Turkey has been seeking to drive out the Kurds from its borders and disarm Kurdish forces in Syria. Russia’s priority, however, is to eliminate Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s rivals. The Kurds want their rights to be recognized within Syria and also by the international community. Recent developments indicate that both Moscow and the Kurds may be closer to achieving their goals than Ankara.   

Turkey and Russia have had signed many in the past, such as on Idlib, and the majority of them have been unbalanced in Russia’s favor. Moreover, the Kremlin has never fulfilled its when it comes to Syria. For , despite agreements between Russia and Turkey to prevent Assad’s forces from attacking Idlib, Damascus has kept up its attacks on the province, and Moscow shows no interest in stopping them. Russia can simply suspend the implementation of what has been agreed between Putin and Erdogan this time, and there is little Turkey can do to confront Moscow.

Understanding the Memorandum

In order to understand who has gained what, it is important to untangle the nuanced language used in this , and what each point really means. The memorandum, once again, demonstrates Vladimir Putin’s diplomatic savviness.

First of all, the two sides reiterated their “commitment to the preservation of the political unity and territorial integrity of Syria and the protection of national security of Turkey.” This is the basis of the , but Russia and Iran have always expressed their that the nature of Turkey’s actions threatens the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Syria. This part of the agreement, therefore, has with the Kurds because Russia has never claimed the Kurds want independence in Syria. Consequently, addressing Syrian territorial integrity is an indication of to Turkey’s move to occupy parts of Syria.

Second, the two sides emphasized their “determination to combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations and to disrupt separatist agendas in the Syrian territory.” This may sound like a reflection of Turkish concerns regarding what it considers to be Kurdish terrorism. However, Russia doesn’t consider the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) or the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to be either terrorist organizations or separatists. Thus, this second point doesn’t indicate that Russia has changed its position and now recognizes the YPG or PYD as terror groups.

On the contrary, despite Turkey’s opposition, during the joint press conference, that he recognizes Kurdish rights as part of multicultural Syria, insisting that the Kurdish issue should be resolved through negotiations with Damascus. Additionally, Russia has always been open to the idea of a , something that the Kurds are pushing for. Furthermore, in practice, Putin regards Turkish-backed groups that Erdogan refers to as the to be organizations.

Third, the memorandum calls for the preservation of the established status quo in the current Operation Peace Spring area covering Tel Abyad (Gre Spi) and Ras Al Ayn (Sari Kani) within a depth of 32 kilometers inside Syria. Turkish officials have been presenting this point as a great success for Turkey. However, there are two growing issues. First of all, YPG forces may conduct attacks in these areas alongside Assad forces in order to push back against Turkey and Turkish-backed groups, so this so-called safe zone could turn into a war zone. Putin will not concede this for nothing in return.

We also can’t ignore that the two leaders may have discussed the province as well. There could very well be a , in which the forces it backs in the province. Indeed, at the same time as the Sochi summit was being held, Bashar al-Assad was visiting his troops in Idlib as they started , aiming to move forward and take more territory from Turkey-backed groups. This could result in another war zone in the area, with Turkey having to back down and watch the groups it backs crumble.

For Russia, Idlib has always been the most difficult part to retake. The region is by al-Qaeda affiliated groups, which have the most battle-hardened fighters, supported by Turkey. The could be the end of in Syria, leaving Turkish experts to what Erdogan is going to do with the 110,000 rebels it backs, who are mostly Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda fighters.

Arm Twists and Handshakes

Fourth, both sides reaffirmed the importance of the , with the Russian side agreeing to facilitate its implementation in the current circumstances. This is where Vladimir Putin finally finds his opportunity to twist Erdogan’s arm. For years, Russia has been trying to stop Erdogan from pursuing the with the help of Sunni Islamist groups and to reestablish relations between Syria and regional countries, domestic forces and the population of Syria. By pushing Erdogan to accept working within the framework of the Adana agreement, Russia wants Erdogan to the regime in Damascus, with Moscow facilitating a handshake between Erdogan and Assad. For the first time, Russia turned this into a written commitment.

However, Erdogan has to do more than shake hands and recognize Assad’s regime. According to a signed between Syria and Turkey in 2011, known as the Ankara agreement, the Adana agreement is only valid if the 2011 accord is implemented. According to that document, Turkey is obliged to fight groups threatening Assad’s regime. It will be interesting to follow how this will work out for Turkey.  

As per article 5 of the memorandum, Russian military police and Syrian border guards will enter the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border, outside the area of Operation Peace Spring, to facilitate the removal of YPG elements and their weapons to the depth of 30 kilometers from the Turkish-Syrian border, which should be finalized in 150 hours. At that moment, joint Russian-Turkish patrols will start in the west and the east of the area of Operation Peace Spring with a depth of 10 kilometers, except Qamishli city, the capital of the Kurdish region in Syria.

Since 2011, Erdogan has been trying to keep Syrian government forces away from the borders. The Turkish president has continuously that the “Syrian regime has lost its legitimacy and is not in a position to ensure its territorial integrity.” Now, Erdogan is forced to back down from this position and endorse the Russian-Iranian roadmap for the Syrian army to take control of the borders. Moreover, Kurdish-led (SDF), founded under the umbrella of the YPG, do not have any issue with this as they have been asking Assad and the Russians to take control of the Turkey-Syrian border for years.

Once Assad’s forces are well positioned at the border, Russia-Turkey joint patrols would likely end. The fact that the SDF was not mentioned in this memorandum is also interesting and might be deliberate.

Furthermore, according to the , which works closely with the Kurdish-led administration in northern Syria, before the Putin-Erdogan summit, a Russian delegation met with the Kurds. As a result, it would appear that the Kurds and the Russians had on handing over border control to Russian and Syrian government forces the Sochi summit. Consequently, Russian and Syrian forces have taken the control of border areas between Minbaj and Derik (Al-Malikiyah). It is hard to imagine that YPG forces would fully beyond the mandated 30 kilometers, and it has been reported that the YPG has simply in the border areas to “” and is conducting joint patrols with Russian forces.

In fact, a border secured by Russia and Syria would enable the Kurds to focus on domestic issues. Approximately 40% of SDF forces were positioned at the borders, but now they can spend more time and resources on infrastructure, education, internal security and countering the Islamic State. Without having anti-aircraft rockets, a missile defense system and not being able to control the airspace, Kurdish forces cannot protect the borders from attacks.

Moreover, the Kurds and the Russians have been discussing a to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army as a . The commander-in-chief of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, has also that his forces would have independence within the military arrangement. If this agreement is implemented, Turkey will have no other choice but to digest the fact that Kurdish forces will remain in the region, but under a different name. Erdogan had hoped to establish a across Syrian-Turkish borders all the way to Iraq, with military checkpoints inside Kurdish regions, like in Idlib. However, Putin has agreed to none of his .

Moveable Border

The memorandum also stipulates that all YPG forces and their weapons will be removed from Manbij and Tal Rifat in west Euphrates. Turkey sees the presence of the YPG as a threat to regions it currently occupies, such as Jerablous and the Kurdish province of Afrin, where the Kurdish forces are Turkey-backed groups. Here, Turkey has not only gained very little, but this arrangement could in fact soon turn into a nightmare for Ankara for two principal reasons. First of all, YPG forces from Manbij back in June 2018, and the Manbij Military Council, which is part of the SDF, is currently in charge. Moreover, prior to the Sochi summit, in an agreement reached between the SDF and Russia, Russian and Syrian forces were deployed to the region to prevent attacks from Turkey.

Second of all, with regards to the YPG forces in Tal Rifat, if the integration of SDF forces (mentioned in article 5 of the memorandum) happens, the first result — which the Kurds have always requested — would be a joint attack on Turkish-backed jihadist groups that have been occupying Afrin. This has always been the primary demand of the SDF regarding any cooperation with the Syrian army. In return, SDF forces may help the Syrian army to province held by . It is precisely this partnership that Erdogan never wanted to materialize.

Article 7 of the memorandum stipulates that “both sides will take necessary measures to prevent infiltrations of terrorist elements.” The reality is that, since 2012, the borders controlled by the Kurds have been the most secure and safest borders with Turkey. As such, this article is in fact about border crossings where Turkish-backed groups are operating, .

Article 8 states that “joint efforts will be launched to facilitate the return of refugees in a safe and voluntary manner.” This suggests that Erdogan’s map of the safe zone has been dismissed. What Erdogan had in mind was establishing a 32-kilometer-deep and 480-kilometer-long safe zone, controlled by Turkey inside Syria, as well as sending back 2 million Syrian refugees. However, Turkey would only be able to conduct joint patrols with Russian forces, in a limited area and only 10 kilometers inside Syria. Furthermore, Turkey will not know if the Kurdish forces and their weapons have withdrawn the promised 30 kilometers, and would have to accept Russia’s word for it. More importantly, Assad’s forces have already started an operation in Ras al-Ayn to drive out the rebels, and are ongoing.

Consequently, Turkish public opinion will demand to know what the point of the incursion was. Moreover, with regards to Syrian refugees, the only way they would voluntarily return to their country is if a political settlement has been achieved in the conflict, as they would evidently prefer going back to their hometowns than an area that could soon turn into a war zone.

In addition, Syrian refugees would not trust Turkish-backed groups positioned in the safe zone to protect them. There is a worldwide understanding that the is mostly formed of al-Qaeda and Islamic State fighters. Needless to say, Syrian refugees would therefore not return to a region held by these forces, as the majority of them fled in the first place because of the very same groups. In essence, the aim of this article of the memorandum is to keep the dynamic of conflict alive. Indeed, by preventing Turkey from forcing the Syrian refugees to return, Assad and the Kurdish forces keep the option open to take back these areas.

