The proposal outlines a step-by-step process for removing and disarming the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, commensurate with an Israeli withdrawal, a reduction in Israeli airstrikes, the demarcation of their shared land border and promises of reconstruction aid for Lebanon. 

A difficult process

Realizing the complete ceasefire agreement is tantamount to pulling teeth. No amount of policy gymnastics can identify the right combination of carrots and sticks for fulfilling the agreement. Additional negotiations, extending deadlines, and revisions to stipulations and processes are pointless endeavors while a critical partner to the agreement — Lebanon — retains a perverse sense of entitlement. 

Much of Lebanon is afflicted with a debilitating narcissism. The narcissism would not warrant much attention if the Mediterranean country resembled Singapore, but in the last 50 years, Lebanon has begun to rival Somalia in its dysfunctional and dystopian qualities.

On the one hand, Lebanese governments and many of its people demand respect, attention and support as a state, society and governing system historically grounded in “multiculturism,” “tolerance” and “equity.” But on the other hand, when that state, society and governing system goes awry and affects other countries (which it repeatedly does), the Lebanese demand that they remain the master of their domain. 

The delusion enables a culture of fecklessness that has enveloped leadership and its supporters over the years. Excuses, half-measures, half-truths, indifference, a lack of urgency, platitudes, political theater, victimhood and window dressing consume how the Lebanese state and society discern and function. Even when an opportunity for improvement presents itself (as it did with the November 2024 US-mediated ceasefire), the self-defeating and self-inflicted behavior and thinking prevail, subjecting the country to a painful future.   

On October 8, 2023, the Lebanese militia, Hezbollah, an unprovoked attack against Israel. The militia framed their attack as an act of solidarity with Hamas and their Palestinian allies in Gaza. The Lebanese militia, which proclaims itself as a defender of Lebanon, did not notify the Lebanese government or seek the approval of the Lebanese people prior to their “act of solidarity” with another nationality, no less.

Similar to previous acts of aggression by Hezbollah, the Lebanese state and large swathes of the population were expected, at a minimum, to tolerate the group’s unilateralism and accept any fallout.

Crisis after conflict 

Thirteen months of deadly and destructive conflict between Israel and Hezbollah ensued before US shuttle diplomacy “persevered.” Amos Hochstein, former US President Joe Biden’s envoy, traveled to and between Israel and Lebanon throughout 2024 to realize the ceasefire.

The Lebanese “tolerance” of Hezbollah’s unilateralism resulted in thousands of Lebanese casualties, hundreds of thousands internally displaced, and billions of dollars in damage to property and infrastructure. The conflict compounded the problems and suffering of an already devastated country and people. A historic economic collapse that witnessed the Lebanese pound lose of its value entered its sixth year in August. One of the largest non-nuclear blasts leveled the port of Beirut, killing over and injuring thousands. Five years later, no one has been held for the egregious case of mismanagement, lack of enforcement and prolific corruption. The events add to a state and society that has not fully recovered from the effects of a 15-year civil war and a 29-year Syrian occupation.Ìę

For those unfamiliar with Lebanon, the announcement of a ceasefire on November 26, 2024, provided a glimmer of hope for the ravaged and exhausted country. Biden it as a “new start for Lebanon.” French President Emanuel Macron that it created “conditions to restore lasting calm.”   

Biden and Macron’s optimism deserved some merit. By the start of the “ceasefire,” Israel had weakened Hezbollah’s leadership and capabilities to a degree that Hezbollah’s Lebanese opponents had only dreamed about. Roughly one week after the announcement, longtime Hezbollah ally Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia, the flow of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah.

Adding to the optimism, one month later, Lebanese Parliamentarians elected Joseph Aoun to the Presidency (the office had been for 26 months due to political squabbling). One month later, the Lebanese agreed on the formation of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government (a caretaker government had operated for the previous 33 months because of political disagreement).Ìę

However, hope does not spring eternal in Lebanon. One year later, Biden and Macron’s words ring hollow, and the celebration falls on deaf ears. The absence of Assad in Syria has not deterred Hezbollah from attempting to acquire Iranian arms. Aoun and Salam disappoint like their predecessors.

The calm between Lebanon and Israel is a myth. The initiator of the conflict, Hezbollah, remains unequivocal in forsaking its absolutist ideology and arms. Witness the recent of Hezbollah leader, Naim Qassem: “We will not abandon the weapons that honor us, nor the weapons that protect us from our enemy.” Reports grow about Hezbollah’s gradual rearmament. Israel remains in five positions on Lebanese territory near their shared border and regularly Hezbollah personalities and weapons depots with drones and airstrikes.Ìę

Lebanon has not moved forward

The president and the prime minister remain ineffective in their duties to uphold Lebanon’s international obligations and their capacity to enforce the law and policy within its borders. Hezbollah fighters remain in South Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces lag in their disarmament of Hezbollah, raising serious doubts about whether it will ever be completed. How can leadership expect investment in their beleaguered country when their words (thus far) are worthless?  

The Biden administration’s zeal for a diplomatic “solution” to the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2024 gave little thought to the history and parties responsible for instituting the ceasefire. The Trump administration inherited a portfolio that requires too much oversight and arm-twisting with too little reward for a country that is not a US national security priority. As each day passes since November 26, 2024, Lebanon’s perverse sense of entitlement triumphs over constructive change and genuine improvement.      

For years, Lebanese officials have sold a bill of goods that tugs at the heartstrings of the world. Officials present the 82-year-old bankrupt and fractured Mediterranean country with an oversensationalized past as a model of Christian-Muslim coexistence and power sharing — using its 18 recognized religious confessions as a vital example of diversity to the world.

Despite its dystopic and dysfunctional state, the international community is that Lebanon cannot be abandoned to unscrupulous actors (i.e., Iran) and allowed to dissolve. Lebanon’s complete failure will be a stain on the world and somehow raise questions and concerns about the future of Christian-Muslim coexistence and diversity elsewhere.Ìę

International assistance has not made things better

The Lebanese succeeded in promoting their exceptional model and issuing their dire warnings. Since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, the state and society have tens of billions of dollars in aid and assistance with few strings attached. Europe has hosted at least a half dozen international aid conferences, with more proposed. Evidence of European-backed projects is scattered throughout the country. Qatar much of southern Lebanon after the Hezbollah-initiated war with Israel in 2006. At times, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia filled financial shortfalls and funded projects. The United States regularly arms, pays and trains the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

Western Europe, America and the monarchies of the Gulf enabled Lebanon’s continued failure. Their 35-year gravy train helped maintain the façade of a state and societal divisions while deepening a culture of inflated self-worth. They bolstered attitudes and behaviors found among long-term welfare recipients. Assistance from others is constantly requested and expected. Accountability is largely absent. Blame is pointed elsewhere. The will to change is fleeting. Given the history, the last 13 months of failing to fully employ the stipulations of the Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire are expected. 

The Lebanese state and, by extension, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) cannot disarm Hezbollah because it has never matured and rarely been held accountable. Providing basic services like a full day of electricity has been a challenge for decades. Delivering justice remains elusive. Even the family of ex-Prime Minister Rafik el-Hariri could only get a in absentia for his murder on Lebanese soil via an international tribunal in The Hague. In 2017, the LAF required the of Hezbollah to defeat an ISIS force along its eastern border.

The failings of the state fuel the continued apathy for the Lebanese nation. Lebanon’s much-acclaimed “co-existence” and “diversity” perpetuate an environment in which one’s communal identity competes with or supersedes the national identity. For that reason, the LAF remains a hollow institution. How can it be an effective force when many of its members have a greater affinity for its religious community than the people of Lebanon?

The latest US proposal gives the LAF until December 31 to finish the job it has failed to complete in the last nine months. Are four additional months going to reverse long-term attitudes and deep-seated behaviors in the institution? 

To obfuscate the failings and the facades, leadership and its supporters resort to hollow words, half-measures, half-truths, excuses, demands and warnings. Instead of acknowledging that the ceasefire was signed under false pretenses or going back on its word, Lebanese officials seek out opportunities to distract and displace blame. Some measures are insulting, while others manipulate fallacies and fears. 

For eight months, President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam have gone through the motions and indulged in platitudes about the sovereignty and supremacy of the Lebanese state. A recent example appeared on the streets of Beirut. A poster with pictures of the two officials proclaimed: “All of us are with you. One army. One weapon. One state. A new era for Lebanon.” Like leadership’s various feckless words, these posters and slogans will eventually be replaced by a new one.  

In August (five months after the creation of the government and considerable US pressure), the Salam government finally issued the unprecedented authorization to the LAF to disarm the militia. On September 5, the LAF plans to the government for disarming the militia. Were they not obliged to disarm Hezbollah since the start of the ceasefire? What then exactly was the LAF doing between November 2024 and August 2025 in the absence of authorization?  

Noticeably absent from the disarmament plans are deadlines. After 13 months, the LAF is supposed to finish disarming Hezbollah in southern Lebanon (south of the Litani River) by December 31. But no evidence exists of deadlines for the rest of the country. Hezbollah maintains a presence in Beirut, Ba’albek, Jbeil and Hermel. The ceasefire agreement is centered around UN Resolution , which explicitly states that Hezbollah must be disarmed throughout the country. At the current rate, Hezbollah may be disarmed in 
 five years?

Lebanese officials couple the platitudes and theater with the celebration of issues that are of secondary importance. “Strong words” are directed at Iranian officials. Political posters in urban areas are removed. Palestinians in Lebanon (at least the non-Hamas and non-Marxist ones) are disarmed. The Beirut International Airport and the Lebanese-Syrian border are secured (for now) to prevent cash and weapons transfers to Hezbollah. 

While initially encouraging, the endeavors and words can only distract from the elephant in the room — Hezbollah’s retention of weapons — for so long. When distractions no longer suffice, excuses and alternative outcomes are employed and suggested to (re)direct the blame, buy some time and impede outcomes.  

Israel is a popular excuse

Antisemitism, disdain for Zionism and conflict with its southern neighbor have produced a cottage industry in Lebanon for identifying Israeli complicity in many, if not most, of Lebanon’s woes. The Beirut Port blast in 2020, a case of gross negligence by government authorities, was initially on an Israeli missile strike by many Lebanese. One can visit Lebanon today and find citizens who still believe Israel played a role in one of the largest non-nuclear explosions or perceive the investigation into the blast as Israeli subterfuge.Ìę

Not surprisingly, the same Lebanese leaders and politicians, whose litany of empty promises are many, claim that the Israeli “occupation” and actions are responsible for their dereliction of duties. Nine months after the deadline extension, the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament for 33 years and Hezbollah ally, Nabih Berri, Israel for delaying the complete deployment of the LAF in southern Lebanon.

In the absence of Lebanese agency and execution, Israel is painted as the aggressor. President Aoun and other Lebanese politicians repeatedly tell the world that Israeli actions are counterproductive. If Israel only withdraws from its five remaining positions inside Lebanon and ceases the targeting of Hezbollah members in the south, the Lebanese could disarm the militia and bring calm to the Israeli-Lebanese border. 

History tells a different story. In 2006, Lebanon UN Resolution 1701, which stipulated an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah. Israel withdrew only to witness the Lebanese government go back on its word and watch Hezbollah rearm and reembed itself along the border.Ìę

Most Lebanese will tell you that they do not trust their government. Why should Israel trust the Lebanese government 
 again?

Another popular excuse is Lebanon’s “fragility.” 

How to move forward?

Lebanese officials assert that Lebanon cannot be pushed to disarm Hezbollah. Previous Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdullah Bou Habib and others that immediate disarmament will trigger communal violence. They guilt the world into believing that Lebanon’s Christian-Muslim coexistence equation and diversity hang in the balance if they are pressured.Ìę 

Therefore, the process is delicate and requires time. The LAF requires more funding and soldiers. A dialogue with Hezbollah must occur. The disarmament is a “” operation and progress is kept from the public to not humiliate the militia and its Shia supporters.Ìę 

All the money in the world and more troops cannot make the LAF an effective fighting force. Money does not generate a love for the nation and the defense of the state. Young Lebanese males who learn to operate sophisticated military equipment do not magically become zealous guardians of a nation they previously had little affinity for.   

Aoun’s dialogue strategy to avert conflict with Hezbollah and its Shia supporters is peculiar. What concessions can be given to a party and its supporters that are already political actors, represented in parliament and members of the government? Surrendering weapons is a black and white issue — you either submit to the will of the state or not. Who exactly dictates the actions and interests of the state? 

A dialogue also raises temporal issues and further questions. Has this dialogue already begun? How long will it last? Should Israel have to wait for the Lebanese to iron out their issues? What if the dialogue breaks down? Then what? Like its struggles to carry out policy, the Lebanese track record with domestic dialogues is poor.

The “classified” disarmament process is ridiculous and unusual for a Lebanese state prolific in incompetence and a society rooted in spectacles. Can one expect a lid to be maintained on a physical, audible and destructive operation by a state that struggles to maintain any sense of order (just try driving in Lebanon)? With the prevalence of social media, can Hezbollah’s Lebanese enemies be restrained from trying to humiliate the party? Some in the Shia would also welcome the opportunity to portray the operation as the victimization of the community at the hands of the state, colluding with Israel and America. 

With the exception of when soldiers died from the explosion of Hezbollah ordnance, the only footage the world witnesses of Hezbollah’s disarmament is when Israel targets their weapons depots. The absence of proof creates doubt about the sincerity and thoroughness of the LAF’s operations. Is it merely a coincidence that the LAF claimed to run out of explosives needed to destroy Hezbollah armaments and infrastructure in the days before the arrival of US deputy special envoy Morgan Ortagus in October?  

History demonstrates that “delicateness” is a ploy to avoid accountability and maintain power. The Taif Agreement, a Lebanese document which bring an end to the 15-year Lebanese civil war in 1990, stipulated political reforms. It’s thirty-five years later, and some of the reforms remain unfulfilled. Why? The powers to be in Lebanon deem it not an appropriate time — it would be too disruptive for the fragile nature of Lebanon.Ìę

The Lebanese reliance on excuses demonstrates a spectacular exhibition of hubris. Many Lebanese officials and elements of society believe the rules do not apply to them despite their precarious plight and predicament. For Lebanon, the beggar can indeed be the chooser. 

Deadlines are made to be broken. The government agreed to institute the ceasefire agreement by January 27, 2025. It then agreed to a 22-day extension. Ten months later, and after considerable arm-twisting, it remains unclear if even one-third of the country will be free of Hezbollah’s weapons. Let’s not forget that the Lebanese agreed to the disarmament process (UN Resolution 1701) almost 20 years ago.

Accountability is for others. After ten months, it remains doubtful that even one-third of the country will be free of Hezbollah’s weapons. Its contempt for accountability is made more outrageous by the bankrupt and broken country’s belief that it can dictate future deadlines for disarmament at its convenience.  

The Lebanese understanding of sovereignty is privileged. Sovereignty is contingent on the actions of others — Israel and the United States. It lacks agency while telling others to mind its own business. The Lebanese mindset is: “If the United States could only prevent Israel from protecting itself, then we could get along with our business, and tomorrow we will start disarming Hezbollah.” Does this country and its leadership believe that it can get away with doing next to nothing — making a few concessions — and expect genuine improvement? Is Lebanon the only country where its sovereignty is the job of others?

The Lebanese exceptionalism further manifests in how it dictates future interactions (or lack thereof) with Israel. Often overlooked in the last 13 months is the continued Lebanese refusal to normalize relations with Israel. Lebanese officials believe it can formally deny the existence of the Israeli state while keeping the forces of “resistance” (i.e., Hezbollah and its allies) at bay. It is a delusional belief by a state that is challenged to deter people from criminal activity, let alone disarm the very people who yearn to eliminate Israel. 

A recent and maybe the most spectacular example of hubris is the by Lebanese officials for additional negotiations with Israel. What is there to (re)negotiate? 13 months ago, Lebanese officials agreed to terms that they failed to fulfill. They have not offered any concessions to reopen negotiations. Why is Lebanon entitled to more negotiations, particularly since it is the weaker of the parties? Do they expect it will simply occur out of compassion? 

The arrogance, delays, excuses, half measures and further negotiations are a blessing to Hezbollah. The militia thrives at undermining processes and impeding outcomes, as demonstrated by reports of its rearmament. The organization’s absolutism — rejecting Israel’s existence—compels it to disrupt and “discover” outstanding issues to justify its armament. 

Two notable examples

On the eve of Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah announced that Israel occupied the Shebaa Farms (an area unbeknownst to most Lebanese until then). It attempted to discredit the withdrawal as complete despite the UN declaring the Israeli withdrawal as full (the UN recognizes Shebaa as Syrian territory).

More recently, in 2022, following the demarcation of the Israeli-Lebanese maritime border, Hezbollah that some Lebanese waters remained occupied by Israel despite the Lebanese government’s endorsement of the agreement.Ìę

Lebanese behavior and thinking are quite perplexing. They enable opportunities to delegitimize the ceasefire agreement or discredit the process. It comes at a costly price. Violence perpetuates. Economic recovery stalls. Poverty deepens. International goodwill and patience erode. 

Lebanese narcissism has created an unviable environment for enacting policy and international agreements. Has Lebanon earned some special status in the world because of its demographics and history to act and think in such a manner? Is Lebanon serious about wanting a monopoly on violence in its territory? Is the country sincere about wanting to create a viable future? The excruciating exceptionalism of Lebanon endures. 

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post The Excruciating Exceptionalism of Lebanon appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

These systems do not want peace because their survival depends on sustained conflict. This is why diplomatic summits, ceasefire deals and foreign interventions consistently fail: they target symptoms, not causes. If the problem is structural, then so must be the solution. Peace in the Middle East will not come through negotiation. It will come through a civilizational shift, and it demands three acts of moral courage.

The first is capitalist liberalization. Every individual must gain the right to produce, to trade and to own. No government has the right to command his labor, confiscate his earnings or dictate his future. Capitalism is not a system of greed. It is the only system that recognizes the moral right of a person to live for his own sake.

The second is cultural conservatism. A society cannot survive without roots. When families collapse, when traditions vanish, when morality fades into relativism, chaos follows. A rational culture does not erase its past. It protects what gives life meaning, not by coercion, but by conviction.

The third is institutional transformation. No regime that survives by crushing liberty, spreading violence and fueling sectarian hate can remain in power without destroying the future. People must not reform such systems. They must replace them. Political freedom requires new institutions built on justice, law and individual rights.

This is the foundation of what I call Conservative modernism. It rejects both Islamic totalitarianism and secular technocracy. It affirms that peace cannot exist without liberty, and liberty cannot exist without moral strength. This is not a policy. It is a philosophy.

Sectarian wars and the legacy of doctrinal politics

We cannot understand the Middle East’s political instability apart from the theological and sectarian divides embedded within Islam itself. The — originating from a dispute over the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad — has long outgrown its historical moment to become the structural backbone of regional conflict. This divide was never merely theological; it became during the first Islamic civil wars and later into full-fledged state ideologies during the rise of rival empires like the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate and the Shia Safavid dynasty.Ìę

These empires did not merely represent competing political centers — they embodied competing claims to spiritual authority. In modern terms, regimes seeking to legitimize their power through religious division have hardened, institutionalized and weaponized these doctrinal fault lines rather than letting them fade. 

The legacy of these doctrinal wars lives on in today’s proxy conflicts, from Yemen to Syria, Iraq to Lebanon. Iran, as the self-appointed guardian of the Shia cause, has instrumentalized this divide to its revolutionary ideology through paramilitary proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq and Syria.Ìę

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, while less overtly ideological, have with their versions of sectarian patronage and security alignments. The result is not simply a clash between states, but a doctrinal cold war that perpetually destabilizes the region through religious identity and existential fear.

Political Islam, once unleashed as the doctrine of the state, does not merely challenge liberty — it annihilates the very concept. Its metaphysical certainty surpasses even the most dogmatic ideologies of the West. It does not see disagreement as an error. It brands it as blasphemy. What follows is inevitable. The state becomes paranoid. It cannot rest. It must constantly search for new traitors to purge. Reform becomes a crime. Dialogue becomes apostasy. There can be no middle ground, no compromise — only absolute control.

In this system, truth belongs to the ruling sect alone. To think differently is not a mistake — it is treason. The state no longer governs; it sanctifies itself. Power fuses with theology. Rule becomes divine command. And from that moment, every act of dissent becomes a threat to the sacred order. No regime built on this logic can tolerate peace. Peace implies coexistence. It suggests that another version of truth might exist. But in sectarian totalitarianism, there is only one truth — and only one authority to speak it. The heretic becomes more dangerous than the foreign enemy, because he corrupts the system from within. That is why these regimes live in constant fear of internal betrayal. They do not govern citizens; they hunt them.

Colonial powers did not build the modern Middle East into nations. They it into fragments. They drew their borders without reason. National identities remained shallow. In this vacuum, sectarian ideology offered a seductive substitute. It gave rulers a way to seize power without earning it. They did not ask for the people’s consent. They claimed divine authority instead.

Theocrats wrapped themselves in clerical robes to escape accountability. In Iran, the doctrine of placed unchecked political power in the hands of a cleric. Ayatollah Khomeini did not rule as a man — he ruled as a voice of God. Sunni radicals followed the same path. Groups like ISIS declared caliphates not to govern, but to sanctify tyranny. These regimes do not fear criticism, because they do not answer to men. They answer to the metaphysical fiction they claim to represent.

Islamic regimes use a dangerous illusion. They raise the banner of anti-Zionism not to unify but to distract. They Judaism and Israel as the ultimate enemy, hoping to forge a sense of solidarity across sectarian lines. But the truth remains: no propaganda can erase centuries of hatred between Sunni and Shia, between Salafi and Sufi, between Arab and Persian, between Turkic and non-Turkic. The hatred runs deep, and it does not disappear when leaders shout slogans against Israel.

This is not unity. It is manipulation. Anti-Zionism becomes a tool to dissent at home. It channels public anger away from corruption, poverty and tyranny, and toward an invented external enemy. It does not heal division; it hides it. The regimes that use this tactic know they cannot survive on truth, so they survive on scapegoats. But lies do not last. The cracks widen. The rhetoric grows louder, while the people grow poorer.

This is the real engine of Middle Eastern conflict. Not just land. Not just oil. It is the battle for the right to define God’s will — and to use that claim as a weapon. No treaty will break this system. No ceasefire will fix it. If regimes like Iran continue to export sectarian revolution as a matter of policy, the region will remain trapped in endless war. Peace will never begin on a battlefield. It begins in the mind. We must name doctrinal tyranny, expose it and defeat it. Only then can the Middle East escape from the chains of sacred war and step into the realm of civil peace.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution

The 1979 was not simply a change of regime; it was a civilizational rupture that produced a theocratic state with an unprecedented mission: to restructure the Islamic world according to the vision of Shiite clerical rule. Iran’s revolution claimed divine authorization through the doctrine of Vilayat al-Faqih. This doctrine, enshrined in Iran’s constitution, granted religious elites not only domestic supremacy but also a global mandate.Ìę

Article 154 explicitly that the Islamic Republic was duty-bound to “support the just struggles of the oppressed” worldwide. This ideological euphemism laid the legal foundation for regional insurgencies, proxy warfare and transnational terror networks. This new paradigm made Iran’s foreign policy an extension of messianic doctrine.

The Islamic Republic institutionalized this transformation of ideology into action by creating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (), and specifically its external wing, the , which carried out the mission of exporting the revolution. These were not simply elite military units but ideological vanguards — armed missionaries designed to reshape the region in Tehran’s image.

The IRGC and funded Shia militant factions during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, inside Iraq, creating the blueprint for what would later evolve into militia-state fusion. As early as 1982, Iran establish Hezbollah in Lebanon, embedding its revolutionary DNA in a new Shia militia that would grow into the region’s most sophisticated paramilitary movement.Ìę

But Iran did not confine its ambitions to its sect. Tehran built connections with Sunni groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran and its allies bypassed doctrinal differences when they faced a shared strategic enemy in Israel and the West, proving that ideology would bend to power.

Of all Iran’s ideological exports, Hezbollah remains the most enduring and institutionally complete. Born in the rubble of Lebanon’s civil war, Hezbollah’s 1985 founding manifesto allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader and its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. As Massaab Al-Aloosy has, Hezbollah evolved into a uniquely hybrid entity — a terrorist organization, political party and social welfare provider. This model of Islamic fascism does not simply mimic the authoritarian features of 20th-century totalitarian regimes. Instead, it integrates them with theological absolutism.Ìę

In Hezbollah’s worldview, the enemy is not merely political dissent or a foreign occupier. It is ideological impurity. Its of martyrdom, strict sectarian loyalty and rejection of pluralism form the core of an authoritarian theocratic identity, where the sect and the imamate define the sacred political community.

Iran’s reach and pragmatism allowed it to overcome sectarian lines when necessary. Nowhere is this clearer than in its alliance with Hamas, a Sunni group originally rooted in ideology. Initially antagonistic due to theological differences, Hamas gradually embraced Iran’s vision of resistance as its conflict with Israel intensified. Iran financial aid, smuggled weapons, supplied tactical training and built tunnel infrastructure that allowed Hamas to survive and militarize Gaza.Ìę

By the mid-2000s, especially after the group’s electoral victory and its, Hamas began to mirror Iran’s revolutionary language, re-framing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a divine struggle, not a solvable territorial dispute. Its leaders visited Tehran, received IRGC guidance and adopted a media strategy aligned with the broader.

This model of revolutionary partnership extended to Yemen, where Iran found a new ideological canvas in the , also known as Ansar Allah. Originally a local revivalist faction rooted in, Iran helped morph the Houthis into a more radicalized, Twelver-aligned militia. The group’s , “Death to America, Death to Israel,” is lifted directly from Iran’s revolutionary chant. By the 2010s, Iran supplied or engineered sophisticated missile and drone capabilities for the Houthis. These weapons the group to strike deep into Saudi Arabia and threaten global commerce in the Red Sea.

The of Saddam Hussein in 2003 provided Iran with its greatest strategic opening since 1979. Iraq, long a bulwark against Iranian expansion, became a vacuum of fractured authority in which Iran could embed deeply rooted proxies. The US-led dismantling of the Iraqi state allowed Tehran to co-opt existing militias such as the and new ones like Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.Ìę

All these militias pledged spiritual allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader. These groups infiltrated Iraqi security institutions, won parliamentary seats and turned Iraq into what I call a militia democracy. What distinguishes them from conventional insurgents is their ideological DNA. Rather than acknowledging themselves as part of a civil war, they present their struggle as resistance to Sunnis and Western imperialism.

Syria’s civil war further deepened Iran’s ideological project. Though the ruling Alawite regime under Bashar al-Assad does not follow mainstream Shiism, its geopolitical vulnerability made it an ideal ally. As protests spiraled into war, Iran intervened with billions in military aid, deploying not just IRGC troops and Hezbollah fighters, but also recruiting tens of thousands of Afghan Shia fighters from the impoverished Hazara population into the.Ìę

These fighters, lured by salaries and promises of martyrdom, became part of Iran’s transnational jihad. Syria thus became the geopolitical artery of Iran’s vision: a corridor of power from Tehran through Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut to the Mediterranean. Iran entrenched what many call the by establishing an ideological, financial and logistical presence in Syria.

Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria are no longer just battlefields. They are proving grounds for a new form of tyranny. These lands have become ideological laboratories, where fanatics test how far they can bend reality to fit a totalitarian creed.

Islamic socialism

The ideological machinery of post-1979 Iran introduced a new hybrid: . While the term may appear contradictory at first glance, it captures the unique fusion of theological absolutism with populist redistributionism. Islamic socialism is an economic-political framework that retains the authoritarian hierarchy of religious fascism, complete with doctrinal obedience and paramilitary enforcement.Ìę

At the same time, it borrows heavily from socialist structures such as centralized welfare, state control over key industries and class-based grievance politics. Just as European fascists in the 20th century adopted socialism to win popular support while retaining autocratic control (e.g., the Nazi “Strength Through Joy” ), the Islamic Republic has developed a theology of resistance economy. Here, economic hardship is not only tolerated but sanctified as martyrdom against global injustice. In this model, people must endure poverty collectively, heroically and violently rather than overcome it through liberal development.Ìę

Shiite theology provides the foundation for this socialist-fascist hybrid, on concepts of suffering, resistance and collective martyrdom. Shiism glorifies the mustadÊżafÄ«n, a group that Islamic texts frame as the downtrodden destined for divine justice. Khomeini’s revolutionary rhetoric this religious concept into a political-economic category, portraying the global poor — and particularly the Shia masses — as victims of Western imperialism.Ìę

Economic disparity is not a result of governance failures or global markets, but of cosmic injustice. Similar to how Nazi ideology peasant sacrifice and national suffering as the price of destiny, the Islamic Republic elevates economic deprivation into a moral calling. It framed subsidy cuts, sanctions and austerity as acts of loyalty to a divine cause.

Crucially, leaders do not just impose the model of Islamic Socialism from above; they enforce it through tribal structures and sectarian identities. It replaces civic institutions with kinship loyalty and doctrinal submission. In the Iranian-led axis, traditional tribal instincts are not suppressed but weaponized. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shia militias in Iraq all demonstrate this structure. 

War footing as the foundation of economic life

These groups offer not only salaries and protection, but welfare, housing and education — all contingent upon ideological alignment and collective loyalty. They systematically erase individualism. One’s worth is not measured by merit or autonomy but by one’s allegiance to the sect, the tribe and ultimately, the martyrdom cause. This mirrors how Italian fascism and German Nazism pre-modern collectivism to erase individuality and convert citizens into functionaries of myth, soldiers of a destiny beyond themselves.

In these theocratic-socialist regimes, the individual disappears as a political subject. Rather than a bearer of rights, the person becomes a vessel of duty — primarily to the sect, then to the Supreme Leader. Ideological training begins early, often in religious schools controlled by paramilitary arms of the state or proxy groups. These institutions teach loyalty not just to God but to the revolutionary cause. 

The regime trains the youth, like those in Nazi Germany’s, not to think but to serve and sacrifice. Hezbollah’s and Iran’s indoctrination programs illustrate this well. Here, Islamic Socialism becomes a mechanism for total identity control: dictating what to believe, what to fear, who to love and who to kill. Welfare is no longer a civic right — it is a weaponized privilege, allocated according to sectarian discipline and revolutionary usefulness.Ìę

Moreover, this system depends on a dual moral economy: one inward-facing, promoting solidarity, and one outward-facing, glorifying hostility. Internally, Islamic Socialist leaders teach their communities to see themselves as pure, righteous and chosen. Externally, however, the world is divided into oppressors and enemies — whether they be the West, secular liberals, Sunni rivals or Zionists. 

The state’s leaders direct the economic and military engines toward this perpetual war footing. Iran’s leaders speak not of GDP growth but of jihad of production and economic resistance as if commerce itself were warfare. People allocate resources not to produce prosperity but to sustain ideological conflict. They Nazi Germany’s approach by fusing industry, propaganda and violence into a single war-making machine.

The myth of the Promised Land

Islamist regimes have spent decades weaponizing one of their most enduring myths: the belief that Israel seeks to fulfill a biblical prophecy by expanding its territory. According to this myth, Israel aims to restore the so-called Promised Land, stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates. Islamist leaders and propagandists frequently this claim in Friday sermons, regime media and militant manifestos.Ìę

The narrative serves both psychological and strategic purposes by fostering a sense of perpetual victimhood among Muslim populations and justifying preemptive violence. However, no formal Israeli policy — past or present — has ever such a fantasy. This contradiction between perception and reality is not an accident. It is the product of Islamic fascism.

Arab and Islamic leaders never admit that the biblical Promised Land in the Old Testament covers far less territory than Islamist propaganda claims. While and do reference land covenants, these verses are highly symbolic, varied in interpretation and not presented as a modern political blueprint. The more expansive version — suggesting Israeli claims over half the Arab world — is a misreading or deliberate distortion.Ìę

Even within Jewish religious scholarship, there is no consensus on whether the land covenant is literal, spiritual or eschatological. More importantly, Israel, as a modern state, has never built policy around these verses. The secular Zionist movement that founded Israel drove its actions with political pragmatism, not theological maximalism. The Declaration of Independence, for instance, contains no reference to religious prophecy as a legal or territorial foundation for the state.

Prominent biblical scholars have repeatedly argued that the Promised Land verses do not apply to modern statecraft. Walter Brueggemann, a leading Old Testament theologian, that the land promises in Genesis and Ezekiel symbolize divine fidelity and human obligation. Ezekiel 47:13–23 outlines a limited, region-specific territory tied to historical tribes, not a universal conquest map. Jewish exegetes widely the Nile to Euphrates phrasing in Genesis 15:18 as covenantal poetry, not a literal border plan. Contemporary Jewish religious institutions and Israel’s Chief Rabbinate have never endorsed any policy derived from these verses.

Oslo Accords and the recognition of a two-state framework

Israel’s territorial policy shows a consistent pattern of contraction and compromise, not expansion, contrary to the myth of expansionism. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Israel accepted the1949 rather than pressing beyond. In 1967, during the , Israel captured territory (including Sinai and the West Bank) but returned the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1982 under the.The (1993–1995) and subsequent negotiations all recognized the concept of a two-state solution, even with territorial compromises. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza, dismantling settlements without a peace agreement.Ìę

These historical milestones disprove the idea of a consistent theological or messianic territorial agenda. Even in contentious areas like the West Bank, Israeli officials and lawmakers debate expansion according to legal and political frameworks rather than divine mandate.

Regimes like Iran and ideological movements like Hezbollah and Hamas the Abraham Accords as an existential crisis. The accords, signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, were a public rejection of the expansionist myth. They demonstrated that Arab nations — particularly those with strategic awareness — do not believe Israel is seeking to fulfill some ancient prophecy. These are not naïve regimes; they signed normalization agreements based on economic cooperation, technological exchange and geopolitical calculations.

The path forward

Real peace in the Middle East requires structural change. This approach rejects the shallow cycle of summit diplomacy and short-term ceasefires. Structural change demands a civilizational shift: leaders must dismantle sacralized politics and stop using religious narratives to justify power. This isn’t Western-style secularism but a deliberate separation of divine claims from state rule. Only through this shift can the region build lasting peace — rooted not in utopias or despair, but in economic freedom, cultural cohesion and strong institutions.

offers a clear alternative to ideological extremes. It doesn’t fuse them. It escapes them. Unlike secular technocracy, which often alienates traditional societies, conservative modernism respects the cultural depth of the Middle East and promotes practical reform. It builds on Enlightenment ideals like individual liberty and economic autonomy while honoring civilizational continuity.Ìę

Its foundation rests on three pillars: economic liberalism, cultural conservatism and institutional reform. It doesn’t force secularism, nor does it permit theocracy. Instead, it preserves spiritual identity while disarming messianic violence. It respects tradition without falling into tribalism, and religion without surrendering to religious absolutism.

offers a powerful historical model within this framework. Mustafa Kemal AtatĂŒrk launched it in the early 20th century as a bold top-down effort to secularize Turkey. He abolished the Ottoman Caliphate, replaced Islamic law with Western legal codes and built a civic nationalism rooted in republican values. Kemalism stands as one of the few successful cases in the Islamic world where state institutions stripped religion of political power without erasing faith itself. Yet, the project also imposed authoritarian control, censorship and bureaucratic rigidity.Ìę

Today, the Middle East can draw lessons from Kemalism — not as a complete solution, but as a foundational blueprint. It shows how nations can curb clerical authority without destroying religious life and how civic nationalism can overcome tribal and sectarian divides by building loyalty to the state.

