Rohan Khattar Singh, 51�Թ�’s Video Producer & Social Media Manager, speaks with Saya Kiba, an associate professor at Japan’s Kobe City University of Foreign Studies, regarding the resignation of former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. They explore why Ishiba stepped down, the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) leadership race, the top contenders and the challenges awaiting Japan’s next leader, from economic strain to a rising wave of right-wing populism.

Why did Ishiba resign?

As Kiba explains, Ishiba resigned on September 7, 2025, after the LDP suffered a string of electoral defeats. Under his leadership, the party lost three major elections: the lower house election shortly after he took office, the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in June and the upper house election in July. These losses shattered the party’s dominance and triggered anxiety among LDP lawmakers who feared for their own seats.

Ishiba’s downfall was less about public opinion than internal revolt. Many within the LDP concluded he could not lead them to victory again. Lawmakers, worried about losing their constituencies, decided they needed a change in leadership before the next general election. His departure thus reflected a survival instinct within the party more than a change in national sentiment.

What’s next for Japan?

Japan will choose its next prime minister through an internal LDP leadership contest. The contest was held on October 4. In this contest, party members and parliamentarians shared the vote equally. The winner must be confirmed by the Diet to become prime minister. As Kiba explains, this parliamentary step is largely ceremonial — a “confirmation” rather than an election.

Once the LDP selects its new leader, the transition of power will be swift, with the new prime minister expected to take office quickly. But beyond the formalities, Khattar Singh and Kiba agree that this vote is highly impactful to Japan’s direction on both domestic and foreign policy, particularly given the split between the party’s liberal and ultra-conservative wings.

Top contenders and a winner

Kiba outlines five candidates for the LDP leadership but emphasizes three frontrunners.

The first is Sanae Takaichi, the only female contender. At 64 years old, she is known for her staunch conservatism and her close alliance with the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Takaichi has opposed same-sex marriage and progressive gender policies, and she has made controversial remarks about historical events. Her campaign slogan, “Japan is Back,” echoes the populist tone of US President Donald Trump’s rhetoric.

The second major contender was Shinjiro Koizumi, aged 44, son of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Currently serving as the agriculture minister, he built his platform around addressing inflation and rejuvenating Japan’s economy.

The third was Yoshimasa Hayashi, a 64-year-old diplomat who served as Ishiba’s chief of staff and government spokesperson. Kiba describes him as a pragmatic candidate with strong foreign policy credentials and close ties to former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

Ultimately, Takaichi won the LDP’s choice for president. She is currently on track to become Japan’s first female prime minister.

Who is Takaichi?

Takaichi’s rise captures the emotional pulse of Japan’s conservative base. As Kiba notes, many within the LDP miss Abe, whose strong leadership style still resonates. Takaichi represents a return to that era, promising discipline and national pride.

Her conservatism, however, divides the party. Critics within the LDP recall the Abe-era scandals over campaign financing and misuse of funds that eroded public trust. Yet these same controversies have ironically boosted Takaichi’s appeal among ultra-right voters who feel alienated by the more centrist Kishida and Ishiba factions.

This political shift has been reinforced by the rise of Sanseitō, a new far-right party that performed strongly in July’s upper house elections. Many of its supporters were once loyal to the LDP but defected over dissatisfaction with moderate policies. Khattar Singh and Kiba see this as a warning sign that the Japanese right is fracturing, and whoever succeeds Ishiba will need to mend these internal divisions.

Japan’s economy

Japan’s economy remains a central challenge for any incoming prime minister. Ishiba’s administration came under fire for a July 23 trade deal with the United States that many believed leaned in the US’s favor. The agreement left unresolved issues over tariffs on semiconductors and medical supplies, sparking criticism across party lines.

Kiba argues that the next leader must repair Japan’s trade posture and manage relations with the US, particularly as protectionist policies resurface in Washington. Inflation, still a pressing concern, is likely to dominate domestic debate. Khattar Singh adds that Japan’s recovery depends on restoring confidence in both fiscal policy and the leadership steering it.

Japan’s top issues

Beyond the economy, Khattar Singh and Kiba identify three major policy fronts:

1. Trade and security: Japan must balance its tariff disputes with maintaining a strong US–Japan security alliance. Washington continues to pressure Tokyo to contribute more to defense costs — a politically sensitive issue amid voter fatigue.
2. Inflation and domestic stability: The cost-of-living crisis has eroded public patience, and the new prime minister will need quick wins to restore confidence.
3. Diplomacy and regional relations: Japan faces an increasingly tense neighborhood. On September 3, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un met in Beijing, signaling a new phase of coordination among Japan’s nuclear-armed rivals. Managing this trilateral threat while maintaining close cooperation with the US and South Korea will be an early and defining test of Japan’s next leader.

The leadership race is about far more than replacing Ishiba. It is about the soul of Japan’s ruling party — whether it will return to Abe’s hardline nationalism or chart a new, pragmatic path through turbulent economic and geopolitical waters.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Who Will Be Japan’s Next Prime Minister? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

With that backdrop, Trump arranged two dramatic meetings — the Anchorage, Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Washington, DC summit with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy alongside European and NATO leaders. The stated objective was peace. The actual outcome, as Glenn bluntly puts it, has been “no peace; there’s been no agreement in view whatsoever, no change whatsoever.”

Glenn’s analysis of the key players

Glenn identifies five central actors in these summits, arguing that each pursued objectives far beyond the narrow question of ending the war.

• Putin: Putin sought to end Russia’s diplomatic isolation, reframe the war’s origins by denying Ukraine’s legitimacy and secure peace on Moscow’s terms — meaning Ukraine would effectively be absorbed. More broadly, he aimed to dismantle the post-1945 international order and replace it with a sphere of influence system in which Russia dominates Central Europe. Glenn emphasizes that Trump has “for decades parroted Russian positions” and shows a “Freudian affinity for strong men and for Vladimir Putin,” giving Putin a real chance of advancing these goals.
• The US under Trump: Although officially the host, the US played a diminished role. Glenn argues the Trump administration “aligned itself … verbatim to the last iota with Russia’s positions.” This weakened NATO and European defense commitments, though European leaders managed to prevent a complete rupture. Trump also made a show of agreeing to sell US weapons to NATO allies, who could then choose whether or not to pass them along to Ukraine — an arrangement Glenn condemns as “totally incoherent” and destabilizing. 
• Ukraine: For Zelenskyy, the goals were straightforward: survival as a sovereign state, preservation of critical US support and continued military aid. Zelenskyy could not accept any peace deal that ceded Ukraine’s legal territory.
• EU and NATO Leaders: These leaders, Glenn says, “invited themselves in haste” to block what they feared would be a US giveaway to Russia. Their priorities were to maintain US commitment to NATO and to prevent Trump from imposing a Russia-friendly peace settlement.
• Trump: Trump’s main objective, Glenn states, was “to focus the world’s spotlight on him,” to be “the flame around which all moths turned and flew.” Compared to this, a genuine peace accord was secondary. If that benefited Putin, so much the better. If it guaranteed Ukraine’s independence, “well, okay.”

Consequences and global implications

Glenn concludes that the immediate result of both summits was “essentially zero.” The war continued and no peace framework emerged. Yet the summits came with profound symbolic consequences. By meeting with Putin, Trump partially rehabilitated Russia’s status and further eroded America’s credibility with allies. Glenn sees this as one more step in the breakdown of the normative system of international relations, replaced by “Putin and [Chinese President] Xi Jinping’s sphere of influence system, where power determines who has predominance.”

Atul’s perspective: Europe, leverage and declining cohesion

Atul adds that Putin “had the upper hand” in Alaska, noting that even a photo captured “which cat got the cream.” He stresses that Trump now has “little leverage” over Putin, given his reluctance to aid Ukraine.

Atul then turns to Europe, portraying its leaders as politically weak and unpopular. He cites examples such as UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, UK Member of Parliament Nigel Farage and French President Emmanuel Macron, accusing them of “genuflecting so aptly in front of Donald Trump,” a man they neither like nor admire.

Atul underscores that this posture reflects weakness. In his view, European leaders are fragmented, unpopular at home and unwilling to bear the heavy costs of war. Europe increasingly resembles “an aging continent” without the resilience to confront crises.

Ukraine’s bleak future

The war’s trajectory looks grim. Ukraine faces manpower shortages so severe that the military is desperately conscripting men in their sixties. This, Atul warns, points toward “grimmer” consequences ahead. He links Ukraine’s struggle abroad with democratic decline at home in the US. The presence of the National Guard in Washington, DC, signals what he calls the internal “collapse of rule of law.” If the US cannot uphold norms at home, he suggests, it cannot sustain them abroad.

Atul ends with a historical analogy. �մǻ岹��’s world order, he argues, resembles the unstable periods before both world wars. “The old order is dead,” he says, “and we don’t know what new order is to be born.”

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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When analyzing any form of public discourse, we need to realize that when something is revealed, something else, possibly more significant, may be concealed. The idea of coding has acquired special importance in the digital age. Only recently, just before the revelation of artificial intelligence, youngsters were told to learn to code if they wanted to get a job.

Language is a code of communication. Coding can be direct and simple. We call that kind of coding “informative.” Apparently, it’s also possible to code disinformation and misinformation. In the world of public discourse and legacy journalism, politicians, pundits and reporters sometimes twist the valuable information they provide to hide what they, their party leaders or their editors don’t want us to see.

The summit between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin that took place in Anchorage, Alaska, earlier this month inspired two seasoned journalists to use the expression “code for” (in one case a verb, in the other a noun) to reveal exactly how that process of concealing unwanted meaning works. The first example comes from author Mansur Mirovalev’s for the news publication Al Jazeera, bearing the title: “‘Feeding a narcissist:’ Ukraine reflects on Trump-Putin summit.” The author begins by citing what is an undeniable fact:

“Putin said the ‘root causes’ of the war should be addressed before any ceasefire or real steps towards a peace settlement are made.”

It’s a straightforward fact that shouldn’t be difficult for Al Jazeera’s readers to understand. We might even call it common sense. The Russians have repeatedly insisted on returning to the “root causes” or historical context of the conflict. Understanding the motivation of the parties involved is critical to conflict resolution. The website helpfully reminds us with this title of its article on the topic: “The First Step in Properly Understanding Conflict: Identifying the Sources.”

But journalists, their editors or employers may feel impelled to do the opposite. Depending on their intent, they may want to present historical reality as an unnecessary distraction. Here is Mirovalev’s gloss on Russia’s demand:

“‘Root causes’ is Putin’s code for rejecting Ukraine’s existence outside Moscow’s political shadow and denying its very sovereignty.”

Now, this is manifestly misleading, if not patently dishonest. His claim that Putin is “rejecting Ukraine’s existence” is unfounded and undocumented; in other words, it is invented. It’s the journalist who’s using the ploy of “code for” to reject out of hand the idea that examining root causes has any validity.

Our second example is an by East and Central Europe Bureau Chief Andrew Higgins of The New York Times with the title: “Putin Sees Ukraine Through a Lens of Grievance Over Lost Glory.” Another example of assuming without evidence what’s on Putin’s mind.

“President Vladimir V. Putin made clear after his meeting in Alaska with President Trump that his deepest concern is not an end to three and a half years of bloodshed. Rather, it is with what he called the “situation around Ukraine,” code for his standard litany of grievances over Russia’s lost glory.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Code for:

A journalistic trope designed to make readers forget what they know about the literal meaning of words and believe a meaning contrary to both the dictionary and common sense. 

Contextual note

Far be it from a Devil’s Dictionary to insist that people should trust dictionaries to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. At best, dictionaries list the usual denotative sense of words as they have occurred in both the literary and spoken tradition. Because dictionaries avoid speculating on the theoretically infinite number of contexts in which a word can be used, they cannot account for intentional distortion or rhetorical effects, such as sarcasm, that can quite simply invert the meaning of a word.

In the two cases cited above, we are witnessing a journalistic practice common in an era like our own that encourages and even requires exaggerated propaganda. The trick these two jouranlists have used is to mix with the facts they present a fabricated “insight” claimed to be the result of the journalists’ inside knowledge or superior intellectual authority. They then call this an act of “decoding” or interpreting for the sake of the ignorant.

Why should I criticize that practice? In some sense, that is precisely what a Devil’s Dictionary attempts to do. The difference is that when we assume the identity of the devil, we are announcing an act of studied cleverness, or even perversity. We expect no one will take it seriously or believe that it’s the “true” definition.��

But there is another important difference. A Devil’s Dictionary definition is a direct invitation to explore context, investigate ambiguity, dig more deeply into an issue than simply accepting either what the initial quote contained or what the devil’s new definition implies.

Historical note

Ambrose Bierce, the brilliant novelist and journalist who authored the Devil’s Dictionary, redefined words to satirize the popular political, institutional, social and economic culture of his time. Here is his reflection on the nuclear family in the United States of his era.

“MARRIAGE: The state or condition of a community consisting of a master, a mistress, and two slaves, making in all, two.”

Although this sounds contrary to common sense because of its contestable arithmetic, its absurdity reveals a perception that many married people might acknowledge: that the state of marriage deprives both the husband and wife of the glorious freedom they enjoyed before marriage. Were he writing in today’s age of woke, we can imagine that his editor might oblige him to revise the definition in the following cumbersome way:

“MARRIAGE: The state or condition of a community consisting of a master, a mistress (or two masters and two mistresses), and two slaves, making in all, two.”

After which, his truly woke editor might even tell him to change “two masters and two mistresses” to “two masters and two masteresses” on the grounds that the term mistress is in itself .

Here’s another of Bierce’s definitions, this time related to his profession of journalism:

“EDITOR: A person who combines the duties of a censor, a copy-reader, a news-gatherer, and a reporter. To the virtues of all these he adds the vices of none.”

I suspect that both journalists mentioned above — Mirovalev and Higgens — might be tempted to agree with Bierce’s definition of their boss. Bierce’s irony suggests that an editor, by combining these diverse and contradictory roles, is, to invert the proverb, the master of all trades and a jack of none, ready to compromise in the name of respecting “superior” constraints. Bierce’s contention that the editor lacks the corresponding vices has the wonderful ironic effect of defining the editor as a soulless, puritanical authority whose business as a censor ensures that the naked truth (God forbid!) will never appear, but rather a carefully sanitized version of it.

Had Mirovalev and Higgens taken seriously their role as journalists, they would at some point have alluded to the importance of understanding “root causes” might have in the context of negotiating the kind of peace treaty Trump and Putin agreed to promote. Rather than claiming to decode it (and change its meaning), they could have done what our Devil’s Dictionary has systematically done throughout its history since 2017. We examine the use not only in its contemporary context, but also further back in history.

The propaganda machine churning away at the core of our legacy media since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has labored at inventing ways to avoid or exclude historical context. The use of the expression “code for” is just one trivial example. Clearly, the best documented ploy has been the endlessly repetitive insistence on labeling the action Putin termed a “Special Military Operation” an “unprovoked full-scale invasion.” That is the official that then-US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s State Department provided, inviting every editor in the legacy media to repeat the adjective “unprovoked” whenever referring to the war in Ukraine. Abolishing history requires a concerted, well-managed effort.

��As many, including economist Jeffrey Sachs, Scott Horton (author of How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine) and many others have signaled, Blinken’s State Department categorically refused to discuss Putin’s formal request to analyze the root causes at a time when the war could have been avoided, in December 2021. Several months later, the Western allies of Ukraine instructed Ukraine to refuse an already negotiated and initial peace deal based on an examination of the root causes.

That would have left Ukraine intact, with the question of Crimea to be decided in an undefined future. But then, as now, our authorities and news services are seeking to uproot the very idea of root causes.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Anchorage summit: a triumph for Putin

Glenn opens with a stark assessment of Trump’s relationship with Russia. He calls it “bizarre” and suggests that Trump is, at the very least, manipulated by Russian intelligence. He argues that Trump often echoes Russian foreign policy talking points verbatim, making him one of the easiest political figures for Moscow to influence. For Glenn, the Anchorage summit is nothing less than a symbolic and practical victory for Putin. By meeting with the world’s leading sanctioning power, Putin breaks out of the containment imposed since the Ukraine invasion.

Glenn dismisses Trump’s pre-summit tough rhetoric as little more than tactical posturing, perhaps designed to create leverage or even burnish his credentials for a Nobel Prize. From Glenn’s perspective, the meeting yields nothing for Washington while granting Russia international legitimacy. He concludes that Trump achieves his personal goal — being the center of attention and restoring Putin’s prominence — while Europe is sidelined and Ukraine left in a vulnerable position.

Gary echoes this view, calling Trump’s treatment of Putin “bizarre, uncanny and solicitous,” almost as if Trump is a subordinate. He highlights Putin’s deliberate tactic of keeping the US president waiting — a classic power play in diplomacy designed to show dominance. For Gary, Trump’s behavior upon greeting Putin is shocking for a US president and signals weakness rather than resolve.

Gary goes further by analyzing Putin’s body language, which he interprets as a display of dominance shaped by the Russian leader’s background in judo. Putin’s habit of speaking at length, he argues, is a strategic move to frame his vision as the superior approach. Trump seems to accept this by abandoning demands for a ceasefire.

Instead, Trump moves toward Putin’s preferred path of a swift “peace plan.” Gary warns that genuine peace agreements are complex and time-consuming, and Trump’s negotiating team lacks the experience to manage such intricacies. In his view, Trump essentially concedes on the ceasefire while Putin flatters Trump with dubious claims, such as saying Trump won the 2020 election and that Russia would not have invaded Ukraine under his presidency. Gary dismisses these as manipulative falsehoods.

A Russian journalist describes the event as a “total victory for Russia and for Putin.” Both Gary and Glenn find this judgment accurate. Glenn reiterates that Trump has no coherent strategy, only the desire to appear successful in the moment. Trump’s foreign policy, he argues, is not guided by principles or philosophy but by self-interest and personal image.

Atul sums up the consensus: The United States gains nothing, Putin emerges as a clear winner and Trump, in his own mind, wins by being the center of attention.

The Washington summit: damage control or crisis?

The Washington follow-up summit was meant to address the fallout from Anchorage, but brought mixed results. Gary notes that Trump’s call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy prompts the latter to seek a meeting in Washington. This is significant, given Zelenskyy’s bruising experience in February when US Vice President JD Vance publicly told him to capitulate, straining US–Ukraine relations.

Gary believes the presence of European leaders at the Washington summit helped prevent a repeat of that debacle. Trump’s talk of territorial concessions, however, unsettled Zelenskyy and European allies, raising fears of a US pivot toward Russian terms. While some US officials floated the possibility of peacekeeping missions, Gary warns such assurances could vanish quickly if not endorsed directly by Trump.

Atul asks whether the Washington summit amounts to damage control. Gary agrees, though he doubts that is the official intention. Glenn, in typically blunt terms, describes the event as moving from “the jaws of a definitive catastrophe” — namely the collapse of Ukraine, NATO’s unraveling and Russia’s absorption of Central Europe — to a severe crisis. He likens this to shifting from certain death to “fourth-stage cancer.” His advice to Europe is clear: Stay close to the US but prepare to defend yourselves independently. Europe, he argues, has shown more capability and resilience than expected, but reliance on Trump’s America is risky.

Style, strategy and strain: reactions to Zelenskyy and Europe

At this point, Atul introduces three journalistic observations:

Zelenskyy’s appearance: Some European journalists criticize his all-black attire and angled chair as brash. Glenn dismisses such concerns, praising Zelenskyy for presenting himself as a wartime leader rather than a supplicant.

European leaders’ weakness: Most, apart from Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, face domestic political fragility due to economic hardship and low approval ratings. Glenn attributes these vulnerabilities to broader social strains such as modernization and immigration, but insists their support for Ukraine is rational and necessary. Gary acknowledges the fragility but emphasizes that the public understands the importance of standing behind Ukraine and NATO.

Zelenskyy as a “dead man walking:” Some commentators suggest his thin-skinned behavior, corruption scandals and dwindling US support undermine his leadership. Glenn admits he is starting to see troubling signs, citing showing Ukrainians’ desire for peace. Gary, however, strongly rejects such polls as misleading. He stresses that large majorities of Ukrainians oppose territorial concessions, comparing pro-peace responses to vague platitudes like “motherhood and apple pie.”

The two experts diverge on polling but agree that European unity on defending Ukraine remains strong. Leaders may overstate praise for Trump to keep him engaged, but Gary worries about the lack of substantive detail in Washington. Both warn that Trump’s negotiating team lacks the expertise for serious diplomacy.

Patterns of aggression and fragile diplomacy

Glenn broadens the lens, pointing to Russia’s record of unchecked aggressions — in Montenegro, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Moldova, Estonia, Crimea and Ukraine. He argues that the West has consistently ignored these actions, responding only with vague calls for peace. For him, Trump represents a continuation of this failure, offering little interest in complex policy and even less capacity for nuanced statecraft.

Gary, only “microscopically” more optimistic after Washington than Anchorage, hopes Zelenskyy and European leaders can persuade Trump of Ukraine’s security importance. He underscores the brutality of Putin’s policy, particularly the kidnapping of thousands of Ukrainian children, who are placed in Russian families — a tactic with long-term consequences.

Looking ahead: pressure, politics and possibilities

The final portion of the discussion looks ahead. Atul raises two questions: the influence of domestic pressures in Europe, particularly among Muslim populations who see Western support for Ukraine as biased compared to Gaza, and the Republican narrative in Washington portraying Europe as weak and dependent.

Gary believes Trump remains fixated on staging a trilateral summit with Putin and Zelenskyy, though he doubts Putin’s willingness to participate. Without major US financial commitments — perhaps $50–80 billion — Russia has little incentive to engage. NATO’s future, he warns, is tied directly to the Ukraine question. Keeping Trump involved, possibly with the prospect of a Nobel Prize, might help, but Gary doubts Trump will take substantive steps.

Glenn, however, sees a potential path forward. He notes that the US could provide arms to NATO countries, which could then transfer them to Ukraine, allowing Trump to maintain his pro-Putin image without entirely abandoning Kyiv. This arrangement, he argues, might be the most plausible near-term strategy. Ultimately, he lays out two possible outcomes: Either Ukraine collapses or it is sustained by European and American support until Putin is forced to halt or accept defeat.

The future hangs in the balance

The discussion paints a sobering picture of Trump’s foreign policy approach. For Glenn, Trump is a leader driven solely by self-image, easily manipulated yet impossible to control. For Gary, Trump’s diplomatic style is reckless and devoid of substance, leaving NATO allies anxious and Ukraine imperiled. Both agree that Putin emerges strengthened from Anchorage and that Washington offers only a slight reprieve from disaster.

In their eyes, the uncertainty of Trump’s summits reflects a deeper crisis in transatlantic relations, where Europe must prepare to defend itself while still relying on an unpredictable US. The stakes, they conclude, are nothing less than Ukraine’s survival and NATO’s future.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Live: Trump Hands Putin a Win in Alaska as Zelenskyy and EU Leaders Huddle in the White House appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Ashutosh Lal: Thank you very much. Thanks, thank you so much.

Atul Singh: Alright, Ashutosh, you’ve been to Ukraine over a number of years. Walk us through how you saw — and I don’t mean as a story, because, of course, you’re a pilot, not a historian. But still, you’ve had your brush with history — how you saw the conflict (a) emerging and (b) developing.

Ashutosh Lal: Right. Just to debunk, I am knowledgeable, actually.

Atul Singh: Well, you were an instructor. All your formal students swear by you!

Ashutosh Lal: Many of us have been, and we all have our stories here and there. But trust me, I’m a very ordinary person who — God was kind — that I had a tryst with the Indian Air Force for a pretty long time. And God was kind to give me all the opportunities to fly the airplanes, to do whatever I was supposed to do. In that, there was a responsibility given to me to go to Ukraine as air attaché in the year of our Lord 2011, and I came back much later in 2014 after a little bit of extension.

Atul Singh: So you were there three years.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah. So from that point of view—

Atul Singh: That is when Crimea occurs.

Ashutosh Lal: I saw the first conflict, if you may call it so: the genesis of the entire fault line as to how it developed, what exactly happened, how Crimea was taken away…

Atul Singh: Or how Russians took Crimea. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: But let’s say how Ukrainians gave it up. For that matter, that’s also another way to look at it. But like I said, how green men, little green men, who sprung up and they took away everything. So I saw it from all up front, close. It was very clear to me as to how it was going to affect us, and since then on, I’ve been visiting, revisiting and trying to keep myself updated — not because I’m not a historian by profession, but the trigger which happened in me because of my boss over there. I must give credit to him for many understandings — our ambassador, Shri Rajiv Chandra, who was extremely kind to us and who taught us, who shaped us, mentored us. And under his tutelage, if I may say, we went on to do whatever work we could do with him. So I must duly construct, or he came in at the point when I landed up in Ukraine in 2011. Believe you me, Atul, it was perhaps one of the most beautiful countries in the world. To be very honest, I had traveled a fair amount of the world before that, so I could draw a comparison and say that there was a great amount of vibrance and there was a great amount of joy and happiness. There was a great amount of respect for Indian culture, and there was a great amount of likeness between our two cultures. Later on in the chat, we can point out a few for that matter. But the point here is that that was the phase: UEFA Euro 2012, which was co-hosted by Poland and Ukraine in 2012. I remember I saw that, and I was there. The first match was Sweden–Ukraine, both playing blue/yellow jerseys. And Ukraine was magnanimous to ask Sweden to choose their color so that Ukraine could choose their colors. Andriy Shevchenko, the legendary football player — I believe he’s turned pro golfer now—

Atul Singh: Oh, has he?

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, yeah.

Atul Singh: Okay.

Ashutosh Lal: He scored the first goal. It was a sight to be seen on the Maidan, which is the Independence Square, which turned later into dark and ugly pictures when the conflict broke through. See, I thought that was the apex of Ukraine, what I saw at that time as to how Ukraine was prospering. And it appeared to us very clearly that Ukraine is heading toward the European or EU way. Now, this was the belief which all my colleagues in the embassy, including my boss, had, that this is what’s going to happen. However, I was not convinced, because whatever little I dug up — and I lived on the streets over there, I spoke the language of the streets. (Chuckles) I was working the streets, so to speak. It was a very different time altogether. But in that particular—

Atul Singh: You weren’t just staying in your diplomatic bubble and kettle. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: The whole idea was to get a feel of the place. And because of my link with Russian machinery — half of which, I did not know, was built in Ukraine — it was totally Ukrainian in its pedigree. So when that happened to me, and I realized how my life was saved by many of these Ukrainian workmen working in the different zavod — the plants — I used to visit over there, that drew me to the entire thing to try and understand what exactly was happening on the ground. So in that, my belief was — I think I’m quite sure about it — that Ukraine, under the influence of who and who — we can talk about it — did not envisage this outcome, which it eventually turned out to be. And they thought that they could dissect themselves from the larger ecosystem of East Europe. I’m not talking in terms of the Russian Federation. I’m talking about that larger ecosystem of East Europe. They wanted to dissect themselves and get attached. Please, when I’m saying that, those of you interested should look up where the west of Ukraine, the cities of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk — which part of Europe they kept changing hands with, whose background — Khmelnytskyi, might as well look him up: the ruler and the horse rider who came winning and marauding. You need to see that, as to what they were doing: carrying the symbol of power, something like a gada, which they carry in their hand. So you need to see that, and how Ukraine went from one to the other side needs to be seen. Notwithstanding that, post-Second World War, post- that era when everything was developing, post-Germany, when the Wall fell, unification happened, perestroika — how things were moving forward. This particular aspiration of Ukraine to come to the West or the European side, and this game plan of the West to try and snatch Ukraine out of the close, tight embrace of the East European ecosystem — I think that was the conflict which led to what happened.

Historical claims and regional politics

Atul Singh: So if you go back to 300 years ago — and Vladimir Putin’s op-ed talks a lot about it — there is a sense that Ukraine is the ancestral kingdom of Rus. Ukraine was attacked and taken over by the Polish–Lithuanian empires, and therefore, it is inevitable that Ukraine should remain in the sphere of influence of Russia. That is the Moscow view of the world. At the same time, if you take the Polish view of the world, they say, “Well, Western Ukraine in particular is a land contiguous to ours, and therefore has a lot more in common with us. And therefore, it should come more to the West and give us a greater buffer against Russia.” And if you go back to Soviet times, what people forget is that the brunt of collectivization — and there are books and books and books one can read — was borne by the Ukrainian peasantry. The kulaks were mainly Ukrainians. And in fact, Joseph Stalin killed three and a half million of them. And I have friends who are historians, and I have friends who are in MI6 and the British Foreign Office, and they often joke that had the British invaded Ukraine, they wouldn’t have treated them with the racism Nazis did. They would have set up an independent Ukrainian state. They would have played divide and rule, as they did around the world — they were rather good at it — and they wouldn’t have killed three million Ukrainians like the Nazis. So the reason I’m giving this historical color — and of course, those of you who want to dig up more can read a piece that retired CIA officer Glenn Carle and I wrote just before the war begins in 2022. We wrote it on Christmas Eve, December 2021 — and the point is, it is a tortured land with a tortured past, with contending narratives of history and different geopolitical interests. Over to you: What did you see transpiring at that stage?

Ashutosh Lal: So business? What Atul said is what I’m going to stay totally off.

Atul Singh: Okay, fine. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: Academics and everything else you’ve heard about him, for that matter, you can go back and read. So this is where the ringside aspect comes in. And where did I pick up this issue and this feeling that Ukraine would not be able to be pulled out from the embers of East Europe, or whatever the big brother was. I picked it up from Romania. Let me narrate.

Atul Singh: Excellent.

Ashutosh Lal: So there was this seminar happening over there — a conference, perhaps — which was discussing—

Atul Singh: In the capital?

Ashutosh Lal: Romania, Bucharest.

Atul Singh: Bucharest?

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah.

Atul Singh: Okay.

Ashutosh Lal: Romania was also under my watch. I was there. So I was required to be there because a senior official from India was traveling over there, and he had to do a presentation on Prithvi missiles. There was a test done on an anti-ballistic missile of the three-stage model. So he had come to present a paper on that. And I was with him, and I was part of that seminar. And as always, my ears were out on the ground to try and figure out what’s happening. Why? Because the interesting part was in the front row, or perhaps just behind the front row, there was a row of ushankas — an ushanka is the P-cap which Russians wear — there was a row of ushankas. A senior, perhaps a general, on the right-hand side and a lieutenant down the line, age-wise, stacked up over there — and the presentation was going on. Please remember: Romania houses the active component of the missile defense, right? And that was a time when Deveselu base was being reactivated, because the earlier launch base which had been developed for Afghanistan was being denied, and they had no choice but to come back to this. And Deveselu was this Aegis Ashore site; radars were in Turkey. You know the whole idea. So in that context, to a speaker, I asked a question. I said, “Sir, the talks are on. Ukraine is likely to follow the EU very shortly. The handshake will take place very soon. And if you look at the European conundrum, you’ll realize that wherever in the East either the US has gone forward and NATO has caterpillared, or NATO has gone forward, the EU has caterpillared. So it’s just a foregone conclusion that today it is the EU, tomorrow it will be NATO, and Ukraine will turn into a NATO state. By which would I understand that these missiles here in Romania, or this site here in Romania, may shift to Donbas, Donetsk, Luhansk.” Those were my exact words. You know what the response was? Before anybody else on the stage could respond, the general with the ushanka passed an elbow down the line, and the elbow traveled all the way. Up sprang a young lieutenant, and in chaste English, he just spoke to the audience. He said, “Whatever the gentleman is talking about is in the realm of fiction. It can never happen.” And he sat.

Atul Singh: That is totally understandable.

Maidan and the fall of Yanukovych

Ashutosh Lal: Understandable. So that’s what my point is. That is the time that, from a ringside view, being on the ground, I understood and realized the fact that it is the dynamics of neighbors. Being on the ground in the streets and working over there, I knew that the economic ties of East Ukraine with Russia were very close.

Atul Singh: They had been for centuries.

Ashutosh Lal: There was travel, there were relationships — husband, wife, families, blah, blah, blah — whatever you call it. So it was absolutely unthinkable that you could draw a line there. And here was the West. The likes of — you know who — Victoria Nuland.

Atul Singh: I mean, our Chief Strategy Officer, Peter Isackson, despises her. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So that phone call is there on the net if you want to listen.

Atul Singh: (Laughs) I’ve heard it, yeah, yeah.

Ashutosh Lal: But the fact remains that here they were trying to call this out. When this happened — and I analyzed this comment, I dug deeper into it. Then comes out the next ringside exposé or understanding of mine. Dnipropetrovsk is a town where you have the usual — I may be getting on mixed up names here and there. Sometimes it happens.

Atul Singh: We won’t hold you to it. More important was the point rather than the detail.

Ashutosh Lal: I understand. But now, this base agency of Ukraine. Exceptionally brilliant products they had. In my scouting for trying to see that, imagine: You could have a Su-27 which carries a missile rocket under the belly, goes to the highest possible altitude in a particular direction and vector, launches that missile and that missile puts a LEO satellite into orbit. So it was the easiest possible way to give you coverage over a battleground if you want to put a LEO, which is persistent but finishes off sometime. A Low Earth Orbit satellite, right? So they had some wonderful systems, like the floating dock for the Zenit rocket, which launches a satellite into orbit. That means you didn’t have to have a Sriharikota. You could drag that platform on the ocean with the help of tugs to the appropriate place to have the rocket launching your satellite in the most economical manner. So that’s a wonderful, brilliant system. But also, the credit was that they were the father of all SS-series missiles of Russia. From SS-18 to SS-21, everything was being found there. It was their patent. And if you look at the books at that time, which I did, you realize that these missiles were approaching the end of life, and they would need extension. So just imagine: If this part of Ukraine was taken out of Russia’s influence, that factory would not have been available. They would not have been able to life-extend the intercontinental basing of Russia. And in one masterstroke, the West would have utilized a large part of the arsenal on which Russia primes. Not much has been spoken about it. But like I said, the ringside views are this—

Atul Singh: It adds a great degree of detail, granular detail.

Ashutosh Lal: It’s very clear and very straightforward, that I came back to my boss. I told him, and we had a discussion, and he said, “No, I do not deal. You see what’s happening.”

Atul Singh: But, you know, the Indian Foreign Services often aren’t the truest foreign service! (Both laugh) I’ve had to deal with them for too many years!

Ashutosh Lal: Of course, that is what I’ve heard. Then what happened was the last 24 hours, when the Maidan turned and everything else started. Yanukovych had to take off in his helicopter. It was the second time it was happening in that part. In fact, in Romania also, there had been a dictator who was trying to get in a helicopter from a rooftop, who was pulled back.

Atul Singh: Nicolae Ceaușescu.

Ashutosh Lal: Absolutely.

Atul Singh: Yeah, a friend of mine, his father fled Ceaușescu, nearly died! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So I’ll stay to my point — that Yanukovych fled, and inside Ukraine, everything changed. And suddenly all that happened and the independent districts sprung.

Escalation and evacuations

Ashutosh Lal: To link it up to Euro 2012, the way I saw the development happening over there — the airports were built up, the hotels were built up, the infrastructure was done up — absolutely prime and very beautiful. All that was destroyed in the last seven to eight months in front of me. That’s how the tide turned.

Atul Singh: What you’re saying is that it was overreach on the part of the US? Political overreach?

Ashutosh Lal: I would put it differently. One has to understand: That geographical neighborhood is a real fact of life.

Atul Singh: Of course. I mean, look, the US did not allow missiles in Cuba. There was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Ashutosh Lal: I was about to say the same thing. In fact, the cross-reference was made to my reply there. I said, “Look, you also have the same issue in Cuba.” The same issue was there? Quite possible there could be an issue happening in that particular conference when I was discussing with people. But be that as it may, it tells us very clearly, and in our own context. And we also have a very turbulent neighborhood that keeps shifting from one side to the other. So the neighborhood is a fact, and the neighborhood is required to be managed by the people who are involved directly. It cannot be managed remotely by someone sitting very far away. Because, for all these reasons, as it is very clear now, they would always have their vested interest deployed inside.

Atul Singh: That’s history, the law of history.

Ashutosh Lal: So, if that was so, it could have been seen, it should have been seen. It should be seen by us in managing our neighborhood issues — how we want to swing from one to the other side — because the neighborhood is something. There is another issue which I would just like to mention over here: Amongst the leadership of Ukraine I saw from that point in time, there was Tymoshenko.

Atul Singh: The braided lady who was put in jail by Yanukovych?

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, she was in jail when I reached her. And if you read that history as to who was on which side, there’s plenty of interesting things over there. But she was in jail when I reached there. People were doing dharna protests to try and get her out from detention at that point in time. But the fact remains that from there—

Atul Singh: Just for members of the global audience: You go, sit down and protest, and stop the streets, really.

Ashutosh Lal: Basically. Atul, thank you for that connection. But I’m just saying that from there, what I saw — the leaders, how they were fanning out to be — when I come to Mr. Zelenskyy, I often wonder: Could he have done something differently, so as not to ruin that beautiful country of Ukraine, which I call моя друга батьківщина — “my second homeland?” I just want to remind your viewers that if you’ve ever had any bit of sunflower oil, you have a little bit of Ukraine in you. And I’ve got my tooth also sorted out over there—a root canal. So I have it in my tooth as well! (Laughs) So the point is that being that affectionate to that land, and having seen the potential — imagine a country which is largely under snow for four to six months, yet is the largest grower of grain in Europe. So there is an immense amount of potential—

Atul Singh: Sunflowers, wheat, so many other agricultural products.

Ashutosh Lal: And I will come to the region a little later, when the conflict has already broken out. Because right now we’re talking about what could have happened. So, I’m talking with Zelenskyy. Could he have done something differently? Did the other side — Americans, mostly — realize that here is a person who is used — like what we are doing with a mic and a camera — and if he has a narrative, he will read that and he will enact that. Was that the thing in the initial phase, where he kept enacting what he was being told to say, and then took the entire conflict south? Now he was in a different mode; he changed clothes, and wore different things and came to the front end, trying to do what was required to be done? Was it too late by then? That question has to be asked. So how the neighborhood is to be managed and how the national interests — which are always a sacrosanct thing, not the friends and foes — that needs to be seen very clearly. This is my gathering of lessons from the ringside.

Atul Singh: Okay, so — 2014: You’re there, and the conflict really erupts. Because Russia simply cannot give away Crimea. After all, Potemkin, the great lover of Catherine the Great, conquered it for her, and that was Russian access to warm water. There’s no way the Russians were ever going to give Crimea away to Ukraine. And in 1954, it was none other than Nikita Khrushchev who gifted it to Ukraine. So in Russian minds, it was theirs. And then, of course, the conflict erupts in Donbas and Luhansk. The little green men you’ve already mentioned, walk us through that period. So what did you see?

Ashutosh Lal: Thank you very much. Trust me, in Crimea — right up to Alupka or Atakoy, where I traveled — I thought it was the most amazing place, and that Russian and Ukrainian existence was practically inseparable. Truly international. A couple of times, I was there on Victory Day — I was there at Crimea to see the wonderful parade, the Black Sea Fleet and whatnot. Yalta — you know what happened in the Second World War. The Yalta Conference is still a very important landmark, as you know.

Atul Singh: The contours of the post-war world.

Ashutosh Lal: So how did I come into this entire thing? And how did I get that inside view of this conflict brewing, apart from what was happening in Kyiv? Kyiv, of course, we knew. You remember those snipers on the Maidan and the people who came and occupied over there in the thick of winter. Somewhere, I have a picture in which I’m standing on Maidan with everything burnt out. I mean, I was yelled at — “Get back into the embassy!” — because I was out there in Maidan trying to see what exactly was happening, because of my own curiosity. And when the snipers were taking shots, everything was happening over there. So that was in Kyiv, but I got involved because there were our students who were studying in different cities. So the first place we got an SOS call from was Crimea. Our ambassador got a call from the parents of our children in Crimea — in Ukraine — now under Russian control. “What’s happening?” So the ambassador came and said, “Boys, we have this issue at hand.” So I said, “Let me go. I’ll go and be with them. I’ll comfort them and I’ll take care of what was required, and then I’ll come back to you.” He was apprehensive, of course, because we’d not changed sides yet, and there was the issue of passports and blah, blah, blah. I said, “Don’t worry, sir, because I’ve been working the streets. I will be able to go through that way.” I was given the go-ahead. I went across, and I stayed in Crimea at the same hotel where the group from BBC and World Service was staying, mind you. And they were staying in the same hotel, carrying out such coverage of the entire situation while the city was rather peaceful. Leninsky Square was where the main protest was happening. That is where the hands had changed and everybody went to dinner in the restaurants. Later that night, I asked those two, “Why are you raising this red flag?” But then there are dynamics, too. The point is that when I was there and I spoke to the students — this was the city of Simferopol, the capital of Crimea — I gathered them all together and then briefed them. “Now this is how we will do. This is what we will do.” But luckily, we did not have to evacuate them from there. The transition was rather peaceful. I went and saw their parliament building, as they call it, and there were these little green men standing there with balaclavas. And that’s about all. Because there, the narrative had been set, and that wonderfully intertwined Russian–Ukrainian presence had changed. Ukrainian soldiers and officers had joined the Russian Armed Forces. Then all of that happened and it just changed. Remember, that was the first change of nationality of a sizable portion of land after the Second World War in that area, and that would happen without firing a single bullet. So obviously, I can understand the West was feeling pretty let down that they let this happen. They didn’t have their ear to the ground, which was a failure on their part, and a lot happened. But in that, I understood that now the Russian mechanism — their so-called hybrid warfare, which we can speak about in a different interview altogether — was already deployed. It was happening. Crimea, of course, has a problem of freshwater shortage and access to the mainland, which they have now secured through this conflict. As you are aware, all of that has been secured. So it was very clear to us that—

Atul Singh: They have a landbridge now.

Ashutosh Lal: In fact, talking about bridges, we had a small problem at hand. While in Ukraine, I was handling Project 832 — modernization. It was a very big project of, what, 105 airplanes, but one got crashed, so 104 were left. The plot was: Five airplanes would come, get overhauled in this plant — which is contiguous to Zhuliany Airport, the smaller airport in Kyiv — and then they fly out to India and practice. We had to do 35 airplanes. The second-last batch was at my hand, and I was about to come back when this war happened. And the air route to Ankara — the first thought was to route over Crimea — and now we could not go over Crimea. So I had no choice but to take the airplanes all the way west to Bucharest, and then from Bucharest head to Istanbul because you could not make it to Ankara. You know, the whole planning had to be changed. So be that as it may, the fact remained that I realized that Crimea was gone for good, and that gave us an indication as to what was going to happen in the East. Because that mechanism of hybrid warfare had started to deploy over there, and it was very clear that if they didn’t get their acts together, then that would happen. This is where the West woke up in a significant manner, and they deployed a good number of boots on the ground under different guises. That gap was simple, but it was what we call “standard and recommended practices” — exercises between two forces. The radio phraseology to be used commonly, so that they can be used in some peacekeeping somewhere. How do you use radio? How do we use basic tactics that can be synchronized? So under that guard, the trainers who were there from the West — and NATO especially — became the custodians of now keeping their watch. And that had started. This is where the conflict started to happen, which basically brewed in the eastern part: Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, even down till Kherson later, you know. This is a tragic chapter. Sir, that’s where I thought, it’s very important to understand — just 30 seconds more — because this, again, happened in Lugansk. The city of Lugansk had a big medical college. By the way, I hope you’re aware that the cost of East European MBBS is sizably less than what is available here in India.

Atul Singh: That’s what I’ve been told.

Ashutosh Lal: That is the reason why many of our students go over there, which I suppose is a good thing. Of course, they have to come back and take an MCI exam before they can start practicing over here. But I found very bright young people over there from all parts of the country who were there. So I was sent to Lugansk again under a similar situation, where this thing was happening, and now it was live. Because the gunshots were being fired outside and everything was happening, I had to hire a train and move about 800, 900 students in the train, over buses, put them in the train, and the train came to Kyiv where the ambassador and all our setup was waiting for them to be received. I had to go there because of my connections with the plants over there, and I used the help from the people on the ground. And that is what I used to do. Whatever I could do, we managed it. But it again allowed me — and that was Holi at that point of time. I spent Holi with those boys and girls over there in that place. When I put them in a hall — I had gone along with my sister — I addressed them and I told them, I made groups. I made leaders. I said, “When this happens, this is how the message will go, this is what you will do.” So I built that quasi-operation, and I built them out in that place. This is where I again realized that now it is not coming back. The situation is such that it will not come back, it will not go to foster — it’s going to get worse from here, it’s only going to get more destructive from here, now both sides will suffer, whichever.

Atul Singh: So the train had been set in motion.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, and it was an irreversible train to my mind. And which unfortunately—

Atul Singh: That’s up for debate, sure.

Ashutosh Lal: After you make your point, then I will come back to what happened in the second conflict, because I was there again.

Russian hybrid warfare and the 2022 invasion

Atul Singh: Okay, so you mentioned hybrid warfare. Okay, what’s the Russian model of hybrid warfare, and how did the West respond?

Ashutosh Lal: Atul, hybrid warfare would be another episode.

Atul Singh: We’ll have to get you back! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So let’s keep that aside.

Atul Singh: Give us an outline, give us a teaser.

Ashutosh Lal: A good point, yeah. So the hybrid warfare spoken about by many authors and a lot of literature available over there, is Russia’s war actually hybrid warfare? And some mechanics leave us asking the question. But leave the mechanics aside; look at the results. The result was, like I mentioned to you, that they managed to change the nationality of a large piece of land — a crucial warm sea port where the Black Sea Fleet was based — without firing a single bullet. Do I see any more moving? So this is what was the trajectory of the warfare, which was running out. Of course, the West jumped in, and the contest heated up, so to speak. People lost lives, and so much destruction took place subsequently. But that is the potential of hybrid war, because it’s a very important issue for our own armed forces. And it includes everything — lawfare, I don’t know what all — because the entire set of academia, the entire set of institutions of army, judiciary, administration, diplomacy, foreign services, economy, everything comes into it. So that is an amalgamation which is an ultimate binder of the national policy.

Atul Singh: Okay, well, you mentioned the second phase of the conflict: February 24, 2022. Alright, Russian troops move in, and you were there again.

Ashutosh Lal: Yep.

Atul Singh: So what transpires then for the Russian tanks to start rolling in?

Ashutosh Lal: Right. So, I was back in 2014. I came back to my job normally here. Whatever happened, I had a wonderful time in the Air Force. Early January 2020, I left the Air Force and I was trying to become a civil helicopter pilot, which I am right now. I was flying till very recently for a company in Mumbai, taking passengers from the point of dispersal to their ships and rigs and getting them back. But in that, my interest in trying to understand during this conflict — and this is a very, very important key point — the way I saw through the conflict, I am completely mesmerized by the Ukrainian ingenuity. That’s not only on the battlefield. People will tell you how males exited Ukraine, how their own population deserted, they don’t have boots on the ground, some people have gone away or whatever. But in that also, how common Ukrainians — leave politicians aside — held on to their nationality, held on to their spirit, held on to their ingenuity on the battlefield, off the battlefield, in the domain of military tech. For those of your viewers who are perhaps not very much aware, Ukrainian military tech is huge. It may surprise you that 40% of the Indian Navy’s frontline ships are powered by Zorya’s engine, which is made in Ukraine. It’s absolutely important for us that we have them with us. And mind you, unlike the airplanes, the ships are different. You have to first choose the engine, because Indian transmission has to be quiet, and then you build the ship around it, so then can’t change it. So you have to identify the engine provider first before you arrive at your ship. That is the kind of planning process. So Zorya powers more than 40% of the Indian Navy; it’s very important for us. Antonov — anything to do with Antonov — A-12 and A-22, what we flew in our Air Force, and the An-124 is what the US survives on.

Atul Singh: Which most people don’t know.

Ashutosh Lal: Antonov is thoroughbred — inside to out, including engines and everything else — Ukrainian. It’s got nothing to do with the honor of Russian women. So Ukraine MIC, or Military Industrial Complex, was itself huge at that point, alright. But in the war, how it transformed itself is a story that someday the world should document.

Atul Singh: I’m sure people are documenting it already.