As mandated by article 9, a joint monitoring and verification mechanism will be established to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the memorandum. Many may think this is a solid guarantee. However, if Russia rejects the grievances Turkey may have with this memorandum, Ankara will receive no backing from the West or regional countries having gone against not to invade northeastern Syria. Now that the Americans have left the border area, and with Turkey facing for its invasion, the fate of this monitoring process currently rests in the hands of Russia. As a result, Turkey is now on its own and soon may even face from the rebels it .

Finally, the two sides have agreed to “continue to work on finding a lasting political solution to the Syrian conflict within the Astana Mechanism and will support the activity of the Constitutional Committee.” One of the main reasons behind the failure of both the Geneva and the Astana talks is the exclusion of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, which still one third of the country. Since the start of peace negotiations, Turkey has been the only force behind banning the administration from having a seat at the table.

However, now that Turkey is under unprecedented pressure, Russia and other players may push Ankara to accept the participation of the Kurds in the ongoing talks. Indeed, in the , President Putin made it clear that “the rights of the Kurds in Syria should be respected.” Furthermore, for the first time, Americans are publicly talking about for the Kurds at the negotiation table. This stipulation of the memorandum could yet turn into the final nail in the coffin of Turkey’s invasion of Kurdish lands.

Playing their Hand

Nonetheless, it all depends on how the Kurds play their hand. It is important that they maintain their in Syria. Ironically, the Kurds are now arguably in a better position than before Turkey’s invasion in terms of their political demands as well as militarily. Predictably, Erdogan’s move has been highly for Turkey. For instance, for the first time, Kurdish politicians in Syria are by foreign ministers, invited to the US and meeting with .

Abdi has been invited to the White House, has held talks with the Russian defense minister and was praised by US President Donald Trump. The international community, with public opinion behind it, is for the first time openly Turkey’s claims of “border security” and the “YPG threat.”

In addition, there is now an emerging consensus among the international community that Turkey’s priority is not counterterrorism but the of the Kurds and other minorities in the region — not an unfamiliar pattern with regards to Turkey’s in the past. Furthermore, Turkey is now accused of and of using against civilians, which could have severe implications for Ankara.

Moreover, it is unlikely that Russia would sound the for the Kurds as neither the Kurds nor the Arabs in northeastern Syria accept Assad’s rule over their region. Consequently, Russia will try to gain some legitimacy for Assad by working with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria until a political solution is reached. This explains Moscow’s on the need for negotiations between the Kurds and Damascus as vital. The Russians have also made it clear that they are willing to do anything necessary in this regard.

Additionally, keeping some US forces in the SDF-held territories as well as reports of heavy of US forces to the region give the Kurds another card to play in their negotiations with Moscow and Syria. Nevertheless, the Kurds should also reach out to Europe and regional countries for support in order to make a success of these talks.

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Finally, beyond demonstrating that this invasion is not going to according to Erdogan’s plan, the memorandum is also having deeper consequences for the Turkish president. What is revealing are the that are beginning to appear within Turkey’s political circles, even more so among those who initially supported President Erdogan’s move. A former Turkish government official has recently asked the , and the very same Turkish expert who cheered Turkey’s military operations is now asking Erdogan to in Syria.

More importantly, the leader of the main opposition group in Turkey, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who publicly supported Erdogan’s invasion of Syria, is now Erdogan of “arming terrorist and jihadists and isolating Turkey.” In a speech before parliament, Kilicdaroglu went on to accuse Ankara, alongside Qatar, of facilitating the passage of terrorists from Asia, Europe and America through Turkey into Syria. Turkey is also with undermining the fight against the Islamic State, with questions being asked about how the group’s notorious leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was killed in a US raid on October 26, was able to hide for months in a region controlled by Turkish army and intelligence.

It seems that now that Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s supporters have understood that what they hoped for with this military operation is not going to happen, many are trying to distance themselves from the president. Indeed, with Turkey’s move backfiring, Ankara’s gamble may end up costing it an unexpectedly high price.

*[This piece has been updated.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Turkey’s Syria Gamble May Be a Losing Game appeared first on 51�Թ�.

There is a tendency in Western policymaking circles to view the consequences of Iran’s actions as being confined to the Middle East. Recent attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman clearly demonstrate the fact that Iran’s actions are not only targeting regional countries. Tehran’s ambitions to build on its anti-Western ideology and strategy have now become a threat to the wider international community with its targeting of the freedom of navigation that affects the interests of global actors.

An increasingly powerful and violent Hezbollah doesn’t overly trouble the mind of Western observers, even when the organization’s bomb factory in London and its are revealed to the world. A Houthi missile strike, using Tehran’s latest delivery of weaponry, may be met with quiet disapproval, but it isn’t taken seriously as a threat beyond the confines of the region. This may explain a continued European desire to appease Iran.

However, this appeasement fundamentally overlooks the threat that such instability poses further afield, based on the misguided view that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his cronies can be placated. Accordingly, this policy has further emboldened Iran, deepened the current crisis and could have severe international consequences.

When the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in 2015, it is often forgotten that it was meant to be the first in a series of accords. Future agreements aimed at curtailing Iranian support for proxies was intended as next on the list. Yet the Western signatories patted themselves on the back and considered it a job well done, ignoring the concerns of Iran’s neighbors — those on the frontline of Tehran’s violence and aggression. Ultimately, the nuclear deal simply freed Iran to further ramp up this behavior.

In Yemen, for example, despite the JCPOA being in place for most of the conflict, Iran has continued to ship to the Houthi rebels. This aid has come in form of increasingly sophisticated drones, powerful missiles and other high-tech arms. In turn, this weaponry has been targeted at oil tankers bound for Europe in the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and at Saudi Aramco pipelines. The much heralded JCPOA did nothing to arrest these increasingly hostile actions having a direct impact on oil supplies vital to global stability.

Just last week the world witnessed this hostility in full effect. The compelling evidence of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) trying to when a bomb planted on one of the oil tankers targeted in the Strait of Hormuz on June 13 failed to explode, exemplified in disturbing footage released by the United States Navy, highlights the desperate measures Tehran is willing to resort to. The Gulf of Oman is one of the world’s busiest shipping routes, for a third of the world’s seaborne oil supplies. Aggression in this arena is clearly designed to provoke a response from powers beyond the region. It is an effort to signal to the rest of the world that no one is beyond Iran’s reach.

While all-out hostilities are not in anyone’s interest for, Tehran is trying to push the situation as close to the brink as possible. These are the increasingly desperate acts of a regime with a diminishing number of options. The disintegration of the JCPOA has cut off a vital financial lifeline, one which has been used to fund proxies with increasingly complex weaponry. This was demonstrated in full effect by the Houthis’ for a “cash-strapped” Hezbollah.

The increasingly dire economic situation in the country, in part due to this drying up of funds, has rattled the regime. Protests across Iran have been rumbling in the background for some time now. People are fed up with a corrupt government channeling billions to foreign extremist groups when infrastructure needs upgrading, living standards are falling and public services are in desperate need of improvement. Where the JCPOA failed to tackle Iran’s predilection for proxy violence, it seems people power is starting to have some impact.

America has done what European nations have thus far failed to do: call out Tehran on its destructive behavior. The people of Iran have done what European nations have thus far failed to do: call on Tehran to end its support for proxy extremists. However, the desire to heighten tension further remains strong within the country’s governing circles. Iran claims to be a global power, with recent events finally waking the world up to the wider threat the Islamic Republic poses. Maybe the West will now realize that standing up to Tehran’s destabilization efforts is not just a matter of regional interest.

It is also evident that Iranian proxies are in conducting attacks on oil tankers. In response, Europeans should sanction Iran’s proxies, as well as confront these groups effectively through closer military and intelligence cooperation with the United States. Iran has crossed a line, and it is time for the UK and Europe to join America in putting maximum pressure on Tehran rather than pursuing a futile and divergent policy.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post It’s Time the World Wakes Up to Iran’s Threat appeared first on 51�Թ�.

On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran from exile and, 10 days later, 2,500 thousand years of monarchy . Although the of those who started the revolution against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi were , the Iranian Revolution is known, above all, because of the leadership of Ruhollah Khomeini. Indeed, Khomeini knew that and rivals in a short period of time was key to holding power for decades. The ayatollah and his successor, Ali Khamenei, managed a unique and successful policy never seen before in Iran’s history: Since 1986, none of the main Persian opposition groups have managed to organize and bring people on to the streets in opposition to the regime.

Many opposition groups believed a foreign hand was behind Khomeini’s dramatic rise to power. However, in reality they always underestimated the supreme leader’s extraordinary ability to organize his networks and gather support, as well as the power and long-lasting legacy, of the religious cult he created. For instance, at the beginning of the revolution, Khomeini shuttered universities, which were the of other opposition groups and student movements, for two years in the name of the . Instead, he built more mosques to strengthen his organized support, and executed and assassinated figures who posed a potential threat to his power inside and outside the country.

Moreover, against the Kurds, and separatists in order to unite Persian nationalists behind him. Finally, he broke all ties between opposition groups and the people by pushing dissenters out of the country. Consequently, out of 12 known opposition groups, apart from the Kurds and some organized underground cells in Ahwaz and Baluchestan regions, no other opposition groups have any base inside the country. Any opposition group is treated as anti-Islamic Revolution force and, therefore, is an “enemy of God.”

This tactic was and has remained the Islamic regime’s key success in thwarting any attempts at regime change since Khomeini established his Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). A majority of Persians and non-Persians share the same goal when it comes to overthrowing the regime. However, ethnic minorities and Persian opposition groups do not have any political goals in common when it comes to post-IRI.

Political Masterstroke

According to Dr. Amir Abbasi, a university lecturer in Tehran, “The lack of an effective opposition group in the central part of the country is devastating, and the prospect of change in Iran coming from the people is becoming a weaker option. People do not think that opposition groups active only on social media have the capability of confronting Khomeini’s regime.” This highlights Khomeini’s political masterstroke of disabling the opposition through arrest, torture, execution and exile, which have played out over decades: Despite significant resistance to the regime, opposition groups have not been able to physically organize and lead Iran toward change.

