This transformation carries consequences extending far beyond Afghanistan itself. The collapse of civil liberties, exclusion of women from public life and suppression of pluralism are not simply domestic governance concerns. They directly affect long-term regional stability, humanitarian conditions, migration pressures and the future trajectory of extremism across South and Central Asia.

Despite repeated Taliban efforts to secure international legitimacy, conditions inside Afghanistan continue moving in the opposite direction.

The systematic removal of women from public life

The Taliban’s restrictions on women now represent one of the most extensive systems of gender exclusion in the modern world. Since 2021, according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), more than Afghan girls and women have been denied access to secondary and higher education. The prohibition on education for girls beyond grade six has now entered its fifth consecutive year in 2026, creating consequences that will shape Afghanistan’s economic and social future for decades.Ěý

A new United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) says nearly 28 million Afghans live in poverty under Taliban rule, with three in four unable to meet basic daily needs. Afghanistan’s GDP grew by 1.9% in 2025, but rapid population growth, estimated at 6.5%, worsened per capita income and living conditions. More than 80% of households are in debt, while three-quarters rely on negative coping mechanisms to survive. The return of approximately 5 million Afghans since 2023, including 2.7 million in 2025, has strained resources, with 92% of returnees unable to secure basic necessities.Ěý

The restrictions extend well beyond education. Women have steadily disappeared from large sectors of public employment, including government institutions civil administration, while female participation in economic life has been constrained through overlapping restrictions on mobility, employment and public interaction.

Even international institutions have become targets of Taliban policies. Since September 2025, , including UN staff members, contractors and visitors, have been prohibited from entering UN compounds nationwide.

The mechanisms enforcing these policies have become increasingly intrusive. Inspectors from the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice actively monitor women’s clothing, movement and behavior in public spaces. In Herat, women were reportedly removed from taxis and buses on January 11 and February 12, for allegedly failing to wear chadors.

Healthcare restrictions further demonstrate the extent of over women’s daily lives. Authorities in Kandahar, Paktya and Uruzgan reportedly instructed health centers not to treat women unless accompanied by a male guardian, or mahram. Female healthcare workers themselves were ordered to travel only with male escorts.

Economic activity has likewise become heavily constrained. In Uruzgan and Ghazni, Taliban inspectors shopkeepers not to sell goods to women unless they were accompanied by a mahram and wearing a Taliban-approved hijab. In Kandahar, real estate agents were instructed not to rent property to women independently, further weakening women’s economic autonomy.

Governance through surveillance and social control

The Taliban’s governing model increasingly relies on mechanisms designed to regulate both public and private life. Between January 1 and March 31, alone, Taliban authorities reportedly carried out at least arbitrary arrests and detentions alongside 59 incidents of ill-treatment targeting Afghan men and women.

Citizens are routinely monitored for dress, fasting practices, social interaction and perceived moral conduct. The Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice has evolved into a nationwide apparatus with expanding authority over everyday life.

Religious observance has become subject to active state monitoring. During Ramadan between February 17 and March 18, Taliban inspectors reportedly mosque attendance and fasting compliance. The broader objective appears increasingly clear: The state is attempting not simply to enforce religious norms, but to regulate social behavior and public morality through coercive oversight.

The Taliban’s intervention into cultural life reflects the same pattern. On February 14, Taliban officials targeted flower shops to discourage celebrations. On March 21, Taliban authorities publicly warned citizens against celebrating Nowruz, the Persian New Year observed across much of the region.

The result is a society in which ordinary social behavior is increasingly politicized and regulated by the threat of punishment.

Codifying authoritarian rule through Taliban decrees

One of the most significant developments under Taliban rule is the gradual formalization of restrictions through legal and judicial decrees. What initially emerged through arbitrary practices is increasingly being institutionalized through codified controls.

Under Decree on Criminal Rules of Courts, circulated by the Taliban Supreme Court on January 7, women can reportedly face imprisonment for remaining outside their husband’s home without permission. Relatives who refuse to force women back into those homes may themselves be jailed for up to three months.

The decree also institutionalizes sectarian hierarchy by formally declaring dominant while describing alternative beliefs as “heretical.” Such provisions reveal the increasingly sectarian character of Taliban governance and raise growing concerns among Afghanistan’s minority communities.

Criticism of Taliban authorities and their interpretation of has likewise been criminalized. Insulting an imam is punishable by 39 lashes and one year of imprisonment, while insulting Taliban leaders carries penalties including prison terms and corporal punishment. Failure to report meetings involving alleged “opponents of the government” can reportedly result in a two-year prison sentence.

The implementation of these also reflects unequal social enforcement. Clerics and elites often receive warnings or admonishments, while lower- and middle-class individuals face lashings, detention and imprisonment.

The Taliban justice system itself increasingly relies on as a visible instrument of control. At least 312 individuals, including 269 men, 39 women and four boys, were reportedly subjected to corporal punishment during the period. In Bagram district on February 5, Taliban courts ordered five men and three women to receive 39 lashes each inside school premises over alleged “illicit relationships,” with several additionally sentenced to prison terms.

These punishments are designed not only to penalize individuals but also to reinforce compliance through public intimidation.

The collapse of independent media and civic space

Independent journalism in Afghanistan has undergone systematic dismantling since the Taliban takeover. operate under constant threat of suspension, censorship and retaliation, while journalists increasingly face detention, intimidation and exile. Afghanistan ranks out of 180 countries in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index, reflecting an extremely critical environment for journalists and media workers.Ěý

On January 26, the Taliban Ministry of Information and Culture revoked the licenses of all media support organizations except three. A month later, was suspended after its head criticized Taliban policies publicly. On March 3, was suspended because female students spoke with a male host during a live broadcast. No transparent legal mechanism exists to challenge or appeal such suspensions.

have nearly disappeared from the Afghan media landscape altogether. Hundreds of journalists have fled the country, fearing arrest or persecution, while more than half of Afghanistan’s media outlets have reportedly shut down since the Taliban’s return to power.

The destruction of independent journalism has created a controlled information environment dominated by censorship, propaganda and enforced silence. Public criticism has become dangerous, civil society organizations have weakened dramatically and political dissent has effectively been criminalized.

Former Afghan government officials and of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces continue facing retaliation despite Taliban promises of amnesty following the 2021 takeover. Reports during the current reporting period documented at least arbitrary arrests and detentions, nine incidents of torture and ill-treatment and at least five killings involving former Afghan security personnel.

The Taliban’s promised amnesty increasingly appears to have functioned less as reconciliation and more as a mechanism for identifying and neutralizing former opponents.

Why Afghanistan’s trajectory matters internationally

The international debate surrounding Afghanistan has increasingly narrowed to questions of humanitarian aid and diplomatic engagement. Yet the Taliban’s trajectory carries broader geopolitical and security implications that extend well beyond Afghan borders.

Restricting in the workforce and education could cost the Afghan economy up to 12.5% of its GDP. Conversely, integrating women into the economy and reversing bans could expand the country’s GDP by up to 35% over their working lifetime. Therefore, the systematic of women from education and employment is steadily weakening Afghanistan’s long-term economic viability and institutional capacity. The erosion of pluralism and suppression of dissent risk creating conditions historically associated with radicalization, underground resistance movements and chronic instability.

Over time, the continued dismantling of independent institutions may deepen state fragility and reduce Afghanistan’s ability to function as a stable political system. Governance structures built primarily around religious policing rather than institutional legitimacy often struggle to sustain long-term social cohesion and economic resilience.

At the same time, international normalization of Taliban rule without meaningful conditions risks legitimizing a governing model rooted in authoritarian religious control and gender exclusion. The Taliban continues seeking diplomatic recognition and economic engagement while simultaneously deepening internal restrictions.

For regional actors, particularly Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian Republics (CARs), Afghanistan’s trajectory remains closely tied to refugee flows, cross-border militancy, narcotics trafficking and long-term security dynamics. Pakistan continues to face challenges related to cross-border terrorism and refugee management, while Iran confronts migration pressures and border security concerns. The CARs remain concerned about the potential spillover of extremism, transnational crime and instability into their territories. For the US, Afghanistan’s trajectory raises longer-term concerns regarding regional instability, extremist safe havens and the strategic consequences of disengagement following the US withdrawal. 

The Taliban frequently argues that territorial control and reduced large-scale conflict constitute evidence of stability. But stability imposed through exclusion and centralized coercive control is inherently fragile. A political system that systematically suppresses women, criminalizes criticism and eliminates civic space may consolidate authority temporarily, but it also deepens social fragmentation and institutional decay.

Afghanistan today increasingly resembles an authoritarian state where fear has replaced political participation and compliance has replaced accountability. Ordinary Afghan life is increasingly shaped not by citizenship, but by enforced obedience.

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Early casualty figures varied across outlets, but the political meaning of the massacre did not. This was not a freak breach in an otherwise secure order. It was another reminder that under Taliban rule, Afghanistan remains a space where sectarian terrorists can assemble, move, select soft targets and strike minorities in broad daylight. That is the real story of Herat: not just who was killed, but what the attack says about who is still able to operate.

The Taliban response is by now predictable. Officials repeatedly insist that Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). ISKP, also called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) in UN reporting, has been defeated, dismantled or pushed outside Afghanistan.

In October 2024, the Taliban said an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) group in the Ghor Province had after attacks on Shia civilians. In October 2025, the Islamic Emirate repeated this claim in a broader anti-Pakistan security statement, ISIS/Daesh had been dismantled inside Afghanistan and that remaining members had fled to Pakistan.

In February 2026, Deputy Information Minister of Afghanistan Zabihullah Mujahid said that no foreign or exist in the country and that ISIS had been defeated there. In May, he , saying ISIS had been eliminated in the country.

These are useful examples of the Taliban line. They are also the problem with it: Governments that are truly containing a terrorist network do not keep producing the same headlines year after year. Repetition is evidence. Continuity is evidence. Geographic spread is evidence. Afghanistan’s post-2021 record shows not eradication, but endurance.

A pattern of operational freedom

Consider the January 19, 2026, a Chinese-run restaurant in Kabul’s Shahr-e-Naw district, the Islamic State. The blast killed at least seven people, including one Chinese national, and wounded others. The attack hit a commercial neighborhood associated with foreigners and embassies, not some distant rural pocket beyond the reach of the state.

Its meaning was therefore strategic. The message was ISKP’s, not the Taliban’s: Chinese investors, diplomats, aid agencies and governments considering normalization should understand that the Taliban cannot reliably protect even politically sensitive foreign-linked targets in the capital.

That message did not appear out of nowhere. It followed the December 12, 2022, assault on Kabul’s , a property known for hosting Chinese nationals, that took planning, surveillance and follow-through. When ISKP can repeatedly hit Chinese-linked venues in Kabul, it is not merely causing casualties. It is undermining the Taliban’s most important diplomatic sales pitch: that engagement with the Emirate will buy stability.

The same logic applies to the September 5, 2022, the Russian Embassy in Kabul, which killed two Russian embassy staff and Afghan civilians and was claimed by the Islamic State. Before that came the October 8, 2021, massacre at a in Kunduz and the October 15, 2021, a Shia Mosque in Kandahar.

Those atrocities were central markers in a deliberate anti-Shia campaign, part of a of ISKP attacks on Afghanistan’s Shia minority. The bloodshed in Herat in April 2026 belongs to that continuum. It is the continuation of a campaign, not the exception to one.

How the Taliban enables the terror environment

The Taliban does not need to order every attack to be responsible for the security order that makes attacks possible. Nor should ISKP be treated as a simple Taliban proxy. ISKP is an ideological rival that has killed Taliban officials and embarrassed the regime internationally.

The more accurate charge is different: Taliban rule has created a permissive environment in which terrorists can recruit, transit, hide, communicate, raise money and choose targets with tolerable risk. That permissiveness comes from five overlapping features of the Taliban state.

First, Taliban counterterrorism . The regime strikes ISKP when the group threatens Taliban authority, but it has not built a neutral security order that suppresses all militant actors equally.

Furthermore, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had been given greater liberty and support, and Al-Qaeda continued to enjoy Taliban patronage, so Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) remained active in areas where the Haqqani Network exerts influence. Furthermore, yet more terrorist organization members had received identity documents and moved freely inside Afghanistan. This is not comprehensive counterterrorism. It is a hierarchy of enemies and tolerated allies.

Second, the Taliban is not a disciplined modern state in the way its suggests. It is a victorious insurgent coalition governing through clerical authority, intelligence services, provincial networks, former battlefield commanders and factional patronage. Central edicts can coexist with local protection, informal deals, family ties and old jihadist relationships.

That matters because terrorist ecosystems do not require an official ministry of terrorism. They require safe houses, documents, local guides, sympathetic clerics, non-interference at checkpoints, and the ability to disappear into communities or allied networks.

Third, the regime’s treatment of vulnerable communities worsens the problem. ISKP targets Shia, Hazara, Sufi, Sikh, Hindu and foreign-linked civilians for ideological and propaganda reasons. But the Taliban’s own sectarian bias, repression of minority civic life and unwillingness to build inclusive protection leave those communities exposed.

ISKP repeatedly attacked Hazaras and other religious minorities while the did little to protect these communities or assist victims. That failure is not merely operational. It is political.

Fourth, the Taliban has weak incentives to police the entire infrastructure that sustains armed groups. Afghanistan’s informal financial sector, porous borders, weapons markets and cross-border smuggling routes remain difficult to regulate.

The International Centre for Counterterrorism has noted that Taliban checks on informal banking remain , partly because the sector is economically vital. That weakness benefits ISKP, but also the broader militant field around TTP, Al-Qaeda and other groups.

Fifth, the Taliban profits politically from the wider militant ecosystem even when it suffers from ISKP attacks. Keeping older jihadist allies close reduces the risk that they defect en masse to ISKP. Tolerating or restraining groups selectively gives Kabul leverage over neighbors, especially Pakistan.

At the same time, the Taliban presents itself to Russia, China, Iran, Central Asian states and Western interlocutors as the capable of containing these terrorists. In other words, the Taliban benefits less from ISKP’s individual attacks than from the bargain that those attacks make possible: engage us, fund us, equip us or recognize us because the alternative is worse.

Different from the American occupation, but not innocent

There is an obvious objection that Afghanistan was also violent during the and the Islamic Republic. That is true. ISKP emerged before the Taliban returned to Kabul; the previous state was corrupt and unevenly present outside major cities, and insurgents exploited rural sanctuaries, cross-border networks, weak policing and factional politics. The difference is not that pre-2021 Afghanistan was secure. It was not.

The difference is responsibility and structure. Before August 2021, the internationally backed state was fighting the Taliban and ISKP while depending on foreign military, intelligence and financial support. Today, the Taliban controls the state, border posts, intelligence service, prisons, police, ministries, identity documents, checkpoints and most public spaces.

It also governs through the same movement that historically maintained relationships with Al-Qaeda and other jihadist actors. When terrorism persists under these conditions, the Taliban cannot blame a foreign-backed government, NATO operations or republican corruption. It owns the security architecture it has created.

The Taliban’s security narrative has collapsed

There is a tendency in some foreign capitals to separate Taliban incompetence from Taliban responsibility, as if repeated failure somehow absolves the regime. It does not. Once a movement claims sovereign authority, monopolizes force and demands diplomatic legitimacy, it owns the consequences of the security order it creates. The April 2024 in Herat already showed that western Afghanistan was vulnerable to anti-Shia terrorism.

±őł§±őł§-°­â€™s make clear that the branch is not merely a local irritant. The Council on Foreign Relations tracker continues to describe and ISIS-K violence under Taliban rule. A regime cannot market itself as the provider of order while its adversary keeps staging headline attacks against civilians, diplomats, minorities and foreigners.

What matters most is not whether every attack is centrally directed from one command room or whether local cells vary in quality. What matters is the enabling environment. By that standard, Afghanistan is not hostile terrain for ISKP; it is permissive terrain. If a network can keep resurfacing from Kabul to Herat, keep selecting symbolic targets and keep forcing emergency responses after every supposed crackdown, then the crackdown is not solving the problem. It is managing headlines.

A wider terror ecosystem, not a single threat

The most damning evidence comes from the international monitoring architecture itself. The UN Monitoring Team report of , its predecessor and the broader UN monitoring point toward the same conclusion: Afghanistan under Taliban control remains a permissive environment for multiple terrorist entities.

An Amu summary of UN findings captured the blunt assessment that the a haven to terrorist groups, while SATP’s note on ISKP manpower putting ISKP strength around 2,000 fighters. A separate EU Institute for Security Studies brief warned years ago that from Afghanistan were not disappearing but diffusing outward. The wider terrorist ecosystem matters because it demolishes the fiction that the Taliban has delivered counterterrorism success.

The reality, then, is clear. Herat is not a tragic outlier. It is a fresh exhibit in an old case. ISKP survives under Taliban rule because Afghanistan has again become what the Taliban promised it would not be: a terror-permissive sanctuary. Minorities are paying the price first, foreigners are being warned in blood and the region will keep absorbing the consequences so long as rhetoric about Taliban stability outruns the evidence on the ground.

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This content, showing calm streets, active markets, friendly interactions with locals and sometimes even with Taliban members, attempts to present a different image of post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Many groups have participated in the trend, from travel vloggers seeking “unusual” experiences to influencers who attract audiences by going against dominant narratives. For example, an American pornographic Afghanistan at a time when women in Afghanistan are deprived of even their most basic rights is not just a marginal incident, but a clear example of how such images are produced and circulated.

At first glance, these videos may appear to be personal experiences. But that interpretation is dangerously simplistic. What this content presents as “Afghanistan” is not reality, but a constructed version of it, shaped through selection, omission and control. This ultimately contributes to softening the coercive image of the regime and rendering repression more socially acceptable. The issue is not simply truth versus falsehood; it is what is allowed to be seen and what is systematically left out. These portrayals do not merely misrepresent Afghanistan; they circulate what I call “performative safety,” a selective image of “safety” that obscures the exclusion of women, normalizes authoritarian rule and may carry real political consequences.

The Taliban does not govern only through force; it also reshapes how it is seen. Every “peaceful” image, every “calm” video and every “against-the-media” narrative helps reduce the symbolic costs of this system. In this process, influencers, even when they see themselves as neutral, become informal participants in a broader project: turning a repressive system into something that appears livable.

Unequal experiences: safety for whom?

The experience of safety under Taliban rule is deeply unequal. What influencers experience and present as “safety” is structurally out of reach for a large part of the population, especially women in Afghanistan.

While in Afghanistan are detained for minor reasons and subjected to humiliation and violence, women from outside the country can move freely in the same spaces, go to restaurants and even interact casually with Taliban members. This reveals a deep gap in power and in who has the right to be present.

Cases like the visit of an American pornographic actress make this gap painfully visible. At a time when women in Afghanistan are denied education, excluded from most forms of work and restricted in their movement, presenting those same spaces as “safe” or “interesting” is misleading and politically problematic.

What influencers present as “safety” is, in fact, a privilege that is available only to certain bodies under specific conditions within a discriminatory system. It is not a general condition; it is selective. Presenting it as a shared reality distorts the truth.

Within what can be described as a system of gender apartheid, these representations take on a deeper meaning. When foreign women appear alongside Taliban members, joke with them or take photos with their weapons, these images, regardless of intent, contribute to normalizing a system that has pushed women in Afghanistan out of public life. This is not neutrality. It is participation in the production of a political image.

Safety as performance

A key concept for understanding this phenomenon is “performative safety.” In many of these videos, influencers walk through markets, talk to people and describe the environment as calm. But this calm is the result of selective spaces and controlled interactions.

Influencers usually film in places where “normality” can be easily shown, while other elements, such as structural restrictions, social control and especially the absence of women in public spaces, are systematically left out.

In other words, safety is not simply observed; it is staged. It is a scene built through highlighting certain realities and hiding others. This performance shapes not only what is seen but also how audiences understand it. When the dominant image of Afghanistan on social media is calm and tension-free, it becomes harder to recognize deeper inequalities and forms of structural violence. What influencers present as “safety” is therefore not a shared social condition, but a limited and highly political experience.

Normalizing authoritarianism

These representations, whether intentional or not, contribute to the normalization of authoritarian rule. When Taliban members are shown as “ordinary,” “friendly” or even “humorous,” the broader system of restrictions and violence they represent is pushed out of view.

This process makes violence invisible. As a result, authoritarianism begins to appear as part of everyday life rather than something to question. Viewers gradually accept the system as normal rather than critically examining it. Representation becomes a tool of power.

Attention economy and content production

To understand why these representations persist, we need to look at the “attention economy,” a system in which attention is limited and the value of content depends on its ability to attract and hold audiences, not on its accuracy.

In this environment, Afghanistan becomes an ideal subject. Since it is widely associated with war and danger, any content that challenges this expectation, such as by showing “safety,” immediately attracts attention. The contrast between expectation and presentation drives visibility and engagement. like Business Insider’s show that such content performs well precisely because of this contrast.

Digital platforms reinforce this dynamic. Their algorithms promote surprising, contradictory or emotionally engaging content. As a result, creators are pushed toward narratives that generate reactions, even if this means simplifying or distorting reality.

In this context, “safety” becomes a kind of media product, valued not for how accurately it reflects reality, but for how well it can be consumed and shared. The more it contradicts common assumptions about Afghanistan, the more attention it gains. At the same time, complex realities, especially the situation of women in Afghanistan and deeper structural inequalities, are pushed aside because they do not fit easily into short, fast-paced content.

Indirect complicity and ethical implications

Influencers who create these videos cannot be seen as neutral. Presenting a positive image of a system that systematically violates the rights of women is not just a personal choice; it is a political act with ethical consequences. Producing and sharing such content contributes, in practice, to legitimizing a system built on exclusion and control.

This complicity is not necessarily intentional. Many influencers may see themselves as simply sharing personal experiences. But from a sociological perspective, the issue is not intention, but outcome. When influencers remove suffering and inequality from the frame, what remains is an image that makes the existing system appear normal and acceptable.

The key question is not only what is shown, but what is allowed to remain unseen. When repression is removed from view, it is also removed from judgment. Representation, in this sense, becomes an ethical act: it can either expose inequality or hide it. In many of these cases, it clearly does the latter.

When images turn into risk

Presenting Afghanistan as a “safe” and “accessible” place is not just a matter of perception; it can have real-world consequences. In the attention economy, content that challenges expectations spreads quickly and becomes convincing. As a result, some viewers, especially adventure travelers, may take these narratives as a basis for real decisions.

In this way, the distance between image and action collapses. What begins as digital consumption can lead to physical travel into a complex and unpredictable political environment. Yet such decisions are made in a context with no reliable legal protections, no transparency and no meaningful accountability.

Under such conditions, ordinary individuals without strong institutional or diplomatic support may find themselves in vulnerable, risky situations. Evidence from other authoritarian contexts, including Iran, shows that governments have at times detained and used foreign nationals as tools of political pressure. There are also that the Taliban has, in certain cases, used the detention of foreign nationals as leverage. In a system without accountability, this risk is not simply hypothetical.

The way influencers portray Afghanistan is not a neutral reflection of reality, but a selective reconstruction of it. Through the systematic removal of violence, especially the exclusion of women in Afghanistan, influencers produce an image of a system that appears stable and livable. What they present as “safety” is not a shared condition, but a deeply unequal and political one.

The issue is not just distortion, but its consequences. These images shape perception, perception shapes decisions, and those decisions can lead individuals into environments where basic protections do not exist. In such a setting, even ordinary people can become exposed to serious risks.

Ultimately, the question is not whether these images are “true” or “false.” The question is how they reshape reality itself, what they show, what they hide and whose absence makes the image possible. Representation moves beyond storytelling and becomes part of power, shaping what repression can hide and what the world is allowed to ignore.

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For decades, the world has fought the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Yet, as the US withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan was left alone to fight the menace of terrorism. Terrorism emanating from Afghanistan has become a transnational threat, affecting regional countries as well as those further afield in Europe and the , as recent incidents indicate. However, a question still remains: What prompted Pakistan to launch a military action inside its neighboring country with whom it has historically maintained brotherly ties?

Post-2021 Taliban takeover and militant regrouping

As Kabul fell to the Taliban in 2021, the first order of business was to release the terrorists held captive by the US and its allied forces. The released almost 1,500 individuals belonging to different terror groups, including Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and others who had been apprehended during 20 years of the GWOT.Ěý

Over the years, these individuals have regrouped and reorganized under the patronage of the ruling Afghan Taliban. These regrouped terrorists have from leftover weapons of the US and allied forces, while also logistically and financially exploiting humanitarian aid meant for Afghan locals.Ěý

Multiple reports by international bodies have over the years that rampant corruption within the Taliban regime has strengthened terrorism in Afghanistan, affecting Central Asia and South Asia, specifically Pakistan. The 35th and 36th of the UN Monitoring Team assessed that Al-Qaeda and TTP had regrouped in Afghanistan with documented facilitation by the Taliban regime. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction () reports confirmed the presence of 6,000–8,000 TTP fighters in Afghanistan, while also noting the country hosts senior leadership of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and TTP.Ěý

Recently, Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an independent report indicating the presence of 20,000–23,000 terrorists in Afghanistan, just months after normalizing diplomatic ties.Ěý

Diplomatic engagement and exhaustion of channelsĚý

Pakistan has always engaged with Afghanistan diplomatically, from playing a significant role in the 2020 to bring all parties to the dialogue table, to demanding the curtailment of terrorism.Ěý

Since 2021, Pakistan has been raising concerns over terrorism emanating from Afghan soil with the Taliban, which has yet to take cognizance. In its efforts, Pakistan all diplomatic channels of bilateral engagement with Afghanistan. These included four Foreign Ministers’ visits, two Defense Ministers’ visits (one of which also included former Chief of Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI], Lieutenant General Ahmed Nadeem Anjum), five Special Representatives’ visits, five Secretary-level meetings, one visit by the National Security Advisor, eight Joint Coordination Committee sessions, 225 border flag meetings, 836 protest notes and 13 formal demarches to the Afghan representative in Pakistan. All these channels were used to highlight a single-point agenda: that Afghanistan must ensure its soil is not used for terrorism against Pakistan.

However, in response, Afghanistan has not only hosted and harbored terrorist organizations, but also them logistical and financial support, along with human resources, arms and ammunition. This assistance is not limited to religious groups, but extends to Baloch terrorist groups as well.Ěý

Escalation of cross-border attacks (2025–2026)Ěý

In February 2025, a significant development rattled security analysts watching Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan. A senior commander of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) — a terrorist group — Mushtaq Kohi, was assassinated in Kabul’s Khushal Khan area.Ěý

This development once again reaffirmed Pakistan’s claim that terrorist attacks on its soil were being orchestrated from Afghanistan. In 2025 alone, major attacks in Pakistan have been linked to terrorists present in Afghanistan. In March 2025, the BLA a hostage attack on a Quetta-bound train, the Jaffar Express, in the Bolan area. The attackers on the ground were found to be commands from their handlers in Afghanistan.Ěý

Similarly, an attack in May 2025 on a school bus of Army Public School in Khuzdar, which seven young girls and a boy, was also traced back to Afghanistan. It is important to note that the suicide attack on the Judicial Complex in Islamabad in October 2025 was carried out by an Afghan national, Qari Usman alias Zubair. From to , Peshawar, Besham and Waziristan, Afghan nationals have targeted civilians across Pakistan in multiple terrorist attacks, including the attack on Wana Cadet College.

In 2025 alone, Afghan nationals were reportedly killed in two separate military operations against terrorism conducted by the Pakistan Army. However, terrorist infiltration across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border did not cease, and continued into 2026 as well.

Operation Ghazab Lil Haq and military responseĚý

In February 2026, a horrific terrorist attack on a congregation at an Imambargah in became a decisive moment for Pakistan to act against terrorist camps and hideouts across the border in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Army and Air Force launched Operation Ghazab-lil-Haq against TTP hideouts, initially hitting seven targets in the Khost, Paktika and Nangarhar provinces adjoining the border.

To date, Pakistan has targeted locations across Afghanistan, with the largest being Bagram Airbase. In recent airstrikes, Pakistan destroyed a weapons depot at Bagram Airbase containing leftover US weaponry that had been illegally transferred to terrorist organizations.Ěý

Strategic justification and security narrativeĚý

Pakistan acted against Afghanistan as a last resort after exhausting all diplomatic options and multiple failed dialogues. Afghanistan’s stubborn refusal to expel terrorist organizations poses a threat to Pakistan’s national security, regional stability and world peace. In the war against terrorism, Pakistan has paid heavily, sacrificing nearly of its nationals, including civilians, military personnel and children.

Pakistan has made its position clear at international forums and at the Security Council that terrorism emanating from Afghanistan is unacceptable. For regional peace to prevail, Afghanistan must stop its soil from being used for terrorist attacks against Pakistan.

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One of the most consequential provisions involved the release of approximately prisoners. While the agreement conditioned their release on their refraining from combat, within weeks, these fighters ranks, reinforcing insurgent capabilities across Afghanistan. Prior intelligence assessments had warned of this outcome, highlighting structural weaknesses in the agreement’s enforcement mechanisms.

Counterterrorism commitments and regional security risks

The Doha Accord obligated the Taliban to prevent Afghan territory from being used to threaten the security of the US and its allies. In practice, however, this provision has proven largely ineffective. The Taliban’s tolerance and facilitation of transnational militant groups, including al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), constitutes a clear violation.

, the leader of al-Qaeda, reportedly lived openly in Kabul before being killed in a US drone strike in 2022, nearly a year after the Taliban assumed power. His presence in the Afghan capital raised questions about the effectiveness of counterterrorism assurances. Additionally, reports that members of Osama bin Laden’s family continue to reside in Afghanistan fueled debate over whether the Taliban have fully met their commitments.

These developments extend beyond Afghanistan. They complicate border insurgencies and compel regional powers to rethink their security arrangements.

Khalilzad’s advocacy and selective framing

Former US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad’s portraying the Taliban as ready to engage constructively with regional actors, including Pakistan, echoes a familiar pattern of misrepresentation. Khalilzad presents the group as cooperative and compliant, claiming any agreement would prevent extremist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and TTP from using Afghan territory to threaten others, with third-party monitoring. In reality, the Taliban’s record under the 2020 Doha Accord tells a starkly different story: promises of intra-Afghan dialogue were ignored, and the group marched unopposed on Kabul, exposing the failures of Khalilzad’s diplomacy.

Khalilzad’s repeated framing of the Taliban as reasonable actors overlooks the broader regional consequences and security risks, while his renewed advocacy for agreements modeled on Doha risks repeating past strategic mistakes where enforcement mechanisms were lacking and accountability is absent. Despite no longer holding a US government position, Khalilzad continues to in Afghan affairs, raising serious questions about his motives, judgment and credibility. The pattern is clear: overstatement, miscalculation and self-serving maneuvering consistently undermine meaningful conflict resolution, leaving the region to grapple with the consequences.

Multiple Pakistan–Taliban agreements

Over the past three years, Pakistan and the Taliban have engaged in several rounds of security dialogue. These efforts included a bilateral agreement guaranteed by the United Arab Emirates, promises made in backed by Turkey and Qatar, as well as follow-up discussions in Istanbul.

Despite repeated diplomatic engagement, none of the agreements yielded the expected results, thereby indicating the Taliban’s continued inability or unwillingness to fulfill their commitments.

Recent Saudi-mediated in Riyadh reportedly stalled when the Taliban rejected the proposed verification mechanisms, reinforcing a consistent practice of demanding recognition and legitimacy without taking responsibility. Pakistan has emphasized the need for enforceable monitoring frameworks, drawing lessons from earlier agreements: trust cannot be extended based on words alone; it must be secured through actual performance.

Regional fallout and security implications

The Taliban’s noncompliance has broader for South and Central Asia. Neighboring countries — including Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian states — face heightened risks of cross-border attacks because of the unregulated movement of militants. Activities linked to the anti-state Pakistan-based militant group were facilitated by the areas under Taliban control, while the presence of al-Qaeda in Kabul complicates regional counterterrorism coordination, exposing significant fault lines in regional cooperation.

Instability also affects economic cooperation. Trade corridors, humanitarian assistance channels and regional integration initiatives depend on predictable security conditions. As a result, the shortcomings of the Doha Accord have become a matter of transnational concern.

The Doha legacy

The Taliban’s consolidation of power also carried significant humanitarian consequences. Communities protesting coercion, resource seizures and governance abuses have faced violent repression. These actions highlight a governance model prioritizing power consolidation over human life, exacerbating instability within Afghanistan.

The Doha Accord failed because it lacked compliance and transparency, illustrating the importance of enforceability in diplomatic agreements. Verification is not a procedural luxury; it is essential for credible security cooperation and sustainable regional stability. Agreements that rely primarily on trust risk creating gaps between formal commitments and actual behavior, allowing the Taliban to consolidate power while projecting an image of compliance and perpetuating insecurity both inside and outside Afghanistan.

The Doha legacy is defined by strategic failure and its cascading effects on regional security. Taliban violations, internal repression and facilitation of militant networks have undermined intra-Afghan peace prospects and South Asian stability. Future diplomatic efforts depend on prioritizing enforceability, transparency and accountability frameworks with measurable performance to prevent further erosion of trust and mitigate the political, security and human costs that have defined the past three years.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Rise of Afghanistan as a base for transnational and proxy terrorism

The findings of the UN rely on multilateral verification, rather than mere claims made by Pakistan. More importantly, this fact has even been backed up by respected voices in Afghanistan. , leader of the National Resistance Front, and , ex-commander of Afghan special operations forces and former director of military intelligence, have both stated publicly that Afghanistan has turned into a breeding ground of extremist networks that are involved in cross-border attacks inside Pakistan. The facts become impossible to deny when credible international institutions, along with Afghan insiders, come to the same conclusion.Ěý

What complicates the situation further is the reported dimension. Afghan informers have reported that TTP violence is being financed by money that passes through Afghan Taliban networks. Assuming this to be true would imply that Afghanistan is not only a passive host but is serving as a frontline in regional proxy warfare. To India, these kinds of tactics would appear to undermine Pakistan in the short term, but in the long term, the consequences are threatening.Ěý

Sponsorship of terror by states to destabilize international norms cultivates retaliatory circles and reinforces the extremist ecosystems that ignore national boundaries. It is clear through rational analysis that these kinds of strategies will ultimately prove to be self-defeating.

Afghanistan’s silence met with Pakistan’s resistance to cross-border terror

The fact that the is in power contributes to the issue. Kabul can claim that it cannot withstand these terrorist organizations, but avoiding effective measures raises questions over Kabul’s approach and seriousness. Whether it is ideological symbiosis or a political calculus, the result is the same. The Afghan territory has been into a for militants, undermining Afghanistan’s credibility as a responsible state.Ěý

Sovereignty implies responsibility; the government that proclaims its right to rule the territory should also assume the burden of making sure that its soil is not utilized in cross-border aggression. Inactivity will just widen the distance between Afghanistan and its developmental prospects.

The recent infiltration attempt of TTP Islamic terrorists, through the Afghan soil, across Gangi Khel Shawal in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, was as Pakistani forces neutralized 10–12 Terrorists on August 30, averting a major cross-border assault. The losses were confirmed through videos by the terrorists themselves.Ěý

Previously, in April 2025, were killed over a period of three days, and on August 7, were killed in Zhob, a province of Balochistan in Pakistan. Hence, the TTP is no longer a hypothetical danger but an actual threat to the security of Pakistan. The defensive measures taken by Islamabad indicate that it is determined to safeguard its population and land, and to invalidate any allegations that it overestimates the danger posed by Afghanistan.

The regional spread of TTP and its toll on Afghanistan’s progress

The involvement of fighters is not just limited to Afghanistan but has extended beyond its neighboring borders. This is a threat to regional security. The capture of associated with the TTP proves that the networks of this organization are now developing in the region. History bears multiple testimonies that terrorist movements, when left unchecked, almost always refuse to stay within the borders of only one geography. In the same way Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) developed into global franchises out of local insurgencies, the is becoming a transnational threat.

Such a path also contravenes the possibility of Afghanistan acting as a point of contact among the regions. Pakistan, China and Afghanistan have been trying to develop structures of trade and development, which terrorism renders impractical. Investors will not risk working in unstable environments, connectivity projects will fail and populations will not receive the benefits of economic integration. Allowing the unchecked use of its territory, Afghanistan is setting up its own economic grave and making sure that it will be viewed as a threat to the region, rather than a contributor to the regional development.

The alternative to Afghanistan is clear-cut. It may move decisively to destroy terrorist havens, and thus become part of regional collaboration and enjoy economic payoffs, or remain idle and risk more isolation. Pakistan has displayed determination as well as sacrifice in tackling this menace. The global society needs to learn that terrorism in Afghanistan is a threat not only to Pakistan but to the rest of the region, and needs to support its words with actions. They need to be sanctioned, diplomatically pressured and monitored.

It is no longer disputed that Afghanistan is a terrorist haven. The facts are too many, the risks are rising and the consequences are international. Not a single argument can reach another conclusion than that, unless Kabul and the international community move swiftly, the TTP and its affiliates will become a transnational franchise and destabilize South and Central Asia. Not only Pakistan but the whole region will pay the price of inaction, and ultimately the entire world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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It Can Never Be The Same

Tugnoli explains that the title of his book carries two meanings. First, foreigners continue to view and portray Afghanistan in repetitive, static ways that fail to capture its evolving realities. Second, no photograph can ever replicate the lived experience of being in a place. Looking at an image and living through an event are fundamentally different, and that gap in experience is central to his project.

Tugnoli emphasizes that photography can be seductive in its apparent clarity, yet misleading when it erases the distance between representation and reality. His book tries to remind readers that what they see is only one version of an infinitely more complex world.

Beauty and pain in Afghanistan

Khattar Singh notes that Afghanistan is one of the most photographed regions on earth, yet most images follow clichés — armed men and veiled women. His own 2019 visit to Kabul revealed a far more diverse reality. Tugnoli acknowledges that photographers, himself included, often start with such clichés. But with time, they move beyond them, finding layers of contradiction and complexity. His book deliberately preserves ambiguity, pushing against journalism’s tendency to impose a clear narrative.

He argues that beauty and pain coexist in Afghanistan: the beauty of mountains, traditions and art, and the pain of war, poverty and endless political interference. To ignore either side would be dishonest, and Tugnoli’s photographs seek to hold both in tension.

Life in Afghanistan

Between 2009 and 2015, Tugnoli lived in Afghanistan, returning frequently afterward. This long engagement helped him look past surface images to capture everyday life. He recalls Afghan soldiers dancing during a ceasefire — men who, without context, could easily be mistaken for Taliban fighters. Khattar Singh notes that “Taliban” means “students” in Arabic and Pashto, underscoring how both sides were largely young men. For Tugnoli, this kind of ambiguity is the strength of photography: It allows multiple interpretations instead of forcing a single truth.

He notes that Afghans often lived in ways that defied outside categories altogether, with markets bustling, weddings being celebrated and children attending school even as bombs went off only a few miles away. Such juxtapositions, he insists, show the resilience of ordinary Afghans and highlight how little of their daily existence fits into foreign reporting.

The US Army in Afghanistan

Some of Tugnoli’s most telling images emerged from assignments for The Washington Post. He describes a photograph of the pre-September 11 New York skyline hanging inside the US Army’s base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Initially unremarkable, it later struck him as symbolic of America’s “twisted mission” in the country. The paradox was stark: the United States invaded to kill al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, succeeded after ten years, stayed another decade and departed with the Taliban once again in power. For Tugnoli, the photograph embodied that circular futility.

He describes the base itself as a strange hybrid space: part-fortress, part-small American town. Soldiers watched American football, ate fast food and lived behind concertina wire, disconnected from the country they claimed to be securing. The photograph of New York encapsulated that distance, showing how American memories of September 11 overshadowed Afghan realities.

America’s war

Asked whether misunderstanding led to the Taliban’s return, Tugnoli answers without hesitation: yes. The problem was not just language or culture, but a lack of genuine interest in understanding Afghanistan. Decisions were often made in Washington or behind the fortified walls of UN compounds — enclaves that resembled foreign homelands more than Afghanistan. With overwhelming firepower, occupying forces had no incentive to learn or listen. Their mission, Tugnoli argues, served Western political agendas, not Afghan needs.

Khattar Singh contrasts this insularity with the murals painted on blast walls by Afghan artists like Omaid Sharifi — messages of love and peace that stand as a poignant counterpoint to the war’s brutality. These works of art, Khattar Singh observes, reveal that Afghans did not passively accept foreign domination. They responded with creativity, using color and words to reclaim public space from fear. This tension between military power and human resilience is one of the strongest themes in Tugnoli’s reflections.

Lessons from Afghanistan

Tugnoli believes the central lesson of Afghanistan is that ambiguity cannot be erased. His book avoids simple explanations, preferring to immerse readers in the atmosphere of uncertainty that defined Afghan life. By presenting images stripped of captions and reinterpreted in black and white, he asks viewers to confront instability and contradiction directly.

Rather than delivering “the truth,” It Can Never Be the Same invites reflection on beauty, pain and paradox. Khattar Singh concludes by praising this approach as a profound way to understand Afghanistan — not through answers, but through questions that remain open.

For Tugnoli, photography is most powerful not when it explains but when it unsettles. His hope is that audiences leave the book with questions about war, power and humanity that continue to resonate long after the last page is turned.

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These challenges are deeply interconnected, creating a vortex of instability that not only endangers Afghanistan’s future but also threatens regional and global peace. Stabilizing the country will require more than isolated efforts or rhetorical condemnations; it demands a comprehensive international response, led by US leadership. Such an approach would strengthen regional security, restore America’s moral standing and reaffirm its leadership in peacemaking, aligning with US President Donald Trump’s focus on diplomacy over endless war.

This international effort would also uphold the foundational values of the , including respect for sovereignty and the pursuit of peace through dialogue. When done correctly, this creates a rare alignment of interests and principles — a potential win for Afghans, regional powers and global unity.

The collapse and its drivers

Afghanistan’s current predicament stems from an extremist regime lacking political legitimacy. The Taliban rule by repression, not consent. Democratic institutions have been dismantled, civil society silenced and dissent punished. between the leadership in Kandahar and the Haqqani network further weaken prospects for inclusive governance. Terrorism has resurged under Taliban rule. A 2024 confirms that al-Qaeda, ISIS-K and the Pakistani Taliban have significantly expanded in Afghanistan, with al-Qaeda establishing nine new terrorist camps that year. This tolerance or facilitation of terrorism provides a pretext for continued repression.

