse of the Assad regime, the Middle East entered a renewed phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the Trump administration shifted from maximum pressure to a more diplomatic approach towards Iran. The new strategy had two objectives: to push Iran to its nuclear program to ensure regional security and secure a diplomatic and media win by introducing a stronger alternative to the JCPOA.Ģż

However, Iran insisted on limiting ā€” not dismantling ā€” its nuclear program while demanding sanctions relief, creating a deadlock. Trump Iran, ā€œThere will be bombing,ā€ if a deal wasnā€™t reached, escalating tensions further.

This caused Israel great anxiety on two counts. One, it feared that the talks were buying Iran more time, as by March 2025, Iran had uranium enrichment. Within a few weeks, it could initiate the process to develop nuclear weapons, which would then take just a year to complete. Two, it feared that the US might rush a compromised or weak deal to claim diplomatic success. According to , the Mossad struggled to convince the US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steven Charles Witkoff, of the risks of re-negotiating with Iran. This contributed to its growing distrust in the negotiation process and prompted a reassessment of its military posture toward Iran.

Israel has now made a few things clear: it no longer aims to simply disrupt ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program but wants to paralyze it as it did with Iraq and Syria. 

While 2024ā€™s struck several of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s strategic and military sites, the operational scope was limited on the nuclear front, with one minor nuclear research facility in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Parchin being targeted.Ģż

However, in Operation Rising Lion, Israel aggressively struck key nuclear sites. While effectiveness was one startling difference, several reasons forced Israel not only to shift its operational scope but also to take strategic risks with regional stability. One: cut short ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s time-buying tactics. Two: force Iran back to the negotiating table under pressure. And three: weaken its strategic position to the point of conceding to US demands and surrendering its nuclear ambitions. 

While some tactical goals were achieved by Israel, broader strategic successes will only be possible if Iran fully abandons its nuclear ambitions. Although a regime change is an option, the US is likely to prioritize regional security and stability, for now. 

Operation Midnight Hammer has not deterred Iran

Following Israelā€™s lead, the US launched targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, intended as both deterrence and leverage in negotiations.

However, will the US actually transform this tactical success into strategic gains by pushing Iran to negotiate a new plan or by dropping its nuclear obsession? The answer is no. 

±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s fixation on nuclear weapons is deeply linked to its identity and national pride, which can be reduced through coercion but not entirely abandoned. Trumpā€™s efforts to do so complicate new negotiations and ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s obsession is evident: it did not aim to import a nuclear bomb but to develop its own. 

With 400kg of uranium missing after US strikes, JD Vance has asked the burning question, ā€œCan Iran enrich the uranium to weapons-grade level and can they convert that fuel into a nuclear weapon?ā€ He raises genuine fears that Iran may pursue a nuclear weapon directly, bypassing diplomacy and brinkmanship entirely ā€” a move reminiscent of North Korea. 

The limited effectiveness of the US attacks, which reportedly set ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s program back by only a few months, underscores the folly of symbolic actions without long-term planning. Iran, undeterred from its nuclear ambitions, has since escalated threats, including moves to close the Strait of Hormuz, heightening global energy and security concerns. 

These security fears could threaten the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Iran, especially as the USā€“Israeli relationship remains far from its goals. 

In effect, the US military gamble may have exacerbated the Middle Eastā€™s tensions rather than neutralizing them, with ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear trajectory still firmly in motion.Ģż

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Operation Rising Lion to Midnight Hammer: Why the US and Israel are Gambling with ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Nuclear Ambitions appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Khosrow Isfahani: I always mix it up myself as well. 

Atul Singh: (Laughs) Came from Isfahan. So, Khosrow, what a pleasure. What an honor. Welcome.

Khosrow Isfahani: Thank you, Atul, for your kind introduction. That was just beyond and above. Thank you very much. Happy to be with you.

Atul Singh: Happy to introduce an Iranian, ha! Farsi was the official language of India for 800 years. And today, we will be discussing ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Axis of Resistance. I repeat: yes, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Axis of Resistance. And the topic of the podcast is ā€œ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Axis of Resistance Is in Shambles: What Next?ā€ So, without further ado, Khosrow, tell us: What is this Axis of Resistance?

Khosrow Isfahani: So, the ayatollahs in Tehran who run this rogue state ā€” that from the get-go of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 has gone head-to-head with neighboring countries and international powers ā€” have constantly found themselves in a jam, constantly fearing for the continuation of their rule over this nation of 90 million people. One of the pillars of their security doctrine, their response to outside threats as they perceive it, has been the Axis of Resistance. What is Axis of Resistance? It is a network of terrorist groups ā€” and sometimes they are called militant groups ā€” and allied states that, most of the time, are allied against the United States as well. Who are the members of this Axis of Resistance? Letā€™s start with ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s neighbors. In Iraq, you have the Hashd al-Shaabi ā€” the Popular Mobilization Units, the PMU, or sometimes PMF. You have Houthi rebels in Yemen. You have smaller militia groups that are highly controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC. The small militant groups under its banner are Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun. The first one is made up of Afghan refugees that the IRGC forced into submission and into serving its wars abroad with the promise of citizenship. And Zainabiyoun is made up of Pakistanis.

Atul Singh: Are both of these populations Shia? Are the Afghans Hazaras?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Atul Singh: Or are the Afghans Hazaras, and the Pakistanis Shia refugees from Pakistan?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And in both cases, these are marginalized people who try to find refuge or some pocket of safety in Iran. And when they arrive in Iran, they face persecution from the state. They are barred from using banking services, accessing education, healthcare services. And this sinister state that the Islamic Republic is uses this fertile ground for recruiting these poor souls, to make them into soldiers for its adventurism around the region.

Atul Singh: Now, as I understand it, Bashar al-Assad ā€” whoā€™s now deposed, he has fled ā€” he was an Alawi, an Alawite. He was Shia. The Houthis are Ismailis, if Iā€™m correct ā€” they are also Shia. So in a way, this is ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Shia Crescent, extending all the way from Israelā€™s border to Hazara territory in Afghanistan.

Khosrow Isfahani: So yes, there is an ideological element to the creation of the Axis of Resistance, butā€”

Atul Singh: Religious, I would say, even more than ideological.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, yes, that would be a fair framing of it. But when you look at the Palestinian groups that have aligned themselves with the Islamic Republic, you would find groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the General Command ā€” that was a leftist group with leftist agendas, not at all religious, that literally has been one of the linchpins of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s network of terror near the Israeli border.

Atul Singh: So itā€™s not just religion ā€” itā€™s broader than that. But in the Palestinian case, thatā€™s perhaps because Israel has backed them firmly, and no other Arab state is doing so right now.

Khosrow Isfahani: In the case of Iran and its relations with Palestinian groups, itā€™s not about the Palestinian people or religion. Itā€™s just that the Islamic Republic sees Israel as its eternal enemy. As a mortal enemy thatā€™s either the Islamic Republic or Israel should not exist for this war between them to end. Thatā€™s constantly present in the propaganda of the Islamic Republic. So anyone who is fighting against Israel the Islamic Republic sees it as an ally.

Atul Singh: And they join the Axis of Resistance.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Ideology vs. realpolitik: ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s security doctrine

Atul Singh: So, alright, I understand now what is the Axis of Resistance. But what purpose does it serve? What is ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s security doctrine?

Khosrow Isfahani: So let me just add two points about what the Axis of Resistance is, and I promise I will answer that question as well. In addition to these groups, Syria under Bashar al-Assad was one of the main pillars of the Axis of Resistance. And the crown jewel of the Axis of Resistance used to be Hezbollah in Lebanon. These two main elements in the Axis have been reduced to rubble over the past couple of months, as well as Hamas, as well as the ouster of Assad from Syria, which has changed the whole regionā€™s face. But back to your question: What purpose did the Axis of Resistance serve? It is a combination of, again, ideology and the realpolitik of this ideologically-driven authoritarian state that we have in Iran. So after the Islamic Revolution, we had an extended eight-year war between Iran and its neighboring country, Iraq. It was a brutal war. Hundreds of thousands of people on both sides were killed.

Atul Singh: 1980 to 1988 ā€” Saddam Hussein on one side, Ayatollah Khomeini on the other side.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And during this period, Iran and its leaders found themselves isolated. The war comes at the heels of the hostage situation ā€” forces allied with the Ayatollah Khomeini taking American diplomats in Tehran hostage for over a year. It comes at the same time that Khomeini is exporting the Islamic Revolution around the world. So when there is a war, when Iran is under attack, no one is willing to sell weapons to Tehran. So in response, the Islamic Republic has developed a multi-pronged defense strategy. A core element of it ā€” they took a page out of the Soviet book ā€” they have moved the periphery of the war away from mainland Iran. They describe it as ā€œstrategic depthā€ in Iranian defense language.

Atul Singh: Well, Pakistan also obsesses about strategic depth, and that is why it has funded and supported first the Mujahideen and then the Taliban: to have security in its backyard and an ally against India. So that seems to be a common obsession.

Khosrow Isfahani: And to a great extent, it has been effective for a rogue state like the Islamic Republic that has constantly, over the past four decades, sought WMDs. It has kept this regime in power and safe from outside aggression, to a great extent. So one is this Axis of Resistance, that was one of the main pillars of the Islamic Republicā€™s security doctrine. The other two is self-sufficiency through development of conventional weapons. What are the examples of that? The ballistic missile projects, the drone projects. These have been ongoing since the inception of the Islamic Republic.

Atul Singh: And these are conventional weapons?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And over the past couple of years, we have seen the Islamic Republic exporting these weapons to other countries, including Russia, which has used the Iran-made weapons for war crimes against the Ukrainians. So when you look at the wider map of the world, you see the footprint of Iran whenever there is death and destruction. Letā€™s get back to our main topic.

Missiles, drones and nuclear threats

Atul Singh: Thereā€™s also the WMD program. Thatā€™s also part of the security doctrine.

Khosrow Isfahani: Exactly. Since the daysā€”

Atul Singh: And that basically means the nuclear program?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Atul Singh: Also, I suspect chemical, too?

Khosrow Isfahani: There have been aspirations of acquiring chemical weapons. At some point during the Iranā€“Iraq War, one of the senior IRGC commanders even was looking into making a laser weapon that can shoot laser beams from space at adversaries and destroy countries. So they have looked at every possible scenario.

Atul Singh: Did they succeed?

Khosrow Isfahani: No. That was very cartoonish of him.

Atul Singh: Was he reading too many science fiction novels?

Khosrow Isfahani: I am assuming thatā€™s where the root of that idea was. But on a more serious note, the Islamic Republic has sought weapons of mass destruction. There has been concerted efforts within the Islamic Republicā€™s establishment to create nuclear weapons. Over the years, there have been periods that this program has been put on pause, but it has always been at least on the back burner. And in recent weeks, with the collapse of the Axis of Resistance, the Islamic Republic has been left with two options when it comes to maintaining its security: One is expansion of its conventional weapons programs. Over the past couple of months, they have seen multiple tests and drills inside Iran where new drones were unveiled. Allegedly, ballistic missiles were tested. These are all signaling to the world that ā€œwe are still in the game, we are not bowing out and we are pursuing all these options.ā€ At the same time, a couple of weeks ago, in negotiations with European counterparts, Iranian diplomats for the first time ā€” I emphasize, for the first time ā€” threatened their counterparts that Iran might change its nuclear doctrine. Over the years, they have stuck to this talking point that Iran doesnā€™t seek a nuclear weapon. But now they are openly saying that they might make their leap. So we are facing this new reality.

Collapse of the Axis and economic strain

Atul Singh: I see. So thatā€™s the security doctrine: Basically, have deterrents in the form of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, move the locus of conflict away from the Iranian heartland, have a strong periphery which acts as the outer wall ā€” the outer wall of a fort ā€” to defend Iran and secure the great Islamic Revolution of 1979. Now, all of that makes sense. However, as you yourself pointed out earlier, the Axis of Resistance has collapsed. Hamas is weak.

Khosrow Isfahani: Its operational capabilities have been reduced.

Atul Singh: Yeah, Hezbollah has been decapitated. The leadership at least has been decapitated. And Bashar al-Assad is cooling his fine derriĆØre in icy Moscow. So how is Iran coping with the new reality?

Khosrow Isfahani: Itā€™s doubling down on the two programs. One: the expansion of the conventional weapons program.

Atul Singh: Such as drones, missiles and now, of course, a greater show of force.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. We have had multiple drills inside Iran that they are trying to project an image of power and control, that nothing has changed and Iran is still capable of sending off if there is war. Literally not a single week passes without a senior Iranian military official telling the press that if there is aggression against Iran, it will face a decisive response. So thatā€™s one element. And on the other hand, there is the threat of acquiring a nuclear weapon. As I mentioned earlier, they are constantly buzzing about making the leap for a nuclear weapon. And I just want to remind you: A senior Iranian official a couple of years ago described that Iran might act like a cornered cat. ā€œIt doesnā€™t want a nuclear weapon, but if you corner a cat, you cannot predict what it does next.ā€ As broken as that rationale is, and as somber as that image would be for the world, this is the mindset of the ayatollahs ruling Iran.

Atul Singh: Right. So the ayatollahs might be cornered cats and might want to spend a lot of money on programs and defense, but the big question arises: Where is the money coming from?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the main source of the money that Iran has for its military expenditure is its revenue from oil and gas exports. The main customers of that: China. Syria used to be a customer, but the payments werenā€™t on time. Same with Iraq. So thatā€™s where the money is coming from.

Atul Singh: So China is sending the money that is keeping aloft Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. But the issue is, a large portion of this money is not being spent on anything. The ayatollahs are constantly in fear of a protracted war, of a foreign attack, so they are saving this money for that possible attack ā€” and at the same time, lavishly spending it on weapons development. And at the same time, a lot of them ā€” and their children ā€” are living lavish lives in Iran, while the rest of the country is suffering in absolute poverty.

Atul Singh: So in a way, the ayatollahs have become the new Shah of Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: I wouldnā€™t go down that road, and I wouldnā€™t make that comparison.

Atul Singh: They did throw a huge party in Persepolis ā€” $800 million on god knows what.

Khosrow Isfahani: Again, different time, different context. So I wouldnā€™t compare these two rulers with each other in any form or shape.

Atul Singh: You know, I mean, I come from India. The Taj Mahal was built for an Iranian woman, and it caused famine and arguably death of thousands if not millions. So we are used to Iranian opulence!

Khosrow Isfahani: If I were to compare the approach of the ayatollahs to the economy and how they are wasting the resources of a very proud nation, it would be what the North Korean dictators are doing. Nothing trickles down to the people. People suffer, they stay in power.

Civil unrest and the war on women

Atul Singh: Excellent. And I guess it is that suffering that is causing increased frequency of civil unrest in Iran? Weā€™ve had news about women protesting, weā€™ve had news about young people protesting. If Iran is using its scarce cash on military expenditure and in corruption, then will this lead to an intensification of this unrest?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the thing is, over the past couple of years ā€” mostly, we can mark from 2016, 2017 ā€” we have seen a shift in Iranian society. In the past, we have had multiple cycles of protests, but they were happening in cycles that there were gaps between them ā€” around 10 years. When you look at the years after 2016, the gap is not even a year. So, people are on the streets over water shortage, fuel shortage, food shortage, food crisis.

Atul Singh: Wasnā€™t there a big protest over fuel prices in 2019?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. In 2019, the government of so-called reformist President Hassan Rouhani increased fuel prices three times overnight.

Atul Singh: Why?

Khosrow Isfahani: Because they argued they cannot subsidize fuel anymore. Some economistsā€”

Atul Singh: They were subsidizing their own RMs.

Khosrow Isfahani: There you go. And spending the riches of this country on their adventurism abroad. So in 2019, when they tripled fuel prices, people took to the streets. And in response, they killed 1,500 people. Thatā€™s a lot.

Atul Singh: Not by the standards of Joseph Stalin, or even Saddam Hussein.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, but that was the longest period of time. And again, they were in an olden age. In 2019, if you kill 1,500 people in less than a week in the darkness of an absolute nationwide Internet shutdown, thatā€™s a nightmare. I lived through that. I was on the ground in Iran reporting those events.

Atul Singh: And you were under a huge threat of life and limb, I suppose?

Khosrow Isfahani: Absolutely, like every other journalist who is doing their job. And after 2019, we have seen a reoccurrence of these types of protests in Iran. After that, we had protests against water shortage, which again was brutally suppressed. And recently, in 2022ā€“2023, we had the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which was triggered by police killing this young woman from ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s persecuted Kurdish minority over showing too much hair. Over 500 were killed.

Atul Singh: She wasnā€™t even wearing a bikini.

Khosrow Isfahani: She was very ā€” if you see the photos of her before this incident, everyone would describe it as very modestly covered. So it shocked the whole nation.

Atul Singh: Some Iranians I know have called it ā€” and you as well have called it ā€” a war on women.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And it didnā€™t start with the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini. It has been a war that has been ongoing since 1979, with the inception of the Islamic Republic. This regime has a three-pillar ideological system. One of them is animosity toward the West, specifically the US; hatred of Israel ā€” itā€™s irreconcilable ā€” and this unending war against women. It started with oppressing women into wearing very, very conservative clothing ā€” forcing them to wear the hijab, firing people from their jobs, arresting them, sentencing them to lashing, denying them access to services, and itā€™s continuing. And to mark that continuation, despite the lies that ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s chief propagandist, Zarif, would likeā€”

Atul Singh: Javad Zarif.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, the former foreign minister and current aide to the president.

Atul Singh: He went to school with the father of a friend. And my friendā€™s father ā€” whoā€™s passed away ā€” didnā€™t have very many pleasant things to say about him.

Khosrow Isfahani: Not any. I cannot think of a single person with a shred of dignity who would have anything nice to say about Javad Zarif. This man has whitewashed crimes of the Islamic Republic ā€” crimes against humanity, war crimes of this regime ā€” over the past four decades, nonstop.

Atul Singh: Heā€™s a smooth operator, to give the devil his due.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. That makes him a more dangerous actor compared to his predecessor who died in a helicopter crash recently.

Trump, deterrence and future scenarios

Atul Singh: I see. So letā€™s discuss the new world we live in, you and I are sitting in Washington, DC. Donald Trump is back in the White House. As of today, he has issued 37 executive orders, and things are extremely uncertain. The Pentagon jargon: Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous ā€” VUCA. We very much are in the VUCA world. So what lies ahead for Iran now?

Khosrow Isfahani: So, on one end, we have an Iranian establishment in its entirety swearing absolute revenge against President Trump after the killing of IRGC Quds Force Commander, the Islamic Republicā€™s chief terror operator, Qasem Soleimani. The Islamic Republic, its Supreme Leader and the civilian government have sworn that they are going to kill the president. The official website of the Supreme Leader has published posters saying that President Trump should be killed and assassinated.

Atul Singh: As revenge for killing Qasem Soleimani who was killed in Baghdad, and in the eyes of many Iranians, was a hero.

Khosrow Isfahani: And in the eyes of many, a murderous war criminal who had the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent people on his hands ā€” people in especially Syria. He was the commander that led the bloody crackdown that the Islamic Republic, Russia and the deposed Bashar al-Assad led against the uprising of the Syrian people for justice and liberty in their country.

Atul Singh: So in particular, a lot of Sunnis ā€” who form the majority of Syria ā€” were targeted and tortured and killed.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And he was responsible for a lot of that.

Atul Singh: Okay. So letā€™s come back to Trump. Yes, so on the one hand, they want Donald Trump dead.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. But at the same time, they are extremely afraid of a second-term President Trump in office. The first term didnā€™t end well for the Islamic Republic. It was marked with the maximum pressure campaign.

Atul Singh: Well, he threw out Obamaā€™s nuclear deal with Iran.

Khosrow Isfahani: Which many experts believe was a flawed agreement that didnā€™t include ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s regional activities and missile program under the JCPOA, the nuclear deal.

Atul Singh: Yes, JCPOA is the full form, yeah.

Khosrow Isfahani: ā€”expanded its missile and drone program. It enriched its militants ā€” the network of militant groups across the region. So yes, in his first term, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, reimposed strict sanctions against the Islamic Republic. And as one very knowledgeable economist back in Iran at the time told me, President Trump was like a lion having Iran by its back, biting the back of the neck of the ayatollahs, rendering them incapacitated, unable to make any moves.

Atul Singh: Well, I think Donald Trump would love that image. Heā€™s got blonde hair and he fancies himself as a lion. The ayatollahs would be, you know, the bisons or the wildebeests, or whatever you want to call them.

Khosrow Isfahani: Thatā€™s the analysis of this very senior, experienced economist at the time I knew.

Atul Singh: Excellent. I mean, he will certainly be appointed in the Trump White House. You should send his name over to the Donald.

Khosrow Isfahani: So thatā€™s one thing that the ayatollahs are afraid of. But more importantly is that over the years, the clerical establishment in Iran has almost successfully gamed all presidents in the US. The two parties had become predictable for the ayatollahs in Tehran. They knew how they can play their cards to remain in this sphere of safety without being too limited. But with President Trump, they donā€™t know what would be the consequences of their actions. So right now, literally today, the Iranian Supreme Leader delivered a speech about the possibility of negotiations with ā€œthe enemy.ā€ He said that ā€œwhen you negotiate with the enemy, you should remember who you are negotiating with ā€” but you may proceed.ā€ Some have seen this as a signal from the Ayatollah for negotiations with the US. But the issue is: With a regime like the Islamic Republic, whatever negotiation you clinch, whatever deal you achieve, it would amount to nothing but kicking the can down the road. Itā€™s not going to change the behavior or the ideology of this regime that has been the largest state sponsor of terrorism around the world. Itā€™s not going to change the behavior of a regime that has been responsible for death and destruction around the Middle East. And itā€™s not going to change the behavior of a regime that constantly kills and oppresses the people under its rule.

Khosrow Isfahani: So what youā€™re saying is, Donald Trump would be unwise to negotiate with the Iranian regime, and what youā€™re implying is that he should kill the beast he has by his jaws.

Khosrow Isfahani: So, Iā€™m going to quote, actually, the two-term president Hassan Rouhani in the book The Secret War with Iran. Ronen Bergman, when heā€™s talking about the McFarlane affair ā€” Iran purchasing weapons from Israel with the US being in the middle and a lot else going on in the background ā€” there is a specific chapter in this whole affair that I believe has remained true: During these negotiations, Hassan Rouhani was a senior security official within the Islamic Republicā€™s structure. He travels to France to meet with different stakeholders in the McFarlane affair. And sitting down with one of the officers negotiating the deal, he tells them that, ā€œYou donā€™t understand the ayatollahs in Tehran. You show weakness, and they exploit it. If you show strength, they would abide.ā€ There is a direct quote ā€” the conversation has actually been recorded by an intelligence officer who was in the room ā€” and he says: ā€œYou should tell them that if you cross this red line, this specific military target can be hit and will be hit. And if you do that, the ayatollahs would change their behavior.ā€

Atul Singh: Youā€™re sounding like Bibi Netanyahu.

Khosrow Isfahani: Iā€™m quoting a two-term president within the Islamic Republic.

Atul Singh: (Laughs) Rouhani is sounding like Bibi Netanyahu. So what youā€™re saying is, paradoxically, Trumpā€™s hardball tactics might yield some results with Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the thing is, a very wise friend a couple of months ago told me that there is connective tissue between diplomacy, military action and sanctions. These donā€™t exist in the void. And any administration in the US would be wise to use the wide array of ā€” and all the tools at its disposal ā€” for containing a rogue state like the Islamic Republic and re-establishing deterrence in the Middle East.

Atul Singh: On that note, great to have you, Khosrow. We learned a few things. Obviously, weā€™d love to have you back on a vast area of issues ā€” not just on the Middle East, because you have much broader interests ā€” but also civil society, journalism, how geopolitics is shaping up worldwide. And we look forward to seeing you very soon.

Khosrow Isfahani: Thank you, Atul. Thanks for having me.

Atul Singh: Thank you.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FOĀ° Podcasts: ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Axis of Resistance Is Now in Shambles. What Next? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Gary Grappo: Thank you very much, Atul, and for your flattering introduction. And itā€™s always a pleasure to be with you and to talk about whatā€™s happening in the world as we speak. And in todayā€™s interview, weā€™ll be obviously talking about the Middle East, where the situation remains quite fluid and very dynamic.

Atul Singh: What is this new geopolitical landscape we are talking about? How is it different to the old one? And when does this new era begin?

Gary Grappo: Well, the fundamental problems of the Middle East are unchanged. We have governments that are largely, widely unpopular. We have an extensive amount of oppression, particularly in the Arab countries; we have continuing instability in several of the countries, with militia groups quite active, terrorist organizations quite active; and we still have the ongoing problem, of course, of the Israeliā€“Palestinian conflict, although the tenor of that has changed considerably as well. But what has changed is the dynamic. Over the course of the last several months, of course, we have seen significant diminishing of the capabilities of Hamas in Gaza. We had a ceasefire that lasted almost two months and is now finished, and Israel has relaunched both its ground and air campaign against Hamas in Gaza. We can get into the details of that and what that may portend. Further to the north, we have a largely decimated Hezbollah. Israel, by dint of cleverness and truly impressive technological innovation and then massive air attacks, was able to eliminate at least the top two, if not top three, levels of the Hezbollah organization in southern Lebanon, while at the same time decimating its arsenal of weapons, although not entirely destroying it. And so it presents much less threat to the people of Israel. At the same time, we finally ā€” after waiting almost two years ā€” we have an actual government in place with a president and a prime minister in Lebanon. The Lebanese people, for the first time, will have a government that appears committed to addressing the real challenges that that country is facing, both on the political front and most especially on the economic front. We can get into what to anticipate as that moves forward. Probably one of the most significant developments has been the fall of the Assad regime. Father and son lasted some 53ā€“54 years and ruled with an iron fist, including over the last ten or 12 years during the Syrian civil war. They saw the complete devastation of the Syrian economy, deaths that ran into the hundreds of thousands, and huge numbers of Syrian refugees fleeing to Jordan, Turkey, even to Europe and Lebanon. It was then replaced with a government which initially showed some positive signs of moving forward, despite its jihadist heritage ā€” actually quite steeped in jihadism. But weā€™re now seeing what I refer to as a default position in the Middle East. And that is, you see a change in government, hopes and expectations are high, and then cracks begin to appear. In this particular case, we are seeing an increase in the number of Assadists ā€” that is, remnants of pro-Assad forces ā€” attacking Syrian government forces, and those are leading to some actually quite pitched battles and to the exacting of revenge against the Alawite minority in the western and northwestern parts of Syria, with fairly large numbers of fatalities. There were also reports of some Christians being killed as well ā€” not, at least from my perspective, unanticipated at all. And then finally ā€” and we can get into other elements ā€” but the situation in Iran has dramatically changed as a result of two Israeli attacks: in April of last year and then in October. That has greatly diminished the capability of the Iranian regime to protect itself from future attacks, providing Donald Trump with a potential, perhaps, of maybe reaching some kind of a negotiated solution with respect to ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear weapons program. So thatā€™s the lineup. We can talk also, if youā€™d like, about whatā€™s happening in Yemen right now. Thereā€™s certainly been an uptick in the last five days of activity there as well.

Instability in Israel

Atul Singh: So what youā€™re saying is part of the warp and woof of the Middle East. The Middle East has been unstable. You can argue that after , once the Ottoman Empire was replaced by the British and French empires, and after they unraveled and left behind nation-states in largely ethnic and tribal territories, the instability has never ended. Whatā€™s new? Whatā€™s new about this, Gary? How is it different to what transpired earlier?

Gary Grappo: Well, certainly what is new is the character of the conflict between Israel and some of its neighbors. And when I say that, we have to be cautious, because the states that border Israel donā€™t necessarily present a threat to Israel at all. Certainly not Egypt, not Jordan, not Lebanon and not even Syria, to be quite frank, although Israel is keeping its powder dry with respect to the future of Syria. But we still have the security threats to the State of Israel emanating from Hamas in Gaza and still from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. And then the Iranian regime has not changed at all. There is certainly the realization on the part of the leadership, including that of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, that they do not have the defense mechanisms that they thought they once had, with their so-called Axis of Resistance now as a result of conflicts with Israel. But the fundamental lay of the land, so to speak, in terms of the unpopularity of governments, inability of governments to respond to the needs of their peoples ā€” probably, with the exception, obviously, of the monarchies, which do a much better job in that regard and therefore enjoy a measure of legitimacy that other governments do not have ā€” that all remains the same. And the fear that governments have of their populations, that at any moment streets could erupt over whatever the issue du jour happens to be ā€” whether itā€™s the Israeliā€“Palestinian issue, whether itā€™s the economic situation, whether itā€™s oppressive government security forces, whether itā€™s the inability to hold the governments accountable to their people ā€” all of those things still register quite prominently among the peoples of the Middle East.

Atul Singh: Alright, so Gary, what youā€™re painting is a fundamentally unstable situation. Letā€™s begin with Israelā€“Palestine, since you mentioned that is an issue that animates the Arab street, and thereā€™s a tension between the Arab street and the Arab palace on that issue. And of course, we can talk about whether Israel has been just or unjust, whether in its response to the terrorist attacks of October 7, whether theyā€™ve been proportionate or disproportionate. But for me, our deeper concern is the inherent instability we see in Israel itself now. We are speaking just after Bibi Netanyahu and his cabinet have the head of Shin Bet, the internal intelligence agency of Israel. Now, this sort of politicization of intelligence agencies ā€” and indeed the military ā€” has not happened in Israel. Israel has had a fantastic military, a fantastic intelligence and a really cohesive state until quite recently. And now that internal cohesion in Israel seems to be breaking, and that for me perhaps is even more worrying than the usual fault lines everyone talks about.

Gary Grappo: Thereā€™s no question that Israel is facing some rather difficult internal political challenges. The specific one that you mentioned on the firing of the head of Shin Bet is overlaid with the quite emotional upheaval over the situation of Israeli hostages who remain in Gaza. Of course, there are some 59ā€“60 of those. How many of them are still alive? I guess the Israelis perhaps may know, but there are most definitely some of them who are not alive today. And so thatā€™s a fault line. 

Atul Singh: Sorry to interject, but I think even the Israelis cannot know for sure, because as of now, we know that they have not quite managed to break Hamas completely. Theyā€™ve done a lot of damage, but Hamas has proved more resilient than anyone could have estimated given the disparity in force.

Gary Grappo: Yes. No, Hamas is, despite the devastating losses theyā€™ve suffered in manpower and in weapons and in overall structural cohesiveness of the organization, theyā€™re still standing. And we saw that during the ceasefire, when they made a show of their continued presence in the territory. And Israel knows that, and I think thatā€™s why Israel finally decided that since the ceasefire was obviously not going to move into a phase two ā€” I will just say quite bluntly ā€” there was never any possibility of that happening. It looked good on paper ā€” the phase one, the phase two and the phase three. There was never any chance of moving into phase two. There really wasnā€™t. And so Hamas still exists as an organization. They are attempting to rearm. Itā€™s going to be difficult because their supply lines have suffered rather dramatic deterioration. They canā€™t get the supplies in they previously had received, for example, say, from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon or from Iran. So theyā€™re going to be hard-pressed to replace their stockpile of weapons and other material. But they are recruiting quite strongly, as a matter of fact. And I think we have to acknowledge the fact that itā€™s pretty fertile territory for the recruitment of fighters, given what has transpired since October 7. So their strength is probably back up to at least 20,000 fighters ā€” not nearly with the capabilities that they might have had post-October 7. Theyā€™ve lost those veteran fighters ā€” many, many of them. But theyā€™ll get there. And I think thatā€™s why Israel decided to capitalize while it could, in going after this still-less-than-previously-very-capable Hamas fighting force. But to get back to Israel, the issue over the firing of the Shin Bet chief is overlaid with the dissension in the Israeli public over the state of the hostages and whether the government is doing enough or not to secure their release. And then underpinning all of that, if you recall, before October 7, there was quite a bit of attention devoted to what Bibi was trying to do to undermine the authority of the Israeli judiciary, and that still remains so. So we do see a lot of political cracks within Israel internally. And Iā€™ll make the final point ā€” and I know Bibi Netanyahu is very mindful of this ā€” and that is: Israel must decide on its state budget by the end of this month. If they finish the month without a state budget, it effectively means the collapse of the government. They will have to call for new elections, which would take ā€” in Israel, given its election laws ā€” three months. So all of this internal churn is having an impact. And then, of course, thereā€™s all the back and forth over the person Bibi Netanyahu himself and how Israelis view him, how much or not it can be debated. Netanyahu needs war to maintain his position as prime minister. All of that is being debated today in Israel. So yeah, Israel faces its problems within itself, in addition to the external threats.

Lebanonā€™s prospects

Atul Singh: And so letā€™s move on from Israel to Lebanon. Lebanon, you mentioned, seems to have greater hope now. But Lebanon still has a fractious, multi-ethnic society, which in the past even struggled to collect rubbish, leave aside deliver other elements of governance. Hezbollah ran a parallel state, which was arguably more powerful than the state itself, at least in the areas it dominated. Is there hope for Lebanon as a state, or are we going to see Lebanon limp along as a failed state?

Gary Grappo: I think thereā€™s more hope today in Lebanon than there has been ā€” most certainly in the last 10 years, maybe in the last 25 years. There genuinely is an opportunity here. Now, Lebanon has been put nearly on its back. Its economy, which was considered a middle-income country at one point, has now been reduced to almost . Most of the country is living at or below that today. The infrastructure has suffered considerably, particularly the neighborhoods in Beirut and in southern Lebanon and in the Beqaa Valley, which is on the east near the border with Syria. So a lot of work needs to be done on the Lebanese economy. But the Lebanese people are some of the most industrious ā€” in fact, I would argue the most industrious people in the Middle East after Israel. And there can be a natural affinity between Lebanon and Israel in terms of how they approach innovation, how they approach business, how they approach development, if they can overcome some of these problems. Now, this is where Lebanon is going to need some help. And I would argue, if I were sitting before Donald Trump, that if you really want to do some good not only for the people of Lebanon and for our interest in Lebanon, but also for Israel, we need to invest in Lebanon. We need to invest in their armed forces. We need to work with the armed forces as closely as we can to ensure they are able to disarm Hezbollah, which is not going to willingly lay down all of its arms. Itā€™s obliged to do that going back to a UN Security Council following the 2006 war. And the terms of the latest ceasefire called for the enforcement of that, as well as the of all Lebanese armed forces north of the Litani River, which is around 20 miles north of the Israeli border. And Lebanon is supposed to ā€” the Lebanese armed forces are supposed to have that responsibility and that authority. Itā€™s uncertain how effectively they can carry that out. They are going to need some help ā€” in fact, considerable help. And this is where I think the West, particularly the United States ā€” I would also argue France and other countries ā€” could help Lebanon. One of the good things is they were finally able to name a , and they have a , both of whom are opposed to Hezbollah. They want to see the ceasefire terms fully enforced. They have taken on that responsibility. Itā€™s just the ability to do that is a bit constrained at the moment. And then finally, I will say that Hezbollah is greatly weakened within Lebanon today. They do not have anywhere near the political stature they once had. Even though they still maintain a sizable presence ā€” not a majority, but a sizable presence ā€” in the Lebanese parliament. There are going to be elections for the parliament, I want to say, in two years. And the hope is that if Lebanon can show some genuine progress, that the Hezbollah presence in the parliament can be even further reduced. Just as an indication, weā€™re seeing that the level of popularity of Hezbollah, even among Lebanese Shia, is reduced from what it has historically been. So these are important points to consider and offer a genuine opportunity for hope and progress in Lebanon. And we should take stock of that and try to capitalize on that in the interest of Lebanon and overall stability in the Middle East.

