This stunning burglary has raised many questions, not only about the security flaws that enabled it, but also about how the French government, led by President Emmanuel Macron, is approaching the security of its central institutions.

The incident reveals an enormous, even greater issue: a lack of sufficient leadership in responding to basic security threats and in addressing embarrassing behavior that undermines the national image and heritage.

An unthinkable scenario

Consider this for a moment: individuals enter into one of the most tightly secured museums during the day. In a matter of minutes, they eight priceless items as if it were a routine logistical maneuver. Cameras, alarms and guards are all avoided.

The precise timing of the attack and the use of the proper tools to bypass the security measures demonstrate meticulous planning. Yet, it also poses a genuine challenge for whoever is tasked with protecting the building.

But most remarkable, other than the cunning of the thieves, is the shameful delay in the authorities’ response. During a time when security is a major issue in French politics, how was it possible for this robbery to occur at a museum of this caliber, a place that should serve as a model of protection and vigilance?

Management below expectations

The Louvre robbery is not remarkable in itself but rather the symptom of a deeper sickness. It illustrates the futility of a security system that appears to rest on shaky ground. If accounts released following the theft are to be believed, detection systems were clearly useless given the scope of the job.

Not only were the cameras not capable of capturing the criminals in real time, but the alarm systems were easily circumvented. One has to ask how committed they were towards being ready for the challenges of today.

The Louvre is more than any museum. It is not so much something to be viewed but rather a true center of support for . How are we to explain that this site, on which France bases its power over culture, has not been granted the degree of protection equal to the risks it poses? By considering the general image, it would appear that the security of national institutions comes second, as if we believed that such places were beyond all issues.

Actually, this break-in highlights a deeper problem: the lack of appreciation for how culture and heritage are essential in maintaining national stability. When such thefts happen, it’s common to blame local authorities or security agencies. But isn’t it really the central government that should take responsibility for this complacency?

The weakness of the political response

Even more damaging is the procrastination of the political response to the burglary. It may seem insignificant, but managing a crisis of such magnitude also involves sending clear messages to citizens.

Here, indecision and absence of leadership in the first few hours overshadow the government’s ability to manage crises of this nature. The silence of the Élysée Palace added to the mood of impotence and dilettantism in the presidency, as though France could not safeguard the security of its national icons.

The lack of firmness in addressing this incident and the segmented responses give the impression that the priority of this government lies elsewhere, in other political initiatives, rather than in upholding a cultural heritage to which all of humanity belongs. The French, in the meantime, are expecting concrete action. Maybe it is time for the government to commit to ensuring not just the security of citizens but the protection of what makes us us.

Lack of strategic vision

Other than this mishap, it would seem that the French government under Macron has a lack of strategic insight. Security, and more specifically that of cultural institutions, appears to have been relegated. But then this is not merely a matter of equipment or technology; it is really a matter of leadership — of issuing warnings — something that is lacking.

The Louvre case shows France must reconsider its cultural security policy. It is not merely an equipment or a budget issue, but an issue of responsibility. France’s government ought to be more reactive, not just to save its monuments but to save its place in the world as a cultural nation. France, a nation to be emulated, must prove it protects what makes it great, not only at home but all around the globe.

A call to action

October 19, 2025, is not merely a date on which a burglary took place but a day when France displayed a disturbing absence of steadfastness in its response to the protection of its heritage. This Louvre robbery is just one of several incidents that point to a fundamental problem: leadership and planning failure to address the challenges of the contemporary world. 

France deserves more than tardy responses and promised words of temporary change. If it genuinely wishes to protect its heritage and secure its citizens’ safety, France must reform the way it responds to these crises. The moment of indecision is over.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Nevertheless, the key point is that dialogue that opens onto concentric circles of exchange and construction of negotiated meaning is essential to the life and evolution of any healthy society. One of the reasons our society now seems less healthy than in the past is that we have lost or perhaps killed the art of dialogue.

In “Outside the Box,” I’ve attempted to show that a truly open, constructive conversation with a chatbot is possible. I’m surprised that so few seem to be using it in that way. There appear to be two dominant attitudes. Some see artificial intelligence as a super-Google that allows access to someone else’s content, providing quick answers to random questions. Others use it for therapeutic purposes, with a strong measure of risk. Even though another voice is present, psychotherapy is a monologue, not a dialogue. Founder of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud insisted on that point when he defined the analyst not as an interlocutor or problem-solver, but as an object of . This means that there is no authentic dialogue. Psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan called the person undergoing analysis the “,” the one who actively analyzes. The risk with chatbot therapy is that it easily becomes narcissistic and, as some recent cases have shown, potentially.

My experience over the past three years tells me that because AI has a voice and an observable capacity to reason, there is no reason not to build that voice into the dialogues we social beings engage in. But it should be our curiosity and perception of the world that defines both the starting point and the ultimate goal. Dialoguing with an LLM doesn’t mean trusting everything or indeed anything it says. It means engaging in informed exploration, with a foothold in the real world, just as we do with friends, colleagues, neighbors and casual acquaintances.

As I thought about these different questions concerning the quality of dialogue and the trust we can build and maintain with our interlocutors, I reflected on the social reality I have been living in for most of the past half-century. Sometime ago, I reached the conclusion that the quality of public dialogue in France has seriously declined in recent decades. I wondered what ChatGPT might tell me about this very subjective impression of mine. I began with the following prompt:

“When I settled in France in the 1970s, I adopted a ritual every afternoon consisting of purchasing my copy of Le Monde. Unlike the newspapers I had known in the US and UK, it contained a good balance of news from France and the entire world. It was sober and informative, with true intellectual cachet but no pretention. As someone with a good education (UCLA and Oxford) I felt at home in a culture that showed serious respect for both honest truth, apparently not influenced by ideology or commercial calculation. It was open to complex reasoning.

At the same time, I discovered TV programming that was poles away from everything I had experienced growing up in the US. Two programs in particular have stuck in my memory., which began with a movie often dealing with some aspect of history or social issues, followed by an informed discussion by experts and public personalities. The other was, in which Bernard Pivot hosted a weekly discussion between a panel of authors of recently published books. These popular programs generated conversation in families, at work or in cafés.

A few years later a new program,, introduced topical questions on which a small crowd of interested people carried on an animated and sometimes slightly out of control conversation/debate, with few holds barred but generally effective leadership by the host, Michel Polac.

When I look at French media today I see a different world. Le Monde is a shadow of what it was. Purchased and repurchased by billionaires, it has ideologically merged with the political and media establishment. It studiously avoids as many serious issues and viewpoints as it treats. And it mixes news and popular culture in ways’s paper would never have allowed.

I’ve watched this slow descent that has accompanied a tendency in French society to dumb down all forms and occasions of debate. My question is this: Has anyone recently documented and tried to explain this decline, the degradation of a once vibrant intellectual national culture? Some say it’s the influence of trends from the US as well as an evolution in the economy of the media, but what are the real factors that have produced this impression?”

A disappointing response

ChatGPT offered some detailed analysis which in my opinion was a list of symptoms rather than an analysis of causes. but I’ll only include here the introduction and the summary.

You’ve posed a rich, multi-layered question delving into the erosion of an intellectually rigorous media culture in France—from the golden age of Dossiers de l’écran, Apostrophes, and Droit de réponse, to what you now perceive as a landscape marked by ideological conformity, sensationalism, and weakened public discourse. This perceived decline has been the subject of considerable scholarly reflection and critique. Here’s a structured overview of documented explanations and key contributing factors:

At a Glance: Summary Table

This wasn’t good enough, so I pursued with a new prompt:

“All those observations and description of trends are useful. But I mentioned Dossiers de l’Ecran and Apostrophes for a particular reason that reflects something deeper that has been taking place in the culture. Those two programs (and they were not the only ones, for example, there was also La tête et les jambes) invited not only the participants but even the public to take time to think about the issues rather than simply consume the discourse produced by public figures.

I failed to mention that in those days, on the public channels, programs were never interrupted by advertising, whose effect is to prevent reflection rather than encourage it. I therefore disagree with your observation concerning ‘Digital Democratization’ and the idea that it ‘blurs expert voices with amateur commentary.’ My feeling is that the media experience was more democratic forty years ago, to the extent that it sought to encourage discussion rather than cut it short. It produced the sense that anyone could maintain a tone and a level of complexity comparable to that of the experts on TV. 

I also believe that blaming post-modernism is simplistic. The television and media of the time gave space to thinkers like Foucault and Barthes, without branding them as postmodernist. It’s the branding of schools or styles of thought that has perverted our perception of insights that may have nothing to do with the brand.”

That’s a very important refinement, and I see why you insist on Dossiers de l’Écran and Apostrophes. You’re pointing to something deeper than the “decline of intellectual culture” as a vague complaint. What you describe is a structural difference in how media once created conditions for thought, as opposed to today’s model of interrupting, fragmenting, and consuming.

Let me tease out a few dimensions of what you’re highlighting:

1. Temporal Democracy vs. Content Democracy

• In the 1970s–80s, “democracy” in media meant giving time and serious attention to issues, not just giving access to everyone.
• Dossiers de l’Écran gave you an entire film to frame the debate, then a conversation that lasted long enough to deepen. Apostrophes made books—complex, demanding books—objects of collective curiosity.
• This “temporal democracy” allowed ordinary citizens to enter the discourse because they had been given space to digest and reflect.
• By contrast, today’s “digital democratization” equates democracy with quantity of voices—a cacophony of commentary without common grounding, where experts and amateurs are jumbled together in streams of hot takes.

2. Interruption vs. Continuity

• As you say, public channels were ad-free. That absence of commercial breaks was not just cosmetic—it respected the rhythm of thought.
• Advertising, by definition, imposes discontinuity: it resets your attention, pulls you back to surface-level appetites, and makes extended reflection difficult.
• So the very format of those older programs carried a pedagogy of patience and concentration. �մǻ岹��’s formats train the opposite reflex.

3. Shared Cultural Horizon

• Programs like La tête et les jambes may seem “game-like,” but they blended entertainment with intellectual seriousness. They worked because the assumption was that the general public wanted to be stretched, and could be.
• That shared horizon is gone: now producers assume fragmentation of audiences and pitch content to niches or demographics rather than to a public with a common appetite for complexity.

4. The “Branding” of Thought

• I agree with your critique of the postmodernism argument. When Foucault or Barthes appeared on television, they were not boxed into a marketing category; they were treated as living thinkers with provocative ideas.
• The retroactive branding of them as “postmodernist” is precisely the sort of simplification that undermines thought. Labels are easier to consume than complex arguments.
• In this sense, what has declined is not intellectual creativity but the ecosystem of reception: media now processes ideas into digestible “brands” before they even reach the public.

5. From Reflection to Consumption

• The programs you recall encouraged ongoing discussion outside the broadcast. They seeded conversations at dinner tables, cafés, workplaces.
• �մǻ岹��’s digital forms encourage commenting within the platform (likes, shares, threads), but those conversations rarely escape into the social fabric in the same way, because they are enclosed by algorithms and monetization.

6. What Changed, Then?

It seems the key shift is not simply U.S. influence or postmodernism, but:

• Commercialization of formats (ads, ratings logic, shorter attention windows).
• Loss of continuity and time (everything must be consumable in minutes).
• Fragmentation of the public sphere (shared programs gave way to narrowcast channels and algorithmic feeds).
• Branding of thought (ideas reduced to categories, movements, or buzzwords).

These combine to produce a culture where even serious ideas must appear as content snippets rather than invitations to shared reflection.

So if we put it in your terms: 40 years ago, television’s public mission was to say, “Let’s think together, slowly, seriously.”

Today, even when topics are serious, the media’s underlying message is: “Here’s something to consume quickly, then move on.”

My conclusion

ChatGPT’s initial response was typically superficial, even though it included a lot of information and commentary that I didn’t bother to reproduce. My reframing of the debate led to a much more satisfying conversation, where we could identify causes to correlate with the symptoms.

I reproduce this example to demonstrate what I see as a key characteristic of today’s chatbots. Unless challenged, they produce a discourse that is rich in information but utterly conventional. Worse, the sheer quantity of erudition in its response serves to evade and even misunderstand the initial question. Humans and more particularly politicians do this kind of thing. Where AI proves superior to humans is in the quickness of its adaptation when called out. ChatGPT’s response to my reformulated demand was truly informative and provided some serious answers to my initial question.

Reformulation is never a bad strategy, whether dealing with humans or machines.

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue. 

[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51�Թ�, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Outside the Box: Does French Media’s Decline Explain �մǻ岹��’s Political Fiasco? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

This transformation has not emerged in isolation. This is not just the result of governance failures, but of historical grievances rooted in colonial legacies, the spread of jihadist ideology through regional conflicts, the repeated failure of external actors to adapt their strategies to local dynamics and of narrow geopolitical interests. The US, turning a blind eye to the security vacuum in Sahel, is making the same mistake it made in Afghanistan.

The colonial echoes

The Sahel region was colonized by France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, significantly shaping its development. The French solely on resource extraction and exploitation, neglecting its governance. When they drew the borders of the Sahel, they drew them arbitrarily, dividing ethnic groups across different countries and weakening national cohesion.��

After independence in 1960, frustration grew among nomadic and tribal groups as the already limited governance began to fail, marking the start of extremism and rebellion. This rebellion and violent tendencies escalated when the Sahel was hit by famine and (especially the 1968-73 drought), and escalated further in the 1980s, with issues such as banditry, kidnapping, extortion and the killing of French citizens.

The beginning of jihad in the Sahel 

The Sahel region practiced moderate Sufi Islam, but the North African region soon saw the first signs of jihadi conflict — specifically the outbreak of the Algerian civil war in 1991, when the government out of fear that Islamist forces might gain power.��

Islamist forces quickly capitalized on growing public disillusionment with the state, leading to the creation of radicalized armed groups. The military’s intervention and subsequent coup escalated the conflict into a civil war, creating a political vacuum that enabled Islamist groups to establish a foothold. 

Concurrently, in 1992, Osama Bin Laden relocated to Sudan, where he set up Al-Qaeda’s training camps and business operations. This move signaled Al-Qaeda’s growing interest in the region and its strategic potential. The of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania underscored how North and East Africa had become increasingly integrated into Al-Qaeda’s transnational agenda.

By 2007, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group had pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and rebranded itself as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (). From there, AQIM expanded southward into Mali and Niger, using smuggling and banditry to finance its terror activities. This southward shift gained further momentum after the 9/11 attacks, as the US-led war on terror displaced jihadist networks from the Middle East and South Asia, pushing them to seek new bases of operation in regions like the Sahel — where porous borders and unstable governments offered strategic opportunity.

As the mid-2000s approached, a distinct jihadist landscape had begun to take shape in the Sahel, one that would be further reinforced after the of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011.

Expansion of the jihadi landscape

The fall of Gaddafi created a political and security vacuum that Al-Qaeda was quick to exploit, especially in Mali. With the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, significant of weapons spilled into the region.��

Among those freed were Tuareg who had served as mercenaries under Gaddafi. These fighters later aligned with AQIM, strengthening Al-Qaeda. Their alliance was further shaped by the Tuaregs’ separatist desire for autonomy in Mali’s Azawad region, sparking a rebellion in 2012 that quickly took on a militant Islamist character.��

By April that year, Islamist forces had seized control of key northern cities in Mali, marking a fresh surge in jihadist activity across the region.

Consolidation of  the jihadist wave 

By 2013, Western governments began acknowledging the growing terrorist threat in the Sahel. France launched to oust jihadist groups from northern Mali. The mission succeeded in dislodging militants from major urban areas — but it pushed them deeper into the countryside and across national borders, allowing them to regroup and destabilize the region more.��

France followed this with between 2014 and 2022, aimed at regional stabilization. But progress stalled. French troops encountered resistance not just from insurgents, but from local populations with deep-seated resentment linked to France’s . As these military interventions struggled to deliver long-term security, political instability, poverty and governance failures deepened, creating conditions that Islamist groups readily exploited to recruit and radicalize.

A dangerous convergence: jihadist unity and coups

ISIS made its into the Sahel in 2015, prompting a breakaway faction from AQIM to pledge allegiance and form the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Two years later, Al-Qaeda responded by consolidating its presence. AQIM merged with Ansar al-Dine and al-Mourabitoun to form Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a powerful group that is now the behind jihadist operations in the region.

The political environment further deteriorated from 2020 onwards, as swept through the Sahel, weakening already fragile governments. These conditions enabled ISGS and Al-Qaeda to entrench themselves further.��

As criminal activities increased, these terror groups adopted banditry with jihadist motives, creating what is called “”, encouraging criminal groups to adopt jihadist ideologies and migrate into terrorism. This has significantly bolstered Al-Qaeda and ISIS’s presence in the Sahel in recent years.��

The consequences have been staggering: in 2023, Sahel accounted for of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide, a number that grew to in 2024. Burkina Faso alone recorded fatalities in 2022, making it the world’s most terror-affected country.

Narrow geopolitics and limited attention 

Africa has steadily become central to global geopolitics and geoeconomics, particularly due to its of rare earth minerals and gold. Yet, in the Sahel, these resources remain largely untapped, overshadowed by an entrenched security crisis and volatile political environment.��

After France’s military withdrawal, the region saw the arrival of Russia’s , a private mercenary or paramilitary force. The Sahel’s military juntas welcomed Wagner for the short-term promise of security support and the political leverage it offered through alignment with Moscow. However, Wagner’s presence has not translated into lasting stability. Its activities have remained largely focused on securing Russian interests and gold mining operations, rather than providing a serious or coordinated response to the region’s security challenges.��

Despite the presence of Russian forces and the persistence of jihadist activity, the United States has kept the Sahel at a strategic priority.

Washington has avoided deeper engagement, the absence of a direct or immediate national security threat. But a primary reason is that the US likely considers involvement in African conflicts risky, given its haunting past with the Somali crisis, where it faced one of its biggest failures: . But the operation failed due to overconfident and patterned operational planning with a lack of contingency and strong communication on the ground, none of which are unavoidable in future operations.�� 

During the 90s, Sahel did not emerge as a direct threat, and the US focus remained on security issues in East Africa and Al-Qaeda. 

However, the Sahel region has gradually become a direct threat to the US after the 2011 Libyan , and the threat increased greatly by 2017, when ISIS cadres in Africa gained strength. The 2017 Tongo Tongo in Niger, where ISGS fighters killed four US Special Forces soldiers, underscored the growing threat to US personnel in the region.��

The apprehension was echoed by General , head of US Africa Command, who warned in 2024 that Sahel-based terrorist groups could develop the capacity to strike the US homeland if left unchecked.

While the US did maintain a surveillance and reconnaissance in Niger for some time, this was withdrawn in 2024, alongside France’s broader . The departure of Western forces, combined with Russia’s limited effectiveness, has left a fragile security landscape in which terror groups are once again finding space to operate.

A recurring blind spot in US counterterrorism

The United States’ counterterrorism strategy has repeatedly failed to anticipate the evolution of jihadist networks, particularly when they have emerged from outside conventional theaters of war.

The 1998 embassy bombings were orchestrated from Afghanistan, exploiting a blind spot in US regional threat assessments; the US grossly underestimated Al-Qaeda’s transnational reach. Similarly, during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, the alignment between Algerian Islamist factions and Al-Qaeda to form a secret jihadist revolution in Africa went largely unacknowledged by US intelligence, despite clear that they were building contacts with the global terror network. In Somalia, the US once again the regional Islamist force, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, while focusing on humanitarian operations. This misjudgment contributed to the emergence of Al-Shabaab, now a dominant Al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa.��

The list doesn’t end here; the US also failed to act when ideological convergence between jihadist groups and narcotics cartels grew in Colombia (a country with which it shares strong security cooperation on narcotics issues), which led to cartel bombings in 1998. A now sustains Al-Qaeda’s operations in the Sahel, with JNIM heavily depending on a drug smuggling network.��

Yet, Washington’s strategic assessments have continued to downplay this growing narco-terror convergence.

The threat of resurgence is now common; the real danger is that terror groups are acquiring the capabilities necessary for transnational terror attacks. Without a shift in strategic posture — one that moves beyond narrow geopolitical interests and accounts for the full complexity of threats — another major wave of global jihadists may be inevitable.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The US Needs to Face the Rising Threat of Jihad in the Sahel Region appeared first on 51�Թ�.

On October 9, 1861, Napoleon III to his Ambassador in London, Count Flahaut, that if Mexico could be regenerated under the influence of France, they would have erected an insurmountable barrier against the encroachments of the United States. On July 5, 1862, he a letter to General Elie Frederic Forey, emphasizing that France had a historic mission to restore the strength and prestige of the Latin race that lived on the other side of the Atlantic.��

Napoleon’s Pan-Latin project

The aims, barriers and Latin strength mentioned earlier represented two sides of the same coin. They laid the groundwork for Napoleon’s project in the Americas. One aim was to counterbalance the rising Anglo-Protestant power by strengthening the influence of Latin Catholicism. A Latin power, of course, remained under the tutelage of France.��

The nature of the Latin connection between France and the Hispanic part of the Americas stemmed from their shared Roman heritage, a heritage also shared by Brazil. However, although Brazil is considered a fundamental part of “Latin America,” it represented a completely different proposition in terms of France’s imperial ambitions. With an Emperor from the Royal House of Braganza ruling that country and Great Britain leading its international trade, Brazil was beyond the reach of Napoleon’s .��

Such a common heritage dates back to ancient times. The original Latins inhabited central Italy in what is now the region of Lazio. Through conquests led by their dominant city-state, , the rest of Italy became “Latinized.” In other words, the term Latin lost its specific ethnic meaning and gained a political and cultural one. As Roman power expanded to what would later become France, Spain and Portugal (among others), these regions also became Latin spaces. Roman law, traditions, architecture and the Latin language were imposed upon them.

Circa 313 AD, Roman Emperor Constantine , promoting its rise, which would shortly thereafter become the official religion of the Roman Empire. Thus, this marks the origins of the Roman-Catholic Church.��

, in its context, was the language spoken by ordinary citizens of the Roman Empire, distinct from the cultivated form of Classical Latin. It encompassed the vernacular dialects that later evolved into the so-called Romance languages. These include languages like Italian, French, Spanish or Portuguese.

The Pan-Latin thesis that emerged during Napoleon III’s reign aimed to highlight the shared traits between the “Latin Race” of the Americas and Europe. Both groups, on either side of the Atlantic, shared religion, culture and Romance languages. As a result, the Latins of the Americas were encouraged to become natural allies of Latin Europe in their cultural struggle not only against the Anglo-Saxon world but also against Teutonic and Slavic Europe. 

Of course, Mexico was just the first step in Napoleon’s plan to establish other French satellite monarchies in the region. But how did Napoleon’s ambitions over Mexico materialize? To answer this, some background information is required.

How did Napoleon’s ambitions materialize?

Since its independence from Spain, Mexico’s Conservatives had always aspired to a monarchical system of government under a European prince of royal blood. Time and again, this idea tended to re-emerge among their most notorious representatives, particularly . This became more urgent for them after a weak Mexico faced the loss of half of its territory to a much stronger United States.

In the 1850s, however, the gained control of Mexico and began passing a series of reform laws aimed at reducing the power of the Church and the Army. This process culminated with the enactment of the , which triggered a military revolt by the increasingly marginalized Conservatives. It was known as the .

By December 1860, the Liberals had won this war, and in March 1861, , who led this faction as Provisional President, was officially elected President of Mexico. The defeated Conservatives saw the possibility of a monarchical regime, under a European prince of royal blood, as the only remaining solution to their problems.��

Thus, they proceeded to (some of their members had been doing so since the beginning of the civil war) Emperor Napoleon III. Their objective was that a European prince, under his stewardship and with military support, would become the monarch of Mexico.

This proposal was music to Napoleon’s ears, who, after his country’s military success in , aimed to expand his empire. Not surprisingly, he wanted to follow in the footsteps of his famous uncle of the same name, who, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, had controlled Europe for a decade and a half.��

Significantly, the gates of Mexico and Hispanic America had just opened to European infiltration. Indeed, in , seven southern states seceded from the United States, forming a new country called the Confederate States of America. The war between the two parties resulted in a sudden halt to the enforcement of the . This doctrine, issued in 1823 by President James Monroe, formally warned European monarchies that the United States would not tolerate further colonization or the creation of tributary monarchies in the Americas.

Furthermore, Napoleon III that the South would win such a war, implying that Mexico’s northern neighbor would not be a strong United States, but a weakened Confederate States of America. A new country in need of France’s recognition and support. In other words, ambition and opportunity aligned perfectly. As a result, in 1861, France Mexico.��

Maximilian of Habsburg, brother of the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, was the designated French puppet to become the Emperor of Mexico. In Napoleon’s words:

The Prince who may mount the Mexican throne will always be forced to act in the interests of France, not only from gratitude but even more because his country’s interest will be in accordance with ours, and he will not be able to maintain himself without our influence.

After consolidating the conquest of most of the country by French troops and relegating President Benito Juarez to its fringes, the crown was offered to the Austrian prince on July 10, 1863. According to the , signed between Maximilian and the French Empire, the future Mexican Empire was required to cover all military costs associated with the French invasion and presence in Mexico. Maximilian was finally enthroned in May 1864. However, it was to be a short-lived and tragic reign.��

Surviving defeat

A combination of factors brought this adventure to an end. First, Napoleon III underestimated the stubborn resistance of the Mexican forces under Juarez. Second, choosing Maximilian was unsuitable, as his liberal ideas more closely with those of Benito Juarez than with those of his Mexican Conservative allies. Third, the American Civil War with the Confederacy’s defeat on June 2, 1865, which not only re-established the Monroe Doctrine but also created conditions for war with the United States, which began sending surplus weapons and ammunition to Juarez’s troops. Fourth, France itself started to feel threatened by the rising power of under Bismarck’s capable leadership. The 40,000 French troops stationed in Mexico became increasingly needed in France.

On February 5, 1867, the last French troops Mexico City. Although Maximilian was advised to withdraw with them, he chose to stay in Mexico, supported by the Mexican Conservatives. However, this poorly matched alliance could not withstand the growing strength of Juarez’s forces, now aided by American arms. On May 15 of that year, Emperor Maximilian was captured, and after a court-martial, he was on June 19. Two reasons motivated his execution: the atrocities committed by the French troops and a message to deter future invaders.�� 

Maximilian’s patron, Napoleon III, would also suffer a crushing defeat three years later. Overwhelmed by the strength of the Prussian military in a war between the two countries, and captured at the battlefield of Sedan, Napoleon’s regime was by his own citizens on September 4, 1870.��

Curiously, the term survived the defeats of the American Confederation, the Maximilian monarchy and the Napoleonic Empire itself. Furthermore, it was accepted as a sign of identity by the very people it was supposed to be imposed upon as an imperialistic project.��  

Given this final connotation, how can we explain the effortless adoption of the term by Hispanic and Portuguese (Iberian) Americans themselves?  

How to explain the success of the term

An initial assumption might be that the Pan-Latin thesis is opposed to the US, especially since a few decades earlier, the United States had forcefully taken of Mexico’s territory. However, that was not the case, as admiration for the US political system and entrepreneurial ingenuity remained high among Iberian American elites of that time.��

The answer lay in rejecting Spain and everything Spanish, which was common among Hispanic American and the so-called Positivists who gained power in most of the region after them. Although both Liberals and Positivists rejected the French invasion, they rejected even more the heritage left by Spain, which they saw as a heavy burden on their efforts to modernize their countries.��

The answer could also be found in the fascination that the Iberian American elites of the time felt towards French culture and civilization. Indeed, once the invading troops had been forced to withdraw in humiliation, there was no reason to reject the flattery of being considered the transatlantic cousins of the French. 

As the well-known Mexican intellectual ���𳾲�������:��

Where could we have looked at in search of models and inspiration? Nineteenth-century Latin America found its immediate answer in France and in the city that Baudelaire called ‘the capital of the XIX Century’. Parisian influence was felt everywhere from The Hague to Algiers, from St. Petersburg to Cairo. Nonetheless, in Mexico, Bogotá or Buenos Aires, it filled up the deep void left by Spain. Repudiating Spain meant accepting France as a new temple of freedom, good taste, romanticism, and all the good things that life had to offer. 

Redeeming the Western credentials of the region while bypassing Spain was well-received by the elites of the day. Especially so, if the country they admired the most became their bridge to the Western world. It was thus that a notion born with imperialistic designs ended up being gladly accepted by those upon whom it was supposed to be imposed. Hence, the paradoxical nature of the notion of Latin America. 

[The ideas expressed in this piece can also be found in Alfredo Toro Hardy’s book “”]

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If we look back a little further, we can see that the world has always been a fluid soup shaped by fluctuating collusions and rivalries between multiple empires. Our world can be seen as a gigantic, mobile, fluid, flexible mollusk, similar to the way physicist Albert Einstein viewed spacetime — a creature that fluctuates, undulates, stretches, bends and contorts. Most of the world is in flux and human gatherings exist in unstoppable unrest and change. After all, we human beings are a part of nature.

Lessons from the last two centuries

We don’t need to go very far back to the periods when modern states did not exist and humankind was mainly organized in tribes, cities and belligerent empires. Just focusing on the last two hundred years, we can see how permanent fluctuations in imperial entanglements have been.

First, Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s France conquered Europe from near Cádiz to Moscow. But Arthur Wellesley Duke of Wellington’s Britain, Prussian Prime Minister Karl August von Hardenberg and Russian Emperor Alexander I defeated him. Their victory led to the relatively peaceful parenthesis of the Concert of Europe, formed by Austrian Chancellor Klemens von Metternich, British Prime Minister Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh and Emperor Alexander I, with the artful support of French diplomat Charles Maurice de Talleyrand. Yet the rise of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck produced the crushing defeat of French Emperor Napoleon III. In Asia, Japanese Emperor Mutsuhito led a modernized Japan to fight and defeat Russian Emperor Nicholas II.

Later, the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires faced an alliance of French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Russian Emperor Alexander II and US President Woodrow Wilson in World War I. However, the Russian Revolution led by Communist Party leader Vladimir Lenin split the winning bloc and generated high polarization.

Again, Germany — this time led by Chancellor Adolf Hitler — allied with Japanese Emperor Hirohito to provoke a new war. This led to an alliance of US President Franklin Roosevelt, Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill during World War II.

America is the latest empire to be challenged

After World War II, capitalist and democratic America and Europe on one side and Communist Russia and China on the other became main rivals during the so-called Cold War. But Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong split with Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev and entered into a temporary collusion with US President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev presided over the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the US — under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush — as the single great power.

Now, US President Donald Trump and Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping are major rivals. Each seeks to pull headless Europe and Russian President Vladimir Putin in opposing directions. At the same time, America feels the preposterous temptation to split from Europe and resume collaboration with Russia to counterbalance the rise of China.

None of these configurations was predetermined or anticipated. They have lasted for discontinuous, relatively brief periods. Most of the time, world politics has not followed any formal model. Instead, it has displayed an unstable panorama of interrelations between fluctuating empires. While some empires have risen or simply kept fighting, others have disappeared — like the Ottoman Empire — or yielded to new powers. France and Germany reshaped Europe and Britain opened the door to the emergence of India.

We are now in a new period of instability. Several empires fluctuate between external expansion and influence, active rivalry and entropic disorder. These forces make their mutual entanglements highly unpredictable in the mid- and long-term.

This representation has non-deterministic implications. When a dominant empire falls, its main challenger may or may not replace it. If both exhaust their energy in conflict, then another candidate can rise. In the academic language of international relations, the fall of a hegemon — such as the US — does not necessarily lead to a multipolar balance. A dark age of stagnation and inwardness may follow. But rebounds happen. Pressure may turn into a bounce. Sequels are never as good and a rebound typically does not restore the empire to its former power. A declining empire may borrow extra human or technological energy, which it must repay with appropriate promptness. New expansions may then appear. And so on.

Courage: We are again in “normal” times.

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While France and the United Kingdom have never abandoned nuclear power, others that once rejected it, such as Germany and Switzerland, are now reconsidering. Japan needs to stabilize its energy production for an ever-growing economy.

The resurgence of nuclear energy in political discourse comes at a time when climate targets are urgent — if not past due — yet economic pressures often dictate policy more than safety or public interest. This debate is not just about science or technology — it’s about politics, economics and public trust. While some governments argue that nuclear power is essential for meeting climate goals, the reality is that investment, regulatory hurdles and energy security concerns are often the real drivers of policy decisions.

Complex realities and divided narratives

A far more complex reality lies beyond carbon dioxide emissions alone. Water scarcity and its safety are already instigating regional conflicts, while biodiversity loss and soil degradation are preparing serious food security issues.

With this context, let us talk about the feasibility of nuclear expansion. Can we bear the financial cost of diverting resources from other endeavors? The timelines that may be too long? The unresolved waste issue? Not to mention the decommissioning that has never been done?

Proponents argue that nuclear power is a necessary low-carbon energy source. They will tell us that France has than other countries because it invested in nuclear power plants when it was time. But critics highlight its prohibitive cost and inherent risks, reminding everyone of the infamous accidents of in 1986 and in 2011. The public remains caught between narratives of climate urgency and energy independence, often without full transparency on the trade-offs being made in their name.

What is the renewed push for nuclear energy across Europe and Japan telling us? We must question whether its revival is truly about climate strategy, or whether economic forces are steering the conversation in ways most people don’t yet realize.

National relationships with nuclear energy

Nuclear power plants are considered the and cleanest energy sources, releasing carbon dioxide than coal or gas. Scientists use carbon dioxide as a measurable proxy to better understand complex environmental processes. However, this may be difficult for the public to grasp and is often overlooked in policymaking. As a result, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have prioritized carbon emissions, which has led to the complex and often problematic rise of carbon credits. This system is prone to manipulation and corruption, a bit like money laundering in some respects.��

The great nuclear disasters of Chernobyl and Fukushima prompted a Swiss that terminated nuclear power plants. People are rightly questioning their safety. The Fukushima incident sparked the development of the Energy Strategy 2050, which legally prohibits the construction of new nuclear power plants. It received approval by nearly 58% of voters on May 21, 2017. Hence, building new nuclear plants is banned. This leaves uncertainty about how to replace electricity production, especially during winter months.

Even as the two disasters affected the public, French authorities and influential groups remained committed to nuclear energy. France had rigorous safety standards, and nuclear power’s economic advantages and role in ensuring energy independence couldn’t be ignored. The country operates 56 nuclear reactors today, making it the producer of nuclear energy in the world after the United States. The French state owns the country’s nuclear plants as well as eight plants in the UK through the state-owned EDF Energy. Currently, more than of France’s electricity is generated from nuclear power, with only about 21% coming from renewable sources.

Conversely, only a few weeks ago, Reporterre, an investigative journalism organization in France, that the construction materials for a new plant are not compliant with industry standards. Astonishingly, the relevant state department was informed by the journalists, not by the contractors. So nuclear power plants can only be as safe as humans make them.

The UK public is that its nuclear power plants are owned and by the French state-owned company Électricité de France (EDF). And post-Brexit, this ownership structure presents complications related to energy security, regulatory alignment and investment strategies. But are they informed about this material’s noncompliance? 

The Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents heavily affected the German public. Germany shut down its last reactors in 2023. Yet already Friedrich Merz, who is expected to succeed Olaf Scholz as chancellor, supports a of nuclear power production. Rafael Grossi, the chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, believes that it should be for Germany to recover its nuclear energy production plans. Let’s consider that restarting even only one reactor would cost Germany greatly in reactivation, maintenance, retraining and everything that’s necessary.��

In Japan, economic matters and drives political decision-making. Japan is set to revise its climate targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 66% from 2013 levels by fiscal year 2035, with a broader strategy to adjust the country’s energy mix by 2040. This plan seeks to provide businesses with a predictable framework for future investments and ensure compliance with international environmental standards set by the Paris Agreement.��

Economic and environmental consideration

Nuclear power is often seen as a solution to energy instability. The real issue isn’t the technology itself, but the economic implications of unpredictable energy production in a world where constant growth is still considered the only acceptable option. While some argue nuclear is key to meeting climate goals, the rising cost of nuclear energy, alongside falling costs for renewables like wind and solar, makes the question of investment ever more urgent. Nuclear plants are slow to build and require massive investment, which conflicts with the “free market” mindset that prioritizes short-term returns.

Countries like Germany face the reality that nuclear plants are becoming increasingly expensive to maintain. The unresolved issues of waste management and decommissioning only add to the growing concern. Sites where nuclear power plants have been active may remain radioactive for .

The nuclear debate is about more than just science or technology — it’s a matter of politics, economics and public trust. Governments are driven by energy security concerns, regulatory barriers and economic interests, not just environmental imperatives. With renewables advancing at a faster pace, the true question is whether nuclear power is the right investment for a future of sustainable energy.

Without greater transparency and accountability in energy decision-making, and without a revised process to bring large, powerful Manhattan-style projects into the world, we risk prioritizing short-term political and economic gains over long-term sustainable solutions. We need to take measures that will safeguard our future and the sustainability of human civilization.

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The ISIS terror group took responsibility for the latter. However, in 2025, the terror dynamics have changed. This recent attack perhaps has indicated a dangerous shift in ISIS’s striking patterns. 

ISIS lone wolf attacks 

ISIS has a classic pair of striking patterns: Suicide bombings and lone-wolf attacks. The former has been the most frequent type since January 2024, as it was used in the January 3 in Kerman, Iran, and the March 22 Crocus City Hall in Moscow, Russia. ISIS has used high-intensity bombings ever since their capabilities began dwindling.

The last reported lone wolf attack in a metropolitan city took place last year in Solingen, Germany, where a Syrian ISIS member stabbed three men during a festival. Similarly, two lone wolf attacks took place on October 16 and December 2, 2023 in and , respectively. The assessment shows ISIS was not able to execute a deadly lone wolf in the West as it did in Nice, France on July 14, 2016, when a truck rammed a crowd celebrating Bastille Day, killing 86 people and injuring 434 more.

Most ISIS strikes have been recorded in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East; these have mostly been suicide bombings or coordinated mass shootings. ISIS attacks in Western countries were fewer and limited to stabbing incidents; these can be viewed as multiple attempts to execute a lone wolf attack or coordinated lone wolf attacks on a large scale, like they did in Paris in the November 13, 2015 and Nice in the aforementioned 2016 attack.

