51吃瓜

Events in Syria continue to evolve at lightspeed. In December 2024, regional and Western governments to engage the new al-Qaeda-affiliated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) government, which is supported by NATO member Turkey. Jubilation intoxicated the general population and the following the anticlimactic fall of the Assad . Nearly three months later, the honeymoon has run its course and the jungle holds on to the spots.

After the regressive series of events following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, regional and Western powers wait to see if the HTS government leaders can truly change their spots, as they traded fatigues for designer .

The region has witnessed the chaos following the of notorious Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and most recently the of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In both cases, the region experienced a series of events where al-Qaeda and ISIS gained a lifeline, and women and minorities suffered from tremendous regressive policies under corrupt and extremist regimes. Damascus, the first Arab capital governed by self-made extremists listed as by the international community, surfaced as a unique case. In contrast to other extremist groups, HTS leaders immediately launched a well-coordinated 鈥溾�� and presented themselves as statesmen, surrounded by a jungle of militants marginalized by the victors, and away from the spoils.

HTS leaders and their patrons aim to convince the world they鈥檝e changed their spots. Can the jungle let it last? This is a loaded question. First, the international community must wait and see where the approach to de-radicalization since the September 11 attacks failed and the revolutionary spirit achieves change. The world waits to see the difference between al-Qaeda ideologues and their former hosts: the Taliban and ISIS. The experiment also raises the stakes for the 鈥� can it succeed in Damascus where it failed in Cairo?

Damascus and the jungle

On January 29, 2025, the gathered to Abu Mohammed (now ) during a symbolic 鈥� Islamic oath of allegiance to a leader 鈥� summit in . Civilian and military loyalists gathered to consolidate the image of the State, but this was as much a message to rival Islamist factions as it was to international audiences.

Under overt guidance and with material support from Turkey, the moved quickly to address a major obstacle to international legitimacy, from by the , and . The new rulers in Damascus also need to consolidate authority and power over rival factions, ethnic minority groups, former regime remnants and hostile neighbors like Iran, Iraq and Israel.

While HTS does not yet control all of Syria鈥檚 territory, it is relying on an extensive network of Islamist militants to deter fragmentation. Jawlani鈥檚 chess game smartly moved toward Iraq, where it hosted a meeting with former enemies in neighboring . The meeting with Hamid al-Shatri, Head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, aimed to mend fences from Jawlani鈥檚 ISIS days. It also sought to strengthen the rear front to prevent new incursions by Iran-affiliated militias and elements of Lebanon鈥檚 Hezbollah paramilitary group. By meeting with Iraqi intelligence rather than diplomats, Jawlani signaled a merging of interests with Turkey.

More interesting, and of higher risk for HTS, has been the reported collaboration with the . A US State Department visited Damascus in late December 2024. Soon after, a report emerged of possible between Washington and HTS leadership. The meeting with Iraq officials and sharing of intelligence with the seems like a carrot from Turkey to sweeten up the deal with Damascus. US against ISIS and elements serve Jawlani鈥檚 interests as much as the West鈥檚. Members of groups from the resisting Jawlani鈥檚 authority may turn on Damascus, derail HTS governance and attract negative attention.

Enemies inside and outside pose as much threat as the inability to govern a highly diverse Syrian environment. HTS鈥檚 move from a jihadist militant group to a government entity complicates funding. Damascus no longer must simply a patronage network of jihadists. As a central government, HTS must provide costly services beyond the center, beyond security. Collection of taxes beyond their safe haven in the city of is no longer a model, neither are 鈥渆xtortion, kidnapping and oil-smuggling 鈥� [or] at least $94 million from prisoner-exchange deals with the Syrian government, Iran, Lebanon and Italy.鈥� Damascus needs a with for access to oil supplies. This requires a delicate balance as Turkey lies in the middle of an agreement with them.

Can the leopard change its spots?

Just as Afghanistan under the Taliban, the potential for Syria to surface as a new safe haven for jihadist militants is a primary concern for the region and the West. Every militant group is bound to experience a struggle for power, and Jawlani is at the center. As he switches from jihadist field commander to head of state, he must guard his as much as rivals among militant factions beyond the center.

It is still unclear how power will project beyond the core. Likewise, no one knows what role Jawlani鈥檚 loyalists will play. Security and State revenue beyond Damascus will undoubtedly depend on in areas with , Druze, and Yazidi . Relations with minority groups will test the ability to govern and the degree to which Islamist can change their spots. Jawlani has spoken the magic words for the West and pointed to being held around five years from now.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial聽policy.