Atul Singh: Donald Trump has, I believe, two daughters ā€” or three, probably two, if I remember correctly ā€” and one of them is married to a Lebanese gentleman, and her father-in-law is apparently now mediating. Heā€™s Maronite, and hopefully, if heā€™s involved, do you think there will be US investment and attention to Lebanon?

Gary Grappo: If he has the ear of Donald Trump, then there is a possibility. Now, I havenā€™t heard much about what heā€™s actually doing at the moment in Lebanon. Heā€™s been given some other responsibilities, too, so I donā€™t know how heā€™s dividing his time and efforts. Nevertheless, yeah, if you have the ear of Donald Trump, obviously youā€™re going to be an influential person, and youā€™re going to be viewed as someone with influence and people will pay attention to you. We havenā€™t yet seen his influence demonstrated clearly in terms of his relationship with the president vis-Ć -vis the presidentā€™s daughter. You would think he would. So that remains to be seen.

Rising pressure in Jordan

Atul Singh: Moving on from Lebanon to Jordan, we know that the monarchy feels the heat. The King of Jordan has not been terribly enthused about Donald Trumpā€™s plan for Gaza, turning it into a . We know that the majority of Jordan is now Palestinian. We know that Palestinians in Jordan are increasingly in solidarity with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. So from a geopolitical point of view, it seems that Jordan seems to be quite unstable. The king is not getting any younger either. So what lies ahead there?

Gary Grappo: There hasnā€™t been much attention given to Jordan, and thatā€™s unfortunate, because Jordan is facing some challenges. There is this very restive Palestinian population within Jordan. Estimates vary ā€” anywhere between 60 and 80% of the population of the country. It seems to be in a perpetual economic crisis. They donā€™t have the natural resource wealth that other countries in the region have, and they are dependent to a great extent on American largesse. The American aid program, if it continues, is quite substantial, and the king needs that, which is why the king ā€” after Donald Trumpā€™s statement about his ambitions for Gaza ā€” was anxious to fly to Washington and meet with the president in order to maybe talk him down from this grandiose plan for Gaza. But he was quite diplomatic about it. It was not confrontational, but also made it clear that this was not something that Jordan would be able to accept. But he knows how to be deferential when he has to be to the United States ā€” and specifically to Donald Trump, who likes that. And so he ended up leaving, having made his point, but not losing Jordanā€™s status in terms of how itā€™s viewed in Washington. But it faces continuing economic challenges, which are quite dire ā€” whether itā€™s unemployment, whether itā€™s the level of business activity, economic growth, development and so forth. The other problem that many folks have not focused on is the security challenges that Jordan faces, coming not only from the West Bank, where you have the appearance now of these small militia groups that are causing a great deal of instability in the West Bank ā€” confronting settlers, confronting the IDF. Thereā€™s some of that also present in Jordan. The Jordanian security forces are quite competent.

Atul Singh: [Are these groups directly tied to Hamas? Or are they more independent, acting on their own?]

Gary Grappo: Both. Some will have some kind of tie to Hamas but donā€™t take guidance from Hamas. Others may take some guidance from Hamas, and some are entirely independent and are operating on their own. In fact, itā€™s uncertain the extent to which some of them actually even coordinate their activities with one another, which is why they havenā€™t been all that effective. And the Israelis have been able to tamp them down as they appear but not eliminate them. The suspicion is that the Iranians may be behind some of this in terms of provoking them, maybe providing them with funds, even weapons that are smuggled in via Syria and Jordan. So itā€™s all kind of opaque at this point, but it presents problems for Jordan. And there are some interesting reports coming out of Iran that the Iranians view Jordan as a particularly weak point, and that if their efforts to re-establish a link between Iran and Hezbollah through Syria ā€” and thatā€™s not working out so well up to this point ā€” that they may attempt to use Jordan. Now, theyā€™ll find very stiff challenge in Jordan. The Jordanian forces are not to be trifled with. Theyā€™re very effective, very capable. They have an excellent intelligence service. They cooperate very closely with both the Americans and the Israelis. So theyā€™ll find the going very tough, butā€” 

Atul Singh: [Did King Abdullah himself serve in the Jordanian Armed Forces or receive military training?]

Gary Grappo: Hm, I want to say he did, but I canā€™t be sure. I know his father did, but I canā€™t be sure about Abdullah. But I think so, be that as itā€”

Atul Singh: [Well, regardless, the king seems to command deep loyalty from the armed forces. Thatā€™s a critical pillar of stability in a region where rulers often take great care to ensure military loyalty.]

Gary Grappo: Absolutely. And the king enjoys their loyalty 100%, which is very important in the Middle East. And they are indeed very loyal to the king and will remain so. And so I have every reason to believe that with the continued cooperation with the Americans and the Israelis, that theyā€™ll be able to thwart any effort on the part of the Iranians. But itā€™s still a challenge that the Jordanians now have to confront. But I am worried about the internal political stability because of the large Palestinian presence there. I donā€™t think itā€™ll turn terribly violent, other than maybe potential pockets in some areas. But nevertheless, itā€™s something Iā€™m sure the king is very much aware of, and the Israeli and American intelligence services are also quite aware of and trying to provide the king with whatever support he may need. So itā€™s worth keeping an eye on developments in Jordan.

Can the country of Syria survive?

Atul Singh: Letā€™s talk about Syria. Youā€™ve already mentioned that it has followed a familiar pattern. And youā€™ve mentioned the killings of Alawites. Youā€™ve also mentioned the former Assad regime soldiers mounting attacks on the new regime. Of course, we know that Turkish intelligence, MIT, did support the current rulers of Syria. So what happens now with the Kurds, who represent one area and one ethnicity of Syria? The Sunnis ā€” also not just Sunnis who are in the plains in that road going all the way from Damascus to Istanbul, formerly Constantinople ā€” but also the Arabs living by the Tigris and Euphrates. They are different. Those peasants are different to the more urban population. And in fact, arguably, a led to their migration to the cities and triggered the Arab uprisings in Syria. And then, of course, we have the issue of the Alawites, who are along the coasts and who were by the Sunnis under none other than Selim I. And of course, when they ruled, they werenā€™t particularly kind and loving and peaceful either. So there is a whole cycle of violence there. Can Syria even survive as a country de jure?

Gary Grappo: That may be the ultimate question, and that question has been posed more than once. Itā€™s not coincidence that the centrifugal sectarian forces of Lebanon mirror those almost, in some cases, identically to those in Syria. You have a multiplicity of sectarian groups ā€” whether religious or ethnic ā€” and it makes it very, very difficult to have a unifying identity for Syria, despite efforts by previous regimes to create one. Assad tried to create one, and it ultimately came down to oppression. If you opposed Assad, you ended up either dead or in jail. And thatā€™s how it was enforced. I think al-Sharaa, who is the interim president ā€” weā€™ll see how long the interim period is ā€” former head of the Hayā€™at Tahrir al-Sham, the jihadist group that emerged victorious after the fall of Assad, he said all the right things, which new Arab leaders often do, with all these wonderful aspirations of Syrian unity and respect for its multi-identities within the country. But the default position is these groups go at one another, and certainly they go after the government. And you mentioned a few of these. But there are Druze down in the south. There are Ismailis who are closer to being Shia, actually, than the Alawites, who were represented in the person of Assad and his father. You had Turkmen up in the very northern part of the country ā€” the remnants of the Turkish population after the fall of the Ottomans. You have the Kurds up in the northeast. And you mentioned a very good point: that the Arabs who typically settle in some of the cities stretching from Damascus in the south to Aleppo in the north have a very different perspective on things than the desert Arabs who live to the east. And also their views on Islam ā€” Sunni Islam. Theyā€™re all Sunni, but how they view it, how strongly they adhere to it, where they tend to be more conservative or not, all of that. There are many complexions. And even in the western areas on that main highway that goes from Damascus to Hama, Homs and Aleppo, from city to city, it changes. And those are four very big cities in Syria. That all changes. You have several Christian groups that inhabit the country. And so all of these are pulling at one another. All of these are vying for influence, power, and wealth in a country which ā€” we have to remember ā€” has been destroyed. 80% of its economy has been effectively destroyed as a result of that 12-year civil war. And then you have another six million or so Syrians residing outside the country, who are forming actually a new identity of themselves and of Syria, whether they reside in Jordan or Turkey or Lebanon, or even in Europe. So all of these are pushing and pulling against one another, presenting enormous challenges to the government and the governmentā€™s ability to actually govern. And the default position ā€” and thatā€™s kind of a situation where you have the sectarian strains pulling at one another ā€” the government brings down the hammer. Thatā€™s what Assad did. And thatā€™s what the predecessors of the Assads did. Although they have had brief experiences with democracy, they didnā€™t last. They didnā€™t last.

Atul Singh: [So even when Syria flirted with democracy, it couldnā€™t overcome those deep sectarian divisions, could it?]

Gary Grappo: Yes, they even tried that! But thatā€™s another point, because letā€™s bear in mind there are external players in all of that mix. This is not just Syria alone. Thereā€™s Lebanon, of course, to the west. Thereā€™s Turkey, which is probably the most significant influence today to the north. Iran has not given up on Syria and will try to re-establish its pipeline of weapons of war material and money into Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. There are folks who were greatly affected by the fall of the Assad regime and the collapse of the huge Captagon industry that was resident in Syria. Basically, thatā€™s how the Syrian regime made money. They sell ā€” which is the Middle Eastern equivalent almost of meth ā€” and were making billions. And thatā€™s how the army earned whatever funds it could to support itself. It wasnā€™t nearly enough, and obviously collapsed very easily. And there are others in the mix. The Iraqis are watching very, very closely what happens. This may present some opportunities for the western Arabs of Iraq to influence Syria as well. And then you have the Americans, the Europeans and the Israelis exerting their influence. The Israelis, by the way, have moved beyond the neutral territory between their borders and have now settled on ā€” Iā€™m talking about military forces ā€” on actual Syrian territory. And theyā€™re going to wait and see how things play out to ensure that whatever result does not present a threat to Israel. And so they have that new buffer zone that they have established.

Atul Singh: Yes, some of the Israelis say that thereā€™s no way they can give it up. And they say that the Druze actually in Syria want Israeli protection. And the Druze are a great buffer zone against a potential fundamentalist Sunni regime in Damascus.

Gary Grappo: Thatā€™s 100% correct. Of course, there is a significant, relatively speaking, Druze population in Israel, which does quite well. They do not experience many of the problems that the Israeli Arabs have in Israel, and theyā€™re quite pleased, for the most part, with their status in Israel. And of course, they have their contacts with their brothers in Syria. And itā€™s a natural affinity that the Druze would have toward Israel. Theyā€™re far more trusting of Israel than this new government. And theyā€™re trying to figure it out. Theyā€™re trying to feel their way through this new government. Theyā€™re not sure exactly how much authority, how much power they will be given. And so itā€™s not surprising that theyā€™re maintaining pretty close ties with Israel and will find a way to cooperate with Israel if they feel that their interests may be threatened by this new government in Damascus.

Atul Singh: Alright, you havenā€™t mentioned the Russians. They have Latakia and they have Tartus still, and Iā€™m sure they are not going to disappear quietly into the sun.

Gary Grappo: Youā€™re right. And they donā€™t have quite the presence they had before the fall of the Assad regime. There are supposedly ongoing negotiations to both their air base at Hmeimim and their naval base at Tartus. The naval base in particular is vitally important for the Russians, and they desperately want to hold on to that. Theyā€™ve lost all other influence in Syria today, not only because of the fall of Assad, but of course having to overextend itself in Ukraine, in that misbegotten war. And so theyā€™re struggling. And itā€™s not clear that the government may necessarily want them, particularly given the close relationship between Russia today and Iran. One thing you can say about the regime in Damascus now is they donā€™t want the Iranians back. They most definitely donā€™t want Hezbollah back. And weā€™re already seeing fighting take place between the government forces of Syria and Hezbollah, which is a very interesting development ā€” and from the purely selfish perspective of the Americans and Israelis ā€” not bad at all. Now, Hezbollah is probably also allying with these pro-Assad factions in the western part of the country, which is something to be watched. And again, Atul, I just come back to all the centrifugal forces at play in Syria, which argue against, unfortunately, the best hopes of the Syrian people after the regime fell.

Egypt: the ticking time bomb

Atul Singh: Alright, letā€™s move on from Syria, and letā€™s talk about Egypt, the other neighbor of Israel. One ex-MI6 officer told me that he believes that Egypt could be the ticking time bomb in the region because of its population, because of the of the Nile Delta, and because of persistent youth unemployment and resentment against the regime. He also said that as of now, Sisi is a pretty effective ruler. The military has managed to clamp down pretty hard on the Muslim Brotherhood. And as of now, there is no immediate risk. But the structural problems persist in the economy, and the political problem exists in society, and there is such democratic deficit and a demographic time bomb that Egypt will ultimately implode. What do you say to that, Gary?

Gary Grappo: Egypt is a perfect illustration of the essential problem of the Middle East that I outlined at the outset. And that is the fact that you have unpopular governments, unaccountable to their people and fearful of their people, and maintaining authority through their security forces ā€” essentially oppression ā€” while at the same time the economic and social needs are not being met adequately. And thereā€™s no recourse. And in the case of Egypt, you have very effective internal security forces. They have almost eradicated the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt ā€” ruthlessly, too. And they packed up and left while they could. And those who couldnā€™t ended up either dead or in jail. And there are a number of jails that are chock-a-block full of former Muslim Brotherhood members. So for the time being, as you mentioned, the problem is contained. But the challenge remains: how do you reconcile a country ā€” itā€™s the largest population by far in the Middle East ā€” that is unable at the present time to meet the needs of those people? Education, health care, employment and so forth. The government was able to attract money to build this mammoth new capital, which by all accounts is quite impressive, outside of Cairo. Most people cannot afford to live there, only probably the top 10ā€“15%. Even some Egyptians who work there in the government canā€™t afford to live there. And so thatā€™s presenting problems for the people of Cairo especially, which is the largest city by far in Egypt, if not in the entire Middle East. And then the environmental problems that you mentioned are not going away. They are not going away. If you look at coastal Egypt, which extends considerably south up the Nile, one can foresee in 20 years and in 40 years ā€” Iā€™ve looked at these projections ā€” how the salinization effectively takes over the Nile Delta and even flooding, including in the second-largest city of Alexandria. If you look at the population ā€” Alexandria, Cairo, the Nile Delta ā€” that is a significant percentage of the population of Egypt. I want to say at least a third, it could be even more than that. When they lose their ability to live somewhere thatā€™s livable and also earn an income, what happens? Well, you can have internal unrest. You can have massive refugee flows. And we have seen in the example of the Syrian civil war what happens when that occurs. And my guess is many of those refugees would seek to go to either Turkey ā€” maybe Lebanon, although thereā€™s not much space for them there ā€” but more than likely the southern Mediterranean countries of Europe. And so all of that certainly bears watching, and it further underscores the importance of the Sisi regime to find a way to deflate these growing pressures within his society ā€” outside of the use of his security forces. It also argues for greater investment on the part of the Gulf countries in development in Egypt ā€” particularly creating economic opportunity. You create economic opportunity, and then the options begin to open up. And that hasnā€™t materialized yet. So thatā€™s the pressure cooker of Egypt today. The pressure is manageable, as you indicated ā€” for now. What will it be like in 10 years? I canā€™t predict, and I wouldnā€™t even try to.

The Gulf: A regional ray of hope

Atul Singh: Alright, youā€™ve mentioned the Gulf countries. So letā€™s now talk about the Gulf. And the Gulf includes, of course, small countries like Qatar, that punch way above their weight. They have created . Dubai, which is the financial center now of the Middle East, where you now have the in some kind of entente with Israel. You also have countries like Bahrain and Oman, where you were ambassador. And then, of course, the big boys ā€” Saudi Arabia. Now Yemen doesnā€™t quite come. It is an important place, because the Houthis have proved that they can de facto the Suez Canal. The Bab al-Mandab Strait is de facto unusable, and ships are going around the Cape of Good Hope, just like pre-Henry the Navigator times or Henry the Navigator times. So talk about the Gulf, now that youā€™ve mentioned the Gulf ā€” and itā€™s a diverse picture, as listeners can already divine.

Gary Grappo: Yes. Setting aside the case of Yemen, because itā€™s just ā€” yes, it occupies the same Arabian Peninsula, but itā€™s not like any of the other Gulf countries. The Gulf countries, unlike the rest of the region, are actually doing rather well economically and even socially. You have cradle-to-grave healthcare systems. You have respectable education systems. The level of extremism and jihadism is very, very low, if it exists at all. And to the extent that it might exist, the security forces are very effective in tamping them down. And most of them are quite active on the regional and international diplomatic scene. You mentioned the case of Qatar, but I think the two major players are Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

Atul Singh: [Yes. They really are the powerhouses of the Gulf now, especially when it comes to diplomacy.]

Gary Grappo: Exactly. Both of them are extraordinarily wealthy countries. On a per capita basis, Iā€™d say the Emirates is probably much wealthier and Qatar wealthier than them all, and are doing lots of things on the international scene to raise their profile. I mean, just take the example of these negotiations over Ukraine. Theyā€™re taking place in Saudi Arabia! Who could have imagined such a thing five years ago? 

Atul Singh: Yeah, thatā€™s unbelievable! The Europeans are turning and tossing in complete indignation.

Gary Grappo: Yes. So, back in the day ā€” certainly my day, and up to maybe about five or ten years ago ā€” when you had to do these kinds of negotiations, everyone flocked to Geneva. Now theyā€™re going to Jeddah or to Riyadh, perhaps Doha or even Abu Dhabi. So the Gulf states are doing quite well, and we should all wish that we would find that kind of stability. Obviously, none of them is a democracy, and in all likelihood, theyā€™re not going to be for a very, very long time. But theyā€™re quite stable.

Atul Singh: Including, if I may interject, Saudi Arabia, because some people fear for Saudi Arabia, because Mohammed bin Salman has ruled it with a very strong hand, an iron fist, and there is fear that there might be factions brewing within his own family that might turn against him, lead even to assassination. So there is that fear, as you know, amongst intelligence circles. This is what I hear, both from the Israelis and the British.

Gary Grappo: Yes. And itā€™s varied from king to king. And I will say itā€™s certainly present now. But I think one thing that makes this situation in Saudi Arabia different today is that socially, the country is in a much better position. Saudis do not face the kind of restrictions in social interaction and activity that they used to face. When I was there, you had this very distinct segregation of the sexes and there were very few opportunities for people to engage in social activity outside of the home. That has changed! You have Americaā€™s Cup regional competition. You have had major tennis tournaments, golf tournaments ā€” even, God help them ā€” American professional wrestling. Youā€™ve had rock concerts. Movie theaters are starting to proliferate. 

Atul Singh: They even have Cristiano Ronaldo with his girlfriend and many children from many different women! (laughs)

Gary Grappo: Yeah, yeah. So theyā€™ve opened the floodgates socially, and thatā€™s reduced a lot of the tension. And that was a brilliant move on the part of Mohammed bin Salman. On the economic side, theyā€™ve created new opportunities. Now, Iā€™ve been reading recently that because of the low price of oil that maybe their coffers will not be as enriched this year as in earlier years. Theyā€™re used to that. Theyā€™ve faced those times before, and they know how to deal with that. Theyā€™ll have to ratchet back their ambitions on the NEOM project in western Saudi Arabia, and theyā€™ll manage to do that. Having said all of that, I will say that despite some concerns that I have on his positions on human rights, Mohammed bin Salman has done a good job of managing that country. The only thing now theyā€™re waiting on is what happens to his father, King Salman. I mean, heā€™s probably not long for this world. Well, none of us is, but he in particular. And when he becomes the king ā€” heā€™s effectively behaving like the king now, with some limits ā€” I think we could see even more changes that will be occurring in his country. He seems to have forged respectable relations ā€” sometimes close relations ā€” with other countries, including in the region. He faces this nemesis down in the south, Yemen. Heā€™s managed to extricate his forces from the actual conflict, but the conflict still continues. So heā€™s done, I have to say, a credible job, first and foremost in maintaining stability and mollifying the population of Saudi Arabia, as have all the other Gulf countries. Oman was facing some economic problems because of oil prices and so forth a few years ago. Thatā€™s begun to change. And weā€™re now seeing some impressive growth figures in Oman. The new sultan has now kind of asserted himself, and weā€™re seeing his unique imprint in the governance of the Sultanate. All of the Gulf countries seem to be doing very well, or at least respectably, not facing any of the challenges that the other countries in the region are. In fact, theyā€™re seen as a potential solution, including in the conflict in Gaza, with future investment to redevelop, rebuild Gaza, if and when that conflict ends.

Iraq, Kuwait and the shadow of empires

Atul Singh: Alright, so the Gulf is a ray of hope in the region. Weā€™ve covered a number of countries. Weā€™ve got two big former empires left ā€” correct me if Iā€™m wrong, and please chime in and add if Iā€™m missing any major country. Of course, some may say youā€™ve missed out Kuwait, youā€™ve missed out Iraq. And weā€™ve mentioned Iraq. We can talk about Kuwait and Iraq briefly. Perhaps you begin with them. But the two countries that come to my mind are the descendants of the Ottomans and the Safavids, the two great empires of the region. But over to you. Letā€™s cover Kuwait and Iraq lest we offend anyone. Iraq is very similar to Syria. Both Syria and Iraq were run by Baā€™athists. Both were bloody regimes run by minorities. Syria was run by an Alawite family. And of course, we know that Iraq was run by a Sunni family from Tikrit, the Saddam Hussein . He and his boys were terrors, to say the least. Iraq is also multi-ethnic. And few people know Iraq better than Gary. So we have Kuwait and Iraq. Kuwait presumably is doing all right. Iraq ā€” you can tell us more. And then letā€™s move on. Please move on to Turkey and Iran.

Gary Grappo: Iā€™m not sure Iā€™ll have much to contribute with respect to Turkey. I donā€™t follow Turkey as closely as I do the Arab countries. But with respect to Iraq, I will say, because of the weakened state of affairs in Iran, that it does present some opportunities to Iraq. It is worth noting that the Iraqi leadership has indicated fairly clearly that it wants the very limited American presence in that country to remain. Now, the various Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq have indicated that if American forces have not withdrawn by the end of this year, they will resume against that American presence, and perhaps an American presence elsewhere, including in the very eastern part of Syria. They certainly have some ability to do that. Itā€™s going to be limited. And I think they understand that, were they to do that, they would find overwhelming response certainly from the Americans and maybe from the Iraqi government itself. Itā€™s unclear how strongly the Iraqi leadership wants to assert its independence from Iran. The Iranians have had so much influence in that country since the departure of the Americans. But the card deck has been reshuffled, and not all the cards are held by Iran today. The Iraqis have a few more than they have had in the past. And so there is some opportunity. Weā€™re seeing new oil investment, for example, in the country. They have resolved some of the problems that they have had previously with their own Kurds up in the north. And so Iraq has something to look forward to, some potential. But again, they are riven by the sectarian problems that have been there ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Very similar to Shia, Sunni, Kurds and to a lesser extent, Christians and other minority groups. And so that remains a very significant challenge for them, particularly given the fact that the way the Iraqi Council of Representatives is established, where seats are apportioned according to sect, various groups are locked in. And that creates a bit of a road jam in terms of maybe getting things done. And weā€™ve seen in the past demonstrations of younger Iraqis wanting to do away with this system of preferences ā€” to just open it up completely and let Iraqi citizens vote for those they believe best able to serve the interest of the State of Iraq and the Iraqi people. So I would say that Iraq is still a bit of a question mark ā€” potentially in a somewhat better position, but unclear how they might capitalize on that, particularly given some of the internal problems that they have. They are going to need significant foreign investment if theyā€™re truly going to be able to develop their oil potential. We should also mention, given our brief discussion about the problem in Egypt ā€” environmental problems, in the fact that the water flow in the two main rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, has been diminishing over the years. Climate change, one cause. The other is the dams that Turkey has built, and to a lesser extent, Syria. Itā€™s mostly Turkey which has reduced the water flow that reaches Iraq. And itā€™s something to be aware of because agriculture was a major factor in the Iraqi economy and in the Iraqi employment scene. So all of these are challenges that the government is going to have to face. With respect to Iran, this is the real challenge ā€” certainly for Israel, for the United States and for the West in general. The Iranian government has suffered, over the course of the past year, a series of setbacks they could never have anticipated. They overestimated their own power and influence and they grossly underestimated the capabilities of the Israelis, particularly with the support of the United States. The current state of affairs: They are not able to effectively defend themselves against an Israeli air attack. The one that occurred last October ā€” two waves of the most advanced fighters built by the United States, the F-35, the stealth fighters ā€” their radar systems completely failed to detect them. And as a result, the Israelis were able to carry out their attacks without restraint. They delivered all of their ordnance and on the air defenses that Iran had. And theyā€™re not going to be replaced anytime soon. They were Russian-made, and the Russians are not going to be shipping any military equipment outside Russia.

Atul Singh: Very quick question: There is also the matter of the regimeā€™s popularity at home, which seems to be the biggest risk. Add to that an economic crisis which is worsening, and Donald Trump has been no friend to Iran. In fact, he threw out the that Barack Obama negotiated. So the noose around Iran is likely to tighten. Speaking of internal stability, the other imperial power, Turkey, isnā€™t doing that well either. There are as we speak in Turkey because Ekrem Ä°mamoğlu, the secular Republican Peopleā€™s Partyā€™s candidate, was locked up by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğanā€™s regime. Erdoğan has been in power forever, but still, thatā€™s a far more democratic country than a country ruled by mullahs. And in Iran, thereā€™s also the specter of the different minorities resenting Farsi or Fars dominance. The Baluchs donā€™t like it, the Azeris donā€™t like it, the Kurds donā€™t like it and so on and so forth ā€” not to mention the Chinese Sunni minority left. So William Butler Yeatsā€™ ā€” ā€œThings fall apart; the centre cannot holdā€ ā€” certainly seems to be the fear for the Iranian regime.

Gary Grappo: Thatā€™s the major challenge of this current regime. And that is, in addition to the external threat that they face from Israel. By the way, in those attacks that occurred in April, Israel took out one of the main factories for the manufacture of ballistic missiles. So ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s vaunted ballistic missile capability has been significantly diminished as well. And this was their final defense. This was intended to be the defense that would protect the Islamic Republic. And those defenses have been greatly weakened vis-Ć -vis any potential attack from Israel. But most especially, if the Americans were to join the Israelis, thereā€™s no way to repel it. And they would suffer devastating losses. And you can be sure that in addition to going after whatā€™s left of the missile forces and other defense areas, they would be going after IRGC camps and doing maximumā€” 

Atul Singh: Very quickly, explain IRGC to our viewers and listeners.

Gary Grappo: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is basically a military force apart from the Artesh, which is the standard military force: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. Thatā€™s the Iranian defense forces under the Ministry of Defense. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reports to the Supreme Leader. And as the name implies, they protect the Islamic Revolution, which is basically the regime. Thatā€™s their job. And they do this in many ways. They probably attract more resources on a per capita basis than does the regular military. And they certainly have the ear of the Supreme Leader the way the military forces do not, and so they are given preeminence. And they are seen as a much greater threat to Israel or even to ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s neighbors than the Iranian armed forces.

Atul Singh: So think of them like the of the Roman Empire.

Gary Grappo: Thatā€™s a good way to put it, except much larger and very ideologically committed.

Atul Singh: More fanatically. 

Gary Grappo: Yes. And itā€™s not just them. They have militia groups that work for them, and these are the ones who enforce domestic law in Iran, particularly with respect to religious law ā€” and most especially when it comes to ensuring, for example, that women are covered. These are the guys going around on black motorbikes with baseball bats and nailing women who are not properly covered, enforcing Islamic law.

Atul Singh: Isnā€™t the use of baseball bats very American? The irony!

Gary Grappo: Yeah, we pretend not to use baseball bats as weapons, but it can be a very effective one!

Atul Singh: Al Capone used it.

Gary Grappo: Yes, yes. Itā€™s not unknown as a very effective, bloody weapon. So these are some of the external threats that Iran is facing. And then one cannot overestimate the challenge they face internally. There is a lot of dissension there. I read some of these various polls that are taken ā€” you donā€™t know how much to attribute to them ā€” but where popularity now is at or below even 20%. They are almost universally despised ā€” the Iranian leadership in that country ā€” for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the appalling economic situation.

Atul Singh: And no jobs for the youth.

Gary Grappo: No jobs. The Iranian rial continues to fall and explore new depths, and thereā€™s no way that they can shore it up. And add now Donald Trump to the mix. He has now doubled down if not tripled on his maximum pressure campaign and is really exploiting every opportunity in terms of secondary sanctions. And for those who donā€™t quite understand the nature of US economic sanctions: When the US sanctions a particular nation, organization, business, entity or person directly, thatā€™s primary sanctions. A secondary sanction is going after someone who does business with any of those. So for example, Iranian exports: Iran is putting its oil onto ghost ships. They load them onto tankers in a port in Iran. Theyā€™re taken out somewhere not far offshore, out of sight. The transponders are turned off. A ghost tanker shows up ā€” itā€™s not registered in any country ā€” and they transfer the oil to the ghost tanker, sometimes mixing it with oil from a legitimate oil exporter, maybe Saudi Arabia, maybe the Emirates, maybe Oman, Kuwait, whatever. And then it goes to its final destination, where itā€™s offloaded. The United States has begun sanctioning the ghost ships when they find them and sanctioning the ports and the refineries who take on that illicit oil from Iran. This has made everybody involved in the illicit import and export of oil very, very wary. And for the first time, the United States is going after ports and businesses in India and in China who are not particularly excited about getting on the wrong side of the law when it comes to the Americans. They do not want to be sanctioned. Itā€™s a death sentence. You canā€™t do business in dollars. And if you canā€™t do business in dollars ā€” and itā€™ll effectively mean euros, too ā€” what are you left with? So those sanctions are going to be very effective. In fact, Joe Biden started toward the end of his administration ā€” I would say October, November, certainly December ā€” and Donald Trump has screwed it down even more tightly. And weā€™re going to see declining exports of oil from Iran, which is a principal hard currency earner.

Atul Singh: So let me tell you a story. I ran into a former British Special Forces soldier, and he was in the smuggling business. He was earning $20,000 per night for captaining a tanker. And he would take the tanker and he would go to one of these ghost tankers ā€” Iranian tankers ā€” transfer the oil from the ghost tanker into whatever tanker he was captaining, and then sail and offload that oil. And basically, that earned him $20,000 per night for this high-risk operation, shall we say. (laughs) Shall we say, he has a very nice house in England right now!

Gary Grappo: And heā€™s exactly the kind of people that the Americans are looking for now. These are the kind of people they want to go after.

Atul Singh: So maybe heā€™s one of the lucky ones who got away!

Gary Grappo: Well, he got out of the business just at the right time, because I think this administration really wants to screw down the lid as tightly as possible. Now, on the positive side ā€” as we all know, itā€™s been prominently reported in the news ā€” Donald Trump has communicated to the Supreme Leader heā€™s willing to sit down and begin to end ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear weapons program. The Iranians would be well advised to accept that. Iā€™m not sure theyā€™re going to, to their detriment. This is going to greatly disappoint the people of Iran, who are only going to become more frustrated and more angry with their government. And itā€™s going to increase the pressure internally on that government. So here you have rising dissent in Iran. You have a growing, acute economic situation in that country which shows no signs of being able to improve itself. And then these external threats that the country faces, without the defenses it previously had expected to rely on. And so the lineup of factors against the current regime in Iran is all very negative. Youā€™d be pretty hard-pressed to find a bright spot. Maybe Yemen. And I tell you, youā€™ve got to be pretty desperate to look at Yemen as a bright spot. So now they have their relationships with Russia and with China. I will say that China is not going to jeopardize its trade relationship ā€” which is already facing difficulties with the United States ā€” for Iran. Theyā€™re not going to do it. They will cut the rope if they have to, when it comes to Iran. Russia, on the other hand, needs Iran, and Iran needs Russia. And so that relationship will probably remain in place and likely even strengthen. But still, the various challenges facing that regime are all bad to abominable, which is why it would be a good idea to negotiate with the Americans and get this out of the way. Remove sanctions. It would change everything. And for what? All they would have to do is cease their nuclear weapons program. I donā€™t know whether the leadership is willing to concede that.

Atul Singh: The Ayatollah is now aging dramatically and may not last very long. So we have no idea what comes next.

Donald Trump has a real opportunity

Atul Singh: So, letā€™s talk about Donald Trump. Youā€™ve mentioned him a few times. What is the new Middle East policy of his administration? And what can we expect in the next three and a half years or four years of his presidency? A little less than four years, of course. Now we are in March.

Gary Grappo: Yeah, yeah. I would say that Donald Trump inherited, with respect to the Middle East, probably the most opportunistic set of circumstances that any American president has ever had coming into office. I mean, weā€™ve covered the various areas of the Middle East, and in almost every respect, itā€™s an opportunity for the United States. I will say, however, that the Middle East is the place where American ambition goes to die. And weā€™ve seen that time after time after time. The last genuinely successful American adventure ā€” Iā€™m not sure thatā€™s the proper word for it ā€” in the Middle East was brokering the peace accord between Egypt and Israel. Just going back to Bill Clinton, the collapse of the Camp David in 2000, weā€™ve seen the efforts on the part of George Bush in Iraq that turned out to be disastrous not only for the region but for the United States. Barack Obama started out nobly, seeking to address the Israeliā€“Palestinian conflict, also fell on very bad times and he eventually just gave up his hands. His new Secretary of State after Hillary Clinton left, John Kerry, wanted to pick up the ball and thought, ā€œNo, he could deliver the goods,ā€ ā€” collapsed, frustrated again both by the Israelis and the Palestinians. And of course, Obama tried to negotiate the , which looked pretty good on paper. It wasnā€™t certainly a perfect agreement. He was succeeded by Donald Trump, who proceeded to tear it up about a year into his first term as president. And the situation progressed to the point where, at the end of his administration, the situation in Iran had worsened, despite his promises that by tearing up the agreement, it would improve. Donā€™t forget, we had maximum pressure back then, too. And it did not work to the extent that he had promised. Joe Biden seemed to be doing okay until October 7. And it just exploded ā€” and this was not his fault, obviously. And thatā€™s the whole problem of the Middle East; you canā€™t control events as President of the United States. And that situation exploded, he cast his lot with Israel, which you had to expect the United States would do. And that only worsened. But on the other hand, it allowed Israel to address other problems, namely Hezbollah. And just lucky with the collapse of the government in Syria and the weakening of Iranā€”

Atul Singh: Maybe it was related, because they couldnā€™t rely on Hezbollah this time around. It has been weakened. It was a great opportunity. And with, of course, Turkish backing ā€” MIT backed ā€” you have this group which is now ruling Damascus. So I think it is related to a great degree.