Economically, Afghanistan is in freefall. Since 2021, its economy has contracted , according to the World Bank. With increased dependence on foreign humanitarian aid, the Taliban have turned to illicit revenue sources such as drug trafficking, unregulated mining and smuggling. Although a nominal opium ban was imposed in , production shifted to like methamphetamine.Ěý

Meanwhile, of the population lives below the poverty line. Public services have collapsed, inflation is volatile and youth unemployment is rampant. With few options, many Afghans are fleeing — roughly young people annually attempt to cross into neighboring countries. Families in rural areas often resort to selling children into labor or early marriage, and many young men are drawn into extremist groups, creating a cycle of poverty and radicalization.

adds another layer of crisis. The Taliban have issued more than restricting women’s rights. Girls are banned from education beyond sixth grade; women are barred from most employment and public life. This exclusion has gutted vital public services once staffed by women. Mothers now to madrassas for food, exposing them to indoctrination and terrorist recruitment for operations at home and abroad. The suppression of women not only violates universal rights but also deprives the country of critical human capital, feeding into the larger crisis with far-reaching security implications.

These dynamics culminate in a massive humanitarian emergency. As of early 2024, of Afghans require humanitarian aid. Over 3 million Afghans are internally displaced, and about 6 million are refugees. However, aid alone cannot solve a crisis rooted in systemic collapse. Without political and economic reform, the situation will only deteriorate. Afghanistan’s collapse is a closed loop: repression fuels extremism, which erodes economic viability, deepening human suffering and increasing dependency. The Taliban will not reform themselves. Only meaningful external engagement — diplomatic and strategic — can disrupt this cycle.

Diplomatic opportunity and strategic leverage

Despite the Taliban’s firm grip, their regime is fragile, their economy untenable and their global standing nonexistent. This creates a diplomatic opening that the United States and regional actors must seize. Several developments make this moment an ideal time for action.

First, the Afghan people demand that the Taliban change and form an inclusive government consistent with Afghanistan’s international obligations. To that end, civic resistance in the country is ongoing and courageous. Women continue to , and underground schools for girls are growing. Youth activists, journalists and civil society leaders refuse to be silenced. This resilience underscores the population’s desire for inclusive governance and dignity.

Second, regional powers that once tolerated or supported the Taliban are now suffering the consequences. Pakistan faces from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) elements within Afghanistan. Iran is involved in border clashes and . China and Russia are intelligence operations to counter extremism. These countries now recognize that a failed Afghan state threatens them all.

Third, international actors are disillusioned with the Taliban’s to reform. Diplomatic and humanitarian engagement has yielded deeper repression. As hope for internal moderation fades, external stakeholders are more receptive to new strategies.

Finally, is emerging. In regions like Panjshir and northern Afghanistan, former security personnel and grassroots fighters are mounting a challenge to Taliban rule. Although fragmented, their presence signals political dissatisfaction and provides leverage in diplomacy. While peace must remain the primary goal, acknowledging this resistance adds pressure for negotiated solutions.

The United States has a critical opportunity to lead a values-driven strategy involving diplomacy, sanctions, regional cooperation and moral clarity. This does not mean military redeployment but a re-engagement on terms that reflect both American interests and Afghan needs.

A US-led framework for peace

The US should spearhead a United Nations-backed peace process, rooted in global interests and the harsh realities on the ground. Five key pillars can guide this effort.

First, a UN-led political process must be inclusive and Afghan-owned, involving the Taliban, opposition groups, women, civil society and ethnic minorities. The aim should be the formation of a transitional government supported by a multinational peacekeeping force. This body would undertake a constitutional review and lay the groundwork for lasting governance.

Second, the White House should appoint a for Afghanistan to coordinate diplomatic efforts. The US should also take the lead as Afghanistan’s at the UN Security Council and support key recommendations from the 2023 . Coordination between US and would create a coherent strategy uniting donors and regional actors.

Third, the US must pursue faith-based diplomacy to counter the Taliban’s ideological legitimacy. Collaborating with Muslim-majority countries and institutions such as the , the US can promote Islamic principles that support education, human rights and peace. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are to challenge the Taliban’s theological justifications.

Fourth, the US should initiate a regional stability compact that brings together Pakistan, Iran, India, China, Russia and the Central Asian republics. This agreement would focus on non-interference, counterterrorism, refugee repatriation and regional connectivity. Afghanistan could then from a zone of competition to a platform for cooperation.

Finally, until a political settlement is reached, calibrated pressure and support for civil society must continue. Sanctions, visa bans, and withholding should remain tools to penalize repression. However, phased incentives tied to concrete progress could encourage reforms. Crucially, civil society — especially women’s organizations and independent media — must receive robust international support to preserve democratic values under threat.

Why it matters for the United States

Reengaging in Afghanistan is not charity — it is a strategic and moral imperative aligned with America’s national interests. The future of Afghanistan intersects with national security, economic competitiveness, geopolitical influence and ethical credibility.

From a security standpoint, Afghanistan risks becoming a base for transnational terrorism. Al-Qaeda to the Taliban, and ISIS-K is expanding its reach. With diminished intelligence post-withdrawal, the threat is harder to monitor. To prevent future attacks, the US must rebuild partnerships and intelligence networks.

Economically, Afghanistan is estimated to possess in untapped minerals essential for clean energy and technology supply chains. Disengagement hands this opportunity to China. A transparent development framework would benefit both Afghan communities and US national security interests.

Geopolitically, Afghanistan is central to the region where great power competition plays out. A power vacuum benefits China, Russia and Iran. However, this same complexity allows the US to lead a cooperative agenda that fosters stability, infrastructure and shared prosperity.

Morally, the US has a in Afghanistan. More than 2,400 American lives were lost, and over $2 trillion was spent in pursuit of a free and democratic society. Abandoning Afghanistan would not only betray those who believed in that vision but also damage America’s credibility. Leading a peace-focused strategy affirms US values and strengthens its global leadership.

A legacy of peace through leadership

America faces a defining moral and strategic choice: to retreat into the false comfort of disengagement or to lead with clarity, conviction and conscience. Indifference is not neutrality — it is complicity in the erosion of human rights, regional stability and US credibility. Geographic distance shield us from the consequences of instability abroad, especially when it endangers security at home.

Sustainable peace in Afghanistan is not merely a regional imperative — it is a national security priority. Disengagement risks the resurgence of transnational threats, while principled engagement through diplomacy, multilateral cooperation and sustained peacebuilding advances both American interests and global stability. This approach reflects the President Trump has aspired to: ending endless wars through durable, negotiated solutions that preserve US values and strategic aims.

This is not about reliving past missteps but about preventing new ones through responsible and forward-looking leadership. True leadership means rallying others through example and shared purpose. Let history record that the United States chose to lead, not out of guilt, but out of duty, correcting the flawed choices made by successive administrations in pursuing and executing .

Peace does not happen by accident. It must be built — and it begins with a choice. Let us choose wisely.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Atul Singh: Well, Gary, one of the things that we have to look at when we look at places like Israel and Palestine and India and Pakistan is the nature of history and the nature of competing narratives. Now, as far as India is concerned, this was a cold-blooded Islamist terror attack. Twenty-six people are dead, killed after being asked about their religion.

Gary Grappo: This is up in Kashmir in the Indian—

Atul Singh: This is up near Pahalgam, a terrorist spot, yes. And this is part of a pattern. Islam has used terror as an instrument of state policy. Its leaders have admitted to using terror as an instrument of state policy, and they have sought strategic depth against India, in particular since the loss of Bangladesh in 1971. Remember, there was a 1971 India–Pakistan war. Pakistan came up short, and after it came up short, Bangladesh was formed. Pakistan has pursued a strategy of bleeding India through a thousand cuts. It was General Zia-ul-Haq, the Islamist president, who took over in a military coup and hung Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who initiated it. Lest we forget, it was Bhutto who declared the Ahmadis to be non-Muslims in 1974 and said they would eat grass for a thousand years but get a nuclear bomb. So Bhutto was no saint, but Zia was worse. In fact, it was Bhutto’s intransigence that led to Bangladesh. He was racist; he thought the Bangladeshis were dark-skinned for Muslims. So we can go into a whole eddy, but the bottom line is that Pakistan was founded on the idea that all Muslims of the Indian subcontinent are a separate nation. It was founded on the nostalgia of the Delhi Sultanate, which was a garrison state, as Ishtiaq Ahmed — a noted historian or political scientist at the University of Stockholm, professor emeritus, originally of Pakistani origin — has talked about. He’s talked about a garrison state in the context of post-1947 history, and for Pakistan to inflict damage in India, they have fanned many insurgencies. In fact, in the early days, it was Punjab. There was disaffection there. And then after 1989, it was Kashmir. Now, as far as India is concerned, since 2014, India has been ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party — it’s a Hindu right party. And the Bharatiya Janata Party has thumped its chest and, literally, the prime minister has said he’s got a 56-inch chest and claimed to be the great masters of national security. And they have trumpeted that tourism has replaced terrorism. So this is not egg in their face, but blood in their face. And so they’ve lost a lot of face because they had put in a lot of investment, they had built infrastructure, they had liaised with the Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to get investment in Kashmir. Indian tourists have started going to Kashmir in large numbers, and so for this to happen will have a chilling effect on tourism. So there’ll be less money flowing into Kashmir, so there’ll be more unemployment, and that Pakistan will hope to exploit. They’ve killed tourists, and now kill tourism.

Strategic fallout and historic patterns

Atul Singh: And what has happened on top of that is that they’ve been weighed, measured and found wanting. And mind you, since 2023, Pakistan has been following a policy of targeting Indian army and Indian security personnel in Poonch and Rajouri. That’s in Jammu, the other region, because Jammu and Kashmir are, as you know, twin regions.

Gary Grappo: Right. It’s probably useful to note that Kashmir has long been known as a popular tourist destination, dating back even to the early middle part of the British colonial period. Obviously, during that time, it was quite exotic, but Westerners in particular have looked to Kashmir with aspirations of sometime visiting this place that is somewhat reminiscent of Shangri-La, (Atul laughs) with high elevations, the spectacular mountains, gorgeous lakes, lovely weather. It seems to have it all. And so it’s not unusual that the government of India would put that kind of investment into developing the tourism infrastructure in order to drum up not only foreign tourism but, as you mentioned, Indian tourism.

Atul Singh: Massive domestic tourism. Especially, it was pent-up demand — because for decades, people wanted to go but couldn’t. And now the government said, “Everything’s hunky-dory, you can go,” and everyone went. And tourism in Kashmir was not just British times, Gary. It goes back to Jahangir, who came to the throne in 1605 and would wander off to Kashmir to escape the heat of the North Indian plains. And of course, he was a Mughal emperor who liked his booze, and he’s the one who allowed the British East India Company in. So I don’t want to get lost in history, but he’s the father of the chap who built the Taj Mahal.

Gary Grappo: Aha.

Atul Singh: So Akbar, the only great Mughal emperor, apart from his grandfather who conquered India. So Kashmir has long been regarded as this magical Shangri-La place. And during the attack, what transpired is: There was complacency. It was a complete failure of intelligence — we’ll get to that in a bit — on the Indian side. There weren’t security personnel there in the meadow. There should have been; it was a very popular tourist place. And the response time of the security personnel to get to the spot of massacre was quite high. So once again, a terrorist attack happens in India — remember Mumbai, 2008 — and once again, Indian intelligence and Indian security forces are found wanting.

Gary Grappo: This sounds eerily reminiscent of the Hamas attack on the Israelis on October 7.

Atul Singh: Exactly. Yes, it is eerily similar. The scale was smaller, but they have gone far deeper inland. Hamas, they just crossed the border. Here, if you look at where the attack happened, that’s quite a long way away from the Line of Control. So it is a pretty impressive logistical achievement of the Pakistani army to conduct this attack.

ISI, Asim Munir and Pakistan’s terror networks

Atul Singh: Now, what are the incentives? I always—

Gary Grappo: Just a cautionary note: You said, “Pakistani army.”

Atul Singh: Yeah.

Gary Grappo: But it was a terrorist organization.

Atul Singh: Yes, it was, it was. But the reports that we are getting from people in intelligence and also contacts outside India is that, most likely, the Pakistani army was behind this attack. The balance of probabilities — this is including our British friends — and the reason for it is threefold. Number one, we have to talk about the new Chief of Army Staff, Syed Asim Munir Ahmad Shah. As you know, Pakistan has always had “Allah, Army, America.” And of course, Syed Asim Munir is not like his predecessor, Bajwa. You’ll be surprised to learn, Gary, that he went to a traditional Islamic seminary. He went to the Markazi Madarsa Darul Tajweed, and his father was an imam. So this is not your Scotch-drinking Pakistani patrician landlord general, whose top interests are Scotch, Scotch and Scotch. (Laughs) This is more of a General Zia-ul-Haq kind of figure, alright?

Gary Grappo: Yeah.

Atul Singh: And his family is originally from Jalandhar, which is Indian Punjab. And guess what? He was Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence. Surprise, surprise! (Laughs)

Gary Grappo: Which has a rather extensive history of collaboration with extremist Islamic groups, not least of which was the Taliban during the American period in Afghanistan, much to the never-ending fury of the Americans.

Atul Singh: Exactly. So General Asim Munir — and he’s the chap who had the shortest stint as DG, Director General of ISI, apparently because he exposed the corruption of Imran Khan’s wife, Bushra Bibi. Well, hey ho, there we go; that is what it is. He gave a speech recently which was very telling, very Islamist, very targeting of India. I’ll dig it out and send it. In fact, I’ll try to share it with our viewers in analysis. So, the nature of Asim Munir is important, because he believes that Pakistan needs strategic depth and strength against India, and they cannot let Kashmir normalize, because otherwise it’ll slip out of Pakistani hands. Number two is the Pakistani army’s unpopularity. We know that they have locked up Imran Khan, their most popular leader since Ali Bhutto. Of course, Imran’s blamed America, as usual. Everything is America’s fault. Gary, as you know, you’re omniscient and omnipotent. You are the gods, the great Olympians of today’s times — those of you in the State Department and CIA.

Gary Grappo: The world’s favorite whipping boy.

Atul Singh: Exactly. I meet people at the State Department. I sometimes think, “If only they were as people imagine them to be, they really could do a lot of damage.” (Laughs) But as you know, people are people. And the unpopularity of the Pakistani army is owed to the fact that the country is in an economic crisis, a disproportionate share of resources end up with the Pakistani army. And it’s not just the budget — they have prime land, they have golf courses, they have extraordinary benefits, and their top generals tend to be corrupt and amass massive fortunes. Rumor has it that they’ve sold all their shells to Ukraine. So should there be war with India, they’ll run out of artillery shells. So the Pakistani military is not quite the US military, Gary — and it’s certainly not the British military, especially of colonial or imperial times. So the Pakistani army needed a distraction. And remember that recently they’ve suffered in Balochistan. They’ve had demonstrations by large crowds against them for the first time in their history, houses of generals have been sacked. All of this has happened. How do you unify a country? And look at the kafir — India, run by evil idol worshippers who are running an apartheid regime against our fellow Muslims who rightfully belong to Pakistan, i.e., Kashmir. Good narrative, gets everyone worked up. The only thing holding Pakistan together, as we know, is hatred for India, because it is the “Pure Land,” Pakistan. So they needed something to do to boost their popularity again. And indeed, India’s actions have boosted unity in Pakistan and the popularity of the Pakistani army. Insofar as the attack goes, it has served a certain end.

India’s institutional weakness and complacency

Gary Grappo: There has been a claim on the Pakistani side that this is a response to Indian-inspired attacks by separatist groups in Balochistan and Pakistan. How do you assess those claims?

Atul Singh: Well, look — India may have given some money to these groups, but I doubt Indian intelligence is that competent. Because, again, remember that people end up in Indian intelligence — especially India’s R&AW — when they don’t get what they want. The top choice of everybody in India is the Indian Administrative Service. We have one civil services exam. There’s no separate entry, really, for any of the civil services. So you write one civil services exam. So the chap who hates numbers ends up as the taxman in the Indian Revenue Service. The chap who can barely do pull-ups ends up in the Indian Police Service and can hardly run. And the chap who cannot speak ends up in the Indian Foreign Service. (Laughs) So, to put it politely, it is a Kafkaesque nightmare — to use language that my British friends would use, and that includes the Scots and the Welsh — it’s a clusterfuck, you know. And also on top of that, what happens is that people get in at 28, 29. It’s too late to mold them. People go to R&AW initially from the lower civil services — which is not so much of a problem, but the fact that they are going in because they didn’t get any of the top choices, where you have more opportunities for graft — i.e., corruption — and for power. And then the top positions are held by the IPS, the Indian Police Service. And the only IPS officers who join R&AW, which is the Research and Analysis Wing, or even the Intelligence Bureau, are those who are unhappy. I repeat: those who are unhappy with the cadre they are allotted, meaning they’re allotted Tamil Nadu, and they are from Delhi and they are hating the southern heat. Or they’re from Delhi and they’re allotted Nagaland — my previous state cadre — because you’re allotted a state cadre and you want to come to Delhi for your children’s education. So if you don’t like your cadre, your state, or you don’t like your chief minister, or for some reason you fall out with the local state political bosses, then you flee to a central deputation. So the reality is that unlike the Inter-Services Intelligence, which is the crème de la crème of Pakistan, the R&AW is the slough of the Indian system. So their competence is, shall we say, not dramatically high. So Pakistan blames R&AW after it blames the CIA. And just as the CIA doesn’t have Pakistan as a top priority, so does the R&AW not have Pakistan as a top priority. Their top priority is probably stealing money, which is the top priority of Indian bureaucrats when they cannot… And then, of course, it is getting a posting to the US or UK so that their children can go to top universities like Harvard or Oxford on taxpayer money. So no one even learns Balochi in the R&AW. We have such a crisis. You’ll have the odd man who’s extremely determined and is very motivated, and maybe that’s five to 10%, but generally it’s a dysfunctional organization. So to blame a completely dysfunctional organization for all the evils in Pakistan is slightly tall. I would suspect that the Iranians have had more of a hand in stirring the pot. And they certainly do have an intelligence service that is effective. They are motivated. You have talked about the IRGC as well — very motivated is the Iranian intelligence, just as the Turkish intelligence has memory of an empire. We know that the Turks have a great role to play in Syria, and the Iranians have a great role to play in Syria and their near neighborhood. So I would rather, if I had to just do a logical, cool-headed analysis — and I don’t have inside information here — I’d say, hmm, probably it is the Iranians. Yes, the Indians may have given some money, but the operational ability of Indian intelligence to do much is highly doubtful. So I made the first two points: One, it is Asim Munir, then two, it is the Pakistani army. And number three — and I think this is important — is that Pakistan now wants to go back to using the terror groups again, because it faces a new threat, and that threat is Afghanistan. The Taliban has not accepted the Durand Line. The ISI feels that they are in an extraordinary squeeze, with an aggressive Taliban on its border, with a local Taliban conducting insurgency, with an India that is becoming economically mightier, with Kashmir—

Gary Grappo: Significantly mightier.

Atul Singh: Sorry?

Gary Grappo: Significantly mightier. As I said at the outset, India is now rising to one of the top economies in the world and Pakistan is nowhere near that level. So clearly, they must look on what is happening in India today, particularly with the foreign investment that is now pouring into the country, with great envy and with little, little hope of attracting comparable investment in Pakistan.

Atul Singh: Yeah. So just a wrinkle there: Because Narendra Modi has adopted a policy of Sanatan socialism — I call it Sanatan because the local word for Hinduism is “Sanatana Dharma.” Actually, there was a huge outflow of foreign institutional investors from India last year. The stock market fell, and foreign direct investment was practically zero. So yes, over the last few years, investment has come in, but India will have to correct its path. And should the free trade agreement with the US and the UK transpire — and that will require India to bring in some market-friendly reforms — India will be back in business. But you’re right in over a decade or two-decade or even three-decade span, but not the latest, Gary. There are problems in the Indian economy. And we’ll do a separate issue, separate discussion on that. Very happy to, because that, for me, is the big worry for India: its economics. To go back to James Carville, it’s the economy, stupid. And we have a big population. But still, despite that, we have high growth. Yes, we have local industry. Now we are making a lot of our own missiles, we have a nuclear program that is decent, we are making artillery shells. India will inevitably improve. It’ll never be China. It’ll never be the workshop of the world. But it’ll be significantly better than Pakistan.

Gary Grappo: In their flock with the United States, they are looking at joint production of military aircraft similar to what America has done previously in places like Egypt and in Turkey, including advanced fighter aircraft, radar systems and so forth. And now, with the move of Western technology firms out of China, India is very much in the scope of these companies as a place that is much more friendly, although it obviously faces some challenges, particularly in dealing with the Byzantine bureaucracy of India.

Atul Singh: Exactly.

Gary Grappo: And it has a very capable workforce, very trainable workforce, and so it’s looked at as a place where Western firms, despite some obvious challenges, can do business and be very successful.

Atul Singh: Yes. And certain states of India, in the West and the South in particular, are very market-friendly — the coastal states. So we’ll get to that later. But the third point that I was making was that you have a hostile Taliban in the West — the very Frankenstein’s monster that Dr. Frankenstein created; Dr. Frankenstein being, of course, the ISI — has turned against Pakistan. And you have an India which is strengthening. And the Taliban and India, curiously, are talking to each other. So if you are Pakistan, it is in your imperative to rally people around the Islamic flag. And that attack does that beautifully, because it does upset a lot of the Hindus. Because remember, in the Hindu mind, there is this extraordinary sense of shame and this extraordinary thin-skinned feeling of impotence — because 1192-on, India was first ruled by the Turks, then the Pashtuns, then the Mughals. And of course, Nader Shah from Iran invaded India and slaughtered thousands. I believe it was 1739 — give or take one or two years, 1739 if my memory serves right. And then Ahmed Shah Abdali, a Pashtun, smashed the Marathas in 1761 and allowed the British to take over because they destroyed the most powerful local Hindu power. So in the Hindu mind, there’s this extraordinary sense that we’ve always been beaten. Farsi was the official language of India. We had to pay jizya, we always got defeated, our women always got abducted. We are weak. And now we must turn the clock, and we must be strong. And the Hindu Right takes inspiration from Israel, where the Israelis wanted to create a new type of Jewish man — and indeed, woman — stronger, tougher, aggressive, willing to respond, militarily innovative, with intelligence that was top-notch. And India has never achieved it, because India has many different countries rolled into one. The Tamils have their own script, and the southern Indian languages come from the Dravidian school. The northern languages are Indo-European. Hindi has more in common with German than with Tamil. So India is, in many ways, an ethnic and linguistic zoo. You go to Nagaland, where I served, and it’s basically 99%, if not 100%, American Baptists, and it has prohibition. And then Goa — I was born there — that’s Catholic. And you go to Kerala, and that’s Syrian Christians. And then you go to Lucknow, and the culture is Shia. But then you go to Delhi, and you go to Deoband. And Deoband is Sunni — it’s a theological seminary — and the Taliban follow the Deobandi school. By the time I finish explaining India to your colleagues in the State Department, their heads are spinning, because there are layers after layers after layers. And in such a diverse country, which is fundamentally a colonial state where we’ve inherited everything from the British, and the British created two sets of institutions: one at home in London, and they’re extraordinary; and one for the colonies, and they were to be run on the cheap. So the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service — they’re relics of the empire. They never created this at home; they created this in India. And the Pakistanis have it, and the Bangladeshis have it. The Pakistanis have the PAS, the Bangladeshis have the BAS. And the reality is that the Indian state is fundamentally a flailing state, to use the words of a political scientist; I think he was American. And the reason is: One day you’ll be running agriculture, the next day you may be running culture, the third day you may be running finance. The economist does not head the Reserve Bank of India, an IAS officer does. So at the top, the IAS is the general management, the elite management, the equivalent of the McKinseys. And they run everything from the Surveyor General of India, which should be a military position because you’re looking at maps, to the Director General of Civil Aviation, which you should probably know something about civil aviation. But the chap going to head it is coming from the agriculture ministry.

Gary Grappo: Perfectly logical!

Atul Singh: Yeah, perfectly logical! The Archaeological Survey of India is, of course, headed by an IAS officer, too — and that’s a punishment posting. But they don’t let go of any of the fiefdoms, because the principle that you can have a specialist in charge, a domain expert in charge, is a particularly despicable one. It’ll challenge the top caste that rules India, which is the IAS — the modern caste system. So India is not a professional state. And therefore, neither is Pakistan, nor is Bangladesh. And so, therefore, you have this inability to respond to crises, because people look up, they don’t take decisions at the grassroots: the top-man culture. And under Modi, the Prime Minister’s Office is all-powerful. It has expanded to a historic high. And it’s an open secret in India that if you don’t want to take a decision — an IAS officer wants to screw you over — they send the file to the PMO, the Prime Minister’s Office. It will never come back. So for years now, everybody in intelligence has been telling me that human intelligence in Kashmir has collapsed. And especially the young officers: “Sir, we rely too much on technical intelligence. Sir, things are really bad. No one is talking about it.” There’s a l’affaire du meta in the Indian media, because we are supposed to tell the story that everything is wonderful in Kashmir. We’ve hosted G20 in Kashmir. There are rivers of milk and honey flowing in Kashmir. And the reality is that in Kashmir, number one, the intelligence, especially human intelligence, had collapsed. The Intelligence Bureau was doing a shitty job. The R&AW, many of its agents were, in fact, double agents who were helping get Indian Army officers killed. They didn’t have a clue. The military intelligence as well had — they were marginally, probably arguably, a little bit better, but they don’t have the resources. But they weren’t doing great either. And every paramilitary or every central police organization has its own intelligence… well, yeah, they were complacent. The lieutenant governor is reputed to be incompetent. India has changed Article 370, in which Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh — three different regions — were one state. Now Ladakh is Union Territory, separate. Jammu and Kashmir is one Union Territory, separate. And the lieutenant governor came from Uttar Pradesh. He is a BJP man — a Bharatiya Janata Party man — but he does not have a good reputation within the BJP as someone competent. And he comes from my state, UP — Uttar Pradesh. So, from what I know from my family and my contacts, he wasn’t terribly competent, he likes sycophants and he’s in charge of law and order. And fundamentally, they merged the cadre. Jammu and Kashmir was a separate cadre. Once it became a National Union Territory, there was a general cadre, and you had officers who had served in Delhi suddenly popping up in Jammu and Kashmir. Officers who’d served in Goa, suddenly in Jammu and Kashmir or Ladakh. And they didn’t understand local conditions. So there was a weakening of the state machinery. So all in all, there was institutional decline and complacency over many years, and the government ignored it — just as there were weaknesses on October 7, remember, in Israel. It happened because a lot of reservists were not on duty. Israelis had become complacent. They had automated everything. They never thought that Hamas would be able to manage such a concerted attack. So just as there were many failures there because of complacency and incompetence, the Indian side displayed both as well. And at some point, there has to be a reckoning.

Geopolitical leverage: water and naval power

And this then, you know, takes away the scab of this inferiority complex that Indians have had — that we are militarily inferior, we have been beaten and we never respond in a muscular way. We never did in Mumbai. Before that, in Kandahar, we just went and released extremists who went on to found jihadi organizations that killed thousands. We never crossed the Line of Control in Kargil in the 1999 border conflict. We could have surrounded the hills and starved them, but we didn’t even dare to do that. We sent young men to die. So there’s a lot of this angst and heartburn. And in a way, Modi is now a prisoner of the popular outreach and this sensibility of having been on the losing side of history, culturally and civilizationally.

Gary Grappo: That, Atul, from the perspective of an outsider presents a very dangerous alignment of conditions, because it would appear almost inevitable, based on what you have said, that not only is there going to be an armed response on the part of the Indians, but a pretty forceful one to reassert an image of strength — which they have to project internally, but also externally to the Pakistanis and to the rest of the world — because they do have aspirations of being a global power. And being victimized by this extremist group demonstrates a certain vulnerability, particularly when it has its origins in Pakistan. So what do you anticipate will be the response of India, and what happens after that?

Atul Singh: Well, the most significant thing to remember is that the current government has weakened the military tremendously. And it has weakened the military by bringing in a new policy called Agnipath, the Agnipath scheme, which is that you recruit everyone in the Army, Navy and Air Force for four years, and only a quarter will be retained — supposedly the best. Now, why is it a problem? You may say it’ll create a meritocracy. It is a problem because every other government service offers a permanent job. And because of India’s socialist history and still-feudal society, people crave government jobs. You’ve been in such societies, Gary, so you understand this much better than people who’ve grown up just in America and have just seen American capitalism. And so what this has signaled to the army is that, “We are bottom priority. We don’t matter. We are just armed guards.” And so morale is rock bottom in the Indian military. Right now, in a village, the top priorities go to the local police, then to the central police organizations. And if you don’t get in, then you come to the military, which is frightening. And also the training period is just six months. So what happens is that often people commanders will wait four years to see if someone can be sent for an advanced gunnery course or technical course. Because if you send a soldier away and invest in that person, and that person is not retained; it’s a waste of investment. Luckily, the scheme is new. And so there are lots of old, time-tested and battle-hardened soldiers around. But morale is low and there’s a shortage of officers, too, because ultimately, civil services have all the power and all the glamour, and they can steal money hand over fist. So in Indian society, except for very idealistic people or people who really care about the military, or who just think they won’t get into the civil services, no one really wants to be a military officer. And that is a challenge many militaries are facing — the shortage of officers — not just India. So is the Indian military ready to fight? Well, we don’t know. Maybe, maybe not. India has not increased its investment in the military as it should have, especially given the threat of China on one side, Pakistan on the other and now Bangladesh, which has turned Islamist. And Myanmar, which is up in flames. Every border is active. I don’t think most American viewers and listeners appreciate it. India lives in a very rough neighborhood, right? So now, let’s then get to the other response: the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960. It survived the 1965 war, it survived the 1971 war, it survived the 1999 Kargil border conflict. It has survived all sorts of insurgencies. It survived the Mumbai attacks, which were spectacularly brutal, in 2008. It has survived all these tensions. But now, earlier threatened, the government has said, “We are suspending participation.”

Gary Grappo: And just for our viewers, explain why this agreement, this understanding is so critical to both countries.

Atul Singh: It gives the use of the upper three rivers — I could go through the names of the rivers, but we’ll keep it very simple. The Indus has five tributaries. Punjab literally is the land of five rivers. Some of them begin in China, and they flow into Pakistan. And Pakistan lives off the water of these rivers. The British built canals, and that canal system ensures that Pakistani agriculture produces enough grain to feed a lot of its people. Pakistan’s population has grown fivefold since 1960. And so the waters are very crucial for Pakistan. There’s always been a fear that India could build a dam and start using the water, because India’s population has grown threefold and Kashmir’s population has grown dramatically, too. They need more water. And a lot of people on the Indian side think that this treaty is overly generous to Pakistan and it releases far too much water to Pakistan. It’s like feeding milk to a snake. That’s an Indian metaphor — that snake drinks that milk and then bites you all the time. And so they say, “You know what? Just stop the milk.” And there has been this thinking, but no one has acted on this. And I think India now is at that stage where it says, “Okay, you keep hurting us. What can we do to hurt you?” It’s like, “Maybe we can build a dam in the future. We suspend the water treaty. We can increase and decrease the flow of water — increase it when you have floods, decrease it when you have droughts, build dams, choke you out. And then what? Then let’s see if you conduct terror. Because if you won’t stop, we have to do something.” That is the thinking of the Indian side.

Gary Grappo: That climbs a very dangerous ladder of escalation, because when you threaten the livelihood of a nation, which is what you’re describing in the case of Pakistan and its need for water to sustain so much of its population and its agricultural sector, then—

Atul Singh: It is a feudal society living off agriculture.

Gary Grappo: Yeah. So then you’re talking about casus belli.

Atul Singh: Yes, and so Pakistan says, “Then we’ll treat this as an act of war.” And the reality is that India thinks, “You know what? You’re inflicting war on us anytime at a time and place of your choosing. So we have to do something now.” Ironically, the suspension of this treaty is really popular in Kashmir, because they’ll get more water from the Indus. (Laughs)

Gary Grappo: It’s not ironic at all. It makes perfect sense.

Atul Singh: Yeah, from Chenab, from Jhelum. So yes, it is a ladder of escalation. It will take a lot of time to really make a difference — to build the dams, to build the pipes, divert water. They can pipe it out, actually. That’s the cheapest way. But the reality is that India is embarking on this because it is militarily less expensive and less risky for the government. Yes, it could also use its navy, which is far superior, to blockade Pakistan. And that is a scenario, too. That’s scenario two. Scenario one: Choke off the water. Scenario two: Use your navy to block off energy imports and just block off their exports. Just do something higher-impact, lower-casualty. That is the new thinking in India. And number three, which is the Israeli suggestion — and you will laugh at this — the Israelis say, “Why don’t you start conducting selective elimination of the top leadership of the Pakistani military?” Which is what they do in Iran. (Both laugh)

Gary Grappo: They have the intelligence and precision to carry it out in the fashion Israelis have.

Atul Singh: Exactly, exactly! So maybe we’ll say, “Why don’t you do it for us, and we’ll give you the money?” (Both laugh) So Israel keeps marveling at the fact how, “If Asim Munir is a problem, you can kill his child.” This is literally what an Israeli friend suggested. “You can take a pistol — you have to inflict damage, after all, and establish deterrence.” You can see the Israelis think a little bit quicker than the Indians. (Gary laughs) And the reality is that all of these three might be on the cards, but India is not in a position to conduct targeted assassinations. We do not have the capabilities. The state is flailing; the structure of the state, that needs reform. We can’t do that. The Navy — possibly, yes, definitely. And the first two retaliations under the Narendra Modi government were by the Army and Air Force. In Balakot, for instance, when the last attack happened. And maybe it’s the Navy’s turn. That could happen. And I’m sure that the Pakistanis have their own scenarios to inflict pain. And they need the war more than us.

China, drones and the manufacturing squeeze

Atul Singh: And there’s another dangerous scenario: Remember that China does not like the stock of manufacturing going from China to India. You wouldn’t if you were China, Gary. You would come up with your own response. It’s a chessboard with many players moving pieces, and even the chessboard itself changes. (Gary laughs) So let’s say you’re an ambitious People’s Liberation Army general. Let’s say you go to Xi Jinping and say, “You know what? The Indians are bothering the Pakistanis. We can give them 10% of our drone production” — not even other stuff. China is the factory of the world. The Chinese can arm Pakistanis. If the Chinese put troops on the Line of Actual Control — LAC — they put troops because both borders are contested with Pakistan and with China. So let’s say they put troops on the Line of Actual Control — boom. Alright, India will have to put troops there. And let’s say they supply Pakistan with drones, not even artillery. Let’s assume it’s just drones. That’ll be a huge problem for Indians, because India cannot match the production — 70% of the drones, apparently, according to some reports, are produced by China. China produces an extraordinary number of drones. And if they arm Pakistan, they could trap India within the subcontinent, because they don’t want India to emerge as a power in Asia. Just as the US fears the rise of China, China fears the rise of India. So Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap applies in the global context to the US and China, and in the Asian context to China and India. And that would be a nightmare, because the Pakistanis could conduct strikes. And Islamic radicalization within India has created a number of what you call sleeper cells. And remember, there are radical Muslims from Kerala, the most educated state of India, who ended up in the Islamic State — volunteered and went to the Middle East and fought. Remember — I think it was just a few years ago — there was an entire Love Jihad gang busted. The chap is in jail now. And the whole idea was that Muslim men, who tend to spend more time in the gym in India — you look at all the film stars: Shah Rukh Khan, Aamir Khan, Saif Ali Khan — they’re all basically of Pashtun origin. They’re all short, they are two feet tall. They are not like the tall Pashtuns of Afghanistan or northwest Pakistan. They don’t look like Imran Khan. But they have Pashtun origins. But they all tend to marry Hindu women, because the middle-class Hindu boys are too busy cracking competitive exams. They are geeky, they are weedy. And Muslim women are kept under wraps — they don’t come out, in the Indian social setting in particular. But the Hindu women are professionals — they are doctors, they are nurses, they are out and about. And the taxi drivers, the mechanics, the motorcycle riders, the gym boys with their tight T-shirts and big muscles often tend to be Muslims. Often they end up seducing and then marrying these women. And then, once women are involved, they will say, “Yeah, if you convert, it’s just nominal.” But before you know it, they convert. And I heard a tape of this person who’s now in jail talking about, “Oh, you’re converting — you’re just targeting girls of lower caste. I need you to convert girls of Brahmins and the other upper caste.” Because remember, the Indian social system, being such that if you marry outside your caste — in urban areas, that’s happening a lot — but even that is frowned upon, at least in rural areas. So one community doesn’t want you to marry out, and the other community — and I was told this by a very dear friend of mine — that the maulvi gives you a prize if you marry out and you get someone to convert. So that is also going on. That’s not huge, but that touches upon the insecurity of a lot of the Hindu middle class — that we are girly boys, we are vegetarian surrender monkeys, and the Pashtuns are more manly, taller, handsome, fairer than us — and they get our girls. Of course, it goes back to Alauddin Khilji. And Khilji is a derivative of “Zalkhai,” which I was told means “the abductor of women.” And he literally went around abducting or kidnapping all the beautiful local Rajput princesses for his harem. So this goes back 800 years ago. So again, there are layers within layers and memories. 

Gary Grappo: The historical roots of the animosities between the two religious groups, Hindu and Muslim, and the two countries—

Atul Singh: Not just two! The Sikhs have an even worse experience of Islam, because their gurus were killed. So Islam has, shall we say, a rocky past, a rocky relationship with other communities everywhere, but especially in the subcontinent. But then amongst Muslims, there’s this feeling that, “The BJP has pushed us out. We don’t matter. They don’t have a single Muslim Member of Parliament. We are excluded politically, and we have to hit back.” So there is this strong animus. And so the ISI has built a number of small cells which it could activate, and in fact, this is what the Mossad keep talking about. They say, “You could have a five-front war. You could have Pakistan. You could have China. You could have attacks on your coasts, which the Bombay and Mumbai attacks proved are very vulnerable. You could have an insurgency.” Let’s say you have 200 million Muslims. Let’s say 1% of them are radicalized — that’s just two million. And let’s say 1% of that 1% actually can do stuff — that’s 20,000. But 20,000 is still a big number.

Gary Grappo: Very big number.

Atul Singh: So if they blow up power plants, if they derail your rail tracks, if they poison your towns’ water supply, you’ll be stretched. You’ll be at breaking point. And we are not even talking about Bangladesh, which has turned against India recently, after Sheikh Hasina has left. It’s now far more radical than it was, the current government doesn’t really have control. Nepal, which has fallen into the communist arc of influence; Bhutan, where the king and I were at Oxford together — a very good chap — but he’s having to gingerly navigate both India and China; Maldives, which has turned more radical Islamic — that is not far from us; Sri Lanka, which, yes, also in the recent past allowed the Chinese to build a port at Hambantota. And so India is scared of the “String of Pearls” that may be used to choke it. The Chinese are scared of the Indians fighting for Anglo-Saxon masters, as they did. Remember the sack of Beijing and Lord Elgin II. Lord Elgin I brought back the Elgin Marbles from the then-Ottoman Empire, and they are in the British Museum proudly — as the British will tell you, they’ve preserved them well. And Lord Elgin II, the son — a Scotsman indeed — went off to Beijing with his Indian troops and sacked the Summer Palace. And the Chinese have not forgotten that. (Laughs) So the Chinese are scared that the Indians may yet again fight for Anglo-Saxon masters.

Gary Grappo: Well, they’re not quite Anglo-Saxon, but it’s not too far-fetched when India now looks at this new relationship — the so-called Quad — that includes the United States and India, Australia and Japan.

Atul Singh: But the US is seen as an Anglo-Saxon power, although—

Gary Grappo: Of course. And I’m sure Austria is as well. And so that leaves Japan, which now has a very cozy relationship with so-called Anglo-Saxon nations, particularly the United States and Australia. And now there’s India, that’s in the mix again.

Atul Singh: It grates on Chinese sensibilities. Please finish your point.

Gary Grappo: Well, the point is that this is a very new development in South Asia. I say “new” in terms of the longer stretch of history, where you have four disparate countries coming together, not yet in a military pact, although three of the four do have a military pact—United States, Japan and Australia. And the Indians, increasingly warming to a quasi-soft, technology-oriented military relationship with the United States, appreciating the superior technology that they’re going to get from the US and the rest of the West, which they’re not going to get — certainly from Russia, which can hardly afford to export even bullets these days, and of course, nothing from China. And so this is a critical relationship, but it hasn’t moved into the traditional Western alliance that the United States has with Japan, with Australia, with its NATO allies. Although, I think deep within the heart of many Americans — and now I’m thinking of the traditional — this administration is hard to predict — would probably love to see that kind of a security relationship with India.

Atul Singh: Yeah, absolutely. And that makes China insecure. So when the Chinese are acting — and remember, India is in a bind with China, as is the US — because India imports a lot of stuff from China.

Gary Grappo: Absolutely.

Atul Singh: It’s economically dependent on China. So, so many of the things India makes, from solar panels to electric cars, the ingredients are all coming from China. So India is in a bind. China is a frenemy in some ways. But China then is propping up Pakistan. The CPEC — China–Pakistan Economic Corridor — and the port in Gwadar. The idea for China is to tie India down in South Asia so that India doesn’t get too big for its boots. So we are in a very tricky geopolitical cocktail, where everyone feels the squeeze in a different way. And I’ve already explained the squeeze Pakistan is feeling. So you’ve got a lot of cats on a hot tin roof. It remains to be seen what transpires. (Laughs)

Gary Grappo: And summer’s not even here yet!

Atul Singh: Exactly, exactly.

US mediation in the face of nuclear danger

Gary Grappo: Well, to close out this subject of this recent rise in tensions when it looks like military action is imminent, is there a role, and is there a mediator? Like, is there a role that a mediator can play in lowering tensions, at least at the moment — the most proximate cause of tensions — to avoid something truly no one would want to contemplate? And if so, who might that be? If you look at the major powers, it ain’t going to be China. The Europeans probably don’t have the heft — they certainly have the interest in seeing this conflict moderated — so who’s that going to be? And can a mediator be helpful here?

Atul Singh: So, two things. India is traditionally averse to mediation between India and Pakistan because of the history. Because it was banned by the United Nations when it took the matter in 1948 to the United Nations instead of finishing the military operations, which it could and would have won at that stage. They could have taken all of Kashmir. They didn’t. And Pakistan changed the demography of Kashmir. And in Kashmir, what happened is that Pakistan-inspired Islamist jihadi terror groups changed the demography of Kashmir, and, in fact — I forgot to say this — they have been changing even the demography of Poonch and Rajouri, the border districts, over the last two, three years in a very concerted way. They target Hindu and Sikh minorities, then they flee. Over a period of time, the district becomes completely Muslim. So ironically, the Indians didn’t do that, and they felt they were always blamed, despite the fact that they had acted in a far more equitable manner than the Pakistanis in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. So Indians lost complete faith in Europe. They saw Europe and, of course, the US, partly because of Cold War alliances, as too beholden to Pakistan.