Kemalism needs a complement. Its authoritarian legacy demands correction through the principles of libertarianism, which counters centralized coercion. Many in the Middle East misinterpret libertarianism as a Western indulgence or a form of moral anarchy. In truth, it is a philosophy of restraint — placing clear limits on state power. 

Within conservative modernism, libertarianism protects individual dignity from being sacrificed for national unity. It upholds free association, freedom of speech, private enterprise and personal conscience as essential pillars of post-sectarian societies. When paired with Kemalist reforms, libertarianism softens the state’s edges and makes room for civil liberties to thrive where ideological control once prevailed.

This fusion directly targets what I call the tribal complex — the web of kinship, patronage and sectarian loyalty that cripples modern statehood across the Middle East. In tribal systems, the individual never stands alone; he serves as a proxy for his group, bound by blood ties and religious allegiance. Tribal logic dictates political loyalty, economic access and legal protection, leaving little room for citizenship or merit. 

This is the real enemy of peace: the absence of a civic concept of the individual. Kemalism dismantles tribal structures through land reform, education and militia disarmament. Libertarianism then builds the culture of self-ownership and economic agency needed to prevent tribalism’s return.  

Conservative modernism demands a profound psychological transformation. Middle Eastern societies must abandon the mythology of martyrdom and embrace the everyday heroism of building families, businesses, schools and institutions. Peace begins when people stop seeking symbolic sacrifice and start pursuing tangible contribution. The new citizen must become a rational actor — focused on dignity through property ownership, child-rearing and value creation. Economic liberalism, in this vision, goes beyond material systems; it launches a moral revolt against fatalism.

Turkey’s potential role in reshaping the Abrahamic framework

Turkey holds the key to securing lasting peace in the Middle East through its integration into the Abrahamic framework. Turkey is a historic power. Unlike the Gulf monarchies that are dependent on petroleum dollars and foreign support, Turkey possesses the internal civilizational strength to lead. Its NATO membership, industrial capacity and nuanced relationship with Islam give it a unique ability to balance religious heritage with strategic logic. Including Turkey in the Abraham Accords would shift the regional balance. It would show that Iran’s ideological barriers are not only penetrable but also collapsing. 

Turkey’s participation would also redefine Muslim solidarity, moving it away from perpetual hostility toward Israel and shared goals in economic growth and technological progress. A regional alliance among Turkey, Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia could create a new peace axis and weaken Iran’s grip on ideological leadership.

The Islamic Republic of Iran remains the greatest single barrier to sustainable peace. This is not merely because of its actions, but because of its doctrine. One cannot reach a lasting agreement with a state that must, by its very ideology, destroy its negotiating partner to remain legitimate. Any peace built upon negotiation with such a regime is a ceasefire with a time limit. We must replace the Islamic Republic not through foreign war, but through internal transformation.

Regime change imposed by foreign powers breeds dependency and resentment, as seen in Iraq. Instead, change must emerge from within Iranian civil society — through education, economic empowerment and ideological detoxification. This requires long-term investment in civic literacy, especially among the youth. Only a population that understands the moral and civic basis of pluralism can dismantle a system built on sectarian fear. Empowered with economic agency and a desacralized worldview, Iranians themselves can — and must — be the agents of transformation.

A stable society must depoliticize religion without erasing it. Secularism is not atheism or cultural erasure — it is a safeguard. By limiting the political misuse of faith, secularism protects mosques, churches and synagogues as spaces for moral reflection, not power. To end partisan abuse, sectarian violence and theocratic repression, states must build a legal firewall between belief and authority. In this separation, both faith and civic life can thrive.

To summarize the core prescriptions proposed throughout this work, the following principles outline a structural roadmap for achieving sustainable peace in the Middle East:

• Depoliticize religion by enforcing constitutional secularism that protects faith while preventing its weaponization.
• Embrace economic liberalism to dismantle tribal patronage and foster individual autonomy.
• Redefine conservatism as civil order, family cohesion and moral continuity — not authoritarianism.
• Promote education reform rooted in critical reasoning, pluralism and civic ethics over sectarian indoctrination.
• Foster internal regime change in Iran and similar regimes through economic empowerment and ideological detoxification.
• Reject foreign invasions, supporting revolutions that emerge organically from educated and self-actualized societies.
• Integrate Turkey into the Abraham Accords to establish a strong axis of pragmatic, non-apocalyptic Islam.
• Normalize ties with Israel as a regional partner in trade, security and scientific advancement — not as a messianic threat.
• Fuse Kemalism with Libertarianism to combine institutional reform with civil liberty and crush the tribal complex.
• Replace martyrdom cultures with economic liberalism that prioritizes life, dignity and opportunity.
• Establish conservative modernism as the only viable doctrine suited to Middle Eastern reform.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post Conservative Modernism: A Roadmap for Sustainable Peace in the Middle East appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

Josef Olmert: Hello. This is going to be our ninth and last episode in the current series about Syria. And I need to start with a methodical comment, I should say, because people ask me, knowing that’s going to be the last episode in this series, as to, “Why didn’t you talk enough about that issue or about this issue?” And obviously, Syria is a complicated, diversified and very important country. There’s so much to talk about, so I promise that I will talk more about certain aspects of the Syria situation in another series or in a couple or three more video presentations later on, and I will announce it to my followers on Facebook, on YouTube and all that. So this will happen.

Western media and grounded reality

Now, about what has happened in Syria recently, I have to again and again emphasize the fact that the media in the West — I have to say it. It’s not a campaign I conducted against the media in the West, but I want my watchers, my listeners, my followers to know what really is going on in Syria. There are lots and lots and lots of troubles between Sunnis and Alawis. Mostly the Alawis are now the victims. And the videos that come out from Syria — and they are authentic, they are authentic — are very bad, are very disturbing and should arouse concerns about what really is happening. Also, there are videos that show clearly that despite the image that the leaders of the new regime, particularly Ahmed al-Sharaa or al-Julani, are trying to portray about moderation or a more realistic approach, there are signs of attempts to enforce religious behavior. You see more and more women with the hijab in a lot of the videos, as opposed to before. And there are stories about the enforcement to do so and so on. And of course, the problems between the Turks and the Kurds in the northeast of Syria continue to simmer. So there are lots of issues that put together form a picture of a very fluid, unstable situation in Syria that doesn’t necessarily come to the attention of the world media. And it should, because we need to know what’s going on. Otherwise we shall be again surprised, like we were surprised so many times before, or at least those who were surprised — not everybody was as surprised. So today, in our last episode of this series, I would like to make some very concrete comments about what’s happening and will happen in Syria in the foreseeable future.

Elections and representation

And let’s start with the question: What government is Syria? Is the current guys that are in Damascus — al-Julani or Ahmed al-Sharaa, the people around him — are going to be the government of Syria? Or there might be elections? I would say that we cannot see or foresee — and that’s maybe a prediction — a situation whereby Syria will be conducted by a group of people that were not elected for a period of time that will be more than, say, a few months or so. It’s not that Syria has a tradition of elections. They used to have elections in Syria. There were elections in 1949, 1954 that were relatively democratic. But they don’t have a tradition of elections. So if this group of people, if this coalition of Islamic or Islamist groups, will continue to rule Syria without elections, there will be troubles. There will be also troubles if there will be elections, and the results will be the usual in some Arab dictatorships — of the 99%. There’s not going to be 99% in the real elections in Syria. You know, it used to be under Hafez Assad, under Bashar Assad. And you know, Hafez Assad was elected president for seven years, the term was, and it was like 99.96%. And then seven years later, it was 99.97%. And people asked me at that time, “What’s going on?” I said, “Look, he’s become more popular — from 99.96 to 99.97.” But we know, of course, this was elections. So we’ll see what happens about that. My prediction is there won’t be real elections in Syria that will be democratic on the basis of one person, one vote. And if there will be elections, there will be sham elections. Real elections in Syria should reflect the cleavages of society according to religious, ethnic and other divisions. I’ll say, to some in surprise, “Look, in Iraq, there were relatively free elections after the fall of Saddam. Under the American supervision, but they were more democratic than any time in Iraq before and maybe in most Arab countries at any time.” And what they showed was the role of local forces, of ethnic groups, of religious divisions as part of the overall new political fabric. Civil wars in countries like Iraq or Lebanon or Syria brought about a real breakup of society according to bases of loyalty that were primordial, traditional. And at the time of conflict, people went back to the original basis of their social and therefore political loyalties. And that was reflected, at least in the case of Iraq, in the results of elections. So if there will be real elections in Syria, there should be representation for people representing different regions, even within the Sunni community. And there are differences between Hama, Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. There are many differences. Regionalism is very significant. There will have to be representation for the various communities: the Kurds; the Druze; the Alawis, of course, they should be represented; the Ismailis, which is a Shia sect; the various Christian groups. And there are quite a few: Armenians, Assyrians, alongside the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholics of Syria and others. The Turkmen — there are lots of Turkmen people in the north of Syria, more than what people know about, over a million. It’s a large group of people. And the Turks will take care and they will be represented. So that remains to be seen, and that will be a test. So to sum up this point, there are not going to be real democratic elections in the foreseeable future. And if there will be elections, and the results will be the usual 90-whatever, you know it was sham elections. Real elections will show all those divisions that I talked about. They will have to show them if they are really real.

Islamization and social tensions

Islamization will be significant, even if these people claim to be more moderate, which is very logical for them to say and do and very clever politically, because they need to show a nicer face in order to be able to then talk to other governments and ask for economic aid or any of those, or political aid, diplomatic aid, diplomatic support. There will be definitely an Islamization in society that again will create issues with the religious minorities. Arab Sunnis in Syria are 55 to 60%. That means 40 to 45%, definitely around 40, are not Sunni Arabs. And any Sunni Islamization process that will be enforced from above is bound, therefore, to cause troubles. Very obvious it’s going to happen.

Regional relations and internal divides

When we talk about foreign relations of Syria, obviously Iran is out of the game. The question is the level and the depth of Turkish support to the new regime and influence over it. And we talked a lot about the Turkish part of all this. Iraq, neighboring country, Sunni Arab minority. Will they be encouraged by the new regime in Damascus? Possibly. Not necessarily going to happen. My prediction: will not be a major factor. More important is the connection between the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. That could be a much bigger problem for both the Syrians and the Iraqis. The Druze in the south will not like to separate themselves in any formal way from the Syrian state. Never mind what some agitated Israelis have in mind about that. It’s not going to happen. But I can see, and I believe it will be, an informal Israeli zone of influence in parts of south Syria bordering with Jordan as well, inhabited by the Druze of the Jabal, of the mountain, that will make sure, from their perspective, because of their interest, that the border will not become a zone of hostilities between any government in Damascus and Israel. And that will be a difference from what it was when the Assad regime was so much dominated by Hezbollah, the Iranians, that tried to turn the Syrian side of the Golan Heights into a zone of conflict with Israel. And what Israelis are doing in Syria or have done in Syria to destroy any presence of hostile elements in those areas of Syria was intended to make it easier for the local forces that are there to keep stability along the border, which will be their interest. The real problem will be between the regime in Damascus and the Alawis. Killing Alawis in the streets now, of cities in Syria which are not Alawi-dominated, is terrible. It’s one thing, though. Trying to invade the mountains and really take over the entire mountainous region of the Alawis and then enforce a regime upon them would lead to a bloodbath, to a real major bloodshed. It hasn’t yet happened. Hopefully, it will not happen. But then the question is, what will be the representation of the Alawis in the new regime, in the new parliament that will be in any body of influence in the country? It will be very small. And you can’t ignore a certain percent of the population if you adapt to this. Also the 2% of the Ismailis — about 50% that are closer to Shia Islam than to Sunni Islam.

Sectarian dynamics, regional influence and outlook

And, of course, the question of the relation between Syria and Lebanon. In a famous speech in 1976, when Hafez Assad justified the Syrian invasion of Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war at that time, he said in simple words, Syria and Lebanon is one country, is one nation. That’s the typical Greater Syria approach that was adopted by the Ba’ath regime, even though originally, it is the approach of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party of Antoun Saadeh, the SSNP, that was mistakenly in French called the PPS. It’s not the right acronym in Arabic. The Syrian regime now will have to let the Lebanese conduct their affairs by themselves, and they will have to leave Lebanon for itself. Lebanon will have its own problems. We don’t talk about Lebanon now. They elected a new president, he talks a lot about changes, and all this remains to be seen. We always have to take with a grain of salt what Lebanese politicians say, particularly after they are elected. But that remains to be seen. So Syria and Lebanon will not be one country, one nation. And that also depends on the Iranians. If Iran is not allowed to move anymore from Iraq via Syria to Lebanon, the Iranian influence in Lebanon will have to be weakened, and will be weakened. And it will be not totally destroyed. There are Shias that are always supporters of Iran — many of them — but it will be decreased dramatically. And it also depends on Israel, how Israel would tolerate or not any attempts to recreate connection between Syria and Lebanon that would have also adverse repercussions on the border between Lebanon and Syria. Now we come to the last point about this — foreign affairs — and this is the role of the powers. Russia is out of the game. There are talks about, if vacuum created by the absence of Russia, China will move in. Remains to be seen, I doubt it. There’s an opening here for other countries. The question really is, who would fill the vacuum? Mostly, initially, it will be by Turkey. But the Turks cannot do in Syria what everybody said that they intend to do. They don’t have the funds, the financial resources, the economic resources rather, to reconstruct Syria. That will have to come from the Gulf countries, which as of now keep their hands off. They’re very careful and will remain careful for time to come. And, of course, the role played by the US. What will the Trump administration do? Surely, they have to make sure that the Kurds’ virtual autonomy in the northeast will be maintained, but to try and do it in a way that will prevent Turkish–Kurdish war. That remains to be seen. I doubt whether the Trump administration will invest too much money in Syria or at all. So we are going back to the EU. Somebody will have to put some money because Syria is a ruined, destroyed country after all those years of civil war. And if you don’t rehabilitate, reconstruct, rebuild Syria, there will not be stability there. Doesn’t matter who rules the country. As of now, we hear statements from the Europeans about the desire to accommodate themselves to the new regime. And al-Julani shows how moderate he is, and visits by the German and French foreign ministers and all this. But in the meantime, no money is coming, and money will be the key here. I will leave you with that, because we can go on and on like this. But the picture coming or emerging — isn’t that the main point? Syria is in a very bad situation. Rehabilitating, rebuilding a country after such an atrocious civil war is not a simple matter. And even if you can establish some political institutions that will be considered representative, to rebuild the relationship between the various communities is another story altogether. The same problem in Iraq. We have the same problem in Lebanon. We have the same problem in Libya. We shall have troubles in Syria. We shall have troubles by Syria. We shall have troubles connected with Syria. And therefore, there will be more talks from me, more presentations, but not immediately. I will let you know when we shall do more. So I will leave you with that. Sometimes people like an end to a story like this to be a happy end. The history of Syria over 100 years is not a happy history. I have no reason to believe that we are witnessing now a dramatic departure from traditional Syrian history, unfortunately. Thank you, my friends.

[ edited this piece.]

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Gary Grappo: Thank you very much, Atul, and for your flattering introduction. And it’s always a pleasure to be with you and to talk about what’s happening in the world as we speak. And in today’s interview, we’ll be obviously talking about the Middle East, where the situation remains quite fluid and very dynamic.

Atul Singh: What is this new geopolitical landscape we are talking about? How is it different to the old one? And when does this new era begin?

Gary Grappo: Well, the fundamental problems of the Middle East are unchanged. We have governments that are largely, widely unpopular. We have an extensive amount of oppression, particularly in the Arab countries; we have continuing instability in several of the countries, with militia groups quite active, terrorist organizations quite active; and we still have the ongoing problem, of course, of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, although the tenor of that has changed considerably as well. But what has changed is the dynamic. Over the course of the last several months, of course, we have seen significant diminishing of the capabilities of Hamas in Gaza. We had a ceasefire that lasted almost two months and is now finished, and Israel has relaunched both its ground and air campaign against Hamas in Gaza. We can get into the details of that and what that may portend. Further to the north, we have a largely decimated Hezbollah. Israel, by dint of cleverness and truly impressive technological innovation and then massive air attacks, was able to eliminate at least the top two, if not top three, levels of the Hezbollah organization in southern Lebanon, while at the same time decimating its arsenal of weapons, although not entirely destroying it. And so it presents much less threat to the people of Israel. At the same time, we finally — after waiting almost two years — we have an actual government in place with a president and a prime minister in Lebanon. The Lebanese people, for the first time, will have a government that appears committed to addressing the real challenges that that country is facing, both on the political front and most especially on the economic front. We can get into what to anticipate as that moves forward. Probably one of the most significant developments has been the fall of the Assad regime. Father and son lasted some 53–54 years and ruled with an iron fist, including over the last ten or 12 years during the Syrian civil war. They saw the complete devastation of the Syrian economy, deaths that ran into the hundreds of thousands, and huge numbers of Syrian refugees fleeing to Jordan, Turkey, even to Europe and Lebanon. It was then replaced with a government which initially showed some positive signs of moving forward, despite its jihadist heritage — actually quite steeped in jihadism. But we’re now seeing what I refer to as a default position in the Middle East. And that is, you see a change in government, hopes and expectations are high, and then cracks begin to appear. In this particular case, we are seeing an increase in the number of Assadists — that is, remnants of pro-Assad forces — attacking Syrian government forces, and those are leading to some actually quite pitched battles and to the exacting of revenge against the Alawite minority in the western and northwestern parts of Syria, with fairly large numbers of fatalities. There were also reports of some Christians being killed as well — not, at least from my perspective, unanticipated at all. And then finally — and we can get into other elements — but the situation in Iran has dramatically changed as a result of two Israeli attacks: in April of last year and then in October. That has greatly diminished the capability of the Iranian regime to protect itself from future attacks, providing Donald Trump with a potential, perhaps, of maybe reaching some kind of a negotiated solution with respect to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. So that’s the lineup. We can talk also, if you’d like, about what’s happening in Yemen right now. There’s certainly been an uptick in the last five days of activity there as well.

Instability in Israel

Atul Singh: So what you’re saying is part of the warp and woof of the Middle East. The Middle East has been unstable. You can argue that after , once the Ottoman Empire was replaced by the British and French empires, and after they unraveled and left behind nation-states in largely ethnic and tribal territories, the instability has never ended. What’s new? What’s new about this, Gary? How is it different to what transpired earlier?

Gary Grappo: Well, certainly what is new is the character of the conflict between Israel and some of its neighbors. And when I say that, we have to be cautious, because the states that border Israel don’t necessarily present a threat to Israel at all. Certainly not Egypt, not Jordan, not Lebanon and not even Syria, to be quite frank, although Israel is keeping its powder dry with respect to the future of Syria. But we still have the security threats to the State of Israel emanating from Hamas in Gaza and still from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. And then the Iranian regime has not changed at all. There is certainly the realization on the part of the leadership, including that of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, that they do not have the defense mechanisms that they thought they once had, with their so-called Axis of Resistance now as a result of conflicts with Israel. But the fundamental lay of the land, so to speak, in terms of the unpopularity of governments, inability of governments to respond to the needs of their peoples — probably, with the exception, obviously, of the monarchies, which do a much better job in that regard and therefore enjoy a measure of legitimacy that other governments do not have — that all remains the same. And the fear that governments have of their populations, that at any moment streets could erupt over whatever the issue du jour happens to be — whether it’s the Israeli–Palestinian issue, whether it’s the economic situation, whether it’s oppressive government security forces, whether it’s the inability to hold the governments accountable to their people — all of those things still register quite prominently among the peoples of the Middle East.

Atul Singh: Alright, so Gary, what you’re painting is a fundamentally unstable situation. Let’s begin with Israel–Palestine, since you mentioned that is an issue that animates the Arab street, and there’s a tension between the Arab street and the Arab palace on that issue. And of course, we can talk about whether Israel has been just or unjust, whether in its response to the terrorist attacks of October 7, whether they’ve been proportionate or disproportionate. But for me, our deeper concern is the inherent instability we see in Israel itself now. We are speaking just after Bibi Netanyahu and his cabinet have the head of Shin Bet, the internal intelligence agency of Israel. Now, this sort of politicization of intelligence agencies — and indeed the military — has not happened in Israel. Israel has had a fantastic military, a fantastic intelligence and a really cohesive state until quite recently. And now that internal cohesion in Israel seems to be breaking, and that for me perhaps is even more worrying than the usual fault lines everyone talks about.

Gary Grappo: There’s no question that Israel is facing some rather difficult internal political challenges. The specific one that you mentioned on the firing of the head of Shin Bet is overlaid with the quite emotional upheaval over the situation of Israeli hostages who remain in Gaza. Of course, there are some 59–60 of those. How many of them are still alive? I guess the Israelis perhaps may know, but there are most definitely some of them who are not alive today. And so that’s a fault line. 

Atul Singh: Sorry to interject, but I think even the Israelis cannot know for sure, because as of now, we know that they have not quite managed to break Hamas completely. They’ve done a lot of damage, but Hamas has proved more resilient than anyone could have estimated given the disparity in force.

Gary Grappo: Yes. No, Hamas is, despite the devastating losses they’ve suffered in manpower and in weapons and in overall structural cohesiveness of the organization, they’re still standing. And we saw that during the ceasefire, when they made a show of their continued presence in the territory. And Israel knows that, and I think that’s why Israel finally decided that since the ceasefire was obviously not going to move into a phase two — I will just say quite bluntly — there was never any possibility of that happening. It looked good on paper — the phase one, the phase two and the phase three. There was never any chance of moving into phase two. There really wasn’t. And so Hamas still exists as an organization. They are attempting to rearm. It’s going to be difficult because their supply lines have suffered rather dramatic deterioration. They can’t get the supplies in they previously had received, for example, say, from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon or from Iran. So they’re going to be hard-pressed to replace their stockpile of weapons and other material. But they are recruiting quite strongly, as a matter of fact. And I think we have to acknowledge the fact that it’s pretty fertile territory for the recruitment of fighters, given what has transpired since October 7. So their strength is probably back up to at least 20,000 fighters — not nearly with the capabilities that they might have had post-October 7. They’ve lost those veteran fighters — many, many of them. But they’ll get there. And I think that’s why Israel decided to capitalize while it could, in going after this still-less-than-previously-very-capable Hamas fighting force. But to get back to Israel, the issue over the firing of the Shin Bet chief is overlaid with the dissension in the Israeli public over the state of the hostages and whether the government is doing enough or not to secure their release. And then underpinning all of that, if you recall, before October 7, there was quite a bit of attention devoted to what Bibi was trying to do to undermine the authority of the Israeli judiciary, and that still remains so. So we do see a lot of political cracks within Israel internally. And I’ll make the final point — and I know Bibi Netanyahu is very mindful of this — and that is: Israel must decide on its state budget by the end of this month. If they finish the month without a state budget, it effectively means the collapse of the government. They will have to call for new elections, which would take — in Israel, given its election laws — three months. So all of this internal churn is having an impact. And then, of course, there’s all the back and forth over the person Bibi Netanyahu himself and how Israelis view him, how much or not it can be debated. Netanyahu needs war to maintain his position as prime minister. All of that is being debated today in Israel. So yeah, Israel faces its problems within itself, in addition to the external threats.

Lebanon’s prospects

Atul Singh: And so let’s move on from Israel to Lebanon. Lebanon, you mentioned, seems to have greater hope now. But Lebanon still has a fractious, multi-ethnic society, which in the past even struggled to collect rubbish, leave aside deliver other elements of governance. Hezbollah ran a parallel state, which was arguably more powerful than the state itself, at least in the areas it dominated. Is there hope for Lebanon as a state, or are we going to see Lebanon limp along as a failed state?

Gary Grappo: I think there’s more hope today in Lebanon than there has been — most certainly in the last 10 years, maybe in the last 25 years. There genuinely is an opportunity here. Now, Lebanon has been put nearly on its back. Its economy, which was considered a middle-income country at one point, has now been reduced to almost . Most of the country is living at or below that today. The infrastructure has suffered considerably, particularly the neighborhoods in Beirut and in southern Lebanon and in the Beqaa Valley, which is on the east near the border with Syria. So a lot of work needs to be done on the Lebanese economy. But the Lebanese people are some of the most industrious — in fact, I would argue the most industrious people in the Middle East after Israel. And there can be a natural affinity between Lebanon and Israel in terms of how they approach innovation, how they approach business, how they approach development, if they can overcome some of these problems. Now, this is where Lebanon is going to need some help. And I would argue, if I were sitting before Donald Trump, that if you really want to do some good not only for the people of Lebanon and for our interest in Lebanon, but also for Israel, we need to invest in Lebanon. We need to invest in their armed forces. We need to work with the armed forces as closely as we can to ensure they are able to disarm Hezbollah, which is not going to willingly lay down all of its arms. It’s obliged to do that going back to a UN Security Council following the 2006 war. And the terms of the latest ceasefire called for the enforcement of that, as well as the of all Lebanese armed forces north of the Litani River, which is around 20 miles north of the Israeli border. And Lebanon is supposed to — the Lebanese armed forces are supposed to have that responsibility and that authority. It’s uncertain how effectively they can carry that out. They are going to need some help — in fact, considerable help. And this is where I think the West, particularly the United States — I would also argue France and other countries — could help Lebanon. One of the good things is they were finally able to name a , and they have a , both of whom are opposed to Hezbollah. They want to see the ceasefire terms fully enforced. They have taken on that responsibility. It’s just the ability to do that is a bit constrained at the moment. And then finally, I will say that Hezbollah is greatly weakened within Lebanon today. They do not have anywhere near the political stature they once had. Even though they still maintain a sizable presence — not a majority, but a sizable presence — in the Lebanese parliament. There are going to be elections for the parliament, I want to say, in two years. And the hope is that if Lebanon can show some genuine progress, that the Hezbollah presence in the parliament can be even further reduced. Just as an indication, we’re seeing that the level of popularity of Hezbollah, even among Lebanese Shia, is reduced from what it has historically been. So these are important points to consider and offer a genuine opportunity for hope and progress in Lebanon. And we should take stock of that and try to capitalize on that in the interest of Lebanon and overall stability in the Middle East.

Atul Singh: Donald Trump has, I believe, two daughters — or three, probably two, if I remember correctly — and one of them is married to a Lebanese gentleman, and her father-in-law is apparently now mediating. He’s Maronite, and hopefully, if he’s involved, do you think there will be US investment and attention to Lebanon?

Gary Grappo: If he has the ear of Donald Trump, then there is a possibility. Now, I haven’t heard much about what he’s actually doing at the moment in Lebanon. He’s been given some other responsibilities, too, so I don’t know how he’s dividing his time and efforts. Nevertheless, yeah, if you have the ear of Donald Trump, obviously you’re going to be an influential person, and you’re going to be viewed as someone with influence and people will pay attention to you. We haven’t yet seen his influence demonstrated clearly in terms of his relationship with the president ±čŸ±Čő-Ă -±čŸ±Čő the president’s daughter. You would think he would. So that remains to be seen.

Rising pressure in Jordan

Atul Singh: Moving on from Lebanon to Jordan, we know that the monarchy feels the heat. The King of Jordan has not been terribly enthused about Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza, turning it into a . We know that the majority of Jordan is now Palestinian. We know that Palestinians in Jordan are increasingly in solidarity with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. So from a geopolitical point of view, it seems that Jordan seems to be quite unstable. The king is not getting any younger either. So what lies ahead there?

Gary Grappo: There hasn’t been much attention given to Jordan, and that’s unfortunate, because Jordan is facing some challenges. There is this very restive Palestinian population within Jordan. Estimates vary — anywhere between 60 and 80% of the population of the country. It seems to be in a perpetual economic crisis. They don’t have the natural resource wealth that other countries in the region have, and they are dependent to a great extent on American largesse. The American aid program, if it continues, is quite substantial, and the king needs that, which is why the king — after Donald Trump’s statement about his ambitions for Gaza — was anxious to fly to Washington and meet with the president in order to maybe talk him down from this grandiose plan for Gaza. But he was quite diplomatic about it. It was not confrontational, but also made it clear that this was not something that Jordan would be able to accept. But he knows how to be deferential when he has to be to the United States — and specifically to Donald Trump, who likes that. And so he ended up leaving, having made his point, but not losing Jordan’s status in terms of how it’s viewed in Washington. But it faces continuing economic challenges, which are quite dire — whether it’s unemployment, whether it’s the level of business activity, economic growth, development and so forth. The other problem that many folks have not focused on is the security challenges that Jordan faces, coming not only from the West Bank, where you have the appearance now of these small militia groups that are causing a great deal of instability in the West Bank — confronting settlers, confronting the IDF. There’s some of that also present in Jordan. The Jordanian security forces are quite competent.

Atul Singh: [Are these groups directly tied to Hamas? Or are they more independent, acting on their own?]

Gary Grappo: Both. Some will have some kind of tie to Hamas but don’t take guidance from Hamas. Others may take some guidance from Hamas, and some are entirely independent and are operating on their own. In fact, it’s uncertain the extent to which some of them actually even coordinate their activities with one another, which is why they haven’t been all that effective. And the Israelis have been able to tamp them down as they appear but not eliminate them. The suspicion is that the Iranians may be behind some of this in terms of provoking them, maybe providing them with funds, even weapons that are smuggled in via Syria and Jordan. So it’s all kind of opaque at this point, but it presents problems for Jordan. And there are some interesting reports coming out of Iran that the Iranians view Jordan as a particularly weak point, and that if their efforts to re-establish a link between Iran and Hezbollah through Syria — and that’s not working out so well up to this point — that they may attempt to use Jordan. Now, they’ll find very stiff challenge in Jordan. The Jordanian forces are not to be trifled with. They’re very effective, very capable. They have an excellent intelligence service. They cooperate very closely with both the Americans and the Israelis. So they’ll find the going very tough, but— 

Atul Singh: [Did King Abdullah himself serve in the Jordanian Armed Forces or receive military training?]

Gary Grappo: Hm, I want to say he did, but I can’t be sure. I know his father did, but I can’t be sure about Abdullah. But I think so, be that as it—

Atul Singh: [Well, regardless, the king seems to command deep loyalty from the armed forces. That’s a critical pillar of stability in a region where rulers often take great care to ensure military loyalty.]

Gary Grappo: Absolutely. And the king enjoys their loyalty 100%, which is very important in the Middle East. And they are indeed very loyal to the king and will remain so. And so I have every reason to believe that with the continued cooperation with the Americans and the Israelis, that they’ll be able to thwart any effort on the part of the Iranians. But it’s still a challenge that the Jordanians now have to confront. But I am worried about the internal political stability because of the large Palestinian presence there. I don’t think it’ll turn terribly violent, other than maybe potential pockets in some areas. But nevertheless, it’s something I’m sure the king is very much aware of, and the Israeli and American intelligence services are also quite aware of and trying to provide the king with whatever support he may need. So it’s worth keeping an eye on developments in Jordan.

Can the country of Syria survive?

Atul Singh: Let’s talk about Syria. You’ve already mentioned that it has followed a familiar pattern. And you’ve mentioned the killings of Alawites. You’ve also mentioned the former Assad regime soldiers mounting attacks on the new regime. Of course, we know that Turkish intelligence, MIT, did support the current rulers of Syria. So what happens now with the Kurds, who represent one area and one ethnicity of Syria? The Sunnis — also not just Sunnis who are in the plains in that road going all the way from Damascus to Istanbul, formerly Constantinople — but also the Arabs living by the Tigris and Euphrates. They are different. Those peasants are different to the more urban population. And in fact, arguably, a led to their migration to the cities and triggered the Arab uprisings in Syria. And then, of course, we have the issue of the Alawites, who are along the coasts and who were by the Sunnis under none other than Selim I. And of course, when they ruled, they weren’t particularly kind and loving and peaceful either. So there is a whole cycle of violence there. Can Syria even survive as a country de jure?

Gary Grappo: That may be the ultimate question, and that question has been posed more than once. It’s not coincidence that the centrifugal sectarian forces of Lebanon mirror those almost, in some cases, identically to those in Syria. You have a multiplicity of sectarian groups — whether religious or ethnic — and it makes it very, very difficult to have a unifying identity for Syria, despite efforts by previous regimes to create one. Assad tried to create one, and it ultimately came down to oppression. If you opposed Assad, you ended up either dead or in jail. And that’s how it was enforced. I think al-Sharaa, who is the interim president — we’ll see how long the interim period is — former head of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the jihadist group that emerged victorious after the fall of Assad, he said all the right things, which new Arab leaders often do, with all these wonderful aspirations of Syrian unity and respect for its multi-identities within the country. But the default position is these groups go at one another, and certainly they go after the government. And you mentioned a few of these. But there are Druze down in the south. There are Ismailis who are closer to being Shia, actually, than the Alawites, who were represented in the person of Assad and his father. You had Turkmen up in the very northern part of the country — the remnants of the Turkish population after the fall of the Ottomans. You have the Kurds up in the northeast. And you mentioned a very good point: that the Arabs who typically settle in some of the cities stretching from Damascus in the south to Aleppo in the north have a very different perspective on things than the desert Arabs who live to the east. And also their views on Islam — Sunni Islam. They’re all Sunni, but how they view it, how strongly they adhere to it, where they tend to be more conservative or not, all of that. There are many complexions. And even in the western areas on that main highway that goes from Damascus to Hama, Homs and Aleppo, from city to city, it changes. And those are four very big cities in Syria. That all changes. You have several Christian groups that inhabit the country. And so all of these are pulling at one another. All of these are vying for influence, power, and wealth in a country which — we have to remember — has been destroyed. 80% of its economy has been effectively destroyed as a result of that 12-year civil war. And then you have another six million or so Syrians residing outside the country, who are forming actually a new identity of themselves and of Syria, whether they reside in Jordan or Turkey or Lebanon, or even in Europe. So all of these are pushing and pulling against one another, presenting enormous challenges to the government and the government’s ability to actually govern. And the default position — and that’s kind of a situation where you have the sectarian strains pulling at one another — the government brings down the hammer. That’s what Assad did. And that’s what the predecessors of the Assads did. Although they have had brief experiences with democracy, they didn’t last. They didn’t last.

Atul Singh: [So even when Syria flirted with democracy, it couldn’t overcome those deep sectarian divisions, could it?]

Gary Grappo: Yes, they even tried that! But that’s another point, because let’s bear in mind there are external players in all of that mix. This is not just Syria alone. There’s Lebanon, of course, to the west. There’s Turkey, which is probably the most significant influence today to the north. Iran has not given up on Syria and will try to re-establish its pipeline of weapons of war material and money into Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. There are folks who were greatly affected by the fall of the Assad regime and the collapse of the huge Captagon industry that was resident in Syria. Basically, that’s how the Syrian regime made money. They sell — which is the Middle Eastern equivalent almost of meth — and were making billions. And that’s how the army earned whatever funds it could to support itself. It wasn’t nearly enough, and obviously collapsed very easily. And there are others in the mix. The Iraqis are watching very, very closely what happens. This may present some opportunities for the western Arabs of Iraq to influence Syria as well. And then you have the Americans, the Europeans and the Israelis exerting their influence. The Israelis, by the way, have moved beyond the neutral territory between their borders and have now settled on — I’m talking about military forces — on actual Syrian territory. And they’re going to wait and see how things play out to ensure that whatever result does not present a threat to Israel. And so they have that new buffer zone that they have established.

Atul Singh: Yes, some of the Israelis say that there’s no way they can give it up. And they say that the Druze actually in Syria want Israeli protection. And the Druze are a great buffer zone against a potential fundamentalist Sunni regime in Damascus.