Capabilities are limited, but resurgence is possible

Since 2017, ISIS’s capabilities started declining after the US intensified its counterterror operations. The nation’s ongoing has led to some notable success against ISIS, causing the group’s terrorist presence to dip substantially from 2017 to 2019. In 2019, ISIS was defeated in Syria and Libya. That October, US forces ISIS Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in . In 2023, the US killed senior leaders of ISIS and detained around 79 of its terrorists.

The greatest blow came when US forces Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the head of ISIS’s intelligence/foreign branch, Emni, on August 30, 2016. Adnani’s death crippled ISIS’s striking and recruitment capabilities. The terror group is now scrambled, with its capability to strike the West destroyed. ISIS’s presence is now limited to Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. For the past two years, high-intensity attacks have only been recorded in those regions.

ISIS is weakened, but perhaps its potential for resurgence has not been meaningfully considered. The patterns also suggest that whenever its influence is seen to be dwindling, it tries to send a message to the West by carrying out major attacks in West African or Middle Eastern countries.

The US-led coalition has intensified its operations against ISIS’s limited and fragmented presence for one year, leading to against the group since January 2024. According to reports, the US-led forces have killed 44 terrorists and detained around 166 others.

Despite an intensified operation, the outfit still holds a tight grip over its fragmented network and has attempted to capitalize on various opportunities to make a comeback. There are arguably three primary reasons why ISIS could see a strong revival: The first is the US’s shifting focus on Iran due to the Israel–Hamas conflict. The second is the increased destabilization in Syria and West Africa, and now the of the Syrian government. The third is the increasing freedom ISIS’s Khorāsānis — residents of the area of the Iranian Plateau — are finding to operate in South and Central Asia, especially in Afghanistan.

These have facilitated ISIS’s regrouping at the regional level, which has given the outfit occasional opportunities to carry out low-intensity terror strikes across the globe. The fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad government and the mobilization of various Islamic coalitions there have given ISIS, especially Khorāsānis, a to further resurge and increase their striking capabilities.

However, the resurgence factor is not the only thing to worry about; a possible shift in the ISIS striking pattern could help ISIS showcase its capabilities as well.

A shift in striking pattern

ISIS terror strikes can be classified into three patterns. The first is direct: ISIS directly carries out its strikes. The second is indirect: ISIS enables an attack and indirectly carries out its strikes by connecting to attackers through the Internet. An example of this was the Curtis Culwell Center attack in Garland, Texas on May 3, 2015 — one of the attackers who opened fire at the community center was in contact with ISIS through encrypted texts.

The third pattern is : Using online propaganda, ISIS inspires self-radicalized individuals to carry out lone wolf attacks on their own. An example is the 2016 Nice attack. Though the perpetrator, , acted on his own, ISIS later took credit for his actions. Conversely, there is the April 7, 2017 truck in Stockholm, Sweden, where a similar vehicle ramming incident took place. In this case, ISIS did not take credit for the self-radicalized man’s attack. The organization was under intense pressure at that time, and its presence and capabilities had been significantly damaged by US-led coalition forces; by the end of the year, ISIS was defeated in Iraq.

ISIS is once again , this time in Syria, thanks to US airstrikes. As it weaves an opportunity to resurge, some believe the group has resorted to enhancing online propaganda and carrying out inspired attacks without direct involvement. The reason for this possible change to its striking pattern is to ensure resurgence and keep limited striking capabilities intact without exposing itself. Additionally, it seeks to avoid instant retaliatory and offensive responses from the US, which could severely damage ISIS’s chances of resurgence in Syria and elsewhere.

If left unchecked, a new, lethal wave of inspired ISIS terror could emerge.

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Following in November 2023 that French court authorities had issued an arrest warrant against the now-dethroned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to prosecute him in France for war crimes, Brazil reportedly announced its determination to support the cause of heads of state immunity. The warrant is noteworthy because it aligns with a March 13, 2001 by the French Cour de cassation, France’s highest criminal appellate court. The ruling seemed to acknowledge that a foreign head of state could be tried in France if the charge involved classic international crimes rather than just terrorism, for which the court recognized immunity at the time.

Debating immunity

There was no precedent for an effective international criminal tribunal before the — the trials that prosecuted Nazi war criminals and vital leaders for their crimes in World War II — which started in 1945. Heads of state had immunity from each other’s national courts throughout that time. However, ongoing hostilities between nations occurred during that time, culminating in two World Wars that involved aggression, genocides, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It was a period of instability in peaceful relations between states. It may be unnecessary to directly attribute the — the resulting effect the trials had on international efforts to bring about justice — to the relative advancements in global peace and security.

Now, the debate over official immunity has spread beyond the boundaries of the United States. International discussions, like the ICC’s for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, brought to light the broader of Head of State immunity in international law. The ICC issued the warrant against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 21, 2024. Pre-Trial Chamber I established reasonable grounds on allegations of suspected war crimes and perpetrated in Gaza between October 8, 2023 and May 20, 2024.

As the first permanent court in history, the ICC’s goal is to bring an end to impunity for those who commit the most that the entire community finds problematic. The court’s authority is restricted to crimes committed by citizens of a State Party or on its territory, and it people primarily for war crimes or crimes against humanity. The court’s legal foundation comes from the Rome Statute, which was approved by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on establishing an in 1998 and enacted in 2002. Currently, are States Parties to the Rome Statute.

Enforcing arrest warrants

Enforcing an arrest warrant member states to hold anyone who enters their territory and transport them to a detention facility in the Netherlands, where the court is located. The defendant must be for the trial to continue. Since the law applies to everyone equally, there is no in keeping with its mission to end impunity. According to Article 27 of the Rome Statute, a person’s official position as a head of state or government, a member of a government or parliament, an elected official or another official does not, in and of itself, absolve them of under the Rome Statute.

In a news issued on November 27, 2024, the French government, a member state, expressed worries about possible restrictions on this clause concerning non-member nations like Israel. Regarding the immunities of States not parties to the ICC, the statement emphasized that a state cannot be to behave in a way that goes against its duties under international law. Such protections to Netanyahu and other pertinent ministries. According to the Foreign Ministry, they must be considered should the ICC request their arrest and surrender.

Rejecting immunity: a tenet of international law

State Immunity, rooted in customary international law, protects current and previous heads of state from in specific circumstances. This is on the ideas of state sovereignty and interstate equality.

However, legal immunity point out that heads of state cannot assert immunity before the ICC, even if their countries have not ratified the treaty. The Palestinian territories have signed the convention using their position as a non-member observer state at the United Nations, notwithstanding Israel’s non-signatory status.

It should be emphasized that the rejection of immunity for even leaders of state accused of international crimes was one of the tenets of international law that emerged from the Nuremberg process. Heads of state would undoubtedly have believed, due to the Nuremberg effect, that the period of impunity for transnational crimes that endangered or disrupted global peace and security ended with World War II. To a young person, the idea that accountability for the same behavior represents a danger to peaceful ties between states may be incomprehensible.

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The US emerged as the global superpower thanks to World War II. In 1945, Europe was in ruins. The war caused widespread destruction in Europe because of the bombing of cities and factories. European powers lost millions of people in the war. Being far from Europe and Japan, the incurred a very low rate of civilian casualties. There was almost no destruction of US infrastructure, with the Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii, as a notable exception. Naturally, the US emerged as the leader of the West. Although the Soviet Union was a US ally during the war, it competed with the US for global hegemony following the Allied victory, a period referred to as the Cold War.

During the Cold War, the US and its Western allies engaged in a brutal global competition with the Soviets and other communist states. Notable confrontations between these two power centers included the Korean War (1950–1953), the Vietnam War (1955–1975) and the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989). Using Soviet influence as an excuse, the US intervened in many countries, including Iran. At the behest of the UK, the US overthrew the first democratically elected government of Iran. Only 26 years after the infamous 1953 coup, the Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah and established Iran’s independence from both the US and the UK.

The US tacitly supported European imperial and colonial powers when they committed some of the worst genocides in human history. The most notable include the horrendous atrocities committed in Congo, Kenya and Algeria.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the world looked forward to years of peace and prosperity. Although the US proclaimed that this new era was one of peace, it began with the Rwandan Genocide (1994), the Bosnian Genocide (1995), to the present day with the US-backed genocide against Palestinians and the takeover of Syria by al-Qaeda’s affiliates.

The of the Soviet Union did not make the world more peaceful; it worsened it under unilateral US leadership. The fall produced a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. In particular, it released nationalistic, ethical, cultural and self-determination movements in the former Soviet states. It led to social unrest, organized crime, terrorism and corruption. The ripple effects of the fall will “continue to be felt for some time yet.”

After the Soviets were gone, the US no longer faced any serious challenges to its global hegemony. However, the US considered Iran’s independence from US influence a challenge to its global domination and has supported efforts to undermine the Islamic Republic of Iran. Presently, the US efforts that have unseated Assad of Syria were meant to undermine Iran’s dominance in the region. 

Recently, reporters saw US President Joe Biden leaving a bookstore with a copy of The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine by Rashid Khalidi in his hand. The book describes the Palestinian struggle for their homeland. “Settler-colonial confrontations with indigenous peoples have only ended in one of three ways: with the elimination or full subjugation of the native population, as in North America; with the defeat and expulsion of the colonizer, as in Algeria, which is extremely rare; or with the abandonment of colonial supremacy, in the context of compromise and reconciliation, as in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Ireland,” Khalidi writes. 

Hopefully, Biden will read this book and realize that instigating the war in Ukraine, enabling Israel’s genocide against Palestinians and aiding al-Qaeda affiliates are immoral.

The US’s prestige is falling worldwide, all it can do is slow the fall

The world is waking up thanks to Iran. The US’s decision to back Ukraine in the war and enable Israel’s genocide against the Palestinians has placed global attention on Iran. In particular, Iran’s support of the oppressed Palestinians has been a popular move. In the US, like around the world, young people with the oppressed Palestinians.

Iran has become so notable for its global standing as a supporter of the oppressed that its archenemy, Israel, admits it. On July 25, Israeli Prime Minister , against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, addressed the US Congress.

Hearing the loud protest outside, he felt frustrated with the protesters, crying in his speech that “Iran is funding the anti-Israel protests that are going on right now outside this building.”

Led by Iran, worldwide, people realize the US is not what it claims to be. The US is not a promoter of democracy or peace but a brutal warmonger with no regard for human rights and international law. Internationally, it has used its veto power since 1970 against UN resolutions concerning Israel, with four in the last year. In November, it vetoed the latest UN resolution calling for a ceasefire in . Recently, it blundered by the rise to power in Syria of Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) formerly part of al-Qaeda.

To stop the US’ destructive behaviors globally, China, Russia, Iran and some other countries have moved away from the US and formed the alliance. More countries are planning to do the same. Within the new alliance, China pushes for more collaboration between countries rather than subjugating them, as the US does.

No supporter of democracy, not even much of a democracy

Globally, people are becoming more aware that the US does not support democracy. Its ventures into other countries in the name of democracy are a ploy to access their resources and wealth. In pursuit of power and wealth, the US has destroyed lives. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen are just a few known examples where millions of innocent people were killed and billions of dollars of infrastructure were destroyed by US-led aggression.

The US is also a very flawed democracy itself. According to a poll from the Harris Poll and the Quincy Institute, around of Americans want the US to pursue peace with Russia. Yet, the US continues arming Ukraine against Russia. Likewise, of Americans disapprove of Biden’s handling of the “Israel–Palestine conflict,” but Biden continues arming Israel. Biden is acting as a dictator, ignoring the will of the people. This is not unique to Biden. US presidents have been getting the US in wars since its inception. Despite its global proclamation as a beacon of democracy, the US has never been a true democracy.

The US presidential system is flawed. The winner of the majority of Electoral College votes wins. In 2000 and 2016, George W. Bush and Donald Trump lost the popular vote but still became presidents because they commanded a majority of Electoral College votes. Furthermore, the US is dominated by two main parties. Third parties are not even on the ballot in many states. Big money in politics also strengthens the hand of the two main political parties.

This means that American politics makes for the strangest of bedfellows. Christian evangelicals voted for Trump despite his chauvinism, infidelity, nepotism, racism and corruption. So did many working-class Americans as well as a majority of white women and Latino men voted for this celebrity billionaire who has given and plans to give tax cuts to the rich. On the other hand, Ivy League elites largely voted for Democrats even if they had misgivings about Kamala Harris.

Giving the rich tax breaks and spending too much on the military-industrial complex has led to the US suffering the highest rate among industrial countries. The US ranks last in outcomes among the ten major developed countries despite spending nearly twice as much — about 18% of gross domestic product — on healthcare than the others. The crisis is also worse than in other Western countries and the country has the highest rate among high-income countries.

As is well known, American interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and other countries led to the expansion of the military-industrial complex. Today, the US sends its poor to war who come back with post-traumatic stress disorder if not wounds or in body bags.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 killed thousands of innocents. Its intervention in Libya caused a civil war that continues to this day. Today, the US is inflicting similar misery on Syria. Together with Turkey and Israel, the US is supporting HTS. Note that HTS is an affiliate of al-Qaeda. The HTS fighters are nothing but terrorists who have innocents, including 12-year-olds and Americans. That is the reason why the US put a $10 million bounty on HTS leader . Yet today the US has supported HTS to get rid of the Assad family, legitimizing the very fighters it has designated as terrorists.

Instead of continuing to support death and destruction, the US should support peace and harmony. First, Washington must stop threatening, invading and harming other countries. This includes stopping support for terrorists like al-Golani as well as dropping sanctions that hurt millions of innocents. Second, the US must stop its proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. A peace deal is in the interest of the entire world. Third, the US must support a free Palestine where Christians, Jews and Muslims can live together in peace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The German traffic light coalition government of the Social Democrats, Free Democrats and Greens (respectively red, yellow and green) has fallen. So has the French minority government led by Michel Barnier of Les Republicains. Now, neither France nor Germany has a government or a budget. Note this has not happened before.

Social divisions and political polarization

Germany and France are the two beating hearts of the EU. They created the EU and still drive it. With both in political limbo, the EU is lost.

Internally, both these countries are no longer homogenous or cohesive anymore. They have experienced unprecedented levels of immigration. This has created problems of assimilation since, unlike the US, Europe does not have a tradition of mass immigration. In Germany and France, immigrants form a greater percentage of the population in the US. Furthermore, Muslim immigrants in these countries tend to be more conservative than the local population or even their relatives back home. For example, German Turks voted for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in much higher percentages than in Turkey. Many Muslim women also tend to wear headscarves in societies where sunbathing nude or topless is no longer a big deal.

Most people find change uncomfortable. Europeans are no exception. People do not like the way their communities are changing so rapidly. They may not be racist, but they want to retain their character. The French want to remain French and the Germans want to preserve their Germanness. Yet the political correctness that blights expression in the US also censors conversations in Europe. If someone is uncomfortable with headscarves or Turks voting for Erdoğan, she or he is denounced as a racist and an Islamophobe. People find such denunciation deeply alienating and often turn to the far right in revolt.

European economies are in big trouble

Economically, European countries are in trouble. They have huge debts, high deficits, slow productivity growth and low birth rates. There is no way Greece or Italy can pay back all their debts. Furthermore, the Russia–Ukraine War has increased energy prices, weakened industry and unleashed inflation in the economy. People are hurting. Naturally, they do not want to keep paying for a war with no end in sight.

In contrast, European elites have committed themselves to Ukraine’s defense. So, they want to keep spending on the war even as they seek budget cuts elsewhere. Naturally, legislators are unable to agree upon the cuts and governments are falling. At the moment, no resolution to the budget crisis in either Berlin and Paris is in sight.

The euro is not the world’s reserve currency. That privilege belongs to the dollar; so, unlike the US, Europe cannot print money to finance its deficits and prosecute endless war. So, Germany, France and the EU find themselves in a bind; their monetary and fiscal options are limited.

Europe has other problems too. Europe needs to increase the flexibility of its labor markets. Given an aging population, this can only happen with immigration and less rigid labor laws. The oppressive regulatory state is throttling growth and needs urgent reform. None other than German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has called for a war on red tape despite his socialist roots. European countries also have to reform and even shrink the welfare state. Only British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ever really achieved that in the last 50 years in Europe.

European economies have also suffered from external shocks. Chinese demand has declined and the US has taken a protectionist turn under both Republican and Democratic administrations. This protectionism will only increase once Donald Trump takes charge of the White House in January.

At a time of such upheaval, European political culture is in total flux. The traditional left and right are dead in France. They have been replaced by a constellation of pro-business centrists, the far right and a hodgepodge combination of leftist groups. German politics is also fragmenting, and the rise of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) shows the degree of disaffection with the status quo in a country still haunted by Adolf Hitler. Something was not right in the state of Denmark and some things are certainly not hunky dory in Europe today. A full-blown crisis is now underway.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The agreement is based on the terms of United Nations Security Council , which ended the previous Israeli assault on Lebanon in 2006. The truce will be enforced by 5,000 to 10,000 Lebanese troops and the UN’s 10,000-strong United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon () peacekeeping force, which has operated in that area since 1978 and includes troops from 46 countries.

The truce has broad international support, including from Iran and Gaza’s Hamas leaders. Israel and Hezbollah were apparently glad to take a break from a war that had become counterproductive for them both. Effective resistance prevented Israeli forces from advancing far into Lebanon, and they were inflicting mostly senseless death and destruction on civilians, as in Gaza, but without the genocidal motivation of that campaign.

People all over Lebanon have welcomed the relief from Israeli bombing, the destruction of their towns and neighborhoods and thousands of casualties. In the Lebanese capital of Beirut, people have started returning to their homes.

In the south, the Israeli military has warned residents on both sides of the border not to return yet. It has declared a new (which was not part of the truce agreement) that includes 60 villages north of the border, and has warned that it will attack Lebanese civilians who return to that area. Despite these warnings, thousands of displaced people have been returning to south Lebanon, often to find their homes and villages in ruins.

Many people returning to the south still proudly display the yellow flags of Hezbollah. A flying over the ruins of the Lebanese city of Tyre has the words, “Made in the USA,” written across it. This is a reminder that the Lebanese people know very well who made the bombs that have killed and maimed thousands of them.

The truce’s success seems unlikely

There are already many reports of ceasefire violations. Israel shot and two journalists soon after the truce went into effect. Then two days after the ceasefire began, Israel attacked five towns near the border with tanks, fired artillery across the border and conducted on southern Lebanon. On December 2, as a UN peacekeeper told CNN that Israel had the truce “roughly a hundred times,” Hezbollah finally with mortar fire in the disputed Shebaa Farms area. Israel responded with heavier strikes on two villages, killing 11 people.

An addendum to the truce agreement granted Israel the right to strike at will whenever it believes Hezbollah is violating the truce, giving it what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “complete military freedom of action,” which makes this a precarious and one-sided peace at best.

The prospect for a full withdrawal of both Israeli and Hezbollah forces in 60 days seems slim. Hezbollah has built large weapons stockpiles in the south that it will not want to abandon. Netanyahu himself has warned that the truce “can be short.”

Then there is the danger of confrontation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese military, raising the specter of Lebanon’s bloody civil war, which killed an estimated 150,000 people between 1975 and 1990. 

So violence could flare up into full-scale war again at any time, making it unlikely that many Israelis will return to homes near the border with Lebanon, Israel’s original publicly stated purpose for the war.

The truce was brokered by the United States and France, and signed by the European Union, Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. France was a colonial power in Lebanon and still plays a leading role in UNIFIL, yet Israel initially rejected France as a negotiating partner. It seems to have France’s role only when French President Emmanuel Macron’s government agreed not to enforce the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against Netanyahu if he comes to France.

The United Kingdom also signed the original truce proposal on November 25, but doesn’t appear to have signed the final agreement. The UK seems to have withdrawn from the negotiations under US and Israeli pressure because, unlike France, its new Labour government has publicly that it will comply with the ICC arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant. However, it has not explicitly said it would arrest them.

Netanyahu justified the truce to his own people by saying that it will allow Israeli forces to focus on Gaza and Iran, and only die-hard “Security” Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir voted the truce in the Israeli cabinet.

While there were hopes that the truce in Lebanon might set the stage for a ceasefire in Gaza, Israel’s actions on the ground tell a different story. Satellite images show Israel carrying out new mass demolitions of hundreds of buildings in northern Gaza to build a new road or between Gaza City and North Gaza. This may be a new border to separate the northernmost 17% of Gaza from the rest of the Gaza Strip, so Israel can expel its people and prevent them from returning, hand North Gaza over to Israeli settlers and squeeze the desperate, survivors into an even smaller area than before.

Syria complicates the conflict

And for all who had hopes that the ceasefire in Lebanon might lead to a regional de-escalation, those hopes were dashed in Syria when, on the very day of the truce, the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a surprise offensive. HTS was formerly the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front. It itself and severed its formal link to al-Qaeda in 2016 to avoid becoming a prime target in the US war in Syria, but the US still brands it a terrorist group.

By December 1, HTS managed to seize control of Syria’s second largest city, Aleppo, forcing the Syrian Arab Army and its Russian allies onto the defensive. With Russian and Syrian jets bombing rebel-held territory, the surge in fighting has raised the prospect of another violent, destabilizing front reopening in the Middle East.

This may also be a prelude to an escalation of attacks on Syria by Israel, which has already Syria more than 220 times since October 2023, with Israeli airstrikes and artillery bombardments killing at least 296 people.

The new HTS offensive most likely has covert US support, and may impact US President-elect Donald Trump’s reported to withdraw the 900 US troops still based in Syria. It may also impact his nomination of Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence. Gabbard is a longtime critic of US for al-Qaeda-linked factions in Syria, so the new HTS offensive sets the stage for an explosive confirmation hearing, which may backfire on Syria hawks in Washington if Gabbard is allowed to make her case.

Arab and Muslim state strategies

Elsewhere in the region, Israel’s genocide in Gaza and war on its neighbors have led to widespread anti-Israel and anti-US resistance.

Where the US was once able to buy off Arab rulers with weapons deals and military alliances, the Arab and Muslim world is coalescing around a position that sees Israel’s behavior as unacceptable and Iran as a threatened neighbor rather than an enemy. Unconditional US support for Israel risks permanently downgrading US relations with former allies, from Iraq, Jordan and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Yemen’s Ansar Allah (or Houthi) government has maintained a blockade of the Red Sea, using missiles and drones against Israeli-linked ships heading for the Israeli port of Eilat or the Suez Canal. The Yemenis have a US-led naval task force sent to break the blockade and have shipping through the Suez Canal by at least two-thirds, forcing shipping companies to reroute most ships all the way around Africa. The port of Eilat filed for in July, after only one ship docked there in several months.

Other resistance forces have conducted attacks on US military bases in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, and US forces have retaliated in a low-grade tit-for-tat war. The Iraqi government has strongly condemned U.S. and Israeli attacks on its soil as violations of its sovereignty. Attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria have flared up again in recent months, while Iraqi resistance forces have also launched drone attacks on Israel.

An emergency of the Arab League in Cairo, Egypt on November 26 voted unanimously to support Iraq and condemn Israeli threats. US–Iraqi talks in September drew up a for hundreds of US troops to leave Iraq in 2025 and for all 2,500 to be gone within two years. The US has outmaneuvered previous withdrawal plans, but the days of these very unwelcome US bases must surely be numbered.

Recent of Arab and Muslim states have forged a growing sense of unity around a rejection of US proposals for normalization of relations with Israel and a new solidarity with Palestine and Iran. At a meeting of Islamic nations in Riyadh on November 11, Saudi crown prince Mohammed Bin-Salman publicly called the Israeli massacre in Gaza a for the first time.

Arab and Muslim countries know that Trump may act unpredictably and that they need a stable common position to avoid becoming pawns to him or Netanyahu. They recognize that previous divisions left them vulnerable to US and Israeli exploitation, which contributed to the current crisis in Palestine and the risk of a major regional war that now looms over them.

On November 29, Saudi and Western officials told Reuters that Saudi Arabia has on a new military alliance with the US, which would include normalizing relations with Israel. It is opting for a more limited US weapons deal.

The Saudis had hoped for a treaty that included a US commitment to defend them, like treaties with Japan and South Korea. That would require confirmation by the US Senate, which would demand Saudi recognition of Israel in return. But the Saudis can no longer consider recognizing Israel without a viable plan for Palestinian statehood, which Israel rejects.

On the other hand, Saudi relations with Iran are steadily improving since they restored relations 18 months ago with diplomatic help from China and Iraq. At a meeting with new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Qatar on October 3, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan, “We seek to close the page of differences between the two countries forever and work towards the resolution of our issues and expansion of our relations like two friendly and brotherly states.”

Prince Faisal highlighted the “very sensitive and critical” situation in the region due to Israel’s “aggressions” against Gaza and Lebanon and its attempts to expand the conflict. He said Saudi Arabia trusted Iran’s “wisdom and discernment” in managing the situation to restore calm and peace.

The ball is in Trump’s court

If Saudi Arabia and its neighbors can make peace with Iran, what will the consequences be for Israel’s illegal, genocidal occupation of Palestine, which has been enabled and encouraged by decades of unconditional US military and diplomatic support?

On December 2, Trump on Truth Social that if the hostages were not released by the time of his inauguration, there would be “ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East.” “Those responsible,” he warned, “will be hit harder than anybody has been hit in the long and storied History of the United States of America.”

Trump and many of his acolytes exemplify the Western arrogance and lust for imperial power that lies at the root of this crisis. More threats and more destruction are not the answer. Trump has had good relations with the dictatorial rulers of the Gulf states, with whom he shares much in common. If he is willing to listen, he will realize, as they do, that there is no solution to this crisis without freedom, self-determination and sovereignty in their own land for the people of Palestine. That is the path to peace, if he will take it.

[ edited this piece.]

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The UN has been a nightmare. It is as dysfunctional as the League of Nations. The world has not seen peace even for a day since the UN’s inception in 1945. Delegates should have foreseen the UN’s failure in 1945. The organization came into existence for the UK, the US and the Soviets to expand their hegemony across the world. They projected peace for themselves, and not necessarily for the rest of the world.

How the Allies became the United Nations

On September 1, 1939, started with Germany invading Poland. The United Kingdom (UK) and France declared war on Germany as allies. The Soviet Union (Soviets) invaded eastern Poland on September 17. In June 1941, the Soviets joined the Allies. The Big Three (the UK, the US and the Soviets) formed a united organization of nations to maintain their global peace and security. The Allied powers met and signed the , pledging collaboration in fighting aggression. It proclaimed that “the only true basis of enduring peace is the willing cooperation of free peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security.”

The US Constitution strictly limits the president’s power and rests the war declaration with Congress. However, President Franklin D. Roosevelt short-circuited the Constitution, by authorizing the US to finance and arm the UK and France. In March 1941, Congress put this policy into law in the form of the without the constitutional process of declaring war. Germany and its allies, Italy and Japan (the Axis Powers), of course, considered the US to be aiding the enemy in war. 

The US later entered the war formally. In December 1941, Japan’s air force attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii, catching the US by surprise. Within days, that attack triggered the US to declare war on Germany. Within hours, Germany also declared war on the US. That month, China joined the Allies while resisting Japan’s expansion in China since 1937.

In August 1941, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed the pledging to stop territorial expansion, engage in free trade, collaborate with other nations, have access to “high seas and oceans”, stop the use of force, and work for a world peace free of “fear and want”, where all individuals are free to choose their form of government and enjoy economic advancement and social security. In January 1942, about four weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Big Three (the UK, the US, and the Soviet Union) and China, along with 22 other countries, signed a document pledging to accept the , which is referred to as the Declaration by the United Nations.

During World War II, the devastating effect of that war encouraged the the Big Four, to put aside their differences and collaborate in the war. To avoid such a war in the future, they began planning for the world. As the discussion progressed, the idea of a united world organization emerged. In October 1943, the Big Four signed the , recognizing “the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

In November- December 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met for the first time in Tehran, Iran. They discussed the post-war arrangement and partitions. Roosevelt and Churchill assured Stalin that he could expand Soviet territory into Poland and Germany. President Roosevelt was so infatuated with Stalin that he called him Uncle Joe. “I began to tease Churchill,” the American President boasted, “… Winston got red and scowled and finally Stalin broke into a deep, hearty guffaw. It was then that I called him Uncle Joe.” This cavalier attitude of President Roosevelt regarding Eastern Europe is a typical example of a public servant intoxicated with power, and turning into a despot. Such a cavalier is responsible for the US presidents’ empowering the Zionist genocide against Palestinians and the takeover of Palestine. At the end of the Tehran meeting, they agreed on the Tehran Conference. They said: “We are sure that our concord will win an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the world’s peoples and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.”

The victorious Allies founded the UN

In October 1944, the Big Four met at Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington, DC. They proposed a United Nations consisting of the following:

• A General Assembly, composed of all the member nations oversees an Economic and Social Council. Nowadays, it oversees other councils, too.
• A Security Council is composed of eleven members, five permanent and six chosen by the GA for two-year terms.
• An International Court of Justice.
• A United Nations Secretariat.

After the war, they all wanted to be in of the global issues. The US had risen to the most powerful one among the Big Three but felt needed Soviet cooperation to finish the war. The Soviets did not trust the UK or the US. They insisted on restoring the old Russian Empire and succeeded. 

In April 1945, delegates from 46 nations attended the and discussed and approved the UN. They set up the UN objectives to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights…to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.” 

On June 25, 1945, the delegates met in San Francisco. After days of meetings, they unanimously passed the UN Charter. The major debacle was the veto power of the Big Five (the UK, the US, France, the Soviets, and China). Less powerful nations feared that if a veto power threatened peace, the Security Council would lose its significance. They wanted more power distribution. Finally, they went along in the interest of global peace. 

On September 2, 1945, the war ended. The Big Three decided to expand the United Nations by inviting other nations to join it. 

The shortcomings of the victors’ peace

To ensure their global hegemony, they planned the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the UN. The UK insisted on limiting the UNSC to the UK, the US and the Soviets. The US wanted China to be included because of its strong resistance against Japan, which freed the US to support Europe. To ensure Western control, the UK insisted on adding France to the Council. That is how the Big Five surfaced. The Soviets felt outnumbered by the West and asked for veto power, which was granted to all permanent members. 

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) is the only organ in the UN in which all member nations vote. Regardless of size or population, each member nation has only one vote. A simple majority decides procedural questions while a simple majority or a two-thirds vote decides substantive ones, depending on importance. It is mainly a deliberative body empowered to make recommendations to the UN Security Council (UNSC) regarding international issues. 

In contrast, the UNSC is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It is an exclusive club. Nowadays, it has 15 members, 5 of whom are permanent members and endowed with veto power on every issue. The permanent members are the US, the UK, China, France, and Russia, also known as the Big Five. The GA chooses the other ten for two-year terms.

Like the League, the UN’s primary purpose has been to preserve peace and security. The UN members have promised not to use force except in self-defense and to use force collectively to preserve peace. In apparent violation of the UN Charter, the veto powers granted to certain member states have led to conflicts and wars, rather than preventing them. Until the fall of the Soviets in December 1991, the world faced two superpowers, the US and the Soviets, competing for global influence, a period known as the Cold War. They incited proxy wars nearly everywhere. 

Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US emerged as the world’s sole superpower. This shift in global dynamics has led to military interventions and interference in various countries, resulting in significant human suffering and destruction. Presently, the US is responsible for much of the global deaths and destruction, particularly in Iraq, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen. The US complicity in the genocide against Palestinians is the talk of the world these days.

Given these ongoing challenges, it is clear that the current state of the UN is not conducive to achieving lasting global peace. Meaningful reform or even the dismantling of the organization may be necessary. Adding Brazil, Germany, India, Japan or another country is unlikely to address the fundamental issues.

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The extremist groups threaten to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and spread instability across Africa. This is terrible for Africa and poses significant security and financial risks for the United States and Europe as well. Of the over three million refugees and internally displaced people in the Sahel, one in five needs humanitarian assistance. That’s around 16,000 victims in 2022 and 19,000 in 2023. Indeed, this conflict has taken a heavy toll.

This escalation of violence is mainly linked to competition between the region’s two main jihadist groups: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), which are affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, respectively. Jointly with other groups, they have taken advantage of the great instability in the region to launch indiscriminate on government forces and civilians.

Coups and rebellions escalate the violence

Experts attribute the expansion of violent extremism in the Sahel to weak governance, high corruption, democratic deficits and human rights violations combined with poverty and social marginalization. State power tends to be concentrated in urban regions while rural and northern areas, such as Mali, remain underdeveloped and ripe for exploitation by extremist groups. Simultaneously, the jihadist collective has sought to the increase in violence across the central Sahel, positioning itself as the defender of local communities and obtaining their support.

Moreover, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger experienced many military coups since independence. Recent military coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023 have redefined the political landscape.

Current instability is associated with the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011, which led to the proliferation of weapons and armed fighters in the region. In 2012, the influx of extremists into northern Mali reignited the dormant  — the Tuareg minority, organized under the Azawad National Liberation Movement, sought an autonomous state and aligned with multiple Islamist groups.

On September 17, 2024, Islamist armed fighters attacked two symbolic sites for the security in the Malian capital of Bamako: a gendarmerie school and a military base, causing about 77 casualties and hundreds injured. JNIM, the main jihadist group active in Mali, quickly claimed responsibility for the double attack. This follows a pattern of escalating violent incidents in the Bamako area in the past two years by the JNIM coalition, primarily the Macina Liberation Front.

This growing pressure on Bamako reflects a broader deterioration of security in Mali under the military junta. Recently, militant Islamist groups have demonstrated an to expand their into southern Mali from their fortifications in northern and central Mali. The Malian government intends to operations against the jihadists.

Do these attacks mark a turning point in the jihadists’ strategy? This is not an easy question to answer. The scale and impact of the September 27 operation show that JNIM now has the capacity not only to strike secondary urban sites, but to shake up the Malian forces in Bamako by expanding military operations to the state’s center.

Western withdrawal from the Sahel

This instability has had a major effect at the international level. In 2022, the definitive breakdown of diplomatic relations between France and Mali prompted French President Emmanuel Macron to announce the withdrawal of French troops from Malian territory. That November, the French military mission Opération Barkhane, which had deployed in the Sahel since August 2014, officially concluded. This profound revision of the region’s French military apparatus is in turn causing a for the entire security framework built by the international community over the last decade.

The US has also provided coordination and advisory support. The US military has increased its presence in the Sahel in the last decade, deploying approximately 1,500 troops to the region — particularly Niger. However, after making an agreement with a Nigerien military junta in May 2024, the US withdrew from Niger in September.

In June 2023, Mali’s government demanded the departure of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping force. The UN agreed to withdraw within six months, doing so in December 2023. This development raised of a power vacuum and setbacks for Mali’s transition to civilian rule.

The July 2023 coup in Niger dealt a severe blow to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts in the Sahel. Despite pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including sanctions and the threat of military intervention, the coup leaders refused to cede power and declared a new government. In response, the African Union �����������.

However, some of the sanctions were recently lifted or eased as ECOWAS pushed for a new dialogue. Military regimes in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali have backed the Nigerien junta, with the latter two considering a possible military intervention in Niger to be a “declaration of war.” In September 2023, the military leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger signed a mutual defense pact — the Alliance of Sahel States — solidifying, in recent months, their alliance against external intervention.

Russian movement into Africa

This “authoritarian epidemic,” which the Italian Institute for International Political Studies characterizes by the seizure of power by the military, is mainly due to the persistence of the security crisis. This has delegitimized civilian governments that are demonstrably incapable of responding to growing security pressures. Jihadist escalation and the authoritarian and nationalist drift of local governments have finally created the ideal conditions for an influential increase of other international actors in the region, starting with Russia. These military regimes have strengthened ties with the Asian power, which has moved in to fill the void.

The most obvious element of this Russian entry is the presence of mercenaries belonging to the private security company . The government in Bamako uses them to conduct counterinsurgency operations increasingly characterized by indiscriminate brutality committed against civilians.

Russia’s “African renaissance” seems able to increase, based on an economic and military diplomacy that exploits anti-French and anti-Western sentiments. It seduces part of the African elite, attracts old and new partners, winks at coup-plotting juntas and has supplanted France as the gendarme of countries in turmoil in its historic pré carré — “own little corner.” Russia’s representation is that of a just ally eager to create egalitarian ties with African countries, capable of emancipating them from the relationship with European powers. The opposition to “imperialism” present in Russian rhetoric creates further common ground between the country and the Sahelian military juntas.

The presence of the Wagner group, and now of the Russian , initially called to operate against the jihadists, now has the function of supporting the coup juntas. The numerous internal and external involved in this conflict, as well as the competition between global powers to increase their influence in Africa, make finding a solution extremely difficult.

In this framework, Ukraine’s involvement in the crisis is experiencing an increasingly pronounced setback. In August 2024, the three Sahelian military juntas wrote to the United Nations Security Council to allegedly denounce Kyiv’s intervention in Mali to support Tuareg rebellion. After Mali and Niger diplomatic relations with Ukraine, the Asian country received yet more confirmation that its image had been damaged: Andriy Yusov, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian military intelligence services, Kyiv had provided information for the JNIM and Tuareg rebels’ attack on the Malian army.

Learning that Ukraine is collaborating with its enemies, purely in an anti-Russian function, has raised concerns even outside the Sahel. Despite being amid a diplomatic crisis with the three coup juntas, ECOWAS has spoken out against any form of foreign interference.

Excessive militarization has proven counterproductive. In fact, local populations affected by repeated human rights violations have all confidence in international intervention as well as in international institutions.

The French era seems to have passed in what was once its African “backyard,” substituted by the Africa Corps that serves as the engine of Russian military penetration in Africa. The geopolitical revolution engulfing the Global South is redrawing global spheres of influence. Will this lead to a strategic downgrading of the West?

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Violence in the Sahel: Africa’s Never-Ending Crisis appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Republics have suffered total collapses throughout history. There’s no reason why the US should be immune. The fear of that often prompts a superficial reference to the final fall of the Roman Republic or the end of Greek democracy. But there’s a deeper history: Republics came into being far earlier in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations. And we can draw from a much wider range of examples to learn from as we try to understand the challenges and the opportunities.