Gary Grappo: Yeah.

Atul Singh: And the narrative in Europe, even the use of language — that “militant groups” attack — that upsets the Indians. Because, come on, it’s an Islamist terrorist attack. People have been asked whether they are Muslim or not, and if they cannot recite the Kalma — or Kalima, as you would call it in traditional Arabic — they are shot. And in fact, a Christian said, “I’m a Christian. Don’t kill me. I’m not Hindu. I’m not Sikh. I’m not Buddhist.” And they said, “Well, look at what you’re doing in Palestine,” and they shot him anyway. So the reality is, Europe has absolutely no political perches in India at all. If the Europeans say, “We’ll mediate,” the Indians will say, “You can go fuck yourself,” — not in as many words. But there’s a real animosity to European mediation. With the US now changing its policy — and I have a friend who’s Republican, who says that India is the new frontline state against Islamism and communism. And he thinks that the US — obviously, he’s Texan, he’s a Republican — should get India to act robustly. And that is one end of the spectrum. The Pentagon and others, they want closer security ties, you said, with India to counter China. So with that, there are perches. And the US has the ability to mediate, but it’ll have to be a bit deft, and it will have to offer a sweet trade deal to have leverage in India, because India needs a trade deal. And now, with the tariffs, India could hurt very badly. So the US has the ability to mediate, but it would have to be deft and make sure that it understands Indian sensibilities.

Gary Grappo: And how would Pakistanis see an American mediation effort?

Atul Singh: I think the Pakistanis need the International Monetary Fund. You have a lot of leverage against the Pakistanis. (Laughs)

Gary Grappo: Oh yeah — 25% of the vote. (Atul laughs) If they want that next IMF bailout, yeah, they’re going to have to have the Americans.

Atul Singh: Yeah. And remember, all their kit is American. You can just stop upgrading kit and stop sending them spares. So you have a lot of influence. Asim Munir may still offer namaz — or prayer, salah — five times a day, and might remember his imam father preaching jihad against the infidels, and may still resent America and, of course, the Indians. But at the end of the day, he’s become chief. He knows the realities of his army. He’s not going to stand up to the Americans. And the Chinese cannot bail Pakistan out. Ultimately, it is the IMF. So the US has a lot of leverage in Pakistan and can use it. And the US has some leverage against India. And the US, despite all the decline, despite everything, is the only player that can mediate. But it has to be deft about it and not trample sensibilities.

Gary Grappo: And this is where the current US administration would be challenged. You really have to have an appreciation for the nature of this conflict. Yes, there was a devastating terrorist attack by jihadists, with which Americans, of course, can sympathize greatly. But the level of tensions are far, far deeper, and the complexities you’ve just outlined over the course of this discussion are virtually infinite. And that’s where I think this deftness is really critical in understanding that this is just not another conflict; this is something very different. And kid gloves are going to be necessary if you’re going to be able to successfully ratchet down tensions here and avoid an ugly military confrontation.

Atul Singh: Yeah. And one more thing we have to remember is that the reality is that neither side wants all-out war.

Gary Grappo: Correct.

Atul Singh: And so they want — what’s the term — an off-ramp. They want a ramp they can take and something that’ll save face for both parties.

Gary Grappo: Absolutely.

Atul Singh: Do you think Narendra Modi wants war? Absolutely not. After the Agnipath scheme, a war may be tricky. And Asim Munir knows he runs a bankrupt country.

Gary Grappo: Yeah. And it’s important to remind all of our viewers that we are talking about two nuclear-armed states.

Atul Singh: Yep.

Gary Grappo: And there is no individual on either side who wants to see this escalate to a point where one side may feel pressured, so threatened, to resort to the use of a nuclear weapon. And both sides understand that very, very clearly. This is—

Atul Singh: On that note, maybe I will differ a little bit. Because I think Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is really low.

Gary Grappo: Oh, yeah. Their thresholds are different.

Atul Singh: And India has a no-nuclear-first-strike doctrine. So India is not going to use nuclear weapons first. But Pakistan keeps threatening to, because that’s what gives it leverage. And fanatics in Pakistan — the graduates of the madrasas who have now infiltrated the army — the top man has gone to a madrasa, right?

Gary Grappo: Yep.

Atul Singh: So they, unfortunately, are talking a lot about using tactical nukes. So it’s not that both sides don’t want to use it. One side, increasingly, is open to using nukes, at least tactical nukes — and that is something to throw in the calculus. Because the old assumption, when you had the Scotch-drinking generals running Pakistan — let’s say Pervez Musharraf, right? The chap liked tennis. His top priority was Scotch, Scotch and Scotch, and then tennis came a distant second, okay? He certainly didn’t want nuclear weapons. Yeah, he wanted an advantage, he took the Kargil heights and yada ya. But I think what you said held absolutely true then. Now, we are not so sure that there aren’t people who are willing, and who make this assumption that, “Yeah, we have nothing to lose,” because Pakistan has gotten poorer, it’s gotten more desperate. Its population has increased, it is an extremely fractious society. The most popular leader, Imran Khan, has been locked up. The Pakistani military now has put the Sharif family and the Bhutto family in charge, both of whom are extraordinarily corrupt. The Sharif family is notorious for making tons of money. They are businessmen. The Bhuttos, the less said, the better. Bilawal Bhutto was known at Oxford for sex, drugs and rock and roll. There are tabloid reports of orgies that he used to conduct back in the day — that may or may not be true, who knows? But the point is that he speaks Urdu with an English accent; he’s completely not credible. So what the military has done to Pakistan is that because the democratic escape valve isn’t there for the tension to get out, because the state has not provided things like schools, hospitals, basic services, the population has swung and turned to the mullahs and the madrasas. And there’s a millenarian element in Pakistan. And Pakistan could very easily, in five, ten, 20 years — if it doesn’t implode — go the Iran way. So the calculus doesn’t hold that neither side wants nuclear weapons. I think if it’s an American diplomat, if it is an American politician, if it is anybody in Europe who’s thinking about these issues, or elsewhere in the world — even if it’s someone Chinese listening to our conversation — they have to bear in mind that the risks here are really high. And remember, because India is nationalist now, India will respond. In an earlier era, India would have restrained. And I think in India, their preferred response is as little war as possible. Because remember, Modi is Gujarati and his home minister is Gujarati: Amit Shah. They don’t come from military backgrounds, they don’t come from military families. No one in their family has ever served in the military, as far as I know. They are not geared for military conflict. But they understand water because they come from an arid region. So their favored method would be: stop the water.

Gary Grappo: Good point. Well, I think we’ve come up on our time here before we got into the great power discussion. And we’ll save that for a part two. But thank you so much for giving us these insights, sharing these insights. Confrontation between these two very, very large, heavily armed countries has great import — not only within the region, but globally.

Atul Singh: Thank you, sir. Thank you for the conversation.

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Yet even under such oppressive conditions, Afghan women refuse to go down quietly. Instead, they find courageous and inventive ways to resist, and offer hope to future generations of not only Afghan women, but all women. Their struggle is not merely an isolated regional issue — it embodies the fight for women’s rights under authoritarian regimes everywhere.

Taliban restrictions and secret schools

The fundamentalist Taliban regime has systematically and wholly dismantled the hard-won rights of women. Since the 2021 takeover, the status of Afghan women’s rights has to that of pre-2002 conditions — when the Taliban last dominated the country. Two decades of human rights progress were erased overnight.

By early 2023, the Taliban had banned girls from secondary schools and universities, which 1.1 million young women of formal education. The regime also barred women from most kinds of employment, except in highly restricted sectors such as healthcare. The social and economic consequences of these policy impositions have devastated families and pushed them — and especially young women — further into poverty and deprivation.

But Afghan women have responded to these injustices with courage and determination. They refuse to be silenced.

Against Taliban bans, secret schools have become some of the most potent symbols of women’s defiance. These undercover classrooms are by volunteer teachers who educate Afghan girls at the risk of severe punishment. These covert education efforts operate in civilian homes and hidden locations. They teach math, science and literature, and they are under constant threat of Taliban surveillance. For many girls, these makeshift schools represent not just opportunities for education but also a reminder of their inalienable rights to learn and shape their futures.

“Every time I walk to class, I fear I may be caught,” one such student, who attends an underground school in Kabul. “If my education is a crime, it is worth the risk.”Ěý

“We [tell them] that they are not alone.”

Education is not the only front where Afghan women are fighting back. In a further show of resistance, women have begun to lead media initiatives — like Radio Femme, a station to educating Afghan women and advocating for their rights — to empower those subjugated. Broadcasting in Pashto and Dari, Afghanistan’s two official languages, Radio Femme provides critical information on health, education and women’s legal rights. Despite operating under severe restrictions, the station provides Afghan women with invaluable knowledge and a sense of solidarity in an environment where their access to information and community has been systematically cut off.

“Our listeners are women who feel isolated and forgotten. We give them information but also the message that they are not alone,” Hawa, a former teacher who founded the station. The women behind Radio Femme face harassment and threats, yet they persist in their vital work. They have no other option under the brutal Taliban regime.

Social media has become a key means for Afghan women to amplify their voices and share their stories with the world. They leverage platforms like and to expose abuses, organize protests and connect with global supporters. Their digital resistance has effectively raised awareness, but it comes with significant perils.

Online harassment, gendered hate speech and even death threats have become commonplace dealings for Afghan women activists. Within the first year of the Taliban’s return, the for Information Resilience reported a threefold increase in online abuse targeting politically engaged Afghan women. These women live with an ever-present sense of danger — but they refuse to stop fighting.

Beyond the digital sphere, Afghan women have also begun to defy the Taliban’s tyranny through artistic mediums such as art, poetry and photography. Some artists challenge the erasure of women from public life, while others honor the memories of those who have suffered from or been lost to violence and oppression.

Atena, a 23-year-old artist from Herat, paints murals of Afghan women in traditional clothing. “Through my art,” she , “I show the world that we exist and that we are more than victims.”

Global solidarity and our responsibility

Afghan women continue to resist oppression, but they cannot fight alone. The international community must act, regardless of past setbacks in dealing with the Taliban. Since the Taliban’s return, the United Nations has $2.9 billion in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, with the United States among the key contributors. However, reports reveal that much of this aid has been diverted into Taliban hands — it offers little relief to Afghan women.

The rollback of US aid programs has only conditions for Afghan women. With the dismantling of USAID, efforts like secret schools, independent media such as Zan Times, and women-led initiatives are now at risk of disappearing entirely.

Individuals and organizations worldwide must push back against policies that threaten Afghan women’s survival, including the dismantling of USAID. Advocacy groups like UN Women, Women for Afghan Women and RAWA are crucial in ensuring resources reach grassroots efforts that provide education, shelter and healthcare. Public pressure is equally critical — urging policymakers to protect existing aid programs, prioritize Afghan women in refugee resettlement and enforce stricter oversight can help prevent further harm.

International aid must come with clear conditions. Funding should be redirected to underground schools, women-led initiatives and verified humanitarian efforts rather than flowing into Taliban-controlled channels. The elimination of USAID programs demands an urgent response to prevent the collapse of crucial support systems.

Policymakers respond to public pressure, diplomatic leverage and media scrutiny. Ensuring aid reaches those who need it most requires legal accountability, strategic funding and unwavering advocacy. Without these safeguards, Afghan women will continue to be systematically excluded from the very assistance meant to protect them.

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorialĚýpolicy.

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The Great GameĚý

In the past few years, especially after the Bangladesh crisis, India’s traditional sphere of influence was under tension as India’s eastern and western frontiers became unstable in the west— the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and east-Bangladesh witnessed a dramatic . The eastern frontier after the Dhaka episode became more tense as India was already negotiating a tense situation in Myanmar after a coup in 2021, keeping its northeast borders secure from and arms cartels, which had surged ever since the Manipur crises began in 2023. Measured diplomatic and watching from the fence approaches were a kind of mood-observing behaviours, which were no more effective given dynamically evolving strategic security where, at one end, Pakistan is pressing hard to develop strategic depth, especially after the Afghanistan debacle and Bangladesh crises. On the other hand, China used show-off tactics, and the clandestine drug-arm cartel was attempting to weaken the northeastern region, especially the Indo-Myanmar border. If we pay closer attention to recent regional developments in and around South Asia, undercurrents challenging Delhi’s Sphere of Influence are quietly building up.Ěý

Asim Malik, Pakistan’s Intelligence Chief, visited after decades, indicating that Pakistan is opening a sense of strategic depth against India after its Afghanistan strategy has backfired. If nurtured well, Pakistan can develop an interesting opportunity. First, sustainable strategic strategies against India by staging terror proxy groups this is a strategy that has been in an eroding position for a few years. Second, it sets the stage for Pakistan-China-Bangladesh strategic and economic cooperation, which can help Pakistan with its short-term financial problems. Third, suppose the above two things get into the flow. In that case, Pakistan can carve out tactical sustainability and pursue an anti-Taliban campaign in full throttle, which is currently limited due to multiple crises at home.

Easier said than done: Pakistan–China axisĚý

Pakistan’s diplomacy in Bangladesh, China and Turkey may be an effort to create a strategic competition that includes Bangladesh within the Pakistan-China axis against India. As noted earlier, this diplomatic maneuvering by Pakistan is significant, at least in the long term. However, it remains challenging for Pakistan to find a silver lining in this escalating diplomatic game in South Asia.

First, there is the absence of full backhand support in Bangladesh. Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus’s regime received clandestine support from the US, but as the US underwent a regime change, it adjusted to the evolving Asian geopolitical realities. Bangladesh would have limited options to bank entirely on China as Dhaka must also keep the US in its court. The void in full backhand support will create problems for Yunus, who will face mounting pressure to call early elections in Bangladesh.

Second, the Taliban threat in Pakistan has recently increased. Tajik militant organizations supported by the Taliban have established their presence in Afghanistan with the backing of Al Qaeda. The threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan is growing, especially after the ISIS-Khorasan resurgence, which is attempting to establish itself in Afghanistan. If it goes out of the grip, then this security nightmare is enough for Pakistan not to make much noise in the neighborhood.

Third, China and Turkey are close strategic partners to Pakistan and may carefully deal with it. Turkey has already observed a moderate response to the backdrop of Pakistan’s President’s visit. Turkish President Recep Tayyip recently made a statement that India and Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir issue through dialogue, unlike years ago when Turkey used to back Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. The backdrop of the visit shows some such signs. China plans to shift its focus toward the US, similar to its approach during the Trump administration. At the same time, the US intends to confront China directly, particularly in the South Asia theater. Such diverted attention and efforts of Pakistan’s all-weather partners will make initiating a strategic competition or great game-like situation targeting India challenging. This highlights Pakistan’s intricate challenges in the geopolitical game in South Asia.

India’s deft diplomacy and growing depth with the USĚý

India’s effective negotiations and organized tactics drive adjustments to adapt to the changing political scene in South Asia. On the one hand, this deft diplomacy will help moderate and negotiate with emerging threats and attempt to increase and secure India’s traditional sphere of influence.

New Delhi’s efforts to engage with the Taliban and even allow them to send a representative to Afghanistan’s embassy, which has seen almost no diplomatic presence since the Taliban’s takeover, were notable. The most notable deft diplomacy was with and Myanmar. New Delhi engaged with top BNP leaders and attempted to influence and moderate relations with Bangladesh, which underwent significant change after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster. Last year, New Delhi Myanmar’s rebel group to negotiate a deteriorating security situation at its northeastern border, which impacted Manipur.Ěý

The increasing clout of India’s deft diplomacy puts New Delhi in a good spot not only to progress but also to contest the changing power dynamics of South Asia. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to the US has led to tectonic movements in the power balance of South Asia. The US and India are deepening their strategic ties with initiatives like (“Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology”) and TRUST (“Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology”) to explore multi-dimensional areas of cooperation, especially in technology and defence, which can build a strong US axis in developing multilateral forums such as Indo-Pacific, enlarging strategic and political salience at the regional level.Ěý

However, what is intriguing is Trump’s of F-35 jets to India. This offer, which New Delhi should seriously consider, has the potential to influence the power balance in South Asia. India does not possess standalone air striking capability and does not have fifth-generation fighter jets. Suppose India agrees to this deal after considering its acquisition needs and calculations. In that case, it will be a game-changer, putting India in direct competition with China regarding air superiority. Air denial operations and air striking capabilities against Pakistan would significantly increase, giving India an option for carrying out more precise and in-depth strikes inside Pakistan without much noise, as the F-35 comes with a high degree of stealth. India’s increase in offensive and deterrence capabilities will surely stir the China–Pakistan axis, but that’s what the US wants. They want to push China to such a limit where the US can significantly influence Asian power dynamics against China to contain its overreaching sphere of influence in and around the South and Southeast region. At the same time, the US continues to develop its political and strategic clout in the region through the West- South Asia Connect and Indo-Pacific theatres.

With changes happening in West Asia and Europe, there is ample space for India’s deft diplomacy and the Indo-US relationship to explore geopolitical and geostrategic aspects. This exploration will open South Asia to significant multilateral connections, ultimately contributing to India’s strategic rise in the world order. However, a caveat in this bright possibility is the dangers of misadventure and miscalculations by those who will come under intense pressure to respond to India’s strategic rise and Asia’s changing power balance.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorialĚýpolicy.

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After the regressive series of events following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, regional and Western powers wait to see if the HTS government leaders can truly change their spots, as they traded fatigues for designer .

The region has witnessed the chaos following the of notorious Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and most recently the of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In both cases, the region experienced a series of events where al-Qaeda and ISIS gained a lifeline, and women and minorities suffered from tremendous regressive policies under corrupt and extremist regimes. Damascus, the first Arab capital governed by self-made extremists listed as by the international community, surfaced as a unique case. In contrast to other extremist groups, HTS leaders immediately launched a well-coordinated “” and presented themselves as statesmen, surrounded by a jungle of militants marginalized by the victors, and away from the spoils.

HTS leaders and their patrons aim to convince the world they’ve changed their spots. Can the jungle let it last? This is a loaded question. First, the international community must wait and see where the approach to de-radicalization since the September 11 attacks failed and the revolutionary spirit achieves change. The world waits to see the difference between al-Qaeda ideologues and their former hosts: the Taliban and ISIS. The experiment also raises the stakes for the — can it succeed in Damascus where it failed in Cairo?

Damascus and the jungle

On January 29, 2025, the gathered to Abu Mohammed (now ) during a symbolic — Islamic oath of allegiance to a leader — summit in . Civilian and military loyalists gathered to consolidate the image of the State, but this was as much a message to rival Islamist factions as it was to international audiences.

Under overt guidance and with material support from Turkey, the moved quickly to address a major obstacle to international legitimacy, from by the , and . The new rulers in Damascus also need to consolidate authority and power over rival factions, ethnic minority groups, former regime remnants and hostile neighbors like Iran, Iraq and Israel.

While HTS does not yet control all of Syria’s territory, it is relying on an extensive network of Islamist militants to deter fragmentation. Jawlani’s chess game smartly moved toward Iraq, where it hosted a meeting with former enemies in neighboring . The meeting with Hamid al-Shatri, Head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, aimed to mend fences from Jawlani’s ISIS days. It also sought to strengthen the rear front to prevent new incursions by Iran-affiliated militias and elements of Lebanon’s Hezbollah paramilitary group. By meeting with Iraqi intelligence rather than diplomats, Jawlani signaled a merging of interests with Turkey.

More interesting, and of higher risk for HTS, has been the reported collaboration with the . A US State Department visited Damascus in late December 2024. Soon after, a report emerged of possible between Washington and HTS leadership. The meeting with Iraq officials and sharing of intelligence with the seems like a carrot from Turkey to sweeten up the deal with Damascus. US against ISIS and elements serve Jawlani’s interests as much as the West’s. Members of groups from the resisting Jawlani’s authority may turn on Damascus, derail HTS governance and attract negative attention.

Enemies inside and outside pose as much threat as the inability to govern a highly diverse Syrian environment. HTS’s move from a jihadist militant group to a government entity complicates funding. Damascus no longer must simply a patronage network of jihadists. As a central government, HTS must provide costly services beyond the center, beyond security. Collection of taxes beyond their safe haven in the city of is no longer a model, neither are “extortion, kidnapping and oil-smuggling … [or] at least $94 million from prisoner-exchange deals with the Syrian government, Iran, Lebanon and Italy.” Damascus needs a with for access to oil supplies. This requires a delicate balance as Turkey lies in the middle of an agreement with them.

Can the leopard change its spots?

Just as Afghanistan under the Taliban, the potential for Syria to surface as a new safe haven for jihadist militants is a primary concern for the region and the West. Every militant group is bound to experience a struggle for power, and Jawlani is at the center. As he switches from jihadist field commander to head of state, he must guard his as much as rivals among militant factions beyond the center.

It is still unclear how power will project beyond the core. Likewise, no one knows what role Jawlani’s loyalists will play. Security and State revenue beyond Damascus will undoubtedly depend on in areas with , Druze, and Yazidi . Relations with minority groups will test the ability to govern and the degree to which Islamist can change their spots. Jawlani has spoken the magic words for the West and pointed to being held around five years from now.

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In today’s international climate, expecting Western diplomats to calculate that it might be healthier to avoid war than prove a point about who has the right to make decisions for others would be totally illusory. From Washington’s point of view, there are principles that must be applied in the defense of a “rules-based order,” even at the expense of another allied country’s population.

Perhaps the seasoned strategists of DC’s State Department felt that the larger issue of European security was too big a morsel to chew on. In their eyes, the only manageable issue to consider was the right of a particular nation, Ukraine, to adhere to a sprawling and fundamentally incoherent military alliance. They had good reason to insist on this. In their mind, this was the key to maintaining control of what Zbigniew Brzezinski “the grand chessboard.” The risk associated with spending unproductive months seeking to thrash out the mutual security requirements of neighboring, culturally connected nations was clearly not worth taking. By refusing to waste time in pointless discussion, they could seize the opportunity to continue on a well-trodden path by launching yet another one of Washington’s forever wars, another one of those epic conflicts that can carry on for “as long as it takes.”

War may be bad for some, but the war economy is good for anyone in power. That is the lesson America learned during World War II and it has never been forgotten.

In August 2021, the administration of American President Joe Biden finally wound up one of the most recent forever wars in Afghanistan. After 20 years, it had clearly run out of gas. The new Biden administration knew that Ukraine could be the new opportunity to focus on. Nearly three years on, it has become clear to everyone that — just like Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria — the war could not be won by the “good guys.” But winning apparently isn’t the major objective. Keeping a wartime economy going is clearly the top priority.

If, as early remarks by none other than Hillary Clinton, the Ukraine fiasco was strategically planned to create an “Afghanistan situation” for Russia, the war that broke out in Gaza and Israel on October 7, 2023 was on no one’s agenda. Washington didn’t need another headache. It was too busy stoking the fires in Ukraine in its quest to postpone the resolution as long as possible. This time, the value of waging a new forever hot war accrued to a local leader, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu. A prolonged war would have the twofold merit of pleasing a lot of key people in his own government and postponing the inevitable inglorious end of Bibi’s political career.

For authoritative voices inside the Beltway, the successive killing of the two top leaders of Hamas — Ismail Haniya and Yahya Sinwar — tells them the end of the conflict may be in sight. The White House followed up Sinwar’s elimination with this: “There is now the opportunity for a �day after’ in Gaza without Hamas in power, and for a political settlement that provides a better future for Israelis and Palestinians alike.”

°Ő´Ç»ĺ˛ą˛â’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Day after:

An imaginary moment of the future that governments and every other defender of the status quo in times of war has an absolute need to invoke rhetorically as a demonstration of their commitment to peace while doing everything in their power to prevent it from occurring.

Contextual note

Washington’s track record on assessing the dynamics of ongoing wars — how long they might last and when they might end — has never been brilliant. No sooner had Biden expressed his optimism about the sunny day after than his staunch ally, Netanyahu, contradicted him. “Israeli leaders,” Al Jazeera, “had a drastically different message. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the war is �not over’ and pledged that Israeli forces would operate in Gaza for �years to come.’”

H.A. Hellyer, a geopolitical analyst, dismissed American talks of a day after in Gaza as “laughable,” noting “that the Israelis have made it very clear that they’re not leaving Gaza, that the military presence will remain, so the idea of any sort of political horizon here is just very, very unrealistic.”

So why such disparity of perception between the two allies, Bibi and Biden? One answer might be the American penchant for “hyperreality” that infects the country’s political and social culture, transforming even the average citizen’s perception of the world. Americans simply don’t see the meaning of events in the same way as others, including their ironclad allies, the Israelis. In fact, no two countries share the same vision of history, a fact State Department diplomats would do well to ponder.

For Americans, days are always significant, especially for tracking the ends of wars. The American Civil War ended on April 9, 1865, with the unconditional surrender of General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox. General Ulysses S. Grant and Lee concretized the moment with a dramatic handshake. Adolf Hitler’s suicide on April 30, 1945 put an end to World War II in Europe. A pair of atomic bombs in early August of that year ended the Pacific version of the conflict.

Hollywood war films and most westerns build up to the single dramatic moment — often a showdown — when the villain dies or is humiliated and a brighter future emerges. This pattern of expectations appears to be wired into every American’s mindset as the key to understanding existential dramas. The successive deaths of Hamas leaders Haniya and Sinwar, with the added subplot of Israel’s elimination of Hassan Nasrallah’s in Lebanon, inevitably signaled to Americans that the year-long violent movie was coming to an end.

What Americans fail to recognize is that the Israeli screenwriters were working on a different script, one that derives not from Hollywood screenplays but from the mythology of the Old Testament. Messiahs don’t take over after the death of a villain. They don’t sign peace agreements. As instruments of a divine will, they install a new order. Their mission transcends the kind of everyday human goals associated with the banalities of governance and democracy.

Historical note

 â€śForever wars” inevitably produce a curious linguistic paradox. “Forever” evokes timelessness, if not eternity. But for the sake of reasonable, peace-loving political discourse, the same promoters of forever war need to invoke a precise moment of theoretical resolution: the day after. Sadly, neither term — “forever war” or day after — makes any real-world sense.

Take the case of Afghanistan. In 2001, America mobilized NATO, transporting Western troops well beyond the confines of its “home base,” the North Atlantic. Its goal was to rid a remote Asian nation of the dreaded Taliban. On that occasion, America rejected a reasonable proposal to negotiate a solution whereby Afghanistan itself would arrest and try the criminals. The administration of President George W. Bush preferred launching a war that would last 20 years. And what did the day after of that war turn out to be in 2021? The restoration of an even more radicalized Taliban.

In 1967, in the midst of the war in Vietnam that provided the initial template for future forever wars, General Westmoreland and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson began repeatedly “the light at the end of the tunnel.” That was an earlier version of the day after. That war lasted 20 years and ended in chaotic humiliation for America.

The Hollywood treatment of war may appear inspired by Shakespearean tragedy, which always ends with a dramatic death. But William Shakespeare’s tragic characters, even villains like Richard III or Macbeth, have something heroic about them that we cannot help but admire. And the perception of the day after always remains ambiguous. When Hamlet dies, the crown is given not to a Dane, but a Norwegian rival, Fortinbras, whose name, derived from French, means “strong in arm.” In other words, despite Hamlet’s own encouragement (“he has my dying voice”), the day after will more likely be a continuation of a forever war.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51łÔąĎ Devil’s Dictionary.]

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Politics of terror

For decades, Pakistan has used state-sponsored terror as an instrument to buy geopolitical rent from the United States via Afghanistan. In the past, Pakistan gave operational control to terror proxies to cultivate ground for against India.

However, the strategy of using terror did not last long. On May 2, 2011, the US al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. This incident sowed seeds of distrust between the two nations.

Similarly, Iran Pakistan in the 1971 war against India. However, ideological confrontations have led to distrust and hostility between the parties. Iran also believes that Pakistan is Baloch jihadists to please the West and Saudi Arabia.

Evidently, politics of terror have cost Pakistan heavily, without much reward. The state is clearly weakening, as several signs indicate. The Afghan Taliban’s is being more assertive than it otherwise would be. Pakistan is targeting Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamist nationalist network opposing the Pakistani military. Pakistan’s approach against Afghanistan’s Supreme Council is also telling.

Middle Eastern terror conflicts have increased following Israel’s 2023 invasion of Gaza. Pakistan seems to be negotiating with a few proxies, and allegedly with . These actions may be in order to de-escalate terror attacks in Pakistan and deter the TTP.

The nation may also be seeking openings for security and strategic cooperation with the West. In December 2023, Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir and former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Nadeem Anjum, Washington, DC. The US didn’t show any interest in engaging with Pakistan; it is already locked in multiple fronts from Ukraine to Israel. The nation also believes that TTP is already weakening the ISIS threat.

However, the ISIS in Iran in January paint a worrisome picture of regional security.ĚýThe on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March stoked fear of revival of ISIS regional branches, especially in Central Asia.

Islamization and flashpoints

Pakistan’s politics of terror typically end poorly, which complicates its negotiation of geopolitical rent. It suffers from the usual dilemma that comes with terror politics; proxies can be useful for some time, but eventually, their radicalism becomes too extreme.

One can argue that the US, too, had relations with terror proxies. In December 1979, the CIA’s provided arms and logistics to jihadist groups in Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet Union. Unlike Pakistan’s relationship with proxies, however, this was a limited relationship.

Pakistan’s continued engagement with proxies may come from former president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s regime in the 1970s and 1980s. He Sharia Benches in the High Court to align the nation’s legal statutes with Islamic doctrine. His policies brought in officers who wanted to pursue an active Islamic agenda in military matters. A new breed of military thinkers and strategists also emerged. They pushed for a merger of social jihadism with military plans.

Islamization had far-reaching consequences. It led non-state actors, directed by Pakistan’s ISI, to quell opposition to Zia’s pro-Sunni Islamization measures. This in turn the extremist Jaish-e-Mohammad and Soviet jihad groups.

Zia’s radical Islamization continues to permeate the Pakistani Army, which has prevented action against Islamic terror groups such as TTP. The virus of Islamization has removed Pakistan’s ability to think like a rational nation, putting it in a state of poly-crises.

In January, Pakistan witnessed new flashpoints, including Iranian against the Baluch terror group Jaish al-Adl. This attack on the Pakistani province of Balochistan further deteriorated Iran–Pakistan relations.

Pakistan’s response was limited to diplomatic protests and the of Iran’s ambassador. However, Pakistan likewise carried out retaliatory precision strikes against Baluch camps on Iranian territory. This indicates a strategy of deterrence similar to the it used against India in 2019.Ěý

Pakistan does have the option to use force against Iran; it did so in a limited manner on January 17, when it launched a series of air and artillery inside Iran’s Sistan and Balochistan province. The limited strike demonstrated Pakistan’s deterrence capabilities, but terror groups inside Pakistan continue to complicate its situation.

Attacks on Chinese workers

On October 7, Baloch terrorists in the Pakistani city of Karachi conducted a that killed two Chinese nationals. Before that, on March 26, Baloch insurgents conducted a that killed five Chinese workers in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. These are merely the most recent instances of deadly attacks on Chinese nationals. In 2022, a in Karachi killed three Chinese instructors. In 2021, yet another killed two Chinese nationals in the Gwadar region.

These incidents have raised serious questions over Pakistan’s credentials of being a safe investment for China. In defense, China shut its firms and launched a sound into these incidents.

Pakistan is attempting to revive its economic situation and its relations with China, but such incidents might jeopardize long-term Pakistan–China economic relations. The issue of terror attacks paints Pakistan as an unsafe investment, to China and the rest of the world. Regardless, for the time being, China intends to with Pakistan to protect its personnel.

For Pakistan, going full throttle against insurgents raises the concern of a mass insurgency. However, Pakistan has gradually begun cross-border operations in relation to Afghanistan. The consequences may put Pakistan into a severe security headache as the capital of Islamabad is now caught in a twin terror trap with the TTP and Baloch militants. If flared, this situation could heavily impede Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests.

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After the Taliban retook power in 2021 with a shockingly rapid advance on the capital, Kabul, Ghani fled the country. His sudden departure damaged his reputation and exacerbated the country’s already precarious situation. Afghans regarded the move as self-centered decision-making and callous, given what became of the country after Ghani left.

Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan’s economy, as per the World Bank, is and heavily reliant on external support. The economy has shrunk by 25% over the last two years. The Taliban’s restrictive policies on women’s education and work are expected to further hinder Afghanistan’s recovery prospects. Additionally, according to the latest Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Index, Afghanistan ranks as the among 177 countries in terms of the status of women. Many Afghans blame Ghani for their misery.

Ghani claims his escape was necessitated by factors outside of his control. It is true that the Taliban’s advance meant Ghani’s safety was at stake. His close circle urged him to flee the country. Despite facing criticism for his actions, Ghani vigorously asserts that he is still Afghanistan’s president.

Ghani is as stubborn a pretender as he was a president

Even as his regime was collapsing, Ghan was high-handed and brooked no compromise. In his mind, the Afghan constitution empowered him to complete his term, so he would complete it. Influential figures like Zalmay Khalilzad, the senior US negotiator with the Taliban, sharply criticized Ghani. In his testimony before the House Foreign iRelations Committee, Khalilzad a last-minute success in persuading the Taliban to avoid entering Kabul and instead engage in discussions with the government to establish a transitional administration. Both sides agreed, but Ghani’s surprising departure led to the swift collapse of the now leaderless Afghan military and police. Apparently, he would rather claim his rights abroad than lay them down during negotiations in Afghanistan.

Ghani found refuge in Abu Dhabi. From this base, he has continued to leveraged any possible platforms, from diplomatic meetings to , to push his agenda. Ghani believes that Afghanistan can function as an economic bridge between West, Central, South and East Asia, and for some reason he seems to think that he has a role to play in developing that. In his podcasts, Ghani actively seeks support from both the Taliban and the broader region.

In on podcast , at the 18-minute mark, Ghani seamlessly transitions from technical discourse to outlining Afghanistan’s political path. He critiques militant groups opposing the Taliban and acknowledges ethnic diversity challenges within his administration. Ghani advocates for establishing a Loya Jirga (a great council of tribal leaders) to focus on the internal dimension of political legitimacy for the Taliban regime and emphasizes the importance of reforms. He aims for measures that could secure minimum acceptance from the people without necessitating unanimous national approval. Ghani promotes the idea that such minimum acceptance from the Afghan populace may pave the way for legitimizing the Taliban by the international community.

So desperate is Ghani to have a role to play in Afghan politics that he, who once fled the country rather than recognize the Taliban, now appears willing to sell his country out to the militants.

Ghani and allies play the influence game abroad

Meanwhile, former Afghan army officials appointed by Ghani are overseas offices, positioning themselves as representatives of the former Afghan National Defense Forces prepared to confront the Taliban. This initiative explores potential avenues and strategically engages with the new US administration, as President Donald Trump’s by floating the a possible US return to Afghanistan while speaking to a crowd in Fort Dodge, Iowa. If Afghanistan garners the attention of the new US administration, significant opportunities for such maneuvers could emerge as a bargaining chip.

With the potential for regional security cooperation on the rise, Ghani highlights Afghanistan’s regional significance and signals readiness to engage with the recently established for cooperation with Kabul. Nonetheless, Iran’s sway over specific Taliban factions presents a challenge to Ghani’s endeavors to initiate dialogue with the group. The region is marked by a lack of trust and duplicity, leading countries to cultivate relationships with all parties both within and outside Afghanistan as bargaining tools to advance their agendas. The regional contact group will encompass all Afghan groups, including Ghani, in the pursuit of inclusive solutions.

The collapse of the government unsettled Afghan elites, leading to their disengagement. However, two years later, these communities are regrouping and actively seeking a leader capable of articulating their concerns. Ghani positions himself as a leader within a specific faction of the Taliban opposition, advocating for reform and actively seeking a role in shaping Afghanistan’s future.

Despite the Taliban’s capture of power in Afghanistan, Ghani still maintains his Twitter profile as of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. All administrative signs, flags, passports and other symbols of authority still belong to the exiled government. Afghan embassies, representatives in other countries and the UN continue to operate and represent the previous government.

Yet this is not the sort of government in exile that dreams of recapturing its homeland from the enemy like Charles de Gaulle did France in World War II. Instead, if Ghani can garner enough attention and support, he may consider playing his last card by joining with the Taliban, a preferable option to fading into obscurity. Such a move could benefit the Taliban by showcasing their tolerance and promoting legitimacy.

Although Ghani faces formidable challenges, the historical transformations in Afghanistan hint at potential advantages for both Ghani and the Taliban should his inclination to cooperate with them come to fruition. While a return to Afghanistan may not align with Ghani’s preferences, it offers a more favorable prospect compared to fading into obscurity in Abu Dhabi. Through astute positioning in negotiations, particularly by considering regional interests, Ghani may move closer to achieving his aspirations.

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A US-led invasion ousted the Taliban from power in 2001. Despite their removal, they continued to wage a guerrilla war against the Afghan government and foreign forces. Fast-forward to 2021. The world witnessed a seismic shift in Afghanistan’s geopolitical landscape when the Taliban launched a massive offensive and seized control of the country. This resurgence followed the US announcement of its withdrawal, marking the end of a 20-year war. The Taliban declared they would re-establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a statement that would reverberate globally and complex questions about the legitimacy of their rule.

The Taliban assert their legitimacy as Afghanistan’s rightful rulers although they have the support of neither the Afghan populace nor the global community. The organization’s claim to legitimacy is rooted in its ideology, relying on three pillars: its supposed connection to the Afghanistan’s historical emirate, its Pashtun ethnic identity and its adherence to the Deobandi school of Islam.

Rekindling the emirate

The Taliban’s right to rule starts with their self-proclaimed position as heirs to Afghanistan’s historical monarchy, officially called the Emirate of Afghanistan. in 1826 by Emir Dōst Moḥammad Kh�n, the emirate symbolized unification under Pashtun leadership and staunch resistance against foreign incursions, particularly from the British and Persians. It marked the country’s first independent state, solidifying its borders and identity.

While facing internal and external challenges like the and , the emirate witnessed significant advancements. Constitutions, flags, anthems, a currency, postal systems and even a nascent railway network all marked notable strides during this period. In 1926, the emirate came to an end when Emir Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan a “kingdom” with himself as king. The name change marked a shift to a more modernizing, Western-influenced style of governance.

The Taliban strongly both a kingdom and a republic as incompatible with their Islamic ideology. They view an emirate as the sole licit, authentic political system for Afghanistan. This stance is further bolstered by their adoption of the original emirate’s name, flag and symbols. They see themselves as its rightful successors, inheriting its legacy and its responsibility to safeguard Afghanistan’s sovereignty against foreign influence.

In their narrative, the British, Soviets and Americans as historical invaders and enemies, while their own resistance is a sacred — a struggle for moral correctness. The internationally recognized government and its security forces were illegitimate collaborators in their eyes, puppets of foreign powers. The Taliban strive to establish a pure Islamic state governed by their understanding of Sharia law, with the emirate’s revival serving as a cornerstone of their legitimacy claim.

The horrific obsession of the Deobandi school

Building upon their historical connection to the emirate, the Taliban further bolster their legitimacy with their strict adherence to the Deobandi school of Islam. Born in 19th-century India, emerged as a reformist movement that emphasized strict adherence to the Quran and Sunnah, traditional Islamic practices, and social reform. While not entirely rejecting the four conventional Sunni schools of jurisprudence, Deobandis prioritize the direct interpretation of religious texts. They advocate for a literal, conservative understanding of Islam.

This ideology fertile ground in Afghanistan, particularly among rural Pashtun communities. Deobandi madrasas — colleges dedicated to Islamic study — flourished, educating generations of scholars and religious leaders, including many future Taliban members. The Taliban embraced Deobandi principles as their official creed, shaping their vision for an Islamic state governed by an unwavering understanding of Sharia law.

The Taliban’s specific interpretation of Deobandi principles led them to impose an austere version of Islam in Afghanistan. They music, art, entertainment and for women, viewing these things as incompatible with their morality. Religious minorities, deemed heretical or infidel, faced persecution. While these actions are justified by the Taliban as upholding Deobandi doctrine and defending Islam, they are broadly by Deobandis and the international community.

Crucially, this Deobandi foundation imbues the Taliban’s claim to legitimacy with a unique character. Their fight is cast as a divinely ordained crusade, drawing authority directly from God. This renders modern concepts like democracy and nation-states obsolete in their eyes. They see themselves as instruments of God’s will, liberated from the need for earthly validation through elections or global recognition. This divine mandate, they argue, justifies their actions and grants them unyielding support from their devout followers.

Assimilation, xenophobia and Pashtun identity

The Taliban also draw their legitimacy from their ethnic identity. They are predominantly , members of the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Primarily located in eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan, Pashtuns approximately 42% of the population. For centuries, Pashtuns have not simply inhabited Afghanistan, but have played a role in shaping its destiny, leaving a legacy that the Taliban now weaponize as their birthright to leadership.

Prior to the ascendancy of the Pashtuns, Mongol and Turkic dynasties ruled Afghanistan. The 18th and 19th centuries witnessed the rise of Pashtun like Hotak, Durrani and B�rakzai. Their empires stand as testaments to Pashtun political prowess and influence. The Hotakis challenged the Mughal Empire’s dominance by capturing Kandah�r Province from them. The Durranis established an empire stretching from Mashhad in Persia to Kashmir and Delhi in India. The B�rakzais shaped the of modern Afghanistan and founded the emirate.

This legacy forms the bedrock of the Taliban’s narrative. The Pashtun identity they claim suggests an inherent right to rule stemming from ancestral ties and past achievements. They argue that Pashtuns are not merely Afghanistan’s largest minority but the core of its national identity. For the Taliban, the term “Afghan” itself as an synonym of “Pashtun.” (The name, “Afghanistan,” meaning, “Land of Afghans,” first appeared in the 1879 following the .)

Beyond their historical narrative, the Taliban draw heavily on , a deeply ingrained ethical and social code that governs Pashtun life. This intricate tapestry of values, encompassing łľ±đ±ôłľ˛ą˛őłŮ˛âÄĺĚ� (hospitality), ˛ÔÉ™˛Ô˛ą·ÉÄĺĚ�łŮ±đ (asylum), nang (justice), ˛ú˛ą»ĺá±ô (revenge) and łŮĂş°ů˛ą (bravery), serves as a cornerstone of their legitimacy claim. They portray themselves as not only rulers, but caretakers of this moral code.