Gary Grappo: That’s 100% correct. Of course, there is a significant, relatively speaking, Druze population in Israel, which does quite well. They do not experience many of the problems that the Israeli Arabs have in Israel, and they’re quite pleased, for the most part, with their status in Israel. And of course, they have their contacts with their brothers in Syria. And it’s a natural affinity that the Druze would have toward Israel. They’re far more trusting of Israel than this new government. And they’re trying to figure it out. They’re trying to feel their way through this new government. They’re not sure exactly how much authority, how much power they will be given. And so it’s not surprising that they’re maintaining pretty close ties with Israel and will find a way to cooperate with Israel if they feel that their interests may be threatened by this new government in Damascus.

Atul Singh: Alright, you haven’t mentioned the Russians. They have Latakia and they have Tartus still, and I’m sure they are not going to disappear quietly into the sun.

Gary Grappo: You’re right. And they don’t have quite the presence they had before the fall of the Assad regime. There are supposedly ongoing negotiations to both their air base at Hmeimim and their naval base at Tartus. The naval base in particular is vitally important for the Russians, and they desperately want to hold on to that. They’ve lost all other influence in Syria today, not only because of the fall of Assad, but of course having to overextend itself in Ukraine, in that misbegotten war. And so they’re struggling. And it’s not clear that the government may necessarily want them, particularly given the close relationship between Russia today and Iran. One thing you can say about the regime in Damascus now is they don’t want the Iranians back. They most definitely don’t want Hezbollah back. And we’re already seeing fighting take place between the government forces of Syria and Hezbollah, which is a very interesting development — and from the purely selfish perspective of the Americans and Israelis — not bad at all. Now, Hezbollah is probably also allying with these pro-Assad factions in the western part of the country, which is something to be watched. And again, Atul, I just come back to all the centrifugal forces at play in Syria, which argue against, unfortunately, the best hopes of the Syrian people after the regime fell.

Egypt: the ticking time bomb

Atul Singh: Alright, let’s move on from Syria, and let’s talk about Egypt, the other neighbor of Israel. One ex-MI6 officer told me that he believes that Egypt could be the ticking time bomb in the region because of its population, because of the of the Nile Delta, and because of persistent youth unemployment and resentment against the regime. He also said that as of now, Sisi is a pretty effective ruler. The military has managed to clamp down pretty hard on the Muslim Brotherhood. And as of now, there is no immediate risk. But the structural problems persist in the economy, and the political problem exists in society, and there is such democratic deficit and a demographic time bomb that Egypt will ultimately implode. What do you say to that, Gary?

Gary Grappo: Egypt is a perfect illustration of the essential problem of the Middle East that I outlined at the outset. And that is the fact that you have unpopular governments, unaccountable to their people and fearful of their people, and maintaining authority through their security forces — essentially oppression — while at the same time the economic and social needs are not being met adequately. And there’s no recourse. And in the case of Egypt, you have very effective internal security forces. They have almost eradicated the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt — ruthlessly, too. And they packed up and left while they could. And those who couldn’t ended up either dead or in jail. And there are a number of jails that are chock-a-block full of former Muslim Brotherhood members. So for the time being, as you mentioned, the problem is contained. But the challenge remains: how do you reconcile a country — it’s the largest population by far in the Middle East — that is unable at the present time to meet the needs of those people? Education, health care, employment and so forth. The government was able to attract money to build this mammoth new capital, which by all accounts is quite impressive, outside of Cairo. Most people cannot afford to live there, only probably the top 10–15%. Even some Egyptians who work there in the government can’t afford to live there. And so that’s presenting problems for the people of Cairo especially, which is the largest city by far in Egypt, if not in the entire Middle East. And then the environmental problems that you mentioned are not going away. They are not going away. If you look at coastal Egypt, which extends considerably south up the Nile, one can foresee in 20 years and in 40 years — I’ve looked at these projections — how the salinization effectively takes over the Nile Delta and even flooding, including in the second-largest city of Alexandria. If you look at the population — Alexandria, Cairo, the Nile Delta — that is a significant percentage of the population of Egypt. I want to say at least a third, it could be even more than that. When they lose their ability to live somewhere that’s livable and also earn an income, what happens? Well, you can have internal unrest. You can have massive refugee flows. And we have seen in the example of the Syrian civil war what happens when that occurs. And my guess is many of those refugees would seek to go to either Turkey — maybe Lebanon, although there’s not much space for them there — but more than likely the southern Mediterranean countries of Europe. And so all of that certainly bears watching, and it further underscores the importance of the Sisi regime to find a way to deflate these growing pressures within his society — outside of the use of his security forces. It also argues for greater investment on the part of the Gulf countries in development in Egypt — particularly creating economic opportunity. You create economic opportunity, and then the options begin to open up. And that hasn’t materialized yet. So that’s the pressure cooker of Egypt today. The pressure is manageable, as you indicated — for now. What will it be like in 10 years? I can’t predict, and I wouldn’t even try to.

The Gulf: A regional ray of hope

Atul Singh: Alright, you’ve mentioned the Gulf countries. So let’s now talk about the Gulf. And the Gulf includes, of course, small countries like Qatar, that punch way above their weight. They have created . Dubai, which is the financial center now of the Middle East, where you now have the in some kind of entente with Israel. You also have countries like Bahrain and Oman, where you were ambassador. And then, of course, the big boys — Saudi Arabia. Now Yemen doesn’t quite come. It is an important place, because the Houthis have proved that they can de facto the Suez Canal. The Bab al-Mandab Strait is de facto unusable, and ships are going around the Cape of Good Hope, just like pre-Henry the Navigator times or Henry the Navigator times. So talk about the Gulf, now that you’ve mentioned the Gulf — and it’s a diverse picture, as listeners can already divine.

Gary Grappo: Yes. Setting aside the case of Yemen, because it’s just — yes, it occupies the same Arabian Peninsula, but it’s not like any of the other Gulf countries. The Gulf countries, unlike the rest of the region, are actually doing rather well economically and even socially. You have cradle-to-grave healthcare systems. You have respectable education systems. The level of extremism and jihadism is very, very low, if it exists at all. And to the extent that it might exist, the security forces are very effective in tamping them down. And most of them are quite active on the regional and international diplomatic scene. You mentioned the case of Qatar, but I think the two major players are Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

Atul Singh: [Yes. They really are the powerhouses of the Gulf now, especially when it comes to diplomacy.]

Gary Grappo: Exactly. Both of them are extraordinarily wealthy countries. On a per capita basis, I’d say the Emirates is probably much wealthier and Qatar wealthier than them all, and are doing lots of things on the international scene to raise their profile. I mean, just take the example of these negotiations over Ukraine. They’re taking place in Saudi Arabia! Who could have imagined such a thing five years ago? 

Atul Singh: Yeah, that’s unbelievable! The Europeans are turning and tossing in complete indignation.

Gary Grappo: Yes. So, back in the day — certainly my day, and up to maybe about five or ten years ago — when you had to do these kinds of negotiations, everyone flocked to Geneva. Now they’re going to Jeddah or to Riyadh, perhaps Doha or even Abu Dhabi. So the Gulf states are doing quite well, and we should all wish that we would find that kind of stability. Obviously, none of them is a democracy, and in all likelihood, they’re not going to be for a very, very long time. But they’re quite stable.

Atul Singh: Including, if I may interject, Saudi Arabia, because some people fear for Saudi Arabia, because Mohammed bin Salman has ruled it with a very strong hand, an iron fist, and there is fear that there might be factions brewing within his own family that might turn against him, lead even to assassination. So there is that fear, as you know, amongst intelligence circles. This is what I hear, both from the Israelis and the British.

Gary Grappo: Yes. And it’s varied from king to king. And I will say it’s certainly present now. But I think one thing that makes this situation in Saudi Arabia different today is that socially, the country is in a much better position. Saudis do not face the kind of restrictions in social interaction and activity that they used to face. When I was there, you had this very distinct segregation of the sexes and there were very few opportunities for people to engage in social activity outside of the home. That has changed! You have America’s Cup regional competition. You have had major tennis tournaments, golf tournaments — even, God help them — American professional wrestling. You’ve had rock concerts. Movie theaters are starting to proliferate. 

Atul Singh: They even have Cristiano Ronaldo with his girlfriend and many children from many different women! (laughs)

Gary Grappo: Yeah, yeah. So they’ve opened the floodgates socially, and that’s reduced a lot of the tension. And that was a brilliant move on the part of Mohammed bin Salman. On the economic side, they’ve created new opportunities. Now, I’ve been reading recently that because of the low price of oil that maybe their coffers will not be as enriched this year as in earlier years. They’re used to that. They’ve faced those times before, and they know how to deal with that. They’ll have to ratchet back their ambitions on the NEOM project in western Saudi Arabia, and they’ll manage to do that. Having said all of that, I will say that despite some concerns that I have on his positions on human rights, Mohammed bin Salman has done a good job of managing that country. The only thing now they’re waiting on is what happens to his father, King Salman. I mean, he’s probably not long for this world. Well, none of us is, but he in particular. And when he becomes the king — he’s effectively behaving like the king now, with some limits — I think we could see even more changes that will be occurring in his country. He seems to have forged respectable relations — sometimes close relations — with other countries, including in the region. He faces this nemesis down in the south, Yemen. He’s managed to extricate his forces from the actual conflict, but the conflict still continues. So he’s done, I have to say, a credible job, first and foremost in maintaining stability and mollifying the population of Saudi Arabia, as have all the other Gulf countries. Oman was facing some economic problems because of oil prices and so forth a few years ago. That’s begun to change. And we’re now seeing some impressive growth figures in Oman. The new sultan has now kind of asserted himself, and we’re seeing his unique imprint in the governance of the Sultanate. All of the Gulf countries seem to be doing very well, or at least respectably, not facing any of the challenges that the other countries in the region are. In fact, they’re seen as a potential solution, including in the conflict in Gaza, with future investment to redevelop, rebuild Gaza, if and when that conflict ends.

Iraq, Kuwait and the shadow of empires

Atul Singh: Alright, so the Gulf is a ray of hope in the region. We’ve covered a number of countries. We’ve got two big former empires left — correct me if I’m wrong, and please chime in and add if I’m missing any major country. Of course, some may say you’ve missed out Kuwait, you’ve missed out Iraq. And we’ve mentioned Iraq. We can talk about Kuwait and Iraq briefly. Perhaps you begin with them. But the two countries that come to my mind are the descendants of the Ottomans and the Safavids, the two great empires of the region. But over to you. Let’s cover Kuwait and Iraq lest we offend anyone. Iraq is very similar to Syria. Both Syria and Iraq were run by Ba’athists. Both were bloody regimes run by minorities. Syria was run by an Alawite family. And of course, we know that Iraq was run by a Sunni family from Tikrit, the Saddam Hussein . He and his boys were terrors, to say the least. Iraq is also multi-ethnic. And few people know Iraq better than Gary. So we have Kuwait and Iraq. Kuwait presumably is doing all right. Iraq — you can tell us more. And then let’s move on. Please move on to Turkey and Iran.

Gary Grappo: I’m not sure I’ll have much to contribute with respect to Turkey. I don’t follow Turkey as closely as I do the Arab countries. But with respect to Iraq, I will say, because of the weakened state of affairs in Iran, that it does present some opportunities to Iraq. It is worth noting that the Iraqi leadership has indicated fairly clearly that it wants the very limited American presence in that country to remain. Now, the various Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq have indicated that if American forces have not withdrawn by the end of this year, they will resume against that American presence, and perhaps an American presence elsewhere, including in the very eastern part of Syria. They certainly have some ability to do that. It’s going to be limited. And I think they understand that, were they to do that, they would find overwhelming response certainly from the Americans and maybe from the Iraqi government itself. It’s unclear how strongly the Iraqi leadership wants to assert its independence from Iran. The Iranians have had so much influence in that country since the departure of the Americans. But the card deck has been reshuffled, and not all the cards are held by Iran today. The Iraqis have a few more than they have had in the past. And so there is some opportunity. We’re seeing new oil investment, for example, in the country. They have resolved some of the problems that they have had previously with their own Kurds up in the north. And so Iraq has something to look forward to, some potential. But again, they are riven by the sectarian problems that have been there ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Very similar to Shia, Sunni, Kurds and to a lesser extent, Christians and other minority groups. And so that remains a very significant challenge for them, particularly given the fact that the way the Iraqi Council of Representatives is established, where seats are apportioned according to sect, various groups are locked in. And that creates a bit of a road jam in terms of maybe getting things done. And we’ve seen in the past demonstrations of younger Iraqis wanting to do away with this system of preferences — to just open it up completely and let Iraqi citizens vote for those they believe best able to serve the interest of the State of Iraq and the Iraqi people. So I would say that Iraq is still a bit of a question mark — potentially in a somewhat better position, but unclear how they might capitalize on that, particularly given some of the internal problems that they have. They are going to need significant foreign investment if they’re truly going to be able to develop their oil potential. We should also mention, given our brief discussion about the problem in Egypt — environmental problems, in the fact that the water flow in the two main rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, has been diminishing over the years. Climate change, one cause. The other is the dams that Turkey has built, and to a lesser extent, Syria. It’s mostly Turkey which has reduced the water flow that reaches Iraq. And it’s something to be aware of because agriculture was a major factor in the Iraqi economy and in the Iraqi employment scene. So all of these are challenges that the government is going to have to face. With respect to Iran, this is the real challenge — certainly for Israel, for the United States and for the West in general. The Iranian government has suffered, over the course of the past year, a series of setbacks they could never have anticipated. They overestimated their own power and influence and they grossly underestimated the capabilities of the Israelis, particularly with the support of the United States. The current state of affairs: They are not able to effectively defend themselves against an Israeli air attack. The one that occurred last October — two waves of the most advanced fighters built by the United States, the F-35, the stealth fighters — their radar systems completely failed to detect them. And as a result, the Israelis were able to carry out their attacks without restraint. They delivered all of their ordnance and on the air defenses that Iran had. And they’re not going to be replaced anytime soon. They were Russian-made, and the Russians are not going to be shipping any military equipment outside Russia.

Atul Singh: Very quick question: There is also the matter of the regime’s popularity at home, which seems to be the biggest risk. Add to that an economic crisis which is worsening, and Donald Trump has been no friend to Iran. In fact, he threw out the that Barack Obama negotiated. So the noose around Iran is likely to tighten. Speaking of internal stability, the other imperial power, Turkey, isn’t doing that well either. There are as we speak in Turkey because Ekrem İmamoğlu, the secular Republican People’s Party’s candidate, was locked up by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regime. Erdoğan has been in power forever, but still, that’s a far more democratic country than a country ruled by mullahs. And in Iran, there’s also the specter of the different minorities resenting Farsi or Fars dominance. The Baluchs don’t like it, the Azeris don’t like it, the Kurds don’t like it and so on and so forth — not to mention the Chinese Sunni minority left. So William Butler Yeats’ — “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold” — certainly seems to be the fear for the Iranian regime.

Gary Grappo: That’s the major challenge of this current regime. And that is, in addition to the external threat that they face from Israel. By the way, in those attacks that occurred in April, Israel took out one of the main factories for the manufacture of ballistic missiles. So Iran’s vaunted ballistic missile capability has been significantly diminished as well. And this was their final defense. This was intended to be the defense that would protect the Islamic Republic. And those defenses have been greatly weakened ±čŸ±Čő-Ă -±čŸ±Čő any potential attack from Israel. But most especially, if the Americans were to join the Israelis, there’s no way to repel it. And they would suffer devastating losses. And you can be sure that in addition to going after what’s left of the missile forces and other defense areas, they would be going after IRGC camps and doing maximum— 

Atul Singh: Very quickly, explain IRGC to our viewers and listeners.

Gary Grappo: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is basically a military force apart from the Artesh, which is the standard military force: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. That’s the Iranian defense forces under the Ministry of Defense. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reports to the Supreme Leader. And as the name implies, they protect the Islamic Revolution, which is basically the regime. That’s their job. And they do this in many ways. They probably attract more resources on a per capita basis than does the regular military. And they certainly have the ear of the Supreme Leader the way the military forces do not, and so they are given preeminence. And they are seen as a much greater threat to Israel or even to Iran’s neighbors than the Iranian armed forces.

Atul Singh: So think of them like the of the Roman Empire.

Gary Grappo: That’s a good way to put it, except much larger and very ideologically committed.

Atul Singh: More fanatically. 

Gary Grappo: Yes. And it’s not just them. They have militia groups that work for them, and these are the ones who enforce domestic law in Iran, particularly with respect to religious law — and most especially when it comes to ensuring, for example, that women are covered. These are the guys going around on black motorbikes with baseball bats and nailing women who are not properly covered, enforcing Islamic law.

Atul Singh: Isn’t the use of baseball bats very American? The irony!

Gary Grappo: Yeah, we pretend not to use baseball bats as weapons, but it can be a very effective one!

Atul Singh: Al Capone used it.

Gary Grappo: Yes, yes. It’s not unknown as a very effective, bloody weapon. So these are some of the external threats that Iran is facing. And then one cannot overestimate the challenge they face internally. There is a lot of dissension there. I read some of these various polls that are taken — you don’t know how much to attribute to them — but where popularity now is at or below even 20%. They are almost universally despised — the Iranian leadership in that country — for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the appalling economic situation.

Atul Singh: And no jobs for the youth.

Gary Grappo: No jobs. The Iranian rial continues to fall and explore new depths, and there’s no way that they can shore it up. And add now Donald Trump to the mix. He has now doubled down if not tripled on his maximum pressure campaign and is really exploiting every opportunity in terms of secondary sanctions. And for those who don’t quite understand the nature of US economic sanctions: When the US sanctions a particular nation, organization, business, entity or person directly, that’s primary sanctions. A secondary sanction is going after someone who does business with any of those. So for example, Iranian exports: Iran is putting its oil onto ghost ships. They load them onto tankers in a port in Iran. They’re taken out somewhere not far offshore, out of sight. The transponders are turned off. A ghost tanker shows up — it’s not registered in any country — and they transfer the oil to the ghost tanker, sometimes mixing it with oil from a legitimate oil exporter, maybe Saudi Arabia, maybe the Emirates, maybe Oman, Kuwait, whatever. And then it goes to its final destination, where it’s offloaded. The United States has begun sanctioning the ghost ships when they find them and sanctioning the ports and the refineries who take on that illicit oil from Iran. This has made everybody involved in the illicit import and export of oil very, very wary. And for the first time, the United States is going after ports and businesses in India and in China who are not particularly excited about getting on the wrong side of the law when it comes to the Americans. They do not want to be sanctioned. It’s a death sentence. You can’t do business in dollars. And if you can’t do business in dollars — and it’ll effectively mean euros, too — what are you left with? So those sanctions are going to be very effective. In fact, Joe Biden started toward the end of his administration — I would say October, November, certainly December — and Donald Trump has screwed it down even more tightly. And we’re going to see declining exports of oil from Iran, which is a principal hard currency earner.

Atul Singh: So let me tell you a story. I ran into a former British Special Forces soldier, and he was in the smuggling business. He was earning $20,000 per night for captaining a tanker. And he would take the tanker and he would go to one of these ghost tankers — Iranian tankers — transfer the oil from the ghost tanker into whatever tanker he was captaining, and then sail and offload that oil. And basically, that earned him $20,000 per night for this high-risk operation, shall we say. (laughs) Shall we say, he has a very nice house in England right now!

Gary Grappo: And he’s exactly the kind of people that the Americans are looking for now. These are the kind of people they want to go after.

Atul Singh: So maybe he’s one of the lucky ones who got away!

Gary Grappo: Well, he got out of the business just at the right time, because I think this administration really wants to screw down the lid as tightly as possible. Now, on the positive side — as we all know, it’s been prominently reported in the news — Donald Trump has communicated to the Supreme Leader he’s willing to sit down and begin to end Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The Iranians would be well advised to accept that. I’m not sure they’re going to, to their detriment. This is going to greatly disappoint the people of Iran, who are only going to become more frustrated and more angry with their government. And it’s going to increase the pressure internally on that government. So here you have rising dissent in Iran. You have a growing, acute economic situation in that country which shows no signs of being able to improve itself. And then these external threats that the country faces, without the defenses it previously had expected to rely on. And so the lineup of factors against the current regime in Iran is all very negative. You’d be pretty hard-pressed to find a bright spot. Maybe Yemen. And I tell you, you’ve got to be pretty desperate to look at Yemen as a bright spot. So now they have their relationships with Russia and with China. I will say that China is not going to jeopardize its trade relationship — which is already facing difficulties with the United States — for Iran. They’re not going to do it. They will cut the rope if they have to, when it comes to Iran. Russia, on the other hand, needs Iran, and Iran needs Russia. And so that relationship will probably remain in place and likely even strengthen. But still, the various challenges facing that regime are all bad to abominable, which is why it would be a good idea to negotiate with the Americans and get this out of the way. Remove sanctions. It would change everything. And for what? All they would have to do is cease their nuclear weapons program. I don’t know whether the leadership is willing to concede that.

Atul Singh: The Ayatollah is now aging dramatically and may not last very long. So we have no idea what comes next.

Donald Trump has a real opportunity

Atul Singh: So, let’s talk about Donald Trump. You’ve mentioned him a few times. What is the new Middle East policy of his administration? And what can we expect in the next three and a half years or four years of his presidency? A little less than four years, of course. Now we are in March.

Gary Grappo: Yeah, yeah. I would say that Donald Trump inherited, with respect to the Middle East, probably the most opportunistic set of circumstances that any American president has ever had coming into office. I mean, we’ve covered the various areas of the Middle East, and in almost every respect, it’s an opportunity for the United States. I will say, however, that the Middle East is the place where American ambition goes to die. And we’ve seen that time after time after time. The last genuinely successful American adventure — I’m not sure that’s the proper word for it — in the Middle East was brokering the peace accord between Egypt and Israel. Just going back to Bill Clinton, the collapse of the Camp David in 2000, we’ve seen the efforts on the part of George Bush in Iraq that turned out to be disastrous not only for the region but for the United States. Barack Obama started out nobly, seeking to address the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, also fell on very bad times and he eventually just gave up his hands. His new Secretary of State after Hillary Clinton left, John Kerry, wanted to pick up the ball and thought, “No, he could deliver the goods,” — collapsed, frustrated again both by the Israelis and the Palestinians. And of course, Obama tried to negotiate the , which looked pretty good on paper. It wasn’t certainly a perfect agreement. He was succeeded by Donald Trump, who proceeded to tear it up about a year into his first term as president. And the situation progressed to the point where, at the end of his administration, the situation in Iran had worsened, despite his promises that by tearing up the agreement, it would improve. Don’t forget, we had maximum pressure back then, too. And it did not work to the extent that he had promised. Joe Biden seemed to be doing okay until October 7. And it just exploded — and this was not his fault, obviously. And that’s the whole problem of the Middle East; you can’t control events as President of the United States. And that situation exploded, he cast his lot with Israel, which you had to expect the United States would do. And that only worsened. But on the other hand, it allowed Israel to address other problems, namely Hezbollah. And just lucky with the collapse of the government in Syria and the weakening of Iran—

Atul Singh: Maybe it was related, because they couldn’t rely on Hezbollah this time around. It has been weakened. It was a great opportunity. And with, of course, Turkish backing — MIT backed — you have this group which is now ruling Damascus. So I think it is related to a great degree.

Gary Grappo: Oh, oh, most definitely, the collapse of Hezbollah presented a real opportunity for HTS to go after Assad. And I think there was also the recognition that the Assad regime was a house of cards, that it was not capable of defending itself. And that’s just apparent from how quickly HTS moved from the northwestern part of the country — up in Idlib — all the way down to Damascus in a matter of what, two and a half weeks? And took control of the government. And its previous backers, Hezbollah, quiet, nothing. Syria or Iran, nothing. Russia, nothing. It was Assad — all of them. And he did not have the forces. It wouldn’t have taken much, but he didn’t have that. So Donald Trump comes in as president, and all these problems that earlier presidents have had to contend with are either gone or much diminished. So he has a real opportunity here. I’m pleased that he does not want confrontation with Iran and has offered this opportunity to negotiate. But on the other hand, I don’t think he’s going to shy from a confrontation. Just as in the case of his dealing with Hamas, United States broke protocol, broke precedent, and actually had an official meeting between Americans and Hamas. Never done before, ever! 
That we know of. Maybe on the intelligence side, there may have been some. But this was policy people, and they laid all the cards out for Hamas and gave them an opportunity: “Do this, it’s in your interest.” Hamas refused to do it. And now we see Israel going in without constraints and Donald Trump fully behind them, 100%. I don’t think it’ll reach the intensity that we saw perhaps a year or so ago in Gaza, simply because Hamas is not the threat that it was at that time. But it’s going to be long, it’s going to be bloody. We’ll see more loss of life, tragically, innocent life in Gaza. But I think Israel is attempting to go in for the real kill this time. I don’t think they’re going to be successful, but they will wreak havoc, certainly within Hamas and what’s left of Gaza. So you would hope that the Iranian leadership will learn something from that example. That Donald Trump tried to work with Hamas, tried to show them, there’s a way out of this, “You just got to take it.” They refused. And now they will pay a very heavy price. If Iran is listening, paying attention and can set aside some of its ideology and fanaticism, they could find a way out of their predicament. I’m not sure—

Atul Singh: So you expect the Iranian regime to fall, as a number of people do? A number of people are now predicting the end of the Iranian regime by the end of Donald Trump’s term?

Gary Grappo: Well, that would be a wonderful thing, of course. We would certainly like to see that.

Atul Singh: So you’re happy with Donald Trump on at least one thing?

Gary Grappo: No, I
 but the mechanism for that downfall is unclear yet. If someone is going to make the case that there will be an internal collapse — that the internal dynamic will force the collapse — I’m very suspicious. That I think would take longer than the next four years. It could happen. And the principal argument against it is because of the commitment and dedication and power of the IRGC. They will defend it to the bitter end, and it will be a very bloody, bitter end. Not the kind of end that happened with the Shah, with the Grand Ayatollah taking off in an airplane and going somewhere, although God knows where he could go. Maybe Moscow. That seems to be the new refuge of tyrants. But that, I think, is a bit far-fetched at the time being. However, I think the clock is ticking on an eventual Israeli attack against Iran, if Iran continues to show that it’s unwilling to negotiate and moves its nuclear development program further down the road toward possible weaponization. It hasn’t done it yet, but it’s building all the infrastructure it could possibly need for it. I think the Israelis will want to capitalize before it’s too late on the vulnerability of the regime, and they will attack. And the only question that remains is: Will the Americans join them? If the Americans join them, it will be a devastating attack on the complete defense structure of Iran. And that could spell the end of the regime in Iran. So what rules after that? Because we’re not sending ground troops. Nor are the Israelis sending ground troops. So the regime collapses. Who takes over? I’ll just throw out one possibility: the IRGC. It becomes a military regime, something like we see in Egypt. They do away with a lot of the religious nonsense that was imposed by the Ayatollahs or the mullahs. They reach some kind of an understanding on their nuclear program, simply because they will have no choice. And you have a military regime, and if they can reach an agreement with the various powers with respect to their nuclear program, maybe the sanctions will be dropped and they can prosper. I think any grand ambitions for a democracy in Iran or anywhere else in the Middle East have to be dismissed, just completely. What do we want most? We want stability. That’s what we want. We want regimes to clamp down on extremist organizations, with the various militias in Iraq and in Syria and elsewhere. And with that, I think everybody — including in the Middle East — will be very, very happy, even if they don’t get to choose who governs them.

Atul Singh: On that note, Gary, we’ve spent a lot of time going over so many countries and coming up with various scenarios. It’s been a pleasure, as always, and we’ll have you back before too long.

Gary Grappo: I look forward to that, Atul. We’ll have to discuss Yemen at this time. I think it’s an interesting case study. It’s a bit of an outlier, but nevertheless is becoming a significant problem area in the Middle East. So perhaps next time we can address the challenge of Yemen.

Atul Singh: Alright, everybody, stay tuned for Yemen next time. Until then, thank you very much, Gary. See you soon.

Gary Grappo: My pleasure, Atul.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: The New Geopolitical Landscape of the Middle East appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

Israel has always considered Syria a militant, very pro-Arab, brutal country, but stable under its Assad family dictatorship. Simply put, Israel sees Syria as a danger to its existence. While Israeli intelligence services often criticize the West for not understanding the Middle East, they themselves have also been wrong about Syria. Even under the Soviet umbrella, former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad kept Syria out of wars with Israel and only provoked the rival state from behind the veil of terrorist groups.

Israel avoids Syrian war

When the Soviet Union began to collapse in 1991, Syria entered peace talks with Israel via the Madrid . Its willingness to engage came as a surprise for the West and Israel themselves. The talks over the years ended with little change. In 2011, Syria became embroiled in its .

Israel did not get involved in this war. It held the Golan Heights as it had for many years, and it kept its head down. The Israeli government did not want to repeat the same mistake it had with Lebanon, when it became mired in the 1982 for 18 years before withdrawing in 2000.

The Assad regime collapsed in December 2024. Israel remains as uninvolved in Syria as possible. Israel protects the area but is also committed to defending the Druze community in southern Syria if necessary.

[ and edited this piece.]

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The Islamic Republic of Iran has a mission to spread Shi’ism in the Middle East, which is why it created the . Their greater goal is to destroy the state of Israel.

An unintended consequence of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was that Iran became a force in Iraqi politics due to democratic elections. The Shia of Iraq and Iran may be very different, but they’re both influenced by Iran.

Iran is connected to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. These three nations were key elements in the creation of the Shia Crescent that encircles Israel with pro-Iranian, Shia-dominated powers. Syria and Lebanon became the main targets for Iranian influence. The Iranians invested heavily in Syria, even sending citizens there — according to rumors, up to 800,000 earned Syrian citizenship. The current and upcoming rulers in Damascus won’t tolerate this for long.

Crushing defeats

Iran turned Syria’s Qalamoun area, the mountains on the Syrian–Lebanese border, into a . Here, long-range missiles were smuggled to the Lebanese Shia paramilitary group, Hezbollah.

Fed up with the arms-dealing, Israel waged a low-intensity war with Syria in 2012. Syria became a major place of Iranian investment, on top of their efforts in Iraq and Lebanon. They sent thousands to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the civil war — not just Shia Iranians, but also people from Afghanistan and other Shia communities. Due to their dire economy, they were investing money they didn’t have, estimated at tens of of dollars.

The downfall of the Assad regime in December 2024 is a disaster for Iranian plans to create the Shia Crescent around Israel. Israeli Hezbollah in Lebanon after 11 months of Lebanese aggression. This defeat was far more devastating than their previous in the 2006 .

The Iranian defeat is resounding. There were elements in Syria who opposed the Iranian involvement and were ready to support Israeli military efforts. The Iranian presence in Syria even caused a rift within the Assad clan. Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s younger brother, was in Iran’s pocket, while Bashar had his own reservations. Before that, Russia did not like the Iranian involvement, as it viewed Iran as competition to be the dominant force in Syria.

The Russians allowed Israeli activities in Syria, but these were always targeted at the Iranians. The Syrians will not accept a Turkish occupation by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The Turks will face problems in Syria, especially in Kurdish areas.

What will happen now?

The Syrians will not allow domination by Sunni-run Turkey. This is a historic rivalry. Iran wanted to use Syria against Israel, but failed.

Will Iran realistically assess the cost-benefit? Will they still be committed to destroying Israel? Or will they realize they’re now under siege and need to be careful?

This could lead to two options: One, they minimize their involvement in Syria and Lebanon. But then, they’ll feel under siege. Two, they speed up their nuclear program to deal with the perceived danger. This might pressure US President Donald Trump to talk to the Iranians. The situation could create conditions for a dialogue, though they would have to make concessions.

[ edited this piece.]

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Trump’s allies need to understand what Trump’s transition team accomplished with the Biden White House and why Lebanon matters to an America First foreign policy.

The main headline achievement from the November ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah is the withdrawal of both Israel and Hezbollah from southern Lebanon and the mobilization of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to that region to serve as a buffer and prevent future conflict from erupting between the two sides. It is also important to note that the agreement also recommits Lebanon to disarming all non-state militias (namely, Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militia that has effectively controlled Lebanon for the last decade) and lays the groundwork for a border demarcation negotiation, mediated by the US, between Israel and Lebanon.

On the political front, the US helped break Lebanon’s two-year leadership gridlock and empowered Lebanese lawmakers to elect reform-oriented leaders Joseph Aoun as president and Nawaf Salam as prime minister.

While recognizing these accomplishments in his confirmation hearing, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio added that his country will need “to take advantage of those opportunities.” 

The Trump Transition Team actively advanced a historic opportunity in Lebanon. This opportunity allows the US to secure Israel, counter Iran and build the foundation for an alliance with the Arab world’s only democracy. This alliance is strategically beneficial for US economic and security interests.

The threefold criteria for US assistance outlined by the new chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Brian Mast, provides a helpful framework for understanding how this will benefit the US:

1. What does America need from each country or region?
2. What does that country or region want from the US?
3. Does what America’s providing get America what it needs?

What does the US need from Lebanon?

In Lebanon, the US needs a partner to counter Iran and protect Israel. Lebanon also serves as the only model of a pluralistic democracy in the region.

For the first time in modern history, Lebanon’s president and prime minister are committed to sovereignty and international law. Aoun’s inaugural address that his “commitment [is to] ensure the state’s right to hold a monopoly on weapons and to invest in the army to monitor the borders.” Salam has also the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, the basis for the agreement.

Lebanon is also one of the few countries in the region that strongly resonates with US values. It is a democracy and the only country in the region where Christians and Muslims have worked together to create a system of government in which everyone has equal representation.

What does Lebanon want from the US?

In the United States, Lebanon is looking for a partner for peace. Lebanon’s new reform-oriented leadership provides the army with the mandate and direction to reclaim state sovereignty and disarm non-state militias. The US will need to do its part (along with our allies, particularly in Europe and the Gulf) to ensure that the Lebanese army can mobilize 10,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon to enforce the agreement in the short term and even more to implement the agreement’s disarmament provisions north of the Litani River as well as to stabilize the Syrian border. 

Lebanon and Israel will both look to the US to begin work on demarcating their land borders, an essential part of the 2024 ceasefire agreement.

In the aftermath of the Israel–Hezbollah war, which inflicted billions of dollars of damage on Lebanon’s economy and infrastructure, Lebanon is looking to the US and its allies for help with reconstruction and addressing the many humanitarian-related challenges facing its population on issues ranging from health to education.

Now that there has been a change of regime in Syria, Lebanon is also importantly looking to the US for leadership in supporting the return of Syrian refugees in Lebanon back to their homeland now that the fear of persecution from the Assad regime is off the table.

Does what the US provides to Lebanon provide a return on investment for the US?

The Lebanese Armed Forces have already proven to be a reliable partner for the US up to the ceasefire agreement with Israel. With US support, it successfully drove ISIS out of Lebanon, confronted Hezbollah in (2023) and (2021), Captagon trafficking supported by the former Assad regime and Hezbollah, and even protected the US embassy in Lebanon from violent protestors and gunmen with ISIS throughout the Israel-Gaza war. Since the signing of the ceasefire, the LAF has received from US officials for its progress in disarming Hezbollah and securing the Lebanon-Israel border. Lebanon’s government has Iranian airlines from landing in Beirut, inspections on flights from Iraq and a man arriving from Turkey with $2.5 million in cash for Hezbollah.Ìę

These actions are making the region safer.