Bahman Karimi, a masters student in Isfahan, claims that “In Iran, there are organized, and in some cases, armed Azeri, Kurdish, Ahwazi Arab and Baluchi , but the people do not see any organized Persian group. Ethnic minority opposition groups have shown that they are capable of confronting Tehran, however, they are not willing to take the lead in any regime change efforts unless their demands are met.”

After the revolution, ethnic minorities were the only ones who opposed Ayatollah Khomeini and his cult. But the supreme leader managed to use against them, labeling anyone opposing him as a pro-Saddam traitor during the Iraq-Iran War, and setting Shia Muslims against Sunni Baluchis — all compounded by Persian nationalism.

Consequently, with minorities from Tehran, these groups have distanced themselves from any Persian-led opposition. The reason is because both the shah and the Islamic regime embraced Persian-Iranian nationalism, which has systematically excluded ethnic minorities such as Azeris, Ahwazi Arabs, Baluchis, Turkmen and Kurds and others who comprise almost half of the population in Iran.

This policy, however, backfired. The fate of the Tehran-based ��is revealing. When protesters demanded the removal of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from office following the 2009 election, a political movement arose and failed in a short period of time. The main reason behind the was that ethnic minorities . The movement didn’t manage to reach into the country beyond Tehran and some parts of Isfahan and Mashhad.

However, during the Iran protests in December 2017 and January 2018, Kurds, Azeris, Baluchis and Ahwazi Arabs in leading the protests. The first anti-regime slogans were chanted in the Kurdish city of Kermanshah, followed by Ahwazi Arabs and Baluchis. Moreover, the Kurds and Ahwazi Arabs took the lead and turned the protests into the biggest and most significant opposition to the regime since 1979, with protests reaching all the provinces of Iran.

Abbasi states: “One of the most effective ways to confront the regime is to promote Iranian nationalism. However, due to decades of oppression and discrimination by Tehran against ethnic minorities, we cannot talk about Iranian nationalism anymore. We have Kurdish, Azeri, Ahwazi Arab, Baluchi and Persian nationalism. Even Persian nationalism is divided between two camps of anti and pro-regime. Any efforts to promote Iranian nationalism without taking the views of ethnic minorities, who form more than 50% of the population, will fail.”

Key Role

Indeed, one of the main reasons the 1979 revolution succeeded that is rarely mentioned is that ethnic minorities were determined to overthrow the shah as they wanted to a democratic and federalized Iran. However, Ayatollah Khomeini crushed any democratic aspirations, first and foremost by labeling federalism as separatism —��hence the felt today by ethnic minorities toward Persian or Iranian nationalism, as it has always excluded them from any national project.

For instance, long before Khomeini’s return and the victory of revolutionary forces in Tehran, the monarchy had already collapsed in Kurdish, Azeri and Ahwaz regions. One year before the revolution, the shah and his army had the revolutionary forces in Tehran, Qom and Isfahan, and stopped the protests by the end of January 1978. However, on February 18, 1978, ��into the revolution by starting mass protests and taking over cities one after the other, which became known as the February 18 Uprising.

In fact, even Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei that without Tabriz and other Azeri cities rising up the revolution had no chance of succeeding. At the same time, , and by the end of 1978, the army had fled, and the Kurds took control of the region. Contrary to popular perception, Tehran, Isfahan and Qom were the last cities to fall into the hands of revolutionary forces.

However, while ethnic minorities sought to participate in the creation of a new federalized system, Islamists had very successfully and shrewdly managed to portray Khomeini as the most charismatic . In turn, Persian nationalists regarded Khomeini as their new shah, who would secure a centralized government under Persian rule, to the extent that many fervent supporters of the shah then became equally fervent supporters of Khomeini who promoted Persian nationalism at the expense of ethnic minorities.

Furthermore, according to US diplomatic cables, during this chaotic period the West had already recognized Khomeini as the best option for the West. Even years after the revolution, when Iran was in Europe one after the other, Tehran got away with it without facing any repercussions. In return, according to the revealed documents, that he would be a good friend to the West. This promise was broken as soon as he secured his position, just like his other promises made to the Iranian people.

Another Revolution?

Khomeini succeeded in taking over the revolution through foreign support but also by crushing all opposition groups and ethnic minorities’ aspirations for ��— hence the longevity of the Islamic regime. Nevertheless, as the revolution marked its 40th anniversary this year, it should perhaps not come as much of a surprise that discontent continues amongst Iranians. Indeed, since the protests started in December 2017, the prospect of regime change through revolution has become one of the main topics.

However, according to some experts, expecting a possibility of a revolution, without any support from outside, may be unrealistic. Dr. Reza Parchizadeh, an Iranian political theorist and analyst, believes that “The security apparatus of the regime is tightly monitoring all the movements inside the country. Any movement with the intention of regime change, or even making any kind of meaningful change, will be harshly crushed. That is why many Iranians expect the US and its allies to finish off the Islamist regime once and for all.”

One of the figures advocating for regime change since the advent of the protests is Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah, who calls himself “the prince.” For some Persian , he is “the true representative of the Iranian will,” and they are asking the international community to recognize him as “the leader of Iranian democratic opposition.” However, ethnic minority groups and Iranian experts do not agree with this position.��A key success of Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime has been dividing nations inside Iran. Despite a strong opposition from ethnic minorities to the regime, they also strongly refuse to side with Persian nationalists and centric opposition groups such as the monarchists and the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq. Apart from the monarchists, no one believes that the country will ever unite behind him and his father’s legacy.

Parchizadeh says: “I do not think that the country will unite behind Reza Pahlavi. Monarchists do not have the necessary means inside Iran to challenge the regime, therefore, the monarchists cannot create a workable network to pose a threat to the Islamic Republic. Moreover, ethnic minority groups see Pahlavi as too centrist, and in many respects too close to the fundamentals of the discourse of the regime to trust him. An alliance that wants to attract the minorities must be more conscious of their plights and demands.”

Nonetheless, Turkey-based Iranian journalist Kaveh Taheri believes that “The exiled crown prince has the necessary means to challenge the regime as in some cities protesters chanted “Reza Shah, grandfather of Reza Pahlavi, god bless your soul.” Taheri also believes that “Although no polls have been conducted to know exactly the level of his popularity in Iran, Reza Pahlavi has a grassroots movement.” These contrasting views emphasize that regardless of the fact that regime change is inevitable, there are very divided opinions and a lack of unity on who can lead an opposition.

Moreover, according to Ahwazi Arab author and journalist Rahim Hamid, the political landscape in Iran has changed dramatically. “The international reality in 2019 is radically different from that of the international situation 40 years ago. Ethnic minorities have made great strides in their struggle during the rule of the mullahs, expanded their movement and succeeded in reaching out to most of the world’s influential centers … difficult to overcome. Furthermore, they have become the pillar for the success of any solution seeking security and stability in the region,” says Hamid.

Indeed, Iran’s history has shown that have always been the Achil�����’ heel for any regime. In essence, it seems current US administration’s policy is based on imposing sanctions and putting , mostly economic, on Tehran, hoping for people to take to the streets and oppose the regime. However, for ethnic minorities who have been facing for decades, financial difficulties and promoting Iranian nationalism will in pushing them to protest. Consequently, the pressure campaign is likely to fail due to lack of proper analysis on Iran, as well as excluding ethnic minorities from the media and political campaign against the current regime in Tehran.

*[Some of the names who live in Iran have been changed to protect their identity.]

��The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Without Ethnic Minorities, Regime Change in Iran Will Remain a Distant Hope appeared first on 51�Թ�.

On February��18, the head of Britain’s MI6 intelligence agency Israel to discuss Iran’s nuclear activity. Amid concerns that Tehran may be preparing to breach the conditions of the 2015 agreement, the visit may have been prompted by the new information about the country’s nuclear program. On January 22, in an�� with Iranian TV, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), revealed that “Iran has not removed the core of its Arak heavy water reactor nor poured cement into it.” It seems Salehi’s revelations could have been unintentional; Iranian media have since removed the interview, followed by a complete silence from the government.

In�� with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran was required to fill the calandria — the core of the —��at the Arak facility with cement to render it unusable. Iran was also prohibited from acquiring metal tubes that can make reactors suitable for plutonium production. As such, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors released a report by its director general, confirming that Iran had removed, and rendered inoperable, the Arak facility’s calandria. At the time, Iran that Arak’s heavy water nuclear reactor had been filled with cement.

However, according to Salehi, “Iran removed the calandria from the Arak reactor and poured cement into metal tubes contained within fuel bundles.” This contradicts the terms of the nuclear deal that stipulated the removal of calandria and covering the core of Arak reactor with cement in order to curb Iran’s ability to advance its nuclear ambition. Moreover, according to the negotiations, Iran was prohibited from purchasing new calandria.

Nonetheless, Salehi went on to say that “Iran had bought extra metal tube equivalents, transferred them to a secret location, and Iran has been using them since then.” Under the terms of the JCPOA, it is prohibited for Iran to have access to open calandria, which is used for nuclear application. “Only myself and the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, knew about buying calandria secretly. Neither P5+1, nor Iranian negotiators knew about this” said Salehi. He continued: “The international community would have asked us to fill new metal tubes with cement as well. That is why we never told them that we had these metal tube equivalents. That is why we hid this from P5+1 and the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

Nuclear Achievements

The head of AEOI described the move as “maintaining the bridges — achievements in our nuclear program — and, more importantly, building new bridges for the future.” What was revealing in Salehi’s statement, raising suspicions about the effectiveness of the JCPOA, was that Salehi praised the fact that the nuclear deal gave Iran the ability to produce plutonium:

“The Iran Deal made it possible for us to get rid of the 60-year-old Russian-made reactor in Arak and redesign the reactor to produce plutonium. We could not produce plutonium used to make bombs with the old reactor we had. Prior to signing the deal, we had designed our own reactor, but we were not sure if it would work. One of our conditions was that P5+1 scientists certify our designed reactor and, because of the JCPOA, American and Chinese experts confirmed that our own designed reactor is accurate and will work. This was a significant achievement for us.”