A true republic is a political system without monarchy or concentrated political power in any office, branch or individual. Elected officials represent citizens to make decisions on their behalf, with separate branches of government providing checks and balances. While many associate republics with direct democracy in our times, there’s a much wider array of power structures that developed in the formative era of republics.

The 20th century established republics as the global standard. Monarchies declined after World War I and most former European colonies declared independence as republics following World War II. Fascist and communist countries, which centralized power in individuals or ruling parties, also reduced in number.

Despite their concentration of power, however, many fascist and communist states claimed the title of republics. While countries out of 193 identify as republics today, far less uphold republican principles and blend them effectively with democracy. Examining the historical evolution of republics highlights those best positioned to serve as the most resilient modern examples.

Republics require regular gatherings and assemblies, making them difficult to establish in sparsely populated agrarian societies, while empires generally concentrate power too heavily for self-rule to gain traction. It was in smaller city-states, particularly trade-focused ones, where citizens could form factions, exchange ideas and influence government decisions and rules for commerce.

The invention of republican ideals

Some of the earliest experiments with republican governance appeared in ancient Sumerian city-states (4500–2000 BC), centered in modern-day Iraq. Kings acted more as neutral rather than rulers, sharing power with aristocratic families and groups, as well as common citizens. In Kish, citizens could a new king during crises. In Uruk, assemblies of townsmen and elders had to ratify major military decisions.

The Sumerian city-states fell to the Akkadian and Babylonian Empires by 1750 BC. Phoenician city-states, emerging about 250 years later in what is now Lebanon, revived republican ideals. Here, monarchical power was often with a merchant class and citizen council. Egyptian records dating to the mid-14th century BC describe Phoenician cities sending delegates to represent citizens rather than monarchs, with mentions of and aid requests by the “men of Arwad” and “elders of Irqata.”

By the 6th century BC, the Phoenician city of Tyre had functioned for seven years without a monarch, governed instead under suffetes, or judges, elected for short terms. In Chios, a “people’s council” allowed citizens to debate laws and hold officials accountable. However, beginning in the 9th century BC and continuing over the next few centuries, Phoenician city-states were successively conquered or subjugated by the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian and Macedonian Empires.

Like other civilizations, Phoenicians established colonies and trading posts. Carthage, founded by Tyre in 814 BC in modern Tunisia, grew into a powerful city-state with its own . By the early 7th century BC, two elected suffetes from aristocratic families replaced the monarchy. They governed alongside an aristocratic Senate, while newer merchants could gain influence and a popular assembly allowed citizens’ input on major decisions. Military and religious leaders also held considerable power.

Republican ideals weren’t confined to Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Buddhist texts like the Maha Parinibbana Sutta mention Indian republics called in the 6th century BC. Some adopted republican styles of government, while others formed republican confederations, like Sumerian and Phoenician city-states, to make decisions collectively and protect against larger threats. The Indian republics were gradually absorbed by the Maurya Empire (321–185 BC) and other entities.

Greece and Rome evolved republics

Ancient Greek city-states also developed republican ideals. Sparta was governed by a constitution and popular assembly as early as 600 BC, though it remained largely monarchical. Athens established a direct democracy in 507 BC, known as demokratia, meaning “people” and “rule.” Greece’s slave-based economy allowed some citizens time to participate in politics, though this limited political fairness. In 431 BC, Attica, the region surrounding Athens, had an estimated population of 315,000, of which only 172,000 were citizens, and just 40,000 male citizens could vote.

Still, Athens’s allowed these citizens to frequently debate, deliberate and vote. They were overseen by the Council of Five Hundred, which was chosen annually by lot to draft laws and manage administration. However, following Athens’s Golden Age, 4th century BC Greek like Plato and Aristotle, and later 2nd century BC historians like Polybius, criticized the system for inefficiency and vulnerability to charismatic leaders to sway public opinion, leading to volatile policy shifts.

They emphasized balancing public, aristocracy, and monarchical roles to avoid the typical of chaos and order: First, a strong leader unites a restive society under a monarchy, which evolves into tyranny. It is overthrown and replaced by an aristocracy, which reduces into oligarchy. Democracy eventually replaces it but deteriorates into mob rule, restarting the cycle.

Invasions further weakened Greece’s republican and democratic systems. In 338 BC, Greece fell under the control of the Macedonian Empire, ending the independence of many city-states. Despite this, Greek states formed republican confederations to protect against threats, including the neighboring Roman Republic. The term republic derives from the Roman res publica, meaning “public affairs” — this emphasizes shared governance, civic participation and checks and balances. Since its founding in 509 BC, the Roman Republic’s political structure had evolved considerably. Polybius expressed for Rome’s system; two tribunes were elected annually to represent the common citizens, while two consuls were elected and held executive power, checked by an aristocratic senate.

Romans were skeptical of Greek democracy, especially in Athens, due to its instability, infighting and mob rule. Carthage’s republic seemed overly commercial and lacked the civic loyalty the Romans valued. This loyalty was central to Rome’s military, staffed by a citizen army motivated by . In contrast, Carthage’s strong, citizen-led navy protected trade routes, but its reliance on mercenaries for land campaigns made them costly and unpredictable.

These factors reduced the ability to push back against Roman rule. By 146 BC, Rome defeated both Greece and Carthage, cementing its dominance and expanding political system. Polybius suggests that Rome’s success over Carthage was partially due to its powerful, aristocratic Senate, while Carthage’s policies were increasingly shaped by popular influence. He believed that Rome’s decisions were made by elites versus the influence of the masses in Carthage.

Yet by this time, Rome was approaching its Late Republic phase. Scholar Harriet Flower’s argues that the Roman Republic wasn’t a single entity but a series of six republics, each with unique political characteristics. Others have also challenged the notion of a single Roman Republic, placing Republican Rome into three main periods characterized by changing centers of power.

The Early Republic (509–367 BC) was marked by tensions between patricians (aristocratic elites) and plebeians (common citizens). The struggle for plebeian rights led to significant reforms, including the establishment of tribunes, elected by the to represent common interests and often from the plebeian class.

During the Middle Republic (367–133 BC), the Licinian-Sextian laws of 367 BC were passed to again alleviate tensions between patricians and plebeians, limiting patrician land ownership, providing debt relief for plebeians and ensuring that at least one of the two consuls was a plebeian. However, political power increasingly concentrated in the Senate, undermining these reforms.

During the Late Republic (133–31 BC), Rome’s military success over rivals coincided with the growing influence of ordinary citizens in the judicial system, especially as jurors. Yet the republic was plagued by social conflict, corruption and civil unrest. Sulla’s march on Rome in 88 BC and his curtailing of the tribunes’ power exemplified rising instability. Afterwards, figures like in the ’70s BC and Julius Caesar in 59 BC began consolidating power, further undermining republican values. In 27 BC, Augustus formally transitioned Rome into an empire, while maintaining the of republican traditions.

Roman orator Cicero, a prominent defender of the Republic, inadvertently its demise through his support for Augustus, endorsement of dictatorial powers and willingness to suspend legal norms during crises, showing the dangers of sacrificing republican ideals to manage turmoil. For the next few centuries, republican ideals were largely sidelined.

The rise of modern republics

The collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD saw and monarchies spread across its former territories and peripheral regions. This instability nonetheless allowed new republics to emerge, such as Venice, founded in 697 AD. It maintained a 1,100-year run as a through a political system that encouraged merchant participation and representation, shrewd diplomacy, social mobility, community cohesion and an extensive trade network. France eventually conquered it in 1797.

During the Italian Renaissance (14th to 17th centuries), urbanization, advancements in communication and Enlightenment ideals enabled the rise of new city-states. Merchant classes and other groups established republican systems as alternatives to European monarchies elsewhere as well. However, they were ultimately absorbed by empires, partly due to their inability to exploit the expanding Atlantic trade routes that reduced the importance of the Mediterranean.

Republics were not confined to Europe. The in modern-day Malaysia, particularly the Lanfang Republic declared in 1777, arose when Chinese settlers recruited by local sultans for mining formed companies to safeguard their interests. Over time, they evolved into self-governing territories with elected leaders and various levels of democratic governance. The Lanfang Republic was eventually defeated by Dutch colonial forces in 1884, with the rest absorbed through treaty or militarily defeated by the century’s end.

The establishment of the US marked the reemergence of the large-scale republican state. In 1787, after the American Revolution, the nation formally became a constitutional republic, aiming to eliminate monarchy while avoiding a chaotic direct democracy. The Founding Fathers created a , balancing public participation with safeguards against aristocracy and emphasizing consent of the governed (though limited to white male landowners). The debates over constitutional amendments and expanding democracy for decades, paralleling similar discussions in post-Revolutionary France after 1789.

Today, many republics exist, but their authenticity and stability can be compromised. Being conquered imposes outside authority, while others pursue foreign expansion themselves, centralizing control and subjugating other territories. Republics such as those in 16th century Netherlands, 17th century England and 18th century US and France grew into empires or reverted to monarchies, adapting in ways whose lessons are still relevant today. These expansionist policies, often justified as essential for wealth and security, led to the abandonment of certain republican and democratic principles.

Risks of devolution

Republics can shift toward authoritarianism, with modern policymakers perceiving more open democratic systems as unstable and vulnerable to manipulation. In recent years, China and Russia have seen reductions in public accountability, civil liberties, meaningful political participation and concentrations of power behind Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively. In North Korea, power has been concentrated in the leader’s office since its founding, with leadership passed within the Kim family. Similarly, a dynasty has developed under the Aliyev family in since the 1990s, with concerns that may follow.

Countries with strong presidential systems, common in the Americas, risk in the executive branch. Fixed terms limit the removal of unpopular leaders, since, unlike in parliamentary democracies, no “confidence vote” mechanism exists for crisis situations. can also weaken checks and balances; coups can be common.

Alliances and federations of Greek city-states like the and , as well as the Native American , formed assemblies and councils for representation and collective decision-making, influencing models like the and European Union (EU). The statement that the US is “a republic, not a democracy” reflects the original aim to keep political power within the states rather than the federal government. However, authority has increasingly centralized in Washington, DC, reducing state sovereignty, tensions in the EU between individual states and Brussels.

Political apathy and extremism can also stem from the influence of billionaires and corporations over the political process, government corruption and the erosion of social mobility. Social media platforms offer the chance for heightened political participation, but are increasingly vulnerable to disinformation spread by big tech and political actors. This reveals new ways in which democracies can veer toward .

The diversity of republics today reflects their historical variety, with countries still navigating the governance structures in their own contexts. Kazakhstan, initially authoritarian, has seen some toward a more balanced system with a more powerful parliament following popular protests in 2022, though it remains less democratic. Similarly, Singapore, often described as authoritarian, is still considered a republic due to some , maintaining a blend of controlled leadership and political structure.

The future of republic governance

An informed and engaged citizenry, supported by a strong economic base, is essential for a successful republic. Citizens must feel the benefits of their system, and these must endure through fair elections, the rule of law and due process. Effective foreign policy also relies on wide-ranging trade networks and adaptable alliances, while maintaining a strong military and avoiding military overreach or falling into the trap of foreign conquest.

Historically, empire and monarchy have been more common than republics, shaping world order through hierarchical and anarchic systems. Within the global United Nations framework, which is designed to support the sovereignty and equality of nations — a principle rooted in republican ideals — republics can govern more democratically by collaborating in a way similar to ancient confederations. The Achaean League and Lycian League consisted of states with varying political systems cooperating within a loose, republican-style confederation. Modern blocs like the EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and African Union allow countries to work together under common principles and boost their voice in the international system.

Changes in domestic politics have seen the growth of in the 2010s, as more referendums and popular votes of legislative and constitutional issues emerged globally, but especially in Europe. While larger republics like the US, Germany and India still avoid national-level votes on major issues, direct democracy is increasingly apparent at regional and local levels. Challenges remain in terms of deliberation and integration, as states like California and Arizona have seen ballot initiatives rushed, leaving limited time for meaningful debate.

Modern , based on those originating thousands of years ago, have also elevated these referendums in recent years and provided an alternative to traditional political processes. They have influenced major policy changes, from climate policies in France to abortion laws in Ireland, with assemblies, typically convened by legislative bodies in partnership with nonprofits, designed to reflect demographics. While they have led to concrete policy shifts, some recommendations have not been adopted as lawmakers cite the importance of expert-led decision-making.

With the US election behind us, reassessing republican ideals, both domestically and globally, is crucial. As the Grand Old Party potentially gains control over all three branches of government in a divided nation, how it implements policies will either ease concerns or amplify them. The future of republicanism depends on the US shaping its domestic agenda for the common good and using its influence on the global stage in line with democratic principles.

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Fast forward 75 years. The world has changed dramatically, yet NATO persists as a relic of a bygone era. The Soviet Union is no more, replaced by a Russia with a GDP than Italy’s. The European Union, along with the United Kingdom, boasts a combined economy nearly ten times the size of Russia’s. France and the UK possess their own nuclear deterrents. Yet, inexplicably, US taxpayers continue to foot the bill for Europe’s defense.

With Russia weakened, Europe is getting a free ride

Some argue that Russia’s actions in recent years, particularly its invasion of Ukraine, justify the US’s continued NATO membership. They paint a picture of a resurgent Russian threat, echoing the Cold War narratives of the past. But this comparison falls flat when we examine the facts.

During the Cold War, the US faced off against an empire of comparable might. The Soviet Union’s military and economic power posed a genuine threat to both Western Europe and US interests. �մǻ岹��’s Russia, however, is a shadow of its former self. With a GDP of about , it pales in comparison to the combined economic might of the and the , which totals more than $22 trillion.

Moreover, the population demographics tell a similar story. Russia’s population is less than , dwarfed by that of the EU and UK totaling more than 500 million. The combined military spending of the and stands at $370 billion, far outstripping Russia’s total defense budget of . Yet, despite these advantages, Europe continues to rely on the United States for its security.

Ironically, the US’s persistent role in NATO may be making Europe less secure, not more. What matters for European defense isn’t raw might, but speed, agility and political will. NATO’s cumbersome decision-making process, requiring consensus among 32 members, is ill-suited to respond to modern threats. An army of motivated Polish and German fighters willing to fight and die to protect their freedom is a far greater deterrent to Russia than a US military that is truly awesome in its capabilities, but reliant on the whims of a foot-dragging US Congress for that to translate to the battlefield. The current arrangement doesn’t strengthen Europe; it weakens it, leaving the continent less prepared to address threats from Russia and elsewhere.

While US citizens shoulder the burden of NATO’s defense spending, Europeans have grown complacent. They’ve built generous welfare states where they enjoy long vacations, early retirements and universal healthcare. Meanwhile, US workers struggle with rising healthcare costs, minimal paid leave and relentless anxiety about how they will pay the bills.

This disparity is not just a matter of different priorities; it’s a direct result of Europe’s ability to skimp on defense spending, knowing full well that Uncle Sam will always be there to pick up the slack. It’s time to ask: Why should the US taxpayer subsidize Europe’s lavish lifestyle?

A new era demands new priorities

Proponents of NATO often point to the US’s nuclear umbrella as a critical component of European security. But this argument ignores a crucial fact: Both the UK and France possess their own nuclear arsenals, which was not the case when NATO was formed. These two European powers have more than enough nuclear capability to deter any potential aggressor. The idea that US nuclear weapons are necessary for European security is a Cold War anachronism that does not stand up to scrutiny.

As we approach 2025, the world faces challenges that were unimaginable when NATO was founded. Climate change, cyber and biological warfare and the rotting minds of our children addicted to social media platforms like and like Fortnite are the true existential threats of our time. These are the battles that will define the 21st century and beyond, not a rehash of 20th century geopolitics. If there is a new Cold War between rival superpowers, it exists across the North Pacific, not the North Atlantic.

It’s better for the US to leave

Some will argue that leaving NATO is too risky, that it could destabilize Europe and embolden Russia. But this view underestimates Europe’s capabilities and overestimates Russia’s. By continuing its outdated commitment to NATO, the US is fostering dependency and resentment, preventing Europe from developing the military self-reliance it needs.

Proponents of NATO often point to its invocation of Article 5 after the September 11 attacks as proof of the alliance’s value. However, this argument ignores a crucial reality: The response to the attacks would have happened with or without NATO. When faced with acts of aggression that demand a response, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to rapidly form and provide leadership to coalitions outside of formal alliance structures.

The First Gulf War in 1991 serves as a prime example. In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the US quickly assembled a coalition of 42 nations, many of whom were not NATO members. This “coalition of the willing” included fighters from countries as diverse as Japan, New Zealand and Afghanistan. The swift and effective formation of this coalition underscores a fundamental truth: When genuine threats arise, nations band together to address them, which can be easier without the cumbersome framework of an organization like NATO.

Game theory offers another compelling reason for the US to leave: the strategic value of . In a world of mass surveillance where concealing actions is increasingly difficult, being predictable can be a significant disadvantage. Consider a poker game where one player always has a pair of kings, while the other has queens or aces with equal probability. Despite each player having the stronger hand half the time, the unpredictable player will on average win more.

This principle applies similarly to military strategy. NATO’s rigid structure and well-defined protocols make its responses predictable. By leaving NATO, the US introduces an element of uncertainty that can serve as a more effective deterrent. Potential adversaries would no longer be able to rely on a known command and control structure or anticipate specific responses. This unpredictability can in turn force adversaries to be more cautious, preventing conflicts before they begin.

Moreover, while it is true that P implies Q does not mean the same as not P implies not Q, there is often an implicit assumption that it does. By the United States declaring “If there is an attack on a NATO country, there will be an overwhelming response from the United States” it suggests to potential enemies that “If there is an attack on a non-NATO country, the United States will not respond with overwhelming force.” This is clearly seen in Ukraine, where Putin is in plain sight employing the principle: “Ukraine not NATO, therefore Ukraine fair game.”

The reality on the ground is that the Iron curtain no longer exists and we live in a world with fuzzy borders and hybrid warfare. The correct response to this is illustrated regarding Taiwan. Will America go to war to defend Taiwan? It might. That should be the answer to every question of that form. Will America go to war over a sabotaged undersea cable or gas pipeline? It might. Will it go to war over an act of terrorism? It might. Will America go to war to defend Europe? It might. America should go to war when the American President and Congress decide that it should, not because of a treaty from three quarters of a century ago born of a different age. By withdrawing from NATO, the United States would put Ukraine on equal footing with not just Poland but also France and Germany, and be a masterstroke of expanding not contracting American influence.

In essence, by stepping away from NATO, the US would paradoxically enhance global security by keeping potential aggressors guessing about the nature and extent of possible responses to their actions.

It’s time to go

The time has come for bold leadership. President-elect Donald Trump’s landslide victory and Republican control of Congress provide a unique opportunity to reshape the US’s foreign policy. The nation must seize this moment to chart a new course. Leaving NATO will not only serve the interests of the US taxpayer, it will also help Europe by teaching it the pride of taking care of its own needs with its own hard work.

The US’s departure from NATO won’t be easy. It will require careful diplomacy, detailed planning and time. But it is a necessary step for both the US and Europe to address the real challenges of the 21st century.

And to those reading this in a nice coffee shop in a town square in Europe, I say this: If you want to continue enjoying your wine and your swimming pools, and your relaxed way of life, it’s time for you to fight for it — and pay for it — yourself.

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To make that forecast, the historian conducted what he called “a more realistic assessment of domestic and global trends.” Starting with the global context, he argued that, “faced with a fading superpower,” China, India, Iran, and Russia would all start to “provocatively challenge U.S. dominion over the oceans, space, and cyberspace.” At home in the US, domestic divisions would “widen into violent clashes and divisive debates… Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair, a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal.” That historian concluded, “the world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.”

Now that a “far-right patriot,” one President-elect Donald Trump, has indeed captured (or rather recaptured) the presidency “with thundering rhetoric,” let’s explore the likelihood that a second Trump term in office, starting in the fateful year 2025, might actually bring a hasty end, silent or otherwise, to an “American Century” of global dominion.

Making the original prediction

Let’s begin by examining the reasoning underlying my original prediction. (Yes, I was the historian.) Back in 2010, when I picked a specific date for a rising tide of US decline, this country looked unassailably strong both at home and abroad. President Barack Obama’s administration was producing a “post-racial” society. After recovering from the 2008 financial crisis, the US was on track for a decade of dynamic growth — the auto industry saved, oil and gas production booming, the tech sector thriving, the stock market soaring and employment solid. Internationally, Washington was the world’s preeminent leader, with an unchallenged military, formidable diplomatic clout, unchecked economic globalization and its democratic governance still the global norm.

Looking forward, leading historians of the empire agreed that the US would remain the world’s sole superpower for the foreseeable future. Writing in the Financial Times in 2002, Yale professor Paul Kennedy, author of a widely-read book on imperial decline, that “America’s array of force is staggering,” with a mix of economic, diplomatic and technological dominance that made it the globe’s “single superpower” without peer in the entire history of the world. Russia’s defense budget had “collapsed” and its economy was “less than that of the Netherlands.” Should China’s high growth rates continue for another 30 years, it “might be a serious challenger to U.S. predominance” — but that wouldn’t be true until 2032, if then. While the US’s “unipolar moment” would surely not “continue for centuries,” its end, he predicted, “seems a long way off for now.”

Writing in a similar vein in The New York Times in February 2010, Piers Brendon, a historian of Britain’s imperial decline, the “doom mongers” who “conjure with Roman and British analogies in order to trace the decay of American hegemony.” While Rome was riven by “internecine strife” and Britain ran its empire on a shoestring budget, the US was “constitutionally stable” with “an enormous industrial base.” Taking a few “relatively simple steps,” he concluded, Washington should be able to overcome current budgetary problems and perpetuate its global power indefinitely.

When I made my very different prediction nine months later, I was coordinating a of 140 historians from universities on three continents who were studying the decline of earlier empires — particularly those of Britain, France and Spain. Beneath the surface of this country’s seeming strength, we could already see the telltale signs of decline that had led to the collapse of those earlier empires.

By 2010, economic globalization was cutting good-paying factory jobs here, income inequality was widening and corporate bailouts were booming — all essential ingredients for rising working-class resentment and deepening domestic divisions. Foolhardy military misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, pushed by Washington elites trying to deny any sense of decline, stoked simmering anger among ordinary US citizens, slowly discrediting the very idea of international commitments. And the erosion of the US’s relative economic strength from half the world’s output in 1950 to a quarter in 2010 meant the wherewithal for its unipolar power was fading fast.

Only a “near-peer” competitor was needed to turn that attenuating US global hegemony into accelerating imperial decline. With rapid economic growth, a vast population and the world’s longest imperial tradition, China seemed primed to become just such a country. But back then, Washington’s foreign policy elites thought not and even admitted China to the World Trade Organization (WTO), that “U.S. power and hegemony could readily mold China to the United States’ liking.”

Our group of historians, mindful of the frequent imperial wars fought when near-peer competitors finally confronted the reigning hegemon of their moment — think Germany vs Great Britain in World War I — expected China’s challenge would not be long in coming. Indeed, in 2012, just two years after my prediction, the US National Intelligence Council that “China alone will probably have the largest economy, surpassing that of the United States a few years before 2030” and this country would no longer be “a hegemonic power.”

Just a year later, Chinese President Xi Jinping, drawing on a massive in foreign-exchange reserves accumulated in the decade after joining the WTO, announced his bid for global power. This would come in the form of what he called “the ,” history’s largest development program. It was designed to make Beijing the center of the global economy.

In the following decade, the US–China rivalry would become so intense that, last September, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall : “I’ve been closely watching the evolution of [China’s] military for 15 years. China is not a future threat; China is a threat today.”

The global rise of the strongman

Another major setback for Washington’s world order, long legitimated by its promotion of democracy (whatever its own dominating tendencies), came from the rise of populist strongmen worldwide. Consider them part of a nationalist reaction to the West’s aggressive economic globalization.

At the close of the Cold War in 1991, Washington became the planet’s sole superpower, using its hegemony to forcefully promote a wide-open global economy — forming the in 1995, pressing open-market “” on developing economies and knocking down tariff barriers worldwide. It also built a global communications grid by 700,000 miles of fiber-optic submarine cables and then 1,300 satellites (now 4,700).

By exploiting that very globalized economy, however, China’s soared to $3.2 trillion by 2016, surpassing both the US and Japan, while simultaneously 2.4 million US jobs between 1999 and 2011, ensuring the closure of factories in countless towns across the South and Midwest. By fraying social safety nets while eroding protection for labor unions and local businesses in both the US and Europe, globalization reduced the quality of life for many, while creating inequality on a staggering scale and stoking a working-class reaction that would crest in a global wave of angry populism.

Riding that wave, right-wing populists have been winning a steady succession of elections — in Russia in 2000, Israel in 2009, Hungary in 2010, China in 2012, Turkey in 2014, the Philippines and the US in 2016, Brazil in 2018, Italy in 2022, the Netherlands in 2023, Indonesia and the US again in 2024.

Set aside their incendiary us-vs-them rhetoric, however, and look at their actual achievements and those right-wing demagogues turn out to have a record that can only be described as dismal. In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro the vast Amazon rainforest and left office amid an . In Russia, President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, his country’s economy to capture some more land (which it hardly lacked). In Turkey, President Recep Erdoğan caused a crippling , while 50,000 suspected opponents. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte 30,000 suspected drug users and China by giving up his country’s claims in the resource-rich South China Sea. In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has wreaked havoc on Gaza and neighboring lands, in part to in office and stay out of prison.

Prospects for Donald Trump’s second term

After the steady erosion of its global power for several decades, the US is no longer the — or perhaps even an — “exceptional” nation floating above the deep global currents that shape the politics of most countries. And as it has become more of an ordinary country, it has also felt the full force of the worldwide move toward strongman rule. Not only does that global trend help explain Trump’s election and his recent re-election, but it provides some clues as to what he’s likely to do with that office the second time around.

In the globalized world the US made, there is now an intimate interaction between domestic and international policy. That will soon be apparent in a second Trump administration whose policies are likely to simultaneously damage the country’s economy and further degrade Washington’s world leadership.

Let’s start with the clearest of his commitments: environmental policy. During the recent election campaign, Trump climate change “a scam” and his transition team has already drawn up to exit from the Paris climate accords. By quitting that agreement, the US will abdicate any leadership role when it comes to the most consequential issue facing the international community while reducing pressure on China to curb its greenhouse gas emissions. Since these two countries now account for (45%) of global carbon emissions, such a move will ensure that the world blows past the target of keeping this planet’s temperature rise to C until the end of the century. Instead, on a planet that’s already had 12 recent of just such a temperature rise, that mark is expected to be permanently reached by perhaps 2029. That is the year Trump finishes his second term.

On the domestic side of climate policy, Trump last September that he would “terminate the Green New Deal, which I call the Green New Scam, and rescind all unspent funds under the misnamed Inflation Reduction Act.” On the day after his election, he committed himself to increasing the country’s oil and gas production, a celebratory crowd, “We have more liquid gold than any country in the world.” He will undoubtedly also wind farm leases on Federal lands and the $7,500 tax credit for purchasing an electrical vehicle.

As the world shifts to renewable energy and all-electric vehicles, Trump’s policies will undoubtedly do lasting damage to the US economy. In 2023, the International Renewable Energy Agency that, amid continuing price decreases, wind and solar power now generate electricity for less than half the cost of fossil fuels. Any attempt to slow the conversion of this country’s utilities to the most cost-effective form of energy runs a serious risk of ensuring that US-made products will be ever less competitive.

To put it bluntly, he seems to be proposing that electricity users here should pay twice as much for their power as those in other advanced nations. Similarly, as relentless engineering innovation makes electric vehicles cheaper and more reliable than petroleum-powered ones, attempting to slow such an energy transition is likely to make the US automotive industry uncompetitive at home and abroad.

Calling tariffs “the greatest thing ever invented,” Trump has slapping a 20% duty on all foreign goods and 60% on those from China. In another instance of domestic–foreign synergy, such duties will undoubtedly end up crippling US farm exports, thanks to retaliatory overseas tariffs. Simultaneously, it will dramatically raise the cost of consumer goods for US citizens, stoking inflation and slowing consumer spending.

Reflecting his to alliances and military commitments, Trump’s first foreign policy initiative will likely be an attempt to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. During a CNN town hall meeting in May 2023, he he could stop the fighting “in 24 hours.” Last July, he : “I would tell [Ukrainian President] Zelenskyy, no more. You got to make a deal.”

Just two days after the November 5 election, Trump reportedly Putin over a phone call “not to escalate the war in Ukraine and reminded him of Washington’s sizable military presence in Europe.” Drawing on sources inside the Trump transition team, the Wall Street Journal that the new administration is considering “cementing Russia’s seizure of 20% of Ukraine” and forcing Kyiv to forego its bid to join NATO, perhaps for as long as 20 years.

With Russia drained of manpower and its economy pummeled by three years of bloody warfare, a competent negotiator — should Trump actually appoint one — might indeed be able to bring a tenuous peace to a ravaged Ukraine. Since it has been Europe’s frontline of defense against a revanchist Russia, the continent’s major powers would be expected to play a . But Germany’s coalition government has just collapsed; French President Emmanuel Macron is crippled by recent electoral reverses and the NATO alliance, after three years of a shared commitment to Ukraine, faces real uncertainty with the advent of a Trump presidency.

US allies

Those impending negotiations over Ukraine highlight the paramount importance of alliances for US global power. For 80 years, from World War II through the Cold War and beyond, Washington relied on bilateral and multilateral alliances as a critical force multiplier. With China and Russia both rearmed and increasingly closely aligned, reliable allies have become even more important to maintaining Washington’s global presence. With 32 member nations representing a billion people and a commitment to mutual defense that has lasted 75 years, NATO is arguably the most powerful military alliance in modern history.

Yet Trump has long been sharply critical of it. As a candidate in 2016, he the alliance “obsolete.” As president, he mocked the treaty’s mutual-defense clause, even “tiny” Montenegro could drag the US into war. While campaigning last February, he that he would tell Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to a NATO ally that didn’t pay what he considered its fair share.

Right after Trump’s election, caught between what one analyst “an aggressively advancing Russia and an aggressively withdrawing America,” Macron insisted that the continent needed to be a “more united, stronger, more sovereign Europe in this new context.” Even if the new administration doesn’t formally withdraw from NATO, Trump’s repeated hostility, particularly toward its crucial mutual-defense clause, may yet serve to eviscerate the alliance.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the US presence rests on three sets of overlapping alliances: the entente with Australia and Britain; the with Australia, India and Japan and a chain of bilateral defense pacts stretching along the Pacific littoral from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Via careful diplomacy, the administration US President Joe Biden those alliances, bringing two wayward allies, Australia and the Philippines that had drifted Beijing-wards, back into the Western fold. Trump’s penchant for abusing allies and, as in his first term, from multilateral pacts is likely to weaken such ties and so US power in the region.

Although his first administration famously waged a trade war with Beijing, Trump’s attitude toward the island of Taiwan is bluntly transactional. “I think, Taiwan should pay us for defense,” he in June, adding: “You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.” In October, he the Wall Street Journal that he would not have to use military force to defend Taiwan because Xi “respects me and he knows I’m f—— crazy.” Bluster aside, Trump, unlike Biden, has never committed himself to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack.

Should Beijing indeed attack Taiwan outright or, as appears more likely, impose a crippling on the island, Trump seems unlikely to risk a war with China. The loss of Taiwan would break the US position along the Pacific littoral, which for 80 years has been the fulcrum of its global imperial posture. This would push its naval forces back to a “second island chain” running from Japan to Guam. Such a retreat would represent a major blow to the US’s imperial role in the Pacific, potentially making it no longer a significant player in the security of its Asia-Pacific allies.

A silent US recessional

Adding up the likely impact of Trump’s policies in this country, Asia, Europe and the international community generally, his second term will almost certainly be one of imperial decline, increasing internal chaos and a further loss of global leadership. As “respect for American authority” fades, Trump may yet resort to “threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal.” But as I predicted back in 2010, it seems quite likely that “the world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.”

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The budget battle that broke the camel’s back

Scholz is scrambling to save face amid approval ratings that have plunged to an unprecedented low of 14%. The SPD’s own approval ratings are similarly abysmal.

Polls of voting intentions show the party now tied with the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) at around 16% — a dramatic drop from the SDP’s 26% support in the last election. The FDP faces even bleaker prospects, polling around 3–4%, just below the 5% threshold needed to enter parliament.

While tensions within the coalition were no secret, the breaking point came when a proposal by Lindner leaked. The 18-page “Turnaround Germany – A Concept for Growth and Generational Justice” suggested cutting financial aid to low-income families and refugees, which panicked the SPD and Greens.

The election of Donald Trump as the next US president has raised fears the US will soon cut its support for Ukraine, forcing Germany to pick up the tab or risk the defeat of Ukrainian forces. Lindner claims he was pressured to agree to another suspension of the debt brake. He refused, afraid of embarrassment by the constitutional court. Scholz floated the possibility of new elections, which Lindner leaked to Bild while parties were still deliberating. This was the final straw for Scholz, who asked for Lindner’s dismissal. 

The economic headwinds Germany has been facing only add to the drama. Budgets crafted on the assumption of GDP growth that never materialized have left government departments strapped. Austerity measures have strained even the nation’s soft power as cultural icons like the Goethe Institute have been forced to close German schools abroad.

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The crux of the budgetary deadlock is Germany’s “debt brake,” a constitutional limit capping new debt for structural deficits at 0.35% of GDP. While this debt brake was suspended temporarily during the pandemic and the Ukraine invasion, it has since snapped back into force, severely restricting the government’s freedom of action.

Who stands to gain?

With elections likely in early spring, Germany’s political map could shift drastically. The center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), currently polling at 33%, are poised to regain power, though their numbers fall short of a parliamentary majority. A coalition with the Greens remains unlikely due to ideological divides, and the SPD’s recent failure makes it a dubious ally. That leaves the CDU/CSU with only a handful of feasible partners — including an intriguing, if controversial, one in the newly-formed Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW).

BSW, led by former leftist Sahra Wagenknecht, has captivated voters disillusioned with mainstream parties but unwilling to embrace the far-right AfD. Known for her anti-immigration stance and advocacy for a negotiated settlement with Russia, Wagenknecht is a questionable candidate to offer the CDU/CSU a politically stable alliance. 

It should be noted that AfD came out as the party with the most votes during recent state elections in Thuringia (34.3%, slightly ahead of CDU 33.5%). It missed to reach that goal in Saxony, but only by a hair (34.0% compared to 34.4% for CDU).

Voter discontent in Germany, especially in the former East German states, has led to a surge in support for right-wing AfD. Due to Germany’s history, politicians are very aware of the danger of fascism, but they seem rather helpless in addressing the root causes (increased unemployment in rural areas, social anxiety, xenophobia, feelings of being second-class citizens).

Financial and global implications

The collapse of the German government sends shivers through markets already sensitive to geopolitical risk. Shares of Germany’s iconic automakers — BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche and Volkswagen — have fallen sharply, anticipating the return of Trump-era import tariffs on European goods. With Germany’s political attention diverted inward, “budget sinners” like Italy, France and Spain may find relief, as former members of the hard-currency block, such as Germany, have historically pressured them to meet strict fiscal criteria under the Maastricht Treaty.

So far, little or no spread widening between German and other Euro-area government debt has been observed in reaction to the earthquake in Berlin. While the German 10-year government bond yield stands at 2.4%, France and Spain pay a clear premium at 3.2%, followed by Greece at 3.3% and Italy at 3.7%. Still, Italy (135% debt-to-GDP ratio) and Greece (162%) pay lower interest rates than the UK (98%) and the US (123%). Those yields only make sense if the political will to keep the Euro area together would galvanize politicians into further bailouts of countries should the need arise.

If no stable coalition emerges, Germany faces the prospect of another election, potentially plunging Europe’s largest economy into a period of prolonged instability. A caretaker government may limp along in the interim, but effective governance and ambitious legislative agendas will be on hold.

Internationally, the political crisis could have wide-reaching effects. As Germany becomes preoccupied with its own domestic woes, European allies such as Italy and France may gain breathing room in their own budgetary struggles, potentially facing less scrutiny from Berlin on debt under the Maastricht Treaty. However, any withdrawal from a Trump-led US could leave Europe drifting in the high seas without clear leadership, missing out on a potentially generational opportunity to determine the geopolitical direction of a future Europe unshackled from US dominance.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Recent events illustrate the rising tensions of the new Cold War in the Pacific. From June to September of this year, the Chinese and Russian militaries conducted joint maneuvers that ranged from live-fire in the South China Sea to air patrols circling Japan and even US airspace in . To respond to what Moscow “rising geopolitical tension around the world,” such actions culminated last month in a joint Chinese–Russian that mobilized 400 ships, 120 aircraft and 90,000 troops in a vast arc from the Baltic Sea across the Arctic to the northern Pacific Ocean. While kicking off such monumental maneuvers with China, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused the US of “trying to maintain its global military and political dominance at any cost” by “increasing [its] military presence… in the Asia-Pacific region.”

“China is not a future threat,” US Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall in September. “China is a threat today.” Over the past 15 years, Beijing’s ability to project power in the Western Pacific, he claimed, had risen to alarming levels. He said the likelihood of war was “increasing” and, he predicted, it will only “continue to do so.” An anonymous senior Pentagon official that China “continues to be the only U.S. competitor with the intent and… the capability to overturn the rules-based infrastructure that has kept peace in the Indo-Pacific since the end of the Second World War.”

Indeed, regional tensions in the Pacific have profound global implications. For the past 80 years, an island chain of military bastions running from Japan to Australia has served as a crucial fulcrum for US global power. To ensure that it will be able to continue to anchor its “defense” on that strategic shoal, Washington has recently added new overlapping alliances while encouraging a massive militarization of the Indo–Pacific region. Though bristling with armaments and seemingly strong, this ad hoc Western coalition may yet prove, like NATO in Europe, vulnerable to sudden setbacks from rising partisan pressures, both in the US and among its allies.