By finishing the job in Lebanon, the US can deal a blow to Iran, eliminate future threats to Israel and ensure that there is a viable model of democracy and pluralism in the Middle East.

As a candidate, Trump to work to ensure the Lebanese “live in peace, prosperity and harmony with their neighbors.” By supporting the Biden Administration’s diplomatic efforts, he helped secure a ceasefire agreement and break a political stalemate. Now that he is in the White House, Trump will need the commitment of his allies to ensure the US capitalizes on this historic opportunity in Lebanon.

[ edited this piece.]

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Leftist observers have long characterized several entities as the “.” This group includes Iran, Iraq’s militia groups, Assad’s Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and more recently Gaza’s Hamas and Yemen’s Ansar Allah (a.k.a. “the Houthis”). They are seen as a collective counterweight to the American Empire’s regional domination. This domination is enforced via Israeli military strength and the Gulf states’ financial heft.

A failed response to Gaza

There is some geopolitical truth to that characterization. While one can debate the strategic wisdom of Hamas’ October 7 attack, many argue it was inevitable. Few options were left available due to the unending of Gaza, the stifling of all diplomatic and non-violent means to resist occupation and expulsion and the of the Palestinians throughout the region, particularly by Gulf monarchies.

Once fighting started in Gaza, feckless Arab regimes did not offer anything useful to the Palestinian resistance — indeed, several continue to with the Israeli state. Yes, Hezbollah launched an effective against the Zionist regime and imposed real costs on Israel’s ongoing aggression against Gaza, as did Yemen’s Ansar Allah. Such responses further highlighted the ineffectual, even hypocritical, complaints lodged by Arab autocrats acting as US allies throughout the region.

However, how much support did Iran, the supposed anchor of this Axis of Resistance, actually offer Palestinians? In their tit-for-tat with the Israelis, Iran demonstrated prowess with ballistic missile technology sufficient to potentially overwhelm Israeli air defenses and trigger catastrophic military and economic losses. But the Iranian regime was not about to go to war for Palestine. Their responses were calibrated to save face, while re-establishing a limited measure of deterrence.

A harsh truth is that the Iranian regime has often treated its Arab allies as kindling, using them to generate smokescreens when necessary. They do this to deflect American and Israeli military designs against their sovereignty. Iran deftly the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq to tie down the US military for years, likely preventing an American attack on Iran under George W. Bush. Similarly, the Iranian regime has long Hezbollah for geopolitical leverage, as they are a useful mercenary force, no matter the expense to broader Lebanese society.

​​Hezbollah’s attempt to relieve Israeli military pressure on Gaza this past year stands in glaring contrast to the rest of the Arab and Islamic world’s inaction at the state level. Meanwhile, the people of Lebanon, particularly southern Lebanon, can take pride in their support for Gaza.

Hezbollah’s role in the region

At the same time, is it fair that Hezbollah has operated effectively inside the Lebanese state, in turn preventing Lebanon from being governed normally? Is it right that as Lebanon’s economy collapsed, its politics remain gridlocked by Hezbollah? Is it right that no one was held when the port of Beirut suffered a nuclear-sized because fertilizer was carelessly left in a warehouse for months by Hezbollah, which runs the ports and siphons off tax revenues?

While Hezbollah’s militia has proven quite effective in fighting Israel, its political strategy has remained a failure. How strong can Hezbollah be if it continues to paralyze Lebanon? When push came to shove, the group largely chose to answer to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) rather than the people of Lebanon.

Once the current dystopian conflict subsides, Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon’s south could be reorganized into a national guard or territorial army to defend the country from future Israeli invasions. If Lebanon were a functioning state with a functioning military, that state might also choose to uphold international law and intervene in an attempt to stop the genocide in Gaza — but such a decision belongs to Beirut, not Tehran.

Around the beginning of the Syrian revolution, Arab militia leaders faced a similar choice. Khaled Mashal, the Hamas leader, and Hassan Nasrallah, the now-departed leader of Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad and encouraged him to moderate and compromise with the still peaceful demonstrators. Assad thundered back, in effect stating, “it’s my way or the highway,” demanding they support his crackdown.

On behalf of Hamas, Mashal to obey, promptly moving Hamas’ main office from Damascus to Qatar, where it remains today. As a result, Hamas remained estranged from Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” coalition for years afterward.

In contradiction, Nasrallah Hezbollah into a needless civil war in Syria, massacring thousands in , , around and elsewhere. Hezbollah’s intervention even included the use of in Madaya and Zabadani — where militia members on loan to the Assad regime laid siege to opposition enclaves and mocked their starvation with social media posts of banquets boasting the hashtag “in solidarity with Madaya.”

Before the rebel victory, Hezbollah was admired among both Sunni and Shia populations throughout the Arab world. Still, their intervention on behalf of this ruthless sectarian regime poisoned relations between different religious and ethnic groups for years. Only in recent years did those divisions begin to ease, largely due to how destructive they were throughout the region.

Syria’s past, present and future

As long as Assad was in power, no path forward was open for Syria. He devastated the country instead of relinquishing any control. At least half a million Syrians in the process. Before Assad’s fall, as many as half of all Syrians were — about 12 million in total — scattered throughout the country, Turkey, Germany and multiple other safe havens.

Syria was reduced to a bankrupt narco-state, led by a regime financed by Captagon on international drug markets. Bashar al-Assad’s regime never Israel directly. Syria’s military stopped fighting for its external defense decades ago, including for the liberation of occupied Golan. Like every other Arab military, Syria’s existed only to oppress its own population. That ended when its soldiers voted with their feet and put an end to the oppression.

What now? The Assad regime was brutal and useless to everyone, including Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. From Syria’s perspective, external powers such as Turkey, Russia, Iran, Israel and the United States will happily manipulate or even dismember Syria for their own state or imperial interests. Israel has already underscored that point over the past few days, seizing several villages in Golan’s Mt. Hermon as a “buffer zone” and mounting a punishing new bombing campaign.

However, Syria’s people have agency. Against all expectations and after a lengthy civil war, they recently shattered this brutal regime with astonishing speed, without incurring massive civilian casualties and without significant external support. They put an end to the Iranian regime’s cynical game of defending their own interests in Syria while using Arabs as cannon fodder. By liberating Syria, they shattered the Arab republican dictatorship model of governance.

For the first time in decades, the people of Syria have a chance for a future. Syrians have long had to emigrate abroad to succeed, and many who did so made remarkable achievements. Now, they have an opportunity to build a country that can harness the talents of its people. That alone is worth celebrating today and fighting for tomorrow — but for this liberation to succeed, external powers must exercise restraint and let the Syrian people chart their own future.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post The Axis of Resistance: Fault Lines and Fallout appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

Why is this moment significant? The downfall of the brutal dictatorship that has held Syria in an iron grip since 1971 — first under Hafez al-Assad, and later under his son, Bashar al-Assad — is a moment of triumph for millions of Syrians who have suffered under its rule. Over the past decade, more than 13 million Syrians, or roughly 60% of the population, have been displaced by the brutal repression and the civil war that ensued. Of these, 7 million have fled to neighboring countries or further abroad as refugees. With the Assad regime now toppled, these refugees may now dare to dream of returning to their homeland.

This turn of events also signals a strategic defeat for the “axis of resistance” led by Iran. The axis, which includes Hezbollah (a Shiite militant group based in Lebanon), has relied on a land bridge through Iraq and Syria to maintain its influence in the region. With the fall of Assad, this land corridor is severed, isolating Hezbollah from its Iranian backers and cutting off vital supply lines. This is a significant blow to Iranian and Hezbollah ambitions in the region.

Russia, too, finds itself on the losing side. Despite its military intervention in support of Bashar al-Assad in 2015, Russia has been unable to protect its ally. The fall of Assad puts Russia’s strategic interests at risk, including its naval bases on the Mediterranean coast of Syria, which have served as key outposts for Russian influence in the region.

In contrast, Turkey stands to emerge as the new central player in the region. Turkey has long opposed Assad and has supported various factions in the Syrian conflict, particularly in northern Syria. With the Assad regime weakened, Turkey’s role in shaping Syria’s future becomes all the more crucial. Israel, too, stands to gain from the fall of Assad, as it weakens two of its most formidable regional enemies — Syria and Hezbollah — while simultaneously diminishing Iran’s influence in the region.

Who are these people?

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a movement that emerged from the remnants of al-Qaeda in Syria. It controls the northwestern region of Syria, along the Turkish border. Over the past few years, with significant assistance from Turkey and Western countries, HTS has made efforts to rebrand itself, trying to present a more palatable face to the international community. Despite these efforts, many Syrians, especially the country’s Christian minority (which makes up around 5-10% of the population), are deeply apprehensive about the possibility of HTS establishing a vengeful Islamist regime. These groups fear that under HTS’s control, they would be subjected to harsh treatment and persecution, given the group’s hardline interpretation of Islam.

However, HTS does not control all of Syria. There are at least three other major militias that hold significant territory. The Kurds of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), particularly the YPG (People’s Defense Units), are one of the most prominent. The YPG is closely linked to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a Kurdish militant group that has been involved in an ongoing insurgency against Turkey. The United States has supported the YPG and its allies in the fight against ISIS, and the group controls northeastern Syria, including areas rich in oil resources.

Meanwhile, ISIS (Islamic State) continues to have a presence in central and eastern Syria, particularly in tribal areas. Despite being defeated as a territorial entity, ISIS remains active as a guerilla force, capable of launching insurgent attacks and destabilizing the region. This ongoing conflict between various militias complicates the situation in Syria, as different factions, often backed by external powers, vie for control of the country’s future.

To be continued


The future of Syria remains uncertain: will it progress toward an orderly transition, or will it descend further into civil war? One of the key players in this evolving situation is Turkey, which has set its sights on creating a 30-kilometer buffer zone along its border with Syria. This zone would be cleared of Kurdish militias, particularly the YPG, which Turkey views as an extension of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a group it considers a terrorist organization. Turkey’s objective of establishing this buffer zone is difficult to imagine being realized without significant military action and possible conflict with the Kurdish forces.

The role of the United States in the future of Syria is also a pressing question, especially with the potential return of Donald Trump to the presidency. During his first term, Trump advocated for the withdrawal of the small contingent of U.S. troops stationed in Syria alongside Kurdish forces, a position he reiterated recently. If Trump follows through on his desire for disengagement, the U.S. might reduce its involvement, which could shift the balance of power in Syria, leaving Kurdish groups more vulnerable to Turkish aggression and potentially influencing the broader regional dynamics.

Israel’s role in Syria is also evolving, with its military forces advancing into key areas of the country. Israeli forces have deployed to the east and north of the Golan Heights, a strategically important region, particularly around Mount Hermon, which is often referred to as the “water tower” of the region due to its significance in controlling water resources. Israeli forces are now positioned just about 20 kilometers from Damascus, Syria’s capital, raising the stakes and complicating the security situation in the area. Israel’s continued military presence in Syria suggests that it has strategic objectives in play, particularly concerning Iranian influence in the region and the threat posed by Hezbollah and other hostile groups.

Syria’s roadmap for a peaceful transition, which was agreed upon by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Syria’s neighboring states, dates back to June 30, 2012. At the time, the international community seemed committed to finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict, with Didier Burkhalter, the Swiss Foreign Minister at the time, playing a key role in the conference. Yet, over a decade later, this plan seems increasingly distant, as the situation in Syria has devolved into an ongoing war with no clear path toward peace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post Uncertain Transition in Syria After the Surprise End of Assad appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

“I was angry. I him it had to stop, or our entire future relationship was endangered. I used the word holocaust deliberately & said the symbol of his war was becoming a picture of a 7-month-old baby with its arms blown off,” Reagan noted in his diary.

The August 1982 phone call between Reagan and Begin provides a template for the US’s ability to twist Israel’s arm and the limits of the Western giant’s influence.

Begin wasted no time in halting his saturation bombing of the Lebanese capital in response to Reagan’s threat. Yet, he rejected the president’s demand that he allow an international force to enter Beirut to protect the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees in the Israeli-besieged city. His refusal had dire consequences.

A month later, at least 800 Palestinians, many of them women and children, were massacred in their homes in Sabra and Shatila in West Beirut by Lebanese Christian gunmen under the watchful eyes of the Israeli military. Public outrage in Israel forced Begin to resign, ending his career.

Biden failed where Reagan succeeded

More than four decades later, US President Joe Biden understood the stakes when Israel went to war in response to Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. He also the levers of power at his disposal after test-driving Reagan’s approach in 2021.

At the time, Biden, like his predecessor, picked up the phone to read Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the riot act. As a new on Biden, The Last Politician, describes, it was his fourth phone call to the Israeli leader in ten days in which behind-the-scenes diplomacy and cajoling failed to end fighting between Israel and Hamas. The president advised him that he “expected a significant de-escalation today on the path to a ceasefire.” When Netanyahu sought to buy time, Biden replied: “Hey man, we’re out of runway here. It’s over.”

Netanyahu and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire a day later. Even so, he knew then and now that he had less to worry about than Begin did with the Reagan presidency.

In contrast to Reagan’s administration, which allowed the United Nations Security Council to pass 21 resolutions , if not condemning, Israel’s policies, Biden gave Israel blanket diplomatic cover and provided it with arms. With these, it could prosecute wars that make 1982 pale in comparison.

Biden’s test-driving of Reagan’s template, familiarity with the Israeli interventions in Lebanon and annexationist policies in the 1980s and beyond, coupled with his predecessor’s willingness to confront Begin in the 1982 war leave the president with little excuse for refusing to rein Israel in over the past year.

Biden’s failure has tangibly devastating consequences for the Palestinians and yet to materialize fallouts for Israelis and the rest of the Middle East. These will haunt the region for a generation, if not more.

Like Begin, Biden will likely see his legacy sullied by Israeli conduct on the Middle East’s battlefields.

Historic destruction may only increase

A heated with Begin during the 1982 war, which involved finger jabbing and fists pounding on a table, spotlights Biden’s lack of an excuse. Echoing Reagan, Biden warned Begin that Israeli settlement policy could cost it US support. In response, Begin snapped, “I am not a Jew with trembling knees.”

Forty-two years later, Biden studiously ignores the fact that Israel’s latest Gaza and Lebanon wars are a repeat of the early 1980s on steroids.

Begin created the for Israel’s systematic targeting of militants irrespective of the risk to civilians with the 1981 bombing of Fakhani. This densely populated Beirut neighborhood was home to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its affiliates. The bombing destroyed a seven-story building and damaged four nearby structures, killing some 90 people and wounding hundreds of others.

In a letter to Reagan, written during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Begin the carpet bombing of Beirut to the Allied destruction of Berlin during World War II.

“I feel as a prime minister empowered to instruct a valiant army facing ‘Berlin’ where, amongst innocent civilians, Hitler and his henchmen hide in a bunker deep beneath the surface,” Begin said.

Begin’s equation of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and his organization with Adolf Hitler and his associates, like Netanyahu equating Hamas with the Nazis, served to justify civilian casualties in operations that were as much about targeting fighters as they were designed to incite the local population against the militants.

“In certain cases, the Israeli shelling and bombing were carefully targeted, sometimes on the basis of good intelligence. All too often, however, that was not the case. Scores of eight-to twelve-story apartment buildings were destroyed
 Many of the buildings that were levelled
had no plausible ,” recalled historian Rashid Khalidi, who lived in Beirut at the time of the 1982 bombings.

The strategy produced mixed results but, on balance, hardened rather than weakened popular resistance to Israeli policies.

There is little reason to believe that the impact of Israel’s current wars will be any different. Israel has already prepared the ground by turning Gaza into what onetime Australian human rights commissioner and United Nations rapporteur Chris Sidoti calls a “terrorism creation .”

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The agreement is based on the terms of United Nations Security Council , which ended the previous Israeli assault on Lebanon in 2006. The truce will be enforced by 5,000 to 10,000 Lebanese troops and the UN’s 10,000-strong United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon () peacekeeping force, which has operated in that area since 1978 and includes troops from 46 countries.

The truce has broad international support, including from Iran and Gaza’s Hamas leaders. Israel and Hezbollah were apparently glad to take a break from a war that had become counterproductive for them both. Effective resistance prevented Israeli forces from advancing far into Lebanon, and they were inflicting mostly senseless death and destruction on civilians, as in Gaza, but without the genocidal motivation of that campaign.

People all over Lebanon have welcomed the relief from Israeli bombing, the destruction of their towns and neighborhoods and thousands of casualties. In the Lebanese capital of Beirut, people have started returning to their homes.

In the south, the Israeli military has warned residents on both sides of the border not to return yet. It has declared a new (which was not part of the truce agreement) that includes 60 villages north of the border, and has warned that it will attack Lebanese civilians who return to that area. Despite these warnings, thousands of displaced people have been returning to south Lebanon, often to find their homes and villages in ruins.

Many people returning to the south still proudly display the yellow flags of Hezbollah. A flying over the ruins of the Lebanese city of Tyre has the words, “Made in the USA,” written across it. This is a reminder that the Lebanese people know very well who made the bombs that have killed and maimed thousands of them.

The truce’s success seems unlikely

There are already many reports of ceasefire violations. Israel shot and two journalists soon after the truce went into effect. Then two days after the ceasefire began, Israel attacked five towns near the border with tanks, fired artillery across the border and conducted on southern Lebanon. On December 2, as a UN peacekeeper told CNN that Israel had the truce “roughly a hundred times,” Hezbollah finally with mortar fire in the disputed Shebaa Farms area. Israel responded with heavier strikes on two villages, killing 11 people.

An addendum to the truce agreement granted Israel the right to strike at will whenever it believes Hezbollah is violating the truce, giving it what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “complete military freedom of action,” which makes this a precarious and one-sided peace at best.

The prospect for a full withdrawal of both Israeli and Hezbollah forces in 60 days seems slim. Hezbollah has built large weapons stockpiles in the south that it will not want to abandon. Netanyahu himself has warned that the truce “can be short.”

Then there is the danger of confrontation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese military, raising the specter of Lebanon’s bloody civil war, which killed an estimated 150,000 people between 1975 and 1990. 

So violence could flare up into full-scale war again at any time, making it unlikely that many Israelis will return to homes near the border with Lebanon, Israel’s original publicly stated purpose for the war.

The truce was brokered by the United States and France, and signed by the European Union, Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. France was a colonial power in Lebanon and still plays a leading role in UNIFIL, yet Israel initially rejected France as a negotiating partner. It seems to have France’s role only when French President Emmanuel Macron’s government agreed not to enforce the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against Netanyahu if he comes to France.

The United Kingdom also signed the original truce proposal on November 25, but doesn’t appear to have signed the final agreement. The UK seems to have withdrawn from the negotiations under US and Israeli pressure because, unlike France, its new Labour government has publicly that it will comply with the ICC arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant. However, it has not explicitly said it would arrest them.

Netanyahu justified the truce to his own people by saying that it will allow Israeli forces to focus on Gaza and Iran, and only die-hard “Security” Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir voted the truce in the Israeli cabinet.

While there were hopes that the truce in Lebanon might set the stage for a ceasefire in Gaza, Israel’s actions on the ground tell a different story. Satellite images show Israel carrying out new mass demolitions of hundreds of buildings in northern Gaza to build a new road or between Gaza City and North Gaza. This may be a new border to separate the northernmost 17% of Gaza from the rest of the Gaza Strip, so Israel can expel its people and prevent them from returning, hand North Gaza over to Israeli settlers and squeeze the desperate, survivors into an even smaller area than before.

Syria complicates the conflict

And for all who had hopes that the ceasefire in Lebanon might lead to a regional de-escalation, those hopes were dashed in Syria when, on the very day of the truce, the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a surprise offensive. HTS was formerly the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front. It itself and severed its formal link to al-Qaeda in 2016 to avoid becoming a prime target in the US war in Syria, but the US still brands it a terrorist group.

By December 1, HTS managed to seize control of Syria’s second largest city, Aleppo, forcing the Syrian Arab Army and its Russian allies onto the defensive. With Russian and Syrian jets bombing rebel-held territory, the surge in fighting has raised the prospect of another violent, destabilizing front reopening in the Middle East.

This may also be a prelude to an escalation of attacks on Syria by Israel, which has already Syria more than 220 times since October 2023, with Israeli airstrikes and artillery bombardments killing at least 296 people.

The new HTS offensive most likely has covert US support, and may impact US President-elect Donald Trump’s reported to withdraw the 900 US troops still based in Syria. It may also impact his nomination of Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence. Gabbard is a longtime critic of US for al-Qaeda-linked factions in Syria, so the new HTS offensive sets the stage for an explosive confirmation hearing, which may backfire on Syria hawks in Washington if Gabbard is allowed to make her case.

Arab and Muslim state strategies

Elsewhere in the region, Israel’s genocide in Gaza and war on its neighbors have led to widespread anti-Israel and anti-US resistance.

Where the US was once able to buy off Arab rulers with weapons deals and military alliances, the Arab and Muslim world is coalescing around a position that sees Israel’s behavior as unacceptable and Iran as a threatened neighbor rather than an enemy. Unconditional US support for Israel risks permanently downgrading US relations with former allies, from Iraq, Jordan and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Yemen’s Ansar Allah (or Houthi) government has maintained a blockade of the Red Sea, using missiles and drones against Israeli-linked ships heading for the Israeli port of Eilat or the Suez Canal. The Yemenis have a US-led naval task force sent to break the blockade and have shipping through the Suez Canal by at least two-thirds, forcing shipping companies to reroute most ships all the way around Africa. The port of Eilat filed for in July, after only one ship docked there in several months.

Other resistance forces have conducted attacks on US military bases in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, and US forces have retaliated in a low-grade tit-for-tat war. The Iraqi government has strongly condemned U.S. and Israeli attacks on its soil as violations of its sovereignty. Attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria have flared up again in recent months, while Iraqi resistance forces have also launched drone attacks on Israel.

An emergency of the Arab League in Cairo, Egypt on November 26 voted unanimously to support Iraq and condemn Israeli threats. US–Iraqi talks in September drew up a for hundreds of US troops to leave Iraq in 2025 and for all 2,500 to be gone within two years. The US has outmaneuvered previous withdrawal plans, but the days of these very unwelcome US bases must surely be numbered.

Recent of Arab and Muslim states have forged a growing sense of unity around a rejection of US proposals for normalization of relations with Israel and a new solidarity with Palestine and Iran. At a meeting of Islamic nations in Riyadh on November 11, Saudi crown prince Mohammed Bin-Salman publicly called the Israeli massacre in Gaza a for the first time.

Arab and Muslim countries know that Trump may act unpredictably and that they need a stable common position to avoid becoming pawns to him or Netanyahu. They recognize that previous divisions left them vulnerable to US and Israeli exploitation, which contributed to the current crisis in Palestine and the risk of a major regional war that now looms over them.

On November 29, Saudi and Western officials told Reuters that Saudi Arabia has on a new military alliance with the US, which would include normalizing relations with Israel. It is opting for a more limited US weapons deal.

The Saudis had hoped for a treaty that included a US commitment to defend them, like treaties with Japan and South Korea. That would require confirmation by the US Senate, which would demand Saudi recognition of Israel in return. But the Saudis can no longer consider recognizing Israel without a viable plan for Palestinian statehood, which Israel rejects.

On the other hand, Saudi relations with Iran are steadily improving since they restored relations 18 months ago with diplomatic help from China and Iraq. At a meeting with new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Qatar on October 3, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan, “We seek to close the page of differences between the two countries forever and work towards the resolution of our issues and expansion of our relations like two friendly and brotherly states.”

Prince Faisal highlighted the “very sensitive and critical” situation in the region due to Israel’s “aggressions” against Gaza and Lebanon and its attempts to expand the conflict. He said Saudi Arabia trusted Iran’s “wisdom and discernment” in managing the situation to restore calm and peace.

The ball is in Trump’s court

If Saudi Arabia and its neighbors can make peace with Iran, what will the consequences be for Israel’s illegal, genocidal occupation of Palestine, which has been enabled and encouraged by decades of unconditional US military and diplomatic support?

On December 2, Trump on Truth Social that if the hostages were not released by the time of his inauguration, there would be “ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East.” “Those responsible,” he warned, “will be hit harder than anybody has been hit in the long and storied History of the United States of America.”

Trump and many of his acolytes exemplify the Western arrogance and lust for imperial power that lies at the root of this crisis. More threats and more destruction are not the answer. Trump has had good relations with the dictatorial rulers of the Gulf states, with whom he shares much in common. If he is willing to listen, he will realize, as they do, that there is no solution to this crisis without freedom, self-determination and sovereignty in their own land for the people of Palestine. That is the path to peace, if he will take it.

[ edited this piece.]

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In Gaza, Israel appears to be launching its “” to drive the most devastated and traumatized 2.2 million people in the world into the southern half of their open-air prison. Under this , Israel would hand the northern half over to greedy developers and settlers who, after decades of encouragement from the United States, have become a dominant force in Israeli politics and society. The of those who cannot or refuse to move south has already begun.

In , millions are fleeing for their lives. Israel is blowing thousands to pieces in a repeat of the first phase of the genocide in Gaza. Every person it kills or forces out and every building in a neighboring country it demolishes opens the way for future Israeli settlements. The people of Iran, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia ask which of them will be next.

Israel attacks UNIFIL

Israel is not only attacking its neighbors — it is at war with the entire world. The nation is especially threatened when the world’s governments convene at the United Nations and in international courts to try to enforce the rule of international law. Like every other country, Israel is legally bound by the rules of the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions and other multilateral treaties.

In July, the International Court of Justice ruled that Israel’s occupation of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem since 1967 is , and that it must withdraw its military forces and settlers from all those territories. In September, the UN General Assembly passed a giving Israel one year to complete that withdrawal. If Israel fails to comply, as expected, the UN Security Council or the General Assembly may take stronger measures. These could include an international arms embargo, economic sanctions or even the use of force.

Now, amid the escalating violence of Israel’s latest bombing and invasion of Lebanon, Israel is attacking the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This peacekeeping force’s thankless job is to monitor and mitigate the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Shiite militia and political party in Lebanon.

On October 10 and 11, Israeli forces fired on UNIFIL positions in Lebanon. At least peacekeepers were injured. UNIFIL also accused Israeli soldiers of deliberately firing at and disabling the monitoring cameras at its headquarters, before two Israeli tanks later crashed into its gates, destroying them. On October 15, an Israeli tank at a watchtower in what UNIFIL described as “direct and apparently deliberate fire on a UNIFIL position.” UN missions is a war crime.

This is far from the first time Israel has attacked the soldiers of UNIFIL. The force has the worst death toll of any of the UN’s 52 peacekeeping missions since 1948. Since UNIFIL took up its positions in southern Lebanon in , Israel has UN peacekeepers from Ireland, Norway, Nepal, France, Finland, Austria and China. The South Lebanon Army, Israel’s Christian militia proxy in Lebanon from 1984 to 2000, killed many more, as have other Palestinian and Lebanese groups. In fact, 337 UN peacekeepers from all over the world have trying to keep the peace in southern Lebanon, which is sovereign Lebanese territory and should not face repeated Israeli invasions.Ìę

A full 50 countries contribute to the 10,000-strong UNIFIL peacekeeping mission, anchored by battalions from France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Nepal and Spain. All those governments have strongly and unanimously Israel’s latest attacks, and that “such actions must stop immediately and should be adequately investigated.”

Israel works to dismantle UNRWA

Israel’s assault on UN agencies is not confined to attacking its peacekeepers in Lebanon. The vulnerable United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), staffed by unarmed civilians, is under an even more vicious assault by Israel in Gaza. In the past year alone, Israel has and fired on UNRWA schools, warehouses, aid convoys and UN personnel, killing nearly workers.

UNRWA was created in 1949 by the UN General Assembly to provide to Palestinian refugees after the 1948 (catastrophe). The Zionist militias that later became the Israeli army violently expelled over 700,000 Palestinians from their homes and homeland, ignoring the UN partition plan. They forcibly seized much of the land the UN plan had allocated to form a Palestinian state.

In 1949, the UN recognized all that Zionist-occupied territory as the new state of Israel. The state’s most aggressive, racist leaders concluded that they could get away with making and remaking their own borders by force — the world would not lift a finger to stop them. Emboldened by its growing military and diplomatic alliance with the US, Israel has only expanded its territorial ambitions.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now brazenly stands before the whole world and displays of “Greater Israel” that include all the land it illegally occupies. Meanwhile Israelis openly talk of parts of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Israel has long desired to dismantle UNRWA. In 2017, Netanyahu the agency of inciting anti-Israeli sentiment. He blamed UNRWA for “perpetuating the Palestinian refugee problem” and for its elimination.

After Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, Israel 12 of UNRWA’s 13,000 staff of involvement. The agency immediately suspended those workers, and many countries pulled their UNRWA funding. However, a UN report later that Israeli authorities did not provide “any supporting evidence” to back up their allegations. Since this revelation, every country that previously supported UNRWA except the has restored its funding.

Israel’s assault on the refugee agency has only continued. There are now three in the Israeli Knesset. One aims to ban the organization from operating in Israel, another to strip UNRWA’s staff of legal protections afforded to UN workers under Israeli law and a third to brand the agency as a terrorist organization. Israeli members of parliament are also proposing legislation to UNRWA’s headquarters in Jerusalem and use the land for new settlements.

UN Secretary General Guterres that if these bills become law and UNRWA is unable to aid the people of Gaza, “it would be a catastrophe in what is already an unmitigated disaster.”

The US obstructs resolution

Israel’s relationship with the UN and the rest of the world is at a breaking point. When Netanyahu the General Assembly in New York in September, he called the UN a “swamp of antisemitic bile.” But the UN is not an alien body from another planet. It is simply the world’s nations coming together to try to solve our most serious common problems. One of these problems is the endless crisis that Israel’s actions are causing for its neighbors and, increasingly, the whole planet.

Now Israel wants to ban UN Secretary General António Guterres from even entering the country. AsIsrael invaded Lebanon on October 1, Iran responded to a series of Israeli attacks and assassinations by launching 180 missiles at Israel. Guterres put out a statement deploring the “broadening conflict in the Middle East,” but did not specifically mention Iran. Israel responded by him persona non grata in Israel, a new low in relations between Israel and UN officials.

Over the years, the US has partnered with Israel in its attacks on the UN. It has used its in the Security Council 40 times to obstruct the world’s efforts to force Israel to comply with international law.

US obstruction offers no solution. As chaos grows and spreads and the US’s unconditional support gradually pulls it deeper into the conflict, this policy can only fuel the crisis.

The rest of the world is looking on in horror. Many world leaders are making sincere efforts to activate the collective mechanisms of the UN system. US leadership helped build these mechanisms in 1945 so that the world would never again be consumed by global conflict and genocide after World War II.

A US arms embargo against Israel and an end to US obstruction in the UN Security Council could tip the political power balance in favor of the world’s collective efforts to resolve the crisis.

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Continued escalation by Israel, on the other hand, will increase the likelihood of another Lebanese Civil War or a wider regional conflagration. It may also play right into the hands of Hezbollah.

What is the US policy towards Lebanon?

Ever since the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on Friday, September 27, US policy regarding Israel’s invasion of Lebanon has been opaque. Earlier that week, the US had collaborated with France and several allied nations in presenting a 21-day ceasefire to Israel and Lebanon, as well as indirectly to Hezbollah. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the proposal throughout much of that week.

At the same time, there are reports that the US, while publicly calling for the ceasefire, tacitly gave Israel some form of to escalate heavily in Lebanon. Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib has also that Israel was aware Hezbollah accepted the proposal and then decided to assassinate the organization’s leader Hassan Nasrallah and proceed with a bombing campaign and ground invasion of Lebanon.

War in Lebanon is not in Israel’s interests

Israel’s official war ±čŸ±Čő-Ă -±čŸ±Čő Lebanon is to create a safe border area so that the roughly 60,000 Israelis displaced by Hezbollah rocket attacks in the north can return to their homes. Yet the US has publicly stated that the fastest and ultimately the most sustainable to achieve this is diplomacy. Israel has invaded Lebanon over the past five decades and has, to date, been unable to eliminate all threats to its security by force. In any event, there can be no diplomatic deal while Lebanon is under invasion.

Further, the longer Israel continues to escalate with Hezbollah, the greater the risk of a state-to-state war with its backer Iran becomes.

A ceasefire is the first step in the diplomatic process. It would enable the deployment of US-supported Lebanese Armed Forces to the border area and ultimately facilitate the demarcation of the Israel–Lebanon land border so that civilian communities are protected for generations to come.

Israel’s current invasion and bombing campaign of Lebanon are going far beyond their stated goal. It appears Israel is trying to eliminate Hezbollah completely, and there is no clear timetable or roadmap for how to do that.

Israeli escalation may strengthen Hezbollah

It is quite likely that Israel’s overreach will backfire. Widespread civilian death and displacement are fueling resentment and anger towards Israel that ironically may drive people to join Hezbollah or other aligned groups.

Hezbollah’s origins as an organization trace back to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It bills itself as the defender of Lebanon. So, Israel’s land invasion of Lebanon is justifying the organization’s raison d’ĂȘtre. 

Furthermore, at a time when Hezbollah’s popularity has been waning in Lebanon, Israel’s brutal assaults in the country may actually be resuscitating the group. Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel greatly boosted its legitimacy and led to its heightened influence in government for years to come. While there is no doubt the organization is greatly weakened today, it is likely, with the violent assault against it, to revert back to its original framework, operating outside the state rather than cooperating with it. The last time this was the case, the group carried out brutal attacks and assassinations even outside the borders of Lebanon. Hezbollah may again pivot away from its affiliation with a corrupt political establishment and use popular resentment against Israel and, by extension, the US to justify itself and attract new followers.

The interests of the US are in a resolution, not a prolonged conflict 

There are two dangerous scenarios that continued hostilities in Lebanon can lead to. 

First, Israel’s invasion may destabilize Lebanon. Even prior to the outbreak of the ongoing Israel–Hamas war on October 7, 2023, Lebanon was one of the most fragile states in the world. The delicate balance of power between the country’s various sects had created a prolonged political gridlock. The humanitarian crisis Israel is creating, with already people internally displaced, will likely exacerbate social tensions that could quite easily erupt into civil conflict and effective state collapse. In this scenario, malign actors will exploit the resulting power vacuum. The corresponding instability will be to Israel’s detriment.Ìę

Secondly, the Israeli invasion may lead to a hot war with Iran. The US policy aim for the last year has been to diplomatically resolve this conflict, not to go to war with Iran and its terrorist allies. If Israel provokes such a conflict, it will put US forces and interests at threat of being attacked and would likely necessitate a direct US military commitment.

Even though Hezbollah is greatly crippled presently, it is still part of Iran’s axis. Iran has already responded to Israel’s escalation and attacked it directly. Israel’s strategy as of late appears to be to try and provoke Iran into a larger conflict. If the US is not careful, Iran may change its posture from avoiding a full-scale war with Israel to preparing for one. If this calculus changes, the US would necessarily have to intervene and then this conflict will have escalated to one between states with no clear offramp.

However, there is still time. Hezbollah Deputy Chief Nasim Qassem’s apparent of a ceasefire in Lebanon from a truce in Gaza could be a major breakthrough and indicator that Hezbollah may pivot its operations internally. Right now, Hezbollah does not pose the same threat to Israel’s security as it did one year ago and is signaling to Israel it is ready to end this conflict.

The US should leave no stone unturned in pushing Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah towards a ceasefire and diplomatic solution before it is too late.