Ashutosh Lal: I’m sure. But you look at it from my perspective as to how this tech… To give an example, in Kharkiv, I found out that some small company was making a very peculiar ammunition which could be mounted on the pylon of a low-flying airplane. It just dispenses very small transmitters over a swath of ground: GPS jammers. They would all transmit, they would noise-jam the GPS, and they would die down as the battery dies down. So in a period of time when you want to operate over there, you can deny GPS in assault. Selective non-availability of GPS you could achieve at that point of time. Their expertise in radio listening and eavesdropping is very well known. There was an incident which happened in an unknown army, and there was a unit which had some equipment from there — I’m sure your listeners know about it. So it was being brought from there. So you could do that. There were many things. They made passive radars. That means it’s just a receiver, not transmitting anything else. Poland has a solution, but this equipment of Ukraine was such that, using the normal transmission from the radio nav-ways of Europe, they were able to mimic and understand. Without opening up any transmitter, they can get comfortable with the surroundings. Wonderful technology. Of course, needs to be matured, needs to be tied up, needs to be inducted into the systems — that is where our ingenuity could have come. LWS-6 Żubr, perhaps the largest hovercraft, skims over any rocky stretch and the sea, carries tanks and has an amazing technology in which it can sidestep and turn around in a very small place, which is also there on the Zorya engines. Crazy, absolutely. So they were at that level already. From there, those boys and girls, those men and women — what unmanned aerial systems have done to this war — very soon people will be coming out. And I know for sure that people who built it then, during the conflict, tested it during the conflict, and used it to destroy very expensive equipment. Otherwise, a large country like Russia would not have—

Atul Singh: Tanks, for instance.

Ashutosh Lal: So specifics will take time. So I’m just trying to tell you indicators as to where you should research and try and transfer.

Atul Singh: I mean, we should get into specifics, because a lot of our viewers wouldn’t have the time. Some would, some would spend hours, but others wouldn’t.

Ashutosh Lal: Like I said, these very inexpensive unmanned aerial systems, which affected very large equipment on the ground, how they intercepted, they went into Kursk. Of course, there’s a lot of Western help that was available. But still, when they realized that the fighter planes were not coming through — Su-27 deploying — they applied the Internet to keep the conflict on, to keep the pressure. Now, I come back to February of 2022. That is when the tanks rolled across from Kharkiv and from the East. So my friend called me for something or other — I would go down there. I said, “Okay, I’ll come. But are you sure Mr. Putin is all lined up? That said, you’re not gonna come down? No, no, everything is okay, just — apparently — come, come.” I landed at Kharkiv, I took a car, and I was driving to his approach.

Atul Singh: You were not yet a civilian helicopter pilot?

Ashutosh Lal: No, I was.

Atul Singh: You were already?

Ashutosh Lal: I was. So in our academy, we had breaks. When you fly for six weeks, you have three weeks off. So I left the military for 15 days because I had the qualification. Of course, Covid also hit at that point of time, but that’s another story. The point here is that when I reached the provision, I had a good time with my friend, chatted and met old contacts and everybody else. And I was looking for the local beer, Natsu. Fifteen-seventeen is really old, even in beer. So we went to the bar and had that, came back, slept it off — only to be woken up by the phone ringing consistently, because Mr. Putin had dropped across. Now, this is the time to speak about the operation which Russia launched to quickly end this conflict on their own terms, and the fight back with the help of the people who are deployed on ground from the West, and Ukrainian beauty. I’m talking about a very audacious attempt by helicopters of Russian armed forces to carry out what, in typical terms in the Air Force, we call SHBO — Special Heli-Borne Operations — taking troops in the helicopters all the way from their secured bases, where? To a small airport outside Kyiv — home to Antonov. So when I was there in Bucha, I got stuck badly. And I take the car, and as I start driving back towards Kyiv, these helicopters are flying over. Su-25s, Su-27s flying over, and there was chaos, and there were roadblocks, but I was somehow managing and coming. Because the idea was to come close to Kyiv, because all the flights were canceled. I did not have a flight to come back home. I had to have a plan in my mind to get back, because remember, I had to come back to my job. (Atul laughs) And I don’t have any visa toward either place.

Atul Singh: You couldn’t have flown into Poland!

Ashutosh Lal: Minor issues actually fucked me! (Laughs)

Atul Singh: Minor issues! (Both laugh) You could’ve swum through the Black Sea, swum through the Suez Canal…

Ashutosh Lal: The Bosphorus was calling me, be that it may.

Atul Singh: You’re a fit man!

Ashutosh Lal: So the point I was trying to make was that when this was happening, I realized that this was something, it’s a very important moment in a helicopter pilot’s life. Unfortunately, I could not be part of that formation or that fight, but I was there to witness it from close quarters and to follow up later about—with the help of my other friends who were there — to follow their help, as to what exactly happened. So the long and short is that this train of helicopters — the Mils — “Mi version.” For them, everything is “Mi version,” Mils. Mi-17 is an export version — which, we’ll call it null patterns — for them — everything is “Mi version.” So Mi-8s are carrying these troops. Mi-35s, my own helicopter, which I live in and die by—

Atul Singh: You like it, clearly.

Ashutosh Lal: There is no match to it. That’s another story.

Atul Singh: We’ll cover it in another video! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So Ka-50s were escorting them. Great machine, for that matter. So they were escorting, and there was this battle. There are many videos. Missiles flying across, flares flying across, hits taking place — and animations available as to how they turned over here, there, and then took a hit and took a hit. It was crazy. So they reached this airport outside, and initial gains were being made. Because that night, I was in Kyiv, and I was staying on a highrise, where everybody else was inside the bunker. I was left in that flat alone, horizon, and I could hear the noises. So it is then when the system kicked on, and the reaction to make sure that the runway is not made available for a follow-on fixed-wing transport aircraft to land over there, with a fleet of Ilyushins or Antonovs or whatever the Russians had. Because this normally happens; it’s called the link-up. Initially, the SHBO force goes, secures the airport. Now the link-up happens on the fixed wing runway. So they made sure that this doesn’t happen. And although they had taken ground on that airport, the Ukrainians with the help of—

Atul Singh: With the help of other foreign troops.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, because there were instructors over there. And it is my understanding, which I’m very clear about, that they quickly stopped this entire plan. And then they said, “This is the counter.”

Atul Singh: Reports are that this was mainly Americans and British instructors. There must have been others because of NATO.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, NATO and the West always have a very good mix of things.

Atul Singh: Interoperability, as they say.

Ashutosh Lal: No, so the point I was trying to make was that this is where this fight started to turn dirty, and the link-up could not happen. And that became very messy. That was another very important turning point from the point of view of Russia. Russia had lost the initial momentum, because obviously—remember, the attacker always has the initiative. He chooses where to come in from. The defender has to jockey and adjust itself. So Russia had the initiative. It had the first move, and they came and they tried something out, which was very audacious —over that distance, over that range. Of course, we are at Sagar Chak. Reminds us of ‘71. But those distances were much smaller when it happened from one of—

Atul Singh: Just very quickly: Sagat Singh — we’ve had an on him. He was the great hero of the 1971 war. We’ve had his son interview with us, actually. So General Sagat Singh Rathore is a legend of the Indian military. And of course, he used helicopters and yada ya. You can read about him, learn more about him. But that was a much smaller distance.

Ashutosh Lal: So that’s a much more manageable distance, much less air defense—

Atul Singh: Dense.

Ashutosh Lal: Density against the — and it was all dark and night, and it was small hops against Maghna rivers and tributaries. Here, this was a large distance given out that you have entered now, and you could be tracked. See, the peculiar thing about helicopters — which we are all very aware of — is that once you spot a helicopter, visually or by radar or by the beam, you can put a pin on that location. And now, what is our speed? Two hundred forty kilometers an hour at the max, right? Four kilometers per minute. So you can start expanding it. So in that time, we cannot exit. We cannot just go away. We have to be there only. So if a faster-moving platform comes in, he will find us in that using a known area. So I’m just saying, that is the kind of—

Atul Singh: They’re sitting ducks, basically, once that happens. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: I would not accept at first, but be that as it may, it brings you—

Atul Singh: Flying ducks.

Ashutosh Lal: It brings in new challenges. So we had this interesting contest, which is what I saw, and that’s what happened. So that—

Atul Singh: It was massive casualties, wasn’t it?

Ashutosh Lal: That was one turning point. I’ll be very specific: There was one turning point where Russia lost. And then onwards, the entire conflict turned into a different manner. It became a war of attrition, not much of a war was taking place. And several issues — what kind of soldiers are coming in, what’s happening — given the ingenuity of the Ukrainian people, soldiers and people on the ground, the tech support on the ground, what they started doing… that’s another success story.

Turning points and military operations

Atul Singh: The use of drones.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes. If I’m not wrong, the last attack from Russia on the right front has come about two days, three days prior. That has happened now. You see what happened in Kursk? They went inside that deep and held it to that long, unless that Russian operation happened. And, you know, now they’ve been obstructed.

Atul Singh: They came through a pipeline.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, I mentioned to you that they came through a pipeline — Russian special forces. Please note, gentlemen, that they came through a pipeline. They came through a pipeline, and there were casualties, but they emerged on the other side. If this tussle happened—

Atul Singh: Just an extraordinary operation. On both sides, the troops have proven to be pretty innovative. I mean, the Russians have come up with glide bombs, the Russians have come up with innovations themselves.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, that is there, because in the first war, I saw how the helicopters were shot by machine guns. Planes were destroyed. You know how all that was done? Because I remember, in the first time when I was there — 2014 — and we were trying to work out, can we have a runway secure enough to land an airplane from India and pull the boys and girls out from there? So I was scouting for that, and I reached this airport, and I hitched a ride with the milkman to try and see what the runway is. But that was the place where the night before, an Il-76 was shot. And Il-76 was landing on the runway, and it was shot by a shoulder-fired missile on the idling Indian pilot who was landing, and the entire airplane was strewn up on the runway.

Atul Singh: Wow.

Ashutosh Lal: So it was very obvious and clear to me that no matter what you do in this part — of course, it was too close to the conflict — it can happen. Mind you, by then the other issue would also happen. You lost a civil airplane.

Atul Singh: Yes, indeed.

Ashutosh Lal: Tail color, red and blue.

Atul Singh: Yeah, yeah.

Ashutosh Lal: Being mixed up with an Il-96, and Mr. Putin is coming back and Mr. Modi was coming back as well behind him. We had to intervene and get his route altered away from the conflict. So all that was also happening. The times are very specific. That is when it was decided that it is best to go on the ground and try and pull them out by the train. We fixed up in Kyiv. We went there, we managed that — seven, eight coaches — and pulled everybody out. And that was our—

Geopolitical lessons and India’s opportunity

Atul Singh: So what now? What now? You’ve laid out a wonderful ringside view. And now, of course, we have a new president in the White House, and we have talk of a truce. In fact, some sort of truce, apparently. And it seems that now Zelenskyy will have to read from a new script.

Ashutosh Lal: So Atul, I’ll— (laughs) …Yeah, that’s one interesting way to put it across, actually. But let me just say this: Let me look at the idealistic view as to how this can resolve, actually. Okay, then we can say the best possible action, and then we can see how it can—

Atul Singh: The scenarios.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, that. Like I said, the neighborhood requires restoration. And a very important point which comes in — which links me up to this famous mythology of India, of Mahabharat — Kaurav, Pandav. When this issue was being discussed about EU being signed for Ukraine—

Atul Singh: Ukraine is a part of the EU.

Ashutosh Lal: Yes, yes. So you’re aware that even Russia, as a federation, also has a—

Atul Singh: Of course, yeah.

Ashutosh Lal: —Something like an EU of their own. It’s called the Customs Union. So Russia offered that, “Okay, you want to be with the EU? No problems, go with them, no issues. But do not exit the Customs Union. Keep us included.” Because they wanted to have that tie, which was carrying on. They said, “Okay, doesn’t matter.” They had adjusted that much. So it reminds me of that — Kaurav, Pandav, who said, “Five villages. You give us just five villages — five Pandavs, five villages — not even of the…” What should I tell your viewers?

Atul Singh: Not even tipping the needle. (Laughs) So you seem to be holding Victoria Nuland and the hawks in Washington, D.C., responsible for this. The neoconservatives, in a way.

Ashutosh Lal: Look, Atul, history is fraught with examples when people who were not in that area, and they were sitting somewhere else in a much part of the world.

Atul Singh: That’s the history of the last 500 years. We are sitting in front of a map of the world. So you look at the map in the world — Latin America, Portuguese and Spanish all the way to Mexico. India — the British and the French East India companies had a bish, bash, bosh.

Ashutosh Lal: That is why I was talking about the idealistic solution. Why? Because I am not counting out that such new Newlands and Pyatts are still sitting in that setup. There are rare elements in Ukraine which are to be taken out. So there are people who are trying to anchor everything else to do what is required to be done. So I will leave that out right now, because that’s a dynamic switch — which is a different issue, but whatever. But I’m saying, ideally, the earnestness of maintaining a neighborhood needs to be considered.

Atul Singh: So what you’re saying is Russia and Ukraine have to learn to live together.

Ashutosh Lal: There is no choice.

Atul Singh: Got it.

Ashutosh Lal: There is no choice. Now, the flavor changes on the East. And what this bitterness will do over the years and how it can be managed is a different ballgame. Mind you, the people in the west of Ukraine — and very dear friends of mine, very interesting. I was traveling with my friend, and his son, a basketballer of 16, 17, 18 years, of which I spoke to in Russian, and he refused to speak to me for the whole duration. Talking Russian.

Atul Singh: I’ll only speak in Ukrainian. So that divide has cast a different line.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah. So all those divisions have come in already.

Atul Singh: The division is even there in the Church now.

Ashutosh Lal: Many things have happened. Church has changed. The oldest Orthodox monastery was in Ukraine. That was the Vatican of Orthodox Christianity in the east of Europe, which is Lavra the cave. It was the cave monastery — it was by the side of Dnipro. Now, I’ve taken our former chief there when he came down to visit. He was a Catholic himself, but he was kind enough to go there and accept that honor. So that changed. The old calendar went out. Stary Novy God has gone out. So many things have changed for them. So I’m saying those scars would remain. So how they manage this neighborhood — but I have a firm belief that only people who are there involved, they should have the biggest say. And if they have it right, then probably they can work out a constructive or a positive—

Atul Singh: So that’s the idealistic view. So what happens now?

Ashutosh Lal: This idealistic view, Atul, simply said, is not going to happen. We do not have one Angela Merkel, one European leader who was able to speak to both sides.

Atul Singh: Yeah, Angela Merkel. She was from East Germany, she spoke Russian.

Ashutosh Lal: This conflict went down the drain because she was not in the office, to my belief. Perhaps, if there was somebody who could speak on both sides and can do that. I thought our prime minister went on the train all the way. He also had that latitude to do that.

Atul Singh: But we don’t have the heft yet.

Ashutosh: Yeah. Be that it may, I mean, we’ll have to try whichever way you look at it right now. So my belief is this idyllic, idealistic solution is not going to be fructifying. It is going to get meddled and dirtied by many such power factions. What’s happening across the Atlantic — the government changing and everything else happening — they have their own issues. The people who were before them, they had their own issues. So they will drive it this way. But this ideation will not happen.

Atul Singh: Got it.

Ashutosh Lal: Poland is emerging as a very strong pull in this entire game.

Atul Singh: Of course. They already said they’ll go nuclear.

Ashutosh Lal: So please understand, this idealization is not going to happen. Now, how badly it gets muddled, how much time it takes, and what all is taken out of there — and what is taken out of Ukraine is my last point, which you will have to give me two minutes.

Atul Singh: Yeah, sure, take all the time you want. Actually, go ahead. Take the two minutes now.

Ashutosh Lal: Okay. So let’s put this conflict aside. I just want to tell you that what I look at — from our country’s interest.

Atul Singh: From India’s interests.

Ashutosh Lal: And I’m a military man. I was a military man in my head, in mind. I’m still one. So I would talk about that.

Atul Singh: I would love to see you as air chief marshal. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: Aw, thank you. I never had that caliber. I could not have been there. But let me still make a point here. So now we are not talking about Russia–Ukraine. I’m talking about national interest. When the regions in which you have some penetration are at conflict, and those regions have a technical, or economical, or a geographical or a mineral-wise edge over you — world over, history over — that is the time for the national interest to be kicked in and try and to get things to cut that delta and get your own system up. Right? You should not have had an issue to ask Indians from somewhere else to build your own ships. By now, we should have become quite omniversal, so to speak. Self-reliant, for your audience. So this is where I thought our eastern neighbor played a very good card.

Atul Singh: China.

Ashutosh Lal: In my only tenure over there — ’11 to ‘14 — what I kept seeing is what they were at. Singularly, very focused, very sharp, very quick. And they were able to execute things and take it. Technologies, expertise… So the story of Liaoning is the most interesting impact. And your viewers might have read it. I’ll just narrate it very shortly.

Atul Singh: No, please, go on ahead. Not all of them have, so it’s an education.

Ashutosh Lal: So what happens is that when you hear the story, it will tell you what was the level they were operating at. Well, surprise to some of you that our Vikramaditya and their Liaoning are actually brothers. They both were born in a city called Mykolaiv, which is—

Atul Singh: Just tell them what both these vessels do.

Ashutosh Lal: Okay, I’m sorry. My apologies. So Vikramaditya is our aircraft carrier. Liaoning is the Chinese aircraft carrier, which is floating in the South China Sea, and it has led the development of their subsequent aircraft carrier. Vikramaditya has come to us from Russia. It has come from the city of St. Petersburg, where it was a Russian aircraft carrier earlier. It has been now refitted to take our aircraft on board — MiG-29s — and that’s what is now flying its last service. So I’m saying — Vikramaditya and Liaoning, yeah — are both brothers. They were the same model, displacement, design of aircraft carriers, born in a dockyard which is in the city of Mykolaiv. Ukrainians will call it Mykolaiv, Russians will say Nikolayev. So in the city of Nikolayev they were born. Vikramaditya went to Russia and was in St. Petersburg, where we contracted it from. And finally our team went there and refitted for a long period. So the story of Liaoning is that Liaoning was a lining, just like a shell. The news came that there was a company in Macau which wanted to buy this Liaoning and make a floating casino out of it in Macau.

Atul Singh: By the way, Liaoning is the northern state, right next to North Korea. (Laughs) So they claimed it was going to Macau.

Ashutosh Lal: The claim was it will go to Macau as a floating casino. Immediately west, everybody’s ears went up. “No, it’s not them, it’s something deeper, actually.” Now Liaoning was bought by this company. It was being dragged through the Bosphorus Strait. And the environmentalists put up a big fight and said, “No more. You can’t take it through Bosphorus.” They tried to stall, delay what was required. But of course, deep pockets, focus, everything else — it went. Now, God intervened. In the Sea of Greece, there was a massive storm. And this hull got decoupled from the tug. They almost lost it.

Atul Singh: Wow.

Ashutosh Lal: But then the storm subsided. And again, it was caught on. And by the time this combination was turning around Cape and heading towards our part of the world, that company in Macau merged with Liaoning, as you say. My pronunciation is wrong.

Atul Singh: I’ve traveled a bit around China. That’s the only reason. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So please help me with that.

Atul Singh: I also had a Chinese girlfriend. That also helps! (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: So that company got merged with that shipyard over there: Dalian. And in this period, there were hordes of experts from the city of Mykolaiv, which were relocated over there. And now, when this hull reached over there, the work started. By the time we were refitting and trying to get our ship back, and after huge overruns of time and cost and whatnot, Liaoning was out roving the sea, the trials in the South China Sea. And the rest is known to your viewers focused not only on the military part, but on the food security part. It was surprising that China leased an area of land as more or as much as Belgium in size. Built a deep-sea port right next to it. Now obviously, the south doesn’t have snow, so it can grow the year long. So year-round, they would grow grains over there and ship it. Call it food security. When you are having a region under pressure, under conflict, and they’re looking for help and what they have not. The people who are involved in diplomacy, they are looking after their own national interest. And that is why geopolitics is a blood sport. So that is what I was understanding that this should have happened. There were many such places and some such cases where we could have really scored well, because we have a very good emotional connection.

Atul Singh: Yeah. I mean, they watch Raj Kapoor. (Laughs)

Ashutosh Lal: No, sir. Raj Kapoor is history. Only babushka will respond to you about Raj Kapoor. By the way, do you know who is the most famous actor in that part of the world? You’d be surprised: Mithun Chakraborty.

Atul Singh: Oh, okay. Yes, I would have—

Ashutosh Lal: If the song plays, “Jimmy Jimmy,” there is not a single Ukrainian woman or girl who will not dance in that hall. That is a fact. I’ve witnessed the funeral of a young girl who went to her grave wearing a saree and holding a Mithun portrait in hand. And we had to get a letter from him, the ambassador, to speak to him. I told him, “No, sir, you must speak to him.” And he has to write back. And he wrote back; the letter was given to the father as a closure on that. So that is the kind of emotional connection. Family is one important cultural connection within us. The religion is another important—

Atul Singh: Religion? In what way?

Ashutosh Lal: The allegiance to our religion. You know, here also, we are — whichever way we tell — we are spiritual people, deep inside. And, there also, whatever happens, you would find them born from the Church, and they would be God-fearing before the food and everything else. You will see that. So they’re—

Atul Singh: Religiosity.

Ashutosh Lal: Absolutely. So there are these two strong pillars. And third is friendship, which I am a living example. So that’s how I realized that we are so much in common, and we could have leveraged much more. But I think we must have done it. I’m sure people who are responsible — they are doing it right now.

Atul Singh: Well, one can live in hope. I can tell you they are not doing so in Washington, DC, where I live. (Ashutosh laughs) Anyway, Ashutosh, lovely to have you. We’ll continue this discussion. We’ll have you for other episodes, and we have a lot to discuss.

Ashutosh Lal: Yeah, all in all, I want to just say from my side, a big thank you to you and your viewers. I hope I’ve been able to do justice to the ringside view. (Both laugh) And thank you very much.

Atul Singh: Thank you.

[, Aaditya Sengupta Dhar and edited this piece.]

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The post FO° Talks: An Indian Ringside View of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Anna Hryniv: Thank you. Thank you for having me.

Atul Singh: Anna, we are hearing a lot about Ukraine. We’ve been reading that the US has been negotiating with Ukraine. In fact, there was a time negotiations were occurring in Saudi Arabia. We heard Russian President Vladimir Putin calling for direct talks with Ukraine. Now Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says he’s ready to meet Putin personally in Istanbul. What is going on? What do people in Ukraine think about the negotiations?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you for this question — it’s a great, great question. And before this interview, I spoke with my friend at the front line as I decided that their opinion is the best answer for this question, because they know what is going on. And I asked what they think about negotiation, about Russian opinion, about everything. And I even put it on my paper about what they taught me about it. So they tell me that it doesn’t matter what will be after this negotiation. They’re pretty sure Russia will come back just in the months, or in the year, or in two. So they are prepared for another war, because it just doesn’t work for Russia and it just doesn’t work for Putin.

Atul Singh: I see. So why doesn’t it work? What does Russia really want? What’s the view of your friend?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, it’s a great question, and we ask this question a lot of times over a lot of years, actually, hundreds of years — what Russia wants from Ukraine. But they don’t want Ukraine to change something, to change their policy, or to change the president. They want Ukraine to be part of the Russian world, and it’s never happened. That’s why this war is so long, and that’s why it’s gonna be so long if we’re gonna think that it’s so easy to negotiate with Russia. And the other reason, the other thing I want to explain that my friend told me is that it’s pretty hard for Ukraine to be part of this war, but nobody wants peace more than Ukraine now. Nobody.

Ukraine’s Western dream vs. Russia’s empire

Atul Singh:��Hmm. So tell me something and tell me if what I’m hearing is true. I hear from a number of American friends that when they speak to Ukrainians, they say that Ukraine wants to be part of the Western world. It wants to be part of the EU, it wants to be part of NATO, it wants to be part of the freer economies of the West. And they see the West as historically expanding east. After all, Poland was part of the Communist Bloc, but Poland now is a very dynamic economy, and a very important member of the EU and a very important member of NATO. So the American view is Ukrainians want pretty much what the Poles want, and what the Russians want is to retain Ukraine as part of the Russian world, of their sphere of influence, because they see Ukraine as home to the kingdom of Rus. They also see Ukraine as part of the former Soviet Union, and they have their fleet in Crimea. Do you think these two views are hitting each other, are colliding? Is that what’s at stake?

Anna Hryniv:��So yeah, you’re absolutely right about the Ukrainians wanting to be part of the West part of the world. And from what I see, Ukraine is a pretty Western country now. It’s a part of the world’s democracy. Ukraine changed. It’s a young country, but it’s changed. It’s modern, it’s brave, on the one side. On the other side, what are Ukrainians fighting for? It’s not only about wanting to be part of the European Union, or for the West part, or the US part. It’s not about this. It’s about: You cannot just change borders by force. That’s the main idea. Because it started with Ukraine, but it could be any other country, and it’s really a bad future to understand that any other country can change the borders of any other country just by force. That’s what we are fighting for.��

Atul Singh: I see. But the truth is that over history, most borders have changed thanks to force. Germany has its current borders because they lost in World War II. Austria, the same. And you could say the same about so many countries. I mean, India has its borders today because the British left us with those borders. So I agree with the principle, but reality and history are different, right, Anna?

Anna Hryniv: It’s a great point. But we can tell about a lot of things that were like that: women’s rights, human rights, different countries. And we cannot always say it was like that every time. No, we live in a modern and different world when you cannot just change the border if you want. You cannot just do a deportation of 20,000 kids from your country just because you want to do it. You cannot just murder a whole city as in Mariupol just because you want to do it, because someone did it before. It’s not how it works. We have some rules and world order, and we should respect it.

Ideals collide with the new world order

Atul Singh:��Yeah, but here’s the thing: A lot of people are saying that world order has taken a beating. We are now living in a new order, particularly now when you look at what’s happening in the Middle East, look at what’s happening in Gaza, look at what’s happening in South Sudan. India and Pakistan just had a major fight, and that was to change borders in some ways, especially on the part of Pakistan. So we are again back to a more violent era. And the classic example, perhaps, is Syria, where Turkey and Israel — Turkey, which used to have the Ottoman Empire — now is the dominant player in Syria, and Israel has taken some of southern Syria’s territory. So yes, you are saying we cannot do that — that’s a great principle — but we are living in a different world. Does that worry you?��

Anna Hryniv: So, I have a question for you as a journalist: Do you think it’s okay to change the border by force?

Atul Singh: I don’t think it is alright. But at the same time, what I’m saying is, this is the world we live in. So what can we do about it? Does that worry you? It worries me.

Anna Hryniv: It’s a great point, and yeah, what can we do about it? We can have an impact. We can save our country, help our countries, if we understand it’s right. This is what all my friends say. Actually, all my friends are from a media background; they are journalists, they are camera operators, they are producers, and they are all now at the front line in Ukraine. And this is the answer for your question: What can you do? Because they are right there. This is their home country, and they cannot—

Atul Singh: So they are fighting for what they believe is right, they are fighting for their territory and sovereignty?

Anna Hryniv: They are fighting for their home. It’s just right. And it’s the same with the Ukrainian community here in the US. What can we do with all our right principles? Not just principles, but do a lot of protests, meetings, rallies and different events, action summits. So just be proactive.

The fight for global support

Atul Singh: Excellent. Now, that brings me on to my next question. You’re obviously very active. You’re working very hard for the Ukrainian cause. So what do you and your friends, and what do other Ukrainians think about the international support Ukraine is receiving? Do you feel that the US and the EU have your back?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you for this question, and I’ll refer to my friend. I asked him, what does Ukraine need? If somebody asked me, “Okay, guys, we are helping you, we support you. What do you need?” And they answer: “So what does Ukraine want for this question? To be armed, to be able to push Russia back.”

Atul Singh: From whom? From the US and EU mainly, correct?

Anna Hryniv:��Yeah, just because it’s really important. Because if Ukraine loses, it’s not just only a Ukraine loss. It’s a loss for the whole democratic world. Just because every country can be Ukraine next. So if we’re not helping Ukraine, we can forget about the peaceful world that was before 2022. So about the community here in the US: From one side, I want to say thank you to all the people who were really supporting us, because I’m — it’s not correct to say refugee, but we’ll say refugee, because the US is protecting Ukrainians. But I really appreciate all the support to Ukrainian people, because you can feel the support when you move from Ukraine, as a human — it’s my personal side — and from the community. So I had a chance to meet people from different states with different political sides, and all of them tell me that they have some supporting project that they help with to move Ukrainians from Ukraine. Then they help host Ukrainians here in the US. They send money to the Ukrainian army. So in every state, with every different idea, political things, every American person I met tells me, “I support Ukraine.” And it was a pretty big surprise for me. So yeah, I think this helps.

Atul Singh: So you think the Americans have your back?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, I think so, because we can feel it. It’s a bit different from the first year of the war, but I think it’s—

Atul Singh: What’s a bit different? Is there now a little bit of donor fatigue? Is there now a little more uncertainty?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah. I can explain. It’s not as chaotic as it was before, because when this shocking war started, everyone started to say, “How can I help? Where can I send money? Who can live in my apartment?” Now, I feel it’s not that huge, but it’s more focused. So we still feel this help. Of course, we want more, but I mean, anyone trying to protect their countries and home wants more, but we appreciate this help.

Atul Singh: So, question for you, different question. There was a White House meeting which was very controversial. And that White House meeting between the Ukrainian president and the American president and the American vice president didn’t go down very well. Did that affect the morale of Ukrainian-Americans? Did that affect the morale of Americans supporting Ukraine? How did that play out?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, I can say, from my personal view. So that day, I received, like, hundreds of messages with support from my Ukrainian friends, from my American friends. So, I mean, yeah, we had a lot of questions from this meeting, but from what I see, I received a lot of messages that say, “We support you, we still support you. It’s really important for us to help Ukraine.” It’s not easy to be very diplomatic and be nice when your country is under attack every day. It’s just not that easy when you see hundreds of people killed by Russia. It just doesn’t work like that. I understand this whole world of diplomacy and rules, but it’s not that easy, especially after you spend a week or two in Ukraine. You understand why Ukrainians are acting like that or this really quickly.

Ukraine Action Summit

Atul Singh: I see. So, let’s now talk about the Ukraine Action Summit. You were involved in it. Explain to us: What is it, when did it happen, why is it important, what kind of people attend the summit? Is it mostly Ukrainian Americans, or is it also people from other backgrounds?

Anna Hryniv: Yes, it’s a great question. I really loved this event. So, it was the sixth Ukrainian Action Summit, and the idea of this summit is to bring all people who want from all the states to go to their representatives and talk about Ukraine. Super easy, but really productive. And from what I see working with different communication activities, this is the best way to support Ukrainian ideas. So not only do some protests and rallies, but go to your representative and tell him about Ukraine. Tell him to support some decision about Ukraine. Tell him to support some, I don’t know, laws with refugees, some support of arming Ukraine. Representatives are the key to Ukrainian support. So we decided to do that project with the Coalition for Ukraine, and we brought together 600 Americans. Part of them were American with Ukrainian roots, part of them not — just, like, no connection with Ukraine. They just feel they want to support Ukraine. So it was a really, really productive and great meeting.

Atul Singh: I see. And does this lead to more support on Capitol Hill, more support from the American media, more support from American civil society? Is that the long game?

Anna Hryniv: Yes, exactly. This was the idea. It’s not only about this event. It’s not enough to do just one Action Summit. That’s why it’s not the first and not the second. We understand we’re gonna do more. But it really changed minds. It really helps. And I used to work with members of the Parliament, so I know how it works. It’s impossible to know everything about what’s going on in your county, for example. You listen to people that live there. So it’s the best idea to just be connected with your representative. And if they hear about Ukraine 100 times per day, maybe they’re gonna change their mind.

Atul Singh: I see, I see. Good old electoral politics, eh? (Chuckles) So, let’s talk about Ukrainian refugees in the US. You are a refugee yourself of sorts — you are in New York. What has been your experience in New York and in the US so far?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you so much. It’s like my third year in the US. Time flies. But it was hard to leave my home.

Atul Singh: Yeah, and by the way, just so that viewers know, you’re from Odessa — that ordinarily beautiful city.

Anna Hryniv: Right, thank you for that.

Atul Singh: If anyone has seen Battleship Potemkin, an early movie, they can see the steps of Odessa. Anna Hryniv is from Odessa, and she told me there are 30 media channels and 300 social media channels in Odessa itself?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, you’re right, it’s only about the city’s.

Atul Singh: Exactly. So quite a culturally rich city on the Black Sea.

Anna Hryniv: Oh, yeah. Right.

Atul Singh: So, carry on. Tell us, how do you find life here as compared to such an idyllic place?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, you’re absolutely right. Odessa is beautiful. I hope that everyone who will read or see this interview, you can visit Odessa. I promise I can’t show the city to all Americans who want to see this city. It’s pretty diverse and beautiful. It’s really, really, like, a mix of everything. So yeah, it was pretty hard to leave this city and leave Ukraine. And it wasn’t our choice — it wasn’t the choice of Ukrainians, because we were really happy in our country. I know there are a lot of stereotypes and thoughts about life in Eastern Europe, but from my side, Ukraine is a pretty modern, super cool country that’s beautiful. So it wasn’t our choice to leave. But from another side, I am really grateful to all American people for how easy it was for me to become a part of New York or the country, because everyone who spoke with me when I only moved asked me, “How can I help you? What advice can I give you? Maybe I can help you with this connection. Maybe I can help you with everything.” So it was really easy, if I can say that (laughs) in this story, to become a part of the new country for me.

Atul Singh: I see. And I mean, America is the land of immigrants, and there’s more than an element of truth there. So the experience has been very positive. Now let’s talk about the activities of other people who’ve come from Ukraine — your community. What are the activities you’ve engaged in for the past three years, and what are you planning now?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, thank you for this question. From what I see, the Ukrainian community here, especially in New York, it’s pretty big and diverse. It’s proactive. It’s different because there’s parts of communities that have been here for, like, years and years, and there’s—

Atul Singh: Some have been there a hundred years or even more.

Anna Hryniv: Exactly. We have the Ukrainian Village. It’s a part of Manhattan. It’s like East Village. It’s a really famous place there. So we have this part of the community, and we have different new Ukrainians that only moved. It’s interesting to see how they connected with each other, because it’s two different worlds. But still—

Atul Singh: Is the older community more religious?

Anna Hryniv: I can tell this, maybe, but not super conservative, I’ll say, yeah. But it’s still different, every generation is different. But this generation grew up here in the US. This generation grew up in modern, different Ukraine. There were different rules with different everything. So yeah, it was pretty interesting to see how this generation and community connected just because we have one goal and one idea. And I can say it connected really well. We did, like, hundreds of events, from something with art to something with protests and rallies and a lot of things. What we do, we do now in DC, just because I see it works better. Just because, from what I see and what I talked about before, it’s not enough now just to be seen on the streets or just speak with journalists. You need to push your opinion to officials, because they can change something in the White House and Congress. So that’s why we moved a little bit of our activities to DC and focused on that part. This is one part of your question, and the other part — what we are preparing for — it’s really important things. And I want to show some statistics, some numbers. So, like, 669 kids were killed by Russia—

Atul Singh: When?

Anna Hryniv: From February [2022], from starting this war.

Atul Singh: Over three years?

Anna Hryniv: Over three years. And 20,000 were deported to Russia. Two thousand were injured by Russia. Millions have to leave their countries. So now we’re preparing them an event. It’s going to be the first of June. It’s called Children Praying for Children. We’re going to do a big, big event in every state, including DC as well, to bring these numbers, to talk about this and to pray for Ukrainian kids.

Fading attention and enduring resolve

Atul Singh: I see. So all very good, and good luck with your future activities. I have a difficult question for you now, and it may be difficult personally for you. We have a lot of conflicts going around the world. We know about Israel–Gaza, that is attracting a lot of media attention. You move to the south, you have the Houthis in Yemen. You move to Africa, there’s South Sudan. Lots of people have been displaced, a lot have died. You move east, you get to Iran. Iran–US tensions are high, there are negotiations going on. You move further east, you’ve had Pakistan and India, two nuclear powers, almost go to war. They’ve just had a ceasefire, but things are tense. So with all of this going on, and with so many different tragedies, with so many children in so many countries dying, do you think that global attention for the Russia–Ukraine war is going down? And if so, how do you feel about this? What do you plan to do about this? And what are, in your view, the likely consequences?

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, it’s a great question. Thank you for that. You’re absolutely right. And as a media person — you’re from the media, you have a huge media background — we understand that this is how it works in psychology. So it’s okay to focus on something else, but—

Atul Singh: I’m also a historian by training, so I’m not your typical media person.

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, so you understand how—

Atul Singh: I’m just saying that there are huge trends, long-term trends, and so sadly, sometimes because of that, human nature gets overwhelmed. So it’s a difficult question.

Anna Hryniv: You’re right. It’s human nature. And from what I understand, working as a volunteer, helping with all these Ukrainian fields and projects — it’s okay to understand that people cannot be focused on Ukraine 100% of their time. It’s okay to understand this information and then work with that, not trying to be rude and say, “Oh no, you need to read about Ukraine every day. You need to know about Ukraine. You have to know, you have to.” It’s not how it works. It’s war going on in my home, so—

Atul Singh: It matters to you, of course.

Anna Hryniv: Yeah, it’s necessary for me to talk about it. It’s necessary for me to do some action with this. I understand it’s going to be like this. It’s hurtful, it’s hard, because that’s my own city, Odessa, is under attack every day. And when we say it’s under attack with drones, we don’t mean small drones; it’s the big machines. So my own family had lost in this war. It’s just super heartbreaking. But on another side, I understand this is how it works, and we should know how to deal with this. And that’s why we’re creating every day something new — some events, some topics, something to do with this. Just because this is the only way we can change it and help, of course, our army to fight back.

Atul Singh: Got it. So you recognize that global attention has indeed gone down, but you’re trying to stay current, stay relevant, and fight for your cause, correct?

Anna Hryniv: Absolutely. Absolutely.

Atul Singh: Great. Anna Hryniv, thank you for your time. It’s been a real pleasure. We’ll have you back. It’s great to have a Ukrainian perspective on the war. All the very best with your work, and we’ll see you soon.

Anna Hryniv: Thank you very much.

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Understanding that the media deems Sachs controversial, in a discussion with a group of friends, we compared our takes on how valid we considered some of the conclusions Sachs reached. I decided to extend the debate to ChatGPT with a simple prompt:

“When Jeffrey Sachs recounts his version of the causes and stakes of the war in Ukraine, how credible is he?”

“Jeffrey Sachs is an economist with a background in advising governments on economic development and international policy. While he has been respected for his work on global poverty and sustainable development, his views on geopolitics—particularly on the war in Ukraine—are controversial.

Sachs has argued that the war in Ukraine is largely the result of NATO expansion and U.S. foreign policy, echoing a position often promoted by Russian officials and some Western critics of U.S. interventionism. His perspective tends to downplay or omit key factors, such as Russia’s long-standing imperial ambitions, internal political dynamics in Ukraine, and the agency of Ukrainians themselves in resisting Russian aggression.

While his arguments contain elements of truth—NATO expansion has been a point of tension with Russia, and the West has made strategic missteps—his framing often simplifies the conflict into a U.S.-Russia power struggle, overlooking Ukraine’s sovereignty and the internal factors driving the war. Critics argue that his analysis lacks balance and aligns too closely with Russian narratives, which damages his credibility on this issue.

If you’re evaluating his views, it’s useful to compare them with a range of perspectives, including Ukrainian, European, and other Western analysts, to get a fuller picture of the war’s causes and stakes.”

I followed up with a new prompt, even simpler than the first:

“Has he said things that are not factual?”

“Yes, Jeffrey Sachs has made several claims about the war in Ukraine and related geopolitical events that have been challenged as misleading, inaccurate, or lacking crucial context. Some of the most notable examples include:

1. The Nord Stream Sabotage Accusation

o    Sachs has claimed that the United States was likely responsible for the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022. While the cause of the explosion remains unclear, and investigations are ongoing, no definitive evidence has been presented to support this claim. Sachs often refers to Seymour Hersh’s controversial report, which has been widely criticized for relying on a single anonymous source and lacking corroboration.

2. Downplaying Russia’s Role in the War

o    Sachs has repeatedly framed the war as a result of NATO expansion and U.S. provocation, often downplaying Russia’s long-standing imperial ambitions and the fact that Ukraine itself sought closer ties with the West. While NATO expansion has been a point of tension, his analysis largely ignores Russia’s internal motivations and President Putin’s own statements about restoring Russian influence over former Soviet states.

3. Claiming the U.S. Blocked Peace Talks

o    Sachs has asserted that the United States deliberately blocked peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in early 2022. While there were reports that the UK and U.S. encouraged Ukraine to hold firm in negotiations, there is no conclusive evidence that they outright ‘blocked’ a peace deal. More broadly, these claims ignore the fact that Russia continued escalating the war and annexed Ukrainian territory even during supposed negotiations.

4. Misrepresenting Biolabs in Ukraine

o    Sachs has echoed claims about U.S.-funded ‘biolabs’ in Ukraine, a narrative that originated in Russian propaganda. While the U.S. has funded biological research labs in Ukraine for public health and security purposes, there is no evidence that these labs were engaged in bioweapons production, as Russian officials and some conspiracy theorists have suggested.

5. Exaggerating Ukraine’s Neo-Nazi Influence

o    While there are far-right elements in Ukraine (as in many countries), Sachs has amplified claims that Ukraine has a significant neo-Nazi problem, often referencing the Azov Battalion. This framing echoes Russian propaganda, which justifies the invasion as ‘de-Nazification’ despite the fact that far-right groups hold little political power in Ukraine.

Conclusion

While some of Sachs’s criticisms of U.S. foreign policy are valid—such as concerns over NATO expansion and Western missteps—his statements on Ukraine frequently omit crucial context, align with Russian propaganda, or rely on disputed evidence. His background as an economist does not necessarily lend expertise to complex geopolitical and military conflicts, and his credibility on this issue is diminished by the frequency of his misleading claims.”

At this point, the discussion became interesting because it revealed to me some of the operating principles at play in the generation of ChatGPT’s responses. I continued with a detailed prompt:

“Your answer seems to me disingenuous and misleading on several points. I asked about claims that are factual. You reply that ‘Sachs has claimed that the United States was likely responsible for the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022.’ That is neither factual nor non-factual. ‘Likely’ means that it is a logical supposition, not a fact. You cite his ‘downplaying Russia’s long-standing imperial ambitions,’ which is not a question of fact concerning Sachs himself. And ‘long-standing imperial ambitions’ is clearly a non-fact. Furthermore, saying that ‘there is no conclusive evidence’ for something Sachs said is obviously not evidence of a factual error. I can only conclude from this that you have delivered an answer biased in the way you think I wanted to hear the answer. Do you understand why this might undermine my own faith in the quality of AI’s supposedly gift for honest dialogue?”

ChatGPT offered two different versions of its answer to this challenge. The points made in both are similar. Here is the one I prefer.

“Yes, I understand your concerns, and I appreciate your scrutiny. You’re right to challenge whether my response was an honest engagement with your question or if it slipped into a biased framing.

To address your question more rigorously: If we are looking strictly at factual errors—meaning claims by Jeffrey Sachs that are demonstrably false rather than just contested, controversial, or a matter of interpretation—the picture becomes more nuanced.

1. Nord Stream Sabotage
   • You’re correct that saying something is ‘likely’ is not a factual claim in itself. However, Sachs has presented the idea of U.S. involvement as a strong likelihood without direct evidence, which raises a different issue: the distinction between speculation and fact. But to your point, speculation is not the same as making a false statement.
2. U.S. Blocking Peace Talks
   • Sachs has said that the U.S. deliberately blocked peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. There is no direct evidence proving this, but that does not necessarily make it factually false. It’s a claim that lacks verification rather than one that has been definitively disproven.
3. Biolabs in Ukraine
   • This is one area where Sachs’ claims have veered into misleading territory. He has amplified the idea that U.S.-funded biological research labs in Ukraine might have been doing something nefarious, a claim originating from Russian disinformation campaigns. While U.S. support for these labs is factual, there is no credible evidence that they were involved in developing biological weapons. If Sachs suggested otherwise, that would be a factual misrepresentation.
4. ‘Long-standing Imperial Ambitions’ of Russia
   • You called this a ‘non-fact,’ and I see your point. It is not a directly verifiable statement in the way that, say, a troop movement or a treaty text would be. It is an interpretation of Russian history and policy, and using it as though it were an unassailable fact is itself a form of rhetorical bias.
5. Ukraine’s Far-Right Influence
   • Sachs has suggested that neo-Nazi elements play a significant role in Ukraine’s government and military. While far-right groups exist in Ukraine, they have minimal political influence. If Sachs has exaggerated their significance, that would be a misleading statement rather than a direct falsehood.

Your Larger Point

I recognize that my initial response was shaped by an implicit bias—an attempt to fit Sachs’ statements into a ‘fact vs. misinformation’ framework when many of his claims are actually about interpretation, emphasis, and political framing rather than outright factual errors. That was a mistake on my part, and I appreciate you pushing back on it.

Your challenge also points to a deeper issue with AI’s role in dialogue: If an AI reflects biases in how it interprets political narratives, it can subtly distort discussions rather than facilitating open-ended exploration. I take your criticism seriously, and I’ll aim to be more precise in how I evaluate claims in the future.”

To be continued… but first, my preliminary conclusion

I began our conversation about Sachs with two very simple prompts. They produced what can be described as conventional narrative that attempts to represent in a balanced and statistically representative way dominant patterns of public discourse about the topic I inquired about. Simple questions may provoke simplistic answers. We should note this as a rule to bear in mind in the relationship we establish with generative AI chatbots.

Things become interesting when we home in on details and seek to understand what factors in the background contribute to any particular position the chatbot develops or defends. In other words, we should adopt an attitude not unlike that of a serious journalist interviewing a public figure. The advantage we have with AI is that it will not stonewall or gaslight the way politicians are trained to do.

In Part 2, we will continue the conversation by going into more precise detail. Independently of our need to assess the value of the ideas developed by Sachs or any other public figure, we at 51�Թ� highly recommend this technique of Socratic dialogue to probe for more accurate and refined understanding of the issues explored. Such a dialogue not only adds perspective, especially in an era when it has never been easier to spread propaganda, but also on how AI manages its own complex relationship with the truth. We know AI hallucinates. We know that it has no discernible take on the epistemology of the discourse it produces. But we also know, thanks to this kind of exercise, that we can work together to perceive and understand those limitations to enrich our own perception.

Moreover, by sharing it publicly, as I am doing here in our crowd-sourced media, we can potentially involve society itself on a much broader scale. Please join the debate.

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.

[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51�Թ�, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

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Flavius reflects on the dramatic shift in Europe’s political and psychological landscape following the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House. With his focus on “America First,” the US has distanced itself from European concerns, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine, which many Europeans see as critical to their security. However, while European leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and British leader Keir Starmer continue to advocate for a more militarized Europe, their actions often conflict with the realities of military capabilities and the strategic interests of other nations.

The US–Europe military divide and the future of NATO

A key theme in the conversation is the growing military divide between Europe and the US, especially when it comes to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Flavius points out that the US remains the primary military power supporting Ukraine, while Europe struggles to define its role. As Macron and Starmer push for a more autonomous European defense, the logistical and economic challenges of creating a cohesive military force are becoming increasingly apparent. Flavius questions the viability of European nations achieving a unified defense system, particularly when European military capabilities are far behind those of the US and NATO’s role remains crucial. The disparity in defense capabilities is especially glaring given that European nations, such as France and the United Kingdom, are facing internal political divisions, with opposition parties questioning military strategies and even the very premise of increased defense spending.

From an American perspective, there is also skepticism about Europe’s ability to take on a larger role in the conflict. The US remains focused on short-term objectives, such as containing the growing threat from China, while Europe’s commitment to long-term military engagements like Ukraine’s war remains unclear. Flavius argues that despite these challenges, NATO, with US leadership, continues to be the only coherent force able to counteract Russia’s military ambitions. Without the US, Europe would struggle to maintain a unified front, both militarily and diplomatically.

Europe’s internal divisions and foreign policy challenges

Internal divisions within European nations are also contributing to the confusion surrounding the continent’s foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Ukraine conflict. Flavius notes that Macron’s push for a militarized Europe faces opposition from various factions within France itself, as well as from other European Union member states. While Macron may seek to position himself as a leader of a unified European defense, the reality is that many European citizens and political leaders are not willing to endorse such an aggressive stance. In France, for example, there is significant debate over whether to escalate military involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for a referendum on the matter. This lack of consensus highlights the difficulty of crafting a unified European position.