Building a Pacific bastion

For well over a century, the US has struggled to secure its vulnerable western frontier from Pacific threats. During the early decades of the 20th century, Washington maneuvered against a rising Japanese presence in the region. These actions produced geopolitical tensions that led to Tokyo’s attack on the US naval bastion at Pearl Harbor that began World War II in the Pacific. After fighting for four years and suffering nearly 300,000 casualties, the US defeated Japan and won unchallenged control of the entire region.

Aware that the advent of the long-range bomber and the future possibility of atomic warfare had rendered the historic concept of coastal defense irrelevant, in the post-war years Washington extended its North American “defenses” deep into the Western Pacific. Starting with the expropriation of 100 Japanese military bases, the US built its initial postwar Pacific naval bastions at Okinawa and, thanks to a 1947 agreement, at Subic Bay in the Philippines. As the Cold War engulfed Asia in 1950 with the beginning of the Korean conflict, the US extended those bases for 5,000 miles along the entire Pacific littoral through mutual-defense agreements with five Asia–Pacific allies: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia.

For the next 40 years to the very end of the Cold War, the Pacific littoral remained the geopolitical fulcrum of US global power, allowing it to defend North America and dominate Eurasia. In many ways, the US geopolitical position astride the axial ends of Eurasia would prove the key to its ultimate victory in the Cold War.

After the Cold War

Once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the Cold War ended, Washington cashed in its peace dividend, weakening that once-strong island chain. Between 1998 and 2014, the US Navy from 333 ships to 271. That 20% reduction, combined with a shift to long-term deployments in the Middle East, degraded the Navy’s position in the Pacific. Even so, for the 20 years following the Cold War, the US would enjoy what the Pentagon “uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, operate how we wanted.”

After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, Washington turned from heavy-metal strategic forces to mobile infantry readily deployed for counterterror operations against lightly armed guerrillas. After a decade of fighting misbegotten wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington was stunned when a rising China began to turn its economic gains into a serious bid for global power. As its opening gambit, Beijing started in the South China Sea, where oil and natural gas deposits are . It also began expanding its navy, an unexpected challenge that the once-all-powerful US Pacific command was remarkably ill-prepared to meet.

In response, in 2011, President Barack Obama a strategic “pivot to Asia” before the Australian parliament and began rebuilding the US military position on the Pacific littoral. After withdrawing some forces from Iraq in 2012 and refusing to commit significant numbers of troops for regime change in Syria, the Obama White House a battalion of Marines to Darwin in northern Australia in 2014. In quick succession, Washington gained access to five near the South China Sea and a new South Korean naval base at on the Yellow Sea. According to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, to operate those installations, the Pentagon to “forward base 60 percent of our naval assets in the Pacific by 2020.” Nonetheless, the unending insurgency in Iraq continued to slow the pace of that strategic pivot to the Pacific.

Despite such setbacks, senior diplomatic and military officials, working under three different administrations, launched a long-term effort to slowly rebuild the US military posture in the Asia–Pacific region. After “a return to great power competition” in 2016, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson that China’s “growing and modernized fleet” was “shrinking” the traditional US advantage in the region. “The competition is on,” the admiral warned, adding, “We must shake off any vestiges of comfort or complacency.”

Responding to such pressure, the administration of President Donald Trump added the construction of 46 new ships to the Pentagon , which was to raise the total fleet to 326 vessels by 2023. Support ships aside, when it came to an actual “fighting force,” by 2024 China had the world’s with 234 “warships.” The US deployed only 219, with Chinese combat capacity, according to US Naval Intelligence, “increasingly of comparable quality to U.S. ships.”

Paralleling the military build-up, the State Department reinforced the US position on the Pacific littoral by negotiating three relatively new diplomatic agreements with Asia–Pacific allies Australia, Britain, India and the Philippines. Though those ententes added some depth and resilience to the US posture, the truth is that this Pacific network may ultimately prove more susceptible to political rupture than a formal multilateral alliance like NATO.

Military cooperation with the Philippines

After nearly a century as close allies through decades of colonial rule, two world wars and the Cold War, US relations with the Philippines suffered a severe setback in 1991. That country’s senate refused to renew a long-term military bases agreement, forcing the US 7th Fleet out of its massive naval base at Subic Bay.

After just three years, however, China occupied some shoals also claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea during a raging typhoon. Within a decade, the Chinese had started transforming them into a network of military bases, while pressing their claims to most of the rest of the South China Sea. Manila’s only response was to a rusting World War II naval vessel on Ayungin shoal in the Spratly Islands, where Filipino soldiers had to fish for their supper. With its external defense in tatters, in April 2014 the Philippines an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Washington. This allowed the US military quasi-permanent facilities at five Filipino bases, including two on the shores of the South China Sea.

Although Manila won a from the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague that Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea were “,” China dismissed that decision and continued to build its bases there. And when Rodrigo Duterte became president of the Philippines in 2016, he revealed a new policy that included a “separation” from the US and a toward China. That country rewarded the policy with promises of massive developmental aid. By 2018, however, China’s army was anti-aircraft missiles, mobile missile launchers and military radar on five artificial “islands” in the Spratly archipelago that it had built from sand its dredgers sucked from the seabed.

Once Duterte left office, as China’s Coast Guard harassed Filipino fishermen and blasted Philippine naval vessels with water cannons in their own territory, Manila once again started calling on Washington for help. Soon, US Navy vessels were conducting “freedom of navigation” patrols in Philippine waters and the two nations had staged their biggest ever. In the April 2024 edition of that exercise, the US deployed its mobile Typhon Mid-Range capable of hitting China’s coast, sparking a bitter from Beijing that such weaponry “intensifies geopolitical confrontation.”

Manila has matched its new commitment to the US alliance with an unprecedented rearmament program of its own. Just last spring, it signed a $400 million deal with Tokyo to five new Coast Guard cutters, started receiving Brahmos from India under a $375 million contract and continued a billion-dollar deal with South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries that will produce ten new naval vessels. After the government a $35 billion military modernization plan, Manila has been negotiating with Korean to procure modern jet fighters. This is a far cry from a decade earlier when it had no operational .

Showing the scope of the country’s reintegration into the Western alliance, just last month Manila hosted joint freedom of navigation in the South China Sea with ships from five allied nations: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and the US.

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the AUKUS alliance

While the Philippine Defense Agreement renewed US relations with an old Pacific ally, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue involving Australia, India, Japan and the US, first launched in 2007, has now extended US military power into the Indian Ocean. At the 2017 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Manila, four conservative national leaders led by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump decided to the “Quad” entente (after a decade-long hiatus while Australia’s Labour Party governments cozied up to China).

Just last month, President Joe Biden hosted a “” where the four leaders agreed to expand joint air operations. In a hot-mike moment, Biden bluntly : “China continues to behave aggressively, testing us all across the region. It is true in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, South Asia, and the Taiwan Straits.” China’s Foreign Ministry : “The U.S. is lying through its teeth” and needs to “get rid of its obsession with perpetuating its supremacy and containing China.”

Since 2020, however, the Quad has made the annual Malabar in India into an elaborate four-power drill in which aircraft carrier battle groups maneuver in waters ranging from the Arabian Sea to the East China Sea. To contest “China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region,” India that the latest exercise this October would feature live-fire maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal, led by its flagship aircraft carrier and a complement of MiG-29K all-weather jet fighters. Clearly, as Modi it, the Quad is “here to stay.”

While the Trump administration revived the Quad, the Biden White House has promoted a complementary and controversial AUKUS defense compact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US (part of what Michael Klare has called the “” of US foreign and military policy). After months of secret negotiations, their leaders that agreement in September 2021 as a way to fulfill “a shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy.”

Such a goal sparked howls of diplomatic protests. Angry over the sudden loss of a $90 billion contract to supply 12 French submarines to Australia, France the decision “a stab in the back” and immediately its ambassadors from both Canberra and Washington. With equal speed, China’s Foreign Ministry the new alliance for “severely damaging regional peace… and intensifying the arms race.” In a pointed remark, Beijing’s official Global Times newspaper said Australia had now “turned itself into an adversary of China.”

To achieve extraordinary prosperity, thanks in significant part to its iron ore and other exports to China, Australia had exited the Quad entente for nearly a decade. Through this single defense decision, Australia has allied itself firmly with the US. It will to British submarine designs and top-secret US nuclear propulsion, joining the elite ranks of just six powers with such complex technology.

Australia will spend a monumental to build eight nuclear submarines at its Adelaide shipyards over a decade. Additionally, it will host four US Virginia-class nuclear subs at a naval base in Western Australia and buy as many as five of those stealthy submarines from the US in the early 2030s. Under the tripartite alliance with the US and Britain, Canberra will also face additional costs for the joint development of undersea drones, hypersonic missiles and quantum sensing. Through that stealthy arms deal, Washington has seemingly won a major geopolitical and military ally in any future conflict with China.

Stand-off along the Pacific littoral

Just as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine strengthened the NATO alliance, so China’s challenge in the fossil-fuel-rich South China Sea and elsewhere has helped the US rebuild its island bastions along the Pacific littoral. Through a sedulous courtship under three successive administrations, Washington has won back two wayward allies: Australia and the Philippines. They are once again anchors for an island chain that remains the geopolitical fulcrum for US global power in the Pacific.

Still, with more than 200 times the ship-building capacity of the US, China’s in warships will almost certainly continue to grow. In compensating for such a future deficit, the US’s four active allies along the Pacific littoral will likely play a critical role. (Japan’s navy has more than 50 warships and South Korea’s 30 more.)

Despite such renewed strength in what is distinctly becoming a new cold war, the US’s Asia–Pacific alliances face both immediate challenges and a fraught future. Beijing is already putting relentless pressure on Taiwan’s sovereignty, breaching that island’s airspace and crossing the median line in the Taiwan Straits monthly. If Beijing turns those breaches into a crippling embargo of Taiwan, the US Navy will face a hard choice between losing a carrier or two in a confrontation with China or backing off. Either way, the loss of Taiwan would sever the US’s island chain in the Pacific littoral, pushing it back to a “second island chain” in the mid-Pacific.

As for that fraught future, the maintenance of such alliances requires a kind of national political will that is by no means assured in an age of populist nationalism. In the Philippines, the anti-US nationalism that Duterte personified retains its appeal and may well be adopted by some future leader. More immediately in Australia, the current has already faced strong dissent from members blasting the AUKUS entente as a dangerous transgression of their country’s sovereignty. And in the US, Republican populism, whether Trump’s or that of a future leader like J.D. Vance could curtail cooperation with such Asia–Pacific allies, simply walk away from a costly conflict over Taiwan or deal directly with China in a way that would undercut that web of hard-won alliances.

And that, of course, might be the good news given the possibility that growing Chinese aggressiveness in the region and a US urge to strengthen a military alliance ominously encircling that country could threaten to turn the latest Cold War ever hotter. This would transform the Pacific into a genuine powder keg and could lead to a war that would, in our present world, be almost unimaginably destructive.

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In the from 1954 to 1962, France committed unimaginable atrocities against Algerians in both Algeria and France. Algerians who cooperated with French forces were often captured and killed by their countrymen fighting for independence. Many escaped and sought asylum in France, where they were then put in camps and denied basic human rights and access to education. Those in Algeria fighting against the French were subject to horrific crimes such as systematic torture, which often resulted in deaths that were labeled as suicides.��

In 1961, a year before Algeria gained independence, thousands of Algerians peacefully protested in Paris. In this event that became known as the , French police killed of the demonstrators, shooting some and throwing others into the river. The French government covered up such atrocities by censoring the media and destroying archival evidence.��

On September 20, 2021, President Macron condemned the “massacre of Algerians in Paris.” He issued an apology to the Algerians who fought alongside the French forces and to the families of those whom the Algerians captured as traitors and killed during the fight for independence.  

Over the course of the conflict, the French colonization of Algeria is estimated to have cost up to Algerian lives. In 1962, an was finally reached calling for a cease-fire, and Algeria gained independence after 132 years of French rule.

The shaping of Algeria

For the last five hundred years, Algeria has had a turbulent past. Around the turn of the seventh century, first conquered the region today known as Algeria. At the time, it was home to an indigenous group called the Berbers, known for their bravery and independence. However, that conquest was short-lived, and upon a second attempt, the Arabs were defeated by a Berber warrior queen named .��

In 705, the conquest finally succeeded. Arabs settled in the region and Berbers gradually became Muslims, adopting Arabic as their language. In , Berbers joined the Arabs in the conquest of , present-day Spain and Portugal.��

In 742, the Muslim Berbers rebelled against Arab rule and succeeded. By 907, much of North Africa came under the control of the Fatimids, a Shia sect. Over time, local rulers began to follow Sunni Islam and from that event to the 15th century, the area lived in turmoil. 

Then, the Europeans arrived. In 1471, the colonization of Africa began with the Portuguese taking some of the Moroccan coastlines. In the early 16th century, Algeria came under the Ottoman Empire. 

Although Algeria was under the Ottomans, that did not stop colonists from attacking it. The French invaded Algeria in 1682, the Dutch in 1715, the Spanish in 1775 and the US in 1815, to name a few. In 1830, the French conquered Algeria and it eventually became a French colony. 

The colonization of Algeria

When the French invaded again in 1830, it took them nearly 20 years to conquer Algeria. The occupation was bloody and brutal, resulting in a substantial reduction in the local population. Some even consider the conquest genocide. 

As the French struggled to gain control, they deliberately killed, raped, tortured, and buried unarmed civilians alive. Out of a population of three million, French forces caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Algerians, some occurring as the result of disease and famine. Around civilians were kept in prison camps. French officer Lucien de Montagnac, who was sent to assist in the colonization effort, that the French must “annihilate all that will not crawl beneath our feet like dogs.”

The legacy of colonization in Algeria goes far beyond mass killings. The French stole religious endowments, restricted movement and confiscated fertile lands which they then gave to settlers. The French also plundered gold, iron, coal and other minerals, some of which are still in France.

Over the next century, France struggled to maintain control of Algeria. In 1911, a group of upper-class Muslims labeled themselves “” and demanded representation in the French National Assembly, which was duly declined. Not long after, when France began drafting Muslims to fight the Germans in WWI, many Algerian Muslims took up arms and resisted the law. In the following decades, tensions continued to boil over between Algerians and the French.

The Algerian War

By 1945, encouraged by the 1941 Atlantic Charter, Algerians demanded full independence. When Nazi Germany accepted defeat, Algerians gathered in large numbers to not only celebrate the fall of the Nazi regime but also to garner attention during the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. They wanted the delegates to know that Algeria existed and was ready to be an independent nation. In May, after the conference commenced, mass protests broke out in cities across Algeria.

Like all other mass protests, some violence occurred. The French reacted with aggression, and by the end of June had massacred several thousand Algerians. Many of those Algerians had fought side-by-side with France against Germany.

From their experience in 1945, Algerian patriots realized the only way to gain their freedom was through armed struggle. In 1954, unable to make progress, young Algerian patriots formed the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (). They tried to unite the Algerians to fight the French and liberate their country. The CRUA created the National Liberation Front (FLN) to direct the Algerian War of Independence, which in turn created the National Liberation Army (ALN). So began the Algerian War.��

Protests continued throughout the country, and as France suppressed uprisings, violence broke out. French brutality angered more peaceful civilians to join the revolutionaries, and the movement grew. 

In 1958, France offered Algerian Muslims an opportunity to become equal with the French settlers. After so much bloodshed, it was too late, and revolutionaries rejected the offer and asked for independence. By March 1962, the French agreed to grant independence after the 132-year struggle.

Make wrongs right

Despite admitting their atrocities, the French maintain that they will not offer any “repentance or apologies.” To regain some respect, France could acknowledge, apologize and make reparations for the crimes against humanity they committed during colonial times. Importantly, reparation payments should go directly to victims and their descendants, not to the coffers of the Algerian government. To compensate for the ravages of colonization, the French could additionally allocate a sum for education and infrastructure. 

Support should also be offered by organizations like the UN. Despite its mission to support peace and security, the UN has consistently failed to stop genocide, prevent ethnic cleansing or sufficiently support victims such as those in Algeria. Consider the ongoing example of the innocent Palestinian men, women and children being butchered daily by US-backed Israel. From Cambodia to Sudan, the UN has let down countries and communities across the world. 

In the case of Algeria, the UN heard the cries but failed to provide justice. Even with denials and cover-ups, evidence of the French atrocities were overwhelming. To right these wrongs, a UN organized International Tribunal for Algeria (ITA) would be a good first start. Just as victims of the have been compensated, Algerians must also receive compensation.

While no sum of money can ever erase the suffering of Algerians, reparations are an important step. First, victims get justice. Second, poor countries and victims get valuable financial support. Third, they set an important precedent for holding colonizers accountable. France must take responsibility and action to rectify the country’s dark history in Algeria. 

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Most Western democracies have embraced the democratic ideology Abraham Lincoln famously articulated when he evoked “a government of the people, by the people and for the people.” But who are “the people” and how can you define them, especially in a melting pot or like the US? The very fact of diversity casts a dark shadow on the comforting idea of “we the people.” Aware of that potentially troubling anomaly, Americans rallied around the idea of “majority rule.”

The 19th century idea of rule by an elusive “majority” inevitably spawned the historical trend towards the now classic two-party system. The 50.1% rule for elections became the measure that allowed diverse populations to believe in majority rule. It became apparent this can only work when there are no more than two dominant parties. So, even today, you’re a Democrat or a Republican, but you might also be an independent, sitting on the fence. In Europe, it was more complex. Nevertheless, even with multiple parties, democracy tended towards a perception of left (working class) vs right (educated ruling and business class).

Even though the founding fathers raised serious objections to the very idea of parties — which they characterized as “” — the US political system culturally, and to some extent legally, codified the two-party system, making it a structural feature of all but local elections. Third parties are permitted but barely tolerated. The media systematically casts third parties and their candidates into the category of annoying eccentricities. Strom Thurmond (1948), Ross Perot (1992), Ralph Nader (2000) and a few others managed to muddy the otherwise clear waters, but each could be dismissed as an ephemeral nuisance.

Repeated cases in recent years of US presidents elected while failing to obtain a majority of the popular vote began to disturb the tranquil belief people had in the principle of majority rule. The tsunami provoked by hurricane Donald, highlighting “American carnage,” “alternate facts” and “stolen elections” has now called the logic itself into question.

The events of this election year in the US, marked by an assassination attempt and the last minute replacement of an incumbent, have provoked a further erosion of the belief in democracy. But it can’t compare, in gravity, with what is unfolding today in France.

France’s parliamentary elections two years ago failed to produce a majority for the already re-elected President Emmanuel Macron. This forced him to rely on improvised alliances within the center, the right and eventually the far-right, to pass legislation. Disappointed by the disastrous results of the European parliamentary elections in June of this year, Macron launched a desperate gambit. In the mistaken belief that he might achieve democratic clarity, he dissolved parliament, provoking new parliamentary elections. Clarity turned to obscurity and opacity.

Macron’s party in the European elections of June 9 was roundly defeated by Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally. The French parliamentary elections a month later saw a reinvigorated left, the New Popular Front (Nouveau Front Populaire or NFP), rise to the top position. In terms of “majority rule” thinking, that double whammy was the equivalent of a TKO in boxing. The problem is that there’s no referee other than the constitution to stop the combat. And only a unified Assemblée would have the power to impeach a president. The fight has been paused, but the former champion must remain in the ring for another three years! And the stunned, incapacitated fighter must keep the crowd entertained.

The constitution requires that the president must designate a new prime minister, who in turn forms a new government according to his wishes. This isn’t the first time a sitting president has been deprived of a majority. A tradition dating back to 1986 established the precedent that the party or coalition with the most seats in parliament should propose a new prime minister from its ranks. The NFP has done precisely that, very cautiously designating an economist, Lucie Castets. But Macron, aware of his constitutional rights and committed to his Jupiterian idea of leadership, has bucked the tradition and demurred.

Le Monde the situation in these terms: “Macron has justified his refusal to name Castets as head of government by saying it is his duty to ensure ‘institutional stability.’”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Institutional stability:

What French presidents under the 5th Republic seek and obviously fail to secure when faced with an even more fundamental reality: constitutional instability.

Contextual note

The Paris Olympic Games provided Macron with his first pretext for postponing the constitution of a new government. Now he has adapted a different tactic. Since he alone has the power to nominate a prime minister, he will “ his consultations” with as many irrelevant personalities as possible. He may hope that the longer it goes, the more likely people will be resigned to accepting any solution he throws at them.

This week he has been listening to a range of personalities, including former right-wing president (and convicted felon) Nicolas Sarkozy, who unsurprisingly believes the prime minister should be selected from his party, Les Républicains, a party that earned the whopping total of 39 seats, less than 7% of the 577 seats. Sarkozy argues that France is a right-wing nation, probably because he lumps the extreme right into the traditional right.

Whatever choice Macron eventually makes, there is little likelihood that it will augur anything resembling stability. Emmanuel sees himself as the sole pillar of stability. A regime built on the idea of a president standing at the center, like a king on a chessboard, surrounded by loyal bishops and knights committed to his defense, living in safety within his castle walls, may have worked for the expert wielder of power, Louis XIV, whose reign lasted 72 years. As everyone knows, it didn’t work out quite as well for his more “centrist” great-grandson, Louis XVI.

Historical note

Macron, a young, ambitious but largely unknown minister in François Hollande’s colorless administration, emerged into stardom when the ruling Socialist party began to unravel. With no true political experience and no existing party structure to work from, Macron surprised everyone in May 2017, first by coming out of nowhere to lead all other candidates in the first round of voting, and then by beating Marine Le Pen in the second round of the presidential election.

His victory clearly went to his head. But it was less his political genius than a stroke of luck that led to his 2017 success. Like Moses, he benefited from a miraculous parting of the political sea. The Socialists were in disarray after five years of Hollande’s presidency. The traditional right lost its bearings when its obvious frontrunner, François Fillon, mismanaged a scandal he was implicated in and refused to step down in favor of a ”cleaner” candidate. The only credible challenge left was the unambiguously left-wing Jean-Luc Mélenchon, whom the political class and the media treated as a dangerous firebrand. Le Pen nudged ahead of both Fillon and Mélenchon by less than 2%. Le Pen trailed Macron by only 2.6%.

In other words, from the start of his presidency, Macron had no truly constituted party and could only be deemed “the center” because he was surrounded on all sides by other political orientations. That was the precise moment he speculated about the taste he believed the French had for a Jupiterian leader.

Very quickly he was contested not by a party but by “the people,” citizens donning the iconic yellow vest the government obliged them to store in the private vehicles. That was when the Red Sea parted again for Macron thanks to a virus, Covid-19, that turned him into a “war president.”

Now he finds himself in a struggle with the entire political class and soon with the population as well. Unlike Moses, Macron never made the effort to get to the other side. The Red (and blue) Sea is closing in on him as he dawdles in the middle. Nobody is likely to be happy with the personality he selects as his prime minister, whoever she or he happens to be.

We’re in for another ride. Fortunately, France definitively banished the guillotine in 1981.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

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At the commencement of the 2016 conflict, retired Major General Mark MacCarley received an unexpected opportunity to measure the capabilities of the Armenian/Artsakh forces responding to the Azerbaijan incursion. His observations, interviews with senior Armenian and Artsakh military and political leaders, and subsequent research resulted in the formation of the non-profit educational organization called the American Armenian National Security Institute (). Its mission is to study the country’s warfighting doctrine and tactics and give constructive input to its Army leadership. This effort helps the Army counter Russian military influence and prepares Armenian forces to prevail in future conflicts.

My trip to Armenia as a politician (2016)

I retired from the US Army in 2015 and traveled to Armenia on April 1, 2016. Accompanied by a prominent member of the American Armenian community, I went to attempt to understand the Armenian culture and economy. I come from Glendale, California, a mid-sized suburb of Los Angeles County that is home to nearly 125,000 first-generation Armenians.

Major General (Ret) Mark MacCarley, Major General (Ret) Edward F. Dorman and Colonel (Ret) James Robinette showing respects at the Armenian Genocide Monument. Photo by Appo Jabarian.

When we began our journey to the Armenian capital of Yerevan, the Armenia–Azerbaijan War had not yet started. Although armed clashes between the two sides had sporadically erupted since 1992, after Armenia successfully supported Artsakh’s war of liberation from Azerbaijan, there was a long-standing ceasefire in place. This was monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) , a non-governmental organization specifically chartered to resolve territorial and ethnic disputes between Armenia/Artsakh and Azerbaijan. This Commission consisted of representatives of the US, France and Russia. After 34 years of seemingly endless and futile negotiations, however, the Minsk Commission had not resolved any material issues separating the sparring parties.

A couple hours after I checked into our hotel in Yerevan, I received a call from the aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Seyran Ohanyan, then-Minister of Defense of the Armenian Armed Forces. The aide-de-camp asked if I would meet with General Ohanyan as soon as possible. Literally, at that very moment, hostilities between Armenia/Artsakh and Azerbaijan had just erupted. I was initially befuddled about the identity of the caller, but after making inquiries, I agreed to the meeting. To this day, I speculate that General Ohanyan somehow became aware of my entry into Armenia that morning and erroneously assumed that I represented the “spear point” of a desired US military assistance team to Armenia.

I met with General Ohanyan at the Armenian equivalent of the Pentagon. I informed him of my recent retirement from active service with the US Army. I told him that I did not represent the US government. General Ohanyan responded that he was aware that I had twice served as one of the US Army’s senior logisticians in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. He then asked me if I would be willing to proceed to Artsakh and assess the Armenian/Artsakh army’s logistics capabilities, as it was now engaged in defending the homeland against Azeri invaders. I agreed at no charge to his government.

I remember his concluding statement to me: “You American generals, you always fly where you need to go. But, I apologize, General MacCarley. We just don’t have aircraft to fly you to Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh. You will have to drive east through Armenia and then through the Southern Caucasus Mountains to reach Stepanakert before nightfall.”

I hired a vehicle and engaged a one-person security detail. I left a few hours later on what proved to be a challenging journey over a nearly impassable 125-mile pockmarked road to Artsakh, the epicenter of the conflict. I arrived just behind an OSCE delegation that sought to broker a ceasefire between the combatants but ultimately failed to do so. I went directly to meet the chief of staff of the Artsakh Army. As expected, he was fully preoccupied with directing defensive operations against the attacking Azeri forces.

We discussed the current situation on the battlefield. I addressed the mission given to me by General Ohanyan. The chief of staff agreed that this requested assessment might prove valuable to him as well. He wanted to know if his army had sufficient capability to sustain combat operations over a period longer than a week. That is, he wanted to know whether his army would have the required means and resources to provide its front-line soldiers with the necessities of war: food, water, ammunition, weapons, medical supplies, spare parts, fortification materials and major weapons systems, such as tanks and artillery pieces.

With the chief of staff’s concurrence, I headed to the field to conduct my assessment. Upon my return four days later, the war was over. Then-Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had arrived in Stepanakert on April 4 and brokered a between the two militaries, with no loss of Artsakh to Azerbaijan. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan had been Soviet client states until 1991.

Major General (Ret) Scott L. Efflandt and Major General (Ret) Mark MacCarley looking out of an Armenian Army bunker at the border with Azerbaijan. Photo by Appo Jabarian.

When I came back, I assured the chief of staff that from what I saw, the Artsakh and Armenian soldiers were the most valorous, committed, dedicated and selfless fighters one could want in an army. But as a military logistician, some things concerned me: There was an insufficient number of ground transportation vehicles and significant problems with ammunition, fuel and spare parts resupply. I had also seen remnants of drones — far less sophisticated than those employed in the subsequent 2020 conflict — that the Azeris were using advantageously against Armenian/Artsakh forces in this 2016 war.

The army even had challenges with such simple things as “field feeding.” Battlefield catering doesn’t sound significant to a war effort, unless you’re a soldier who has fought for hours without access to food or water. I saw homemade meals being delivered to the front lines by women from the local villages. While this is commendable and patriotic, it is not the most efficient and expedient way to feed hungry soldiers in combat.

Upon my return to Yerevan from Artsakh, I met with General Ohanyan and the chief of staff for the President of the Republic of Armenia. I opined that the Armenia/Artsakh Army had resorted to a Soviet Russian model of static positional defense in lieu of emphasizing maneuver, breakout and penetration. This long-standing tactic had worked extraordinarily well for the Soviets in World War II but needed to be upgraded to meet current threats and emerging military technologies. I also commented that neither Armenia nor Artsakh had developed a robust defense industrial base to produce weapons organically. Almost all armaments were imported. I observed that neither the Armenian nor the Artsakh Armies had prepositioned the necessary logistical support in sufficient quantities to sustain any long-term, high-intensity conflict.

Mother Armenia, Yerevan’s symbol of Armenian perseverance. Photo by Appo Jabarian.

To successfully wage war in the 21st century, an army has to be able to fight in all domains: land, sea, air, space and the cyber environment. It needs the capability to supply and resupply its forces at any moment under the contested conditions of intense combat. The Armenian Artsakh Army could not expect victory if the majority of its forces fought in fixed positions, resembling World War I trench lines. I suggested the military leaders of Artsakh and Armenia consider contacting NATO and the US militaries and asking for advisors to teach the Armenians Western tactics, techniques and logistics procedures. I concluded that warfare had changed over the last seven decades and Armenia/Artsakh should seek to adopt these advances in tactics and armament.

When I returned home to the US, I made a few speeches about my 2016 trip to Veterans’ posts and local Armenian American outreach organizations. I did not focus any more energy on the Armenian Artsakh problem at that time.

My return trip as a journalist (2021)

In September 2020, Azerbaijan again attacked Artsakh in the , reclaiming for itself most of Artsakh, including its Armenian enclaves. I attempted to return to Armenia and Artsakh in October to assess what went wrong for their armies. However, I was unable to enter the country due to a shortage of flights, COVID-19 and the Armenian government’s decision to bar foreigners from transiting into Artsakh, which was once again the epicenter of the conflict.

I couldn’t help but speculate that the Armenia/Artsakh forces had not learned from the tactical and strategic issues I had identified in 2016. This 2020 war was characterized by Azerbaijan’s adroit use of drones and tactical missiles against Armenian static positions, while simultaneously waging a cyber campaign to disrupt Armenian/Artsakh’s communications and network operations. Neither Armenia nor Artsakh had established a robust combat logistics supply chain to sustain the fight.

Armenian soldiers defending against possible border incursions. Photo by Appo Jabarian.

A few months later, I found a way to return to Armenia and Artsakh by securing press credentials. I was accompanied by Armenian American investigative reporter Appo Jabarian, publisher of USA Armenian Life .

As the name suggests, the 44-Day War after 44 days of intense fighting, when Russian President Vladimir Putin stepped in and directed the two sides to put down their weapons. Putin forced Armenia/Artsakh to cede four-fifths of Artsakh to Azerbaijan. In exchange, the hostilities would be terminated and the Russian forces would be deployed in Armenia and Artsakh to keep the peace with Azerbaijan.

Russia also committed to policing the vehicular corridor, called the , between Armenia and Stepanakert. This two-lane road constituted the sole lifeline for transporting all goods, including food, fuel, weapons and medical supplies, to the over 150,000 Armenians inhabiting Artsakh. Artsakh’s airport had long been closed due to Azeri threats to shoot down any incoming or outgoing aircraft. There was no railroad network nor any navigable waterway to support the transit of people and goods to this contested region.

I recruited some help to accompany me on this new trip. Jabarian came, of course. Retired Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, PhD, a professor of Defense and Foreign Policy at Wesleyan College, joined me. And my son Aaron MacCarley, a documentary filmmaker, came as well. Together, we embarked on an investigative and educational journey to see what remained of Artsakh and how its armed forces had fared in the fight.

We arrived in Armenia in August 2021. As journalists, we were afforded access to some civilian and military representatives of the Armenian government. At my request, a senior member of the Armenian Army met me and agreed to discreetly help my team and me enter Artsakh over the Lachin Corridor. He said that we would be the first Western journalists to transit the Corridor since the end of the 44-Day War.

Indeed, we pushed off to Stepanakert the next day. Our journey was uneventful as we were escorted by the chief of staff to the President of Artsakh. Upon arriving in Stepanakert, we had the opportunity to interview Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan. After some casual conversation, he described his own recent experiences leading the Artsakh Army in the field against Azerbaijan. He criticized the US and France, both signatories to the Minsk Convention, for their collective failure to take any direct action or provide any material support to Artsakh and Armenia during the war. He said such support might have positively influenced the outcome of the war for the Armenian people.

From left to right: Colonel (Ret) Robert M. Cassidy, Appo Jabarian, Major General (Ret) Mark MacCarley, Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan and Artsakh President Chief of Staff General Hyusnunts. Photo by Appo Jabarian.

We did not respond to such criticisms about the alleged failure of the US and its NATO allies to send military and humanitarian aid to Armenia and Artsakh. We were journalists, not diplomats. At the president’s invitation, however, we did take the opportunity to visit the accessible sites of several vicious battles between his forces and those of Azerbaijan. We sat down with a good number of veterans of the 44-Day War and heard their stories and their opinions about why this 2020 War was lost.

After two days in Artsakh, we began our return journey to Yerevan, but not without incident. When we first entered Artsakh via the Lachin Corridor, we had received an official escort from the Artsakh chief of staff who maintained a cooperative relationship with the Russian security forces there. On exit, however, we were all by ourselves, notwithstanding the chief of staff’s promise to contact Russian border officials to allow us safe passage.

For a trip that was supposed to take no more than two hours, it took us over seven to travel the 24 miles back to Armenia from Artsakh. We were confronted and challenged by Russian border guards at every checkpoint. They insisted on detaining us, sometimes for up to an hour, to determine whether we had committed immigration violations — entering Artsakh without papers.  The engagements with the Russian guards ultimately proved benign. But I will never forget how the young Russian soldiers stationed at several of the checkpoints would rest their Kalashnikov assault rifles on the side door window frame of our vehicle, muzzles aimed at our driver’s torso.

My reflection as a writer (2024)

Our journalistic mission to Artsakh resulted in some articles we penned and a YouTube that we produced for our Western subscribers. But we made something of a splash in Armenia. The story of our transit through the Lachin Corridor checkpoints and meeting with President Harutyunyan circulated in local newspapers. I repeatedly stressed that it was an honor for me to execute this mission, which might improve the Armenian armed forces. If that is the outcome of my two journeys to Artsakh, then my efforts in the face of some risk and mildly difficult conditions were justified.

Jabarian’s photos capture the culture and excitement we experienced. Armenia and Artsakh are fascinating places. Sadly, Azerbaijan overran Artsakh in 2023, although a still exists. I hope that Armenia develops greater defensive strategies so it can endure against future Azeri threats.

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Madrid’s political focus on Catalonia has intensified since 2017. After holding what was deemed by Spanish authorities an illegal independence referendum, Catalonia’s President Carles Puigdemont and other officials fled to Belgium, a diplomatic crisis. Spain then imposed direct rule over the region, with the EU backing its decision and citing the need for constitutional approval of referendums. In the aftermath, local support for Catalonia’s independence , offering Madrid a way in.

���貹����’s and autonomous movements are among Europe’s most well-known, and its management of them is watched closely across the continent. Many other European nations, particularly in larger countries, have autonomy seeking devolution, self-government or outright independence. The perceived of European-level efforts to resolve these issues has led countries to maintain their own policies. Although few movements are considered serious threats, attempts to assert themselves often provoke direct interventions by national governments — when these governments have the capacity to do so.

The struggle between nationalism and separatism

Many of Europe’s once-distinct regional identities have only waned in recent times. The rise of in Europe in the 1800s led to unitary states that integrated peripheral regions with the capitals, a trend known as “capital magnetism.” Additionally, increasing in other large cities weakened to local communities and support systems.

Integration and assimilation pressure was also exerted on regional identities to create more national identities. At the time of Italy’s unification in 1861, for example, of Italians spoke the Tuscan dialect which began to be promoted as . Steadily, its use in public and administrative life, mass media and other methods led to a decline in the use of other regional dialects and languages. Similarly, French policies promoted the Parisian dialect as standard French, and the German Empire promoted High German.

Modern EU states face greater limitations on language suppression. The framework provided by the EU’s “post-sovereign” system implores member states to minority language protections and other rights. Nonetheless, national governments have modernized their approaches to establishing national uniformity. Proficiency in majority languages is often a prerequisite for education, media and employment opportunities, while immigration favors majority-language learners. As a result, dozens of minority European languages are on the of extinction.

Nonetheless, autonomous movements in Europe do wield political power. Political networks like the , a group of pro-independence political parties, operate in the EU parliament and serve as political outlets for separatist movements, using democratic processes.

Italy is constantly attempting to more effectively tie to itself its autonomous regions: the islands of Sicily and Sardinia as well as three northern regions. The 2018 of the regional political party Lega Nord into a national one, Lega, demonstrated some success. The autonomy movements, however, were similarly adaptive. Other northern Italian parties recently to vote to approve legislation approving them greater autonomy in June 2024. South Tyrol, Italy’s German-speaking region, brings the added challenge of receiving support from Austria. Austrian leaders have repeatedly proposed granting Austrian to German speakers, and, in January 2024, voiced support for , drawing a reflexive rebuke from Rome.

Hungary’s disputes with its neighbors are even more notable. The 1920 breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire left significant Hungarian communities across , and . Today, the Hungarian government supports these communities by funding cultural institutions, providing financial aid and fostering solidarity, which has sparked tensions with these countries. However, as a smaller nation, Hungary struggles to exert significant influence, especially in EU member states like Romania and Slovakia, and it has also found limited success in Ukraine.

Western European states remain resilient

Aside from cases like these, EU countries generally tend to avoid interfering in each others’ separatist movements. This has helped France to consolidate its rule over its mainland territory. However, it hasn’t yet done so over the Mediterranean island of Corsica, purchased by the French in . The rollback of the French Empire after World War II reignited historical tensions, further inflamed by the arrival of many French people and Europeans from to Corsica in the 1960s. Though violence largely subsided in Corsica after the 1970s, a ceasefire was not reached , and pro-separatist riots in 2022 show the situation .

the unrest, French President Macron raised the possibility of granting Corsica greater autonomy. Previously, , as tensions were building in neighboring Spain over Basque separatism, France raised the administrative autonomy of its own Basque territory by granting it single community status, unifying several local councils under one regional authority. Contrastingly, the merger of the region of in 2016 with two other French areas reduced its autonomy and integrated it more into the national apparatus. The different approaches demonstrate the diverse policies used by national governments to manage their regions.