The Taliban that Pashtunwali forms the bedrock of Afghan identity. They propose that other ethnic groups in Afghanistan either share Pashtun ancestry, having assimilated into their cultural sphere over centuries, or have embraced Pashtunwali as their own moral compass. This assertion of cultural hegemony is another vital argument in their narrative, suggesting that their leadership is not merely a political choice, but an imperative for maintaining moral and cultural unity. The Taliban’s ideology is a hybrid and synthesis of the Pashtunwali and Deobandi schools of thought, which complement and reinforce each other.

The Taliban’s emphasis on Pashtun identity breeds xenophobia. Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks face suspicion, and even demonization. The Taliban ignore their legal and cultural systems in favor of a rigid of Pashtunwali and Sharia law. The Pashtuns’ language, Pashto, flourishes in education and government while other languages wither. Representation in these spheres is deeply imbalanced, stoking resentment among excluded groups. The most brutal manifestation of this xenophobia is the Taliban’s use of violence and intimidation, creating a climate of fear that silences dissent. This exclusionary approach sows deep societal fissures, jeopardizing Afghanistan’s fragile unity.

The Taliban’s rule remains at odds with the desires of the Afghan people and the principles of the international community. As long as this fundamental dissonance persists, the question of legitimacy will continue to cast a long shadow over Afghanistan’s future, with profound consequences for its stability and prosperity.

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Boys struggle in Afghanistan’s new educational environment

The Taliban have received international criticism for preventing women and girls from attending secondary schools and universities. Still, their severe on boys’ education in Afghanistan have received less attention. Due to the Taliban’s harsh educational , which have resulted in the exodus of qualified teachers and regressive curriculum modifications, boys are too. There is a greater fear of going to school, a decline in attendance and a loss of optimism for the future. Consequently, the Taliban run the risk of producing a lost generation.

Since assuming power, the Taliban’s impact on boys’ education in Afghanistan is detailed in the Human Rights Watch entitled “Schools are Failing Boys Too.” The report highlights regressive curriculum changes, an uptick in corporal punishment, and the dismissal of female teachers, posing a threat to Afghan boys’ education. While global attention has focused on the Taliban’s bans on girls’ and women’s secondary and higher education, the substantial harm inflicted on the male education system has garnered less notice. The report’s author contends that the Taliban’s actions seriously undermine both boys’ and girls’ education in Afghanistan, potentially leaving behind a lost generation without a quality education and the nation’s educational foundation.

Between June and August 2022 and March and April 2023, Human Rights Watch remotely five parents and 22 boys in grades 8 through 12 across the provinces of Kabul, Balkh, Herat, Farah, Parwan, Bamiyan, Nangarhar and Daikundi. The Taliban, in a sweeping move, dismissed all female teachers from boys’ schools. This action left many boys with instructors or no professors at all. Boys now a surge in physical punishment, including public beatings for minor infractions like owning a cell phone or getting a haircut. The Taliban’s removal of subjects like athletics, English, the arts and civics has led to a decline in educational quality.

Worsening economic and humanitarian challenges in Afghanistan are forcing boys to and aid their families. In a landscape with mental health care, boys experience rising anxiety, and other mental health issues. Though the Taliban hasn’t explicitly barred boys from school beyond the 6th grade, their actions still the education of all children. Afghanistan’s of international law, specifically the right to education for all children, is evident. The Taliban’s systemic discrimination against women and girls adversely affects boys, reinforcing negative gender stereotypes and intensifying financial pressure to support their families.

Women and girls’ right to education from an Islamic perspective

The Taliban have made education worse for all children. Still, their exclusion of women and girls from post-primary education is particularly abhorrent.

In Islam, women’s education is as a fundamental and sacred right, aligned with key principles in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted by the Islamic Council of Europe on September 19, 1981, this declaration upholds the sanctity of various rights, including life, property, religion and the intellect. Rooted in the Holy Quran and international human rights law, these cardinal rights, particularly the right to education, are essential to the deen (faith). The Quran emphasizes the significance of intellect (al-aql) as a divine endowment, allowing individuals to make moral decisions and strive for harmony (Q 17:70, 95:4, 2:30–34, 33:72). Reason serves as the basis for distinguishing right from wrong. For girls, education is not only integral to their faith but also pivotal in expanding knowledge, fostering critical thinking, and molding them into exemplary Muslims and community members. It empowers women and girls to harness the blessings bestowed upon them by Allah.

Education is a divine for both genders. The Quran and Hadith leave no doubt that women, like men, must pursue knowledge. With over 800 references to ilm (knowledge) and its derivatives, the Holy Quran underscores its value. Allah commands both men and women to seek knowledge and punishes ignorance. “Read” (iqra) is how the very first revelation to Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) begins: “Read in the name of your Lord, who formed humanity from a blood clot (Q 96:1–5) A basic of Quranic interpretation is that when a commandment is revealed, the feminine gender is likewise encompassed by it, regardless of whether the masculine version of the word is employed. Ignoring this principle undermines fundamental Islamic for women, including prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and almsgiving. The Hadith and Sunnah affirm the obligation for men and women to pursue higher education. By keeping women and girls from going to school, you are stopping them from carrying out Allah’s sacred mandate and interfering with their eternity.

The Taliban’s educational policies violate international law

The Taliban not only defy the laws of Allah, but they also violate the laws of man by denying education to their citizens. The Taliban regime must not overlook its international obligations under international human rights law and customary international law. Afghanistan became a party to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 2003. According to this convention, countries must eradicate stereotypes about gender roles from all levels of education and society.

Corporal punishment in schools also children’s rights, causing dehumanization, needless suffering and detriment to their growth, academic performance, and mental health. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child every child’s right to an education in a violence-free environment, and international law prohibits all forms of corporal punishment. Afghanistan, having adopted the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1994, is committed to ensuring children’s rights to safety, education, and protection from violence.

There are relatively few policy options to deal with the Taliban’s stringent restrictions or prompt behavioral change. The group has shown resistance to international pressure. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Muslim-majority countries have the Taliban to lift their bans, but no tangible changes have occurred, and the likelihood of increased OIC involvement remains uncertain.

International sanctions, thus far, have yielded no apparent results. Afghanistan’s dire situation struggles to garner attention amidst the international focus on issues in Ukraine and Gaza. It’s crucial for the global community to persist in highlighting the Taliban’s mistreatment of oppressed Afghan women and girls.

If the international community is not more forceful, options for Afghanistani children are indeed slim. For example, while offers a secure option for studying at home, millions of Afghan women and girls in remote areas lack internet access.

Governments concerned about the matter must exert pressure on the Taliban to lift their discriminatory ban on women’s and girls’ education and cease depriving boys of a safe and high-quality learning environment. The Taliban cannot flout Quranic directives on the right to education while adhering to an un-Islamic and regressive interpretation. Concrete steps, such as rehiring all female teachers, aligning the curriculum with international human rights law standards, and prohibiting corporal punishment, are indispensable.

The repercussions of the Taliban’s assault on the educational system are palpable now and will cast a long shadow over Afghanistan’s future. The urgent need for an international response to Afghanistan’s education crisis demands both swiftness and effectiveness.

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In this episode of FO° Podcasts, Bilal Rahmani explains exactly how the Taliban are transforming Afghanistan into an oppressive pariah state through rank incompetence and self-enriching policy decisions. Eventually, this downward spiral of corruption and violence could spell an end to the modern borders of Afghanistan. 

Economic stagnation and brutal oppression

Restoring some semblance of normalcy in the Taliban’s Afghanistan has been incredibly difficult. Policy around economic activity shifts on the whims of elder militant leaders. Some days, entire sectors, like women’s beauty salons, are told to close. On other days, crops are simply not allowed to leave the country, killing exports. Operating on this shifting ground has created new risks in Afghanistan’s economy. Business planning has become impossible because the Taliban make economic policy on a whim. 

Land seizures by the Taliban are the most egregious example of a toxic economic environment. The Taliban’s Ministry of Justice is seizing agricultural or housing land en masse and redistributing it to Taliban leaders. These seizures force many Afghans off their land and deprive them of their livelihoods. Furthermore, these warlords are probably the least productive members of society. The land grab is making Taliban leaders rent-seeking parasitical landlords who live off the blood, sweat and toil of ordinary Afghans.

Just as the Taliban are deciding who are the winners in Afghanistan’s economy, they are also anointing the winners in society. The Taliban have deemed Pashtun men as the undisputed top dogs in Afghanistan. Fanatical Islamist policies that interpret the Koran literally deny women education, bar them from jobs, prevent them from traveling alone and reduce them to second-class members of society.

Even when women are given rights by the Taliban leadership — often to appease international organizations or foreign governments — ground-level Taliban members unleash violence and intimidation to ensure that women do not exercise their rights. Fearing for their safety, women are increasingly excluding themselves from normal social activities and living in hiding.

Ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks have also found themselves on the losing side of the new Taliban-led state that dispenses patronage overwhelmingly to Pashtuns. The Taliban are seizing ancestral Hazara and Tajik lands. There is a distinct punitive military character to the land seizures. Taliban leaders do not feel the need to negotiate with their historical ethnic rivals. Instead, they are following medieval tactics and using extreme military force and human rights abuses to take away land from those they consider their enemies.

The Taliban bait and switch and the future of Afghanistan

The Taliban have proved that they are neither competent nor cohesive. They are now targeting Pakistan to win domestic legitimacy. Simply put, the Taliban are using their insurgent tactics to take back their ancestral ethnic Pashtun lands in Pakistan and create Pashtunistan, a new state that reclaims the historic lands of the Pashtuns.

This shift in the Taliban’s paradigm has caught Pakistan napping. Ironically, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) once backed the Taliban. This dreaded military intelligence wanted strategic depth against India and aimed to use Pashtun jihadis in Kashmir. Now that the Taliban are in charge, they do not feel beholden to the ISI. They have turned their guns on Pakistan itself. Alarmingly, Taliban forces have already clashed with Pakistani troops.

Some senior leaders in the Taliban do not want relations with Pakistan to deteriorate. They are resorting to both direct talks and shuttle diplomacy. Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, the ISI chief, Kabul recently to smooth ruffled feathers. In a very public appearance, he told journalists not to worry and that “everything would be okay.” However, Hameed might be putting on a brave face because the more ethnonationalist members of the Taliban fanatically believe in the creation of Pashtunistan.

Just as the Taliban seek to redraw the borders of modern Afghanistan and Pakistan to benefit the Pashtun people, Afghanistan’s many ethnic groups have carved out their own centers of power for self-preservation. Militant rebellions have broken out. Mawlawi Mehdi Mujahid, a Hazara leader, and the National Resistance Front, composed chiefly of Tajiks, have rebelled. So far, the Taliban have been successful at quashing these rebellions. They deploy overwhelming force to quash the rebellion and maintain control over rebel territories. However, rebellions still keep erupting to challenge the Taliban.

Such rebellions will continue. During the Afghan Civil War, Abdul Rashid Dostum created a proto-state for ethnic Uzbek Afghans. With the Taliban repeatedly threatening the lives and livelihoods of ethnic minorities, they are bound to create Dostum-style enclaves for survival. At some point, multiple rebellions might erupt simultaneously and threaten Taliban rule.

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The grand dream of General Zia-ul-Haq, architect of Pakistan’s insurgent strategy, that Pakistan achieve geopolitical dominance in South Asia by facilitating domestic and international jihadist groups never seemed more in focus.

Now using its newfound ally’s resources, Pakistan could set its security problems to rest. The Taliban had adept combat capabilities and resilient from madrasas. They also carried the credibility based on their status as a Pashtun and Islamic group.

Pakistan placed its hopes in the ability of the Afghan Taliban to broker peace between Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban. The Taliban could further assist in fighting Islamic State — Khorasan Province and militant groups in Balochistan and, ultimately, continue its “Global Jihad” in Jammu and Kashmir.

Yet, the dream has been cut short by a rude awakening. The ISI has instead seen its assets tied up in a, major operations, continued and new with Afghanistan.

The Taliban haven’t been Pakistan’s geopolitical silver bullet; they may become one of its greatest existential challenges. Not only does Taliban-controlled Afghanistan pose new challenges to Pakistan’s security establishment, but it directly challenges Pakistan’s territorial integrity by igniting clashes at its border, inspiring insurgency in border provinces and sheltering new security vacuums Pakistan must fill or combat.

The Taliban had already planned their next steps for Global Jihad: pressure the Durand Line border from within Pakistan and from Afghanistan, establish shadow control over border areas and ultimately erase the Durand Line. Through this long-war strategy, the Taliban could expand Afghanistan and finally heal the scars of its colonial wars with the British Empire by regaining lands taken from the nation during the Anglo–Afghan Wars, taking on the mantle of the heroes of the Pashtun people and the saviors of South Asia.

The saviors of South Asia?

In the midst of the Afghan Civil War, Mullah Mohammed Omar founded the Taliban to address issues in their immediate surroundings in Kandahar. It is unknown if Omar and his group of extremist Deobandi Islamic militant scholars saw the future of the Taliban’s exploits then, but their early success certainly prepared the way for a truly meteoric rise. From the Taliban’s very first successful against two pedophilic warlords in Kandahar, they won the hearts and minds of locals for their ability to bring stability and maintain credibility.

It was at this early stage in the group’s operations that a sort of “Taliban Promise” was formed. The group could take control of territory with use of insurgent and guerilla ground tactics in storm-type attacks and defend the territory through its ability to rapidly recruit new units. Then once in control, the Taliban would govern through a mix of Deobandi Islamic principles — adherence to extreme literalist fundamental Islam with specific belief in declaring apostasy — and Pashtun ethnic principles — honor, reciprocity and tribal courts.

Both aspects of the Taliban’s initial Afghan campaign fed into one another, and their identification as Muslim and Pashtun gave them legitimacy and access to fighters while continued territorial control and battlefield success gave their rule legitimacy. This Taliban Promise wasn’t glamorous, but it was something Afghans could predict, expect, understand to some extent and accept as the alternative was being at the whims of a vagrant warlord.

Thus, the Taliban set out from Kandahar, reversing the of Afghanistan, destroying fiefdoms and maintaining a common link to most Afghans through religious and ethnic values. The Taliban’s movement likewise stood in stark contrast to Pakistan’s then main ally, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (not a difficult feat, as he was best known for residential neighborhoods in Kabul, earning him the title “Gulbuddin Rocket-yar”). With no real competitors and an incredibly successful domestic campaign, the group became the de facto future rulers of Afghanistan, gaining Pakistan’s full support by 1994 and even earning from the US in early 2001.

It was only when the Taliban was implicated in the events of 9/11 that the international community’s hope for its success faded. With the façade revealed and the Taliban’s links to international terror organizations like al-Qaeda plain to see, almost all of the group’s bridges with the international community were burned. Then, with the US invasion of Afghanistan and the end of the Taliban government, it seemed the Taliban’s fate was sealed. With no ability to fight against the US military in a head-to-head conflict, Taliban leadership quickly withdrew across the Durand Line to Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal lands.

Pakistan could never let the Taliban fail. The nation had abandoned its previous allies for the Taliban and, therefore, this was Pakistan’s last real chance at creating an insurgent movement to dominate South Asia. Too much had been invested in the Taliban to let them be destroyed by the US military. So, while the US was establishing supply lines through Pakistan for its invasion of Afghanistan, the ISI began the Taliban arms, logistics, intelligence and shelter to ensure their survival.

Double games, double problems

The Pakistani intelligence and security community would not abandon its master plan to fulfill General Zia’s goal of creating and controlling the world’s preeminent insurgent paramilitary group for the domination of South Asia. These were the cards Pakistan had played for over 20 years to this point, and changing strategies was not under discussion. The foundational moves for Pakistan were too consequential to even consider looking back. 

General Zia’s 1979 decision to combat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by funneling international funds specifically into extremist Islam had opened Pandora’s box. Partnering with extremist, the architect of the Global Jihad, created the current pipeline of militants, and dismantling it would be immensely difficult. This was the original “double game” Pakistan had created during the Soviet–Afghan War, supporting US interests by supporting counter-Soviet religious militants in Afghanistan but ultimately damaging US interests by instrumentalizing those militants.

Pakistan’s plan, however, does not seem to have been specifically directed at damaging US national security. The intention was, and always has been, to open the door to extremist militant Islam while directing its violence against Pakistan’s immediate national security concerns. Pakistan would become the champion of Islam in South Asia and lead the Global Jihad against the region’s greatest threat: rival India — Hindustan.

Islamabad’s double game therefore could not end with the US invasion of Afghanistan; it just became more dangerous. The ISI had to directly oppose the US by aiding the Taliban while also maintaining outward support for the US and facilitating its military operations. The stakes were never higher, but in 2021, with the Taliban yet again in control of Kabul and the US still not explicitly pursuing action against Pakistan for its role, it looked as if the double game had been won.

Pakistan’s double game, however, has only created double the problems. Today, the nation remains ensnared by daily insurgent violence and, all under the dark cloud of devastating. The Taliban have not proven to be the magnanimous allies Pakistan had hoped for, and Pakistan’s problems have only grown as a result of its costly partnership with them.

A stark reminder of the enmity now between the two allies is theTorkham Border Crossing seen in February. Pakistani Frontier Corps and Afghan Taliban troops opened fire, wounding one member of the corps and prompting a swift Pakistani diplomatic response to ease tensions.

The documented gunfights between the two militaries in broad daylight at their busiest crossing, however, do not encompass the entirety of their negative interactions. Clashes have died down since February, but smaller interactions like explosions at border points, and drug seizures and illegal crossings still show the Taliban’s continued destabilizing effect on Pakistan.

The Taliban’s active clashes with Pakistan are not even the largest destabilizing factor. The group’s takeover of Afghanistan has proven far more problematic to security because it has given modern insurgency a proof of concept. Insurgents in South Asia and beyond may feel they don’t have to settle for a seat at the table, because if they wait long enough they may own the whole restaurant just as the Taliban seized Afghanistan.

The TTP is the greatest example of this new insurgent impetus. Emboldened by the Afghan Taliban’s victories, it has taken to a new campaign of violence against Pakistani forces and civilians. With no war in Afghanistan, Taliban fighters likewise gain a new purpose and can easily move through Pashtun tribal networks to join a new battlefield.

Pakistan attempted to execute its strategy of controlling the Taliban when it entered into Afghan Taliban-negotiated talks with the TTP, but this quickly failed. Negotiations between the two sides after only a few rounds of talks;Pakistan TTP core leadership, decisively ending the rapproachment, and violence has trended upward since. Now, one need look no further than the front page of Pakistan’s or the TTP’s propaganda websites to see that clashes between Pakistan and the TTP have become a daily occurrence.

Likewise, the drumbeat of attacks by Baloch militant groups like the , the and the has only increased. These groups have also become emboldened by the Taliban’s advances and now conduct gruesome attacks specifically targeting Chinese nationals, like in the, and broader regional critical infrastructure.

This turn of events has proven that although the Taliban are a byproduct of long-term Pakistani national security and intelligence decision-making, the Taliban do not feel they are beholden to Pakistan. Although the ISI sheltered the Taliban from the US, the Taliban are still a grassroots ethno-religious militant movement with its own goals that now challenge Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

With Afghanistan firmly in the Taliban’s grasp, a new double game is beginning in South Asia: a double game that seeks to rewrite the history of British colonial rule.

The New Fight for the Durand Line

Pakistan’s strategy to gain a stronger position in South Asia by supporting militant extremism has turned out to be quite flawed. While it was possible to steer the Mujahideen’s Global Jihad during the Soviet–Afghan War, it does not seem equally possible to direct the Taliban. The success of Pakistan’s strategy of directing militancy during the Soviet–Afghan War was largely due to the Mujahideen being a specifically Islamist militant movement; the interests of both Pakistan and the militants were mostly aligned. However, the Taliban is a hybrid organization that represents both extremist Islam and Pashtun nationalism; as a result, many of the Taliban’s interests run entirely contrary to Pakistan’s. Erasing the Durand Line and retaking the Pashtun land taken from Afghanistan by the British is the largest of these differing interests.

The Durand Line was drawn in 1893 by the British Empire to better administer Afghanistan after its Pyrrhic conquest during the Second Anglo–Afghan War (1878–1880). Learning from theBritish army’s at the hands of Pashtun tribal alliances during the First Anglo–Afghan War (1838–1842), colonial Britain was unwilling to invest too heavily in Afghanistan and sought a strategy that would instead defang the nation.

Abdur Rahman Khan was installed as shah by the British in 1880, allowing him to lead a violent domestic campaign to gain undisputed control of Afghanistan from the powerful Pashtun tribal networks. Then, once the Pashtun tribes had been cowed, it was necessary to permanently debilitate them so their tribal alliances could never rise again to challenge Afghanistan or British India.

Pashtunistan was cut in two by the Durand Line, dividing the lands governed by the Pashtun tribes between Afghanistan and British India. Then, with tribal networks separated by administrative and political borders, there was no way for them to form a cohesive military organization to threaten British control of South Asia again as they once did in theFirst Anglo–Afghan . Furthermore, subjugating and ruling over fractured tribal networks allowed both Abdur Rahman Khan and the British to maintain a high degree of regional autonomy without consulting domestic power brokers.

The British Empire’s scar on Afghanistan was challenged during the Third Anglo–Afghan War (1919), but ultimately maintained when Afghanistan gained independence. When Pakistan was created in 1947, the border was retained and it has lasted ever since.

The Durand Line served a significant strategic purpose during the Soviet–Afghan War, the Afghan Civil War and US–Afghan War which followed. The political boundary allowed combatants in Afghanistan to easily retreat and regroup into Pakistan when in danger and launch sorties from a safer position than from within Afghanistan. Yet, with no current foreign invading force in Afghanistan, Afghan militants no longer have a need for the border.

Militant Deobandi Islam has proven to be the potion Pashtun nationalism needed to revive itself, and now the Taliban are emerging as the champions of Pashtunistan as an entity. Likewise, the Taliban have good reason to reunite Pashtunistan and erase the Durand Line, as doing so would provide them immense domestic and regional legitimacy, potentially cementing their rule.

Gheyrat and izat, the Afghan concept of honor, run deep through the nation’s history and future. Invasion after invasion has instilled within our storied nation a ceaseless, brave resilience to cruelty in the face of insurmountable odds.

Just as all nations who foray into the Graveyard of Empires do, Pakistan is learning this lesson from the inside out. This all converges on the faultline of their shared scar of British colonial rule — the Durand Line — with a promise to restore Afghanistan’s honor at the price of accepting an extreme Deobandi, kleptocratic military state.

Pakistan’s territorial integrity is facing its first true challenge: The Taliban are increasing their influence and violence at an alarming rate, and insurgents are inching ever closer to nuclear capabilities, all as we peer from over the horizon.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The Taliban’s ban on women’s access to work and education is just the latest example of their inability to reform or moderate. If the international community once held any realistic hope that the Taliban might soften their extreme policies, that hope has now evaporated.

The cowardly escape of President Ashraf Ghani along with The Doha signed on February 29, 2020, paved the way for the final collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021. The country was plunged back into an age of repression.

Afghanistan now faces an escalating political and humanitarian crisis. NATO member states, the UN, and other humanitarian organizations have been sending aid in an attempt to mitigate the Taliban-created disaster. Since 2022, Afghanistan has received approximately in aid.

The international community continues to push the Taliban to form an inclusive government, respect human rights, and prevent the spread of terrorism. Yet, engaging with the Taliban in hopes of moderation is futile—because moderation itself contradicts their core ideological principles.

The Taliban’s Ideological Foundations

The Taliban are not merely a military movement; they are a radical Islamist and Pashtun dominated tribal group whose ideology is Ěý around three core pillars: their ends, ways, and means.

End Goals: The Islamic Emirate and Absolute Obedience

The Taliban pursue two overarching goals: one in this life and one in the afterlife. Their vision for the afterlife is simple—to enter heaven. In this world, their primary objective is to enforce their own interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) by establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Under this system, an Emir or supreme leader rules absolutely, and all citizens are expected to obey without question.

The Taliban construct their legal framework through a selective and self-serving application of Islamic jurisprudence, using sources such as traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, juridical consensus, reasoning by analogy and benevolence.

Mullah Haibatullah, the Taliban’s supreme leader, has been explicit about his commitment to absolute Sharia rule. Addressing the United States, he :

“You have used the mother of all bombs, and you are welcome to use even the atomic bomb against us, because nothing can scare us into taking any step that is against Islam or Sharia.”

The Taliban also Ěý their dominance through ethnic oppression, particularly targeting non-Pashtun groups like the Hazaras. Their leaders enforce , a tribal code emphasizing patriarchal control, revenge, and honor, which further entrenches social division and gender subjugation.

Understanding these ideological end goals is key to deciphering the Taliban’s policy decisions and long-term ambitions.

How the Taliban Maintain Control: Suppression, Exclusion, and Fear

The Taliban enforce their ideology through elimination, exclusion, and submission. Their mandates eradicating any resistance against the IEA—by force if necessary. Maulawi Mujeeb Rahman Ansari, a Taliban ally, openly :

Ěý“Anyone who opposes the current government should be beheaded.”

Following these directives, the Taliban have hundreds of extrajudicial killings since 2021. In Daikundi province, Taliban fightersĚý eight Hazara civilians, including children as young as six. In Panjshir, Hasht-e Subh DailyĚý that the Taliban executed 27 people accused of having ties to the National Resistance Front. The IEA consistently favors annihilation over dialogue.

Beyond outright violence, the Taliban have established a system of exclusion and repression. Their ruling consists of 33 men—30 of whom are Pashtun, with only token representation for Tajiks (two members) and Uzbeks (one member). This structure excludes Afghanistan’s , reinforcing Pashtun dominance.

Citizens are treated asĚý . The Taliban Ěý dress codes, personal grooming, and religious practices, enforcing their version of Islam on every aspect of life. Those who fail to comply face brutal consequences.

Women, in particular, have been reduced to second-class citizens. Under the Taliban’s , women belong in the home—to cook, bear children, and serve men. As a result, the Taliban have:

• BannedĚý women from education and employment.
• Imposed mandatory full-body coverings (burqas).
• Prohibited women from traveling without male chaperones.

When women protest, the Taliban respond with gunfire. Civil society organizations and political groups have been systematically . The IEA tolerates no opposition.

The Taliban also reject modern institutions such as democracy, elections, and human rights. Mullah Haibatullah has these concepts as “anti-Sharia.” Instead, the Taliban prioritize religious education, converting secular schools into madrasas. Their goal is clear: to Ěý Afghanistan’s liberal institutions and replace them with an extremist Islamic order.

Resources and Financial Backing: How the Taliban Sustain Themselves

The Taliban are well-funded and have a steady supply of recruits, largely from impoverished, uneducated Pashtun communities. Before toppling the Afghan government in 2021, they Ěý an estimated 60,000 core fighters and 140,000 auxiliary members.

Financially, the Taliban rely on two primary income sources: domestic taxation and foreign support. Between August and November 2021 alone, they collected million in taxes. Other revenue streams :

• Illegal opium cultivation and drug trafficking
• Illicit mining and resource extraction
• Extortion and unlawful taxation

ĚýIn 2020, NATO estimated that the Taliban $1.6 billion from illicit activities.

During their insurgency, the Taliban received extensive foreign funding. A Combating Terrorism Center report in 2021 that they benefited from financial, logistical, and technical aid from neighboring and Gulf countries, private donors, extremist groups, and al-Qaeda. The Taliban are among the wealthiest extremist organizations in the world.

The Taliban will not changeĚý

Many in the international community hoped that the Taliban, having learned from their past mistakes, would moderate their governance after reclaiming power in 2021. This belief was naive.

During their first reign (1996–2001), the Taliban’s refusal to surrender Osama bin Laden after 9/11 led to their downfall. After their defeat, they to have softened their fundamentalist stance. This was a deception—designed to mislead both the Afghan people and the world.

The Taliban are a product of a rigid, absolutist ideology. Democratic governance, human rights, and scientific progress threaten their existence. Their leaders understand that survival depends on adhering to radicalism, not moderation.

What the International Community Must Do

The world now faces a choice:

1. Continue engaging with the Taliban, thereby legitimizing and strengthening their regime.
2. Support democratic opposition groups, including political activists, ethnic representatives, women leaders, and the younger generation.

To counter the Taliban effectively, the international community must:

• Attach strict conditions to any aid.
• Ban free travel for Taliban officials.
• Limit direct engagement with the IEA.

Over time, these measures will weaken the Taliban’s grip while increasing the international community’s leverage.

The world must stop waiting for the Taliban to change. They won’t.

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Here Is Why the Taliban Cannot Change appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Afghanistan’s Taliban regime had given refuge to Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. They planned and executed terror attacks against the US from their base in Afghanistan. In spite of US demands for extradition, the Taliban hosted al-Qaeda leaders. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, which killed more than 3,000 innocent people on US soil, the gloves came off. The US invoked NATO’s Article 5, calling all allies to its defense, an invocation unprecedented in history. The NATO allies, in cooperation with the local Northern Alliance, took Afghanistan by storm.

Bin Laden, who had expected a decadent, pluralistic and materialistic United States simply to fall over after an attack like 9/11, must have been sorely surprised by the ferocity of the US response. The allied invasion destroyed Taliban rule in just six weeks and inaugurated a new era in Afghanistan.

Trapped in Afghanistan

However, bin Laden escaped and this prolonged the US presence in Afghanistan. Soon, an Islamist insurgency led by the remaining elements of the Taliban broke out. President George W. Bush understood from the start that nation-building was an unrealistic goal and promised not to engage in it. However, the US soon found itself unable to pull out of Afghanistan.

The decision to remain was influenced by the assessment, which Carle regards as flawed, that al-Qaeda remained as a potent force in Afghanistan. The intelligence community sincerely believed that al-Qaeda continued to be a coherent and organized global existential threat to Western democracy. Carle points out that it is implausible that a secret resistance of any such magnitude would be able to maintain such hierarchical discipline, especially in such a fragmented country as Afghanistan.

The US had no plausible plan for victory, but felt compelled to stay. The cost of leaving, thereby enabling terrorists to regroup and tarnishing America’s credibility as a world power, was just too high. But it was a fool’s errand. Afghanistan is simply not a nation. It is a region populated by numerous ethnic groups, over whom the Pashtuns exert a dubious suzerainty. Pakistan, which has a sizable Pashtun population of its own, has a vested interest in keeping Afghanistan weak. It supported the Taliban chiefly to achieve strategic depth against India and to keep the influence of rivals like Iran and India weak in Afghanistan.

The Iraq Blunder

Building an Afghan nation was already impossible, but it was more than impossible by the diversion of resources toward Iraq, starting as early as the autumn of 2002.

Why, we must ask, did the intelligence community see Saddam as such a vital target? The Arab socialist dictator was no natural ally of al-Qaeda. He held many of their operatives in prison, and tortured them. Even still, the US administration managed to convince itself of a connection between the two.

At the time, terrorism concerns focused on state sponsors or state-like sponsors of terrorism: Libya, Iran, Pakistan and the Palestine Liberation Organization. US intelligence failed to recognize that al-Qaeda was a new type of threat, searching instead for a state as a culprit.

While Saddam had occasionally allowed terrorist factions to operate in Iraq, there was no evidence of coordination between the Ba’athist government and al-Qaeda’s high command. US intelligence officials mistakenly made the connection between Iraq and Afghanistan and neoconservative ideologues seized up this assessment. Ironically, this connection became reality when the US roped both unrelated wars into a single “Global War on Terror.”

American leadership did indeed have valid concerns that Saddam, who had previously pursued nuclear weapons, might seek them again and potentially use nuclear or biological weapons against Israel. The administration perceived Israel as an island of democracy, which America had a sacred duty to defend. Beyond security concerns, though, neoconservative elites in Washington saw Iraq as an opportunity to create an Arab democracy that would reshape the Middle East. As per their utopian vision, Iraq would serve as a beacon of democracy and, quite implausibly, as an example to Iran of what happens when a regime goes too far. In the end, the Iraq that emerged was much more amenable to the Islamic Republic’s interests than Iraq of Saddam Hussein. The Shias in Iraq are now under Tehran’s influence.

US leadership was mistaken on many points, but it was not simply irrational. The threat posed by international terrorism was real, and Americans had died. Perhaps, though, a more targeted, counterterrorism approach carried out by intelligence operatives and special operations teams might have better served the US administration. Washington needed a scalpel instead of a sledgehammer.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The G7 did indeed dedicate a to Afghanistan, and the parties agreed in condemning the Taliban’s suppression of fundamental rights. However, it could not be more of an understatement to say that the G7’s response to the Afghan crisis could have been more assertive. Alongside their critique of the Taliban’s conduct, the G7 also underscored a need to maintain continuous and direct dialogue with them, balancing its condemnation with engagement. This was an attempt to reflect the complexity of the international response required in this volatile situation, but it raises questions about the commitment of the international community to the well-being of the Afghan people.

Condemnations without action

The G7’s first perspective reflects the G7’s commitment to uphold the international order based on the rule of law. This commitment is paramount in resisting unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, as exemplified by ¸éłÜ˛ő˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s threat to use nuclear weapons. It should also be crucial in countering other forms of lawlessness that can destabilize the international order, such as those currently unfolding in Afghanistan.

Through addressing the issue of Afghanistan under Taliban rule, the G7 had a prime opportunity to manifest its resolute determination to repudiate such actions and uphold the rule of law. Afghanistan must transition from a Taliban regime imposed at the point of a sword to a representative, lawfully installed government, encompassing all echelons of Afghan society. Regrettably, the dialogue on strategic measures to aid this transition was bleak.

Does the Future Belong to the Taliban?

Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, the country has been plunged into a state of lawlessness that directly violates the principles upon which the international order stands. Reports of women being denied basic rights, minority groups facing persecution, and a lack of inclusivity in government structures are not only troubling but represent a blatant disregard for the rule of law. It was the responsibility of the G7 to stand united and address this crisis. Failure to act would not only compromise the credibility of the international order but also perpetuate the suffering of millions.

One of the most distressing consequences of the Taliban’s rule is the blatant violation of. For nearly two years, women and girls in Afghanistan have been denied access to education and basic freedoms. The implementation of a gender apartheid which confines women to their homes is a gross violation of human rights and a setback for gender equality worldwide. The Taliban’s actions demonstrate a clear and present danger to the international order, because lawlessness within a member of the international community can indeed become a new normal if left unchallenged.

The issued by the G7’s foreign ministers did voice a robust opposition against such repressive practices. However, it is insufficient for a multitude of reasons. While their vocal opposition to oppressive practices marks a positive first step, it is crucial that these words be underpinned by tangible actions and strategic policy initiatives that can catalyze substantial, meaningful change.

Furthermore, the G7’s primary focus on diplomatic endeavors and economic sanctions falls short of addressing the multifaceted challenges that Afghan women routinely face. In order to formulate a genuinely impactful response, it is imperative to incorporate an element of inclusivity, ensuring that the unique voices and perspectives of Afghan women are taken into account.

One Of The Taliban’s Monumental Ruins: Gender-Apartheid Policies

Only with a sustained, long-term commitment, bolstered by active collaboration with international organizations and a comprehensive strategy emphasizing the primacy of women’s rights and gender equality, can the G7 make significant strides in effectuating the deeply needed change in Afghanistan. This necessitates expanding the scope of their efforts beyond conventional diplomacy and sanctions, thereby unlocking the potential for transformative progress in this critical area.

The absence of an inclusive government in Afghanistan poses a significant challenge to stability and progress. A sustainable peace and future for the country can only be achieved through a government that represents the interests and aspirations of all Afghan citizens. The G7, as a collective voice of influential nations, could have exerted pressure on the Taliban to foster inclusivity and ensure that minority rights are respected and protected. Unfortunately, the issued statement from the G7 does not live up to this vital mandate. The international community would do well to take a more assertive stance in advocating for a truly inclusive governance structure in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan issues placed on the sidelines

The second perspective emphasized the G7’s mission to strengthen outreach to the Global South. The group sought to demonstrate its contributions to the issues that concern these nations.

Afghanistan, as part of the Global South, is a test case for this commitment. The G7 had a moral responsibility to ensure that the plight of Afghans, especially the most vulnerable, is not ignored. However, the shift of attention towards the “Global South” was mainly aimed at the influence of Russian and China. Thus, only a limited number of nations within the Global South were invited, and unfortunately, this meant that the issue of Afghanistan received scant attention.

Addressing Afghanistan’s issues would not have been just about resolving a single country’s crisis, but about reaffirming the values that the G7 represents and that the world needs. It should have been about demonstrating that the international order, based on the rule of law, isn’t just a concept but a practice that can, and should, be upheld even in the most challenging situations.

As the host of the G7, Japan held a unique position to drive the agenda and focus attention on pressing global issues like the Afghanistan crisis, which impacts global security, precipitates a humanitarian crisis, and affects regional stability. Given its strategic location in Asia, Japan’s security interests could be influenced by instability in Afghanistan. Additionally, Japan’s historic role in fostering international cooperation could have been leveraged to unite G7 nations in advocating for an inclusive government in Afghanistan, ensuring the rights of all citizens are respected. Unfortunately, the latest G7 meeting overlooked this opportunity.

The G7, therefore, should have taken a more robust stance on the situation in Afghanistan. It was incumbent on the G7 to leverage its combined influence to push for the restoration of women’s rights, the establishment of a legitimate government, and the protection of minority rights. The G7’s statement seemed strong towards ensuring that girls and women are once again allowed to attend schools and colleges, but a statement alone is not much unless it is followed by action.

In summary, as we navigate these tumultuous times and upon the conclusion of the summit, it is imperative for the G7 to prove that the international order it upholds extends beyond the boundaries of its member states. It must demonstrate that its commitment to the rule of law and its outreach to the Global South are not just theoretical constructs, but actual policies that have meaningful, practical impacts. In doing so the powers will affirm their role as a beacon of hope and a pillar of stability in a world that desperately needs both.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Potential for Mediation in Afghanistan 

Afghanistan was once the venue for the . The British Empire and the Soviet Union jostled for influence here. Today, external articles are involved too. Pakistan, the US, India, Iran, Russia, Turkey, China and the EU are involved in one way or another in Afghanistan. There are many organizations, regions and ethnic groups jostling for power as well.

With so many actors in the conflict, Afghanistan needs a neutral mediator. In the past, the likes of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran have tried to mediate but failed because they were unable to remain neutral. Qatar, however, is a neutral player in Afghanistan and its efforts deserve a closer look. 

Complicated Past but Profitable Future

Earlier mediation efforts by Qatar did not prevent the Taliban’s dramatic takeover in Afghanistan but Qatar’s leverage is considerable. Economic factors, neutrality, security, branding, and friendly connections with conservative Islamists make Qatar uniquely positioned to be a successful mediator. 

In the last two decades, Qatar sought to make an impact on the international stage by playing mediation roles since it lacks political clout and military power. Accordingly, Qatar authorities have demonstrated an ability to perform third-party dispute settlements and have also proved themselves to be successful local and worldwide investors. Qatar’s economic success has made them a major player on the global energy scene, heightening their importance in the eyes of public and private sectors  around the world.

Qatar’s foreign policy aim is to position itself as the champion of Arab diplomacy in the Arab and Islamic world, particularly the Middle East. Doha, Qatar’s Capital, sees itself as a beneficent mediator in all disputes. In addition, Qatar is not a member of any group in the Afghanistan conflict. This implies that Doha has no commercial ties to the Afghanistan war, which has earned Qatar the trust of other prominent actors in the conflict. 

Qatar has been heavily engaged in Afghanistan in recent years, using its advantage of historical experience to position itself as a key participant in several mediation procedures. They also established a modality for dispute resolution, which is called the Qatari Model of Conflict Resolution (QMCR). It is through this model that Doha has engaged in different conflict resolution processes in Middle Eastern and North African nations—as well as in the failed Afghanistan peace process.

Even though Qatar’s goal of ending the Afghanistan conflict has not yet been achieved, there is still potential that Doha can be successful in mediation efforts to resolve the newest phase of the crisis in Afghanistan.

A Breakthrough Plan for Qatar

The following seven steps can help Doha achieve success in ending the half-century conflict in Afghanistan. 

Step 1: The most important reason for Doha’s advantage in the Afghanistan peace process is Qatar hosting the Taliban. Many of the group’s leaders have lived in Qatar over the last 20 years and the group’s political office has long operated out of the country.

However, this could raise concerns about partiality and Qatar’s role in the conflict since the Taliban is an extremist and terrorist group. Therefore, Qatar should work to assure the people of Afghanistan and anti-Taliban groups of its intention to support a secure Afghanistan and to adopt an inclusive citizen-oriented democratic set-up. Qatar should open offices of the Taliban’s oppositions abroad, particularly an office for the National Resistance Front in Doha. This would lay the groundwork for building trust and direct talks between the conflicting factions.

Step 2: The nature of hostilities varies by location. Afghanistan’s history, culture, identity, and narratives are distinctly different from those of the Arab world, like Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Sudan. The lack of a clear definition of the relationships among ethnic groups and an effective government structure has caused the crisis to be extended. Therefore, mediation to define a social contract and build trust among the leaders, elites and intellectuals of Afghanistan will help solve the ongoing crisis. 

Step 3:  Doha has often used a checkbook approach, or financial leverage, during mediations. However, this is a potential challenge in the Afghanistan context. Doha’s financial assistance to the Taliban and the republic government often resulted in a short-term or shaky peace, like the temporary in 2020. However, Qatar’s leadership can use its clout to join the US and NATO as a hard leveraging factor through likely military means, alongside checkbooks. To mediate, a combination of financial and military leverage is required in Afghanistan given the Taliban’s ideological and rejectionist nature. 

Step 4: Since , US representatives have visited the Taliban in their Qatar headquarters, but the Qatari government has attempted to keep these visits private to the public. Doha thought it could break the ice between the Taliban and the USA by not publicly revealing the agenda or the significance of the meetings. However, Qatar’s covert approach to talking to the Taliban resulted in a lack of trust in Doha in parts of Afghanistan and anti-Taliban organizations. Therefore, Qatar should begin open negotiations instead.

Step 5: Since Doha’s aim is to bring all stakeholders to the table, the Qatari government should also use the QMCR approach both in and outside Afghanistan. For example, Doha even attempted to bring Iran and US officials to the table to talk about Iran’s nuclear .

Step 6: The QMCR model also faces challenges because of criticisms of Qatar’s approach to Afghanistan society. Many feel that Qatar has closer ties to Pashtunwali and the Taliban than the Persianized Tajiks because of Qatar’s allegiance to Salafi and Deobandi Orthodoxy. Some in Afghanistan also believe that Doha’s foreign policy strengthened the Taliban. To distinguish Qatar as a neutral player, it must gain the trust of its critics.  To do this, Qatar must be sensitive to the complexities of the socio-political fabric of Afghanistan. This is vital for ending the Afghanistan conflict.