Gary Grappo: Oh, oh, most definitely, the collapse of Hezbollah presented a real opportunity for HTS to go after Assad. And I think there was also the recognition that the Assad regime was a house of cards, that it was not capable of defending itself. And thatā€™s just apparent from how quickly HTS moved from the northwestern part of the country ā€” up in Idlib ā€” all the way down to Damascus in a matter of what, two and a half weeks? And took control of the government. And its previous backers, Hezbollah, quiet, nothing. Syria or Iran, nothing. Russia, nothing. It was Assad ā€” all of them. And he did not have the forces. It wouldnā€™t have taken much, but he didnā€™t have that. So Donald Trump comes in as president, and all these problems that earlier presidents have had to contend with are either gone or much diminished. So he has a real opportunity here. Iā€™m pleased that he does not want confrontation with Iran and has offered this opportunity to negotiate. But on the other hand, I donā€™t think heā€™s going to shy from a confrontation. Just as in the case of his dealing with Hamas, United States broke protocol, broke precedent, and actually had an official meeting between Americans and Hamas. Never done before, ever! ā€¦That we know of. Maybe on the intelligence side, there may have been some. But this was policy people, and they laid all the cards out for Hamas and gave them an opportunity: ā€œDo this, itā€™s in your interest.ā€ Hamas refused to do it. And now we see Israel going in without constraints and Donald Trump fully behind them, 100%. I donā€™t think itā€™ll reach the intensity that we saw perhaps a year or so ago in Gaza, simply because Hamas is not the threat that it was at that time. But itā€™s going to be long, itā€™s going to be bloody. Weā€™ll see more loss of life, tragically, innocent life in Gaza. But I think Israel is attempting to go in for the real kill this time. I donā€™t think theyā€™re going to be successful, but they will wreak havoc, certainly within Hamas and whatā€™s left of Gaza. So you would hope that the Iranian leadership will learn something from that example. That Donald Trump tried to work with Hamas, tried to show them, thereā€™s a way out of this, ā€œYou just got to take it.ā€ They refused. And now they will pay a very heavy price. If Iran is listening, paying attention and can set aside some of its ideology and fanaticism, they could find a way out of their predicament. Iā€™m not sureā€”

Atul Singh: So you expect the Iranian regime to fall, as a number of people do? A number of people are now predicting the end of the Iranian regime by the end of Donald Trumpā€™s term?

Gary Grappo: Well, that would be a wonderful thing, of course. We would certainly like to see that.

Atul Singh: So youā€™re happy with Donald Trump on at least one thing?

Gary Grappo: No, Iā€¦ but the mechanism for that downfall is unclear yet. If someone is going to make the case that there will be an internal collapse ā€” that the internal dynamic will force the collapse ā€” Iā€™m very suspicious. That I think would take longer than the next four years. It could happen. And the principal argument against it is because of the commitment and dedication and power of the IRGC. They will defend it to the bitter end, and it will be a very bloody, bitter end. Not the kind of end that happened with the Shah, with the Grand Ayatollah taking off in an airplane and going somewhere, although God knows where he could go. Maybe Moscow. That seems to be the new refuge of tyrants. But that, I think, is a bit far-fetched at the time being. However, I think the clock is ticking on an eventual Israeli attack against Iran, if Iran continues to show that itā€™s unwilling to negotiate and moves its nuclear development program further down the road toward possible weaponization. It hasnā€™t done it yet, but itā€™s building all the infrastructure it could possibly need for it. I think the Israelis will want to capitalize before itā€™s too late on the vulnerability of the regime, and they will attack. And the only question that remains is: Will the Americans join them? If the Americans join them, it will be a devastating attack on the complete defense structure of Iran. And that could spell the end of the regime in Iran. So what rules after that? Because weā€™re not sending ground troops. Nor are the Israelis sending ground troops. So the regime collapses. Who takes over? Iā€™ll just throw out one possibility: the IRGC. It becomes a military regime, something like we see in Egypt. They do away with a lot of the religious nonsense that was imposed by the Ayatollahs or the mullahs. They reach some kind of an understanding on their nuclear program, simply because they will have no choice. And you have a military regime, and if they can reach an agreement with the various powers with respect to their nuclear program, maybe the sanctions will be dropped and they can prosper. I think any grand ambitions for a democracy in Iran or anywhere else in the Middle East have to be dismissed, just completely. What do we want most? We want stability. Thatā€™s what we want. We want regimes to clamp down on extremist organizations, with the various militias in Iraq and in Syria and elsewhere. And with that, I think everybody ā€” including in the Middle East ā€” will be very, very happy, even if they donā€™t get to choose who governs them.

Atul Singh: On that note, Gary, weā€™ve spent a lot of time going over so many countries and coming up with various scenarios. Itā€™s been a pleasure, as always, and weā€™ll have you back before too long.

Gary Grappo: I look forward to that, Atul. Weā€™ll have to discuss Yemen at this time. I think itā€™s an interesting case study. Itā€™s a bit of an outlier, but nevertheless is becoming a significant problem area in the Middle East. So perhaps next time we can address the challenge of Yemen.

Atul Singh: Alright, everybody, stay tuned for Yemen next time. Until then, thank you very much, Gary. See you soon.

Gary Grappo: My pleasure, Atul.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FOĀ° Talks: The New Geopolitical Landscape of the Middle East appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The US emerged as the global superpower thanks to World War II. In 1945, Europe was in ruins. The war caused widespread destruction in Europe because of the bombing of cities and factories. European powers lost millions of people in the war. Being far from Europe and Japan, the incurred a very low rate of civilian casualties. There was almost no destruction of US infrastructure, with the Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii, as a notable exception. Naturally, the US emerged as the leader of the West. Although the Soviet Union was a US ally during the war, it competed with the US for global hegemony following the Allied victory, a period referred to as the Cold War.

During the Cold War, the US and its Western allies engaged in a brutal global competition with the Soviets and other communist states. Notable confrontations between these two power centers included the Korean War (1950ā€“1953), the Vietnam War (1955ā€“1975) and the Sovietā€“Afghan War (1979ā€“1989). Using Soviet influence as an excuse, the US intervened in many countries, including Iran. At the behest of the UK, the US overthrew the first democratically elected government of Iran. Only 26 years after the infamous 1953 coup, the Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah and established ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s independence from both the US and the UK.

The US tacitly supported European imperial and colonial powers when they committed some of the worst genocides in human history. The most notable include the horrendous atrocities committed in Congo, Kenya and Algeria.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the world looked forward to years of peace and prosperity. Although the US proclaimed that this new era was one of peace, it began with the Rwandan Genocide (1994), the Bosnian Genocide (1995), to the present day with the US-backed genocide against Palestinians and the takeover of Syria by al-Qaedaā€™s affiliates.

The of the Soviet Union did not make the world more peaceful; it worsened it under unilateral US leadership. The fall produced a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. In particular, it released nationalistic, ethical, cultural and self-determination movements in the former Soviet states. It led to social unrest, organized crime, terrorism and corruption. The ripple effects of the fall will ā€œcontinue to be felt for some time yet.ā€

After the Soviets were gone, the US no longer faced any serious challenges to its global hegemony. However, the US considered ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s independence from US influence a challenge to its global domination and has supported efforts to undermine the Islamic Republic of Iran. Presently, the US efforts that have unseated Assad of Syria were meant to undermine ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s dominance in the region. 

Recently, reporters saw US President Joe Biden leaving a bookstore with a copy of The Hundred Yearsā€™ War on Palestine by Rashid Khalidi in his hand. The book describes the Palestinian struggle for their homeland. ā€œSettler-colonial confrontations with indigenous peoples have only ended in one of three ways: with the elimination or full subjugation of the native population, as in North America; with the defeat and expulsion of the colonizer, as in Algeria, which is extremely rare; or with the abandonment of colonial supremacy, in the context of compromise and reconciliation, as in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Ireland,ā€ Khalidi writes. 

Hopefully, Biden will read this book and realize that instigating the war in Ukraine, enabling Israelā€™s genocide against Palestinians and aiding al-Qaeda affiliates are immoral.

The USā€™s prestige is falling worldwide, all it can do is slow the fall

The world is waking up thanks to Iran. The USā€™s decision to back Ukraine in the war and enable Israelā€™s genocide against the Palestinians has placed global attention on Iran. In particular, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s support of the oppressed Palestinians has been a popular move. In the US, like around the world, young people with the oppressed Palestinians.

Iran has become so notable for its global standing as a supporter of the oppressed that its archenemy, Israel, admits it. On July 25, Israeli Prime Minister , against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, addressed the US Congress.

Hearing the loud protest outside, he felt frustrated with the protesters, crying in his speech that ā€œIran is funding the anti-Israel protests that are going on right now outside this building.ā€

Led by Iran, worldwide, people realize the US is not what it claims to be. The US is not a promoter of democracy or peace but a brutal warmonger with no regard for human rights and international law. Internationally, it has used its veto power since 1970 against UN resolutions concerning Israel, with four in the last year. In November, it vetoed the latest UN resolution calling for a ceasefire in . Recently, it blundered by the rise to power in Syria of HayŹ¼at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) formerly part of al-Qaeda.

To stop the USā€™ destructive behaviors globally, China, Russia, Iran and some other countries have moved away from the US and formed the alliance. More countries are planning to do the same. Within the new alliance, China pushes for more collaboration between countries rather than subjugating them, as the US does.

No supporter of democracy, not even much of a democracy

Globally, people are becoming more aware that the US does not support democracy. Its ventures into other countries in the name of democracy are a ploy to access their resources and wealth. In pursuit of power and wealth, the US has destroyed lives. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen are just a few known examples where millions of innocent people were killed and billions of dollars of infrastructure were destroyed by US-led aggression.

The US is also a very flawed democracy itself. According to a poll from the Harris Poll and the Quincy Institute, around of Americans want the US to pursue peace with Russia. Yet, the US continues arming Ukraine against Russia. Likewise, of Americans disapprove of Bidenā€™s handling of the ā€œIsraelā€“Palestine conflict,ā€ but Biden continues arming Israel. Biden is acting as a dictator, ignoring the will of the people. This is not unique to Biden. US presidents have been getting the US in wars since its inception. Despite its global proclamation as a beacon of democracy, the US has never been a true democracy.

The US presidential system is flawed. The winner of the majority of Electoral College votes wins. In 2000 and 2016, George W. Bush and Donald Trump lost the popular vote but still became presidents because they commanded a majority of Electoral College votes. Furthermore, the US is dominated by two main parties. Third parties are not even on the ballot in many states. Big money in politics also strengthens the hand of the two main political parties.

This means that American politics makes for the strangest of bedfellows. Christian evangelicals voted for Trump despite his chauvinism, infidelity, nepotism, racism and corruption. So did many working-class Americans as well as a majority of white women and Latino men voted for this celebrity billionaire who has given and plans to give tax cuts to the rich. On the other hand, Ivy League elites largely voted for Democrats even if they had misgivings about Kamala Harris.

Giving the rich tax breaks and spending too much on the military-industrial complex has led to the US suffering the highest rate among industrial countries. The US ranks last in outcomes among the ten major developed countries despite spending nearly twice as much ā€” about 18% of gross domestic product ā€” on healthcare than the others. The crisis is also worse than in other Western countries and the country has the highest rate among high-income countries.

As is well known, American interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and other countries led to the expansion of the military-industrial complex. Today, the US sends its poor to war who come back with post-traumatic stress disorder if not wounds or in body bags.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 killed thousands of innocents. Its intervention in Libya caused a civil war that continues to this day. Today, the US is inflicting similar misery on Syria. Together with Turkey and Israel, the US is supporting HTS. Note that HTS is an affiliate of al-Qaeda. The HTS fighters are nothing but terrorists who have innocents, including 12-year-olds and Americans. That is the reason why the US put a $10 million bounty on HTS leader . Yet today the US has supported HTS to get rid of the Assad family, legitimizing the very fighters it has designated as terrorists.

Instead of continuing to support death and destruction, the US should support peace and harmony. First, Washington must stop threatening, invading and harming other countries. This includes stopping support for terrorists like al-Golani as well as dropping sanctions that hurt millions of innocents. Second, the US must stop its proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. A peace deal is in the interest of the entire world. Third, the US must support a free Palestine where Christians, Jews and Muslims can live together in peace.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Facilitating the Rise of HTS Is the Latest US Blunder appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The only area where there might be some hope for ending a war is Ukraine. Rubio has come close to Trumpā€™s position on that matter, praising Ukraine for standing up to Russia, but that the US is funding a deadly ā€œstalemate warā€ that needs to be ā€œbrought to a conclusion.ā€

But in all the other hotspots around the world, Rubio is likely to make conflicts even hotter, or start new ones. Here are eight reasons why he would make a dangerous secretary of state:

Rubioā€™s obsession with Cuban regime change will sink any chance of better relations there

Like other Cuban-American politicians, Rubio has built his career on vilifying the Cuban Revolution and trying to economically strangle and starve the people of his parentsā€™ homeland into submission.

It is ironic, therefore, that his parents left Cuba before the Revolution, during the US-backed dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Batistaā€™s executioners, secret police and death squads killed an 20,000 people, leading to a wildly popular revolution in 1959.

When President Barack Obama began to restore relations with Cuba in 2014, Rubio swore to do ā€œeverything possibleā€ to obstruct and reverse that policy. In May 2024, Rubio his zero-tolerance for any kind of social or economic contacts between the US and Cuba, claiming that any easing of the US blockade will only ā€œstrengthen the oppressive regime and undermine the oppositionā€¦ Until there is freedom in Cuba, the United States must maintain a firm stance.ā€ĢżTwo months earlier, Rubio legislation to ensure that Cuba would remain on the US ā€œState Sponsor of Terrorism List,ā€ imposing sanctions that cut Cuba off from the US-dominated Western banking system.

These measures to destroy the Cuban economy have led to a massive wave of migration in the past two years. But when the US Coast Guard tried to coordinate with their Cuban counterparts, Rubio introduced legislation to prohibit such interaction. While Trump has vowed to stem immigration, his secretary of state wants to crush Cubaā€™s economy, forcing people to abandon the island and set sail for the US.

Applying Rubioā€™s anti-Cuba template to the rest of Latin America will make enemies of more of our neighbors

Rubioā€™s disdain for his ancestral home has served him so well as a US politician that he has extended it to the rest of Latin America. He has sided with extreme right-wing politicians like Argentinian President Javier Milei and former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. He rails against progressive ones, from Brazilian President Luiz InĆ”cio Lula da Silva to the popular Mexican former President LĆ³pez Obrador, whom he ā€œan apologist for tyrannyā€ for supporting other leftist governments.

In Venezuela, Rubio has promoted brutal sanctions and plots to topple the government of Nicolas Maduro. In 2019, he was one of the of Trumpā€™s failed policy of recognizing opposition figure Juan GuaidĆ³ as president. He has also advocated for sanctions and regime change in Nicaragua.

In March 2023, Rubio urged President Joe Biden to impose on Bolivia for prosecutingĢż leaders of a 2019 US-backed coup that led to that killed at least 21 people.ĢżHe also the government of Honduras for withdrawing from an extradition treaty with the US this past August. This was a response to decades of US interference that had turned Honduras into a narco-state riven by poverty, gang violence and mass , until the election of democratic socialist President Xiomara Castro in January 2022.

Rubioā€™s major concern in this part of the world now seems to be the of China, which has become the second-largest of most Latin American countries. Unlike the US, China focuses on economic benefits and not internal politics. Meanwhile, US politicians like Rubio still see Latin America as the USā€™s ā€œbackyard.ā€

While Rubioā€™s virulent anti-leftist stands have served him well in climbing to senior positions in the US government, and now into Trumpā€™s inner circle, his disdain for Latin American sovereignty bodes ill for US relations in the region.

Rubio insists that the US and Israel can do no wrong, and that God has given Palestine to Israel

Despite the massive death toll in Gaza and global condemnation of Israelā€™s genocide, Rubio still the myth that ā€œIsrael takes extraordinary steps to avoid civilian lossesā€ and that innocent people die in Gaza because Hamas has deliberately placed them in the way and used them as human shields. The problem, he says, is ā€œan enemy that doesnā€™t value human life.ā€

In November 2024, when CODEPINK if Rubio would support a ceasefire, he replied, ā€œOn the contrary. I want them to destroy every element of Hamas they can get their hands on. These people are vicious animals.ā€

There are few times in this past year that the Biden administration has tried to restrain Israel, but when Biden begged Israel not to send troops into the southern city of Rafah, Rubio that was like telling the Allied forces in World War II not to attack Berlin to get Adolf Hitler.

In a to Secretary of State Antony Blinken in August 2024, Rubio criticized the Biden administrationā€™s decision to sanction Israeli settlers linked to anti-Palestinian violence in the occupied West Bank.

ā€œIsrael has consistently sought peace with the Palestinians. It is unfortunate that the Palestinians, whether it be the Palestinian Authority or FTOs [Foreign Terrorist Organisations] such as Hamas, have rejected such overtures,ā€ Rubio wrote. ā€œIsraelis rightfully living in their historic homeland are not the impediment to peace; the Palestinians are,ā€ he added.

No country besides Israel subscribes to the idea that its borders should be based on 2,000-year-old religious scriptures, and that it has a God-given right to displace or exterminate people who have lived there since then to reconquer its ancient homeland. The US will find itself extraordinarily isolated from the rest of the world if Rubio tries to assert that as a matter of US policy.

Rubioā€™s enmity toward Iran will fuel Israelā€™s war on its neighbors, and may lead the US to war

Rubio is obsessed with Iran. He that the central cause of violence and suffering in the Middle East is not Israeli policy but ā€œ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ambition to be a regional hegemonic power.ā€ He that ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s goal in the Middle East is to ā€œseek to drive America out of the region and then destroy Israel.ā€

He has been a proponent of maximum pressure on Iran, including for more and more sanctions. He believes the US should not re-enter the Iran nuclear deal, saying: ā€œWe must not trade away U.S. and Israeli security for vague commitments from a terrorist-sponsoring regime that has killed Americans and threatens to annihilate Israel.ā€

Rubio calls Lebanonā€™s Hezbollah a ā€œfull blown agent of Iran right on Israelā€™s borderā€ and claims that wiping out Hezbollahā€™s leadership, along with entire neighborhoods full of civilians, is a ā€œservice to humanity.ā€ He alleges that Iran has control over Iraq, Syria and the Houthis in Yemen, and is a threat to Jordan. He claims that ā€œIran has put a noose around Israel,ā€ and says the goal of US policy should be regime change in Iran. This would set the stage for war.

While there will hopefully be leaders in the Pentagon who will caution Trump about the of a war with Iran, Rubio will not be a voice of reason.

Rubio is beholden to big money, from the weapons industry to the Israel lobby

Rubio has reportedly received over in campaign contributions from pro-Israel groups during his career. The Pro-Israel America PAC was his single campaign contributor over the last five years. When he last ran for re-election in 2022, he was the recipient of funding by pro-Israel groups in the Senate, taking in $367,000 from them for that campaign.

Rubio was also the recipient of funding from the ā€œdefenseā€ industry in the Senate for the 2022 cycle, receiving $196,000. Altogether, the weapons industry has invested $663,000 in his Congressional career.

Rubio is clearly beholden to the US arms industry. Heā€™s even more beholden to the Israel lobby, which has been one of his largest sources of campaign funding. This has placed him in the vanguard of Congressā€™s blind, unconditional support for Israel and subservience to Israeli narratives and propaganda. Therefore, it is unlikely that he will ever challenge the ongoing extermination of the Palestinian people or their expulsion from their homeland.

Rubio is so antagonistic towards China that China has sanctioned him ā€” twice

at the Heritage Foundation in 2022, Rubio said: ā€œThe gravest threat facing America today ā€” it is the challenge that will define not just this century, but my generation and every generation represented here in this room today ā€” that challenge is not climate change, itā€™s not the pandemic, itā€™s not the leftā€™s version of social justice. The threat that will define this century is China.ā€

It will be hard for our nationā€™s ā€œtop diplomatā€ to ease tensions with a country he has so maligned. He antagonized China by co-sponsoring the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which allows the US to bar Chinese imports over alleged Uyghur rights abuses ā€” abuses that China denies and independent question. In fact, Rubio has gone so far as to accuse China of a ā€œgrotesque campaign of genocideā€ against the Uyghurs.

On Taiwan, he has not only introduced legislation to increase military aid to the island, but actually supports Taiwanese ā€” a dangerous deviation from the US governmentā€™s long-standing One China approach.

The Chinese responded to Rubio by sanctioning him, not once but twice: once regarding the Uyghurs and once for his support of Hong Kong protests. Unless China lifts the sanctions, he would be the first US secretary of state to be banned from even visiting China.

Analysts expect China to try to sidestep Rubio and engage directly with Trump and other senior officials. Steve Tsang, the director of the China Institute at the United Kingdomā€™s School of Oriental and African Studies, told , ā€œIf that doesnā€™t work, then I think weā€™re going to get into a much more regular escalation of a bad relationship.ā€

Rubio knows sanctions are a trap, but doesnā€™t know how to escape them

Rubio is a leading advocate of unilateral economic sanctions, which are under international law, and which the UN and other countries refer to as ā€œunilateral economic coercive measures.ā€

The US has used these measures so widely and wildly that they now a third of the worldā€™s population. Officials from Treasury Secretary to Rubio himself have warned that using the US financial system and the dollarā€™s reserve currency status as weapons against other countries is driving the rest of the world to conduct trade in other currencies and develop alternative financial systems.

In March 2023, Rubio on Fox News, ā€œWe wonā€™t have to talk sanctions in five years, because there will be so many countries in currencies other than the dollar that we wonā€™t have the ability to sanction them.ā€

And yet Rubio has continued to be a leading sponsor of sanctions bills in the Senate. These include new on Iran in January 2024 and a in July to sanction foreign banks that participate in alternative financial systems.

While other countries develop new financial and trading systems to escape abusive, illegal US sanctions, the nominee for secretary of state remains caught in the same sanctions trap that he complained about on Fox.

Rubio wants to oppress US free speech

Rubio wants to curtail the right to enshrined in the First Amendment of the US Constitution. In May, he campus protests against Israel as a ā€œcomplete breakdown of law and order.ā€

Rubio claimed to be speaking up for other students at US universities. ā€œ[They] paid a lot of money to go to these schools, [but are being disrupted by] a few thousand antisemitic zombies who have been brainwashed by two decades of indoctrination in the belief that the world is divided between victimizers and victims, and that the victimizers in this particular case, the ones that are oppressing people, are Jews in Israel,ā€ Rubio said.

The Florida senator has said he supports Trumpā€™s to deport foreign students who engage in pro-Palestinian campus . In April, he for punishing supporters of the Israel boycott movement as part of efforts to counter antisemitism, falsely equating any attempt to respond to Israelā€™s international crimes with antisemitism.

And what about those crimes, which the students are protesting? After visiting Israel in May, Rubio wrote an article for in which he never mentioned the thousands of civilians Israel has killed. He instead blamed Iran, Biden and ā€œmorally corrupt international institutionsā€ for the crisis.

Rubio expects US citizens to believe that it is not genocide itself, but protests against genocide, that are a complete breakdown of law and order. He couldnā€™t be more wrong if he tried.

Students are not Rubioā€™s only target. In August 2023, he that certain ā€œfar-left and antisemitic entitiesā€ may have violated the Foreign Assistance Registration Act by their ties to China. He called for a Justice Department investigation into 18 groups, starting with CODEPINK. These unfounded claims of Chinese connections are only meant to intimidate legitimate groups that are exercising their free speech rights.

Conclusion: Rubio is a dangerous choice for secretary of state.

On each of these issues, Rubio has shown no sign of understanding the difference between domestic politics and diplomacy. Whether heā€™s talking about Cuba, Palestine, Iran or China, or even about CODEPINK, all his supposedly tough positions are based on cynically mischaracterizing the actions and motivations of his enemies and then attacking the straw man he has falsely set up.

Unscrupulous politicians often get away with that, and Rubio is no exception. He has made it his signature tactic because it works so well for him in US politics. But that will not work if and when he sits down to negotiate with other world leaders as secretary of state.

His underlying attitude to foreign relations is, like Trumpā€™s, that the US must get its way or else. Additionally, other countries who wonā€™t submit must be coerced, threatened, couped, bombed or invaded. This makes Rubio just as ill-equipped as Blinken to conduct diplomacy, improve US relations with other countries or resolve disputes and conflicts peacefully, as the United Nations Charter requires.

[ edited this piece.]

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Among the prominent experts, former central banker at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Kathleen Tyson, recently concerning the global trend of central banks to diversify away from strict dependence on the US dollar: ā€œCurrency optionality is now a matter of economic and national security. US threats of more tariffs and sanctions against states moving to Local Currency Trade demonstrate the dangers of dollar dependence and the urgency of optionality and resiliency.ā€

Everyone understands the meaning of resiliency. But what about optionality?

°Õ“Ē»å²¹²āā€™s Weekly Devilā€™s Dictionary definition:

Optionality:

A euphemistic synonym of the common noun ā€œchoice.ā€ It is employed to avoid provoking the simulacrum of ā€œmoral judgmentā€ exercised by dominant powers who believe that their set of rules intended to normalize economic behavior endow them with the right to coerce others and the duty to limit othersā€™ ability to choose.

Contextual note

Tyson is of course referring to the growing trend seen in a diversity of nations to devise methods, techniques and technology that will allow central banks and other foreign exchange operators to conduct transactions flexibly and, when possible, directly between the widest range of individual currencies. This means adopting an attitude that aims at avoiding dependence on what used to be the most convenient solution for everyone: holding US dollars reserves.

So why pedantically insist on a technocratic neologism? Why not be more simple and natural and call this ā€œcurrency choice?ā€ 

There are several comprehensible reasons for this innovation in vocabulary. Unlike the idea behind the word choice, optionality refers not to the act of choosing but to a persistent state in which flexible strategic choice appears as the default setting. In contrast, the idea of choice to modern ears evokes a specific act governed as much by taste as rational calculation. It even includes the idea of not choosing. Optionality implies the necessity to choose.

The emergence of the notion of ā€œconsumer choiceā€ in the 20th century has polluted our vocabulary. It defines a mentality in which consumers, confronted with a diversity of brands, exercise their free will by choosing the one they find most attractive. This has even affected the model of democracy in the US. Americans now understand that they have a choice between exactly two viable brands. Elections are about convincing the electorate that one brand is better than the other. 

The advent of the consumer society enabled marketers to develop a complementary concept, the notion of impulse purchasing decisions fueled by advertising. Given the seriousness of foreign exchange, optionality can thus be seen as the necessary alternative to the ultimately trivial notion of consumer choice. 

Unlike consumer decisions, optionality is emotionally neutral. It supposes cold rationality in its decision making. Some find it ironic that at the same time dominant macro theories of modern capitalism posit and indeed require a belief in the existence of homo economicus ā€” a purely rational being capable at all times of calculating what best correlated with their interest ā€” the notion of impulse buying emerged as a staple of the ā€œscienceā€ of marketing.

To understand the transition from the increasingly unipolar, normative and conformist 20th century and the disruptive increasingly multipolar 21st century, pondering these distinctions of vocabulary can prove helpful. Itā€™s too easy to dismiss a word like optionality as a futile example of a self-enamored professional eliteā€™s taste for jargon, designed to meet their need to feel both different from and superior to the common culture.

What weā€™re seeing today is an emerging world wounded and sent into disarray by Washingtonā€™s obsessive recourse to sanctions. Rather than seeking to undermine the dollar, the wise bankers and politicians are focusing on defining a field of options in which normal economic relationships may play out, free of the fear of coercion and intimidation. Rather than taking the form of a slave revolt, they are inventing not only new practices and technologies, but even a vocabulary that helps define a new economic culture.

Historical note

Since the beginning of the 21st century, two major events have transformed the way nations understand the world order. When President George W. Bush responded to the drama of the September 11 attacks by launching a war with a nation state, Afghanistan, instead of framing the issue as a criminal affair, his futile ā€œforever warsā€ focused on regime change ultimately undermined the image of the US as the unipolar enforcer of a self-defined rules-based order. The prestige of its global military presence, ready to police the world in the name of democracy, took a serious hit. President Joe Bidenā€™s ignominious retreat from Afghanistan in 2021, after 20 years of feckless war, confirmed the worldā€™s worst suspicions.

The supposedly indomitable US military machine had confirmed what should have been clear with the fall of Saigon nearly 50 years earlier: Even with no rival global power on Earth, the US military was incapable of imposing its will on other regions of the world. Thanks to Bush, one pillar of US supremacy was seriously cracked for all the world to see. 

The financial crisis of 2007ā€“2008 offered an initial glimpse of the weakness of the other pillar: the US economy, its tentacular stock market and the almighty dollar. The shock was real but not fatal. Thanks to President Barack Obamaā€™s commitment to quantitative easing (QE), the dollar maintained its pivotal role, but at its core it was already seriously fragilized.

After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Biden made a new strategic error that had the effect of confirming the worldā€™s perception that currency optionality had become an existential necessity. For decades, Washington has been addicted to sanctions designed to weaken and ultimately topple the governments of every nation that fails to show due respect to what Noam Chomsky has ā€œthe Godfather.ā€ The extreme measures taken in reaction to Russian President Vladimir Putinā€™s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought to the fore what should have been obvious: every nation should fear the dollar. When Biden cut Russia off from the SWIFT payment system and threatened to punish any country that did business with Russia, nations across the face of the globe realized that holding too many dollars, though convenient for trade, entailed a possibly existential risk.

The ā€œde-dollarizationā€ movement has been growing slowly over time. In 2016, Obamaā€™s Treasury Secretary Jack Lew expressed his awareness of the risk for the US. He that the ā€œescalation of financial sanctions will only accelerate this trend, precipitating further de-dollarization as more countries capitalize on digitalization to expand their use of LCS for bilateral transactions and to develop more hedging instruments.ā€ He added this: ā€œThe more we condition the use of the dollar and our financial system on adherence to US foreign policy, the more the risk of migration to other currencies and other financial systems in the medium term grows.ā€

As Lew predicted, the medium term is living up to his forecast. Currency optionality will inexorably be part of a new world order.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devilā€™s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51³Ō¹Ļ Devilā€™s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The BRICS countries argue that the US and its allies have weaponized the global financial system. The dominance of the dollar, and to a lesser extent the euro, in international trade and finance allows the West to impose sanctions that impact countries’ economies deeply. For instance, following øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the US and its allies froze $282 billion of Russian assets held overseas and cut Russian banks off from SWIFT, a global system for cross-border payments. America also warned other countriesā€™ banks of potential ā€œsecondary sanctionsā€ if they supported Russia.

These actions have led several countries to reevaluate their reliance on the US dollar. Central banks around the world, especially in countries at odds with the US, are stockpiling gold and exploring alternatives to dollar-based transactions. BRICS members see this dependency on Western-controlled systems as risky and are eager to reduce it. China, in particular, views reliance on the dollar as a major security vulnerability.

The proposed solution: BRICS Bridge

To reduce dependency on Western financial systems, Russia proposed a new payment system called ā€œBRICS Bridge.ā€ This digital platform would allow BRICS countries to conduct cross-border payments through their central banks without relying on US-controlled networks like SWIFT. The concept borrows elements from a similar system, mBridge, which is partly overseen by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Switzerland, a prominent institution in the Western-led financial order. However, BRICS Bridge aims to challenge that order, offering a financial lifeline to countries facing Western sanctions and creating a more multipolar financial system.

Different visions of global influence

Russia and China are the main drivers behind the push for BRICS reforms, but their motivations differ. Russia seeks to create a sphere of influence that protects its interests and supports its allies through a flexible, transactional approach to international relations. This approach would allow countries to engage with Russia based on mutual benefits without subscribing to Western ā€œnormativeā€ values, which Russia sees as biased.

Chinaā€™s ambitions go further. Rather than just establishing an independent sphere, China wants to rewrite international rules, shaping a world order where multiple centers of power coexist, with China as a central authority. This would give China greater control over global trade, finance, and diplomacy, gradually replacing the US as the primary rulemaker.

Many countries in the Global South support BRICS because they see it as a pathway to a more flexible international environment where they can negotiate deals that directly benefit their economic growth. For example, India has reaped significant benefits from purchasing discounted Russian oil, prioritizing these economic gains despite the moral conflict posed by the ongoing war in Ukraine. In a multipolar world, countries in the Global South could avoid being tied down by Western rules and make independent decisions in their best interests.

However, this freedom comes with risks. Without a dominant Western power like the US to counterbalance rising powers, these smaller countries could find themselves vulnerable to regional giants, such as China, who may impose their will on them by force in the future.

The BRICS alliance reflects a growing dissatisfaction with the current global order. Critics argue that the US-led international system has become ineffective and no longer serves the interests of many countries, leading them to seek alternatives. However, BRICS itself has limitations. Despite its symbolic appeal, it has not achieved substantial progress on key issues like creating a global currency to rival the dollar or liberalizing global trade. The dollar remains dominant, and the influence of Western-led institutions persists.

Even if BRICS doesnā€™t have the power to immediately reshape the world, its existence signals a significant shift. Countries are increasingly interested in alternatives, showing that faith in the US-led system is waning. The BRICS alliance may lack the cohesion and power to fully realize its vision, but its popularity underscores a global desire for change.

[Anton Schauble wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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There is no indication of foul play at work here. It seems the crash was caused by a combination of bad decision-making by the pilot, dismal weather conditions and a poorly maintained helicopter. The craft was a Bell 212 from the 1960s, so it needed to be well maintained to operate for all these years, which US sanctions have made difficult.

Raisiā€™s sudden death raises pertinent questions about ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s future. He was set to succeed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the top dog in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s theocratic state. Raisiā€™s premature demise raises the question of succession. Who will be Khameneiā€™s successor now, and who will succeed Raisi as president? There is another follow-up question: How will these new leaders shape Iran, the Middle East and the rest of the world?