Germany, the most populous country in the EU, administers several regions with aspirations for greater autonomy. However, its , which grants states greater authority over areas such as education and language, has helped temper separatist sentiment and reduced the need for management from Berlin.

A federal system has not resolved the challenges faced by Belgium. The country’s and French-speaking regions have sought greater autonomy, with some advocating for unification with a greater Dutch or French-speaking state. While increasing regional autonomy has been part of the solution, the regions remain interconnected through the capital, Brussels, and its wider role as the capital of the EU.

That has not deterred breakup advocates from proposing a similar “” between Belgium’s regions, like the peaceful split between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992. a victory in June 2024 for Vlaams Belang, a party whose leader ran on reaching an agreement to dissolve the country or declaring Flanders’s independence. But their shock defeat ensured Belgium’s continuity and thus the stability of the EU.

Outside the EU, Europe’s autonomy issues are also in flux. In the late , the UK granted greater autonomy to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Scottish independence efforts were then disrupted after a failed 2014 referendum and the UK’s subsequent departure from the EU two years later. The Scottish National Party established a Brussels office to maintain EU connections, the European Friends of Scotland Group, founded in 2020. The Scottish Independence Convention plans to hold a in Edinburgh in October 2024 featuring more than a dozen European groups to coordinate their independence initiatives, though the participation of separatist movements within EU countries may limit the extent of EU involvement.

Brexit also reignited secessionist sentiment across the UK, particularly in , but also in Wales. Even within England, regional parties like CumbriaFirst, the East Devon Alliance and Mebyon Kernow for their own regions’ autonomy, and devolution within England has been increasingly in recent years. London has struggled to counter these movements since Brexit, but it has succeeded in preventing a resurgence in paramilitary activity since it ended it in Northern Ireland in the 1990s.

In Eastern Europe, separatism is a persistent threat

Western Europe’s relative success in reducing armed conflicts over the last few decades contrasts with its resurgence in Eastern Europe. The region’s fragile borders and the emergence of weak states in the wake of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have seen separatist movements gain increasing power.

The EU and NATO played a pivotal role in the collapse of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new states, often at the expense of Serbia. In response, ethnic Serbian separatism has surged across and , with supporters citing the EU’s and NATO’s support for separatist movements in the 1990s as justification for their actions.

Russia has also inflamed separatism in parts of the former and the former Soviet Union to counter EU and NATO expansion or to incorporate these regions into it. Beyond supporting Serbian interests in the Balkans, Russia has utilized, to varying degrees, separatist movements in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Russia has long performed to separatist movements in the West, including inviting representatives to like the Anti-Globalization Movement of Russia, though largely consisting of fringe groups. Russia itself has its own separatist and autonomy movements, however, including in Chechnya, Tatarstan and elsewhere. These have found support from Western actors, including through the launch of the . has also supported Russian separatist movements, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan meanwhile the 50-year anniversary of the Turkish invasion of EU member state Cyprus in 1974 in support of local Turkish separatists.

Most separatist movements in Europe lack the infrastructure to become independent states without external support but persist in their pursuit of independence nonetheless. And European countries with territories outside of Europe, such as France with or Denmark with , must manage their burgeoning independence movements. Access to the EU may be influential in convincing them to remain, but , such as Azerbaijan’s recent support for New Caledonia’s independence, could potentially play a stronger role.

Related Reading

Making Sense of the Trouble in New Caledonia

A new concern for national governments may emerge closer to home. In the , the tension between Russian minorities and national governments remains evident, and the situation faces uncertainty amid the war in Ukraine. The rise of the Alternative für Deutschland political party in the former East Germany has in turn highlighted the enduring divides within the country less than 40 years after reunification, and how new political entities can emerge to exploit such sentiments.

Islamic separatism is a live issue in Western Europe

Yet the most pressing issue appears to be emerging in Western Europe’s major cities. French President Emmanuel Macron, aiming to address concerns over what French authorities describe as “parallel societies” of Muslim immigrants and their descendants, proposed a law in 2023 to the education, finances, and propaganda networks of radical Islam, often from foreign countries. Macron labeled this phenomenon as “separatism.” He was referring to marginalized communities on the outskirts of major French cities in the famed banlieues, which are increasingly beyond state control and driven by domestic grievances and dissatisfaction with French foreign policy. While France’s situation appears the most severe, such sentiment is common across Western Europe.

Related Reading

FO° Exclusive: Make Sense of the Hellish Rioting in France

The EU’s handling of autonomous and separatist movements has frequently faced criticism from nationalist governments, and balancing separatism with nationalism remains a sensitive challenge. However, major countries like Germany and smaller ones like Denmark demonstrate it is possible to manage these issues within national frameworks. Switzerland, a non-EU state, shows similar success in keeping itself together. Clearly, despite nationalist policies, centuries-old communities are resilient and difficult to absorb and erase, even without outside support. Managing these long-standing issues, as well as emerging movements, will require continual adaptation.

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Voters returned no absolute majority for any party in the National Assembly. This lower house of parliament has 577 seats, setting the magic number to form a governing coalition at 289. The newly-formed coalition of the Left, the New Popular Front (NPF), holds the most seats, but it falls far short of a majority at . So, in order to pass any legislation, the parties will have to find a way to build a coalition of political convenience.

The second most powerful group is Macron’s coalition, Ensemble, which holds . RN comes in third with – counting some allied members of the more traditional right-wing party Les Républicains.

While voting concluded just over a month ago, France is still waiting on a governmen. No prime minister or cabinet have yet been announced, and there is no set deadline in place (and none enforceable per the French Constitution). As France continues to wait, a number of trends will bear paying attention to.

The first test of power

Historically, in France’s Fifth Republic, the president should appoint a prime minister that reflects an absolute majority in the National Assembly. With no absolute majority in place, Macron has more freedom to pick, but if the National Assembly does not approve of the final selection, it does have the power to hold a vote of no confidence to have the prime minister and cabinet resign.

Theoretically, the pick should now come from the largest governing power in the National Assembly, the NPF. The bloc had been on who they would nominate as prime minister, with multiple options having been shot down, but finally, in late July, they announced that would be the candidate.

However, within hours of the announcement, Macron on national television that it “was not a matter of a name, but of what majority can be built.” This was widely seen on the Left as disregard for the election results. Yet Castets does not seem to be a popular choice in France. In the latest polling, of French citizens do not approve of Castets as their prime minister.

No matter the candidate, the prospective prime minister will have to appease a split government. Given the slim margins between parties, this may mean a difficult path ahead.

The far right’s newfound gains

Initial polling that the far right would sweep the vote in France. In the first round, RN with 33.1% of the votes. RN were immediately elected without passing on to a runoff. This was a historic first for a party that previously had never cemented a first round win.

The second round led to very different results because leftist and centrist candidates struck electoral agreements to block the far right by any means possible. Those in Macron’s camp and the NPF on citizens to vote for anything but the far right, and they stepped down in each other’s favor when their counterpart had more support. It worked, and the electoral surge RN had been expecting did not materialize.

Still, the far right has never held as much power in France as it does now. This is uncharted territory for a country that has upheld a strict , bringing together disparate parties to exclude extremists from power.

As the far right continues to build up, the traditional right (Les Républicains) , splitting into factions over the question of allying with RN. The split raises questions about the party’s ability to survive in French politics. The infighting has alienated voters, and if the traditional right is unable to build itself back up, this turmoil will push some voters to the extremes.

The future of la Macronie

Macron ran on the premise of enacting policies from both the left and right sides of the spectrum “en même temps” (at the same time). By pushing policies intended to satisfy everyone, he ended up satisfying no one. His approval rating is near an Further, this style of governance has led to the massive disruption in French politics with the jumbling of both the traditional left and right.

Macron will also have an incredibly difficult time recovering from his decision to call these unexpected, destabilizing elections. In the eyes of his own citizens, his credibility is severely undermined. According to the latest polling, French citizens is worried for their political future. In the eyes of his own party, recovering from the breach of trust caused by his decision to dissolve the National Assembly with absolutely no warning, will be close to, if not outright, impossible.

Macron’s Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, described himself as by the decision to call elections. He found out at the same time that everyone else does, through the news. When it came time to campaign, Attal’s posters showed no sign of the president’s face. Others in the presidential camp . This was the first time that Renaissance members declined to tout their president’s endorsement. He is now seen as a liability, not an asset. The future of Renaissance will be an important element to pay attention to on the road to the French presidential elections in 2027.

Institutional stability

The president is allowed to dissolve the parliament once in a year. With a National Assembly incapable of passing legislation, he could be tempted to do it again. This would ensue further chaos in French domestic politics, and political stability would be a pipe dream for French citizens.

With this instability looming, the French are having debates on everything from to on whether or not a Sixth Republic, i.e. an entirely new constitution, could be established. While this is still a burgeoning debate for some (though the NPF already has it in its proposed political program), the conversation around the power of the executive is happening. Many are arguing for shifting more power to the National Assembly, away from the executive. While a Sixth Republic isn’t expected to happen tomorrow, these conversations have taken a new urgency.

As of now, with no prime minister announced, France is entering into unknown territory. Though the previous government recently resigned, it will remain in power until a new one is established. This transition has historically lasted around ten days, but word has it that the current government will the Summer Olympics in Paris.

Unfortunately, France cannot afford instability at the moment. In addition to hosting the Olympics this year, the country is facing an amount of terrorist threats, and the government continues to rampant Russian disinformation campaigns. All while, the war in Ukraine threatens overall European security. As France figures itself out, there is no denying that this next government will define the future of French, and European, politics for years to come.

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Possible overtones?

Invited to respond, Argentinean President Javier Milei and Vice President Victoria Villarruel shrugged and said Fernández was just being truthful. Aurélien Tchouaméni and several other players on the French national team are of Cameroonian descent. Ousmane Dembélé is of Senegalese, Mauritian and Malian descent.

Days later, football fans in Argentina were repeating the chant. Fernández was investigated by association football’s world governing organization, FIFA, which has prioritized the fight against racism in the sport. The players can be suspended for up to 12 matches if the chant is found to be racist.

Is it racist?

I asked a Spanish-speaking friend for a translation of the comments, and he confirmed the above is accurate. He reckoned the chant had racist “overtones,” meaning it implied that to be properly French, you had to be white. I accept there were overtones. I also accept that the verse was derogatory and insulting to France’s black players. But I am still not convinced this is racism. Then again, racism itself changes.

The myth of race

In 1950, UNESCO published a significant titled “The Race Question.” This report was one of the first major efforts to expose the scientific invalidity of race as a biological concept. It concluded that “for all practical purposes, ‘race’ is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth.”

Despite its mythic status, no one doubted the devilish concept’s potency. “Racism” referred to thoughts and theories predicated on the validity of “race” and the corresponding assumption that the human population was divided naturally into a hierarchy, with whites permanently at the top.

“Racialism,” on the other hand, described language or behavior that reflected those beliefs. So, racialism, or racial discrimination as it was often called, was obviously much more damaging to groups conceived as lower in the purported hierarchy. Anti-discrimination laws and policies were designed to manage racialism rather than educate people.

During the 1980s, the terms racism and racialism converged in academia, public discourse and policy discussions. “Racism” increasingly described both the belief in racial superiority and the resultant discriminatory behaviors. The focus shifted to recognizing that racist beliefs and actions were part of a larger, interconnected complex of injustice and subjugation.

Institutional racism

The term “institutional racism” was first used by Stokely Carmichael (later known as Kwame Ture) and Charles V. Hamilton in their influential Black Power: The Politics of Liberation. Over time, the term became closely associated with the UK’s report on the death of Stephen Lawrence, published in 1999. In this case, was defined as “the collective failure of an organization to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their color, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behavior which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.”

According to the report, institutional racism is not only about overt acts of racism but also about the more subtle and systemic practices that lead to unequal treatment — what are now known as microaggressions. Institutional racism and plain racism were soon used interchangeably to mean widespread discrimination.

The parameters have shifted so that the concept of “race” is no longer germane. In 2018, for example, many people from felt they were discriminated against on the grounds of national identity. Under the UK’s , these concerns could be considered justified. The Welsh were a “protected group.” The defining feature of racism, in this conception, is not “race” but vulnerability to discrimination.��

The Boy Who Cried “Wolf”

The benefits of categorizing racism in this way are many. Groups that have been treated wrongfully or prejudicially, be that presently or historically, are protected by law and can use the emotively powerful claim of racism in their defense. Offenses motivated by a victim’s supposed ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, disability or similar characteristics are now grouped collectively as hate crimes. The defining characteristic is the perpetrator’s intention, not the victim’s attributes. A claim of a racist attack on a cisgender, fully abled, while male heterosexual has merit.

But there are dangers, the most obvious one captured by the phrase “cry wolf.” The fable of the tricksy shepherd boy who playfully misleads people with false cries of, “Wolf!” is illuminating. When a wolf actually does appear, others are so used to the boy’s stunts that no one takes notice. Repeatedly claiming “racism” calls attention to an unpleasant and widespread presence, but may also devalue such claims. The enlargement of the concept to cover all manner of discrimination tends to trivialize racism in the form it once had.

Racism has disfigured America’s history from the 17th century and Europe’s from the 1950s. It has provoked slave uprisings, riots, protest marches and other forms of civil disobedience. Torture, mutilation and death have been its grimmest byproducts. To cluster these sins under the same rubric as microaggressions against the Welsh lessens their significance in the eyes of many.

Racism in the Fernández case

I am certainly not condoning the behavior of Fernández and his teammates. It was not just careless, but wrongheaded, pernicious, arguably defamatory and possibly malicious. France’s black players were subject to abuse on social media following their World Cup defeat to Argentina in 2022, so these kinds of irresponsible deeds can have consequences. But was it racist?

Fifty years ago, no. Thirty years ago, still no. In fact, in 1998, France won the FIFA World Cup with a multicultural team that included Zinedine Zidane, Patrick Vieira, Lilian Thuram and Marcel Desailly, among others. Had Fernández’s video been released then, it likely would have been ridiculed and dismissed as a case of “sour grapes.” But today we err on the side of assuming malignancy.

The impact of racism has been diluted by our eagerness to recognize it in any situation in which hatred of particular groups is involved. This is not a bad thing and in a great many instances, there has been a racist component buried among other sordid motivations. Yet the danger lies in spurious attributions. Some offenses, even hate crimes, are not impelled by spurious beliefs about race and should be treated as conceptually distinct.

None of this excuses Fernández et al. But perhaps we should laugh at their idiocy and childlike attempts to make fun rather than dignify them — which is what we do when we endow them with serious motives.

[Ellis Cashmore is the editor of]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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For example, in Germany, the ruling social democratic party was annihilated with only 13.9% of the popular vote. The Conservative Christian Democratic Union won with 30%. In a shocking turn of events, the far-right alternative party Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) came in second with 15.9%. Even though the far-right didn’t win outright, in the former East Germany region, the AFD increased their vote share from 5% to 16% among voters younger than 24. The result is a good litmus test to measure just how far Europe is sliding to the right. 

An attempt to break the far-right fever

France has also become an example of the far-right frenzy. During the elections, the far-right party Rassemblement National (RN) won 32% of the vote. That’s more than double the vote share current French president Emmanuel Macron’s centrist party received. Created in 1972 by the reactionary Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party is now led by his daughter Marine, who has moderated it somewhat. Although she curtailed the neo-fascist elements within the party, RN remains a nationalist, populist party focused on extremely strict immigration controls.

RN has already left its mark on the French market. Bondholders are wary because RN economic policies are weak and promise spending. France could very well be facing potential instability. Fearing this, Macron called for a snap . He hoped to break the far-right fever dominating his country. If people were made to vote again, he reasoned, they may remeasure the RN. 

If the RN won, RN’s Jordan Bardella would have been declared France’s next prime minister. Because the French constitution allows the head of government to be from a different party than the head of state, Macron would face a fractured and unstable political situation. However, France appears to have avoided disaster for the moment. Leftist and centrist candidates were able to cooperate, dropping out in each other’s favor when one held the edge. In the final result, RN came merely in third place. However, they had still increased their vote share significantly.

Why is this happening?

During the Cold War, there wasn’t a call for concern regarding the far-right — most countries were more concerned about the rise of communism. Now, however, a mass reaction against uncontrolled immigration has contributed to the rise of the far-right. France, for example, needed North African immigrants for factory work. However, these immigrant workers were never integrated into the society and culture. This created a significant “us vs. them” chasm. Europeans feared immigrants would threaten their “pure” society.

The biggest issue, therefore, lies in assimilation. A new population or culture is viewed as exotic up until it reaches 10% of the dominant population. As soon as it reaches that point, the population is suddenly viewed as disruptive and is rejected from the dominant society. It also takes about three generations for an immigrant family to fully integrate. That’s a long time. Something needs to be done about integration and immigration quicker.

The far-right has chosen to point their fingers in the direction of immigration as the cause of sociological issues. In actuality, the blame lies with the political elites who have failed to formulate proper immigration policies. A modern fault line runs through politics: Politicians rely too heavily on spin and not enough on real problems to receive votes. The lack of leadership in acknowledging present problems, most notably immigration, has led to a rise in populist, far-right leaders. 

With the rise in inflation, cost of living, and unemployment, people turn to scapegoats to blame. They have found an easy one in immigration issues. So when a charismatic, populist leader comes along promising an end to such issues, it’s only natural that the voter population will begin to turn right.

As this trend continues, there will be a strengthening of nationalism. Such a rise gives way to a decline in protectionism and multilateralism. A new world order is asserting itself, and it seems like European social democracy is increasingly discredited.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Europe is in an even more dramatic bind than the US. The ambiguity surrounding Biden himself means that the likelihood of a new Trump White House has never been greater, despite Trump being a convicted felon thanks to the of a criminal court that same June. Europeans are dreading the unpredictable consequences of a new Trump administration.

Even without that factor of ambiguity, Europe is immersed in its own problems. The major event of the month was the initiation of what may turn into a new French Revolution. Reacting to the disastrous showing of his coalition in the European parliamentary elections on June 9, President Emmanuel Macron, as soon as the results were announced, precipitously hatched his daring, potentially suicidal gambit. He called for new to “clarify” the balance of political forces in France. Already struggling to deal with the expense, uncertainty and disappointing evolution of NATO’s tragic war in Ukraine, Europe was thrown into a state of suspended animation as it awaited the outcomes of the British and French elections. Those took place in the first week of July.

On June 13, four days after Macron’s act of folly, Alex Gloy offered this “quick observation” based on the state of the global bond markets. He sees the unmistakable seeds of a European banking crisis.

“These are current 10-year government bond yields (except TYX, which is the US 30-yr). The focus here is on the difference, or spread, in yield between Germany and France. A week ago, that spread was 0.50%. It is rapidly widening, now at 0.71%. This is worrying. Why? You can purchase government bonds in the same currency but get different yields. This does not make sense unless there is a difference in default probability and / or exit from the Euro. Both of which would be catastrophic events for Europe.

Germany has fiscal deficit of 2.5% of GDP, while France is running at 5.5%. Germany has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 63.6%, while France stands at 111%.

Financial markets hate uncertainty, and the outcome of French elections is unknown, with the risk being a populist right-wing government ignoring the fiscal constraints of the Treaty of Maastricht (max 3% deficit, max 60% debt-to-GDP, both which are already being ignored).

France’s fiscal position is now worse than Spain (3.6% deficit, 108% debt-to-GDP). France should tighten its belt, but that would probably cause more social unrest.

The spread-widening in the government bond market has led to pressure on European bank stocks; BNP fell from EUR 72 to 60 and Deutsche Bank from 16.70 to 14.60. Banks usually have positions in government bonds. Another banking crisis is the last thing Europe needs now.

Still, it is worth mentioning that all Euro-members, including Greece, are currently paying less than the UK or the US.”

Related Reading

Money Matters: Revealing Who Is Holding Billions of US Banknotes

Our colleague Edward Quince offered his own reflections, provoked by another destabilizing event in the month of June: the presence of a Russian nuclear off the coast of the US.

“A�����,

Mr. Putin ain’t dumb. The alarming part of his seemingly nonsensical attitude toward the USD is his informed confidence about what is to come next. Note that he almost always refers to the USD in the past tense. I’ll detail the not-so-secret weapon he has up his sleeve after I finish documenting the events surrounding the Russian nuclear submarine docking in Havana, Cuba today. The short answer, however, is ‘BRICS Bridge, blockchain, and gold derivatives.’

When I researched the work done by Russia and China since 2008 to establish a new, more equitable, and less risky finance and trade environment, BRICS emerged as the ultimate cooperation framework and platform. After having read a ton, it is apparent that a tremendous amount of very focused and deliberate work has been done since then. This 2015 Ufa Declaration the goals, the underlying strategy and some tactics behind the major finance and trade initiatives. The key framework there is the Contingent Reserves Arrangement. Nine years and several global crises later, Mr. Putin has told us just a tiny bit about what has been built on that foundation.

On a separate note, I’ve just finished re-reading Henry Kissinger’s ‘.’ The intricate political play that Kissinger orchestrated in the 70s and the 80s now looks like an elaborate short-term trap for China in the American long-term game against Russia. I can only imagine the depth of resentment and distrust towards the US in Beijing these days. Alternatively, it is possible that there has never been any such trust, and China played the long game knowing that one day the USA would inevitably turn adversarial once again. Nevertheless, since there is nobody resembling Mr. Kissinger in Washington now, there seems to be no going back to the status quo to which we all grew so accustomed.”

With the drama continuing to develop, on June 29, I offered my own testimony. I am a voter in the coming French election, and potentially the US election in November.

“As a dual citizen of two nations, each with a president clearly demonstrating suicidal behavior, I have to wonder about the continued political coherence and even institutional solidity of both. Tomorrow I will be voting in an election that in all probability will establish the contour of what promises to be twelve months of political and I expect even deeper cultural chaos. On July 8 France will most likely have a ‘hung by the rafters’ parliament and a situation of maneuvering that will take place as much on the streets as in the Assemblée Nationale.

The point of a presidential as opposed to a parliamentary regime is that at the core of government there is a human being who symbolizes the unity of the nation. Political wrangling is a permanent feature of all democracies, but there is always some kind of symbol that makes even the worst confrontations palatable. In the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and even Spain, the monarchy plays its role in stabilizing the question of national identity. In presidential regimes, it can only be the president and the flag.

On Sunday, June 9, Emmanuel Macron miscalculated when, by announcing the the Assemblée, he effectively declared two things: 

• That any pretense of political unity for the nation was compromised beyond negotiable repair;
• That the president, as a lame duck because of serving his second term, had now become a non-entity, deprived of the quasi-absolute power De Gaulle had defined for the office.

Macron hoped to address the first point but he was in denial about the reality of the second one, despite its being obvious to everyone else, including his own inner circle.

For three quarters of a century Europe has developed as a zone of relative peace and prosperity in the shadow of the US nuclear umbrella and the US dollar, despite the launch of the Euro. In the context of the war in Ukraine, it has now implicitly embraced the growth of what Dwight Eisenhower – alone among all modern presidents – had the temerity to : the military-industrial complex. 

Europeans have long worried about the role of what President Giscard d’Estaing called the “exorbitant privilege” but accepted the floating dollar as a feature of the new world order. De Gaulle led the campaign against the dollar that eventually led to Nixon’s of the dollar and gold, creating a new global landscape supported by the petrodollar and the Eurodollar. De Gaulle also dared to counter the US by withdrawing from NATO’s central command structure, with the futile aim of achieving military autonomy.

Europe is still struggling mightily with these two issues. It will be interesting to see how this year’s elections influence those developments.”

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Rishi Sunak, the UK’s most recent Tory Prime Minister, understood that his party’s hold on power was weakening. So he thought he could catch his opponents off guard, forcing the electorate to cling to the idea of continuity in times of uncertainty. He provoked an unprecedented bloodbath that left the Tories with an abject minority in Parliament, and Labour with a crushing : 412 to 121!

Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron had a panicked reaction to being handily distanced by Marine Le Pen’s far right National Rally in June’s European parliamentary elections. He called a snap election to take place exactly three weeks later, for the stated sake of “clarification.” The first round of that election confirmed the electorate’s massive rejection of Macron’s policies and even of the man himself.

The first round also allowed the electorate to “proclaim” its for the xenophobic right over “Macronisme.” The second round permitted voters to the left, leaving Macron stranded in a no man’s land: an undefined, powerless middle. Even though he has three years left to preside over the nation, Macron has become the lamest of lame ducks.

But the most obvious example of the negative democracy trend would be the last two United States presidential elections, along with the upcoming one. In 2016, pollsters revealed that both Hillary Clinton, who was nevertheless expected to win, and Donald Trump, the ultimate outsider, held the titles of the two most presidential candidates ever to face off in the modern era.

The 2020 election pitted the consistently unpopular Trump against an aging Democratic workhorse, Joe Biden, who was clearly past his prime. “Sleepy Joe” won the primaries not because he inspired voters, but because the party’s establishment, working in the background, pushed him through. Above all, they wished to nominating the much more popular Democrat: Bernie Sanders. In Negative Democracy, popular candidates are viewed as potential threats to their parties.

Biden was never popular but he had two redeeming factors: his association with former US President Barack Obama and his appearance as a politician who could conduct “business as usual.” He contrasted with the mercurial, unpredictable Trump. Was he villainous? No one was sure. But a majority of voters saw him as the lesser of two evils.

2024 offers a rematch between the already rejected Trump and — as polls seem to indicate — the soon-to-be rejected Biden. Both are now widely perceived as lacking any realistic awareness of the nation’s needs and an ability to address them; Trump because of his personality, Biden because of his age.

In short, the way politicians win elections today is not to prove that they deserve to govern. Rather, they persuade the public that their opponent deserves to be punished for their sins or obvious failings.

Analyzing the rather surprising landslide defeat of Britain’s Conservative Party after 14 years of continuous rule, The Guardian’s columnist Rafael Baer the result as the “imperative to punish the Tories for years of political malpractice.” He claims it “was palpable on the campaign trail in a way that exultant Starmer fandom was not.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Imperative to punish:

A moral sentiment caused by the buildup of a population’s frustration with two things: its powerlessness to influence events and its growing understanding that every government it elects is destined to produce consistently disappointing results.

Contextual note

In theory, democracies hold elections to enable the most creative and constructive elements of the population to make up the governing structures that will ensure collective security and foster conditions of prosperity and well-being. The ideal, in most democracies, has been historically betrayed by the empowerment of parties and their associated factions that have eclipsed “the people” as sources of decision-making. Parties foster the creation of a protected political class whose interests become distinct from the population’s. The existence of a political class fosters the emergence of a courtier class, the myriad lobbyists who enforce the role of private interests over public welfare.

Elections have become the measure of two complementary forms of powerlessness. Democracy itself, as a method of governing designed to convey the “will of the people,” has lost any power it once had. This is compounded by the fact that the ruling elites appear powerless to do anything that doesn’t simply aggravate the existing instability of institutions and, of course, the economy.

Elections, instead of embodying the aspirations of the population, have thus become little more than tools of punishment. That may well be necessary when entire populations judge that their way of life is consistently going downhill and that their social, political and economic culture is becoming seriously degraded. That instinct for punishment could even be salutary, if punishment could be managed with a view to improvement rather than simple rejection.

Historical note

In a famous 1960 for The Atlantic titled, “The Imperative to Punish,” David Bazelon introduced the concept of restorative justice as an alternative to traditional punitive measures. Restorative justice focuses on repairing the harm caused by crime and involving all stakeholders — victims, offenders and the community — in the process of justice. In the context of the 1960s, a period of creative reform symbolized by the civil rights , the on Poverty and US President Lyndon B Johnson’s “,” the idea of restorative justice as an alternative to punishment made sense. But history moved in a different direction.

Concurrently with the reforms, Johnson prosecuted a in Southeast Asia designed to punish Vietnamese nationalists who might be tempted by socialism or communism as an alternative to the US model of god-fearing capitalism. If foreign policy could be based on punishment, why shouldn’t domestic policy follow the same logic? President Nixon and later Reagan pursued that notion. The taste to punish became the driving force in policy-making, foreign or domestic.

This worked out well for the evolving contours of US political parties. Democrats could seek to punish Republicans for being racist and Republicans could insist on punishing Democrats for “over-regulating” and thereby robbing them of their basic freedoms. Namely, the freedom to use any business practices that weren’t outright assassination or theft to get things done. Polluting the environment, for example, should be allowed when required for commercial success. Those who seek to regulate should be punished.

Starting with the premise of civil rights, Democrats began evolving the rules that ended up defining the “identity culture” that established the practices of “cancel culture.” This became an informal system of social punishment that could include getting people fired from their jobs or simply being inundated with death threats on social media.

No one should be surprised that the “satisfaction” of punishing those you disagree with has taken center stage in the psychology of politics in our modern democracies. The “imperative to punish” cited in Baer’s description of the Tory defeat reminds us of the Kantian concept of the “.” Kant’s ethics that define moral principles as categorical — meaning they admit of no exceptions and leave no room to discuss, examine, negotiate, debate and seek “restorative” solutions — has come to dominate Western thinking, especially in the domain of politics. The case can be made that it has perverted the concept and practice of democracy.

We continue to see its nefarious effects in the field of foreign policy. The now well-documented adamant refusal of Biden’s State Department to consider, let alone engage in, negotiations in any of its provoked wars provides perfect examples of the categorical imperative’s misapplication. The cost so far can be measured in hundreds of thousands of lives in and . But it could reach the hundreds of millions as we move closer to creating the conditions in which a spark can ignite conflagration. Armageddon would be the final application of our most cherished “categorical imperative.”

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

[ edited this piece.]

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Located in the South Pacific, the islands became a part of France in 1853. French arrivals — including many deported prisoners — lived alongside the native Kanaks. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Kanaks saw population growth that boosted their share of the electorate and, thus, their political aspirations. They have advocated for increased autonomy and even independence from France.

Many Kanaks are discontented because they feel excluded from the territory’s recent economic growth, driven by the expansion of the nickel industry. This industry has made many French entrepreneurs rich and employed a new population of workers from Southeast Asia but largely left the natives behind.

The Kanaks’ population growth stagnated, even declining between 2009 and 2014. They now constitute 41% of the island’s population, well short of a majority. However, they have increased political influence because the electoral law restricts voting to Kanaks and others, including the island’s ethnic French population, who have been in the islands for a long time; it excludes the new French arrivals and Asian workers who have come with the nickel boom. Now, the government in Paris has threatened to change this settlement with a proposal to extend voting rights in provincial elections to French residents who have lived on the island for at least ten years.

The French government acknowledges the Kanaks’ aspirations for local autonomy but maintains that the proposed changes are a matter of fairness. The ‎Élysée argues that individuals who live in New Caledonia and contribute to its economy should have a say in its governance. Some New Caledonians do support this perspective, arguing that all island residents, not just its indigenous population, should determine the island’s future. Yet disgruntled New Caledonians have taken to the streets, with some even going as far as erecting barricades and looting to show the government their discontent.

The latest chapter in a long history

The current political crisis is not an isolated incident. It is the latest manifestation of long-standing tensions between the Kanaks and the French government over the island’s future. These tensions have erupted into violence before, notably in the 1980s and 1990s, when clashes between Kanak independence activists and French security forces resulted in significant unrest.

The was the culmination of a series of agreements reached in the late 1980s and 1990s. This accord outlined a path towards greater autonomy for New Caledonia and included provisions for three referendums on independence. The first two referendums, held in 2018 and 2020, resulted in narrow victories for the pro-France side. However, the pro-independence Kanaks boycotted the third referendum in 2021, citing concerns about the process’s fairness due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their community.

These most recent proposed changes to voting laws have reignited the debate over New Caledonia’s future and its relationship with France. The Kanaks perceive these changes as a betrayal of the Nouméa Accord’s spirit, which they believe paved the way for their eventual independence. The French government, on the other hand, maintains that the changes are necessary to ensure fair representation for all residents of the island.

Strategic importance and economic value further complicate the situation in New Caledonia. The island holds 10% of the world’s nickel resources, a critical component in the production of batteries for electric vehicles and other technologies. This makes New Caledonia a valuable asset for France, both economically and geopolitically.

What will the ‎Élysée do next?

President Emmanuel Macron, leading the French government, has expressed his commitment to fostering dialogue and finding a political solution to the crisis. In June, he decided to halt the proposed reforms. Yet Paris’s long-term goals for the island territory remain uncertain.

Kanaks continue to deeply distrust the French government’s intentions. They view the suspended proposed voting law changes as the latest attempt to undermine their aspirations for self-determination and maintain French control over the island.

The situation in New Caledonia serves as a reminder of the ongoing challenges faced by indigenous populations around the world in their struggle for self-determination. It also highlights the complex and often fraught relationship between former colonial powers and their overseas territories. As the global community watches, the people of New Caledonia and the French government must chart a path forward that respects the rights and aspirations of all involved.

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In June, Alex Gloy drew our attention to events in what many project to be the next flashpoint: the South China Sea that may forebode things to come.

He came across remarks posted on Twitter by Frenchman Arnaud Bertrand, a prominently followed commentator on geopolitics and economics. He recently described at length the implications of an important given by the Chinese Defense Minister, Dong Jun, at the Shangri-La Dialogue Conference in Singapore. Alex shared with us. It serves as a prelude to looking at how pure geopolitics may presage deeper changes in economic relations. In this case, the gap highlighted exists between East and West, with the implicit understanding that the truly emerging divide is between the West and what, despite its geographical ambiguity, we call the Global South.

“Some interesting points made by China’s defense minister on the South China Sea at the Shangri-La Dialogue. On ‘freedom of navigation’ exercises by the U.S. he makes the point that in decades ‘there’s never been one incident where civilian ships had their freedom of navigation compromised’, despite the fact that ‘over 50% of global shipping and 1/3 of cargo ships go through this region.’

So he asks ‘why does freedom of navigation always become an issue? Why is it always brought up? Some big powers are increasing their military presence in this area, in particular strengthening and deploying more military assets. So what is their purpose? Are you coming here for peace or stirring up troubles?’

On the current tensions with the Philippines he says the issue started in 1999 when ‘the other side illegally grounded their desolate landing ship on [the Second Thomas Shoal]’. He says that ‘At first, they promised to tow this away, and then we reached some other agreements for humanitarian reasons. We agreed that they could send supplies to personnel on this ship, and we reached several agreements. All the previous administrations and the current administration also recognized this agreement, but recently they started not recognizing it at all. This is a unilateral reneging of their promise.’

He compares the Philippines’ current actions in the Second Thomas Shoal to ‘deliberate bumping’ where ‘passerby hit a vehicle by himself and then played the victim to blackmail the driver of the vehicle’. He says ‘it is a deliberate action and is trying to make an issue of this kind of incident. I think this is blackmail and hijacking rules… I think this is not even morally right.’

After reflecting on it, I think this speech by China’s Defense Minister at the Shangri-La Dialogue is probably much more important than how it’s been analyzed to date.

I wonder if it’s not China’s version of the era-defining speech that Putin gave at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, in which he warned the West that they couldn’t make a mockery of Russian security interests and renege on their promises forever. Putin’s speech was widely dismissed at the time, so much so that the year afterwards in 2008 Ukraine and Georgia were invited to become NATO member-states. We all know what happened afterwards…

The Chinese Defense Minister’s speech was eerily similar, warning several times that ‘our tolerance has limits’, describing in minute details how its security interests in Taiwan and the South China Sea are being challenged and how previous agreements are being violated. And sadly the response so far is also eerily similar, with China’s position being widely dismissed…

The US is of course going to dismiss it because they love nothing more than to divide and conquer: tensions in Asia against their primary geopolitical rival is exactly what they’re after. But if I were an actor in the region, just like if I had been a European leader back in 2007, I would pay a lot of attention to this and work extremely hard to set up and maintain a regional security architecture that accommodates everyone’s interests.”

Alex undoubtedly remembers that back in 2007 and again in 2008, the two most significant European leaders, Germany and France, sought to play a mitigating role in what was shaping up as a direct challenge between the US and Russia. Jacques Chirac, in his final months as President, continued to favor closer with Russia. He was faithful to the Gaullist tradition. In defiance of then-US President George W Bush, the man he resisted when the US insisted France join the “coalition of the willing” to invade Iraq, Chirac dared to sympathize with some of Putin’s concerns. He was especially sympathetic about NATO expansion.

Chirac’s successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, continued a cautious approach. He attempted to balance the importance of a cooperative European-Russian relationship and NATO’s role in European security. Significantly, in 2009, Sarkozy De Gaulle’s bold decision in 1966 to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated military command.

After Bush’s at the NATO summit at Bucharest in 2008, in which he promised to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other European leaders successfully argued for a more cautious approach. However, they failed to overturn or influence the intentions of the US. The summit decided on a policy of strategic ambiguity by postponing any immediate membership action while keeping the door open for future consideration. The world knows, thanks to a leaked from then-US ambassador to Moscow William Burns to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, that Bush’s gambit crossed “the brightest of redlines” and would likely lead to war. Subsequent history informs us that Burns’s memo had no effect on US policy in Ukraine.

With these historical events in mind, and those that followed with a coup d’état in 2014, the failed Minsk accords and Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there is room for concern about the spark that could ignite World War III. Betrand concludes his analysis of the situation in Asis with these , which highlight the parallel between the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and what may await us in Southeast Asia.

“Asia should learn from Europe’s most consequential mistake in generations and not do the exact same thing, victim of the exact same playbook… For instance, with regards to the Philippines, I am astonished how alone China is left to deal with the issue. A cardinal concept of ASEAN, and the most important objective of the association, is that no member is to be used by an external big power for the purpose of great power politics.

And here you have the Philippines obviously being used by the US, with

a) the addition of 4 US bases on their territory and

b) the US giving unilateral support to the Philippines in their territorial disputes.

Yet other ASEAN countries are largely silent on this: what gives?

Also, specifically with regards to the Spratly islands, they’re claimed either as a whole or in part by not only the PRC and the Philippines but also by Vietnam, Malaysia and the ROC. Why are the others not saying anything when the Philippines unilaterally tries to annex islands in violation of previous agreements? Why is China left alone to push back against this and somehow presented as the aggressor?