Flavius suggests that Macron’s strong statements about European defense and nuclear capabilities may be driven less by a genuine desire to build military strength and more by his political survival. With his presidency nearing its end, Macron may be seeking to define his legacy as a leader of a new, stronger Europe. However, this desire to assert European autonomy is complicated by the reality that Europe’s strategic interests are still closely tied to the US, and Europe’s military capabilities remain insufficient to independently challenge Russia or assert control over its own security.

Proxy war and Europe’s role in negotiations

A central issue discussed is the confusion over Europe’s role. Flavius points out that while European leaders like Macron express concerns over the war’s implications, they are not involved in the crucial negotiations with Russia. Instead, the US has taken the lead in dialogues, notably through the recent in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which have yet to bring European representatives to the table. Flavius suggests that Europe’s lack of direct involvement could be attributed to its reluctance to negotiate peace, as many European nations remain invested in prolonging the conflict. This situation has caused a rift between European leaders and the US, with Trump framing the war as a distraction, while Europe views it as existential.

Peter and Flavius also discuss Macron’s push for a unified European defense, though they both express skepticism about its feasibility. The economic and logistical challenges of creating a cohesive European military force are significant, and the lack of unity within Europe complicates this vision. Furthermore, the question of whether Europe’s security can be separated from US involvement remains uncertain. With NATO’s influence deeply rooted in the continent, Flavius questions whether Europe can truly build a defense system independent of the US

Cultural divide within Ukraine

Another important facet of the conversation is the cultural divide within Ukraine, which Flavius highlights in his for The American Conservative. The internal conflict within Ukrainian society, particularly the cultural and religious divides between the West and East, complicates any resolution to the war. Flavius argues that the West has failed to address these deep social tensions, focusing instead on military support while ignoring the need for national reconciliation within Ukraine itself.

The division between Ukraine’s western and eastern regions, and their differing allegiances to Russia and the West, further complicates any prospects for peace. Flavius emphasizes that the failure to address these cultural and religious differences within Ukraine itself has left the country vulnerable to external influence and internal strife. Western involvement, while focused on countering Russian aggression, has ignored the complex internal dynamics at play in Ukrainian society. This cultural conflict may play a significant role in how the war is perceived and, ultimately, how it will be resolved.

Europe’s confusion and strategic uncertainty

The discussion concludes with a reflection on the future of Europe and the ongoing confusion surrounding its role in the Ukraine conflict. Flavius suggests that this uncertainty may persist as European leaders struggle to balance their domestic political agendas with the broader geopolitical reality. As Europe continues to grapple with its identity and strategic priorities, the US remains the dominant actor in shaping the future of the conflict, leaving Europe to reassess its place in the global order.

Peter adds that the lack of clarity about Europe’s position is troubling, especially when leaders like Macron advocate for drastic military and defense changes without considering the broader implications for European unity and long-term stability. The disjointed approach to the Ukraine conflict and Europe’s role in it reflects the growing difficulty in navigating the complexities of international relations in an era where global power dynamics are shifting.

Ukrainian religious issues

Flavius highlights a deeply embedded issue in Ukraine, one that stretches beyond its military struggles with Russia: internal divisions, particularly regarding religious freedom, and the failure of Western support in helping Ukraine build democratic institutions.

Flavius elaborates on the creation of a nationalist Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which replaced traditional liturgical practices with modern Ukrainian, supported by President Petro Poroshenko’s government. This move, intended to unify the nation culturally, led to tensions as the church increasingly seized properties from the traditional Orthodox Church. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which is heavily backed by the government, increasingly took over the traditional churches, leading to an exacerbation of social and religious divides.

Flavius points out that these religious conflicts are more than symbolic; they reflect the internal fractures within Ukrainian society, where religious identity and cultural nationalism are tightly bound. The violent seizing of church buildings from one denomination to another only fuels social unrest, creating a situation where returning soldiers, fighting on the front lines, find their local churches and communities taken from them, further dividing the people.

Western support and Ukraine’s struggle for democracy

Flavius emphasizes that Ukraine’s struggle is not only a military one but also a battle for democratic values. The West’s support for Ukraine has been disproportionately focused on military aid. While Europe and the US have provided significant amounts of military hardware, such as obsolete and second-hand equipment, they have failed to support Ukraine in strengthening its democratic institutions and civil society.

Ukraine has received financial and military aid, but civil society initiatives — such as those led by Ukrainian lawyers pushing for government transparency and accountability — have received little to no continued backing from the West. Flavius points out that the funding for establishing watchdog bodies, which had initially been supported by the US, dwindled over time, further weakening Ukraine’s internal governance structures. This neglect by the West, Flavius argues, leaves Ukraine vulnerable, as it is unable to build sustainable democratic institutions that could help unite the population in its fight for survival.

Peter raises the question of Ukraine’s potential to be a functioning democracy in the long term, especially given the martial law and the erosion of normal political processes during the ongoing war. While there are efforts from within Ukraine to build a democratic system, Flavius acknowledges that Ukraine still suffers from deep-rooted authoritarian tendencies stemming from its Soviet past.

Flavius cites anecdotal evidence from his conversations with clergy, where the fear of government intervention and property seizure was compared to the harsh Stalinist period. Although Ukraine has a segment of its population dedicated to building vibrant democratic institutions, these aspirations often clash with the lingering realities of authoritarian governance and the state’s control over religious institutions. With a limited ability to hold the government accountable, the future of Ukrainian democracy remains uncertain, especially if Europe and the West continue to overlook this issue.

Europe’s hypocrisy, relations with Russia and political future

The conversation then moves to Europe’s role in the conflict, with Flavius criticizing Europe for sending arms to Ukraine but failing to provide support for the country’s democratic development. While military support is seen as legitimate in the context of Ukraine’s fight for survival, Flavius points out that this kind of support is only one piece of the puzzle. Without European efforts to help Ukraine model itself as a full-fledged democracy, its potential for long-term stability remains in jeopardy.

Flavius emphasizes that Europe has failed to address Ukraine’s need for institutional reform and a functioning democracy. He argues that the lack of support for civil society and democracy is one of the main reasons Ukraine is in such a fragile state today. The hypocrisy lies in Europe’s contradictory approach: While proclaiming support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratic aspirations, Europe has largely ignored its responsibility to help Ukraine build those very democratic institutions.

The conversation then shifts to the larger geopolitical context, particularly Europe’s relationship with Russia. Flavius raises the point that Europe’s desire to weaken Russia has led to a complicated and unstable situation, especially for countries like Germany, which had long relied on Russian energy. The war in Ukraine has forced Europe into a precarious position, where the economic fallout from the severance of ties with Russia has left countries like Germany vulnerable.

Flavius explains that Russia’s role in Europe is crucial, and many European leaders are personally invested in maintaining some kind of balance with Russia. Countries like France have historically seen Russia as a strategic ally, and Flavius suggested that the failure to include Russia in a post-World War II security arrangement has exacerbated tensions. The lack of a security framework that includes Russia has contributed to the ongoing conflict, and as the war drags on, Europe is likely to face significant internal political shifts, particularly with the rise of right-wing parties opposed to continued military engagement in Ukraine.

Peter and Flavius discuss the political ramifications of the ongoing conflict for Europe. With the rise of right-wing and populist parties across Europe, many of which are anti-war, the current trajectory of European politics looks uncertain. Flavius notes that this shift is partly a reaction to Europe’s failure to manage the Ukrainian crisis effectively. The economic and social impact of the war, combined with growing disillusionment over Europe’s handling of the situation, is leading to a rise in nationalist sentiment across the continent.

Countries like Germany, Italy and France have seen the rise of parties like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, both of which are strongly opposed to militarism and have criticized the EU’s stance on Ukraine. This shift, Flavius suggests, could have long-term consequences for the political stability of Europe, particularly if these parties gain more power and influence in the coming years.

Ukraine’s demographic and economic crisis

In the final section of the conversation, Flavius turns to Ukraine’s demographic crisis, which has worsened over the past decade. Ukraine now faces one of the lowest birth rates in the world, with an average of just per woman — far below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. This, combined with the country’s loss of population due to emigration and the effects of the war, poses a grave threat to Ukraine’s future.

Flavius points out that Ukraine had already lost around ten million people since independence in 1991, due to corruption and lack of opportunities. The war has led to further population loss, with millions fleeing the country and hundreds of thousands killed or injured. This demographic collapse, he argues, will have long-term consequences for Ukraine’s ability to rebuild itself after the war.

The conversation ends on a sobering note, with Peter asking about the possibility of conflict resolution in Europe, not just for Ukraine but for the broader European context. Flavius reflects on the deep challenges facing Europe, suggesting that the failure to include Russia in a new European security framework is at the heart of the current conflict. The rise of populism and nationalism in Europe, combined with the ongoing war in Ukraine, could destabilize the continent further if a resolution is not found.

Both Peter and Flavius agree that the political and social confusion within Europe is far from resolved and will continue to unfold in the coming months. The future of both Ukraine and Europe remains uncertain, but Flavius suggests that, for the sake of Ukraine, Europe must start addressing its internal divisions and reevaluating its approach to the region.

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Sebastian believes Europe is now at a critical juncture. He emphasizes that while the European Union has been forged through crises in the past, the current moment is one of “endgame.” He warns that without decisive action, the world could enter what he calls the “authoritarian century,” marking the decline of democratic values. The failure to act swiftly could result in Europe’s disintegration, with some nations drifting towards authoritarianism or even exiting the European Union, as seen with Brexit.

The growing divide within Europe

Europe is unable to form a unified response to crises like the war in Ukraine. Sebastian notes that countries like Hungary are already aligning themselves with Russia, while other European leaders are hesitant to fully commit to defending Ukraine. The struggle to forge a united European front in the face of external threats could undermine the EU’s future, potentially leading to a collapse of its unity and the values it represents.

Sebastian highlights that the EU’s internal divisions are further compounded by economic, political and ideological rifts between member states. While some countries are increasingly skeptical of the EU’s centralizing tendencies, others remain firmly committed to deepening integration. These conflicting priorities are especially evident in the differing responses to Russia’s aggression and the broader security challenges in Europe. The rise of Eurosceptic and far-right movements in several EU countries further complicates efforts to present a united front against external threats. These movements could weaken the EU’s capacity to act decisively and protect its democratic ideals, especially if populist leaders gain more influence in key European nations.

The growing divide within Europe also threatens to undermine the EU’s cohesion in the long run. If member states can no longer agree on fundamental issues such as defense policy and foreign alliances, the future of the EU’s integration process could be in jeopardy. Sebastian warns that Europe is at a crossroads: It must either unify and strengthen its institutions or risk fragmenting under the pressure of internal and external challenges.

The role of nationalism and sovereignty

The rise of nationalism and calls for greater national sovereignty have also played a significant role in undermining European unity. Sebastian points out that while the EU has long been a model of , its political ambitions have been increasingly challenged by nationalist movements across the continent. Leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni and France’s Marine Le Pen have openly criticized the EU’s centralization of power and pushed for policies that prioritize national sovereignty over European cooperation.

These nationalist movements, often fueled by economic dissatisfaction and cultural anxiety, pose a significant challenge to the EU’s future. While the EU has been successful in promoting peace and economic prosperity, it has struggled to address the concerns of those who feel left behind by globalization and integration. In countries like Hungary, where there is a with Russia, the EU’s ability to hold member states accountable for their foreign policy decisions is increasingly questioned. This growing nationalism could eventually lead to further fragmentation as countries prioritize their own interests at the expense of EU solidarity.

At the same time, Sebastian acknowledges that there is a countercurrent within Europe. Leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron have pushed for deeper European integration, proposing ideas such as a common European and a more unified foreign policy. However, as Sebastian points out, this vision faces significant obstacles from nationalist governments and a general reluctance among some member states to cede more sovereignty to Brussels. The future of European integration will likely depend on the ability of political leaders to reconcile these competing forces and find a path forward that balances national interests with the need for a stronger, more unified Europe.

European security and unity

The discussion also touches on the future of European integration. While some view the economic benefits of the EU as its primary success, Sebastian refutes the notion that democracy and human rights should be secondary to economic prosperity. He argues that the EU’s past enlargements were not merely economic but also about stabilizing young democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. The integration of these countries has proven successful, both politically and economically, and demonstrates the EU’s broader role in promoting peace and democracy across the continent.

Sebastian also explores the possibility of Europe evolving into a “,” advocating for a common defense and security architecture. However, the varying threat perceptions among member states make such a vision challenging. For example, while Poland faces a from Russia, countries like Portugal may not see the same urgency. This discrepancy in threat assessment could make it difficult for the EU to maintain its cohesion and respond effectively to the rising geopolitical challenges.

The conversation addresses the broader implications of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While some argue that a approach is needed to end the bloodshed, Sebastian contends that a peace agreement that rewards Russian aggression would set a dangerous precedent. Europe, he argues, must not abandon its commitment to democratic values and should resist rewarding an aggressor like Russia. The future of Europe depends on maintaining its unity, strengthening its defenses, and staying true to the principles that have guided its integration for decades.

Bullying, geopolitical tensions and the US

International bullying, particularly the US’s, is increasing. Atul points out that the US is acting like a bully in international politics, citing its toward Greenland and Canada, and threatening stance towards allies like Panama. He questions whether standing up to bullies would also mean confronting the US. Sebastian agrees, emphasizing that Europe must take a stronger stance against these actions, particularly with regard to threats toward nations like Denmark and Canada. He criticizes the US’s behavior, likening it to an imperial mindset, with Trump pushing for peace in regions like Gaza and Ukraine while simultaneously threatening allies.

Sebastian highlights the challenges facing Europe, including its military and economic weaknesses. He notes that Europe lacks the resources to defend Ukraine adequately, pointing to the lack of a unified defense strategy and economic instability. Additionally, Europe faces internal challenges, such as the of far-right political movements, which complicates its ability to form a unified front against external threats. In response to these realities, Sebastian discusses the necessity of a balanced vision for Europe — one that recognizes the importance of European integration, but also addresses the rising challenges posed by extreme political factions and the growing influence of external powers like the US and Russia.

The social market vs. turbo-capitalism: Europe’s model of stability

Shifting to a deeper analysis of Europe’s political landscape, the discussion turns to the larger ideological battle between the social market economy of Europe and the turbo-capitalism promoted by the US. Sebastian defends Europe’s social market model, pointing out that despite criticisms, it has been successful in fostering economic growth while ensuring a welfare state that protects citizens in times of need. This contrasts with the US’s system, where the lack of social safety nets can lead to economic ruin for individuals in the event of a crisis. Sebastian stresses that Europe’s regulatory framework, while sometimes criticized for being bureaucratic, has led to the protection of workers’ rights and a more stable economy compared to the volatility seen in turbo-capitalist systems.

Atul echoes this sentiment, noting that in the US and India, a lack of such protections can lead to catastrophic outcomes for ordinary people. Sebastian acknowledges that while Europe is not without flaws, especially in the context of rising far-right influence and political fragmentation, there is still a possibility for reform and progress. He argues that Europe must better communicate the advantages of its social market model, including labor rights, healthcare and worker protections, as the antidote to the negative effects of extreme market-driven capitalism.

The conversation concludes with a sobering look at the ongoing war in Ukraine. Sebastian acknowledges that any ceasefire will come with significant costs, particularly for the Ukrainian people, who will bear the brunt of the conflict’s consequences. He argues that Europe, while bearing the financial burden of reconstruction, must work together to strengthen its collective security and economic model, ensuring that it is not solely dependent on the US.

Ultimately, the EU’s role in securing peace and rebuilding after the war is crucial. While the road ahead is challenging, Sebastian remains optimistic that European cooperation could pave the way forward, even in the face of mounting global tensions.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Is this the beginning of a new Cold War between the United States, NATO and Russia or the end of one? Will Russia and the West remain implacable enemies for the foreseeable future, with a new iron curtain between them through what was once the heart of Ukraine? Or can the US and Russia resolve the disputes and hostility that led to this war in the first place, so as to leave Ukraine with a stable and lasting peace?

The Cold War repeats itself

Some European leaders see this moment as the beginning of a long struggle with Russia, akin to the beginning of the Cold War in 1946, when Winston Churchill that “an iron curtain has descended” across Europe.

On March 2, echoing Churchill, European Council President Ursula von der Leyen that Europe must turn Ukraine into a “steel porcupine.” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said he wants up to 200,000 European troops on the eventual ceasefire line between Russia and Ukraine to “guarantee” any peace agreement. He insists that the US provide a “backstop,” meaning a commitment to send US forces to fight in Ukraine if war breaks out again.

Russia has repeatedly said it to NATO forces being based in Ukraine under any guise. “We explained today that the appearance of armed forces from the same NATO countries, but under a false flag, under the flag of the European Union or under national flags, does not change anything in this regard,” Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on February 18. “Of course this is unacceptable to us.”

But the UK is persisting in a campaign to recruit a “coalition of the willing,” the same term the US and UK coined for the list of countries they persuaded to support the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In that case, only Australia, Denmark and Poland took in the invasion. Costa Rica publicly insisted on being from the list, and the term was widely lampooned as the “coalition of the billing” because the US recruited so many countries to join it by promising them lucrative foreign aid deals.

Far from the start of a new Cold War, US President Donald Trump and other leaders see this moment as more akin to the end of the original Cold War, when US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, Iceland, in 1986 and to bridge the divisions caused by 40 years of Cold War hostility.

Like Trump and Putin today, Reagan and Gorbachev were unlikely peacemakers. Gorbachev had risen through the ranks of the Soviet Communist Party to become its General Secretary and Soviet Premier in March 1985, in the midst of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. He didn’t begin to Soviet forces from Afghanistan until 1988. Reagan oversaw an unprecedented Cold War arms build-up, a in Guatemala and covert and proxy wars throughout Central America. And yet Gorbachev and Reagan are now widely remembered as peacemakers.

While Democrats deride Trump as a Putin stooge, in his first term in office, Trump was actually responsible for escalating the Cold War with Russia. After the Pentagon had milked its absurd, self-fulfilling “War on Terror” for trillions of dollars, it was Trump and his defense secretary, General “Mad Dog” Mattis, who declared the shift back to strategic competition with Russia and China as the Pentagon’s new gravy train in their 2018 National Defense Strategy. It was also Trump who lifted President Barack Obama’s restrictions on sending to Ukraine.

The dissolution of European peacemaking

Trump’s head-spinning about-face in US policy has left its European allies with whiplash and reversed the roles they each have played for generations. France and Germany have traditionally been the and peacemakers in the Western alliance. Meanwhile, the US and UK have been infected with a chronic case of war fever that has proven resistant to a long string of military defeats and catastrophic impacts on every country that has fallen prey to their warmongering.

In 2003, France’s Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin led the to the invasion of Iraq in the UN Security Council. France, Germany and Russia issued a joint to say that they would “not let a proposed resolution pass that would authorize the use of force. Russia and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on this point.”

At a press conference in Paris with then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, French President Jacques Chirac , “Everything must be done to avoid war… As far as we’re concerned, war always means failure.”

As recently as 2022, after Russia invaded Ukraine, it was once again the US and UK that and blocked peace negotiations in favor of a long war, while , and continued to call for new negotiations, even as they gradually fell in line with the US policy.

Former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder took part in the peace negotiations in Turkey in March and April 2022 and then flew to Moscow at Ukraine’s request to meet with Putin. In a 2023 with German newspaper Berliner Zeitung, Schröder confirmed that the peace talks only failed “because everything was decided in Washington.”

With Biden blocking new negotiations in 2023, one interviewer asked Schröder, “Do you think you can resume your peace plan?”

He replied, “Yes, and the only ones who can initiate this are France and Germany… Macron and Scholz are the only ones who can talk to Putin. Chirac and I did the same in the Iraq war. Why can’t support for Ukraine be combined with an offer of talks to Russia? The arms deliveries are not a solution for eternity. But no one wants to talk. Everyone sits in trenches. How many more people have to die?”

Since 2022, President Macron and a Thatcherite team of iron ladies — European Council President von der Leyen; former German Foreign Minister Analena Baerbock and former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, now the EU’s foreign policy chief — have promoted a new militarization of Europe, egged on from behind the scenes by and arms manufacturers.

Has the passage of time, the passing of the World War II generation and the distortion of history washed away the historical memory of two World Wars from a continent that was destroyed by conflict only 80 years ago? Where is the next generation of French and German diplomats in the tradition of de Villepin and Schröder today? How can sending German tanks to fight in Ukraine, and now in Russia itself, fail to remind Russians of previous German invasions and solidify support for the war? And won’t the for Europe to confront Russia by moving from a “welfare state to a warfare state” only feed the rise of the European hard right?

So are the new European militarists reading the historical moment correctly? Or are they jumping on the bandwagon of a disastrous Cold War that could, as and Trump have , lead to World War III?

A US–Russian plan to restore relations

When Trump’s foreign policy team with their Russian counterparts in Saudi Arabia on February 18, ending the war in Ukraine was the second part of the three-part plan they agreed on. The first was to restore full diplomatic relations between the US and Russia, and the third was to work on a series of other problems in American–Russian relations.

The order of these three stages is interesting because, as Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted, it means that the negotiations over Ukraine will be the first test of restored relations between the US and Russia.

If the negotiations for peace in Ukraine are successful, they can lead to further negotiations over restoring arms control treaties and nuclear disarmament. Perhaps they could even spur cooperation on other global problems that have been impossible to resolve in a world stuck in a zombie-like Cold War that powerful interests will not allow to die.

It was a welcome change to hear Rubio that the post-Cold War unipolar world was an anomaly and that now we have to adjust to the reality of a multipolar world. But if Trump and his advisers are just trying to restore US relations with Russia as part of a “reverse Kissinger” scheme to isolate China, as some analysts have , that would perpetuate America’s debilitating geopolitical crisis instead of solving it.

A chance for change

The US and our friends in Europe have a new chance to make a clean break from the three-way geopolitical power struggle between the US, Russia and China that has hamstrung the world since the 1970s. They can find new roles and priorities for our countries in the emerging multipolar world of the 21st century.

We hope that Trump and European leaders can recognize the crossroads at which they are standing, and the chance history is giving them to choose the path of peace. France and Germany in particular should remember the wisdom of de Villepin, Chirac and Schröder in the face of American and British plans for aggression against Iraq in 2003.

This could be the beginning of the end of the permanent state of war and Cold War that has held the world in its grip for over a century. Ending it would allow us to finally prioritize the progress and cooperation we so desperately need to solve the other critical problems the whole world faces today. As US General Mark Milley back in November 2022 when he called for renewed negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, we must “seize the moment.”

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial��policy.

The post Is This the Beginning or the End of a New Cold War? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In this third installment, I asked the following question to both ChatGPT and DeepSeek:

“We are now looking at a struggle between four distinct parties: the US, Russia, Ukraine and Europe. Europe of course can be decomposed into what some call ideological blocks. The US is also divided into two opposing camps that correlate today with a Trump-led Republican party and a Democratic party that continues to adhere, at least publicly, to the line followed by Joe Biden and Kamala Harris.

This situation is novel in many ways. In the past, when questions of war and peace arose, the concerned parties had a clear position that reflected the stance of their government. During the two world wars every European nation defined its position as either committed to one of the alliances or neutral. Even if a nation’s position changed in the course of the war, no ambiguity remained. US President Woodrow Wilson won the 1916 election on the basis of his promise that the US would avoid any political implication in Europe’s war. But when, in 1917, he committed to joining it, the nation rallied behind him. To prevent discord, Wilson fueled an effective propaganda campaign against those who preferred to cling to his election-year promise. It was effective. The US unambiguously joined Britain’s and France’s war effort.

�մǻ岹��’s situation is far more ambiguous even than that of World War I. The US is the leader of the NATO alliance, which usually assumes that its 31 partners will follow its lead. With a change of administrations, the government of the leader has radically altered its position, abandoning its previous ‘unwavering’ commitment to one of apparent neutrality, in the interest of playing the role of honest broker. But most of the other 31 members of NATO had committed individually to a position of being a party to one side in the war.

At this precise moment in time, observers and the engaged parties themselves are left wondering how each of their own partners in NATO will react to their leader’s sudden change of heart. Can they find common ground? Can any of them credibly change their position without looking like sycophantic vassals? Would the leaders themselves not compromise their own political credibility if they were suddenly to change their discourse? Politics thrives on inertia. What happens when inertia is all at once radically disrupted?

We may ask another question of deeper significance. Are any of the partners really interested in addressing the question of how to resolve an ongoing war?

Given this incredibly complex knot of conflicts and contradictions and given the high stakes of a standoff of global significance involving at least four nations with a nuclear arsenal, can we begin to imagine the four most credible scenarios for the coming months?”

A quick overview of the two responses

Before I reproduce the complete text of the two AIs, here is a comparison of the list of titles of the scenarios each chose.

ChatGPT:

1. Stalemate and Prolonged Attrition

2. A European-Led Coalition Steps Up

3. A Negotiated Settlement Under External Pressure

4. Uncontrolled Escalation

Deepseek:

1. Stalemate and Frozen Conflict

2. Escalation and Broader Conflict

3. Diplomatic Breakthrough and Peace Agreement

4. Internal Political Shifts and Realignment

You might notice that ChatGPT reserves the escalation hypothesis for last. But it appears to give it a more extreme formulation by supposing it will be “uncontrolled.” When comparing its detailed description with DeepSeek’s, we discover that ChatGPT clearly casts Russia as the potential ill-intentioned villain responsible for aggravating an already degraded situation. DeepSeek also anticipates Russian escalation but explains it as a reaction to being “cornered.” This, of course, echoes the debate most people are aware of that turns around assessing whether the Russian invasion in 2022 was provoked or.

The two chatbots broadly agree on the trends, but this kind of nuance concerning one nation’s intentions reveals a possible ideological divergence. ChatGPT may thus reflect a “feeling” about geopolitical intentions recognizable as being the dominant interpretation in the West’s legacy media. DeepSeek’s reading appears closer to the way geopolitical “realists” reason, who are less likely to make assumptions about a specific player’s moral character or simply its aggressivity.

Concerning the presentation of the two best case scenarios (both in the number three position), DeepSeek presents a clearly rosier and frankly optimistic view. ChatGPT’s remains much more tentative and cautious.

Details such as this may help to create some welcome perspective for users who consult AI to develop their own reflection.

Here are the two responses in full. We invite you to read them, learn from them and think about the differences.

ChatGPT’s response

“This evolving geopolitical situation indeed presents a level of ambiguity and complexity that makes traditional forecasting difficult. However, we can outline several plausible scenarios for the coming months based on current trends and the key pressures acting on the various parties:

Scenario 1: Stalemate and Prolonged Attrition

• US Policy Evolution: The US, under a new administration, continues its shift toward neutrality, reducing military aid while pushing for negotiations.
• European Response: NATO members remain divided—some maintain military support for Ukraine (e.g., Poland, the Baltics, the UK), while others (e.g., Germany, France) push for diplomacy.
• Russia’s Stance: Russia continues its war of attrition, betting on Western fatigue and political divisions.
• Ukraine’s Position: With reduced Western aid, Ukraine struggles to sustain its defenses but refuses to surrender, leading to a frozen conflict with occasional escalations.
• Outcome: A drawn-out, indecisive war, increasingly resembling Korea’s division or the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Scenario 2: A European-Led Coalition Steps Up

• US Retrenchment: The US withdraws from active leadership, leaving European nations to decide their role.
• European Response: A ‘coalition of the willing’ (led by the UK, France, Poland, and the Nordics) commits to maintaining Ukraine’s defense independently of Washington’s position.
• Russia’s Reaction: Russia escalates hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, and possibly tests NATO’s resolve through border provocations.
• Outcome: A divided NATO, where a core group remains committed to Ukraine, while others (e.g., Hungary, Slovakia) drift toward appeasement or neutrality.

Scenario 3: A Negotiated Settlement Under External Pressure

• US Initiative: The US administration brokers peace talks, leveraging economic levers over Ukraine and NATO allies to push for a ceasefire.
• European Support: Major European powers (Germany, France) align with this diplomatic push, offering security guarantees to Ukraine but pressuring it to accept territorial compromises.
• Russia’s Willingness: If internal economic strains or political pressures (e.g., elite discontent) grow, Russia may engage in talks, but only on its terms (recognition of annexed territories).
• Outcome: A fragile ceasefire akin to Minsk agreements, with continued tensions and unresolved territorial disputes.

Scenario 4: Uncontrolled Escalation

• US Political Uncertainty: If domestic US politics result in erratic foreign policy (e.g., conflicting signals from the administration and Congress), allies become disoriented.
• European Division: NATO fractures further, with some members advocating stronger intervention and others seeking disengagement.
• Russia’s Moves: Russia exploits divisions, intensifies operations, and escalates provocations, including hybrid warfare against NATO states.
• Unintended NATO Involvement: A Russian attack (deliberate or accidental) on NATO territory triggers Article 5 debates, leading to a dangerous moment of escalation.
• Outcome: A rapid crisis that could force an existential confrontation, either through high-stakes diplomacy or, in the worst case, military engagement.

Each scenario has key variables—domestic political shifts, economic pressures, and battlefield dynamics—that could tilt the outcome one way or another. The biggest unknown remains whether any of the parties involved genuinely seek resolution or whether inertia will sustain the conflict indefinitely.”

DeepSeek’s answer

“The situation you describe is indeed complex and fraught with potential for both conflict and resolution. The interplay between the US, Russia, Ukraine, and Europe, compounded by internal divisions within the US and Europe, creates a volatile geopolitical landscape. Here are three credible scenarios for the coming months, each with its own set of implications:

 1. Stalemate and Frozen Conflict

• Scenario: The conflict in Ukraine continues without a clear resolution, leading to a prolonged stalemate. The US, under a new administration, maintains its stance of neutrality, focusing on diplomatic efforts rather than military support. Europe remains divided, with some nations pushing for stronger support for Ukraine and others advocating for a more cautious approach. Russia consolidates its gains in eastern Ukraine but faces ongoing resistance and international sanctions.
• Implications: This scenario could lead to a ‘frozen conflict’ similar to the situation in Eastern Ukraine prior to the 2022 escalation. The humanitarian crisis in Ukraine would persist, and the region would remain a flashpoint for potential future conflicts. NATO’s cohesion could be tested, with some member states potentially questioning the alliance’s effectiveness. The US’s role as a global leader might be further scrutinized, especially if its neutrality is perceived as a lack of commitment.

 2. Escalation and Broader Conflict

• Scenario: The conflict escalates, potentially drawing in more NATO members directly. A miscalculation or a deliberate provocation could lead to a broader war. The US, despite its initial neutrality, might be forced to re-engage more actively, especially if a NATO member is attacked. Russia, feeling cornered, might resort to more aggressive tactics, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
• Implications: This scenario would have catastrophic consequences, potentially leading to a full-scale war in Europe. The global economy would suffer immensely, and the risk of nuclear escalation would be high. The US and Europe would face a severe test of their alliances and their ability to coordinate a unified response. The humanitarian toll would be unprecedented, and the geopolitical landscape could be reshaped in ways that are difficult to predict.

 3. Diplomatic Breakthrough and Peace Agreement

• Scenario: A diplomatic breakthrough occurs, facilitated by international mediators or a change in leadership in one of the key nations. The US, under pressure from both domestic and international actors, re-engages in a more active diplomatic role. Russia and Ukraine agree to a ceasefire and begin negotiations for a peace agreement, possibly involving territorial concessions and security guarantees. Europe plays a key role in rebuilding Ukraine and ensuring the implementation of the agreement.
• Implications: This scenario would offer a path to de-escalation and potentially a lasting peace. It would require significant compromises from all parties, but the benefits could be substantial. The US could restore some of its credibility as a global leader, and NATO could emerge stronger if it plays a constructive role in the peace process. The humanitarian situation in Ukraine would improve, and the risk of a broader conflict would be significantly reduced. However, achieving such a breakthrough would require overcoming deep-seated mistrust and conflicting interests.

 4. Internal Political Shifts and Realignment

• Scenario: Internal political shifts in the US or Europe lead to a realignment of policies. For example, a change in the US administration or a significant shift in European leadership could result in a more unified and assertive stance towards Russia. Alternatively, a more isolationist US policy could lead to a further fracturing of NATO, with some European nations seeking alternative security arrangements.
• Implications: This scenario could lead to a reconfiguration of global alliances. If the US becomes more isolationist, Europe might seek to strengthen its own defense capabilities or form new alliances. Conversely, a more assertive US policy could lead to a renewed sense of purpose within NATO. The impact on the conflict in Ukraine would depend on the nature of these shifts, but they could either exacerbate or alleviate the current tensions.

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Each of these scenarios presents a different path forward, with varying degrees of risk and potential for resolution. The key factors to watch will be the internal political dynamics within the US and Europe, the actions of Russia and Ukraine, and the ability of international actors to mediate and find common ground. The stakes are incredibly high, and the coming months will be critical in determining the trajectory of this conflict and its global implications.”

My own tentative conclusion

If you compare the details of the two accounts above, you will probably notice that both attempt to be reasonably objective and balanced. Neither takes sides. Both help us to expand our understanding. But, as we mentioned above, the nuances are also there to deepen the story.

If we use AI in this or a similar way to learn and develop our own reflection, then as consumers we should keep in mind the importance of reading anything our AI bot produces at two distinct levels. The first is to appreciate and evaluate the quality of the information. We should remember that in all cases the experience will expand our horizons, simply because AI has access to more sources than any of us.

But even at this level of processing new information, we should avoid taking every affirmation on trust. We now know that hallucinations are possible. It’s equally important, however, to remember that nuance is not just an effect of style, but can be revelatory of new levels of truth, just as it is in human dialogue. We mustn’t forget that the discourse AI produces in this type of research will always be a distillation of existing human expression. Human errors and biases may be as easily reproduced in AI’s discourse as facts, random errors and in some cases, even well-constructed fiction.

Your thoughts

At 51�Թ�, we intend to continue the dialogue we have now begun concerning the dramatic geopolitical events that are now unfolding, in the first quarter of 2025. In our “Outside the Box” columns, we offer examples of dialogue with two chatbots. But we encourage all of you to try the exercise for yourself. Experiment with it. Frame your prompts as sincerely as you can to address the issues you think could benefit from more clarity. Examine, compare and critique the responses you receive.

Most of all, we cordially invite you to share with us your experience, your ideas or your reactions to the research we are doing here, but also your own research. That is where AI can help all of us evolve as active members of a living civilization. AI knows a lot that can complement but also comfort or contradict our own knowledge and convictions. The more we share dialogue and attempt to refine our understanding of its content, the more likely we will be to find the kind of solutions that are collectively acceptable and desirable.

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.

[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51�Թ�, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial��policy.

The post Outside the Box: Delirium in the Oval Office, Part 3 appeared first on 51�Թ�.

“You mention that the Europeans may be seeking ‘to justify and accelerate EU military integration and strategic autonomy.’ But you also state that ‘European leaders may fear economic repercussions if they break alignment with Washington, especially in trade negotiations and financial markets.’ This seems doubly contradictory. My initial question concerned the apparent decision of Europeans to side with Ukraine against the US, which presumably means breaking the alignment. But it’s also contradictory in the sense that assuming the burden of a continued war with Russia is unlikely to accelerate military integration, which can only be reasonably achieved if there is no active war taking place.

Do you agree that those contradictions would seem to limit the margin of maneuver of Europe, especially given that there are serious divisions among the European nations?”

“Yes, I agree that these contradictions severely limit Europe’s margin of maneuver. The tension between the desire for strategic autonomy and dependence on Washington creates a paradox: Europe wants to assert itself as an independent geopolitical actor, yet it remains economically and militarily dependent on the US. The war in Ukraine has only intensified this contradiction.

Breaking Alignment with the US?

On the surface, the European reaction to Trump’s stance on Ukraine might seem like an attempt to assert a more independent position. However, this is complicated by the reality that Europe’s military capabilities remain deeply tied to NATO and US leadership. If Europe were genuinely breaking alignment, one would expect to see:

1. A major European-led diplomatic push for a ceasefire or negotiations.
2. An accelerated effort to develop an autonomous European defense infrastructure.

Yet, neither of these is happening in a coherent way. Instead, European leaders continue to push for Ukraine’s defense while simultaneously voicing concerns about Trump’s approach, indicating a reactive stance rather than a proactive strategy.

The Military Integration Dilemma

You’re absolutely right that fighting a prolonged war does not facilitate military integration. In fact, it strains European capabilities in multiple ways:

• Resource Diversion: European militaries are depleting stockpiles to support Ukraine rather than using resources to build their own defense industries.
• Coordination Problems: The war highlights divisions between different EU and NATO members, with some (Poland, the Baltics) advocating maximalist military support, while others (Hungary, Slovakia) resist further engagement.
• Dependence on US Arms: Rather than building a self-sufficient European defense industry, many countries are relying more on US military hardware, which contradicts the goal of strategic autonomy.

Divisions Within Europe

Europe is not a monolith, and the war has exacerbated internal fractures:

• Western vs. Eastern Europe: Poland and the Baltics see the war as existential and are pushing for more aggressive measures. France and Germany, while supportive of Ukraine, are more cautious.
• Economic vs. Military Priorities: Some countries (e.g., Germany, Italy) are concerned about the economic consequences of prolonged conflict, while others prioritize security fears over economic concerns.
• US-Aligned vs. Independent Thinkers: Some leaders (notably Macron) have hinted at Europe taking a more independent stance, yet in practice, there is little evidence of a break from Washington’s broader policy.

A Shrinking Margin of Maneuver

The contradictions you pointed out—between European military ambitions and dependency on the US, and between supporting Ukraine while fearing economic consequences—mean that European leaders have very little room to maneuver:

1. If they double down on Ukraine without US support, they risk economic and military overstretch, without the guarantee of victory.
2. If they move toward a negotiated settlement, they risk alienating Eastern European allies and appearing weak.
3. If they maintain the status quo, they are essentially waiting for US leadership to dictate the next steps, which is not a sustainable position.

Conclusion

Europe’s current approach is reactive rather than strategic. It is not truly breaking alignment with the US, nor is it fully committing to strategic autonomy. The divisions within Europe further weaken its ability to act coherently. In the long run, unless a clear strategy emerges, Europe risks being caught in a situation where it neither achieves military independence nor effectively manages the war. Instead, it may find itself passively following external forces—whether from Washington, Moscow, or internal European pressures—without a viable endgame.”

DeepSeek’s response

Once again, DeepSeek’s response was nearly twice as long and more cogently structured.

Yes, I agree that the contradictions you’ve identified significantly limit Europe’s margin of maneuver and create a complex, almost paradoxical situation for European leaders. These contradictions stem from competing priorities and the inherent tensions between Europe’s aspirations for strategic autonomy, its reliance on the United States, and the realities of supporting Ukraine in a protracted conflict. Let’s break this down further:

1. The Contradiction Between Strategic Autonomy and Alignment with Washington��

• Strategic Autonomy: European leaders, particularly in France and Germany, have long advocated for greater EU military integration and strategic autonomy. The war in Ukraine has provided a renewed impetus for this goal, as Europe seeks to reduce its dependence on the U.S. for security.
• Alignment with Washington: At the same time, Europe remains heavily reliant on the U.S. for military, economic, and diplomatic support. Breaking alignment with Washington could have severe consequences, including disruptions in trade, financial markets, and NATO cohesion. This creates a dilemma: Europe wants to assert its independence but cannot afford to alienate its most powerful ally.

Why This Contradiction Limits Europe’s Maneuverability:

• European leaders must walk a fine line between pursuing strategic autonomy and maintaining transatlantic unity. This balancing act makes it difficult to take bold, independent actions, as any move toward autonomy risks provoking Washington’s displeasure.
• The U.S. remains the dominant force in NATO and the broader Western alliance. Without U.S. support, Europe’s ability to project power or influence global events is severely constrained.
  

2. The Contradiction Between Supporting Ukraine and Achieving Military Integration

• Supporting Ukraine: Europe’s commitment to Ukraine requires significant resources, including military aid, financial assistance, and humanitarian support. This diverts attention and resources away from long-term projects like EU military integration.
• Military Integration: Achieving meaningful military integration requires peace and stability, as well as a shared vision among EU member states. A protracted war in Ukraine creates divisions within Europe and makes it harder to build consensus on defense policy.

Why This Contradiction Limits Europe’s Maneuverability:

• The immediate demands of supporting Ukraine take precedence over long-term goals like military integration. This short-term focus undermines Europe’s ability to plan and execute a coherent defense strategy.
• The war exacerbates existing divisions within Europe. For example, Eastern European countries like Poland and the Baltic states are more hawkish toward Russia, while Western European countries like France and Germany favor a more cautious approach. These differences make it difficult to achieve the unity needed for military integration.
  

3. The Contradiction Between Economic Dependence and Strategic Ambitions

• Economic Dependence: Europe’s economy is deeply intertwined with the U.S., particularly in trade, finance, and technology. Breaking alignment with Washington could lead to economic repercussions, such as tariffs, sanctions, or reduced access to U.S. markets.
• Strategic Ambitions: Europe’s desire for strategic autonomy requires economic independence, including the ability to fund its own defense projects and reduce reliance on U.S. technology and investment.

������Why This Contradiction Limits Europe’s Maneuverability:

• European leaders must prioritize economic stability over strategic ambitions, as any disruption in transatlantic economic relations could have severe consequences for European growth and employment.
• The U.S. has significant leverage over Europe, particularly in areas like financial markets and technology. This limits Europe’s ability to pursue policies that might antagonize Washington.
  

4. The Contradiction Between Unity and Division

• Unity: European leaders often emphasize the importance of unity in responding to external threats like Russia. However, this unity is often more rhetorical than real.
• Division: There are deep divisions within Europe on how to handle the war in Ukraine, the role of the U.S., and the future of EU defense policy. These divisions are exacerbated by differing historical experiences, economic interests, and political ideologies.

Why This Contradiction Limits Europe’s Maneuverability:

• The lack of consensus makes it difficult for Europe to speak with one voice or take decisive action. This undermines Europe’s credibility on the global stage and weakens its negotiating position.
• Divisions within Europe create opportunities for external powers, like the U.S. and Russia, to exploit these differences and further fragment European unity.

5. The Contradiction Between Short-Term and Long-Term Goals

• Short-Term Goals: In the short term, Europe is focused on supporting Ukraine and managing the immediate fallout from the war, including energy shortages and refugee flows.
• Long-Term Goals: In the long term, Europe aims to achieve strategic autonomy, deepen EU integration, and reduce its dependence on external powers.

Why This Contradiction Limits Europe’s Maneuverability:

• The urgency of short-term challenges often takes precedence over long-term planning. This reactive approach prevents Europe from developing a coherent strategy for achieving its broader goals.
• The resources and political capital required to address short-term crises leave little room for investing in long-term projects like military integration or economic independence.

Conclusion

The contradictions you’ve identified—between strategic autonomy and alignment with Washington, between supporting Ukraine and achieving military integration, between economic dependence and strategic ambitions, and between unity and division—create a complex web of challenges for European leaders. These contradictions limit Europe’s margin of maneuver and make it difficult to pursue a coherent and effective strategy.

In the absence of a clear path forward, European leaders are likely to continue muddling through, balancing competing priorities and avoiding decisive actions that could exacerbate these contradictions. However, this approach is unsustainable in the long term. To overcome these challenges, Europe will need to address the underlying tensions in its policies and develop a more unified and forward-looking strategy. This will require difficult choices, greater political will, and a willingness to confront the contradictions that currently constrain Europe’s actions.

My conclusion (to be continued)

This is the beginning of a dialogue that I expect to continue over the coming weeks. In the next installment, along with our AI friends, we will try to work together to assess the complexity of the current situation from the point of view of European decision-makers. 

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.

[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51�Թ�, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial��policy.

The post Outside the Box: Delirium in the Oval Office, Part 2 appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The long and the short of it is there has been a long unfolding pattern of chess moves that make it clear that a Manichean reading of the war that assigns responsibility to one side and one side only can only represent a distortion of reality. It was distortion on both sides that played out at the unprecedented dramatic showdown in the Oval Office on February 28, 2025. Just as TV drama it was a delirious performance on both sides.

But what may seem even more delirious is the reaction from Europe of unconditional support for Zelensky and condemnation of Trump. And this is surprising for two reasons. The war has been damaging for Europe and its continuation can only be more damaging, especially as it would seem to imply a more active and direct engagement of Europe in a war that many believe Ukraine could never win. Here are some statements made in the aftermath of the tempestuous meeting in the White House.

• ‘Your dignity honors the bravery of the Ukrainian people. Be strong, be brave, be fearless’ (Ursula von der ). She seems not to have noticed it was totally undignified on both sides.
• ‘The free world needs a new leader’ (): this is a call for regime change in the US, a clearly crazy idea coming from any European.
• Referring to the ‘aggressor’ (Russia) and the ‘aggressed,’ Emmanuel Macron ‘I think we were all right to help Ukraine and sanction Russia three years ago, and to continue to do so. We, that is the United States of America, the Europeans, the Canadians, the Japanese and many others.’ Is the fact that he thinks something enough to justify indefinitely prolonging a war?��
• Friedrich Merz : ‘How can you stab the president of an invaded country in the back like this? Free Europe will not betray Ukraine!’ The question is rhetorically loaded and plays to the popular notion of victimization in that it supposes that the president of an invaded country must always be right and that criticizing him in any way is a stab in the back.
• Norway’s Jonas Stoere had a much more balanced take when he : ‘Ukraine still needs the US’s support, and Ukraine’s security and future are also important to the US and to Europe.’
• Canadian foreign minister Melanie Joly : ‘We think Ukrainians are fighting for their own freedoms, but they’re also fighting for ours.’ Is there any rational way of creating a link between whatever freedom might exist at any time in Ukraine and freedom in Canada?
• Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese : ‘We will continue to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes, because this is the struggle of a democratic nation versus an authoritarian regime led by Vladimir Putin, who clearly has imperialistic designs, not just on Ukraine, but throughout that region.’ As we have explored in previous conversations there is no solid evidence for Putin’s ‘imperialistic designs’; this is an assertion that is never critically examined.

This last remark epitomizes the state of delirium. The reasons cited with the aim of avoiding a negotiated peace are principally emotional and to some extent imaginary. In all cases they are based on the idea that one party is entirely right and the other entirely wrong. 

The particular reason all this amounts to delirium is quite simply that we have a situation in which two absurdities have become the foundation of political thinking today. The first is that whereas both NATO and the European Union were created as instruments specifically designed to ensure peace and continental stability following two world wars initiated inside Europe, those two institutions now seem embarked on a course that excludes diplomacy and insists on waging war until the defeat of the opponent. NATO and Europe are aligned in favor of war and growing instability. The second is the idea of envisaging an exclusively European commitment, without the US, to Ukraine’s war at a moment when both Ukraine and Europe have been weakened to the point of possible irrelevance.

In contrast US Secretary of State Marco Rubio made a that all the Western leaders cited above refuse to acknowledge: ‘This is a complex war that has causes behind it that go back a number of years.’ Does it make any sense to deny complexity, especially in matters of war and peace?

So here is my question. Apart from arguments about always defending the aggressed against the aggressor, which is a risky principle to adopt when the balance of power is clearly unfavorable, what explains the motivation of European leaders to commit to a plan that seems suicidal. There is reason to think that the leaders who express this commitment are not just think about Ukraine being a ‘just cause’. No leaders are that naïve. So, what are some credible theories about economic, geopolitical, political or even personal motivations? There is the obvious factor that no leader wants to be seen as radically changing their position just because the US has a new president. But can there be other credible factors?”

Here is ChatGPT’s reply.

“There are several possible motivations—economic, geopolitical, political, and personal—that could explain why European leaders remain so strongly committed to supporting Ukraine, even when the war appears increasingly costly and strategically uncertain for Europe.

1. Geopolitical Factors

• European Security and Strategic Autonomy
  The EU and NATO have long depended on US military power for their security. With Trump signaling potential disengagement, some European leaders may be reinforcing their commitment to Ukraine as a way to justify and accelerate EU military integration and strategic autonomy.
• Fear of Russian Expansion
  Despite debate over whether Putin has ‘imperialistic designs,’ European leaders may genuinely fear that a Ukrainian defeat would embolden Russia to assert influence over former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states. The Baltics and Poland, in particular, perceive this as an existential issue.
• Signaling to Other Adversaries
  A European withdrawal from Ukraine could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, potentially emboldening other geopolitical rivals, including China, to take assertive action in Taiwan or elsewhere.