However, in November 2017, secretary of state under Barack Obama, John Kerry,�� that “Iran had the ability to produce plutonium.” Speaking at Chatham House in London, Kerry stated that “Iran was only two months away from making a nuclear bomb.” This claim has since been widely repeated in various global��media,��leading to the belief��that Iran had the capability to produce plutonium.��Now, if we are to believe Salehi’s words, this assertion seems to contradict the reality on the ground.

Nevertheless, Salehi did not mention whether Iran currently produces plutonium, nor did he mention the secret location of where the core and metal tubes are being used. Furthermore, during the JCPOA negotiations, Iran repeatedly�� to allow IAEA inspectors to visit the country’s Kurdish region. At the time, according to one of the members of P5+1, there were suspicions that Iran had a secret nuclear site in the Kurdish region — a claim repeatedly denied by Iran.

Nonetheless, the White House�� on its website that Iran agreed to allow the IAEA inspectors “to access and inspect any site they deem suspicious.” However, there is no indication of requests or visits to the Kurdish region in the IAEA reports. Consequently, on July 22, 2016, the Intelligence Organizations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), known as SAS, arrested a French and a British diplomat in the Kurdish region and seized their cameras. The IRGC released a����to diplomats in Iran, stating that the “Kurdish regions are IRGC’s red line, without getting permission from the IRGC and accompanied by the IRGC forces, no diplomat can visit the region.”

A year later, in September 2017, one of the Kurdish opposition groups�� one of the biggest secret IRGC sites in Iran. According to the report, the “site is built 400 meters underground, no one is allowed to go near the location, and the site is heavily secured by the IRGC forces for a five-mile radius.” It would appear significant that the location of this site is very close to where British and French diplomats were arrested. Yet the IAEA has never requested permission to visit the site.

New Capabilities

According to the latest�� by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Iran’s secret nuclear archive exposed by Israel “provides substantial evidence that Iran’s declarations to IAEA are incomplete and deliberately false.” Indeed, what Salehi revealed in his interview appears to confirm ISIS analysts’ report.

The IAEA has repeatedly confirmed that Iran is abiding by the nuclear deal. However, Salehi claimed that if “Iran withdraws from the deal, then Iran can take its steps much quicker than before.” If this is true, then the JCPOA has not curbed the regime’s nuclear capability, but has in fact facilitated the building of a new reactor for production of plutonium used in nuclear bombs —��a capability Iran did not have before. Tehran had always managed to keep many aspects of its nuclear program secret, and it would appear it may have succeeded in doing so again.

In essence, it is difficult to verify if Iran has violated the nuclear agreement, as its activities remain secret, and the statements coming from by the former US administration and Iran’s top officials in charge of the nuclear program are contradictory. Nevertheless, recent revelations by the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran give more weight to the current US administration’s that the Iran deal was indeed poorly negotiated.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On March 6, Musa Ghazanfarabadi, head of Tehran’s Revolutionary Court, , if necessary, to bring in foreign fighters to prevent an overthrow of the government. Speaking to young Islamic scholars and clerics in the city of Qom, Ghazanfarabadi claimed that “If internal forces fail to protect the regime, then the Houthi rebels, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) known as ‎al-Hashd al-Shaabi, Liwa Fatemiyoun, Liwa Zainebiyoun and other militia groups who are part of the axis of resistance will take over the task and protect the Islamic Revolution in Iran.”

This statement has triggered anger among Iranians on social media — the only platform where people from Iran can freely express themselves. Reza Haghighat Nejad, a prominent Iranian journalist, slammed those who have been fabricating justifications for Iran’s regional policies, : “Those who theorized the justifications behind Tehran’s regional policies and its support for militias did not really know that one day the regime will use these groups against our people in order to prevent regime change?”

Others by threatening the Iranian officials and claimed that “If people see foreign fighters in Tehran, Esfahan and elsewhere, then they will take up arms and will teach them a historic lesson.” Moreover, many that “This threat should be welcomed as it exposes the reality in Iran and indicates that Iranian people do not want��the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Bringing in foreign fighters to confront protesters is a clear indication of fear of regime change amongst Iranian officials.”

Many Iranians have�� this “a treason against Iran and its people,” with others that “This threat means if Iranians want freedom and democracy then they should pay the price.” Civil and human rights organizations also condemned the rhetoric and warned people that the Islamic Republic could well resort to the help of armed foreign groups to prop up its regime. “Ghazanfar Abadi’s statement must be taken seriously as Iran has used these groups in Syria to suppress and kill Syrians. There is no reason why the IRI will not use them against its own people,” the Tavaana E-Learning Institute for Iranian Civil Society.

Dr. Reza Parchizadeh, an Iranian political analyst, believes that Iran would use extremist groups against its people: “Rather than being a form of national government in a traditional sense, the Islamic Republic is a religious-military cult that regards Iran only as a source of capital and occasionally manpower to advance its goal of an Islamist global revolution. In other words, the Islamist regime’s loyalty is to the idea of a supranational Islamic State that includes vast swaths of the Middle East. That is why the IRI has no scruples whatsoever about using foreign forces of the same ideological nature against the people of Iran when the regime feels compelled to.”

Foreign militias established and supported by Iran in Syria, Iraq and Yemen have been by the UN and Human Rights Watch for and using child soldiers. Threats to target these militias against Iranian citizens are likely to push groups like the monarchists and Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) to take up arms to protect people. “Iran threatening to use foreign militia against its people is a crucial factor the Trump administration should take into account as it will not be the first time. Therefore, anyone trying to change Iran must take this into account,” says Parchizadeh.

Moreover, according to the latest conducted by Zamaneh, an independent media organization based in Amsterdam, there is an increasing tendency in Iranian society to take up arms against the government. According to this research, the main reason is protection against security forces when anti-regime protests erupt. For many Iranians, the threat coming from the country’s officials reminds them of the early years of the revolution in 1979, when tens of thousands were tortured and executed by the Islamic Revolutionary Courts.

In Qom, Ghazanfarabadi claimed that the clerics must change their methods in order to win over the youth: “Convincing the young generation to believe in the Islamic Revolution is becoming more difficult and impossible with our current programs. We need to change our methods and speeches to gather and galvanize support amongst the youth.” This is a clear indication that the ideological system in place since 1979 is losing its popularity and legitimacy among the younger generations.

What is shocking is that no Iranian official has responded to the statement coming from the head of Revolutionary Courts in Tehran. Despite people’s frustration, ongoing silence from the government on this issue suggests that using foreign fighters against people is likely to be an official decision. If so, a majority of Iranian opposition groups could seek financial and military support from countries willing to confront Iran.

It appears that Iran is facing unprecedented pressure at home, with Tehran willing to use all its power to push back against those who want fundamental changes. A threat to use foreign extremist groups against its own people is a clear indication that many within the Iranian security forces will not follow orders if mass protests erupt. There is a precedent for this when, during the 1979 Revolution, the army and security forces refused to obey their commanders and the shah’s orders to kill more people on the streets.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The ongoing saga of Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif shows how chaotic the government has become. On February 25, he announced his resignation via Instagram, : “I apologize for not being able to continue in the post and for all the shortcomings and flaws in the period.” President Hassan Rouhani has since his attempt to leave office.

The foreign minister’s are believed to have exposed a rift between Zarif and the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Zarif handed in his resignation soon after he was allegedly excluded from a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who visit to Iran since the civil war in began in 2011.

Yet part of the reason behind Zarif’s public attempt to resign was to pressure Khamenei into approving the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) — an intergovernmental body that sets global standards for banks — which Iran is required to be compliant with for anti-money laundering purposes. Indeed, this is the only card left for Rouhani and Zarif to play.

Whilst the news about Zarif was a shock to Western media, for Iranians it was not a surprise. It is believed that Zarif his resignation in January, days before the expediency discernment council’s first meeting to consider approving the FATF. Rouhani’s alleged reaction to the move was revealing. He said: “The supreme leader is not against the FATF, why are we not approving the FATF adoption?”

The answer to this may lie in Rouhani and Zarif’s failure to deliver on a host of promises. They were both tasked with 11 important issues, including a nuclear deal, improving the economy, ending the war in Yemen and approving the FATF. The nuclear agreement has since fallen apart following the US withdrawal in 2018, the economy is stagnant, the Yemen War has been prolonged by Tehran’s malign influence ��and the FATF remains unapproved.

Zarif’s role has increasingly been to promote Tehran’s missile program and defend human rights abuses in Iran. In reality, regional affairs and normalizing relations with other countries, or lack thereof, have been designed by Khamenei and Qasem Soleimani, chief commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force.

Due to failed promises over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the nuclear deal — especially economic pledges, Rouhani and Zarif have lost much credibility in the eyes of the people. Iranians who voted for Rouhani are disappointed in his government’s failure to resist hard-liners, many of whom opposed the JCPOA. Since Zarif essentially became a public relations officer for the “axis of resistance” — an alliance of Iran, Syria and Lebanon’s Hezbollah — Iranians have been increasingly convinced that neither Rouhani nor Zarif are capable of confronting the hard-liners.

Getting FATF Approved

Nevertheless, Zarif and Rouhani have one card left to play, which would require Iran to adopt FATF requirements. Despite Europe launching a so-called special purpose vehicle — a to “facilitate legitimate financial transactions with Iran” — the adoption of FATF requirements against money laundering and terror financing by Iran is a necessity to circumvent US sanctions. Approving the FATF would be Zarif and Rouhani’s last chance to gain support inside and outside the country, push back the hard-liners and heal a crippled economy until the 2020 US presidential election, in the hope of a Democrat winning and rejoining the JCPOA.