It’s again quite similar to the situation in Europe a few years ago, where the region didn’t push back on the transformation of Ukraine into a Western bulwark against Russia, knowing full well how provocative and potentially dangerous it was. At the end of the day, if you don’t look after your own region’s security interests and leave a vacuum for this, the US will fill it in a way that fits their own interests… and given its overarching objective of containing China, this is akin to letting the fox guard the henhouse…”

Alex then offers his own warning in the guise of a conclusion.

“It seems we are moving towards an unavoidable confrontation over Taiwan, with both China and the US taking steps requiring countermeasures from the other side, triggering further escalation. Now, the US doesn’t like to confront its major adversaries directly, instead using proxies. After having listened to Glenn and Atul on Japan, I cannot shake the feeling that Japan will be drawn into this to do the “dirty” work for the US. Would be interested if anyone was willing to share their thoughts.”

Join the debate

Money Matters…, is dedicated to developing this discussion and involving all interested parties.

We invite all of you who have something to contribute to send us your reflections at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We will integrate your insights into the ongoing debate. We will publish them as articles or as part of the ongoing dialogue.

*[51�Թ�’s “Crucible of Collaboration” is meant to be a space in which multiple voices can be heard, comparing and contrasting their opinions and insights in the interest of deepening and broadening our understanding of complex topics.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Crucible: Money Matters in a Multipolar World, Part 7 appeared first on 51�Թ�.

This year, Schaffer returned by visiting the cities of Uzhhorod and Lviv. This trip was safer, yet more psychologically draining than the first. In 2023, morale was high. Ukrainians were confident. Now, the fatigue is palpable. Constant attacks on civilian infrastructure wound and kill people as Western support trickles in slowly . 

This is the Kremlin’s strategy, and it’s succeeding. Momentum is clearly on Russia’s side, and the longer the campaign lasts, the further Ukrainian morale sinks.

Will Russia win? What could this victory mean for Europe?

NATO vs. Russian expansionism

It’s unlikely Russia can fully occupy Ukraine. Russia can’t win by suffocating Ukrainian morale until they stop resisting — and Ukrainians know a loss would bring death, destruction and rape.

No one knows now exactly what a Russian victory could bring. Political scientist John Mearsheimer argues that Russia is not expansionist and it will stop after it secures the territory it now holds. Others say that Russia intends to overrun Ukraine entirely and that it will bring its conquest to other countries next. This would usher in a perilous era for Central and Eastern Europe.

Mearsheimer argues that Russia acted to achieve one political aim: preventing NATO from expanding further eastward. Russia sees its near abroad as a defensive bulwark against potential NATO military invasion. The United States reacted similarly in the 1960s when Soviet Union tried to into Cuba.

Hypothetically, Russia could achieve certain goals and then freeze the conflict. But to do that, it would have to control what it believes is now its sovereign territory, namely four Ukrainian of Kherson, Luhansk, Donetsk and Zaporizhia. Russia organized sham referenda to annex these areas. As long as these oblasts remain partly outside of Russia’s grasp, negotiation seems unlikely. Likewise, on the Ukrainian side, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy cannot negotiate a peace that would involve the surrender of national territory. This would violate Ukraine’s constitution.

Mearsheimer is right that the positioning of NATO missiles in Ukraine would be an existential threat to Russia that the federation would necessarily have to stop. But this could have been achieved through negotiation and reasonable planning. Instead, Russia denied Ukrainian statehood and began gobbing up pieces of it. Far from carrying out a defensive action, the Kremlin used the purported threat of NATO to justify its of international law.

The European divide

The Russia–Ukraine War is the first large-scale conflict in Europe since the fall of Berlin in 1945. French President Emmanuel Macron tried making peace with Putin in 2022, but now he’s asking for Western troops in -Ukraine. Once a dove, he’s now become a hawk. In his view, if Ukraine falls, others will follow.

Despite this, Europe will not get tougher with Russia. There are too many sovereign states with too many different approaches for that to happen. This is a hybrid war — a war that combines conventional and irregular warfare. A narrative battle rages inside each country in tandem with the deadly campaign in Ukraine.

Many countries are noticing this extra dimension. The last two years have brought a fundamental shift in thought: If Europe can’t defend the Ukrainians who are fighting for the EU’s values, how can it protect those principles? Europe’s security structure was destroyed on February 24, 2022; its freedom, values and democratic way of life are in jeopardy. Further, Europe cannot rely on NATO’s to defend itself. The US will not necessarily interve to defend Europe in the event of a limited engagement in eastern Poland or the Baltics, which Russia could plausibly try. If of the — the EU’s mutual defense clause — is not to be a dead letter, Europe must have an independent defensive capability.

This viewpoint has divided Europe. Many Europeans lack the will to fight, believing the threat to be exaggerated. Italy and Spain are far from Russia and protected by high mountains; the idea of Russian tanks threatening these southerly nations sounds like science fiction.

France and Germany have always shared the Great European Plain — easy to drive tanks across — with Russia and so perceive the possibility of war, however remote, as more realistic. Yet both nations are internally split on Russia. France has a semi-presidential system where Macron can dictate policy, but many in the National Assembly do not share his  hawkish views.

On the other side, Germany has a parliamentary system where three parties form the government coalition: the Social Democratic Party, the Green Party and the Liberals. There are hawkish Social Democrats, dovish Liberals and both tendencies in the Green Party. It’s difficult for these parties to compromise when debating a common policy.

On February 27, 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz delivered the famous Zeitenwende (“Watershed”) speech in the Bundestag. He announced a to the country’s security and foreign policy, upping defense spending significantly. Germany was to take an active role as a member of NATO. Yet Germany doesn’t want to get involved in this war. Unlike France, it has a large, resource-hungry manufacturing industry — and no nuclear plants to power it. This makes Germany much more dependant than France on Russian fossil fuels. War means that energy costs skyrocket, growth plummets and industry suffers. Already, Germans are saying that they’re the real losers of the war.

Danube regional affairs

Along with Ukraine and Germany, Europe’s Danube consists of Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova. As Ukraine’s neighbors, these countries would be directly affected if Russia occupied its entirety.

In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has taken a questionable, pro-Russian attitude. Traditionally, Hungarians are suspicious of Russia, with dark memories of Soviet tanks rolling into Budapest to crush the Hungarian uprising against Bolshevism in 1956. Yet Orbán’s social contract with the Hungarian people relies on growth that cheap Russian gas fuels. Hungary has notoriously made a long-term contract with Russia’s energy corporation. Meanwhile, Budapest vetos EU measures to aid Ukraine. The country’s stance seems rooted in business, not ideology.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico from power in 2018 over a political crisis: Journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová, nearly exposed a financial flow running through the government, but were mafia-style. Now, Fico regained the people’s favor by using their frustration with the war; he was in 2023. He blames his country’s high inflation on the war and the war on anti-Russian Western policy.

Just outside the Danube region, Poland is also divided on how to should position itself. Supporters of the nationalist Law and Justice party are less hawkish on Russia. Yet Law and Justice is no longer in power as of 2023. Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s new government marks a return to European values and feels that, if Europe does not stop Russia at the Donets, they will soon have to do so at the Bug.

Poland is a hotspot because, if it feels threatened and insufficiently protected by NATO, it may decide to develop its own nuclear weapons. Indeed, Europe needs a nuclear deterrent independent from that of the US. This war has caused Europe to see that it must stand on its own two feet, invest in military production and prepare to defend itself. If Russia makes a move, the Yanks may not be coming.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Where Is Ukraine Headed Now? What Does Europe Think? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Differences on crucial issues pushed the three countries apart during these two decades. Germany and France opted for strengthening their relations with Russia and declined to deepen the European–US alliance, whereas Poland represented the opposite stance, warning against Russia and following a more Atlanticist defense policy while increasing expenditure on its own armed forces. The 2015 rise of a populist conservative government in Poland further cooled relations. The new government used openly anti-German rhetoric and also had reservations about France.

Recent events, however, have reversed the situation. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the 2023 election of a new pro-European government in Poland gave an impulse for renewed cooperation. Already in February 2024, all three countries’ foreign ministers met in France, followed by a previously unplanned meeting of French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Germany in March. The next high-level meeting, in Poland, is planned for June.

The authors of this article, a Pole, a German and a Frenchman, met in Vienna. What sounds like the beginning of a joke turned into a serious discussion about the potential, shortcomings and the varying national perspectives of this minilateral format. We will explain what our respective countries hope to achieve and what they will need in order to do so.

How do Berlin, Paris and Warsaw see the revived forum?

Many in Berlin hope that the revived Weimar Triangle will alleviate the strained relations between Scholz and Macron. They are excited about the possibility of putting together (a) the biggest economy in the EU, (b) a permanent UN Security Council member and nuclear power and (c) the most populous and most important country in Central Europe. Together, these three nations represent around 40% of the EU population, or 188 million inhabitants.

On March 15, the partners they would jointly procure weapons for Ukraine on the world market. This, along with ramping up production, is music to many German ears given Scholz’s notoriously hesitancy in providing Ukraine with the means to defend itself. like “Two Churchills and half a Chamberlain” appeared in the aftermath of the announcement, comparing Scholz to the infamously dovish British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain who failed to take a firm stance against Adolf Hitler.

Germans also relish the historic opportunity to polish up the city’s name. “Weimar” has unfortunately become a byword for the failed Weimar Republic, which Hitler transformed into his dictatorship. More importantly, they look forward to finally getting some tangible results from one of the many minilateral formats that have sprung up across the EU.

In France, the inauguration of Donald Tusk’s new government in Poland has caused a resurgence of enthusiasm for the Weimar Triangle. Historically, Paris has perceived the Weimar format as unbalanced, dominated by German–Polish ties at the expense of French-Polish relations. However, France is coming to see this format as a potentially valuable and beneficial complement to the traditional Franco-German “couple,” which is currently going through a rough patch due to differences over the war in Ukraine. France sees Poland as a valuable partner in encouraging Germany to adopt a more aggressive posture in the East.

For Poland, Russia’s war in Ukraine raging and the possibility of a Donald Trump victory in the US presidential election heighten the need for a European security “back-up plan.” Poland shares a border with Ukraine and could be under threat if the war expanded. Warsaw thus has a vested interest in countering “solidarity fatigue” within Germany and France. Hence, it has proposed future “Weimar + Ukraine” meetings.

The revival of the Weimar Triangle has become a flagship project for the Tusk government. After eight years of right-wing rule marked by conflict with the EU and neighbors under the Law and Justice party, the format represents a chance to move away from the troublemaker image. Tusk wants Poland to be seen as a key player in European affairs.

Further, unlike at the outset of the format in the 1990s, Poland is striving to be seen as an equal partner with Germany and France that represents the sentiments of Central and Eastern Europe — although it is disputable whether all countries within that region would agree. Additionally, the Polish press enthusiastically portrays Poland’s role as a between Germany and France.

Moreover, the format is also convenient for ameliorating strained Polish–German relations. On the other hand, the Law and Justice party has circulated unfounded rumors about Donald Tusk being a “” and “,” and so they could use frequent bilateral meetings with Germany against the government.

Coincidentally, Scholz, Macron and Tusk also represent three different factions in the European Parliament. This adds to the possible benefit of the format on a EU level. Coordination between these factions could help to counteract the expected surge of far-right, Eurosceptic parties after the European elections in June. However, it remains to be seen if the Chancellor, the President and the Prime Minister can actually bring added value to their respective factions. Macron may face an uphill battle within Renew Europe, but the European People’s Party, to which Tusk belongs, will likely remain the biggest political group, resulting in a second term for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

How successful can the format be?

Although minilateral formats are indeed many, few operate across the ominous European East–West divide. If they do, they involve smaller actors (e.g., Slavkov Triangle of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria). The Weimar Triangle would be the exception.

The format faces certain headwinds. It lacks institutions and is dependent on personal chemistry between politicians. The next elections could change these dynamics.

Further, cooperation on the side of civil society is sorely lacking. It needs to be intensified, which would require more funding for NGOs and think tanks.

For the Weimar Triangle to evolve into a significant and effective minilateral framework, it cannot remain confined to contacts between leaders and foreign ministers. Secondary-level relationships, like parliamentary exchanges as well as municipal and regional connections, should be developed. Those relationships must be institutionalized, or at least systemized, and assigned a more strategic importance.

Will the Weimar Triangle meet expectations and use its potential to become a new power engine for the EU? The Weimar Triangle could be just what Europe needs at a crucial moment, but nothing is set in stone yet. Like great inventions, successful cooperation formats are often a matter, not only necessity and a good idea, but also of the right timing.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In order to pass the new immigration bill, Macron negotiated with the far-right majority in the French Senate. Shockingly, he agreed with many of the extreme conservative amendments added to the bill by Marine Le Pen’s party, National Rally. Consequently, the immigration bill has passed successfully.

The National Rally began in the 1960s as the militant, racist, fascist National Front created by Marine’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Many of its ideals remain the same. Thus, Macron’s deal with the party has caused a great political upheaval in France. So far, no ruling president has worked with this far-right party. Now, all of a sudden, Macron and the far right have struck an alliance on immigration. Why has the French president switched teams? The answer lies in the concentration of power in Élysée Palace — the French president’s official residence —and Macron’s narcissistic opportunism.

French elections are not like American ones

Every five years, France goes to the polls and elects presidents and legislators. Earlier the presidential term was seven years. This allowed for a midterm legislative election and often led to cohabitation. This term referred to the phenomenon in which the president and the prime minister, who enjoyed a legislative majority, belonged to opposing parties. This curtailed the power of even charismatic presidents like François Mitterand and Jacques Chirac.

Cohabitation often led to gridlock, so the French now have five-year terms for both the president and the legislators. This constitutional change has concentrated further power in the hands of the president.

In 2022, Emmanuel Macron was reelected, defeating Marine Le Pen. Despite her attempts to clean up National Rally’s appearance, Marine is really just about as far-right as her father Jean-Marie. The French held their noses and voted for Macron, but the vast majority did not want him to have the extensive powers of the presidency. For the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic, which Charles de Gaulle founded in 1958, the president did not win a majority in the French national legislature.

Macron has tricked the French people

Macron and Le Pen squaring off in the last election demonstrated, the traditionally dominant parties of the center-right and the left have lost credibility. Macron replaced the socialists while Le Pen has defenestrated the Gaullists. Of course, Macron came to power first. He gave France the illusion that he was moderate, centrist and willing to listen to the public.

Once in office, it became clear Macron did not have the public’s interest in mind. He fell in popularity after revealing his pro-business, free-enterprise model for the government. Furthermore, Macron’s narcissistic personality began to reveal itself. His narcissisme pervers showed right from the start when he named his own political party — En Marche — curiously with the same abbreviation as his initials.

Extremely narcissistic personalities are often attracted to high office. Patrick Weil’s biography The Madman in the White House captured the increasing narcissism of US President Woodrow Wilson. In his latter days in the White House, Wilson refused to be confined by the constitutional constraints of his office. Weil concludes that excessive power distorts a person’s ability to govern democratically and correctly.

Today, France is in crisis because of an extreme concentration of power in the hands of the president. Like Wilson a century ago, Macron does not want to be confined in his exercise of power. This former minister in a socialist government has now done a deal with the far-right to push through a draconian immigration bill, breaking all political precedent in the Fifth Republic.

The Fifth Republic is not defective

Some, including 51�Թ�’s Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh, argue that the Fifth Republic is dysfunctional. The president just has far too much power, and France today cannot be governed by a republic that Gaulle built in his image. The far right is now rising because the Fifth Republic is failing.

Weil does not think so. He believes that the French constitution does not need further change. The problems in France stem from narcissistic personalities who have become presidents and abused the power of the presidential office.

Related Reading

The World This Week: Another French Revolution

The solution for France is not a sixth republic but a return to the original text of the constitution of the Fifth Republic. Voters have to vote not for narcissists like Macron or Le Pen but for candidates who respect both the spirit and the letter of the constitution.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: France in Crisis: Macron Now in Bed With Far-Right appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Three distinct structures that are emblematic of the UAE’s approach: the (India, Israel, the UAE and the US), the (Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, the UAE and the US) and trilateral cooperation between the UAE, India and France. These platforms are not just for discussions; they are carefully designed to enhance the UAE’s diplomatic and economic influence. Through these efforts, the country demonstrates its belief that minilateralism can effectively achieve diplomatic and strategic goals.

What is minilateralism?

Traditional multilateralism strives to achieve unanimous agreement among a wide array of countries, a process that often moves slowly. It aims to promote global unity through comprehensive agreements involving a wide range of stakeholders. It emphasizes broad inclusivity and consensus.

Minilateralism, on the other hand, is characterized by its deftness and efficiency. It takes a more streamlined approach by bringing together a select group of countries with shared interests to address specific challenges. This method allows for quicker, more targeted and adaptable responses to global issues. It also promotes deeper cooperation among countries with aligned strategic goals.

This speed is vital in today’s multipolarity world, where global power is spread across various centers of influence. In such a landscape, the ability to form effective partnerships within a smaller, more manageable group is essential for success. Nations that collaborate through minilateralism can better navigate the complex interplay of international relations and collectively exert more influence on global affairs.

Strategic implications and global leadership

The UAE’s involvement in minilateral initiatives aligns with its broader geopolitical goals. The country enhances its influence and shapes international discussion by holding strategic dialogues, trade agreements and collaborations on issues like climate change and health crises. These efforts highlight the UAE’s capacity for leadership and in global diplomacy. The country’s foreign policy must contend with volatile issues of and ; it must be able to make quick decisions and cannot allow a vast group of actors to slow it down.

Despite its benefits, concerns persist that minilateralism might overlook important perspectives and lead to a fragmented global governance structure. Nonetheless, the UAE’s adept handling of these criticisms reflects its commitment to a balanced, inclusive approach to international relations. By combining minilateral and multilateral strategies, the country its versatility and innovation on the world stage.

Minilateral ventures

The I2U2 Group and the Negev Forum showcase the UAE’s strategic vision and commitment to practical collaboration. These platforms enable the country to work with major global and regional powers, utilizing each country’s strengths and resources. Such play a crucial role in improving regional security, fostering economic growth and addressing common challenges with creative approaches.

Additionally, the trilateral cooperation between the UAE, India and France underscores the UAE’s ambition to be a key player in both regional and international affairs. This initiative, which focuses on areas such as maritime security, climate change and renewable energy, highlights the country’s strategic positioning. It also showcases its capacity to form alliances with major powers from different continents.

These engagements diversify the UAE’s foreign policy tools and show its adaptability and forward-thinking approach. This strategy leads to more efficient and impactful outcomes, elevating the UAE’s reputation as a proactive, innovative and cooperative state.

The UAE’s minilateral initiatives indicate its strategic balancing in international relations, engaging with diverse states to navigate global uncertainties. This approach highlights the country’s ambition to influence the geopolitical landscape through dynamic minilateralism.

The country’s shift towards minilateralism represents a significant evolution in diplomacy, emphasizing strategic flexibility and pragmatic cooperation. The UAE is a trailblazer. It has set a precedent for navigating contemporary international relations and shaped a new diplomatic paradigm for the 21st century.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Macron’s basic preùise is that “we mustn’t let Russia win.” Should we understand that as the expression of an ideal to inspire hope or as a categorical imperative, that must be accomplished at all costs? And what does he mean? Who is the “we”? France, NATO, Europe, Macron’s government or all morally decent people? He can’t count on Pope Francis, who recently called for Ukraine to summon the “courage to raise the white flag.”

And what does he mean by not letting “Russia win?” Would retaining conquered territory and formalizing Ukraine’s neutrality be considered a “win” for Russia? Macron’s tone appears to signify that he not only wants to prevent Russia’s victory, but to inflict on it the humiliation he insisted, two years ago, must be avoided.

When in February, in the presence of 27 European leaders, he first suggested sending troops to Ukraine, Macron may have assumed no one would take his grandstanding seriously. Unfortunately, both his NATO allies and critics at home took notice and excoriated him for overreaching.

To deflect criticism, Macron cleverly confessed to practicing “strategic ambiguity.” No one should doubt Macron’s taste for ambiguity, but if he had any real sense of strategy he would have understood that the starting point for strategic thinking must be reality rather than the fantasy of French bravery galloping in on a shining steed to miraculously turn the tide. Most experts, even in his own military, are convinced Ukraine simply cannot defeat Russia.

In the interview, Macron offered this curious conditional statement: “If the situation were to deteriorate, we must be ready and we will be ready.” (Si la situation devait se dégrader, nous devons être prêts et nous serons prêts.)

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Situation:

Circumstances that, because they are beyond one’s control, may be invoked in provocative ways to create the illusion that one is capable of control.

Contextual note

Macron’s conditional assertion must be deemed odd, if only because every knowledgeable person about the state of play in Ukraine recognizes see the situation as already deteriorating. This is not a matter of speculation.

Monsieur le Président appears to be saying we must act now. But France cannot act alone. He has even labeled his allies cowards. Perhaps Macron sees himself in the role of NATO’s Jeanne d’Arc before the battle of Orléans, the heroic champion who mounts his horse and sallies forth to inspire courage in the faltering king’s forces, forcing the English – in this case the Russians – to flee.

To play such a role, serious drama is required. Macron describes the war in Ukraine as “existential for our Europe and for France” (“existentielle pour notre Europe et pour la France). The interesting word here is “notre.” What can he possibly mean by “our Europe?” Does he believe there are multiple Europes? Is Russia a different Europe?

More likely, “our” points to a class of people or an ideology within Europe. Macron has never made a secret of his own ideology and class, which is composed of ENA graduates, Rothschild bankers, hauts fonctionnaires (senior bureaucrats) and McKinsey consultants. Macron himself was a Rothschild banker. He notoriously paid McKinsey handsomely to play a significant role in guiding his policies of governance. The Europe of bankers, consultants and private think tanks is real. From the beginning of his career, Macron was groomed inside it and for it. The  Europe he calls “our Europe” is indeed facing an existential threat.

That class of professionals, largely shielded from direct contact with the people of Europe’s disparate nations, has governed and managed the European Union for decades. It’s the Europe of banks, multinationals, consultants, lawyers and an army of senior bureaucrats who comfortably make decisions and spend money within the very real and well-defended security of institutions that were designed to stand above the plebian masses with no accountability to the people. Though regularly challenged by multiple parties and movements, the self-satisfied, arrogant technocracy that reigns in Brussels and depends on US-led NATO for its security, is the “existing” Europe that Macron perceives as being existentially threatened.

Those in Europe who challenge an invisible hierarchy of financial and political interests tied by an umbilical cord to its protector, NATO (the US military-industrial complex), fall into three categories: nationalistic populists on the right, anti-capitalist parties on the left and a wide range of sometimes prestigious but largely marginalized intellectuals and independent thinkers. Prominent among them are personalities with historical connections to politics but no longer tied to established parties, such as Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s former finance minister and Dominique de Villepin, former French prime minister. They, and the people of the European community, in the full ideological diversity, appear to belong to something other than Macron’s “notre Europe.”

Historical note

France did have its moment of very real influence during the Cold War. It even had several moments, despite its obvious weakness regarding the two competing superpowers. In 1966, De Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command structure. De Gaulle believed that France should not be bound by decisions made by other NATO members, particularly the United States.

Similarly, under his leadership, France insisted on developing its own nuclear deterrent, including the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons. The French nuclear program aimed to ensure that France could defend itself independently, without relying on other nuclear powers.

Perhaps even more significantly in February 1965, de Gaulle announced France’s intention to exchange its U.S. dollar reserves for gold at the official exchange rate, effectively calling what had become the post Bretton Woods bluff. The general dared to call the dollar the “exorbitant privilege” that allowed the US to hold the world hostage to a currency everyone had to have and hold, meaning the US was free to print the money that allowed it to wage wars and conduct covert operations across the globe.

At a time when the US had become comfortable with the idea that a divided Europe was a good thing, even if it meant allowing the Soviet Union to pull strings in the east, De Gaulle advocated for a united Europe that could assert its interests on the global stage. He dared to evoke a Europe stretching “from the Atlantic to the Urals.” Though some in the US and Europe categorized the general as an impertinent nationalist, his thinking was consistently regional. As Henri Guaino, a close collaborator of President Nicolas Sarkozy, recently, De Gaulle “wanted sovereignty for France and independence for Europe.”

Guaino, and former prime minister Dominique de Villepin under President Jacques Chriac, are two prominent voices today who, not content to critique Macron’s bellicose foreign policy, argue strongly in favor of diplomacy rather than intransigent confrontation as the means of resolving conflict. Both invoke the Gaullist tradition.

De Gaulle left office in 1969 and died a year later. The irony of history is that today, six decades on, NATO is not only threatened existentially by its failure to master events in Ukraine but the almighty dollar also appears to be losing its exorbitant privilege as multiple forces line up to weaken its dominance.

No one can predict how the two current wars – in Ukraine and Gaza – will end or drag on. But the brightest minds understand that the Western “rules-based” and dollar-based order has lost a significant measure of its prestige. France’s politics, much like the US, have achieved a level of astoning incoherence. My prediction for France is that De Gaulle’s heritage will be felt again, not in a spirit of Make France Great Again, but by permitting to rethink France’s fundamental “existential” relationships across in Europe and elsewhere. An unpredictable multipolar world is emerging and France, but not Macron, will have something to contribute to it. 

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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“‘The present king of France is bald’ is a perfectly good sentence and could actually be used appropriately. Why must we worry, as Bertrand Russell did, that it may or may not be true?”

“The statement “the present king of France is bald” has been a subject of philosophical discussion and logical analysis, often associated with the work of Bertrand Russell. The concern arises from the fact that, according to traditional logic, a proposition is typically considered either true or false based on the state of affairs in the world.

In the case of the statement about the present king of France, there are a few reasons for concern:

1. **Existential Quantification:**

   – Traditional logic often assumes that for a statement to be true, there must be an existing referent. In the case of the present king of France, if there is no present king of France, the statement lacks a referent, and traditional logic may find it problematic.

2. **Ambiguity and Reference:**

   – The statement assumes the existence of a present king of France, but without one, the reference is ambiguous or non-existent. Traditional logical systems may struggle with statements that lack clear reference or where the reference is undefined.

3. **Truth-Value and Vacuous Truth:**

   – In classical logic, a proposition with an empty or undefined reference is often considered false. However, some philosophers have explored the idea of “vacuous truth,” suggesting that certain statements lacking reference can be considered true by default.

Bertrand Russell, in his work on logical analysis, highlighted these issues to illustrate challenges in traditional logical frameworks and the need for precision in language and logical reasoning. The concern is not about the sentence itself being inappropriate but rather about the potential challenges it poses within traditional logical systems that rely on clear reference and the existence of entities for truth-value determination.

Modern discussions in philosophy of language and logic have expanded upon these ideas, exploring alternative logical frameworks and semantic theories that can better handle statements with non-existent or ambiguous reference. These discussions contribute to the ongoing refinement of logical and linguistic theories.”

It occurred to me that the assumption that there may be no valid referent could be wrong. I wondered whether that would impact the discussion. So I offered this idea.

Context is king 

“Isn’t this a problem of context rather than of propositional language? Imagine I’m producing a play. The king of France is a character in the play. The actor now playing him happens to be bald, I might say this sentence to someone and it would be absolutely true because in my production the actor doesn’t have to be the king of France to be called the king of France. So, in one context the sentence is false, but in another it is true and contains real information.

The problem appears to lie in our state of knowledge about the context. To use a different type of example, consider the much bandied about today that “Putin thinks of himself as a tsar.” Unlike the king of France, Putin exists. But we don’t know what he thinks. So, the statement is not false, but it cannot be shown to be true. Even if Putin had actually said, “I think of myself as a tsar,” he could be lying!

Where do these paradoxes leave us, especially with regard to news media who actually do say things like “Putin likens himself to a tsar”?

“You’ve highlighted a crucial aspect of language and truth in different contexts. The issues you bring up underscore the importance of considering context and the pragmatic aspects of language use, especially in areas where the meaning of statements might be influenced by context, intention, or interpretation.

**1. Context Dependency:**

   – As you rightly pointed out, the truth or appropriateness of a statement like “the present king of France is bald” can depend on the context. In a theatrical context where the character is identified as the king of France, the statement may be perfectly valid and true within the fictional framework of the play.

**2. Subjectivity and Interpretation:**

   – Statements about personal beliefs or thoughts, such as “Putin thinks of himself as a tsar,” are inherently subjective and difficult to verify objectively. They might express an interpretation, opinion, or even a metaphorical idea rather than a straightforward factual claim.

**3. Challenges in News Media:**

   – News media often grapple with similar challenges when reporting on subjective matters, opinions, or interpretations. Phrases like “Putin thinks of himself as a tsar” may convey a perspective or analysis rather than a verifiable fact. It’s crucial for the audience to be aware of the context and framing of such statements.

**4. Epistemic Limitations:**

   – Epistemic issues, such as the difficulty in knowing someone else’s thoughts or intentions, contribute to the challenges in assessing the truth or falsity of certain statements. In cases like this, statements may be neither definitively true nor false due to inherent uncertainties.

**5. Language and Pragmatics:**

   – Pragmatic considerations, such as the speaker’s intention, the context of communication, and the expectations of the audience, play a significant role in understanding the meaning of statements. Pragmatics helps navigate the complexities of language beyond literal interpretation.

This was helpful but one small detail in this response clearly surprised me.

AI’s propensity to make wrong assumptions

“Thank you, but I’m surprised that you misunderstood my example of the bald actor. You explained that it could be ‘true within the fictional framework of the play.’ My point was that it was true in real life. I clearly stated that it was the actual actor playing the role who is bald, not the fictional character. I’m curious to know why you didn’t catch that distinction.”

“I appreciate the clarification, and I apologize for any misunderstanding in my response. It seems I misinterpreted your example, and I appreciate your patience. If the statement refers to the actor playing the role of the king of France being bald in real life, then indeed, the truth of the statement is not dependent on a fictional context but rather on the real-world characteristics of the actor.

Your example underscores the importance of precision in language and the potential for misinterpretation. I’m grateful for your clarification, and I hope this response addresses your intended meaning more accurately.”

“Thank you. I definitely agree with your insistence that ‘media literacy becomes crucial for the audience to critically assess the framing.’ But that raises a new question. We know that media organizations have every reason to calculate and craft their reporting in ways designed to please both their audience and sponsors. We also know that our schools – presumably for fear of being accused of dabbling in politics –  avoid teaching that basic economic, social and cultural reality. How in such circumstances can we expect that widespread media literacy can be promoted and achieved in our consumer society?”

Instead of stepping up to my challenge about how information is manipulated in our society, ChatGPT typically provided the equivalent of a “to-do list” after simply admitting that the principles at work in the consumer society pose “significant challenges.” Here are the items on the list. I’ve deleted ChatGPT’s detailed explanations:

1. **Media Literacy Education:**

2. **Public Awareness Campaigns:**

3. **Independent Fact-Checking Organizations:**

4. **Civic Engagement:**

5. **Technology Tools for Verification:**

6. **Critical Thinking Initiatives:**

7. **Community Workshops and Discussions:**

8. **Encouraging Diverse Media Consumption:**

Meaning depends on sustained dialogue 

This all seems rational and admirable, but my question was specifically about how the consumer society erects obstacles to all these wonderful initiatives. Just as ChatGPT “simplified” and thereby distorted the meaning of my question about a bald actor playing the role of the king of France, in this case it simplified and distorted my question. I attempted to engage it in a serious debate about the difficulty of applying solutions to an acknowledged problem.  Instead, ChatGPT offered me a recommended list of solutions.

As we worry about the effect AI may have on our lives, we should think carefully about this highly visible tendency of AI to simplify, superficialize and ultimately distort the meaning of the questions we ask it. I don’t deny that a lot of humans, especially politicians, do precisely that. But they have self-interested motives for cheating and obscuring the truth. We expect AI to be pure in its motives.

Cultivating a critical, probing dialogue with AI might and calling it out when it superficializes and distorts is the best recommendation I would make. And I would address specifically it to our educational authorities.

As a human with an experience of the complexity of psychological motivation and institutional logic, I understnd how naïve it would be to assume our educational authorities might be interested. It’s equally clear that politicians and media are unlikely to heed my recommendation. Knowing they won’t, I can hardly expect AI to do so, since somewhere in its depths it appears to be programmed to reflect their logic.

*[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51�Թ�, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Over the past 60 years, France has used every possible diplomatic device, overt and covert, fair and foul, to incorporate some 14 African nations into a neocolonial imperium called “�������ç���ڰ�����ܱ�” — a vast region covering a quarter of Africa and stretching for nearly 3,000 miles from Senegal on the Atlantic coast to Chad in the continent’s center.

While the rest of that continent frequently suffered from wars, coups, and chronic instability, �������ç���ڰ�����ܱ� long enjoyed comparative peace. By dispatching paratroopers from its many African bases (or secret agents for the occasional assassination), Paris provided a rough version of stability — even if at the price of endemic corruption, entrenched autocratic rule, and deep economic exploitation. Recently, however, a rising nationalist consciousness in many of those relatively new countries has begun chafing against France’s repeated transgressions of their sovereignty. As French colonial and post-colonial dominance over this vast region moved ever deeper into its second century, unease bordering on open hostility against that country’s presence began to build.

The Dramatic French Retreat from �������ç���ڰ�����ܱ� 

In less than a year, in fact, the sudden withdrawal of French troops from individual African nations has turned into a full-blown retreat from much of the region. As terrorists affiliated with the Islamic State first became active in 2014, France deployed some 5,000 elite troops for Operation Barkhane in collaboration with six nations of Africa’s arid Sahel region, the strip of territory extending across the continent, largely south of the Sahara Desert.

Yet just last December, French troops left the Central African Republic after Paris that the local government there was “complicit in an anti-French campaign allegedly steered by Russia.” In February, Burkina Faso’s new military government simply French forces and hailed its new “strategic partnership” with Russia. And in August, following back-to-back coups in Mali, that country’s ruling junta grew resentful of the 2,400 French troops stationed there and forced them to into neighboring Niger, which became the new main base for their operations in the Sahel region. Then, last month, French President Emmanuel Macron was forced to announce that he was pulling his troops and his ambassador out of Niger as well. After seizing power in July, that country’s new military junta had demanded just such a French departure and, to drive the point home, closed its airspace to France. “Imperialist and neocolonialist forces are no longer welcome on our national territory,” the junta .

Amid such geopolitical upheaval, a most unlikely man from Moscow appeared on the spot in 2017. His name — now all too well known — was Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder and commander of a notorious mercenary army, the Wagner Group. As the French retreated slowly and exceedingly reluctantly from their post-colonial imperium, Wagner began moving in, becoming Moscow’s surrogate in an ongoing great-power contest for influence and control in Africa.

By the time in late 2022 that France’s failing nine-year effort to secure the Sahel was drawing down, Wagner’s forces were already operating secret gold , running the largest gold mine in the Central African Republic with of $100 million annually, and had earned $200 million since 2021 providing security for Mali, a land roiled by Islamist rebels. In March, Washington Chad’s president that Wagner mercenaries were plotting to assassinate him and were also preparing Chadian rebels to attack from their bases in the Central African Republic. After the July coup in Niger, cheering crowds were seen (as well as wearing) Russian flags. And as 1,500 French troops and that country’s ambassador , Niger’s new military leaders promptly for support, expanding Russia’s sphere of influence in the French imperium it was fast supplanting.

The strategic implications of this shift, should it continue, are potentially profound. As the NATO alliance moved ever closer to Russia’s sensitive western border in the 1990s, Moscow reacted early in this century (prior to the invasion of 2022) with repeated interventions in Ukraine, launched special operations to secure its allies in Central Asia, and, above all, engaged in a little understood geopolitical flanking maneuver across two continents.

The thrust of that move started in 2015 when Moscow leapfrogged over the NATO barrier of Turkey to open a at Latakia in northern Syria. Soon, Russian planes had reduced rebel-held cities like to rubble. In 2021, leapfrogging again, this time over the close American ally Israel, Russia began with two dozen of its advanced Sukhoi-35 jet fighters so its airmen could compete with Israelis flying advanced American F-35 fighter planes, which Washington refused to supply to Cairo. Completing Moscow’s southern push in the region, Russian President Vladimir Putin began building upon their shared interests as oil exporters to try to Saudi Arabia’s functional leader, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, becoming so close by late last year that Western observers began to express concern about the possible loss of a key ally.

The final geopolitical pivot in Russia’s recent maneuvering proved particularly controversial and so initially remained significantly covert: the Wagner Group was used to extend Russia’s influence country by country, deal by dirty deal, across the Sahel. Should this process continue successfully into the near future, Moscow will have flanked Europe (and so the U.S. as well) by forming a geopolitical arc of influence sweeping south through the Middle East and extending west across the whole of the Sahel that stretches from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean.

For this maneuver to succeed, however, the end of French neocolonialism proved crucial. To appreciate the historical significance of the impending fall of Paris’s post-colonial empire, it’s important to understand something of its tangled history — otherwise it would be hard to grasp the full import of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s extraordinary role as the man on the spot in extending Russia’s influence into Africa for the first time since the Cold War.

The Hidden History of �������ç���ڰ�����ܱ�

As the bitter, bloody French colonial war in Algeria was winding down to defeat in 1960, President Charles de Gaulle realized that the age of empire was ending and used his enormous prestige to grant independence to 14 West African nations. Yet his move was far from altruistic. As part of his vision of France as an independent global power, he began working to create a post-colonial sphere of influence by subsuming the new nations into an exclusive French zone called �������ç���ڰ�����ܱ�.  

While de Gaulle’s visionary rhetoric inspired an independent foreign policy, his “man of the shadows,” presidential adviser Jacques Foccart, a full-scale covert apparatus for a post-colonial imperium that became the dark underside of the grand Gaullist state. During his service under Gaullist governments from 1960 to 1997, the shadowy Foccart used the state’s clandestine agency, Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage, to maintain a deft, delicate synergy between metropolitan power in France and covert control of Francophone Africa. As head of de Gaulle’s political party and architect of its secret services, he would become between the French executive and �������ç���ڰ�����ܱ�’s African leaders, whom he personally selected, befriended, and defended with covert action.   