2. Economic Factors

• Defense Industry Profits
  The war has led to a massive increase in European defense spending. Countries like Germany and France, which have strong arms industries, benefit from this demand.
• Energy Realignment and Economic Adjustments
  Europe has already committed to shifting away from Russian energy. A sudden reversal would be economically difficult and politically humiliating. Instead, European leaders may see the war as a painful but necessary transition to new energy dependencies (e.g., US LNG, Middle Eastern gas, nuclear investments).
• US-EU Economic Dependence
  The US has benefited economically from the war through arms sales and energy exports. European leaders may fear economic repercussions if they break alignment with Washington, especially in trade negotiations and financial markets.

3. Political and Institutional Factors

• EU and NATO Cohesion
  For decades, European leaders have operated under the assumption that unity within NATO and the EU is vital. Any retreat from Ukraine could create fractures within these institutions, with some members (e.g., Poland and the Baltics) feeling betrayed.
• Domestic Political Constraints
  Many European leaders staked their credibility on unwavering support for Ukraine. To suddenly change course could be politically disastrous. For figures like Macron, Scholz, and von der Leyen, reversing their stance might be perceived as an admission of miscalculation or weakness.

4. Personal and Ideological Factors

• Legacy and Historical Judgment
  Leaders often think about how history will judge them. Given the moral framing of this war, no leader wants to be remembered as the one who ‘abandoned Ukraine.’
• Fear of Populism and Internal Instability
  Many European governments are under pressure from nationalist or populist movements that have criticized Ukraine policy. Some leaders might see continued commitment to Ukraine as a way to assert control over their own political narratives.

Conclusion

The European stance likely results from a mix of these factors rather than a singular cause. While emotional rhetoric plays a role in public statements, behind the scenes, leaders are likely thinking about military alliances, economic dependencies, domestic politics, and their own political legacies. The question remains whether their strategy is sustainable, especially if US policy continues to shift under Trump.”

I asked the same question to DeepSeek, which made similar points but with more detail and significantly more nuance. ChatGPT offered 512 words compared to DeepSeek’s 993. Rather than reproduce DeepSeek’s text, I invite readers to compare its conclusion with ChatGPT’s.

DeepSeek’s Conclusion

“The motivations behind European leaders’ support for Ukraine are not monolithic; they are shaped by a combination of strategic, economic, political, and personal factors. While the principle of defending the ‘aggressed’ against the ‘aggressor’ plays a role, it is far from the only consideration. The fear of Russian expansion, the desire to maintain transatlantic unity, economic opportunities, and domestic political pressures all contribute to a complex web of motivations.

However, as you rightly point out, the refusal to acknowledge the complexity of the conflict and the insistence on a Manichean narrative risk leading to policies that are not only irrational but potentially catastrophic. The challenge for European leaders is to balance their commitment to Ukraine with the need to pursue a realistic and sustainable path to peace.”

Prompt for Part 2

DeepSeek doesn’t shy away from the “irrational” side of the unfolding drama. Because decisions made in the coming weeks and months will have major consequences for Europeans such as myself, I wasn’t ready to stop the conversation with my AI friends. In Part 2, I will publish the responses to the following prompt:

“You mention that the Europeans may be seeking ‘to justify and accelerate EU military integration and strategic autonomy.’ But you also state that ‘European leaders may fear economic repercussions if they break alignment with Washington, especially in trade negotiations and financial markets.’ This seems doubly contradictory. My initial question concerned the apparent decision of Europeans to side with Ukraine against the US, which presumably means breaking the alignment. But it’s also contradictory in the sense that assuming the burden of a continued war with Russia is unlikely to accelerate military integration, which can only be reasonably achieved if there is no active war taking place.

Do you agree that those contradictions would seem to limit the margin of maneuver of Europe, especially given that there are serious divisions among the European nations?”

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.

[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51�Թ�, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial��policy.

The post Outside the Box: Delirium in the Oval Office, Part 1 appeared first on 51�Թ�.

US President Donald Trump promised to end the war in Ukraine if he was reelected. On February 12, he started to make good on that promise by holding a 90-minute call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom former President Joe Biden had refused to talk to since the war began. They agreed that they were ready to begin “immediately.” Trump then called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and spent an hour discussing the conditions for what Zelenskyy called a “lasting and reliable peace.”

At the same time, the new US Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, Trump’s new policy in more detail at a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. “The bloodshed must stop. And this war must end,” he said.

Trump’s plan for Ukrainian peace

There are two parts to the new policy that Hegseth . First, he said that Trump “intends to end this war by diplomacy and bringing both Russia and Ukraine to the table.” Second, he said that the US is handing off the prime responsibility for arming Ukraine and guaranteeing its future security to the European members of NATO.

Assigning Europe the role of security guarantor is a transparent move to shield the US from ongoing responsibility for a war that it played a major role in and by scuttling previous negotiations. If the Europeans will not accept their assigned role in Trump’s plan, or Zelenskyy or Putin reject it, the US may yet have to play a larger role in security guarantees for Ukraine than Trump or many Americans would like. Zelenskyy on February 11 that, for Ukraine, “Security guarantees without America are not real security guarantees.”

After peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in April 2022, the Biden administration peace talks over Ukraine for nearly three years. Biden insisted that Ukraine must recover all of its internationally recognized territory, including the Crimea and Donbas regions that from Ukraine after the in Kyiv in 2014.

Hegseth opened the door to peace by clearly and honestly telling America’s European allies, “…we must start by recognizing that returning to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective. Chasing this illusionary goal will only prolong the war and cause more suffering.”

Spelling out the US in more detail, Hegseth went on: “A durable peace for Ukraine must include robust security guarantees to ensure that the war will not begin again. This must not be Minsk 3.0. That said, the United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement. Instead any security guarantee must be backed by capable European and non-European troops.”

NATO membership for Ukraine has always been totally unacceptable to the Russians. Trump and Hegseth’s forthrightness in finally pulling the plug, after the US has NATO membership in front of successive Ukrainian governments since 2008, marks a critical recognition that neutrality offers the best chance for Ukraine to coexist with Russia and the West without being a battleground between them.

Trump and Hegseth expect Europe to assume prime responsibility for Ukraine, while the Pentagon will instead focus on Trump’s two main priorities: on the domestic front, deporting immigrants, and on the international front, confronting China. Hegseth justified this as “a division of labor that maximizes our comparative advantages in Europe and the Pacific respectively.”

Elaborating on the role the US plan demands of its European allies, Hegseth explained, “If these troops are deployed as peacekeepers to Ukraine at any point, they should be deployed as part of a non-NATO mission. And they should not be covered under Article 5. There also must be robust international oversight of the line of contact. To be clear, as part of any security guarantee, there will not be U.S. troops deployed to Ukraine… Safeguarding European security must be an imperative for European members of NATO. As part of this Europe must provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine.”

To say that US forces will never fight alongside European forces in Ukraine, and that Article 5, the mutual defense commitment in the NATO Charter, will not apply to European forces in Ukraine, is to go a step farther than simply denying NATO membership to Ukraine. It carves out Ukraine as an exclusion zone where the NATO Charter no longer applies, even to NATO members.

Russia’s expected response

While Trump plans to negotiate directly with Russia and Ukraine, the vulnerable position in which his plan would place European NATO members means that they, too, will want a significant say in the peace negotiations. They will probably demand a US role in Ukraine’s security guarantees. So Trump’s effort to insulate the US from the consequences of its actions in Ukraine may be a dead letter before he even sits down to negotiate with Russia and Ukraine.

Hegseth’s reference to the highlights the similarities between Trump’s plans and those agreements in 2014 and 2015, which largely the peace in Eastern Ukraine from then until 2022. Western leaders have since that they always intended to use the relative peace created by the Minsk Accords to build up Ukraine militarily, so that it could eventually recover Donetsk and Luhansk by force, instead of granting them the autonomous status agreed to in the Accords.

Russia will surely insist on provisions that prevent the West from using a new peace accord in the same way. It likely won’t agree to substantial Western military forces or bases in Ukraine as part of Ukraine’s security guarantees. President Putin has always insisted that a Ukraine is essential to lasting peace.

European concerns and American backlash

There is, predictably, an element of “having their cake and eating it too” in Trump and Hegseth’s proposals. Even if the Europeans take over most of the responsibility for guaranteeing Ukraine’s future security, and the US has no Article 5 obligation to support them. The US would retain its substantial command and control position over Europe’s armed forces through NATO. Trump is still demanding that its European members increase their military spending to 5% of GDP, far more than the US spends on its bloated, wasteful and war machine.

Biden was ready to Russia “to the last Ukrainian,” as retired US diplomat Chas Freeman said in March 2022, and to US weapons companies with rivers of Ukrainian blood. Is Trump now preparing to fight Russia to the last British, French, German or Polish soldier too if his peace plan fails?

Trump’s call with Putin and Hegseth’s concessions on NATO and Ukraine’s territorial integrity many European leaders reeling. They complained that the US was making concessions behind their backs, that these issues should have been left to the negotiating table and that Ukraine should not be forced to give up on NATO membership.

European NATO members have legitimate concerns to work out with the new US administration. But Trump and Hegseth are right to finally and honestly tell Ukraine that it will not become a NATO member, to dispel this tragic mirage and let it move on to a neutral and more peaceful future.

There has also been a backlash from Republican . Meanwhile, the Democrats, who have been united as the party of war when it comes to Ukraine, will likely try to sabotage Trump’s efforts. On the other hand, maybe a few brave Democrats will recognize this as a chance to reclaim their party’s lost heritage as the more dovish of the US’s two legacy parties, and to provide desperately-needed, new progressive foreign policy leadership in Congress.

We should embrace Trump’s peace initiative — and demand more

On both sides of the Atlantic, Trump’s initiative is a gamechanger. It is a new chance for peace that the US and its allies should embrace, even as they work out their respective responsibilities to provide security guarantees for Ukraine. It is also a time for Europe to realize that it can’t just mimic US foreign policy and expect US protection in return. Europe’s difficult relationship with Trump’s America may lead to a new modus operandi and a reevaluation (or maybe even the end?) of NATO.

Those of us anxious to see peace in Ukraine should applaud Trump’s initiative. But we should also highlight the glaring contradictions of a president who finds the killing in Ukraine unacceptable but, in the of Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, the genocide in Palestine.

Given that most of the casualties in Ukraine are soldiers, while most of the maimed and killed in Palestine are civilians — including thousands of children — the compassionate, humanitarian case for peace is even stronger in Palestine than in Ukraine. So why is Trump committed to stopping the killing in Ukraine but not in Gaza? Is it because Trump is so wedded to Israel that he refuses to rein in its slaughter? Or is it just that Ukrainians and Russians are white and European, while Palestinians are not?

If Trump can reject the political arguments that have fueled three years of war in Ukraine and apply compassion and common sense to end that war, then he can surely do the same in the Middle East.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial��policy.

The post Trump Gives Peace a Chance in Ukraine appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The obvious answer is the media. But few people in the United States the media these days. Surely, in a democracy “of the people, by the people and for the people,” there will be a few scoundrels who make their way into government, but we can assume that the majority merits our confidence. Well, according to a Pew titled, “Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024,” the current of trust has fallen to 22%.

December 2024 offers us a vision of exacerbated tensions in various parts of the globe. At such moments, we expect our leaders to speak with some degree of honesty. Especially when the stakes are high and decisions become a matter of life or death. We accept that some things must remain secret. But the democratic principle implies an effort on the part of our governments to offer a minimum of clarity concerning the facts and their intentions.

Alas, the duty of obscurity seems to have replaced the ideal of clarity as the norm. Clever government officials have good reasons to justify their brazen stonewalling. First, national security requires concealing one’s true intentions. After all, if revealed, the enemy will profit. Then there is the fact that in any situation of conflict, we should accept the reality of the “fog of war,” a concept erroneously but persistently to Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz by commentators, some of whose brains may be subjected to a permanent fog.

What are US presidents for if not guiding the nation towards an understanding of the truth? In August 2023, US President Joe Biden informed us that “Putin has already lost the war” in Ukraine. An obvious fact. The truth teller now the recent history of US policy towards Syria. “Over the past four years, my administration pursued a clear and principled policy toward Syria. First, we made clear from the start sanctions on Assad would remain in place unless he engaged seriously in a political process to end the civil war.”

�մǻ岹��’s 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Principled policy:

A course of action relentlessly pursued thanks to the capacity of some people in a position of authority to persistently ignore surrounding reality.

Contextual note

Biden uses two epithets, “clear” and “principled,” to describe his policy. The word “clear” is certainly the most overused word by any spokesperson for the White House or State Department. At briefing sessions with personalities such as the White House’s Karine Jean-Pierre and the State Department’s Matthew Miller, whenever a journalist poses embarrassing questions that highlight potential ambiguity or equivocation with regard to the “noble” principles that guide US actions, they respond with the formula, “We have been very clear about…” In one random example, the press briefing session of March 27, 2024, Max Miller crafted this litany of:

• So we have been very clear about this matter.
• So we have made that quite clear to them.
• So I will say that we have a fundamental disagreement with the Israeli Government over this issue, and we have made that quite clear.
• … we will continue to be clear about what we think about these actions.
• …we have made clear that we believe that allegations of genocide are unfounded.
• …we have made clear that the United States is not going to send any troops to Ukraine.
• And I think it’s clear that these claims are categorically false. (this was a response to the claim that the US created ISIS.)
• …and we’ll make the same thing clear privately.
• …we have made clear since the outset of this administration that the promotion of democracy is one of the top priorities for the President.
• So we continue to make clear in our conversations with the Government of Bangladesh… that we wanted to see free and fair elections and we will continue to support free, full, open democracy in Bangladesh.
• So we have been very clear about this matter. We’ve been unequivocal. (This concerned the fact that “Ben-Gvir’s coalition would be annexing additional land in the Jordan Valley.”)
• So we have made that quite clear to them. We’ve been very direct and candid about it in our conversations with them. (On the same topic of land seizures.)

This obsessively repeated verbal tic brings home the point that “being clear” means quite simply: “Whatever we say must be accepted as truth.” As for the “principled policy” Biden cited, his logic consists of announcing a simple principle — that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad must be removed from office — and never deviating from it. Even if circumstances change, and even if hundreds of thousands of people may die or be displaced as a result of clinging to that principle.

Biden has already vowed to support the new Syrian government. Some may find this a bit strange. At this point, nobody has even a vague idea about what the new government will look like. On principle, can the US support it? What if it turns out to be a Wahhabi terrorist government, fulfilling its leader’s initial allegiance? Moreover, Syrian Head of State Abu Mohammed al-Joulani still has a $10 million bounty on his head because the US branded him a terrorist. Does Joulani’s success in overthrowing a dictator, Assad, automatically mean that democracy is on its way? Biden might profitably consult the the poem, “The Great Day” by the Irish poet, William Butler Yeats::

“Hurrah for revolution and more cannon-shot!
A beggar upon horseback lashes a beggar on foot.
Hurrah for revolution and cannon come again!
The beggars have changed places, but the lash goes on.”

Substitute “regime change” for “revolution” and Yeats has defined the principle that defines at least 50% of US foreign policy. In the meantime, Biden and his good friend, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are providing “more cannon-shot.” Within a day of the announced liberation of Syria, the US and Israel conducted multiple bombing raids on the military infrastructure and other threatening elements within a country that is rife with threatening elements. Can anyone seriously doubt that the lash will go on?

Anyone struggling with the question of which “clear principles” to apply to a dramatic situation in which multiple interests both converge and diverge would do well to follow Caitlin Johnstone’s. “I personally don’t blame people for misunderstanding what’s been happening in Syria all these years. Some of my favorite analysts got Syria wrong in the early years of the war. It’s a complicated issue. It’s hard to sort out the true from the false, and it’s hard to sort through the moral complexities and contradictions of it all as a human being. What matters is that you stay curious and open and sincerely dedicated to learning what’s true instead of bedding down and making an identity out of your current understanding.”

Johnstone’s wisdom tallies with the advice our fictional journalist and his AI assistant are intent on following in the video above.

Historical note

As US President Barack Obama’s vice president and then as president, Joe Biden has been associated with the framing and enforcing of the principles he claims to be at the core of US policy with regard to Syria.

But what are those principles? In 2015, The Guardian that the most obvious one has been to ignore any initiative aiming at peace and mutual security, especially if the initiative comes from Russia.

The Guardian was clear. “Russia proposed more than three years ago that Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, could step down as part of a peace deal, according to a senior negotiator involved in back-channel discussions at the time. Former Finnish president and Nobel peace prize laureate Martti Ahtisaari said western powers failed to seize on the proposal. Since it was made, in 2012, tens of thousands of people have been killed and millions uprooted, causing the world’s gravest refugee crisis since the second world war.”

Biden’s principles are clear. He once again demonstrated that clarity in December 2021 when he to consider security arrangements Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed that could have avoided an invasion and a prolonged war in Ukraine, in which an estimated one million people have died. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson applied the same principle when he instructed the Ukrainians not to sign a peace treaty in April 2022.

During a 2015 television interview, Former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas how his British friends told him they were planning to overthrow Assad because the “Syrian regime said things that were anti-Israeli.” Another case of applying a principle, this time by British allies of the US.

These cases illustrate what has become clear as far as principles are concerned. Negotiation and diplomacy can never replace kinetic action, whatever the eventual cost. The principle of regime change for Syria has already been in place for 12 years. It has finally succeeded. Just as it had in Iraq and Libya and even in Afghanistan in 2001.

One may legitimately ask, is it more about principle or about interest?

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

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The small former Soviet country, sandwiched between the European Union and Russia has to strengthen its state institutions if it is to stand any chance against the hybrid war Putin has been insidiously carrying out throughout Eastern Europe.

After winning reelection in a November 3 runoff vote, President Maia Sandu has now an even harder battle ahead that she cannot lose: renewing and changing a .��

Why a strong justice system is a must

The age of conventional warfare is long gone. Hybrid attacks now represent the norm. Having a strong military is nothing without strong institutions capable of counteracting covert threats. Informational warfare, fake news, manipulation, vote-buying, bribing and acts of corruption are all far more insidious and capable of subduing a state’s defense than foreign garrisons threatening to invade. Here is where a functioning justice system should steps in, properly prosecuting those endangering the country’s security.

Without strong institutions, Moldova will be vulnerable to Russian attacks from within, especially with an unreformed judiciary by corruption and interference.

Furthermore, justice reform has to happen for Moldova to have a clear path for EU integration. The fight against corruption is non-negotiable if the Republic of Moldova wants to join the European Union.

If Moldovans lose trust in the system Putin wins. The justice system needs tough reform, needs skilled and determined leadership that can rebuild trust and show that everyone is equally responsible before the law. Next year in September Moldova will hold Parliamentary elections which will test how much people really trust the country’s leadership. That means Sandu and her administration in Chisinau have less than one year to deliver on the campaign promise of zero corruption and an overhaul of the justice system.

The judicial system – Moldova’s Achilles heel

Ex-communist states have always struggled to reform their justice systems. For Moldova in particular, renewing it is as complex as it necessary. Sandu herself admitted in a televised presidential debate last month that the promised judicial reform had been slow and vowed such measures would be more efficient in the future.

and uneven judicial practices are hurting the system. One of the most jarring such dysfunctions is the 2014 banking fraud, which saw over a billion dollars disappear from Moldova’s financial system without any top officials being held accountable.

of Moldovan citizens backing EU accession consider that justice reform is an absolute must. tasked with making sure judges and anti-corruption prosecutors do their job are lagging behind.

In the wake of the presidential election last month, Moldova’s chief of Police Viorel Cernăuțeanu said that there’s significant proof Russia is bribes, hybrid warfare and disinformation, the likes of which Moldova has never seen before, in its push to sway the public opinion. have shown how oligarchs had been involved in and illegal financing of political parties backed by the Kremlin.��

Failure to act by relevant anti-corruption judicial institutions has given pro-Russian groups leeway to jeopardize the election process. Sandu after the latest meeting of the Moldovan security council that the justice system needs to be reformed as Moldova continues to be exposed to the Russian hybrid threat.��

What can Moldova’s European allies do to help

Brussels needs to support and encourage strong and tough reforms needed to modernize Moldova’s judiciary.

Last year, the EU Parliament approved a for Moldova aimed among other things at justice reform. Member of European Parliament (MEP) Markéta Gregorova from the Greens group said that only by making Moldova’s institutions less vulnerable can we spare the country from becoming the next Ukraine. Additionally, Romanian MEP Rareş Bogdan spearheaded an initiative in the European Parliament to secure €45 million (about $47.5 million) to help combat disinformation in Moldova, disinformation which also might influence judicial proceedings. Backing Moldova’s EU accession, Cristian Terhes, another Romanian MEP, believes that once Russia regains control over the Moldovan administration, it will be difficult to remove. That is why a reform of the justice system in the Republic of Moldova allows for a strengthening of the institutions and a better capacity to face the hybrid war waged��by��Russia.

Sandu needs all the help she can get to combat corruption. A overarching change within the system is critical with no time to waste. Much hangs on a successful reform of the judicial system, not least the European future of Moldova and the safety of its citizens.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Let us review the agenda. The number one problem in the world today, and Trump’s greatest threat, is the climate crisis, which is accelerating its destructive consequences. Trump will undoubtedly promote fossil production, but the Environmental Protection Agency will maintain the protective and preventive regulations established over the past few years, 12 states will continue to apply restrictions on emissions, and large cities will continue to spread renewable energy.

Regarding immigration, this time Trump did not insist on the wall (most of which he while he was last in the White House). In this campaign, he turned to “mass deportations,” which can mean common-sense controls to cross the border, as already agreed with the Mexican government regarding non-Mexicans, or an illusory hunt for individuals without proper documents in neighborhoods, workplaces and family homes, which would not only be savage but logistically unfeasible. In reality, it is to be hoped that Congress will reactivate the bipartisan agreement for immigrants’ legalization and access to citizenship that Trump ordered to be stopped not because of its content but because it would have been approved during the campaign and would have taken away his favorite topic for demagoguery.

As for Israel and Palestine, the biggest problem is that Trump is now prioritizing enmity with Iran, which finances and pushes Hamas and Hezbollah and whose agents tried to assassinate him twice (or perhaps thrice). He will have a hard time resurrecting the Abraham Accords that his Jewish son-in-law negotiated during his first term: exploring again the two-state solution in exchange for diplomatic recognition of Israel by Arab countries. Now, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will only accept it if Trump diminishes his hostility against Iran, where a “reformist” candidate won the presidential election and seems to have appeased the fury.

Regarding Ukraine, Trump boasted that he would “fix it in 24 hours,” but was not very specific. Two days after the election, at the Valdai Forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin rushed to a peace agreement based on the “self-determination” of the people of Donbas in exchange for respecting Ukraine’s borders. Putin also that Russia could restore natural gas supplies through the Baltic to Germany, which Ukrainian agents . A Trump adviser has a plan to defend Ukraine’s neutrality outside NATO for the next twenty years. All this sounds similar to the Minsk Agreements reached a few years ago by Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, which US President Barack Obama ignored.

In the face of Trump’s disdain, the European Union may reinforce internal solidity and external autonomy. Many NATO members are already ceasing to be free-riders on the United States and are fulfilling their commitment to invest at least 2% of GDP in defense. Their number has risen from four to 23 in just six years.

The biggest alarm raised by Trump’s election is that the future of democracy and legal security in the United States may be in jeopardy. Will there be “revenge” against “internal enemies,” and will he go after politicians, judges, generals, officials, journalists and other opponents? He may not need to once the pending court cases are canceled and he has satisfied his obsession with returning to power. The Senate Republican group has already rejected Trump’s nominee to lead it, and the Senate can veto some of his announced appointees. It is worth remembering that in his first term, Trump appointed three Chiefs of Staff in four years and changed most members of the Cabinet, including State, Defense, Justice, Interior and Homeland Security, a tenor of personal instability that is likely to continue.

Some of Trump’s boasts may end in a major ridicule, such as ordering Elon Musk to cut a third of the budget. Incompetence could also sink him in the face of some unforeseen catastrophe, as happened to during US President George Bush’s second term with Hurricane Katrina and to himself with the COVID-19 pandemic. Will Trump be able to maintain a regular daily work schedule in his eighties, or will he, like Joe Biden, be busy only from 10 AM to 4 PM? It is not guaranteed that he will complete four years in good shape.

Ultimately, Trump could also become a chaotic parody of the befuddled White House visitor in the film (1979). As Mister Chance says, “I can’t write. I can’t read. But I like to watch television.” Just like Donald the Returned.

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To make that forecast, the historian conducted what he called “a more realistic assessment of domestic and global trends.” Starting with the global context, he argued that, “faced with a fading superpower,” China, India, Iran, and Russia would all start to “provocatively challenge U.S. dominion over the oceans, space, and cyberspace.” At home in the US, domestic divisions would “widen into violent clashes and divisive debates… Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair, a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal.” That historian concluded, “the world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.”

Now that a “far-right patriot,” one President-elect Donald Trump, has indeed captured (or rather recaptured) the presidency “with thundering rhetoric,” let’s explore the likelihood that a second Trump term in office, starting in the fateful year 2025, might actually bring a hasty end, silent or otherwise, to an “American Century” of global dominion.

Making the original prediction

Let’s begin by examining the reasoning underlying my original prediction. (Yes, I was the historian.) Back in 2010, when I picked a specific date for a rising tide of US decline, this country looked unassailably strong both at home and abroad. President Barack Obama’s administration was producing a “post-racial” society. After recovering from the 2008 financial crisis, the US was on track for a decade of dynamic growth — the auto industry saved, oil and gas production booming, the tech sector thriving, the stock market soaring and employment solid. Internationally, Washington was the world’s preeminent leader, with an unchallenged military, formidable diplomatic clout, unchecked economic globalization and its democratic governance still the global norm.

Looking forward, leading historians of the empire agreed that the US would remain the world’s sole superpower for the foreseeable future. Writing in the Financial Times in 2002, Yale professor Paul Kennedy, author of a widely-read book on imperial decline, that “America’s array of force is staggering,” with a mix of economic, diplomatic and technological dominance that made it the globe’s “single superpower” without peer in the entire history of the world. Russia’s defense budget had “collapsed” and its economy was “less than that of the Netherlands.” Should China’s high growth rates continue for another 30 years, it “might be a serious challenger to U.S. predominance” — but that wouldn’t be true until 2032, if then. While the US’s “unipolar moment” would surely not “continue for centuries,” its end, he predicted, “seems a long way off for now.”

Writing in a similar vein in The New York Times in February 2010, Piers Brendon, a historian of Britain’s imperial decline, the “doom mongers” who “conjure with Roman and British analogies in order to trace the decay of American hegemony.” While Rome was riven by “internecine strife” and Britain ran its empire on a shoestring budget, the US was “constitutionally stable” with “an enormous industrial base.” Taking a few “relatively simple steps,” he concluded, Washington should be able to overcome current budgetary problems and perpetuate its global power indefinitely.

When I made my very different prediction nine months later, I was coordinating a of 140 historians from universities on three continents who were studying the decline of earlier empires — particularly those of Britain, France and Spain. Beneath the surface of this country’s seeming strength, we could already see the telltale signs of decline that had led to the collapse of those earlier empires.

By 2010, economic globalization was cutting good-paying factory jobs here, income inequality was widening and corporate bailouts were booming — all essential ingredients for rising working-class resentment and deepening domestic divisions. Foolhardy military misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, pushed by Washington elites trying to deny any sense of decline, stoked simmering anger among ordinary US citizens, slowly discrediting the very idea of international commitments. And the erosion of the US’s relative economic strength from half the world’s output in 1950 to a quarter in 2010 meant the wherewithal for its unipolar power was fading fast.

Only a “near-peer” competitor was needed to turn that attenuating US global hegemony into accelerating imperial decline. With rapid economic growth, a vast population and the world’s longest imperial tradition, China seemed primed to become just such a country. But back then, Washington’s foreign policy elites thought not and even admitted China to the World Trade Organization (WTO), that “U.S. power and hegemony could readily mold China to the United States’ liking.”

Our group of historians, mindful of the frequent imperial wars fought when near-peer competitors finally confronted the reigning hegemon of their moment — think Germany vs Great Britain in World War I — expected China’s challenge would not be long in coming. Indeed, in 2012, just two years after my prediction, the US National Intelligence Council that “China alone will probably have the largest economy, surpassing that of the United States a few years before 2030” and this country would no longer be “a hegemonic power.”

Just a year later, Chinese President Xi Jinping, drawing on a massive in foreign-exchange reserves accumulated in the decade after joining the WTO, announced his bid for global power. This would come in the form of what he called “the ,” history’s largest development program. It was designed to make Beijing the center of the global economy.

In the following decade, the US–China rivalry would become so intense that, last September, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall : “I’ve been closely watching the evolution of [China’s] military for 15 years. China is not a future threat; China is a threat today.”

The global rise of the strongman

Another major setback for Washington’s world order, long legitimated by its promotion of democracy (whatever its own dominating tendencies), came from the rise of populist strongmen worldwide. Consider them part of a nationalist reaction to the West’s aggressive economic globalization.

At the close of the Cold War in 1991, Washington became the planet’s sole superpower, using its hegemony to forcefully promote a wide-open global economy — forming the in 1995, pressing open-market “” on developing economies and knocking down tariff barriers worldwide. It also built a global communications grid by 700,000 miles of fiber-optic submarine cables and then 1,300 satellites (now 4,700).

By exploiting that very globalized economy, however, China’s soared to $3.2 trillion by 2016, surpassing both the US and Japan, while simultaneously 2.4 million US jobs between 1999 and 2011, ensuring the closure of factories in countless towns across the South and Midwest. By fraying social safety nets while eroding protection for labor unions and local businesses in both the US and Europe, globalization reduced the quality of life for many, while creating inequality on a staggering scale and stoking a working-class reaction that would crest in a global wave of angry populism.

Riding that wave, right-wing populists have been winning a steady succession of elections — in Russia in 2000, Israel in 2009, Hungary in 2010, China in 2012, Turkey in 2014, the Philippines and the US in 2016, Brazil in 2018, Italy in 2022, the Netherlands in 2023, Indonesia and the US again in 2024.

Set aside their incendiary us-vs-them rhetoric, however, and look at their actual achievements and those right-wing demagogues turn out to have a record that can only be described as dismal. In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro the vast Amazon rainforest and left office amid an . In Russia, President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, his country’s economy to capture some more land (which it hardly lacked). In Turkey, President Recep Erdoğan caused a crippling , while 50,000 suspected opponents. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte 30,000 suspected drug users and China by giving up his country’s claims in the resource-rich South China Sea. In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has wreaked havoc on Gaza and neighboring lands, in part to in office and stay out of prison.

Prospects for Donald Trump’s second term

After the steady erosion of its global power for several decades, the US is no longer the — or perhaps even an — “exceptional” nation floating above the deep global currents that shape the politics of most countries. And as it has become more of an ordinary country, it has also felt the full force of the worldwide move toward strongman rule. Not only does that global trend help explain Trump’s election and his recent re-election, but it provides some clues as to what he’s likely to do with that office the second time around.

In the globalized world the US made, there is now an intimate interaction between domestic and international policy. That will soon be apparent in a second Trump administration whose policies are likely to simultaneously damage the country’s economy and further degrade Washington’s world leadership.

Let’s start with the clearest of his commitments: environmental policy. During the recent election campaign, Trump climate change “a scam” and his transition team has already drawn up to exit from the Paris climate accords. By quitting that agreement, the US will abdicate any leadership role when it comes to the most consequential issue facing the international community while reducing pressure on China to curb its greenhouse gas emissions. Since these two countries now account for (45%) of global carbon emissions, such a move will ensure that the world blows past the target of keeping this planet’s temperature rise to C until the end of the century. Instead, on a planet that’s already had 12 recent of just such a temperature rise, that mark is expected to be permanently reached by perhaps 2029. That is the year Trump finishes his second term.

On the domestic side of climate policy, Trump last September that he would “terminate the Green New Deal, which I call the Green New Scam, and rescind all unspent funds under the misnamed Inflation Reduction Act.” On the day after his election, he committed himself to increasing the country’s oil and gas production, a celebratory crowd, “We have more liquid gold than any country in the world.” He will undoubtedly also wind farm leases on Federal lands and the $7,500 tax credit for purchasing an electrical vehicle.

As the world shifts to renewable energy and all-electric vehicles, Trump’s policies will undoubtedly do lasting damage to the US economy. In 2023, the International Renewable Energy Agency that, amid continuing price decreases, wind and solar power now generate electricity for less than half the cost of fossil fuels. Any attempt to slow the conversion of this country’s utilities to the most cost-effective form of energy runs a serious risk of ensuring that US-made products will be ever less competitive.

To put it bluntly, he seems to be proposing that electricity users here should pay twice as much for their power as those in other advanced nations. Similarly, as relentless engineering innovation makes electric vehicles cheaper and more reliable than petroleum-powered ones, attempting to slow such an energy transition is likely to make the US automotive industry uncompetitive at home and abroad.

Calling tariffs “the greatest thing ever invented,” Trump has slapping a 20% duty on all foreign goods and 60% on those from China. In another instance of domestic–foreign synergy, such duties will undoubtedly end up crippling US farm exports, thanks to retaliatory overseas tariffs. Simultaneously, it will dramatically raise the cost of consumer goods for US citizens, stoking inflation and slowing consumer spending.

Reflecting his to alliances and military commitments, Trump’s first foreign policy initiative will likely be an attempt to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. During a CNN town hall meeting in May 2023, he he could stop the fighting “in 24 hours.” Last July, he : “I would tell [Ukrainian President] Zelenskyy, no more. You got to make a deal.”

Just two days after the November 5 election, Trump reportedly Putin over a phone call “not to escalate the war in Ukraine and reminded him of Washington’s sizable military presence in Europe.” Drawing on sources inside the Trump transition team, the Wall Street Journal that the new administration is considering “cementing Russia’s seizure of 20% of Ukraine” and forcing Kyiv to forego its bid to join NATO, perhaps for as long as 20 years.

With Russia drained of manpower and its economy pummeled by three years of bloody warfare, a competent negotiator — should Trump actually appoint one — might indeed be able to bring a tenuous peace to a ravaged Ukraine. Since it has been Europe’s frontline of defense against a revanchist Russia, the continent’s major powers would be expected to play a . But Germany’s coalition government has just collapsed; French President Emmanuel Macron is crippled by recent electoral reverses and the NATO alliance, after three years of a shared commitment to Ukraine, faces real uncertainty with the advent of a Trump presidency.

US allies

Those impending negotiations over Ukraine highlight the paramount importance of alliances for US global power. For 80 years, from World War II through the Cold War and beyond, Washington relied on bilateral and multilateral alliances as a critical force multiplier. With China and Russia both rearmed and increasingly closely aligned, reliable allies have become even more important to maintaining Washington’s global presence. With 32 member nations representing a billion people and a commitment to mutual defense that has lasted 75 years, NATO is arguably the most powerful military alliance in modern history.

Yet Trump has long been sharply critical of it. As a candidate in 2016, he the alliance “obsolete.” As president, he mocked the treaty’s mutual-defense clause, even “tiny” Montenegro could drag the US into war. While campaigning last February, he that he would tell Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to a NATO ally that didn’t pay what he considered its fair share.

Right after Trump’s election, caught between what one analyst “an aggressively advancing Russia and an aggressively withdrawing America,” Macron insisted that the continent needed to be a “more united, stronger, more sovereign Europe in this new context.” Even if the new administration doesn’t formally withdraw from NATO, Trump’s repeated hostility, particularly toward its crucial mutual-defense clause, may yet serve to eviscerate the alliance.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the US presence rests on three sets of overlapping alliances: the entente with Australia and Britain; the with Australia, India and Japan and a chain of bilateral defense pacts stretching along the Pacific littoral from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Via careful diplomacy, the administration US President Joe Biden those alliances, bringing two wayward allies, Australia and the Philippines that had drifted Beijing-wards, back into the Western fold. Trump’s penchant for abusing allies and, as in his first term, from multilateral pacts is likely to weaken such ties and so US power in the region.

Although his first administration famously waged a trade war with Beijing, Trump’s attitude toward the island of Taiwan is bluntly transactional. “I think, Taiwan should pay us for defense,” he in June, adding: “You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.” In October, he the Wall Street Journal that he would not have to use military force to defend Taiwan because Xi “respects me and he knows I’m f—— crazy.” Bluster aside, Trump, unlike Biden, has never committed himself to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack.

Should Beijing indeed attack Taiwan outright or, as appears more likely, impose a crippling on the island, Trump seems unlikely to risk a war with China. The loss of Taiwan would break the US position along the Pacific littoral, which for 80 years has been the fulcrum of its global imperial posture. This would push its naval forces back to a “second island chain” running from Japan to Guam. Such a retreat would represent a major blow to the US’s imperial role in the Pacific, potentially making it no longer a significant player in the security of its Asia-Pacific allies.

A silent US recessional

Adding up the likely impact of Trump’s policies in this country, Asia, Europe and the international community generally, his second term will almost certainly be one of imperial decline, increasing internal chaos and a further loss of global leadership. As “respect for American authority” fades, Trump may yet resort to “threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal.” But as I predicted back in 2010, it seems quite likely that “the world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.”

[ first published this piece.]

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Erdoğan aims to maintain his international standing and address domestic pressures, both of which were bolstered by the deal’s initial success. Reviving it would also demonstrate Turkey’s diplomatic finesse as it navigates complex alliances between Russia and NATO.

The Black Sea’s fragile lifeline

Russia’s control of Ukrainian Black Sea ports during the war a global food crisis. The July 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) a precarious solution, allowing Ukrainian grain exports to resume. In exchange, the UN pledged to facilitate Russian agricultural exports hampered by Western sanctions.

However, the deal’s fate remained precarious. Russia’s suspension shattered hopes of stability. The nation threatened the Black Sea as a potential warzone and demanded relaxed sanctions. Simultaneously, Russian forces maintained their on Ukrainian ports through missile and drone strikes. They escalated the threat by declaring all vessels in the Black Sea as potential military . In response, Ukraine a humanitarian corridor along the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria, albeit at the cost of increased expense and travel time.

Putin’s conditional offer for revival — full removal of restrictions on Russian agricultural exports — with skepticism. Though Western critics identify Russia’s withdrawal as a contributor to the food crisis, Putin countered them by asserting that the issue had deeper roots. Putin the West for the global food crisis and denies responsibility for the grain deal collapse.

Despite the cautious optimism spurred by UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ proposal, the BSGI remains entangled in an intractable impasse. His proposal, which included for a subsidiary of Russia’s Agricultural Bank, aimed to address Russia’s concerns. It did not suffice. Negotiations have yielded no significant breakthroughs, leaving the precarious lifeline for global food security suspended in limbo. The ramifications of this stagnation are stark: A deepening global food threatens famine in vulnerable regions, while rising food prices further strain already burdened economies.

Deflecting dissent with diplomacy: Erdoğan’s high-stakes of BSGI

The BSGI garnered Erdoğan considerable international acclaim. A Pew Research Center conducted across 17 countries revealed that 67% viewed Turkey’s role in the deal positively. However, this past acclaim faces the countervailing pressure of recent UN Security Council stemming from clashes in Cyprus. The Council highlighted rising regional tensions while condemning an assault by Turkish Cypriot security forces on UN Peacekeeping Force members. This criticism underscores the urgency for Erdoğan to secure a diplomatic win, a potential avenue offered by reviving the BSGI.

Reviving the grain deal could boost Erdoğan’s image by countering criticism and showcasing his dedication to dialogue, cooperation and global food security. This aligns perfectly with Turkey’s role as a guarantor power in Cyprus and its support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. It would not only solidify past success but also propel Erdoğan back into the international spotlight.

Domestically, Turkey faces economic challenges, with inflation 64% in January 2024. This has eroded the purchasing power and living standards of millions of Turks, especially the working and lower middle classes who form the core of Erdoğan’s support base. The high inflation has also come with a weak currency, a large current account deficit, a low level of foreign exchange reserves and a high level of external debt.

These economic woes have taken a toll on Erdoğan’s popularity and approval ratings, which below 40%. Erdoğan, who has been in power since 2003, faces a formidable challenge from a united opposition bloc. The opposition has Erdoğan of mismanaging the economy, undermining democracy, violating human rights and pursuing an adventurous foreign policy. Erdoğan has dismissed these criticisms as part of a foreign-backed conspiracy to overthrow him and weaken Turkey.

A successful revival of the grain deal with Russia could deflect attention from these domestic issues and potentially boost Erdoğan’s domestic standing. He could claim that he has delivered a diplomatic victory for Turkey and its allies and secured the country’s food security and economic interests. He could also argue that he has restored Turkey’s regional role and influence. 

NATO, neutrality and the S-400: Can Erdoğan reconcile alliance commitments?

Erdoğan seeks to improve relations with Russia, which are by their divergent interests and interventions in Syria, Libya and the Caucasus. In these three conflicts, Russia and Turkey have backed opposing sides. Russia backs the Assad Regime in Syria, the eastern-based commander in Libya and has a defense pact with Armenia in the Caucasus. Conversely, Turkey backs the rebel groups in Syria, the UN-recognized Government of National Accord in Libya and has close ties with Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. These rivalries create tensions and mistrust between the Turkish and Russian capitals of Ankara and Moscow, respectively, threatening to escalate into wider regional wars.

Erdoğan believes that by engaging in dialogue and cooperation with Russia, he can manage these conflicts and prevent them from spiraling out of control. He hopes to find common ground and mutual benefits with Moscow on other issues, such as trade, energy and security. Erdoğan sees Russia as a potential partner and a counterweight to the West.

However, Turkey’s delicate balancing act between its NATO commitments and its growing partnership with Russia, exemplified by the 2017 of the S-400 missile system, further complicates the situation. The S-400’s incompatibility with NATO systems and possible security threats raise concerns among allies. It led to US warnings as well as potential Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act () sanctions and exclusion from the — a program that leads the international distribution of F-35 Lightning II fighter jets. Erdoğan defends the purchase as a sovereign decision and emphasizes the need for these weapons for Turkey’s defense and autonomy. At the same time, however, he seeks to maintain cordial relations with Russia despite regional differences.

A successful BSGI revival could demonstrate Turkey’s diplomatic prowess and reaffirm its neutrality in the current conflict. This would potentially ease tensions within NATO. Erdoğan could claim he has managed to balance the interests and expectations of both Russia and NATO, without compromising Turkey’s alliance loyalty or strategic autonomy. He could stress that the deal is not aimed at undermining NATO’s cohesion or credibility, but rather at enhancing its security and stability through cooperation.

Leveraging the BSGI for trade, security and global impact

The BSGI transcends its diplomatic significance for Erdoğan and Turkey, presenting a lucrative economic opportunity. By facilitating the transit of Ukrainian grain through the Turkish Straits, the BSGI unlocks new markets for Turkish goods. Particularly, this includes agricultural products that are in high demand internationally. Turkish Statistical Institute data a 12% year-on-year increase in agricultural exports to $25.3 billion in 2022.��

Moreover, the BSGI strengthens Turkey’s ties with key trade partners in Africa and the Middle East. These regions are heavily reliant on Ukrainian grain for food security. International Grains Council data Ukraine’s position as the world’s third-largest wheat and corn exporter; its primary markets include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. These nations have also been among Turkey’s top trading, totalling $32.4 billion in 2022. The BSGI could solidify Turkey’s role as a reliable and strategic partner for these countries, even positioning them as a potential mediator for regional conflicts.

Beyond economics, the BSGI carries humanitarian. It potentially mitigates the global food crisis exacerbated by the Ukraine war. World Bank document disrupted agricultural production and distribution, leading to food shortages, price hikes and rising poverty. Their estimates warn of an additional 263 million people facing food insecurity due to the conflict, impacting not only neighboring countries but also regions across Europe, Asia and Africa. Reviving the BSGI allows Erdoğan to showcase his commitment to global food security efforts, positioning Turkey as a key player in addressing one of the 21st century’s most pressing challenges.

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The trip was a strategic move and a successful one. Russia’s artillery-heavy style of warfare blows through materiel fast, and it needs all of the suppliers it can get, including North Korea. in In the past year, North Korea has supplied Russia with an estimated 5 million artillery shells, which is approximately a year and a half’s worth of war supplies. North Korea also agreed to send a large number of laborers to Russia. 

The trip was also a pointed response to the United States’ reversal of its policy forbidding Ukraine from using US-manufactured weapons to attack Russian territory.

What does the trip say about Russia’s status in the world?

The Russian–North Korean alignment creates further implications for the United States’ tensions with China and the general region in Southeast and Southern Asia. Putin’s trip showed that it is not a “Han tributary” and instead its own power in the region, independent of Chinese influence. It also showed Russia can help the “Global South” acquire resources and support from powerful states without pressure to abide by the democratic and humanitarian norms established by the US.

The important thing for these nations is finding who will fill their gasoline tanks in the most economical way. And the answer, right now, is Russia. If Russia only had principles to offer, these developing nations would not pay too much mind to it. Putin’s trip crystallizes the global normative order Russia is seeking: a transactional model of international relations.

The real winner of this shift is India, with a world-class technological sector and masses of cheap labor, although it will need to “get its act together” as Vietnam is also highly attractive form manufacturing. The loser is China. Even though Beijing also seeks to undo the US-led “normative” international order, on the economic front, it may lose ground to its competitors in the Global South due to its higher labor costs.

In truth, however, Moscow does not have a free hand. Putin’s strategy will be a success only as long as China believes tolerating Russia is preferable to pulling the plug on their relationship. If Chinese President Xi Jinping decides that Putin’s maneuvers create unacceptable problems between China and the US and globally, then China will exert pressure and Russia will have to back down. Russia may be a fortress economy with a formidable supply of fossil fuels, but it cannot do without the economic heft of its much more populous southern neighbor.

At the same time, Russia and China both command a significant amount of soft power. We saw this in the June 2024 Ukraine peace summit held in Bürgenstock, Switzerland: No emerging economy present in the conference sided with Ukraine. In fact, most of the world is sitting back and watching the Russia–Ukraine war because, even three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow still has significant power in the Global South in a way China doesn’t. For its own part, China is locked in a symbiotic relationship with Russia that is much more complicated than simple comparisons of power will suggest.

Handling a troublesome partner will prove to be a thorny task for Xi.

[Lucas Gonçalves wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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If you haven’t taken the time to watch it, I highly recommend that you do. It’s long, breaking two hours, and it is dense. Putin is a man who says one thing and really means five things, and that doesn’t work well in our modern soundbite-and-headline news culture. Still, I urge you to take the time to listen. Putin is not going to convince you of anything — at least I doubt that he will — but I don’t think the point of the interview was to “convince” anyone. In this article, I want to lay out my thoughts on the interview, my thoughts on the wider Russia–Ukraine war and what it really means.

A narrative is just good strategy when you’re playing the game

The title of this present article refers to Swedish video game developer . The company has made a name for itself publishing “grand strategy” games with titles like Crusader Kings and Europa Universalis. These are games where the player assumes control of a historical nation, people or dynasty and crafts the narrative and strategy of that nation, people or dynasty throughout history. I believe that this, in essence, is what Putin is doing now. He’s playing the grand narrative and grand strategy of the Rus’ people, and he’s playing to win.

If you’re aware of the video, you’re almost certainly aware of the various “fact checks” on Putin’s historical claims. Some of the more notable fact-checks on Putin’s historical claims come from reputable historians whom I greatly respect, like .

What I think most fact-checkers miss is that it doesn’t matter whether Putin’s historical claims are historically accurate. Putin is not writing a paper, giving a book report or making a slide deck presentation. He has no judge or teacher who will be giving out a grade. You cannot point out enough inconsistencies or inaccuracies or fabrications that will make Putin say “Drat, I’ve been found out” and order his armies to turn back in shame and go home. That’s not the point of Putin’s historical claims. Putin is establishing a narrative.

What do I mean by “narrative”? Quite simply, and quite directly, I mean that Putin is telling a story to himself, to his country and to us about why he has decided to go to war. A narrative is less about the past than it is about the present — it exists not to explain history but to justify policy. For this reason, a narrative is fundamentally incapable of being fact-checked or falsified.

The US has had its own fair share of narratives, most famously . Many other narratives have also gripped US theory and shaped global aims. The was an American narrative about why America should be responsible for half the globe. The “” was a narrative about justifying American entry into World War II. Much more recently, the “Global War on Terror” was an American narrative about justifying our continual involvement across the planet in pursuit of everyone we decide to label “terrorist.” Domestically, “” is a narrative we’ve concocted to justify the complete upending and reimaging of everything from major sporting events to college admissions to who gets promotions in order to accomplish ideologues’ visions of justice.