Step 7: Qatar can also forestall future conflict in the new Taliban-led Afghanistan. This entails building trust between conflicted parties, which Doha must understand cannot be done overnight. QMCR’s major priority should be to reduce conflict between the National Resistance Forces, other anti-Taliban fighters, and the Taliban in various districts of Afghanistan.

The Best Way Forward 

Considering the half-century conflict in Afghanistan has domestic and international dimensions, Qatar has the opportunity to play an effective role as a powerful mediator. This can bring major achievements for Afghanistan, but also for Qatar’s foreign policy interests.

Qatar has projected its mediation capacities as part of its foreign policy brand, but its mediation efforts in international diplomacy have largely been unsuccessful. Establishing lasting peace is not only  important to end this  long-term crisis in Afghanistan, but Qatar can regain its reputation as a successful mediator.

Ultimately, the Qatar conflict resolution model must make adjustments while retaining its core principles. If the government of Qatar adopts this new approach to this complex crisis, it stands a strong chance of success.

[edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In March 2021, the Kamal Khan Dam finally after years of setback on the lower Helmand. Naturally, it was met with animus in Iran. In 1973, the two signed the . The agreement guaranteed Iran with a monthly allocation of water from the river. But Tehran insists that its neighbor has consistently failed to hold its end of the deal.

According to Kabul, the dam was built to solve many of the region’s vast infrastructural and agricultural challenges, such as providing in the Nimruz Province with a steady supply of water and electricity. However, Tehran has attempted to halt its construction for years, maintaining that it would interrupt the water supply that feeds the Hamoun wetlands. 

The Destiny of Pakistan’s Totalitarian Proxy Regime in Afghanistan

At the inauguration, former President Ashraf Gani , “Afghanistan would no longer give free water to anyone, so Iran should provide fuel to Afghans in exchange for water.” Not long after, the country came under the control of the Taliban. 

In late , Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned his counterpart, Afghanistan’s Amir Khan Muttaqi, that prohibiting Tehran from its rightful access to the Helmand River will only cause further strain to an already splintered relationship. President Ebrahim Raisi, too, urged serious action. 

This article will attempt to address the following question: Is Afghanistan legally permitted to divert the natural course of the Helmand River? Before we begin, let’s underscore the key elements of this bilateral accord.

An Overview of the Helmand River Treaty

According to the Helmand River Treaty of 1973, Afghanistan must deliver water from the Helmand River to Iran at a rate of 22 cubic meters per second per annum (normal water year) with an additional four cubic meters per second for “goodwill and brotherly relations.” This would supply Iran with an annual average of 556,000 acre-feet or 820 million cubic meters under normal conditions. 

But although the treaty guarantees Iran’s access to the Helmand River, Article V gives Afghanistan full rights to the remaining water supply. Article V begins by stipulating Iran’s rightful allocation as specified in the previous articles. However, it continues by stating that Afghanistan, “shall retain all rights to the balance of the water of the Helmand River and may make such use or disposition of the water as it chooses.” 

Afghanistan Is Losing Faith in the Taliban

The final paragraph of the article emphasizes that Iran is only entitled to the specified amount of water agreed upon, irrespective if  “additional amounts of water may be available” and “be put to beneficial use.” 

Thus, Afghanistan unequivocally has unilateral rights over the remaining water supply of the Helmand River. This means that it has the power to implement agricultural, hydroelectric, and reservoir projects as it sees fit. 

Afghanistan’s sole responsibility is not to pollute the water or take any action that will deprive Iran of its water right entirely or partially. Article V must be read along with Article II (Iran water rights), III (monthly distribution), and IV (i.e., climate change). An argument based on the first paragraph of Article V without considering the context of the treaty and its other provisions will end in unreasonable conclusions.

No Harm, No Foul

That the Helmand River Treaty permits Afghanistan the right to pursue developmental projects over the remaining waters is incontrovertible. However, the question remains whether the development of dams or canals is permissible under customary international law. 

Under the Taliban, Afghanistan’s Madrassas Increase and Harbor Terrorists

The Helmand River is considered to be an international or transboundary watercourse. The two neighbors are therefore legally obligated to share the river’s waters. The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and the no-harm rule is regarded as the cornerstones of international water law and were included in the UN Watercourse Convention in . 

According to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, all states are obligated to “use an international watercourse in a manner that is equitable and reasonable vis-a-vis other states sharing the watercourse.” The no-harm requires states not to cause significant harm to other states. More precisely, “ countries should not use their territorial waters in ways that cause damage and undesirable impact to downstream co-riparian countries.”

Indeed, states have an equal right to an equitable share of a shared river. But the term “equitable” must not be confused with “equal.” Every state has the right to use water equitably but is not entitled to an equal share of the water. Therefore, under customary international law, it is permissible for Afghanistan to develop projects on the Helmand River, so long as they do not cause significant environmental damage to its neighbor. 

It should be stated that without clearly understanding the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, any activity will be deemed a violation. Such astrict is neither supported by state practice nor by case law.

Appeal to the UN to Protect Hazaras in Afghanistan

To conclude, neither the Helmand River Treaty nor customary international law denies Afghanistan the right to construct Kamal Khan Dam. It is not a violation of the two aforementioned components of international law. Instead, the Helmand river treaty gives Afghanistan an absolute right to use the remaining water of the Helmand River as it chooses.

What Needs to be Done?

Clearly, the passage of the Helmand River Treaty in 1973, has not led to any peaceful resolution between Iran and Afghanistan. The terms of the agreement have repeatedly been violated, according to Tehran. But Kabul has always insisted that these claims are baseless. 

Iran has complained before that the proper allocation of water was not delivered to them. But these complaints were made at a time when the Helmand River Basin was under drought which severely reduced the river’s water flow. Nonetheless, this must be addressed.

Before, the construction of Kamal Khan Dam, Iran wasn’t ready at all to build these three joint hydrometric stations. It was only agreed upon in the 21st meeting of commissioners (October 2019) when Afghanistan was about to inaugurate Kamal Khan Dam. Kamal Khan Dam is a regulatory dam that diverts/regulate the water of the Helmand river. Before the construction of the Kamal Khan Dam, the water of the Helmand river was flowing to Iran uninterrupted.

To solve this impasse, Afghanistan and Iran must: jointly determine places of delivery and construct joint hydrometric stations as defined under Article III of the treaty. Joint hydrometric stations will settle the issue of the amount of water that is required to be delivered to Iran. Each issue has been addressed by the Helmand River Commissioners who’ve convened at least twenty-five times in the past 20 years.Ěý

Iran has always been against the building of joint hydrometric stations. The reason is that Iran had been receiving more water during normal and above-normal water years. The construction of joint hydrometric stations would regulate their water share more strictly.

An agreement was reached to build joint hydrometric stations in the 21st meeting of the Joint Committee of Commissioners of Helmand River. However, it remains only on paper. Similarly, in August 2022, Afghanistan and Iran again agreed to a timeline for the construction of joint hydrometric stations. But experience shows that it will take years to complete.

In the meantime, Iran should stop digging wells and installing heavy-duty water pumps along the river. Iran has expanded its irrigation and installed pumps through which it diverts 26 million cubic water annually to Zahedan. Such projects will only increase Iran’s water demand. Furthermore, Afghanistan should register the Gowd-e-Zera lake as an international wetland as it is considered to be a part of the Hamouns. [Naveed Ahsan edited this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Iran-Afghanistan Tensions Now Rising Over Water appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The term hegemony of masculinity, which was first used by , describes the social hierarchy that tends to validate the superiority of masculinity over feminine, and is founded on historical precedent or adheres to societal norms. It defines a male-dominated social structure that denies females with feminine traits the right to participate in public life. Tragically, this hegemony leads to a heteronormative social structure and the predominance of heterosexism in Islamic doctrines.

The Destiny of Pakistan’s Totalitarian Proxy Regime in Afghanistan

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The political discriminatory ideologies of apartheid have been widely employed in several fields of social science ever since first articulated it. is the systematic discrimination of individuals based on whether they were born a man or a woman. Gender-apartheid and the term sexism are connected through historical and cultural roots, which are still tangible in the modern world. 

With six sections and 30 articles, the UN General Assembly approved the on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1979. This treaty emphasizes and puts into practice the rights of women and girls around the world. It protects them in areas like discrimination, policy measures, the defense of fundamental freedoms and rights, sex-role stereotyping and prejudice, prostitution, political and public life, representation, nationality, education, employment, health, economic and social benefits, law, marriage, and family life. It has since been ratified and adopted by one hundred eighty nine states. However, despite having the pact in 1980, gender discrimination still exists in Afghanistan under the Taliban’s rule.

The Taliban runs a de facto government that is not officially recognized. They are centered on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, and have close ties to the terrorist group . On August 15, 2021, the Taliban took back , and since then they have ruled Afghanistan with an Islamic system based on the Deobandi school. The Taliban progressively began to implement their ideologically-based teachings throughout the nation; among them, the Taliban are passing anti-feminine legislation and marketing them as Islamic teachings through their media apparatus. Their curriculum is dominated by masculinity and violates the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

The Taliban’s Motivation

In the 1948 , the UN lists the right to an education as one of the most important human rights. This is a cosmic and global right, not one that is exclusive to a place or location. Everyone is entitled to a high-quality education, regardless of their race, color, ethnicity, country, or gender. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes the value of education, which includes tolerance, community, and mutual understanding among all people, as well as the right to be educated.

Afghanistan Is Losing Faith in the Taliban

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In opposition to international values, the Taliban regime has denied Afghan girls and women the chance to enroll in schools and institutions. The Taliban government may be utilizing the education of Afghan women as a tool to pressure Western democracies to embrace them. However, It is evident that nothing has changed to date, despite the fact that sanctions against the Taliban’s administration have gotten tougher.

Under the Taliban government, women no longer play an active part in society. At the cabinet, provincial, or municipal levels, no women have been appointed by the Taliban. In actuality, the Taliban rule has usurped the social lives of women and, by relegating them to the private sphere, has diminished their stature. The Taliban regime’s workforce is patriarchal and sexist in this sense. It might be argued that patriarchy has a significant impact on the Taliban’s administrative structure.

The Taliban bureaucratic system’s gender-centricity cannot be boiled down to a call for recognition. In fact, one of the tenets of the Deobandi school, which forms the Taliban ideology, values that the public sphere should be gender-centric. As a phenomenon, work is considered to be man-centered. The that permits women to work in a setting where there is no chance for conversation with males is the only area where the Deobandi school has shown flexibility so far on women’s right to employment. According to this, the Taliban’s manifesto has a clause that is said to support the barring of women from bureaucratic roles.

Consequences of Gender Apartheid Policies

The Taliban’s anti-women policies diminish the idea of women as fully human beings. Women are denied citizenship rights and are not regarded as social contract signatories under this system. Due to the Taliban regime’s treatment of women, Afghan society has regressed both politically and economically. A political setback is the absence of women in the public sphere, the centralization of Afghan bureaucracy, and its concentration on the position of the man as well as the political exclusion of women from these positions.

Women have less economic influence under the Taliban government. The Taliban system makes women into workers with very low human capital, little incomes, and limited opportunities for growth in the workplace by denying them the access to study. Women who work as men’s employees won’t advance because they lack the capacity to handle affairs. On the one hand, this economic paralysis of women contributes to the inefficiency of half the people of the society, and on the other, it causes the economic paralysis of the entire nation.The Taliban administration imposed gender segregation and patriarchal control on Afghan society by defining women in the private sphere. Afghanistan’s radicalization eventually will only lead to disaster and the emergence of a radical generation. [ edited this article]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post One Of The Taliban’s Monumental Ruins: Gender-Apartheid Policies appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The Taliban is largely considered a pariah by the international community. No country has officially recognized the Islamic Emirate as the legitimate Afghan government or normalized diplomatic relations with it. As the Taliban seek solutions to its severe credibility problem, the group is largely out of touch with the basic needs of the Afghans. The country is still riddled with major problems: half of its population are on the brink of and terrorist attacks targeting as well as minorities are a regular occurrence.

Balancing past and present

Since the capture of Kabul, the Taliban to win some credibility on the international stage by presenting itself as the only force capable of stabilizing and uniting Afghanistan after twenty years of civil conflict. This is an old narrative that the radical group promoted when they first rose to power in 1996.

The Destiny of Pakistan’s Totalitarian Proxy Regime in Afghanistan

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However, since a mere dusting operation of the old playbook is unlikely to work in the current circumstances, the Taliban has signaled an interest in doing things differently this time. Its foreign policy outlook seems to fall somewhere between abiding by and shaping.

The Taliban still sticks to the idea of isolating  Afghanistan at a global level. The leadership believes the country’s detachment is a viable tool to preserve the regime’s stability and longevity. 

In its previous ruling experience, the Taliban had limited, rudimental knowledge of international politics and showed minimal interest in establishing basic diplomatic relations with external actors. Their victory over the Afghan regular forces and the experience of dealing on an equal footing with the US in the Doha talks have further emboldened the regime.

However, although the Taliban aims to continue its isolationism, the trauma of the regime’s fall in 2001 and the two-decade-long foreign occupation afterwards have prompted them to evaluate alternative strategies for its agenda. 

Afghanistan Is Losing Faith in the Taliban

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For over twenty years, the Taliban has sought a comeback, and now that the Islamic Emirate is in place again the radical group is determined to prevent a second overthrow. Recent events demonstrate a more mature, pragmatic foreign policy and one that makes greater use of diplomacy.

Back to the drawing board

Since Kabul’s takeover, the Islamic Emirate has sought to cultivate with several state and non-state actors. High-ranking figures in the Taliban hierarchy – the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Maulvi Amir Khan Muttaqi and the acting Deputy Foreign Ministry Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai – are a few examples. 

Aside from meetings with foreign state officials, the Taliban has also been in dialogue with prominent humanitarian agencies. Most recently, the Taliban held talks with the Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, and the Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegation in Afghanistan Eloi Fillion.

There is a two-pronged goal for these engagements: cleansing the Taliban’s tarnished image while building diplomatic credibility. 

First, the radical group seeks to draw a wedge between itself and the widespread perception of the Taliban as a movement driven by an uncompromising, strict Islamic morale. Second, the Taliban aims to secure diplomatic capital and gain political legitimacy in the global arena. 

Under the Taliban, Afghanistan’s Madrassas Increase and Harbor Terrorists

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The Taliban aims to reshape its former image as a violent and extremist regime.By publicly displaying its willingness to play by the rules, the Taliban attempts to cast itself as a trustworthy partner in the eyes of the international community.

While it remains to be seen whether these efforts stem from a genuine spirit of cooperation or a pragmatic calculus, it is undeniable that the Taliban’s diplomatic campaign has improved their international standing..  If successful, the group could be endowed with a number of high-priced gains. Gaining control over the overseas frozen Afghan assets and securing full travel mobility for senior Taliban figures are among the most sought-after rewards.

Until September 2022, the bulk of the reserves of Afghanistan’s Central Bank –$7 billion – were detained by the US-based financial institutions. Then, Washington half of the frozen Afghan assets to a joint Swiss-Afghan trust fund, known as the Afghan Fund 

The fund was designed to support Afghanistan’s Central Bank and is inaccessible to the Taliban . However, chances to funnel funds into Afghanistan while eluding the Taliban’s oversight look grim. As Graeme Smith, a Senior Consultant at the International Crisis Group, “the Taliban have proven they will block efforts to circumvent their government, and aid experts warn that parallel structures cannot substitute for Afghan state institutions.”

Appeal to the UN to Protect Hazaras in Afghanistan

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The freezing of funds, the weapons embargos, and the UN travel ban on dozens of Taliban officials are among the longest-running measures to keep a lid on the group. Travelwaivers were occasionally  approved to allow the participation of high-profile Taliban representatives in third-country forums

Thelack of on the terms for extending the travel ban exemption for 13 Taliban officials led to its suspension. Whether the UN will  use thetravel to coax the regime into making  meaningful concessions remains an open question. Although the Taliban has e shown strong resilience against pressures to compromise, their ambition to continue  its diplomatic machine maybe a cause for change.

The moment of truth on the horizon

While the Taliban has made some impressive gains, the Afghan political landscape still remains in flux. The Taliban neither exercise capillary control across all the rural districts nor do they have a monopoly of power over the different non-Pashtun ethnic groups. 

Pockets of resistance scattered across the country continueto the Taliban’s rule. Ejections of local leaders who bandwagoned with the Taliban in their rise to power are becoming more frequent. The result is a gradual weakening of the radical group’s clout and a thinning of its ranks. However, although some cracks are opening from within, they still the most powerful actor on the ground.

The Taliban-Occupied Afghanistan Threatens Global Security

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Nations around the world still look at the Taliban with skepticism, but the pragmatic needs to prevent Afghanistan from becoming once again a sanctuary for international terrorism, to keep a lid on the drugs trade, and to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people have turned the Taliban into a near-indispensable actor. The radical group banks on the fact that no matter its status within  the international community, regional and global powers will continue to seek its cooperation to tackle these pressing security concerns.

However, two main problems remain. First, the Taliban have taken few steps in managing the country’s serious security concerns. Its verbal assurance still rings hollow and the same pathologies that tainted its past rule – such as targeted killings of Tajiks and Hazara, enforced disappearing, and extortion practices – seem to be present today. As the UN recently, the Afghan humanitarian condition looks grim and the Taliban struggles to meet basic international standards for human rights and respect for minority groups. 

Second, the Taliban’s endgame is quite elusive. While it seeks to legitimize its leadership by adopting state-resembling rhetoric and posture, the regime’s long-term ambitions and foreign policy trajectories remain hard to predict.

Although it is debatable if the latest developments reflect agenuine or , the Taliban is determined to do whatever it takes to prevent its brand-new regime from experiencing a second failure. The old playbook based on neutrality and balancing posture remains the bedrock of the Taliban’s foreign policy compass, especially when it comes to fending off the pressure of external forces. 

However, acknowledging the vast costs of diplomatic isolationism has prompted the radical group to do things differently this time and to seek minimal approval from foreign observers. While it is too early to tell if the Taliban’s recalibration will help the regime’s credibility, it is clear that it is capable of adjusting its foreign policy outlook to serve its evolving strategic interests better.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Toward a New Foreign Policy for the Taliban? A Timid Thaw in the Afghan Great Cold appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The Taliban is the product of Pakistan’s proxy wars driven by ideology. Thousands of religious madrassas that have taught millions promote extremism and violence. Their was developed in the 1980s for the mujahideen to unleash violence on Soviet troops. As is well known, the US and Saudi Arabia supported the mujahideen during the Cold War. In fact, hardline Saudi Wahhabi ideology deeply influenced the madrassas, the mujahideen and the Taliban.

When the US decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, the government collapsed and the Pashtun-led Taliban took over. Much of the world was stunned by this speedy takeover. Pakistan was the only major actor prepared for this development. Note that the Taliban  took over on August 15, 2021 and, as early as September 4, Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, the chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),was in . Hameed helped settle the Taliban’s internal disputes and paved the path for a caretaker government.

The same thing but different context

In many ways, the Taliban’s victory is a repetition of Afghanistan’s history. The 2020 US-Taliban deal was consistent with the 1988 Afghanistan-Pakistan Geneva Accords. That deal paved the way for the Soviet withdrawal and, subsequently, the collapse of the Afghan government.  For many Afghanistan experts, the US “peace” negotiation with the Taliban was a “” process.

Afghanistan’s government was excluded from the 2020 deal. The US made a deal with a misogynistic, ethnonationalist, fundamentalist terrorist organization and abandoned the democratically elected government. This led to its speedy collapse.

Once the Taliban took over Kabul, they captured all the institutions of the state that had been built over 20 years since 2001. The previous Taliban regime fell because the US intervened after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Now, the Taliban are back and they have captured billions of dollars worth of US military equipment, which they are using to consolidate their power.

Although there is uncertainty in the region concerning the Taliban’s future, regional players, such as Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and China, have adopted a strategy of .  The Taliban also control all sources of the country’s income, which sustains their forces and protects their regime.

Contrary to the rhetoric and promises of the so-called Taliban 2.0, they have been pursuing the same brutal policies that characterized their reign in the 1990s. Extrajudicial killings, ethnic cleansing, discrimination against women and other oppressive measures are back. They have trampled civil society and lack political legitimacy.

The Talibanization of Afghanistan’s society is proceeding swiftly. They are building thousands of madrassas to promote their radical ideology. They have banned schools for girls, changed the education curriculum and impose their radical interpretations of Islam upon an ethnically diverse nation.

The Taliban have also maintained their relationship with terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. The killing of Aiman al-Zawahiri by the US on July 31, 2022 in Kabul demonstrates that the Taliban is still harboring top leaders of al-Qaeda and is a haven for terrorists.

Brutal repression, little legitimacy

The Taliban have imposed a primitive totalitarian regime on a diverse country. They have failed to create a formal political process or a vision for the country. Instead, the Taliban have used violence, rural Pashtun tribalism and hardline Islamic Sharia law on ethnic groups with very different cultures. They are marginalizing and often killing non-Pashtuns, particularly the Shia Hazaras.

Pashtuns are now in-charge of areas. Naturally, the Hazaras feel their homeland has been occupied. The Taliban have also changed signs in universities from Farsi to Pashto even in Persian-speaking areas such as Balkh in the north. Signs outside ministries are also in . Naturally, non-Pashtuns are not pleased.

The Taliban’s policy toward women is extremely harsh. They have re-instituted their “,” decimating existing women’s rights, such as their right to travel, work, education, and participate in public life. Torture and extra-judicial killings are now common practice.

The Taliban’s highly centralized model of governance does not, cannot and will not function well. Once, Afghanistan’s kings had the mandate to control the country on behalf of a colonial power through a highly centralized system. This history created a highly centralized model of governance and fostered a psychology of ethnic domination within the Pashtun elites. The Taliban are deeply committed to this model.  

This centralized model has taken a hit. Both during the Soviet occupation and the 20-year democratic experiment, concentration of power abated. Unsurprisingly, the anti-Taliban fronts are calling for a decentralized political setup. Centralization is associated with brutality, dysfunction, and a crisis of legitimacy. The current centralization is no different. It is brutal, violent and oppressive.

The Taliban rejects elections and rules the countrywithout any formally-defined or system of checks and balances. There are no political processes that establish legitimacy. Most of the Taliban leaders and commanders are not familiar with Afghan society, and they cannot speak Persian, the lingua franca of the country.

The Taliban has also failed to behave like a normal state at the international level. No country has recognized them even when they are compelled to interact with the Taliban. Even did not recognize them unilaterally. Their links with terrorist groups have been an added concern.

It seems unlikely that the Taliban should succeed in the long term. Their Pashtun ethnonationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, violent oppression and extreme centralization does not work in multiethnic Afghanistan. As proxies of Pakistan, the Taliban do not even command legitimacy among all Pashtuns.

More war and the danger of mass atrocities

The situation in Afghanistan is moving towards another round of conflict. The people are finally rising up against the brutal regime. In recent months, an insurrection is in the north. The Taliban is crushing this with its customary savagery. The international community has largely overlooked in the north but resistance is strengthening.

In the online sphere, the “#StopHazaraGenocide” has been tweeted more than 17 million times and sparked protests in cities around the world, which shows that the Taliban failed to provide security. As continue, so do protests. Women are protesting too.  Hundreds of them have taken to the streets in the provinces of Kabul, Balkh, Bamiyan, Herat and Ghazni since the return of the Taliban to power but were repressed by the Taliban.

Given rising protests, the Taliban are likely to find it difficult to rule. To support the people, the international community must systematically monitor and document violence in Afghanistan. The Security Council and the Human Rights Council at the UN have a critical role to play. Overlooking the Taliban’s violence and building relationships with them is a bad idea. It sends a signal that they can continue their repressive rule. The international community must put pressure on the Taliban to to stop human rights violations, recommence girls education, and conduct political dialogue with other ethnicities, groups and stakeholders. If the international community fails to act, there will be even more death and suffering in Afghanistan.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Destiny of Pakistan’s Totalitarian Proxy Regime in Afghanistan appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Recent developments seem undesirable for the Pakistani establishment, which had high hopes for a negotiated settlement between Islamabad and the TTP. After two rounds of official negotiations, Pakistan seems to be opting for a military solution. In April 2022, the Pakistani military carried out a against TTP hideouts in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. As per the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) representative, these killed 20 children and 47 civilians. Tweets by the UNICEF representative caused in western capitals because sleeping children died.

It seems that what appeared a victory last year is turning out to be a strategic blunder. Pakistan has empowered the Afghan Taliban and, in the process, the TTP as well. Now, how can Islamabad protect its security interests threatened by the TTP? Can Pakistan counter the strategic insecurity emanating from its western client state led by its protégé, the Taliban?

Peace Talks Do Not Promise Long Term Peace

As per Atul Singh and Tabish Forugh, “the Taliban provide inspiration, ideology, organization, support, and expertise to Islamic fundamentalists from around the world and especially in South Asia.” The TTP is a more extreme version of the Taliban. Inspired by their cousins in Afghanistan, the TTP wants to establish a similar fundamentalist Islamist form of governance in the tribal areas across the border in Pakistan. Recently, it has unleashed attacks on Pakistani cities and towns.

The Taliban-Occupied Afghanistan Threatens Global Security

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This was to be expected. The TTP has the support of the Taliban. The two organizations share the same extremist ideology and have similar long term goals. The TTP has become very active this year. On April 2, it kicked off , an offensive that will include “martyrdom attacks, ambushes, bombings, counter-attacks, targeted attacks, laser and sniper attacks.”

Pakistan has responded both militarily and diplomatically. On May 9, a Pakistani arrived in Kabul to have talks with the TTP leadership. It was the third attempt by Pakistan’s leadership to negotiate with the TTP. The Pakistani side was led by Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed who spoke directly with Noor Wali Mehsood, the TTP chief. These talks were mediated by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s Acting Interior Minister and the leader of the Haqqani Network. Haqqani has long been a close Pakistani ally.

The talks were a protracted affair. The parties took a break and reconvened. On May 18, they announced a ceasefire. The TTP promised to halt its attacks on Pakistani soil while Islamabad released 30 high-level TTP from its prisons. 

For all these tangible results, most analysts take the view that these talks are unlikely to lead to long term peace. Both sides have such contradictory long term goals that it is just a matter of time before dissolve into conflict.

Implications for the US and India

The US is now focused on Ukraine. It has abandoned Afghanistan and taken its eye off the security situation in South Asia. The Taliban is now supporting terror groups with similar extremist Islamist ideology. One of them is its old ally, . As per the UN Sanction Monitoring Team Report, al-Qaeda operatives have already found safe havens and have started bases in Afghanistan.

The US must recalibrate its Afghanistan policy given the increased terror activity in the region. The TTP and al-Qaeda represent the tip of the iceberg. The Taliban is likely to export terror first to Central and South Asia, and then to Europe and the US itself. 

As a non-Muslim nation, India ranks high as a target for Islamists. A nation of kafirs is always a good target for jihad. For centuries, Pashtun tribesmen swept down from their mountain strongholds to raid the plains for gold and women in wave after wave of jihad. Therefore, India has to form a more robust policy vis-Ă -vis Afghanistan. Already, there have been in Kabul but India needs to have clarity about its long term strategic goals.

Pakistan now has a client regime in Afghanistan. However, it faces a TTP problem. Also, the Taliban itself is divided. Islamabad does not have it all its own way. Furthermore, the Hazaras face violent persecution, if not ethnic cleansing and genocide. The Tajiks are also being hunted down. Both the US and India can play a major role in supporting persecuted groups and containing the Taliban as well as its extremist jihadi allies.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Has Pakistan Made a Strategic Blunder By Backing The Taliban in Afghanistan? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In March 2022, the two leaders met for the first time in Kandahar, the traditional hub for the Taliban. Today, the Haqqanis and Kandaharis are jostling for pole position. Unknown to most outside Afghanistan, these two factions have irreconcilable political agendas rooted in two mutually exclusive interpretations of Islamic governance. Both timeworn interpretations have their fanatical adherents, which makes not only compromise but also dialogue difficult.

The Haqqanis see their leader as a caliph. Hence they have given him the title of khalifa. The Kandaharis refer to their boss as the leader of the faithful. Hence, he goes by the title amir al-mu’minin. This seemingly minor difference in their titles is a big deal. The Haqqanis are universalists who see their big boss as a potential, if not real, leader of all Muslims. The Kandaharis are satisfied with creating a pure Islamic emirate in their region and do not have pretensions to world domination.

What Is the Significance of the Haqqani-Kandahari Meeting?

The meeting in Kandahar revealed that the Taliban’s factional politics had reached the point of no return. Unable to agree upon sharing power, a civil war between the Taliban factions is inevitable. Both camps are powerful enough to challenge the other’s ambition of dominating the national scene completely.

Interestingly, as the group continues to disappoint its regional backers, the chances of a foreign mediator settling the Taliban’s internal division are slim. Last September, Pakistan’s chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency traveled to Kabul to force Haqqanis and the Kandaharis to come to a power-sharing caretaker administration. Notably, the mediation of the ISI chief produced more division than harmony.

For now, it seems that the Taliban lacks political maturity and capacity to avert prolonged internal division. Given the structural and political differences of the caliphate and the emirate,  the future of Taliban governance depends on how the fight between the Kandahari and Haqqanis plays out.

What is an Emirate, What is a Caliphate and Why is it a Big Deal?

In Islamic political litreature amir al-mu’minin is a nominal title given to persons in command of particular aspects of Muslim affairs.  The caliph, however, is the title given to the Prophet’s successors. This leader is in control of the Islamic ummah’s political structure.

The amir al-mu’minin was first used to refer to the second Islamic caliph, Omar ibn al-Khattab. Prophet Mohammad’s successor and first caliph, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq, was not called amir al-mu’minin. The term caliph, khalifa in Arabic, is used to describe someone who is authorized by the majority of the Muslims as the successor of the Prophet and the four rightly guided caliphs: Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman, and Ali. Many Muslims believe that the administratiive and governance model in Medina under the first four successors of Prophet Mohammad, known as the Rashidun caliphs, put  Islam on the path to greatness and purity.

Historically, restoring the caliphate gained momentum among various Islamic movements in the early 20^th century following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In retrospect,  the nostalgia for reestablishing the caliphate emerged in response to political decay and civilizational degeneration in the Islamic world. Like any other Islamic religious concept, the difference between the amir and the caliph dates back to early periods of Islam.

Since the collapse of the Durrani Empire and the emergence of the modern state of Afghanistan in the late 19^th century, Pashtun tribal leaders and the monarchs have titled themselves as amirs. Amir Dost Mohammad Khan (1826–63), Amir Shir Ali Khan (1863 to 1879) and Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (1880–1901) are three famous examples.

Since the caliphate has a universal political and ideological implication, none of the rulers of Afghanistan dared to call themselves khalifa because the title would have implied being in charge of Muslim affairs across the Islamic world.When the Ottomans were around, this claim would have been challenged because the sultans in Istanbul were regarded as the rightful caliphs. In recent years, Saudi Arabia saw itself as the rightful leader of the Sunni Muslim world and Afghanistan’s leaders shied away from taking their patrons on.

What Lies Ahead for the Taliban?

According to Islamic historical references, the caliphate is a dynastic governing entity. The Haqqanis are aware of the historical connotations and political implications of calling their leader the khalifa or the caliph. In the Emirate of the Kandahari Taliban, power and leadership can be passed from one individual to another who satisfies their specifications. The Haqqanis do not meet them.

Given the history of rivalry between southern and eastern tribes of Afghanistan’s Pashtuns, the Haqqanis would never become amir al-mu’minins. The Kandahari Taliban rightly consider themselves as the founders of the emirate, leaving the Haqqanis with no option but to go rogue, declare a caliphate and claim the leadership of Islamic ummah.

As the Haqqanis consolidate power in Kabul, the structural and organizational distinctions between emirate and caliphate are useful to understand how the two factions of the Taliban will conduct themselves in Afghanistan, the region, and the world. They also help anticipate the different threats the world faces from various factions of the Taliban. 

The Kandahari-led Taliban are orthodox Hanafi Muslims with a tribal mentality whose ultimate aim is to establish an Islamic state in Afghanistan, dominated and governed by Pashtuns. The Haqqani group, on the other hand, follow a  transnational jihadist ideology. Its ultimate aim is to unify all Islamic movements under a single Islamic caliphate, a goal previously pursued by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The Haqqanis’ aspiration of establishing a caliphate is based on the resources and network they built during the anti-Soviet jihad project. Their base lies in the largely ungoverned territories on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. While the Haqqanis maintained symbiotic relations with the Kandahari Taliban throughout the so-called “Global War on Terror,” they used this time to build and deepen relationships with other Islamic militant groups in South Asia. Since the Haqqanis are in a position of power, the support they command in the region provides them with a comparative advantage vis-Ă -vis the Kandahari-led Taliban.

The pace at which Haqqanis are consolidating their power in Afghanistan makes it a matter of time before they become the dominant faction within the Taliban. Once that mission is accomplished, the Haqqanis will establish the Islamic Caliphate by Afghanistan as the capital and become the patron of all terrorist organizations worldwide. If history can tell us anything, any form of a Taliban-led and dominated government in Afghanistan threatens regional and global peace, and a caliphate led by the Haqqanis even more so.

(This article was edited by Contributing Editor Tabish Forugh.)

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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To: H.E. AntĂłnio Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General

CC:H.E. Ambassador Barbara Woodward, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN and President of United Nations Security Council

H.E. Ambassador Federico Villegas, Permanent Representative of Argentina and President of United Nations Human Rights Council

Excellencies,

We are writing this letter to express our grave concern about the escalation of violence targeting the Hazara Shia communities in Afghanistan. We are writing to demand your immediate action to address these targeted attacks, which can amount to crime against humanity, and when taken together, constitute an act of genocide. We believe the persistent and deliberate campaign of violence against the Shia Hazara community in Afghanistan requires an urgent and coordinated response by the United Nations and the international community.

On April 19, 2022, a high school and an education center in a Hazara neighborhood in West of Kabul, Afghanistan were bombed, killing and maiming scores of school children. The next day, an attack on a Shia Hazara mosque in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif was bombed, killing thirty one  and injuring eighty seven worshipers attending prayers during the holy month of Ramadan. Local reports, however, indicate a much higher level of casualties. Another mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif was also attacked on the same day and in the same manner, killing and injuring dozens. On April 28, two explosions targeting civilian mini-buses in Mazar-i-Sharif killed at least eleven and wounded at least eighteen Hazaras. On the same day, five Hazara miners traveling in a civilian passenger car were stopped and shot dead in Samangan province.

While terrorist attacks such as the last week’s horrific attacks on Sufi Mosques in Kunduz and Kabul provinces continue to affect civilians throughout Afghanistan, the attacks on Hazaras represent a pattern in recent years that target Hazara-Shia mosques, schools, education centers, public gatherings, sports clubs, public transports, and even maternity hospitals. In the first six months of 2021 UNAMA recorded 20 deliberate attacks against the Hazara ethnic group, resulting in around 500 civilian casualties. The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), an affiliate group of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), claimed responsibility for most attacks, including recent incidents in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, although perpetrators have not claimed responsibility for some attacks.

Residents, observers of Afghanistan, and international human rights groups have raised constant concern about such a growing trend of targeted violence against Hazaras. In October 2021, after a series of attacks on Shia Hazara mosques in Kunduz and Kandahar, that killed and wounded hundreds, Human Rights Watch characterized the attacks as “designed to spread terror and inflict maximum suffering, particularly on Afghanistan’s Hazara community.” The statement highlighted that “[t]he numerous attacks targeting Hazaras amount to crimes against humanity, and those responsible should be brought to justice.” 

In May 2021, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) called on the Afghan government and the international community to consider the Hazaras as a “population at risk of war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing or genocide”. In July 2021, Genocide Watch issued an emergency warning for Afghanistan, stating, “The Hazara religious minority is a portent of an approaching genocide.” In August 2021, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum issued a similar statement underlining the risk of genocide against Hazaras in Afghanistan.

Hazaras have a long history of persecution in Afghanistan at the hands of state and non-state actors such as the Taliban and other extremist groups. This history and recent events align with the warning factors of mass atrocity crimes that the United Nations identified in the 2014 Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes.

The return of the Taliban to power has made the Hazaras more vulnerable and subject to increased violence. On August 19, 2021, Amnesty International released a report documenting the Taliban’s targeted attacks against Hazaras and called the group responsible for the “brutal massacre of Hazara men” in Ghazni and Daykundi provinces. Since coming to power in August 2021, the Taliban forcibly removed hundreds of Hazara families from their homes and villages in Helmand, Uruzgan, Daykundi, and Balkh provinces. This is compounded by the Taliban history of brutality against the community, including massacring thousands of Hazaras in Mazar-i-Sharif (1998), Bamyan (2001), and Zabul (between 1996 and 2001).

In January 2022, following its report on Afghanistan, the UK Parliament’s House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations and Defence established a bi-cameral and cross-party inquiry team on the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The report stated that “The Hazaras have a long history of suffering state persecution on both ethnic and sectarian grounds.”

Following these most recent attacks targeting Hazaras in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, human rights groups and officials in the international community, including The UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan Richard Bennett, expressed concerns about these “targeted attacks on  Hazaras”, and called for “immediate investigation and accountability” to “end such human rights violations.” Similar statements of condemnation and calls for action have been made by special representatives and Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the EU, Sweden, Norway, and Canada. Afghanistan’s diplomatic missions to the UN and in many countries in Europe, North America, and South Asia also expressed concerns and demanded immediate international attention to attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructures in Afghanistan, particularly in Hazaras and Shia communities.

However, more must be done to protect the Hazaras in Afghanistan, especially by the United Nations. Thus, we, the undersigned group of intellectuals, academics, human rights, media, and civil society activists from Afghanistan and around the world, urge the United Nations to take immediate actions addressing human rights situation of the Hazaras in Afghanistan, and adopt appropriate measures to protect the community against risks of genocide and crimes against humanity. We urge you to:

• Call a special session of the United Nations Security Council to discuss, as matter of urgency, the situation of the Hazaras and adopt a resolution ensuring that the community will be protected against such heinous targeted attacks;
  
  
• Call for a special session of the United Nations Human Rights Council to discuss and address the ongoing genocidal attacks on Hazaras, and work to prevent such atrocities and bring the perpetrators to justice;
  
  
• Launch an immediate investigation into the targeted killing of the Hazara and Shias in Afghanistan, and use instruments under the international law to address and put an end to the perpetual killings of Hazaras;
  
  
• Request the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan to collect and publicize substantiated information relating to grave violations of international human rights law, including breaches of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide committed against the Hazaras;
  
  
• Request UNAMA and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan to submit a special report on the situation of Hazaras identifying urgent and practical measures to protect the community against targeted attacks and mass atrocities.

Sincerely,

1. Dr. , Former Chairperson of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
2. , Former Chairperson of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
3. Dr., Ambassador, Afghanistan Mission, Geneva,
4. , Charge d’Affaires, Afghanistan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York
5. Dr. Abbas Farasoo, University of Melbourne, Australia
6. Dr. , University of Pennsylvania, USA
7. Dr. , Sheffield University, UK
8. Dr. Dawood Rezai, Legal Scholar, Canada
9. Dr., University of Coimbra, Portugal
10. Dr. , Monash University, Australia
11. Dr. , Texas Christian University, USA
12. Dr. , Carleton University, Canada
13. Dr. Humaira May Rizayee, Hazara rights activist, UK
14. Dr., University College London, UK
15. Dr. , Lecturer & Fellow, Stanford University, USA
16. Dr. , Zayed University, UAE.
17. Dr. , La Trobe University, Australia
18. Dr. , University of Pittsburgh, USA
19. Dr. , American University of Afghanistan/University of Minnesota, USA
20. Dr. , Kanazawa University, Japan
21. Dr. , SOAS University of London, UK
22. Dr. , University of Ottawa, Canada
23. Dr. , Associate Fellow, London School of Economics, UK
24. , Journalist, UK
25. , PhD Candidate, Ryerson University, Canada
26. , Former Diplomat, USA
27. , University Lecturer, Canada
28. , Fellow, New York University, USA
29. , Attorney, USA
30. , Fellow, Yale University, USA
31. , PhD Candidate, Oxford University, UK
32. , PhD Candidate, Fiji National University, Fiji
33. , Chairman of Gilgamesh Foundation, Brussels
34. , Non-resident Fellow, New York University
35. , former diplomat, Canada
36. , Publisher and Founder, Hasht-e-Subh  Daily, Afghanistan
37. , Reagan-Fascell Fellow, National Endowment for Democracy, USA
38. , American University of Afghanistan/The New School, New York
39. Tabish Forugh, Democracy Activist and Contributing Editor at 51łÔąĎ, USA
40. , Human Rights Activist, Canada
41. , Publisher and Founder, Daily Etilaat-e- Roz, Afghanistan
42. , Former Diplomat of Afghanistan to the UN, USA.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In hindsight, this neglect of Afghanistan was unwise. It cost the US much blood and treasure. The Taliban emerged in the 1990s in Pakistan. It took over Afghanistan and ran a barbarous regime, stoning women to death and decapitating people in public. For a while, all these things seemed far away. That changed on 9/11. What happened in Afghanistan did not stay in Afghanistan. Those attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon still haunt the US.

History is repeating itself. Yet again, Europe is in turmoil. Conflict in Ukraine has proved all-absorbing for Washington. After 20 years, the Taliban are back in power in Afghanistan. They are battle-hardened, more resourceful and savvier than in their earlier avatar. They are no less dangerous though.

In much of the Islamic world, anti-American and anti-Western sentiment runs high. The Taliban are seen as the David that has brought down a Goliath. In Central and South Asia, the Taliban have particular appeal. A new generation of jihadists are looking to the Taliban for inspiration now that the Islamic State no longer has the same allure as it once did. Even as many countries engage with the Taliban, they present a growing threat to global security just as they did in the 1990s.

The Taliban Inspire Pakistan’s Terror Factories

In the eyes of fundamentalist Islamists, the Pashtun-led Taliban have a new halo. They are seen as successors of the mujahideen that brought the Soviet Union to its knees. Now, the Taliban have humbled none other than mighty Uncle Sam. They are Allah’s chosen soldiers, role models for terror groups around the world and especially in South Asia. 