This may prove unachievable as approving the FATF would imply the end of supplying support for proxies and terrorist groups across the Middle East. This support, delivered in the form of weapons and money to in Lebanon, rebels in Yemen and in Gaza, has been an effective tool for Khamenei staying in power. It has also had a devastating and destabilizing effect on the region, none more so than Yemen and Lebanon.

It is clear that the row over the FATF has caused tension in Tehran. Ayatollah Khamenei indirectly responded to Zarif’s resignation, , “[U]nlike claims by our officials the Islamic revolution is stronger than before and therefore, we will continue on our path.”

Zarif’s failure stems from his attempt to balance two different roles internationally and domestically. On one hand, he was undeniably successful in public relations, able to portray Iran as a nation the West should normalize relations with. On the other hand, he remained faithful to the axis-of-resistance ideology, which backfired amongst moderate Iranians.

However, in Iran, where the supreme leader and his team hold absolute power, Zarif got caught in his double act. In essence, by announcing his resignation, the foreign minister made a gamble and his most significant miscalculation. Indeed, the move has failed considerably as it is seen as a threat by hard-liners.

Zarif tried to twist Khamenei’s arm by threatening him with chaos inside the country in an effort to approve the FATF. This could have major consequences for Zarif and Rouhani as the supreme leader is now probably more suspicious than ever, which may result in the rejection of the FATF in their final meeting. Zarif’s resignation has resulted in another failure, surely bringing him one step closer to the end of his diplomatic career.

It is evident that Javad Zarif and the moderates in Iran have lost once again against Ayatollah Khamenei. If the international community wants to avoid a war with Iran, negotiate with Tehran over its nuclear and missile programs and halt its funding of regional proxies, then it should have welcomed Zarif’s resignation. Indeed, this is the only way to finally sit down with Iran and Khamenei’s real foreign ministers: Ali Akbar Velayati, Qasem Soleimani and Ali Akbar Salehi.

*[Update: This article previously stated that��Qasem Soleimani was the chief of the IRGC.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In a recent summary of human rights abuses in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa research and advocacy director, Philip Luther, referred to 2018 as a “.” The unenviable title is the result of the arrest of more than 7,000 anti-regime dissidents and activists, including over 5,000 of those who have participated in the anti-government protests that took place between December 2017 and January 2018. The demonstrations were the biggest and most widespread since those that ushered in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, with Amnesty describing them as “anti-authoritarian and anti-corruption protests.”

In Luther’s words, “the scale of the arrests, imprisonment and flogging sentences reveal the extreme lengths the authorities have gone to in order to suppress peaceful protesters.” According to the human rights group, most of the mass arrests are taking place in the regions where ethnic minorities such Azeris, Kurds, Arabs and Baluchis live. As Ahwazi activist Yasser Assadi has told this author, “since the attack on the military parade in September 2018, Iranian security forces have arrested more than 700 Ahwazi Arab activists.” Assadi also believes that “Iran used the attack to start a wide-scale crackdown on activists in Khuzestan province.”

The mass arrests are ongoing and, according to the Human Rights Organization of Kurdistan in Iran and the Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN), environmental and civil rights activists have been detained, summoned or arrested in Kurdish areas since the beginning of 2019. According to Kaveh Kermanshahi, the speaker for KHRN and a consultant at Berlin-based LesMigraS, “the new wave of arresting activists in Kurdish cities is alarming and 2019 may be the worst year for activists in Iran.” Kermanshahi thinks that the silence of the Western media on this issue emboldens the Iranian government. “Tehran starts to arrest activists, and as the media in the West do not react, security forces then widen their mass arrest operations across the region,” he says.

One of the most disturbing aspects of these mass arrests has been the routine torture of detainees and the ensuing . Torture in Iranian prisons has always been , aimed at extracting false confessions to be broadcast on state television. The Iranian government favors this method for two main reasons. First, to legitimize its claims that activists are all agents of foreign countries. Second, to of those who oppose the policies of the government.

Since December 2017, the authorities intensified their efforts, specifically targeting journalists, social media and women’s rights activists, Ahwazi Arabs, Kurds and their families. A human rights activist based in Tehran who wishes to remain anonymous says that “Iran uses this method to establish a regime of fear where people would hesitate to participate in any anti-regime protest. However, whilst this method may scare people in central parts of the country for the time being, for ethnic minority groups this is not the case as this pushes more of them to join opposition groups in order to take revenge and protect themselves.”

“The Iranian regime’s violations of human rights in Ahwaz are so widespread that many Ahwazis have resigned themselves to joking that there are no rights left to be violated. Prisons are flooded with dissidents and the increasing amount of protests against the government have resulted in extreme measures against Ahwazi Arabs,” says Rahim Hamid, an Iranian journalist.

Amnesty International’s findings, as well as by other human rights organizations, prove that the situation in Iran has deteriorated under President Hassan Rouhani, who is widely considered to be a moderate. Despite this, his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, has repeatedly that Iran does not have political prisoners��— although he only does so when . However, the documented reports demonstrate the opposite, and data from the likes of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) is in with Zarif’s assertions. Iran habitually makes the CPJ’s top list and was the in eighths place for the number of journalists imprisoned in 2018 (down from a decade ago.).

This may not be the last year of shame for Iran because, inevitably, as more protests occur, the more arrests and torture of dissidents by security forces are bound happen. These human rights violations have always been justified by sentences given to opponents of the regime. For instance, the Islamic Revolutionary Courts of Iran have sentenced activists and political figures to death since the 1979 Islamic Revolution — all the sentences have been carried out. Moreover, more than 300 Iranians have been by the Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Shameful statistics like this is what has led the majority of Iranians and observers who have been following Iran closely to believe that the regime in Tehran cannot be reformed, and that the only option to end this misery is regime change coming from within, with the support of the international community.

*[An earlier version of this article mistakenly named Rahim Hamid as��Rahim Rashidi.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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When the 1979 Revolution in Iran was still in its nascent phase, the majority of the groups involved were secular and left-wing. However, the religious factions ultimately took over and established the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) due to, in large part, better organizational capacities, pragmatism and . In turn, the regime became, and still is, a theocratic dictatorship. As a result, and as is the case in any dictatorship, the regime set out to devise a strategy to legitimize its dictatorial nature as well as the cult of its supreme leader.

To do so, the regime adopted a double-pronged strategy. On the one hand, it exported its ideological religious revolution to Shia-majority countries and, crucially, to Shia-majority areas in Sunni countries to stir sectarian disorder. On the other hand, Tehran established an effective propaganda machine in what it deems to be a hostile West. The latter aspect is a fact that is little known and even less recognized, and yet it has been of great significance in helping to legitimize the regime.

The body behind this propaganda machine in the Western world is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is directly run by Ayatollah Khamenei and his son, Mojtaba Khamenei. Indeed, the IRGC trains both the regime’s armed and ideological soldiers who go through extreme indoctrination from a very early age. Thousands of non-combatant IRGC members were enrolled in order to implement Iran’s ideological war by publishing articles and research papers in the media, making documentaries and, more recently, adopting a savvy use of social media. In fact, in Iran IRGC members are commonly referred to as the Unknown Soldiers of the Imam Mehdi, and as Cyber Corps, which is part of the Intelligence Organization of the IRGC (SAS) known as the Cyber Attack Army.

Ideological Drive

Although the Islamic Republic has always been an ideologically-driven regime, these efforts increased dramatically when Khamenei became the supreme leader in 1989. Prior to this, the ayatollah’s position was presented by Khomeini as the velāyat-e faqīh (guardianship of the jurist), not only the most important religious position in the Shia world, but also the most important political one — as the leader of the revolution. In turn, Khomeini realized that in order to secure the concentration of all powers in his hands, he needed to achieve two things: the creation of the cult of the supreme leader and the reinforcement of ideological indoctrination in order to extend his influence abroad.

However, during the 1990s, these efforts were increased by his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, who started to invest billions of dollars in ideological centers in order to further cement his power. This policy also became an important part of all government institutions in Iran, and there are now numerous ideological centers that are solely funded by the government, alongside others run directly by the supreme leader and his son, with no verifiable information on their expenditure. Moreover, despite the current economic difficulties, an important part of the state budget still goes toward these institutions.

Significantly, unlike Ayatollah Khomeini, who had absolute power and support of his followers from the outset, Ali Khamenei only reached supreme power after 10 years, after an indoctrination process during which he eliminated all potential rivals, , the son of Ayatollah Khomeini. Following this, Khamenei was able to secure his power through an astute understanding of how to use the ideological role of supreme leader to secure religious support through the ideological centers.

Herein lies the deceptive and disingenuous nature of Iran Poll surveys. They claim that Iranians believe the IRI is democratic while simultaneously claiming that Iranians do not want democratic forms of expression.��

One of these, the , was established directly by Ayatollah Khamenei in 1989, only a few months after becoming supreme leader. Until present day, this center is one of the institutions responsible for delivering ideological training on the role of the supreme leader to many government officials, particularly security and IRGC forces, as well as their families. This center now has in many cities in central and northeastern Iran, areas that the popularity of the supreme leader depends on. This center was first established for young children to be educated outside of the remit of the Ministry of Education, but it now also offers higher education courses up to postgraduate level and works very closely with which is the main body responsible for deploying Iranian students to study and settle in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Malaysia and the United Kingdom.

Apart from indoctrination, this center also strongly relies on Sajjadiyah, a holy Shia manuscript similar to the hadiths (the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) which Khamenei as being of equal importance to the Quran. In fact, some people very close to the ayatollah even consider it as more important and trustworthy than some hadiths and the best book that describes the Quran. Sajjadiyah and its school are by Khamenei and Shia ideologues as the only path to finding truth and justice.