[The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the American Task Force on Lebanon.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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She also cited the paper’s hostility to her self-described courageous attempts to bring diverse voices to the paper. Disappointed at the journal’s failure to implement the goals she had defined, she complained of constant bullying from colleagues who disagreed with her views. Weiss described the environment as “illiberal,” accusing some colleagues of calling her a Nazi and a racist.

The 51łÔčÏ Devil’s Dictionary has, in its brief history, had no qualms about calling into question the NYT’s journalism for its ideological bias and its servile relationship with the US national security state. We can therefore sympathize with a former employee in a position to reveal why some of the news and analysis produced by the Gray Lady comes out as distorted and unreliable.

It may therefore seem paradoxical that we are convinced by the breath of fresh air Bari Weiss has promised to bring to the world of US journalism.

Bari Weiss founded The Free Press in 2021. Her aim was to “produce news stories that exemplify the journalistic ideals of honesty, doggedness, and fierce independence,” which she felt were lacking in mainstream journalism, committed as it appeared to be to the ideological conformity that permeates legacy media.

The NYT author Matt čó±ô±đČ”±đČÔłó±đŸ±łŸ±đ°ù’s offers this description of Weiss’s method: “The founder of The Free Press has built a new media empire by persuading audiences that she is a teller of dangerous truths.”

°ŐŽÇ»ćČčČâ’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Dangerous truths:

An expression that pretentious people apply to the largely unoriginal ideas they think they have invented and which they mistakenly believe will upset and humiliate people whose viewpoint differs from their own.

Contextual note

čó±ô±đČ”±đČÔłó±đŸ±łŸ±đ°ù’s is officially listed as The New York Times correspondent “focusing on in-depth profiles of powerful figures.” As a kind of takedown artist he reformulates our definition, applied to Weiss, in these terms: “She has created, or at least created space at, a cool kids’ table all her own, positioning herself as a teller of dangerous truths while becoming a kind of brand ambassador for the views and passions of her audience, which often seem to track neatly with her own: that elite universities have lost the plot; that legacy outlets have lost their minds; that Ms. Weiss knows the way forward.”

The NYT may be guilty of many of the many of the flaws and even crimes Weiss attributes to it, but at least has the humility to present itself as a collective effort to present the news of the world. Despite its obvious biases and often sanctimonious tone, it embraces a variety of styles of addressing the questions in the news, even when consciously limiting the breadth of its worldview. In contrast, Weiss makes it clear that The Free Press was created to revolve around her unique personality and her particular sensibilities. Its overall purpose, despite her fake commitment to variety, consists of ennobling her own personal assemblage of popular ideologies, which range from the provocatively unorthodox to the shamelessly conformist.

Flegenheimer quotes the assessment of veteran pollster and strategist Frank Luntz: “She doesn’t just speak to the 1 percent. She speaks to the one-hundredth of 1 percent. And they’ll listen.” They are titillated by the idea that what interests them may be deemed by others to be “dangerous truths,” even though they more often resemble narcissistic self-celebration.

To prove Luntz is right, here is how Weiss responds to the challenge by her interviewer at the recent All-In Summit of changing a society that is “morally bankrupt.” As expected, she has the foolproof, universally appropriate. “It starts with something very simple. Give up the heroin needle of prestige. Rip it out of your arm immediately. Stop poisoning yourself, your family and your children with the bankrupt notion that getting them into Harvard and Yale is more important than inculcating in them a sense of love of family, of country and of all of the things we used to think were normal.” This was followed by the audience’s deafening applause.

For Weiss, the key to solving the problem at the core of US culture will be to change the outlook of literally “one-hundredth of 1 percent” of the US population: those who see their parental mission as consisting of getting their children into Harvard or Yale. What could anyone who thinks in those terms possibly mean when she evokes “all of the things we used to think were normal?” Who is the “we” she has in mind? And what is “normal?” Does she not know that among “normal” Americans, more likely to be affected by the risk of homelessness and the opioid pandemic than by the “heroin” of sending their children to Harvard, survival rather than “prestige” is what they are focused on?

Weiss apparently sees the quest for prestige as the unique original sin of contemporary US culture. “Prestige and honor,” she adds, “is [sic] not something that has been granted to you by institutions that have allowed themselves to be corrupted by morally bankrupt people.” The world around Weiss is morally corrupt. Her own pursuit of prestige and honor by launching the nobly inclusive Free Press should not, on the other hand, be deemed “morally bankrupt.”

Historical note

Analyzing US culture is one thing. Looking at historical events gives us another perspective on what it means to be morally rich or morally bankrupt.

On October 3, Weiss featured her with Douglas Murray on Israel’s war on Gaza, which the International Court of Justice assessed as a “” back in January. Subsequent actions have confirmed that assessment, as schools, hospitals and civilian infrastructure have been sacrificed in what literally resembles an extermination campaign that has now been extended to the neighboring state of Lebanon. United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres has now called the war an “.”

The subtitle of Weiss’s interview with Murray reads, “The West is ‘drunk on peace.’ What will it take to wake them up?” Weiss describes Murray in the following terms: “And it is Douglas, more than almost anyone in the world, who has articulated the stakes of this war with the moral clarity it requires.” The UN and the International Court of Justice cannot be deemed purveyors of moral clarity. They are too “drunk on peace” to appreciate the necessity of a never-ending genocide.

How is the following as an example of Murray’s superior moral reasoning? “I was told by a Jewish friend the other day that apparently there is something in the Torah that says one should not take enormous delight in the decimation of one’s foes. But I’m not Jewish, and so I don’t have to follow this.” So, Murray’s superior “moral clarity” tells us that the rules governing the religion committing atrocities should be suspended because he, who is not subject to those rules, has a moral vision that sees those atrocities as justified. It would be difficult to find a better example not of moral bankruptcy, which so preoccupies Weiss, but of moral perversity.

Weiss is a product and promoter of the American art of hyperreality. She sucks up bits of reality and processes them for commercial advantage. That’s why the Venture Capitalist (VC) crowd that organized the All-In Summit loves her. She has done what all the great entrepreneurs celebrated in VC lore have done: She has not just made money — a banal accomplishment anyone with talent can manage — but built fame and prestige out of fabricating truly dangerous truths.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51łÔčÏ Devil’s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post How Morally Bankrupt Can a Free Press Be? appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

Citizens are angry, and in response, the state has cracked down on free expression, using criminal defamation laws to punish those who complain. Meanwhile, the government is in a state of paralysis. Twelve sessions of voting in parliament have to elect a new president since Michel Aoun’s mandate expired in 2022.

To make matters worse, war is brewing to the south. Ever since the Israel–Hamas war started in October 2023, hostilities along the border between Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have mounted.

To make a long matter short, Lebanon is in crisis, and something must be done. 

Current prescriptions for Lebanon

Everyone, of course, is full of ideas on how to solve the crisis. Few realize how many contradictions their recommendations involve. “Sovereignty and stability” are the watchwords.

Nearly everyone agrees there must be »ćĂ©łÙ±đČÔłÙ±đ between the various, sometimes warring, political factions in Lebanon in order to elect a new president and make the accompanying government changes. They further agree on the United Nations’ 1989 and the UN’s 2006 Security Council . These two diplomatic documents aim to promote order in Lebanon by detailing power-sharing among various factions and outlining the responsibility of the Lebanese Army (LAF) and the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) to maintain security and secure Lebanon’s borders. In April 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) added another plan for recovery when it reached a staff-level for economic reform with Lebanon. Yet despite the consensus, efforts have been fruitless.

It is not clear that effective efforts are even possible. The situation on the Israeli border is rapidly deteriorating, with over people internally displaced. It is not likely that internal reforms are on the government’s agenda at all when Lebanon’s territorial integrity and state functionality are in question.

External relations with the US, Hezbollah and Israel

Externally, Lebanon is unable to control or even positively influence its relationships with the many outside powers who seek to influence Lebanese policy. Chief among those actors are Iran and the US. Iranian and American influence on Lebanon, whether good or ill-intentioned, has not caused any palpable improvement in Lebanon’s situation.

Many Lebanese ascribe Lebanon’s ills to the machinations of , a Shia Islamist political party and militant group, and its patron, Iran. The recent cross-border violence between Hezbollah and Israel is seen as an existential threat to Lebanon, and some believe Lebanon may consequently become a victim of the “” Israel is visiting upon Palestinians. Furthermore, Lebanese believe that Israel, thanks to US support, faces little opposition to its posture of deterrence through preponderant in Lebanon.Ìę

Then there is the US, which is cast as both the savior and tormentor of Lebanon. Through its relationships with the LAF and ISF, the US has and worked to their status as the first defenders of Lebanon. Unfortunately, US reluctance to act to rein in the excesses of the IDF, violent settlers, and the extremist cabinet of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu tars the US as the abettor of Lebanon’s looming potential destruction. Additionally, the US seems to be shirking some of its ability to aid Lebanon by using SCR 1701 to place unworkable responsibility on the LAF.

On the one hand, voices in the US Congress and government remind the Lebanese that SCR 1701 places relatively clear guidelines on the central role of the LAF in stabilizing Lebanon. They raise the topic whenever appropriations are allocated or the of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is annually . On the other hand, the US insists that the LAF follow civilian leadership and respect Lebanon’s laws. This requirement severely the LAF’s power because that same civilian leadership obstructs it from maintaining borders and ensuring peace. Whether the theater is violence on the Lebanon–Israel border or dealing with armed militias, the LAF and ISF are routinely barred from carrying out their increasingly complex responsibilities.Ìę

Despite the inconsistencies in America’s role, many Lebanese believe that only the US holds the power to keep Lebanon together. Just this week, LAF commander General Joseph Aoun visited the US to with senior Pentagon officials and discuss possible solutions to the border violence. Aoun’s visit reinforced the perception that US support is critical. Still, while the intentions behind the talks were good, it remains to be seen whether the US will take action.

Military leadership and complex foreign dynamics

Many Lebanese are calling for the LAF to corral Hezbollah in order to provoking Israel. The Quintet (the US, Qatar, France, Saudi Arabia and Egypt), too, is pushing for the LAF to keep a short leash on Hezbollah pursuant to SCR 1701. (For example, just this June, French President Emmanuel Macron for the implementation of SCR 1701 in order to temper escalations on the Lebanese–Israeli border.)

Iran, on the other hand, wants Hezbollah to put pressure on Israel. Could the West and Iran be pushing the LAF and Hezbollah into a civil war — one in which the LAF is outgunned? How far will the US go to support Israel?

How does one balance the Abraham Accords — a US declaration affirming the importance of cooperatively peace in the Middle East — with the deterioration in US public support for a solution that sidelines Palestine?

How long can Saudi Arabia and others tolerate rogue behavior by Israel that may affect their regional priorities?

The dynamics of this region are as fraught as ever, and divided Lebanon seems to be caught in the middle of it all. Amid the turmoil, Lebanon might turn to a military leader. Officers have taken presidential office four times since 1958. Lebanon tends to rely on the military when no political consensus emerges. An article in Al Majalla last year how each case of general-turned-president was in response to a particular crisis or crises.Ìę

Currently, there is a buzz about Aoun as president. To many, he seems the only option left as politicians who lack the motivation to sacrifice their personal agendas for Lebanon’s sake fail to compromise.

This presidential crisis is nearly old now. The rest of the region has better things to do than abet a continuation of dysfunctional Lebanese politics. While members of the Quintet, particularly the US and France, have recent proposals to cease hostilities in Lebanon, they have more urgent business than holding Beirut by the hand. Clashes on the Lebanese-Israeli border continue to . Lebanon must take the lead.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post Contradictory Strategies for Achieving Sovereignty and Stability in Lebanon appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

On April 14, Iran retaliated with a large airstrike of 330 missiles and drones targeted across Israel. This marks the first time Iran has directly struck Israeli territory. Israel came into being in 1948 and has faced attacks from its Arab neighbors in the past. In a historic development, the Arab states have stood by Israel while Iran has attacked the Jewish state.

On April 19, Israel responded with a small missile strike in Natanz, which is in Iran’s central Esfahan province. The attack targeted an airbase close to nuclear facilities.

Iran has not retaliated against this latest strike. For the moment things seem to be calm. However, there is no telling whether this latest escalation will be the end of hostilities between the two Middle Eastern powers.

51łÔčÏ Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh spoke with retired CIA operations officer Glenn Carle and distinguished US diplomat Gary Grappo who retired as the Envoy and Head of Mission of the Office of the Quartet Representative in Jerusalem.

At that time, Tony Blair occupied this position after he left 10 Downing Street. Blair had success in bringing peace to Northern Ireland but his magic did not quite work with Israelis and Palestinians. Relations between the two had deteriorated by then and Blair himself was damaged goods after the 2003 Iraq War.

Carle played a key role in the War on Terror and has a deep understanding of radical Islamist terrorism. Likewise, few experts and analysts know the Middle East as well as Grappo who was also the US Ambassador to Oman. Singh is no expert on the region but has studied it with avid interest, is an astute analyst of geopolitics and an insightful interlocutor.

Iran shows that it can strike Israel if it wants to

Iran struck Israel with 330 drones and missiles. Many were outdated and slow-flying pieces (or even duds). Unsurprisingly, they fell easy prey to Israeli air defenses. International media were quick to report that Israel and its US, British and French allies successfully shot down 99% of the incoming weapons. 

While technically true, this soundbite misses an important fact. Iran used most of these missiles and drones as decoys. Shooting down these Iranian weapons cost the allies an arm and a leg. More worryingly, Iran struck all the Israeli targets it had identified, signaling its ability to hit any part of Israel anytime. This “swarm attack” tactic may be a harbinger of things to come in modern Middle Eastern warfare.

While Iran achieved tactical success, Israel’s security architecture proved resilient. Its Western allies came to its aid and so did its Arab neighbors. If the Arab states’ tacit support for Israel were not so solid, the situation would be a lot more volatile.

More than two weeks have passed without further incident. For now, the situation seems to be stable. However, Iran and Israel have now crossed a line that they cannot un-cross. What has long been a shadow war or a regional cold war — involving cyberattacks, honey traps, assassinations et al. — has now turned into a hot war.  This is the first time that Iranians and Jews have fought one another since ancient times. 

Despite the fireworks, there are no reported casualties as yet. Iran had broadcasted its attack days in advance, giving Israel time to prepare. In addition, they targeted military assets, not populated areas. The Iranian attack sought to avenge their honor and signal to Israel that Tehran would strike back in a more aggressive manner going forward.

Encouragingly, all sides have pulled back from all-out war. They have let off some steam, and deft diplomacy behind the scenes has prevented the escalation of conflict in the region as well as saved the global economy from another oil shock.

Still, both sides can make mistakes and random incidents can trigger conflict. No one predicted the assassination of Austrian heir apparent, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that led to World War I. Likewise, a stray Hezbollah missile striking an Israeli village could spark a war.

Indeed, Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have been exchanging strikes across the Israel–Lebanon border. This conflict has already threatened to break out into war more than once. At the beginning of the Israel–Hamas war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu wanted to mount a preemptive strike against Hezbollah. Only with difficulty did the US persuade him not to. The resulting two-front war against both Hamas and Hezbollah would have dragged Israel’s ally Uncle Sam into the conflict.

Hezbollah is Iran’s oldest and dearest ally in the Levant. The two powers share the Twelver Shia Muslim faith. Iran views its other Arab partners, like Hamas (which is Sunni) and the Houthis (which belong to a different Shia sect), as pawns. They may be expended to gain Tehran an advantage. Hezbollah is not a pawn but a queen on Iran’s geopolitical chessboard. Tehran would not risk Hezbollah’s destruction unless there was an existential threat to the Iranian state.

Hezbollah does not all-out want war either. This Shia militia still remembers the savage beating the IDF gave them in the 2006 Israel–Lebanon war. Although Hezbollah survived that conflict, its leaders have no desire to see another war devastate southern Lebanon and damage their dominance in Beirut.

Still, unless Israel and Iran somehow decide to live and let live, the tit for tat will continue, and a serious incident can easily happen. To prevent this scenario, the two sides must negotiate. But they cannot do so without a trustworthy mediator that can credibly speak for each side’s interests. Neither the UN nor the US is capable of doing so, and it is not clear who this mediator could be.

Hawks are in charge from Tehran to Jerusalem as US campuses erupt

While things are calm for a moment, the prospects for peace look poor.

Iran struck Israel in revenge for IRGC officers. This echoes similar events in 2020. On January 3, the US assassinated Major General Qasem Soleimani, head of the Quds Force. Iran took revenge by striking an American airbase in Iraq, injuring more than 100 US soldiers. Like the April 2024 attack, Iran was striking its adversary directly for the first time, and for the same reason: to defend the honor of the IRGC.

This suggests a disturbing possibility. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei does not want war. Yet he has twice compromised, allowed direct attacks and risked war. At least as far as war policy goes, the Supreme Leader may no longer be in the driver’s seat. The hardline IRGC seems to be directing things.

Hardliners are also running the show in Israel. Israel has a unicameral legislature elected by proportional representation. This creates a fragmented multiparty system. The main political parties need the support of small extremist parties to form a coalition government. These extremists can easily make or break a coalition, giving these small parties outsized influence. Any coalition leader would be beholden to extremist allies in the Knesset (Israeli parliament). Bibi is especially beholden because he is desperately clinging to power. He is accused of corruption and has pending proceedings in court. When Bibi’s prime ministership ends, so will his immunity from prosecution and he might end up in jail.

Bibi, who is already a right-wing Zionist himself, relies for support on far-right leaders like Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir. These religious Zionists still harbor the hope of incorporating all of Palestine into the Jewish state. Israel thus finds itself led by a cadre of nationalists with an extreme, even messianic commitment to the war.

Unfortunately, Israel has committed itself to the impossible. It has found that, despite its first-class intelligence capability and its overwhelming superiority in firepower, the IDF cannot achieve its stated war goal of destroying Hamas. Israel has failed to learn a lesson that Iraq bitterly taught the United States earlier in this century: armies are only good for destroying other armies or cities or other physical targets. However, they cannot build a society, change minds or even contain extremism.

After seven months of brutal fighting, the IDFhas failed to destroy Hamas or liberate the hostages this extremist militia kidnapped on October 7, 2023. Yet the Jewish state is fanatically devoted to fighting a brutal war, regardless of the cost. So, the IDF has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza, and degraded the lives of over two million people..

While most Israelis despise Netanyahu, a majority still support the war effort. Most are not right-wing extremists, yet they do not seem to understand how their ongoing war is unwinnable. The longer the war goes on, the more Palestinian resentment rises. Reports of abuse against Arab civilians in the West Bank, where reservists perform primarily law-and-order duties, are increasingly frequent. Note that most of these IDF reservists are secular Jews, not religious Haredis (a community of Orthodox Jews). Clearly, anti-Arab sentiment in Israel is on the rise. 

Israel’s actions have led to public outrage not only in the Muslim world but also the West. Attitudes are shifting in the international community and particularly within the US, which has long been Israel’s guardian angel. Protests have broken out in US college campuses, reminding many of the upheaval in 1978. 

Some student protests have turned violent, with fistfights between protesters and counter-protestors. Many protesters are wearing Palestinian keffiyehs — black and white cloth head coverings — and some have even waved Hamas flags. Protesters have dramatically occupied university buildings and police have entered campuses to make mass arrests.

Importantly, these incidents are just the tip of the iceberg. Many young Democrats harbor a deep animosity for Israel, which they perceive as a white imperialist project, and have unprecedented solidarity with Palestinians. Many of these young Democrats come from Arab or Muslim backgrounds, and do not feel the instinctive sympathy with Israel that many Americans have felt for decades. Even white Americans who are the children of Baby Boomers increasingly see Israel as an apartheid state that has grabbed the land of dark-skinned Palestinians and continues to exploit them.

US President Joe Bide is a Democrat and now faces a revolt within his own party. He is avowedly pro-Israel and has even described himself as a Zionist. While pro-Palestinian Democrats are unlikely to nominate a rival candidate, many of them feel betrayed by Biden and will not vote for him again in November. This could tip the scales in favor of the Republican frontrunner Donald Trump whom Biden replaced as president. In 1968, similar college campus protests in support of the civil rights movement and against the Vietnam War harmed the Democratic campaign of Hubert Humphrey and clinched the election for Republican candidate Richard Nixon.

What would it take to resolve the conflict?

With hardliners in charge of Israel and Iran, it is hard to imagine what negotiations would look like. Any peace settlement would require Israel to have a credible Palestinian interlocutor, a role which neither the terrorist Hamas nor the hopelessly corrupt Fatah, which governs the West Bank, can play.

Yet negotiations will be necessary for any sort of lasting solution. Israel’s failure to destroy Hamas has proven that a one-sided Israeli solution is not feasible. Indeed, the IDF has already partly withdrawn from Gaza and peace talks have intensified.

There are ways to end this conflict. If Hamas released all the remaining hostages, that would take the wind out of Israel’s war sails. Hamas’s allies like Hezbollah and the Houthis say that they will stand down in case of a ceasefire. While we cannot take the statements of these two Iran-backed Shia militias at face value, there is good reason to believe they might be telling the truth.

Ultimately, Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands and poor treatment of Palestinians fuels Arab and Iranian hostility towards the Jewish state. If Israel were to grant Palestinians a state, such bitter hatred for Israel would not exist. Israel’s relentless nibbling of the West Bank and blockade of Gaza is the raison d’ĂȘtre for the rise of extremist groups arrayed against the Jewish state. A two-state solution — towards which a ceasefire would be a necessary first step — would resolve decades-long Israeli-Palestinian tension.

In this conflict, no one’s hands are clean. Both Palestine and Israel have passed up chances for peace before. In 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian National Authority President Yasser Arafat came closest to peace at the Camp David Summit with US President Bill Clinton. Yet Arafat ultimately refused all proposals and began the Second Intifada (uprising) later that year. Israelis perceived this as a slap in the face after what they say as a generous offer of peace. Yet, in the following years, Bibi himself scuttled the possibility of a two-state solution. Notably, Israel committed a strategic blunder by covertly supporting Hamas to undercut Fatah. In hindsight, this move was spectacularly shortsighted.

For now, those in charge in Israel need the war to continue. The Israeli far right will not contemplate a two-state solution because it would involve renouncing forever their ambition to unite all of Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel). Perversely, Iran and its extremist allies need the conflict to continue too in order to justify their pavlovian hatred of Israel. It also helps the mullahs to retain their vice-like grip on power by whipping up public support by taking on Israel. The existence of a Palestinian state, giving Palestinians both a physical and symbolic home, would undercut hardliners in both Jerusalem and Tehran.

The peace process cannot begin until Israelis take back their country from the ilk of Bibi, Smotrich and Ben-Gvir — no small feat in Israel’s proportional system. Yet even then, only heroic leaders on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides, capable of forcing their own peoples to give up on cherished aspirations and agree to a realistic deal, could possibly conclude a peace agreement and find a solution to a so-far intractable problem.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Live: Make Sense of the New Israel–Iran Clash appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

Hamas is battered but not defeated, having suffered extraordinary losses. Though real figures are unknown, Israel estimates that it has killed and captured half of Hamas’ population. It also confirms it has 75% of Hamas’ fighting force: 18 of 24 battalions. Casualties in Gaza, meanwhile, exceed 30,000.

Israel has heavily targeted Gaza’s underground tunnel system. Hamas uses this structure to house its fighters, command and control systems, leadership and hostages. The network is vulnerable but vast; Israel estimates it has destroyed half the tunnels. Nevertheless, Hamas can still use the remaining ones to shuttle its fighters from one end of the Gaza Strip to the other.

The diplomatic front has been active recently as well. Progress between the US, Qatar, Egypt and Israel looked promising early this month. Hamas proposed a promising counteroffer, one that would have provided a three-month suspension of fighting, a phased release of hostages and a move toward settlement. The countries agreed, sending US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Jerusalem to present the offer to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He rejected Blinken’s plan on February 7, 2024. Hamas was asking too much, he decided, and Israel was not interested in negotiating a ceasefire. So the carnage continues.

Since October 7, 2023, the international community has been deeply concerned that the Israel–Hamas War could escalate, dragging more nations into the battle. This would see Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant group, threatening northern Israel and the West Bank with rocket fire. It would also prompt the involvement of the Houthi fighters in Yemen, as well as militia groups in eastern Syria and western Iraq.

Sporadic attacks have increased in number and lethality. One prominent example is the recent January 29 on the US outpost in northeastern Jordan, which killed three US soldiers. The US response has been vigorous, especially against militia groups in Iraq. A US strike a Kata’ib Hezbollah leader in Baghdad, infuriating the Iraqi Government.

So the war has indeed escalated. Fortunately, the combatants have been able to avoid the gravest worry most parties have: all-out war between Israeli and Hezbollah troops in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Though they have had their skirmishes, neither side wants to cross the line and trigger a conflagration on par with the brutal .

Strategic goals

The Axis of Resistance, comprising Iran and its militant allies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere, is unified by an overriding desire to remove the US from the Middle East. These actors also want to eliminate the State of Israel, which is more likely to happen if the US abandons it.

Excluding Iran, the Axis parties are ruthless fighting organizations, not governing bodies. They care little about human rights or their people’s needs. This is especially true of Hamas — they ruled Gaza for 17 years. During their tenure, they pilfered public resources to build their Israel-fighting force while the Gazans suffered. These groups may also be sustaining the violence so they can continue living off the spoils of war.

The disparate groups have not coordinated their military actions, as demonstrated on October 7. It would make sense for Hamas to take Israel by surprise and have the others act simultaneously, but they did not. None of the parties, including Iran, knew the attack’s timing. This delivered a heavy message: If Hamas does not keep the Axis parties informed, they will not assist in Hamas’ time of need. Perhaps this is why Hezbollah has not wholeheartedly engaged.

Geopolitical and economic risks

Yemen’s Houthi militia has accidentally globalized the conflict, specifically by expanding it to the Red Sea. It has attacked shipping vessels traveling through the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb, two major shipping routes. Striking a cargo ship with a drone is cheap and easy for Houthi fighters, but has a serious effect on the world economy.

When these attacks occur, shipping companies have to reroute ships. Cargo that would normally travel through Bab-el-Mandeb must now be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds fuel, labor and insurance costs to the process. Increasing the shipping cost consequently increases the consumer cost, resulting in inflation. The marketplace cannot correct this.

Several populations in Europe and Asia, especially China, rely on Red Sea trading. This has seriously disrupted trade in Europe and Asia. North and Latin America can trade with Europe and Asia without the Suez Canal, but they are experiencing another problem: a drought in the Panama Canal. With the canal’s level lowered, operators must lessen the traffic passing through it, thus reducing trade. While the economic impact is currently minor, it will increase the longer this crisis lasts.

Europe will have a tough decade. Russian energy is now expensive, China is suffering from deflation, and the US has turned protectionist. On top of that, the Russo–Ukrainian War marches on with no end in sight. When conflicts increase costs to Europe’s economy and bottleneck the trade there, international confidence in that trade drops.

Instability in the face of the Israel–Hamas War is a growing concern around the globe. As these fears grip world leaders, conservative or autocratic figures often rise to “fix things.” When a country’s economy is deprived of critical inputs (ie oil or microchips), that country becomes aggressive, as seen with the two World Wars. Protectionism prompts this response, which can be destabilizing.

Is another great conflict on the way?

It is frightening to imagine the possibility of a new all-out war. Fortunately, the major parties know the consequences of another global war and will work to prevent it. Widescale nuclear bombardments would make Earth uninhabitable.

However, chaotic non-state actors like Hezbollah do not care about governance. They fight for the sake of causing destruction and lack the guard rails that established governments (e.g., the US, China and Russia) have.

Barring the US and its allies, all the adversaries here are ruled by autocrats. Rulers with absolute power are unpredictable and opportunistic. How can the US deal with autocrats, especially when it feels compelled to use its powers for its own interests?

What happens in our world is determined and exacerbated by the information space. An information war rages as every major player fights to spin a narrative. No one can control the space; anyone with Internet access can enter and spread all manner of disinformation. It is easy to fabricate the truth with AI. When people cannot decide what is correct, they fall back on their biases instead of doing due research. Social media exacerbates this, as the algorithms and filters there create echo chambers.

We must hope that the US can bring the Israel–Hamas War to an end, for the security needs of Israel and the humanitarian needs of Gaza. If left unabated, this bloodshed will breed unrest and further wound the world stage.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Israel’s Invasion of Gaza Will Not Be Over Quickly appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

Secondly, Hochstein was already in preliminary discussions on demarcating the land border before the Israel–Hamas war began on October 7, 2023. Finally, Israel, Lebanon and the US all have publicly identified UN Security Council Resolution 1701 as the framework for stabilizing the Israel–Lebanon border. This was passed in 2006, following the Israel–Hezbollah war that same year. It calls for the security forces of Lebanon to be the only armed actors south of the Litani river and for Israel to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty.

Stabilizing this land border is a foreign policy win for all parties involved that can be achieved in the short term. However, there are some key challenges that lie before all parties.

To explore how the US and Lebanon can advance these negotiations, retired US Ambassador Ed Gabriel, president of the American Task Force on Lebanon (ATFL), Najib Mikati, Lebanon’s caretaker prime minister, via Zoom.

Lebanon wants a ceasefire and long-term peace with Israel

In the discussion, Mikati shared his peace plan, which would involve a long term pause and cessation of hostilities. This would allow for humanitarian aid for Gaza and renewed mediation for hostage-prisoner exchanges. The plan also calls for resuming tripartite meetings to address lingering disputes between Israel and Lebanon, including pursuing the implementation of Resolution 1701. Finally, Mikati calls for an international effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would “revive” the two-state solution framework.

Mikati re-emphasized that Lebanon’s participation in any diplomatic effort is contingent on a ceasefire. Gabriel pushed back on this and asked why Lebanon cannot begin with negotiations today. While Mikati argued this was the most realistic approach, the US today is not prepared to endorse a full ceasefire, making another temporary humanitarian pause the most likely next step.

In a panel that followed the interview, Tarek Mitri, a former Lebanese government minister and a contributor to Resolution 1701’s inception, made the same point. He noted that even a long humanitarian pause “would create conditions that may be conducive to an agreement.”

Importantly, Mikati reaffirmed Lebanon’s commitment to Resolution 1701, which he notes “calls for a ceasefire in the south and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon.” When asked why Resolution 1701 was never implemented in the first place, Mikati Lebanon had registered 35,000 Israeli violations of Resolution 1701 via land, air and sea. At the same time, he acknowledged it “has to be implemented in full for both sides.”

Another panelist, Jeffrey Feltman, former US ambassador to Lebanon at the time of Resolution 1701’s creation, agreed that “[b]oth sides have failed to implement [the resolution].” However, he went a step beyond Mikati and pointed to Hezbollah, noting that they are “deciding questions of war and peace for Lebanon without any reference to the Lebanese people” and that their “arms pose an existential threat to Lebanon.”

Another key shortcoming is Lebanon’s prolonged presidential vacuum. In the absence of a head of state, Lebanon cannot become party to any international agreement. At the same time, there is some well-found that international powers may be willing to engage in a transaction to fill the presidency in the most expedient manner possible, regardless of the qualities of a such a leader, in order to facilitate a border agreement. The 2020 Beirut and the economic the country is currently experiencing both serve as important reminders of how the qualities of such a leader matter.

Where do we go from here?

Given the parameters outlined by Mikati and two key experts on Resolution 1701, the plan for peace on the Lebanon-Israel border can be understood as follows. There are two crucial first steps, which can be taken concurrently or interchangeably: A ceasefire or, more likely, a long humanitarian pause in Gaza, and the election of a president in Lebanon. This would be followed by a complete land border agreement between Israel and Lebanon and, finally, full Implementation of Resolution 1701.

However, given the uncertainties in timing of accomplishing these objectives, there is one initial step that may precede all of this. At present, the US is relying on Hochstein’s proven leadership to current tensions on the Israel–Lebanon border.

suggest the plan he is proposing entails Hezbollah moving eight to ten kilometers north of Lebanon’s border with Israel, which will allow for Israeli civilians to return to their communities. This would be followed by an increased deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL peacekeeping forces to the border area.

Two remaining challenges facing the US are finding a way to ensure Israel remains committed to reaching a diplomatic solution and leading the international community in facilitating a process that can enable the election of a president in Lebanon committed to prioritizing the country’s people.

Moving forward, the US must push for a ceasefire or humanitarian pause in Gaza, increase its leadership of the Quintet, and lay the groundwork for a cessation of hostilities on the Israel–Lebanon border.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post Lebanon Wants Peace. How Can It Get There? appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

The poll are significant with Hezbollah and Israel engaged in tit-for-tat cross-border attacks that both parties have sought to contain but could spin out of control at any moment. Hezbollah has wanted to contain the hostilities because a majority of Lebanese oppose their country becoming embroiled in a war, particularly with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel could turn Beirut into another Gaza.

In the final analysis, the poll, conducted in late November and early December 2023 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, suggested that public support for Iranian-backed militants was on the rise. The poll further indicated that the majority of Lebanese opposed to increased military engagement in support of Gaza is fragile.

Various factors could upset the apple cart. These include an unintended escalation of the border hostilities sparked by a large number of civilian casualties, repeated Israeli targeted killings on Lebanese soil of prominent Hezbollah and Hamas figures, a potential International Court of Justice ruling asserting that Israel’s military campaign in Gaza risks genocide in a case submitted by South Africa and the fallout of Netanyahu the creation of an independent Palestinian state and insisting that Israel would maintain control of territory conquered in the 1967 Middle East war.

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“This is a necessary condition, and it conflicts with the idea of [Palestinian] sovereignty. What to do? I tell this truth to our American friends, and I also stopped the attempt to impose a reality on us that would harm Israel’s security,” Netanyahu . “[In] every area that we evacuate we receive terrible terror against us. It happened in South Lebanon, in Gaza, and also in Judea and Samaria,” i.e., the West Bank. “And therefore I clarify that in any other arrangement, in the future, the state of Israel has to control the entire area from the river to the sea,” he .

Lebanese support for Hezbollah and for war is rising

The poll showed that only a slim majority of Lebanese, 53%, prioritized addressing their country’s political and economic crisis above becoming embroiled in a “foreign war.” An identical majority believed resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict required negotiations rather than a military solution. Even so, a vast majority postulated that Israeli weakness and internal divisions meant that Israel ultimately can be defeated.

At the same time, Lebanese were unanimous (99%) in wanting Arab states to break all ties to Israel because of the Gaza war.

Hezbollah is likely to take heart from significant increases in its popularity across denominations. Shia Muslims, Sunni Muslims and Christians each account for roughly one-third of Lebanon’s population.

89% of Shiites had a “very positive” view of Hezbollah, up from 66% in 2020. The number of Sunnis who had at least a “somewhat positive” attitude towards the group jumped from 6% in 2020 to 34%. Among Christians, this number rose from 16% to 29%.

Similarly, 79% of Lebanese viewed Hamas favorably.

Netanyahu’s hardline stance

Netanyahu’s public rejection of a Palestinian state fit a long-standing pattern of Middle Eastern politics in which hardliners on both sides of various divides reinforce one another. That may be only the icing on his cake. Netanyahu did not say anything he had not suggested over the years, which puts the emphasis on the timing of the prime minister’s comments.

His reiterated rejection of a Palestinian state was designed to pacify his ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative coalition partners as well as stymie US efforts to persuade Saudi Arabia to establish diplomatic relations with Israel that emphasize a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

“There is a profound opportunity for regionalization in the Middle East, in the greater Middle East, that we have not had before. The challenge is realizing it,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken this week’s World Economic Forum gathering of leaders in Davos.