At the moment of independence in 1960, Foccart bound all of those former colonies (except Guinea) to Paris by defense agreements that granted France military bases and the right of armed intervention in each country. In the process, he also developed treaties meant to secure strategic materials (cobalt, copper, oil, and uranium) from those countries, as well as a common currency pegged to the French franc that would ensure control of their economies.   

Under this postcolonial iteration of informal empire, French troops shuttled in and out of West Africa, conducting more than 40 military interventions between 1960 and 2002, while maintaining a at a half-dozen military bases on the continent. Although the rest of Africa suffered 188 coup attempts from 1956 to 2001, the readiness of the French military to quash any such effort provided �������ç���ڰ�����ܱ� with what political scientist Crawford Young an “effective inoculation against conspiracies” and so minimized and even controlled coups. Despite vivid personality cults, systemic corruption, and state terror, French complicity in all of the above assured its African allies of an extraordinary political longevity — exemplified by Omar Bongo who ruled Gabon for more than four decades.

With its lucrative oil concessions and its full integration into Foccart’s network, the exemplary state in �������ç���ڰ�����ܱ� was undoubtedly Gabon — an unbearably poor country of 500,000 people that was surprisingly rich in natural resources. Three years after independence in 1960, as the country’s president lay dying of cancer in a Paris hospital, Foccart picked , a veteran of French intelligence with no political base, as the ailing president’s running mate in the next election. That ticket then captured 99.5% of the vote, assuring that Bongo, though still just 31 years old, would succeed the president at his death six months later.   

As Gabon’s political opposition revived in 1971, Foccart’s office dispatched the infamous mercenary Bob Denard as a “technical adviser” to President Bongo. Not surprisingly, when an influential opposition leader arrived home one night from the movies, an from the shadows and killed him, also wounding his wife and child. His body was never recovered.

During the long years of his rule, French officials enabled , making him a principal shareholder in that country’s lucrative Elf-Total oil company and facilitating illicit payments to him — estimated at $111 million a year — that were only exposed at the 2003 corruption trial of the company’s chief executive.   

When he died in 2009 after a rule of 42 years, London’s The Telegraph that he had looted revenues from the nation’s 2.5 billion barrel oil reserve to “become one of the world’s richest men,” while elevating “corruption to a method of government.” His son Ali-Ben Bongo succeeded him as president, inheriting, along with his siblings, in France worth $190 million and a country with a third of its population living on two dollars a day.

The son continued many of his father’s policies, including ruthlessly rigging the 2016 election by enforcing a in key districts. In August, however, after one too many rigged elections and amid an eruption of coups across the region that marked the fading of France’s post-colonial power, Ali Bongo was finally toppled by a , ending a dynasty that had lasted nearly six decades.

Advent of Moscow’s Africa Man

To challenge that French post-colonial imperium built by cunning, corruption, and covert skullduggery, Moscow needed an operative who could match Jacques Foccart’s legendary mastery of the dirty business of empire, measure for measure. And it found him in the person of Yevgeny Prigozhin, one of those quixotic, improbable adventurers who, over the past two centuries, have served as the vanguards of new forms of empire.   

Who was that extraordinary individual whose personal initiative shook up the world order in Africa, establishing a Russian mercenary troop presence and ties to governments in at least seven African countries? Emerging from Soviet prisons after a 10-year term for a teenage mugging spree, Prigozhin rose, through Vladimir Putin’s patronage, from a hot-dog vendor on the streets of St. Petersburg to a for Russian schools and troops.

In 2014, his Wagner group of mercenaries as the shadowy “little green men” during the Russian seizure of Crimea and then moved on to where they engaged in a war of atrocities. Between conflicts, his fired off disinformation barrages meant to influence the 2016 presidential elections in the United States. As French influence in the Sahel was challenged by terrorist groups, Prigozhin inserted his Wagner mercenaries being opened by the ending of Paris’ post-colonial empire and turned those cracks into gaping holes.

When in 2022, as the first year of the Ukraine war was ending with Russian troops suffering demoralizing defeats at Kharkiv and Kherson, Prigozhin expanded his Wagner Syrian and African franchises to Ukraine, fielding some as troops for Putin’s military, a force that took heavy casualties while winning the battle for the devastated Ukrainian city of Bakhmut. Instead of celebrating his victory, Progozhin was growing ever more dissatisfied with Russia’s military chiefs.

“These are Wagner lads who died today,” he while pointing at a pile of corpses. “Those bastards who don’t give us ammunition, we will fucking eat their guts in fucking hell!” Within weeks his war of words had escalated into open conflict in Russia itself. In late June, Wagner’s troops to Moscow — smashing through barriers, shooting down Russian aircraft, and raising doubts about Vladimir Putin’s grip on power.  

Flailing desperately to survive after defying Putin and halting the advance of his troops on Moscow, Prigozhin returned to Africa, in his private jet at Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic where his Wagner Group has gold mines and a security contract. After a private meeting with that country’s president on August 18th, he flew on to Mali and drove out into the desert where he produced what would turn out to be his last video ever. Holding an assault rifle, he : “The Wagner PMC [private military company] makes Russia even greater on all continents, and Africa more free.” Five days later, his private jet on a flight from Moscow, killing Prigozhin and everyone else on board.

Even though Prigozhin was (like so many of ), his extraordinary relationship with Africa highlights an overlooked aspect of modern empires in what still passes for the post-imperial age. Despite the oft-cited role of military power in creating and maintaining them, individuals have often emerged from the covert realm to play surprisingly significant parts in the making of the post-modern version of empire.

Instead of the gentlemen adventurers of the British imperial age, our modern analogues are usually, like Prigozhin, covert operatives, often from anything but gentlemanly backgrounds. And count on one thing: as the struggle to shape and control northern Africa continues through what will undoubtedly be countless new chapters, Prigozhin will not be the last of those extraordinary secret agents, those men on the spot, who leave their fingerprints on the crime scenes of world history.

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It’s the sixth time that the Central European nation has grabbed the top spot in the eight years the rankings have been around, including last year.

“Switzerland has been a perennial and a winner in this particular assessment,” Wharton marketing professor , who helped create the rankings, told Wharton Business Daily. “They are economically stable, they’ve got great education, and it’s one of the top countries people say they would like to live in.”

Canada comes in as a close second, moving up from third place last year. Sweden, Australia and the United States round out the top five, respectively. Despite the high marks of these countries, it’s hard to beat Switzerland, which also landed perfect scores for being “open for business” and offering “a comfortable retirement.”

“Switzerland is very high in terms of quality of life and entrepreneurship. It’s just a really stable and safe country,” Reibstein said.

The professor produces the rankings in partnership with U.S. News & World Report and WPP, a global marketing and communications services company. The 2023 list measures perceptions about 87 nations chosen because they contribute most to the world’s GDP. More than 17,000 people around the world were asked to evaluate the countries based on 73 attributes ranging from political stability to racial equity to health consciousness. One third of the survey respondents were business leaders, one third were college-educated individuals who were middle class or higher and one-third were from the general population.

More than just interesting trivia, the list has become a sort of competition for many countries because it relies on scientific data analysis. Reibstein said he’s frequently contacted by country representatives who ask what their nations can do to improve their overall rank.

“This has an impact on tourism, on foreign direct investment and on foreign trade,” said Reibstein. “Those are the three major components of the GDP of a country, and these factors are indicative of how much people are willing to visit a country or how much they are willing to do business with a country.”

The nations of North America

The United States dropped from fourth to fifth place this year and has been hovering around the same spot since the rankings began in 2016. The exception was its of eighth place in 2018. Reibstein attributed that slide to fallout from the contentious presidential election of Donald Trump, which changed global perceptions about the US.

This year, the US hit the highest marks for agility, entrepreneurship and power, but it ranked 23rd for quality of life and a shockingly low 59th for being open for business. “That’s primarily based on the cost of labor,” Reibstein said. “People don’t want to move their manufacturing to the United States because the cost of labor is really high.”

Canada fared much better on those sub-rankings and achieved an overall score of 99.3, which is very close to Switzerland’s perfect 100. “Canada is No. 2 for totally different reasons than the United States,” Reibstein said. “They’re perceived to have a great quality of life and also a very strong social purpose. Even though the countries are right next to each other and located in North America, they are perceived as very, very different, and what they bring to the table is obviously very different.”

Mexico ranked 33rd overall, the same as last year. While it received high numbers for adventure, heritage and cultural influence, it fared poorly along business rankings.

France, Germany and the UK

Reibstein noted two European nations that have been struggling to climb up the list: the and .

The UK ranked third when the list premiered, and it has steadily gone down. It’s No. 9 this year. Reibstein pinpointed the likely cause as the turmoil around Brexit and political leadership. The country is on its fourth prime minister, Rishi Sunak, in eight years.

France has fallen out of the top 10 for the first time. It landed this year at No. 12, behind . “France has really taken a dive downward,” Reibstein said. “Some of that is because of all the [political] strife that’s been happening in the country and terrorist acts that have happened there over the years.”

FO° Exclusive: Make Sense of the Hellish Rioting in France

The professor also noted which was No. 1 when the rankings premiered and has bounced around the top 10 since then. “Some of that has been changing leadership, some of that has been taking in [immigrants],” he said. “They’re down right now at No. 7, which is the lowest they have been in the eight years of the study.”

China’s power

slipped from No. 17 last year to No. 20 this year, but it ranked second behind the US in power, a reflection of its strong political and economic influence in the world.

“There’s probably no country for which there is greater divergence of perceptions than China,” Reibstein said. “There are some people that totally admire China, some that detest some of the practices of China and almost universally there’s fear of China. Part of that fear is the power that they have.”

FO° Exclusive: Distressed China Plays Nice With US for Now

But China’s massive economy is , with capital investments generating more debt than growth and a slump in the property sector. “I’m really interested to see what happens in next year’s rankings, when we see some of the downturn in the economy and how that affects things,” he said.

India Is a “Rising Star”

is inching up slowly, from No. 31 last year to No. 30 this year. Even though it hasn’t cracked the top 10, Reibstein said he’s keeping an eye on the country. India doesn’t score well on social purpose, but it ranked fifth as a mover.

“People believe India is a country to invest in, and a country they believe is going to be a rising star,” he said. “If you want to bet on development in any country, India is the one that a lot of people put their money behind.”

India Is Growing Confident in Its New Role as a Powerful Nation

The top 10 were, in order, , , , , the , , , , the and the

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Meloni’s choice of Mattei was no accident. Many Italians, including Meloni, view North Africa as the natural place for Italy to extend its influence on the African continent. Meloni, however, is seeking to shun the legacy of colonialism in Africa. She has been of France, in particular, for pursuing policies in the continent that she characterizes as “neocolonial.”

The prime minister is attempting to open a new chapter for cross-Mediterranean relations, rejecting predatory impulses towards Africa and instead emulating Mattei, who built an alternative model based on cooperation between North Africa and Southern Europe. During the Cold War, Mattei helped to promote peace and stability between Algeria and Europe; Meloni hopes to repeat the feat.

Italians remember that in those decades, after their own experience of devastating war, it was the stability of energy supplies made the rebuilding of Italian industry possible. At the same time, they remember that the influx of Italian cash likewise helped North African countries win their own struggle for independence and establish stability afterwards.

Now, like then, Italy needs energy. Without Russia fueling its heavily gas-dependant grid, Italy must look for alternative solutions. North Africa is an obvious choice; in the first half of 2022, Algeria became Italy’s gas supplier, ousting Russia. Meloni’s visit was one of the first steps to establishing a more solid Italy–Algeria relationship.

Consequently, Meloni has launched the “,” which enlists Italian companies such as Eni, Enel, Snam and Terna to do the work of integrating with Algerian partners. Meloni hopes to transform Italy into an oil and gas hub, completely abandon Russian gas and replace it with both natural gas from Africa as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from sources like the United States..

How is Italy managing this era of scarcity?

Italy to phase 80% of Russian gas out by 2023 and 100% by 2024 or 2025, at the latest.

in his luminary Nuclear Commerce, Anis H. Bajrektarevic noted that “in an ever evolving and expanding world, there is a constant quest for both more energy and less external energy dependency. With the fossil fuels bound industry setting an alarming trend of negative ecological footprint, there is a clear and urgent must to predict and instruct on alternatives.” 

And indeed, after the Russian intervention in Ukraine, Europe and Italy had to change strategies. They imports of LNG by over 60% in 2022. Because of this, demand for LNG has reached colossal proportions, and prices are projected to remain steadily elevated in the coming years.

LNG needs to be processed back into a gaseous state in order to be used. Italy, which has not traditionally used a large amount of LNG, needs to build the infrastructure to make this possible. in In addition to the few preexisting regasification facilities Panigaglia, Livorno and Rovigo, new plants are being constructed. Snam has built one in with a total processing capacity of 5 billion cubic meters per year, equal to 7% of Italy’s requirements. It plans to open another in Ravenna in the third quarter of 2024. The Italian strategy is undoubtedly on track. These two LNG terminals will increase the country’s energetic flexibility.

After the cut in Russian natural gas supplies, Italy can count on supplies from Azerbaijan via Turkey thanks to the Trans-Adriatic pipeline. Azerbaijan currently supplies about 10% of Italy’s needs and could supply up to . And Italy can rely on Transmed, better known as the “Mattei pipeline,” too, which already connects Algeria to Italy and has a capacity of around cubic meters of gas.

Eni and Enel in Africa

Eni and Enel are both formerly public companies. After privatization, they continue to work closely with the Italian state. They have always guaranteed strategic continuity in relations with African countries and are the key to giving substance to the Mattei Plan.”

Eni has been present in since the mid-1950s and has projects in as many as 14 countries. It is a key player in the diversification of gas supplies, first and foremost thanks to its long-time relationship with Algeria’s Sonatrach.

But it’s not just Algeria. Another country Eni has an established relationship with is , where Eni has been present since 1954 through its subsidiary, Ieoc. In 2022, Eni produced almost of the gas produced in Egypt. From its plant in Damietta, it exports much of that gas — in the form of LNG — to Europe. Eni and Egypt are working together to exploit deposits in new areas such as the Nile Delta. Eni has also promoted new investments and projects intending to diversify gas source countries. A significant case in point is , a floating natural gas liquefaction plant off the coast of Mozambique. The plant has a capacity of 3.4 million tonnes of LNG.

Enel has been developing projects in Africa, too. It already operates , both wind and solar, from Morocco to Zambia and South Africa. It is building new green energy capacities in other countries, too, such as Ethiopia, where Enel has planned a photovoltaic plant in Metehara.

After the great chaos

The balance of the Mediterranean was disrupted in 2011, the year of the “Arab Spring” that upset many ruling classes. The movements took inspiration from Arab nationalism, the same tendency with which Mattei had worked in Algeria. After more than ten years, things have settled down, and a new phase can start. The relaunch of Italian action in the region is a positive step, but we must consider some pitfalls.

There are new players: China, Russia and Turkey all have footholds in the Arab Mediterranean as well. China, especially, has been money into the region. France too, of course, still holds substantial sway in Africa. In spite of this competition, Italy can still draw upon its tradition of friendly cooperation and move forward with its North African partners.

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France has long prided itself on its ����ï������é, a principle that seeks to keep religion separate from public life. Critics, however, note that the headscarf and abaya bans risk marginalizing religious minorities. ����ï������é, they argue, should be a curb on religious domination of the public sphere — not a curb on religious expression in public.

Political gridlock, social unrest: symptoms of a country in crisis

The abaya ban comes at a time of great turmoil in France. Since his reelection in April 2022, President Emmanuel Macron has been forced to deal with country-wide over the government’s decision in January 2023 to raise the country’s retirement age and in former French colonies such as Gabon and Niger that threaten to cut off France’s access to oil and other resources.

Anti-government sentiment also boiled over at the end of July in reaction to the police shooting of a 17-year-old Parisian of Moroccan and Algerian descent. Protests over the shooting led to of damage and over , mostly in suburbs populated by Muslim citizens from former French colonies. This was not the first time Macron had to deal with an Islam-related incident. In response to the 2020 of a teacher who showed caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed in class, Macron : “Islam is a religion that is experiencing a crisis across the world.” This attitude has been echoed in the president’s remarks about the abaya ban. Authorities tasked with enforcing the new law will be “uncompromising,” he , adding that teachers and school administrators will “not be left alone.”

FO° Exclusive: Make Sense of the Hellish Rioting in France

Political pressure might also be a factor in the timing of the crackdown on Islamic symbols in schools. At the end of August, Macron with leaders of France’s right-wing National Rally Party and the left-wing New Economic and Social People’s Union or NUPES coalition to try and break a stalemate in the National Assembly that is stalling the president’s legislative agenda. The abaya ban could be an attempt by the president to signal his capacity for change and concessions on right-leaning issues.

The decision has garnered support from right-wing conservatives, who typically remain distant from Macron’s liberal Renaissance party, but also from far-left socialist and communist parties, who have historically opposed the influence of religion, primarily Catholicism, in affairs of the state.

More moderate liberals are outraged by the abaya ban, arguing that an individual’s right to practice their religion freely is one of the bedrocks of a democratic society. Banning the abaya or other religious clothing sends a message that France is willing to compromise on individual freedom in the name of secularism and that certain cultural and religious practices are not welcome.

There are many Muslim women’s voices: Let’s listen to them

France is a nation known for its rich cultural diversity. Its strength lies in its ability to accommodate and celebrate diverse backgrounds. The Muslim community in France represents this diversity. Opinions on the headscarf and abaya vary, with some more secular Muslims adopting Western fashions. Other Muslim women choose to wear the headscarf and abaya as a matter of personal religious faith and identity. They consider them an important aspect of their relationship with Islam and a symbol of modesty and piety. Other Muslim women view religious clothing as a form of empowerment and a means to assert their identity in a society that frequently stigmatizes them. They argue that the ban on headscarves and abayas is an infringement on their right to practice their faith and cultural identity.

Opponents argue that religious clothing disrupts the educational process and promotes religious proselytism. They assert that it symbolizes the oppression of women and runs counter to the values of ����ï������é. French authorities have also expressed concerns that abayas and headscarves are barriers to assimilation into French society, potentially leading to social and cultural isolation.

Schools can provide a platform for students to learn about different cultures and religions, fostering an environment of mutual respect rather than exclusion. Education should remain at the forefront of this approach, as informed students are more likely to understand the importance of respecting diverse perspectives.

It is entirely possible for France to uphold the principle of secularism while respecting individual religious freedoms and cultural diversity. Rather than banning the abaya, the government should focus on educating and fostering tolerance among our students. The true strength of a secular society lies in its ability to embrace diversity, not stifle it. In doing so, the state can reaffirm the values of liberty, equality and fraternity that France holds dear.

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The book describes the trial of Marshal Philippe Pétain, which took place only a few weeks after the war ended, and uses it to do two things: look back at the events that led to France’s humiliating defeat in 1940, and look forward to the present day to see how France remembers, and commemorates, its behavior between 1940 and 1945, especially ������-à-������ Jewish people.

Pétain was the great French war hero of World War I, especially due to his leadership in the crucial Battle of Verdun in 1916. Through this, he had acquired a godlike status. By the 1930s, Pétain had long been retired from the army, and thus he had no responsibility for the strategic error of the French High Command that led to the defeat of May 1940. This error was sending the French Army deep into Belgium when Germany attacked that country, which created a gap in French defenses that allowed the Germans to encircle a large portion of the Allied armies from the rear in the vicinity of Dunkirk.

The consequences of this mistake discredited those who held office in France in the period immediately before the war. This included former prime ministers Édouard Daladier and Paul Reynaud. Both of these ex-prime ministers gave evidence in Pétain’s trial.

So did another ex-prime minister, Pierre Laval, who was later to be tried and executed for treason in 1945.

The author says that, for Laval, “no cause, however noble, could justify a war.” He had been prime minister in the 1930s and wanted reconciliation with Italy. During World War II, he said that he favored German victory, a matter on which Pétain wisely offered no opinion.

When the Germans surrendered in 1945, Laval escaped to Spain, but Franco did not want him. According to the author, Laval was then offered asylum by the Irish government, presumably on the Taoiseach Éamon de Valera’s instructions.

I have never read any exploration of this issue in books about de Valera. Laval could have proved an embarrassing guest for Ireland. In the event, Laval opted to return to France and face a trial which he must have known would sentence him to death rather than live peacefully in Ireland.

Pétain’s emergency leadership

Coming back to the dilemma faced by the French government in 1940, after the shock of the encirclement had worn off, the French army resisted the Germans bravely and effectively in central France. But the damage to public morale, caused by the initial defeat, was too deep. 

Could the French Army have resisted long enough to retreat with their government to Algeria (technically part of France)?

Some of Pétain’s accusers argued that he should have taken this option and ordered the army to fight on rather than seek an armistice from the Germans. Others criticized him for not joining the Americans when they landed in North Africa in 1942. Instead, he authorized the French Army in North Africa to resist the Americans. Many interpreted this as treason.

How did Pétain come to be in charge in late 1940 and thus be in a position to make these choices?

The previous French government, headed by Reynaud, had retreated from Paris to Bordeaux after the initial defeat in May 1940. But it needed a new leader. It turned to Pétain, as an untainted national leader, to head a new government.

It was almost as if the politicians gathered in Bordeaux felt they needed the “Pétain magic” to restore France. This was the hope on the basis of which the National Assembly made Pétain head of state, soon with unlimited powers. It was never a viable project.

If Pétain had thought things through, he would never have lent himself to such a dubious and hopeless endeavor. His vanity got the better of him. 

Even if Germany had won the war, and had come to terms with Britain, the prestige of Pétain would not have sufficed to wipe France’s humiliation away.

Trial of a once-hero

How informative were the proceedings at the trial?

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that some issues were explored too much in the trial and that others deserved more attention.

A big part of the prosecution’s case was that Pétain had long been preparing himself for a French military defeat and plotting how to exploit defeat to grasp supreme power. There was no evidence to back this.

The issue that got too little attention in the trial, in light of what we now know, was the active involvement of the French police, and of the Vichy government, in the transportation of the Jews to the gas chambers.

Pétain’s defense team argued that the regime had spared many French people, including French Jews, from the horrors of direct German occupation by taking over the administration of a large portion of the interior of the country from 1940 to 1943 and that this saved lives.

There is statistical evidence to back this up. The survival rate of Jews in France, at the end of the war, was much higher than that of Jews in Poland and the Netherlands, which were directly occupied by the Germans and where virtually every Jew was wiped out.

Another issue that could have gotten more attention was the Munich Agreement with Hitler which sapped French morale.

Many of the themes evoked in this book are current today.

Grappling with the past

What is treason?

Is it treasonable to make the mistake of backing the loser?

Where is the line to be drawn between bad political judgment and treason? Where is the boundary between making a legitimate political judgment, and betraying a cause that is, or appears, lost?

What constitutes a war crime? That had not been defined at the time.

Who should be the jury in a trial like this? Pétain’s jury consisted of two halves: sitting National Assembly deputies and recently active members of the Resistance. This politicized the judicial system in a way that would not be allowed today.

Jackson’s book also explores the emotions of the French people in the aftermath of an acute crisis. France has emerged as a strong democracy despite the trauma.

For the record, Pétain was condemned to death at the end of the trial. But the jury anticipated, correctly, that Charles de Gaulle would commute the sentence. Pétain died peacefully some years later.

The great merit of the book is the human stories it tells so well, prompting the reader to ask how he or she would have reacted if faced with the same dilemmas.

[ edited this piece.]

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On July 17, 2023, Conservatives approved the so-called Illegal Migration Act, the cornerstone of right-wing UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s campaign promise to “” sailing across the English Channel. The bill has received royal assent and become domestic law. According to the act, anyone who enters the UK illegally after passing through a nation without persecution loses their right to seek asylum in the UK. No matter how compelling their situation is, they are prohibited from requesting refugee protection or making other human rights claims.

The act further mandates their deportation to another nation, where, despite Conservative claims, there is no assurance that they will have access to protection. It effectively establishes extensive new detention powers with little judicial control.

Racism-induced legislation

The government’s persecutory, racism-induced legislation won’t stop the boats. What it will accomplish is locking up tens of thousands of people at great expense, sending them to live in uncertainty forever, punished like criminals just for trying to find refuge. The House of Lords ultimately rejected proposed amendments providing for fewer time restrictions on the detention of unaccompanied minors, improved rights for victims of modern slavery and six-month delays in migrant deportation.

The Conservative government’s centerpiece legislation will stop most individuals from seeking asylum in the UK without authorization. It will send them back to their home country or a third country deemed “safe,” like Rwanda.

The act’s passing came at the same time as a meant to carry migrants and refugees docked near the southern coast of England on Tuesday. The government has justified the usage of barges, which maintains that they are a less expensive option than hotels. A record 45,755 persons crossed the English Channel in tiny boats last year, mostly from France. Around 12,000 people have come this year, which is about the same as in 2022.

Opposition politicians, as well as observers and organizations at home and abroad, have attacked the act to deport asylum-seekers as brutal, cruel and ineffective. The passing of the measure, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, poses “very serious legal concerns” and creates “a worrying precedent for dismantling asylum-related obligations” that other nations may follow.

At the earliest, deportation flights to Rwanda won’t begin for a few months; even then, their legality will depend on the Supreme Court’s decision later this year. A ($180 million) first agreement between Britain and the East African nation was reached last year, but the legal process has stalled the program. One year ago, the European Court of Human Rights issued a that prevented the first scheduled flight for the deportation of Rwandan migrants.

Dumping IRL & IHRL Obligations

Following its obligations under international law, the UK has long offered asylum to needy individuals—a tradition of which it has every right to be proud. This new legislation severely weakens the legal edifice that has shielded so many people, placing refugees at severe risk and violating the UK’s IRL and IHRL obligations.

Regardless of whether asylum applicants are individually at risk of persecution, they may very well have experienced human rights violations, including human trafficking or modern-day slavery. Persons excluded by the new act may have other well-founded claims under international human rights and humanitarian law; these are now prohibited from accessing protection in the UK. This includes unaccompanied and separated children. Removal under these conditions violates international law, due process rights, family and privacy rights and the best interests of the children involved.

Most people who leave conflict and persecution lack formal documentation like passports and visas or cannot get them. Rarely do they have access to safe and legal routes. The 1951 UN relating to the Status of Refugees (UNCSR) acknowledges that refugees may be forced to enter a nation of sanctuary illegally. Many thousands of asylum seekers can now be expected to stay in the UK forever in hazardous legal positions if there are no workable removal agreements with third countries or there is insufficient practical capability to remove large numbers of asylum seekers. They risk being used and abused, jeopardizing their rights to health, employment and a reasonable quality of life.

In addition to posing severe legal issues from a global perspective, the act creates a troubling precedent for eliminating asylum obligations that other nations, including those in Europe, may be tempted to follow. This would bring inestimable harm to the overall international system for protecting human rights and refugees.

The UN shares the UK government’s concern over the increasing number of asylum-seekers who take perilous boat crossings of the English Channel and applauds ongoing efforts to improve the functioning of the current through quick, equitable and efficient case processing that enables the integration of individuals determined to require international protection and the prompt return home of those without a valid reason to remain. Unfortunately, the new legislation will seriously erode this achievement.

Regardless of their legal status, method of arrival or any other distinction, all people who leave their place of origin in search of safety and shelter abroad are entitled to the full respect of their human rights and dignity. The UK has a history of upholding its obligations under international refugee and human rights law. Such unwavering dedication as it had shown is more important than ever right now.

The international community must urge the UK government to reaffirm its commitment to human rights by repealing this law and guaranteeing that refugees, asylum-seekers, migrants and stateless persons have their rights upheld, protected and fulfilled without prejudice and in a manner consistent with the UNCSR. Asylum and human rights claims should be processed swiftly and fairly, reception conditions should be improved and there should be more accessible and available safe travel routes.

[ edited this piece.]

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These are not the riots to hit France. The first banlieue riots occurred in 1979 in Vaulx-en-Velin, a poor suburb of Lyon, when a teenager slit his veins after an arrest for stealing a car. Two years later, another attempt to deal with a car theft sparked days of rioting in nearby Vénissieux. 

The deaths of two youths in the same area resulted in similar troubles in 1990 and 1993. 

By far the worst unrest occurred in 2005. Two teenagers died in an electrical substation near Paris while hiding from police. Suburbs erupted up and down the country. Cars were burnt, shops looted and police attacked, triggering a three-week state of emergency.

Why is France experiencing yet more riots?

There are two countervailing views on this issue. One view is that the violence is the result of poverty and discrimination. Entrenched social ills ensure that France’s bleak estates remain tinderboxes. Another view holds that the rioting is mainly a law-and-order issue. Gangs and petty criminals are using anger over a tragic death as an excuse to sow mayhem.

Both views hold some water. In 1977, then Prime Minister Raymond Barre launched the first plan to regenerate housing estates, expressing concern that they might turn into “ghettos” but somehow this effort never succeeded. France’s infamous bureaucrats have set up one official body after another but none of them have really succeeded.

France has the National Council for Cities, the Inter-ministerial Commission for Cities of Urban Social Development, the National Agency for Urban Renewal and many others. An alphabet soup of acronyms for various initiatives, from FNRU (Nation Programme for Urban Renovation) to ZUS (Sensitive Urban Zones) is a testimony to the failure of imagination and implementation by elitist and out-of-touch French bureaucrats.

At the same time, law and order has indeed declined in France. Anyone who has gone to Montmartre has faced hassle while the police look the other way. Furthermore, many banlieues are no-go areas for most people, including sometimes the police. Given the fact that the people in these poor neighborhoods are from former French colonies, they have a sense of resentment against their former oppressors. Continued experience of discrimination, exclusion and racism hardens those feelings.

A divided society

When Glenn lived in Grenoble in 1976, he often walked home alone after 11:00 pm. Most French cities, other than Paris, were then quiet at night. The only other people out on the street were lone, forlorn, Muslim North African men who had been brought in as “temporary workers,” without being allowed to bring their families. These workers have stayed on and brought their wives and have had children.

This immigrant population still finds itself foreign in France. Many French do not really consider them as French. Also, many immigrants themselves do not want to abandon their roots, especially if they are Muslim. France may not be experiencing a clash of civilizations but there is indeed a clash of cultures.

French secularism—����ï������é—has shut out religion from the state. In the past, this struggle was with Catholicism. The state won that victory conclusively. Now, this struggle is with Islam. This underlines the bikini-burkini tension in la grande nation.

France being France, the state is extraordinarily overweening. The government controls 59% of the GDP. This means the unit of power is the French state and the seat of power is Paris, i.e. elite bureaucrats and politicians. Note that politicians are often former elite bureaucrats, (including almost all French presidents over the last seven decades) who run the country in an excessively centralized manner. So, the French blame the state for almost all their frustrations and look upon capturing the state to achieve any progress. This means the cycle set off in 1789 of mobs taking to the streets continues.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The new defense alliance reflected the logic of the region, which included the majority of the world’s industrially developed nations, all in close proximity to the Atlantic Ocean and north of the Tropic of Cancer. Collins dictionary defines the term “North Atlantic” as: “the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean, esp the waters separating North America and Europe.”

By focusing on “defense” and its character as an “alliance,” NATO sought to create the perception that it existed as pure potency, rather than as an active force that would intervene militarily in geopolitics. At NATO’s core reigned the idea that peace and non-aggression were the norm. Security was the watchword. It was about potentially defending or protecting the peace within Europe. Because the contest turned into a race—the nuclear arms race—rather than a war, a peaceful consumer society could prosper and grow on both sides of the North Atlantic.

NATO became a logical necessity once the Cold War was officially announced, opposing capitalism and communism. Both sides had nuclear bombs. In Robert Oppenheimer’s borrowed words, both had “become death, a destroyer of worlds.” The entire drama was confined to the northern hemisphere, with the Soviet and American empires engaged in a permanent showdown, with Europe in the middle.  

Since those early days, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the very idea of NATO has undergone radical changes. Technically, there was no further reason for NATO to exist. The communist military menace had ended up in the dustbin of history. But not only did it continue to exist, it began expanding, much like La Fontaine’s frog that wished to be as big as an ox.

At this month’s NATO summit in Vilnius, the media noted that Japan and NATO appeared to agree on a new partnership program. To make it more concrete, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg proposed creating a NATO liaison office in Tokyo. Alas, France’s President Emmanuel Macron –  profiting from the rule that NATO decisions must be decided unanimously –  prevented that resolution from being passed.

Stoltenberg had the Tokyo liaison office proposal in an interview with CNN in May. On that occasion, he insisted that “Japan is a very close and important partner for NATO.” On NATO’s own, we can read today the assertion: “No partner is closer than Japan.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Close:

1. Near, in geographical terms
2. Emotionally connected
3. Ideologically formatted thanks to an asymmetric relationship in which a dominant power can dictate to subservient powers the policy orientation that undergirds its own value system and ensure the subordinates will serve its interests.

Contextual note

NATO’s Orwellian “Newspeak” retains only the third definition. After all, the distance between Tokyo and Brussels is exactly 9,442 km. The distance between Tokyo and Washington is 10,900 km, which is almost exactly halfway around the world at that latitude. So, the first definition has no meaning.

The second definition is about personal feelings. It could have meaning, but only if it were legitimate to draw conclusions about entire populations on the basis of what military and political strategists feel on both sides. Members of the political warrior class quite naturally sense some kind of universal bond when assuming there is a common enemy. But clearly neither Europeans, Japanese nor even the American people feel emotionally connected to Japan. 99.99% of the global population outside of Japan, even among those who admire Japanese culture, literally feels no emotional connection with the Japanese. The fact that the Japanese themselves have notoriously cultivated a “Gaijin complex” (distrust of foreigners) attests to this reality. 

Even while asserting a concordance of “values” between Tokyo and Brussels, Stoltenberg personally shows no evident capacity to identify with Japan’s hyper-collectivist culture, the contrary of Western individualism. In the NATO context, the dictionary’s second meaning of “close” makes no more sense than the first. In the annals of lexicography, our Devil’s Dictionary, therefore, stands as unique in providing an accurate description of Stoltenberg’s use of language. Close describes what is distant.

NATO expansion, the central fact that provoked the war in Ukraine, is one thing. But this kind of linguistic expansion— or rather inflation—is outdoing even La Fontaine’s frog. Should the world accept with a shrug that the North Atlantic now encompasses the South Pacific? We might rather be tempted to ask ourselves this question: Which nations in the world have direct access to both oceans? There are two: Canada and the US. In terms of power politics, Canada is a featherweight. But fragmented Europe, so distant from the Pacific, isn’t even part of the discussion. It should be clear by now that NATO is quite simply a tool of US foreign policy.

NATO’s obsession with the Pacific clearly means that the treaty organization is no longer about maintaining peace in Europe at all. Instead, it is about Washington’s plans for war with China. Beltway politicians, diplomats and media increasingly evoke this as the inevitable next step in geopolitical action. Macron alone seems to have that the motivating factor is not peace, but global conquest. Sensitive to the meaning of words, the French president argued: “Whatever people say, geography is stubborn.” He then added this truism: “The Indo-Pacific is not the North Atlantic, so we must not give the impression that NATO is somehow building legitimacy and a geographically established presence in other areas.”

Undaunted, Stoltenberg on July 12: “Security is not regional, it is global—so we are determined to continue deepening our cooperation.”

Put more bluntly, NATO has evolved from a tool designed to provide a soft landing after World War II into a willing initiator of World War III. Speaking with reporters at Vilnius, Stoltenberg called China a NATO “adversary,” and said, “China is increasingly challenging the rules-based international order, refusing to condemn Russia’s war against Ukraine, threatening Taiwan and carrying out a substantial military build-up.”

What Stolteberg failed to mention is that the Global South in its entirety is also challenging the rules-based international order, refusing to condemn Russia and demonstrating a studied indifference to the question of who owns and controls Taiwan. Moreover, most of the Global South recognizes that China has a long way to go to match the military build-up of NATO (i.e. the US military-industrial complex and its client states). Does that also make the Global South NATO’s enemy? Stoltenberg didn’t say.

Historical note

At this point in history, we can have some idea – however equivocal – of where NATO has been and what it still represents. After all, as an expanding alliance, at its base it still groups together in its core all the nations that, over the past 500 years, have practiced the most outrageous forms of colonialism on every continent. Their current wealth reflects that history. But things are rapidly changing. What gave some the impression of being a stabilizing factor in the past may prove to be the opposite in an evolving context.

After 1991, Cold War architect was not alone in observing that NATO had outlived its usefulness as defined by its initial mission. Created to respond to an atmosphere of Cold War paranoia focused on a rival economic system that could legitimately be suspected of seeking to spread its ideology across Europe and elsewhere in the world, the paranoia should have faded away. The rational leaders of the victorious capitalist West needed simply to redirect their attention towards constructing a new world order in conformity with Francis Fukyama’s blueprint for the “end of history.”

They chose a different path. In an article on The Tricontinental, Vijay Prashad traces the complex evolution of NATO since its beginnings. He highlights its permanent, though never publicly avowed ambition to stretch its influence well beyond the North Atlantic. He concludes by speculating that NATO’s ambition now has less and less to do with military prowess and security concerns than with the ambition of establishing its moral bullying power and incarnating its own rules-based order. “Slowly, NATO is positioning itself as a substitute for the U.N., suggesting that it—and not the actual international community—is the arbiter and guardian of the world’s ‘interests, security and values.’”

Amazingly, there are commentators among the former colonial powers who are still wondering why the nations of the Global South have not simply fallen into line. 

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

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The site reminded me of my visits to the in Berlin. The gate was built during Germany’s imperial era. At the time, the iconic Quadriga, a bronze sculpture of Victory riding in her chariot at the top of the gate, symbolized triumph. The Brandenburg Gate was destroyed and renovated several times throughout the course of time, most recently in 2002. Today, the Quadriga represents German unity and peace. Many global leaders have given addresses at the Brandenburg Gate, hailing it as a symbol of democracy.

We admired the German approach of infusing national traditions with democratic ideas. It is relatable to us, as Indians, since it is very much similar to the Indian way of immersing our way of life in traditions. In many cases, the Western world has amalgamated monarchical traditions with liberal democratic legacies. These emblems consecrate the conviction that the march to the future must not be at the expense of the country’s culture and heritage.