Spreading the Influence

Rouzbeh Center in Iran is one of the most effective institutions that has worked relentlessly to legitimatize Ayatollah Khamenei as the leader of the revolution and the importance of his role in the Islamic world. The majority of graduate students from this institution have important positions in various fields in Iran and abroad. A teacher who used to work at the institution told this author that “the amount of investment poured into these centers is very dangerous for the future of Iran as they gather, train and then deploy soldiers instead of being an institution dedicated to developing the country’s infrastructure.”��Their university cadre, known as “the “,” go to remote villages across Iran on ideological and recruitment missions.

In order to understand the extent of the influence wielded by ideological institutions such as the Rouzbeh Center, the example of Iran Poll — a Canada-based polling company — is revealing. In the past few years, the Center for International Security Studies (CISSM) at Maryland University has produced reports on that have become popular among academics, the media and politicians in the West. The reports are mostly published under the name of . In 2009, Mojtaba Khamenei helped Mohseni and Professor Mohammad Marandi to establish the University of Tehran Centre for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR). Marandi —��who studied in America and understands the mentality of Western media, politicians and writers —��leads UTCPOR, which is monitored by the Iranian Foreign Ministry. He frequently appears on mainstream media, such as the�� and , among others, but one thing that these media organizations either do not know or fail to mention is that he is the son of , the head of Ayatollah Khamenei’s special medical team.

Professor Marandi occupies his position thanks to nepotism and because his father is a loyal member of the regime, and he is fully trusted to carry out further indoctrination and to promote the IRI. On the other hand, some that Ebrahim Mohseni works for the IRGC as he appears to to the at in Iran and is frequently quoted on —��a fact never mentioned in Western media.

At the heart of this network lies the very founder of Iran Poll, Amir Farmanesh, shown in this in a dark blue jacket, third from the left, during training at the Rouzbeh Center. One of his teachers told this author: “He was brought to study at this center and the center is run by the supreme leader’s office. They always try to bring in smart students. It is a center to produce the most loyal figures and they provide students with everything they need.” He added, “Last year I was shocked when I saw him in Switzerland presenting polling surveys, because Farmanesh always wanted to go and fight alongside his brothers in Palestine.”

One of Farmanesh’s friends described him to the author as “a quiet person but very smart and someone who surprises you as soon as he participates in a subject.” In short, the regime has not only spread its influence in the region but has penetrated Western institutions and media, which is what the IRGC calls . These polling surveys aim to ensure that public opinion in the West is shaped by the narrative presented by the IRGC in which Ayatollah Khamenei represents the will of Iranians, —��the head of Iran’s Quds Force (the special forces branch of the IRGC) — is the most beloved person among Iranians, and Iran is a free and democratic country.

Iran Poll plays a central role, while CISSM and others are used to present the main objective designed by Iran Poll.

A Different Reality

Furthermore, a significant amount of effort has been dedicated to presenting the polling surveys as a product of Maryland University. However, these are produced by Iran Poll. Iran Poll conducts research freely in Iran, which no other organization is allowed to do, and almost all of their election polls correctly predict official results. In addition, the majority of popular media outlets on the internet have one or more pieces that name Iran Poll as a reference. To a large extent, this is because there are no non-governmental polling institutes in Iran as this is prohibited by the regime, as in any other dictatorship.

Nevertheless, this also reveals the monopoly Iran Poll has over the Western media when it comes to Iran, which demonstrates a troubling lack of critical assessment toward a polling institution supported by the regime in Tehran, which by its very essence cannot be neutral. In fact, has even got a special from the United States Treasury Department, which allows it to make all the necessary transactions to pay for public opinion polling in Iran. (According to an informed source, the Treasury may revoke the license, which was issued to People Analytics Inc. but is being used by Iran Poll.)

By way of example, according to one of , the reason for people’s participation in elections is based on their belief in in the current political system. One survey question asks, “Do you think people in Iran have too much, too little, or just about the right amount of freedom?” The result indicates that the vast majority of Iranians believe Iran is free and democratic, and more than 15% also claim that there is too much freedom in Iran. Moreover, other suggest that more than 90% of Iranians think that elections are fair, democratic and free. The same report continues: “In your opinion, to what degree should our country’s policy makers take religious teachings into account when they make decisions?” Over 45% reply as “a lot,” 29.5% “somewhat,” 15.5% “not much” and 6.9% “not at all.”

The sad reality about countries like Iran is that totalitarian states only understand the language of force and economic pressure. In the past, Iran refused to negotiate over its nuclear program, but sanctions ended up playing the most important role in bringing it to the negotiating table.��

It is clear that the polling survey reports have the intention of galvanizing support for the regime by showing that there is backing for it. The results presented suggest that the overwhelming majority of Iranians support the position of the supreme leader, think that Iran is a democratic and free country, their country to be a and are behind Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. In addition, the polling surveys suggest that Iranians condone the mass killing of Syrians by Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Iran’s role in Syria and Iran’s expansionist policies in the region.

What is apparent is that these results do not reflect the reality on the ground but seem to resemble the official government propaganda. Furthermore, the partnership with Maryland University has given Iran Poll a certain degree of legitimacy, which is also concerning because the polling institutes of many other dictatorships would be met with legitimate caution and reserve. (The university has not yet responded to the author’s questions regarding the partnership when approached for comment.)

Domestic Media

The latest survey by Iran Poll claims that 82% of Iranians consume news about domestic and international affairs through domestic state-owned media. However, according to reports published in Iran, domestic channels have been by foreign media — a fact that even Iranian officials admit.

Furthermore, just over 6% watch the Indeed, according to experts and those who work for domestic and state-run TV channels, the often doesn’t even know the names of the domestic outlets. In fact, the recent attempts by the government to ban the popular Telegram messenger and other social media applications is based on the awareness that this is where Iranians get their news from and, most importantly, where they challenge the regime. Yet, despite all this, Iran Poll surveys are still presented as reliable and scientific sources.

In relation to Iranians challenging the regime on social media, an Iran Poll survey nonetheless claims that, following popular protests that started at the end of 2017, 68% of Iranians believe that those who chanted slogans against the political system of the IRI should be punished, and 93% believe those who burned the Iranian flag should be punished harshly. These results are in line with the regime’s justification of�� that took place after the protests.

Herein lies the deceptive and disingenuous nature of Iran Poll surveys. They claim that Iranians believe the IRI is democratic while simultaneously claiming that Iranians do not want democratic forms of expression. These examples underline the fact that these surveys are neither scientific nor reliable, but rather a mouthpiece for the supreme leader. A critical approach to these surveys demonstrates that these polls are not only fabricated, but are also the product of Ayatollah Khamenei’s ideological foot soldiers, who have ingeniously used a respected Western tool such as polling surveys, and a respected body — a university — to spread the idea that Ayatollah Khamenei is the true representative of the Iranians’ democratic will.

Significantly, the numerous reports published by the United Nations and human rights organizations that denounce Iran’s grave human rights violations, such as mass torture, public hangings and the repression of women’s rights, are never mentioned.

Another aspect that demonstrates these people’s loyalty to the regime is that none of the institutions they represent have written anything critical about Iran or its human rights abuses, such as its use of child soldiers — a 2017 documents that the IRI has used Afghan children in the fight against Syrian opposition groups — but solely focus on how Iran could confront US pressure. This is yet another demonstration of how influential Ayatollah Khamenei’s ideological army in the West is when it comes to covering Iran affairs. Pro-regime writers who are either at the helm of these organizations or work for these entities in the West try to connect Iran’s destabilizing role in the region to Tehran’s national security.

Nevertheless, they are clearly aware of the desire for regime change by Iranians because they do in fact write about it. Some of them even that regime change will not work, and that diplomatic solutions are a better way to negotiate on regional and human rights issues. However, it goes without saying that there can be no human rights in a dictatorship, so it seems apparent that they are merely seeking to secure the status quo. In fact, reports prove that under ��and his so-called moderate government Iran’s human rights records is worse than under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and that Iran’s destabilizing, sectarian and hostile influence has spread more than ever in the region.

Increasing the Pressure

These efforts by Ayatollah Khamenei to establish such organizations and deploy more of his soldiers to the West have increased due to challenges he faces at home. The regime has lost its ideological and political legitimacy among Iranians — especially among the young generation — and this has pushed Tehran to establish its defense system in the West by misleading public opinion. This plan has worked, as seen from the poor coverage of the most in Western media.

Ayatollah Khamenei’s ideological foot soldiers are producing more reports to prevent Western countries, organizations or individuals from supporting the Iranians’ efforts for change by spreading fear that supporting protests directly leads to a war with Iran. They know that after the Iraq War, the appetite for military conflict in the West has declined considerably. Therefore, Iran has been successful in dividing public opinion in the West over supporting the Iranians’ struggle for freedom and democracy.

Sanctions imposed on Iran on November 4 heavily target Iranian security forces, which play a crucial role in torturing and executing political prisoners and activists in Iran — the same security forces that have tried to conduct in recent months. It is also these security forces that are tasked with spreading Iran’s influence abroad through various organizations in the West and destabilizing activities, proxy wars in Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine and in Syria, and the training and funding of terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Ansarollah. In essence, if the EU and the international community want to prevent more wars, the key to pressuring Iran into ending its support for terrorism and spreading conflict in the region is to ensure the successful implementation of .

The sad reality about countries like Iran is that totalitarian states only understand the language of force and economic pressure. In the past, Iran refused to negotiate over its nuclear program, but sanctions ended up playing the most important role in bringing it to the negotiating table. It was not the will of the regime to open up Iran to the international community like pro-Iran deal voices claim. More importantly, the true nature of organizations that represent the policies of Tehran in the West should be known and be treated accordingly.

*[Editor’s Note:��Following an editorial review, we retract the claim made by the author regarding the National Iranian American Council, Bourse and Bazar and the Europe-Iran Forum.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The year was 1639. For the first time in their history, the Kurds of present-day Iran were separated from their brethren due to a signed by the Ottoman and Safavid Empires. The final division of the Kurdish homeland came in 1923 when the divided it between four countries: Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. The Kurds have been trying to establish their own state since 1639, but they have always failed. Since the Treaty of Lausanne, they have launched at least 12 uprisings to obtain independence or autonomy, but most them have ended in massacres, or assimilation plans for the Kurds.