More repression in store ahead

Raisi was a murderous leader. In 1988, at the end of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s war with Iraq, he over 5,000 people ā€” political prisoners, militants and more ā€” to death. In 2022, massive protests broke out over Kurdish Iranian Mahsa Aminiā€™s death in custody. This young woman was arrested and fatally beaten for failing to observe Islamic headscarf laws. The former president authorized security to use to quash the outcry, killing over 500 protesters. Raisiā€™s propensity for bloodshed made many Iranians loathe him.

Though he was colorless and uncreative, Raisi was ruthless. Furthermore, he was a doctrinaire upholder of Islamic theology and a faithful servant of the regime. Thus, he was a good fit to be the next Supreme Leader. Khamenei is now 85 years old, and the question of succession is in the air. A few plausible successors have emerged. They are theologians or political figures. Importantly, Khameneiā€™s son, , is also in the fray.

Despite his violent past, Raisi was a bulwark against the total dominance of the increasingly aggressive Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is the praetorian guard of the revolutionary regime and is now the most powerful institution in Iran. Dangerously, the IRGC is demanding a more assertive policy in the Middle East. Without Raisi to hold the organization back, the IRGC is likely to claim more power ā€” probably all of it ā€” in the state and the economy.

The next generation of potential leaders holds more conservative and anti-Western views than Raisiā€™s generation, which rose to power in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s 1979 . Raisi, the ruling ayatollahs and the IRGC recognized that most of Iranian society repudiates the regimeā€™s conservative theological tenets and repressive restrictions. To keep the regimeā€™s hold on power, the next Iranian president will probably tighten these restrictions, crushing any form of dissent and engaging in foreign aggression to appeal to Iranian patriotism.

An Iran more hostile to the West

In his international political career, Raisi pursued ā€œresistance diplomacy.ā€ While Iran was hostile to the West, particularly the US, it sought the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear and rapprochement. US President Donald Trump undid this by withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018 and imposing further sanctions.

This development led Raisi to conclude that rapprochement would not be beneficial for Iran. He the Iranian nuclear weapons program in 2021, bringing the countryā€™s first nuclear weapon closer to reality. Yet his government still signaled to the US and Israel that Iran did not want regional war.

Tensions flared up from time to time with sporadic attacks and assassinations. These further increased on October 7, 2023 when Hamas, the militant Islamist Palestinian group, a devastating attack on Israelis. On April 1, 2024, an Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, the capital of Syria, killed top IRGC officers. In retaliation, Iran officially Israeli territory for the first time in history, deploying 300 missiles and drones. Though Israeli forces intercepted and destroyed most of these weapons, Iran proved it could strike Israel. Intercepting the Iranian weapons also cost Israel and the US billions of dollars, while it only cost Iran millions to launch them.

Before his death, Raisi closer relations with Russia and China, two of the USā€™s greatest adversaries. His coming successor is likely to continue this outreach. This is a strategic disaster for the West and creates a more dangerous Middle East.

What governmental changes lie in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s future?

The Iranian president is a figurehead and the Supreme Leader holds all real power. So, it barely matters who is elected the next president. Further, the IRGC will increase its already determinative power. In the near future, it may ascend the throne openly and rule Iran directly as a thugocracy. This control will bring forth a leader who will likely be worse for the world than Raisi and Khamenei. The only countries that will not be negatively impacted by such a development are Russia, China and North Korea.

As stated earlier, the new Iranian government will probably become more oppressive. It is likely to enforce an even stricter interpretation of Islamic law on Iranian society. This will make the country more miserable and the Middle East more menacing. The government is also likely to continue the policies of ā€œdeath to Israelā€ and ā€œdeath to America.ā€ This would involve more aggressive actions to expand Iranian influence in the Middle East via ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s regional surrogates: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen as well as various Shia groups in Iraq and Syria. Finally, the new Iranian government will move closer to developing a nuclear weapon.

Raisi was cruel, but the next generation of leaders are more merciless. Raisiā€™s generation is slowly dying out, ushering in a younger, even more radical set of leaders. No matter how bad things are, they can always get worse. It looks like they will soon.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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On February 23, 2024, the European Commission (EC) adopted the 13th package of against Russia. No surprises are expected as the latest round of sanctions deals with preventing the circumvention of EU sanctions through third countries. Deutsche Welle, citing its own sources, that about 200 individuals and legal entities will be added to the sanctions list. Restrictions will be imposed, in particular, against several firms from China and Turkey, which help Russian companies and state held corporations bypass sanctions. also reported that the EU plans to impose restrictions on about twenty companies from China, India, Hong Kong, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Turkey which allegedly help Russia evade previously imposed sanctions.

Instead of cracking down on Moscow’s multibillion-dollar oil and gas sales, including, or ensuring that banned technology does not reach its military, the European Union (EU), as reports, is scaling back its ambitions in favor of sanctioning a small number of rule-breaking companies. Given the lack of consensus among the countries and fierce opposition from Hungary, which continues to seek closer ties with Russia and China, it is clear that the EU may find it difficult to agree on new yet significant sanction measures against Russia. In the meantime, the decline in foreign trade turnover allows Russia to increase its GDP by utilizing the opportunities present within its own market, something that sanctions have enabled.

The impact of sanctions on the Russian Ruble

The question of the effectiveness of sanctions has been raised more than once over the past two years of war. The most obvious indicator is the . In Russia, the dollar exchange rate depends much more on the volume of than on other factors, especially those not related to exports. In addition, for the Russian population, the dollar exchange rate is than just an exchange rate. Russians pin their hopes on it for protection from inflation and depreciation of their cash savings.  Before the war in Ukraine started, it was 77.4 rubles to 1 dollar Immediately after the introduction of the first sanctions package, the ruble fell sharply to104 rublesper dollar. However, by June it had increased to57.2 rubles per dollar 

The change took place because in anticipation of the introduction of the announced restrictions, Western buyers sought to speed up their purchases of cheap Russian energy sources as much as possible. Due to the purchase, Russian exports exceeded imports. Moreover, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation introduced a mandatory sale offor domestic exporters. These measures led to the supply of U.S. Dollar exceeding the demand for it in the Russian market in 2022. 

However, the developments created problems for the Russian budget, which was not prepared to handle a circumstance under which the ruble would become more expensive. Therefore, the norm of mandatory currency sales for Russian exporters was reduced to 50% in May 2022, and in June 2022, it was completely

In 2023, the situation began to change. Firstly, restrictions on Russian energy exports began to work. Secondly, the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which had been exporting gas directly to Germany, bypassing Ukraine, was blown up in September 2022. Thirdly, it became clear that India’s massive purchases of crude oil could not be paid for in U.S. currency because of the sanctions and revenue received in Indian rupees could not be counted as foreign exchange earnings because India’s national currency is not convertible. Due to this Russian shipments to India began to resemble barter transactions more than classic trade. Fourth and finally, Western importers did their best to switch from cheap but politically toxic Russian energy to more expensive supplies from other countries, primarily from the United States. 

As a result of all of the above points there was a sharp decline in Russian exports energy exports fell byin 2023 and total exports by 28.3%) and, as a consequence it led to an equally sharp fall in the ruble from 69.2 rubles per dollar in January 2023 toper 1 dollar in December 2023 While revenues from oil and gas exports grew by in 2022 to $383.7 billion theyfell by in 2023. Almost 90% of all oil and petroleum product supplies were toIndia and China This seriously impacted the Russian economy, although there were other consequences as well.

Energy prices and the cost of living

In Europe, sanctions led to an almost two-fold in energy prices between January 2021 and January 2023. Consequently, the cost of household utilities in the EU countries increased in addition to other utilities such as motor fuel. The consequence of the increase in energy prices was inflation in Europe. In October 2022 overall inflation to 11.5% and for energy inflation amounted to 40.2% in March 2022. However, the EU economies quickly adapted and byDecember 2023 inflation had fallen to 3.4% 

But this did not solve the problem of rising utility prices for households. This was due to the continued rise in electricity prices. In 22 EU countries, residential electricity prices in the first half of 2023 compared to the same period last year.The largest increase was observed in the Netherlands, where electricity bills increased by 953%, helped by national tax policies. However, Lithuania, Romania and Latvia also saw significant jumps in electricity prices by 88%, 77% and 74% respectively. In Germany and the Czech Republic it was 25 and 35% respectively. 

The situation is even worse with gas prices. They rose in 20 of the 24 EU member states that report gas prices to Eurostat. (in national currencies) increased the most in Latvia (+139%) followed by Romania (+134%), Austria (+103%), the Netherlands (+99%) and Ireland (+73%).

The increase in gas prices led to food inflation, which unlike general inflation in the EU remains high. According to , real food inflation stood at 4.6% in the euro area (4% in the EU) in October 2023, putting enormous pressure on low-income households. In October 2023, annual food and non-alcoholic beverage inflation exceeded headline inflation in 33 of 37 European countries. Moreover, if in Belgium it was 10.9%, then in the Czech Republic it was 5.7%. Food inflation led by rising energy prices, affected the entire agri-food chain: from farmers to processing enterprises and transport.

In Russia, the average price for electricity has remained virtually. Russian consumers faced an in the regulated tariff at the end of 2022 when natural gas exports to Europe fell by 75% on an year on year basis.The increase in in rubles was 5% from February 2022 to September 2023. Gasoline costs approximately 0.56 euros per liter. However, in 2022, the general inflation was recordedat which is slightly higher than European inflation of the same year and 3.55% higher than what was recorded in Russia in 2021. At the end of 2023, inflation in the Russian Federation was at 7.42%.

The discrepancy between the collapse of the ruble and declining inflation in 2023 suggests that Russia has overcome its dependence on imports, at least for the main groups of goods. The cost of food items in Russia increased between January 2023 and January of 2024.Ģż

Moreover, the Russian leadership did not put up much resistance to the sharp depreciation of the ruble, as in October 2023 when Putin signed a decreeobliging 43 exporting (out of several hundred) to sell foreign exchange exposure. The remaining companies were not affected. This stopped the collapse of the Russian currency, but did not bring it back to its previous high values of mid-2022. In the context of a mass exodus of foreign suppliers, the state benefits from a weak ruble, as it stimulates domestic industry.

The steps taken by the Russian government demonstrated the ineffectiveness of sanctions. Far from severely impacting the Russian economy, the sanctions brought Russia to a point that it was able to stimulate its domestic industry and led to it overcoming its dependence on imports. 

Effects of sanctions on the Russian domestic market

The weakening of the ruble exchange rate and decreased export revenues are probably the only serious results of the sanctions. A close look at the developments within the Russian domestic market suggests that McDonald’s restaurants changed their signage to the Russian “Tasty and That’s it!” (the author did not notice any difference in the menu and in the quality of dishes), the Zara brand of clothing stores wasthe Maag brand of Fashion And More Management DMCC from the UAE, the Australian 2XU replaced Adidas, and the South Korean firm Inni replaced H&M.

The Commonwealth Partnership (CMWP) estimates that of the 85 brands that wanted to shut down their business in Russia,only have actually closed According to the since March 2022, 23 foreign companies have announced their departure from Russia, while another 34 have rebranded and transferred (or announced plans to transfer) Russian business to other market players. At the same time,new brandsentered the country in 2023. Among them, the largest number of chain stores were from Turkey (5), two big companies from China, one each from the USA, Italy, Australia, South Korea, Estonia and Kyrgyzstan, and three from Belarus.

Hotels operating under the Radisson Blu, Park Inn by Radisson, and Olympia Garden brands, which were owned by the international company Wenaas Hotel Russia until March 2023,started operating under the Cosmos In March, the Russian Cosmos Hotel bought 10 hotels in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, and Murmansk from this company for $200 million.

Moreover, the Russian population which had never been spoiled with high wages, survived the impact of European sanctions quite calmly, as energy prices remained virtually unchanged since the end of 2021. It is also the case that Russian manufacturers have very quickly replaced imported products with their own, especially in the consumer sectors.

Western companies that stopped business operations on the Russian market did so because they did not want to pay taxes to the aggressor country were replaced by other companies, mainly from Asian countries and by Russian companies themselves. Today, chain stores in Russia lack only well-known brands of expensive spirits. 

From the developments it is clear that Russia was prepared to deal with the economic consequences of the sanctions and there were countries that were willing to have economic relations with Russia in spite of the sanctions. This could clearly be seen in the developments that took place in the Russian market after the imposition of sanctions by Western Europe. 

The only place where the changes are noticeable is the car market – Western brands are no longer supplied to the Russian market. Their place has been taken by Chinese brands. Instead of new BMW, Opel, Volvo or Volkswagen, those Russians who could afford to buy new cars are opting for Chinese car brands such as Chery, Exeed, Omoda among others.

According to the citing a Yale University database, by June 2023, 151 foreign companies are reducing business in Russia, 175 firms are trying to buy time, and another 230 are undecided over how to exit the Russian market. Among the latter, Chinese companies are particularly numerous.

As for production, the for 2023 allow us to draw conclusions about the industrial production growth rate in Russia. At the end of the year, growth amounted to 3.6%. The positive dynamics were provided by manufacturing industries, which grew by 7.5%. On the contrary, the extraction of minerals decreased by 1.3%, primarily due to reduced exports to Europe.

The main problem with the Russian industry last year was in the large raw material regions, mainly located beyond the Urals. Growth was mainly driven by the defense industry and import-substituting machine building in a country where economic activity is driven by raw material extraction. The growth of the military industry pulled along a number of related industries, primarily metallurgy, as well as those companies that took advantage of the withdrawal of certain sanctioned goods from Russia. These include food products, industrial production and machine building. 

While the defense industry is losing money, it has the potential to increase employment and wages, allowing the population greater purchasing power for individuals employed in the defense and manufacturing industries. During war time a larger than usual number of people will be employed in the defense and manufacturing industries due to which the war results in impact across the chain of the military industrial complex ranging from demand for metallurgical materials which produces metal for tanks to the textile industry which sews uniforms for soldiers. While the impact stemming from war and increase in employment prospects and the resultant purchasing power in the hands of the civilians is purely temporary in nature, money in the hands of ordinary people results in them having disposable income to buy civilian products. 

From the developments in the Russian domestic market it is clear that the sanctions have led to the revival of Russian manufacturing which is driven by war. If the sanctions intended to hurt the Russian economy that did not take place. 

Effects on the flow of capital

The situation with capital outflow from Russia best illustrates this process. In 2022, it reached a record high ofor 13.5% of GDP. This was certainly one more serious challenge for the Russian economy. It was related to several factors. First was that Russian companies were forced to repay their loans to Western banks in one go. Second was the withdrawal of Western companies and the purchase of assets from them by Russian companies. Third was the refusal of Western suppliers to work with Russian importers on pre-supplies (Reference in this context is only about advance financing of all imports) and the fourth was the withdrawal of western investments from the Russian economy. 

However, in 2023 the capital outflowdecreased according to the estimates of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. This outflow was largely compensated by the inflow of capital from Russian citizens, who have or had their accounts closed by Western banks and did not want to risk their assets previously based in Western countries.

Many of the most significant decisions of the West are restrictions related to money transfers from Russia and the entry of Russian citizens into Western countries, which I wrote about here. Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has been unable to solve the two important problems concerning its economy – stopping the flight of money and brain drain of individuals from Russia.  Sanctions on Russian banks, refusal to accept money from Russia and seizures of Russian bank accounts in the West resulted in Russians abroad transferring their money home. As of September 2023, worth of money has returned to Russia. 

By closing its borders in the spring of 2022, the West did everything possible to ensure that Russian individuals, especially skilled individuals remained within Russia. The visa restrictions by countries in the West have helped the Putin regime reduce brain drain. One important example of this has been the reduction in the number of Russian scientists leaving the country. According to the Higher School of Economics of Russia in 2021 before the start of the war, had left the country. The total number of scientists who left Russia after the start of the war till 2024 is . However, the reduction is not limited to just scientists leaving Russia. 

Approximately 261 thousand left Russia after the announcement of mobilization to other countries primarily Turkey, Georgia, Armenia and other countries in Central Asia. The question that arises is why did the people who wanted to avoid mobilization chose to go to these countries in specifc?. The answer quite simply was that at the beginning of the mobilization these countries did not prevent the entry of citizens who were leaving Russia in large numbers. The individuals are mostly educated people working in different sectors of the economy. Many of them have since these countries began to deny them the right to stay.  It is notable that Western countries did nothing to help these individuals.

The West promised, “” at the beginning of the conflict in February 2022. The question is, who are the sinners who have felt them in full? These sanctions did not stop the war in Ukraine nor did it destroy the Russian economy. In fact in some cases the sanctions contributed to Russia’s development. The sanctions led to financial losses for millions of people in the West, losses of Western companies and their loss of access to the Russian market. Moreover, by imposing all sanctions almost simultaneously, the West lost its final opportunities to influence Putin. If this was done in the name of victory in Ukraine, then clearly, ineffective, means were chosen.

While the sanctions may work in a few years time say 3 to 5 years we may not have this time. The fate of Ukraine, and with it the future world order, will be definitely decided in 2024. Immediate and fundamental steps will need to take effect here and now in matters connected to the Ukraine conflict and in turn the international world order.

[, and edited the piece]

[ fact-checked this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Myth of Economic Armageddon: The Truth About Western Sanctions on Russia appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Paul Krugman last year how ā€œZombie Reaganomicsā€ continues to infect the brains of Republican politicians in the United States. Iā€™d like here to promote two additional policy notions to similar ā€œzombieā€ status. First, the idea that widespread sanctions can drive regime change under autocratic governments. And second, that expanding Internet access can achieve the same.

Of course, these two levers of political control appear quite different on the surface. The Internet is a positive force in the world allowing for increased communication and information ā€” something I do believe, despite my pessimistic views to follow. Meanwhile, sanctions, as even one conservative-libertarian think tank , are increasingly seen as both ā€œineffective and immoralā€ means of punishing governments deemed unsavory.

But some policymakers and pundits today, especially in the United States, seem to think both increasing Internet availability and sanctions can still do good for the citizens of their target countries. See for instance, US Senators Marco Rubio and Rick Scott. They recently co-sponsored Senate and urging the US to fund expanded Internet access on the island of Cuba. Scott and Rubio this advocacy as coming from a place of care for the wellbeing of the Cuban people. In December 2020, Rubio issued a statement the US work harder ā€œto protect the fundamental rights of Cubans.ā€

Yet only six months later, the same senator the Biden administration to increase sanctions against the Cuban government ā€” in effect, against the very same people whose ā€œfundamental rightsā€ he says he wants to protect. 

How is it possible for one person to both wish to expand Cuban sanctions and Cuban Internet access? Presumably, Rubio hopes these things will magically lead to more freedom for Cubans, despite mounting evidence neither can do so. I believe thereā€™s a Cranberries for that.

These zombie ideas have proven false nearly everywhere in the world, but thereā€™s a great deal of evidence this is especially true for Cuba. So letā€™s separately examine the impacts of the Internet and sanctions on autocratic governments, and then see how the two have played out together in Cuba over the past several years to disastrous effect.

Comparison shopping

An idea has persisted throughout the politics, media and tech space for decades that the Internet inevitably leads to democracy in places with autocratic regimes. As Thomas Friedman wrote in his 1999 book The Lexus and the Olive Tree:

On the Internet people are ā€¦ uploading and downloading ideologies. In a few years, every citizen of the world will be able to comparison shop between his country and his own government and the one next door.

Since Friedman wrote these words, the Internet has expanded and changed in too many ways to count. The hope that social media and the Internet might lead to enduring political change has changed with it, as can be seen most prevalently in the hopeful run-up to, and then subsequent disappointment, of the variously named , , and ā€œrevolutions.ā€ Entire books examining how the Internet has helped fuel protest movements and then, more often than not, helped repressive regimes crush them ā€” and then allowed these same regimes to strengthen grips on power, tightening government palms over civilian mouths.

In fact, as James Griffiths in his book The Great Firewall of China: How to Build and Control an Alternative Version of the Internet, US rhetoric about Internet freedoms has even helped strengthen autocratic governments by validating claims of US imperialism. Griffiths points to a situation in which the government of China pointed at US efforts in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ā€œTwitter Revolutionā€ to justify its own Internet controls. He cites Yu Wanli, an expert on USā€“China relations, who explained to US diplomats that pro-Internet rhetoric, like that of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, ā€œempowered the censors, ā€˜who could now plausibly argue that the United States was explicitly using the Internet as a tool for regime change.ā€™ā€

We can see another example of Internet evangelistic backfire in the deployment of , a Twitter-like app secretly created and deployed in Cuba by the United States Agency for International Development. After the app made headlines, , ā€œWas ZunZuneo to Promote Free Speech or Destabilize Cuba?ā€ To some extent, the answer doesnā€™t matter ā€” either way, the incident created a credible intervention the Cuban government could point to in making claims of US imperialism. As Jon Lee Anderson , ā€œEpisodes like ZunZuneo will only make the Cuban security state more paranoid and more fearful of opening up, and the losers will be the Cuban people.ā€

As for sanctions, a mounting body of evidence shows they tend to succeed in anything but preserving the ā€œfundamental rightsā€ of citizens. As the Center for Economic and Policy Research documented extensively in a recent , 30 separate studies have found sanctions negatively affect ā€œper capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality, and human rights.ā€ 

A 2018 UN estimate found the US embargo of Cuba in particular the Cuban economy a phenomenal $130 billion over the course of nearly sixty years, a figure which has surely risen since. William LeoGrande, professor and former dean of the American Universityā€™s School of Public Affairs, that the embargo is ā€œthe oldest and most comprehensive US economic sanctions regime against any country in the world,ā€ and that it ā€œhas never been effective at achieving its principal purpose: forcing Cuba’s revolutionary regime out of power or bending it to Washington’s will.ā€ My co-host and I the ongoing failure of Americaā€™s Cuba sanctions on our podcast with policy expert Rob Morris, who also the devastating cruelty and failure of sanctions around the world earlier in the year.

To be clear, Iā€™m no apologist for the Cuban government. But it is evident that, as we approach the 65th year of the islandā€™s US sanctions without any semblance of the regime change they , we should finally find a way to retire them. 

A case study of Cuba

Now with the Internet, we can see the reality of the world… before it was just Cuba, but now we see on the Internet, England, France. We think ‘what the f—?!’ People are unhappy.

I heard this in Havana in May 2023 from Elizabeth, a waitress in her twenties. And I heard similar attitudes from others I met too ā€” sentiments much different from my first visit to Cuba, seven years earlier. When I told a young man, JosĆ©, that it was my second visit to the island, he replied with a resigned tone. ā€œOh, so you know. Things were much better then.”

What could have led to such a visible change in Cuban attitudes toward life on the island ā€” a change large enough to allow Cubans to share their negative opinions of the country with me, a visiting stranger, despite their governmentā€™s of dissent?

A few salient events are worth noting:

ā€” In 2017, Donald Trump entered the US White House and
much of the economic normalization pursued
by Obama. Joe Biden entered the US presidency in 2021 and
has maintained most (though ) of Trumpā€™s Cuba policies.Ģż

ā€” In 2019, Cubaā€™s state-run telecommunications company, ETECSA,
finally began the purchase of 4G data. This marked a
crucial opening in Internet access for the average Cuban, which
had primarily been confined to high-cost, low-speed
wifi hotspots in public parks.

ā€” In 2020, the Covid pandemic on Cubaā€™s tourism
industry and economy. This was by a sharp
currency devaluation, soaring food prices and one of the highest
inflation rates in Latin America.

ā€” On July 11, 2021, Cubans staged the largest on
the island in decades ā€” protests which locals say were fueled by
social media, an idea corroborated by . In
response, the Cuban government arrested protesters,
killed at least one and ā€œdisappearedā€ and detained hundreds for
. Internet access on the island was also for
days after the July 11 protests.

So, we can observe all the elements here of the zombie ideas that some say should lead to protest and regime change under a government traditionally averse to it ā€” strict sanctions, a rapid deterioration of living conditions, and rapid expansion of the Internet and information access. 

All the underlying conditions are there. But whereā€™s the change?

Itā€™s not as though Cubans are naĆÆve. I was told by a man working as a Havana tour guide, ā€œCuba is not like China, where they have the technology to control the Internet. If the Internet cuts out when you’re talking with a friend, the first thing you wonder is, ‘Where is the protest now?'” 

But they also see what the government is doing, arresting and otherwise ā€œdisappearingā€ dissenters. And so many I met, rather than endanger their lives and livelihoods by continuing to try to change the government, are opting instead to do what many other rational people would in their same situations: .

ā€œI donā€™t want the same life as my parents,ā€ Elizabeth told me. She said sheā€™d like to go to Mexico first, and then ā€œmaybe somewhere else.ā€

JosĆ©, who recognized how much worse things had become in the country since 2016, told me he has a grandfather in Spain and would like to get a ā€œred [European] passportā€ within the year. Then heā€™d be gone too.

So we can see in Cuba a seemingly tight and tragic causal circle: 

1. Sanctions immiserate a civilian population.

2. Internet access helps the population recognize and share their sense
of immiseration, and perhaps even bind together to protest
conditions.

3. The civilian government shows an unwillingness to tolerate this
shared sense of immiseration and protest and works to quash
dissent.

4. Members of the population who are able, rather than risk life and
livelihood trying to change a government unwilling to change,
give up and decide to leave.

Thereā€™s a fifth, and especially tragic, link in this chain. At least in the situation of Cuba, record numbers of refugees have to the US in recent years ā€” surely at least in part because of the sanctions that have helped make life untenable there and the Internet that has raised awareness of this general untenability. We can see the same Rubio who has pushed for sanctions and increased Internet in Cuba to ā€œprotect the fundamental rights of Cubansā€ also for their exile and to block access to Cuban refugee benefits, ultimately pushing the US government to large numbers of the Cuban refugee population back to Cuba ā€” back to the government and country they were trying so hard to leave.

A failed tactic

Does Internet access ever lead to regime change? Sadly, the answer seems to be no. Or at least not yet, and not in the long term.

We can see this in Cuba, as Iā€™ve outlined above. The Internet can perhaps even help protests bond together, but the idea that protest movements will change governments hinges on an assumption of democratic responsiveness. And the places where policymakers and pundits focus their hopes on Internet-driven revolution are almost always countries lacking just this ā€” indeed, a dearth of democratic responsiveness is the very reason for much of the focus on Internet and sanctions in those places to begin with.

This is perhaps no better summed up than by Elizabeth, the waitress I met in Havana this spring. Because of the Internet, she says, ā€œthe government has less power over the people.ā€ But when I asked if she thought the government would change as a result, she rolled her eyes, and stifled a laugh. ā€œChange anything? No!ā€

I, in fact, largely agree with Friedmanā€™s claim over 20 years ago that the Internet will allow ā€œevery citizen of the world ā€¦  to comparison shop between his country and his own government and the one next door.ā€ But itā€™s evident from all thatā€™s occurred since that this ā€œcomparison shoppingā€ wonā€™t usually lead to new and better governments for those citizens, it only means theyā€™ll either grumble through it or leave that ā€œstoreā€, their country, for another, better one. And then hope that country doesnā€™t deport them.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Sanctions and Internet Access Will Fail to Promote Regime Change appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

In recent months, European countries have increasingly adopted restrictions aimed at reducing contact between Western and Russian citizens. This is difficult to explain with the purpose of the sanctions ā€” to economically weaken Russia and force it to make peace with Ukraine.

The EUā€™s increasingly restrictive travel sanctions

Recall that back on February 25, 2022, the day after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Council visa sanctions on Russian diplomats and businessmen, who from that moment lost simplified access to the EU. The EU such restrictions to all Russians in September 2022.

Furthermore, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland visas at the national level and restricted border crossings for Russian citizens with EU visas, citing ā€œa serious threat to our public security.ā€ To put it bluntly, after the introduction of restrictions on money transfers to the EU for Russians, as well as the refusal of Western insurance companies to cooperate with Russian partners, obtaining Schengen visas for most Russian citizens is now impossible.

As early as the February and March of 2022, all EU member states, as well as the US and Canada, Russian airlines from flying to their countries. Russia retaliatory sanctions. Air travel is now much more expensive and time-consuming, requiring additional connections to avoid banned airspace.

For now, however, Russia still has a land border with the EU, which runs through the territory of Finland, the Baltic States and Norway. However, all of them have restricted the issuance of visas and the movement of Russians with transit visas.

On March 2, 2022, the EU that it was banning key Russian banks from SWIFT, the most important global financial messaging system. It also prohibited the importation of EU-denominated banknotes into Russia. On March 5, leading credit card companies Visa and Mastercard in Russia. On March 11, the US government also the importation of its currency to Russia. A little later, in April 2022, the EU its restrictions to all other official currencies of EU member states.

These measures primarily hit, not Russian citizens, but citizens of other countries who wanted to enter Russia. However, the EU did not object to its people exchanging euros for US Dollars and taking out the amounts of cash they needed in American currency. This proves that the goal was to make traveling to Russia more expensive ā€” after all, in order to eventually buy the Russian ruble, people in European countries had to pay an additional fee for the double conversion.

On October 6, the EU adopted the eighth package of sanctions, providing for a ban on exports of Russian products, including , to Europe. In July 2023, German authorities this clause as a ban not only on imports for the purpose of sale but also on the temporary entry of cars with Russian license plates. Both Russian car owners who had the right to be in the EU (for example, family members of European citizens) and EU citizens who had cars with Russian registration came under threat. These cars began to be seized and confiscated.

On September 8, 2023, the European Commission (EC) issued a clarification confirming that Russian-registered personal vehicles were not allowed in the EU. This measure applies to all vehicles with Russian license plates. Moreover, the that Russians are prohibited from importing not only cars into the EU but also suitcases, bags, purses, leather and fur products, cosmetics, semi-precious and precious stones, cell phones, cameras and laptops. EC spokesman Balazs Ujvari later that EU countries should not confiscate Russians’ clothes, but insisted that this should be done with regard to cars.

EC spokesman Daniel Ferri that member states must strictly enforce the ban on importing cars specifically, even if the vehicle is not actually ā€œimportedā€ but crosses the border only for tourism or short-term stays. Ferri did not specify whether there could be exceptions to the obligation of national authorities to confiscate cars of Russian citizens, for example, if these citizens permanently reside in an EU member state or enjoy refugee or humanitarian status.

While Italy, Spain, Austria and a number of other Western European countries immediately announced that they Russian cars, the countries bordering Russia ā€” Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Finland immediately agreed with the EC’s clarification. Moreover, only Finland agreed to respect an exception for EU citizens and Russians permanently residing in that country. Moreover, on November 2, 2023, Latvia this by amending its law on road traffic.

In the near future, it appears that countries that have land borders with Russia will close their border crossings under the controversial pretext of ā€œsecurity.ā€ Thus, slowly but surely, the West is lowering the “iron curtain” with Russia. This is fundamentally different from the situation in the 1930s, when it was the USSR that closed itself from the West. 

Travel bans are achieving the opposite of their stated purpose

Letā€™s try to understand why the West has chosen such a policy and how it will help to establish peace in Ukraine and democratize Russia.

The EUā€™s is that sanctions are aimed at weakening the Russian government’s ability to finance a war of aggression against Ukraine and are designed to ā€œminimise the negative consequences on the Russian populationā€; ā€œsanctions are designed to maximise the negative impact for the Russian economy, while limiting the consequences for EU businesses and citizens.ā€

That is, formally, the European Council declares that it does not aim to collectively punish the Russian population and or restrict EU citizens in their contacts. Its goal is to weaken the Kremlin’s economic and military-technical power and force it to make peace. Thus, there is a contradiction between the spirit of the sanctions originally laid down by the European Council and its interpretation by overzealous European law enforcers.

How has the actual massive visa ban on Russians and air travel ban advanced the peace process? If one assumes that Russian business has the ability to influence President Vladimir Putin (which is not really true, because Russian business is completely dependent on the government, not the other way around), then one would assume that these restrictions were anti-business. But this is also not true, because those rich Russians who are not under sanctions and own real estate in Europe have, as a rule, residence permission in these countries; they do not need a visa. Unlike to ordinary people, the additional costs associated with longer flights are of no consequence to the rich.

Ordinary people bear the brunt of the difficulties. Among these are representatives of the Russian opposition, who previously had the ability to run to one of Moscowā€™s nine airports in order to escape retaliation after a protest. It is interesting that after the air travel ban, protests in Russia virtually ceased.

The opposition has no longer the moral right to call on Russians to take to the streets, as that call is tantamount to imprisonment for a minimum of five years.

Could Russia’s economy and military potential really have been hit by sanctions on private Russian cars driving into the EU? There is not and has never been any significant importation of Russian cars into the EU. There has always been the reverse process ā€” exportation of cars to Russia.

Given the visa restrictions already existing, the car ban only affects a limited number of Russian citizens, mostly permanent residents of EU countries with residence permits as well as Europeans with residence permits in Russia, who need a car with Russian license plates to travel safely around Russia. It is unlikely that they have any influence over Putin or the Russian authorities.

What do these people do now? They cannot neglect their families. They have to take a train or hitchhike to the Russian border, cross the border on foot and take a cab to the city of Pskov in order to access the rest of Russia by train or plane. And the ticket price will go to a Russian state-owned railroad company or airline, which in turn pays into the Russian budget.

And there are many such people who have families on both sides of the border. About 1,000 Karelian families moved to Finland from Russian Karelia in the 1990s. All of them have relatives in Russia. Let alone the several million Russian-speaking families in the Baltic States and Germany.

The real purpose of the restrictions

So, what effect have such sanctions really achieved?

Bans on the transportation of euros, or of Russian travelersā€™ cell phones or cosmetics, as well as the possible complete closure of borders with Russia ā€” these measures are all of a piece. Their goal is to reduce contacts, to isolate Russians from the West and the West from Russia. In reality, these measures hurt those who have family ties on both sides of the border. This is completely contrary to the EU’s humanitarian policy, which prioritizes the maintenance of kinship ties.

Are we sure that these people blame the Russian authorities, who started the war with Ukraine, for the new difficulties and financial costs they are now having to bear? My personal experience suggests that such people are in the minority. People’s thinking is much more straightforward: It is the fault of the one who introduced the restrictions.

Most people who have trouble traveling across the border are convinced that they are not personally to blame for the Kremlinā€™s waging war against Ukraine and therefore should not be held accountable for its actions. And they begin to wonder whether Putin is right when he claims that the West simply hates Russians. Thus, the measures do not weaken support for Putin, but for Europe.

It is possible that those officials who made such decisions in Brussels or Berlin were simply mistaken. Perhaps they did not realize that the interests of permanent residents of the EU, including their own citizens, would actually be affected. Perhaps they did not realize that these measures would have no effect on the Kremlin or the war in Ukraine.

But why were these decisions so enthusiastically supported by European politicians and political analysts, especially in Eastern European countries? Perhaps authorities in countries bordering Russia want to use the moment to detach their fellow citizens from Russia, some of whom view it as a ā€œhistorical homelandā€. What does this have to do with the purpose of the sanctions?