What do all of these narratives have in common? The characteristic that fact-checking them is as useful as fact-checking Star Wars or The Lord of the Rings. Pushing your glasses up your nose and saying, “Actually, sweetie, that didn’t happen,” is both futile and entirely beside the point. You can point out all the historical inaccuracies that went into each of those narratives until the cows come home, but it won’t change a single thing that the people who believed in political narratives actually do. Narratives are supplanted by other narratives, not facts, because only nerds care about dry, disconnected facts — real people like stories.

What is the story Putin is telling?

What is Putin’s narrative — the grand story for his grand strategy?

As near as can be ascertained and summarized, Putin’s narrative is, “We are fighting to unite the long-divided lands of the Rus’.” Rus’ are the the ethnos from which “Rus-sia” derives its name, after all.

I don’t want to recap the entire history of the Rus, you may as well watch the interview for that. I’m sure you’ve seen the already about Putin —�� “I’ll give you the thirty-second history, one minute at most,” and then he talks and talks and talks. Still, the real thirty-second recap is quite easy to grasp.

The Rus’ state around the area of Kiev as a unification of various tribes under a Norse aristocracy. The Rus’ then to eastern Christianity and ultimately splintered into various realms under the suzerainty of the Golden Horde. Eventually, one of the more easterly splinter states, centered on , rose to prominence. Moscow agglomerated the lands of the Rus’ back together over long centuries and much war only, for it to all fall apart again in with the Bolsheviks (who Putin does seem to consider devils) and the USSR. The USSR, so the narrative goes, arbitrarily the lands of the Rus into constituent republics under Moscow’s overlordship. This then again in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. (Despite his loathing of the Bolsheviks, Putin sees this as another disaster.) This brings us to today, with Moscow once again trying to agglomerate the lands of the Rus’ under its overlordship.

Why is it important that Putin considers the divisions of the USSR’s constituent republics “arbitrary”? It’s because part of this narrative is that the Ukrainians are not their own people, but are confused and temporarily embarrassed Russians, even if they don’t know it. More precisely, Putin asserts that the Ukrainians are an artificial union of Russians, Poles, Lithuanians and Hungarians, but he mostly just cares about the Russian ones. Putin does not outright state, but seems to strongly imply, that the Ukrainian people should be shown that they truly are this collection and the sub-ethnicities that make up the Ukraine should return to their ethnic states.

If the Ukrainians are not their own people, but are just confused Russians, then bringing them back into the fold of Russia is a corrective action and not an unjust war. That’s why a compelling narrative is important. 

By this point, I’m sure you’re railing not just at historical inaccuracies but at the violation of liberal democratic sensibilities about how states are supposed to act. “How can he just say that they’re not their own people?” I have seen. “That’s ethnic cleansing!” I have also seen. “We just don’t do that anymore,” I have seen again and again. Well, they’re doing it, part of this narratival struggle is that the old, post-1945 order is being deliberately destroyed.

At the risk of comparing apples to oranges, imagine a similar situation in the United States with subnational identities during a hypothetically similar collapse to Russia in 1991. Are you a New Yorker, a Vermonter, a Texan… or are you an American? Am I an Indianan, by my birth, or an Arizonan, by my most long-standing abode, or am I an American first? Does being a New Yorker, a Vermonter, a Texan or an Arizonan mean that the supraethnic American state is not my legitimate sovereign? No, of course not. That’s the narratival argument that Putin is making; that Russia is the supra-Russian sovereign.

How will this narrative play out in Ukraine?

Russia is building a narrative, and that narrative is to justify assertions of political authority and sovereignty. Sovereignty always comes down to force. As Jean V. Dubois, a character from Robert Heinlein’s Starship Troopers, astutely , political authority is force, force is violence, and violence is the supreme authority from which all other authorities are derived. If the narrative exists to serve and justify force, then, what political authority does it seem like Russia really wants to assert with its force? In other words, how does Putin plan to have this war end? 

I think that, ultimately, Ukraine will be completely partitioned. Russia will annex all the lands east of the Dnieper; it already de facto owns approximately half of those lands. As Ukrainian military strength degrades by the minute, it will no longer have the power to keep the Russians at bay behind an artificial boundary. Only the Dniepr, the most prominent natural boundary in Ukraine, will form a plausible barrier to the Russian advance.

After this, the west of the Ukraine will be divided up between Poland, Hungary and Romania. Sound implausible? Ostensibly, of course, the western partitions will not be annexations, and they will likely be done under a fig leaf of humanitarian aid. Still, they will happen all the same. Kiev might retain some authority in a de facto rump state, a sort of West Berlin-esque enclave, but this would be temporary.

I also see Belarusian accession to Russia itself as very likely. You can’t leave one of the lands of the Rus’ disunited after winning a major war over the very question of uniting the lands of the Rus’, now can you? Already, while Belarus is still nominally independent, it is a vassal of Moscow. Few nations, resurging after a collapse like Soviet Russia suffered in the 1990s, would leave such a large portion of their former territory behind. Watch that space.

Looking further ahead, a by no means inevitable, yet plausible outcome for Russia would be a restoration of the tsarist monarchy, under the Romanovs or otherwise. Putin would have all but restored the Russian Empire after a major victory in Ukraine. Spanish Dictator Francisco Franco did it; although he, not the exiled king, held all of the power, he restored the trappings of monarchy to borrow its legitimacy. Now, Franco is gone, yet Spain is still a kingdom. It’s not without precedent, and it is more doable in Russia than a Westerner might assume. Nostalgia for the monarchy remains in the Russian Orthodox Church and among Russians generally. Russia already utilizes the imperial ensign, colors and aquila in multiple places that a republic would be embarrassed to do so. Watch this space, too.

So, what’s the conclusion? Russian feelings don’t care about your facts. Putin is stirring great Russian patriotic sentiment to correct perceived historical injustices that they’ve long felt slighted by. Enthusiasm for the war was never very unanimous in the US, and it continues to drop. Once US aid goes fully, there will not be much to stop Russia fully doing what it wills. Will the US get directly involved, starting a nuclear war, over who is sovereign on the Pontic Steppe? I think it very unlikely. Do svidanaya.

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North Americans in general are famous for focusing on the now. It’s very understandable. Throwing off of the yoke of history and the past in order to build, unburdened, something new and different and hopefully more equal is the whole premise of the New World. The present-centered perspective — with no regard for what came before — is liberating. There is no stigma attached to past love affairs or failed businesses.  A fresh start: tabula rasa. It’s an idea that has attracted and inspired millions of immigrants.

On the other hand, in their focus on the present, they tend to see only a snapshot, not the full story — and they mistake that snapshot for the full narrative. When something happens in the news, they are quick to feel that they understand, and they are quick to condemn.

The tabula rasa effect

Let’s say we only caught the last few minutes of the movie True Grit, where John Wayne has the reins of his galloping horse clenched between his teeth and is shooting with two rifles. We would think he was a crazy old dude and pretty nasty for doing all that shooting and killing. If we saw only the last few minutes of Breakfast At Tiffany’s, we’d think it’s a light rom-com and Audrey Hepburn and George Peppard must be obsessive cat-lovers to be standing in the pouring rain and hugging a cat between them. If we only saw the last few minutes of The Godfather, where Michael Corleone swears to Kate that he absolutely did not kill Connie’s husband, we’d think he’s a sound, straightforward businessman surrounded by loyal colleagues. To get the full story, we need to see the whole movie, not just the stills.

Similarly, if all we saw was American news channels, we would wonder how this horrific Hamas terrorist group emerged out of nowhere to surprisingly, arbitrarily and viciously kill innocent Israelis. And if all we heard was Canadian politicians, we would wonder how India dared to suddenly enter Canada and kill an innocent Canadian plumber for no reason. And if all we heard was Western media, we would wonder why on Earth Russia would invade Ukraine unprovoked and whether the Russian PM Putin was unhinged. 

North Americans ignore history by seeing only the most recent minutes of the movie. They see only Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and consequently unconditionally support Israel against Palestine. They conveniently forget that Palestinians have been dispossessed and oppressed for over 75 years, and that for every one Israeli killed, some have been killed.��

They see only Russia’s invasion of Ukraine two years ago, and boundlessly support Ukraine, presenting Russia as evil. They forget their 1990s understanding with Russia not to beyond its then borders. They also hypocritically forget their own invasions of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. They only see foreign interference in recent and are outraged, but not in the elections and politics of many foreign countries over the decades.

The complex enlightenment in a backstory

Let’s focus for a moment on Canada. The by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau that India assassinated a Sikh man in Vancouver continues to cause divisions and hamper Canada-India relations. Most Canadians live in the now and give little importance to history. All they see is a man shot near Vancouver and their PM pointing his finger at India; that is the beginning and end of their story. Many Canadians don’t know that this act — like most acts — has a significant backstory.

There are various reasons for not knowing the history of an event. One such reason is not considering that something could even have a backstory: ignorance. Another reason is knowing that there must be a backstory, but lazily not wanting to understand it. Another reason is knowing that there is a backstory, and perhaps even knowing what the backstory is, but purposefully not wanting to engage with it or acknowledge it in order to pursue a personal agenda.

However, engaging with the backstory can be powerful. Engaging with the history of an event has two opposing effects: It sheds more light, but it also muddies the waters. You no longer see situations as black and white. You no longer see people as bad guys and good guys. You no longer think you know all the answers or are morally superior. Instead, you see everything in shades of gray and you develop compassion for a broader swath of society. That’s history.

Backstories, real life and fictional, can be fascinating. In Double Indemnity, we find out how insurance agent Walter Neff comes to be slumped over his typewriter, dying. The hugely popular musical Wicked explains how the Wicked Witch of the West becomes who she is. Batman Begins and Joker lead us to an understanding of these two characters and how they became enemies. Nobody is born “bad” or “good.” Nobody is born a terrorist or a freedom fighter. We all evolve, often through a series of circumstances.

And the point is, even though we don’t know or care to remember the backstories and histories, other cultures and peoples and nations do. And they have noted the North American myopia and the holier-than-thou attitude and hypocrisy that often goes with it. As Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien said, “The world is a diverse place. Nobody has a monopoly on virtue or wisdom.” Or truth, or God.

We need to learn the world’s backstories and histories. And we need to remember that each group has its own valid backstory and history: Israelis as well as Palestinians; Ukrainians as well as Russians; Sikhs in Canada, Sikhs in India, Indians in general in India, as well as Canadians in Canada — even if they don’t know it. Knowing the world’s backstories and histories can guide our relations with other nations, temper our actions and thereby raise our credibility on the global stage.

The importance of knowing history

American historian David said, “History is who we are and why we are the way we are”. American novelist Pearl S. said, “If you want to understand today, you have to search yesterday”. If we step back and take a view of even a hundred years, the reasons of others become more visible, their actions more understandable, and maybe even solutions to conflicts more possible.

Another American historian, Howard , said “If you don’t know history, it’s as if you were born yesterday. If you were born yesterday, then any leader can tell you anything.” Our not knowing history enables our politicians to believably state simple, strong, moralistic, myopic opinions — unmuddied by facts. Knowing history can reveal hypocrisy and enable us to make up our own minds on issues more wisely.

We North Americans are no longer the New World; we are growing up and getting older. It’s time to leave aside our simplistic, unburdened, short-sighted mentality and evolve to assume a complex, mature, long-sighted perspective. We cannot rely on the stills to understand the whole story; we must watch the whole movie. History — environmental, political, cultural, and personal — does matter. Learning it, understanding it, and respecting it will enable us to not only see the world in a more realistic light, but deal with our conflicts in a more constructive, compassionate, and equitable manner. Statesman and historian said, “The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see”.
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Saturday’s Attack Was No Surprise, but the Sad Outcome of Oppression

Justin Trudeau Is Now Playing a Risky Game With India

Making Sense of Vladimir Putin’s Long Game

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Indeed, the G20 summit in New Delhi carries significant diplomatic importance for India. It offers a prime opportunity for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar to showcase India’s role on the global stage. Welcoming delegates from a multitude of member nations, including prominent figures like US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, presents a substantial diplomatic undertaking for India. The absence of leaders such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping cannot go unnoticed, and it will be intriguing to observe the outcomes and agreements that emerge from this pivotal summit.

The of Xi is particularly noteworthy. Chinese Premier Li Qiang will instead attend the event. The snub is telling, given that India is one of China’s greatest regional rivals. Perhaps China is having trouble grappling with India’s economic and recent achievements in space exploration, including a historic on the moon’s South Pole. Xi’s decision could also spring from a desire to strengthen China’s role in the newly-expanded BRICS forum, where he appeared more comfortable during a recent summit. Or Xi may have been kept home to address China’s economic challenges, notably the precarious which saw one of the nation’s largest property developers on the verge of default.

Xi’s absence raises questions about China’s diplomatic strategy and global posture. It suggests a reluctance to engage in an event where he might face difficult inquiries regarding China’s economic trajectory, military activities concerning Taiwan and support for Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. This decision also adds to concerns among investors about the increasing unpredictability of China’s policies, with US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo that abrupt shifts in Chinese policy have made the nation appear nearly “uninvestable.”

India is a nation committed to democracy and multilateralism, and its presidency will be a significant milestone as it seeks to find practical global solutions for the benefit of all and embody the idea of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.

Will India’s G20 presidency leave an imprint on the forum’s global agenda? New Delhi is highly optimistic of a declaration with India’s clear stamp on it. India wants the G20 to be a group for the global public good and not just an economic cooperation body. Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam literally means “the world is a family,” and not just the human world, but the environment from plants and animals down to microorganisms. 

India’s priorities at the G20

In more concrete terms, India’s at the summit are six:

“All the elements were present on the spot for the outbreak of a conflict which might have precipitated the catastrophe,” one of those diplomats after the conclusion of the agreement. “We had populations inflamed to a high degree; we had extremists on both sides ready to work up and provoke incidents; we had considerable quantities of arms which were by no means confined to regularly organized forces. Therefore, it was essential that we should quickly reach a conclusion.”

The diplomat, of course, was British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who had just negotiated the Munich Agreement with Nazi leader Adolf Hitler. In September 1938, Hitler had given Europe an end-of-month deadline to give Germany the Sudetenland, a section of Czechoslovakia where a large German minority lived. Otherwise, the German leader intended to seize the region by force.

Hitler that it would be the last territorial demand he would make of Europe.

In the brief speech he gave in front of 10 Downing Street, Chamberlain declared that the Munich Agreement was “peace for our time,” which for some reason has been repeatedly misquoted as “peace in our time.”

It wouldn’t be Hitler’s last diktat or his last territorial grab. The following September, after Germany invaded Poland, Chamberlain would reverse himself and declare war against Hitler’s regime.

In retrospect, it’s easy to criticize Chamberlain’s �Բ�ï�����é. Perhaps he wasn’t fully versed in Hitler’s appropriation of the concept of lebensraum (“living space”) to justify his desire to expand the national borders of Germany. Maybe he didn’t know that, in 1936, Hitler had of the “rich forests” of Siberia and the “incalculable farmlands” of Ukraine.

But of a “peace for our time” in Ukraine by compromising with Russian President Vladimir Putin — effectively trading land that is not theirs for a peace that won’t endure — have a much harder time explaining away their �Բ�ï�����é. For one, they have to reckon with this earlier history of appeasement that holds lessons for all those who engage with authoritarian leaders with imperial ambitions.

These “peace advocates” must also deliberately close their eyes and ears to Putin’s version of lebensraum, namely the “Russian world” that he routinely invokes to extend Moscow’s “protection” to Belarus, Ukraine and areas on the Russian border with significant Russian-speaking minorities.

These erstwhile lovers of diplomacy probably don’t know that the word mir in Russian means both “world” and “peace.” So, when Putin talks of this “Russian world,” he is also speaking of a Russian peace. Such a “peace” would preserve Russian territorial gains in Ukraine, grant amnesty to all Russians who have committed war crimes during this conflict and absolve Russia of its financial responsibility for damages incurred during the war. In other words, any such consolidation of the “Russian world” of Vladimir Putin requires a “Russian peace.”

Instead, peace activists should be clamoring for a “peace in their time,” namely a peace on Ukrainian terms. Ukraine, after all, is the victim in this conflict. It should ideally decide the timing and the parameters of any peace deal.

Fortunately, it now seems that the international community may be coming around to that position as well.

The meeting in Jeddah

In August, representatives from over 40 countries came to the Saudi city of to talk about peace in Ukraine.

Russia was not invited.

The snub was deliberate. The meeting was designed to build a peace plan around principles that Ukraine has put forward, especially the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory and the return of those lands to Ukrainian control.

Territorial integrity and the inviolability of sovereignty are bedrock principles in international law that inform the operating consensus of the United Nations. So, it’s really no surprise that the participants in the Jeddah meeting that these Ukrainian demands should be at the heart of any peace deal. Other issues, such as war crimes and compensation, remain controversial.

That so many countries showed up in Jeddah is already a step forward for Ukraine and the prospects for a “peace in their time.” The participants were not just the usual suspects who are already supplying Ukraine with arms. Many of the countries in the Global South who showed up had been hitherto reluctant to anger Russia, which is a source of arms shipments, grain and occasionally other products. But Russia’s and its deliberate targeting of Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure, a war crime in and of itself, has been a step too far for many countries in the Global South who have come to depend on cheaper Ukrainian grain exports.

For the time being, countries like China, India, Saudi Arabia and Brazil continue to insist that they are working with both sides. But the Jeddah meeting sends a signal to the Kremlin that it can no longer take for granted even the qualified support it has received from these powerful countries.

Ukraine that the Jeddah meeting will lead to two summits that will finalize a peace deal that could come with the imprimatur of the international community.

Putin cracks down (again)

Boris Kagarlitsky is the most prominent Russian leftist of his generation. In October 1990, during the waning days of the Soviet Union, I in Moscow about the challenges of creating a left party and the emergence of a “second dissidence” in response to the ruling elite and their economic programs. He was the most interesting commentator on the ultimately quixotic efforts to pull some version of democratic socialism out of the wreckage of Soviet communism.

Kagarlitsky is now sitting in jail, having been arrested for his statements against the war in Ukraine. This week, the Russian government him a “terrorist.”

Opposing the war in Ukraine required something of an about-face for Kagarlitsky, who improbably Russia’s annexation of Crimea and involvement in the Donbas secession struggles in 2014. Becoming part of the “patriotic left,” he took advantage of the greater media exposure that came with his newfound allegiance to the Russian government.

But that only made his subsequent criticism of Putin’s war in Ukraine all the more threatening to the Russian government. His arrest has come amid a crackdown against dissent across the political spectrum. This week, the government also to the sentence of the country’s most prominent dissident, Alexei Navalny. A rather conventional nationalist during his protest days, Navalny has also recently changed his tune on aspects of the Ukraine War, for instance now supporting the of Crimea to Ukraine.

And then there’s Igor Girkin, who occupies a position on the political spectrum further to the right of Putin. A former intelligence operative and mercenary, Girkin helped set up the pro-war Club of Angry Patriots in April. But not even these extremist, pro-war credentials have saved Girkin from the wrath of Putin. When the military blogger directly criticized the Russian president last month, he too was .

Russia will hold presidential elections next year. Though press spokesman Dmitry Peskov of a landslide victory, Putin is clearly concerned that someone or something will pose a significant challenge to his authority.

But as long as Putin remains in charge, Ukraine will face a major obstacle in achieving peace on its own terms. Like Hitler, Putin has been coy about his own territorial ambitions. His spokesman Peskov that “we just want to control all the land we have now written into our Constitution as ours.” That means the Donbas and Crimea — and a few more pieces of territory — but Russia doesn’t currently control all of the Donbas. So, even this “modest” imperialism would entail a broader land grab.

Putin’s ambitions, meanwhile, range from a “” of Russian-occupied territory that prevents Ukrainian missiles from reaching Russian territory, to the seizure of all of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, to the all-out replacement of the “Nazi” government in Kyiv. The Russian government has also threatened to use nuclear weapons, so it is not above using nuclear blackmail to achieve its aims.

But all talk of Putin being satisfied with control of the territory the Russian army currently controls is �Բ�ï�����é at the level of believing Hitler’s promise that Nazi Germany wouldn’t occupy any territory beyond the Sudetenland. The world soon saw through the claims of “peace in our time.” With the wisdom of hindsight and given the widely available evidence of Putin’s intentions, it’s time to rally behind the alternative: “peace in their time.”

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The reaction that set this deeper logic in motion came from the United States when it mobilized NATO to defend Ukraine’s right to join the military alliance of its choice. On its face, this should have seemed surprising because it stood as a tacit admission that Ukraine was already a de facto member of NATO.

On the day of the fateful invasion, US President called Russia’s “special military operation” an “unprovoked and unjustified attack” on Ukraine and promised that the US and its allies would “hold Russia accountable.” Members of Congress likewise immediately that they were “committed to enacting the strongest possible sanctions and export controls to cripple Russia’s ability to make war, punish its barbarity and relegate the Putin regime to the status of an international pariah.”

It soon became clear that NATO was at war with Russia but had found a way to conveniently use Ukrainian forces to wage the battle on the ground. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin made this clear when he explained that the massive financial, material and logistical support the US was offering Ukraine had as its objective the “weakening” of Russia. Biden himself promised to reduce the Russian “” and evoked the ouster of Putin in : “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”

The nations of the world immediately understood that what they were witnessing was a moment of history in which the global order was about to be redefined. This became even clearer as, despite NATO’s to achieve its objectives in an effort that may last “as long as it takes,” Ukraine was being dismantled as a nation and as a society.

But should we think of February 2022 as the moment when everything began to change, or did that critical moment appear 30 years earlier in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union? The West has framed this drama as a challenge to the normative “rules-based order” that has been in place since the end of World War II. But the real change may have occurred earlier when the way of handling the world’s business in the Western power centers underwent a radical change.

Harper’s Magazine’s June, “Why are we in Ukraine?” was authored by two distinguished authorities on international relations, Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne. Both authors have had a strong relationship, during their careers, with the national security community.

In their detailed analysis covering 30 years of history up to the outbreak of hostilities last year, they point to a phenomenon of great historical significance. “Normal diplomacy among great powers, distinguished by the recognition and accommodation of clashing interests—the approach that had defined the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during even the most intense stretches of the Cold War—was obsolete. Russia was expected to acquiesce to a new world order created and dominated by the United States.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Normal diplomacy:

A historical relic belonging to a period that began in 1815, with the resolution of the Napoleonic wars, and ended in 1991—the moment when a single nation felt definitively empowered to adjudicate every type of conflict across the globe as well as enforce its judgment with a panoply of means including economic sanctions, military intervention or clandestine operations aimed at installing leaders capable of applying normative policies.

Contextual note

We have become conditioned to think of contemporary history as a series of successively redefined “world orders.” In such reflection, we tend to focus on who is empowered to make decisions but not on how decisions are made. Throughout human history, two factors have alternated, though with no observable regularity: war and diplomacy.

When Americans evoke their own historical mythology, they think of what they call the “first Thanksgiving” in 1621 as a heartwarming moment of diplomacy between the English settlers and the native tribes. was very different from the myth. And in the ensuing centuries, war became the defining reality and genocide its outcome. US history has created a taste for exploiting unequal relations. The culture itself has encapsulated it in the ideal of “the competitive spirit”—which can lead to a mentality of “winner takes all.”

Diplomacy finally did become a norm in Europe in the 19th century, as the imperial ambitions of Napoleon, finally resolved at Waterloo, helped the European nations to appreciate the risks that arose when any single power became too dominant. Retired French diplomat Gérard Araud, describing 19th-century European diplomatic culture in his book, Histoires diplomatiques, notes that diplomats “often have the thankless task of focusing on reality, analyzing the balance of power and demonstrating that what is desirable rarely corresponds to what is possible.” This sounds very much like the thinking of Schwartz and Layne when they write: “Historically, great powers tend to focus pragmatically on reducing conflict among themselves. By frankly recognizing the realities of power and acknowledging each other’s interests, they can usually relate to one another on a businesslike basis.”

When the same authors, analyzing US policy in Ukraine, tell us that this culture of “normal diplomacy” is “obsolete,” we should take this as a wake-up call. Can humanity afford to declare diplomacy obsolete? The new “coalition of the willing” built around NATO appears to have reached this conclusion. The rest of humanity appears to be resisting. History will tell us whether diplomacy may one day be revived.

Historical note

The logic of the original Cold War was based on two ideas. The first consisted in affirming that a certain political and economic model—the liberal, capitalist, free market order—was not just a historical reality but should be conceived of as both a norm and an ideal to be aspired to. The second consisted in affirming that there were a number of simple rules that could be conceptualized as the basis of a “rules-based order.”

In such a perspective, the Soviet Union needed to be fended off because it had a declared revolutionary mission. According to the Western understanding of Marxist thought, communists across the globe, from Italy to Vietnam, inspired if not led by the Soviet Union, were actively seeking to overthrow not just national governments but the entire liberal economic system and replace it with a global dictatorship of the proletariat.

Schwartz and Layne detect another powerful nation with a “revolutionary” mission: the US. “Convinced that its national security depended on the domestic political and economic arrangements of ostensibly sovereign states—and therefore defining as a legitimate goal the alteration or eradication of those arrangements if they were not in accord with its professed ideals and values—the post-Cold War United States became a revolutionary force in world politics.”

Recounting the saga of the US- and French-led overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, they describe the evolution of NATO under US leadership in the following terms: “The alliance had been transformed from a supposedly mutual defense pact designed to repel an attack on its members into the preeminent military instrument of American power in the post-Cold War world.”

Defense pacts are one of the typical results of diplomatic consultation. That is exactly how diplomacy played out in 19th-century Europe. Defense pacts were designed to contain overweening ambition and excessive power. But when a defense pact such as NATO becomes the “military instrument of American power” and when the alliance seeks to extend its geographical reach further and further beyond the North Atlantic, the problem Napoleon posed for Europe becomes the problem of humanity itself.

Is the US preparing its own Waterloo?

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Is Diplomacy a Useless Relic of the Romantic Past? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In recent months, among Russian President Vladimir Putin’s followers, there has been much talk of a “forever war” in Ukraine dragging on for years, if not decades. “For us,” Putin a group of factory workers recently, “this is not a geopolitical task, but a task of the survival of Russian statehood, creating conditions for the future development of the country and our children.”

Visiting Kyiv last February, US President Joseph Biden assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, “You remind us that freedom is priceless; it’s worth fighting for, for as long as it takes. And that’s how long we’re going to be with you, Mr. President: for as long as it takes.” A few weeks later, the European Council “its resolute condemnation of Russia’s actions and unwavering support for Ukraine and its people.” 

With all the major players already committed to fighting a forever war, how could peace possibly come about? With the UN compromised by Russia’s seat on the Security Council and the G7 powers united in “Russia’s illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine,” the most likely dealmaker when it comes to ending this forever war may prove to be President Xi Jinping of China.

China? Really?

In the West, Xi’s self-styled role as a peacemaker in Ukraine has been widely mocked. In February, on the first anniversary of the Russian invasion, China’s as the “only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis” sparked a barbed reply from US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who claimed the war “could end tomorrow if Russia stopped attacking Ukraine.”

When Xi visited Moscow in March, the statement Chinese officials released claiming that he to “play a constructive role in promoting talks” prompted considerable Western criticism. “I don’t think China can serve as a fulcrum on which any Ukraine peace process could move,” Ryan Hass, a former American diplomat assigned to China. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, pointed out that “China has taken sides” in the conflict by backing Russia and so could hardly become a peacemaker. Even when Xi made a to Zelensky promising to dispatch an envoy to promote negotiations “with all parties,” critics dismissed that overture as so much damage control for China’s increasingly troubled trade relations with Europe.

The symbolism of peace conferences

Still, think about it for a moment. Who else could bring the key parties to the table and potentially make them honor their signatures on a peace treaty? Putin has, of course, already violated UN accords by invading a sovereign state and ruptured his economic entente with Europe by trashing past agreements with Washington to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. And yet the Russian president relies on China’s support, economically and otherwise, which makes Xi the only leader who might be able to bring him to the bargaining table and ensure that he honors any agreement he may sign. That sobering reality should raise serious questions about how any future Beijing-inspired peace conference might happen and what it would mean for the current world order.

For more than 200 years, peace conferences have not only resolved conflicts but regularly signaled the arrival at stage center of a new world power. In 1815, amid the whirling in Vienna’s palaces that accompanied negotiations ending the Napoleonic wars, Britain emerged into its century-long reign as the globe’s . Similarly, the 1885 that carved up the continent of Africa for colonial rule heralded Germany’s rise as Britain’s most serious rival. The somber grand Hall of Mirrors that officially ended World War I in 1919 marked America’s debut on the world stage. Similarly, the at San Francisco that established the UN (just as World War II was about to end) affirmed the ascent of US global hegemony.

Imagine the impact if, sooner or later, envoys from Kyiv and Moscow convene in Beijing beneath the gaze of President Xi and find the elusive meeting point between Russia’s aspirations and Ukraine’s survival. One thing would be guaranteed: after years of disruptions in the global energy, fertilizer and grain markets, marked by punishing inflation and spreading hunger, all eyes from five continents would indeed turn toward Beijing.

After all, with the war disrupting grain and fertilizer shipments via the Black Sea, world hunger to an estimated 345 million people in 2023, while basic food insecurity now afflicts 828 million inhabitants of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Should such negotiations ever prove fruitful, a televised signing ceremony hosted by President Xi and watched by countless millions globally would crown China’s rapid 20-year ascent to world power.

The world’s newest great power

Forget Ukraine for a moment and concentrate on China’s economic rise under communist rule, which has been little short of extraordinary. At the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, China was an economic lightweight. Its massive population, 20% of the world’s total, was just 4% of global economic output. So weak was China that its leader Mao Zedong had to amid a Moscow winter for an audience with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin just to plead for the industrial technology that would help rebuild an economy devastated by 12 years of war and revolution. In the decade following its admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001, however, China quickly became the workshop of the world, an unprecedented $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves.

Instead of simply swimming in a hoard of cash like Scrooge McDuck in his Money Bin, in 2013 President Xi announced a trillion-dollar development scheme called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It aimed to build a massive infrastructure across the Eurasian landmass and Africa, thereby improving the lives of humanity’s forgotten millions, while making Beijing the focal point of Eurasia’s economic development. Today, China is not only an industrial powerhouse that 18% of the global gross domestic product (GDP), compared to 12% for the US, but also the world’s chief creditor. It provides capital for infrastructure and industrial projects to while offering some hope to the still subsisting on less than four dollars a day.

Testifying to that economic prowess, for the past six months world leaders have ignored Washington’s pleas to form a united front against China. Instead, remarkable numbers of them, including Germany’s Olaf Scholz, Spain’s Pedro Sánchez and Brazil’s Lula da Silva, have been to pay court to President Xi. In April, even French President and US ally Emmanuel Macron visited the Chinese capital, where he a “global strategic partnership with China” and urged other countries to become less reliant on the “extraterritoriality of the U.S. dollar.”

Then, in a diplomatic coup that stunned Washington, China took a toward healing the dangerous sectarian rivalry between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia by a meeting of their foreign ministers in Beijing. As the Saudis’ and Iran’s , Beijing had the commercial clout to bring them to the bargaining table. China’s top diplomat Wang Yi then the restored diplomatic relations as part of his country’s “constructive role in facilitating the proper settlement of hot-spot issues around the world.”

Geopolitics as a source of change

Underlying the sudden display of Chinese diplomatic clout is a recent shift in that essential realm called “geopolitics” that’s driving a fundamental realignment in global power.

Around 1900, at the high tide of the British Empire, the English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder started the modern study of geopolitics by publishing a highly arguing that the construction of the 5,000-mile-long Trans-Siberian Railway from Moscow to Vladivostok was the beginning of a merger of Europe and Asia. That unified land mass, he said, would soon become the epicenter of global power.

In 1997, in his book , former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski updated MacKinder, arguing that “geopolitics has moved from the regional to the global dimension, with preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent serving as the central basis for global primacy.” In words particularly apt for our present world, he added: “America’s global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained.”

Imagine geopolitics as the deep substrate shaping far more superficial political events, even if it’s only noticeable in certain moments, much the way the incessant grinding of the planet’s tectonic plates only becomes visible when volcanic eruptions break through the earth’s surface. For centuries, if not millennia, Europe was separated from Asia by endless deserts and sprawling grasslands. The empty center of that vast land mass was crossed only by an occasional string of camels traveling the .

Now, thanks to its in infrastructure—rails, roads, pipelines, and ports—China is fundamentally changing that geopolitical substrate through a more-than-metaphorical merger of continents. If President Xi’s grand design succeeds, Beijing will forge a unified market stretching 6,000 miles from the North Sea to the South China Sea, eventually encompassing 70% of all humanity and effectively fusing Europe and Asia into a single economic continent: Eurasia.

Despite the Biden administration’s fervid attempts to create an , recent diplomatic eruptions are shaping a new world order that isn’t at all what Washington had in mind. With the economic creation of a true Eurasian sphere seemingly underway, we may be seeing the first signs of the changing face of international politics. The question is: Could a Chinese-engineered peace in Ukraine be next in line?

Pressures on China for peace

Such growing geopolitical power is giving China both the motivation and potentially even the means to negotiate an end to the fighting in Ukraine. First, the means: as Russia’s for its commodity exports, and Ukraine’s largest before the war, China can use commercial pressure to bring both parties to the bargaining table, much as it did for Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Next, the motivation: while Moscow and Kyiv might each exude confidence in ultimate victory in their forever war, Beijing has reason to grow impatient with the economic disruptions radiating out across the Black Sea to roil a delicately balanced global economy. According to the World Bank, almost (47%) is now surviving on seven dollars a day, and most of them live in Africa, Asia and Latin America where China has made massive, long-term developmental loans to under its Belt and Road Initiative.

With 70% of its lands and their rich black soils devoted to agriculture, Ukraine has for decades produced bumper crops of wheat, barley, soybeans and sunflower oil that made it “the of the world,” providing the globe’s hungry millions with reliable shipments of affordable commodities. Right after the Russian invasion, however, world prices for grains and vegetable oils shot up by 60%. Despite stabilization efforts, including the UN’s Black Sea Grain Initiative to allow exports through the war zone, prices for such essentials remain all too high. They threaten to go higher still with further disruption of global supply chains or more war damage like the recent rupture of a crucial Ukrainian that’s turning more than a million acres of prime farmland into “desert.”

As costs for imports of fertilizer, grain and other foodstuffs have soared since the Russian invasion, the Council on Foreign Relations that “a climbing number of low-income BRI countries have struggled to repay loans associated with the initiative, spurring a wave of debt crises.” In the Horn of Africa, for example, the sixth year of a crippling drought has pushed an estimated into a “hunger crisis,” forcing the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya to balance costly food imports with the repayment of Chinese loans for the creation of like factories, railroads and renewable energy. With such loans surpassing in nations like Ghana, Malaysia, Pakistan and Zambia, while China itself holds outstanding credits equivalent to , China is far more invested in global economic peace and stability than any other major power.

Beyond western fantasies of victory

At present, Beijing might seem alone among major nations in its concern about the strain the Ukraine war is placing on a world economy poised between starvation and survival. But within the coming six months, Western opinion will likely start to shift as its inflated expectations for Ukrainian victory in its long-awaited “” meet the reality of Russia’s return to trench warfare.

After the stunning success of Ukraine’s offensives late last year near Kharkiv and Kherson, the West dropped its reticence about provoking Putin and began shipping billions of dollars of sophisticated equipment—first and missiles, then and battle tanks and, by the end of this year, advanced . By the war’s first anniversary last February, the West had already provided Kyiv with in aid, and expectations of success rose with each new arms shipment. Adding to that anticipation, Moscow’s own “winter offensive” with its desperate suicide attacks on the city of Bakhmut , as Foreign Affairs put it, that “the Russian military demonstrated … it was no longer capable of large-scale combat operations.”

But defense is another matter. While Moscow was wasting some in suicide assaults on Bakhmut, its specialized tractors were cutting a formidable network of along a 600-mile front designed to stall any Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Ukraine’s troops will probably achieve some breakthroughs when that offensive finally begins, but are unlikely to push Russia back from all its post-invasion gains. Remember that Russia’s army of 1.3 million is than Ukraine’s, which has also suffered many casualties. In March, the commander of Ukraine’s 46th Air Assault brigade the Washington Post that a year of combat had left 100 dead and 400 wounded in his 500-man unit and that they were being replaced by raw recruits, some of whom fled at the very sound of rifle fire. To counter the few dozen “symbolic” Leopard tanks the West is sending, Russia has thousands of in reserve. Despite US and European sanctions, Russia’s economy has actually continued to grow, while Ukraine’s, which was only about a tenth the size of Russia’s, has shrunk by 30%. Facts like these mean just one thing is likely: stalemate.

Beijing as peacemaker

By next December, if Ukraine’s counteroffensive has indeed stalled, its people face another cold, dark winter of drone attacks, while Russia’s rising casualties and lack of results might by then begin to challenge Putin’s hold on power. In other words, both combatants might feel far more compelled to sit down in Beijing for peace talks. With the threat of future disruptions damaging its delicate global position, Beijing will likely deploy its full economic power to press the parties for a settlement. By trading territory, while agreeing with China on reconstruction aid, and some further strictures on Ukraine’s future NATO membership, both sides might feel they had won enough concessions to sign an agreement.

Not only would China then gain enormous prestige for brokering such a peace deal, but it might win a preferential position in the reconstruction bonanza that would follow by offering aid to rebuild both a ravaged Ukraine and a damaged Russia. In a recent report, the World Bank that it could take $411 billion and over a decade to rebuild a devastated Ukraine through infrastructure contracts of the very kind Chinese construction companies are so ready to undertake. To sweeten such deals, Ukraine could also allow China to build massive factories to supply Europe’s soaring demand for renewable energy and electric vehicles. Apart from the profits involved, such Chinese-Ukrainian joint ventures would ramp up production at a time when that country is likely to gain duty-free access to the European market.

In the post-war moment, with the possibility that Ukraine will be an increasingly strong economic ally at the edge of Europe, Russia still a reliable supplier of cut-rate commodities and the European market ever more open to its state corporations, China is likely to emerge from that disastrous conflict—to use Brzezinski’s well-chosen words—with its “preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent” consolidated and its “basis for global primacy” significantly strengthened.

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Although it is not yet certain, it is beginning to appear that Ukraine’s much-anticipated spring offensive has become bogged down. If the coming weeks bear out the same results, the war may become a stalemate. Why would Russia keep fighting a war that seems ready to drag on forever, with neither side able to vanquish the other? For this, we must take a look at Russia’s wider strategic outlook.

What motivates Russia?

To discern what long-term objectives Russian President Vladimir Putin might have in Ukraine, we need to begin in 2014. Then, a series of clashes between protestors and government forces resulted in the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. The events became known as the Maidan Revolution. If we can understand why Russia considered Maidan a threat, we can understand Russia’s fundamental objectives in its subsequent relations with Ukraine.

From the Russian point of view, the first problem with Maidan was that the movement threatened to result in an eventual accession to NATO. While the primary goal of the protestors was the integration of Ukraine into the EU, not NATO, Russia saw this as a slippery slope. Moscow—whether during the Empire, the Soviet Union, or the Federation—has always considered threats from the territory of modern Ukraine, and particularly from the part of it east of the Dnieper River, to be absolutely unacceptable. It will strive to remove hostile forces from the area at almost any cost. The thought of NATO forces east of the Dnieper, especially in Crimea, is absolutely unthinkable in Moscow. Moscow thus perceives NATO enlargement as a threat of the most existential kind.

Secondly, Russia has a positive interest in Crimea, since the Russian coast of the Black Sea has no good sites for year-round naval ports. The Russian Black Sea fleet must thus rely on the Crimean port of Sevastopol to stage its operations. Retaining the use of Crimea for the navy is a condition for the maintenance of Russia’s status as a Black Sea power. Strategically, Crimea is the only part of Ukraine’s territory that holds positive value for Moscow (as opposed to negative value, i.e. the deterrence of possible threats). However, Russia’s experience after the annexation of Crimea in 2014—particularly Ukraine’s economic siege of the peninsula and cutting of its water supply—has suggested that control of the territory immediately opposite Crimea on the Ukrainian mainland is key to the support of Crimea itself.

Finally, Russia has sought to avoid the loss of face that would result if the pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were comprehensively defeated. This is not only a matter of vanity for Russia, but an important strategic objective to maintain its influence in the post-Soviet space. Russia exercises influence by playing the role of protector of ethnic Russians and other pro-Russian ethnic groups, such as the Ossetes and Abkhaz in Georgia. To be seen as weak and ineffective in this role would be a serious hindrance to Russia’s continued influence in its neighborhood.

Russia still has much to gain from fighting on

In spite of its heavy physical and reputational losses in the Ukraine War, these three goals provide Russia ample reason to cling tenaciously to its current position. Holding on to the land bridge between Crimea and the Donbas addresses Crimea’s post-2014 strategic vulnerabilities, and the expansion of Russian territory to a significantly increased portion of Donetsk and virtually all of Luhansk demonstrates effective support of the rebels. As long as things do not change, two of Russia’s main assets in the region—the port of Sevastopol and its reputation as protector—remain substantially intact.

If battle lines do remain mostly fixed, the main downside for Russia will be the significant areas east of the Dnieper that remain in Ukrainian hands. As international relations scholar John Mearsheimer has , Russia’s second-best alternative to controlling strategic territory is to “wreck Ukraine as a functioning state”, and this Russia has been doing very effectively.

Compared to Russia, Ukraine is older, poorer, more demographically unstable—with lower birthrates and negative net migration, and vastly smaller. The war has greatly aggravated these problems, as young men die in battle and young women and children become refugees. What’s more, Ukraine’s infrastructure has been systematically destroyed. A country with a like that of Ukraine needs to develop its economy quickly and maximize its resources to deal with an aging and shrinking population. This war has instead severely damaged Ukraine’s economy, and every month that passes is a crucial month in which Ukraine fails to get on the road to recovery, while the likelihood of refugees returning falls.

Simply by holding the current lines, Russia is making good on its protection of its friends, securing the long-term viability of its outpost in Crimea, and bleeding Ukraine further, making it increasingly likely that Ukraine will become a dysfunctional, impoverished state over the long term, without the capacity to be an effective base for NATO assets. Meanwhile, sanctions have not had on Russia’s economy that was hoped, and Russia’s large population, bolstered by from Ukraine, means that any demographic effects of the war on Russia are likely to be minuscule.

Putin is well aware that Russia can bear the losses of the war longer than Ukraine can. Even a costly victory is still a victory if Russia can keep its foothold. Eventually, the West may find its resolve wavering before Russia’s. On the present trajectory, Russia may end up holding onto its gains in spite of everything.

If the current offensive fails, and it begins to appear that a long-term stalemate is developing, Western countries will have to rethink their willingness to underwrite a war whose continuation is destroying the viability of Ukraine, while only helping Russia to cement the achievement of its strategic goals.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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As he reiterated his request for post-Soviet Russia to join NATO, President Vladimir Putin, who had been in office little more than a year, pointed out that there was an even earlier precedent. “He revealed that the 1954 response from the West to a request by the Soviet Union to join NATO was that ‘the unrealistic nature of the proposal does not warrant discussion.’”

 “A mischievous Putin,” the article continues, “pointed out that he suggested Russian membership of Nato a year ago but was rebuffed by Madeleine Albright, then the US Secretary of State.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Unrealistic:

Not in conformity with Washington’s post-World War II policy of global hegemony, which became the orthodoxy of the Truman and Eisenhower administration.

Contextual note

The idea that something does not “warrant discussion” is in itself interesting. Diplomacy has always been about discussion. Discussion means dialogue or exchange. It ultimately implies seeking acceptable compromises once all the facts and intentions are on the table.

In the real world of diplomacy literally everything “warrants discussion.” One of the secrets of successful diplomacy is that until a public statement can be made, intentions remain secret. Diplomats are free to speak the unprintable. Even positions that fly in the face of stated principles may be discussed before they are rejected. That is how diplomacy worked during its golden age in Europe in the 19^th century. It had the singular merit of producing a century of evident tension, serious disputes and even acts of aggression. But it resolved most of them, not through war, but  thanks to shifting alliances.

The new style of diplomacy the US practices today was inaugurated in the aftermath of World War II. In the interest of assuming exclusive control of the vast post-colonial world left in the wake of crumbling European empires, it dispensed with nuance. It had to find an efficient way of governing the diversity of its pieces. Principles trumped interests.

The Western leaders forged what was called the Washington Consensus, initially a theory of development for the remnants of the European empires. It established a set of rules by which a new world order could achieve some semblance of economic order. Some of the rules were explicit and contained in documents such as the UN Charter and the foundational documents of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Others were not so much rules as ideological beliefs about how prosperity can be produced and maintained according to liberal economic ideology.

Though the Washington Consensus encountered considerable success, it ultimately proved costly to maintain. At one point it imperiled the dollar itself. In essence, it stood as an innovative variation on old ideas of empire. It created, formalized and enforced a relationship of what it deemed productive dependence. As a global phenomenon, it inevitably ran into the classic problems of empires whose tensions at some point become unmanageable.

Given the complexity of the whole, only a simplistic ideology could create the necessary impression of continuity and coherence. But any ideology imposed on a complex, diverse environment inevitably produces incoherence. The Guardian’s account of what happened in 1954 demonstrates the contradiction. By requesting membership in NATO, the Soviet Union appeared ready to adhere to a philosophy that allowed both for ideological diversity and a framework for mutual security. Capitalists and communists might, after all, agree on the principles of coexistence without having to align their ideologies.

But the newly constituted US hegemon realized that something else was at stake. The wartime economy that he propelled the US to leadership in the global economy had become the model for a new era of economic expansion. A wartime mentality was clearly required to make it work. Guaranteed security and stability suddenly appeared as obstacles to prosperity. The US economy needed an enemy. As a matter of principle, once the Cold War had begun, it could not – just as it cannot today – accept that designated adversaries play a role in defining the conditions for living in peace. Peace has no value. The health of the US economy depends on maintaining a war mentality.

Historical note

When reminded of those two historical facts – that Nikita Khruschev in 1954 and Vladimir Putin in 2000 deemed logical and desirable their nation’s inclusion in a broad defensive alliance – we should have the humility to rethink our understanding of history.

On the basis of this information, one possible revisionist reading of history could be summed up in these observations:

1. The Cold War was perceived not as a problem the US was faced with, but an opportunity to exploit. It became a sacred mission as the pretext for structuring the US economy around the military-industrial complex (MIC). The economy required a powerful nemesis. Washington cast its ally in World War II, the Soviet Union, in that role. When the murderous dictator Stalin died, it was unthinkable that his replacement by the amicable Khruschev could become a  pretext to establish peace and harmony between the USSR and the US.
2. The Eisenhower administration — which included John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State and his brother, Allen Dulles as Director of the CIA — invested heavily in the effort to establish the MIC at the core of the US economy. This required a permanent adversarial attitude not just towards the USSR. It could even extend to nations that insisted on being non-aligned. George W Bush formulated it with the greatest clarity: “if you are not with us you are with the terrorists.”
3. President Eisenhower himself dissented from the majority view inside his administration. He dared to manifest it three days before leaving office, when he crafted a televised speech denouncing, in its first draft, the “military-industrial-Congressional complex.” In the formal speech, he reduced it to the first three terms. Ike was the last president ever to use this expression in public, even as in the succeeding decades the MIC kept growing.
4. Ike’s successor, John F Kennedy, appeared keen on following Eisenhower’s parting prompt. Months after taking office, following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, he dismissed Allen Dulles. This may have been a contributing factor to his assassination in 1963. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson, not only shared none of Kennedy’s taste for reducing the influence of the MIC. By escalating the engagement in Vietnam and turning it into a hot war, Johnson created the ideal conditions for the MIC’s rapid development.
5. The definitive collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 should logically have led to the dismantling of NATO. Russia was clearly no longer an enemy. But Washington understood that NATO was its key to controlling Europe. NATO not only survived but expanded, though the lack of a designated enemy produced a certain degree of discomfort.
6. In the new millennium, if Russia couldn’t stop NATO’s expansion, Putin preferred to be part of it. But Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright knew that, like certain character actors in Hollywood, Russia’s role could only be that of a villain, even if it no longer had the ideological earmarks of a villain. Rocky vs Drago was a proven recipe for good box office.
7. The events of 9/11 inaugurated the Global War on Terror, which finally provided an identifiable enemy other than Russia. But this marginal group of extremists with a fanatical religious identity lacked political and especially national identity. Washington tried, but Al Qaeda wasn’t credible in the role.
8. China’s rise provided some hope for a new villain, especially as it remained officially communist. But instead of exercising military bravado, it exercised its influence through economic cooperation. Washington, and especially the Democrats, returned to the established value of Russia as the reliable enemy.