The United States needs regionalization for Arab buy-in to postwar arrangements in Gaza and the West Bank. This is unlikely to be forthcoming without the prospect of a credible peace process.

Speaking at the Davos forum, Israeli President Isaac Herzog relations with Saudi Arabia as a gamechanger and a key to ending the Gaza war. However, that remains a pipedream with the current Israeli government. Moreover, the problem is that a new Israeli government may not have the sharp edges of Netanyahu’s ultra-nationalists and ultra-conservatives but may be equally unwilling to make the kind of concessions required for a credible peace process.

Former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to the US and UK Turki al Faisal, who is believed to be close to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, appeared to that sentiment and take it a step further. “The present leadership of Hamas, of the [Palestine Liberation Organization] and of Israel should be excluded from any participation in any future political role. They have to pay for what they have done 
 All of them are failures,” Al Faisal told CNN’s Christiane Amanpour.

Responding to Netanyahu’s rejection, US President Joe Biden, wittingly or unwittingly, noted that a two-state solution means different things to different people. Biden a two-state solution could involve a demilitarized Palestinian state that would be more palatable for Israeli hardliners.

That has long been Israel’s often unspoken definition of the term across the country’s political spectrum, with few exceptions. Hamas’ October 7 attack in which people, mostly civilians, were killed reinforced this perspective. The problem is that Israeli security concerns about Palestinians are a mirror-image of Palestinian security concerns about Israel after more than half a century of occupation and the current Gaza carnage, likely making demilitarization a non-starter for Palestinians.

For his part, Netanyahu feels emboldened by Biden’s poor in an election year, Republican support for Israel and his past ability to a US president domestically in the United States.

Iran is emboldened

At the same time, Netanyahu bolstered with his comments the credibility of Iran’s opposition to Arab states normalizing relations with Israel. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei days before Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel that normalization of relations with Israel amounted to “gambling” that was “doomed to failure.” He warned that countries establishing relations with the Jewish state would be “in harm’s way.”

Events since October 7 have reinforced Iran’s sense that the winds of Middle Eastern geopolitics are blowing in its favor. Israel’s conduct in the Gaza war has drawn from much of the international community, except for the United States and several European countries. A potential international court ruling would deepen the dent in Israel’s moral standing inflicted by the war. In Switzerland, prosecutors they were investigating unspecified criminal complaints against Herzog as he attended the World Economic Forum. It was unclear whether the complaint was related to his remarks at the Forum or to past remarks or actions. Herzog was also cited in South Africa’s international court case as suggesting that all Gazans were responsible for Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel.

In addition, Iran’s non-state allies complicate affairs for Israel and the United States. More than three months into the war, Israel has yet to achieve its goals of destroying Hamas and liberating the remaining 139 Hamas-held hostages abducted during the October 7 fighting, including the bodies of those since killed in Gaza.

While not directly involving Iranian non-state allies, mounting in the West Bank, where Israeli raids and clashes with Palestinian fighters threaten to mushroom into an insurgency, strengthen Iran’s hardline position. Meanwhile, Hezbollah, backed by Iran, has 100,000 Israelis to evacuate northern Israel and has tied down a substantial number of Israeli forces along the border.

Simultaneously, Iran-supported Houthi rebels in Yemen have the United States in a catch-22 with attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.

Finally, Iranian missile strikes earlier in January in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan reflect Iran’s sense of having the upper hand rather than an intention to escalate regional tensions. They signal Iran’s willingness to defend itself, even if it does not want to see Gaza escalate into a regional conflagration. The strikes were in response to attacks on Iranian targets, including Islamic State in the city of Kerman that killed 94 people, the in Syria of a senior Revolutionary Guard commander and an on an Iranian police station by a Pakistan-based jihadist group.

Overall, the different hot spots suggest that hardliners are calling the shots for now.

Without a halt to the fighting in Gaza, containing the various flashpoints and preventing them from spinning out of control increasingly is becoming mission impossible.

US foreign policy scholar Christopher S Chivvis: “In a situation where emotions are running high thanks to the appalling violence in Gaza, with hawks in Washington eager to dole out hellfire and brimstone on Tehran, and the global economy at stake, it will be even harder to exercise restraint and avoid a broader regional war – the worst-case outcome for American interests.”

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The heightened risk suggests US efforts to allow Israel to continue attempting to destroy Hamas while minimizing civilian Palestinian casualties may backfire. This would further underline that a ceasefire is the only way of preventing an escalation, protecting innocent lives and securing the release of Hamas-held hostages.

Disputes between allies

Despite the risk, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, on his fifth visit to Tel Aviv since the war began, “Israel’s right to prevent another October 7 from occurring” in talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, he “stressed the importance of avoiding civilian harm, protecting civilian infrastructure and ensuring the distribution of humanitarian assistance throughout Gaza.” Blinken was referring to Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel that sparked the Israeli assault on Gaza.

His reference to infrastructure constituted the United States’ first public criticism of Israeli attacks on Gazan hospitals, schools, and other civilian infrastructure. Signaling differences with Blinken, Netanyahu’s office a readout after the meeting.

Even so, US reluctance to go beyond verbal pressure, by threatening consequences if Israel fails to heed US advice, may stem from a belief that America’s leverage on Israel has over time in economic and political terms. In past decades, US financial support amounted to a significant chunk of Israel’s budget. Now, the US’s annual contribution is worth less than 1% of Israel’s GDP. Moreover, Israel today produces many of its most essential weapons domestically, making it less dependent on US arms sales.

In addition, Israel concluded in 1991 that it could no longer blindly rely on US protection after the United States did not come to its aid when Iraq fired Scud missiles at the Jewish state during the Gulf war. Despite remaining dependent on US vetoes in the United Nations Security Council and military cooperation, Israel worked to increase its margin of autonomy, much like Gulf states did three decades later after the United States failed to respond to Iranian-inspired attacks on their critical infrastructure in 2019 and 2020.

Israel’s campaign of targeted killings

Nevertheless, acting on seemingly accurate and up-to-the-minute detailed intelligence, Israel appears to have responded to US pressure by carrying out a series of targeted killings, including of Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese Shiite militia, an Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Syria and a top Hamas in Beirut.

On Januar 9, Israeli forces a car in southern Lebanon carrying three Hezbollah operatives north of the narrow band along the Lebanese-Israeli border, to which hostilities with the Lebanese group have so far been contained. The attack, the second in 24 hours, occurred as Blinken Israeli military strategy with Netanyahu and members of his war cabinet.

Israel a second car, hours after the attack, close to the home of Wassim Al-Tawil, a senior Hezbollah commander together with another of the group’s fighters in a drone attack on January 8, as they traveled by car north of the band. The car was targeted as Al-Tawil was laid to rest.

“We’re targeting Hezbollah operatives, infrastructure, and systems they’ve set up to deter Israel,” newly appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz.

The United States has been pushing Israel to scale back its bombing of Gaza — which has killed more than people, a majority innocent Palestinian civilians — to withdraw troops from the Strip, and focus on militant Palestinian targets.

The killings of senior Hezbollah, Hamas and Iranian commanders threaten to push Iranian-supported forces to retaliate in ways that could escalate hostilities beyond Gaza and the so far narrow Israel–Lebanese border band. In an indication of how hostilities could escalate, Hezbollah an Israeli air traffic control base south of the band on January 8 in retaliation for last week’s assassination in Beirut of a senior Hamas official, Salah al Arouri.

The fact that a majority of Israel’s targeted killings have been Hezbollah operatives likely has much to do with US, French and German efforts to prevent an escalation of exchanges between Israel and the Lebanese group and negotiate a definitive demarcation of the two countries’ borders. Hezbollah has Israeli demands to withdraw to a line north of the border beyond the Litani River. Hezbollah has also said it would agree to Lebanese government border demarcation talks only after Israel halts its assault on Gaza and accepts a permanent ceasefire.

Israel has threatened to militarily push Hezbollah back to the Litani if diplomatic efforts fail. On a visit this week to Israeli troops on the Lebanese border, Netanyahu , “If Hezbollah chooses to start an all-out war then it will 
 turn Beirut and southern Lebanon, not far from here, into Gaza and Khan Younis.”

The Israeli attacks on Hezbollah appear designed to force the group to choose between withdrawing and sparking an all-out war that bankrupt Lebanon cannot afford and many Lebanese do not want. Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah has that he does not seek an escalation of hostilities but that his group was prepared if Israel opted for a full-fledged conflagration.

Israel’s apparent focus on Hezbollah operatives may also be because of its inability so far to take out Hamas’ most senior Gaza leaders, including Yahya Sinwar, more than three months into the war.

Last week, David Barnea, the head of Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service to hunt down every Hamas member involved in the group’s October 7 attack on Israel, no matter where they are. Barnea compared the manhunt to Israel’s pursuit of Palestinian Black September after it attacked the Israeli team at the 1972 Munich Olympics and killed 11 athletes.

Last month, Ronen Bar, chief of Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security agency, Israel would hunt down Hamas in Lebanon, Turkey, and Qatar even if it took years. “This is our Munich. We will do this everywhere, in Gaza, in the West Bank, in Lebanon, in Turkey, in Qatar. It will take a few years, but we will be there to do it,” Bar said.

While Hamas has yet to retaliate for Al-Arouri’s killing, a senior official warned that it may expand the war beyond Israel and Palestine if the United States continued to support Israel. “The West in general, and the US government in particular, need to reconsider their position because this will have consequences 
 If the US insists on its position, our entire nation will view it, and treat it, as an enemy 
 This conflict could go beyond Palestine’s borders, and expand in scope,” Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri.

Mr. Abu Zuhri’s warning coincided with a by the Islamic State for lone-wolf attacks on civilian targets in Europe and the United States, including churches and synagogues.

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Unfortunately, one million children in Lebanon are deprived of a quality education today in addition to incomplete school terms in each of the past four years.

Lebanon’s economic crisis is an entirely caused by corruption. The World Bank has referred to Lebanon’s economic crisis as the worst the world has seen since the mid-19th century. The depreciation of the Lebanese Lira has understandably seen public school teachers go on strike for higher salaries, which amount to around $90 per month.

The pain felt by teachers is evident in a recent Centre for Lebanese Policy Studies survey, which findings that 73% of Lebanese teachers plan on leaving the education sector and three out of four plan on leaving Lebanon altogether.

However, even before the depreciation of the Lebanese Lira and the strikes, there were still issues getting teachers into classrooms. For example, teacher absenteeism was a widespread , and even the average work week under normal circumstances less time dedicated to classroom instruction — 10 to 15 hours — than the international benchmark, which is 20 hours.

Lebanon needs a vision for its education sector

Lebanon has been without a president for over a year, and the current prime minister and cabinet are only caretakers. Lebanon’s lack of government means it is unable to tackle meaningful reforms in education.

In a of Lebanese parents with students enrolled in public schools, 43% noted that schools lacked multipurpose rooms and 30% reported that schools lacked laboratories. This reflects a need for greater government spending on school infrastructure.

There are straightforward reforms that can make education more cost-effective and support better learning for students. For example, the adoption of solar energy could lower operating costs. Right now, electricity can sometimes cost up to of a school’s budget.

out of ten children in Lebanon also face high acute food insecurity, and so the provision of food and water at school also has great potential to improve the quality of learning.

Support from the international community is needed

The biggest challenge for Lebanon’s public sector is getting both teachers and students back to school. The biggest obstacle is the funding mechanism, given that teachers’ current salaries cannot even cover the cost of their commute to work. For this reason, a donors’ conference should assemble to coordinate both financial assistance to the education sector and to identify reforms to improve the sector. It could include both states and non-governmental organizations, civil society groups and diaspora groups.

Western countries should also understand the significance of private schools to Lebanon’s education sector. The of Lebanese students — 60% — are enrolled in private schools, and while Lebanon is home to some very elite private institutions, many private schools provide a quality education to disadvantaged students across the country with tuitions of only $150–$300. 

While many private schools have religious affiliations, they are committed to respecting Lebanon’s religious diversity and do not proselytize students from different backgrounds. For example, many Catholic schools educate predominantly Muslim student bodies who are exempt from the religious instruction offered by those institutions. The private sector has to be seen as a partner for the international community.

This should be treated as a priority for Lebanon and the region

Lebanon is faced with the prospect of a “lost generation.” Where will the one million youth go who do not have an education today?

The future of Lebanon cannot be held hostage to the country’s political elite, and the international community should not condition additional support for the country’s youth to political reform. Lebanon’s youth are victims of a failed system, and they are owed access to a quality education.

The Lebanese government and international community must prioritize the plight of Lebanon’s youth. A “lost generation” of over one million young people would have disastrous consequences for Lebanon and the wider region for years to come.

This article excerpts findings and recommendations from the recently released policy “How to Prevent Lebanon from Experiencing a ‘Lost Generation,’” published by the American Task Force on Lebanon.

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Second, the Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah. This marked a change in the relationship between Israel and Iran. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established “Quds Day” as an annual event to express opposition to the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and other Palestinian territories, including Gaza. (Quds is the Islamic name for Jerusalem.)

These events had a profound regional impact, shaping politics and conflicts from the 1980s onward. Israel had defeated its Arab neighbors in several wars (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973), but now militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas took their place. Backed by the US, Israel has in its favor a greater disparity in military power than history has ever seen. In conflicts with these militants (1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s), the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) won every battle. Despite this, Israel has never been able to secure a strategic victory. Each time, Hezbollah and Hamas emerged stronger and more determined in their resistance. With Israel engaged in another war against Hamas in Gaza, we are seeing the same conflict play out once again.

Israel’s failed occupation of Lebanon

Over the past 40 years, Israel has demonstrated time and again that it cannot win wars against Hezbollah or end them by military means.

On June 6, 1982, the IDF crossed into southern Lebanon and quickly advanced to the outskirts of Beirut. However, the war that Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon believed would last for just few days turned into Israel’s version of Vietnam. By the end of the war, Israeli totaled 455 dead and 2,460 wounded.

Hezbollah, a Shia Muslim militia, formed during this war. It forced the IDF to retreat 30 kilometers south of Beirut, a major setback for Israel.

Faced with growing public pressure, Begin resigned on September 28, 1983. The new Israeli government, led by Shimon Peres, faced the same challenges as before and eventually withdrew to a self-declared security buffer zone in southern Lebanon on January 14, 1985. This move set a precedent for future Israeli withdrawals from occupied territories without negotiated agreements with opposing sides.

Israel left the battlefield to Hezbollah, which became a prominent actor in Lebanon and it solidified its presence and influence in the following years. 

Israeli dissatisfaction with the occupation of a buffer zone grew during the 1990s. It escalated following a 1997 in which 73 Israeli soldiers were killed.

Ultimately, on May 23, 2000, the Israeli army executed the third and final withdrawal of Israeli forces. The IDF pulled out of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, effectively ending the 22-year occupation. It was the second Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in Lebanon without a negotiated agreement, marking another strategic setback for Israel. 

After the withdrawal, the border with Lebanon remained unstable. Hezbollah expanded its missile and military capabilities in the area, and a new conflict erupted in the region only six years later. Although the Israeli army destroyed Lebanon’s infrastructure in the 2006 Lebanon War, Hezbollah was not defeated. Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah called the war a “.” For Israel, the conflict was a military failure. The conduct of the war discredited Israel’s leadership, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s approval rating soon fell to . 

From Hezbollah to Hamas

Israel has demonstrated time and again that it cannot win wars against Hamas, either, or end them by military means.

Israeli security forces have many leaders from the military and political wings of Hamas. In 2004, they Hamas’s founder and spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Yasin. In the same year, they one of the co-founders of Hamas, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi. Despite these targeted killings, Hamas has demonstrated the ability to rebuild its leadership, increase its popularity and act effectively as a political organization. It the plurality of the vote in the 2006 Palestinian legislative election. 

Some argue that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu carried out a strategy designed to weaken the power of the Palestinian Authority, the governing body led by President Mahmoud Abbas, by allowing Hamas to retain control over Gaza. One of Netanyahu’s associates, Major General Gershon Hacohen, , “We need to tell the truth. Netanyahu’s strategy is to prevent the option of two-states, so he is turning Hamas into his closest partner. Openly Hamas is an enemy. Covertly, it’s an ally.”

Whatever the truth, Hamas maintained its presence in Gaza. Despite facing conflicts with Israel in 2008-09 (Operation Cast Lead), 2012 (Operation Pillar of Defense), 2014 (Operation Protective Edge), 2018 (Gaza Border Protests) and 2021 (Israel-Gaza Conflict), Hamas survived with support coming from regional actors like Iran, Qatar and Turkey. While Israel won each battle, Hamas, after suffering casualties and infrastructure damage, consistently demonstrated resilience. Following each conflict, Hamas rebuilt infrastructure, adapted new tactics, and refined strategies.

On October 7, Hamas executed a swift and coordinated action by land, sea and air, resulting in the deaths of around people, including at least 846 civilians, 278 soldiers and 44 police. Hamas also took an estimated 239 hostages. This unexpected move disrupted the status quo, altering dynamics in the Middle East. Journalist Alon Pinkas Hamas’s incursion as an “epic Israeli debacle.”

Israel’s mission impossible

Given the historical patterns of conflict between the Israel Defense Forces and non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas over the past 40 years, we can predict how this present conflict will evolve. Israel’s chances of winning the war against Hamas are slim. Netanyahu painted himself into a corner with “destroy Hamas” as an objective, just asBegin and Olmert painted themselves into corners with “destroy PLO” or “destroy Hezbollah.” Both of them won their battles but eventually lost their wars, withdrawing from the fight without achieving their declared objectives. 

If Netanyahu aims to “destroy Hamas,” he would have to wage a protracted and bloody urban war, similar to what Begin faced. The question arises: Is Israel prepared for a prolonged war on multiple fronts against highly motivated militias entrenched for over a decade? Will the Israeli public tolerate significant IDF casualties? Even if the IDF incapacitates Hamas in Gaza, as it did with the PLO in Lebanon in 1982–83, merely destroying infrastructure will not eradicate its ideology. As Ami Ayalon, Gilead Sher and Orni Petruschka , Hamas is an idea, and it will persist among Palestinians as long as there is no real peace option to which they can attach their hopes.

Moreover, Tel Aviv is unlikely to bring the 2 million Palestinians in an occupied Gaza to submission. More likely, considering history, we will witness the IDF leaving Gaza, leaving destruction in its wake, similar to its compelled withdrawal from Lebanon. Hamas would claim a victory because it, or at least its ideology, wasn’t completely destroyed.

New trends in the Middle East

Netanyahu has said he will “change the Middle East,” establishing a regional order aligning with Israel’s interests. However, his actions following October 7 have had the opposite effect. The region has undergone drastic changes: have erupted in major Arab capitals, leading to the of normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia and forcing Cairo, Amman and Riyadh to change their official narrative. Israel’s relations with Turkey are strained, and Iran’s proxies have Israel, as well as in Iraq and Syria, with missiles and drones.

A sustained ground operation by Israel could result in tens of thousands of casualties, heighten the risk of a broader regional conflict and destabilize governments in multiple Arab countries. Iran has also that it would not allow Hamas to lose without escalating the conflict.

Internationally, Israel’s maneuvering space is narrowing, as public opinion increasingly rejects the dehumanization of the Palestinian people. The voices supporting Palestinians resonate from London to Madrid to Washington. The United States, once the primary force in the Middle East, is no longer the sole or main authority. We live in a multipolar world. Muslim-majority states in the Middle East are demonstrating greater independence and a willingness to establish strategic partnerships with different global powers, including BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011 and Afghanistan in 2021 serve as poignant reminders of evolving regional realities.

Prime Minister Netanyahu presented himself as a master statesman who could do the impossible for Israel. In addition to killing two-state solution, his plan involved normalizing relations with all Arab states, and treating Palestinians as a security concern to be managed indefinitely. But everything Netanyahu has built for decades crashed in a matter of hours. The political grave he dug for the two-state solution may now become his own, and like Menachem Begin four decades earlier, he and his unpopular ministers may retire from politics.

The recent conflict and devastation in Gaza might sow the seeds for a new order, challenging the existing structure of the occupation of Palestine, which, in turn, contains the seeds for more wars that Israel cannot win and cannot end. The two-state solution is the only thing that can fix this system. Ending what UN Secretary-General António Guterres “56 years of suffocating occupation” is the only reasonable option for any future Israeli government. This is the only victory Israel could make.

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While the US has sent strong messages denouncing the continued paralysis, it is time for the administration to be more proactive in pushing for a competent and reform-oriented president who is able to push for the reforms necessary to begin Lebanon’s recovery. 

Lebanon’s two major, rival Christian parties recently made by joining forces with reform-oriented parliamentarians to support International Monetary Fund official Jihad Azour for the presidency against Suleiman Frangieh, candidate of the pro-Hezbollah camp. However, cynicism quickly prevailed as Speaker Nabih Berri adjourned the legislative body immediately after Azour failed to secure a two-thirds majority of votes on the first ballot. This forced a loss of quorum before a second vote—which would require a simple majority of votes and which Azour could conceivably prevail—could take place.

Lebanon’s confessional political system imposes a power-sharing arrangement that requires the president and army commander to be Maronite Christians, the prime minister to be a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament to be a Shi’a Muslim; seats in parliament are split between Christians and Muslims and proportionally distributed amongst the various sects. This means that presidential candidates must possess wide electoral appeal in a parliament that is sharply along political and sectarian lines. The absence of consensus inevitably leads to deadlock, with quorum-busting a tactic.

The US needs to send a stronger message to Lebanon’s leaders

Members of the US Congress and the Biden Administration have urged Lebanon’s political class to take steps to end the gridlock that is hampering economic recovery. Bipartisan leadership in the Senate Foreign Relations , the House Foreign Affairs , and the US-Lebanon Friendship have called for the administration to use all of its , including sanctions, against corrupt officials in Lebanon who are impeding the election process.

Though on point, US messaging has not translated into strong leadership on the Lebanon issue. Quite the opposite.  The US is conspicuously absent from a reported upcoming summit in , which is an effort to bring all Lebanese parties into dialogue to address the way out of the political impasse. 

While many in Washington believe the US should follow France’s lead when it comes to Lebanon, the US and France have increasingly diverging interests. In fact, while a top priority of the US is to weaken Iranian influence in Lebanon, France’s most recent attempt to resolve the crisis was to push for the election of Hezbollah’s top candidate. 

This shows that a backseat US approach would likely result in not only a loss of US influence in the region but also a significant setback for those Lebanese who massively protested against the political establishment in 2019 and then mobilized around the 2022 parliamentary to shift the balance of power in parliament towards reform.

The revitalized mobilization of pro-reform MPs was on full display during the last presidential voting session. This can be an opportunity to help the country turn the tide away from corruption and Iranian influence towards stability and reform. Here, the US can lead the international community in supporting the election of a pro-reform president and the formation of a reform-oriented government. This would support US regional interests while introducing improved governance.

Targeted sanctions, not empty statements, are the solution

Plainly put, “what [the US is] doing so far doesn’t seem to be working very well.” This is the offered by Senator Jeanne Shaheen, a Democrat from New Hampshire, to Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf in a recent hearing. Shaheen’s broader argument is that the US needs to increase pressure on Lebanon’s leaders to take needed actions to form a government and respond to the country’s historic economic crisis.

Senator Shaheen is right. Lebanon is at a crossroads. A new president, possessing the right qualities, can partner with the US and its allies to improve regional security and support local actors fighting for democracy. Engagement between senior US officials and political leaders in Lebanon led to the formation of a coalition of parties and groups that rallied behind Azour’s candidacy, but the effort fell short of obtaining the needed threshold of votes. The US must ramp up the pressure and, in coordination with its European allies, move to coercive action against obstructionist members of Lebanon’s elite. This would take the form of targeted sanctions.

Despite alluding to sanctions, the administration has yet to put any penalties in place for those leaders who have obstructed needed reforms and steps towards recovery. While sanctions can indeed be a useful tool to pressure politicians, they need to be carefully targeted to those who have the power to effect change and who are also exposed enough. For example, the sanctions imposed in 2020 against then-Minister of Foreign Affairs for corruption have arguably been impactful enough to block his path to the presidency today. 

The US can pave a positive path forward

In recent weeks, the US has clarified its expectations for Lebanon’s next president to be independent and committed to reform. Non-coercive methods have seemed promising but proven ultimately unsuccessful. Lebanon remains without a president, and France has stepped in to facilitate a resolution that would conflict with US interests and reverse the momentum towards reform made since the 2022 parliamentary elections.

The US here has the opportunity to stand and act more vigorously in support of the Lebanese people, who have been calling for systemic change in their political leadership. At this crucial juncture, the US must reassert itself, and its values, in Lebanon’s presidential vacuum.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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AbiNader paints a dire picture of Lebanon’s current problems. He makes sense of Lebanon’s gutted and struggling economy, entrenched government corruption, identity politics and instability. 

For nearly three years, Lebanon has suffered the most devastating, multi-pronged in its modern history. The unfolding economic and financial crisis started in October 2019. COVID-19 and the 2022 explosion in the Beirut port exacerbated this crisis.

The World Bank’s Spring 2021 Lebanon Economic Monitor found that Lebanon’s crisis ranks among the worst economic crises since the mid-19th century. Nominal GDP plummeted from $52 billion in 2019 to $23.1 billion in 2021. The GDP per capita fell by 36.5%. Incomes fell and jobs vanished.

Lebanon was an upper middle-income country despite the ethnic conflict and the refugee burden. In July 2022, the World Bank reclassified it as a lower-middle income country.  Such a brutal contraction is usually associated with conflicts or wars.

AbiNader makes sense of Lebanon’s crisis, examines why things have come to such a pass and posits solutions for the future.

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post Paint it Black: Lebanon’s Failures and How to Save it appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

Lebanon currently faces numerous challenges to its stability. The two that fall on top of the agenda currently are the economic crisis and vacant presidency. The World Bank describes its economic crisis as possibly the worst the world has seen since the mid-19th century. Last April, Lebanon reached a staff level agreement with the International Monetary Fund to rehabilitate its economy. However, the government and parliament have been unable to implement the mandated reforms to unlock such assistance. In October 2022, Lebanon’s presidency fell vacant. Since then, Lebanese parliamentarians have been unable to agree on a consensus candidate to elect to the presidency.

Amidst these and other challenges, Daou travelled to the US for meetings with the US government, Congress, international organizations, and the Lebanese American diaspora. On February 1, the American Task Force on Lebanon hosted him at their headquarters in Washington, DC where this interview was recorded.

The views expressed in this video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Make Sense of the Future of Lebanese Democracy appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

As journalist Adnan Nasser, The Economist now Lebanon as an authoritarian country, whereas it was once considered a “hybrid system.” In response to the widespread corruption among Lebanon’s political and financial elite, the Lebanese people responded. First they protested, then they voted.

Politics in the way of progress

While Lebanon has not yet experienced the type of political transformation its people long for, the May 2022 parliamentary elections resulted in a larger-than-expected number of reformists elected to office. One of these is Member of Parliament Mark Daou, who unseated a powerful incumbent in his surprise election victory. When I saw him shortly after the signing of the historic maritime agreement between Israel and Lebanon in October 2022, there was a certain sense of optimism in the air.

A great deal had changed when I saw Daou at our office in Washington, DC a few weeks ago. Since October 30, Lebanon’s presidency has remained vacant. Furthermore, the country remains sharply conflicted over Judge Tarek Bitar’s investigation into the Port of Beirut blast as he summoned several high-ranking officials for questioning. The prolonged presidential vacuum and lack of investigation into the port explosion both point to the struggling state of democracy in Lebanon today.

The price can be heavy for those brave enough to fight against corruption in Lebanon. While leaving his home one day, Daou himself found a Kalashnikov bullet in his windshield.

Lebanon needs a functional executive and independent judiciary

Daou’s fellow “Forces of Change” parliamentarians Melhem Khalaf and Najat Saliba have been in Lebanon’s parliament building on a nightly basis until the parliament elects the country’s next president.

The challenge of electing a president in parliament is that the body remains divided and no faction has the necessary votes to elect its preferred candidate. In the months since the presidency fell vacant, eleven sessions have been held to elect a replacement and no consensus candidate has emerged. More recently, parliament has yet to even have a quorum of MPs present to elect a president.

At the same time, the Lebanese parliament is attempting to carry out some of its legislative functions. This prompted 46 MPs, including Daou, Melhem and Saliba, announcing they will boycott future legislative sessions until a president is selected. They the Lebanese Constitution as justification for their stance, which makes clear that, until a president is elected, Lebanon’s parliament is an electoral body and not a legislature.

While the eventual nominee will need to be a consensus candidate, the Lebanese people deserve a president who is clean, reform-oriented and committed to addressing their needs. Similarly, amid political gridlock, Lebanon’s absence of an independent judiciary is crippling its ability to investigate the largest non-nuclear explosion in history, which killed 220 people.

Judge Tarek Bitar resumed his investigation into the blast in January, following 13 months of delay due to political pressure. In doing so, he issued charges against a number of high-ranking political figures, including Ghassan Oueidat, the country’s top prosecutor. The latter by filing against Bitar and releasing all detainees in the case. This episode points to the for a truly independent judiciary in Lebanon, one that even the current draft law in parliament falls short of establishing.

Lebanon’s Elected Leaders Need to Reinforce Lebanon’s Democratic Institutions

The sad thing is that while Lebanon continues to veer away from democracy, its people continue to suffer. of the Lebanese are impoverished and there is a looming food security . The currency continues to plummet while public school teachers and many public servants remain on strike. Many are warning this country could become the world’s next failed state.

The prolonged presidential vacuum and failed port investigation both point to poor political leadership. The sad thing is that a functioning executive and independent judiciary are basic pillars of democratic states. The failure of Lebanon’s elected leaders to satisfy these basic democratic criteria give the Lebanese people and their friends across the globe little to no hope Lebanon’s politicians can address the hard things.

Electing a president, forming a government, and truly protecting the country’s judicial branch from political interference are all necessary steps Lebanon’s leaders should take now to reinforce democratic institutions in their country. Failure to do so would have catastrophic consequences not only for Lebanon but also the region.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Jim Risch (R-ID), Chair and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have not minced words in their recent to Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen in encouraging the administration to “use all available leverage, including the threat of sanctions” to ensure Lebanese lawmakers elect reformers during this transition in governance. They focus on Lebanon’s financial and political elite and desire wider sanctions against those “engaging in corruption and undermining the rule of law.”

Lebanon’s Central Banker Evades Arrest and People Rob Banks

Representatives Debbie Dingell (R-MI), Darin LaHood (R-IL), and Darrell Issa (R-CA), co-chairs of the US-Lebanon Friendship Caucus, in a to Secretaries Blinken and Yellen, have also called on the administration to use “additional diplomatic tools” against those “obstruct[ing] democratic processes” in the country, including the presidential election, implementation of needed financial reforms, support for independence from third-party influences, and judicial independence.

The Biden Administration Must Encourage Lebanese Lawmakers to Put Their Country First

The Biden Administration has a crucial leadership opportunity with Western and Gulf Allies, especially France and Saudi Arabia, to better governance from Lebanon’s political leaders through a carrot-stick approach with the country’s elite. It will also need to prioritize the Lebanon response in a coordinated way, following its success in mediating the maritime boundary between Lebanon and Israel last fall.

Forming a government is a needed first step in addressing the challenges in Lebanon, but it is far from a solution to the challenges ailing the country. The Ponzi scheme, aided and abetted by the country’s elite, has created a man-made financial catastrophe. As David Hale, a former US ambassador to Lebanon, has , the Lebanese are the angriest group of people in the world. They have every right to be.

The US will need to convey to Lebanese lawmakers that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has an essential role to play in the country’s financial recovery. Lebanese leaders have yet to implement the majority of reforms outlined in the staff-level between the IMF and the Lebanese government. Lebanese leaders have no time to waste.

The US Must Increase Assistance to the Lebanese People

In the meantime, of the Lebanese are impoverished and 90% of refugees live in extreme poverty. It is encouraging that USAID Administrator Samantha Power shed light on these challenges during her recent visit. The US should continue increasing assistance to Lebanon, especially with a looming food security in the first quarter of this year. The US needs to ensure it continues increasing assistance to the Lebanese people during this time.

Such suffering is also impacting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), a key US security partner in the region. The devaluation of the Lebanese lira, which just hit a new , of more than 90% has severely impacted LAF soldiers and their families. Livelihood support, by the US and others, is key to responding to this challenge. Support for the LAF is not only necessary for Lebanon’s independence from groups such as Hezbollah, it is also crucial for combatting captagon trafficking (a for Congress) from neighboring Syria.

A key and obvious area where the US can also help is electricity reform. The Lebanese people receive only one to two hours of unscheduled per day. The Levantine Energy Deal, by the US, would more than double the amount of daily electricity provided to Lebanese households. The US should help push this deal across the goal line as more electricity would make a real difference in the daily lives of Lebanese.

The maritime deal with Israel shows proof that US leadership is needed in Lebanon. Today, the same level of engagement is needed to encourage Lebanese leaders to address the challenges facing their nation. Congress is right that the time has come to use sanctions against those who obstruct democratic processes, most urgently the presidential election, in Lebanon. Government formation, however, is only the starting point. Lebanese lawmakers must immediately turn their attention to implementing needed financial and governance reforms or else the people will continue to suffer at the hands of the elite.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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This aggressive response of MBS is unprecedented in US-Saudi relations. It demonstrates that MBS has consolidated his power within the kingdom. It also reveals how high oil prices have given MBS much economic clout. He now clearly believes that Saudi Arabia doesn’t need the US in the same way his predecessors did.  If anything the shoe is on the other foot. Biden is heading into midterms that his party is likely to heavily because of surging inflation driven by high energy costs. The American president needs MBS to pump more oil.

Rising Oil Prices Boost Saudi Economy

The latest economic forecasts have put more wind in MBS’s already expansive sails. London-based Capital Economics estimated that Saudi Arabia’s GDP might have grown by 10% in the first half of 2022 thanks to high oil prices. In their words:

“The oil sector has sustained its strong momentum. Production rose from 10.36mn bpd in April to 10.42mn bpd in May, translating into growth of 22.9% y/y
.  Looking ahead, the prospects for the oil sector look very bright. The decision by OPEC+ to raise its output quotas by 50% in July and August will provide an additional boost to Saudi production. And if, as we expect, OPEC+ removes the shackles of quotas beyond September, Saudi Arabia is one of the few members that will be able to capitalise and we think that output will reach a record high by late-2023.

Capital Economics says the economy, and particularly the private sector, will be further boosted by the loosening of fiscal policies now underway and the distinct possibility of a  The VAT tax rate was tripled in 2020 to 15%. This increase was to shore up government finances under strain because of the then low oil prices.

Biden and MBS hit an impasse on the issue of human rights. That is immaterial. In truth, human rights was not a for the US president. What is significant is that Biden and BMS issued a  shared communique on the economic quagmire in which Lebanon is currently stuck.

As reported by :

In a joint statement, the two men “noted the importance of forming a government and implementing structural and global reforms in politics and economy so that Lebanon can overcome its crisis and not constitute a launchpad for terrorists, drug trafficking and criminal activities which threaten its stability (and) the region’s security.”

Using the King Salman Relief Center the kingdom $36 million in humanitarian aid to Lebanon in March. That was followed in April by the full restoration of that had ruptured over critical comments by Lebanese politicians over the Yemen war.