Where did the idea that the West should close itself off from Russia by minimizing contacts come from? I think the main reason is quite prosaic. In January 2023, Mark Temnitsky, a journalist and staff member of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, published an in Euronews entitled ā€œThe European Union should stop issuing tourist visas to Russians.ā€ In reality, by that time Schengen visas to Russians were practically no longer issued. The article was really about something else, which Temnitsky reveals in the anecdotes he cites.

During a trip to Montenegro, Temnitsky climbed one of the local mountains. He writes,

We reached into our bag and pulled out a Ukrainian flag. A customary tradition, we always take a photo with it during our annual trips.

We took a second to pose with our flag at the fortress and requested a neighbouring tourist to take our picture. 

But this encounter was different. As we stood for a photo, another group of tourists gave us unpleasant looks.

ā€œUkrainians,ā€ one of them snarled in Russian, eyes cold with contempt.

We quickly finished taking our photo, packed our flag, and descended down the fortress. As our group continued on our walk, the discomfort among us became palpable as we came across additional Russian tourists who gave us similar stares.

Temnitsky was offended that the onlooker assumed he was a Ukrainian. But Temnitsky did not check this personā€™s documents, either. The tourist could have been a citizen of any of the former Soviet republics, including the Baltic States, as well as a citizen of Israel, the United States, Germany, Finland, or anywhere there is a Russian-speaking community. But he concluded that these were tourists from Russia.

Then the author went to Greece and Cyprus, where this story repeated itself. On this basis, he concludes: ā€œThis is Russia today. Over the past 19 months, many have mislabeled the Russian invasion of Ukraine as ā€˜Putinā€™s war,ā€™ blaming the current circumstances on the Russian president.ā€ According to him, all 145 million Russian citizens support the war. As proof, he cites the results of opinion polls conducted by Russian sociological services controlled by the Kremlin. 

The author’s conclusion is quite simple and radical: Russians should be punished for the actions of their government. Vacations and trips abroad are a luxury, and banning Russian citizens from traveling abroad will make them think twice about the actions of their government. It’s hard to imagine Temnitsky, an Atlantic Council staffer, could seriously believe what heā€™s saying ā€” since the Atlantic Council regularly Russia of rigging elections and being out of touch with voters. So, either the Atlantic Council is spreading disinformation and Russia remains a democratic state, or we should recognize that the author of this Euronews article is, to put it mildly, not logical in his inferences. His message is based on plain xenophobia.

Xenophobia in the form of Russophobia, as well as growing isolationist sentiments towards Russia, also based on fear of ā€œoutsiders,ā€ is the main reason why the West is now lowering the Iron Curtain. There is simply no other explanation. The restrictions on travelers in no way bring victory over Putin’s Russia, but on the contrary contribute to the consolidation of anti-Western sentiment among the victims of this policy.

One can, of course, accuse the West of incompetence, but then the conclusions are even sadder. But if Western countries, whose main value is tolerance and freedom, begin to be guided by xenophobia in the development of political decisions, it is bad, first of all, for the West itself. 

Openness has always been the main weapon of the free world. We have always been strong because we profess freedom and are not afraid of the truth. We have carried this truth to the whole world, including Russia, and in the 1980s and 90s, it yielded results. Today, with the propaganda that characterizes the main official Russian media, the openness and accessibility of the West with its free information and values is becoming more and more important. Let us not forget that, although reforms in the USSR began with the coming to power of an adequate leader, Soviet public consciousness by that time had already been was already prepared for changes. And it was the openness of the West that played a key role in achieving that.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

Associative Xenophobia in Europe: a New Old Trend

Should We Lift the Ban on Russian Sport?

Making Sense of Vladimir Putinā€™s Long Game

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The article informs us that Huaweiā€™s new generation of smartphones delivers a resounding, though not yet necessarily fatal, blow to what has become the US hegemonā€™s most sacred mission: containing China. First by Trump loyalist and adviser Steve Bannon along with a group of conservative friends in 2019, the policy has been faithfully adopted and refined by the Biden administration.

The idea of containment as the basis of foreign policy emerged during the Cold War. The nation to be contained then was the Soviet Union, which collapsed and disappeared three decades ago. The expansion of NATO over that timespan, despite promises to the contrary, would appear to demonstrate that the obsession with containing anything associated with Russia endures, consciously or unconsciously. The practical result of that ā€œidea we just canā€™t get out of our headsā€ is the current conflict in Ukraine.

But when Foggy Bottom strategists consciously evoke containment today, they are speaking about China, not Russia. There are two justifications for this choice. China has conveniently remained an officially communist regime. More significantly, China, despite current woes, is quickly becoming the worldā€™s most powerful economy, challenging the hegemony of the US for the top spot. That alone justifies a policy of containment.

The Post article explains the gist of the matter. ā€œU.S. sanctions were intended to slow China’s progress in emerging fields like artificial intelligence and big data by cutting off its ability to buy or build advanced semiconductors, which are the brains of these systems. The unveiling of a domestically produced seven-nanometer chip suggests that has not happened.ā€

°Õ“Ē»å²¹²āā€™s Weekly Devilā€™s Dictionary future definition:

US sanctions:

A powerful non-explosive weapon developed by the American military-industrial-political complex in the late 20th century and deployed excessively in the 21st, leading eventually to the disenchantment of the majority of humanity and the dissolution of the post-World War II normative order often referred to as the ā€œrules-based order.ā€

Contextual note

Perhaps the most telling comment in the article was this one: ā€œBiden administration officials declined to comment.ā€ Sanctions have become the go-to instrument in keeping the ā€œrules-based orderā€ intact and asserting Washingtonā€™s authority to judge and punish the infringement of any of the rules. It is unthinkable that anyone inside the Beltway might acknowledge not only that sanctions havenā€™t worked but may have backfired.

Florida Senator Marco Rubio recently elucidated his fear that the dreaded weapon of sanctions, essential to the existing world order, may be wrenched from American hands by the eventual success of the intention stated by BRICS countries to dedollarize the global economy.

Back in 2021, the United Nations this fairly obvious advice in the headline of an article, ā€œPunishment of ā€˜innocent civiliansā€™ through government sanctions must end.ā€ The article focused on economic cost. ā€œActivities essential to every countryā€™s development suffer when unilateral sanctions are imposed.ā€ Economic warfare, though not conducted with destructive weapons, is still warfare and tends to be destructive of peopleā€™s livelihoods, if not directly their lives.

In this case, sanctions have produced the opposite of their intended effect. They have accelerated Chinaā€™s development of cutting-edge technology. This means that China has not only achieved what it may not have achieved without the sanctions, it has also potentially inverted the existing customer-supplier relationship, to the detriment of American industry. China has long been a rich market for US technology. If it produces its own, it disappears as a market. Itā€™s no wonder the Biden administration has been reduced to silence.

Historical note

The Washington Post interviewed one US expert who articulated the long-standing paradox at the core of US ideology. Americans have been taught to view the virtue of free trade as supreme, the foundation of capitalism and the key to their prosperity. At the same time, the US, as the ā€œindispensable nationā€ feels it must control or at least police the markets, meaning they will be less free. This raises a fundamental question no one wants to address: are freedom and control compatible? This existential question has dogged the history of capitalism since the Gilded Age, when the success born of entrepreneurial freedom produced situations in which private companies found themselves in the position to control an entire marketplace.

The historical response came in the form of the anti-trust legislation best associated with President Theodore (Teddy) Roosevelt. Freedom-loving Americans learned to accept the idea that the government must play a role in maintaining the freedom of marketplaces. That seemed to solve the problem at the national level. But, in the course of the 20th century, the question of monopoly and the behavior of cartels became displaced to the international level. Anointing itself the defender of free market ideology for the entire globe in the face of Soviet communism during the Cold War, the US discovered, at the international level, the inebriating secrets of global monopoly.

Following World War II, US foreign policy became dominated not by the management of international relations between sovereign states, but by the defense of ā€œthe national interest.ā€ This was defined not as the defense of the nationā€™s integrity within its borders, but rather in economic terms and extended to a global scale. The US assumed its role of ā€œleadership of the free worldā€ and concretized it through the reign of the dollar.

Quoting Willy Shih, an economist at Harvard Business School, the Post article describes US Cold War policy and its unintended effects. ā€œWashington faced a similar quandary of how to hobble the Soviet Unionā€™s technological development during the Cold War. The U.S. Defense Department developed the technology and restricted its export, wary of it in the hands of rivals. But the export restrictions pushed Moscow and other governments to develop their own versions.ā€ Shih felt it appropriate to add, ā€œyou have to wonder if the same thing is happening now with Huawei.ā€

If any of the aliens and others claim have visited the earth were to examine this situation, wondering how human beings reason today about the paradox between freedom and control, they would most likely be puzzled by the choices the US government has repeatedly made. The reigning orthodoxy seems to suppose that order exists only if the US government is free to exercise control.

In the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, those aliens might have expected to see humans, suddenly aware of the danger of nuclear warfare, engage in a concerted effort to eliminate the obvious risk of the destruction of humanity itself. Similarly, if they are still watching, they might expect todayā€™s nations to be working together to solve, rather than simply debate existential questions raised by climate change or the perceived threat of AI.

Instead, those aliens, had they continued their observations starting with the Cold War, would have observed a never-ending competitive arms race to see which nations could show themselves capable of wielding the most coercive power. Competition, not cooperation, has become the dominant gene in the DNA of modern nation-states. Powerful states proudly allow that gene to express itself without restraint. But what history teaches us today is not only that competition may be bad for oneā€™s health, but that it also serves to incite the adversary to become stronger and presumably more threatening.

One of the experts cited in the Post article predicted the likely reaction to this news about another nationā€™s successful R&D. ā€œThis development will almost certainly prompt much stronger calls for further tightening of export control licensing for U.S. suppliers of Huawei.ā€ But that is bad news for America’s ā€œnational interest,ā€ because China has been a fabulous market for US high tech industries. The same expert noted that ā€œU.S. semiconductor companies would prefer to be able to continue to ship commodity semiconductors to Huawei and other Chinese end users, to maintain market share and stave off the designing [without] U.S. technology from Chinese supply chains more broadly.ā€

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devilā€™s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51³Ō¹Ļ Devilā€™s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Even as is writing about ā€œthe coming food catastrophe,ā€ the Bank of England Governor Andrew Bailey is admitting to be unable to stop UK inflation hitting 10%, and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics is recording 8.3% inflation for April, Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh looks under the surface and around the corner to make sense of what to expect in the global economy.

Atul Singh on the Economic Consequences of Russia-Ukraine War

In this episode of FOĀ° Insights, Atul Singh makes sense of what is going on. You can watch the video above and/or read what he has to say below. The transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

What are the economic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war?

Atul Singh: The consequences are disastrous. The war could not have come at a worse time. We had a global financial crisis in 2007-08. After that, central banks followed loose monetary policy with quantitative easing. And then of course governments had to be fiscally loose to combat a pandemic.

Now, the war gives a supply-side shock, which means energy economics is back, food economics is back, and of course, commodities economics is back. 

Energy economics? Very simply, the price of oil and gas has shot up. Inflation is ripping through the world and even rich countries are suffering. 

Food? Well, we read in The Economist, no less, about an impending food catastrophe ā€” 250 million people are at risk of famine.

Commodities? Russia is the biggest exporter of natural gas, the second biggest of oil and the third biggest of coal. About 25% of battery-grade nickel comes from Russia. In fact, 50% of USA’s uranium imports come from Russia and this is not to mention copper and palladium and whatnot. 

So, there’s a real supply-side shock of monumental proportions. Add to that ships not leaving the Black Sea, and you can see this is going to end very badly. 

Who will suffer most?

Atul Singh: It will be people who need food who will suffer the most. The first requirement to live is of course water and then it is food. It is important to remember that Russia and Ukraine supply 28% of the world’s wheat, 29% of the world’s barley, a lot of the maize and, of course, 75% of sunflower oil. 

Egypt relies for 86% of its imports on Russian and Ukrainian wheat and 30% of Egyptā€™s caloric intake is bread. So it’s a case of bread and oil. With oil prices rising, food prices get a double kicker because costs of production in places like the US, India and China goes up.

India is having an exceptionally hot summer, so its supply is going to go down. China has had delayed rains. So, we have falling harvests combined with rising food and oil prices to make a perfect storm.

And of course, let’s not forget Sub-Saharan Africa where 40% of the family budget goes on food. Everyone will suffer and the big victims are going to be Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, of course, I’ve mentioned them before, and Lebanon, which after the explosion in 2020 can just store a month of food. So rocky times ahead.

What are the results of sanctions?

Atul Singh: Well, the obvious results of sanctions are really-damaged Russian economy. Russia has been shut out of the global financial system. Russian factories are finding it difficult to find spares to keep running. Big brands have pulled out of Russia. Law firms have left Russia. Coca Cola is out, McDonald’s is out and so on and so forth now. 

The damage to the Russian economy is obvious. Damage to the Ukrainian economy is obvious too. There are many, many, many reports talking about how the Ukrainian economy is teetering on the brink of collapse, and perhaps could not sustain a longer war. But apart from Russian and Ukraine there are second order and third order effects.

The results of sanctions are loss of profits for a lot of European companies. German companies are suffering. Obviously, French ones are suffering. And then of course, Chinese companies that operate in the West cannot operate in Russia, at least with the same freedom as they did before. So can’t Indian companies. 

There is, of course, the threat of counter sanctions. What if Russia says this is a game two can play? We switch off the supply of nickel. Goodbye to your green economics. Goodbye to your clean cars. The results of sanctions are manifold.

Then there is the question of the global financial system. Assets of øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s central bank have been frozen and Russia has been shut out of SWIFT. What do the other countries such as Saudi Arabia and China do in response?

Could there be a blowback from sanctions?

Atul Singh: Of course, there could and would be blowback. There are always unintended consequences to these things. Now. Russia could shut off supplies at nickel, palladium etc. Sanctions are a game two can play. 

Saudi Arabia is worried. Not too long ago, a certain journalist was chopped up in Istanbul and sanctions against Russia could very well be used against the Saudis. It’s a good precedent. China isn’t too popular either in Washington or in European capitals these days. So talk of a petrol-yuan trade has emerged which challenges the dollar, talk of rupee-ruble trade has emerged and talk of renminbi-ruble trade has emerged. 

With all these different countries starting to trade in their own correct currencies, this is possibly a challenge to the dollar. Also remember Russia has been kicked out of SWIFT, the global financial transactions and payments network.  SWIFT is expensive. Certainly it’s secure, but this could push for the development of an alternative system that is cheaper and works around SWIFT. The world might be about to get very interesting. 

Will the Russian economy hold or will the dollar dominate?

Atul Singh: Well, one view is it’s curtains for Russia. Inflation is going to cause the collapse of the regime, just as a combination of economic meltdown and military defeat ended the Tsars in 1917. Another view is Russia as a fortress economy. It has food, it has energy and it’ll survive.

If you take the latter point of view, you can say that the ruble has recovered. The Russians have linked it to gold. Russia has the fifth highest gold reserves, and the Russian economy is doing better than expected.

The jury is still out as to what will transpire but Russia is under acute stress and the test of the pudding is in the eating. Let’s see how Russia fares by the end of this year.

Will the dollar dominate? The answer is yes, but the dollar will weaken because sanctions have made big economies like India and China very nervous and these are economies with high growth rates. These are economies that want cut-price oil as oil prices go up. These countries don’t have natural energy resources. So increasingly they are going to try and work around western sanctions through backroom deals.

Also, some sort of a parallel financial system will emerge. We will be seeing a more fragmented world, economically, at the end of this conflict, thanks to the pressures, the inflationary pressures, that the conflict has unleashed around the world.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Making Sense of the Economic Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s Invasion of Ukraine Is a Wake-Up Call for Germany

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Superficially, one might look at the start date of this war as February 24, when Russian forces invaded Ukraine. In fact, President Putin declared his war on the West 15 years ago, when he  the Munich Security Conference, lambasting the US and its allies for overstepping boundaries, unsettling global order and threatening Russia itself. He was especially sharp in his criticism of the US invasion of Iraq and NATO expansion to include the countries of the former Soviet bloc.

Putinā€™s Long-Declared War Against the West

One year later, in the summer of 2008, Putin launched his first military campaign. Russian forces  Georgia, another aspiring democracy, following its (and Ukraineā€™s) application to NATO. He had drawn his line and made clear he was prepared to resist. In 2014, following the ouster of the pro-Moscow President Viktor Yanukovych during the  (aka Euromaidan and Revolution of Dignity), Russian forces ā€” disguised by the absence of uniform ā€” invaded and captured the Crimea region in southern Ukraine, subsequently annexing it. 

Shortly afterward, Putin threw his support behind Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Donbas in eastern Ukraine, on the border with Russia. That conflict continued to fester through last weekā€™s invasion.

As he rationalized in Munich, NATO was advancing east, encircling and threatening Russia. In fact, it was the nations of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus moving West, adopting the Western model of democracy and free economy, and electing to formally associate with them. Their rationale has been made ever clearer now: They feared Russian aggression and sought the security of NATO and the prosperity of the EU. Russia and Putinā€™s model of one-man rule, fear and intimidation, repression and stymied economic opportunity held no attraction, and even less under some misguided, fever-dream version of a resurrected Russian empire.

It may have been easy to compartmentalize Putinā€™s antagonism as directed solely at former eastern bloc states on øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s periphery. But Ukraine and Georgia have always been merely the staging grounds of Putinā€™s assault on the West. His calculation was that a seemingly enfeebled US, weakened abroad and divided at home, and a fractious and divisive NATO would not respond. They would acquiesce to his vision of a neo-Russian empire and the recently resurgent notion ā€” also supported by China ā€” of the spheres of influence of great powers. He also calculated that Ukraine, after its failure to defend Crimea or defeat the Russian-backed separatists in Donbas, would fold in the face of øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s superior military might.

Putin doubtlessly also realized that Russia is a declining power. The base for its economy, oil and natural gas, while still much in demand, is facing a declining shelf life as advanced countries turn rapidly to renewable energy technologies. Enormously rich in natural resources and even richer in human ingenuity, it is a one-dimensional economy, making it dependent on the vagaries of commodity markets to keep its budget in balance. Its population has been  over the last decades and is aging. øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s status in the global power alignment is fading, and Putin knows it. Now was the time to strike.

Putinā€™s whining aside, the invasion of Ukraine was never about the Westā€™s threat to Russia. Democracies go to war only when threatened. In fact, Putin was crystal clear in his purpose when he belittled Ukraine and  its independence in a speech on February 21, a nakedly transparent declaration of Russian expansionism. Holding up NATO as the aggressive villain and Ukraine as an inherent and natural part of greater Russia was a red herring that earned no perch outside his most ardent apologists.

Calculating Putin Miscalculates

The reputedly calculating Putin underestimated his immediate enemy, the Ukrainian people, and his ultimate enemy, the West. Nor did he grasp the dimensions of the new kind of war that would result when great powers enter the fray in an overwhelmingly interdependent world. His war has all the signs not only of a hot war but also the Cold War, an economic war, an exponentially more expansive information war than he could have imagined, and a cyberwar.

All will claim causalities across the map, most especially in his own country and Ukraine. Importantly, øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s vaunted propaganda engine may prove no match for the millions of Ukrainians with cell phones and the hundreds of millions cell phone users around the world supporting them.

But the economic disruption of the unprecedented sanctions imposed by the rest of the worldā€™s economic powers, save China, suggests that people everywhere will suffer to some degree. Financial flows are massively displaced, most seriously for a Russia that has been effectively cut out of global financial markets. Note the  in Russian financial markets and the Russian ruble, the clearest signs of an economy in freefall as investors and consumers rush to cash out and then run for the exits.

Even the massive $630 billion in reserves Putin had thought he was so clever in amassing to blunt the anticipated sanctions have become a dead asset. No one will take his dollars, euros, yen or Swiss francs, not even his gold; theyā€™re all toxic now.

Oil and grain markets have been colossally disrupted. Import-dependent nations, both developed as well as poor, will pay much higher prices, leading to increased inflation and hardship. We should also expect other secondary effects from the war and sanctions.

Make Sense of the World

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Ukraine has become the proving ground for democracy. Can the immense financial and economic powers amassed by the worldā€™s democracies counter the brute force military power of one country? Nine of the 10 largest economies in the world are democracies, China the lone exception; Russia ranks 12^th.

Democracies run the worldā€™s financial systems from SWIFT to the global financial institutions that fall under the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. The US dollar dominates global financial transactions and national reserves. Money has often determined warsā€™ winners in the past, but never one on the scale of this one, especially when the antagonists wield nuclear weapons.

It may all fall to the courage and resilience of the valiant Ukrainians. The longer they can hold out against øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s onslaught, already fraught with unanticipated planning, logistical and tactical problems and questionable troop morale, the more unbearable the economic costs will become for Russia. 

Ukraine possesses some of the worldā€™s largest areas of super-rich and fertile black earth. The world is hoping it may also prove to be the perfect soil for democracy to flourish.

*[An earlier version of this article stated that for “the first time since 1945,” war had returned to Europe. Updated March 2, 2022, at 15:00 GMT.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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We invite readers to join us by submitting their suggestions of words and expressions that deserve exploring, with or without original commentary. To submit a citation from the news and/or provide your own short commentary, send us an email.

February 25: Appetite

Is it justified to think that nations have personalities, along with tastes, fears and desires? People do. But can we assume there is an equivalence between the demonstrable inclinations of a national government and the needs, ambitions and predilections of the people in a democracy? It appears ever more obvious that the political class ā€” increasingly perceived as an isolated elite in modern societies ā€” is less representative of and responsive to the people who elect its leaders and officials than to the economic and cultural elite those politicians tend to associate and identify with.

Beware of Dying Empires, an African Warns

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In a Los Angeles Times article on the Kremlinā€™s view of international sanctions, David Pierson and Sam Dean seek to how the West has been elaborating an effective strategy designed to counter øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s militarily assault on Ukraine. ā€œWith no appetite for military confrontation,ā€ they write, ā€œthe U.S. and its allies are relying on sweeping economic sanctions to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to pull out of Ukraine.ā€

Most people would find this sentence a reasonable description of the American reaction to events in Eastern Europe. The comforting message is that the West has no interest in war. The damage and suffering caused by this war can be blamed on one government and indeed one man, Vladimir Putin. 

But does it make any sense to talk of an ā€œappetiteā€ when speaking of the foreign policy of a nation? If the metaphor of a nationā€™s appetite has any factual foundation in the realm of foreign policy, the history of the United States over at least the past three-quarters of a century reveals an aptitude of American leaders for war in all its forms, which may or may not reflect an appetite or even a craving of its leaders.

Recent decades have revealed a proclivity of the American political class to toggle between physical warfare itself ā€” which traditionally pitted trained and equipped armies against each other ā€” and economic warfare directed against entire civilian populations. The latter has recently been deemed by political leaders to be more humane, even though it spreads suffering wider and disproportionately affects uncounted masses of people not remotely involved in wartime aggression or any of the practices cited to justify going to war.

In 1996, when Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the UN at the time, was asked about the death of 500,000 Iraqi children due to US sanctions, she said ā€œthe price is worth it.ā€ This reflects the kind of political calculus that counts half a million lives not as a tragedy, but as a ā€œprice,ā€ something to be evaluated in purely monetary terms. In moral terms, Albright was counting on a form of specious reasoning that says if we havenā€™t directly sought to kill those children, we bear no responsibility. Their sacrifice is thus of no concern.

A similar form of reasoning led to the policy privileged at least since Barack Obamaā€™s presidency of seeing drone warfare as humane because it is ā€œclean,ā€ to the extent that it precludes any risk to the ā€œgood guysā€ (ourselves) doing the killing. If only bad people are being killed, war appears to be humane and possibly as fun as playing a video game.

So now The Los Angeles Times wants us to accept the idea that American leaders have ā€œno appetite for military confrontationā€ in the current Ukraine drama. Apart from the irrelevance of the question of appetite, that idea is contestable for another reason. In this case, it isnā€™t a question of desire, aptitude, proclivity or even ingrained habit. The unwillingness to mount a military operation is due to the simple fact that the United States has no legal justification for engaging in physical war with Russia, which has not threatened US security or the security of any NATO nation. 

Invoking the idea of appetite is disingenuous. Had Ukraine achieved its goal of joining NATO, no one doubts that there would have been plenty of appetite, even a devouring hunger, at least on the part of the military-industrial complex in the US, who are nevertheless actively supplying weapons. Any war is good for business, even a war the US is not allowed to engage in directly. This one, which holds the promise of reinforcing NATO thanks to the magnified fear of Russia, already makes good economic sense for the defense industry at home. That stimulates a lot of appetites. And for the past five years, mainstream Democrats have plenty to munch on after doing everything in their power to enforce the belief that Vladimir Putin is Satan incarnate.

The complementary question The Times authors raise of ā€œrelying on sweeping economic sanctionsā€ to wage war is more ambiguous. Sanctions can be, and in this case are very likely to be, a two-edged sword, even if itā€™s the only sword left in the armory due to the rules surrounding NATO defense. Disturbing the flow of global commerce entails a raft of unintended and often unanalyzed consequences for all parties concerned. 

What is clear, however, is that US administrations have in recent decades developed not so much an appetite as a craving for applying sanctions in every direction whenever anything displeases them in the behavior of any country in the world. Sanctions have become the essential pheromone of the worldā€™s unique hegemon, intent on leaving its odor in every nook, cranny, crevice or just bare wall of the global economy.

Why Monitoring Language Is Important

Language allows people to express thoughts, theories, ideas, experiences and opinions. But even while doing so, it also serves to obscure what is essential for understanding the complex nature of reality. When people use language to hide essential meaning, it is not only because they cynically seek to prevaricate or spread misinformation. It is because they strive to tell the part or the angle of the story that correlates with their needs and interests.

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In the age of social media, many of our institutions and pundits proclaim their intent to root out ā€œmisinformation.ā€ But often, in so doing, they are literally seeking to miss information.

Is there a solution? It will never be perfect, but critical thinking begins by being attentive to two things: the full context of any issue we are trying to understand and the operation of language itself. In our schools, we are taught to read and write, but, unless we bring rhetoric back into the standard curriculum, we are never taught how the power of language to both convey and distort the truth functions. There is a largely unconscious but observable historical reason for that negligence. Teaching establishments and cultural authorities fear the power of linguistic critique may be used against their authority.

Remember, 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s Language and the News seeks to sensitize our readers to the importance of digging deeper when assimilating the wisdom of our authorities, pundits and the media that transmit their knowledge and wisdom.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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According to , Donald Trumpā€™s national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, insisted that China should impose ā€œmore stringent economic sanctions against North Koreaā€ because it has ā€œtremendous coercive economic powerā€ over the regime.

Here is todayā€™s 3D definition:

Sanctions:

1. In modern diplomacy, a form of excommunication, inspired by the traditional practice of the Catholic Church, but applied with the intention not only to exclude but especially to cause physical suffering for entire populations

2. The policy a modern government puts in place whenever it simply cannot sanction another nationā€™s behavior

Contextual note

US administrations, past and present, are dedicated to the spreading of peace and democracy in the world and, for that reason, are averse to conducting wars. Instead, they prefer to apply economic sanctions to many nations to avoid the cost, inefficiency and trouble of warfare. They resort to war only when there is a threat to ā€œnational interests,ā€ which is generally understood to be the economic activities of American business people working overseas.

War can thus be justified only as a response to acts of pure evil, such as threats by local governments to take control of their own resources rather than confiding them to peace-loving multinational corporations. During the Cold War, this sin against peace was easily identified by the label ā€œcommunismā€ or ā€œsocialism,ā€ making any number of governments tempted or influenced by such ideas targets for military intervention.ĢżVietnam was the most spectacular example, but there were many others.

Because of its commitment to peace, especially since the end of the Cold War, when the threat of communism seemed to vanish for good, the US has repeatedly showed its preference for sanctions over war. Cuba, Russia and Iran are clear examples of nations where the humane policy of sanctions has been applied, just as was the case in Iraq during the 1990s (until it was imagined that there were weapons of mass destruction and war would be necessary).

Ever since, restraint has been the key. Today, the US applies sanctions in many different places, but it is actively involved in warfare in no more than five or seven countries (or 134 depending on ).

Sanctions are particularly useful because they can affect not only nations, but organizations, firms and individuals. For a complete list . And they have the advantage of appearing anodyne, even charitable, because they afford suffering populations the time and provide the motivation to organize a revolt against their own government, which of course never happens.ĢżWhich means that preventive war ā€” never actively sought, but finally assumed as a moral responsibility ā€”Ģżwill ultimately be justified for the sake of the helpless, defenseless, suffering people.

Historical note

In the late Middle Ages, the term sanction emerged within the Catholic Churchā€™s legal system to denote ā€œ.ā€ The church invoked the authority of a deity to apply force in sanctioning certain acts. °Õ“Ē»å²¹²āā€™s sanctions are applied not only against acts, but against entire populations, which many consider a form of progress and an advance in efficiency. Rather than the nebulous authority of a God no one (not even the pope) could consult directly, todayā€™s sanctions invoke the very concrete power of international trade, ultimately meaning the source of all money ā€” a God more powerful because more concrete than a mere creator of the universe, too busy engineering the subtleties of quantum mechanics and deploying dark matter to take a direct interest in the policies of human governments.

Fire-bombing Dresden and Tokyo, dropping the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were acts too brutal, messy and quite possibly immoral to constitute an effective model for controlling other countries and the world economy. But they did show that terrorizing and brutalizing populations could be an effective way of guaranteeing future economic peace for the businesses that were making the world a better place for consumers.

The strategy of state terrorism was born, eventually making conventional wars a thing of the past. And the key that emerged in the second half of the 20th century was none other than sanctions. It worked in Iraq during the 1990s. Itā€™s been working with Cuba for over 50 years. Itā€™s produced results with Russia, where it has even achieved the exceptional result of inciting Vladimir Putin to try to manipulate American elections, a casus belli at least for the Democratic Party in the US.

And itā€™s working with Iran by pushing it further into potential conflict with Saudi Arabia and Israel, justifying an unexpected alliance that could be just what it takes to win the war that breaks out once Mohammed bin Salman gets his act together.

Finally, if sanctions are the modern equivalent of excommunication, we should also acknowledge the degree to which medieval siege tactics have inspired todayā€™s sanctions policy. It was the ideal solution to conquering effectively walled cities. Where kings and barons could only conquer one city at a time through the prolonged suffering of its population, we can now achieve the same thing at the level of entire nations.

Civilization has come a long way since the theocratic Middle Ages.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book,, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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After the fourth summit of the Caspian states, held on September 29, 2014, Russian analysts are unanimous in their opinion that relations between Moscow and Tehran are experiencing a renaissance after the substantial cooling down during the last years of ā€™s presidency. On the sidelines of the summit, Russian President held a meeting with his Iranian counterpart, . Both sides confirmed their previously declared intention to further develop bilateral political and economic ties, as well as continue dialogue on regional .

Indeed, and are deeply involved in talks about , the Caucasus, , Ģżand post-Soviet Central Asia. Moscow and Tehran see each other as key players in the negotiation process over the legal status of the Caspian Sea. They also work together to battle drug and human trafficking, cross-border crimes and terrorist organizations in Asia.

The Kremlin does not conceal the fact that a nuclear agreement between the P5+1 group and Iran may benefit Moscow, andĢżRussia has exerted considerableĢżefforts to settle the problem of theĢż.ĢżAn agreement would eliminate the sanctions that have hindered Russian economic activity in the Islamic Republic, and guarantee that Iran will not become another ā€œhot spotā€ on the periphery of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a regional organization formed by former Soviet republics.

Political Dialogue

The intensity of Moscowā€™s dialogue with Tehran in 2013-14 was unprecedented in the history of modern Russia. Within the last 12 months, Putin met Rouhani four times. As for the ministerial level, meetings between the heads of different governmental bodies were taking place almost every month.ĢżIt is probably no coincidence that the Kremlin is currently advocating for ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s involvement in the international discussions on the situation in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. In September 2014, Russian Foreign Minister even called the Islamic Republic ā€œa natural allyā€ in the struggle against religious extremists in the . All these gestures were supposed to demonstrate that Iran is, at the moment, something more than simply a ā€œsouthern neighborā€ for Russia.

Vladimir Putin Ā© Shutterstock

High-ranking Russian officials also seem to be satisfied with the outcomes of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 that took place in Vienna between November 18-24. Following the conclusion of the talks, Lavrov emphasized that the parties had made significant progress toward a deal. He also stressed the active role that Russia has played, arguing that Moscowā€™s efforts ensured that Iran and the P5+1 were able to move closer to an agreement.

These statements do not appear to be another Kremlin PR maneuver. For the past two years, the Russians have been actively working to secure an effective dialogue between authorities in Tehran and the West on the nuclear issue. Lavrovā€™s in 2011-12 set the stage for the current round of negotiations. During the Vienna talks, Russian diplomats were noticeably active, as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Ryabkov held bilateral consultations with almost all sides involved.

These efforts did not go unnoticed, at least not in Tehran. On November 25, President Rouhani personally called Putin to discuss the results of the Vienna negotiations and assure him of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s intentions to continue the dialogue with the P5+1.

Roots of the New Rapprochement

There have also been concerted efforts to foster relations in the economic realm. In 2014, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak ā€” who is also the head of the Russian-Iranian Joint Trade and Economic Commission ā€” established good relations with the Iranian oil minister, Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, and the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi. His efforts resulted in the adoption of the comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the principles of trade and economic relations between the two countries, signed by Novak and Zanganeh in Moscow on August 5, 2014.

The move was welcomed by President Putin, who stated the necessity to fill the legal framework with concrete substance. It also created important groundwork for the 11^th meeting of the Joint Trade Commission, which was held in Tehran between September 7-11, 2014. According to some sources, both sides agreed to increase the volume of bilateral trade , where the overall volume of hypothetical investment contracts that might be signed in the aftermath of this event could potentially ā‚¬70 billion.

As in previous instances, Moscowā€™s increasing interest in Iran is determined by a number of external factors. For instance, the first steps that were made by the Kremlin toward Tehran were mostly provoked by the events of the . When Russian authorities decided to intensify their contacts with the Islamic Republic in mid-2012, they were seriously concerned with øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s rapidly shrinking political and economic presence in the region. As a result, Moscow considered Tehran as one of its last (if not the only) footholds in the Middle East and did its best to secure Russian influence there. The spreading rumors about the forthcoming rapprochement between the and Iran after the signing of the joint plan of action in November 2013 was yet another incentive. The Russian government presumably believed in the subsequent reorientation of the Iranian foreign policy toward the West and tried to convince the Iranian leadership of the necessity to maintain a certain level of contact with Moscow.

Hassan Rouhani and Vladimir Putin /ĢżFlickr

In 2014, Russian tensions with the USĢżand Ģż(EU) over became a further reason to strengthen its cooperation with Iran. The unprecedented ā€” since the end of the Cold War, at least ā€” scale of confrontation with the West made Moscow regard the intensification of contacts with Middle Eastern countries as highly important. Russian authorities believe that good relations with Middle Eastern states will ensure the Kremlin avoids international isolation and compensate for the sanctions imposed by the US, EU and their partners.