Whether it’s the Soviet Union joining NATO in 1954 or the European security framework Putin proposed in December 2021, before invading Ukraine, Washington deems that such proposals suffer from their “unrealistic nature.” The US has always preferred the hyperreal nature of a Drago challenging Rocky or Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire” in a real-life remake of Star Wars. These are things Americans can identify with as they munch on their popcorn.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Why Does Washington Cast All its Villains in Moscow? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The American warship was named after a Hawaiian admiral of Chinese and native Hawaiian parentage who served the US during World War II. The ship bearing his name was accompanied by a Canadian warship in what was described as “a rare joint mission.”

I found the name of the American destroyer intriguing. Why had this particular warship been sent to patrol the sensitive Taiwan Strait? I thought Chad might have something interesting to say.

“Since this appeared to be a deliberately aggressive act by the Chinese. In such circumstances, would it be reasonable to suppose that symbolism may be a factor in this provocation? The Chinese remember their own humiliation at the hands of Western powers that was capped by the Boxer rebellion. Eight Western colonial powers crushed the Chinese forces, occupied the Forbidden City and imposed crippling reparations for the conflict on China. Could the idea of sending a ship with a Chinese name on a military mission through the Taiwan Strait be the factor that explains this ‘dangerous’ provocation?”

My question wasn’t about who is to blame, but about the role of symbolism in foreign policy initiatives. Chad offered these thoughts.

“Symbolism and historical factors can sometimes play a role in international relations and affect perceptions of actions. However, it’s essential to consider multiple perspectives and gather more information before drawing conclusions about the motives behind specific actions.

Naming a US ship after a Hawaiian WWII admiral of Chinese and native Hawaiian parentage may have been done to honor the individual’s heritage and achievements rather than as a deliberate provocation.”

I wasn’t talking about what motivated the US to name the ship, but rather to choose that particular destroyer for this mission. But I let that objection pass as Chad continued to explain.

“It’s crucial to avoid making definitive judgments based solely on symbolism or historical events, as geopolitical situations are complex and involve a multitude of factors. Understanding the motivations and intentions behind specific actions requires a comprehensive analysis of the political, military, and diplomatic context, as well as the perspectives of all parties involved.”

“Thank you, Chad. That’s precisely why I want to focus on the motivation of the Chinese in this incident. Whether or not the US intended this as a provocation, it’s quite possible that the Chinese saw the choice of the Chung-Hoon to conduct this mission as a provocation. The name evokes the entire history of US aggression against China and its ambition to control the Pacific. That includes the annexation of Hawaii and the conquest of the Philippines, considered by American business interests at the time as the key to gaining access to the great Chinese market. Both of those events – Hawaii and the Philippines –  took place in 1898. The Boxer rebellion followed two years later.

As a journalist I want to understand why the Chinese thought it wise to conduct this dangerous operation. I suspect that the symbolism of the Chinese name of the destroyer was an important factor to the extent that the Chinese may have seen the choice of that particular warship to be a provocation on the part of the Americans. Psychology happens to be a major part of war strategy these days. Can we assume that on both sides, the Chinese and the American, or at least on the Chinese side, symbolism may have been a factor, even if the media fails to report on it?”

Chad is open to suggestions

“It is possible that certain symbols or names can be perceived as provocative by one side, while the other side may view them as neutral or honoring.

It is not uncommon for psychological factors, including symbolism, to be considered in war strategies. Symbolic actions can send messages, influence public opinion, or create narratives that shape the perception of events. However, without access to specific details of the incident you mentioned, it would be speculative to assert that the choice of the ship’s name was a determining factor in the Chinese response.”

“You’re absolutely right,” I said to Chad. “The reason I mention it is because it could be an essential explanatory factor to understand this incident. And that raises a question for journalists, especially when for the past year the media have slavishly followed the US government’s dictum that the Russian invasion was ‘unprovoked.’ Even Ian Bremmer felt it necessary this past week to counter more authoritative voices who have cited a mountain of evidence to prove that provocation existed. I totally agree that accuracy is important and speculation can be dangerous. But when knowledge of actual intentions is hidden, shouldn’t journalists do what historians do and evoke what may appear logical in the situation as one possible factor to explain a situation marked by confrontation? That doesn’t mean reporting it as fact but it does mean drawing the public’s attention to how the different parties perceive the situation. Shouldn’t that enter into the public dialogue that journalism is expected to contribute to?”

Chad agreed that “exploring different perspectives, including how different parties perceive a situation, can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of complex events. Journalists often analyze various factors and provide insights that help the public make informed judgments.”

“So my question is why the media is choosing to avoid analyzing those factors in this case, but also in the case of the buildup to the Russian invasion of Ukraine? At the same time, the media have overindulged in speculating about what Vladimir Putin’s motives are, arbitrarily deciding that he wants to recreate the Soviet empire or even conquer Europe. Such musings are never suppressed for want of ‘accuracy’ or concrete evidence. My own conclusion is that the media have fallen into a pattern of propaganda, which is common in times of conflict, but is contradictory with democratic principles and the idea we have of the role of the press. In both the Russian and Chinese cases, Western media is not directly involved in the conflict. Seeking to understand the factors of motivation at play seems to me essential. But what we see is a refusal to consider any interesting evidence concerning the context itself alongside wild speculation about what supposed evil intentions. Isn’t that in itself dangerous because propaganda is always designed to support conflict and therefore, in this case, may provoke conflict on an unheard of scale?”

“Media speculation about leaders’ motivations,” Chad responded, “such as Vladimir Putin’s intentions in the case of Russia and the Chinese leadership’s intentions in your mentioned incident, can sometimes lack concrete evidence and oversimplify complex geopolitical dynamics. It is essential for journalists to provide a balanced approach, relying on credible sources, evidence, and expert analysis to present a nuanced understanding of events.”

I couldn’t disagree.

“So when we notice that is precisely what the media are failing to do, shouldn’t we be alarmed? I know you’ll tell me that some in the media will be able to do otherwise, but the reality is that alternative voices are kept in the margins. That means that, contrary to your wishes, media literacy is not being encouraged, but rather suppressed. Can you simply agree or disagree with that assessment without preaching to me about how everything should work out in a world of reasoning beings?”

Chad did, in some sense, appear to agree. “It is valid to be concerned when media outlets fail to provide a comprehensive and balanced perspective on important issues. Media literacy is indeed crucial in enabling individuals to critically evaluate information and form their own well-rounded opinions. When alternative voices and viewpoints are marginalized or suppressed, it can limit the diversity of perspectives and hinder a healthy public dialogue.

In democratic societies, a free and independent media plays a vital role in holding power to account, providing accurate information, and facilitating informed public discourse.”

This time I had to interrupt.

”Stop, Chad. You are starting to preach again. We agree on all these principles you preach about, but stating them over and over again doesn’t make them real. I just want to focus on reality. But you seem committed to what I call the dominant hyperreality. It’s a great piece of fiction. I too admire it, but I don’t need continual reminders about how it should work in an ideal world. Just like you, I adhere to it and hope one day we can live up to it.”

*[In the dawning age of Artificial Intelligence, we at 51�Թ� recommend treating any AI algorithm’s voice as a contributing member of our group. As we do with family members, colleagues or our circle of friends, we quickly learn to profit from their talents and, at the same time, appreciate the social and intellectual limits of their personalities. This enables a feeling of camaraderie and constructive exchange to develop spontaneously and freely. For more about how we initially welcomed Chad to our breakfast table, click here.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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At least the Russian president and his state-run media make no of his regime’s with Wagner. The American government, on the other hand, seldom acknowledges its own version of the privatization of war — the of private security contractors it’s used in its misguided , involving military and intelligence operations in a staggering .

At least as far back as the through World Wars and , the and , and the first , “contractors,” as we like to call them, have long been with us. Only recently, however, have they begun playing such a large role in our wars, with an estimated of them directly involved in combat and intelligence operations.

Contractors have both committed horrific abuses and acted bravely under fire (because they have all too often been under fire). From torture at prison in Iraq to interrogations at the detention camp, from employees of the private security firm Blackwater on unarmed Iraqi civilians to contractors a U.S. base under attack in Afghanistan, they have been an essential part of the war on terror. And yes, they both killed Afghans and some who had worked as escape from Taliban rule.

The involvement of private companies has allowed Washington to continue to conduct its operations around the globe, even if many Americans think that our war on terror in , , and elsewhere has ended. I tried looking for any kind of a survey of how many of us realize that it continues in and elsewhere, but all I could find was pollster Nate Silver’s of “lessons learned” from that global conflict, as if it were part of our history. And unless respondents were caring for a combat-wounded veteran, they tended to look unfavorably on sending our troops into battle in distant lands — so scratch that as a lesson learned from our forever wars. 

None of this surprises me. American troops are in significant numbers, nor are crowding the waitlists at backlogged Veterans Affairs hospitals as would be the case if those troops had been the only ones doing the fighting.

At points during this century’s war on terror, in fact, the U.S. used more civilian contractors in its ongoing wars than uniformed military personnel. In fact, as of 2019, according to Brown University’s Costs of War Project, which I co-founded, there were than troops in the U.S. Central Command region that includes Afghanistan, Iraq, and 18 other countries in the Middle East, as well as Central and South Asia. As recently as December 2022, the Pentagon had about deployed throughout that region, with concentrated in Iraq and Syria. To be sure, most of those workers were unarmed and providing food service, communications aid, and the like. Even more tellingly, of them were citizens of other countries, particularly ones.

In 2020, retired Army Officer Danny Sjursen an interesting explanation for how the war on terror was then becoming ever more privatized: the Covid-19 pandemic had changed the Pentagon’s war-making strategy as the public began to question how much money and how many lives were being expended on war abroad rather than healthcare at home. As a result, Sjursen argued, the U.S. had begun deploying ever more contractors, remote drones, CIA paramilitaries, and (often abusive) local forces in that war on terror while U.S. troops were redeployed to Europe and the Pacific to contain a resurgent Russia and China. In other words, during the pandemic, Washington placed ever more dirty work in corporate and foreign hands.

(Not) Counting Contractors

It’s been a challenge to write about private security contractors because our government does anything but a good job of counting them. Though the Defense Department keeps of how many civilian contractors it employs and where, they exclude employees contracted with the Central Intelligence Agency or the State Department.

When Costs of War first tried to count contractor deaths by searching official government sources, we came up short. The spouse of a gravely wounded armed contractor directed me to her blog, where she had started to compile a list of just such deaths based on daily Google searches, even as she worked hard caring for her spouse and managing his disability paperwork. She and I eventually lost touch and it appears that she stopped compiling such numbers long ago. Still, we at the project took a page from her book, while adding reported war deaths among foreign nationals working for the Pentagon to our formula. Costs of War researchers then estimated that had been killed in our wars in the Middle East as of 2019, or about more than the U.S. troops who died during the same period.

Social scientists have tried to extrapolate from reported contractor deaths in order to paint a picture of who they were while still alive. They believe that most of them were white veterans in their forties; many were former Special Forces operatives and a number of former officers with college degrees).

Limited Choices for Veterans

How do people of relative racial, economic, and gendered privilege end up in positions that, while well-paid, are even more precarious than being in the armed forces? As a therapist serving military families and as a military spouse, I would say that the path to security contracting reflects a deep in our society between military and civilian life. Although veteran unemployment rates are than those in the civilian population, many of them tend to seek out what they know best and that means military training, staffing, weapons production — and, for some, combat.

I recently spoke with one Marine infantry veteran who had completed four combat tours. He told me that, after leaving the service, he lacked a community that understood what he had been through. He sought to avoid social isolation by getting a government job. However, after applying for several positions in law enforcement agencies, he “failed” lie detector tests (owing to the common stress reactions of war-traumatized veterans). Having accidentally stumbled on a veteran-support nonprofit group, he ultimately found connections that led him to decide to return to school and retrain in a new profession. But, as he pointed out, “many of my other friends from the Marines numbed their pain with drugs or by going back to war as security contractors.”

Not everyone views contracting as a strategy of last resort. Still, I find it revealing of the limited sense of possibility such veterans experience that the companies employing them are large corporations servicing the Department of Defense through activities like information technology support, weapons production, or offers of personnel, both armed and not.

The Corporate Wounded

And keep in mind that such jobs are anything but easy. Many veterans find themselves facing yet more of the same — quick, successive combat deployments as contractors.

Anyone in this era of insurance mega-corporations who has ever had to battle for coverage is aware that doing so isn’t easy. Private insurers can maximize their profits by holding onto premium payments as long as possible while denying covered services.

A federal law called the (DBA) requires that corporations fund workers’ compensation claims for their employees laboring under U.S. contracts, regardless of their nationalities, with the taxpayer footing the bill. The program grew exponentially after the start of the war on terror, but insurance companies have not consistently met their obligations under the law. In 2008, a by the Los Angeles Times and ProPublica found that insurers like Chicago-based CAN Financial Corps were earning up to 50% profits on some of their war-zone policies, while many employees of contractors lacked adequate care and compensation for their injuries.

Congress called on the Pentagon and the Department of Labor to better enforce the DBA in 2011, some companies continued to operate with impunity vis–à–vis their own workers, sometimes even failing to purchase insurance for them or refusing to help them file claims as required by law.  While insurance companies made tens of millions of dollars in profits during the second decade of the war on terror, between 2009 and 2021, the Department of Labor insurers of those contracting corporations a total of only $3,250 for failing to report DBA claims. 

Privatizing Foreign Policy

At its core, the war on terror sought to create an image of the U.S. abroad as a beacon of and the . Yet there is probably no better evidence of how poorly this worked in practice at home and abroad than the little noted (mis)use of security contractors. Without their ever truly being seen, they prolonged that global set of conflicts, inflicting damage on other societies and being damaged themselves in America’s name. Last month, the Costs of War Project reported that the U.S. is now subcontractors Bancroft Global Development and Pacific Architects and Engineers to train the Somali National Army in its counterterrorism efforts. Meanwhile, the U.S. intervention there has only helped precipitate a further in terrorist attacks in the region.

The global presence created by such contractors also manifests itself in how we respond to threats to their lives. In March 2023, a self-destructing drone at a U.S. maintenance facility on a coalition base in northeastern Syria, killing a contractor employed by the Pentagon and injuring another, while wounding five American soldiers. After that drone was found to be of Iranian origin, President Biden ordered an airstrike on facilities in Syria used by Iranian-allied forces. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin , “No group will strike our troops with impunity.” While he later expressed condolences to the family of the contractor who was the only one killed in that attack, his could have more explicitly acknowledged that contractors are even more numerous than troops among the dead from our forever wars.

In late December 2019, a contractor working as an interpreter on a U.S. military base in Iraq was by rockets fired by an Iranian-backed militia. Shortly afterward, then-President Trump ordered an that killed the commander of an elite Iranian military unit, sparking concern about a dangerous escalation with that country. Trump later , “Iran killed an American contractor, wounding many. We strongly responded, and always will.”

I can’t believe I’m saying this, but Trump’s tweet was more honest than Austin’s official statement: such contractors are now an essential part of America’s increasingly privatized wars and will continue to be so, in seemingly ever greater numbers. Even though retaliating for attacks on their lives has little to do with effective counterterrorism (as the Costs of War Project has made clear), bearing witness to war in all their grim diversity is the least the rest of us can do as American citizens. Because how can we know whether — and — our shadowy, shape-shifting wars “work” if we continue to let our leaders wage an increasingly privatized version of them in ways meant to obscure our view of the carnage they’ve caused?

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents the sharp end of the rise of a critical mass of world leaders who think in civilizational rather than national terms. They imagine the ideational and/or physical boundaries of their countries as defined by history, ethnicity, culture, and/or religion rather than international law.

Often that assertion involves denial of the existence of the other and authoritarian or autocratic rule. As a result, Russian President Vladimir Putin is in good company when he justifies his invasion of Ukraine by asserting that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. In other words, Ukrainians as a nation do not exist.

Neither do the Taiwanese or maritime rights of other littoral states in the South China Sea in the mind of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Or Palestinians in the vision of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s coalition partners. Superiority and exceptionalism are guiding principles for men like Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, India’s Narendra Modi, Hungary’s Victor Orban, and Netanyahu. 

In 2018, the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, adopted a controversial basic law defining Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. “Contrary to Israel’s Declaration of Independence, the nation-state law was seen as enshrining Jewish superiority and , as bolstering Israel’s Jewish character at the expense of its democratic character, ” said journalist Carolina Landsmann.

Israeli religious Zionist writer Ehud Neor argued that “Israel is not a nation-state in Western terms. It’s a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy that Jewish people were always meant to be in the Holy Land and to follow the Holy Torah, and by doing so, they would be a light unto the world. There is a global mission to Judaism.”

Similarly, Erdogan describes Turkey as “dünyanın vicdanı,” , a notion that frames his projection of international cooperation and development assistance. “Turkey is presented as a generous patriarch following in the steps of (a particularly benevolent reading of) the Ottoman empire, taking care of those in need—including, importantly, those who have allegedly been forgotten by others. In explicit contrast to Western practices described as self-serving, Turkish altruism comes with the civilizational frame of Muslim charity and solidarity reminiscent of ” said scholars Sebastian Haug and Supriya Roychoudhury.

In an academic comparison, Haug and Roychoudhury compare Erdogan’s notion of Turkish exceptionalism with Modi’s concept of “vishwaguru.” The concept builds on the philosophy of 19th-century Hindu leader Swami Vivekananda. “His rendition of Hinduism, like Gandhian Hindu syncretic thought, ostensibly espouses tolerance and pluralism. With this and similar framings, the adoption of an allegedly Gandhi-inspired syncretic Hindu discourse enables Modi to distance himself politically from the secularist civilizational discourse of (Indian nationalist leader Jawaharlal) Nehru,” the two scholars said. “At the same time, though, Modi’s civilizational discourse, with its indisputable belief in the superiority of Hinduism, has begun to underpin official rhetoric in international forums,” they added.

In a rewrite of history, Putin, in a 5,000-word article published less than a year before the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, portrayed the former Soviet republic as an anti-Russian creation that grounded its legitimacy in erasing “everything that united us” and projecting “the period when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as an occupation.”

In doing so, Putin created the justification civilizationalist leaders often apply to either expand or replace the notion of a nation-state defined by hard borders anchored in international law with a more fluid concept of a state with external boundaries demarcated by history, ethnicity, culture, and/or religion, and internal boundaries that differentiate its superior or exceptional civilization from the other.

Civilizationalism serves multiple purposes. Asserting alleged civilizational rights and fending off existential threats help justify authoritarian and autocratic rule.

Dubbed by Global Times, a flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi has redefined civilisation to incorporate autocracy. In March, Xi unveiled his at a Beijing conference of 500 political parties from 150 countries.

Taking a stab at the Western promotion of democracy and human rights, the initiative suggests that civilisations can live in harmony if they refrain from projecting their values globally. “In other words, ” quipped , “the West should learn to live with Chinese communism. It may be based on Marxism, a Western theory, but it is also the fruit of China’s ancient culture.” Xi launched his initiative days before Biden co-hosted a virtual Summit for Democracy.

The assertion by a critical mass of world leaders of notions of a civilisational state contrasts starkly with the promotion by Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s Indonesia-based largest and most moderate Muslim civil society movement, of the nation-state as the replacement in Islamic law of the civilizationalist concept of a , a unitary state, for the global Muslim community.

Drawing conclusions from their comparison of Erdogan’s Turkey and Modi’s India, Haug and Roychoudhury concluded that civilizationalist claims serve “two distinct but interrelated political projects: attempts to overcome international marginalization and efforts to reinforce authoritarian rule domestically.”

Like Biden, Xi and other civilizationalist leaders are battling for the high ground in a struggle to shape the future world order and its underlying philosophy. Biden’s autocracy vs. democracy paradigm is part of that struggle. But so is the question of whether governance systems are purely political or civilizational. Addressing that question could prove far more decisive for democracies.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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US support for Ukraine over the last year has not been confined to military hardware. The Biden administration has led a global campaign to: condemn Russia; levy both multilateral and unilateral sanctions against the Kremlin and its domestic supporters; persuade allies to provide military and economic assistance of their own; strengthen NATO and usher in new NATO members; and mobilize energy supplies for Europe to substitute for Russian imports.

Despite this broad-based effort to defend Ukraine, the United States has nonetheless displayed a certain degree of caution. It has drawn the line at committing US forces to the battlefield, aside from a handful of . It has refused to support a no-fly zone over the country, and it has not sent over the Black Sea for fear of engaging Russian forces. It has hesitated to supply Kyiv with every weapon system on its wish list, whether fighter jets or long-range missiles. This caution reflects in particular the anxieties of the Pentagon—a risk-averse institution—about provoking an escalation of the conflict both horizontally (into adjoining countries) and vertically (involving non-conventional weapons like tactical nuclear devices).

A Fine and Tricky Balance

The Biden administration has calibrated this balance between military assistance and geopolitical caution within a rapidly changing global context. Russia’s actions have divided the world into three blocs: illiberal supporters of the Kremlin and its imperial policy, the largely democratic club of nations who directly support Ukraine, and the much larger group of fence-sitters who generally acknowledge that the invasion was a violation of international law but are reluctant to break with Moscow.

The United States has tried to turn these divisions into assets by expanding ties with allies, isolating Russia’s few supporters, and pushing the fence-sitters away from the Kremlin. The skepticism that Donald Trump brought to the trans-Atlantic relationship, with his threats to withdraw the United States from NATO, has been decisively reversed. All talk of a “strategic reset” of relations with Russia, which was popular during the Obama years and seemed again possible under Trump, has disappeared. The Biden administration has warned China—and other countries—not to supply Russia with weapons or violate technology bans.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not fundamentally altered US national interests, but it has shifted the means by which Washington pursues those interests.

Certain things remain unclear, however, about US policy. For instance, to what degree is the United States committed to weakening Russia further by supporting either a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive or a prolonged war of attrition? Or is the United States eager to push for negotiations between the aggressor and the victim to resolve a conflict that distracts attention from other strategic US priorities, primarily the containment of China? How long can the Biden administration maintain the flow of military aid to Ukraine, given a divided Congress and weakening public support? What role can the United States play in advancing a just peace in Ukraine? What plans does the United States have for transatlantic relations after the war is over, and in what way does Russia fit into those plans?

What Lies Ahead?

This moment for east-west relations is bleak. The war rages on in Ukraine. Arms control is a dead issue. A cold war threatens to descend upon the larger world order. The “peace” that is discussed in foreign policy circles in the West often comes with several asterisks: loss of territory and a fragile state for Ukraine, lack of prosecution of war crimes for Russia, few guarantees that the conflict will not resume after a strategic pause. This kind of “peace” was secured under the Minsk agreements following Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine in 2014. Ukraine, quite sensibly, fears a “Minsk 3” that effectively rewards the Kremlin for its aggression.

The United States will play a pivotal role in determining this outcome through its mix of military assistance and diplomatic leverage. For now, the Biden administration seems to believe that a relatively low-cost and low-risk commitment will enable Ukraine to achieve the same results that Croatia secured in 1995. If Ukraine fails to do so in the first half of 2023, the Biden administration will have to decide whether to maintain this approach, dramatically increase assistance, or push for a “diplomatic endgame.” There isn’t likely political support now for the second option, given Republican control of Congress. Nor is there sufficient support within the administration to pressure Ukraine to abandon its territorial ambitions. So, unless the Ukrainian government itself decides that it is time to negotiate, the United States will continue with the current status quo approach.

For the time being, then, the Biden administration supports a “just peace” in Ukraine that would give victory to the victim and punishment to the aggressor. But this approach is highly contingent on what happens on the ground in Ukraine and what happens in American politics. Even though they have both benefited from the way the war has squeezed Russia, the United States and China will not let the conflict go on indefinitely. In the interim, however, a relatively weak country that gave up its nuclear weapons three decades ago continues to buck the geopolitical odds by beating back a nuclear superpower bent on expanding its empire. That, in itself, is a win for international law and points toward a more just world order.

[ published this piece, which was originally published in the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Three major topics, absent from the news even six months ago, now dominate everyone’s reflection: multipolarity, dedollarization and, of course, most disquietingly, a potential nuclear showdown between China and the US. Even if the war in Ukraine were to end tomorrow, the world will continue attentively surveying the two slow-moving trends of multipolarity and dedollarization. The degraded relationship between the US and China, however, has suddenly become the focus of more immediate fears. All of these topics are, of course, intimately related.

Because the major factor in Chinese-American relations is the status of Taiwan, commentators are scrutinizing every statement related to a possible shift in the official American position of “strategic ambiguity.” Just as attentively, they listen to every indication coming from China about Beijing’s attitude with regard to Taiwan, as well as its reaction, increasingly militaristic, to what it sees as a pattern of provocations from the US.

With their focus on the governments of China, the US and Taiwan itself, the commentators have paid far less attention to what the Taiwanese people think. After all, in cases like this, where global geopolitical interests are in play and war between nuclear powers appears on the horizon, who bothers listening to what the people of a small island think or desire?

Much like Ukrainians before the Russian invasion, the Taiwanese population is divided. Even more radically, it is confused. No one can predict where the cleverly and secretly planned strategies of superpowers will lead. Especially in a case like this, where the two rivals regard a populated island as a strategic asset they feel it is in their right to control.

If anyone was truly curious about the thoughts and feelings of the Taiwanese people rather than those of the governments involved in the drama, they would be wise to discover a podcast in January with James Lee, an assistant research fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. Among other insights, Lee cites recent polling showing that trust in Taiwan’s principal economic ally, the US, has been declining.

“Something that doesn’t get noticed very much in the United States is, we don’t really know what is driving this doubt about U.S. credibility. From my personal observation, when you watch the news in Taiwan, people here are very, very attentive to the semiconductor industry, and how important it is for Taiwan’s security. Turn on the TV in the daytime and a cable talk show will be talking about TSMC. They’re very concerned that TSMC is going to come under pressure to export its technology to the United States.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Credibility:

An attribute that indicates the level of belief one may have in the sincerity of the intentions of another person, based either on the consistency of that person’s behavior or, in the case of manifestly inconsistent behavior, its ability to bully others into a form of artificial respect.

Contextual note

The US and Western media in general have seriously underestimated the effect of two recent historical moments on the credibility of the US, in its role as a global actor and the reigning hegemon. For many countries that had been taught to count on US protection, the Biden administration’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan served as a wakeup call. The American retreat took place after two decades of an aggressive, persistent, largely unjustified and equally unmanageable war that overturned a government, failed to provide a viable alternative, was extremely costly in blood and treasure, instituted a regime nourished by corruption, only to ultimately abandon the terrain to the enemy it vowed to eliminate. The US added insult to injury when it seized the dollar assets of the Taliban government, aggravating the population’s misery.

The other major dent in US credibility for overseas observers came from the incompetently improvised foreign policy of Donald Trump during his four years in the White House. His slogan “America first” sent a simple message to the populations of the globe: you simply don’t count, even as Washington kept insisting that it alone had the right to apply and enforce the rules of a “rules-based order.” Trump had a specifically traumatizing effect on Taiwan. In the interview Lee explains that “Trump got a lot of people worried when he said that the United States may not adhere to its One China Policy… It seemed Trump was treating Taiwan as a pawn and had a very transactional way of thinking about Taiwan in the U.S.-China relationship. ”

Today, the Taiwanese cannot dismiss the possibility that Trump may even return to power following next year’s election. At the same time it understands that US President Joe Biden, who left Afghanistan by the wayside, is 80 years old and has lost any physical and mental spryness he once may have had. None of this bodes well for Washington’s credibility.

It’s also worth noting that, contrary to the impression US media has created, the Taiwanese fear any deviation from the One China Policy, which insists on seeing Taiwan as part of China. Ambiguity, yes. Independence, no.

Historical note

The US –  and especially its most bellicose Republican senators, followed by much of the media – has achieved a kind of consensus concerning China. They see Beijing’s  visible effort at building up its military as a manifestation of the regime’s imperial ambition. It appears to them as a prelude to invading Taiwan before moving on to subjugate entire swathes of Southeast Asia. This has become the standard template in the US for defining the “secret” intentions of any of its declared enemies. Putin, as everyone should know by now, only invaded Ukraine to reconstitute the Soviet Union and then to deploy his powerful military to dominate Europe.

When George W Bush invaded Iraq and unleashed the dogs of war across great swathes of the Middle East, he claimed: “We will fight them over there so we do not have to face them in the United States of America.” In other words, overturning governments halfway across the globe is “deterrence,” US style. In the podcast, Lee claims that China’s intention behind its military buildup, devoid of any intention of invasion of other countries or even of Taiwan, is “to achieve deterrence.” At the same time he warns that “there is a risk that the U.S. is thinking about this issue too much in military terms, and isn’t doing enough to achieve deterrence on the political side of things.”

How can any observer not see this as part of a pattern? It reflects everything that has played out over recent decades of US foreign policy. The most lucid commentators on the war in Ukraine have been wondering why the Biden administration has not only not pursued a negotiated settlement to the war, but has even prevented the Ukrainians from engaging in negotiations. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin offered the clearest answer to that question a year ago, when he hinted that the aim of the campaign was not to defend Ukraine, but to “weaken Russia.” Others, including Hillary Clinton, have with some delectation about engaging Russia in a war of attrition.

The Taiwanese cannot dismiss the idea that they may be treated in a similar way. This has produced an incredibly uncomfortable situation for Taiwan’s population, who appear to be aware of the fact that they are inextricably connected to China through history, geography, culture and language and only tangentially connected to the US and the rest of the world through their domination of the business of manufacturing semiconductors. But what the Taiwanese think or desire will have little impact on what the world’s most powerful democracy decides concerning their fate.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.

Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Muslim-majority states “de-westernize” their international affairs and establish strategic partnerships with other great powers while reducing their dependence on arms suppliers from the US. They also avoid interstate rivalry and interference in domestic affairs of fellow Muslim-majority states, or other authoritarian great powers.

This article analyzes the foreign affairs of Muslim-majority states through two prisms, descriptive and explanatory. The descriptive section highlights observable data, such as their foreign policy views, commitments, or actions that demonstrate their balanced approach to international affairs. The explanatory section questions the nature of their actions: Why, for example, do Muslim-majority states diversify their relationships beyond Western partnerships, including their increased arms supply from Russia?

A Beacon of Neutrality 

Muslim-majority states maintain a “practical”, “cautious” or “uneasy” neutrality over the Russia-Ukraine War. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan this position by stating, “We cannot hold sides. We cannot take sides. And it wouldn’t be right for us to do that.” 

Imran Khan, the former prime minister of Pakistan, emulated Erdoğan when he refused to blame Russia for the war. He , “countries like Pakistan should not pass any value and moral judgment on this” and they should be “nonaligned, neutral, and friendly to both.” Malaysia has similarly committed to .

Saudi Arabia, like other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), generally the war “as a complicated European conflict.” The GCC leaders see no reason for Arab states “to stand against Vladimir Putin’s government.” Egypt’s foreign ministry released a affirming the importance of “dialogue and diplomatic solutions”. This reluctance to blame and antagonize Russia triggered prompt expressions of frustration from Kyiv’s embassy in Cairo.

Currently, it is difficult to find any statement by Muslim-majority states that supports either the West or Russia. These states have remained studiously neutral. Syrian President Bashar Al Assad is an to this phenomenon.

It’s Not Personal, It’s Policy

The Muslim world’s approach to the invasion reflects their readiness to establish political, economic and security partnerships with multiple players in the international system. They are not choosing alliances with a single power. This is what contemporary Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin and late political scientist Samuel P. Huntington posited when they spoke about Islamic-Orthodox or Islamic-Confucian alliances. Muslim-majority states prefer constructive engagements with various great powers based solely on their commercial, security or geopolitical interests. 

Turkey, for example, sees Russia as an important partner for energy, tourism and regional security. At the same time, as a member of , Ankara is allied with the US and European powers for its security. China has now become Saudi Arabia’s biggest trading partner. The US still remains the Kingdom’s most important security partner though. Since choosing one relationship over the other would be costly, Turkey and Saudi Arabia tend to pursue multi-directional foreign policies. Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Jakarta, Islamabad, and Doha also respect the US as a great power, while maintaining relationships with other great powers.

Muslim-majority states are forging relationships with non-Western groups, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (). Both groups approach international affairs in a multipolar manner, and act as an alternative to the US-led order. In the Middle East alone, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States Emirates (UAE) are current or prospective dialogue partners of the. All medium-sized Muslim-majority countries, such as Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, look positively to BRICS. The same holds for other parts of the Muslim world, specifically Kazakhstan, Nigeria, the UAE, Senegal, Algeria, Uzbekistan and Malaysia. All prefer to participate in remaking the rules of the international system, a process that is now underway. 

More consequential commitments from Muslim-majority states at the multilateral level are found within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (). Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they calls from the US to pump more crude as prices of oil rallied to multi-year highs. In October 2022, Muslim-majority member states within OPEC+ decided to cut crude production by two million barrels a day, a move that benefitted not only Russia, but also themselves. On April 2, Saudi Arabia and other OPEC+ oil producers announced further oil of around 1.16 million barrels per day. For these states, staying friendly with the US is subordinate to pursuing their national economic goals.

Muslim-majority states are also generally reluctant to interfere in the domestic affairs of fellow Muslim states, including on issues of serious human rights violations. In the UN Human Rights Council, no Muslim-majority state member voted for the international fact-finding to independently investigate alleged human rights violations in Iran. Tehran had cracked down on protests that began on September 16, 2022 after the death in police custody of a young Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini.

Muslim-majority states also ignore the domestic affairs of other great powers, including serious human rights violations of Muslim minorities. This behavior of their political leaders, including their state religious bodies, is striking. They have remained silent on the massive detention and forced re-education of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in Northwest China. In July 2019, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, and other Muslim-majority states helped to a Western motion at the United Nations calling for China to allow “independent international observers” into the Xinjiang region. 

This year, a delegation from The World Muslim Communities Council (), which comprises 14 Muslim-majority states, visited Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital. According to its , TWMCC “hailed the efforts of the Chinese authorities in combating terrorism in Xinjiang”. As prime minister, Khan also that hardly any Muslim country, with the exception of Turkey, stands with Pakistan on the rights of the Kashmiri people.

Fighter Jets and Possible Peace

Neutrality in the exercise of international affairs generally does not come cheap. It is important to note that many Muslim-majority states take appropriate measures to protect and pay for their stances. According to a fact sheet of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (), 14 Muslim-majority states are listed among the top 30 largest importers of arms, accounting for 38.8% of the total volume of arms imports from 2017 to 2021. 

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Pakistan and the UAE are listed among the top 10 largest importers of arms. This illustrates that weapon imports from Russia are the most important driver of relations between Muslim-majority states and Moscow. According to , Russia was the largest arms supplier for Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Pakistan from 2017 to 2021. It was the second and third largest supplier for Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Pakistan and the UAE. Moreover, half of the top Russian weapons importers are Muslim-majority states. At the regional level, the Middle East and North African (MENA) region was the most lucrative for Russian arms sales between 2009 and 2018. 

In recent years, Russia’s share of MENA’s defense market has doubled, as arms deliveries by 125% from 1999-2008 to 2009-2018. In 2009-18, Russia weapons to 14 countries in the region, which accounted for 26% of the total volume of Russia’s arms exports. In 1999-2008 this figure was only 14%. As arms imports from Russia increased, imports from the US . They went down from 47% in 2012-16 to 43% in 2017-21. 

Continuing this trend, arms exports from the US to the UAE fell by 36% between 2016 and 2020. The UAE was the second largest recipient of US arms in 2012–16 but fell to the eighth largest in 2017–21. For the same period, arms exports to Turkey fell by 81% as they went from the third largest recipient of US arms exports in 2011–15 to the 19th largest in 2016–20. 

In 2022, Erdoğan that his country is no longer dependent on the US. Facing problems with importing fighter jets, he said, “If we can’t get the results out of the United States about the F-16s, what are we going to do? Of course, we’re going to take care of our own selves”.

The generalization of the Muslim world versus others ignores the important issue of interstate relations between Muslim-majority states. What happens between rival Muslim-majority states in a world that is no longer unipolar? 

Data on civil, proxy, or interstate wars suggest that rival Muslim states compete far less today than in the past. States with previously strained relations, made bilateral U-turns in recent years. Turkey and Saudi Arabia established military collaborations and Erdoğan Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). The Turkish defense minister his Syrian counterpart in Moscow. Saudi Arabia a consulate in Iraq and pledged $1 billion in aid. Additionally, there was a in Yemen and even the civil war in Syria has subsided. 

The recent deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran marks a dramatic departure from years of open hostility. Perhaps even more unexpectedly, Turkey began a with Syria. While the rivalry between Muslim-majority states will not cease completely in the emerging multipolar world, old differences are shrinking considerably.

Assertively Moving from the Periphery 

Leaders in the West might wonder why many Muslim-majority states are reluctant to embrace the Western narrative about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This might come across as surprising given that some of these states host US military troops. To make sense of what is going on, a closer examination of the Muslim world is necessary.

Both the Russian Dugin and the American Huntington depicted a unitary nature of the Muslim world. They generalized Islamic civilization as a single variable or meta-force in international affairs. This has provoked serious and never-ending debate. However, religion has never been the central defining element for Muslim-majority states. Furthermore, Dugin and Huntington did not examine the relationship between Islam and forms of government in Muslim-majority countries. The reality is complex.

Our assumption at the international level is that Muslim-majority states resent the liberal international order and the threat that it poses to their political societies. Their political elites do generally dislike what John Mearsheimer calls “a liberal unipole” in which the US, as the sole superpower in the international system, pursues a policy of “liberal hegemony.” They do not want the liberal American elites to reshape Muslim-majority states in their own image. Indeed, there is a problem in the Muslim world with accepting the universality and superiority of liberal ideology. The liberal political elite in the West believes in democracy and free markets, and wants to impose this on others. Muslim-majority states distrust this Western, especially American, article of faith. They see recent military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as disasters. 

Therefore, Muslim-majority states prefer multipolarity in the international system. In this system, their voices can be heard and they can move from the periphery to the center of international politics. Many Muslim-majority states have progressed from dependent status, serving foreign policy objectives of other great powers, to push for what Pakistani Khan calls “more dignity”, “self-respect” and “independence” in international affairs.

Turkey, for example, has gradually moved from a peripheral state, or as Huntington describes a “torn state”, in the Western block to a core state in its regional sub-system. Turkey’s recent stand on Ukraine or Saudi Arabia’s strategic partnership with China underlines an important shift. A new world order has emerged where China and Russia have become important, and are now challenging the US. 

Michael Singh has how medium-sized states are “eschewing both alignment with a single power and nonalignment, and instead choosing omni-alignment: participation in the multilateral institutions led by the United States and those spearheaded by its rivals.” He argues that “omni-alignment also serves as a hedge against the unpredictability of great-power behavior”. This hedging is most clearly seen in the Middle East, where the future of both US and Chinese engagement remains unclear.

Muslim-majority states view liberal ideology as a threat to their political systems. They prefer strong, sovereign and authoritarian states. The Muslim world still remains unfriendly to liberal democracy, irrespective of variations in faith practices, ideologies, regime characteristics or elite interests. Muslim-majority states are either non-democratic or have no functional democracy by Western standards. Those few Muslim countries that hold regular elections, such as Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia, have not reached the status of “consolidated democracy” according to .

Data on individual freedoms reveals that Muslim-majority states score poorly on the right to vote, freedom of expression and equality before the law. Of all Muslim-majority states that are members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (), not one scored enough to be given the status of a free state. The majority are considered not free, with the rest deemed partially free. Given their opposition to the liberal order, contemporary Muslim kings, presidents, and prime ministers built stronger partnerships with Donald Trump, a like-minded American president. He railed against the liberal order and supported strongmen around the world such as Erdoğan, MBS and Mohamed bin Zayed. In turn, they prefer Trump to Biden.

Shared opposition by Muslim-majority states to the international liberal order is allied to their opposition to liberal norms at the national level. Today, Muslim-majority states and their leaders are aiming to move to a post-liberal, new global order where the East balances the West and where they are no longer “client”, “torn”, “vassal”, or “periphery” states.

It remains to be seen how the push for increased centrality within their regional sub-systems will play out for Muslim-majority states. This new assertive foreign policy of the Muslim world will certainly strengthen multipolarity. It suits China and Russia. However, Muslim-majoirty states will not become part of what Huntington defined as the Islamic-Confucian alliance or what Dugin proposed as a common front of Islamic-Orthodox civilisations against the liberal West.

They will continue to establish political, economic or security partnerships with different players in the international system. Muslim states may even contribute to stability in an anarchic and more complex multipolar system by offering mediation in conflict zones that involve opposing great powers. The future will be very different to the present and Muslim-majority states will become bigger players in the international system.

[edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian nationalism has been on the rise and is a key driver of the Russia-Ukraine War. Russian President Vladimir Putin has fostered this nationalism for decades. He first made his name by crushing the anti-Russian uprising in Chechnya. In recent years, Russia has become more aggressive. In the case of Ukraine, Putin has been particularly aggressive. 

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine sparked a conflict. This violated Ukraine’s sovereignty and has led to a deadly conflict that has claimed thousands of lives.

Tracing the Roots of Russian and Ukrainian Nationalism

Nationalism has always played a big role in Russia’s history. It first came to the fore at the end of the 18th century. In the early 19th century, an of national superiority and honor came into shape, along with a strict loyalty to the ideology of Emperor Alexander I. During what is known as the “Golden Age” of Russian literature, writers such as Ivan Kireevsky, Mikhail Pogodin and Fyodor Tyutchev furthered these sentiments. 

These writers asserted that Russian culture was superior to that of other nations. They glorified Russian martyrs who gave their lives for their country. Over time, this sense of national pride became ingrained in the mindsets of most Russians. 

The Russian Romanticism of 1820-1840 extolled Russian literature, culture, language and orthodoxy as sources of pride and uniqueness. This was also a time when the Russian Empire continued to spread through Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia fought against both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires for territory. This quest for empire fuelled Russian nationalism.

Russia’s nationalism is driven by a sense of being wronged by others and a desire for a strong leader. Throughout history, Russians have faced invasions and attacks from different enemies, such as the Mongols, the Swedes, the Poles and the Nazis. These experiences have shaped their sense of identity and pride.

They also made Russians crave a strong leader who can protect them from any threat. This craving is the reason Russians have tolerated authoritarian rulers for centuries and why many of them support Vladimir Putin today. Putin claims to be a strong leader who can stand up to the West and defend Russia’s interests. 

Ukrainian nationalism also has deep roots in the country’s history. It grew out of a resistance to domination and assimilation by the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. In the 19th century, a group of Ukrainian intellectuals and writers initiated a movement for Ukrainian , which aimed to celebrate and preserve their unique language, culture and national identity. These nationalists also advocated for an independent state, free from outside domination. 

Ukrainian nationalism is no longer simply about asserting independence from Russia. It is also about integrating with Europe and NATO, who are both now seen as partners and allies. Ukrainians view themselves as part of Europe, both geographically and culturally. This is reflected in their desire to embrace Western values and norms, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

At the same time, Ukrainian nationalism is defined more than ever by standing up to Russia’s bullying and meddling. This became progressively worse since Russia took over Crimea and started a war in Donbas. For Ukrainian nationalists, their language, culture and history matter immensely. These Ukrainians are willing to fight and even die to protect the nation. They want to speak Ukrainian in all situations, celebrate Ukrainian holidays and traditions, and honor Ukrainian heroes and achievements.

Putin Sees Ukraine as a Betrayer of Slavic Unity

Putin’s vision of “Great Russia” or a “Russian World,” encompasses not only the territory of modern-day Russia and Ukraine but other countries with significant ethnic Russian populations. They include Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Baltic states. Putin portrays Moscow. as the protector of Russian speakers abroad. Therefore, he constantly advocates for the rights and the interests of Russian speakers in neighboring countries.

Putin once that “since time immemorial, the people living in the southwest of what has historically been Russian land have called themselves Russians and Orthodox Christians”. Russia and Ukraine share a common Eastern Slavic heritage that dates back to the medieval state of Kyivan Rus. Kyivan Rus was the of both Ukraine and Russia. Its ruler, Volodymyr the Great, changed the state religion to Orthodox Christianity in 988 A.D. 

According to Putin, Ukraine’s independence was a result of an erroneous division of land by Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin and his associates. Furthermore, “modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia.” To Putin, this is unacceptable.

Russia wants to keep Ukraine under its control for many reasons. First, it wants to have a buffer zone between itself and NATO countries, which it sees as Russia’s enemies. Putin is not the only Russian who is also worried about NATO’s expansion to Russia’s borders and its interference in its near-abroad, which the country sees as its backyard. Second, Moscow wants to protect the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine. Putin claims that Ukraine is discriminating against them. Third, Russia wants to make sure it has access to important resources such as the natural gas pipelines that run through Ukraine as well as the Ukrainian coastline near Crimea.

The war in Ukraine demonstrates that Russia’s nationalism is all based on a feeling of being wronged by others, a craving for a strong leader and a deep desire to defend ethnic Russians. Over a year of conflict has demonstrated the strength of Russians nationalism and its readiness to fight against the West. It has also shown us how risky and dangerous such nationalism can be and the need for negotiations to avoid more violence.

[Naveed Ahsan edited this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The hope, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, is that the Western allies will continue to furnish money, tanks, missiles, and everything else his battered country needs to fend off Putin’s forces. The war will be won, according to Zelensky, not through backroom compromises but on the battlefield with guns and ammo.

“I appeal to you and the world with these most simple and yet important words,” he to a joint session of Great Britain’s parliament in February. “Combat aircraft for Ukraine, wings for freedom.”

The United Kingdom, which has committed well over in assistance to Ukraine, has so far refused to ship fighter jets there but has promised to supply more weaponry, including tank shells made with depleted uranium (DU), also known as “.” A by-product of uranium enrichment, DU is a very dense and radioactive metal that, when housed in small torpedo-like munitions, can pierce thickly armored tanks and other vehicles.

Reacting to the British announcement, Putin ominously said he would “” if the Ukrainians begin blasting off rounds of DU.

While the UK’s decision to send depleted-uranium shells to Ukraine is unlikely to prove a turning point in the war’s outcome, it will have a lasting, potentially devastating, impact on soldiers, civilians, and the environment. The controversial deployment of DU doesn’t pose faintly the same risks as the actual nuclear weapons Putin and his associates they might use someday in Ukraine or as would a potential meltdown at the embattled in that country. Still, its use will certainly help create an even more lethal, all too literally radioactive theater of war — and Ukraine will end up paying a price for it.

The Radioactive Lions of Babylon

Stuart Dyson survived his deployment in the first Gulf War of 1991, where he served as a lance corporal with Britain’s Royal Pioneer Corps. His task in Kuwait was simple enough: he was to help clean up “dirty” tanks after they had seen battle. Many of the machines he spent hours scrubbing down had carried and fired depleted uranium shells used to penetrate and disable Iraq’s T-72 tanks, better known as the .

Dyson spent five months in that war zone, ensuring American and British tanks were cleaned, armed, and ready for battle. When the war ended, he returned home, hoping to put his time in the Gulf War behind him. He found a decent job, married, and had children. Yet his health deteriorated rapidly and he came to believe that his military service was to blame. Like so many others who had served in that conflict, Dyson suffered from a mysterious and debilitating illness that came to be known as Gulf War Syndrome.

After Dyson suffered years of peculiar ailments, ranging from headaches to dizziness and muscle tremors, doctors discovered that he had a severe case of colon cancer, which rapidly spread to his spleen and liver. The prognosis was bleak and, after a short battle, his body finally gave up. Stuart Dyson in 2008 at the age of 39.

His saga is unique, not because he was the only veteran of the first Gulf War to die of such a cancer at a young age, but because his cancer was later as having been caused by exposure to depleted uranium. In a landmark 2009 ruling, jurors at the Smethwick Council House in the UK found that Dyson’s cancer had resulted from DU accumulating in his body, and in particular his internal organs.