Already, Pakistan is feeling the pain of creating a Frankenstein’s monster. The (TTP), an alliance of militant networks formed in 2007 and inspired by the Taliban, has been attacking Pakistani soldiers, policemen and civilians for a while. Most recently, they reportedly ambushed a military convoy near the Afghanistan border, killing Pakistani soldiers. In retaliation, the Pakistani military has carried out in eastern Afghanistan on what they deemed to be TTP sanctuaries. Witnesses say dozens of people, including women and children have died. Many more have been injured. Instead of solving the terror problem afflicting Pakistan, this will add fuel to the fire and provide the TTP with fresh recruits.

The Taliban Use Violence Against Women as a Bargaining Chip

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Pakistan finds itself in a bind. It has been running with the hares and hunting with the hounds for much too long. During the War on Terror, Pakistan sold itself to Washington as a partner, even if an unreliable one, that would contain terror in both Afghanistan and Pakistan that is often referred to as AfPak region. At the same time, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) kept supporting the Taliban and other anti-India jihadi groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba.

This double game along with the failure of the Pakistani state to provide basic services such as health and education has fostered a desperation among a fast-growing population. About of the population is under 30. , hardline Islamic schools, have stepped in to fill the void. About 17,000 of them provide free education to nearly two million students with even five-year-olds memorizing and reciting the Quran without understanding Arabic. The 9-11 Commission’s found Pakistani madrassas were “incubators for violent extremism.” 

Graduates of these madrassas have long had their uses for Pakistani elites. From 1947 itself, these elites have been paranoid about the lack of strategic depth vis-Ă -vis India and ethnic nationalism in its western provinces. When Bangladesh won its independence in 1971, these fears were exacerbated. Since then, Pakistan has doubled down on intolerant political Islam while failing to tackle endemic poverty and endemic corruption. With a misplaced sense of both paranoia and grandeur, Pakistani elites have packed off poor graduates of madrassas to fight jihads even as they have sent their own children to Dubai, London and New York. Now, some of these madrassas graduates are turning against the Pakistani state itself.

Trouble Brews in Rest of South Asia

The Taliban are inspiring many Indian Muslims too. Most people in the West do not realize that the ideology that inspires the Taliban comes from India. When the British crushed the 1857 Indian uprising and abolished Mughal rule in 1858, this caused dismay among many traditional Muslims. Some of them founded the Darul Uloom Deoband seminary in 1866 to the northeast of Delhi. They taught their students that Indian Muslims would be able to resist British rule by returning to core principles of Islam. This puritanical ideology spread in British India and later in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. In reent years, it has outcompeted the tolerant Persianate Sufi tradition of Islam in the subcontinent, which has peacefully coexisted with indigenous Indian spiritual traditions for centuries.

The Pashtun-led Taliban Could Break Apart Both Afghanistan and Pakistan

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In multireligious and multiethnic India, Deobandi clerics are the victory of the Taliban over “the defeat of a superpower such as the US.” They point to the collapse of the more numerous American-trained Afghanistan National Security and Defense Forces (ANDSF) as proof of the special powers of the Taliban. Many Muslims resent India’s ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which believes in reclaiming India’s pre-Islamic heritage. Some BJP leaders use inflammatory anti-Muslim . Some opposition leaders fan the flames of Muslim insecurity to win votes. Loose talk by the likes of Shashi Tharoor who writes about Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “” gives great propaganda material for jihadists.

Quickly forgotten is the fact that Modi’s BJP government is sending of wheat to a Taliban-occupied Afghanistan. The reality for Indian Muslims might not be rosy but it is not as grim as Tharoor paints it to be. Being Ahmadi in Pakistan or Hazara in Afghanistan is far more hazardous. The Pakistani parliament decreed that Ahmadis were non-Muslims as early as 1974 and this Islamic sect has faced increasing since. , a Shia ethnic group, have consistently been targeted by the Taliban who are fundamentalist Sunnis. Together, extreme Hindu rhetoric and Tharoor’s scaremongering are strengthening the hands of Islamic fundamentalists inspired by the Taliban. Muslim parents have been over the radicalization of their children, a trend that could accelerate with the victory of the Taliban.

Fundamentalist Islamists are also on the rise in Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka and even Nepal. Except for Bhutan, Islamic fundamentalism has been a threat to peace and stability of all nations. Bangladesh’s syncretic Muslim tradition has been under threat for decades thanks to the rise of . Maldives is experiencing what has called “an ominous rise of intolerant Islam” thanks to Saudi money flowing into and Salafist ideology taking over its mosques. Once Saudi-funded, the Taliban inspires many in the Maldives.

Sri Lanka’s marginalized Muslim community has proved to be a fertile breeding ground for fundamentalist Islamic . In Nepal, Muslims have become “active in the larger global movement of Sunni revival,” adding greater instability to an already turbulent nation. Such fundamentalist Sunni movements are energized by the Taliban’s victory over the US.

Unfortunately, South Asian states are unprepared for this rising Talibanization of Islam. They even lack critical political and strategic insights into the implications of the victory of the Taliban. Islamic fundamentalists from around the world and especially from South Asia will inevitably come to Afghanistan for the finishing school of terror. This has happened before. In the 1980s, young Arab Sunni ideologues and fighters such as Abdullah Azam, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden came to fight jihad in Afghanistan. 

Then as now, Washington took its eye off the ball in this part of the world. After all, they had to sort out post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the successor states to the Soviet Union itself. The ball though, as the late Congressman Charlie Wilson apocryphally , “keeps on bouncing,” and is likely to hit us in the face before too long.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Foreign observers the events of August 15^th as “a bloodless coup.” However, for millions in Afghanistan, particularly Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, the takeover by the Taliban has meant a to “the darkest days.”

A Bloody and Brutal Regime

The Taliban is dominated by Pashtuns. This ethnic group is also referred to as Afghans and Pathans. The Taliban are an ethno-nationalist and Islamo-fascist group who mix tribal and religious beliefs. In the 1990s, they ruled Afghanistan with brutality and barbarity. 

For all their protestations in the media, the Taliban have not changed one bit. They continue to commit atrocities against women, vulnerable social groups and non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Numerous reports have documented their many . The Taliban still impose cruel punishments  such as lashing, amputation, stoning, beheading and other forms of summary executions.

Videos and reports of savagely violent killings, particularly of Tajiks have come to the fore. The Taliban has been engaging in indiscriminate killing in northern Afghanistan, especially in Panjshir and Baghlan provinces.

On March 11, a graphic video was on social media showing the dreadful killing of the 27-year-old Bilal Ahmad, a secondary school teacher in Hesarak district of Panjshir province,  In the 66 seconds of video footage, the Taliban fighters appear to briefly interrogate Bilal, a Persian-speaking Tajik, in Pashto — a language not spoken in Panjshir — and then shoot him. Mohammad Rashed, Bilal’s younger brother, confirmed that the man in the video footage was his brother.

In another 32-second video which went viral on March 13, a Taliban fighter seems to be interrogating a male civilian before shooting him at close range. The was identified as Khairuddin. Observers noted that he was likely killed in Taala wa Barfak district of Baghlan province. Both Bilal and Khairuddin were the breadwinners of their families. Both have left behind their widows and young children.

Numerous other reports of brutal killings have emerged. The Tajiks are finding themselves at the sharp end of a knife or the smoking barrel of a gun.

Why do the Taliban Target the Tajiks?

Since the establishment of the client state of Afghanistan by Abdul Rahman Khan who ruled from 1880 to 1901, the Pashtun ruling class has not reconciled with the  ethnic heterogeneity of Afghanistan.  This class willfully considers Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity a threat to their exclusive rule. They assume that equal participation of non-Pashtuns in national and local political processes  would defuse their grip on power. This underlying fear of fragmentation has been the raison d’etre for creating a highly centralized  governance system that remains dominated by the Pashtuns.

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Before Abdul Rahman Khan’s reign, Pashtun history was steeped in tribal feuds and intra-ethnic conflicts. While Khan fought against fellow Shinwar  Pashtun tribes  in the east, he was able to unite Pashtuns to some degree and channel their aggression against Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north and Hazaras in central Afghanistan.  Despite the repression, Persian-speaking communities have consistently resisted unilateral Pashtun rule. They have always favored  a more decentralized governance system in Afghanistan.

After Khan’s death, the Pashtun ruling class continued its policy of repression. In 1929, Habibullah Kalakani, a Persian Tajik dissident leader – who was given the nickname “Bacha-e-Saqaw [Son of Water Carrier]” by Pashtuns to cast him to an inferior social standing at the time – briefly broke the chain of Pashtun domination by ousting Amanullah Khan, the grandson of Abdul Rahman Khan. In 1992, Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Tajik military genius led his forces into Kabul. Massoud broke another cycle of Pashtun hegemonic domination by defeating the Soviet-backed Afghan communist government. Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik, became president of Afghanistan. This regime was ousted by the Pashtun-led Taliban who later conspired with Al-Qaeda to assassinate Massoud two days before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A number of Pashtuns are euphoric on the return of the Taliban. They belong to many ideological persuasions and political camps. Howerer, ethnic nationalism trumps other sentiments and has plunged Afghanistan into yet another cycle of violence.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy

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A Tale of Tragic Suffering

The Taliban are ruling the country with an iron fist. They have attempted to cut off Afghanistan from the rest of the world by imposing restrictions on local and media. As they rule behind an iron curtain, the Taliban has been arresting and even their opponents, especially those who served in the Afghanistan National Security and Defense Forces.

The Taliban’s behavior does not sit well with the international community. They have cut aid, frozen Afghanistan’s foreign assets and been wary of providing financial assistance to the country. Recently, the international community pledged in humanitarian aid, far less than the $4.4 billion requested by the UN. The World Bank has also four projects worth $600 million.

Because of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, hunger and malnutrition now ravage the land. So, do tragic premature deaths. In the first quarter of 2022, an estimated 13,000 newborn babies have already of malnutrition. In January, the UN estimated that half a million people lost their in the first six months of the Taliban’s rule. The UN has that a staggering 97% of Afghans could plunge into poverty by the middle of this year. The Taliban is unconcerned about saving babies, preserving jobs or alleviating poverty. Instead, it is obsessed only with concentrating power and implementing their fanatical Islamic agenda.

Cultural Genocide and Gender Apartheid

The Taliban has consistently sought to erase longstanding ancient Persian and other native cultures in Afghanistan by deeming them unIslamic. The regime has banned music in public, several musicians, banned soap operas and prohibited celebrations of Nowruz, the Persian new year. For over three millennia, Nowruz has been celebrated in the Persianate world of which modern day Afghanistan has always been a part. The Taliban is severing that umbilical cultural cord between Afghanistan and its Persian roots in the name of Islam.

When it comes to women, the Taliban has unleashed a policy of gender apartheid. They have been in the news for banning girls from returning to secondary and imposing numerous restrictions on women. Under the Taliban, women cannot travel alone, they have to wear what the Taliban prescribe, they cannot work, they are deprived of education and they live in constant fear of the regime’s religious police. More than anyone else, women lead lives of indignity and humiliation.

The Taliban have turned Afghanistan into a de facto open-air prison. estimates that a record-high 53% of Afghans want to leave their country. It is clear that Afghanistan is in crisis but most powerful states in the international community do not see Afghanistan as vital to their strategic interests. Besides, their focus has shifted to ¸éłÜ˛ő˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s occupation of Ukraine and they have no bandwidth to deal with Afghanistan. As a result, Afghans suffer under a fanatical and repressive regime with millions trying to jailbreak to freedom and safety.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Under this agreement, the Taliban are obligated to take measures to prevent terrorist groups from threatening the security of the US and its allies and to engage in a comprehensive intra-Afghan dialogue that would produce a political settlement. The hasty US troop withdrawal in August 2021 emboldened the Taliban to disregard their obligations under the deal and encouraged them to prioritize political takeover instead of a sustainable peace mechanism for Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s Public Intellectuals Fail to Denounce the Taliban

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The Doha Agreement and its contents undermined the sovereign government of Afghanistan at the time and provided an upper hand to the Taliban in both war and peace. Certain assurances in the deal enabled the Taliban to become stronger in both battlefield action and narrative propagation.

These the agreement’s references to a “new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government”; clauses on the release of Taliban combatants referred to as “political prisoners”; indirect legitimization of the Taliban shadow government by virtue of stipulations such as “the Taliban will not provide visas, passports, travel permits, or other legal documents”; and a complete lack of any mention of human rights protections in Afghanistan.

Another Case of Failed Peacemaking

The agreement is not the only pact that was expected to bring a peaceful end to the conflict in the country. In 1988, the  concluded under the auspices of the UN between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the US and the Soviet Union serving as state guarantors, provided an overall framework for the settlement of the Afghan conflict and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Likewise, the  in 2001 — irrespective of whether it is categorized as a peace deal —established a process to manage the political transition in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. It briefly outlined steps from the formation of an interim administration to the development of a new constitution and holding elections.

However, neither the Geneva Accords nor the Bonn Agreement were successful and ultimately failed to foster conditions necessary for enabling a comprehensive settlement to Afghanistan’s complicated problem. More recently, the Taliban’s abject disregard for their commitments under the Doha Agreement, combined with the United States’ rushed exit, sped up the Taliban’s reemergence, once again closing an already narrow window of opportunity for achieving a durable political solution to the protracted conflict in Afghanistan.

There is indeed a qualitative difference between the Geneva Accords, the Bonn Agreement and the Doha Agreement. However, one of the key reasons for their failure, among other factors, is that they are silent on the main cause of the conflict in Afghanistan — i.e., ethnic conflict.

Afghanistan is a multiethnic country where the various ethnic groups are also geographically fragmented. Historically, divisions over who should lead the country and how have been among the core contentious issues in Afghanistan. Disagreements on this matter have manifested in violent ways in the 1990s and non-violent ways in the outcome of four presidential elections held based on the 2004 constitution. Overlooking of the main cause of the conflict and an absence of a viable mechanism for power redistribution among ethnic groups is a common thread that connects each of the three agreements that failed and continued to fuel instability.

The Current Situation

Less than two years since the Doha Agreement was signed, in August 2021, Kabul, the Afghan capital, fell to the Taliban. In the aftermath of this development, residences of several former government officials, particularly those from the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), were raided and these personnel members were either killed or imprisoned. A  found that over 100 personnel from the Afghan security forces and others associated with the former Afghan government have been killed in the country, despite the Taliban announcing a general amnesty. 

Moreover, despite the demands from the international community for the formation of an inclusive government, respect for human rights and counterterrorism assurances, the Taliban have refused to make any concessions. They have brazenly continued suppressing all dissenting voices, severely limiting women’s rights and persecuting civil society members and journalists.

Peace in Afghanistan?

It was apparent from day one that the prospects of the post-July 2018 efforts for a political settlement in Afghanistan were uncertain at best. The Doha Agreement simply laid out a possible schedule for the US withdrawal instead of guarantee or measures enabling a durable political settlement or peace process. The Taliban too negotiated the deal with the US with the aim of winning the war rather than seeking a peace deal or political settlement with their opponents.

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The chaotic withdrawal of American forces and the mayhem at Kabul airport — which was reminiscent of the US pullout from Vietnam — has not only damaged the image of a powerful country like the US around the world, but has also established its reputation as an unreliable ally in times of difficulty. Given historical patterns and the Taliban’s track record, in the absence of any qualitative change of circumstances on the ground, the international community’s positive overtures to the Taliban might be yet another folly.

As it stands, the prospects for peace in Afghanistan will remain distant for as long as the Taliban own the entire political apparatus rather than participate as a party in an inclusive and representative government and respect dissenting voices. In the meantime, the international community should use sanctions mechanisms and official recognition as the few remaining tools of leverage to hold the Taliban accountable to their commitments and to international legal standards.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Prospects of Peace in Afghanistan appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Currently, political fragmentation and polarization under the Taliban have become an existential conflict over culture and ethnicity. The Taliban are a terrorist group, having successfully synthesized both Islamic extremism and Pashtun/Afghan ethnic chauvinism as their ideology. Ironically, they rule over one of the most diverse countries in the world.

What the Taliban’s Constitution Means for Afghanistan

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The Taliban use two vague criteria to dismiss all progress made in the past two decades or, for that matter, any undesirable but transformational changes that occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s: Afghan and Islamic values. The first category denies internal social diversity while the second rejects Islamic pluralism. After usurpation of power by force, the group proudly boasted of committing over a thousand . Now, it is officially a suicide bombers brigade within its security agencies. 

Organic Intellectuals

The exponents of Afghan ethnonationalism desperately aim to present a benign image of the Taliban. Having fundamental, political and social ties with the Taliban, in the words of Antonio Gramsci, they form the Taliban’s “organic intellectuals.” Unlike the traditional intellectuals, Gramsci argues, organic intellectuals are linked with a social class. Contrary to Gramsci, I use it as a negative term as they represent the extreme right. Their genuine undeclared mandate is to articulate and represent the interests and perceptions of the Taliban and to downplay the risks of the group’s rule.

In other words, these organic intellectuals are systematically engaged in PR for the Taliban. The irony is that the same people are recognized as the voices of Afghanistan rather than of the Taliban in Western academic and think-tank circles. Afghan ethnonationalism and its exponents are only challenged by the Persian-speaking Tajik and Hazara intellectuals, whose voices have been relegated to the margins due to acceptance of the Taliban order as the new normal.

The organic intellectuals have the nature of a chameleon, speaking in two different languages to address different audiences and constituencies. On the one hand, they praise and welcome the establishment of the so-called “order,” albeit Taliban-centric, but, with a liberal audience, they speak the language of peaceful coexistence, “cultural particularism,” relativism and political pragmatism. To incorporate such a self-contradictory stance, they adopt a fence-sitting position.

The justifications of the Taliban made by these organic intellectuals contradict both the realist and moralist approaches in political philosophy. First, let us address the five justifications before returning to the philosophical questions.

The Taliban Order

To begin with, treating the Taliban-centric order as default and ignoring the ideological dimension of the Taliban, it argues that the group is adaptable to political and policy reforms. Thus, it tries to undermine the possibility of a thorough transformation of the current scenario through any means.

The telos of political reform is expanding the horizons of rights and liberties. In a totalitarian regime, the goal of reform is not to improve the condition of individuals and communities but to consolidate the regime’s power. To suggest political reform essentially means to work with the existing political framework, not its transformation. This entails admitting the terms and conditions of the totalitarian regime.

Compared to reforms in an authoritarian regime, the prospect of successful political reform and change toward emancipation in the totalitarian regime is limited because, in the latter, the state is based on a rigid doctrinal ideology. An ideological state does not accommodate change and reform unless there is an alteration in the constituent ideology. The longer a totalitarian regime stays in power, the less likely the possibility for political transformation. Thus, change in a totalitarian regime is easier to achieve in the early stages, when its power is not consolidated. 

The Taliban government currently installed in Afghanistan is not simply another dictatorship. By all standards, it is a totalitarian regime. A totalitarian regime, according to British philosopher John Gray, is not the one that negates liberal democracy — it is one that brutally suppresses civil society. The Taliban have created a monstrosity equivalent to that of other totalitarian states. 

Political Pragmatism

The second justification of Taliban apologists is political pragmatism — the Taliban is a reality that could not be done away with and thus it shall be acknowledged. As part of my on the Afghanistan peace process, I conducted an opinion poll in 2018 that showed the Taliban’s popularity as below 10% across the country. Thus, this so-called pragmatism is constituted upon a false assumption. But the Taliban are a reality, like racism, Islamic fundamentalism, bigotry and slavery. Also, they are a reality fostered by sponsors: the Pakistani establishment.

Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that bigotry, racism and fundamentalism could not be eradicated through endorsements by the intellectuals and those who have a moral commitment to fight them. Irrespective of the logic of morality, one cannot buy the argument to accept bigotry or extremism just because they were a reality. Endorsing the Taliban is equivalent to recognizing their wicked acts. 

Third, it is proposed that if we accept the Taliban as a reality, the costs of establishing political order would be reduced. For example, it can prevent another civil war. This argument is built based on a false assumption regarding the nature of the Taliban. Historically, the group has been extremely violent by nature: War, jihad and suicide bombings are an of its ideology. What country in the world prides itself on having suicide squads?

In the seven months of their rule, the Taliban have killed, tortured and humiliated numerous civilians, former security officers and women’s rights activists, primarily ethnic groups like the Tajik and Hazara. Moreover, they maintain strong ties with an international community of jihadists, including al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Turkistan Islamic Party, among others. 

There is an inherent contradiction in the nationalist stance advocating for so-called reconciliation. The nationalists argue that war is costly and hence we should accept working with the Taliban. However, countless civilians being slaughtered or abused by the Taliban on a daily basis is ignored as the human cost of Taliban rule. A doctrinal state imposes its ideology on every single individual even if it is at the cost of the individuals’ lives. 

NaĂŻve Intellectualism

Fourth, the naive social-media public intellectuals suppose that they can hold the Taliban accountable by citing some verses of the Quran or some articles of the law of Afghanistan. It is not that ideological totalitarian regimes do not understand what law is; rather the Taliban misuses the law to further limit the sphere of civil society and expand the regime’s control. Hannah Arendt argued that totalitarianism is primarily a denial of law, the emergence of a state in the absence of law. By this standard, the Taliban are simply a totalitarian entity.

The assumption that the Taliban would be held accountable through a Twitter post is naïve. The issue is not negligence in the application of the law by the Taliban; rather, the fundamental issue is the group’s illegitimate rule. The Taliban have suspended a functioning state apparatus by military takeover of the state that led to the collapse of the republic, purging many technocrats from bureaucracy and creating an environment of terror, intentionally undermining the Doha peace talks.

Lastly, cultural particularism suggests that the Taliban represent a specific culture and shall be given time to adapt and develop according to its own history and context. Taking a relativist stance, it is said that there is no ultimate truth and no one is a final arbiter. Thus, relativist logic fails to recognize evil in its totality. The truth about the evil nature of the Taliban could not simply be dismissed by reducing the issue to a matter of a difference of opinion.

Unlike relativists, cultural pluralists are not naĂŻve enough to engage with evil. According to their line of thinking, although ultimate values are diverse, they are knowable; any order which negates and denies peaceful coexistence is outlawed. The Taliban eschews all forms of coexistence. They treat the Persian-speaking Tajiks, Hazaras and other nationalities as second or third-class subjects. They campaign against Persian cultural heritage such as Nawroz celebrations, the Persian language and much of the country’s pre-Islamic heritage.  

The Realist/Moralist Challenge

Exponents of the Taliban have to respond to both a moralist and a realist question in politics. From a moralist standpoint, by neglecting or dismissing any moral standard, they adopt a peace activist cover. They aim to humanize the Taliban in order to make the group pleasantly acceptable. 

The question here is, what is a morally correct stance against a terrorist group that has a track record of deliberately inciting ethnic hatred, racism, ethnic supremacy, oppression, mass atrocities and terror? The answer is clear: Any act that demonizes humans and perpetuates violence for the sake of subjugation of others is condemned. The perpetrator would thus be fully responsible.

On the contrary, any single word that misrepresents the Taliban and presents a false benign image of the group is a betrayal of the moral principle of justice, liberty and claims of intellectualism. Any responsible citizen and public intellectual has a moral obligation to not just renounce them publicly but to denounce totalitarian regimes and any act of terror.

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Denunciation not only entails a public condemnation of evil in its totality but also an avoidance of any word or deed that contributes to the consolidation of the regime. By any standard, a terrorist group does not have a right to rule. Anyone who advises or applauds terrorist statements or policies is morally bankrupt. When faced with a totalitarian regime, one can only be either for or against it.

Lastly, the realist question is what British philosopher Bernard Williams calls the Basic Legitimation Demand (BLD): “the idea of meeting the BLD implies a sense in which the state has to offer a justification of its power to each subject.” This is the very first question in politics.

Before any other virtues, a state has to present an acceptable answer to those that it rules. Otherwise, the people who consider themselves alien to the rulers and have a basic fear of subjugation, humiliation and persecution, as well as those who are radically disadvantaged, have every right to disobey. As Williams says, “there is nothing to be said to this group to explain why they shouldn’t revolt.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Over the past six months, Afghan women have continued to protest against the Taliban policies, provoking a brutal response. One of the detainees  AFINT: “Unfortunately, there is sexual harassment by the Taliban. The Taliban think that a woman who protests for her rights or has worked before they came to power is a prostitute. So, they consider these women as sex slaves.” While it may be impossible to change the Taliban’s mindset, international and regional pressure is key to helping Afghan women and holding the current regime accountable. 

The Taliban Use Violence Against Women as a Bargaining Chip

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To deal with the international pressures, the Taliban turned the women’s rights issues into a bargaining chip against the international community to gain recognition and force engagement. The US, in particular, consistently calls on the Taliban to respect women’s rights. But does the US have enough leverage over the Taliban to force them to revise their treatment of women?

Power Is Everything 

Since the overthrow of the Afghan government last August, the US remained engaged with the Taliban, although Washington does not recognize the regime as legitimate. Although the Taliban views the US as the loser in this conflict, many within the group’s leadership believe that they have to interact with Washington to gain recognition. 

The Taliban’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai  in December: “If the US embassy reopens in Kabul, all European countries will be here in half an hour. We are working hard in this regard, and since I have been a member of the negotiating team with them (the Americans), I am sure from their morals and behavior that, God willing, they will be back soon.” 

From the Taliban’s perspective, power is everything. As far as they can control the country, the US has to respect them and will have to recognize them. This assumption leads the group to not compromise on women’s rights. Instead of revising their policies, they detained women activists and then released some of them following pressure to do so during the  in January.

The US has profound concerns about the Taliban’s relations with other terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State branch in Afghanistan, but human rights, women’s rights and an inclusive government are all part of the US agenda in its interaction with the country’s new leadership. In his talk at the United States Institute of Peace, Thomas West, the US special representative for Afghanistan,  these values as crucial for the US-Taliban relationship. 

However, it is imperative to keep in mind that any compromise from the international community on women’s rights that suggests to the Taliban that their harsh policies may be accommodated will only exacerbate the situation for women in Afghanistan. 

International Commitment

For more than 20 years, the US and international community repeated their strong commitment to  in Afghanistan, creating the expectation that it should continue doing so after the Taliban takeover. However, many Afghan women saw the US agreement with the Taliban as a .

International pressure is the critical factor for holding the Taliban accountable. When the women activists disappeared without explanation, the Taliban denied its involvement for months. The United Nations and US diplomats repeatedly called on the Taliban to find the missing women.

In the end, the Taliban released several well-known women activists despite denying involvement in detaining them. The group also published videos of  by the activists. Totalitarian regimes use this tactic against human rights activities for propaganda and to mislead the public; exposing the Taliban’s double game will not be easy and will require international commitment and cooperation. 

There are several measures that can be helpful in holding the Taliban accountable, and the US can play a central role. First, the diplomatic contacts with the Taliban should not be interpreted as hope for recognition; rather, diplomacy should be used only for contact and assessing responsibilities.

Second, international consensus on women’s rights and supporting the idea of an inclusive and legitimate government in Afghanistan is key. This is significant for women’s rights and negotiation for building a broad-based government to reflect Afghan society, which is instrumental for avoiding another round of conflict. 

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Third, increasing the activities of international organizations in Afghanistan to support women and monitor their situation under the Taliban is necessary. Currently, there is no access to different corners of the country where crimes against women may be committed. Fourth, financial support to organizations championing women’s education and activities will be vital for women’s voices and Afghan social society to resist the Taliban’s fascist approach.

The US can exert pressure on behalf of Afghan women to demand that their rights to work and education are honored. Any degree of leniency toward the Taliban will make the situation worse for women. If the US shows a faltering resolve or sends a misleading message, the international consensus on human rights will disappear.  

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Does the US Have Leverage to Advocate for Women’s Rights in Afghanistan?Ěý appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

FO° Live: Women Under the Taliban

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In response, the Taliban have deployed various oppressive measures. In September, they the Women’s Affairs Ministry with morality police, which enforces the armed group’s on the country. At the same time, while trying to confine women to their homes by forbidding them to work or study, the Taliban are using the threat of violence against women as a bargaining chip against the Western powers.

Violent Tactics

In September last year, the Taliban attacked the media to prevent them from covering the women’s protests in Kabul. Two journalists were . Etilaatroz is one of the leading Afghan newspapers and a critical voice mainly focused on investigative journalism. An attack on the newspaper was a clear signal for everyone covering the protests against the Taliban.

Since the armed group took control of the country, at least 318 media outlets in 33 of 34 provinces and, according to the International Federation of Journalists, 72% of those who are women.

But the Taliban quickly changed their tactics to tackle women’s protests through more intimidating methods, including nighttime house searches to locate those who dared raise their voice. Tamana Zaryabi Paryani, a member of the movement demanding rights to work and education, is just one of the women from their homes in Kabul in the middle of the night; her whereabouts . Some families report being contacted by detainees from Taliban prisons in undisclosed locations.

The Taliban deny capturing, detaining or killing women and other opponents. This tactic aims to mislead public opinion, the media and policymakers in Western countries. The situation may be even more critical in the provinces, beyond the eyes of the media. In September last year, the Taliban a former police officer with the ousted Afghan government in front of her family in Gor province; she was pregnant at the time of her murder.

There is no way to assess the true number of disappeared women across the country. Some of them are known by the media, such Mursal Ayar, Parwana Ibrahimkhel, Tamana Paryani, Zahra Mohammadi and Alia Azizi. Most of them belong to the protest movement against the Taliban’s policies. Azizi worked as a senior female prison official in Herat and went missing when the Taliban took control of the city. Amnesty International the Taliban to investigate the case and release her “immediately and unconditionally” if she is in their custody.

Last week, the UN repeated its and asked the Taliban to release the disappeared women activists and their relatives. The German Embassy, currently operating from Qatar, has called for an into the missing women. It is entirely possible that the Taliban will eventually release some of the captives, claiming that they were rescued from the clutches of the kidnappers, in order to portray themselves as a responsible government.

Gang rape is another tactic that the Taliban deploy against women in detention. The Independent that last September, bodies of eight detainees arrested during a protest in Mazar-e Sharif were discovered. According to reports, the girls were repeatedly gang-raped and tortured by the Taliban. Sexual assault is a many-sided weapon against women in a society based on strict honor codes. Some of those who survived the rapes were by their families.

In January, The Times that the staff in the government-run Mazar-e Sharif Regional Hospital claim that they receive around 15 bodies from Taliban fighters each month — mostly women with gunshot wounds to the head or chest.

Bargaining Chip

Violence has been the Taliban’s primary tool both in war and during negotiations with Western powers. Over the course of two decades of conflict, the Taliban used violence as a means to win recognition as a political force. During their talks with the US and the Afghan government, the Taliban escalated violence to enhance their position at the negotiating table. Now, they are pursuing the same strategy by trading repression for recognition.

Since the Taliban took control of the country, women’s rights are a constant subject of ongoing diplomatic discussions that have so far brought no result. The international community has failed to press the Taliban to form an inclusive government and respect women’s rights.

But the armed group wants the international community to recognize their government. In January, a Taliban delegation was invited to Oslo to talk with Western powers and representatives of Afghan women for the first time. At the meeting, Hoda Khamosh, a civil society activist, the Taliban delegation: “why are the Taliban imprisoning us in Kabul and now sitting here at the negotiating table with us in Oslo? What is the international community doing in the face of all this torture and repression?”

Since then, nothing has changed. The reality is that the Taliban used the talks in Oslo as an opportunity to make an international appearance to advertise their government. They are deploying precepts like women’s rights to force more international engagement. While Norway was for inviting the Taliban and offering them exposure, Switzerland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it invited the Taliban to talk about “the protection of humanitarian actors and respect for human rights.”

The Taliban is an ideological, zealot religious movement, and years of experience suggest that they are unlikely to revise their position on women’s rights and other fundamental issues, including human rights and political pluralism. Talking about women’s rights in Western capitals is just an opportunity for them to normalize their regime and travel abroad. Human rights violations, particularly violence against women, not only serve the Taliban’s ideological purposes but have turned into a convenient bargaining chip against the international community.

It is critical that Western powers support fundamental human rights in the country without providing the Taliban with opportunities for blackmail, implementig realistic measures to press the group to release activists and to respect women’s rights. First, it is important to maintain or escalate the current sanctions regime against the Taliban leadership. Second, making sure that there is no rush to recognize the Taliban regime mong foreign governments is another key leverage point.

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Third, there is a need to appoint a special rapporteur to monitor the human rights situation and document violations to hold the Taliban accountable. Fourth, it is important to extend and support the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to help monitor the human rights situation in the country.

Finally, the international community can continue its humanitarian support through UN agencies and other organizations without recognizing the Taliban. Recognition of the group will not only increase human rights abuses but will send the wrong signal to other extremists in the region. All these measures will reduce the Taliban’s ability to use violence as a bargaining chip against the international community.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Taliban Use Violence Against Women as a Bargaining Chip appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In August 2021, the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan through unconstitutional means. They initially did not establish a new government or issue a decree suspending or repealing the constitution. However, when prompted by the Chinese ambassador to Afghanistan, the minister of justice noted that the Taliban plan to the 1964 constitution, excluding parts that contradict the principles of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the formal name of the country under the new government. Thus far, the Taliban have not released a formal document or policy statement that would indicate how they plan to govern.

Can the Taliban Govern Responsibly?

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When the administration was introduced last September, the government was modeled on a different system than the one intended in the 2004 constitution, but it shared similarities with the 1964 version. The 2004 model provides for presidential rule, and a direct vote elects a president as the head of state to serve a five-year term.

So far, it is clear that the 2004 constitution is no longer in force in Afghanistan and that the Taliban have, more or less, restored their that was drafted in 1998. Under that version, the Taliban’s caretaker administration is a theocratic monarchial system with a supreme leader, known as the amir al-Mu’minin (leader of the faithful), as its king.

The Taliban’s Constitution

Under its rule between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban never introduced a written constitution for Afghanistan nor validated any previous version. But they made some efforts to draft a constitution. This process began in 1998 when the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar — formally known as amir al-Mu’minin — issued a under which a so-called constituent assembly — or ulema committee (a religious body of scholars) — was established, led by Maulvi Noor Mohammad Saqib, the former chief justice of Afghanistan.

The decree placed the power to review laws with the committee, under the supervision of the supreme court of Afghanistan. The committee’s task was to look at existing laws, including under past constitutions, and to remove articles that did not conform to sharia. The committee began working on the constitution in July 1998 and decided that the review of the previous constitution should be in accordance with the Hanafi madhab (school of jurisprudence) of Sunni Islam. Articles inconsistent with sharia would be amended or repealed and, if necessary, a new article would be added.

The constitution was drafted after a round of sessions, but it was not approved before the Taliban were toppled by US-led forces in 2001. The preamble of the constitution notes that it was adopted in 2005 by the supreme council of the Taliban, with 10 chapters and 110 articles. The constitution’s travaux prĂ©paratoires (preparatory works) are not publicly available to show which constitution of Afghanistan was chosen as the basis for the Taliban’s version. Yet based on preliminary examination of both versions, it appears that the 1964 constitution, which was adopted under King Mohammad Zahir Shah, has been chosen as a foundation for the Taliban’s model. The Taliban’s constituent assembly has reviewed the 1964 constitution and removed, amended or added articles to the constitution that it believes contradict Islamic law.

Despite the considerable differences between the two constitutions, many articles of the Taliban’s version are verbatim to those of the 1964 model. While not explicitly mentioned, the Taliban’s constitution provides for a theocratic ruler under the title of amir al-Mu’minin, who would be similar to a king under the 1964 constitution in terms of political power.

The Taliban’s constitution is focused on the religious dynamics of the country, without considering the social and economic implications, and it forms the basis of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The constitution recognizes Islam as the national religion and adheres to the Hanafi madhab of Sunni Islam. Due to its similarity with the 1964 model, in principle, the constitution commits to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Non-Aligned Movement, and other relevant laws and regulations within the limits of Islamic law and national interests. Power is divided between the amir al-Mu’minin, the prime minister or executive, the Islamic shura (parliament) and the supreme court. Ultimately, however, the amir al-Mu’minin has unlimited power to execute his will in all aspects of the government.

To make sense of the Taliban’s constitution, it is important to examine the responsibilities of the head of state, the shura, the executive and the judiciary and the role of foreign policy.

The De Facto King

Under the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the amir al-Mu’minin is the head of state. He executes his authority in the executive, legislative, and judiciary fields according to the provisions of the constitution and other laws. Under the Taliban, the amir would be an Afghan national, born to Afghan Muslim parents and a follower of the Hanafi madhab. The amir al-Mu’minin has similar immensurable powers as the king had under the 1964 constitution. For example, under that version, the king was able, inter alia, to appoint and remove prime ministers and other government ministers, issue a state of emergency, approve the national budget, ratify laws, select and dismiss judges, promote and retire high-ranking officials and declare war. The Taliban’s constitution gives the same powers to the amir.

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Unlike the 1964 and 2004 constitutions, the procedure for appointing the head of the state is not clearly laid out in the Taliban’s constitution. Yet one of the tasks of the shura, together with the supreme court and the prime minister, is to decide on what happens in the event of the amir al-Mu’minin stepping down. The amir would inform the speaker of the shura, chief justice of the supreme court and the prime minister about his resignation. After this, a meeting between the shura, the chief justice and the prime minister takes place. However, if the amir al-Mu’minin dies and does not choose a successor, then the chief justice takes over as acting leader. 

The constitution does not explicitly state who appoints the amir al-Mu’minin. But it does imply that the authority to appoint him rests with the shura, the chief justice and the prime minister. The one significant difference between the amir and the king under the 1998 and 1964 constitutions, respectively, is that leader of the faithful is accountable and equal before the law like any other citizen. Under the 1964 constitution, the king was not accountable and was to be respected by all.  

Islamic Shura

Chapter three of the Taliban’s constitution deals with the nature of the shura, the appointment of its members and its powers. Under the constitution, Afghanistan would have a unicameral shura that has, inter alia, legislative power and the interpretation of the constitution. Members of the shura are appointed by the amir al-Mu’minin for an indefinite duration. The amir would appoint three members from the first grade I provinces, a maximum of two from the grade II provinces and one from grade III provinces. (Based on criteria determined by the Afghan government, all provinces are given different grades and, according to these grades, they receive particular privileges and allocation of the national budget.)

The members of the shura would also have met the conditions set by the ahl al-hall wa’l �aqd, which refers to those qualified to elect or depose a caliph on behalf of the Muslim community under Sunni Islam. The constitution does not specify a method for the appointment of this group of people. Hence, this process remains open to arbitrariness and biased selection of pro-establishment individuals of dubious credibility and competence.

The amir al-Mu’minin also appoints the speaker of the shura from amongst existing members, but the constitution does not address the appointment of the deputy and secretary of the shura. The shura has the power to ratify, modify or abrogate laws. However, the procedure of enacting laws and abrogation of laws and how the shura will engage with stakeholders is not specified. The shura also has the power, inter alia, to oversee the actions of the government, make decisions on contentious issues, approve the state budget, ratify international treaties and agreements (together with the supreme court and the council of ministers), approve loans and grants, adopt government policies, and elucidate and question the government.

The Taliban’s constitution does not give immunity to members of the shura in case they commit a crime. Article 51 states that if a member of the shura is accused of an offense, the official responsible shall communicate the matter to the speaker. The legal proceedings against the accused would be initiated only when the speaker allows it. In the case of a witnessed crime, the official responsible can start legal proceedings and arrest a member without seeking permission from the speaker.

Executive

The prime minister and other ministers who lead the government are the highest executive and administrative authority under the Taliban’s constitution. Appointees to the position of prime minister must meet specific criteria. This includes being a Muslim, a follower of the Hanafi madhab and born to Muslim parents. The prime minister represents the government (executive) and he chairs the council of ministers. The prime minister can delegate his powers to other ministers, sign contracts and agreements at the government level, organize and oversee the affairs of ministries, and appoint, promote, retire and dismiss government officials.

The government under the Taliban’s model is in charge of the country’s domestic and foreign policies, regulates the performance of ministries and independent authorities, takes necessary measures in executive and administrative matters, drafts government-related laws and regulations, drafts and amends the annual budget, supervises banking affairs, ensures public security in the country and approves external expertise recruitment. The prime minister can also propose removing ministers to the amir al-Mu’minin, but they can only be removed if the head of state gives his approval.  

Judiciary

Articles 70 to 82 of the Taliban’s constitution contain detailed provisions on the courts and the status and independence of the judiciary. The constitution establishes the judiciary as an independent organ of the state. The only court established under the constitution is the supreme court, while the number of other courts and their jurisdiction is determined by law. The jurisdiction of the courts to hear cases brought before them is exclusive and, as per the constitution, “under no circumstances shall a law exclude from the jurisdiction of the judiciary, as defined in this title, a case or sphere, and assign it other authorities.”

The amir al-Mu’minin appoints judges on the recommendation of the chief justice. The number and qualifications of the supreme court judges are not determined. But for the appointment of the chief justice, an ambiguous criterion of “full competence,” or Ahliat-e-Kamil, has been laid down. The deputies and justices of the Supreme Court are also appointed by the amir al-Mu’minin on the recommendation of the chief justice of the supreme court, taking into account the criteria of religion, piety, sufficient knowledge of jurisprudence, the judicial and legal system of the country.

Under the 1964 constitution, the king could appoint judges and review their position after 10 years, but he was not permitted to remove officials from their office through other means. The Taliban’s constitution, on the other hand, does not state the terms of tenure of supreme court judges, and the amir al-Mu’minin can remove judges from their offices.

The power of the amir to remove judges and the appointment of judges for an undetermined period brings the judiciary’s independence into question. The supreme court under the Taliban’s constitution no longer has the power to interpret the constitution under judicial review. That power has been assigned to shura. Thus, the constitution does not recognize the separation of power and enforce checks and balances.

Foreign Policy

According to the Taliban’s constitution, the foreign policy of the Islamic Emirate is based on the teaching of Islam, human values, securing the public interest and political independence, territorial integrity, playing an effective and constructive role in international peace, and cooperating with the international community.

In principle, the constitution supports the UN Charter, the charter of the OIC, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other internationally accepted principles and regulations, as long as they do not conflict with Islamic principles and national interests. The constitution condemns the use of force against any country and calls for dispute settlement through peaceful means. It also supports the program of disarmament and the elimination of the weapon of mass destruction.

The Rights of Afghans

So, with all this in mind, what does the constitution mean for the people of Afghanistan?

First, it is clear that under the Taliban’s constitution, the public has no say in the decision-making process — neither in the form of voting, nor with holding government bodies to account. The constitution denies the people their right to elect members to the shura, choose a prime minister, pick members of provincial assemblies or select governors, mayors and members of district assemblies since, according to the Taliban, elections are considered un-Islamic.