Iran has become an important regional leader for Moscow, capable of influencing public opinion elsewhere in the Muslim world. A key aim in this regard is to counterbalance the anti-Russian campaign in Arab media, which is supported by and . Moscow also has plans to coordinate efforts with Tehran in the energy market, in order to ensure that Iranian hydrocarbons are not used by the Europeans, thus decreasing their dependence on Russian gas. From an economic point of view, the Islamic Republic has become increasingly important as an agricultural exporter, whose produce (predominantly fruit and vegetables) may replace European products banned under recentĢżsanctions. Finally, tensions with the West compelled Russian companies to look for trade and investment opportunities in Asia.

There are at least several opportunities for cooperation for Russian businessmen: oil and gas, petro-chemistry, nuclear energy, electricity and railroad infrastructure. On November 11, 2014, Russia and Iran signed an agreement packageĢżregarding Moscowā€™s participation in the construction of up to eight new nuclear power units. The first two reactors are expected to be built at the Busher power plant, in addition to the power generating block that was previously constructed by Russian engineers and handed over to the Iranians in 2013.

It is important that the Iranians are also interested in developing these economic ties. On the one hand, they believe that the current confrontation with the West brings Russia closer to the Islamic Republic and have expressed their readiness to bind Moscow with economic contracts. On the other hand, the strengthening of relations with Russia may be seen in Tehran as ā€œPlan Bā€ in case the nuclear talks fail or do not lead to desired results.

Under these circumstances, it is probably not a coincidence that the visit of øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s minister of economic development, Aleksey Ulukaev, to Iran took place immediately after the failure to reach a comprehensive agreement inĢżVienna. During his trip to Tehran, Ulukaev and Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s minister of industry, signed an MoU that aims at the promotion of trade and investments between the two countries as well as a strategic partnership between the Russian Export Insurance Agency and the Export Guarantee Fund of Iran. These measures are supposed to mitigate the negative effects of the international sanctions on Russian-Iranian economic cooperation.

P5+1 and Iran talks / Flickr

Problems Ahead

Despite this potential, there are serious obstacles that may hamper growing cooperation between the two countries or even stop this process. Since 1991, relations between Russia and Iran were mainly determined by external political factors ā€” namelyĢżby developments of Russian-American relations such as the ā€œresetā€ of 2009 and the Gore-Chernomyrdin treaty of 1995 ā€” that were unable to guarantee the stability of bilateral ties. Today’s political situation precipitatedĢżpolitical and economic cooperation and this, in turn, can lead to the emergence of a more solid base for dialogue.

However, analysts are convinced that the formation of this solid economic ground requires time and that is the resource that Russia and Iran may lack. There are no guarantees that Moscowā€™s relations with the West will not change and that these changes, in turn, will not affect Russian interests in Iran. As the experience of the Medvedev era demonstrates, Moscow could be tempted to sacrifice some of its stakes in the Islamic Republic for the sake of another reset with the US.

The positions of the two countries in the international arena may also play a role. Certain improvements in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s relations with the EU makes the Islamic Republic less dependent on contacts with Moscow. Russian authorities have already received signals from Tehran that they should forget the times when Moscow dictated conditions for the format of bilateral dialogue. In 2013, Putinā€™s visit to Iran was canceled, due to Iranian dissatisfactionĢżwith Russian for the meeting. Under these circumstances, the Kremlin needs to be inventive in order to keep Tehran interested in bilateral dialogue.

This could be challenging. It is still a big question as to how far Russia is ready to go in its political contacts with Tehran and how much it can offer. The formation of any comprehensive strategic alliances with Tehran is still not in Moscowā€™s interest, as this may seriously harm Russian dialogue with several other countries, including Israel and the (GCC) countries. Thus, the Kremlin is still reluctant to help Iran acquire the status of a full-fledged member in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Additionally, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s influence on the ground in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan often surpasses that of Russia. As a result, the only thing that could be offered by Moscow there is perhaps moral support.

Economic obstacles

In terms of economic cooperation, the Russian-Iranian dialogue also has its limits. Apart from ferrous metals, wood and petrochemical products, Russia has a very limited range of goods to offer Iran ā€” and a continually shrinking range at that. As officials from the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry state, it is not the international sanctions, the growing economic presence of China in the region or the intractability of the Iranian authorities, but mere technological backwardness thatĢżprevents Russian companies from dealing with Iran. Thus, Iran currently lacks engineering and technological support as well as equipment for the upgrade and construction of oil refineries and liquefied natural gas (LNG) producing plants. Russia is unable to provide Iran with all the required assistance, equipment and technologies and, moreover, is badly in need of them itself.

International sanctions against Iran also severely limit options for Russian cooperation. As a result, in practical terms, there is little substance behind this intense exchange of high-ranking delegations and ideas. Different levels of Russian government officials are regularly visiting Iran, but the number of big deals concluded is almost zero. Moreover, since 2011, the volume of trade between the countries has been constantly falling by more than 30% annually and, by 2014, it was at around $1.5 billion.

All in all, in spite of mutual intentions to improve the level of bilateral relations, Russia and Iran have to overcome serious challenges to the practical implementation of their plans. On the one hand, the Russian confrontation with the West makes Moscow extremely interested in developing its relations with Tehran. On the other hand, Iran is gradually becoming disillusioned regarding the possibility of a quick settlement of the nuclear issue and the complete lifting of economic punitive measures adopted by the US, EU and its partners. This, in turn, compels the authorities of the Islamic Republic to be more active in their contacts with the countries that are ready to cooperate with Tehran even under existing sanctions.

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The views expressedĢżin this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflectĢż51³Ō¹Ļā€™sĢżeditorial policy.

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ā€œA new ā€ is upon us,ĢżĢżformer Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev earlier in November as he was standing in front of the Brandenburg Gate during a symposium that was meant to celebrate the fall of the . Echoing this harsh statement, artillery and tanks rolled again in lockstep into eastern , putting to rest the long-touted ceasefire. Eight months after the first round of sanctions were imposed against Russian actors, and with no end in sight for solving the Ukraine situation, itā€™s time to take a critical look at what their effects have been so far.

Historically, it has been proven that sanctions are a multipurpose tool that oftentimes yields unpredictable results. George Friedman, chairman of the think tank Stratfor,Ģż thatĢżthe purpose of sanctions ā€œis to induce behavioral changes in a target state by causing economic pain [but in order] to work, sanctions must cause pain.ā€ In øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s case, the behavioral change wasĢżoutlined by the EU in a directive thatĢżsanctions are Ģżto penalize Moscow for its ā€œillegal annexation of and deliberate destabilization of Ukraine.ā€

But have the sanctions inflicted enough pain on øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s economy to ensure that behavioral change? So far, the evidence is mixed.

No Dramatic Impact

As the ruble took a plummet last week amid the Russian Central Bankā€™sĢżĢżthat it would no longer be spending its reserve dollars to prop up the currency, it appears that Putin has begun to embark on internal policy adjustments. Rather than abruptly spending the countryā€™s foreign currency reserves, the ā€œKremlin has decided to hold its fireā€ as it seeks toĢżsave its Ģżfor the long run. This change goes to show that is preparing for a drawn out battle as he refuses to let go of Ukraine and aims to keep the countryā€™s reserves for the storm looming over the horizon.

Sanctions arenā€™t enough to sway the intentions of KGB-trained Putin, begging the question of the impact their continued use will have for European economies.

øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s economy does indeed appear to be heading down a grim path, with analysis showing that falling oil prices, high inflation, capital flight and lack of funding from Western markets are bound to be a recipe for disaster.ĢżĢżhas already reached 8%, while prices on certain staples have risen as much as 30%. This inflation is a worrying factor for many Russians, who had lived through the hyperinflation that prevailed after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Regardless, the view of the sanctions amongst the Russian public clearly differs from that of the West. Ordinary Russians increasingly feel that the West has embarked on a mission to undermine Russia as a nation on the international arena. Rather than venting anger over Putinā€™s foreign policy and its repercussions on the economy, the presidentā€™s approval ratings remain high at 79%, up from their all time low of 53% prior to the annexation of Crimea, according to the Levada Center.ĢżA Ģżof the polling center has underlined that newfound trust in the president and the ā€œorgans of powerā€ has come about largely due to Moscowā€™s ā€œmanagementā€ of the crisis in Ukraine. In fact, a large part of the population supports the idea that Western sanctions will encourage economic growth and development at home while strengthening øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s economic position in the long run. Evgeni Yacin, of the National Research University and Higher School of Economics, goes even further toĢżĢżthat the only goal of the sanctions ā€“ to portray Russia as an evil force ā€“ has already been achieved and the policy of the Russian Federation should now be to search for internal drivers of growth.

Moreover, the hopes that Putinā€™s food embargo on European imports will cause internal dissatisfaction have failed to materialize. Much of these Western products are rather expensive in relation to the average Russianā€™s salary. A ā€œmiddle classā€ Russian single child household with two working parents Ģżof anywhere between $12,000 and $30,000 a year. While $30,000 can certainly be a considerable sum outside of øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s main cities considering lower living expenses, $12,000 a year is certainly not enough for the average family to indulge in imported Western delicacies that cost significantly more than Russian products and are not widely available outside major urban centers.

And if sanctions were intended to punish those wealthy Russians that live off Western goods, recent reportsĢżĢżways to bypass the embargo. For example, companies can register in Belarus and import Western goods into Russia through the Customs Union. Meanwhile, Russia is building its trade relations with Latin America, and Asia, which have slowly gained a foothold on the Russian market, raising the prospect that Europe could beĢżpermanently Ģżfrom Russian shelves in the future.

Attacks on Putinā€™s inner circle have also failed to materialize into any real policy change. Arkady Rotenberg, a businessman hit by the sanctions regime in March, as well as state oil giant Rosneft and Sberbank, have allĢżtaken their Ģżto the (ECJ) seeking to overturn sanctions. Rotenberg, whose assets in Italy have been seized,Ģżhas Ģżthat while sanctions have failed to have any ā€œdramatic impactā€ on his life, he feels unjustly targeted. Given the lack of sufficient evidence provided by the EU when imposing sanctions, it is hardly clear how it plans to link Russian companies and individuals to Moscowā€™s actions in Ukraine, leaving it powerless to defend its decision against those who have increasinglyĢżbegun to Ģżthat EU sanctions ā€œmay begin to lose their punch.ā€

Export-Import

Despite dark forecasts of øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s economic future, Putin would rather look for opportunities to minimize the impact of the sanctions on the country by looking to other markets. The Chinese Premier Li Keqiangā€™s recent visit to Moscow indicates that such a strategy has already begun to take shape, as Russia turns to for funds and investment. On October 13,Ģża variety of Ģżwere agreed upon including a deal to swap $25 billion in Chinese yuan for Russian rubles over the next three years, and to encourage trade by a newly provided credit line to øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s development bank, Vnesheconombank, by Chinaā€™s Export-Import Bank. Further deals on weapons are to be reached in the near future, indicating that with Western doors closed off, Russia is looking to China for the long haul.

Sanctions arenā€™t enough to sway the intentions of KGB-trained Putin, begging the question of the impact their continued use will have for European economies. While the US is hardly phased by sanctions, given its much smaller trade with the Russian state, Europeā€™s already rattled economies areĢżfar more Ģżas the did 12 times more trade with Russia than the US in 2013.

So far, øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s response to the sanctions has been defiant. Speaking prior to the G20 summit in Australia, PutinĢżcontinuedĢżto callĢżthem illegal as they violate international law.Ģż

The Kremlinā€™s retaliatory measures have particularly taken a toll on Europeā€™s farmers, driving down prices and creating a surplus of European fruit and vegetables. A third of EUā€™s agricultural products were sold to Russia last year, causing uproar amongst farmers who are increasingly frustrated by having to pay the price for Europeā€™s policies. As French farmersĢżflung Ģżat government buildings, Italian farmers, who sold ā‚¬72 million worth of fruits and vegetables to Russia, are also angry over their loss of investment in the country and the lack of space for its goods on the European market. While the situation is less than ideal for Russia, Europe is hardly experiencing prosperous times.

Looking Ahead

Despite øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s creeping recession and the EUā€™s poor growth, Ukraine is by far the greatest loser in this battle between east and west. While sanctions were intended to punish øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, today it is Ukraine that isĢżedging towards Ģżwith its GDP predicted to shrink 9% this year.ĢżWhile keen to inflict pain on Russia, the US and EU have failed to provide the necessary backing to ensure the survival for Ukraine and has offered it ā€œa faƧade of support with little substance behind it,ā€Ģż to George Soros.

In order to alleviate the economic pain the country will face, the West needs to provide Ukraine with a minimum cash injection of $20 billion to save the country from collapse. However, in the US, but particularly in the EU, there is hardly enough money or political will to come up with the funds to prop Ukraine. As Franceā€™s ambassador to the US, , stated, ā€œPutin has won because we were not ready to die for Ukraine.ā€ Any meaningful rescue package would have to involve Russia and China, an agreement that seems unlikely to happen in the near future.

So far, øé³Ü²õ²õ¾±²¹ā€™s response to the sanctions has been defiant. Speaking prior to the G20 summit in Australia, PutinĢż to callĢżthem illegal as they violate international law. While the situation for the Russian economy is certainly far from perfect, the country has thus far managed to avoid a recession. A falling ruble has helped domestic manufacturers and will boost (dollar dominated) oil revenues. The country has enough to sustain the damage from sanctions in the short term, as oil exports still provide a steady stream of revenue. Nevertheless, in the medium term Russia will suffer structural economic problems, as the sanctions regime will undermine its technological modernization and will seriously slash its future growth prospects.

The deal with China will provide much needed short-term funding for the Russian state, but as gas remains the main topic of conversation, the countryā€™s overreliance on natural resources could bring about a serious case of the Dutch disease. Moscowā€™s strategy so far has been to find Band-Aid solutions to its most immediate economic problems, pivoting to Asia and bolstering internal production.

But with Europeā€™s economy in the doldrums and Ukraine on the brink of financial recession, Russia is not the only one to bear the brunt of Western sanctions. Russia today remains the 8^th largest economy in the world and any sanctions that target its wealth will complicate the global economic landscape as a whole.

Moreover, sanctions on Russia have created a serious rift among Western analysts: John Mearsheimer, a respected academic,Ģżhas Ģżhis disagreement with sanctioning Russia, claiming that ā€œthe United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis.ā€ As both blocs continue down their preset path, aloof one from the other, maybe Gorbachev was right: A new Cold War seems to be upon us indeed.

The views expressedĢżin this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflectĢż51³Ō¹Ļā€™sĢżeditorial policy.

Ģż/

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In November 2013, Iran and the West anĢżinterim agreement over Tehranā€™s nuclear program. It was the first successful negotiation between both parties after 35 years ofĢżfruitless efforts, mutual suspicion and a hostile climate that was on the verge of an armed confrontation.

The successful completion of ongoing negotiations could result in a permanent deal. On the one hand, this could lead to the lifting of sanctions on Iran, while on the other, it might render the nuclear program of Tehran to be peaceful after all, erasing fear of a potential nuclear weapon.

Reactions to the Deal

The reception of the interim agreement was varied among world leaders. The deal sparked a heated debate between analysts about its possible consequences for security, as well as for the world and regional order.

In response to claims that concern the nuclear arsenal capabilities of Tehran, a recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report highlighted that IranĢżhas processing uranium to 20% enrichment ā€” a critical threshold above which the production of a nuclear weapon is only a matter of time. The remaining nuclear material of 20% enrichment is converted to other forms that cannot be processed further.

According toĢż, the implementation of these provisions halts the possibility of producing a nuclear bomb during the end of the first phase agreement. It also ā€œadds several weeks to the amount of time that it would theoretically take Iran to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear weaponā€ after the expiration of this period.

At the same time, the US and European Union (EU) suspended a number of economic sanctions that were imposed on Iran. These were mainlyĢżĢżon trade in petrochemicals, precious metals and the provision of insurance for oil shipments.ĢżHowever, many sanctions in domains such as the arms industry, machinery products and financial assistance remain in place. AsĢża senior US officialĢż: ā€œThis temporary relief will not fix the Iranian economy. Iran is not and will not be open for business until it reaches a comprehensive agreement.ā€

Iran and the P5+1: The Process of NegotiationsĢż

The negotiating teams still have to overcome a series of obstacles that prevent a final agreement; ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s ballistic missile program is one of them. The Iranian defense minister, Gen.ĢżHossein Dehghan, recently journalists: ā€œ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s missiles are not up for discussion under any circumstances ā€¦ Iran’s missiles are only our concern … We donā€™t accept any intervention from anybody on this issue.ā€ The reason for this persistent Iranian refusal to negotiate over its missile program is rooted in the important role it plays for ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s defense capabilities. AsĢżMichael EllemanĢż: ā€œThey [the missiles] represent one of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s few capabilities to deter attack, intimidate regional rivals, and boost military morale and national pride.ā€ The US governmentā€™s decision to demand the inclusion of the missiles question in negotiations resulted from pressure by theĢż lobby in America.

Another contentious issue concerns the future enrichment capability of Iran. According to the latest report of theĢż,Ģża possible solution to the enrichment program would be to reduce ā€œthe number of enrichment facilities to one ā€¦ kerbing related research and development (R&D) activities and constraining the number of centrifuge production facilities.ā€ The aim of such a proposal from the P5+1 would be to augment the time that is necessary to enrich all the uranium needed to build a nuclear weapon.

Prior to the imposition of sanctions by EU states, Peugeot and Renault made significant exports to Iran. Peugeot was one of the two biggest automakers in Iran, while sales of the company dropped by 68% after sanctions were placed.

Furthermore, it would stand in opposition to Tehranā€™s plans to produce its own fuel of nuclear reactors, as well as its goal to build new power and research reactors. Such intentionsĢżĢżthe multiplication of centrifuges.ĢżIn April, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear energy, plans to install 30,000 additional centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium in order to fuel the Bushehr power station.

An additional issue that is relevant to enrichment concerns is the research and development program. ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s supreme leader,ĢżAyatollah Ali Khamenei, was Ģżas saying: ā€œThese negotiations should continue, but all should know that negotiations will not stop or slow down any of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s activities in nuclear research and development.ā€ Under these circumstances, one has to take into account Foreign MinisterĢżMohammad Javad Zarifā€™s Ģżafter a recent meeting in Vienna: ā€œI can say we agree on 50-60% of issues, but the remainders are important ones and diverse. Even 2% can torpedo all of it.ā€

Besides the hard negotiation process, the Iranian government has to confront domestic critics who view negotiations and a possible agreement with skepticism, if not open hostility. According toĢż, a parliamentarian who supports Rouhaniā€™s government, the conservative opposition is of the opinion that the president ā€œhad accepted the ideals and standards of the West before the negotiations even began.ā€

, the former head of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s Atomic Energy Organization, spoke of a weakening of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s national interests during a conference held by opponents of negotiations on May 3.ĢżIt is Ģżthe conference was organized by the studentā€™s branch of Basij, a militia closely linked to the conservative establishment of Iran. If this piece of information is accurate, then we can expect sharp criticism from the conservative elite that was associated with former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, if an agreement is reached.

Benefits of a Permanent Arrangement

In the event of a permanent solution, the economies of the US and its Western allies would be boosted by the further lifting of sanctions. According toĢż, American companies like Boeing and Caterpillar ā€œwill be huge recipients of purchase orders coming from Iran,ā€ helping the American Midwest and Pacific Northwest to weather the economic storm. Ģżis also set to benefit from the easing of economic sanctions. Prior to the imposition of sanctions by EU states, Peugeot and Renault made significant exports to Iran. Peugeot was one of the two biggest automakers in Iran, while sales of the company dropped by 68% after sanctions were placed.

There are indications the oil sector is also willing to reactivate its business in Iran.ĢżĢżhas already stated its interest to return to the country. According to Iranian sources,ĢżĢżhas negotiated a new partnership with Tehran. Additionally, there is also the gas domain that has not yet been sufficiently exploited.

Prior to sanctions, theĢżEU economy manufactured and machinery goods worth ā‚¬3.1 billion ($4.3 billion) to Iran. A possible reestablishment of economic cooperation would augment European exports and boost the EUā€™s economy during this critical period.

On the geopolitical level, US initiatives to improve relations with Iran can bring more balance to the Middle East for two reasons. First, Iran can play a constructive role in the Syrian crisis. As the Assad regime regains control of regions and crucial passages, the overthrow of the Syrian government seems to be unrealistic. Only further negotiations between Damascus and the opposition will end the conflict. Therefore, considering ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s strong relations with Syria, its role during these negotiations in pressing the Assad regime to accept a compromise will be crucial.

Second, Iran can also bring more stability to Lebanon. It is well-known that Tehran exerts an important influence over Hezbollah. A moderate government in Tehran that feels safe in its regional environment can put pressure on the Shiā€™a group to accept a settlement on its extensive weapons arsenal. Any deal would demand that Hezbollahā€™s arms are placed under the control of the Lebanese Army.

To sum it up, Iran and West have made important progress in ameliorating their relations with the signing of the interim agreement. Both sides have already implemented various provisions of the deal.

However, the interim agreement does not permanently settle the controversy surrounding Tehranā€™s nuclear program, nor does it suspend the main body of sanctions that keep Iran in an economic stalemate. The current phase of negotiations includes a number of thorny issues, but both sides stand to gain from a comprehensive agreement in political and economic terms. It is important for the interlocutors to sidestep the mutual mistrust and collaborate to reach an agreement within the deadline that expires on July 20.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Hezbollah  any target within Israel, a senior commander in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recently said, while US officials say Syrian forces have  advanced guided missiles to the group in Lebanon, which is considered a terrorist organization by the US, European Union (EU), Israel, and other countries. 

The Iranian interim-deal reached in late November between Iran and the P5+1 – the US, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany — is beset with , including aiding Iran to continue to fund its terrorist wing in Lebanon.

The US and its allies only stand to lose from a deal that grants Tehran the right to enrich uranium; allows Iran to continue its construction of a processing facility and reactor at Arak; provides sanctions relief of what some sources estimate to be  , enabling Iran to support the death of civilians in Syria as well as terrorist organizations; and recognizes the regime as a legitimate state actor. There are reports that the US has already  $8 billion in Iranian assets frozen in 1979.

Iran, designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, has "increased its terrorist-related activity,"  to the US State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism for 2012. Iran serves as the life-blood of the  Hezbollah.

The Lebanese Shi'ite group  millions of dollars from Iran each year, as well as operational and logistical support, , and weaponry. Iran’s rearming of Hezbollah following the 2006 war with Israel is "in direct violation of UNSCR 1701," according to the State Department report.

Inspired by the ideology of the Iranian Revolution, Hezbollah, "the party of God," was  in 1982 out of the IRGC to fight Israel — perceived as an extension of the US — and Western imperialism, and to establish an Islamic movement in Lebanon. Hezbollah was created during the Lebanese Civil War, which lasted from 1975 to 1990 and resulted in divisions among different sects. The war provided room for Iran to unify Shi'ite militias interested in driving out foreign forces and international peacekeepers from Lebanon.   

Iran sent fighters to Lebanon who successfully built their militia among Shi'ite-populated areas in the Beqaa Valley, Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Relations between upcoming Hezbollah players and Iran  in the mid-1970s. Pro-Khomeini Shi'ites living in Lebanon cultivated relationships with like-minded Shi'ite militants – most notoriously with Imad Mughniyeh, the future leader of Hezbollah who worked closely with IRGC commanders.  

Legitimizing Hezbollah

Recognizing Iran at the negotiating table implicitly offers legitimacy to Hezbollah.  

Hezbollah was responsible for the 1983 US Embassy bombing in Beirut, killing 63 people, including 17 Americans. That same year, a Hezbollah suicide bomber  in Lebanon, killing 241 American military personnel stationed in Beirut. A second bomber attacked the French barracks, killing 58 French paratroopers.

The group is responsible for numerous and deadly airplane hijackings, bombings, kidnappings, and the murder of Americans, Jews, Israelis, and citizens of other nationalities across the world, and  to call for "death to America" and "death to Israel."

The Iranian-backed Hezbollah is defending the Bashar al-Assad regime, fighting US-backed Syrian rebels and al-Qaeda-linked jihadist groups both in Syria and on Lebanese soil. The group  "defend Lebanon, Palestine, the Palestinian cause and Syria which is the backbone of resistance," which Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared in November. 

Some suggest that Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict has  the organization’s military capabilities.

The US and Hezbollah are speaking indirectly through British channels, according to a report in Kuwaiti newspaper , which the Jerusalem Post  in late November. The talks "are aimed at keeping tabs on the changes in the region and the world, and [to] prepare for the upcoming return of Iran to the international community," the Jerusalem Post stated.  

If the report is accurate, it serves as an affront to Israel, Western nations targeted by Hezbollah, including the US, and indicates a dramatic change in American policy. In January, a State Department spokeswoman that "the United States does not negotiate with terrorists,” regarding the consideration to release Omar Abdel-Rahman, the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center attack.

Lessons from History

Offering a terrorist organization legitimacy proved to be catastrophic when Israel signed the Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993. The PLO, founded in 1964 by the Arab League with the  of destroying Israel through "armed struggle," was labeled a terrorist organization by the US until 1991.

Under the command of Yasser Arafat, the PLO conducted a countless number of terrorist attacks against innocent Israeli citizens in Israel and around the world. The organization is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Israelis as well as a number of US citizens.

The PLO and its splinter groups waged attacks in the form of hijackings, suicide bombings, targeted killings and kidnappings, including the Munich Massacre of 1972 conducted by the group Black September, in which Palestinian terrorists  11 Israeli Olympic team members.

According to the Oslo Accords, Arafat agreed to end all forms of terror and recognize Israel's right to exist. In exchange, Israel, under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, agreed to expand the Palestinian-ruled territories, withdraw from parts of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and provide the PLO with autonomous rule.

Israel conceded control to the PLO as part of the accords in 1994, 1995 and 1997. In July 2000, Israeli and American negotiators offered Arafat plans for peace, which were all rejected without a counter offer.

Instead, the negotiations were followed by Arafat’s  and the  in 2000. Israel’s efforts to negotiate with the PLO only led to a rise in terrorism. Violence and terrorist attacks against Israel launched by the PLO’s splinter groups, as well as Hamas, Hezbollah and other organizations, continue regularly to this day.

Regardless of whether the report of talks between the US and Hezbollah is accurate, negotiating with Iran offers political legitimacy to its terrorist wing. Providing credibility to an organization that continues to wage violence against innocent civilians through acts of terror is not the path toward peace, but a policy of appeasement that typically results in the shedding of more innocent blood.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has long been a champion for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East, owing to a combination of its isolation from immediate and existential external threats and its ability to procure and field relatively large quantities of the most sophisticated conventional weaponry on the planet.

Since the Joint Plan of Action with Iran was signed, Saudi Arabia has exhibited unusual behavior such as a willingness to cooperate with its arch nemesis, Israel, and openly defy its strongest ally, the United States, in protesting the easing of sanctions against Iran.

Though the US-led negotiations are intended to ultimately persuade the Iranians to halt their pursuit of a nuclear weapon and prevent a regional nuclear arms race, Saudi Arabia and guardedly accepts that easing sanctions and other confidence building measures may be a

This ex post facto display of confidence in diplomatic solutions raises the question over whether or not Saudi Arabia truly believes the Iranian quest for a nuclear weapon can be stopped, as well as Riyadh’s preparations to counter the Iranian nuclear arsenal.

provides an avenue for short-term procurement of a nuclear weapon. However, recent education initiatives by King Abdullah ā€” providing legions of the best and brightest young Saudi scientists and engineers training at world-class institutions abroad ā€” allow for the possibility of a long-term nuclear weapons program in the kingdom itself.

Saudi Arabia’s consistent position as the world’s largest single producer of oil could grant the kingdom immunity from potential sanctions, similar to those facing Iran. This is especially the case if the world supply of oil is already hampered by existing sanctions on another major producer.

The Saudi Motivation to Pursue the Nuclear Option

In 2009, King Abdullah initially warned US Special Envoy to the Middle East Dennis Ross that “” if Iran crosses the threshold. This threshold set by King Abdullah four years ago is largely unknown.

However, recent actions by the kingdom to include the unprecedented denial of a seat at the UN Security Council and unmitigated support for Sunni fighters against Iranian proxies in Syria and Lebanon are direct affronts to all parties outside of the region. It is an indicator of Saudi Arabia’s lack of confidence in its traditional allies to provide protection and exert authority in the Middle East.

In a statement explaining its rejection of the seat as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, the in Washington cited:

“…the failure of the Security Council to make the Middle East a free zone of all weapons of mass destruction… [and] allowing the ruling regime in Syria to kill and burn its people by the chemical weapons, while the world stands idly, without applying deterrent sanctions against the Damascus regime… [as] irrefutable evidence and proof of the inability of the Security Council to carry out its duties and responsibilities.”

This announcement from October 18, 2013, came just two days after the 40th anniversary of the 1973 Arab Oil Boycott initiated by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, which was intended to punish the US and other Western nations for their support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

Forty years ago, the US was highly vulnerable to the “oil weapon” as environmental groups pressured the federal government to cut domestic production in sensitive areas. The quadrupling of gasoline prices and a series of unpopular energy conservation methods put the US on a fast-track towards achieving energy independence.

Energy security has always been the foundation of the US-Saudi relationship, which has frayed in recent years given an explosion in US domestic production thanks to the “unlocking” of massive oil and gas reservoirs in the recent shale revolution.

The combination of this increase in US domestic production and efforts to conserve energy has diminished the importance of a strong relationship between Washington and Riyadh. Despite US Secretary of State John Kerry’s reassurances of American commitment to maintaining a strong and mutually beneficial relationship between the two nations, he continues to express optimism towards negotiations with Iran.

This prompted former Director of General Intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal to express doubt in the outcome of an “,” while former Saudi Ambassador to the US and current Director of General Intelligence Prince Bandar bin Sultan threatened a “” in relations with Washington.

Such a shift has the potential to prevent the US, the primary supplier of the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation, from selling sophisticated conventional weapons to the Saudis. Cutting off the supply of such weapons to Saudi Arabia would further emphasize their need to obtain a nuclear weapon to deter Iranian aggression.

Saudi Capability to Develop or Procure a Nuclear Weapon

Traditionally, Saudi Arabia has never had much potential to develop or procure a nuclear weapon due to its lack of motivation and capability. King Abdullah’s 2009 vow and Saudi Arabia’s lack of confidence in the provides the kingdom with motivation to explore several short-term and long-term avenues available today, due to stronger foreign relations with nuclear states and a bolstered education program to obtain a nuclear insurance policy.

Saudi Arabia has a long-standing relationship with nuclear-armed Pakistan and has made significant investments in the Pakistani nuclear program over the years.

Gary Samore, President Barack Obama’s former counter-proliferation advisor, that the Saudi investment in the Pakistani nuclear program led “the Saudis [to] believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan.”

Pakistan denies this charge, to be “a responsible nuclear weapon state with robust command and control structures and comprehensive export controls.” Though Pakistan may officially have little incentive to either provide nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia or deploy them in Saudi territory, there exists the possibility for unofficial leaks of know-how or material from the Pakistani nuclear program to support a Saudi initiative.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who played a key role in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program, was accused of selling nuclear secrets and equipment to Libya and North Korea. He was subsequently fired by the Pakistani government in 2004 and placed under house arrest until February 2009. The large financial resources available to Saudi Arabia allow access to this avenue of unofficial procurement.

These underhanded attempts at proliferation may prove to be unnecessary for the Saudis in the long-run, given their recent attempts at developing a new generation of highly educated scientists and public desire for a civilian nuclear program.

King Abdullah, seeking to transform the Saudi economy from the “rentier model” dependent on energy exports to a centrally planned economy with an emphasis on technology and innovation, has granted more than 47,000 of the best and brightest Saudi students the opportunity to pursue advanced degrees in hard sciences and engineering at world-class institutions all over the globe.

This upcoming generation of foreign-educated scientists and engineers, combined with Saudi efforts to import foreign students and professors to stimulate such research within the kingdom at the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, are intended to usher in an era of new energy to counter the unsustainable growth in domestic energy consumption that threatens the kingdom’s exports.

The Saudi civilian nuclear program, scheduled to be fully operational by 2032, is among the proposed sources of energy. Prince Turki al-Faisal claimed in a that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognizes the right of the Iranians to develop a civilian nuclear program as the Saudis are doing.

However, he also expresses concern about the foundation that a civilian nuclear program provides for the development of a nuclear weapon, an argument which can also be applied to the Saudi civilian nuclear program.

Deal or No Deal?

The uncompromising Saudi opposition to negotiations with Iran to ease sanctions in return for the slowing of their nuclear program is not based on a long-term goal to prevent Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, but their short-term goal of keeping sanctions in place to hinder Iranian sponsorship of proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

The Joint Plan of Action signed on November 24, 2013, makes no mention of Iranian proxy operations throughout the region. The token amount of sanction relief, approximately 5% according to Kerry, would allow Iran to bolster these proxy operations throughout the region to the detriment of Saudi Arabia with both the resources freed from sanctions and the cessation of expensive enrichment activities over the next six months.

A second round of Geneva talks focusing on quelling the uncontrolled violence in Syria, a major hotbed of Iranian paramilitary activity and proxy support of Bashar al-Assad, began on January 22, .

If the and on both sides of the Joint Plan of Action continues and Iran resumes its pursuit of a nuclear weapon despite the looming sanctions, Saudi Arabia will have the green light to embark on its own program.

Although the US is becoming more energy independent, the rapidly expanding energy demands of countries such as China are not and simultaneous sanctions on Iran and Saudi Arabia are unlikely to be supported by the countries dependent on oil imports.

Sanctions on both Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively the , would remove an estimated 10.7 million barrels per day from the world supply ā€”

The perception of an existential threat from Iran combined with a lack of cooperation from traditional allies serves as justification for the kingdom to divert from its obedient role as it gradually takes a more assertive position in confronting Iran.

Whether or not negotiations or potential military action successfully put a definite stop to the Iranian nuclear program, the Saudis are likely to begin to consider diverting from their role as a champion for regional non-proliferation to maintain an aura of self-determination and reliance in the next crisis.

While it is doubtful the Saudis will pursue their own nuclear umbrella with the flamboyance of the North Koreans or the aggressiveness of the Iranians, it would be prudent to expect gradual and inconspicuous steps such as expanding their civilian nuclear program to the point where it can potentially serve as a sufficient foundation for a modest military nuclear program and an eventual upgrade of its .

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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After intense negotiations between Iran and world powers (chiefly among them the United States), November 24 saw a historic breakthrough. In a six-month ,ĢżTehran has committed itself to a substantial freezing of its nuclear program in return for ā€œā€ ā€” according to US President Barack Obama ā€” in sanctions. The agreement will be a first step towards achieving a comprehensive solution, with which the peaceful nature of ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program will be ensured while all sanctions against the country would be lifted.