In June this year, the ruling parties of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq a referendum on Kurdish independence to be held on September 25, a decision that shocked both the Kurds and the international community. The main opposition parties see this as a by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) — who have been in power since 1992 — to extend their reach instead of solving the region’s political and economic crisis.

This is undoubtedly one of the reasons behind the vote, but the majority of Kurds have always wanted independence. However, considering the current turmoil in the Middle East, a recent suggests that some Kurds are still undecided over the , but the latest could also galvanize the yes vote.

WHY NOW?

It is clear that Kurdish aspirations for self-determination have played an important role in calling the referendum, but this is not the only motivation behind it. There are three reasons to focus on.

First, a driver behind the vote is to secure the disputed areas currently under control by Kurdish peshmerga forces. According to the , Baghdad is responsible for holding a referendum in these areas in order to let the people decide whether they want to be part of the Kurdistan region of Iraq or Baghdad. This constitutional right has never materialized.

In 2014, when the Islamic State (IS) went on the offensive and captured Mosul, the Iraqi army fled. With the support of the international, anti-IS coalition, the peshmerga fought back against the terrorist group. In turn, the Kurds took control of these disputed areas.

Today, the Kurds fear that, as soon as the Islamic State is defeated, Baghdad, with the support of the Shia-dominated Hashd al-Shaabi militia, might start challenging the Kurds on territorial issues and a renewal of bloodshed could ensue. In fact, Hashd al-Shaabi, which is backed by Iran, has already to enter these regions, but they have been stopped by the Kurds.

The KRG, therefore, wants to use this referendum in order to start negotiations with Baghdad while it still has the upper hand to secure these zones.

Second, the current political and economic crisis between the KRG and Baghdad is another reason that has pushed the Kurdish government to insist on its right to hold a referendum. In 2014, Baghdad unconstitutionally cut the KRG’s budget over between the federal government and Erbil, which put the KDP and PUK under considerable political and . At the time, then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki hoped this would end KRG President Masoud Barzani’s reign, but it backfired. Maliki and Barzani’s turned into a conflict between Shia-Arab nationalism versus Kurdish nationalism.

As a result of these disputes, the Kurds have come to realize that, in order to improve their economy, they have to use this referendum to impose their economic requests on Baghdad. However, in the long run, the KRG has understood that, without an independent state, its efforts to improve the regional economy will always be .

Third, have a key role to play behind the referendum. During the war against the Islamic State, the KDP, with the tacit help of the PUK’s silence, crippled the Kurdish parliament because the main opposition parties wanted to end the presidency of Barzani. Consequently, the KDP banned the speaker of parliament from going to the capital and also sent ministers from the Change Movement (Gorran) home. In turn, the Kurds were unsure over whether they should protest this move as they were fighting IS on their doorstep.

Nevertheless, in Gorran’s stronghold in the Sulaimaniyah province, public anger resulted in the in October 2015. However, now that the Islamic State is no longer a threat, the main focus of the Kurds has shifted back to domestic affairs. As a result, lingering tensions have resurfaced and people are once again blaming Barzani and the PUK for the crippling corruption in the KRG and the dismissal of the democratically-elected parliament.

Both the KDP and the PUK are fully aware of the people’s anger, and it is undeniable that announcing this referendum has been a political masterstroke. Indeed, despite the people’s frustration at government corruption, independence remains their dream. So, the ruling parties have managed to quell the tension for the time being by tapping into the longstanding vision of an independent Kurdish state.

The announcement of the referendum is proving to work in favor of the KDP as it is dramatically changing the political landscape in the Kurdish region of Iraq. So far, it the largest opposition group, the Gorran movement, which is over the independence issue. Meanwhile, the PUK has remained silent because it has good relations with both Baghdad and Tehran, so it can come forward and negotiate if the situation deteriorates further. In essence, the KDP and the PUK have used the independence referendum to make a formidable alliance that has crushed internal opposition and extended their influence.

This referendum is crucial for the Kurds as the future of disputed areas, their economy and domestic politics, and their democracy depend on the outcome. If the Kurds do not obtain an alternative deal — as Barzani has said in during independence rallies — then the last option for the Kurds will be declaring independence instead of opting for maximum devolution in Iraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has any referendum attempts within the Kurdish region and disputed areas, but he has also failed to present any constructive dialogue to deal with this issue. Baghdad is trying to stop the vote, and this could result in direct or proxy wars against the Kurds .

The Kurds are unlikely to back down unless they receive an alternative deal, but this is unlikely to come from Baghdad. Indeed, the reaction from both the Iraqi government and the international community clearly demonstrates that the Kurds are seen as convenient pawns to be used on the geopolitical chessboard.

This is where the political masterstroke of the KRG — which, for the first time, has showed a degree of political savviness in declaring the referendum at this time — plays out. The Kurdish government has demonstrated that no party is able to offer an alternative that could benefit both sides, thereby proving to the international community that independence is the last option for the Kurds.

*[This article was updated on September 25, 2017.]

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On June 7, terrorism came to Tehran as 17 and many more wounded. While the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, dismissed the attack as mere “,” in reality it shocked the nation and has revealed that internal security is much more fragile than many had thought.

The Quds force, a unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), has been involved in regional conflicts in the Middle East. Many believed this had strengthened the country’s national security as well, but the recent attacks have exposed its weakness. The Iranians may have fought well in Syria and elsewhere as the government flexes its regional muscle, but it would appear that the forces they have been fighting against are now hitting back — this time in Iran.

Tensions in the Middle East have been running high since US President Donald Trump visited Riyadh in May. After he left, Saudi Arabia and its allies led a regional effort to put pressure on Qatar in order to end its ambiguous , particularly since Tehran aims to engage more with the West after its re-election of President Hassan Rouhani.

But neither the Trump administration nor Saudi Arabia and its allies are prepared to accept this. They seem more intent on isolating Iran rather than allowing the regime to grow stronger by presenting a so-called progressive president to the world. According to , Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir said on June 7 that Iran must be reprimanded for its interference and support of terrorism in the Middle East. The assault on Tehran comes after recent in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, a Shia-majority region.

After the attacks in Iran, the IRGC released a : “The public opinion of the world, especially Iran, recognizes this terrorist attack — which took place a week after a joint meeting of the U.S. president and the head of one of the region’s most backward governments, which continuously supports fundamentalist terrorists — as very significant.” This was in reference to Saudi Arabia. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif also took the opportunity to criticize a US arms deal with the Saudis in a . In May, Mohammed bin Salman al-Saud, the deputy crown prince, : “We know we are a main target of Iran. We are not waiting until there is a battle in our country, so we will work so that it becomes a battle for them in Iran and not in Saudi Arabia.” This all reflects the mounting tension and bellicosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

While Saudi Arabia and Iran have a war of words, militant Sunni groups could become a key challenge for the Iranians. As the , the capital of the so-called Islamic State (IS) caliphate, the attack in Tehran shows that the terrorist organization is willing to target Iran in order to gain support and make up for its territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. In the past few years, IS has showed it is capable of finding new targets and thus keep motivation high amongst its members and supporters when it is under pressure and losing ground. This time, the group is being more pragmatic by shifting its focus from Sunni-majority countries to Shia-majority Iran.

Although Iranian authorities have since announced the , it is claimed they were aware of the presence of extremists and had been using them against secular opposition in the country — a risky policy that has clearly backfired. A����in 2014 by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), an Iranian-Kurdish opposition group, indicated that — one of the Tehran attackers — had been leading an IS cell and recruiting members under the Iranian regime’s watch in the Kurdistan and Kermanshah provinces. The report also adds that Sadeghi and other IS members held meetings publicly in mosques, cities and villages in order to gain support for the group.

Khaled Azizi, the secretary general of the KDP, told this author that: “[The] Iranian government has been using Islamic extremists in [the] west of Iran against secular opposition parties for decades. Also, by providing them a safe zone in Iran, the regime tried to push people to focus on their religious beliefs rather than moving towards more progressive movements.”

IRANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

So, with this in mind, Iran is reluctant to admit the weakness of its national security. Simply put, the Iranians don’t want anyone — inside or outside the country — to ask how terrorists could penetrate parliament and the Ayatollah Khomeini mausoleum and kill people. Tehran, therefore, is trying its best to portray the attack as small and ineffective despite targeting the most secure and symbolic places in the country.

The reason Iranian authorities have is to unite Iranians against any Saudi-Trump plans to destabilize Iran and also to cover up the big hole in the country’s internal security.

The policy of allowing extremists to move freely inside Iran in order to isolate secular parties is backfiring. If Iran now attempts to go after these groups, there could be further attacks on Iranian soil. IS and other militant organizations could look for support from regional and international countries who would be willing to destabilize Iran regardless of whom that would entail supporting. If that happens, the Middle East could become even more volatile.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Iranian presidential election on May 19 has been shaped by sociopolitical changes, the need for a successor to the supreme leader, the rise of nationalism and the nuclear deal. There are��six candidates��who have managed to get the green light from the supreme��leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

In Iran, obtaining the approval of the Guardian Council, which is under the supreme leader’s control, is an arduous task. According to the constitution, any��male Shia — but only the��Twelver��branch of Shiism — can run for the presidency but, in practice, only those of Fars origin are considered for the post. It is, therefore, impossible for a woman or a Kurd, Azeri, or����to stand.

However, in reality, the selection process becomes even narrower because the only ones who can pass the filtering system are those close to the supreme leader and the regime. Anyone who does not share the same ideology or political strategy cannot be elected. Thus, people have to vote for candidates who are elected by the supreme leader. This is why Iranians call the elections a choice “between bad or worse.”