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Second, the selection of members of the shura by the amir al-Mu’minin opens the door for picking individuals who are close to the inner circle of the Taliban, particularly Taliban members themselves. By introducing the strict and ambiguous conditions of Ahl al-hall wa’l �aqd for shura appointees and a constitutional clause for the amir and prime minister to be followers of the Hanafi madhab of Sunni Islam, women and religious minorities such as Shia Muslims are excluded from positions of power and the decision-making process. Such provisions also contradict other clauses of the Taliban’s constitution, including the one that provides for equality before the law and prohibits all forms of discrimination.

Third, the Taliban’s constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights with limitations. This, in principle, includes freedom of speech, the right to a free and fair trial, liberty, human dignity, right to property, right to assemble unarmed and inviolability of person’s residence. It also provides for certain social rights, including the chance to receive free education. Most importantly, however, it leaves the regulation of women’s education to a specific law, which limits their right to education.

Prime Minister Mulla Hasan Akhund also confirmed such limitations in his first speech, where he indicated that only sharia education is compulsory and that women could seek knowledge in other fields if necessary. Thus, it can be inferred from his speech and the constitutional clause that the government will determine and specify faculties where women can take enroll and which the Taliban think are necessary for women. This provision itself contradicts other clauses of the constitution.

Finally, regarding the rights of children, women and minorities, the Taliban’s constitution does not specifically guarantee their protection. However, all Afghan citizens are provided with general protection, which includes children, women and minorities.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Is Afghanistan Going to Break Apart?

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As is well chronicled, Afghanistan emerged as a buffer state between the Russian and British empires. Dominated by the Pashtuns, this state remained an inchoate entity of competing ethnic groups, feuding clans and autonomous villages. As Tabish Forugh and one of the authors noted in an earlier article on 51łÔąĎ, this Pashtun-dominated order crumbled when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The Taliban brought back this order in the 1990s and are establishing Pashtun primacy yet again.

New Life to Old Identities

Modernity has not been kind to Afghanistan. Until the 1970s, this country was a land where hippies showed up to smoke pot and have a good time. Older Pakistani friends reminisce about driving from Peshawar to Kabul to buy videotapes of Bollywood movies and bask in the relatively liberal milieu of Afghanistan. When the Soviets intervened in 1979, this idyllic version of the country disintegrated. For all the efforts of Soviet troops, engineers and administrators, communism failed.

By February 1989, Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. Later that year, the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union itself imploded in 1991. The loosely allied mujahideen turned their guns on each other and a bloody civil war followed. The Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Pashtuns were at each other’s throats. Eventually, the Pakistani-trained, Islamabad-backed, Pashtun-led Taliban triumphed in 1996. Their rule was cut short by the 9/11 attacks in 2001, which brought American intervention and began a 20-year experiment with democracy.

Sadly, the democratic experiment has failed too. In June 2021, Forugh and one of the authors wrote that President Ashraf Ghani occupied “his fancy palace in Kabul thanks to the barrels of American guns,” and, once the Americans left, he would be toast. Americans established a presidential system based on their own model that was destined to fail in a famously diverse and fractious society. Note that the US leaders after World War II chose parliamentary democracy for Germany and Japan, two industrial societies with a far higher degree of homogeneity. If Washington blundered at the beginning, its decisions were catastrophic at the end. Today, democracy is dead and buried, the fanatical Taliban rule the roost and ethnic identity is replacing fragile multiethnic Afghan nationalism.

The Rise of Ethnic Nationalism

As stated earlier, Afghanistan is where two expanding empires met. The British had digested modern-day Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, then British India. The Russians had taken over an odd assortment of clans and khanates in Central Asia, many of whom were descendants of Genghis Khan and Timur. Just like the boundaries drawn by the British or the French, the Russian ones were arbitrary too. As ethnic nationalism rises in Afghanistan, it will spill over into Central Asia.

As late as February 2020, the US State Department  that “a secure and stable Afghanistan [was] a top priority for the Central Asian governments.” It encouraged these governments to boost economic and trade ties with their Kabul counterparts. American hopes for “stable governance of multi-ethnic, Muslim-majority countries” now lie in tatters. Kazakhstan demonstrates that Russian realpolitik of supporting strongmen has triumphed.

Yet even the Kremlin cannot hold back the tide of ethnic nationalism that is unfolding in Afghanistan and spreading to Central Asia. The Tajiks led by Amrullah Saleh and  have the tacit, if not explicit, support of the Tajikistan government. The Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum  to Uzbekistan when the Taliban took over. As the Pashtuns leave not even scraps at the table for others, it is only natural that minority ethnicities are looking across the border for a better future. Just as in former Yugoslavia, ethnic nationalism is now on the rise in Central Asia.

Pakistan’s Frankenstein Monster’s Problem: Radical Islam

To a large degree, Pakistan has fostered, if not created, the ethnic nationalism now rising in Afghanistan and spilling over into Central Asia. It is an open secret that Pakistan’s military elite created the Taliban. As Ishtiaq Ahmed , “the Garrison State” has always been paranoid about its lack of strategic depth. The loss of East Pakistan that won independence as Bangladesh in 1971 has scarred the Pakistani psyche and made the country’s political elites double down on political Islam. In the 1980s, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq moved Pakistan along a fundamentalist arc. Jihad became the order of the day not only against the Soviets in Afghanistan but also against , which he sought to “bleed through a thousand cuts.”

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Zia was not an exception to Pakistani hostility to India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the man Zia ousted through a military coup and hung on the gallows,  to wage a “thousand year war against India.” In 1974, Pakistani mobs massacred thousands of Ahmadis and, instead of delivering them protection or justice, Bhutto brought in a constitutional amendment declaring the Ahmadis non-Muslims. The same year, he declared Pakistan would go , claiming “We shall eat grass but have our bomb.” Islamic fundamentalism and Pavlovian anti-India ethos drive Pakistani state policy regardless of whether the country is under civil or military rule. 

Backed by the US and Saudi Arabia, the Pakistan-backed mujahideen brought the Soviet Union to its knees. Against India, Pakistan has followed an asymmetric strategy of championing irregulars, insurgent and terrorists from its very inception. In the first of a three-part series analyzing the fallout of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, Rakesh Kaul points out how Pakistan supported a Pashtun jihad in Kashmir as early as 1947. The marauding tribesmen killed Kaul’s great-grandfather, “tied his dead body to a horse and dragged it through the streets to terrorize the local population into submission.”

Starting from the 1980s, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) unleashed terror as an instrument of state policy against India. First, the ISI backed the violent Sikh insurgency for an independent state of , a strategy that it continues with till today. Second, the ISI supported the insurgency in  that blew up in 1989 and persists till today. Third, the ISI created and supported militant jihadist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed to overwhelm India through multiple terrorist attacks. With a crisis-ridden economy and much smaller military, Pakistan has bet on asymmetric terror tactics and nuclear deterrence to tie India down.

However, Pakistan is discovering that when you sow the wind, you reap the whirlwind. Like Victor Frankenstein, the Garrison State has created a monster: . Since the 1980s, Pakistan has become intolerant, sectarian and violent. Minorities have faced persecution and suffered ethnic cleansing. The case of the animistic  people in Chitral is a case in point. Many  have recorded how they have faced persistent persecution and forced conversion. As a result, a mere 3,500 Kalash are left and they may not survive for too long.

Radical Islam was meant to be a tool the Pakistani state used against its neighbors. Now, it has spread like cancer throughout all aspects of the country’s life. Instead of Pakistan’s corrupt and inefficient government,  now provide education for refugees and lower-class Pakistanis. Many of them are hardline and churn out jihadis by the thousands. For instance, most of the Afghani Taliban leadership graduated from the madrasa Dur-ul-Uloom Haqqania.

Religious figures can now bring the country over a standstill in an instant. Violent protests repeatedly erupted after French President Emmanuel Macron said that Islam was in crisis. Terror attacks within Pakistan have shot up. Roohafza, a sugary syrupy drink, has replaced whiskey in officer messes. Many officers now sport flowing beards and offer prayer five times a day. In the words of Javed Jabbar, Pakistan has experienced “a steady retreat into showy religiosity and visible piety in the public domain and in most media.” A new law makes it compulsory for every child to learn .

Pakistan finds itself in a bind. It has to direct the thousands of jihadis graduating from madrasas against external enemies to avoid internecine strife. In fact, it is only a question of time before radical Islamists will infiltrate all organs of the Pakistani state. The Taliban’s victory has convinced them that Allah is on their side. The risks of a general like Zia or a cleric like Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini taking over and unleashing nuclear terror or nuclear war are getting higher by the day.

Radical Islam and Pashtun Pride Make an Explosive Cocktail

If radical Islam is dangerous, radical Islam combined with ethnic nationalism is terrifying. After 20 years, the Pashtun-led Taliban is back in power. They are surging with confidence after humbling the world’s superpower. This time, they are battle-hardened, better trained and savvier than their predecessors from the 1990s. The Taliban also have a strong sense of history and look back to the expansionist 18^th-century Ahmed Shah Durrani as a model to follow. 

Durrani was a historic figure who sent troops to Central Asia, defeated the Marathas in the historic 1761 Third Battle of Panipat with assistance of local Muslim rulers and created the modern nation of Afghanistan. Durrani’s young nation soon fell victim to the Great Game and lost much territory to the British. Led by , the British delineated the modern-day border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Till date, many Pashtuns have not accepted this border.

The Taliban are expansionists. In the north, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks will fight a guerilla war, ensuring their eventual retreat. To the west lie Turkmenistan and Iran, two ethnically distinct entities where the Taliban cannot expand. To the south and east lies Pakistan where the Taliban trained and where their Pashtun kin reside. Furthermore, the Pashtuns have a deep memory of raiding and ruling the plains of Indus and the Ganges. When Babur swept down from modern-day Uzbekistan to modern-day Pakistan and India through the Khyber Pass, he defeated a Pashtun sultan who was ruling Delhi.

When Pakistan won independence, Pashtun opinion was divided. Some like  wanted a homeland for Muslim Indians in the shape of Pakistan. Others like , a friend of Mahatma Gandhi, fought for a unified India and then for an autonomous Pashtunistan. Still others wanted reunification with Afghanistan. Worryingly for Pakistan, Pashtun refugees have streamed into the country from Afghanistan since 1979. Encyclopedia  tells us that there were “about 11 million Pashtun in Afghanistan and 25 million in Pakistan in the early 21st century.” Multiple estimates indicate  to be over 15% of Pakistan’s population. In Afghanistan, they comprise about 42% of the population. Once all-out ethnic conflict erupts in Afghanistan, Pashtun identity is only likely to strengthen.

So far, the Punjabi elite running Pakistan has co-opted the Pashtun elite by giving it plum positions in the state apparatus, especially the military. The ruling elite has also used Pashtuns to fight wars and proxy wars in Kashmir since 1947 when both India and Pakistan emerged as two independent entities after the partition of British India. During the 20 years of US presence in Afghanistan, cross-border incursions into and violent incidents in Kashmir declined because Pashtuns were too busy fighting a jihad at home. Now, these jihadis will turn their attention to Kashmir.

Not all jihadis are fixated with Kashmir. Some of them are sworn enemies of the Pakistani state such as the . With the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan may have achieved its long-cherished strategic depth against India, but it now has the tail of the Pashtun tiger in its hands. Pakistan’s ISI has no option but to deploy Pashtun jihadis against India in Kashmir. Failure on the Kashmir front could trigger Pashtun dissatisfaction against Punjabi leadership.

A tiny wrinkle many forget is that Pashtuns see themselves as a warrior people and the natural leaders of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent. They have successfully beaten back the British, the Soviets and the Americans. Pashtuns see the Punjabis as soft, loud and showy. Like the Balochs, the Sindhis, the Muhajirs and others, Pashtuns resent the Punjabi domination of Pakistan. Furthermore, many Pashtuns regard the banks of the Indus, not the Durand Line, as their natural border.

Blood Borders

Pakistan’s Pashtun problem is a particular example of a more widespread phenomenon. Most of the current borders in Africa, the Middle East and Asia are colonial legacies that do not make sense. In 2006, Ralph Peters published a controversial article in Armed Forces Journal titled “” where he argued for redrawing “arbitrary and distorted borders.” Peters took the view that “significant �cheated’ population groups, such as the Kurds, Baluch and Arab Shia” deserved their own states. He blamed “awful-but-sacrosanct international boundaries,” not Islam, for much of the violence in the Middle East and South Asia.

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Since 2006, many analysts have slammed Peters. The US has resolutely upheld the stability of the borders in former British and French colonies even as it has championed the independence of nations once under the Soviet yoke. That policy might be nearing the end of its shelf life. In its moment of triumph in Afghanistan, Pakistan might have set wheels into motion that will lead to its own disintegration.

Today, Pakistan is held together by an anti-India Islamic identity. The different linguistic ethnic groups that comprise Pakistan have long been pulling in different directions. Therefore, Pakistan has fostered a siege mentality among its people and created an identity that looks to Arab, Turkish and Pashtun conquerors of India for inspiration. Pashtun identity is far more cohesive, time-tested and real. After humbling the US, Pashtuns are unlikely to play second fiddle to the Punjabis for much longer. Inevitably, they are bound to take charge of their own destiny as they have done many times in the past.

To add fuel to the fire, Pakistan’s economy is in dire straits. Last year, the International Monetary Fund instituted yet another  and released $6 billion to Islamabad in November. Over the last three years, the Pakistani rupee has  by 30.5% against the US dollar.  and  are running high. In such circumstances, anti-India rhetoric is useful, desirable and essential to keep the country together. 

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has repeatedly condemned India’s “” and claimed that the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the BJP’s parent organization, of being Nazi-inspired entities. This puts pressure on Khan’s government and his military backers to act against such a toxic neighbor and evil enemy. The trouble for Khan and his delusional friends in Islamabad is that state coffers have little money to fund conflict with a far more prosperous and numerous India. Khan and co are riling up a mob that they are bound to disappoint. The last-ditch effort to keep Pakistan together would be war with India and, if Islamic radicals were to seize power in Islamabad, the risk of nuclear war would only turn too real.

Whether conflict with India is conventional or nuclear will be determined by circumstances in the future. It is clear that the Taliban have unleashed ethnic nationalism not only in Afghanistan but also in neighboring Central Asian states. Inevitably, the Pashtuns in Pakistan will be infected by that sentiment as well, especially as Islamabad leads the country to economic and military disaster. The scenario Peters conjured of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier tribes reuniting with their Afghan brethren and creating Pashtunistan would then come true. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan would no longer be the same again.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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A Chequered Past

For more than a century, different power centers in Afghanistan have had some sort of representation in the central government, even if they often got leftovers from the dominant Pashtun ruling class. This class was repressive and often bloody. Abdur Rahman Khan, the Iron Amir, conducted  against the Hazaras in the 1890s, erased a substantial part of the cultural heritage of Nuristanis by forcing them to convert to Islam, and confiscated fertile lands of Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north only to redistribute them to Pashtun tribes. Even a modernist king like Amanulla pursued the Iron Amir’s policies. Yet, at the helm of power, there was generally a servant’s seat at the table for other ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and even the Hazaras. This seat at the table along with the backing of superpowers, first the British and then the Soviets, kept the state and the political order intact.

Afghanistan Is On the Verge of Disaster

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When the Soviets invaded in 1979, the Pashtun-dominated order of Afghanistan gradually crumbled. Ideology trumped ethnicity, and groups like the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Hazaras rose in prominence. Much credit for this goes to , the president of Afghanistan from December 1979 to November 1986. When the Soviets withdrew in February 1989, this order collapsed. The battle-hardened mujahideen groups fought a brutal civil war in which Tajik leaders Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Jamiat Party, and , known as the “Lion of Panjshir,” held the upper hand.

The Pashtuns struck back through the Taliban and took over Kabul in . They exercised power over most of the country while Massoud was leading the resistance to the Taliban government from the Panjshir Valley. He was  in Afghanistan two days before the 9/11 attacks in 2001 by an al-Qaeda suicide squad masquerading as journalists on the pretext of filming an interview. Even after his death, the resistance to the Taliban continued and Massoud’s fighters contributed heavily to the ground fighting that drove out the Taliban from much of the country, including Kabul.

In the five years of Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001, the Pashtuns returned as the dominant military and political group. They ran an autocratic regime, marginalizing other ethnic groups and suppressing opponents. Hence, resistance to the Taliban was persistent and ferocious in many parts of the country.

The Post 9/11 Experience

The 9/11 attacks led to the American intervention and the creation of a new democratic state. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmens and other marginalized communities became active participants in the political process. Despite its fragility and flaws, the post-2001 political order and its democratic components offered a unique opportunity for Afghanistan to transform into a functioning polity and society.

The governing Pashtun ethnonationalist elites, their non-Pashtun partners, including conservative warlords, and the reemergence of a Pashtun-led insurgency squandered the resources and opportunities that otherwise might have consolidated a civil and democratic political order.  

The Taliban’s forceful return to Kabul last August ended the post-2001 American-backed constitutional order. Today, chaos prevails and a fanatical Pashtun clergy has a vice-like grip on every aspect of Afghanistan’s social, political and economic life. Furthermore, the Taliban are fanatical Muslims with ethnofascist tendencies and a profound apathy for Afghanistan’s ethnic, cultural and political diversity.

In recent months, many analysts have been very charitable to the Taliban. In an interview with 51łÔąĎ, political analyst Anas Altikriti said, “The reality is the Taliban have won and in today’s world, they have the right, the absolute right to govern.” If the right to govern comes from conquest, then Altikriti is right. Lest we forget, the Taliban have yet to win an election or demonstrate that they are actually capable of governing. Moreover, they are rigid, dictatorial and revanchist. An inclusive political formula that represents Afghanistan’s mosaic-like diversity is impossible so long as the Taliban remain exclusively in charge.

The legitimate aspirations of non-Pashtun ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, the Uzbeks, the Hazaras, the Turkmens and others are now dissolving in the acid of Sunni fundamentalism. The Taliban have marginalized them completely. These groups have no seat at the table, no representation in the decision-making process and have to live under the barrel of the Taliban gun.

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In 2022, this situation is untenable. Non-Pashtun ethnic groups are fed up and want control over their destiny. Many Pashtun technocrats, including the former president, Hamid Karzai, have switched sides and are part of the ruling dispensation. They claim the Taliban are the source of stability and have formed the only organization capable of ruling the country. However, they forget an important point. Marginalized groups in Afghanistan are chafing under Pashtun hegemony. If the Taliban-led Pashtuns cling to their unilateral rule and convert Afghanistan into a centralized state, the country will indubitably and inevitably break apart.

Federalism Is the Way Forward

To avoid a bloody partition along ethnic lines or a 1990s style civil war, Afghanistan needs a federal political system. Afghanistan is not France or the United Kingdom. It cannot be run out of a grand capital no matter how powerful the ruling class is. Like Switzerland and the United States, Afghanistan is an extremely diverse country with a history of local autonomy and a glorious tradition of bloody rebellion as the British, the Soviets and the Americans discovered at their cost.

Therefore, the balance of power in any political system that can work must lie with local, not national government. Such a system could turn Afghanistan’s disparate ethnic groups into building blocks of a new federal state and avoid the looming bloodbath due to the Taliban’s autocratic rule.

With China and Russia taking center stage, Afghanistan is increasingly forgotten. That is as risky as it is unfortunate. Conflict in Afghanistan could spill over into South and Central Asia, threatening global peace and security. Afghanistan needs dialogue between different groups ready to hammer out a territorial, judicial, and administrative settlement that leads to a functional union. Only then can we expect the fragile state of Afghanistan to survive.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The Financial Sector Needs to Address Whistleblower Retaliation

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An issue that is causing immediate concern amid the increasingly dictatorial reign of the Taliban is the country’s profound financial crisis. Cut off from international financial institutions and with nearly worth of assets frozen, Afghans can’t rely on humanitarian assistance as aid organizations try to navigate their way around the newly-imposed sanctions regime.

The local currency, the afghani, is in ; down nearly 20% since mid-2021, there doesn’t seem to be a stabilization point in the foreseeable future. Jobs have disappeared, and those lucky enough to be employed frequently are months behind in receiving their salaries. The United Nations fears that the Afghan banking system is on the .

Currency Alternatives

With limited funds remaining in the country, lengthy lines form at the banks and ATMs as Afghans seek access to what little is left — many being left with nothing. In addition to having severely constrained access to cash, purchasing power for the average Afghan is falling quickly, placing them in ever more dire straits. 

This perfect financial storm has led many Afghans to look to decentralized finance as an alternative, and has rapidly moved in to fill the void, just as it has done in other countries facing currency crises. Although crypto is still often highly volatile, Afghans see it as a legitimate source for much-needed cash flow and liquidity. They also increasingly view digital wallets as far more stable than their bank accounts.

Even if cryptocurrencies are not truly decentralized, it is possible that Afghans see cryptocurrency as an escape route from at least one aspect of life under an authoritarian regime. Further adding to crypto’s popularity is its ability to promote financial inclusion for people who often have difficulty gaining access to traditional financial services, like women, most of whom weren’t allowed or able to open a bank account in Afghanistan. 

Greater ease of opening accounts, lower documentation requirements and more affordable fee structures make cryptocurrency a viable and attractive alternative to brick-and-mortar banks and hard currency. Given that crypto financial services are intentionally mobile-friendly, they are much more accessible to the average Afghan than the failing internal banking system.

Connecting Scattered Families

According to the UN, as of last year, nearly 5.9 million Afghans , mostly in neighboring Pakistan and Iran. The number has been on the increase since the Taliban takeover as of new refugees seek asylum in countries across the globe. Migration often leaves families separated and in dire need of resources.

Well before the Taliban administration took power, it was common for Afghans living abroad to help support family members back home. According to the World Bank, in 2020, nearly $800 million, or roughly , streamed into the country in the form of remittances. 

As Afghan banks shut down or limited operations and international payment providers like Western Union suspended operations in Afghanistan due to international sanctions, intra-family transfers became increasingly difficult. Moreover, even those banks that remained open typically did not make simple payment systems like Venmo or Zelle available to their customers.

With cryptocurrency-based payment systems, family members have a solution for bypassing the internal financial problems in the country. The result is an acceleration of crypto use, placing Afghanistan among the in the world for adoption rate.

Links Between Crypto and Terrorism

Unfortunately, crypto’s ability to remain outside mainstream financial and regulatory structures has also made it attractive to terrorist organizations. A recent report from the US attorney general’s Cyber Digital Task Force between cryptocurrency and terrorist organizations: “While public data on terrorist use of cryptocurrency is limited, it is clear that terrorist networks have conducted fundraising operations through Internet-based crowdsource platforms in an attempt to evade stopgaps built into the international banking system.” 

Well-known terrorist organizations from Hamas to the Islamic State use cryptocurrency to create funding networks and purchase supplies for their operations. It is remarkably simple for these groups to leverage extensive social media networks to back their fundraising drives.

Ongoing efforts to disrupt such activity have seen some limited success. For example, US anti-terrorism efforts in 2020 led to civil forfeiture cases and the seizure of more than 300 cryptocurrency accounts containing several million dollars.

Can Crypto Help the Taliban Circumvent Sanctions?

As crypto adoption rates skyrocket, concerns are building in the international community that the Taliban itself will turn to cryptocurrency to sidestep sanctions and cloud financial transparency. All of this raises the question of whether crypto adoption in Afghanistan poses a significant security threat for the rest of the world.   

The Taliban continues to seek international recognition and has stated that failure to do so will have significant consequences for the world. However, it does not appear that recognition is forthcoming. Indeed, the US is unlikely to ever officially recognize the Taliban government, with the group still on its list of .

Without formal recognition, the Taliban regime will continue to struggle to access its international accounts or generate international funding to help alleviate its economic woes. While cryptocurrency might seem like a reasonably effective option for the Taliban government, the complexity of the economic situation in the country precludes a single solution. With governments across the world beginning to introduce stricter regulations on cryptocurrency markets and actively working to prevent access by terrorist organizations, things may not be quite so simple for Afghanistan’s new leaders. 

At least one government has explicitly attempted to counteract US sanctions through cryptocurrency in the past. The embattled regime of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela had teamed with Russian banks to back Evrofinance Mosnarbank, the primary supporter of Venezuela’s proposed national cryptocurrency, the . Maduro claimed that the petro would help Venezuela obtain alternative sources of international financing, despite heavy US sanctions. However, the scheme has not been successful, a sign that similar attempts by the Taliban may be of limited use.

The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan represents an ongoing security threat far beyond its borders. Stability, both political and financial, is certainly in the best interests of the people of Afghanistan and everyone else, including cryptocurrency markets.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The Legacy of America’s Failed War on Terror

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In August, President Joe Biden gave a self-serving blaming everyone except the US for the current situation in Afghanistan. His speech does not withstand close scrutiny, though. If anyone is to blame for the Taliban’s dramatic comeback, it is Uncle Sam. Washington demonstrated breathtaking ignorance, arrogance and stupidity in handing Afghanistan from day one.

Failure to Learn From the Past

To handle Afghanistan better, the United States could have done well to dust off some history books and learn from the playbook of the British Empire. At one point, a mere 6,000 British officials 250 million Indians. The key to British success was not military firepower, but an extraordinary understanding of the subcontinent. They wrote gazettes, drafted reports and charted maps that covered every nook and cranny of the landmass. When retired CIA officer Glenn Carle was struggling to find a Pashtun village more than two decades ago, he had to turn to a colleague to pore over imperial maps in London.

In 1800, Lord Wellesley, the elder brother of the Duke of Wellington and then-governor general of India, Fort William College, the first modern institution of learning in the subcontinent. This institution taught British officials Indian languages and prepared them to rule a landmass that the armies of the British East India Company were conquering rapidly. To this day, the best of British diplomatic and intelligence officials strive to learn local languages. The thoughtful who possibly knows Afghanistan like the back of his hand is a direct heir to none other than Lawrence of Arabia. The US has never had a figure like Lawrence or Rory for good reason.

America has long been the promised land for immigrants. However, these immigrants leave their ancestral lands behind. Two oceans separate the US from the rest of the world. This “maintains nearly 800 military bases in over 90 countries,” but it does not have officers who go “native” unlike their British counterparts. In Afghanistan, American troops and administrators almost invariably relied on interpreters. A staggering interpreters have worked for the American military since 2001.

This overreliance on interpreters has proved toxic. Barely 6% of Afghanistan’s population speaks . By relying on this tiny section of Afghan society, the US was cutting itself off from the vast majority of the country, much of which still lives in the remote and rugged countryside. Over time, much of this English-speaking Afghan elite proved to be self-serving and corrupt.

The classic example of this phenomenon is Ashraf Ghani. The high and mighty in Washington backed Ghani in a murky marred by fraud and misconduct. He spoke flawless English, had worked for the World Bank and had taken up American citizenship. Sadly for the Americans, they bet on the wrong horse. When the Taliban rolled into town, President Ghani failed to put up a fight, fleeing with “$169 million from the state coffers.”

Ignorance of Wider World Is a Systemic Weakness

Afghanistan represents a longstanding American weakness. In 1953, the US conducted a coup in Iran for British interests. They had no idea of the lay of the land and this coup spectacularly backfired in 1978-79, The Iranian Revolution haunts the US to this day. The US failure to understand Vietnam has been examined through books, documentaries and countless commentaries. In Afghanistan, the Americans relied on treacherous Pakistan and used interpreters instead of putting in the hard work to truly understand the people and their culture.

At its core, the Taliban was a peasant-supported movement. They shared this similarity with the Vietcong. The Pew Research Center that 99% of Afghans support making sharia the official law. Frighteningly, 67% of Afghans believe “there is only one possible way to understand sharia.” As Stewart observes in his meticulous on Afghanistan, Afghans have always believed in jihad against non-Muslims. Historically, Pashtuns came down the Khyber Pass to raid the plains of Punjab. The more enterprising ones got as far as the Gangetic plains of India. Babur conquered North India in 1526 from the Pashtun Lodi Dynasty. In 1947, Pakistan unleashed Pashtun irregulars against India and, as I pointed out in the previous article, my grandfather paid the price with his life.

Now that the Taliban are in charge of Kabul, Kashmir is its next target. Both the Taliban and Pakistan have persecuted minorities relentlessly. In September 2002, Dr. Iftikhar H. Malik published a damning on Pakistan for Minority Rights Group International. Nearly 20 years ago, he observed how non-Muslims and even many Muslim groups are treated as second-class citizens and pressured to convert to Islam. The Taliban–Pakistan narrative constantly paints India as a land of “Hindu kafirs” that oppresses fellow Muslims in Kashmir.

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Already, the Taliban–Pakistan move against India is in full swing. In November, nine Indian soldiers lost their lives to “” terror groups. Anas Haqqani, the youngest son of the late Jalaluddin Haqqani and the brother of Taliban’s deputy leader Sirajuddin Haqqani, has visited the of Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi. Haqqani called Ghaznavi “a renowned Muslim warrior & Mujahid of the 10th century.” Ghaznavi raided India 17 times, smashing temples, looting gold and taking back hundreds of thousands of male and female slaves with him.

Haqqani’s tweet celebrated this bloodthirsty medieval sultan as the warrior king “who established a strong Muslim rule in the region from Ghazni & smashed the idol of Somnath.” His brother is the interior minister of Afghanistan and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation offers a reward of $10 million for his arrest. The is responsible for some of the deadliest terror attacks in Afghanistan. From their declarations and actions, it is clear that their next target is jihad in Kashmir.

The Americans have long allowed Pakistan to play Pied Piper not only in Afghanistan, but also in Kashmir. Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US constantly lectured India on human rights, often at the behest of Pakistan. Washington failed to realize that much of the violence in Kashmir was being perpetrated by Pakistanis and Afghan irregulars. In 1995, the Sufi shrine of was razed to the ground by a Pashtun named Mast Gul who remains scot-free in Pakistan.

Once the Taliban took over Afghanistan in 1996, they sent jihadi fighters to Kashmir. Retired CIA officers remark that Muzaffarabad, the largest city in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, became the watering hole for the most hardened Islamists on their way to fight jihad against India. To the west of Muzaffarabad lies Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pashtun-dominated Pakistani province bordering Afghanistan. To its east lie the Kupwara and Baramulla districts of Indian Kashmir.

Because of Kashmir, Indian troops had extensive experience in counterinsurgency against militant jihadists from Afghanistan, which analysts in the US government were as early as 2004. Yet the US neither sought nor heeded Indian advice on Afghanistan. Now that the Taliban are back in power, they will inevitably do what they did in the late 1990s: fight jihad in Kashmir.

Opium Fuels Jihad

Under the Taliban, Afghanistan’s economy has suffered a meltdown. The UN has warned that millions of Afghans might face this winter. Even when American troops were in Afghanistan, there was a in opium poppy production. Now, this production will grow exponentially because the Taliban have no other way to fund the national economy and they cannot afford to alienate local farmers. Europe will not only have to deal with increasing numbers of Afghan refugees, but also skyrocketing heroin imports. The US has absolutely no idea as to how to deal with the Frankenstein’s monster it has unleashed on the world.

For the first time, the world will have to deal with a state whose economy is based on narcotic exports. Globally, 85% of opium is sourced from Afghanistan and the are now running the country. Therefore, it is in the economic interest of the state and its leadership to boost opium production. Pakistan will be a willing ally in the distribution of opium to keep the Taliban regime in power in Afghanistan and avoid more refugees spilling over across the border.

Earlier this year, Zulfikar Majid reported how Kashmir’s drug was worsening. Imports from Afghanistan have been rising so dramatically that even 10-year-olds are falling prey to heroin abuse. Kashmir is now firmly in the crosshairs and the map of Asia might soon be in question. The world has just become a more dangerous place and the US, notwithstanding its retreat from Afghanistan, is no exception.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post After Afghanistan’s Fall to the Taliban, Will Kashmir Be Next? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Reports indicate that the problems facing Afghanistan, particularly economic, have multiplied with the rise of the Taliban. At the same time, no nation in the world has yet recognized the Taliban as the legitimate rulers. The Taliban are known by many Afghans as a group that seized power by military force. It is almost impossible for the people to recognize a group that has committed the worst crimes in recent years, including using car  on civilians. When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, they denied girls the right to seek an education. Since returning to power in August this year, they have doing so.

The Legacy of America’s Failed War on Terror

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Despite they would, the Taliban have not formed an inclusive government. What they mean by inclusiveness is a  made up of only men, the clergy and, most importantly, members of the Pashtun community. Notably, the latter are mostly affiliated with the , a militant group that has close ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Taliban cannot even a government that includes all of their members due to the lack of consensus among themselves.

The Taliban will face challenges in gaining political legitimacy, resolving the economic crisis and maintaining public order. In short, they cannot govern. Taliban militants have been trained to carry out suicide attacks and irregular guerrilla warfare. They are not trained to maintain public order and manage government affairs. For this reason, the future of Afghanistan looks bleak.

Mass Hunger

An increase in poverty is inevitable in Afghanistan. The UN Development Programme reports that  of civilians could plunge below the poverty line by mid-2022. According to a of the World Food Program (WFP), 60% of those living in the northern provinces of Afghanistan are currently suffering from hunger and this figure will likely increase in the months ahead. Aid organizations such as Doctors Without Borders have of an “impending humanitarian crisis.”

There is currently a severe economic crisis in the country. Many civilians, including former employees of NGOs and the previous Afghan government, are either unemployed or have no hope of earning a living. The Taliban have not allowed female staff to return to work, which means that these women, many of whom were the sole breadwinners, have no way to make money for their families. The unskilled and manual labor workforce has now minimal or no income at all. Alarmingly, farmers have suffered due to drought, winter is fast approaching and medical supplies are running in the country’s remote provinces. These incidents take place when the price of raw materials has risen . Millions of children are likely to be malnourished as a result of the growing economic crisis.

The all-male Taliban government is not capable of coping with such problems. It expects the international community to resume financial and humanitarian assistance following a freeze on in August amidst the Taliban takeover. The plight of the people and the impending famine seem to be a winning card that the Taliban are using to  with the international community. Given that it is not in their interest to do so, the Taliban are unlikely to address poverty and unemployment themselves. For this reason, with the arrival of winter, a humanitarian catastrophe will occur.

Yet the Afghan crisis is not only about those suffering from hunger. Aside from mass poverty, a new wave of conflict is likely to come.

Sectarian Violence in Afghanistan

With the rise of the Taliban, violence in Afghanistan has not only increased but has also become more complex. The biggest threat to the country is the Islamic State in Khurasan Province (ISKP), which is at odds with the Taliban. ISKP is affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) group that swept through Syria and Iraq in 2014, and it has launched deadly attacks on the Hazara and Shia minorities in Afghanistan.

On October 8, an ISKP suicide bomber attacked worshipers at a mosque attended by Hazaras in the northern city of Kunduz, killing at least 100  and injuring more than 150. A week later during Friday prayers, ISKP launched another deadly attack on Shia Afghans, this time in the southern Kandahar province. At least  were killed.

According to , the Russian president, militants “from Iraq, Syria with experience in military operations” are entering Afghanistan. Although militias operating under the aegis of the Taliban do not make the group’s fighters much different from Islamic State jihadists — both groups use similar — the influx of foreign terrorists from the Middle East into Afghanistan heralds a much darker future for the country.

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Jihadists entering Afghanistan have more practical and strategic warfare experience in places like Syria and Iraq. In these countries, IS and al-Qaeda leaders recruited people by igniting sectarian tensions. This strategy has previously been used by , a Jordanian militant who led al-Qaeda in Iraq. In 2005, he declared an  against Iraqi Shias, which brought death and destruction to the country. The violent turmoil of the past decade in the Middle East owes much to this strategy.

It can now be said that there is no real government in Afghanistan to stop foreign jihadists from attacking civilians. With this in mind, the gathering of fighters from across the world and the continued attacks on Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara community will eventually turn the country into a field of sectarian strife. Not only is ISKP threatening Afghan Shias, but the Taliban will also not be safe. Reports indicate that Taliban members have occasionally fallen victim to as well.

A Terrifying Future

Civilians in Afghanistan are now facing one of the worst challenges of their lives. The most devastating threat to them is not even mass poverty. Rather, it is the beginning of a much more violent conflict in a country that is on the verge of a new civil war. Indeed, Afghans have become more economically vulnerable, but not all of their problems are reduced to poverty.

We are currently seeing an Afghanistan where neither the media can operate freely, nor can human rights observers monitor impartially. Most of Afghanistan’s skilled workforce has left the country. With journalists and human rights defenders no longer living there and few job opportunities for those who remain, a terrifying future awaits.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Afghanistan Is On the Verge of Disaster appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In 2001, a US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan to dismantle al-Qaeda and search for its leader, Osama bin Laden, who were harbored by the Taliban government. The presence of foreign troops sent al-Qaeda militants into hiding and the Taliban were overthrown.

How 9/11 and the War on Terror Shaped the World

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In declaring his war, Bush gave the international community an unequivocal : to either be “with us or against us in the fight against terror.” In 2003, he took this a step further. He leveraged his power and convinced US allies that Iraq was a state sponsor of terror and its president, Saddam Hussein, had developed weapons of mass destruction, which posed an imminent threat. It wasn’t long before the world found out that this narrative was constructed by the White House as the Bush administration was determined to attack Iraq. The results were devastating: hundreds of thousands of Iraqi , the of over 9 million civilians and the political mayhem that continues to this day.

It has been argued that Islam has been conflated with terrorism not only in the media, but also in much of the political discourse. As a direct result of the war on terror, show that an attack by a Muslim perpetrator receives 375% more attention than if the culprit was a non-Muslim.

As these patterns grew with time, countries started to employ their deterrence capacity under the guise of the “war on terror,” only to undermine those who were resisting regimes or seeking self-determination. This was seen in countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Even Russian leader Vladimir Putin, in 2001, quickly persuaded Western leaders that his country faced similar threats from Islamists and was dealt a carte blanche to crack down with brute force on insurgents and civilians alike.

The foreign occupation of Afghanistan ended in August 2021. After 20 grueling and miserable years, the US pulled out from Afghanistan amidst a Taliban takeover, setting a range of events into motion. Chaos filled Kabul Airport as scores of people were desperate to leave the country. The IMF Afghanistan’s access to hundreds of millions in emergency funds due to a “lack of clarity within the international community” over recognizing a Taliban government.  

The war led to irreparable damages and hundreds of thousands of Afghans paid with their lives. The US spent over on the conflict and had of its soldiers returned in body bags. Today, starving families in Afghanistan are their babies for money to feed their children and the world only looks on.

To understand how we got here, I spoke to Anas Altikriti, a political analyst, hostage negotiator and the CEO of , an organization aimed at bridging the gap of understanding between the Muslim world and the West. In this interview, we discuss America’s handling of the occupation and examine Afghanistan’s next steps now that the Taliban has assumed authority in the country.

The transcript has been edited for clarity.

Kholoud Khalifa: Joe Biden has received a certain amount of backlash from both sides of the aisle for withdrawing abruptly from Afghanistan. What do you make of his decision?

Anas Altikriti: Looking from an American perspective, I believe Biden had no choice. We tend to forget that the president who actually signed the agreement to leave Afghanistan was Donald Trump and his deadline was May of this year. Technically, you can state that Biden was carrying out a decision made by his predecessor. However, in reality — and I think that this is what’s important — any American president would have found it extremely difficult and utterly senseless to carry on a failed venture. Afghanistan and Iraq were utterly horrendous mistakes. If not at the point of conception and theory, the implementation was horrid.

However, from a purely analytical political point of view, Biden had absolutely no choice. The fact that he was going to come in for so much criticism, and particularly from the American right, is no surprise whatsoever. I would like to assume that Biden’s administration had the capacity to foresee that and to prepare for that, not only in terms of media, but also in terms of trying to argue the political perspective. Although in America today, I don’t think that is really useful.

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So, generally speaking, I’m not surprised by the fact that he got attacked, because ultimately speaking, on paper, this was a defeat to the Americans. It was a defeat to the Americans on the 20^th anniversary of 9/11, the day in which the idea started to crystallize in terms of those who wanted to see American basis spread far and wide, and the whole intermittent 20 years has been nothing but an utter and an abject failure. Thousands of American troops have been killed, but on the other side, probably more than a million of Afghan lives have been absolutely decimated — either killed or having to flee their homes and live as refugees elsewhere. The cost has been absolutely incredible, and for that, I think the Americans can contend with themselves, as history will judge this to be a failed attempt from start to finish.

Khalifa: What are your thoughts on the Taliban as a political actor in today’s geopolitical landscape?

Altikriti: Well, we’ll wait and see. There is no question that from the military point of view, the Taliban won. They achieved the victory, and they managed to expel the Americans and to defeat them not only on the ground, but also at negotiating. For almost the past 12 years, there had been negotiations between the Taliban and the Americans either directly or indirectly, whilst at the same time, the Taliban had been fighting against the American presence in Afghanistan and never conceding for a moment on their objective that they wanted a full and complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. That, itself, is something to be taught at political science departments across the world, and it has definitely affected my own curriculum that I teach to students.

Negotiations, as well as being backed by real power, are things that have proven to be extremely beneficial and quite successful in this particular time. Now, that might be easy in comparison to catering to a nation of 40 million that have been devastated for almost three generations — from oppressive regimes to conflicts, to wars, to civil war, to occupation, to absolute and utter devastation to the rise of violence, ideological militancy, to all sorts of issues that have ravaged that nation.

Governing Afghanistan is going to be a totally different kettle of fish. It’s not the same as fighting. You can say that actually fighting a war from mountain tops and caves is relatively easy in comparison with the task ahead. Whether they’re going to be successful or not is something that we wait to see, and I hope for the betterment of the Afghan people that they will be.

The reality is the Taliban have won and in today’s world, they have the right the absolute right to govern. Hopefully, within the foreseeable future, the Afghan people will have the choice to either hold them to account and lay the blame for whatever economic failures, for instance, or otherwise.

This struggle between nations and their regimes is a continuous one. Thankfully, where we live, in the West, that struggle is mostly done on a political plane. So, we fight politically and we hold our politicians accountable through the ballot boxes. That is not present in many, many developing countries. Afghanistan is definitely a country that needs to find its own model as to how to govern and how to create that kind of balance between people and regime. I think it is utterly hypocritical from the West to prejudge them and hold them to ransom via mistakes that happened in the past. Every administration commits mistakes of varying sorts. Our own government in the UK is now being investigated by an independent inquiry staff as to how it dealt with COVID and whether some of its decisions led to the death of thousands of people. So, mistakes can happen.

The West needs to contend with why they left Afghanistan after 20 years of absolute misery and suffering no better than when they came to it in 2001. That’s a question that the West, including the UK, need to ask themselves before passing judgment on to the Taliban.

Khalifa: You mentioned something very interesting. You said we’re waiting to see and we cannot judge them right now. Do we see any hints of change? Has today’s Taliban changed from the Taliban of the pre-US occupation? For example, the Taliban issued a public pardon on Afghan military forces that had tried to eradicate them.