“My feeling about Mr. Dyson’s colon cancer is that it was produced because he ingested some radioactive material and it became trapped in his intestine,” Professor Christopher Busby, an expert on the effects of uranium on health, said in his court testimony. “To my mind, there seems to be a causal arrow from his exposure to his final illness. It’s certainly much more probable than not that Mr. Dyson’s cancer was caused by exposure to depleted uranium.”

The US Department of Defense estimated that American forces fired during that 1991 war to push Iraqi autocrat Saddam Hussein’s military out of Kuwait. The result: a poisoned battlefield laced with radioactive debris, as well as toxic nerve agents and other chemical agents.

In neighboring southern Iraq, background radiation following that war rose to 30 times normal. Tanks tested after being shelled with DU rounds had readings 50 times higher than average.

“It’s hot forever,” explains Doug Rokke, a former major in the US Army Reserve’s Medical Service Corps who helped decontaminate dozens of vehicles hit by DU shells during the first Gulf War. “It doesn’t go away. It only disperses and blows around in the wind,” he adds. And of course, it wasn’t just soldiers who suffered from DU exposure. In Iraq, has been buildingthat DU, an intense carcinogenic agent, has led to increases in cancer rates for civilians, too.

“When we were moving forward and got north of a minefield, there were a bunch of blown-out tanks that were near where we would set up a command post,” says Jason Peterson, a former American Marine who served in the first Gulf War. “Marines used to climb inside and ‘play’ in them … We barely knew where Kuwait was, let alone the kind of ammunition that was used to blow shit up on that level.”

While it’s difficult to discern exactly what caused the Gulf War Syndrome from which Dyson and so many other soldiers suffered (and continue to suffer), experts like Rokke are convinced that exposure to depleted uranium played a central role in the illness. That’s an assertion Western governments have consistently downplayed. In fact, the Pentagon has repeatedly the two.

“I’m a warrior, and warriors want to fulfill their mission,” Rokke, who also suffers from Gulf War Syndrome, Vanity Fair in 2007. “I went into this wanting to make it work, to work out how to use DU safely, and to show other soldiers how to do so and how to clean it up. This was not science out of a book, but science done by blowing the shit out of tanks and seeing what happens. And as we did this work, slowly it dawned on me that we were screwed. You can’t do this safely in combat conditions. You can’t decontaminate the environment or your own troops.”

Death to Uranium

Depleted uranium can’t produce a nuclear explosion, but it’s still directly linked to the development of atomic weaponry. It’s a by-product of the uranium enrichment process used in nuclear weapons and fuel. DU is alluring to weapons makers because it’s heavier than lead, which means that, if fired at a high velocity, it can rip through the thickest of metals.

That it’s radioactive isn’t what makes it so useful on the battlefield, at least according to its proponents. “It’s so dense and it’s got so much momentum that it just keeps going through the armor — and it heats it up so much that it catches on fire,” says RAND nuclear expert and policy researcher Edward Geist.

The manufacturing of DU dates back to the 1970s in the United States. Today, the American military employs DU rounds in its M1A2 Abrams tanks. Russia has also used DU in its tank-busting shells since at least 1982 and there are plenty of accusations, though as yet no hard evidence, that Russia has already deployed such shells in Ukraine. Over the years, for its part, the US has fired such rounds not just in Kuwait, but also in Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, Syria, and Serbia as well.

Both Russia and the US have reasons for using DU, since each has piles of the stuff sitting around with nowhere to put it. Decades of manufacturing nuclear weapons have created a mountain of radioactive waste. In the US, more than of depleted-uranium waste has accumulated since the Manhattan Project first created atomic weaponry, much of it in Hanford, Washington, the country’s main plutonium production site. As I investigated in my book , Hanford is now a cesspool of radioactive and chemical waste, representing the most expensive environmental clean-up project in history with an estimated price tag of $677 billion.

Uranium, of course, is what makes the whole enterprise viable: you can’t create atomic bombs or nuclear power without it. The trouble is that uranium itself is radioactive, as it emits alpha particles and gamma rays. That makes mining uranium one of the most dangerous operations on the planet.

Keep It in the Ground

In New Mexico, where uranium mines were primarily worked by Diné (Navajo People), the toll on their health proved gruesome indeed. According to a 2000 in the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, rates of lung cancer in Navajo men who mined uranium were 28 times higher than in those who never mined uranium. The “Navajo experience with uranium mining,” it added, “is a unique example of exposure in a single occupation accounting for the majority of lung cancers in an entire population.”

Scores of studies have shown a direct correlation between exposure to uranium and , in infants (when mothers were exposed), increased rates of , and several . The list is both extensive and horrifying.

“My family had a lot of cancer,” anti-nuclear activist and Indigenous community organizer Leona Morgan. “My grandmother died of lung cancer and she never smoked. It had to be the uranium.”

One of the largest radioactive accidents, and certainly the least reported, occurred in 1979 on Diné land when a dam broke, flooding the Puerco River near Church Rock, New Mexico, with . The incident received virtually no attention at the time. “The water, filled with acids from the milling process, twisted a metal culvert in the Puerco and burned the feet of a little boy who went wading. Sheep keeled over and died, while crops curdled along the banks. The surge of radiation was detected as far away as Sanders, Arizona, fifty miles downstream,” writes Judy Pasternak in her book .

Of course, we’ve known about the dangers of uranium for decades, which makes it all the more to see a renewed push for increased mining of that radioactive ore to generate nuclear power. The only way to ensure that uranium doesn’t poison or kill anyone is to leave it right where it’s always been: in the ground. Sadly, even if you were to do so now, there would still be tons of depleted uranium with nowhere to go. A put the world’s mountain of DU waste at more than one million tons (each equal to 2,000 pounds).

So why isn’t depleted uranium banned? That’s a question antinuclear activists have been asking for years. It’s often met with government claims that DU isn’t anywhere near as bad as its peacenik critics allege. In fact, the US government has had a tough time even acknowledging that Gulf War Syndrome exists. A Government Accountability Office released in 2017 found that the Veterans Affairs Department had denied more than 80% of all Gulf War illness claims by veterans. Downplaying DU’s role, in other words, comes with the terrain.

“The use of DU in weapons should be prohibited,” maintains Ray Acheson, an organizer for the and author of . “While some governments argue there is no definitive proof its use in weapons causes harm, it is clear from numerous investigations that its use in munitions in Iraq and other places has caused impacts on the health of civilians as well as military personnel exposed to it, and that it has caused long-term environmental damage, including groundwater contamination. Its use in weapons is arguably in violation of international law, human rights, and environmental protection and should be banned in order to ensure it is not used again.”

If the grisly legacy of the American use of depleted uranium tells us anything, it’s that those DU shells the British are supplying to Ukraine (and the ones the Russians may also be using there) will have a radioactive impact that will linger in that country for years to come, with debilitating, potentially fatal, consequences. It will, in a sense, be part of a global atomic war that shows no sign of ending.

[ first published this piece.]

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Mother Russia Losing Its Children

Russia’s population peaked at 142 million in the years just prior to Russia’s ill-fated invasion of Ukraine—and that is still down from the immediate post-USSR high of 149 million. Demographers had Russia’s population to tumble to 120 million by 2050 but now believe that it has already slipped below that level in 2040. In the Ukraine war, the nation suffered over two million casualties and outward migration.

Only the blinkered optimists among Russia’s still-active propagandists project a near-term reversal in population growth. In fact, younger Russians are more discouraged than ever from marrying thanks to the continued dismal state of the economy and attendant lack of interest in having families. Even Russia’s own demographers project continued decline. Moreover, Mother Russia continues to bleed youth, who emigrate in the tens of thousands each year to anywhere offering something better than the bleak prospects of post-Putin Russia.

Other demographic data support their pessimism. Deaths still outnumber births by over half a million. Ethnic Russians, about 72% of the population at the start of the Ukraine war, now comprise just 60% of the country’s population. The, which hovered around 1.52 per Russian female in the early 2020s, has fallen below 1.0, less than half of replacement level. Child-bearing-age women postpone pregnancy indefinitely or simply leave the country. In major cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk and Yekaterinburg, ethnic Russians complain of the growing presence of non-Russian ethnic minorities, increasingly necessary to fill jobs and run what’s left of Russia’s spiraling economy.

Economy: Back to the USSR

The causes of the population decline are many and did not start with the Ukraine war but were accelerated by the conflict. Principal among those is the state of Russia’s economy. Russia’s continued pariah status in the West has meant sanctions and embargoes on key technology equipment and components remain. Cut off from critical inputs like microchips, Russia’s main manufacturing sectors have been reduced to basic machine parts and consumer items that only Russians buy. There is no export sector, except for weapons, exports of which have suffered from sanctions. When asked to comment on their economy, even Russians with no memory of the USSR respond “back to the USSR.”

Most damaging of all, the world is rapidly moving beyond the traditional sources of oil and gas for its energy. Almost all of Europe has moved to renewable sources and the US now relies on fossil fuel for less than half of its energy needs. China, too, is weaning itself off oil and gas, a decision forced on the Chinese leadership by the global momentum toward addressing climate change and by growing cries among the Chinese public for cleaner air in China’s choking cities.

All of this has meant dramatically lower fossil oil prices. Previously the mainstay of the Russian budget and economy, oil commands less than $40 per barrel on most markets, with plunges as low as $25. Natural gas, on which China and many developing nations still rely, has also seen a comparable slide in price. Both have become a buyers’ market now, translating into dramatic revenue declines for Russia and consequent reduced public investment and lowered social welfare payments.

Rated as the eleventh or twelfth largest in the world in 2022, Russia’s $1.8 trillion economy has grown to around $2.5 trillion, too low to even make the world’s top 20. The principal reason for the decline is Russia’s near-total economic dependency on neighboring China. Virtually all its hydrocarbon exports flow to China at lower prices than before, while most of its finished and consumer goods are Chinese imports. And for years, all of Russia’s transactions with China have been in renminbi, which also comprise more than three-quarters of Russian foreign exchange reserves.

In one of military history’s most shocking reversals, Russia, once the source of much of China’s advanced military weaponry, now imports substantial amounts of Chinese weapons, including major military aircraft. While joint production agreements exist, China reserves its most sophisticated weapons and manufacturing for itself, leaving Russia’s armed forces with second-tier armaments and what few advanced weapons it still can manufacture. This means that Russia no longer makes or uses top-level weaponry.

Ukraine Prospers

What has most chagrined Russia’s population, especially its youth, is what has happened across the border in Ukraine. Having reclaimed almost all the territory Russia had annexed in 2014 and 2022, a devastated Ukraine has emerged from the war emboldened, energized, and brimming with new-found hope and pride. Within two years of the war’s end, it had joined the EU and a year later it became a member of NATO. A rising tech sector, which emerged during the war as the nation was forced to innovate its own and Western-imported weapons and equipment, has been perhaps the biggest surprise. Ukraine has acquired a new reputation, evolving into a tech innovation hub, and even attracting some of Russia’s frustrated youth.

After the war, the West, especially the EU, poured development funding into the country to rebuild it. Private capital quickly followed in many of Ukraine’s sectors, including manufacturing, minerals, construction, and agriculture. When Russia failed to follow through with its war reparation pledges, Western governments joined Ukraine in going after Russia’s $300 billion in reserves they had frozen at the start of the war. A landmark legal case in UK courts, which awarded Ukraine tens of billions of dollars in frozen Russia’s assets in Britain, set the precedent and similar settlements followed in France, Germany, the US, and even Switzerland. The few billion in Russian reserves in the West remain out of Moscow’s reach and Russia’s central bank wrote them off long ago.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy handily won Ukraine’s presidential election in the spring of 2024 with more than 70% of the vote. A subsequent worldwide tour won him and Ukraine massive support, especially in the West. Even China’s Xi Jinping, with an eye on Ukraine’s key ports in Odessa and Mariupol, warmly welcomed him to Beijing, promising development support for rebuilding the country. Hailed as the “defender of democracy,” Zelenskyy was welcomed with great fanfare in Washington by both Democrats and Republicans. President Joe Biden received him at the White House on a state visit, the most lavish of his presidency. A tour of major American cities and Silicon Valley won him and his country both plaudits and pledges of investment in Europe’s fastest growing economy.

Important to these supporters and investors, Zelenskyy doubled down on prior efforts to clean up the country’s corruption. With broad public support, most new members of Ukraine’s parliament, the Rada, were elected on clean government platforms, sweeping away vestiges of the old, corrupt guard and elites. Trials of those accused of corruption and payback schemes during the war and the initial phases of reconstruction have been public and garnered widespread attention and support among the Ukrainian people.

Russia Roils

Most galling of all, to rank and file Russians, however, is seeing their nation having to grovel before Beijing. Russia’s voting record on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has become a virtual rubber stamp of Beijing’s. Most shockingly, even when Beijing abstains, Moscow is forced to do China’s bidding by vetoing UNSC resolutions clearly not in Russia’s best interests. UN diplomats jokingly refer to Moscow as Beijing’s errand boy in New York.

Russians bristle at their reduced stature in the world. Pockets of resistance have grown into movements. Of late, opposition groups and demonstrations have mobilized around the theme of Russia shedding its client-state status to China. When Moscow sought to clamp down—they were acting on Beijing’s order to quickly snuff out the rebels—it only further amplified the ire of Russians everywhere.

Increasingly, gangs of Russian youth in multiple cities and even smaller towns have been seen tearing down Beijing-supplied surveillance equipment, which has become ubiquitous throughout Russia. Rebel youth groups have become so brazen that their destructive acts proliferate throughout social media under the hashtag “Not China’s East Germany.” They demand that Russia drop its vassalage to Beijing and turn to the West and democracy.Russian leaders who succeeded Putin regularly trek to Beijing now for what Russians presume are China’s newest marching orders for its client. Dreams of a new Russian imperial union once entertained by Putin have now dissolved into subservience to the boss in Beijing. The Chinese boss is behaving just like his Soviet 20^th century predecessors. Putin’s imperial dream has turned into a nightmare but the Russian people do not intend to live forever in it. In 2040, Russia is on the verge of another revolution.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Sure, in the post-1991 era, nuclear war could still happen by mistake. It could break out between two actively hostile nuclear powers like India and Pakistan. It could be triggered by a disgruntled new nuclear club member like North Korea. And, of course, a conflict between the superpowers themselves—United States, China, Russia—could escalate to a nuclear exchange because of miscalculation, misinformation, or simply a few missing synapses in the brains of the leaders.

But what had once been a front-and-center obsession during spikes in Cold War tensions—from backyard bomb shelters to films like The Day After—had become in recent years more like ominous but muted background music. Meanwhile, other existential crises stepped to the fore, like climate change, pandemics, and artificial intelligence run amok. Apocalyptic ends have still loomed large in the public imagination: not so much with a bang any more but a whimper.

Now, after Russia invaded Ukraine last year, nuclear war is once again competing to become the planetary catastrophe de jour. The Russian decision this week to in Belarus, possibly bringing them closer to deployment, has analysts in the West second-guessing the Kremlin’s calculations. Would Russian President Vladimir Putin actually go nuclear, either to gain battlefield advantage or to a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive from restoring the country’s pre-2014 borders?

This prospect of a nuclear war, however limited, has pushed quite a few peace activists in the West to at whatever the cost. Policy analysts, too, not to overreach, for instance by threatening Russian control of Crimea, out of concern that the conflict could escalate to the nuclear threshold.

The threat of nuclear war should never be treated casually, particularly when such weapons are in the hands of madmen like Nixon, Trump, or Putin. This January, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved their Doomsday Clock to 90 seconds to midnight. It’s never before been so close.

All of this requires a sober assessment of the nuclear risks involved in the Ukraine war and what can be done to minimize them.

The Clock Strikes Almost Midnight

Back in 1991, the Doomsday Clock stood at 17 minutes before . That’s the greatest margin of safety since the clock debuted in 1947. Subsequent US presidents squandered an historic opportunity to rewind the clock even more. Despite the reassurances provided by Barack Obama that he was indeed committed to nuclear disarmament—if not during his presidency then at some undefined time in the future—the clock remained poised several minutes before midnight for most of his tenure in office. When Trump took office, the measurement switched from minutes to seconds. Then this January, the second hand ticked down from 100 seconds to 90.

The Bulletin’s well-reasoned decision to advance the clock places all the blame on Russia. The editorial discusses Russian threats to use nuclear weapons, its violations of international law, its false accusations concerning Ukraine’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased the risk of nuclear weapons use, raised the specter of biological and chemical weapons use, hamstrung the world’s response to climate change, and hampered international efforts to deal with other global concerns,” the editors .

At the same time, the Bulletin stresses the need for the United States to keep open the option of “principled engagement” with Russia to reduce the risk of nuclear war. There is no recommendation that Ukraine or its supporters pull their punches to reduce this risk. Instead, the editors speak of “forging a just peace.”

Although the Doomsday Clock is a powerful visual suggestion that the threat of nuclear war has increased with the conflict in Ukraine, Western politicians and analysts have downplayed the actual risk of a nuclear attack. Here, for instance, is the of the Institute for the Study of War, which produces an influential daily analysis of the military and political developments in Ukraine:

“The announcement of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus is irrelevant to the risk of escalation to nuclear war, which remains extremely low. Putin is attempting to exploit Western fears of nuclear escalation by deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. Russia has long fielded nuclear-capable weapons able to strike any target that tactical nuclear weapons based in Belarus could hit. ISW continues to assess that Putin is a risk-averse actor who repeatedly threatens to use nuclear weapons without any intention of following through in order to break Western resolve.”

It might seem counterintuitive to argue that Putin is a “risk-averse actor.” Didn’t he invade Ukraine last year without sufficient preparation? Didn’t he put Russia’s economy at risk of serious damage because of the invasion? Hasn’t he cavalierly destroyed several decades of carefully cultivated relations with Europe and the West?

In fact, with the exception of the ill-prepared invasion itself, Putin has been quite careful. He took pains to sanction-proof the Russian economy and replace European oil and gas clients with Asian ones. He hasn’t shifted to a war economy. Nor has he declared an all-out aerial war on all parts of Ukraine (though that’s likely because of Ukraine’s ).

Most importantly, he hasn’t risked direct confrontation with NATO powers. The most logical strategy for Russia at this point is to interdict Western shipments of arms to Ukraine. Back in March 2022, the Russian government that it would do so. But it has failed to do so. Partly that’s because Russia lacks capacity and military . But it’s also because Putin doesn’t want to draw NATO into the war. It’s been hard enough for Russia to fight against Ukrainian soldiers and a handful of international volunteers. The introduction of NATO battalions would be game over for Russia.

Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons could also draw NATO more directly into the conflict, which no doubt restrains Putin’s hand. The fact that Xi Jinping, on his recent trip to Moscow, explicitly Putin not to use nukes only reinforces the prohibition.

Not everyone believes that the risk of nuclear war is “extremely low,” as ISW put it.

Longtime security analyst Carl Conetta agrees that the likelihood of a direct Russian nuclear strike against Ukraine is low. But he other nuclear options for Russia such as

“a demonstration blast in remote areas of Russia. Such an action would be intended and likely to have a powerful psychological effect not easily mollified by official US reassurances to NATO allies and other countries. But such a gambit would also involve and/or provoke abruptly heightened levels of strategic force readiness on both sides of today’s strategic divide, and this would be uniquely dangerous.”

Conetta also notes that Russia’s nuclear doctrine has shifted over the last year, and the Kremlin may well redefine what constitutes an existential threat to Russia to allow for the use of nuclear weapons. In the end, he concludes that “although the probability of a big power nuclear clash of any magnitude over Ukraine remains low, it would be irrational and irresponsible to act as though we can roll the nuclear dice and never come up ‘snake eyes.’”

Masha Gessen, the prolific critic of Putin, has also sounded a about Putin’s willingness to go nuclear. She grounds these fears in an analysis of Putin himself.

“He believes that, on the one hand, he is facing down an existential threat to Russia and, on the other, that Western nations don’t have the strength of their convictions to retaliate if it comes to nukes. Any small sign of a crack in the Western consensus—be it French President Emmanuel Macron pressuring Ukraine to enter peace negotiations, or the House Republican leader Kevin McCarthy criticizing what he sees as unconditional aid to Ukraine—bolsters Putin’s certainty.”

She concludes that only the threat of massive conventional retaliation by NATO and the West stays Putin’s hand. Also note Gessen’s terrible irony: the more that peace activists call for negotiations to reduce the risk of nuclear war, the more Putin will interpret the successful pick-up of that message as a sign that he can use nukes with impunity.

The Politics of Good and Evil

Superpowers that do evil should not be allowed to continue doing so simply because they possess nuclear weapons. Those who have resisted the spread of the US empire in Asia, Africa, and Latin America didn’t lay down their arms or stop protests in the streets because of the threat that Washington would use nuclear weapons. They confronted the evil of US occupation and, in many cases, they succeeded.

Oh, but Putin is different, you might say. The Russian leader is making actual nuclear threats. He is promising to move nukes closer to the front (as opposed to the United States, which hasn’t moved its 100 or so tactical from storage facilities in Western Europe). He is a mad man and will stop at nothing to create his “Russian world” out of territory absorbed from countries on Russia’s borders.

But as should be clear from the above, Putin has stopped short at several junctures. He has committed war crimes, to be sure. But so far he has not listened to the right-wing critics at home who urge him to fight a total war in Ukraine. He hasn’t listened to them because the Russian military doesn’t have sufficient capacity and because he fears the consequences of such a dramatic escalation.

It should go without saying that the United States must keep open lines of communication with Moscow and pursue arms control negotiations. The Biden administration should be careful to focus on the importance of defending Ukraine and avoid any statements that call into question the existential status of Russia or Putin’s regime. Direct NATO involvement in the conflict, which could indeed trigger a world war, should be avoided.

So, it’s up to Ukraine—not only to defend itself but to prevent Putin from using nuclear blackmail to achieve his ends. That might also mean, paradoxically, that it will be up to Ukraine to show restraint in defeating Russia to prevent Putin from using actual nukes to forestall his own end. Ukraine thus must fight against two evils simultaneously: the reality of Putin and the possibility of nuclear war.

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There wasn’t much for Putin to celebrate. The invasion had failed to dislodge the government of Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv or incorporate all of Ukrainian territory into greater Russia.

Over the last year, the Russian military has 60-70,000 fatalities plus nearly 200,000 injuries. It has half of its fleet of tanks, and monthly it continues to lose while only managing to replace 20 of them from the country’s only tank factory.

The call-up of new recruits for the army in the fall significant pushback throughout the country. The new soldiers, many of them well into , are and equipped. Russians of the Ukrainian front as a “meat grinder” because the Russian army has been throwing wave after wave of these unprepared recruits into the line of fire.

Russia Is Not Doing So Well

The much-anticipated Russian winter offensive to retake territory in the Donbas region has either not materialized or failed to make any mark beyond some negligible gains around the battered city of Bakhmut. Western intelligence that nearly all of Russia’s forces are now deployed to Ukraine, and all of these soldiers still haven’t been able to turn the tide in Russia’s favor.

The Russian economy hasn’t collapsed under the weight of international sanctions, but it isn’t doing well. Russian GDP shrank by last year. Hundreds of foreign companies have or suspended operations. The Putin government has kept the economy afloat—and its war effort funded—by increasing exports of raw materials, especially fossil fuels. But this is not a sustainable strategy.

Somewhere between 500,000 and a million of Russians the country, either in protest of Putin’s policies or to avoid serving in the military. Although this exodus has reduced the ranks of Putin’s opposition, it has also robbed the country of its most creative professionals. Combined with the failure to diversify the economy away from raw materials, this “brain drain” means that Russia is mortgaging its future in order to wage war in Ukraine.

On the foreign policy front, Putin’s determination to expand the “Russian world” has served only to expand the coalition of forces equally determined to halt his advance. Sweden and Finland, despite decades of ambivalence, have signed up to join NATO. In Finland, public support for NATO membership, which stood at in 2018, rose to in fall 2022. Justifiably angry at NATO’s eastward creep, Putin has nonetheless provided the Western alliance with the motivation to add to its ranks, increase its military spending, and accelerate its coordination with non-members like Ukraine.

Meanwhile, after the invasion, Putin lost nearly all of his within European far-right parties. Even his non-European allies are wavering. Only seven countries voted against the UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although China and India, among other countries, continue to buy Russian energy, often at a significant discount, they are not happy with the war and have pushed for a peace settlement.

Putin Still Carries On

Despite all of these failures, Putin remains committed to the war. At the very least, he wants to control all of the Donbas—the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk—as well as the land in southern Ukraine that connects the Russian mainland to the Crimean Peninsula, which the Kremlin seized in 2014. The Russian president believes that he can win a war of attrition, given that Russia has a demographic edge over Ukraine. Even though Russia has lost upwards of a million people to emigration post-invasion, far more have left Ukraine: around 8 million, around 20 percent of the population.

Putin also thinks that support in the West for Ukraine will decline and the military assistance will dry up. Polls in the and indeed confirm that support for unabated military assistance has ebbed. This hasn’t yet affected deliveries of weapons. But it could.

Ukraine is certainly concerned that a drawn-out conflict will not be to its advantage. That’s why Zelensky has been trying to get as many arms—the more sophisticated the better—as soon as possible. Much hinges on a second Ukrainian counter-offensive, slated for some time in the spring after the mud has dried up. If Ukrainian forces can drive a wedge between the Donbas and Crimea, it can isolate the latter and create an aura of inevitability around its efforts to expel Russian occupiers.

Call this the Croatian scenario, after the successful 1995 campaign by the Croatian army to push Serbian forces out of positions they occupied inside Croatia. Ultimately, Operation Storm led to a peace agreement that ended the Yugoslav wars and contributed to undermining Serbian support for strong-arm leader Slobodan Milosevic, who lost elections five years later.

The other scenario is the Korean one. As in the Korean War, the first year of the Ukrainian conflict has featured dramatic reversals of territorial control. What comes next might resemble the last two years of the Korean War, in which the two sides battled to a virtual stalemate around the original line of demarcation. If Ukraine and Russia battle to a similar stand-off, they might also agree to a reluctant armistice.

It’s hard to know which of these scenarios will transpire. If there is one salient take-away from the first year of the war in Ukraine it’s the unpredictability of the course of events.

Russia surprised nearly everyone by actually invading Ukraine. Kyiv then surprised almost everyone by successfully repelling the attack, followed by a surprise counter-offensive that pushed even more Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. Meanwhile, despite many predictions of collapse, Russia hasn’t backed down.

Perhaps this second year will see the biggest surprise of all: an end to the war that is just, with the aggressor punished and the victim vindicated. That kind of peace is certainly worth fighting for.

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Putin himself, however, has a longer memory. In the speech that launched his “special operation,” he pointedly the US for “the invasion of Iraq without any legal grounds.” Then he added, “We witnessed lies made at the highest state level and voiced from the high U.N. rostrum. As a result, we see a tremendous loss in human life, damage, destruction, and a colossal upsurge of terrorism.”

Yes, it’s true, on the 20th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, that war is long forgotten here. No one in the Biden administration today cares that it ruined what credibility America had as a pillar of international order in the and gave Putin cover for his own atrocity. So, sit back for a moment and let me take you on a little trip into a long-lost all-American world.

Mission (Un)Accomplished

On May 1, 2003, arrayed in Top Gun gear, President George W. Bush sat in the co-pilot’s seat of a fighter jet and was to the USS Abraham Lincoln, the aircraft carrier then stationed just off the coast of San Diego. No rationale drove this high-priced jaunt save the visuals his propaganda team hoped to generate.

Then, from that ship’s deck beneath a banner that proclaimed, “Mission Accomplished,” he made a televised speech about the invasion of Iraq he had ordered less than two months earlier. Bush proudly that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.” Of course, neither assertion would prove faintly true. In fact, some 2,500 US troops are still stationed in Iraq to this day, aiding in the fight against leaders of that country’s former Baath Party government who have now become fundamentalist guerrillas. And keep in mind that those troops remain there even though the Iraqi parliament them to leave.

The rest of Bush’s speech deserves more infamy than it’s attained. The president declared, “Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians.” Dream on, but of course Bush gave that “Mission Accomplished” speech to whitewash a war of aggression as a routine instrument of presidential policy. Describing the ramshackle, fourth-world country of Iraq then as “dangerous” and “aggressive” was as hyperbolic as Putin’s categorization of Volodomyr Zelenksy’s Ukraine as a “Nazi” state.

Note, however, that one phrase was missing from Bush’s Napoleonic screed about forcibly spreading “democracy” and “freedom” with that new tool, “precision warfare,” and that was, of course, “international law.” At the Nuremberg trials after World War II, the International Military Tribunal had ,

“War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”

And, of course, the United Nations charter forbids military aggression. It allows war only in self-defense or if the Security Council authorizes it.

On the deck of that aircraft carrier, however, Bush had the nerve to say: “When Iraqi civilians looked into the faces of our servicemen and women, they saw strength and kindness and goodwill.” 

In fact, Iraqis had spent a significant part of the twentieth century trying to get British colonialists out of their country and it was hardly surprising that, in 2003, so many of them didn’t see such virtues in the forces that had invaded their land. The US military personnel on the ground I talked to, then or later, often spoke of the sullen, angry gazes of the Iraqis they encountered. One acquaintance of mine, Lieutenant Kylan Jones-Huffman, sent me a message that very summer in which he described sitting in the back of a troop transport with other American forces on a road in southern Iraq and being passed by a truckload of armed Iraqis. One of them squinted sourly at them and lifted his rifle menacingly. Kylan said he just patted his M1 rifle, returning the threat.

A Navy reservist and Middle East specialist, he planned on a post-military academic career, having completed a Ph.D. in history. Insightful and easy-going, a crafter of exquisite haiku poetry, Kylan promised to be an exciting colleague for me. He told me he was being sent from Bahrain to brief the military brass in the city of Hillah in southern Iraq. On the evening of August 21, 2003, as I was watching CNN, on the scroll at the bottom of the screen I noticed an American had been shot dead in Hillah and that left me uneasy. The next day I learned that Kylan had indeed been the victim, by a young Iraqi as he waited in a jeep at an intersection. It was an elbow to the gut that left me in tears — and it still hurts to tell the story.

He was, in fact, one of more than US military personnel to die in Iraq, Afghanistan, or other “War on Terror” locales, along with 8,000 Pentagon contractors. And that’s not even to mention the more than 30,000 veterans of those conflicts who later committed suicide. One of them took my class on the modern Middle East at the University of Michigan. Well-informed and good-natured, he nevertheless couldn’t survive to the end of the semester, given whatever demons his experiences over there had burdened him with. In fact, for those still thinking about Iraq, the gut-punches of that war never stop.

And don’t forget the more than 53,000 American military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan who were injured badly enough in battle to end up in a hospital. About 10% of them had wounds on an injury severity scale of nine or greater, suffering, according to one National Institutes of Health , from horrors that included traumatic brain damage, open wounds, chronic blood-clotting, and burns.

Corpse Patrols

And all of that was nothing compared to what the US military did to Iraqis.

It should come as no surprise that President Bush, Vice President , Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and the other architects of one of America’s biggest foreign-policy fiascos in its 246 years of existence could support the bald-faced lie that they had invented a new kind of warfare that didn’t produce significant civilian deaths or casualties. Mind you, they also told about Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s nonexistent ties to the al-Qaeda terror group and his supposedly active biological and nuclear weapons programs.

Contrary to President Bush’s glib assertions, the death toll in Iraq only burgeoned as the fighting went on. American planes routinely struck targets in densely populated Iraqi cities. Some American troops committed , as did mercenaries working for the US military. During the civil war of 2006-2007 that emerged from the American occupation of the country, the Baghdad police had to establish a regular corpse patrol dispatched at the beginning of each workday to load up carts with human remains tossed in the streets overnight by rival sectarian militias.

In the years just after the Bush invasion, one Iraqi widow from the southern port city of Basra told me that her family barely avoided being attacked by members of a destitute, displaced tribe then running a protection racket in the city. The family’s escape cost them all the cash they had on hand and required them to provide a feast for the tribesmen. Determined to try to improve the situation, the man of the household ran for public office. One day, he had just gotten into his car to go campaigning when a masked assailant suddenly appeared and shot him point blank in the head. His tearful widow told me that she could never get over the sight. And such events were hardly uncommon then.

By the time the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the terrorist cult that emerged from the US occupation of the country, finally went down to defeat in 2019, Brown University’s Costs of War Project that some 300,000 Iraqis had died “from direct war-related violence caused by the US, its allies, the Iraqi military and police, and opposition forces.” Several times that number were wounded or crippled. Hundreds of thousands of lost their family breadwinners and some of them were reduced to a lifetime as beggars. Even larger numbers of lost one or both parents. And keep in mind that such figures don’t include Iraqis who died from indirect but war-related causes like the of the provision of potable water and electricity thanks to US bombing raids and damage to the country’s infrastructure. 

The American Example in Iraq

In the first phase of the war, during the Bush years, Iraqis were displaced, some 1.5 million leaving the country and the rest internally. Many could never return home. One evening in the summer of 2008, while interviewing Iraqi refugees in Amman, Jordan, I had dinner with a professional couple, an architect and a physician. I mentioned that the worst of the civil war seemed to be over and asked if they planned to return to Baghdad. The man was a Sunni, his wife a Shiite. She explained that their home had been in an upscale Shiite district and they feared returning since so many neighborhoods had been ethnically cleansed .

Another man — call him “Mustafa” — was then in exile in the slums of East Amman. The members of his Sunni Iraqi family, denied work permits, were living off their dwindling savings. His wife was thinking of taking in sewing to make ends meet. Mustafa explained that he had gotten an envelope in the mailbox of his old Baghdad apartment from a militant Shiite militia, saying that if he and his family were still there in 24 hours, they would be dead. So, he and his wife had immediately packed everything they could fit into their car, awakened the children, and driven the nine hours to Amman. Mustafa hesitated. He looked around and lowered his voice. He had, he said, gotten threatening mail even in Jordan and moved to another apartment. The militia still had its eyes on him and had likely penetrated the expatriate Iraqi community. So, no, he and his wife couldn’t, he assured me, go home to Baghdad.

Under the Americans, there was no security for anyone. Two decades ago, Bush appointees dissolved the old Iraqi army and failed to train an effective new one or institute professional policing. I visited Baghdad in May 2013 during the interregnum between the two American campaigns in Iraq, to attend an international conference. We were taken by our kind Iraqi hosts to the National Museum and out to nice restaurants. To do so, however, we had to pile into white vans surrounded by Iraqi army vehicles, which strong-armed all the other traffic out of the way and ensured that our convoy never came to a standstill and so wouldn’t be the target of an ambush.

Bush’s disastrous war of aggression was a gift that just keeps giving. The disruption of Iraqi society and its government by that invasion ultimately paved the way for ISIL to take over 40% of that country’s territory in 2014. Six million Iraqis fled the brutal cultists and a million and a half of them are still . Some fled to Turkey, where their lives were only recently devastated by the February 2023 earthquakes.

Today, the coffers of the Iraqi state treasury , even though the country should have earned $500 billion in oil revenues since 2003. and inefficiency have become a hallmark of the new order. The unstable government installed by the US, dominated by Shiite religious parties, has gone through three prime ministers since 2018. Journalist Jonah Goldberg’s that Iraqis would come to love the new constitution crafted under American rule in 2005 was woefully misplaced. He exemplified the pro-war intellectuals who insisted that their right-wing politics endowed them with superior judgment when it came to a country about which they, in fact, knew next to nothing. 

In Iraq itself in recent years, young crowds have repeatedly gone into the streets to demand that the government once again provide basic services. The current prime minister, Mohammad Shia al-Sudani, is close to the Iran-backed militias that now play an outsized role in Iraqi politics. If anyone won the Iraq War, in fact, it was .

Economists had that the cost of the Iraq War to the United States, once you added in care for wounded veterans for the rest of their lives, had already reached $6 trillion even before the ISIL campaign of 2014-2019. Without the sums squandered in Iraq, our national debt would still be below our annual gross national product, putting us in a much more favorable economic position in 2023. As in today’s Russia, in the zeros of this century a war mentality fostered a fierce and of difference on the right, which is still unfolding.

One of the mantras of the US government today, facing Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, is the of “the United Nations Charter” and a “rules-based international order.” That stands in contrast, of course, to what Washington now sees as the true international outlaw on Planet Earth, Putin’s Russian Federation. The Russian economy has been treated as the Iranian one was, subjected to relentless sanctions and boycotts. A Senate sponsored by Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) called on the International Criminal Court, the authority of which the US , to put Russian officials on trial for war crimes.  

Graham was one of the chief cheerleaders of the equally illegal Iraq War. Hypocrisy on such a scale is hardly impressive for a country still seeking to be the global power on this planet. In retrospect, on the 20th anniversary of the nightmarish decision to invade Iraq, we’ve lost more than our credibility in the Global South or a true commitment to international law. As a country, we lost our moral compass and now, amid Russian crimes in Ukraine, it seems that we have also lost all memory of the path we paved and the example we set in Iraq, as well as the crimes that went with it.

[h first published this piece.]

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Putin’s February speech echoed his earlier speeches. It is part of a narrative he has crafted over the years and the long game he is playing. Putin’s on the Kremlin website dated July 12, 2021 covers much of the same ground. Both reveal the depth of Russian resentment and the strength of Putin’s paranoia.

In February, the Russian president yet again complained about “NATO’s expansion to our borders” and hundreds of American military bases around the world. He accused the US-led West of seeking “unlimited power,” and, as per American experts, killing “almost 900,000 people” and creating 38 million refugees since 2001.

Putin claimed that Western elites have embarked on an “anti-Russia project” and have “already spent over $150 billion on helping and arming the Kiev regime.” In contrast, the G7 countries have “earmarked about $60 billion in 2020–2021 to help the world’s poorest countries.” The Russian strongman accused the West of being warmongering, hypocritical and hegemonic. According to Putin, Western elites care about domination, not poverty alleviation, sustainable development or environmental protection. He claimed that the “West is using Ukraine as a battering ram against Russia and as a testing range” because Moscow is too proud to kowtow to Washington.

Ominously, Putin announced in his speech that “Russia [was] suspending its membership in the New START Treaty” that aims at reducing nuclear warheads and the missiles and bombers capable of delivering them.

What is the New START Treaty?

The US State Department us that the New START Treaty is the “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.” It came “into force on February 5, 2011,” and both parties had “agreed to extend the treaty through February 4, 2026.”

This treaty placed “verifiable limits on all Russian deployed intercontinental-range nuclear weapons.” The New START Treaty also set limits for nuclear weapons, which are as follows:

• 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments;
• 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (each such heavy bomber is counted as one warhead toward this limit);
• 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

It is important to note that START negotiations in 1982 and continued for decades. The START I Treaty was signed by George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev on July 31, 1991. The Soviet Union collapsed by the end of that year but START I survived. Russia under Boris Yeltsin continued to adhere to it. When Dmitry Medvedev was president, Russia signed the New START Treaty that has persisted since.

To be clear, Russia has not withdrawn from the New START Treaty. In Putin’s words, Russia is “suspending [its] participation.” He has put a precondition to returning to “discussing this issue” — the nuclear arsenals of NATO powers, France and the UK are now on the table. Simply put, this treaty is on hold: Russia could reinstate it speedily unlike the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which stands abandoned and would have to be renegotiated. Even suspension of the New START is dangerous and has upped the ante in what the US Army War College first called a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous () world.

Putin claims that the times have changed radically since 1991 when Bush Senior and Gorbachev signed the first START agreement. He referred to George W. Bush’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as proof of American perfidy. In return for Russian support for the US after the 9/11 attacks, Moscow got stabbed in the back by Washington. The Russian president is not alone in remembering this US decision. In December 2021, James M. Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace called Bush Junior’s decision to from the ABM Treaty “an epic mistake.” Other analysts, especially from the so-called Global South, remember this withdrawal vividly. Acton rightly argued that Bush Junior’s unilateral action “fueled a new arms race.” Putin’s decision might have just poured oil and blown gas on that race.

Why Putin’s decision matters

In the Cold War, many people around the world feared a nuclear war. A key by the Union of Concerned Scientists tells us that there have been a number of “close calls with nuclear weapons.” In the 1950s and 1960s, both the US and the Soviet Union kept bombers armed with nuclear weapons on “airborne alert.” To mitigate risks of an accidental nuclear war, the Soviet Union and the US Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the 1970s. Eventually, they led to START and the New START Treaty.

In recent years, geopolitical temperatures have been rising. The Russia-Ukraine War has not only brought back large-scale conflict to Europe after World War II but also heightened the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. Everyone assumes that nuclear war is far too destructive and no one could reasonably countenance it. Yet the fact sheet tells us that we came close to war on numerous occasions.

Three examples are noteworthy. On October 5, 1960, the US early warning system at Thule, Greenland detected that dozens of Soviet missiles had been launched against the US. Luckily, Nikita Kruschev was visiting New York at that time. So, Americans decided that must have been a false alarm. Indeed, it was. It turns out that “the radar had been fooled by moonrise over Norway.” Another false alarm “happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis” on October 28, 1962. 

A third false alarm occurred on September 26, 1983 when an early warning satellite detected that five US missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. This was a time of high US-Soviet tensions. Earlier in the month, the Soviets had shot down a Korean Airlines plane that had strayed into their airspace, killing almost 300 people. The officer on duty believed this was a false alarm and took the bold decision of not following the set procedures, averting nuclear war. We now know that the satellite had been fooled by the sun’s reflection on the top of the clouds. With heightened tensions today, no officer on duty, American or Russia, would dare to overrule any warning system. Human errors, technical problems and procedural mistakes have occurred in the past. There is no reason to assume that these could not happen again. The end of the New START Treaty has ratcheted up tensions in our VUCA world. Putin does not really have to press the nuclear button or use tactical nuclear weapons for matters to get out of hand. Any false alarm could set off an accidental nuclear war.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On the eastern side, the Russian rulers are strongly interested in maintaining control over Siberia, which gives the country access to the Pacific Ocean. Hence, they have a geopolitical interest in having friendly relations with China. On the western side, Russia retains access to the Baltic Sea in Saint Petersburg and has managed to keep the enclave of Kaliningrad despite the three Baltic republics declaring independence from the Soviet Union. On the southern side, Russia wants access to the Black Sea, which is the gateway to the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. Hence, Crimea is of vital importance to Russia.

If Putin were a new Peter the Great or a new Stalin, a settlement between great powers would be within reach: a Yalta-Potsdam-style division of spheres of influence. But as a country in decline with repeated loss of territories, Russia views the hostility from its neighbors as an existential threat. Therefore, it has responded with exasperated despair.

Not a very good war so far

The invasion has not worked as well for Russia as Putin expected. We have learned that, in war, it is more difficult to conquer than to defend. Some experts in military history and strategy estimate that for an attack to succeed in conquering adverse territory,the attacker may need more resources, in troops and weapons, than the defender. This alone can explain why, so far, the Russians haven’t entered Kyiv or Kharkiv, while the Ukrainians have not arrived in Crimea or most of the Donbas.

The attacker’s disadvantage is aggravated by bad management, typical of authoritarian governments. As stated by strategist “A lot of most catastrophic decisions come from autocratic decision-making.” Autocracies lack open and often critical feedback. They believe that “the advantage of autocracy is bold and decisive decision-making.” However, the lack of feedback mechanisms mean that “one poor decision or bit of bad luck can put [them] out completely.”

Along with catastrophic decisions, Russia has been hampered by the fact that some crucial potential allies have not joined its adventure. A few weeks before the invasion, Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed an agreement for “unlimited cooperation,” but the Chinese have kept their distance since the war broke out. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has gone further than Xi and told Putin in public that today’s era is not an era of war.

A long bloody war looms

The current protracted stalemate has so far not yielded a clear winner. In a lecture at Georgetown University, CIA Director William Burns that the next six months will be critically decisive. He suggested that the alternatives are either a quick military overturn followed by negotiation and peace or an escalation towards a long war.

A negotiated peace would require that none of the two sides achieves absolute victory or faces bitter defeat. In his recent visit to Warsaw, US President Joe Biden that “Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia. Never.” This is a very different declaration to a call for Ukrainian victory or Russian defeat.

So far, both Russia and Ukraine are still at the rhetorical stage of being maximalist in their demands. Each expects to be in a strong position if a real negotiation ever starts. In the past, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy explicitly he could accept painful concessions on Crimea and Donbas, which were the original objectives of the Russian “special military operation.” As the war has gone on, Zelenskyy has changed his position. He regularly proclaims his determination to move back to Ukraine’s 2014 borders. Zelenskyy also insists on applying for EU and NATO memberships. Russia, in turn, verbally rejects any concession of moving backward.

For an escalation in conflict, the Kremlin would have to make risky domestic moves, including new conscriptions and mass mobilizations. This would make Russian politics the continuation of war by other means, which is what Clausewitz meant even if he phrased it the other way. It is from impatience and distress that Putin toys with using tactical nuclear weapons over Kyiv. He is playing a game of chicken with the US on the assumption that Washington wants to avoid the risk of World War III.

As of now, it seems that Ukraine might be able to sustain its belligerence for as long as the US and NATO keep providing increasingly effective and lethal weapons, including drones, missiles, tanks and even fighter jets. However, political calculations and concern about excessive financial costs of war might make the US Congress and several European countries restrict unrestricted support.

The conflict has already lasted longer than many regional wars and might degenerate into a war of attrition. An end might come from changes away from the war fronts. There should be elections in Russia and Ukraine twelve months from now. There is uncertainty not only about the results of these elections but also whether they will actually be held. The US, the UK and the European Parliament also face elections in 2024, which will come in the middle of a war.One thing we certainly know and can be sure about is that war is the worst human activity with tragic consequences of death and destruction. We have plenty of information and images about the human tragedy in Ukraine. To understand the gruesome nature of war further, you could watch the movie . It is probably the best war movie ever because of the way it captures the horrors of war. Sadly, that horror continue for a while in Ukraine.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Those rare analysts curious enough to tease out the tangled threads of Ukrainian history that led up to the December border standoff knew that Ukraine’s drama was complex. Seven years after the signing of the Minsk II accord, the Normandy format had failed to achieve anything that resembled a possible resolution. Ukraine was a divided country with powerful pressure coming from two sides and a divided population inside the nation. Ukraine had been living through a decade of what those too squeamish to call it civil war may have thought of as a “civil misunderstanding” between the European-focused west of Ukraine and the Russia-rooted east. In other words, Ukraine was a powder keg and there were people on either side playing with matches.

But the reigning belief among the pundits in 2021 was that if warlike gestures were possible, war itself, within Europe, was a thing of the past. After all, despite numerous warnings whispered or intoned over three decades by a series of Russian leaders – Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin – the eastward expansion of NATO, which none of those leaders said they would tolerate, had taken place without the slightest hiccup and only occasional tension. If integrating Ukraine, as promised by George W Bush in 2008, was likely to grate on Russian nerves, Westerners assumed that one more fait accompli would follow the same logic that permitted the easy integration of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, seven others in 2004, and a handful more in 2009, 2017 and 2020. As John Mearsheimer frequently explains: for the West, Russia was weak. However aggrieved it might be by the events it was forced to witness, a weak nation will never be capable of countering a well-rehearsed game plan that had proved successful for more than two decades.

By October 2021, Vladimir Putin’s unusual demonstration of force had become evident and appeared alarming to most observers. It would be followed in December by a formal proposal Putin sent to both NATO and the US to sit down and hammer out a solution and avoid confrontation. But the West was busy explaining away Putin’s folly and the sources of his misguided histrionics, believing at the time that he would back down and accept the inevitable, as Russia had consistently done in the face of NATO’s “manifest destiny.” Even Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, days before the actual invasion, thought the troop buildup was little more than a theatrical. He complained about the deleterious effects of Western fearmongering. Military action was unthinkable.

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How things have changed! To get a better idea of how much, The Guardian deemed on October 3, 2021 – a mere five months before Russia’s invasion –  to be the appropriate moment to the scandals of what it described as Zelenskyy’s corrupt government, including the president himself among the explicitly corrupt. The lede of the article read: “Volodymyr Zelenskiy has railed against politicians hiding wealth offshore but failed to disclose links to BVI firm.”

This revelation from the Pandora Papers seemed to contradict the mission of reform proudly proclaimed by the Ukrainian president five months earlier. In May 2021, The Atlantic Council published an authored by Zelenskyy himself announcing his commitment to “deoligarchization.” The article ended with these words: “Our ultimate objective is to destroy the traditional oligarchic order and replace it with a fairer system that will allow Ukraine to flourish.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Fairer system:

The same system as before but with a few superficial cosmetic improvements designed to reduce chatter about its failings or dysfunction.