The Lebanese Economic Crisis

Since 2019, Lebanon has endured a complex economic and financial crisis, deepened by political deadlock, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the Beirut Port explosions in August 2020 and now the global food and fuel crisis. As the has highlighted, the ongoing political paralysis is destroying “key pillars of Lebanon’s post-civil war political economy.”  It cites the collapse of most basic public services and the flight of young Lebanese from a failed country in a colossal brain drain.  Both these phenomena will inflict further damage going forward. “Meanwhile,” the report acidly notes: “the poor and the middle class, who were never well served under this model in the first place, are carrying the main burden of the crisis.”

The comic Keystone Cops quality of the current situation emerged yet again on in a farcical judicial matter. Ghada Aoun is the presiding judge in a case against Riad Salameh, the governor of Lebanon’s central bank Banque de Liban (BDL). Aoun attempted to haul BDL’s big boss Salameh in front of court. Aoun first sent state security officers to storm Salameh’s residence in El Metn, a posh neighborhood in Rabieh, an upscale northern suburb of Beirut. When the officers did not find the governor at home, Aoun packed them off to the BDL offices in central Beirut. Again, they did not find Salameh.

The Aoun gambit did accomplish a couple of things. First, it rebuked the current caretaker prime minister Najib Mikati who called the incident a “raid for show.” Second, it led to a three-day strike by outraged BDL employees. The head of the BDL union declared: “We refuse to be treated with militia-like methods. We are not defending Riad Salameh but rather this institution, and these methods are unacceptable to us.”

The bank employees join several other strikers, among them university lecturers and public sector employees. In a broken country, gallows humor is now the order of the day. L’Orient Today summed up the current situation brilliantly:

“Do you need an “Ikhraj Eid” (extract of civil registry)? Sorry, it’s not possible. Do you need a passport? Sorry, it’s not possible. The public sector is collapsing as employees continue in their fifth week of an open-ended strike. Everyone is striking
 The problem is that they are still being paid in lira. It is the government’s cowardly strategy of reducing the sector’s headcount through attrition. Expenses will definitely drop, but so will revenues. Where are the thinking heads? And they say they want to approve the 2022 budget! With what numbers? More made up ones.”

Lebanon is hurtling to disaster and time is running out.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51łÔčÏ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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Over the years, the Lebanese have lost faith in the state. A recent from Zogby Research Services showed that the people had much higher confidence in civil society (85%) and the October 17 Revolution (65%) than in parliament (29%) or traditional political parties (19%). For these reasons, US policy has rightfully focused on combating corruption and providing aid directly to the Lebanese people.

Lebanese Americans Urge Crisis Resolution

Fortunately, over the past few weeks, three encouraging developments in Lebanon have dominated the news. The first was an announcement that the country had reached a staff-level with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The second was that groups have assembled their candidate lists for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The third highlighted that Lebanon took a courageous step in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The US has made resolving the crisis in Lebanon a . The Lebanese American community has stood firmly behind these efforts to aid the Lebanese people and enact necessary reforms. On the eve of the most recent IMF negotiations in March, a delegation of Lebanese American business and civic leaders undertook a to Lebanon, where they met people in the government and the political opposition, as well as religious leaders from all major sects, and those who ran NGOs. The delegation carried a message for key leaders: Lebanon is on the verge of collapse. They urged authorities to conduct upcoming parliamentary elections in a timely, fair and transparent manner. They also found that the prime minister and his economic team were eager to conclude an agreement with the IMF speedily. 

The delegation also met the minister of interior who indicated he was prepared to hold elections on time. He also said that the parliament had allocated the resources necessary to hold fair and free elections. Separately, the UN has pledged aid to support the internal security forces across more than 6,000 polling stations across the country. 

The IMF Staff-Level Agreement Is Promising

It is encouraging now to see that the IMF staff-level agreement concluded quickly. In religiously diverse Lebanon, agreement can be hard to reach. This time, the Maronite Catholic president, the Sunni Muslim prime minister and the Shi’a Muslim speaker of parliament speedily agreed. Hopefully, this might start the process of implementing badly-needed reforms to support the economic and social needs of the people. 

The staff-level agreement is a good start, but the next hurdle for the Lebanese government will be to follow through with legislative actions to implement this deal. Therefore, the coming elections that choose a new parliament on May 15 are critical. The new parliament will have to rebuild the economy, restore financial sustainability, strengthen governance and take anti-corruption measures, remove impediments to job-creating growth, and increase social and reconstruction spending, initially in the electricity sector. Without such actions by the new parliament, no IMF relief will be forthcoming.

May 15 Parliamentary Elections Are Tricky

The upcoming elections offer Lebanese citizens the chance to vote for reformist candidates who advocate change and good governance. As a first order of business, a new parliament will be faced with enacting reform legislation in order to meet the requirements of the IMF and bring badly needed economic relief. But how “new” the new parliament will be after the elections is in question. Will it be dominated by Hezbollah and its allies who will resist change and reform or by new leaders who will move a reform agenda forward? 

The Lebanese American leadership delegation met with a diverse group of reformist candidates. While it is clear that the Lebanese people have more political options, the visiting delegation found an opposition movement that is divided about how to best engage politically. The proof of this division came out recently when political party were finalized on April 5. Instead of joining together, most opposition groups announced lists competing with one another.  

The lack of coordination among the opposition diminishes the chances of the reformists. The good news is that if the opposition can take away 10 of the 128 seats up for election from the current Hezbollah-Christian coalition, the balance of power in parliament will decisively away from the old guard. This is not a big figure but even this may prove hard to achieve.

A New Opening in the US-Lebanon Relationship  

Both elections and the deal with the IMF have come at a time when the US has turned its attention to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The war has caused shortages of and fuel. Inflation has spiked. Yet Lebanon has taken the courageous decision to Russian atrocities and voted with the US at the UN. No other country in the Middle East has been so clear and forceful in its condemnation of Russia. 

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The IMF staff-level agreement and Lebanon’s condemnation of Russia are creating a new opening in the US-Lebanon relationship at a time when both countries can be helpful to one another. Thanks to the US, Lebanon could possibly come to a historic agreement on its maritime border with Israel. It could import electricity and natural gas from Jordan and Egypt to overcome its electricity and energy shortages. However, all of this is contingent on voters electing a reformist parliament. 

The agreement with the IMF could mark a turning point in Lebanon’s history, or it could turn out to be yet another disappointing tactical maneuver by Lebanon’s ruling elite. The future is now squarely in the hands of the Lebanese voters to elect a government that is willing to take the risks necessary to save the country. It is certain that Lebanon’s actions so far have caught the attention of the Biden Administration and the Congress. They would be more than willing to help a government and people courageously standing up to Russia and embracing reforms.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post Lebanon Takes a Step Forward but Risks Still Remain appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

Beirushima: What Lebanon Needs to Survive

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The interlocking political and banking elites who control the government based on sectarian power-sharing have so far ignored the pain of those affected and the need to have a national strategy of reconciliation and economic recovery. The economic erosion was furthered by the Beirut Port explosion of August 4, 2020. That incident destroyed much of the business area of the downtown. It also further set back the country economically and politically as the current government, headed by Prime Minister Najib Mikati, has been unable to remove impediments to an independent investigation.

The people of Lebanon are suffering. The statistics on , loss of and quality of life, of essential goods, cost of living and health care, and of skilled Lebanese are well known. The security and stability of the country are eroding as the families of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) share the depressing costs of a barely functioning economy.

The Governing Troika

The latest threats and demonstrate the fragility of the civil order as the Shia Amal-Hezbollah alliance, along with their Christian enablers in President Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement — now headed by his son-in-law and presidential aspirant, Gebran Bassil — feel free to ignore demands for change. The march on October 14, 2021, demanding the removal of Judge Tarek Bitar, who was calling current and former officials to testify about their roles in the Beirut Port blast, was the latest opportunity to demonstrate their dominance. This was too much of a provocation for those opposed to the governing troika, which led to bloodshed and a spike in instability. Despite the current calm, that chapter has not been concluded.

More damaging is the challenge that inaction poses on two fronts: to the new government and to the security services. Prime Minister Mikati supports an independent judiciary and an independent investigation into the blast. This could lead to the dissolution of his government, which depends on an agreement with the troika to survive. Hezbollah and company have not shown any concern for the integrity of the state up until now, so there are no assurances that they will tolerate an investigation that might expose some of their own friends.

The LAF and ISF are already struggling to hold together their forces, who have experienced a 90% in their salaries while facing hyperinflation in food, medicines and fuel. Desertion rates are as soldiers look for other employment opportunities. With budgets decreased by 90% due to the currency devaluation, the LAF and ISF have to increasingly rely on external assistance from the United States and others to retain their operational readiness.

Time for Action

All the while, the people are on the sidelines, not able to promote changes that will improve their lives and save their country. At the core is the concern that Lebanon for the Lebanese may become an aspiration more than a reality. To avoid the demise of what was once the educational and intellectual center of the region, it is time for remedial action.

It is time to begin the process of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and move toward a single exchange rate by reducing subsidies and public spending. Work must be done to ensure increased stable power supplies throughout Lebanon. The people’s trust needs to be earned through transparent and credible policies to restore a functioning government.

The international community is clear in its position: Clean elections, implementation of basic reforms, and a robust and sustainable social safety net are central to opening the country to outside support. Only then can Lebanon begin the process of reconstruction and recovery. Now, as the people remember the October 17 demonstrations, it is time to recommit to a process of reform and reconciliation that will provide a basis for Lebanon’s reconstruction.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

The post Lebanon’s Future as an Inclusive Democracy in Doubt appeared first on 51łÔčÏ.

In Lebanon, more than 470,000 Palestinians are with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Of this number, around 180,000 currently seek refuge inside the country. Most of these Palestinians are descendants of refugees from the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. In addition, Lebanon hosts a further Palestinian refugees who had lived in Syria but fled that country after a civil war erupted in 2011. According to unofficial estimates, there were already 250,000 Palestinians in Lebanon and another 53,000 who arrived from Syria.

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If fighting between the Israelis and Palestinians were to resume after the brokering of the current ceasefire, and if violence spread to northern Israel, adjacent to the Lebanese border, there is the potential for a new Palestinian exodus to neighboring countries. Yet in Lebanon, one of the taboo topics among the political elites is an open dialogue about the country’s responsibility toward Palestinian refugees. This is rooted in two historical facts: First, the existence of Palestinian camps in Lebanon as a state within a state, having their own community rules and norms, and second, the vivid memories of the role Palestinians played in the Lebanese Civil War between 1975 and 1990 and subsequent agreements that enshrined their extra-legal status.

Second-Class Residents in Lebanon

The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) recently a policy brief titled, “Legal Limbo: Who is a Refugee in Lebanon?” According to the LCPS, Lebanese “authorities have been unwilling to recognize 
 [the] refugee status [of Palestinians] or carry out their responsibilities in providing them with key rights.” Lebanon refuses to acknowledge their status because it would entitle Palestinians to certain rights under international law, such as freedom of movement, health care and education. The paper states that “the Lebanese government insists that Lebanon is not a country of asylum, and provides refugees with limited protection space and rights. 
 [Palestinians] are among the most deprived communities in Lebanon: They face poor living and housing conditions, high unemployment, restrictions from exercising 39 liberal and syndicated professions, restrictions on property ownership, and limited access to public services.”

Some fortunate Palestinians in Lebanon have been able to surreptitiously own businesses fronted by Lebanese companies, while others have found specialized employment as a result of their educational credentials. But the reality remains that Palestinians are second-class residents in Lebanon with restricted rights. Their only available employment options are limited to guest worker status in construction, agriculture, domestic services and similar low-paid jobs that Lebanese citizens have been reluctant to perform. Generally, Palestinians have the poverty level and unemployment of the Lebanese.

For decades, Lebanese leaders have insisted that recognizing Palestinians as refugees would impose enormous costs on Lebanon. They argue that doing so could lead to consequences that would upset the sectarian balance that is the basis of the government; political offices in Lebanon are split among the country’s three biggest communities — Christian, Shia and Sunni.

In the 1950s and 1960s, around 50,000 Christian Palestinians were given Lebanese . In the 1990s, about 60,000 mostly Shia Muslims received Lebanese nationality. This resulted in an uproar by Lebanese Maronites, which led to citizenship being to “mainly Christian Palestinians.” The majority of the remaining stateless Palestinians are Sunnis. If they were to be given citizenship, Lebanese authorities “fear that integration of so many Sunnis would upset the country’s precarious sectarian” makeup, posing challenging questions.

Lebanon is not a signatory to most international protocols extending protections to refugee populations. The Lebanese Constitution was amended after the civil war to explicitly , “There shall be no segregation of the people on the basis of any type of belonging, and no fragmentation, partition, or settlement of non-Lebanese in Lebanon.” This was done to make clear that any resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon would violate the constitution.

More Refugees

This question becomes relevant in light of the reality that the latest Gaza conflict between Israel and Hamas may reach the West Bank. Such a scenario would lead to more Palestinian refugees and the possibility of fighting spreading to the north of Israel.

Under international law, there are three durable solutions for refugees: voluntary repatriation, resettlement and local integration. Voluntary repatriation, referred to as the “right of return,” is anathema to Israelis who cannot consider even a fraction of Palestinian refugees and their descendants attempting to reclaim property they owned before 1948 but now largely occupied by Israelis. Resettlement refers to third-country placement, which has seen Palestinians emigrating to Europe, Gulf Arab states, the US and other destinations where quotas for refugees are recently being curtailed.

Local integration would require Lebanon to follow Jordan’s example and allow Palestinians, over time, to acquire citizenship and the rights entitled to them. This is further by the fact that under the UN Declaration of Human Rights, “Everyone has the right to see and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” Since that document is a reference point in the preamble to the Lebanese Constitution, it can then be argued that the right to seek asylum in Lebanon is a constitutional right.

So, the outcome of this latest conflict has consequences for Lebanon, even though there were no cross-border provocations that the Israelis may deem acts of war — yet. It is not inconceivable that Israel may turn to forced emigration of Palestinian-Israeli citizens as a security measure, should there be a major conflict within its borders. Whether or not this is being considered at this point remains to be seen, but it is an issue that cannot be overlooked. It is up to Lebanon’s friends to insist under any scenario that the country’s territorial integrity be honored and that the Lebanese government does all that it can to limit provocations from its territory.

It is also time for the Lebanese to face the reality that Palestinians are not returning to Palestine. A more creative and stable set of options must be discussed before the choices become constrained by another conflict.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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Toward the end of last year, many demanded on social media that the government use the gold reserves at the central bank — Banque du Liban (BDL) — to inject more liquidity into the monetary system. While this would have stripped Lebanon of its last bunker of fiscal security, the BDL proceeded to print even more pounds, giving credence to the expression “good money after bad,” except that it’s all bad. The good money in Lebanon can’t be accessed by depositors due to informal capital controls and the dwindling foreign currency reserves, which are being squeezed to pay subsidies on basic products.

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While “fresh money” or new dollar deposits from overseas can be for a full range of banking operations — such as foreign currency cash deposits and withdrawals, issuance of banker’s checks, local and international transfers, letters of credit, and commercial transactions in US dollars, euros and other major currencies — this has not relieved the pressure on consumers facing dramatic increases in the cost of living. The most recent currency drop means that the average minimum wage in Lebanon is equal to . In Syria, as of 2017, the monthly average was $100 per — the lowest in the Arab world at the time.

According to a recent Bloomberg , consumer prices skyrocketed by 145.8% in December versus the same month of 2019. This was most painful in food, rising more than 400% from a year ago, along with clothing up 560%, restaurant and hotels at 609%, and furnishing and maintenance up 655.1%. Food security has become the most critical issue in the country, surpassing concerns with securing COVID-19 vaccines. While the recent snowfall in Lebanon made for great , it exacerbated heating fuel issues and the difficulty of navigating muddy fields and tent cities that the refugees endure.

“Fixing” the Problem

A number of “fixes” are being floated to reestablish the value of the lira — from a currency board that would stabilize the lira by setting a fixed exchange rate with a foreign currency, to dollarization replacing the lira completely for transactions with a foreign currency. Any solutions must deal in the immediate term with two basic challenges: enabling a transparently functioning BDL and restraining government expenditures, while creating an economy attractive to international investors. There are many specialists who claim that properly constituting the central bank and preventing it from funding government expenditures are the most impactful actions that can be taken and the quickest route to domestic and international credibility and trust. Dealing with the massive core liability of the national debt as a result of years of mismanagement and corruption will take many more years and require painful adjustments from public sector employees and local banks holding Lebanese government bonds.

The complexity of finding the “right” solutions is highlighted in the BDL report that at the end of February 2021, foreign currency assets fell by 41% from February 2020. This was largely due, among other reasons, to the financing of subsidies for essential consumer items, including imports of fuels, wheat, medicine, medical equipment, a basket of around 300 food and non-food items, and raw materials for agriculture and industry. Unfortunately, the current scheme subsidizes across the whole population, benefiting high-income consumers as well as those in extreme poverty.

While the subsidies have been helpful, the caretaker minister of economy and trade, Raoul Nehme, and his economic adviser, Dr. Leila Dagher, that in “summary, the current scheme is unaffordable, inequitable, and inefficient as a policy instrument to help the poor and vulnerable but was necessary as a quick fix until a full-fledged program is designed and implemented.” They point out that, “It is estimated that the central bank’s current foreign exchange subsidy scheme will deplete its reserves by approximately $7 billion in 2021 if no changes are implemented.”

An Unconditional Cash Transfer System

The current subsidies regime suffers not only from unequal benefit. Nehme and Dagher add: “Moreover, millions of non-Lebanese benefit from the government subsidies. In addition, authorities are unable to monitor prices of subsidized products across the whole country, and even worse, control smuggling across the border.” Subsidized food and medicine imports intended for Lebanese have appeared in Syria, Kuwait, Turkey, East Africa and elsewhere, benefiting from porous borders exploited by Syrian and Hezbollah smugglers. This both takes essential products away from needy Lebanese and generates profits for cartels. At one point, social media circulated of fuel trucks headed into Syria with illicit shipments until the publicity forced them to use alternative, less public routes.

Of increasing is the theft of medicines and medical equipment, much of it donated by overseas Lebanese and humanitarian organizations. In February, expatriate Lebanese in the Congo teamed up with the Lebanese ambassador to Kinshasa, Haitham Ibrahim, to expose the smuggling of vital drugs from Lebanon. This is at a time when Lebanese are suffering from a shortage of medicines and hundreds of pharmacies have shut down.

Nehme and Dagher recommend the adoption of an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) card system that has been used around the world and currently in the Syrian refugee camps in Lebanon. The UCTs have a number of benefits aside from diminishing smuggling and ending subsidies for those with high incomes. UCTs are denominated in US dollars, so they do not add to inflationary pressures and instead support small businesses. Since recipients are targeted through a national registry, the spending leads to an “increase in household assets, consumption, psychological well-being, and food security. Last but not least, cash transfers allow households to have autonomy over their own lives by giving them the flexibility of choosing between different bundles of goods and services.”

Without a significant, immediate and transparent set of solutions to alter the downward trajectory of the fiscal and banking regimes in Lebanon, the country faces a bleak spring. This is due in large part to a leadership that prefers to let the country fall into the abyss while counting on the international community to come to the rescue. The oligarchy will be disappointed. The message from abroad is clear: Implement reforms and funds will come. Without commitment and action from the government, Lebanon will soon drown in its financial excess and humanitarian tragedy.

*[An earlier version of this article was published by .]

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There is a long history of Hezbollah and the disarmament issue being part of Lebanon’s political discourse. The issue is complex and contentious. There are various angles. First, one needs to distinguish between the internal Lebanese debate and the demands imposed externally by Western countries. Both perspectives are interconnected.

Within the Lebanese context, Hezbollah has over time toned down its Islamic narrative and burnished its Lebanese credentials. The party has had representatives elected to parliament, various members in the cabinet, and stated that it would be willing to discuss disarmament within the framework of national dialogue. Hezbollah has pointed out that the Lebanese government itself has sanctioned and acknowledged the Shia organization’s role as a resistance movement. It has also repeatedly that it would be willing to integrate into the national defense system once the Lebanese government is run efficiently, with the Lebanese armed forces proving capable of protecting the country.  

A number of Western and Arab states and Israel have designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization. These governments view the Iranian-sponsored group as a major obstacle that is guilty of impairing progress in the Middle East, sowing chaos and advancing Iran and Syria’s sinister plans. A common narrative in Washington, some Gulf Arab capitals and Tel Aviv is that Hezbollah is mainly an Iranian stooge and/or a Syrian agent. The Shia organization, from this , is a “state within a state” that willfully undermines the sovereignty of the Lebanese state while stripping the government of having the sole monopoly over the use of force in the country. The externally driven disarmament rhetoric, some have , is intended to demonize Iran as “harboring and abetting” terrorist movements and hence isolating it further.

The Taif Accords of 1989, which was the formal peace treaty that ended the Lebanese Civil War, stipulated and mandated that all militias be disbanded within a certain timeframe. Hezbollah was exempt from this and was allowed to hold on to its arms, which must be understood within the context of the Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanon that lasted from 1982 to 2000. For Hezbollah, holding on to its arms fulfilled various purposes.

Rationale for Retaining Its Weapons

The Lebanese group has used the disarmament issue in order to strengthen its leverage ±čŸ±Čő-Ă -±čŸ±Čő various parties, especially the state. While Hezbollah has participated in various elections and had representatives elected to parliament, the organization feels the system has not adequately reflected its legitimate grievances and power-sharing concerns. For many, Hezbollah has on a pragmatic wait-and-see approach, hoping that a political opportunity would arise. Giving up its arms would weaken its position and imply a strategic loss to the party. As some have claimed, this would jeopardize its survival as a party and as a movement as such.

However, regarding recent events, Dr. Aurelie Daher, a researcher at Sciences Po in Paris, warns: “One has to keep in mind that Hezbollah is not a party in the sense that Western political science would give the notion, as much as it is a lobby. Hezbollah does not intend to rule, does not intend to grasp all the governmental portfolios or take all and any kind of decisions at every level.”

She adds: “Their presence in Lebanese politics has been, since its beginning in the early 1990s, motivated by a will to prevent any threat against the interests of the Islamic Resistance [the military part of the organization]. As long as the other political parties and groups do not jeopardize the Islamic Resistance’s weapons, Hezbollah is ready to leave rather a comfortable room for maneuver to the other political actors — whether they are friends or foes.”

Hezbollah has repeatedly stressed its exclusive Lebanese identity while admitting to its longstanding ties to Iran and Syria. Undeniably, both countries are strategic allies that have played critical and essential roles in Hezbollah’s expansion of influence across Lebanon, the greater Middle East and presumably to other parts of the world, such as , , and .

Giving up its arms would not just substantially weaken Hezbollah, but its major patrons in Tehran and Damascus would be less inclined to invest significant amounts of funding in a group that has had to give up its major asset, namely its military capacity. Of course, Hezbollah has been very astute at diversifying its funding sources over the years and is no longer exclusively reliant on Iranian cash, which has gradually declined.

Another factor that has emboldened Hezbollah to hold on to its arms is its openly-declared success against Israel in its various confrontations, such as in the summer of 2006. Hezbollah representatives have used this event to point out the necessity of resisting Israel further. Although many argue that Hezbollah provoked the encounter with Israel and was viewed by many as instigating the conflict, it managed to take advantage of Israel’s misguided policy of coming down hard on the whole of Lebanon. By resisting the surge mounted by Israeli forces and by presenting itself as victorious in the conflict with Israel, Hezbollah managed to remind onlookers of its strength and its continued importance as a resistance movement.

In the wake of the 34-day conflict, Hezbollah once again used its well-established social welfare system to supply money to distraught Lebanese citizens who lost their homes and property. Over time, Hezbollah’s arms narrative has from liberation to resistance to deterrence.

A Moment of Change?

At the beginning of Lebanon’s thawra (also the “WhatsApp Revolution”) back in October 2019, there was little discussion about Hezbollah. Most of the protesters’ attention centered on issues such as corruption, mainstream politicians, sectarianism and the corrupt political system as such. Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, took the high ground by pointing to the party’s fight at Lebanon’s southern border with Israel and its moral stance of being a “clean” and “pure” party.

The picture started to change when Hezbollah supporters started attacking demonstrators, according to certain sources such as . Many demonstrators subsequently felt that Hezbollah, in actuality, was part of the corrupt political system that has been “controlling” the Lebanese people. Many have come to see Hezbollah as the primary backer of the current government, along with its allies, the Amal Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement.

However, according to Nicholas Blanford, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, Hezbollah also faces an array of challenges. He says these include “financial difficulties, largely due to US sanctions against it and its supporters and against Iran; corruption issues which have surfaced in the past decade-plus in part because of the party’s sudden and huge expansion in numbers after the 2006 war; [and] the weakening resistance narrative — a whole new generation of Lebanese Shias have grown up since the Israelis departed Lebanon in May 2000, and they have no memory of the Israeli threat.”

He adds: “The last major engagement with Israel was 14 years ago. Since then, Hezbollah has been fighting Arab Sunnis rather than Israeli Jews. The party has become deeply enmeshed in Lebanese politics, not out of choice but in order to better defend its resistance priority. But playing a greater political role brings its own complications.”

Instability in Syria

Looking ahead, the situation in Syria and the ways in which the US-imposed sanctions on Damascus, known as the Caesar Act, play out in the war-torn country will heavily impact on Hezbollah’s future. To be sure, the crisis in Syria is not resolved, as underscored by the situation in Idlib, the last rebel stronghold. Moreover, with anti-Assad protests breaking out in regime-controlled parts of Syria, saying that the government in Damascus faces major challenges would be an understatement.

Within this context, many Lebanese, including the majority of Shia and Christian citizens, will see Hezbollah disarming as too dangerous from a security standpoint, given that Lebanon’s border with Syria could again become porous. Most likely, wealthier Lebanese citizens who are anti-Hezbollah will leave the country as a result of the Caesar Act’s destabilizing impact on Lebanon amidst other crises stemming from the unrest resulting from the WhatsApp Revolution, the financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Perhaps this will all serve Hezbollah and its allies, who will defend the arsenal of the world’s most-heavily armed non-state actor.

*[ is a partner institution of 51łÔčÏ. This article was updated on July 14, 2020, to correct a quote by Aurelie Daher that mistakenly identified the Islamic Resistance wing of Hezbollah as the Islamic Republic of Iran.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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Refugees Build Bridges Across Society

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What is often misunderstood is that 72 years later, some are still there and living in camps, restricted in their civil rights and upsetting the political comity of Lebanon from time to time, which only deepens suspicion and mistrust among their hosts. Unless they can emigrate to the West or the Gulf, the Palestinians have no place else to go.

The Syrians, on the other hand, have a place to go — it’s right next door. But having fled an ongoing civil war in Syria, they face possible persecution, poverty, forced conscription, displacement, onerous laws for reclaiming their homes and businesses, and a military regime with no compunction to kill its own people if they return.

Lebanon’s Economic Crisis

So, are there any positive stories coming out of the Syrian refugee camps and informal settlements and their host communities in Lebanon? Most would reply that life has only gotten worse this past year as Lebanon is caught between a dysfunctional and depressed economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. Even international donors, facing their own economic and sociopolitical challenges, have cut back their support, and less than half of the $2.6-billion appeal for the national was funded in 2019. 

In an article for the , Salman Husain and Diam Abou-Diab write: “Overall, refugees in Lebanon are unable to benefit from international instruments of refugee protection and more than two-thirds of Syrian households lack legal residency due to institutional barriers.” With the collapse of the Lebanese economy, jobs have disappeared, wages are so low for the few available informal jobs and basic living costs have skyrocketed. And, in the last year, host communities have turned against refugees, which has led to mass evictions, restrictions on entry and egress, and unlawful deportations to Syria. Refugees have become a favorite target for some politicians who blame them for Lebanon’s deteriorating quality of life.

“In April, humanitarian agencies found that at least twenty-one Lebanese municipalities introduced additional restrictions on Syrian refugees that weren’t applied to Lebanese citizens,” Husain and Abou-Diab add, which “further restrained people’s ability to access cash or purchase basic goods.” Syrians have become an easy target for those wanting to circulate rumors about the spread of the novel coronavirus — which causes the COVID-19 disease — as the refugee camps have close quarters, little running water and poor sanitation facilities, and medicines are hard to find.

There has been a substantial rise in the price of basic food commodities like sugar and rice. This has rendered a number of once-affordable items inaccessible to the nearly 70% of Syrian households living in poverty, and the number is growing. “The International Rescue Committee, a humanitarian nongovernmental organization, reported that 90% of Syrian refugees they surveyed in April said they are ‘in critical need of food.’ This figure was only 32% in March,” reports.

Another Day Without Hope

As seen in many countries, the lockdowns caused by the coronavirus pandemic have led to a rise in domestic violence. Husain and Abou-Diab note that, in March, Lebanon saw 100% spike in the number of assault cases against refugees and Lebanese women and girls. They add that “nearly half of Syrian and Lebanese caregivers, recently, reported increased levels of violence against children since the national lockdown caused by COVID-19.” Children are out of school, with no access to remote education, forced out of their tents in refugee camps to find what little employment is available, bearing more scars from their experiences.

While there are many international and local organizations working to improve conditions, funding is in short supply and getting worse. Negotiations between the Lebanese government and the International Monetary Fund will not change the plight of the refugees. Their needs are not included in the government’s financial recovery plan, and IMF assistance is not designated for humanitarian assistance.

With no short-term anticipation of a radical change in Syria that would make a voluntary, safe and supportive return possible, World Refugee Day will turn out to be another day without hope. 

*[Jean AbiNader is an international development consultant who writes on the Middle East and North Africa from Washington, DC. This article represents his own opinions and not that of any of his clients.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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So, in following recent events on social media and articles in various outlets, I hope to find how Lebanese-Americans and our friends can support the peoples’ struggles for dignity, a functioning government that is transparent, and an inclusive society that respects individual human and civil rights. It has not been easy as there are many issues deeply rooted in the dysfunctional political character of the Lebanese government since the 1989 Taif Agreement, which helped to end the 15-year civil war in Lebanon.

Recent articles by and help frame the moods of the protesters, while other sources including from the American University of Beirut and from Lebanese American University have added clarity to both the demands of the demonstrators and possible solutions.

Protests in Lebanon

Identifying the core concern of the demonstrators is a starting point. As the president of the American Task Force for Lebanon (ATFL), Edward Gabriel noted in a the basic issues are the economy and quality of life. These are the central issues because of the corruption, mismanagement and cronyism of those who have exploited Lebanon in its downward spiral of increased national debt, bloated and inefficient bureaucracy, and lack of transparency in its administration. This is at the heart of the chants made by the protesters — that all of them, the current leadership, must go since they are responsible for the crises in Lebanon.

As one of my sources said, “I think the most important thing now is to stabilize the economic/financial situation,” which means moving aggressively to achieve the proposed zero deficit budget and ending “the kind of corruption inside and outside the state.”

Tied to this is the reality that this may not be enough to convince people that the government is serious about changing. For example, last week, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri presented more than 30 steps adopted by the government to reduce expenditures, relieve some of the tax pressures on the people, and move ahead with projects to clean up the infrastructure.

Commentators have questioned how the government is able to do this in 72 hours when it couldn’t even agree on the 2019 budget in seven months. So, the pressure from the people continues as they have little faith in promises from politicians who have consistently let down the public. One suggestion is to replace the leadership with “new, clean, independent figures, to send the kind of signals to the public that things can’t continue like this. The political-economic elite over-stretched, assuming people can be oppressed forever in the name of sectarianism.”

The Words of Lebanese People

One of the observations often mentioned is that the demonstrators come , cutting across sectarian identities and regions, in a common message of “enough.” A friend of mine said: “It is such a historic and hopeful moment for Lebanon. People have beautifully, clearly, and loudly spoke about their demands for change — for genuine reforms that all the Lebanese (beyond the sectarian divide) aspire to achieve. It is equally true that people have a valid feeling of apprehension of what could happen next. The challenge, coupled with anxiety, is how to move from the euphoria of street politics to negotiating workable solutions, knowing how immune the sectarian system is to change.”

This has been the nub of the challenge, how to move forward against the entrenched interests that have led Lebanon for the past 50 years. Some people point to the option of having the military step in to support a transition to new leadership through a reformed and transparent election process. Another person told me that “the main recommendation would be to push for a new, independent provisional cabinet (from professionals, clean judges, etc.) with real powers to work on a two-year plan to enact three priorities: genuine reform drive, including fighting corruption, and quick measures to save the economy; a new general election law that can ensure better representation, which in turn would elect a new president and select a new prime minister; and, start real dialogue on the future of Hezbollah.

The source added, “I know these may sound like wishful thinking, but these demands have been voiced (in different ways) by people on the streets. Today is the right moment to capitalize on the protest movement for real change while stressing on [the] need to be prepared for pushing back the push back.”

When I asked what the US government should be doing, the answer came quickly: “The US government should state that it supports this revolution in Lebanon against corruption and calls the current government to adhere to democracy and not practice violence against demonstrators.”

This would include supporting the formation of a small cabinet of technocrats who can devise, with existing power centers, a roadmap for reform with an oversight body and timeline to implement it. As important is the need to encourage the development of an internal mechanism in the country “to hold accountable all those who misused the public wealth for their own interests and sue them and regain the stolen money.” 

These are the words of Lebanese who are not looking to emigrate. These are people who deeply care about their country and are fighting for its future as a democratic, free and open society. As Lebanese-Americans who care about Lebanon, we too have a stake in their fight. Each of us, in our own way, should find a way to move Lebanon forward and remake it into a country that will once again be an example of a just and progressive society.

*[A version of this article was published by .]

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Let’s talk trash. Over the past year, I have been endlessly lobbying for the right solution to the waste problem to be implemented in Lebanon in my capacity as “national expert on waste-to-energy,” as one minister once called me on TV.

Please! Anyone else competing for that title will be challenged to a duel on top of a mountain of trash. Come forward now or forever hold your peace (and your nose since, you know, the smells and stuff).

Famed author, physician and documentary filmmaker Pedram Shojai, known as “The Urban Monk,” heard of all these efforts and hosted me on his show to discuss my work and the Lebanese waste crisis. This happened in Los Angeles, 12,000 kilometers away from Lebanon. This media personality in LA was more interested in this clean work in Lebanon than most of the news outlets here in Beirut. No complaints. It’s an honor.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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’s decision to ban its citizens from traveling to only raises more questions about the kingdom’s foreign policy in the Middle East. The  comes on the heels of previous decisions to cut off aid to Beirut and withdraw deposits with the Lebanese central bank. Riyadh’s move was followed by similar actions from other members of the (GCC), including Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

These actions come at a bad time for the battered Levantine nation. With its population swelled by nearly 25% by Syrian refugees, the concomitant Syrian Civil War on its eastern border raging into its sixth year, and its presidential selection saga still undecided, Lebanon cannot afford to lose either the GCC funds on which it has depended for so long, nor the many Gulf travelers who come to enjoy and generously spend their vacation cash in the famous Mediterranean resort nation.

Saudi Arabia’s decision was ostensibly made because of Lebanon-based ’s major role in the Syrian crisis, in which Riyadh and Doha are backing forces opposing the Assad regime’s forces, which are heavily supported by Hezbollah fighters, weapons and intelligence.

But one must ask how depriving Beirut of the GCC’s vital support will hurt Hezbollah or in any way undermine its efforts in Syria. The Lebanese government has no ability to diminish, much less eliminate, Hezbollah’s role in Lebanese politics or policy, or the presence of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. For the time being, Hezbollah is an established if undesirable feature of Lebanon’s contorted and ill-constructed political system.