Now, there has been much speculation over the degree in which the decade-long transatlantic Iran strategy of coercive diplomacy was responsible for reaching this diplomatic victory. Was it the permanent threats of war or the increasingly crippling sanctions which, in the eyes of many Western observers, led Iran to ā€œgive inā€?

Arguably, it rather was a shift away from that policy of threats and pressure, and towards serious diplomacy aiming at a reconciliation of interests (especially during the month of November), which rendered the deal possible. But yes, without any doubt the sanctions did have an impact.

The sanctions have severely deepened ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s economic malaise, considerably harmed a variety of social groups, while part of the power elite quite comfortably adjusted to the situation. Consequently, the separating the state and (civil) society was even boosted.

Yet, the immense damage that sanctions have done to society does not bear much relevance for policy-makers. However, what has gone largely unnoticed by supporters of the sanctions policy is the realpolitik fact that, contrary to their stated goal, the escalation of sanctions was accompanied by an increase in ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s nuclear program. When Obama entered the White House, there were not even 1,000 centrifuges spinning in Iran; today, the figure stands at almost 19,000.

The reason for this is that the West views sanctions through the cost-benefit lens, according to which it can only be a matter of time until the sanctioned party will give in. In contrast, Tehran sees sanctions as an illegitimate form of coercion, which ought to be resisted, for the alternative would be nothing less than capitulation.

Nonetheless, many commentators sardonically insist on praising the sanctionsā€™ alleged effectiveness for aiding diplomacy. This is not only a sign of analytical short-sightedness, but also constitutes the not-so-covert attempt to shed a positive light on the coercive diplomacy that was pursued so far.

In reality, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s willingness to offer concessions is rooted within a wider context.

Firstly, Iran already demonstrated its readiness to compromise over the last , which the Obama administration did not dare to accept due to domestic political issues (i.e. his re-election.

Secondly, and this is likely to have been crucial for achieving the agreement in Geneva, ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s current foreign policy is primarily not a result of pressure through sanctions. Instead, it is embedded into a specific foreign-policy school of thought which is characterized by realism and a policy of »åĆ©³Ł±š²Ō³Ł±š.

Notably, with Hassan Rouhaniā€™s election, the “defensive realist” school of thought reasserted power, which had already been leading during Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjaniā€™s and Mohammad Khatamiā€™s administrations. Their prime objective was a policy of »åĆ©³Ł±š²Ō³Ł±š and rapprochement, especially with the West but also with neighboring Arab states ā€” namely ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s geopolitical adversary, Saudi Arabia.

In contrast to the “offensive realists” who were taking the lead under the Ahmadinejad administration, “defensive realists” do not view foreign policy as a zero-sum game but instead as an arena where win-win situations ought to be explored ā€“ especially with the United States. Another pivotal difference between these schools of thought is their estimation of US power.

While “offensive realists” see the superpowerā€™s power-projection capabilities rapidly declining, the “defensive” camp rightly acknowledges that even a US in relative decline can inflict substantial damage on weaker countries like Iran. The historically unprecedented Iran sanctions regime is a prime example for the veracity of the latter view.

Ultimately, the nuclear agreement in its core has to be seen as an American-Iranian one, which expresses the will of both sides to secure their interests in a rapidly changing regional landscape. To what extent this will affect Washingtonā€™s traditional regional allies in Tel Aviv and Riyadh will be highly interesting to watch.

*[Note: A version of this article will be published in the next issue of the German Middle East journal,Ģż. This article was translated from German into English by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Iran’s catastrophic economic situation is seen by many observers as the Rouhani government’s central motive to end the nuclear standoff – and the sanctions against Iran – as quickly as possible. However, there are other reasons, including the domestic political moderation and the new consensus among the security elite. The changing regional dynamics also play an important role.  

At the start of the nuclear negotiations, two political camps opposed each other in Tehran: those who in good revolutionary tradition assumed that the West was secretly working on regime change because of Iran’s Islamic identity and its independent – that is, anti-Western – policies. In this view, the West’s willingness to negotiate is just a sham and any resolution is impossible to reach. Opposed to that were reformists under the leadership of Mohammed Khatami and pragmatists led by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who posited that a resolution through negotiations was possible and necessary, and that it could be achieved through determined and constructive talks.

Khatami's concessions in 2004 and 2005 (halting enrichment and signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s additional protocol) has to be seen in the context of these domestic struggles. Regardless of his personal views, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who is responsible for holding all currents of the regime together, stood between both positions — of course, he is seen as an eminent critic of the West. He did not obstruct the constructive progress of talks under Khatami.

The Iranian position became more complicated during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The highly gifted populist ruined the Iranian negotiating position with his controversial statements about Israel and the Holocaust. Nevertheless, he was actually interested in an agreement on the nuclear question and an improvement in Iranian-US relations; a stance that irritated his followers.

At the end of his term in office — from at least the end of 2011 onwards — Ahmadinejad's intentions became clear: by reaching an agreement on the nuclear question and improving relations with the US, he could have been able to gain more power domestically than Iranian presidents usually enjoyed. His quiet disempowerment by Khamenei from 2012 was paralleled by a strengthening of Saeed Jalili, the chief nuclear negotiator. Jalili’s policy of “resistance diplomacy” was applauded by those well-connected extremist circles that had disappointedly turned away from Ahmadinejad.

Domestic Political Moderation and Regional Changes

However, during the presidential elections in 2013, it became clear that no Iranian president would gain a political mandate if he banks on a confrontational course with Iranian society and the international community. All candidates, except for Jalili and the mostly unknown Mohammad Gharazi, spoke out in favor of dialogue with the international community. Among those were candidates like the mayor of Tehran, Mohammed Qalibaf, who was supportive of a confrontational course 15 years ago.

This moderation in domestic and foreign policy of the political right (the so-called principalists) began in 2009, when the regime realized that it had to at least partly win back the population’s trust. This involved the return of experienced technocrats from Rafsanjani’s camp, the integration of certain reformists, and the support of most important representatives of the political right. All these actors are advocating for a foreign policy which is supposed to preserve Iran’s nationalist (and not Islamist) defined interests, end the isolation, and lead to an easing of sanctions.

With the experienced Dr. Hassan Rouhani, who is one of the most important clerics out of the security apparatus and enjoys Khamenei’s full trust, it was assured that none of the extremist splinter groups would dare to seriously obstruct the negotiation process with the international community. There has never been more support in the domestic political arena for a negotiated settlement. Moreover, ever since the revolution, there has never been a time where talks in Tehran about a potential arrangement with the US have been this open.

One of the reasons for that is the common threat that terrorist networks, under the banner of “Al-Qaeda,” pose to the West and Iran. Thus, the Iranian position on Syria transformed from an offensive policy, where the Assad regime was supported according to a strategic power projection (the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel), to a defensive one which is mainly about fighting Al-Qaeda.

The sectarianism associated with the Syrian conflict which could develop into a Shi’a-Sunni wildfire across the whole region, makes the triangle confrontation between the US, Iran, and the Al-Qaeda networks more difficult and unsustainable for Tehran. A quiet agreement about regional policy with the US is becoming more important for Iran — and this is only possible with a resolution to the nuclear conflict.

*[This article was originally published by , and translated from German to English by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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After seven years' absence from the panel, in May, the United States won back a seat representing the Western group on the United Nations committee on program and coordination. When the committee reorganized on June 3, the United States took its seat — and announced it would boycott all meetings of the committee.

The reason: the chairmanship of the committee, this session, had passed to Iran.

"Countries that are under Chapter VII sanctions for not meeting their international obligations with regard to their nuclear program should not hold formal or ceremonial positions in UN bodies,"  US Representative Joseph M. Torsella. "Allowing Iran — a country that is in flagrant violation of its obligations under multiple UN Security Council resolutions and that expresses flagrant disregard for international terrorism, human rights, and disarmament — to chair this committee diminishes the standing and effectiveness of this institution."

The  is one of the more obscure cogs whirring inside the formidable UN bureaucratic machine, and Washington's symbolic boycott is unlikely to result in a drastic re-direction of UN activities this year; the West still has Britain and Italy there to speak up for its concerns. But the US walkout does reflect how the policies and public face that Iran has projected to the world under the hardline leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has closed off any serious dialogue with the United States in matters small as well as large.

President Rouhani

Perhaps this will change, and one might hope quickly, after the astonishing result in Friday's elections in Iran. Hassan Rouhani was the only candidate among the six permitted to run for president who called for changing the policies that have isolated Iran politically and economically. His first-round victory is a decisive popular repudiation of the rigid conservatism of the past eight years, embodied in the person of Saeed Jalili, the truculent nuclear negotiator who was the favored candidate of the security establishment and, it was believed, of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself.

Rouhani, who  that the hardliners' intransigence had brought on the Iranian people through international sanctions, won . Jalili, who had celebrated the "resistance economy," received a bit less than 4.2 million votes. Conservatives plainly misgauged the Iranian public's enthusiasm for a provocative nuclear program as a cornerstone of national pride. Their attacks on Rouhani's 2004 proposal for nuclear concessions — spurned by an unyielding Bush administration — if anything, enhanced his credibility with Iranians.

Fresh from such a stunning upset, Rouhani will need quickly to show Iranians some results, in particular, on the economic front. Having defended in the campaign his pragmatic flexibility on the nuclear issue a decade ago, Rouhani now needs to persuade Supreme Leader Khamenei to give him the running room to try a new approach.

President Barack Obama can facilitate a more forthcoming position by sending Rouhani his personal congratulations, which would be seen in Tehran as a signal of US readiness to reach a settlement. Khamenei is said to be obsessed with the notion that the United States is determined to overthrow the Islamic Republic, and Obama's recognition of Rouhani's election should assuage that suspicion. Rollbacks of the many layers of sanctions, of course, would be part of a negotiated package that conclusively resolves the well-founded suspicions of the international community about Iranians' nuclear intentions.

More Catholic than the Pope

Obama, too, now has a bit more political space at home for negotiating with Iran. Although Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was quick to dismiss "wishful thinking" about a change in Iranian direction, Israeli newspaper Haaretz  that Rouhani's election "has deprived Israel and its supporters of their most potent weapon against Iran's nuclear plans: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad," whose "incessant provocations against world leaders and his vile denial of the Holocaust angered world public opinion and inflamed American Jews, who viewed him as Adolf Hitler incarnate."

A wider normalization of American and European relations with Iran will depend not only on a nuclear deal, but also Iranian leaders' stepping back from the aggressive hostility toward Israel that Ahmadinejad has represented. Opposition to Israel seems wired in the Islamic Republic's DNA, but Tehran does not need to be "more Catholic than the pope," threatening to sabotage any Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement, as Ahmadinejad clearly seemed ready to do.

Assuming a signal from Rouhani that Iran will welcome a compromise settlement of Syria's civil war, it seems that this would be a useful moment for the United States to drop its opposition to Iranian participation in the planned international conference to end that conflict, and put in place a transition to a more inclusive and democratic regime in Damascus. Even before Rouhani's election, it was hard to see how a settlement could be implemented without Iranian assent. Now talking with Iran should no longer be radioactive.

Perhaps American diplomats can then even return to obscure UN panels where regular geographic rotation has installed an Iranian in the chair.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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In spite of existing sanctions, Iran keeps on developing its petrochemical and gas industries. For instance, in February 2013, Tehran finally managed to settle with Pakistan main issues related to the construction of the gas pipeline between the two countries. According to the Iranian media, Tehran also launched talks on exporting 25 million cubic metres of gas per day to Iraq. This news became the practical confirmation of recent statements by Oil Minister Rostam Ghasemi which he made in January 2013. He promised that, from a short-range perspective, Iran will sign a number of contracts for exporting gas to neighbouring countries. Although it is still unclear where the Iranian authorities will find funds to increase the production capacities of the gas industry, which are barely enough to satisfy domestic demand, the seriousness of their intentions is quite obvious.

Finally, the Iranian government is quite determined about the development of its petrochemical industry. Even before 2012, Tehran generated $14 billion a year through its petrochemical exports. In spite of the fact that the import of equipment and technologies required for the development of the petrochemical industry is severely restricted by the sanctions, the authorities of the country found their way around. First of all, as reported by foreign businessmen trading with Iran, the Iranian government puts particular emphasis on the participation of private companies in the construction of relatively small refineries with refining capacities of up to 10,000 barrels per day. These refineries do not require high-technologies and may function with the use of obsolete equipment produced in Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet republics. Allegedly, the construction of such refineries has been already started with the assistance of Russian and Kazakh businessmen. 

As stated by Patrick Clawson in his recent article , “while still important, oil is becoming a smaller part of Iran's trade.” According to his estimations, in 2012, the non-oil exports of the country covered for 60% (according to alternative sources, 75%) of its total imports, “compared to 24% in 2002 and 14% in 1992.” What is more important from Clawson’s point of view, Iran “produced this shift in part by converting more of its oil into industrial products for export.” Thus, during the eleven months of 1391 (March 2012 to February 2013), the non-oil exports of Iran accounted for $37.69 billion. Its main items included petrochemical and chemical products, minerals, stone, cement, and agricultural products. The items of the so-called traditional industries, such as carpets and sweets, accounted for only around $1 billion. The main importers of the Iranian non-oil goods were Iraq ($6 billion), China ($4.2 billion), the UAE ($4 billion), India ($2.6 billion) and Afghanistan ($2.5 billion). Although, the volume of non-oil exports did not hit the expected level of $40 billion in 2012, the Iranian authorities are quite optimistic in their prognoses. Thus, they believe that this indicator will reach $59 billion in 2013, $74.1 billion in 2014 and $81.1 billion in 2015.

Socio-Political Shifts

It is notable that sanctions became one of the most important incentives for the exports of non-oil goods. The fall of the rial exchange rate towards the US dollar, logically made the foreign trade extremely profitable for a number of Iranian industries within the petrochemical, construction and agricultural sectors. Although rial prices on consumer goods in Iran seriously hiked during 2012, their US dollar equivalents either remained the same or even went down improving the living standards of those social groupings connected to the exports of products.

Moreover, sanctions led to increased income for those people connected to the grey scheme of oil exports and international banking operations, as well as those related to foreign exchange operations. As a result, by 2013, the process of the shrinking of the Iranian middle and upper classes, caused by the political purges of 2009-2012 and the initial negative impact of the sanctions, was stopped and reversed. Subsequently, these “newly rich Iranians,” created by the sanctions, seem to achieve an unofficial agreement with the authorities: the middle-class is not going to get too deeply involved in politics.

On the other hand, the government slows down the tempo of ideological repressions and grants more social freedom. Thus, in January 2013, even some conservative politicians (such as the secretary of the Expediency Council, Rezaee, and Habibollah Asgharouladi) started to doubt the necessity to arrest the leaders of the oppositional Green Movement, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Moussavi — statements that were impossible to articulate just a few months earlier. On a grassroots level, these changes are most obvious in the streets of northern Tehran: youngsters from rich quarters feel free in the way they dress and behave. Although this way is becoming more and more contradictory to the Islamic dogmas, the police try not to notice this, while previously famous raids of Islamic vice squads are becoming rarer.

What is more important, the political and economic elite of the country is unanimous on the necessity to buy the loyalty of the lower classes. In spite of decreased oil incomes, they are still allocating huge sums of money to direct and indirect social subsidies. That is why some of the recent populist programmes, organized and implemented by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, did not find much resistance among his opponents. For instance, in February-March 2013, the president sponsored a program by which Iranians received an assistance payment of 800,000 to 1,000,000 rials for the March 21 Nowruz (New Year), equal to $65 to $82 at the favourable official rate of 12,260 rials to the dollar used to determine prices for basic goods in government-regulated outlets.

Is Ideology Gone?

Finally, the sanctions played an important role in transforming the ideology of modern Iran. Initially, the punitive measures of 2010 were supposed to improve the position of the oppositional Green Movement by broadening its social base. They were expected to limit the income sources of the Iranian budget and to increase governmental spending. This, in turn, would constrain the capabilities of the Iranian government to buy the loyalty of the lower layers of society by providing them with subsidies. This situation would divert the low classes from Ahmadinejad and make them join the Green Movement.

However, the real situation developed according to another scenario. As it was previously demonstrated, the Iranian authorities managed to preserve the necessary level of the budget income to supply the population with subsidies. The reform programme launched in late-2010, eased the subsidies burden of the government. On the other hand, this failed attempt to help the Iranian opposition gave officials in Tehran another justification for a severe crackdown on dissent, and aided the unification of government supporters around the idea to counter foreign attempts to master the domestic situation in the country.

The civil unrest of 2009 and the sanctions of 2010, led to the situation when conservative views remained the only legitimate ideology which allows Iranian politicians to wage full-fledged political activities. The participation of other forces in the political life of Iran is extremely marginalised. The repressions of 2009-2012, left the average Iranian without ideological alternatives: given the current political trends, the public will be choosing only between conservators. Subsequently, this causes the transformation of the whole political environment of the Islamic Republic. The upcoming presidential elections of 2013 will be unique: they will be the first elections in Iran where ideology will play no role in the contest. In other words, this will be an uncovered fight for power and control over financial flows related to it. This means that the political fighting between candidates will be fierce and promises no good for the ruling regime.

First of all, when differences in political platforms are negligible, the struggle for the presidential seat is supposed to be based on personal remarks and compromising materials. Second, in attempts to win additional votes, candidates may use even more unexpected leverage. Thus, some experts point out that in the absence of the ideological division, an important role may be played by the national division through raising the dangerous issue of self-determination in multilingual and multicultural Iran. Third, it is unlikely that the Iranians will make any important moves on the international stage. No one in Iran is concealing the fact that the presidential elections are far more important than any external issues. Given that all groupings within the ruling elite either have already nominated their candidates or are planning to do so, until the end of the elections there will be no force inside of the country that would be ready to deal with foreign policy. Finally, the 2013 presidential campaign can seriously damage the image of the supreme leader. Some people in Iran have already suggested that Ali Khamenei can currently not be considered as the main controlling and decision-making center of the country. If, in autumn 2012 to early winter 2013, he planned to squeeze in his own candidate and tried to stage the elections according to his scenario, by spring 2013, Khamenei was compelled to return to the tactics of manoeuvring between the groupings most loyal to him. His attempts to get involved in the situation on the ground has drastically influenced the perception of Khamenei in the society. Currently, he is seen not as a celestial living far from terrestrial troubles and, thus, untouchable, but just as the first among equals whose orders are important, yet, not always necessary to obey.

Conclusion

All in all, sanctions played and still play a controversial role in the life of modern Iran. Although initially considered effective, they failed to achieve the main goal. The Islamic Republic persistently continues its non-transparent nuclear research, whereas recent negotiation in the P5+1 format brought no results. However, the US and EU’s punitive measures have changed Iran itself: they made the Iranian elite more practical and cynical as well as taught the country how to survive under the pressure of the sanctions. 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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The post Unilateral Economic Sanctions Against Iran: Unexpected Implications (Part 2/2) appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

International reports on the economic and political situation in Iran prepared by different respected analytical institutes and consultancies, state that sanctions adopted against Tehran by the US, EU and their partners in 2010-12, not only appear to be very effective but will inevitably put the Islamic Republic on the fringe of economic collapse. Meanwhile, diplomats and businessmen often travelling to the country draw a different picture: They describe Iran of the early-2013 as a fast developing country with intensively growing cities and actively improving living standards. Foreigners are especially impressed by the number of expensive boutiques and top-class restaurants emerging in the streets of northern and central Tehran, as well as by exclusive cars driving these streets. This difference between consultancies’ reports and stories of eyewitnesses raises a just question: Who is lying about the economic situation of modern Iran and why? However, the answer is as simple as unexpected: all of them speak the truth and, yet, fail to give a comprehensive picture.

Yes, They Work

First of all, it is necessary to disappoint those who repeat the traditional Iranian slogan about the futility of sanctions: the punitive economic measures adopted by the US, EU and their allies work. Moreover, after 2010, the effectiveness of these measures has substantially increased. Iran is almost cut off from the international banking and insurance system. Tehran’s access to foreign investments, advanced technologies and international sea carriage services is restricted. Its options to sell oil in external markets and import gasoline are limited. By April 2013, the Iranian leadership (both the supreme leader and the president) was compelled to acknowledge that the economy of the country was seriously damaged by sanctions. Moreover, in one of his speeches, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that Iran was struggling against an economic war initiated by the West. This is quite obvious even from official statistics distributed by the Central Bank and Statistical Centre of Iran.

According to these sources, during the period of January 2012 and March 2013, the volume of oil production and its export abroad fell from 3.8 and 2.4 million barrels per day, to 2.7 and 1.3 million barrels per day respectively. As stated by the Iranian Minister of Economy and Finance, , on December 15, 2012, the volume of Iran’s oil income in 2012 was 50% lower than those received in 2011. This substantial drop inevitably caused the deficit in the Iranian budget which is heavily dependent on the inflow of petrodollars. Thus, in October 2012, Ahmadinejad stated in his speech that the authorities are compelled to cut some budget items by 25% or, in certain cases, almost stop financing them. Moreover, one month later, Iran was compelled to halt the implementation of the second phase of economic reforms aimed to ease the indirect subsidies burden of the country’s budget. Under these circumstances, the growth rate of the Iranian GDP in 2012 was estimated as 0.36% with the official inflation rate at 32% in March 2013 (compared to 21.5% in early 2012), and the consumer price annual growth rate at 32% in November 2012.

During 2012, the fluctuations of exchange rates at the foreign exchange market of Iran were probably one of the most serious stress tests for the country’s economy. The dollar exchange rate grew from 18000 rials in January 2012, to 33500-34500 rials in March 2013 (in the free market). Moreover, the growth of the dollar’s price was not steady: during the last 15 months, it suddenly hiked at least four times causing serious socio-economic shocks. One of the most dangerous situations emerged in early October 2012, when another plunge of the rial-to-dollar exchange rate at the free market not only caused the deficit of dollar banknotes in Iran, but led to the closing of the Grand Teheran Bazaar and civil unrest in the capital. These events compelled the Iranian authorities to undertake a number of steps. The introduction of the multiple exchange rates system, restrictions on imports of luxury goods, and the ban on the export of gold and silver were among the first and most important steps of the Iranian authorities.

Under these circumstances, social indicators were also bad. Thus, according to different sources, by 2012, up to 60% of the population lived either on or under the poverty line. The social stratification was huge and kept on growing. The income of three richest deciles of the population was 15-16 times higher than that of the three poorest deciles. In 2012, the official rate of unemployment reached 12.2% (more than 19% in unofficial calculations). The shutdown of industrial projects requiring foreign technologies, investments and equipment only sped up the growth of this indicator.

Not Only Sanctions

However, it would be wrong to explain all Iranian economic problems only by sanctions. Moreover, as believed by experts, the above-mentioned sudden confessions by the Iranian authorities on the negative effect of economic sanctions were caused by the necessity to divert people’s attention from the failures of the government’s economic policy. By 2013, traditional attempts of the authorities to persuade the public that existing problems are a result of the unlawful activities of Iranian tycoons, inner enemies of the regime or government officials misusing their power did not work anymore. As a result, since probably December 2012, Ahmadinejad and his team began accusing the sanctions as the reason for Iran’s economic misfortunes. Nevertheless, all the above-mentioned negative trends existed long before the adoption of the sanctions between 2010-2012. As it becomes obvious even from official Iranian statistical data, high rates of inflation, unemployment and liquidity have been the main negative characteristics of the Iranian economy at least for the last six years. Sanctions only aggravated the situation.             

Unexpected Economic Results and Side Effects

The punishing measures adopted by the US, EU and their partners during 2010-2012 were, and still are, a serious blow to the Islamic Republic of Iran. They drastically changed the international environment, making Iran’s living conditions extremely hard. Nevertheless, when changing the rules of the game, it is naïve to think that other players will retain their old habits and stick to their traditional style of playing. The same works for sanctions. The punitive measures of 2010-2012 would have probably strangled Iran and made it more obedient to the external powers if Tehran had preserved its pre-sanctions domestic and external economic policies. Meanwhile, sanctions launched deep structural changes in Iran which allowed it to adjust to new conditions. This process of adjustment took, at least, a year and brought first results by November-December 2012.

By that moment, it became clear that the negative influence of sanctions achieved its climax: a further decrease in exports of Iranian oil (less than 1-1.3 million barrels per day), as well as the adoption of qualitatively new sanctions were hardly possible. At the same time, Tehran became used to living under existing pressure.

First of all, apart from using multiple tricks and grey measures to evade sanctions, the Iranian government learnt how to live on existing income. As stated by researchers, the new Iranian budget for 1392 (March 2013 to March 2014) was designed by the authorities with an assumption that the volume of oil exports will stay under 1.33 million barrels per day with the average price of $90-91 per barrel. According to a recent article, “,” written by the director of research of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Patrick Clawson, Iranian calculations are “largely reasonable: It will be difficult for the West to reduce Iran's exports below the current 1.3 million b/d or drive its earnings below $91 per barrel.” All in all, petrodollars are expected to fund only 40% of the budget, which is considerably lower than the share of oil income in previous budgets (usually from 60-65% to 80%).

Under these conditions, sanctions triggered what was previously considered as hardly achievable: they compelled the Iranian government to turn their promises to diversify the sources of the budget’s income into practical steps. Thus, in December 2012, the Iranian government declared that, during 2009-2012, it managed to create a modern fiscal system in the country, including the working mechanism of value added tax collection. Subsequently, officials in Ahmadinejad’s cabinet stated that it is high time to start using this system and increase the fiscal burden. Although these statements caused the immediate negative reaction of the majlis, in 2012, the Iranian government had already increased its budget incomes from taxes by collecting up to $14 billion (one fourth more than in 2011, calculated at the exchange rate of 33500 rials per US Dollar).

It is noteworthy that the diversification process was not limited to taxes. During the last two years, Tehran boosted the development of almost all economic activities which could not be hurt by sanctions or where sanctions had a minimum effect. Thus, over the past two decades, Iran has positioned itself as an important regional transit hub, connecting Turkey, Russia, China, the Caucasus and Central Asia with the markets of the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia. However, the effort has never been more concerted than during 2010-2012, as Tehran reacts to (and against) sanctions applied by the rest of the world. According to The Gulf States Newsletter, Iranian customs data from 2010-2012 shows that each year, around 10 to 11 million tonnes of goods, worth $30-35 billion and from 100-110 countries, pass through Iran, generating $3 billion income. The plan is to raise this exponentially in order to see transit revenues of up to $12 billion by 2025. As a result, since 2011, Iran has intensified the development of its transport infrastructure, promptly finishing projects that in the past would have taken years, if not decades. In February 2012, for instance, the government reported the start of new works intended to extend the country’s road network by 2000km, and the railroads by between 8,000 and 12,000 km.

Although transit is unlikely the most profitable of available options, it is one of the most obvious examples of diversification processes taking part in Iran. Apart from road construction, Tehran intensified the development of its basic non-oil industries such as steel, cement and energy production, as well as mining during 2010-2013. For instance, in 2012, Iran produced 64.1 million tons of cement and 64.4 million tons of clinker, which were 5.6 and 4.7% respectively more than in 2011. According to different estimations, up to 14 billion tons of cement were exported; at least two of Iran’s neighbours – Iraq and Afghanistan – represent a very appealing consumer market for Iranian construction materials. Deputy Energy Minister Mohammad Behzad stated in February 2013 that, during recent years, the production capacities of the electric industry of Iran have been growing by 7% annually. By the mid-2013,they were supposed to reach 70000 MW. It is not a secret that Tehran sees electricity as one of its export items. Iran is already selling electrical energy to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan. According to recent statistical data, in 2012, the volume of Iranian electricity exports hiked by 29% as compared with 2011.

*Read the final part of “” on May 21, 2013.

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The post Unilateral Economic Sanctions Against Iran: Unexpected Implications (Part 1/2) appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

During the past three decades, sanctions have been the main hallmark of the United States’ policy toward Iran. However, the imposition of European Union (EU) sanctions and the involvement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the issue of sanctions are relatively new developments, beginning only in 2006. These developments have had a significantly negative impact on Iranian society and its citizens.

In particular, the expansion of Western sanctions to cover international transactions with the Central Bank of Iran and to stop the country’s oil exports have lowered the standard of living in Iran. Furthermore, since March 2012, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication has refused to provide monetary services to Iran, effectively blocking Iran's financial transactions with the rest of the world and resulting in difficulty importing medicines, medical equipment and other essential goods.

Impact of Sanctions: Difficult to Measure, Impossible to Ignore

Unfortunately, no accurate figures or information are available on the impact of sanctions on various facets of Iranian life. For example, regarding medicines, apart from a few interviews and cursory comments from officials directly related to Iran's pharmaceutical sector, no other reliable information is available. With regard to the impact of sanctions on Iran's oil sales, other exports, essential goods imports, and monetary and financial sectors, the body of evidence is limited to sporadic views and general advance warnings from a small number of state officials and mass media.

This absence of information is primarily a result of unwritten policies compelling Iran's state-run institutions to avoid leaking information about the problems caused by Western sanctions. The Iranian government worries that Western states will continue or even increase sanctions if Iran shows any weakness in the face of the sanctions, or sends signals which would confirm the impact of them. Additionally, Iran’s sensitive and highly complicated negotiations with the P5+1 over Iran’s nuclear energy program have made it wary of any variable which could hinder the negotiations or increase the bargaining power of either party.

The impact of sanctions has also been obscured by the concurrence of the Iranian government’s implementation of economic reform policies and the escalation of Western sanctions. Since the incumbent Iranian government came into office, it has carried out reforms to remedy Iran’s heavy dependence on oil and gas revenues and its overuse of subsidies on consumer and even luxury goods. However, the implementation of these structural reforms has coincided with extensive sanctions and restrictive measures that have greatly influenced Iran's international banking transactions, raw material imports, foreign investments, and oil, gas, and petrochemical product sales. As a result, it has not been possible to accurately differentiate the impact of sanctions from that of domestic economic reforms.

Nonetheless, the sanctions’ wide scope, precision and ruthlessness suggest that they are responsible for the vast majority of the existing pressure on Iranians, especially medical patients, and Iran’s economy — particularly the oil and gas industry and many other industrial production sectors. A by the Washington DC-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, highlights the severe restrictions on Iranian patients’ access to medicine as a result of sanctions:

“Even when the most reputable American and European pharmaceutical companies are involved, and their lawyers have completed all the necessary paperwork from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), nearly all banks that Iran deals with prefer to err on the side of caution. Their hesitation is understandable given that a mistake could earn a bank the wrath of the US Treasury Department and fines that exceed $1 billion. The recent experience of a reputable Iranian pharmaceutical group shows the magnitude of the problem. When a senior company representative flew to Paris to present a French bank with documentation showing that the trade was fully legal, he was told: ‘Even if you bring a letter from the French president himself saying it is OK to do so, we will not risk this.’”

The pressure of sanctions is also apparent in Iran's oil and gas sector. Sanctions imposed by the US and Europe during the past two years have been so expansive that not only European and American companies, but also Asian firms have gradually shied away from investing in Iran's energy sector in order to avoid US retaliatory measures and heavy fines and, in some cases, to maintain their commercial trade interests with the US and Europe. Furthermore, these sanctions have limited Iran’s exports of crude oil, oil products, and petrochemicals by preventing insurance companies from extending coverage to tankers carrying Iranian oil and related products.

Sanctions Lack Legal Basis

The inhumane impact of sanctions on the Iranian people and economy is simply a manifestation of an even greater issue: the inherent illegality of sanctions. The very act of imposing sanctions, particularly “unilateral coercive” sanctions, on any member of the international community for any reason is at odds with five important sets of  the Charter of the UN; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the UN Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States; various resolutions on the prohibition of unilateral coercive measures; and various resolutions on the enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights.

Additionally, the rich political literature used by the UN heavily emphasizes respect for human rights; recourse to arbitration, investigation, fact-finding and judgment; necessity of increasing international cooperation; and avoidance of unilateral coercive measures, either economically or militarily. In 1997, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights indicated in a that nations imposing economic sanctions should ensure that they respect the economic, social and cultural rights of the targeted population, as outlined in the . Therefore, if sanctions encroach significantly upon any of these basic rights, it would be justified to consider them inhumane and in violation of the internationally-accepted principles of human rights.

It is noteworthy that UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iran Ahmed Shaheed focused on the issue of anti-Iran sanctions in the three final paragraphs of his . Shaheed noted that despite “humanitarian exemptions considered to exempt foodstuffs, medical supplies, and other humanitarian goods from the sanctions,” such exemptions “are potentially not meeting their intended purpose,” especially given the drug shortages for patients with illnesses, such as cancer, hemophilia, and multiple sclerosis.

Finally, the EU's General Court earlier this year that the European Union should lift sanctions which it had imposed in 2010 on two Iranian banks, and against which the banks had fought a two-year legal battle. Regardless of whether Brussels will implement the court’s decision or allow it to be forgotten in the labyrinth of European politics, the decision itself is a clear indication that the sanctions were not legally justifiable. Other Iranian banks that have been covered by Western sanctions are planning to take similar measures.

From the viewpoint of an objective observer, such processes clearly indicate that American and European sanctions against Iran are outcomes of the politicization of the Iranian issue rather than justified measures based on legal frameworks, human rights norms, and international humanitarian law.

Understanding Iran’s Response                            

If researchers and observers recognize the tragic consequences of sanctions for the Iranian people and the lack of legal foundation for sanctions, they may better understand the Iranian government's response to the sanctions and to other hostile measures from Western nations.

At present, Iranian government officials firmly believe that the nuclear issue is simply a pretext. Therefore, they argue, even if Iran satisfied all of the requirements of the UNSC resolutions about its nuclear energy program, the West would find new excuses to put renewed pressure on Iran. These excuses would continue until nothing remained of Iran but a submissive or bankrupt country. The imposition of unilateral sanctions and continued expansion of those sanctions by the US and Europe has further bolstered this argument among the Iranian people. If considered from this perspective, Iran's resistance against the pressure of Western sanctions is more rational than many in the international community assess.

Decades of interactions between Iran and the West have proven that establishing a balanced relationship based on respect for Iran's national sovereignty, as well as Islamic and Iranian values is, if not impossible, at least very difficult. Iran will certainly continue to pursue its covert and overt diplomatic efforts to reduce the impact of sanctions. However, it would be wishful thinking to assume that escalating pressure on ordinary Iranians will force the Iranian government, or even the people, into submission.

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In light of Senator Chuck Hagel’s appointment as US Secretary of Defense, the issue of Iran — and the economic sanctions, in particular — promises to stay in play. Hagel has been lambasted by the neo-conservatives and some hard-line supporters of Israel for daring to question (in the past) that sanctions are the best way to confront Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Well, as it turns out, the sanctions have failed to force Tehran to abandon its nuclear program. Indeed, sanctions have a long history of failure.