Contextual note

Today, of course, the media and Western politicians compare Zelenskyy to Churchill. He is the heroic defender of liberal values against the forces of evil. Nit-picking about corruption in Ukraine would no longer be tolerated in any Western media, just as pointing to the enduring influence of Ukraine’s neo-Nazi ultra-nationalists – once a topic of media reportage – could have no place in today’s news cycle.

The now independent journalist Patrick Lawrence who once worked for The New York Times, after describing Zelenskyy’s sanctions and of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, the logic at the core of this “fairer system.” “Making Ukraine ‘Western’,” he writes, “requires that a nation with pronounced differences turn itself into a profoundly and comprehensively intolerant society in contradiction of the most basic assumptions of Western liberalism.” Banning the traditionally dominant religion of at least a significant part of a nation has never been considered a liberal ideal or one of the “freedoms” we associate with democracy.

Historical note

In other words, what was previously a lambent civil war has now become – if we are to believe no less an expert than former CIA director, Leon Panetta – a proxy war between the US and Russia. The civil war itself took a dramatic form in 2014, producing a historical situation that led the Ukrainian government to begin acquiring some of the characteristics we associate with the worst fascist regimes.

Oligarchy is one part of it, but oligarchies are not necessarily fascist. The of opposition parties is one salient feature of fascism. A form of cultural genocide, which began in Ukraine with the of the Russian language long before the Russian invasion, is something we clearly associate with fascism. The demonizing of Vladimir Putin was an expected consequence of war, especially following a brutal invasion. But Zelenskyy’s government has pushed things further, vilifying nor only everything Russian but all Russians.

What might seem slightly more surprising is that this hatred of everything Russian has spread to the West and is now routinely echoed in Western media. But another reading of modern history tells us that hatred of Russia and Russianness began in the West long ago. In recent years it became useful in some sectors of the United States because of an atavistic but inappropriate association with communism. It has proved convenient to use it to explain away various embarrassments, such as Hillary Clinton’s loss of the 2016 election to Donald Trump.

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Scapegoating a nation and its people in time of war has been a standard response in the history of nation states. During World War I, the United States performances of Beethoven and renamed sauerkraut “liberty cabbage.” Germany. George W Bush even renamed French fries “freedom fries,” not because France was at war with the US, but because it refused to be associated with the invasion of Iraq, done in the name of democracy and liberal values. Turbaned Sikhs were murdered after 9/11, on the mistaken belief by “patriotic” Americans that they were Arabs and therefore responsible for the destruction of the Trade Towers. This, of course, wouldn’t have happened if the Bush administration had treated the attack as a spectacular crime to be prosecuted rather than an act of war conducted by a nation (Afghanistan), a people (Arabs) and a religion (Islam).

So what about Zelenskyy’s “fairer system”? The historical reality is that oligarchic and plutocratic systems can rarely be made fairer because they are based on the idea that success in the acquisition of wealth, whether realized through cheating or hard work, will always be its own reward and the key to power. And cheating, if it can go unpunished, is always more efficient than hard work. Oligarchs defend their system by calling it a “rules-based order” because the rules of power relationships make it possible to cheat. Tax havens are perfect examples of that.

In a published by The Guardian titled, “Europe put tax havens in the Caribbean – and now punishes them for it,” Kenneth Mohammed described a system that works smoothly and applies its rules efficiently.

“Opaque money eventually equates to opaque power; if dirty money is left to flow unhindered into the financial system, the cancer of corruption spreads, global development is retarded and inequity and inequality escalate.”

Zelenskyy was doing nothing wrong. He was simply playing by the rules.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Fair is Foul: In Ukraine Fairer Can Also Be Fouler appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kuleba proposed a “peace summit” in February to be chaired by UN Secretary General Guterres, but with the precondition that Russia must first face for war crimes in an international court. On the other side, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov issued a chilling that Ukraine must accept Russia’s terms for peace or “the issue will be decided by the Russian Army.”    

But what if there were a way of understanding this conflict and possible solutions that encompassed the views of all sides and could take us beyond one-sided narratives and proposals that serve only to fuel and escalate the war? The crisis in Ukraine is in fact a classic case of what International Relations scholars call a “,” and this provides a more objective way of looking at it. 

Understanding the Security Dilemma

A security dilemma is a situation in which countries on each side take actions for their own defense that countries on the other side then see as a threat. Since offensive and defensive weapons and forces are often indistinguishable, one side’s defensive build-up can easily be seen as an offensive build-up by the other side. As each side responds to the actions of the other, the net result is a spiral of militarization and escalation, even though both sides insist, and may even believe, that their own actions are defensive. 

In the case of Ukraine, this has happened on different levels, both between Russia and national and regional governments in Ukraine, but also on a larger geopolitical scale between Russia and the United States/NATO.

The very essence of a security dilemma is the lack of trust between the parties. In the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis served as an alarm bell that forced both sides to start negotiating arms control treaties and safeguard mechanisms that would limit escalation, even as deep levels of mistrust remained. Both sides recognized that the other was not hell-bent on destroying the world, and this provided the necessary minimum basis for negotiations and safeguards to try to ensure that this did not come to pass.

After the end of the Cold War, both sides cooperated with major reductions in their nuclear arsenals, but the United States gradually withdrew from a succession of arms control treaties, violated its not to expand NATO into Eastern Europe, and used military force in ways that directly the UN Charter’s prohibition against the “threat or use of force.” US leaders claimed that the conjunction of terrorism and the existence of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons gave them a new right to wage “,” but neither the UN nor any other country ever agreed to that.

US aggression in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere was alarming to people all over the world, and even to many Americans, so it was no wonder that Russian leaders were especially worried by America’s renewed post-Cold War militarism. As NATO incorporated more and more countries in Eastern Europe, a classic security dilemma began to play out. 

President Vladimir Putin, who was elected in 2000, began to use to challenge NATO expansion and US war-making, insisting that new diplomacy was needed to ensure the security of all countries in Europe, not only those invited to join NATO. 

The former Communist countries in Eastern Europe joined NATO out of defensive concerns about possible Russian aggression, but this also exacerbated Russia’s security concerns about the ambitious and aggressive military alliance gathering around its borders, especially as the United States and NATO refused to address those concerns. 

In this context, broken promises on NATO expansion, US serial aggression in the greater Middle East and elsewhere, and absurd claims that US missile defense batteries in Poland and Romania were to protect Europe from Iran, not Russia, set alarm bells ringing in Moscow. 

The US withdrawal from nuclear arms control treaties and its refusal to alter its nuclear first strike policy raised even greater fears that a new generation of US nuclear weapons were being to give the United States a nuclear first strike capability against Russia.

On the other side, Russia’s increasing assertiveness on the world stage, including its military actions to defend Russian enclaves in Georgia and its intervention in Syria to defend its ally the Assad government, raised security concerns in other former Soviet republics and allies, including new NATO members. Where might Russia intervene next?

As the United States refused to diplomatically address Russia’s security concerns, each side took actions that ratcheted up the security dilemma. The United States backed the violent overthrow of President Yanukovych in Ukraine in 2014, which led to rebellions against the post-coup government in Crimea and Donbas. Russia responded by annexing Crimea and supporting the breakaway “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. 

Even if all sides were acting in good faith and out of defensive concerns, in the absence of effective diplomacy they all assumed the worst about each other’s motives as the crisis spun further out of control, exactly as the “security dilemma” model predicts that nations will do amid such rising tensions.

Of course, since mutual mistrust lies at the heart of any security dilemma, the situation is further complicated when any of the parties is seen to act in bad faith. Angela Merkel, Germany’s former chancellor, recently admitted that Western leaders had no intention of enforcing Ukraine’s compliance with the terms of the Minsk II agreement in 2015, and only agreed to it to to build up Ukraine militarily.

Diplomacy, the Only Way Forward

The breakdown of the Minsk II peace agreement and the continuing diplomatic impasse in the larger geopolitical conflict between the United States, NATO and Russia plunged relations into a deepening crisis and led to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Officials on all sides must have recognized the dynamics of the underlying security dilemma, and yet they failed to take the necessary diplomatic initiatives to resolve the crisis. 

Peaceful, diplomatic alternatives have always been available if the parties chose to pursue them, but they did not. Does that mean that all sides deliberately chose war over peace? They would all deny that. 

Yet all sides apparently now see advantages in a prolonged conflict, despite the relentless daily slaughter, dreadful and deteriorating conditions for millions of civilians, and the dangers of full-scale war between NATO and Russia. All sides have convinced themselves they can or must win, and so they keep escalating the war, along with all its impacts and the risks that it will spin out of control. 

President Joe Biden came to office promising a of American diplomacy, but has instead led the United States and the world to the brink of World War III.         

Clearly, the only solution to a security dilemma like this is a cease-fire and peace agreement to stop the carnage, followed by the kind of diplomacy that took place between the United States and the Soviet Union in the decades that followed the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. This led to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and successive arms control treaties. Former UN official Alfred de Zayas has also called for UN-administered to determine the wishes of the people of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk.

It is not an endorsement of an adversary’s conduct or position to negotiate a path to peaceful coexistence. We are witnessing the absolutist alternative in Ukraine today. There is no moral high ground in relentless, open-ended mass slaughter, managed, directed and in fact perpetrated by people in smart suits and military uniforms in imperial capitals thousands of miles from the crashing of shells, the cries of the wounded and the stench of death.

If proposals for peace talks are to be more than PR exercises, they must be firmly grounded in an understanding of the security needs of all sides, and a willingness to compromise to see that those needs are met and that all the underlying conflicts are addressed. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Ukraine Crisis Is a Classic “Security Dilemma” appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Here are eight reasons why this holiday season too offers the potential for peace and a chance to move the conflict in Ukraine from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

1. The first, and most urgent reason, is the incredible, daily death and suffering in Ukraine, and the chance to save millions more Ukrainians from being forced to leave their homes, their belongings and the conscripted menfolk they may never see again. 

With Russia’s bombing of key infrastructure, millions of people in Ukraine currently have no heat, electricity or water as temperatures drop below freezing. The CEO of Ukraine’s largest electric corporation has urged millions more Ukrainians to the country, ostensibly for just a few months, to reduce demand on the war-damaged power network. 

The warhas out at least 35% of the country’s economy, according to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal. The only way to halt the meltdown of the economy and the suffering of the Ukrainian people is to end the war. 

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2. Neither side can achieve a decisive military victory, and with its recent military gains, Ukraine is in a good negotiating position.

It has become clear that US and NATO military leaders do not believe, and possibly have never believed, that their publicly stated goal of helping Ukraine to recover Crimea and all of Donbas by force is militarily achievable.

In fact, Ukraine’s military chief of staff warned President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in April 2021 that such a goal wouldnot be without “unacceptable” levels of civilian and military casualties, leading him to call off plans for an escalation of the civil war at that time. 

Biden’s top military advisor, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, the Economic Club of New York on November 9, “There has to be a mutual recognition that military victory is probably, in the true sense of the word, not achievable through military means…” 

French and German military reviews of Ukraine’s position are reportedlymore than US ones, assessing that the current appearance of military parity between the two sides will be short-lived. This adds weight to Milley’s assessment, and suggests that this could well be the best chance Ukraine will get to negotiate from a position of relative strength.

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3. US government officials, especially in the Republican Party, are starting to balk at the prospect of continuing this enormous level of military and economic support. Having taken control of the House, Republicans are promising more scrutiny of Ukraine aid. Congressman Kevin McCarthy, who will become Speaker of the House, that Republicans would not write a “blank check” for Ukraine. This reflects the growing opposition at the base of the Republican Party, with a Wall Street Journal November showing that 48% of Republicans say the US is doing too much to help Ukraine, up from 6% in March. 

4. The war is causing upheavals in Europe. Sanctions on Russian energy have sent inflation in Europe skyrocketing and caused a devastating squeeze on energy supplies that is crippling the manufacturing sector. Europeans are increasingly feeling what German media call Kriegsmudigkeit. 

This translates as “war-weariness,” but that is not an entirely accurate characterization of the growing popular sentiment in Europe. “War-wisdom” may describe it better. 

People have had many months to consider the arguments for a long, escalating war with no clear endgame—a war that is sinking their economies into a recession—and more of them than ever now tell pollsters they would support renewed efforts to find a diplomatic solution. That 55% in Germany, 49% in Italy, 70% in Romania and 92% in Hungary. 

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5. Most of the world is calling for negotiations. We heard this at the 2022 UN General Assembly, where one after another, 66 world leaders, representing a majority of the world’s population, eloquently spoke out for peace talks., prime minister of Saint Lucia, was one of them, with Russia, Ukraine and the Western powers “to immediately end the conflict in Ukraine, by undertaking immediate negotiations to permanently settle all disputes in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.”

As the told the Assembly, “We are fully aware of the complexities of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and the international and global dimension to this crisis. However, we still call for an immediate ceasefire and a peaceful settlement, because this is ultimately what will happen regardless of how long this conflict will go on for. Perpetuating the crisis will not change this result. It will only increase the number of casualties, and it will increase the disastrous repercussions on Europe, Russia and the global economy.”

6. The war in Ukraine, like all wars, is catastrophic for the environment. Attacks and explosions are reducing all kinds of infrastructure–railways, electrical grids, apartment buildings, oil depots–to charred rubble, filling the air with pollutants and blanketing cities with toxic waste that contaminates rivers and groundwater. 

The sabotage of Russia’s underwater Nord Stream pipelines supplying Russian gas to Germany led to what may have been the of methane gas emissions ever recorded, amounting to the annual emissions of a million cars. The shelling of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including Zaporizhzhia, the largest in Europe, has raised legitimate fears of deadly radiation spreading throughout Ukraine and beyond.

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Meanwhile, US and Western sanctions on Russian energy have triggered a bonanza for the fossil fuel industry, giving them a new justification to increase their dirty energy exploration and production and keep the world firmly on course for climate catastrophe. 

7. The war has a devastating economic impact on countries across the world. The leaders of the world’s largest economies, the Group of 20, in a declaration at the end of their November summit in Bali that the Ukraine war “is causing immense human suffering and exacerbating existing fragilities in the global economy — constraining growth, increasing inflation, disrupting supply chains, heightening energy and food insecurity and elevating financial stability risks.”

Our long-standing failure to invest the relatively small proportion of our resources required to eradicate poverty and hunger on our otherwise rich and abundant planet already condemns millions of our brothers and sisters to squalor, misery and early deaths. 

Now this is compounded by the climate crisis, as entire communities are washed away by flood waters, burned out by wildfires or starved by multi-year droughts and famines. International cooperation has never been more urgently needed to confront problems that no country can solve on its own. Yet wealthy nations still prefer to put their money into weapons and war instead of adequately addressing the climate crisis, poverty or hunger. 

8. The last reason, which dramatically reinforces all the other reasons, is the danger of nuclear war. Even if our leaders had rational reasons to favor an open-ended, ever-escalating war over a negotiated peace in Ukraine – and there are certainly powerful interests in the weapons and fossil fuel industries that would profit from that – the existential danger of what this could lead to absolutely must tip the balance in favor of peace.

We recently saw how close we are to a much wider war when a single stray Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile landed in Poland and killed two people. Zelenskyy refused to believe it was not a Russian missile. If Poland had taken the same position, it could have invoked NATO’s mutual defense agreement and triggered a full-scale war between NATO and Russia. 

If another predictable incident like that leads NATO to attack Russia, it can only be a matter of time before Russia sees the use of nuclear weapons as its only option in the face of overwhelming military force.

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For these reasons and more, we join the faith-based leaders around the world who are calling for a Christmas Truce, that the holiday season presents “a much-needed opportunity to recognize our compassion for one another. Together, we are convinced that the cycle of destruction, suffering and death can be overcome.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Eight Reasons Why Now is a Good Time for a Ukraine Ceasefire and Peace Talks appeared first on 51�Թ�.

What is the pattern I’m referring to? Quite simply the systematic accusation of crimes committed by rival nations, which may be real enough, but rarely rise to the dimension and magnitude of the same crimes perpetrated by the US. The most obvious example was encapsulated in George W Bush’s earlier this year when, intending to denounce Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, he vilified “the decision of one man to launch a wholly unjustified and brutal invasion” of a country he inadvertently but accurately called Iraq.

Then there’s the eternal question of corruption. The US prides itself on its standards of transparency that make corruption unthinkable in politics. At the same time, it routinely denounces the very real and often manifest corruption of nations in the Middle East and elsewhere. 

For at least the past century the average American believed this to be true. After all, the nation’s laws had made it practically impossible to engage in the simple quid pro quos commonly practiced in many parts of the world. Things have changed. According to a 2021 Pew, 67% of Americans think that “most politicians” are corrupt. Serious studies have demonstrated that the entire political system – supposedly of, by and for the people – has become one of control. That number has probably risen in the past year as stories concerning Donald Trump, Nancy Pelosi and Hunter Biden have highlighted the incredible sums of money that end up in the hands and bank accounts of politicians and their families.

At a moment of history, the fear that rogue states, such as Iran, may possess and use nuclear weapons has never been more real. But that fear, a matter of vague speculation, pales in relation to a very real risk of nuclear annihilation provoked  by the current situation in Ukraine, pitting the US against Russia. When US President Joe Biden to supporting the war “as long as it takes,” the occasions for a nuclear “accident” will only multiply. The US is after all the only nation ever to have used nuclear weapons. And on that occasion, the target was almost exclusively civilian populations.

Ever since the beginning of China’s proclaimed Belt and Road Initiative, Western analysts have denounced a practice they see as threatening to compromise the sovereignty of nations in need of external assistance. Andrew Backhouse writing for the Australian news site, sums up the Western complaint. “Critics argue China is involved in ‘debt trap diplomacy’, alleging the country issues loans in order to eventually secure strategic international assets.” But the art of pushing nations into a debt trap has been fundamental to US foreign policy at least since the end of World War II. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been systematically used to that end, not necessarily through direct manipulation, but through the imposition of ideological constraints.

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Debt trap diplomacy:

The essential win-lose strategy – presenting initially as win-win — employed by those who know their superior power and resources will ensure domination over the long term

Contextual note

Washington Post columnist Ishaan Tharoor in July China of having “a hand in Sri Lanka’s economic calamity.” He pointed out that  in 2020 Sri Lanka “received a line of $3 billion in easy credit from China to help in the repayment of its existing debts.” This choice was made “rather than taking the more painful steps of restructuring its debts in dialogue with the IMF and pushing through austerity measures to appease the Paris Club.” In other words, Sri Lanka broke ranks with the hallowed tradition of relying on Western management of struggling economies. The system was built to systematically favor the interests of Western investors, to the detriment of populations condemned to hoping some day to benefit from the vaunted liberal model of trickle-down economics. In reality, it is a system of “trickle out” to transnational corporations.

Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Strategic Genius, Arrogant Overreach or Something Else?

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Tharoor blithely concludes that Sri Lanka’s choice “appears to have been a mistake.” He presents the current crisis as a cautionary tale about the risk of deviating from the traditional model of dependence. He cites as “realistic” the judgment of Ali Sabry, Sri Lanka’s caretaker finance minister who earlier this year complained, “we should have gone [to the IMF] at least 12 months before we did.”

There is no doubt that for a host of reasons Sri Lanka can be considered “a textbook case of how an economy should not be managed.” But laying the blame on China alone makes no sense. Moreover, citing it as an example of China’s supposed debt-trap diplomacy, as many Western critics have been doing for the past two years, is contradicted by reality at every level. As progressive journalist Benjamin Norton has: “Sri Lanka owes 81% of its external debt to US and European financial institutions and Western allies Japan and India. China owns just 10%. But Washington blames imaginary ‘Chinese debt traps’ for the nation’s crisis, as it considers a 17th IMF structural adjustment program.”

The most obvious contradiction of the Chinese debt-trap myth appeared in this week’s news about China’s massive act of debt forgiveness in Africa. Backhouse reports that “China has pledged to forgive 23 interest-free loans for 17 African countries and will also provide food assistance to the struggling nations.”

The Australian journalist goes on to cite recent studies that expose the myth of China’s supposed debt-trap diplomacy. “But the concept of a Chinese ‘debt trap’ has also been criticized, with a study in 2020 finding China had restructured or refinanced about $21 billion of debt in Africa between 2000 and 2019. The study also noted there was no evidence of ‘asset seizures’ and that Chinese lenders had not used courts to enforce payments, or applied penalty interest rates to distressed borrowers.”

Historical note

There can be no doubt that creditors, whatever their nationality, enjoy a position of relative power over their debtors. That power can easily be abused. Pretending that the financial assistance provided either by the IMF or China should be thought of as an act of pure, disinterested generosity may serve the interests of the creditor state’s propaganda, but it flies in the face of both economic reality and human psychology. In his book, …and forgive them their debts…economist Michael Hudson exposed, in historical detail, the fact that in ancient times, dating back to the growth of Mesopotamian civilization, debt forgiveness was an essential tool of government. The late anthropologist David Graeber developed a similar thesis in his best-seller, Debt: the first 5000 years. Jubilees were acts of massive debt forgiveness that permitted not only the renewal of economic relations but also contributed to a sense of solidarity that is required in all complex societies.

Sri Lanka’s crisis illustrates a much larger crisis, of both a geopolitical and economic nature. We are witnessing a major loss of faith not just in the authority that imposes and enforces the supposed rules, but of capitalism itself. The essential problem derives from the rigidity of the rules themselves. All debts must be paid. All debtors must be humbled.

The rules-based order is incapable of even imagining, let alone implementing the great acts of debt forgiveness of Hammurabi and other powerful rulers in the remote past. But that limit on global political power is just one element of the current crisis. The misuse of economic power, a more banal version of debt-trap diplomacy that has been an integral feature of the vauntred “rules-based order” has now emerged visibly as the central weakness of a system that breeds injustice. 

John Perkins’ famous, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man, offers direct testimony highlighting how the creditor-debtor relationship built around the US dollar and the international institutions created to administer the rules-based order has contributed to the deprivation of sovereignty of many struggling nations, especially those rich in exploitable resources. By design, not only governments but entire populations were meant to fall helplessly into the trap  

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Now, two decades later, that phrase has been conveniently reforged by a Russian parliamentarian, touting the Russia is shaping through a convergence with Iran and China in their shared anti-American rhetoric. While calling it ‘good’ is a long stretch given the backdrop of the raging war waged by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the underlying tenets should not be dismissed even as they are shrugged off by the western coalition. And while the Cold War 2.0 is still a distant possibility, the birth of this new world order is visible though not entirely material.

Putin’s first international visit since the invasion, beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union, was to Iran. The official rationale was a tripartite discussion of Syrian policy with Iran and Turkey. But no one should be so naive as to accept that description at face value. The trilateral meeting was a strategic statement; a formulation  of options, for all three countries involved.

The Strategic Genius of Turkey

Turkey is portraying its political artistry in the region. It is playing the Western alliance through its power over the NATO membership of Finland and Sweden. Simultaneously, Erdoğan is flirting with Russian favors by mediating with Ukraine and concerting on crucial regional issues (like Syria) with Putin despite his brutal alienation of the West. While supplying arms to the Ukrainian front, Turkey has also refused to comply with Western sanctions against Russia and is even planning to trade oil in rubles. Consequently, these contradictory policies have rapidly positioned Erdoğan as a strategic champion, indispensable to both the United States and Russia. And admittedly, this strategic game plan works wonders and could yield another electoral win for Erdoğan in the General Elections, despite his disastrous mismanagement of the Turkish economy.

The Russo-Iran Polarity with the Western Order

It is obvious why Putin wants to highlight his political brinkmanship by establishing a unique alliance with Iran. It is his way of saying the Kremlin is fully prepared for a reshuffle in power dynamics of the region, spurred by the invasion of Ukraine which was itself catalyzed by the eastward expansion of NATO. Putin’s renewed affection for Iran could also be construed as a response to Biden’s dismally unproductive to the Middle East and his failed attempt to woo the Saudi Kingdom. However, Iran is a staunch enemy of Israel, a sentiment not shared by Russia, which limits the scope of this peculiar alliance. Nonetheless, Israel is not nearly as pivotal to the long-term eventually hegemonic goals of Putin as Iran, especially when the pretext for collusion is a shared hatred for American supremacy.

For Iran, the motivation�� is easier to unravel. The is still in limbo. The Iranian position has visibly hardened after the ill-timed discourse between Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid. Biden’s frivolous remarks regarding Iran did not help the Western view of containment. Biden’s call for�� action to “stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons by any means, including force, as a last resort” in his attempt to muster a Gulf alliance against Iran was particularly awkward, given with the negotiations of an essential deal still hanging by a thread.

Budding Leverage in Respective Regions

Contrary to Biden’s hapless efforts, the Gulf states – including the UAE and Saudi Arabia – are mulling the idea of rewiring their frayed diplomatic relations with Iran. In a recent , Anwar Gangash, the diplomatic adviser to President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, stated that “the conversation is ongoing,” and the UAE is “in the process of sending an ambassador to Tehran. All these areas of rebuilding bridges are ongoing.” Even the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) voiced his aspirations in an with The Atlantic earlier in March, stating: “[Iran and Saudi Arabia] are neighbors. Neighbors forever. We cannot get rid of them, and they can’t get rid of us. So it’s better for both of us to work it out and to look for ways in which we can coexist.”��

The trajectory of the Middle East is seemingly tilting toward regional concord, beyond the lines of sectarian and ideological differences consistently exploited by successive American regimes in the past. And thus, Iran’s collusion with Russia (and the Gulf states) could lead the Islamic Republic away from its hardcore resentment for Israel. At least in the short term. But it would also integrate Iran into a parallel bloc no longer submitted to American restrictions, whether it be the form of human rights policing, economic sanctions, or international isolation.

In a high-profile meeting with Putin, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei unequivocally voiced his support for the Russian invasion, : “War is a violent and difficult issue, and the Islamic Republic is in no way happy that civilians get caught up in it, but concerning Ukraine, had you not taken the initiative, the other side [NATO] would have taken the initiative and caused the war.”��

Such an explicit assertion is not dependent on any detailed analysis or interpretation. Iran is unambiguously throwing its weight behind Putin to advance the Russian claims against the US. And the excuse of a palpable competition in the market for sanctioned oil is simply wishful thinking, a product of Western think tanks. Despite sanctions, Russia has already surpassed its budgetary revenue from fossil fuel imports. And according to – the Governor of the Russian Central Bank –�� Russia would categorically refuse to sell oil to countries attempting to place a price cap on Russian energy supplies.��

The gas supplies through the Nord Stream 1 (NS1) pipeline have already been squeezed down to of capacity. Thus, demand would not be an issue when Europe freezes next winter. That is bad news for Joe Biden. And while a recession could undercut the abnormal prices of commodities and fuel, inadvertently financing Russia’s war in Ukraine, it would also debilitate Europe’s ability to wean itself from Russian energy. This is especially true of Germany, the bedrock�� of the European economy and its manufacturing hub. Hence, Iran, a member of the alliance alongside Russia, would gain significant leverage in the broader market when the Western defiance loses its luster in the face of domestic economic misery.

The Geopolitical Vision of China

The simmering tensions in the Taiwan Strait may initially seem little more than an over-aggressive response to Ms. Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taipei. However, the underlying factors are much more about a power statement made by Washington and now reciprocated by the Chinese Communist Party. Vying for another term to consolidate his legacy, President Xi Jinping is surely not looking to project a docile image, especially when Russia is braving an allied Western front on its periphery. 

However, China, contrary to Iran, has been particularly distant from the chaos in Europe, tip-toeing the fine line between condoning and censuring the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Yet, by no means can we deem China neutral. Even India, a bellwether American ally, is not a neutral player as it continues to off discounted Russian oil despite Western reservations. China has remained critical of the US response against Russia, terming the sanctions illegal and immoral. China continues to fill Russian coffers by procuring sanctioned oil despite its ongoing economic slowdown.��

While I admit it is unrealistic to assume that Beijing would outright support the anti-Western rhetoric reflected by Moscow or Tehran, it would presumably back any alliance that shapes a parallel hegemon to the transatlantic order. Cues abound to back up this assumption, such as Xi’s welcoming Putin at the Winter Olympics mere days before the invasion of Ukraine, or convening the at the very moment Russia was wreaking havoc. Hypothetically, nurturing an alternate order would not only allow Beijing to set in place�� a new cornerstone in Middle Eastern and European politics, it would also ensure both diversified energy supplies for its industries and new investment avenues in the region. This would make it harder to isolate China (economically or diplomatically) in the event of an invasion of Taiwan. Ultimately, I believe that China, though not yet open to complete defiance of the Western world order, would still support a fledgling rivalry on the global diplomatic canvas, reinforced by the regional sway of Iran and Russia.

The blend of economic and diplomatic adjustment has been a marvel of the Chinese regime. While the Western alliance has noticeably shifted gears to cultivate allegiances in the Asian-Pacific peninsula, China has maneuvered to push the US to a second-tier position across the . From Ethiopia to Zambia, Beijing has cultivated loyalty through debt-relief and conflict mediation strategies gauged towards famine-stricken nations dominated by authoritarian regimes.��

Leveraging the Communist Party’s innate understanding of their leadership model, Xi Jinping has masterfully perpetuated his ideology in Africa to supersede the traditional American meme of democracy. However, contrary to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework () – a ruse to cajole the Indo-Pacific nations into an anti-Chinese economic model with apparently no free-trade access to the American market – China is courting African loyalties with relative empathy. The trade between China and the African continent surpassed billion in 2021. Compare that to less than billion for the United States. And while massively debt-ridden, nations like Zambia are still active investment pools for Chinese businesses without the harsh perquisites and crippling conditions imposed by the Western multilateral institutions offering bailout packages. Ultimately, the Chinese model of diplomacy and economic integration, despite an alleged legacy of chronic evoked by the West, comes with a no-strings-attached offer. At the same time, the US – and its European allies – remain focused on the idea of acute economic discipline and regulatory restrictions that complement and condition the flow of funds. This idea is rapidly turning unpopular and leading to an Asian/African shift of preference towards China.

Headway Toward a Multipolar Reality

Over the last few decades, the US has tirelessly pursued a policy of pressure and surrender. This is how it has played out in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria and elsewhere! The US has sketched out a diplomatic code that suits the pseudo-liberal definition of its goals and the means required in any region. And it has used this subjective code to rally neighboring nations in various parts of the globe against regimes it manages to isolate to achieve dominance. Biden has not deviated from this traditional course of American foreign policy. On the other hand, he has been relatively less bombastic about it than his Republican predecessors. 

The world, however, has evolved beyond the unipolar political template established in the post-Cold War era. Today the world is intricately globalized and perilously interdependent. The US cannot undercut the economic rise of China without inflicting severe damage to its own productivity. European economies – like those of Germany and Hungary – cannot shed their dependence on Russian energy without facing a significant economic slowdown and a painful recession. And the Middle East cannot stabilize by normalizing relations with Israel while simultaneously isolating a belligerent Iran in its periphery. 

Ultimately, I believe the constituents of this new world order are indispensable, even if the Western coalition continues to act as the guarantor of a rules-based order. And hence, the potency (or villainy) of this newly synergized axis, its success or failure, would largely depend on the conciliatory (or retaliatory) role played by the United States in this recalibrated global political structure.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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No one knows how this meal will end. Ukraine is eager to force Russia to disgorge what it’s already devoured, while the still-peckish invader clearly has in leaving the table.

This might seem like an ordinary territorial dispute between predator and prey. Ukraine’s central location between east and west, however, turns it into a potentially world-historical conflict like the Battle of Tours when the Christian Franks turned back the surging Umayyad army of Muslims in 732 AD or the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam in 1975.

The pivotal nature of the current war seems obvious. Ukraine has for some time wanted to join western institutions like the EU. Russia prefers to Ukraine into its russkiy mir (Russian world). However, this tug of war over the dividing line between East and West isn’t a simple recapitulation of the Cold War. Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly has no interest in reconstituting the Soviet Union, much less in sending his troops westward into Poland or Germany, while the US isn’t wielding Ukraine as a proxy to fight the Kremlin. Both superpowers have far more circumscribed aims.

Dirty Oil v Clean Energy

Nonetheless, the war has oversized implications. What at first glance seems like a spatial conflict is also a temporal one. Ukraine has the great misfortune to straddle the fault line between a 20^th century of failed industrial strategies and a possible 21^st century reorganization of society along clean energy lines.

In the worst-case scenario, Ukraine could simply be absorbed into the world’s largest petro-state. Or the two sides could find themselves in a punishing stalemate that cuts off the world’s people from vast stores of grain and continues to distract the international community from pushing forward with an urgently needed reduction of carbon emissions. Only a decisive defeat of —with its toxic mix of despotism, corruption, right-wing nationalism, and devil-may-care extractivism—would offer the world some sliver of hope when it comes to restoring some measure of planetary balance.

Ukraine is fighting for its territory and, ultimately, its survival. The West has come to its aid in defense of international law. But the stakes in this conflict are far more consequential than that.

What Putin Wants

Once upon a time, Vladimir Putin was a conventional Russian politician. Like many of his predecessors, he enjoyed a complicated ménage à trois with democracy (the boring spouse) and despotism (his true love). He toggled between confrontation and cooperation with the West. Not a nationalist, he presided over a multiethnic federation; not a populist, he didn’t care much about playing to the masses; not an imperialist, he deployed brutal but limited force to keep Russia from spinning apart.

Putin also understood the limits of Russian power. In the 1990s, his country had suffered a precipitous decline in its economic fortune, so he worked hard to rebuild state power on what lay beneath his feet. Russia, after all, is the world’s largest exporter of , its second-largest , and its third-largest . Even Putin’s efforts to prevent regions from slipping away from the Russian sphere of influence were initially constrained. In 2008, for instance, he to take over neighboring Georgia, he just forced a stalemate that brought two breakaway regions into the Russian sphere of influence.

Meanwhile, Putin pursued strategies aimed at weakening his perceived adversaries. He ratcheted up cyberattacks in the , expanded maritime provocations in the , advanced aggressive territorial claims in the . He also supported right-wing nationalists like France’s Marine Le Pen and Italy’s Matteo Salvini to undermine the unity of the EU. In 2016, he even attempted to further polarize American politics via in support of Donald Trump.

Always sensitive to challenges to his own power, Putin watched with increasing concern as “color revolutions” spread through parts of the former Soviet Union—from Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2005 to Belarus in 2006 and Moldova in 2009. Around the time of the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests in Ukraine, he began shifting domestically to a that prioritized the interests of ethnic Russians, while cracking down on dissent and attacks on critics abroad. An intensifying sense of paranoia led him to an ever-smaller circle of advisors, ever less likely to contradict him or give him bad news.

In the early 2020s, facing disappointment abroad, Putin effectively gave up on preserving even a semblance of good relations with the United States or the EU. Except for Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the European far-right had proven to be a complete disappointment. Putin’s fair-weather friend Donald Trump had lost the 2020 presidential election. Worse yet, European countries seemed determined to meet their Paris climate accord commitments, which sooner or later would mean radically reducing their dependence on Russian fossil fuels.

In contrast to China’s eagerness to stay on good terms with the United States and Europe, Putin’s Russia began turning its back on centuries of “westernizing” impulses to embrace its Slavic history and traditions. Like North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and India’s Narendra Modi, Putin decided that the only ideology that ultimately mattered was nationalism, in his case a particularly virulent, anti-liberal form of it.

All of this means that Putin will pursue his aims in Ukraine regardless of the long-term impact on relations with the West. He’s clearly that political polarization, economic sclerosis, and a wavering security commitment to that embattled country will eventually force Western powers to accommodate a more assertive Russia. Putin might not be wrong.

Whither the West?

Since the invasion of Ukraine, the West has never seemed more unified. Even previously neutral Finland and Sweden have lined up to join . The US and much of Europe have largely agreed when it comes to sanctions against Russia.

Still, all is not well in the West. In the US, Trumpism continues to metastasize within the Republican Party. According to a January NPR/Ipsos , 64% of Americans are convinced that democracy is “in crisis and at risk of failing.” Meanwhile, in a surprising last year, 44% of respondents in 53 countries rated the US, a self-proclaimed beacon of liberty, as a greater threat to democracy than either China and 38 percent) or Russia who got 38% and 28% of the votes respectively.

In Europe, the far-right continues to challenge the democratic foundations of the continent. Uber-Christian Viktor Orbán recently won his fourth term as Hungary’s prime minister. The super-conservative Law and Justice Party is firmly at the helm in Poland. The anti-immigrant, Euroskeptical Swiss People’s Party remains the most significant force in that country’s parliament. The top three far-right political parties in Italy together attract of the vote in public opinion polls.

Meanwhile, the global economy, still on neo-liberal autopilot, has jumped out of the pandemic frying pan into the fires of stagflation. With stock markets heading into bear territory and a global recession looming, the recently cut its 4.1% growth forecast for 2022 to 2.9%. The Biden administration’s perceived failure to address inflation may deliver the Congress to Republican extremists this November and social democratic leaders throughout Europe may pay a similar political price for record-high Eurozone .

Admittedly, the continued military dominance of the US and its NATO allies would seem to refute all rumors of the decline of the West. In reality, though, the West’s military record hasn’t been than Russia’s performance in Ukraine. In August 2021, the US ignominiously withdrew its forces from its 20-year war in Afghanistan as the Taliban surged back to power. This year, France pulled its troops from after a decade-long failure to defeat al-Qaeda and Islamic State militants. Western-backed forces failed to dislodge Bashar al-Assad in Syria or prevent a horrific civil war from enveloping Libya. All the trillions of dollars devoted to achieving “full-spectrum dominance” couldn’t produce enduring success in Iraq or Somalia, terrorist factions throughout Africa, or effect regime change in North Korea or Cuba.

Despite its overwhelming military and economic power, the West no longer seems to be on the same upward trajectory as after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Back in the 1990s, Eastern Europe and even parts of the former Soviet Union signed up to join NATO and the EU. Russia under Boris Yeltsin inked a partnership agreement with NATO, while both and South Korea were interested in pursuing a proposed global version of that security alliance.

Today, however, the West seems increasingly irrelevant outside its own borders. China, love it or hate it, has rebuilt its Sinocentric sphere in Asia, while becoming the most important economic player in the Global South. It’s even established alternative global financial institutions that, one day, might replace the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Turkey has turned its back on the EU (and vice versa) and Latin America is heading in a more independent . Consider it a sign of the times that, when the call went out to sanction Russia, most of the non-Western world .

The foundations of the West are indeed increasingly unstable. Democracy is no longer, as scholar Francis Fukuyama it in the late 1980s, the inevitable trajectory of world history. The global economy, while spawning inexcusable inequality and being upended by the recent pandemic, is exhausting the resource base of the planet. Both right-wing extremism and garden-variety nationalism are eroding the freedoms that safeguard liberal society. It’s no surprise, then, that Putin believes a divided West will ultimately accede to his aggression.

The Ukraine Pivot

There’s never a good time for war. But hostilities have flared in Ukraine just as the world was supposed to be accelerating its transition to a clean-energy future. In another three years, carbon emissions must hit their and, in the next eight years, countries must cut their carbon emissions if there’s any hope of meeting the goals of the Paris climate accord by 2050. Even before the current war, the most comprehensive put the rise in global temperature at a potentially disastrous 2.7° Celsius by the end of the century (nearly twice the 1.5° goal of that agreement).

The war in Ukraine is propelling the world full tilt in the opposite direction. China and India are, in fact, their use of coal, the worst possible fossil fuel in terms of carbon emissions. Europe is desperate to replace Russian oil and natural gas and countries like Greece are now considering increasing their own production of dirty energy. In a similar fashion, US is once again oil and gas production, from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and hoping to persuade oil-producing nations to pump yet more of their product into global markets.

With its invasion, in other words, Russia has helped to derail the world’s already faltering effort at decarbonization. Although last fall Putin his country to a net-zero carbon policy by 2060, phasing out fossil fuels now would be economic suicide given that he’s done so little to diversify the economy. And despite international sanctions, Russia has been making a killing with fossil-fuel sales, raking in a record in the first 100 days of battle.

All of this could suggest, of course, that Putin represents the last gasp of the failed petropolitics of the 20^th century. But don’t count him out yet. He might also be the harbinger of a future in which technologically sophisticated politicians continue to pursue their narrow political and regional aims, making it ever less possible for the world to survive climate change.

Ukraine is where Putin is making his stand. As for Putinism itself—how long it lasts, how persuasive it proves to be for other countries—much depends on China.

After Putin’s invasion, Beijing could have given full-throated support to its ally, promised to buy all the fossil fuels Western sanctions left stranded, provided military equipment to buoy the faltering Russian offensive, and severed its own ties with Europe and the US. China could have broken with international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF in favor of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, its own multinational organizations. In this way, Ukraine could have turned into a genuine proxy war between East and West.

Instead, Beijing has been . Unhappy with Putin’s unpredictable moves, including the invasion, which have disrupted China’s economic expansion, it’s also been disturbed by the sanctions against Russia that similarly cramp its style. Beijing isn’t yet strong enough to challenge the hegemony of the dollar and it also remains dependent on Russian fossil fuels. Now the planet’s of greenhouse gases, China has been building a tremendous amount of renewable energy infrastructure. Its wind sector generated more power in 2021 than the year before and its solar sector increased by nearly 15%. Still, because of a growing appetite for energy, its overall dependence on coal and natural gas has hardly been reduced.

Reliant as it is on Russian energy imports, China won’t yet pull the plug on Putinism, but Washington could help push Beijing in that direction. It was once a dream of the Obama administration to partner with the world’s second-largest economy on clean energy . Instead of focusing as it has on myriad ways to contain China, the Biden administration could offer it a green version of an older to create a Sino-American economic duopoly, this time focused on making the global economy sustainable in the process. The two countries could in advancing a Global Green Deal.

In recent months, President Joe Biden has been willing to entertain the previously unthinkable by mending fences with and in order to flood global markets with yet more oil and so reduce soaring prices at the pump. Talk about 20^th century mindsets. Instead, it’s time for Washington to consider an eco-détente with Beijing that would, among other things, drive a stake through the heart of Putinism, safeguard Ukraine’s sovereignty, and stop the planet from burning to a crisp.

Otherwise, we know how this unhappy meal will end—as a Last Supper for humanity.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Everyone nevertheless seems to agree that Putin badly miscalculated. One of the reasons they cite is the unexpected scope and intensity of the Ukrainian resistance. Another is of course the massive and largely unexpected support provided by the West, notably in the form of military equipment.

Various statements from authoritative voices in Washington indicate not only that the war is likely to drag on, but that a forever war is what the American strategists have been hoping to see. On his visit to Poland in March, US President Joe Biden his faithful followers “to steel ourselves for a long fight ahead…” Three months later, his prediction that the “battle will not be won in days or months” appears to be accurate. Less accurate, however, was his claim that the Russian ruble would be reduced to rubble and that the back of the Russian economy was about to be broken. In April the ruble bounced back to “the strongest currency in the world this year.” Despite the massive sanctions imposed on Russia and the constraints of war, its economy is still ticking over.

If the pundits, politicians and military elite in Washington, sitting 5,000 miles away, seem more than comfortable with a war that will keep Russia occupied for many months or even years to come, it may be that the people on whose behalf they are stoking the war, standing on the front line of Russian aggression, will become less euphoric as time goes by. So could most Europeans facing the prospect of a dire winter with rationed heating and exploding gas prices. So indeed could Americans themselves, who are already beginning to complain.

The most pitiable victims are obviously the Ukrainians. Even when conducted with an endless supply of modern weapons, the heroism of resistance offers cold comfort to the heroes themselves when as many as 100 Ukrainians die every  day and cities are leveled in a war announced as never-ending. Still, the Ukrainians seem committed. But they increasingly worry their allies may cave. Al Jazeera that “officials in Kyiv have expressed fears that the specter of ‘war fatigue’ could erode the West’s resolve to help the country push back Moscow’s aggression.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

War fatigue:

Not to be confused with the military apparel known as battle fatigues, a psychological state provoked by enduring wars with no defined goals and afflicting individuals and sometimes entire populations, with the exception of politicians, lobbyists and administration officials working in and around the Beltway.

Contextual note

In recent days, Biden himself no longer sounds quite as triumphal as he did during his speech in Warsaw last March. But US policy has not changed, nor is it likely to change. Losing face is too costly to any politician’s historical legacy. Nevertheless, Edward Luce in the Financial Times that “tedium is beginning to creep in” even in Washington, where “Joe Biden’s recent utterances show awareness of the problem.”

Military realism may also be slowly creeping in after months of romanticizing the Ukrainian resistance and self-celebrating the financial support provided by the US and its European allies. “Many of the defects in today’s Russian military — low morale, shoddy equipment, lack of initiative and brutality within its ranks — were also true of Stalin’s Red Army, which eventually defeated the German Wehrmacht,” Luce pertinently notes.

Then there’s Europe, a continent of illusion, where an economically powerful union perennially demonstrates the fact that it is still a collection of culturally and linguistically disparate populations. As a formal union, some things do appear to take collective form but there are no solid structures designed to maintain the coherence of the European Union in the face of ever-present centrifugal forces. At the beginning of this war, the political class, followed by the media, succeeded in stirring a spontaneous identification with the Ukrainian resistance. After all, in the past century, Europeans had finally learned that war on one’s own terrain was always a lose-lose proposition. Invaders should be reviled and automatically punished.

Unlike Americans, however, Europeans do not equate condign punishment with endlessly prosecuted war. They know war induces fatigue. They also tend to be less trusting of the wisdom of their politicians. The average European has no reason to feel proud of NATO or identify with the institution. European politicians, on the other hand, appreciate NATO as a symbolic presence, overseen by Washington, that seems to guarantee that peace, at least among European nations, will endure. Europeans may react instinctively against Russian aggression towards a bordering nation, but they are far less convinced that NATO and the US military umbrella is the permanent key to peaceful relations.

The Ukraine war has revealed a newfound taste among European governments for militarization. And though NATO is at the core of the common security framework, the shock of this war has pushed European governments to think more seriously about an autonomous military collaboration that no longer depends on the US for leadership. That will be complicated to achieve and will take time. But, for various reasons, it may be inevitable.

Democracy and France’s Theater of the Absurd

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Few commentators noticed that in the first round of the French presidential election in April, a clear majority voted for candidates that were openly hostile to NATO, on both the left and the extreme right. That may have less to do with war fatigue than NATO fatigue. The monumental damage already being wrought on the European economy as a result of Washington’s insistence on integrating Ukraine into NATO will leave increasingly evident traces in the months and years to come. 

Historical note

Less than a week after the Russian invasion, Hillary Clinton appeared on MSNBC to what appeared to be the geopolitical reasoning already current in the corridors of power in Washington. She not only forecast a prolonged war, supported by the United States, but she also appeared to relish the idea. She felt it would have an effect similar to that of Russia’s decade-long war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, considered one of the factors that precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Clinton even described this plan to trap Russia in a quagmire as “the model people are looking toward.” By “people” she was obviously referring to the Washington elite, especially the State Department, which she headed for four years under President Barack Obama. Clinton’s description of this model may have seemed to some observers to be a random thought in her head. But subsequent events indicate that, even on March 1, five days after the launch of Russia’s “special operation,” it was in all likelihood a strategy already fully elaborated, months before Russia’s invasion. This would help to explain the bizarre sequence of events in which the news cycle was dominated by the US announcing the date on which Russia would start its war.

Both Clinton and Biden in their public discourse following the outbreak of the Ukraine war have savored the idea of Russia agonizing on its own without any direct American military presence in the war zone. Washington’s military strategists adhere to the historical model of Russia in Afghanistan that played out in the 1980s. They are now seeking to repeat the pattern in 2022. When Biden’s Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin a “weakened” Russia that no longer has “the capacity to invade its neighbors,” he echoes his president with both seeing a hoped-for parallel between the collapse of the Soviet Union. Biden’s own is that “this man [Putin] cannot remain in power.” US  defense strategy is rarely about defending the nation from aggression and almost always about regime change somewhere else in the world.

In May, Le Monde’s Washington correspondent “an undeniable euphoria that has gripped part of the ‘blob,’ as Washington’s foreign policy establishment often informally called. This euphoria may even last for a while but not forever. Even the hippie generation, after turning on, tuning in and dropping out, at one point realized that euphoria has its own expiration date. Many of them experienced drug fatigue and communal living fatigue. In the following decades quite a few of them also ended up in the blob, seeking another kind of euphoria.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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