Altikriti: Well, the hints are plenty and the hints are positive. The fact that the Taliban, as you put it, issued that decree that there won’t be any military trials or court marshals being held. The fact that from the very first hours, they said that anyone who wants to leave could leave and they won’t stop them, but that they hope everyone will stay to rebuild Afghanistan. I think from a political and PR point of view, that was a very, very shrewd way to lay out the preface of their coming agenda.

The fact that Taliban leaders spoke openly, and I’ll be honest, in quite impressive narratives and discourses to foreign media — to the BBC, to Sky — and, in fact, took the initiative to actually phoning up the BBC and intervening and carrying out long and extensive interviews. This has never happened before. We could never have imagined that they sit with female correspondents and presenters and spoke freely and openly. Also, the fact that they met with the Shia communities in Afghanistan at the time when they were celebrating Muharram and assured them that everything was going to be fine.

I think a big part of whether Afghanistan succeeds or not lies in the hands of the West. For instance, in the first 24 hours of the Americans leaving in such a chaotic manner, which exemplified the chaos of the Taliban as we know it, the IMF said that funds to Afghanistan would be withheld. Therein begins that kind of Western hegemony, Western colonization that I believe is at the very heart of many problems in what we termed the Third World or the developing world.

The fact that sometimes nations aren’t allowed to progress, they aren’t allowed to rise from the ashes, they aren’t allowed to recover, they aren’t allowed to rebuild, not because of any innate deficiency on their part, but because of the international order that we have today in the world. We have so many restraining legal organizations — from the UN downwards, including the IMF and the World Bank — that hold nations to ransom. Either you behave in a particular way or we’re going to withhold what is essentially yours. It’s an absolute travesty, but unfortunately, this goes across all our radars. There is very little response in terms of saying, hang on, that is neither just nor fair nor democratic.

If you really, really want the betterment of Afghanistan and Afghan people, countries should be piling in, in order to afford help, to afford aid and to make absolutely sure that the Afghan people have everything they need in order to rebuild for the future.

But, unfortunately, the opposite is happening. We’re tying the nation’s hands behind its back and saying, we’re just going to watch and see how you do in that boxing ring, and if you don’t fare well, that will be justification for us to maybe reintervene in one way or another sometime down the line.

Khalifa: After seizing the country, the Taliban promised an inclusive government, with the exception of women. Yet the current government only comprises Taliban members. What are the chances that they deliver on forming an inclusive government?

Altikriti: I’m sort of straddling the line between being an academic and an activist, and I have a foot in both, so it’s sometimes a little bit difficult. However, I would suggest that when the Conservative Party in Britain wins an election, it’s never assumed that they include people from the Labour Party or Liberal Democrats in their next government. The same goes in America: When the Republicans win an election, you can’t reasonably ask or expect of them to include those with incredible minds and capacities from the Democratic Party — you simply don’t.

So, the hope for inclusivity in Afghanistan needs to take that into consideration. The Taliban are the winning party — whether by force or by political negotiations — and therefore, they have the right to absolutely build the kind of government they see fit. For them to then reach out to others would be an incredible gesture.

But I think it’s problematic and hypocritical if the West doesn’t allow the winning party to govern. If after some time it doesn’t manage to, then maybe you’d expect it to reach out to others from outside its own party or from outside its own borders and invite them to come and help out. But that’s not what you expect from day one.

The fact that they haven’t done what many people expected, and I personally have to say I feared would happen, and it hasn’t. So, until we find that media stations closed down, radio stations barricaded and people rounded up — and I hope none of that will happen, but if it does, we hold them to account.

Khalifa: Imran Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan, says the international community must engage with the Taliban, avoid isolating Afghanistan and refrain from imposing sanctions. He says the “Taliban are the best bet to get rid of ISIS.” What’s your view on that?

Altikriti: If we’re looking back at their track record, they were the ones who managed to put an end to the civil war that broke out after the liberation from the Soviet Union. I mean, for about five to six years, Afghanistan was ravaged with a civil war, warlords were running the place amok. I remember an American journalist said the only safe haven in Afghanistan was something like a 20-square-meter room in a hotel in the center of Kabul. The Taliban came in and created a sense of normality, once again in terms of putting an end to the civil war. There remained only one or two factions that were still in resistance, but otherwise, the Taliban managed to actually bring Afghanistan to order.

It was only after 9/11 and the US intervention that returned the country back into a state of chaos. So, if we’re going to take their track record into consideration, then it’s only fair to say that they do have the experience, the expertise and the track record that shows that they can bring some semblance of normality and peace.

Now, obviously, we understand that Afghanistan is not disconnected from its regional map and from the regional politics that are at play, including the Pakistani-Indian conflict. It’s no secret that the Taliban were looked after and maintained by the Pakistani intelligence. I understand from the negotiations that were taking place since 2010 that there was almost always a member of the Pakistani intelligence present at the table. So, it’s not a secret that Pakistan saw that in order to quell the so-called factions that represented the mujahideen, the Taliban were its safest bet.

In that sense and from that standpoint, you would suggest that the Taliban are best equipped. Much of what was going on in Afghanistan was based on cultures, traditions and norms that Americans were never ready to embrace, understand or accept. That’s why they fell foul so many times of incidents, which could have been easily appeased with only a little bit of an understanding and of an appreciation of fine cultural or traditional intricacies and nuances. The Taliban wouldn’t have that issue.

So, you would suggest that what Imran Khan said has some ground to stand on. It’s a viable theory. But everything that we’re talking about will be judged by what see is going to happen. But before we do that, we need to allow the Taliban the time, so that when we come to say, listen, they fail, we have grounds and evidence to issue such a judgment.

Khalifa: I want to shift to the US. So we know that there was a US-led coalition, and its presence for over 20 years in Afghanistan and in the Middle East led to very little change in the region. You already alluded to that at the very beginning. The US spent trillions of dollars and incurred the highest death toll out of the coalition members. What has the US learned from this experience?

Altikriti: I think that’s the question we should be focused on. I fear that it has learned virtually nothing and that’s very worrying. Just like we were passing pre-judgments on the Taliban, we need to do the same everywhere. If that’s the kind of ruler that we’re using to judge a straight line, it’s the same ruler we need to judge every straight line.

We heard the statements that emerged from Washington, and to be perfectly honest, very, very few were of any substance. Ninety-nine percent, and this is my own impression, were about America looking back and how they let down the translators and the workers in the alliance government and left them at their own fate. The tears were shed, both in the British Parliament as well as the American Congress, which actually shows that these people didn’t get it. They didn’t get it and that is what worries me the most.

If something as huge as Afghanistan and what happened — this wasn’t a car crash that happened in a split second. This was something that was led over the course of the last 17 years and definitely since President Trump signed the agreement with the Taliban in 2020. This should have been a time for politicians and analysts to actually read the situation and read the map properly. But it seems that they never did and they never bothered to see if there was any need or inclination to take lessons from it.  

I’m yet to come across a decision-maker, a lawmaker, a politician, a senior adviser to come out and say there were horrendous mistakes carried out by the occupation and by the other alliance governments that led to this, and as a result, we need to learn what to do and not do in future. But there is this arrogance and pride that forbids us from doing so, and as such, they’re inclined to make the same mistake time and time and time again.

Khalifa: Given that the so-called war on terror, and more specifically the occupation in Iraq, was an utter failure, what is the probability in your opinion that America will engage in another foreign intervention?

Altikriti: From a purely political view, I find this extremely far-fetched in the foreseeable future. The reasons being that Americans had to endure bruising at every single level and because of the crippling economic crisis. So, it’s extremely difficult to launch an intervention or military intervention in the way that we saw in Iraq, Afghanistan or Panama in the next two to three years. But the thing is, often, American politics is driven by corporate America.

I mean, we talk about the trillions spent, but like someone said in an article I read in The Washington Post, that those trillions were more than made up by American corporations, by American oil, by getting their hands on certain minerals in Afghanistan. Even the drug trade itself, which Britain and America thought they would quell, it was actually the Taliban who brought it under control, who actually went around and burnt the poppy seed farms. The West reinvigorated that tradeline and stabilized it. Therefore, as a friend of a friend tells me, he says many of those who were scrambling for airplanes in Kabul Airport were poppy seed farmers because they knew that they had absolutely no future under the Taliban.

So, once we count the trillions incurred by the taxpayer, we forget that there is another side that you and I probably don’t even know that is gaining riches at the expense of the Afghans.

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The beast now is to try out new weapons. Lockheed Martin and others will always have a vested interest in trying out the new technology, and what’s better than to try it out in real-life situations? If I was to speak to any modern, contemporary, 30-something-year-old military analysts, they’d laugh me off because I’m speaking about a bygone age. We’re talking now about wars where we don’t involve human beings. I mean, in terms of the assailants, they’re flying drones, and there’s an intelligence level to it that I can’t fathom nor understand.

Another aspect that no one is talking about almost is the privatization of militaries. We’re coming now to find brigades, thousands of troops that are mercenaries, people who fight for a wage. Now, this is the new way to fight wars: Why would Britain employ some of its brightest and youngest when it could pay ÂŁ100 a day to have someone else fight wars on its behalf? And this is now becoming a multibillion-dollar industry. It first started out as a reality in Iraq, when we had the likes of Blackwater who were guarding the airports, presidential palaces and government officials. You’d try to speak to them only to realize they were from Georgia or Mozambique or elsewhere, and they don’t fall under the premise of local law. Therefore, if they kill someone by mistake, you can’t take them to court and that’s the contract you sign. That is where I think the danger lies.

Khalifa: In 2010, you appeared on Al Jazeera’s “Inside Iraq” alongside the late Robert Fisk and Jack Burkman, a Republican strategist. Burkman described Arabs and Muslims as a “bunch of barbarians in the desert” and the Bush administration as the savior bringing change. With its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, has the US perceptions of Arabs and Muslims changed, and if so, how?

Altikriti: I’d love to have a chat with Jack right now to see what he thinks 11 years on. To answer your question, it saddens me to say that yes, it’s changed, but only because America and American society are so polarized and so divided. It only took Donald Trump to become president or 50% of Americans to defy everything that Trump said. Being anti-Trump meant standing up for Muslims when he issued the Muslim ban for flights. So, people from their standpoint of being anti-Trump said, no, Muslims are welcome. It’s absolutely the wrong way to go on about it. That’s not how we recognize, for instance, that racism is wrong or evil.

However, the fact is that in the past, anti-Muslim sentiments were everywhere and the feelings that Jack Burkman expressed so horribly in that interview were widespread. I personally believe they still remain because 9/11 has become an industry and that industry has many facets to it. Part of it is ideological, part is media, part is educational and obviously part transpires into something that is military or security-based.

We still have Guantanamo. Why is it that the American people aren’t talking about Guantanamo to the extent that they should be? This is something that is on the conscience of every single American citizen — it is paid from their own taxes. Why no one talks about it is simply because no one dares touch the holy grail — the industry of 9/11. It’s a huge, huge problem.

I still believe that those sentiments expressed by Jack back then are still prevalent, but like I said, they were mitigated by the advent of Trump and by his declaration against Arabs and Muslims. This, as well as the highlighting of certain issues by the left in America, such as the gross crimes committed by the Saudi regime and that’s helped in two ways. Firstly, you expose the crimes committed by Saudis, but it’s also cemented that view that Arabs are barbarians.

Khalifa: Afghanistan wasn’t the only country that suffered. Iraq suffered more dire and devastating consequences from the so-called war on terror. What does a future look like for Iraq now that the US has withdrawn?

Altikriti: Oh, very grim, very, very grim. The Americans haven’t withdrawn — they’re less visible. There are current negotiations regarding the next Iraqi government in the aftermath of the elections that we’ve just had, which shows that the Americans are heavily involved.

Iraq is the playground of Iran. So, therefore, any policy of America or Britain or Europe that involves Iran has to have Iraq in the middle.

There are still about three or four American military bases, and from time to time, we hear the news that certain militias targeted this base or that base where Americans lie. Now, the personnel who are there within the bases might carry ID cards as construction workers, advisers, legal experts, bankers or whatever. But ultimately, they’re all there to represent the best interests of the United States. So, America is still there.

However, Iraq is in dire straits. I think the indices that go around every year that show us levels of corruption, levels of transparency, levels of democracy, levels of happiness of people and satisfaction — Iraq is regarded as one of the 10 worst countries on every single level. I think that shows what’s been done to Iraq and what’s been done to the Iraqi people.

The fact is that we have at least 30% of the Iraqi people living as refugees, either within Iraq or outside of Iraq. The fact that in an election only 20% of the people choose to take part.

You have to ask serious questions. You have to say, OK, so when the Americans accused Iran — and I’m a believer that Iran is the worst of all players in Iraq. But you have to ask: So you occupied the country, why did you allow it to happen? So, you can’t just brush it off and say, well, the Iranian militias and its people and its proxy agents in the sun. Well, what were you doing there? So, I think that, again, what has been done to Iraq and to all Iraqis — regardless of their faith, regardless of their sect, regardless of their ethnicity — all of what has happened is a stain. A huge, huge one on the consciousness of everyone in Britain, America, Spain and all the countries that signed up for this and took part in this, everyone has a responsibility to answer.

I mean, obviously, when we spoke about Afghanistan, we didn’t speak about the crimes, the actual crimes that were committed. The one that we come to recognize and know about is the crimes committed by the Australians, where they actually trained the young cadets to shoot at people and kill them to be acknowledged as soldiers. We didn’t talk about that because there are so many of those that were committed. To speak not of Arab and Muslim barbarity, but of Western barbarity — that’s something I think should be discussed.

Khalifa: In Egypt, it was a military coup in 2013 that overthrew a democratically elected government led by the Muslim Brotherhood. In Tunisia, a constitutional change led to the fall of Ennahda, an Islamist party. In Morocco, it was the people who voted out the Justice and Development Party, which ruled the country for 10 years and suffered a massive defeat in September; they went from having 125 seats to only 12. To juxtapose this, in Afghanistan, the Taliban conquered the country overnight from the US, the most powerful country in the world. What message does this send to Islamist parties in the Muslim world?

Altikriti: Only yesterday, I was discussing this with a group of colleagues, and someone repeated a statement that was sent to me by a fellow of Chatham House. He said to me something quite interesting. He said: “Don’t you see that many around the world, particularly young Muslims, will be looking to Afghanistan — and three months ago in Palestine and what happened there — and think to themselves that the way forward is to carry guns.” I said: “Listen, my friend, you’re saying it. I’m not.”

But in reality, it’s unfortunate that many of my own students are saying, “It’s been proven.” I mean, they say, “you academics, you always talk about empirical evidence. Well, here it is: Politics doesn’t work. Democracy doesn’t work. The ballot box does not work. What does work? There you go, you have Taliban, you have the militias. So go figure.” Unfortunately, that is the kind of discussion that I think will dominate the Muslim scene, particularly the political Muslim scene.

For the next few years, I believe, whilst we analyze political Islam and Islamic parties, whether in Egypt, Morocco or Tunisia, that will be the question. Is it a viable argument to say that these parties will have absolutely no chance, either immediately in the short run or in the long run? In Tunisia, they were allowed to run for about 10 years. In Morocco, they were in government for about 10 years. Before that, they were in opposition and they were thriving. But in Egypt, they weren’t allowed to stay for more than a year. So, ultimately, the end is inevitable. So, is it the need to shift and change tactics? It’s going to be quite an interesting and, at times, problematic discussion, but it’s a discussion you need to have.

And last, by the way, on this particular point, the West did not allow democracy, particularly in Egypt and in Tunisia, to exist. We spoke of democracy, we spoke of human rights, we spoke of freedoms, but when they all came to be crushed, the West did absolutely nothing, which told the others well, you know what? They don’t care, there are no consequences, and that is why it is that many, many Muslim youth today will say, well, there’s only one way to go there.

Khalifa: And lastly, what do you believe are the core causes for Islamic extremist groups, i.e., Daesh or al-Qaeda, to still have a foothold in the region, and in your opinion, what is the best way to combat these groups?

Altikriti: Their biggest arguments, and which works well for them, is the fact that democracy failed and that they got nothing from buying into Western values of how to run their societies.

Their biggest argument now will be the Taliban and how they won. So, those are the main standpoints [for] these extremist groups; they lie on people’s frustrations and their feelings that there is no other way out. That’s essentially the argument. I’ve seen it in groups where someone is trying to recruit for that idea. Their bottom line is it doesn’t work. There is no other way — that’s their only argument.

It’s not theological, by the way. People think they are basing it on these Quranic verses or on hadiths [sayings of Prophet Muhammad], but they absolutely do not, because on that particular front, they lose, they have no ground to stand on. [For them,] it’s the fact that, in reality, it doesn’t work — democracy doesn’t work. Human rights doesn’t work. Because ultimately, your human rights mean nothing to those in power. So, killing us is as easy as killing a chicken. It’s nothing. That is their argument.

So, it’s going to be a struggle, it’s going to be a big, big, big struggle for people who want to advocate democracy, want to advocate civil society and diversity. It’s a struggle we can’t afford not to have, we can’t afford not to be in there, because the outcome, the costs will be so hefty on every single part and no one will be excluded.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In 2013, he wrote a tour de force about in his country. Pakistanis, especially in Punjab and Sindh, might have a love for the bottle, but they have to pay obeisance to hardline clerics who have now defined the state. Instead of Scotch, army messes now serve Rooh Afza, a sugary syrup popular across the Indian subcontinent.

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More importantly, the Pakistani army has created a Frankenstein’s monster that is increasingly out of control. In 2013, the identified the growing Islamization of the army as a security threat for the United States. Starting with the first Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48, Pakistan used militant Islamists to mobilize Pashtun tribesmen against Kashmir.

This began the patron-client relationship between the Pakistani army and militant Islamists that has become deeper with time. The journal correctly predicted that the army “would again support a Taliban takeover of Kabul,” the Afghan capital. Once Kabul fell, the journal took the view that “Afghanistan and Pakistan [would] again become places that jihadis [could] freely roam.”

The Bloody Past of Jihad

My family has vivid memories of the first Pakistan-supported Pashtun jihad in 1947 in Kashmir. My great-grandfather was the first Kashmiri Pandit killed in the town of Varahamula, now known as Baramulla. The Pashtuns tied his dead body to a horse and dragged it through the streets to terrorize the local population into submission.

It was not only Pandits who suffered at the hands of the tribesmen. Fellow Muslim Kashmiris and even Europeans were subjected to murder, robbery and rape. In a haunting account, noted British journalist has documented the massacre at St. Joseph’s Mission in Baramulla during that invasion. 

After 1948, members of my community suffered from growing Islamization in Kashmir aided and abetted by Pakistan and eventually became victims of jihadi ethnic cleansing in . The indigenous Kashmiri Pandits had to flee their homeland to the plains of India after millennia of continuous habitation in the beautiful Himalayan valley. They have now become refugees in their own country and have yet to get justice, reparation or rehabilitation.

Like Kashmiri Pandits, Afghans have also had to flee their ancestral lands. This trend kicked off when the Soviets moved into Afghanistan in 1979. In June 1985, National Geographic published the photograph of , a 12-year-old-refugee from Afghanistan. Her haunting green eyes aroused the compassion of the world. Once described as the Third World’s Mona Lisa, Gula did not go on to have an easy life. In 2016, she was arrested “for using a forged Pakistani identity card—a common practice among the 1 million Afghan refugees who live in the country without legal status.” 

If Gula provided the striking image for Afghanistan during the endgame of the Cold War, the of Taliban fighters standing in front of the iconic painting of Ahmad Khan Abdali with their weapons in full view defines the new era unveiling before our eyes. In that painting, a Sufi saint anoints Abdali as the shah of Afghanistan by touching his forehead with a chaff of wheat. Culturally, the authority and legitimacy of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of the Durrani dynasty, the last of the Afghan empires, came from a Sufi saint.

Today, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has seized power through the barrel of the gun. The Sufi chaff of wheat be damned. With the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, death and devastation will stalk the land, leaving little alternative for the likes of Gula to flee for their lives despite grim prospects across the border.

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In contrast to the divinely ordained shah, an is “a military commander, governor of a province, or a high military official.” The fact that the Taliban have proclaimed Afghanistan to be an emirate demonstrates their nakedly militaristic worldview. Their authority and legitimacy derive from unabated conquest. The Taliban is running a fundamentally anachronistic anti-democratic regime with little regard to the rights of women or minorities, whether ethnic or religious.

The Dangerous Role of Pakistan

The victory of the Taliban is a great boost for Pakistan, a state that has used terror as an instrument of state policy for decades on both its eastern and western fronts. In the early 1990s, some members of the Afghan mujahideen who had fought the Soviets and younger Pashtun tribesmen who studied in Pakistani madrassas came together to the Taliban. From the early days, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a key role in their spectacular success.

In November 1994, the Taliban captured Kandahar and, in September 1996, its fighters seized Kabul. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Tajik president at the time, fled for his life. Later in 1996, the Taliban declared Afghanistan an Islamic emirate. This time around, they are better trained and better equipped than in the past. They have that executions and amputations will be back. The Taliban have hung bodies in public squares of the historic city of , a little over 120 kilometers from Iran. The Taliban are unleashing a reign of terror in Afghanistan thanks both to the ruthlessness of their fighters and the backing of Pakistan. Intelligence officials from many countries have said that Pakistan has deployed ISI agents, special forces and Chinese-built drones in Panjshir Valley.

Pakistan’s current reputation as the world’s global for jihad is a result of disastrous decisions by both populist and fanatical leaders. In 1974, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto brought in a constitutional amendment that declared the Ahmadiyya community to be non-Muslim. In another 2013 piece, identified this act “as the starting point of what began to mutate into a sectarian and religious monstrosity in the next three decades.”

General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq ousted Bhutto through a military coup and had him hanged on the gallows. The general’s first move as the army chief was to change Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s original army from “Unity, Faith, and Discipline” to “Faith, Piety, and Jihad for the sake of Allah,” a change that has come to define the army today. With more religious lower-middle-class young men joining the officer class, there is not even a hairline separation between elements of the Taliban and the Pakistani army. The Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will not just be Pakistan’s strategic depth but instead its sword arm. 

The Taliban inspire not only Pakistanis but also many Indian Muslims. They are , a Sunni Islamic revivalist movement that was founded in 1866, eight years after the bloody 1857-58 Indian rebellion that shook the British Empire to its core. In 1858, the indirect rule of the British East India Company ended. The Mughal Empire was formally dissolved and the Crown took over. Many Muslims regarded the end of Mughal rule as a catastrophe and some charismatic preachers began the Darul Uloom Islamic seminary in Deoband, a town in the northwestern region of India’s most populous state of Uttar Pradesh close to Delhi.

In a recent feature article, American journalist of the National Public Radio covers the roots of the Taliban. She notes that Maulana Arshad Madani, the 80-year-old head of Deoband’s Darul Uloom, expressed admiration for the Taliban kicking out the Americans from Afghanistan. She quotes the cleric as saying, “I’m weak and old, but if given the chance, I would go to Afghanistan.” More worryingly, Madani has supported the Taliban policy to completely men and women in educational institutions. He thinks women should wear hijab and not participate in sports. has also warned of another partition if the Hindu right tampers with Indian secularism.

Like Madani, many Pakistanis are by the victory of the Taliban and some see it as a divine sign of God’s will. Religious extremists are already demanding greater Islamization and the imposition of sharia. Already, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has to the mullahs, abandoning the domestic violence and forced conversion bills. Hardline clerics argue that these bills contradict Islamic teachings. Given such a zeitgeist, it is little surprise that many analysts predict that terrorist attacks will increase. 

India fears increased infiltration by Pakistan of Taliban Pashtuns into Kashmir and yet another cycle of violence. What is emboldening the Pakistanis is support from Turkey. , writing for The National Interest, argues that there is already a tacit working relationship between these two countries to establish a borderless Islamic imperium. Khan has championed the superhit Turkish action-adventure series called “” about “Muslim Oghuz Turks fighting invading Mongols, Christian Byzantines and the fanatic Knights Templar Crusaders in Anatolia (now modern-day Turkey) of the 12^th century.” After turning to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan is now turning to Turkey for its cultural identity.

It is also important to note that the current Pakistani government is led by a Pashtun and is far more pro-Taliban than its predecessors. This increasing of Pakistan is making intelligence officials worry about Pakistan as a potential source for nuclear proliferation. Marvin Kalb, a nonresident senior fellow at , has just written about “the agonizing problem of Pakistan’s nukes.” The specter of “jihadis taking control of a nuclear weapons arsenal” of about 200 warheads is a very real one. There is also the scenario of mid-level officers conspiring to release or sell warheads to militant groups. 

For the World

The international community has been worrying about the security of nuclear facilities for over a decade. In 2008, Mohamed El Baradei, then head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that “nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of an extremist group in Pakistan or in Afghanistan.” Later that year, , a senior analyst of the EastWest Institute, observed that an increasingly overstretched military and rising Islamic extremism was increasing the risk of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands.

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Over the last 75 years, the steady spread of Islamic extremism in Pakistan and then Afghanistan has left the international community confused at best and paralyzed at worst. Leaders in world capitals have ignored long-term trend lines that began with the use of Pashtun tribesmen to invade Kashmir in 1947. Now, the 20-year war on terror has ended in an ignominious American retreat even more dangerous than Vietnam, giving a shot in the arm to the likes of Madani in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. 

In the light of the debacle in Afghanistan, US senators are seeking an assessment of Pakistan’s in Afghanistan. Some are proposing sanctions. This has caused stock market prices to fall and the Pakistani rupee to drop to a record low. Pakistan’s economic woes are expected to boost radicalization further. Vikram Sood, the former chief of India’s intelligence agency R&AW, has repeatedly warned about Pakistan becoming a center of a new global . He is not alone. US General Mark Milley is worried about rising regional instability along with “the security of Pakistan and its ˛ą°ů˛ő±đ˛Ô˛ą±ô˛ő.”&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;

Many senior American military and intelligence officials estimate that the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has not only to the region but also to the US. Europeans are worrying about terror threats and yet another flood of refugees. The world faces a clear, present and unprecedented danger that will only grow with time. A rogue nuclear strike would make the 9/11 attacks of 2001 look like insignificant firecrackers.

Washington’s decades-long fixation with Iran and North Korea has obscured the reality that the Taliban and Pakistan present the greatest global security threat. Therefore, the major powers and the international community must come together to contain both the Taliban and their patron Pakistan before millions of innocents lose their lives.

*[This article is the first of a three-part series analyzing the fallout of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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This security complex is the reason for the increasingly authoritarian tactics employed by the CCP, including the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang intended to suppress Uighur separatism, and the creation of the in the world to function alongside an Orwellian to control citizens at microlevel.

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The idea is simple: If the CCP controls everything and everyone, then security can always be guaranteed. Within China, this is mostly true. To the best of our knowledge, there have not been any major terrorist attacks within China in recent years, the economy has slowed but not halted, and there are no major social movements or actors who can contest the CCP’s authority. Brutal and authoritarian, the Chinese system of social fascism seems to have achieved its goals.

Security Means Control, Control Means Security

However, problems arise when China attempts to apply this absolute control to foreign policy. When eight Chinese nationals were by Zambia’s police force in 2017 as part-time officers, the strategy of exporting China’s authoritarian domestic policy seemed apparent. Zambia is home to major Chinese investment and a sizeable diaspora, prompting Beijing to attempt to exert control over it to ensure security following the same logic used on the mainland.

Zambians reacted with outrage, drawing parallels to European colonization. Ultimately, the officers were forced to , prompting Beijing to get more creative about how it imposes power so as not to cause backlash again.

Without a physical police presence on the ground, artificial intelligence provided the answer to Beijing’s needs. By 2019, according to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, high-tech surveillance systems have been exported to over — more than half of which had signed up to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)— deploying traffic cameras and facial-recognition technology. In Zambia, an investigation by the Wall Street Journal revealed that Huawei technicians allegedly helped the government to on and track down opposition figures.

It was a win for the Zambian leadership, which hoped to its position further with Chinese support. But even if it did care to protest against China’s schemes to gain greater leverage over the nation, the authorities in Lusaka have little recourse as they are currently $6.6 billion in to China.

Of course, China promised Zambia it would be able to pay back this debt with unrealistically explosive growth through infrastructure expansion. But Zambia has struggled to come up with the money and finds itself stuck in what some have characterized as “debt-trap diplomacy,” a strategy of controlling a nation by first overpromising and straddling it with debt, then failing to deliver, refusing to participate in collective restructuring and finally .

Some that China is simply an exploratory investor testing and prodding the markets, but the strategy has played out across dozens of countries to date, and a study of Chinese landing contracts by AidData, a research lab at William and Mary, reveals that the debt trap is both . Chinese contracts include extensive non-disclosure agreements for the borrowing side and are “shrouded in secrecy.”

The authors state that “China is a muscular and commercially-savvy lender to developing countries” which doesn’t allow borrowers to participate in collective restructuring with Paris Club countries, concluding that “Default triggers of the sort we have identified in Chinese debt contracts potentially amplify China’s economic and political influence over a sovereign borrower.”

The strategy playing out in Zambia has resulted in toward China, increased , and more concessions to China in order to pay back that debt. Not only this, but China’s policy in Zambia has only created a hostile environment for Chinese nationals as well. The fixation with controlling foreign nations through surveillance or debt has not led to an increase in security but instead fostered new forms of insecurity in host nations.

Fueling Insecurity

Pakistan is another example of this security dilemma. Even though China has flagged Pakistan as its key partner in the BRI, it is still being crushed under the weight of its in debt. Again, Islamabad has downplayed this, stating that there will be eventually if Pakistan keeps following the CCP’s lead, even if it means allowing China to lease the nation’s southern port in Gwadar for the next 40 years to be able to make payments on its loans.

In a bus traveling to a construction site in northern Pakistan was attacked by a suicide bomber, killing nine Chinese nationals. In , Chinese engineers were targeted in a bombing that left two children dead in the port of Gwadar. Previously, in , gunmen attacked a stock exchange in Karachi, citing China’s exploitative investments in Baluchistan province as motivation for the attack.

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The violence stems again from the unfairness of the Chinese contracts, demanding concessions that don’t benefit the local population but China’s bottom line. In Baluchistan, this means that China is mining resources like copper and gold while the impoverished themselves see no dividends from the minerals they live atop of. They see themselves as being stripped of the bounty of their land and having to share their already meager .

All the while, regarding China’s investments in Pakistan have continued, with local communities facing food shortages because of China’s exploitation of resources like fishing.

More Chinese investment, more concessions, more discontent, more insecurity: The more Beijing attempts to straddle its international partners with debt and use this debt to exert control over their assets, making decisions regarding economic development and forcing them further into China’s orbit, the more insecurity is created for both the host nations and the Chinese nationals there.

Making the Same Mistakes

However, China has not learned its lesson and is now poised to double down on its mistakes again in Afghanistan. Just a few weeks before the Taliban seized control of the country in August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi with the head of the Taliban’s political commission, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. The meeting solidified China’s stance on the Taliban: They are the of the Afghan people, even if few of the people agree.

The truth is that the CCP is far from considering what the will of the people is, be it in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Zambia. What they care much more about is that the Taliban are the ones in charge and that the group desperately needs aid and international recognition, both of which China can provide. If China delivers on those important factors then, perhaps, Beijing can exert control, secure investments, combat terrorism and possibly extend its domestic crackdown to living in Afghanistan.

The process has already begun. A group of landed in Kabul in early September. While Afghanistan remains on the brink of a humanitarian disaster, China seems to be looking into the future, to a day when Afghanistan is ready for its first surveillance cameras and debt. So far, Beijing has been among the first to start delivering to Afghanistan.

It seems to be a match made in heaven, with Afghanistan’s geostrategic position serving as a great asset for the Belt and Road Initiative. Likewise, the nation has sizeable mineral wealth and could provide Chinese manufacturers with a steady source of much-needed materials for manufacturing. Deals have yet to be made between the Taliban and China, but the future looks bright from Beijing’s vantage point.

However, this scenario is only likely to materialize if the Taliban can be trusted and controlled. If history is any indicator at all, they cannot. Instead, the Taliban’s promises to the CCP will follow a long track record of saying what is most convenient to get what the Talibs want, then reneging on their promises as soon as it is safe to do so.

The Taliban did this in their negotiations with the former Afghan government, agreeing to talks, promising that they are looking for a diplomatic solution while waiting for an opportune moment to take Kabul by force. Again, they promised that when they come to power, they would respect women and minority rights but have already the rights of women and have begun the Hazara from their homes.

Likewise, the Taliban had promised amnesty for all who collaborated with foreign militaries or the former Afghan government but have stated the commitment to return to their pre-2001 use of while running door-to-door .

The problem is a lack of understanding — or a desire to understand — on the part of the CCP just who the Taliban are. Just as in Zambia, without considering the nation’s legacy of colonialization, China attempted to impose a police presence. In Pakistan, China’s indiscriminate exploitation of resources causes upheaval. Now in Afghanistan, Beijing makes deals with those who have committed countless barbaric acts of terrorism based on the belief that the Taliban will kowtow if given what they want: recognition, aid and money.

What the CCP fails to understand about its dealings in Afghanistan is that the Taliban are extremists. They believe that those who do not follow their interpretation of Islam are kufr — unbelievers. To them, unbelievers are fair game: They can be lied to, cheated, poisoned, killed; it doesn’t matter, for the unbelievers are going to hell regardless. This is why the Taliban will take what China has to offer, then turn around and open the door for al-Qaeda to train Uighur separatists in Afghanistan.

There are already signs that the Taliban are double-crossing the Chinese. The group’s new chief of army staff, , holds close ties to the Uighur separatist Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). The new minister of the interior and current leader of the Haqqani Network, , also maintains close ties to al-Qaeda, which continues to .

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Whether or not these fighters or other Islamists have or will become active in Xinjiang is unknown, especially given China’s extreme censorship around . But it is likely that they will pose a security risk to Chinese projects and nationals in Afghanistan just as insurgent groups do in Pakistan.

The reality of China’s alignment with the Taliban is that the Chinese Communist Party is purchasing a false sense of security. Beijing knows the Taliban are in control and believes it can hold them on a leash. What it doesn’t understand is that the Taliban are not pets, and that both China and the world at large are more insecure with terrorists in charge.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post China’s Policy of Illusory Security Is Destined to Fail in Afghanistan appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The one issue on which both may have agreed is the growing need for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. The UN and various international NGOs have alerted the international community to the imminent faced by the Afghan people, especially inadequate health care and food shortages. Many of the 12 million at-risk Afghans are children.

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To complicate matters, with only 2.2 million Afghans prior to the Taliban takeover, COVID-19 infections are on the rise. Starved of resources, hospitals and clinics lack basic medicines, and staff is forced to work without pay. Then there is the country’s fast-approaching, notoriously harsh winter when food and fuel come at a premium.

Aware of the pending crisis, the earlier this week at an emergency meeting called for and hosted by Italy agreed to respond, though no specific pledges were made. Attendees, while aware of the need to coordinate any assistance effort with the Taliban, also expressed concerns over the Taliban’s commitment to fighting terrorism, specifically mentioning the Islamic State’s (IS) Khorasan faction inside Afghanistan, known as ISK.

Where’s Our Money?

Part of the humanitarian problem stems from the inability of the Taliban to access Afghanistan’s international accounts, frozen by most of the Western governments in whose banks the funds had been deposited. The asset freeze was imposed almost immediately after the Taliban took control. Of the estimated $9 billion in frozen accounts, $7-$8 billion are believed held in US banks, and the Taliban want it. They assert that they can’t care for their citizens properly without it.

As reflected in the G20 discussions, the US and other governments don’t necessarily dispute the claim but also know full well that the Taliban may, and likely will use any unfrozen funds for other purposes, some not at all to the liking of those governments, such as weapons, aid to terrorist groups, support for their drug trade, etc.

The US and other governments are also well aware of the Taliban’s egregious mismanagement of the Afghan economy when they previously ran the country from 1996 to 2001. Their gross ineffectiveness brought the economy to its knees and their strong affiliation with al-Qaida put the country off-limits to outside aid.

Today, it is fair to ask whether the Taliban have learned anything about economic management since they were toppled by the US in 2001. Unless they are willing to accept genuine experts from the previous regime without prejudice, it’s difficult to believe that 20 years of fighting their way back into political power has taught them much about finance, monetary policy, macroeconomic planning, budgeting, banking or any of the other responsibilities that are needed of competent governments to responsibly manage an economy for 40 million people.

Show Us the Goods

With winter on the way, the Americans are acutely aware of the need to start humanitarian assistance now. But they have their own list of wants. These include fighting terrorism, adhering to basic human rights norms and respecting the rights of women and girls, including to equal education, health care and employment opportunities.

Additionally, the US has a number of citizens who could not be repatriated in the rushed evacuation effort that followed the Taliban’s capture of Kabul and the fall of the previous government. Thousands of Afghans who had worked for the US during its 20-year presence in Afghanistan were also left behind. The US wants immediate and unhindered departure of these individuals and their families, if they freely elect to leave.

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Following the meeting, a Taliban spokesman announced that the Americans had agreed to provide humanitarian assistance. But there was no official confirmation from the US side, and there likely won’t be until it receives some affirmative responses to its demands from the Taliban.

That holds particularly true for the frozen Afghan assets. Without airtight commitments from the Taliban followed by genuine action, the Americans will continue to withhold the Afghan funds. It’s leverage, and right now, it’s the only means the US has of assuring some of its basic requirements for the Taliban government are met. Needless to say, trust on either side likely hovers around zero. Therefore, it’s all about, “What are you going to do for me?” The fact that the Afghan people may bear the brunt of the suffering for this position is unquestionably tragic.

Stepping Up to Responsibilities

The US demands, as well as those of the rest of the international community, are reasonable, basic and expected of a responsible and competent governing authority in any country. So, the Taliban face their first test of governance. Having prevailed in their two-decade struggle, they now need to demonstrate they can govern. That the fate of millions of innocent Afghans hangs in the balance is an unfortunate consequence. But consider it a yardstick of Taliban goodwill to their own people.

Nevertheless, neither the US nor the rest of the international community will be able to ignore for long the increasing need — soon to be desperation — of the Afghan people. Soon, some interim solution will be necessary whereby international NGOs and UN humanitarian organizations can enter and operate in the country to provide and distribute goods and services to meet basic human needs, starting with essential food items, medicines and health care. The G20, working with the UN, may be the best approach for that.

But such an emergency effort will do little to get the Afghan economy on its feet. Much more is necessary, starting with the release of the frozen assets. That will mean the Taliban stepping up to its responsibilities and likely not before.

The Biden administration — already under some pressure at home over an ambitious domestic economic agenda stalled in Congress and the humiliating manner in which the Afghanistan withdrawal unfolded — isn’t about to complicate matters by releasing those funds without real Taliban action. Joe Biden is no doubt familiar with the opprobrium heaped on President Barak Obama when he released about $30 billion in frozen Iranian assets in 2015 after the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To quote from many classic American crime shows, it’s “Show me the goods before I show you the money.”

Perhaps the only good that may be claimed after this first meeting is that the two sides have opened a dialog. But considerable territory will need to be covered before any assertion of “a relationship” may be said to exist.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Can the Taliban Govern Responsibly? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

However, a non-trivial proportion of Afghan women might not be bothered enough by the Taliban’s rule in order to protest. Some might even support the group’s fundamentalist policies. Days after the Taliban took over the Afghan capital on August 15, of women took to the streets to welcome the group’s return to power. Millions of Afghan women took no public stance over the fundamentalist movement.

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Given the Taliban’s long history of misogyny and extremism, it might be puzzling that some women might express their public support or indifference to the loss of their rights.   

Why Some Women Support Extremist Groups

Whether globally or in the Muslim world, it is not an anomaly that some women might support misogynistic leaders or political organizations. In the Middle East, women played a role in different political Islam movements with varying degrees of conservatism. At its peak, recruiters for the Islamic State (IS) group managed to attract female supporters and convince them to migrate to their territories in Syria and Iraq at a time when harrowing stories were emerging about the organization’s treatment of women. So, even if such extremist movements are enemies of women, not all women view them in these black and white terms.

In a research published in the World Politics journal, Lisa Blaydes and Drew Linzer investigate why women might support Muslim fundamentalists. Their answer focuses on the availability of economic opportunities for women. When women lack enough opportunities to achieve their economic and social independence, they might choose to increase their attractiveness in the marriage market of a patriarchal society by becoming more conservative. Thus, limited economic possibilities can push women to trade some of their rights in exchange for financial security.

Afghan women have made significant gains over the last two decades. For example, according to the International Labor Organization’s estimates, female participation in the labor force grew from 15.5% to 22.74% of the female working-age population between 2001 and 2019. This means that more women are looking for inclusion in the labor market.

Yet when it comes to unemployment rates among Afghan women, there is barely any change over the same period. The unemployment rate among women in the labor force moved from 14.75% in 2001 to 13.81% in 2019. Hence, the opportunities available to the increasing numbers of women who choose to work have not significantly increased.

Other Reasons

This economic explanation is only one side of the story. Indoctrination through various processes of socialization can also contribute to women’s conservative attitudes. Households, schools, religious institutions and online spaces are all realms where such attitudes are cultivated and reinforced.

Fundamentalist groups understand the importance of women’s indoctrination. Contemporary extremists such as IS and the Taliban rely on female recruiters to attract female members and build ideological support for their movements among women. In the early days of political Islam movements, Egypt’s Muslim Sisterhood was the female side of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Sisterhood was concerned with educating women about their roles in an ideal Islamic society.

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But a more cynical explanation is that the lives of the vast majority of Afghan women are less affected by the rule of the Taliban. As anthropologists Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood out, the decry against the Taliban’s rule is merely an urban phenomenon. Most Afghan women — —live in rural communities, where conservative social norms are enforced independently of who is in charge of the capital city. For example, in 2017, the of rural women aged 20 to 24 who got married before 15 and 18 were 5% and 31.9%, respectively. This is compared to 2.1% and 18.4% among their urban counterparts.

Being away from the capital in a country plagued with underdevelopment, rural women also suffered disproportionally due to their higher economic vulnerability and exposure to the two-decade violent conflict between the Taliban and the government. Putting an end to the civil conflict may provide hope to some that their situation might improve.  

We do not know precisely how prominent female support is for the Taliban. Yet the picture is more complicated than a simple fight between women-hating extremists and freedom-loving feminists. With successive Afghan governments failing to address the root causes of gender inequalities, seeing women protesting in the streets with Taliban flags becomes a less surprising anecdote.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Why Do Some Women Support the Taliban? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.