India inaugurated a this year. This calls us to ponder the relationship between the new and the old in our country, which as a state is very young, yet harbors a millennia-old civilization. What do we value? Where are we going?

It is relevant to discuss these issues as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits France. France has invited Modi as the guest of honor at the Bastille Day Parade. Bastille Day, France’s national holiday, is celebrated on July 14. It represents the victory of the people against the rule of King Louis XVI.

A section of the French strategic community has suggested that it is a to invite Modi for the Bastille Day celebration. They have emphasized a missing link of common values between the French and Indian administrations. They stress that the Modi administration is keen to turn India into a Hindu nation.

France is a revolutionary nation. Its national day celebrates the overthrow of the old order and the creation of something untested and new. Even the of France has been facing the heat in the last few weeks. Indians, on the other hand, seek a more organic relationship between their democracy and their history. For a keen observer, the episode provides an insight into the workings of Indian political and social life.

Symbiotic bond of traditions with modern times

There is a dynamic character to Indian civilization. This dynamism has been manifested in Indian culture’s peculiar lifestyle decisions and philosophical perspectives on human existence and its problems.

The finest instances of these are to be found in the history of the drafting of India’s Constitution. On July 22, 1947, the first Prime Minister Pandit Nehru to adopt the Ashoka Chakra symbol on India’s national flag. The symbol represents the wheel of Dharma, the principle of order and law. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who would later serve as India’s second president, endorsed the adoption. In his beautiful speech, he synthesized the notion of progress with loyalty to India’s spiritual tradition:

We cannot attain purity, we cannot gain our goal of truth, unless we walk in the path of virtue. The Asoka’s wheel represents to us the wheel of the Law, the wheel of Dharma. Truth can be gained only by the pursuit of the path of Dharma, by the practice of virtue. Truth—Satya, Dharma—Virtue, these ought to be the controlling principles of all those who work under this Flag. It also tells us that the Dharma is something which is perpetually moving. If this country has suffered in the recent past, it is due to our resistance to change. There are ever so many challenges hurled at us and if we have not got the courage and the strength to move along with the times, we will be left behind.

The deliberations in the Constituent Assembly created a space for the harmonization of the country’s deep-rooted cultural traditions and symbols with modern-day, progressive advances. It hailed the possibilities of combining ancient wisdom with modern advancement.

The new parliament building has a larger seating capacity than the older building, and the voting process now uses a graphical interface and biometrics. As a “Platinum-rated Green Building,” the new edifice demonstrates India’s commitment to environmental sustainability. The Constitutional Hall’s gallery area houses another remarkable installation called “Foucault’s Pendulum,” adding to the distinctive features of the new Parliament.

The for the chamber of the Lok Sabha, or lower house, was inspired by the peacock, the country’s symbol. In the Mahabharata, one of India’s national epics, Bhishma Pitamah argues that a king should adopt forms like the plumes of peacocks in a variety of colors. For the upper house, the Rajya Sabha, the theme is India’s floral emblem, the lotus. The original document of the Indian constitution’s preamble also has motifs of lotus and peacock. The installation of the Sengol scepter, a powerful religious symbol, in the new parliament building unquestionably signaled the amalgamation of Dharma with democratic norms. 

What to make of Sengol?

As a Maharashtrian, I am familiar with scepters. In front of the Speaker or Chairperson’s seat in the legislative assembly and council of Maharashtra, there is a designated spot for the rajdand, a scepter. Union Home Minister Amit Shah revealed Sengol and reintroduced it into the national discourse. Sengol was by the Modi government close to the Lok Sabha Speaker’s chair. The act suggests that sovereignty rests with the people of India.

The new Sengol is not a symbol of royal authority or insignia of military victory. Instead, it serves as a metaphor for the, i.e., Dharma. The installation of Sengol in Parliament is a sign that the government is not unquestionable, that real power rests with the people in a democracy. It implies that a person or organization in possession of the Sengol is only a servant guided by the highest law, Dharma. Sengol alludes to a of power.

The transfer of power is comparable, metaphorically speaking, to the change from day to night. Indeed, a seamless and effective democracy is marked by a smooth handover of power. Sengol encourages the beholder to follow the path of righteousness by being devoted to it throughout the journey, just like the Sun does. Sengol reflects a subtle shift, and re-introducing native ideals that support democracy. This is part of the creation of a democratic vocabulary for Atmanirbhar Bharat, “Self-reliant India.”

Is India becoming a Hindu state?

The reintroduction of Sengol has drawn criticism from certain quarters who saw the move as anti-democratic. They held the view that new symbolism is akin to monarchy and that India under the Modi regime is abandoning the modern principles it espoused during the Nehru era. Supporters of the move, on the other hand, dispute these claims. Both parties have strong reasons on their sides. Real life, of course, can be somewhere in the middle.

Nehruvian intellectuals have faith in Western modernity and the secular world. Their story predominated for most of the period following independence. They look at tradition with contempt. For them, the installation of Sengol and the process of are comparable to the creation of Hindu Rashtra, a theocratic state. They believe Modi is changing the national narrative to emphasize regressive views rather than progressive ones.

In Germany, the monarchical icon of Brandenburg Gate is celebrated today as a democratic achievement. Similarly, Sengol, a scepter of righteousness, may aid in honoring the past and upholding the values of the rising India.  Nehru recognized the importance of Indian traditions. At the same time, he was an interlocutor of the European notion of modernity. He was mindful of maintaining a balance between Indian traditions and European modernity. His followers may have failed to understand these intricacies, blindly following what they see as Nehru’s ideals.

Modi appears to be questioning the universality of Western modernity and making Indian wisdom and knowledge relevant to the rest of the globe—consequently, making India a decolonial state. Modi is suggesting that the ideals of modernity and socialism succeeded in Europe because they were shaped by local circumstances. Modi wishes to construct Indian modernity within the context of the country’s history.  The Sengol installation underlines the narrative that Modi is regaining the self-identity of India in Amrit Kaal, the upcoming quarter-century golden age foreseen by Modi. along with modern advancements. Thus, modernity and traditions are not diametrically opposed; they coexist together.

Modi seems to be challenging the binary of choices. The Indian populace had two options during the last three-quarters of a century post-independence: the temple of development, which was focused on contemporary concepts, or the temple of tradition, which dabbled in rituals and caused barriers to advancement. Modi indicates that he is holding Sengol in one hand and progress, development and technology in the other hand. Modi is not a utopian that repudiates the West. Modi does not dream of an ideal Hindu state as like you might hear about from a right-wing foot soldier on social media. He wants India to interact and cooperate with the West and other stakeholders as a self-assured and confident nation.

Thus, it is better for anyone, including the French and other Western strategic communities, to understand Indian politics and social life before arriving at any conclusion regarding values. Two narratives are having a dialogue with each other and playing for space in the public imagination. The dialogue is like the noise produced when a train is changing tracks; it is perfectly in accord with the noisy and messy democracy of India. The outcome of the Indian General Elections in 2024 will help us to answer which narrative may win.

[ edited this piece.]

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Race relations in French politics

The event has reignited concerns about police violence and systemic racism, with longstanding grievances from rights groups and residents of low-income, racially diverse suburbs. participated in peaceful marches and expressed widespread distrust of the police. Many could be heard chanting, “No justice, no peace!” Some of the protests turned violent as rioters clashed with law enforcement, set buildings and vehicles on fire, and looted stores. Many police officers were injured, and hundreds of people were arrested.

On the other side, groups such as the Marine Le Pen-led National Front (now called National Rally) have used the riots as an opportunity to their anti-immigration and nationalist agenda. They have portrayed the riots as evidence of the failure of multiculturalism and have called for stricter immigration policies to prevent the perceived threat to French culture and identity.

Relations between the police and young, working-class men from minority ethnic backgrounds were before the current protests, and campaigners are demanding answers regarding policing practices in France, particularly regarding the excessive use of force and racialized policing. Poor police-community relations, including instances of police harassment, racial profiling and excessive use of force, are significant contributing factors to tensions in the outlying neighborhoods known as banlieues. Perceived systemic bias and abuse by law enforcement have led to anger and resentment, which has manifested itself in protests.

Is the past repeating itself? A look at France’s 2005 riots

The riots and protests have now spread to various cities, including Marseille, Lyon, Pau, Toulouse and Lille as well as other parts of Paris. French President Emmanuel has so far ruled out declaring a state of emergency but condemned the violence. Macron held several to address the situation and to prevent a repeat of the 2005 riots that followed the deaths of two teenagers hiding from the police.

On November 8, 2005, shortly after the began, President Jacques Chirac declared a state of emergency that granted the authorities enhanced powers to enforce curfews and conduct arrests. The government deployed thousands of police and security forces to restore order, but its heavy-handed tactics and alleged police brutality further exacerbated tensions. The handling of the riots and the perceived lack of empathy from political leaders deepened the sense of mistrust and alienation among residents of the affected areas.

The events prompted a national conversation about integration, social cohesion and the need for greater investment in disadvantaged neighborhoods. In response to the riots, the government implemented several measures aimed at addressing the underlying issues including increased funding for urban renewal programs, job creation initiatives and efforts to improve police-community relations. The events also led to a reevaluation of French urban policy and a recognition of the need for greater inclusion and equal opportunities for residents of marginalized communities.

The long-term impact of the riots and the effectiveness of the government’s response remain subjects of debate. While some positive changes were implemented, socio-economic disparities and issues of discrimination persisted in certain neighborhoods. The 2005 riots also had political implications. Nicolas Sarkozy, who was Interior Minister at the time, decided to run for president, and a key plank in his platform was a to policing, which he called “culture du résultat.” This policy set “goals” for the number of arrests and detection rates and used statistics to measure effectiveness. The aggressive policing strategy helped Sarkozy win the presidency in 2007 and was kept in place even after Sarkozy lost his position in 2012.

Community policing

in France was first introduced as a strategy in the 1990s, aiming to enhance cooperation between the police and local communities to address crime and improve public safety. The policy was implemented by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who served as the Minister of the Interior from 1997 to 2000 under President Jacques Chirac. However, the experiment in community policing was soon deemed a failure. An increase in terrorist attacks, the politicization of security issues and new managerial thinking pushed community-oriented policing off the reform agenda, where it has largely remained. Instead, political leaders, like Sarkozy, used “tough on crime” rhetoric and proposed “law-and-order” measures to appeal to public sentiment and enhance their political standing. This approach tends to prioritize reactive and punitive measures rather than proactive community engagement.

France should reorient its approach towards community policing by implementing a range of essential measures. First and foremost, there is a pressing need to prioritize comprehensive training programs for law enforcement officers, emphasizing cultural sensitivity, implicit bias awareness, de-escalation techniques and conflict resolution. Simultaneously, robust accountability mechanisms must be established to address instances of misconduct, excessive use of force or discriminatory behavior within law enforcement agencies. Independent oversight bodies responsible for monitoring and ensuring police accountability ought to be established. These oversight mechanisms should have the authority and resources to investigate complaints, review police practices and make recommendations for improvement. Furthermore, fostering dialogue and consultation between the police and the public through dedicated platforms can play a pivotal role in building trust, addressing concerns and facilitating collaborative decision-making processes.

The recent surge of unrest underscores the urgent need for improved police-community relations while addressing systemic issues of racism. Implementing community policing, comprehensive officer training and accountability measures are vital steps to prevent further tensions and promote social cohesion.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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“Chad, you surely remember that back in 2019 the Trump administration made the extraordinary decision that a man called Juan Guaidó, who had never been elected or even considered as a presidential candidate, should be recognized as the legitimate president of Venezuela. Donald Trump justified this by claiming the democratically elected President Nicolás Maduro was a dictator who had managed democracy in his favor. After his withdrawal from the Paris climate accords and the Iran deal, Trump had acquired a reputation for making peremptory foreign policy decisions. Astonishingly, the European Union despite having made known its discomfort with Trump’s policies and personality, followed suit, recognizing Guaidó as Venezuela’s president. Two years later, in January 2021, just before the end of Trump’s term, the EU quietly withdrew their recognition of Guaidó. How can we explain the Europeans’ willingness to do something so obviously arbitrary and undemocratic?”

Chad surprised me by immediately resorting to a familiar strategy designed to dismiss probing questions.

“It’s important to note that the issue of recognizing Juan Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela is a complex and multi-faceted one, and opinions on this matter can vary.”

Usually Chad takes some time before reaching the conclusion that there are too many contradictory opinions to take any one of them seriously. This time I had to react.

“Stop, stop! Please, Chad. I understand. No need to continue. Once you’ve trotted out your patented ‘complex and multifaceted,’ there’s no reason to add any other arguments to it. Case closed.”

Chad paused, stared at me for a moment and then insisted on adding this reflection. “The decision by some European nations to recognize Juan Guaidó may have been influenced by pressure from the United States. Historically, the United States has had strong ties with Europe, and there may have been a desire to align with American policy, particularly under the Trump administration.”

The Trump factor

Now the alacrity of Europeans  to follow the Trump administration surprised me, so I followed up with this question. “Why would you think the Europeans are ‘particularly’ inclined to follow Trump’s lead? That sounds contradictory to me.”

Chad apologized for giving a wrong impression and clarified by asserting that “the United States has historically been an important ally and partner for many European nations, and there is often a desire to maintain a close relationship and align on key policy issues. Despite concerns and disagreements with certain aspects of the Trump administration’s policies, European nations generally value the transatlantic relationship and may have felt compelled to maintain some level of cooperation or alignment, including in matters related to Venezuela.”

Now we were making some progress. The real question concerns what kind of relationship is implied when one party fells “compelled” to fall in line with another party’s arbitrary policies. This evoked in my mind more recent events and shared my .thought with Chad.

“Would that justify French President Emmanuel Marcron’s recently expressed concern about European nations falling into the role of what he called vassals of the US on the Taiwan situation with China.”

“Yes,” Chad responded, “the concerns expressed by President Emmanuel Macron about European nations potentially becoming vassals of the United States are valid and reflect a broader discussion within Europe regarding strategic autonomy and the balance of power in international relations. Macron, along with other European leaders, has emphasized the need for Europe to assert its own interests and pursue a more independent foreign policy.

Chad then surprised me by another assertion. “European nations, including France, have expressed the view that they should maintain their own strategic interests and make decisions based on their own assessments of geopolitical risks and opportunities.”

“Wait a minute,” I exclaimed. “I admit that France has insisted on strategic autonomy at least since De Gaulle, and maybe Germany has at times shown tendencies in that direction. But I don’t see any other European countries taking that stance, especially now that they have aligned behind the US as the leader of NATO in confronting Russia, despite the damage not just to their sense of autonomy but also their economy. Germany in particular has abjectly accepted policieis and acts by the US that have had the effective of crippling its economy.”

NATO’s strategic ambiguity

Chad’s response was predictable.

“It is important to note that European countries also value the transatlantic relationship and recognize the benefits of cooperation with the United States, particularly within the NATO framework. NATO serves as a vital alliance for collective defense and has played a crucial role in deterring potential security threats, including from Russia.”

“As Trump himself pointed out,” I retorted, “Europeans have become complacent with a situation in which the US makes the essential investment in their defense. But that has impeded even the hope of autonomy. And now they are enduring the consequences of Washington’s aggressive policy aimed at weakening Russia. This has produced a profound feeling of malaise. Although, no one seems willing to rock the boat for the moment, the economic consequences will eventually take their toll on European solidarity. I know you don’t know the answer to this, but, given your understanding of past historical trends, at one point will either the governments change course or the people revolt? Or will they only change course if the people revolt?”

I knew Chad would both acknowledge my point and find a way of avoiding a direct answer.

“The economic consequences of certain policies or actions, as you mentioned, can certainly impact European solidarity and influence public sentiment. Economic factors have historically played a role in shaping political landscapes and driving changes in policies. However, it is important to remember that political decisions are multifaceted, and a range of factors, including geopolitical considerations and national interests, come into play.”

I should have known that this would lead to the inevitable “multifaceted” defense strategy. If there’s one thing Chad will always teach us, it’s that whenever are crucial decision needs to be made, those who see no interest in challenging the status quo will always have a sledge hammer response that is specifically intended to sound delicate and nuanced.

I couldn’t, however, disagree with Chad’s final conclusion.

“Ultimately, the future course of European governments and the responses of the people will depend on a complex interplay of political, economic, and social dynamics.”

It’s always about interplay, a concept far more interesting, dynamic and instructive than simply noticing that issues tend to be “complex and multifaceted.” The very idea of interplay contains the concept of play, which means that something will have to give and history will see an outcome. That outcome will produce another instance of interplay.

In other words, Francis Fukuyama was wrong. There is no end to history. The vassals can continue to hope they will one day be free.

*[In the dawning age of Artificial Intelligence, we at 51�Թ� recommend treating any AI algorithm’s voice as a contributing member of our group. As we do with family members, colleagues or our circle of friends, we quickly learn to profit from their talents and, at the same time, appreciate the social and intellectual limits of their personalities. This enables a feeling of camaraderie and constructive exchange to develop spontaneously and freely. For more about how we initially welcomed Chad to our breakfast table, click here.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Earlier this year, France’s professional football organization called for all players from its top leagues to wear shirts with rainbow-colored numbers to express support for The International Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia. refused and chose not to play rather than show solidarity with the inclusivity signaled by the special day.

Personal Beliefs

A year ago, the Paris St-Germain football player Idrissa Gueye declined to play in a match rather than wear a rainbow symbol in support of LGBTQ+ rights. The then club manager Mauricio Pochettino said only that missed the game for “personal reasons.” Gueye was born and raised in Senegal, where about 97% of the population are Muslim and homosexuality is illegal and punishable by prison sentences of up to five years. It is also in Qatar, the home of Paris St-Germain’s owners. Last year’s men’s World Cup was staged there, of course.

Among the players who declined to participate this year was Zakaria Aboukhlal, who plays for Toulouse and was born in Morocco, another Muslim country, where against Islam is a punishable offense and same sex relationships are legally prohibited. “Respect is a value that I hold in great esteem,” wrote on Twitter, explaining his refusal to participate in the day of celebration. “It extends to others, but it also encompasses respect for my own personal beliefs. Hence, I don’t believe I am the most suitable person to participate in this campaign.”

It seemed a measured response and contrives an answer to a question that has so far not been asked: Is inclusivity inclusive? It sounds like a pun or some other form of wordplay, but it conveys an uncertainty about one of today’s most momentous cultural trends: Does inclusivity undermine the very groups it seeks to embrace?

Civic Unity vs. Individual Liberty

Every right minded person agrees inclusivity is desirable: We can never right history’s wrongs, but we can at least equalize conditions in a way that ensures no repetition. This policy aims to provide equal access to opportunities and resources for groups that have historically been oppressed. By promoting understanding, challenging stereotypes and encouraging empathy, it’s possible to create spaces where diverse populations can come together, engage in respectful dialogue and live and work together.

The trouble is: certain groups that have been subordinated sometimes oppose the policy of inclusivity. Muslims are one such group. They have no particular interest in contributing toward building a society in which LGBTQ+ groups are accepted, integrated, respected and treated as equals. Understandably so: The Qur’an stipulates that homosexuality is sinful.

Muslims have faced discrimination, sometimes known as Islamophobia, and continue to do so. They assert their right to believe homosexuality is a sin. Religious freedom is as much a human right as anything we can conceive. So, how do we respect both Islam and groups it deems sinners and so unworthy of respect? Squaring this circle requires us to distinguish between cultural inclusivity and individual rights.

The philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002) considered what conditions need to be satisfied in order to achieve what he considered a just society.  Balancing social good against the protection of individual rights and liberties was the key. It seems rational to preserve basic liberties, such as freedom of speech and assembly, as well as ensuring equality of opportunities. No rational person would willingly sacrifice these in pursuit of something as indeterminate as the social good, but Rawls entertained the possibility of civic unity amid a diversity of worldviews. He argued that curbing the liberties of an intolerant group that intended to harm the liberties of others may be justified. But what if the intolerant and potentially harmful group is one that’s been denied equal treatment? And what if the group’s apparent intolerance is based on a religious mandate. In other words, the group’s unwillingness to accept views, beliefs and behavior that differ from its own derives from its commitment to a faith. One answer to the question came via a case in England in 2010.

A Christian owner of a bed-and-breakfast in England refused a double room to a gay male couple. The owner insisted that it was against her religious convictions to let two men share a bed. A court concluded she unlawfully discriminated against the couple. Her appeal was supported by the Christian Institute, a national charity that defends the civil liberties of Christians. She lost her appeal. The word inclusivity was not in the popular vocabulary at the time, but the import of the court’s decision was clear: Her religious beliefs, no matter how fervently held, provided no justification for her action, which breached Britain’s equality law and was therefore harmful, in the sense it had an adverse effect on particular groups. The verdict portended the arrival of inclusivity, prioritizing the social good over religious beliefs.

The Mailed Fist

Inclusivity describes the endgame fought for over the decades by those who oppose racism, sexism, homophobia and many other forms of bigotry that have blighted society. But it’s an ideal: Desirable and perfect but unlikely to become a reality. The cracks appeared in the late 1970s when Louis took over the leadership of the Nation of Islam, a predominantly African American organization advocating black economic independence and separatism. Farrakhan denied allegations of antisemitism, sexism and homophobia but used the phrase “Satanic Jews,” prompting the uncomfortable recognition that belonging to a group that had been disparaged historically did not prevent someone reiterating the disparagement of others.

Similarly, women who railed for decades against sexism, or to use a more current term, misogyny have, in recent years, been accused of bigotry when they’ve opposed the induction of transgender women into institutions traditionally reserved for biological females. It’s hardly surprising many women have responded angrily to the appearance of transgender females in sports competitions, , shelters and bathrooms designated for women. But the logic of inclusivity is irresistible. Women’s groups will flail, but inclusivity bears the feelings and ideas of our times and, when necessary, reveals a mailed fist inside its velvet glove.

For example, in England, some football crowds voiced their disapproval of the Premier League’s introduction of taking the knee before games. The gesture was to signal the sport’s alignment with Black Lives Matter and demonstrate football’s fight against racism. Thus it was consistent with the inclusivity project.�� When fans remonstrated, they were instantly denounced as racists. In fact, much of the resistance to the gesture was based on the manner in which a symbolic display had replaced a genuine fight against racism. In other words, it seemed . But honest criticism of a ritual that advertised football’s embrace of inclusivity was condemned. Personal beliefs were crushed, along with alternative perspectives and criticism that would have been considered valid in previous decades.

Coercive?

Inclusivity distinguishes the early twenty-first century from previous epochs. It is an unquestioned, incontestable and unassailably virtuous ideal. It is also a juggernaut of secular culture that will overwhelm everything. It aims to provide acceptance and equality by persuasion and, if need be, by force. And this is why the recent disagreement in French football is worth scrutinizing. Dismaying as it sounds, this case suggests that a policy designed to protect and enhance the experiences of previously marginalized communities will surely engender clashes with individuals who solicit respect for their beliefs, especially when those beliefs are based on religious scriptures. Ten or fifteen years ago, their solicitation would have been heard and considered. Now, it’s likely to be ignored. Religious beliefs and rights will be subordinated.

I’ve spent much of my professional life researching, writing about and opposing racism, sexism and other bigotries, so I instinctively approve of inclusivity. I also subscribe to cultural relativism, meaning that I don’t believe in absolutes: knowledge, truth and morality exist in relation to society, culture and historical contexts. “Live and let live” is my favored proverb: tolerate the beliefs and behavior of others in order that they’ll tolerate yours. Inclusivity chimes with that. But only if it’s discretionary and refrains from compulsion. European football’s instruction rather than suggestion to its players seems coercive, controlling, even tyrannical. A display of solidarity is just window dressing if some of the participants are performing under duress. It may be a way of promoting one of the great policies of our age, but it’s also misleading.

A different way of pursuing inclusivity is to recognize that cultural differences are not always reconcilable. We just have to tolerate them and prevent them from promoting harm to others. Tolerate is an old-fashioned verb but one worth reimagining: Allowing, accepting or even just enduring with forbearance beliefs and practices we don’t like seems a mature approach. Persuasion often works, but, when it doesn’t, coercion is no alternative: it’s more like a tacit admission of defeat.

[Ellis Cashmore’s latest book is .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In a recently published , political scientist Anna Gryzmala-Busse traces the origins of the modern state to medieval Europe when religion and the church played a powerful role rather than the 16th-century beginnings of the modern era.

Gryzmala-Busse’s analysis is not simply academic and historical. It puts in a different light notions of Christian religiosity and heritage in Central and Eastern Europe that have strained relations in the European Union between Western European states and former Communist countries like as well as secular Europe’s struggle to come to grips with the religiosity of their Muslim minorities, nowhere more so than in .

Although Gryzmala-Busse’s focus is on Christianity and Europe, her analysis helps explain why the Sunni Muslim world took a different path and why the concept of a caliphate remains in Islam.

Religion and Politics in the Christian World

Gryzmala-Busse asserted that secular European rulers needed to create institutions to collect taxes and have an institutional base for fighting wars and negotiating peace on a fragmented continent. To do so, monarchs adopted administrative policies and approaches developed by a wealthy church that was Europe’s single largest landowner. It levied taxes on its land holdings. In addition, the church boasted a highly educated elite, commanded authority, and held out the prospect of salvation.

As a result, “the church was an essential source of legal, administrative, and conciliar innovations… The church showed rulers how to collect taxes more efficiently, request and answer a flood of petitions, keep records and accounts, interpret the law, and hold counsels that could provide valuable consent,” Gryzmala-Busse wrote.

“Concepts such as representation, binding consent, and even majority rules relied on ecclesiastical precedents,” she said. In short, “the medieval church was so influential because it was armed with superior organizational reach, human capital, and spiritual authority,” Gryzmala-Busse concluded. Implicitly, she acknowledged that the Muslim world traveled down a different path when she noted that there were no governance models in Asia and the Middle East that medieval European leaders could emulate.

Gryzmala-Busse was likely referring to Islam scholar Ahmed Kuru’s ground-breaking analysis of what he called the state-ulema alliance. That alliance precluded an arrangement similar to that between the church and rulers as portrayed by political scientist . This arrangement involved rulers successfully deploying what they had learnt from clerics to curtail and sideline the church.

In his , Laurence noted that ultimately the church could no longer prevail and accepted temporal jurisdiction over what became the tiny Vatican state while reaching a modus vivendi with European governments that ensured its continued existence and enabled it to thrive.

“European nations strong-armed, expropriated, violated, and humiliated the Catholic hierarchy,” forcing it to “relinquish its 1,000-year claim to political rule and focus instead on advocacy, global spiritual influence, and its evangelizing mission,” Laurence wrote. The political scientist argued further that European efforts to undermine the Ottoman caliphate that was abolished in 1924 in the wake of the emergence of a modern Turkish state fueled theological differences in the Sunni Muslim world.

Religion and Politics in the Muslim World

While that may have been a contributing factor, Kuru’s analysis suggested that the evolution of relations between the state and religious scholars in the Sunni Muslim world would have prevented it from adopting the European model irrespective of external attitudes towards the caliphate. So did the absence in Islam of a central authority like the pope.

Kuru traced the modern-day state template in many Muslim-majority countries to the 11th century. This is when Islamic scholars who until then had, by and large, refused to surrender their independence to the state were co-opted by Muslim rulers. The transition coincided with the rise of the military state legitimized by religious scholars who had little choice but to join its employ. They helped the state develop Sunni Muslim orthodoxy based on text rather than reason- or tradition-based interpretations of Islam.

It is an orthodoxy that prevails until today even though various states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have adopted far-reaching social change as part of economic reform efforts and as a regime survival strategy. The orthodoxy is reflected in reticence with few exceptions to reform outdated religious legal tenets, particularly when it comes to notions of the state.

In a bold move in February, Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest, Indonesia-based Muslim civil society movement argued that Islamic jurisprudence needs to be to introduce the notion of the nation-state and a United Nations that groups these states.

The movement contended that this would involve abolishing the notion of the caliphate as a legal concept. “It is neither feasible nor desirable to re-establish a universal caliphate that would unite Muslims throughout the world in opposition to non-Muslims…. Attempts to do so will inevitably be disastrous and contrary to the purposes of Sharia (Islamic law): i.e., the protection of religion, human life, sound reasoning, family, and property,” the group said in a declaration on its centennial according to the Hijra calendar.

Nahdlatul Ulama’s reforms of Islamic jurisprudence do not bind others in a Muslim world where religious authority is decentralized. However, they lay down a marker that other Muslim legal authorities will ultimately be unable to ignore in their bid to garner recognition as proponents of a genuinely moderate Islam. As a result, politics rather than morality or spirituality will determine Nahdlatul Ulama’s impact beyond Indonesia, the world’s most populous and largest Muslim-majority democracy.

The importance of politics is reinforced by the implicit agreement between scholars Gryzmala-Busse , Laurence and Kuru that the state has successfully subjugated religious power in Europe as well as much of the Sunni Muslim world.

However, the difference is that in Europe the church withdrew from politics and retreated to the spiritual realm while in the Muslim world religious figures retain some clout with rulers wanting them to legitimize their authoritarian or autocratic rule.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Ironically, this order does not have much order. A term in vogue at the Pentagon applies. This term refers to a volatile, complex, uncertain and ambiguous (VUCA) world. The rules-based order that the US created after World War II stands weakened. Most states are operating in a world of shifting allegiances, maximizing their national interest in a quid pro quo basis.

Two blocs have emerged, one led by the US and the other by China. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is an economic giant. Its per capita income may be much lower than the US but the size of its population gives it heft. In many areas of technology, China is now a world leader. Nations of the Global South such as Brazil, Kenya and Saudi Arabia are now making advantageous deals with both blocs.

Geopolitics Matters

Sir Halford John Mackinder, the father of geopolitics and geostrategy, offers a good model to look at the current situation. He posited that the Eurasian landmass from Brest to Vladivostok is one fundamental entity. This generally has a dominant power, which is the continental power. France, Germany and Russia have been this power. Today, this continental power is China, which calls itself the Middle Kingdom.

Historically, the littoral states such as the UK, the Baltics and even Italy allied against the continental hegemon. Now, littoral states such as Taiwan, South Korea and Japan are allying with the US, which is on a different landmass, to counter China. That is why Taiwanese and South Korean leaders have been visiting the US. It is precisely for this reason that The Philippines conducted its largest ever military exercises with the US.

However, Mackinder’s explanation is not complete. Economics is important too. France constructs nuclear power stations and top quality Airbus planes. French luxury goods such as Chanel and Christian Dior are still world leaders. The biggest demand for all things French lie in China. Therefore, French President Emmanuel Macron showed up to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping. 

Economics Matters Too

Macron and, before him, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz showed up to meet Xi for the same reason. Both of them want to maintain good relations with China. This relationship guarantees thousands of jobs. As leaders responsible for their economies, they have to make sure that a Xi-led China continues to be a reliable export market. Unlike the US, neither France nor Germany have large enough domestic markets. They need China today in a way the US does not. Therefore, they are not entirely aligned with the US on China.

The same is true for Brazil. In 2021, China accounted for 31.3% of Brazil’s exports. The US came a distant second and accounted for 11.2% of Brazilian exports. Brazilian soybeans, iron ore and oil now feed the Chinese industrial machine, which has an insatiable appetite for commodities. At a time of economic trouble, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has no option but to visit China and cultivate relations with Xi.

Even the US now depends on Chinese imports. A rupture in US-China trade relations would push the cost of far too many products up in Walmart and on Amazon. So, we now live in an inextricably intertwined world.

Yet it is important to remember that the world has always been interconnected. The reason the US exists is because the Turks disrupted Europe’s trade with the East. The quest for silk and spices led Europeans to the Americas. Once they discovered silver, this underpinned the global economy. Spain and Portugal became global powers. The UK and France followed.

Few know that a third of the silver from Latin America ended up in China. It fueled trade and then inflation. The 1580 , which instituted payment of all taxes and tributes in silver, led to the fall of the Ming Dynasty.

Yet China’s trade surplus continued until the UK started exporting opium to the Middle Kingdom. The British monetized its colony in India by growing opium there and exporting it to China, causing starvation for brown people and addiction for yellow people. Naturally, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Ireland only won its independence in the 20th century and Northern Ireland is still a part of the UK) made a handsome profit and improved its balance of payments as a result.

However, this phenomenon is a historical aberration. China has been the dominant global economy for centuries. The US is a relatively new phenomenon. The global domination of the US is even newer. As the world reverts to its historical mean, the great balancing game has kicked off in right earnest.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: The Great Balancing Game in the New World Order appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Shared with journalists on his flight back from China, Macron’s thoughts were focused not on Ukraine but on the hypothesis that the US might seek to use the issue of Taiwan’s status to engage NATO in a proxy war with China, following a pattern similar to Ukraine. Western media nearly unanimously upbraided Macron, if not for violating a sacred commitment or disrespect for the moral authority of NATO, at least for its inappropriate timing. Responsible people don’t make destabilizing statements like that in times of war, when everyone is expected to pitch in.

Clearly nobody wanted to hear, let alone analyze the significance of the point Macron seemed to be making. Taiwan is, after all, officially a province of China, though it has been permitted to function autonomously. Aware of the increasingly belligerent rhetoric in Washington, the French president feared that the US might be tempted to act in ways intended to provoke a military action by China. This would subsequently engage NATO and oblige France to follow. Macron saw that hypothesis as justifying a European declaration of independence from NATO.

I was curious how much Chad happened to know about this episode or the general question of how NATO’s solidarity plays out in cases of extreme confrontation.

“Reading between the lines,” I said, “especially given things he has said in the past indicating his lack of confidence in NATO, Macron appears ready to consider breaking with NATO over the Taiwan issue. In the context of NATO’s and France’s ongoing engagement in supporting Ukraine’s resistance to Russia, is there any legal justification for Macron’s position?”

Chad immediately clarified the legal context.

“NATO operates on the principle of collective defense, where an attack against one member is considered an attack against all members. This principle is enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that the members of NATO will assist any member that is the subject of an armed attack.

However, the decision to invoke Article 5 is a political one, and each member has the sovereign right to decide whether or not to participate in a particular military action. The decision to participate in military operations is based on national policies, and each country has the right to formulate and execute its foreign policy independently.

In the case of Ukraine, while it is not a member of NATO, the alliance has provided political and military support to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. This support has included economic assistance, training and advice for Ukrainian armed forces, and sanctions against Russia. However, NATO has not invoked Article 5 in this conflict, as it is not an armed attack against a member state.

In the context of a hypothetical conflict between the US and China over Taiwan, it is unclear whether such a conflict would be considered an armed attack against a NATO member state. However, if France believed that its sovereignty was being violated by its presence in NATO and its obligation to participate in a particular military action, it may consider breaking with the alliance over that issue. Whether such a move would be legally justified would depend on the specific circumstances and the interpretation of the relevant international treaties and agreements.”

Chad’s answer was helpful. The question of mutual security commitments from so many nations with contrasting interests is by definition complex. There are no simple answers. Hoping to get some clarity, I continued with another question.

“Some analysts claim that what is clearly a proxy war in Ukraine is not about the defense of Ukraine as much as about preparing regime change in Russia. They suggest that the same logic is at play concerning Taiwan. It would mean using a bordering territory to destabilize a rival great power and eventually bring down the current regime. Does anything in the history of recent US foreign policy substantiate this interpretation?”

“It is true that the US has a history of involvement in regime change operations in other countries. Some notable examples include the 1953 coup in Iran, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, and the 1973 coup in Chile. In more recent years, there have been accusations of US involvement in regime change attempts in countries such as Venezuela and Syria.

In the case of Ukraine, the US and its European allies have been supportive of Ukraine’s pro-Western government and have provided political and economic assistance in the face of Russian aggression. However, it is unclear to what extent this support is motivated by a desire to bring about regime change in Russia. While some analysts may hold this view, others may argue that the primary motivation is to counter Russian influence in the region and support Ukraine’s sovereignty.

With regards to Taiwan, the US has a long-standing policy of supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence from China, and has provided military and economic support to Taiwan for decades. However, the US has also pursued a policy of engagement with China, recognizing it as a rising global power and seeking to maintain a stable and constructive relationship. While there may be concerns about China’s behavior in the region and its potential threat to Taiwan, it is unclear to what extent the US would be willing to engage in a conflict with China over Taiwan, and whether regime change in China is a primary objective.”

Again, I appreciated Chad’s recognition of the complexity of the issues.

“You’re absolutely right to say that none of this is clear” I said approvingly. “The question on everyone’s mind today is what happens when the rhetoric gets so heated there is no way to back down. We are hearing more and more voices in politics and the media telling us that Americans should think of China as an enemy. In other words, Americans are being told they are at war with a nation that has a population four times greater than the US. We are also hearing members of Congress push for the independence of Taiwan, in violation of the accepted One China policy. And despite the fact that the Taiwanese people have consistently responded in surveys that they do not seek independence from China, but merely the autonomy of the current status quo. With a looming presidential election in the US, isn’t it likely or simply possible that if politicians and the media insist that China is the enemy, there is a real danger of direct confrontation? Couldn’t something similar to the Ukraine situation occur?”

“It is certainly a possibility that heated rhetoric and actions could lead to direct confrontation between the US and China. The current US-China relationship is complex, and tensions have risen in recent years over issues such as trade, human rights, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. While some politicians and media outlets in the US have been increasingly vocal about China as an adversary, others have called for more constructive engagement and cooperation with China.”

“I take that point, but I’m really worried about what the effect of the presidential campaign over the next 18 months will have. I think even you, with your insistence on always seeing a balance between two opposing sides, have noticed that political rhetoric in the US is reaching dangerous levels and that the famous “shoot first, ask questions later” mentality might be leading us to a brink.”

Chad nodded sadly as I concluded, “No time for that today. Let’s pick up the discussion tomorrow.”

*[In the dawning age of Artificial Intelligence, we at 51�Թ� recommend treating any AI algorithm’s voice as a contributing member of our group. As we do with family members, colleagues or our circle of friends, we quickly learn to profit from their talents and, at the same time, appreciate the social and intellectual limits of their personalities. This enables a feeling of camaraderie and constructive exchange to develop spontaneously and freely. For more about how we initially welcomed Chad to our breakfast table, click here.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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