One might also conclude that Beirut may end up becoming more dependent on Saudi Arabia’s principal arch-rival for power and influence in the Middle East, Iran. The latter, already heavily entrenched as well in the Syria fighting in support of , will have no interest in seeing yet another important base for Shia influence in the region made more unstable. But then, neither will Jordan, Egypt or Israel. Nor can the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a longtime supporter of the Sunni factions in Lebanon, see instability there as in its interest.

The funding decisions may also have to do with some unfamiliar belt-tightening that is taking place in Saudi Arabia. Oil prices still hang around the $30-dollar mark after an 18-month decline from $100-plus per barrel, and forecasts suggest that it may be until 2017 before oil exporters like Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states see any rebound in those prices.

According to , oil revenue is the single biggest source of government income in Saudi Arabia, at an estimated 90%. The price plummet left a budget deficit of $98 billion in 2015, or about 15% of gross domestic product. The  another $87-billion deficit this year, further eroding the kingdom’s once enormous reserves.

© Shutterstock

So, reducing aid, a familiar budget cutting measure among Western nations, might seem like a logical move for Riyadh.

However, punishing an otherwise Saudi-friendly Lebanon, which also enjoys the support of the US and France among others, would appear to be an unwise tactical move, cutting off one’s nose to spite its face. While perhaps throwing a short-term wrench in Iran’s policy calculations, the move most certainly will not affect its support for Hezbollah or Syria, nor upset Hezbollah’s role in Syria. But it will further weaken Lebanon as it battles to keep afloat on so many fronts: security, economics and domestic politics.

The decisions regarding Lebanon are attributed to King Salman’s young son and deputy crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. While his intentions to diversify the kingdom’s oil-dependent economy, privatize state enterprises and reduce subsidies are to be lauded, this decision, which most assuredly impacts foreign and security policy, appears unwise if not erratic.

Saudi Arabia and the US

Did Saudi Arabia’s policymaking leadership coordinate this among themselves or with important allies beyond the GCC, such as the US?

The status of relations with the latter is well-known, as Saudi authorities have expressed both privately and even publicly their dissatisfaction with Washington’s policy decisions as they apply to the Middle East—from lackluster support for the moderate opposition in Syria to last year’s P5+1 agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear development program.

That Riyadh did not consult with Washington on its decision over Lebanon would seem all but apparent. Had it done so, the US might have advised other ways to address the Hezbollah question in Lebanon without harming the country. Saudi Arabia’s European allies doubtlessly would have counseled the same.

When considered in light of other decisions emanating from the kingdom since Salman’s assumption of the throne in January 2015—for example, the destructive civil war in Yemen, which shows little evidence of ending; fruitless flailing over what to do in Syria; and pointless antagonizing of a resurgent Iran—one is left to wonder how much more damage to Riyadh’s interests await.

More than anything, however, this latest decision may illustrate the erratic nature of decision-making in a Riyadh untethered to what had been heretofore a core strategic relationship with Washington. Saudi Arabia may be correct in that the US has showed some unsophisticated policymaking in the Middle East, perhaps as a result of having failed to listen closely enough to its key allies like Riyadh.

But the two countries still share a vital core interest: Gulf and regional security and stability. This latest decision would appear to act in contravention to both.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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Downtown is known for its fancy shops, luxury restaurants and expensive apartments that no one can afford. This district, which is secured by security forces and the Lebanese army, was famous for not having any street art or graffiti on its walls. But that’s no longer the case.

In summer 2015, with thousands of people descending on the center of Beirut and marching toward ’s parliament and governmental buildings, the armed soldiers couldn’t protect the walls from graffiti.

Protests in Lebanon began in response to the government’s failure to address a mounting waste management crisis. Soon, the focus shifted from the garbage standoff to the sectarian nature of the Lebanese government and high-level corruption in administrative quarters. Even though the activists and residents of Beirut have not seen their demands met, the forbidden part of the Lebanese capital still exposes their mottos and political slogans.

Today, Arabic and English slogans cover the walls of downtown Beirut. The governmental buildings, cement blocks, and jewelry and wedding shops all showcase the demands for political change in Lebanon.

This new wave of graffiti is heavily based on writing and stencil work. During the Lebanese Civil War, the different warring factions used the same techniques to mark their territory and display their slogans. But today, sectarianism does not divide the activists and graffiti artists. During the 2015 social movement, activists from different social and sectarian backgrounds united to hold the Lebanese government to account.

Apart from downtown, the messages and artwork of anti-corruption activists are visible in both East and West Beirut. During the civil war between 1975 and 1990, the two zones were separated due to sectarian differences. The European equivalent for this new wave of street art in Beirut would be  during the 1970s.

Those who spray the recent works on Beirut’s walls are from a different background compared to the famous Lebanese street artists. Most graffiti artists in the country are from the higher class of society and usually avoid direct political messages. Today, what we see on Beirut’s walls is mostly written or created by the middle-class.

The new graffiti writings in downtown Beirut have opponents, but this new eruption of words on the city’s walls demonstrates the real needs, wishes and demands of Lebanese people.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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On a sunny day in the Jaharriyeh refugee camp in ’s Bekaa Valley, winter might seem far away. But for the 250 families living here in tents less than 20 kilometers from the Syrian border, it is coming.

Camp leader Ali is unequivocal when asked whether its inhabitants are ready for winter. “No, nothing has changed from the last year and we are not prepared,” he tells me. In 2014, several people, including children, died during the winter months. Even a superficial look at the tents, rebuilt after a devastating fire hit the camp last June, reveals they won’t provide much shelter when temperatures drop.

In November, Salam LADC, a Lebanese organization working with and host communities predominantly in areas close to the Syrian border, partnered with students from the Lebanese-Armenian Haigazian University to distribute winter hats in the camp as part of efforts to prepare for the cold months.

As people lined up with sheets of paper in their hands noting how many family members they had, members of the university’s Desert Stream Club played games with the children, punctuated by chanting and groups of kids playing football. As a tour around the camp shows, there is not much for children to do here.

While the increasing flow of has dominated international headlines over the last year, it is Middle Eastern countries like Lebanon that are bearing the brunt of the refugee crisis caused by the brutal war in neighboring Syria.

A small country located at the eastern edge of the Mediterranean, Lebanon hosts at least 1 million Syrians according to official numbers by the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR). However, the actual number is estimated to be significantly greater with estimates as high as 1.8 million people. In May 2015, the UNHCR suspended the registration of new refugees as per the instruction of the Lebanese government.

Jaharriyeh camp 

Most of people living in al-Jaharriyeh camp are from Homs, as Oussama Ibrahim, the regional coordinator at Salam LADC in the Bekaa Valley, explains. The camp, which was established in 2012 near the town of El Marj, houses up to 1,300 people in 180 tents—around 400 of them are children.

Ali has been living here for two and a half years. “At the beginning, it started with ten tents,” he says. “Then my relatives came and some other people joined us. Now, there are 250 families and 1,300 refugees in the camp.”

Jaharriyeh camp is only one of countless informal settlements across Lebanon, often erected just at the side of streets next to small communities.

As is the case in other communities, the influx of Syrians around El Marj has put an increasing strain on resources, creating some tensions. But as Joseph Matta, director of Salam LADC, says, problems with the electricity supply and rubbish collection existed before. He goes on to explain that shortages are often falsely blamed on the arrival of Syrians.

“There is more need than capacity” despite support for the refugees from the municipality, he adds.

While this was not the case in El Marj, a mostly Sunni village supporting the uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, tensions between Syrian refugees and Shia communities are frequently intensified due to different stances on the conflict in Syria, Matta points out.

Imad Salamey, an associate professor at the Lebanese American University, tells me that the Syrian Civil War has led to increased polarization and deepened sectarian divisions in Lebanon between Shias and Sunnis.

Back at al-Jaharriyeh, Ali explains that the camp has grown bigger and bigger, even after June’s devastating fire, as the $40 rent for each tent (and $20 for electricity) is a lot cheaper than renting a room or apartment in the nearby communities. Despite the lower rents, it costs about $1,000 to buy a tent, says Ali.

In order to help the camp be more prepared for potential emergencies, Salam LADC is training an emergency team that can handle smaller crises like another fire or collapsing tents, Ibrahim says. Fifteen people are trained to be part of this team.

Despite these efforts, yet another winter without proper housing will be a tough challenge for those who have fled the war in Syria.

A lack of coordination 

While at least three local organizations are coordinating their activities in the refugee camp, such coordination is rather rare, says Sami, a former aid worker who did not want to give his full name due to the sensitivity of the matter.

© Changiz M. Varzi

While local nongovernmental organizations (NGO) establish a more direct and responsive relationship with the refugees than international NGOs, there is often a lack of coordination between them, Sami mentions during our meeting in Beirut. There are no formal mechanisms in place for local NGOs to coordinate, leading to possible duplication of assistance in some cases and a lack of assistance in others—for example, handing out too many blankets to a family that is in need of heating material, Sami says.

“It’s not an exaggeration when someone says coordination saves lives, because it honestly does. And coordination has been lacking, especially with local NGOs,” Sami adds. Looking at the roots of this gap, he points not only at competitiveness between local organizations to gain a better reputation—for example, regarding who responds to a larger number of people—but also sensitivities between people leading NGOs.

“Coordination happens sometimes, but it is on an ad-hoc basis, so there is no structure. There is no inter-agency coordination group or committee,” according to Sami, who witnessed the lack of coordination in northern Lebanon in the winter of 2013.

Other NGO workers confirm off the record that relations between local NGOs can be quite personalized and lack a formal structure.

Reflecting on the overall response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, however, Professor Salamey offers a different perspective: “In a country of 4 million people, receiving 1.5 million refugees and given this country’s sectarian divisions and government failures in many areas—to be capable 
 [of hosting] such a number of refugees without totally breaking down is a miracle.”

While noting various problems, including human rights violations, attacks against refugees, and children begging in the street on top of a lack of an official refugee policy, Salamey says, “Given what we’re encountering and how we’re coping with the situation, I think it’s not bad the response overall.”

“I give huge credit to Lebanon and its people for being able to respond and not totally collapse.”

The question nevertheless remains: How much longer can this “miracle” be upheld?

*[A version of this article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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One look at the old reminds every visitor to the capital that this city was a warzone. Large holes from artillery and sniper shells, some of them about 40-years-old, etch this unofficial landmark of ’s civil war, which ended in 1990.

“A lot of people pass by these buildings every day as if they are something normal, but they are not. They are remnants of the war. They are our wounds, they are the issues that the war left us,” street artist Jad el-Khoury tells me during a meeting in East Beirut’s Gemmayze district.

On November 15, Khoury “attacked” the Holiday Inn. His weapons: spray paint, color and ropes with which to abseil from the top of the remnants of the hotel (all with official permission). Khoury, a young Lebanese man with a background in architecture, transformed part of the façade with his graffiti work. “Highlighting the war traces,” as he explains.

“So the people look at them and are kind of reminded of the war, especially the new generation, which didn’t live through the war, like me.”

“We should know, if we keep going like this, with this racism in us, we might repeat it. In order to prevent this, I am highlighting it,” Khoury says.

This is not the first building he has transformed. Also in November, after long hours of training, he rappelled from a building, spraying his signature characters around the edges of the holes that were caused by shelling during the war. The red characters are hard to miss on the drive between West Beirut and the downtown area.

Talking about the remnants of war in the Lebanese capital, he says, “The government is doing nothing, the owners are doing nothing, so I decided to do something, but without erasing them. Instead, I wanted to highlight them. That’s where the idea of ‘War Peace’ comes from—highlighting the war traces using my signature characters, which I call Potato Nose.”

Khoury says he had wanted to leave Lebanon in the past, out of frustration with “the corruption, the racism, the poverty, the pollution.” During this time, he created a character called Single Man.

© Jad el-Khoury

“Single Man is about the phase when I needed to leave, so I created this character who was living in his bubble and he doesn’t want anyone from society inside.”

But a meeting with Lebanese architect and artist Nadim Karam changed his outlook, he says.

“I always thought an international architect and artist like him should be living in New York or London, and not here,” Khoury explains. After finding out that Karam actually lived in Lebanon, he went to meet him. His first question: “Why are you here?” The reply: “Here they need us the most and this is where we should be.”

This response had a fundamental impact on the young urban artist’s way of looking at his home country.Ìę“My perspective changed and I started to use the traces of war as a source of inspiration,” Khoury says.

But he doesn’t want his art to overpower the traces of war. “If you see the whole thing, the characters are still a minority. The war traces are still the primary thing. The first thing should be the war traces and then the potato nose.”

What’s next? “I still have one more building to attack,” he says with a smile.

*[A version of this article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Jad el-Khoury

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Adel Termos did not hesitate to throw himself at the man he saw approaching a crowded mosque with an explosive vest. He was instantly killed when the bomb went off right in front of his 6-year-old daughter, who survived, along with hundreds of others because of his sacrifice.

Termos’ heroism, however, went largely unnoticed by the rest of the world. On November 12, the (IS) killed 43 people in a in Burj al-Barajneh, a predominantly Shia neighborhood in southern .

The following day, IS launched a series of attacks in Paris that killed 130 people and wounded hundreds more. While the international community reacted to the Beirut bombings with apathy, they were horrified by the Paris attacks. The media coverage surrounding the terrorist attacks, and the magnitude of solidarity that individuals shared with the French, was unprecedented. But it left the Shias of wondering why they were forgotten.

“Hezbollah Bastion”

This is not the first time the West has brushed off a horrific attack like the one in Beirut, but it nonetheless demonstrates extreme double-standards. US President Barack Obama called the atrocities in Paris an “attack on civilization” and a “blow on humanity,” while barely paying lip service about the Beirut bombings. His statements insinuate that Lebanese Shias are not a part of the civilization that the United States and France belong to. Thus, an attack on them is not a blow on humanity.

The media also sought to dehumanize Shias. Reuters described Burj al-Barajneh as a “,” while The New York Times called it a “.” Media outlets reduced the residents of the neighborhood to being mere supporters of Hezbollah, which is deemed a terrorist organization by the West, stripping them of human value for readers.

To add insult to injury, Lebanese watched as people around the world used a French flag filter over their profile pictures to show support for Parisians, courtesy of Facebook. The social network also activated a safety check for those inside Paris during the time of the attacks, which immediately notified friends and family that they were safe with the click of a button.

There was no Lebanese flag filter. There was no safety check for people in Beirut.

Facebook typically reserves this feature for natural disasters, but made an exception for the Paris attacks. While Facebook’s actions were a noble effort to allow people to show their support for France, it illustrates an extreme double-standard held by those in the West—that greater human value is awarded to people in the West, while less is given to those in the East.

In 1978, Edward Said, a noted scholar, described this phenomenon as “Orientalism,” which is the idea that Western identity is superior in comparison with all non-Western people. As evidenced by the different reactions to both IS attacks, not much has changed.

It is understandable why Westerners would feel a closer affinity toward the French than the Lebanese. They share a similar culture, religious practices and have an undeniably longer history that predates any relations the US has had with a Middle Eastern country. It is only natural that an attack on the French pulls harder at American heartstrings than one on the Lebanese.

However, Orientalism is still at play because of people’s misconceptions of Lebanon, due to their bias against people from the East. Lebanon is seen as being a war-torn country where violence is the norm. Conflict is inevitable, as it is in any other country with a significant Muslim population. It came as no surprise when news of the Beirut bombings was received with insignificance, like any other casualties coming from the Middle East.

But it should have.ÌęLebanon has surprisingly faced relative calm in comparison to other states in the region, even though it borders Syria.

Despite its deeply divided society between Maronite Christians and Sunni and Shia Muslims, Lebanon’s sectarianism tends to run through its politics. Although groups like Jabhat al-Nusra from Syria have launched attacks in Tripoli, a city three hours north of Beirut, authorities have been successful in not only quashing other attacks, but also preventing the violence from spreading deeper into Lebanon.

The population of Tripoli largely reflects that of Syria’s, with a majority Sunni population and a minority Alawite community. It also hosts one of the largest Palestinian refugee camps, which radical Islamists see as prime recruiting grounds into their organizations because of Palestinian animosity toward the government, which has failed to not only provide them with a pathway for citizenship, but also integrate them into Lebanese society.

Paris, ironically, has suffered from more recent terrorist attacks on its civilian population than Beirut. Its most recent attack before November 13 took place earlier this year, when gunmen brought France to a standstill over three days of terror. Prior to that, a series of stabbing rampages, vehicle ramming and other shootings have plagued the European state.

Fallout From Syria

Even Arab countries, which have a greater understanding of how unprecedented the attack was on Beirut, have not even condemned the bombings. It was not only the West that received news of the bombings with apathy, but also the rest of the Middle East, particularly Sunni Arab states.

The Middle East has a Shia problem for two reasons: First, many Arabs view Shia Muslims as heretics, and second, because Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is from the Alawite sect, an off-shoot of Shia Islam. Assad’s oppression of the majority Sunni population drove the uprisings in 2011, when Syrians were inspired by their Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts to take action against state injustice.

© Shutterstock

Assad has largely been able to hold onto his power because of groups like Hezbollah, who entered Syria shortly after the conflict began to help bolster his regime. As groups like the IS evolved inside the country, and off-shoots of al-Qaeda began to emerge, the Syrian conflict adopted a sectarian nature that soon spread throughout the rest of the region like a disease. Syria has since become a proxy war between Sunnis and Shias.

It is for this reason that powerful countries like Saudi Arabia swiftly condemned the Paris attacks, while remaining silent on the Beirut bombings. Similar to how many people in the West may negatively view the Shias of southern Beirut, many Sunni Arabs also believe that the Lebanese deserve to feel the wrath that Hezbollah has helped entrap the Syrian people in.

But Lebanese Shias are not calling for the slaughter of the Syrian people. Most did not support Hezbollah’s initial involvement in the Syrian Civil War. Over time and as the conflict grew and introduced new actors like the Islamic State, they began to realize that Hezbollah was a necessary evil to prevent a spillover of the Syrian conflict, despite the human rights atrocities the Shia movement was committing next door.

Hezbollah continues to be the most formidable security force inside Lebanon, even though foreign aid from Saudi Arabia and the US has helped strengthen the Lebanese army. This fact has greatly afflicted the Lebanese, especially Shias, who have been delegitimized by the actions of Hezbollah inside Syria.

However, they do not have much of a choice but to support the organization. Hezbollah is the main Shia political party in Lebanon, and it has provided the group with its first real representation in government—whose power has disproportionately favored the Maronites and Sunnis, thus marginalizing the Shia. Lebanese Shias support Hezbollah not for its terrorist activity and aid to the Assad regime, but because without it, they would wield very little power inside Lebanon.

Long Forgotten

The consequence is that the rest of the world—both the West and the East—has dehumanized Shias and ignored their recent devastation by the Beirut bombings. And it will likely not be the last.

The Paris attacks reminded Lebanese Shias of how unimportant they are in the eyes of the international community. Despite this, the Lebanese have still mourned for the French. The death tolls in Paris may have far exceeded that in Beirut, but the magnitude of the bombings could have had the potential to kill hundreds more if it wasn’t for the courageous sacrifice of Adel Termos.

While Shias have been marginalized and forgotten, so too have the Syrians, who endure what the French and Lebanese went through on a daily basis.

As the world rallies around the Parisians, the Shias of Burj al-Barajneh struggle to rebuild their community and come to terms with not only the loss of loved ones, but also the disregard for their humanity that was made so apparent in the world’s reaction to the Beirut bombings.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Ìę/ /Ìę

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This week, three terrorist attacks shook the world. In Lebanon, the Islamic State (IS) carried out a in the Shia-dominated southern Beirut, killing at least 43 people and injuring more than 200. In Iraq, a blew himself up at the funeral of a pro-government Shia fighter in Baghdad, killing at least 21 people and injuring 46. In France, IS carried out its most  in Paris. A series of shootings, bombings and hostage taking have resulted in 129 dead and more than 350 wounded.

In January, Islamist terrorists carried out attacks in both . This week, the attacks in Paris have been of a different scale altogether. Not since World War II has the French capital experienced such violence. In Europe, an attack of this magnitude has not taken place since the Madrid train bombings of 2004. French President François Hollande has declared it to be “ that was waged by a terrorist army, a jihadist army, by Daesh, against France.” It is important to note that Hollande referred to IS by its Arabic acronym. He went on to declare, “France, because it was freely, cowardly attacked, will be merciless against the terrorists,” and that la grande nation “will triumph over barbarism.”

France is in a state of shock. This great European power with its legendary Gallic pride has woken up to discover that large-scale violence is not the monopoly of revolution and war. US President Barack Obama, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and others have pledged support for France. Buildings around the world were lit up in the French tricolor and sympathy is not in short supply. The Pavlovian media reaction worldwide is an unremitting focus on Paris alone. The same cannot be said for the dead in Beirut or Baghdad. are clearly neither as valuable nor as worthy as French ones.

There is a veritable cornucopia of commentators who are wielding megaphones in the age of attention deficit disorder where social media has spread everyone a mile wide and an inch thick. Yet fundamental questions are not tackled. For instance, why is terror back in business?

A little more than 200 years ago, a French lawyer named Maximilien Robespierre launched the Reign of Terror after the French Revolution. He declared that virtue without terror was impotent and that : “Terror is nothing but prompt, severe, inflexible justice; it is therefore an emanation of virtue.” Robespierre’s ideas did not fall to the guillotine even though his head did.

Terrorism emerged as a major political tool from the 19^th century for those fighting for justice, equality and political change. In 1858, Felice Orsini, a patriot in the eyes of the Italians and a terrorist from the point of view of the French, tried to kill French Emperor Napoleon III. In 1881, Tsar Alexander II, the pragmatist reformist who had emancipated Russian serfs in 1861, was assassinated by anarchists whom some saw as revolutionaries while other condemned as terrorists. In the same year of the tsar’s assassination, the Irish Republican Brotherhood started the Fenway dynamite campaign. They shifted their focus from political assassination to indiscriminate bombings to instill fear in the heart of their English oppressors.

Terrorism during this era was a result of unprecedented political, economic and social strain. People wanted more liberty. Those in power wanted to retain most if not all of it. These tsars, emperors, kings, nobles and assorted flunkeys were fighting to retain their privileges, and revolutionaries were waging what they saw as a struggle for freedom and justice. Industrialization was leading to urban misery, increased inequality and unbridled exploitation. It was also ripping apart rural communities, destroying age-old rhythms of life and creating urban ghettos full of discontent. As the old social fabric disintegrated, a new zeitgeist of revolts, rebellion and revolution emerged. War and oppression were the terror of the strong, while terrorism was sanctified as the war of the weak.

To echo Hamlet, “the time is out of joint” again. Terrorism is the mere symptom of a world gone horribly wrong. In 1989, two centuries after the French Revolution, the Berlin Wall fell. By 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. In the words of Francis Fukuyama, this development was meant to usher in “the end of history” and herald an age where human rights, democracy and liberal values would triumph worldwide. There was also an implicit and often explicit promise. People would benefit from markets that would offer them more freedom and choice. This brave new world was supposed to give people the opportunity not only to buy McDonald’s and Coca Cola, but also to provide them meaningful work that would give their children a better shot at life.

This economic promise of the end of history has been broken. In the words of Ti Ngo, a brilliant young historian at Berkeley, the disenchantment with the broken promise of economic opportunity is leading people to move away from ideas such as democracy and fairness to narrow sectarian and ethnic identities instead. In France, people are turning to Marine Le Pen, while the Islamic State is on the rise in formerly socialist entities of Syria and Iraq.

The attacks in Beirut, Baghdad and Paris ironically occurred barely 12 hours after Obama had declared that IS had been “contained.” Earlier this month, an IS affiliate had brought down a , killing all 224 passengers on board. Clearly, Obama is wrong. The Islamic State is a cunning and formidable enemy. It has taken over the mantle of al-Qaeda and taken advantage of both the Syrian Civil War and the imbroglio in Iraq.

As is well-known, George W. Bush’s intervention destroyed the Sykes-Picot order based on arbitrary nation states with centralized bureaucracies and bloodthirsty despots. Saddam Hussein’s Tikrit-based ostensibly socialist gang was deposed and the Shias began to dominate Baghdad even as the Kurds drifted apart. Since the Syrian Civil War, the Sunni-Shia conflagration has spread across borders. Now, the Middle East is going through its version of the . People are dying by the thousands and fleeing in the millions.

In such traumatic times, the proffered by IS has become seductive to those disgruntled with the status quo. It evokes the myth of a glorious caliphate and provides ready enemies in the form of Shias, other heterodox Islamic sects, Sunnis who do not buy into radical Islam, Christians, atheists and imperial powers such as France, Britain and the US that have long imposed their writ on the Muslim world. Violence is a justified means to achieve God’s will on earth.

The disaffected minorities who have long been discriminated against in countries like France provide rich pickings for IS. La grande nation has , suburban housing projects where unemployment, crime, discrimination, racism and social exclusion are daily phenomena. In 2005, riots broke out in 274 towns for three weeks. The Independent estimates that France provides the highest number of in Syria.

The great risk for France and the world is to view terror through a simplistic lens. Bush’s Global War on Terror was a pathetic failure because terror is just a tool that flares up in times of turmoil. More guns and planes do not necessarily lead to safety. More snooping by an Orwellian state does not do much good either. Slamming doors in the face of refugees will not work. Le Pen’s far-right racism only provides more recruits for the Islamic State. Only an honest effort to tackle the political, economic and social dislocation of our times can curb terror.

*[You can receive “The World This Week” directly in your inbox by subscribing to our mailing list. Simply visit  and enter your email address in the space provided. Meanwhile, please find below five of our finest articles for the week.]

Deadly Attacks in Paris Bring France to a Standstill

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With at least 127 dead in Paris, serious questions will be raised, but where will the answers be found?

There is blood on the streets of Paris. A city under siege. A nation gripped in panic. At the time of writing, at least 127 people have been murdered by terrorists in six separate incidences of horrific violence, with the express aim to instill fear in the hearts of many.

In less than a year, France has once again been subjected to terrorism, this time on a huge scale. There is every indication that these the events follow the pattern of radicalization found among young Muslim men witnessed throughout parts of western Europe for at least a decade. Some of these more prominent incidents occurred in Madrid and Amsterdam in 2004, London in 2005, Woolwich in 2013, and Copenhagen and Paris earlier in 2015.

In the most recent occurrence on November 13, the perpetrators might have been French-born, or not. At this stage, one can only speculate as to their true


Lindsey Graham on US Foreign Policy in the Middle East

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In this edition of The Interview, 51łÔčÏ talks to Republican Senator and US presidential candidate Lindsey Graham.

Foreign policy is a long game—a calculus that should always supersede the whimsical proclivities of election year politics or petty score settling. Unfortunately, this has never really been the case. Over the years, Republicans and Democrats alike have polluted the foreign policy lexicon to score cheap political points at the expense of long-term strategies in places like Iraq and Syria.

However, within this vortex of confusing policy conundrums and complex decision-making, there has always been the steady hand of Republican Senator, and now presidential hopeful, Lindsey Graham.

Senator Graham has been described as many things over the years—war hawk, interventionist, realist—but one thing is for certain: He has a detailed plan to address some of the most challenging foreign policy issues of our times, which is more than what most politicians are ever able to claim.

In this edition of The Interview, 51łÔčÏ talks to Senator Lindsey Graham about Russia, Iraq


Hillary Clinton, Take Another Look at the American Jewish Community

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In an open letter to Hillary Clinton, a Jewish activist calls out the Democratic presidential candidate over a recent article.

Dear Secretary Clinton,

I have faith that you want to stand with the Jewish people as we work toward peace with the Palestinians. But your recent article in The Forward did exactly the opposite.

You glorified Israel without mentioning its nearly 50-year-old military occupation and outlined how you plan to “reaffirm our unbreakable bond with Israel” without addressing its rightward anti-democratic spiral. This was a faulty political calculation, marginalizing a powerful progressive constituency in the American Jewish community. Further, your rhetoric on the situation in Jerusalem deliberately ignored critical context, fanning the flames of incitement. I implore you: ±è±ô±đČčČő±đÌędo better.

Over the past decade, the community of American Jews who oppose the Israeli occupation has built impressive political power. Perhaps most obvious is the rise of J Street, the “pro-Israel, pro-peace” lobby that supports a two state solution. In synagogues, community centers and college campuses across America, J Street has


Yes, Myanmar is a Democracy With An Asterisk

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Myanmar’s constitution awards a quarter of its parliament to the military. But that’s not Aung San Suu Kyi’s biggest problem by a long shot.

On November 8, voters went to the polls in Myanmar to elect a new parliament. The opposition National League for Democracy (NLD)—Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi’s party—scored an impressive victory. According to the early returns, the NLD is on track to win over 80% of the vote and capture a sizeable majority in parliament.

And yet the election carries with it an asterisk—just like the New England Patriots’ 2015 Super Bowl victory (deflated footballs) or Barry Bonds’ home run record (steroids). In Myanmar’s case, the asterisk involves the 25% of seats set aside for representatives of the military. This bloc also holds veto power over any constitutional changes. And, according to the constitution, Suu Kyi can’t be president.

Because of these asterisks, The Washington Post’s Jackson Diehl used Myanmar as Exhibit A in his criticism this week of the Obama


Land Mafia Fire Game Lights Up Indonesia

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The seriousness of the Indonesian forest fires can no longer be ignored.

As 40 million people gasp for breath and tens of thousands of hectares of forest are on fire in Indonesia, the world continues to revolve like nothing dangerous happens. When more than 500,000 people suffer from acute respiratory infection and wildlife habitat are exposed to damage, people across the globe have barely responded.

For the past two months, the sky of the Borneo and Sumatra islands has been blurred in smoke, just as hazy as the huge capitalism game behind this structured, man-made eco-disaster.

What makes matters worse is that mass media appear to be gradually slipping away even though, as George Monbiot said, it’s almost definitely the 21^st century’s greatest environmental disaster to date.

Despite the fact that approximately 40 million people are breathing in noxious smoke day in, day out, the international community seems to care little, if not at all, about the situation. This is indeed surprising, considering that not only is there unspeakable human


The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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The poor conditions of the Bourj El Barajneh Palestinian camp in  of yet another refugee this summer.

A young man named Ahmad Kassab passed away shortly after being electrocuted by one of the many loose wires that drape the camp’s buildings and streets. The incident is disturbingly common. Camp officials reported that approximately to death over a five year span.

The startling frequency of these accidents means that it won’t be long before Kassab becomes just another statistic in a long list of fatalities caused by the neglect of Palestinian refugees. It seems there is no end to the struggle for these people, who were displaced from their homeland in 1948.

Today, there are over  Palestinian refugees worldwide. In the Bourj El Barajneh camp, there are over  squeezed into just one square kilometer of land. The crumbling infrastructure is covered with a crisscross of electric wires that originate from a rusty and exposed power grid in the center of the camp, known to locals as the “Wall of Death.” Bourj El Barajneh is just one of  in Lebanon, which are in similar circumstances. Without help from the Lebanese government, the inhabitants of the camps are unable to fix the safety issues created by extreme overcrowding.

These dangerous living conditions are a direct result of a lack of funding for permanent solutions to the displacement of Palestinian people. In Lebanon, local laws place extreme , making it nearly impossible for most refugees to make a living.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees () was founded in 1950 to provide direct work and relief programs for displaced Palestinians. Using almost exclusively voluntary  from United Nations member states, primarily the United States, UNRWA has been able to provide some of the basic improvements that these camps so desperately need—but it is not nearly enough.

UNRWA has been especially vital to Palestinians who have sought refuge in Lebanon. This is because Lebanon has refused to grant citizenship to their refugees, which means they are , including access to government-run services such as education, health care and social security. Due to this, UNRWA is the only way for people in camps like Bourj El Barajneh to obtain these services.

Unfortunately, UNRWA’s assistance to Palestinians has been severely hampered in recent years due to chronic underfunding. The program estimated that it would begin 2015 with a . While countries have since reached out to the program to provide additional funding, the fact remains that even with help from UNRWA, the conditions of the refugee camps continue to deteriorate.

Further compounding this problem is the Syrian Civil War, which has displaced another  since it began. Bourj El Barajneh alone added another  to its already severely overcrowded population. Organizations like UNRWA have been forced to redirect funding to aid these new refugees, leaving those already struggling to survive in camps like Bourj El Barajneh with even less assistance than before.

During the 2014 United Nations General Assembly, UNRWA’s deputy commissioner-general, , spoke about how the conflict in Syria has made it difficult for the agency to continue assisting those who were already seeking refuge in places like Lebanon and Jordan.

“Both [Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan] are heavily affected by the crisis in Syria,” Ellis said. “But thankfully we have been able to maintain services for refugees and are even able to provide limited humanitarian assistance.”

“What is becoming increasingly clear, however, is that the agency is stretched beyond its means.” Ellis also described Palestinian refugees as being in a “65-year limbo, counting on the international community to find a solution to their plight.” While the description is accurate, it also underlines the fact that the world has moved on from the displacement of Palestinian people in 1948 without ever providing a permanent solution to the problem.

While UNRWA may be able to provide things like limited educational opportunities for children in refugee camps, most of them will only grow up to realize that there is little chance they will find a job that can provide a wage to sustain a family of their own. Without the resources to relocate, their children will be raised to follow the same path that they did. Thus, the vicious cycle continues.

The president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, has done little to alleviate the dire circumstances of his displaced people.

In 2014,  a group of visiting Israelis that he did not wish to change Israel’s nature by “drowning it with millions of [Palestinian] refugees.”

Perhaps the worst part of Abbas’ statement is that while it expresses concern for himself and Israel, it does not in any way address how he plans to help the millions of suffering Palestinian refugees. Except for in title, Abbas seems to have all but abandoned his people.

While organizations like UNRWA may be able to provide short-term relief, it is imperative that the international community formulates a strategy to save Palestinians. Nobody deserves to live in conditions like that of Bourj El Barajneh and the other refugee camps. Instead of pouring money into aid programs, a majority of which have proved to be unsustainable, nations must focus their resources on providing a permanent home for Palestinian people.

What Next?

In August, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper  his party’s plans to launch a new program that would bring to Canada 10,000 refugees displaced by the Islamic State from Iraq and Syria. Harper’s plans set a model example for countries around the world who could do the same for Palestinians by providing a home, rather than spending money to keep them in run down, overcrowded camps.

As it stands, most Arab countries’ laws make it extremely difficult for refugees to obtain a work permit or visitor’s visa. Instead of helping them, these countries are cutting the last lifelines to society that these people have left.

Of all countries, the United States perhaps has the most to gain by providing a home to many Palestinians. The US has been regularly spending over  a year to help UNRWA maintain aid to Palestinian refugees, and it has now spent over  just to keep these people at the bare minimum standards of living.

By using a program like Harper’s, the US government could bring tens of thousands of educated and skilled refugees to work and live in areas where there are needs for their specific profession. This would allow the US to redirect billions of dollars into its own economy, rather than spending it to keep Palestinians in overcrowded camps. The influx of population would be negligible to a country that already hosts over ÌęŸ±łŸłŸŸ±Č”°ùČčČÔłÙČő.

If the world cannot form a definitive plan of action to save displaced Palestinians, refugees like Ahmad Kassab will continue to perish every day. Those who survive must endure the hardships, with little hope that they will ever be able to have a chance in this life, or return to their home in Palestine.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔčÏ’s editorial policy.

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