That said, it is true that sanctions have altered the modus operandi of finance and commerce in Iran and have also contributed to the country’s inflation woes. Ever since hyperinflation briefly reared its head, back in October, the Iranian government has tried to prop up its faltering currency and stop its economy’s death spiral through force and deception. In a sense, and to a minor degree, these oppressive tactics seem to have “worked,” as Iran’s inflation rate has fallen somewhat since it peaked in October 2012. Still, using objective, market-based data and a well established methodology, I estimate that Iran experienced an annual inflation rate of 110% during 2012 — a rate that is almost four times higher than the official rate of 27.4%.

While Iran’s annual inflation rate remains very high, its spiral into hyperinflation has subsided — for the time being, at least. Beyond the government’s establishment of a convoluted multiple-exchange-rate regime and its suppression of currency trading, Iranians have also become increasingly effective at evading Western sanctions.

The most glaring example of this can be seen in the influx of gold into Iran in recent months. With inflation eroding consumer wealth and purchasing power, and Iranian companies effectively unable to access the global financial system, Iranians have turned to gold as a stable, non-traceable store of value and a reliable medium of exchange. Much of this gold has come from Turkey, which is heavily dependent on Iranian natural gas. While Turkey — under pressure from its Western allies — has suspended gold exports to Iran via the Turkish banking system, this has not stopped private couriers from facilitating the Turkish-Iranian gold-for-natural-gas trade, primarily via the UAE.

Conventional wisdom holds that the sanctions will “work” by imposing such severe economic hardship that the Iranian regime will be forced to abandon its nuclear program. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that this is possible, how long will it take? Consider Cuba, where the Castro government has retained power, despite US sanctions, for over 50 years. Well, one might argue that Cuba has not faced the same inflation problems that now confront Iran. Fine. But Zimbabwe has. Indeed, sanctions and severe hyperinflation (the world’s second worst case) have failed to dislodge Robert Mugabe after 33 years in power.

In light of this, it seems highly unlikely that sanctions will succeed in forcing Iran to abandon its nuclear program before it is able to develop a nuclear weapon. Even conservative estimates give Iran two years, at most, before it has enough fissile nuclear material to construct a nuclear weapon. Regardless of the rhetoric coming out of Washington and Brussels, the West is clearly beginning to recognize that reality. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has taken note and initiated talks with Iranian officials. The US and EU have also quietly begun to lay the groundwork for a diplomatic solution.

While the collective punishment delivered by the sanctions has been devastating, it has ultimately failed to deter the Iranian regime from developing nuclear capacity. Instead, it has generated a great deal of resentment. Given the rotting situation in Iran, and the time horizon for Iran to develop nuclear capabilities, it seems that the interests of all concerned are converging on a diplomatic solution. Indeed, it is the only viable option left.

*[A version of this article was published on .]

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The post On the Failure of the Iranian Sanctions appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Readers who recall that four years ago a new US President seemed eager to defuse the West’s quarrel with Iran over its nuclear activities may wonder why we are all still waiting for white smoke. I am not sure I know the answer, but I have a hunch it has something to do with a lack of realism on one side and a profound mistrust on the other.

The lack of realism is a Western failing. The US and the two European states, France and the UK, that still have the most influence on the EU’s Iran policy, ten years after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) first reported certain Iranian failures (long since corrected) to comply with nuclear safeguards obligations, are still reluctant to concede Iran’s right to possess a capacity to enrich uranium.

These Western powers know that the treaty which governs the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), does not prohibit the acquisition of uranium enrichment technology by the treaty’s Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS). 

They know that several NNWS (Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa) already possess this technology. 

They know that the framers of the treaty envisaged that the monitoring of enrichment plants by IAEA inspectors would provide the UN Security Council with timely notice of any move by an NNWS to divert enriched uranium to the production of nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, they cannot bring themselves to tell Iran they accept that Iran, as a NNWS party to the NPT, is entitled to enrich uranium, provided it does so for peaceful purposes, under IAEA supervision, and does not seek to divert any of the material produced.

One of the reasons for this goes back a long way. When India, a non-party to the NPT, detonated a nuclear device in 1974, US officials decided that it had been a mistake to produce a treaty, the NPT, which did not prohibit the acquisition of two dual-use technologies (so-called because they can be used either for peaceful or for military purposes) by NNWS. 

The existence of a non-sequitur in their reasoning, since India was not a party to the NPT, seems not to have occurred to them. They set about persuading other states that were capable of supplying these technologies (uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel) to withhold them from NNWS. 

This could be defended, of course, on prudential grounds. However, it caused resentment among the NNWS who felt that their side of the NPT bargain was being eroded surreptitiously; ultimately, like all forms of prohibition, it was short-sighted, because it encouraged the development of a black market and enhanced the risk of clandestine programmes, unsupervised by the IAEA.

Denying Iran the right to enrich uranium, and trying to deprive Iran of technology that it had developed indigenously, (albeit with help from the black market), seemed more than prudential in 2003. It seemed a necessity, because at the time there were good reasons to think that Iran had a nuclear weapons programme.

Nevertheless, by 2008, the US intelligence community had concluded that Iran abandoned that programme in late 2003 and would only resume it if the benefits of doing so outweighed the costs.

Despite that and subsequent similar findings, this prohibitionist mind-set is still prevalent in Washington, Paris and London. It is one explanation for a lack of progress since President Obama first stretched out the hand of friendship four years ago.

Another explanation is Israel. Israel shares with North Korea, Pakistan and India the distinction of being one of only four states that do not adhere to the NPT. It nonetheless enjoys considerable influence over US, French and British nuclear non-proliferation policies. Israeli ministers are deeply opposed to Iran possessing a uranium enrichment capability. 

They may or may not believe what they frequently claim: that Iran will use its enrichment plants to produce fissile material and will use that fissile material to attack Israel with nuclear weapons, directly or through Hezbollah. In reality, few outside Israel believe this, and many inside are sceptical. However, they do not want Israel’s room for military manoeuvre to be reduced by the existence of a south-west Asian state that could choose to withdraw from the NPT and seek to deter certain Israeli actions by threatening a nuclear response.

A third explanation is Saudi Arabia. Leading Saudis are as opposed as Israeli ministers to Iran retaining an enrichment capability. They are less inclined than Israelis to talk of this capability as posing an “existential” threat; but they share the Israeli fear that it will erode their options in the region. They also fear that it will enhance the regional prestige of their main political rival, an intolerable prospect – all the more so now that Iran and Saudi-Arabia are engaged in a proxy war in Syria that seems increasingly likely to re-ignite sectarian conflict in Iraq.

Finally, there remains strong hostility to Iran in some US quarters, notably Congress. This makes it difficult for any US administration to adopt a realistic policy of accepting Iran’s right to enrich uranium, relying on IAEA safeguards for timely detection of any Iranian violation of its NPT obligations, and minimising through intelligent diplomacy the risk of Iran’s leaders deciding to abuse their enrichment capability.  

On the Iranian side, the lack of trust in the US’ good faith has become increasingly apparent. It is in fact a hall-mark of Iran’s supreme decision-taker, Ayatollah Khamenei. One hears of it from Iranian diplomats. The Ayatollah himself barely conceals it in some of his public statements.

As recently as March 20, marking the Persian New Year, he said: “I am not optimistic about talks [with the US]. Why? Because our past experiences show that talks for the American officials do not mean for us to sit down and reach a logical solution […] What they mean by talks is that we sit down and talk until Iran accepts their viewpoint."

This distrust has militated against progress in nuclear talks by making Iran’s negotiators ultra-cautious. They have been looking for signs of a change in US attitudes – a readiness to engage sincerely in a genuine give-and-take – and have held back when, to their minds, those signs have not been apparent. 

Instead of volunteering measures that might lead the West to have more confidence in the findings of Western intelligence agencies (that Iran is not currently intent on acquiring nuclear weapons), the Iranian side has camped on demanding that its rights be recognised and nuclear-related sanctions lifted.

Unfortunately, this distrust has been fuelled by the Western tactic of relying on sanctions to coerce Iran into negotiating. Ironically, sanctions have had the opposite effect. They have sowed doubts in Ayatollah Khamenei’s mind about the West’s real intentions, and they have augmented his reluctance to take any risks to achieve a deal.

Compounding that counter-productive effect, Western negotiators have been reluctant to offer any serious sanctions relief in return for the concessions they have asked of Iran, whenever talks have taken place. One Iranian diplomat put it this way: “They ask for the moon, and offer peanuts.”

Here part of the problem is a continuing Western hope, despite all experience to date, that unbearable pressure will induce Iran to cut a deal on the West’s unrealistic (and unbalanced) terms.

Another part is ministerial pride in having persuaded the UN Security Council, the EU Council of Ministers, and several Asian states to accept a sanctions regime that is causing hardship among ordinary Iranians (but from which Iran’s elites are benefitting because of their privileged access to foreign exchange and their control of smuggling networks). It sometimes seems as though causing hardship has ceased to be a means to an end; it has become an achievement to be paraded, a mark of ministerial success.

Many of the factors listed in the preceding paragraphs have been visible during the latest round of talks between the US and EU (plus Russia and China), which took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on April 5 and 6, 2013.

According to a draft of the proposal to be presented to Iran which Scott Peterson described in The Christian Science Monitor on April 4, the US and EU demanded:

–          the suspension of all enrichment above the level needed to produce fuel for power reactors [5% or less];

–          the conversion of Iran’s stock of 20% U235 into fuel for research reactors, or its export, or its dilution;

–          the transformation of the well-protected Fordow enrichment plant to a state of reduced readiness [for operations] without dismantlement

–          the acceptance of enhanced monitoring of Iranian facilities by the IAEA, including the installation of cameras at Fordow to provide continuous real-time surveillance of the plant.

In exchange, the US and EU offered to suspend sanctions on gold and precious metals, and the export of petrochemicals, once the IAEA confirmed implementation of all the above measures. They also offered civilian nuclear cooperation, and IAEA technical help with the acquisition of a modern research reactor, safety measures and the supply of isotopes for nuclear medicine. In addition, the US would approve the export of parts for the safety-related repair of Iran’s aging fleet of US-made commercial aircraft.

Finally, the proposal stressed that additional confidence-building steps taken by Iran would yield corresponding steps from the P5+1, including proportionate relief of oil sanctions.

The initial Iranian response on April 5 seems to have been less than wholeheartedly enthusiastic. On the first day of the talks they irritated the US and EU negotiators by failing to react directly to the US/EU proposals. Instead they reiterated their demand for the recognition of Iran’s rights and the lifting of sanctions as preconditions for any short-term confidence building curbs on their 20% enrichment activities.

On the second day, however, according to , writing for AlMonitor on April 6, and quoting Western participants in the talks, Iran “pivoted to arguing for a better deal.”  The Iranian team started to make clear what they would require in return for curbing Iran’s 20% activities, notably the lifting of “all unilateral sanctions.” These mainly comprise the oil and financial sanctions imposed in 2012.

“I’ve never seen anything quite like it,” a US diplomat said. “There was intensive dialogue on key issues at the core of [the proposed confidence building measures].”

Will that pivot be a turning-point? The latest proposal clearly falls far short of what Iran seeks by way of clarity that ultimately the US and EU can accept Iran retaining a dual-use enrichment capability, and by way of relief from oil and financial sanctions. There has been no sign that the US and EU can bring themselves to offer significant movement on either of these points.

Yet, a scintilla of hope can be drawn from the fact that on April 6 there may have been the beginnings of a haggle. If both sides can resume their talks in that haggling mode, progress may finally be achievable. Haggling is central to any good negotiation.  Until now it has been sorely lacking in dealings with Iran under President Obama.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

The post Will There Ever be an End to the Iranian Nuclear Dispute? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Multilateral and unilateral economic sanctions imposed on Iran are contrary to the principle of the . The declaration begins with the preamble that ā€œrecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.ā€ As we see in the following, economic sanctions seriously undermine freedom, democracy, justice and peace both inside the targeted country and at an international level.

According to the preamble ā€œfreedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.ā€ Limiting the access of Iranian people to the international trade and financial system has clearly put in danger the lives of millions of people. Economic sanctions prevent a nation from achieving what has been called ā€œthe highest aspiration of the common people.ā€

The fourth paragraph of the preamble indicates that ā€œit is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations.ā€ Sanctions from the European Union (EU) and the United States have not contributed and will never contribute to such a relationship between Iran, the EU and the US. To the contrary, it is destroying existing relations among our nations.

Based on Article 1, ā€œAll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.ā€ The US and EU sanctions are limiting the freedom and rights of the people in Iran and other countries and are far from resembling ā€œa spirit of brotherhood.ā€ They contribute to enmity among nations with severe consequences.

According to Article 2, ā€œEveryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional orĢżinternational status of the country or territory to which a person belongs.ā€ Most of the sanctions imposed on Iran are discriminatory, and moreover, the nuclear problem began with the discrimination of Western countries against Iran.

Furthermore, the Iranian people, especially those who are living in the US and the EU, are discriminated against even though they have no connection to the nuclear issue. Closing the banking accounts of Iranians or preventing students who study in the West from receiving money from their families or from studying some courses in Western universities are clear violations of Article 2.

According to Article 3, ā€œEveryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.ā€ĢżCurrent sanctions against Iran have endangered all aspects of life and security for Iranians. By limiting peopleā€™s access to medicine, gasoline, jobs, and more, the sanctions have endangered job security, health security and, in general, human security.

Based on Article 5, ā€œNo one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.ā€ Crippling sanctions are leading to mass suffering and mass punishment. How can Western governments justify punishing 75 million people for a crime that they have not committed?

Article 7 says that ā€œall are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.ā€ Sovereignty rights, which apply to all individuals who live in a country, therefore also apply to the nation itself, forming the basis of the equality of nations. Iran as a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member has fully implemented its commitments to the NPT, and yet the EU and the US continue to impose discriminatory obligations on the Iranian people by passing United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The US and the EU have also begun to target specific individuals in the Islamic Republic. These behaviors are contrary to Article 10 of the Declaration. According to this article, ā€œEveryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.ā€ The actions of the US and the EU are arbitrary in this regard, targeting individuals and institutions without any clear charges. They are using economic measures to achieve political purposes.

According to Article 12, ā€œNo one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.ā€ By naming individuals and companies and imposing penalties on them, the sanctions undermine the reputation of the individuals without letting them know their charges in advance. Since individuals are subject to international law, individual rights are also and should be observed internationally.

Articles 18, 19 and 20 emphasize the freedom of thought, expression and assembly. During the past few years in numerous cases we have seen that assemblies related to Iran have been canceled, publication of opinions by those who support ±õ°ł²¹²Ōā€™s rights have been limited and recently, Iranian TV channels have been removed from satellites. These are all violations of basic human rights.

According to Article 23, ā€œEveryone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.ā€ Economic sanctions against Iran have destroyed favorable conditions for work and endangered job security. Furthermore, by weakening the middle class, they have undermined democracy, too. It is not acceptable to say that the Iranian government is responsible for the imposition of sanctions because, according to International Atomic Energy Agency reports, the Iranian government has fully implemented all of its obligations.

Finally, the US and EU sanctions violate Article 25: ā€œEveryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.ā€ Every day we see news about the degradation of living standards and health in Iran and the death of patients in Iranian hospitals because of medicine shortage. These are the consequences of preventing Iran from having access to international markets that are unrelated to its nuclear facilities.

As the humanitarian consequences of sanctions against Iraq during 1990s demonstrated, these economic pressures will lead to malnutrition among women and children. For the same reason that the lives of innocent people should be taken into account in a military strike, the international community should pay attention to human and humanitarian costs and damages that are imposed on the targeted society in an economic war.

These actions have put into question the legitimacy and credibility of the West and undermined its positions around the world. Unfortunately, mainstream media in the EU and the US are controlling public opinion, and there is no democracy on foreign policy issues. As the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq proved, it may be possible to win a war by economic sanctions and military intervention but not the peace. To win the peace the US and the EU need to practice human rights and democracy, not preach them. Economic sanctions violate the first and undermine the second.

*[A version of this article was originally published by theĢż].

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Economic Sanctions and Human Rights appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Nicholas A. Heras: Is the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula under one state possible, and under what conditions?

Michael Bassett: Peaceful unification is not only possible, but it is inevitable. North Korea has wanted unification, as a top desire, since 1948. Kim Jung Un's unification policy is geared through engagement with South Korea. South Korea wants to unify when North Koreans are more socially developed, because such a rapid economic migration from North to South would result in social and economic chaos. The unification process would most likely and most smoothly occur if the US and North Korea were to normalize bi-lateral relations, and if the US was to lift all sanctions and embargoes, and help the North Koreans to develop their special economic zones much like the way China developed.

This also means separating the issues of contention from the peace process, i.e. nuclear weapons and human rights abuses. The US would most likely have to give North Korea de facto nuclear recognition, which is totally unacceptable for most people. But in reality, it wouldn't mean much difference or have any effect on anything. It's very much like a marriage certificate says something on paper but has no impact on defining the relationship of the couple involved. Next, a peace treaty would have to be signed, and then from there about 15 years of economic development would have to occur.

South Korea and China cannot economically afford the responsibility of absorbing a burden of 23 million indigenous peasants from North Korea. There would have to be some social and psychological modernization and transcendence that comes along with development. After that period of time, unification could take place. I imagine that with a peace treaty would come more ability for inter-peninsula travel, so it wouldn't be too shocking when unification takes place. Development of the sorts required wouldn't cost insane amounts of money, and it could come from public and private investors. The main challenge is getting sanctions lifted so it's all possible. Japan should lead the way in paying the initial sum for North Korea’s development, by issuing North Korea colonization reparations, which Japan has issued to every other country they have occupied except for North Korea.

Heras: On the topic of Japanese-North Korean relations, how likely is an expansion in North Korea's nuclear weapon stockpile would compel its enemies, most prominently Japan, to seek to obtain their own nuclear deterrence capability and is an "East Asian nuclear arms race" a realistic scenario?   

Bassett: Japan has been drifting away from its post-World War II deals for over a decade. Though Japan’s government uses the North Korean government’s harsh rhetoric and military first policies, and its outlawed nuclear program, and kidnapping of Japanese citizens as justification for Japanese military expansion, North Korea’s actions do not justify Japanese military expansion. The US guarantees Japan’s security on paper and on the ground. The entire US Navy 7th Fleet is in the East Pacific, and the US military is a phone call away in Afghanistan. Japan seems to have ulterior motives for building up their military and successfully regaining the power of independent offensive action, but as to what they are, one can only speculate. It is my opinion that Japan should remain reliant on the security provided by their proctors.

Heras: Is it accurate to state that war on the Korean Peninsula is a more frightening prospect for the Chinese government than it is for the US government and its allies in the region?

Bassett:Many people like to speculate as to what a war would look like on the peninsula if it were to break out tomorrow. There will be no war on the peninsula in our lifetimes unless North Korea sold highly enriched uranium to another country; and even in that scenario military action against North Korea would be a greatly orchestrated surgical operation and South Korea would barely be affected. No one wants war on the peninsula. The goal of North Korea, the very number one goal of North Korea is survival of the regime and continuance of the North Korean way of life.

If there is one thing that anyone should know about the North Korean government, is they are not suicidal. The number one priority of the regime is survival of the regime. South Korea most certainly does not want war. In response to the prospects of North Korea conducting a third nuclear test, the new Park administration has warned of sanctions, but has said that whatever actions they impose, would be sure to not result in continued development of a peace process. Park is very careful not to destabilize the region or South Korea’s relations with its neighbors. In spite of how the media portrays President Park, she is very much a pacifist.

President Park, often compared to her dictator father who was the former president of South Korea, is actually seeing the forest for the trees. She knows that nothing can be accomplished by rattling sabers, and that South Korea has worked incredibly hard to develop economically in the past 30 years, and they don't want to lose what they've worked so hard for. So again, the prospect of war is slight.

Heras: What do you hope that the international public understands about North Korea that it isn't always informed about?

Bassett: I would ask the international community to see North Korea through the eyes of its people like I do. We are all humans on this planet and are equal parts flesh and blood and have brains and souls and hearts. We can only communicate and coexist if we try to understand each other and put aside every slanted misconception we have about North Koreans. It took me a decade to understand North Korea, and I was focusing all of my time, energy, and resources on it. If you want to understand the relationship between the US and North Korea, read 1984 by Orwell. Then visit the North Korean social networking sites and read the blogs of foreigners who have lived there. My good friend Joseph Ferris is an American Ship Captain who, in his spare time, is a tour guide for North Korea. He has a very well developed blog called "," which is a treasure trove of pictures and stories that go along with them.

Another good friend, Felix Abt, recently published a book called "." He was one of the only westerners to have ever directly worked in Pyongyang on development and despite lack of funding, he made a huge impact in his seven years living and working there. Tourism, I would argue, is very important for the future of North Korea, and its relationship with the international community. The purpose of North Korea tourism is two-fold. One is the economic benefit, and the other, and most important one, is the cultural exchanges that take place. These experiences last a lifetime and are special. It humanizes the situation. Humanizing any situation is a good rule to live by in any dealing we conduct with anybody throughout our lives, and should be no different when dealing with North Koreans.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

The post North Korea: Missing the Forest for the Trees (Part 2/2) appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

North Korea is again at the center of international attention due to assertions that its leadership is pursuing a program of enriching uranium in order to add more nuclear weapons to its current stockpile. In the context of the United Statesā€™ militaryā€™s ongoing ā€œAsia Pivot,ā€ and the disquiet of North Koreaā€™s neighbors at the prospect of a nuclear arms race in East Asia, gaining a strong understanding of North Korea and its society remains a top priority for international affairs professionals and the global public alike.

Nicholas A. Heras:Is North Korea important to the international community only because of its nuclear weapons programs?

Michael Bassett:ĢżI see the international community focusing on nuclear weapons, and human rights, more than anything else, so it does seem that way. I would like to think that we would care about their existence as fellow human beings if they were isolated and in desperate conditions, and if they had no nuclear weapons or human gulags, but I really doubt that we would care otherwise. We should though. North Koreans are human too, and they have a wonderful culture. I always encourage people to experience North Korean culture through a tour of their social media sites before they judge them after listening to the sensationalist media culture in America, or reading some ultra-liberal college textbook here in the USA that doesnā€™t see ā€œthe forest for the trees.ā€

Heras:ĢżBuilding off your point of not missing the ā€œforest for the trees,ā€ what are the largest misconceptions about North Koreaā€™s leadership as rational actors in the international system?

Bassett:ĢżThe largest misconception is that the international community thinks that the North Korean leadership enjoys having their country exist in the state it does, especially since Kim Jung-Un succeeded in transition to dynastic power. Itā€™s safe to say that the international community thinks that North Koreans are irrational. I thought so too on my first encounter with them.

While stationed on the DMZ, I heard propaganda all day from across the Imjin River. I was alerted on hundreds of occasions, and once, when a defector crossed, she spoke to our entire camp about what life was like for her in a political prisoner camp for 13 years of her life after being accused of stealing a box of pencils. As a result of that night, I spent the next ten years of my life trying to understand North Koreans.

When I gave my final presentation at Yonsei University on North Korean Government and Foreign Policy, I proposed my ā€œAbused Person Hypothesisā€ as an analogy to define them as a rational actor. If you are treated as a non-person who is locked in a prison and starved your entire life, and called bad names, and treated as if you were bad for being in such a state, then you would behave in ways people would not likely understand and youā€™d be likely to be ostracized. Now, apply this metaphorical, but very real, experience to North Korea, and compound it with their history of being a ā€œspeed bumpā€ caught in the middle of thousands of years of wars in Asia, then you can easily understand why their number one goal is survival of their way of life.

To me, the North Korean response is quite rational. As a constructivist, I tend to take their historical development and worldview into account, as well as I can do it, trying to place myself in the shoes of the North Koreans. That has helped me to understand them in ways that most people arenā€™t even comfortable with.

Heras: What would constitute the survival of North Koreaā€™s ā€œway of lifeā€?

Bassett:ĢżIt is my opinion that every citizen in North Korea is the victim of human rights abuse, and those in the gulags are the most miserable victims of the abuses. They are the outcasts that the regime values least critical to its survival. By demonizing the regime for having gulags, the international community not only ignores everyone else who is a victim in North Korea, but it influences policy that results in the further deterioration of the regime as a whole. When conditions deteriorate, everyone suffers.

With fewer resources to survive, everyone ends up in gulags. In the gulag, unlike prisons in the United States, the state isnā€™t responsible for keeping prisoners alive. They must fend for themselves. Gulags are part of the nasty machine that is a result of that policy. The system is so fragile that they have opened for tourism because even a small group of ten tourists impacts their economy. North Korea is a sovereign nation, whether the international community likes it or not, and by being a sovereign nation they have the right to survive by default of being a unique nation and culture.

If we look at North Korea as being a human being, we could say that when the human starves it would be rational for him to eat his own arm. It doesnā€™t seem rational for someone to punish someone for ā€œeating their own armā€ if they were isolated and starved. Many North Koreans die of Pallegra, a disease that occurs as a result of eating corn all the time. The skin on the hands get callous, their finger nails fall off, their facial skin hardens, they get cataracts; and then their stomach hardens and they canā€™t digest food anymore so they die. The solution is to eat meat, which sadly is only really available in the form of rodents, canine, or felines.

Whether an individual person or state, everyone has the right to exist by any means possible. I hope that one day that North Koreaā€™s attempts at survival are less drastic, but that will depend upon the policies that are created as a result of the international communityā€™s perception of North Korea.

Heras: What internal pressures would change North Korean society, and how would it change?

Bassett:ĢżNorth Koreans do not expect change to come from the outside world. Since Russia fell, and China normalized relations with the US and entered their industrial revolution, North Korea has had very hard times. They’ve endured soil erosion, famine, draught, sanctions, embargoes, and their very existence has been threatened on a daily basis. The juche ideology is all about being self-sufficient, but it is up to theoretical debate as to the definition of “self-sufficiency”, and Kim Jung Un is the only one legally allowed to theorize on juche. He has been exposed to the west, having lived in Europe for several years. Jang Sang Taek [a North Korean General considered to be the second most powerful person in North Korea] is infamously technocratic, and his major was economics. These two worldviews have resulted in a drastic culture shift in that short time.

The military has been used for beautification and development, especially in regards to housing projects and recreational parks. Tourism now constitutes one of the largest legal industries in North Korea. The North Korean government now has official Twitter, Facebook, Flickr, and YouTube accounts. Some North Koreans have computers, even good ones, like iPads. Many have cellphones and TVs. The regime seems to be desperately trying to get the worldā€™s attention on a more human level. It is using social networking to reach out. If the North Korean government succeeds in getting the worldā€™s attention on all the other aspects of their way of life, besides nuclear weapons and gulags, then perceptions of it could change; and hopefully one day normalization of bi-lateral relations could take place, and then within about 15 years from that, the peninsula would be capable of achieving unification.

Read the final part on February 20, 2013.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post North Korea: Missing the Forest for the Trees (Part 1/2) appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

[This article is based on a talk presented by independent researcher Mehrnaz Shahabi on November 17 at the in London, which seeks to celebrate, explore and promote culture and arts in the Middle East and North Africa.]

For 33 years now, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran has been the target of US economic sanctions, which have increased in scope and severity over time. The impact of sanctions on populations is not always quantifiable and can be contradictory. Despite their negative impact in isolating and hindering Iran’s economic progress, and the tragic loss of life due to the boycott of spare parts for the aging Iranian airline, in so far as necessity is the mother of invention, sanctions in many instances have acted as an impetus for technological progress; and the experience of success and survival through adversity has infused a collective sense of empowerment and self-confidence.

When I was asked in July to talk about the impact of sanctions on Iranian society, the idea was to place some emphasis on the arts and artists. Since then, the reality of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding as a result of the economic warfare on Iran has shifted the emphasis, by necessity, from the artists to their audience, since it is inconceivable to think of arts separately from the audience at which it is directed.

The current sanctions by the US and the EU, under the pretext of a manufactured dispute over Iran’s civilian nuclear programme, are comprehensive sanctions against Iran’s economy for inflicting intentional collective punishment. The damage to the economy and the injury inflicted on the lives of the population in all respects is unambiguous and lethal.

Impact on Healthcare

These sanctions, which went into effect at the end of July 2012, target, amongst other things, Iran’s banking and export of oil. Export of oil comprises 80 percent of Iran’s foreign revenue which finances infrastructural work, social and welfare services, hospitals, schools, universities, state employees' salaries and pensions. The value of Iranian currency has declined by 80 percent in the past year. The prices of imported machinery, medicine, and many types of foodstuff have beyond the reach of ordinary people. Many factories and businesses have folded, and unemployment is mounting.

However, the most critical impact of sanctions is on the availability of drugs and the health of the population. Iran is making of its needed drugs domestically, and pharmaceuticals are heavily . The devalued currency means that raw materials imported for drug production are now a lot more expensive. In many cases, the raw material cannot even be paid for because of the banking sanctions, particularly as the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), in compliance with the EU sanctions has stopped its electronic communication services for Iranian financial institutions and transactions from Iran. As a result, even domestically-produced drugs are becoming unavailable. Two drug manufacturing companies this October, and pharmacies are experiencing widespread .

The most advanced life saving drugs cannot be made in generic form.These include drugs for heart disease, lung problems, kidney disease and dialysis, multiple sclerosis, thalassemia, haemophilia and many forms of cancer.

All of the surgeries for thousands of haemophilic patients have been because a shortage of coagulant drugs. A at the end of October due to the absence of coagulant medication. The head of Iran’s Haemophilia Society has , “This is a blatant hostage-taking of the most vulnerable people by countries which claim they care about human rights. Even a few days of delay can have serious consequences like haemorrhage and disability.”

The drugs for many forms of cancer, particularly leukaemia, which is rife in Iran, cannot be imported, and this absence of drugs is happening in a context where the number of cancer patients in Iran has risen dramatically. It is predicted that by 2015 there will be a “” in Iran.

In Iraq, a estimated that 500,000 children under five had died, as a result of sanctions on the country, between 1991 and 1998. One can presume that by the time of the 2003 invasion, and under deteriorating conditions of poor water sanitation, malnutrition, disease, and the near absence of medication, many more would have died in the entire population. With of lives currently at risk in Iran, it is predicted that the death rate there could dwarf the casualties in Iraq.

I was in Iran recently and returned last Tuesday. Whilst there, this dire humanitarian situation was confirmed by medics and chemists with whom I spoke. Also, some students in medical chemistry told me that they can no longer afford the ingredients to make the drugs required for their doctorate work.

The Effect on Culture and Arts

There is no doubt about the direct or indirect detrimental effects of these sanctions on Iranian society at economic, political, social, cultural and artistic levels. I attended the re-launch of the magazine Danesh va Mardom (Science and People). The writers, poets, translators, and scientists present there were unanimously concerned about the impact of sanctions. I was told how the price of paper had multiplied more than fivefold. In fact, the publishers syndicate has recently warned that publishing is no longer viable.

The double impact of the devalued currency and financial sanctions have made it very difficult to access scientific and other academic papers to keep abreast with the most recent developments and to have effective scientific and cultural exchanges with those outside of Iran. I heard repeatedly from very bright graduates that there was no prospect for jobs and no budget for research, and that there is an unprecedented flood of “brain drain” out of the country.

An example of a visible impact on the arts is the virtual winding up of the National Symphony Orchestra, which to its young conductor, Barda Kiaros, has not practiced and whose musicians have not been paid for over two months. He says that the Tehran Symphony Orchestra too does not receive the recognition it deserves and has not performed the work of great composers in concert for two years.

Abdolhossein Mokhtabaad, a famous composer and traditional singer, commented on the effects of sanctions and expressed the belief that the economic situation is not conducive to arts. He that artists are not supported and likened artistic work in Iran to the work of a tightrope artist — always walking on a thin line.

For an insecure, debilitated, and hand-to-mouth population, artistic appreciation and artistic expression become a rare luxury, even irrelevant on the hierarchy of their people’s priorities. Not only do sanctions destroy the infrastructure for cultural and artistic development, they also create a state of economic and political siege directed at forced regime change, which is intensifying the securitization of Iranian society with dire consequences for civil and political rights, including artistic expression.

The strangulation of Iran’s rights and silencing of its voice on the international scene then finds its parallel in the strangulation and silencing of Iranians’ rights and voice, including artistic expression, at the domestic level. As in Iraq, sanctions are not only destroying the most vulnerable sections of the population but are devastating and weakening the middle class in Iran as the historical engine for creativity and scientific and cultural progress.

No one amongst the leaders or the grassroots of Iran’s legitimate domestic opposition has called for sanctions on Iran. In fact, they have warned that sanctions and war will be the biggest blow to the civil society and democratic aspirations in Iran.

Artistic expressions may defy political repression and economic poverty and find channels and forms of expression, as exemplified by the proud achievements of Iranian cinema. However, there is a tipping point when hardship does not strengthen but destroys the cultural and artistic development, in the long-term and at a societal level.

The economic sanctions on Iran are illegal under the international law and meet the UN definition of genocide. Nonetheless, US Congressman “Critics [of the sanctions] argued that these measures will hurt the Iranian people. Quite frankly, we need to do just that.” Similarly, , “The goal…is to inflict crippling, unendurable economic pain over there.” These sentiments to target the population to feel the pain of the sanctions are echoed by other Western statesmen.

The UN Convention on Genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such…[including] causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; [and] deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” How else are we to interpret the sanctions affecting the import of baby milk and tetanus vaccine, and the by Iran’s Ministry of Health that Iran’s medical drug reserves will run out within two months?

Denis Halliday, who resigned as the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq after 34 years of service for the UN in protest against the impact of economic sanctions on the people of Iraq, described the sanctions as genocidal. Another humanitarian catastrophe and another genocide is now unfolding in Iran. Iranian society and Iranian artists are being strangulated into silence and a collective silent death, unless we intervene boldly in true artistic spirit.

Update: Iran’s Ministry of Health on November 30 that with the Central Bank’s release of $130 million of its foreign currency reserves at a relatively cheap emergency exchange rate, the import of urgently-needed pharmaceutical drugs had begun. The Central Bank also agreed to allocate $1.5 to 2 billion from its foreign currency reserves to cover the pharmaceutical needs of the population for the next year.

The emergency health crisis, however, will only be temporarily abated. On the same day as the announcement of Iran’s Ministry of Health on November 30, the US Senate approved of draconian sanctions against Iran’s economy. These sanctions, which came as an amendment to the US National Defense Authorization Act, further target Iran’s ports, shipbuilding, shipping, and energy sectors. In violation of the international trade law, the sanctions also attempt to deplete Iran’s foreign currency reserve by penalizing countries who make payments of gold or other precious metals in exchange for Iran’s gas and oil, as Turkey did this year when it reportedly paid $6.4 billion in gold for Iranian natural gas. Image: Copyright © . All Rights Reserved

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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