Nonetheless, there are four issues that could help President Hassan Rouhani win a second term in office.

KEY NOTES BEHIND THE ELECTION

First, the new dramatically��as their norms are very different than 10 years ago. Indeed, easy access to the internet has connected them to the world, and they can now follow the latest developments around the globe. The intention of the Islamic Republic since its beginning has always been to depoliticize young people.

While the youth are not politically and socially active compared to previous generations, the change amongst them is becoming more difficult for the regime to control. This will have an effect in the long run when it comes to the fundamental structure of the Islamic Republic.��The ,��wear ��and have open relationships when it comes to social values. The majority of young people are, therefore, in favor of seeing Rouhani in the second round as��.��So, considering the fact that Iran has a large youth population, this could help him win the election.

Second, the��nuclear deal with the P5+1 group is important for a Rouhani victory. Despite Ayatollah Khamenei’s heavy criticism of the accord in public, it is clear that every government policy is first approved by him. The supreme leader’s disapproval of the nuclear agreement was a ploy to show Iranians and the international community that there are major differences between Rouhani and Khamenei.

Without the deal, Iran could not survive because sanctions were crippling the economy, which is why Iranians. The demands of the people have become more economic than political. Rouhani has, therefore, helped the regime to lower people’s political demands, and he has expanded Iran’s influence in the wider region as well as among Iranians abroad.��Of the who live outside the country, 2.5 million are eligible to vote��and Rouhani is likely to get their support.

Third, the rise of����in recent years — especially promoted through TV and radio stations broadcast from abroad and Iranians who have immigrated to the West — has affected the views of people at home. This has also fostered the domestic rise of��,����and�� in Iran,��which could become a big challenge for the next president.

Nevertheless, so far, Persian nationalism has worked in favor for both President Rouhani inside Iran and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif abroad. Indeed, many Iranians who initially fled the country as political refugees have��. Another important fact is that despite hundreds of thousands of Iranians who have claimed political asylum in Europe, the US, Canada and Australia, there have been limited protests from them.

This has helped the regime to focus on spreading its influence in the region rather than worrying about domestic political challenges fueled from the Iranian diaspora. The tension between Iran and the Gulf countries, the rise of the Islamic State and the civil war in Syria have fostered support for the regime from Iranians at home and abroad.

Fourth, the supreme leader has allowed the ��of him receiving treatment at hospital. Khamenei is 78 years old and his poor health condition is undoubtedly making him think about a successor before competing groups inside the government start fighting over the throne. Moreover, he aims to keep the country as united as possible to ensure the continuation of the regime.

There have been suggestions that presidential candidate����could be the supreme leader’s choice for his replacement. But Khamenei is unlikely to ignore the fact that Rouhani is popular — especially among the young generation — amid the country’s economic, social and political situation. The main focus of the supreme leader, as he has mentioned many times, is to get people out to vote as this will give more legitimacy to the system both internationally and amongst Iranians at home. In contrast, almost none of other candidates have the ability to show a good image of the government to both Iranians and the international community.

Rouhani and Zarif have created an atmosphere in which many think the incumbent Iranian president is liberal-minded and more intelligent than other candidates. This was reflected in the presidential debates in which Rouhani presented himself as the harshest critic of the regime and corruption. Rouhani and Zarif have some different approaches and beliefs than the supreme leader. They believe that, in order to keep Iran united against domestic and foreign threats, the regime needs some changes. However, in view of��, they cannot put these into practice.

The incumbent president knows that without protecting the fundamental values of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he will not have any political future. All the candidates need to protect the current system as their career depends on it. So, despite Rouhani’s campaign promises of more rights, freedom and economic development, these will likely remain empty ones — . This has occurred with previous presidents claiming to be reformists, such as��Mohammad Khatami who promised much but changed almost nothing.

President Rouhani is trying to win the election in order to secure the nuclear deal, to unite the country’s different ethnicities under the promise of more freedom, to offer a better economy and more jobs, to be engaged with the outside world, and��to . Rouhani is likely to win the people’s vote, but the realities of today — such as the Trump administration, the rise of domestic nationalism and the socioeconomic crisis — will make it difficult for him to achieve social and political reform even if he wants to.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Since 2011, the relationship between Russia and Turkey has been tumultuous. Despite the new alliance between the two countries, it is undeniably unbalanced in favor of Russia. To achieve this, Moscow understood the deep existential threat that the Kurdish question represents to Ankara and used this to its own advantage by manipulating the Kurds, particularly the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). By linking the Kurdish question in Turkey and Syria, Russia was able to steer Turkish policy in Syria to its advantage.

THE KURDS IN SYRIA

Turkey’s renewed anxiety about the Kurdish situation stems from the PKK using the war in Syria as an opportunity to establish its system—by legitimizing itself through��. As a result, the Turkish parliament passed a resolution in 2013 allowing the Turkish army to invade Syria. The objective of this policy was, first and foremost, to fight the Kurds and halt the linking of the three Kurdish cantons. However, in order to garner support from its allies, Turkey also claimed this invasion would weaken Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

In order to link the Kurdish threat to Assad, Turkey distorted the truth about the PKK’s relationship with the Syrian regime, convincing the United States that the Kurds in Syria were helping Damascus. This invasion plan never materialized because the US and the European Union (EU) considered it to be a very dangerous move that they could not endorse. In part, this was because the Syrian Kurds had found support in Russia.

The main reason behind the Kremlin’s support of the and the interests of the Russia-Iran-Syria alliance.��As such, having the Kurds controlling a large part of the Turkey-Syria border was a shrewd strategy from Iran and Russia as it impeded Turkish and Western influence in Syria.

The crucial point here is that the Kurdish region of Syria is controlled by the Democratic Union Party��(PYD), which is affiliated with the PKK—the latter is recognized by both Turkey and the West as a terrorist group. This, therefore, prevented Washington from having open ties with the PYD until 2014. Even since then, ties between them were a source of unease for the Obama administration, which manifested itself in the exclusion of the Kurds from the Geneva peace talks at the behest of Turkey.

The turning point for the Syrian Kurds was the battle of�� in 2015, which became the focal point of international media and demonstrated to Western powers that the Kurds were wholly committed to the fight against the Islamic State (IS). The US and France soon started arming and supporting the YPG.

THE KURDS IN TURKEY

Meanwhile, as the��, the Kurds in Turkey were also witnessing a turn of events, as the��pro-Kurdish Peop�����’ Democratic Party (HDP) . This Kurdish momentum in both Turkey and Syria was too much to handle for Ankara.

By 2015, after a series of terrorist attacks on pro-Kurdish rallies in Turkey, the PKK killed two Turkish soldiers as it accused the government of having assisted IS in bombing Kurdish rallies. This was a critical moment as the peace process soon collapsed and the PKK launched a fight in the Kurdish region of Turkey in late October 2015. However, this was a����on behalf of the PKK,��.

Kurds are now angry both at the Turkish government and the PKK, as the situation is arguably worse than it was during the “Dirty War” of the 1990s.

RUSSIA MAKES ITS MOVE

In this context of extreme Kurdish-Turkish tension,��the by the Turkish army occurred. Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened that this would have��“serious consequences for relations between Russia and Turkey.”��Indeed, the consequences have cost Ankara, as it offered Moscow its greatest opportunity to put pressure on Turkey.

The PKK was desperate to get revenge for its failed war and the breakdown of the peace process. In the Kurds, Russia found a double-pronged strategy that would not only make Turkey pay the price for the fighter jet incident, but also change its policy in Syria. On May 13,��2016,����belonging to the Turkish army using����in Turkey, and��President Recep Tayyip . Whether Russia did sell weapons to the PKK or not was irrelevant because Moscow understood the paranoid anxiety that the Turkish government was experiencing due to the Kurds, and it seized the opportunity.

The timing of all these incidents is indicative of Russia’s strategy. First, on November 4,��2015, Turkey shot down the Russian jet. Following this, Russian Foreign Minister����in Moscow on December 23, 2015, tapping into Turkish fears of growing Kurdish political power. Then, in May 2016, the PKK shot down the helicopter. Finally, on��June 27, Erdogan , just over one month after the PKK’s attacks.

The most important reason that prompted Erdogan to send a letter of apology to Putin was that, both politically (HDP and PYD) and militarily (PKK and YPG), Turkey was under mounting pressure from the Kurds. Russia, therefore, used the Kurdish tool against Turkey in an astute manner as it was the only way to change Ankara’s policy in Syria. Moscow successfully used the PKK and the Kurds in Turkey to strengthen its strategy in Syria and the Middle East.

WEAKENING THE US POSITION

As a result, Russia has not only pacified Turkish policy in Syria, but it has also managed to weaken the US in the region by getting Turkey on its side. As long as the Kurdish question exists in Turkey, it will be very challenging for Erdogan to move out of Russia’s sphere of influence.

After more than six years of war in Syria, it has become clear that neither the Americans, the Turks or the Kurds are in a winning position. After a humanitarian disaster and billions of dollars spent, neither Western powers nor its allies have grasped the great extent to which Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East is guided by its existential fear of the Kurdish question. This was what Russia and Iran wanted because they now have the upper hand and Turkey is no longer seeking the removal of Assad.

At present, there is a competition between Russia and the US over who can secure Turkey as an ally. Of course, this could put the future of the Kurds both in Turkey and Syria in danger because the only way to get Ankara’s full allegiance is by offering the most support to defeat the Kurds, which Russia is now doing. The Kurds in Turkey and Syria have been played and their future is becoming more uncertain as��. While the Kurds were��, the Russians will keep negotiating with them using back channels in order to keep them on their side.

With the Trump administration in the White House, it is clear that the US has lost much influence in the Middle East as . If Washington wants to turn the tables around, it will need to develop a Kurdish policy that goes beyond simply arming the Kurds without giving them any political rights in return, and which understands the geopolitical significance of the Kurdish question.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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