Recent military exchanges between Israel, the US and Iran have exposed a structural vulnerability in Europe’s economic position. While Washington and Tehran confront each other strategically, Europe remains highly exposed to the resulting economic shockwaves. In a globalized energy system, instability in the Persian Gulf quickly translates into economic pressure on European markets.

The energy vulnerability

At the center of this vulnerability lies energy. Iran sits in a region that dominates global oil flows, hence tensions around the Persian Gulf frequently reverberate across international markets. As global energy systems remain tightly interconnected, even localized instability can trigger worldwide price volatility. According to theUS Energy Information , the region surrounding Iran plays a central role in global energy supply and maritime oil transport.

Europe remains particularly exposed to such shocks. Before the war in Ukraine, the more than 55% of its total energy consumption from external suppliers. Although European governments have since accelerated efforts to diversify supply sources — particularly under initiatives such as the — the continent’s industrial economy still relies heavily on stable global energy markets. A sudden surge in oil prices translates directly into higher transportation costs, rising industrial expenses and renewed inflationary pressure across the eurozone.

The green deal is at risk

Beyond immediate inflation, a wider US–Iran escalation threatens one of Europe’s most ambitious policy projects: the European — the EU’s flagship strategy to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. In theory, higher fossil fuel prices could accelerate the transition to renewable energy. In practice, however, economic crises often force governments to prioritize short-term stability over long-term transformation.

When energy prices surge, European governments typically spend billions of euros on to shield households and industries. While politically necessary, such measures divert public funds away from long-term investments in renewable infrastructure and climate transition. This creates a strategic paradox, where Europe’s dependence on volatile global energy markets generates economic shocks that weaken the financial capacity needed to accelerate the transition away from those very markets.

The economic effects

The economic ripple effects of escalation extend beyond fuel prices. The Middle East sits at the intersection of major maritime trade routes, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, which connect Europe and Asia. Disruptions in these corridors have already had tangible effects on European trade.

Recent instability in the Red Sea has forced shipping companies to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, significantly increasing transit times and transportation costs. Insurance premiums for vessels transiting high-risk zones have also surged, adding further pressure on supply chains.

For European economies, these disruptions translate into higher import costs, delays in industrial supply chains and increased pressure on already fragile economic recovery. What appears as a regional security issue thus becomes a direct economic burden for Europe.

The political consequences

However, the political consequences of escalation may be even more complex than the economic impact. External military pressure on Iran has historically produced a political paradox. Rather than weakening the state, periods of confrontation with foreign powers have often factions within ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s political system — particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Ěý

Institutions tied to national security tend to gain influence during times of external threat, while more pragmatic or reform-oriented voices lose political space. This dynamic has been visible throughout the history of US–Iran relations, particularly since the 1979 , as periods of external pressure have often reinforced hardline elements within the system. External pressure allows hardliners to frame domestic politics around narratives of resistance and national survival. As a result, escalation designed to coerce Tehran can inadvertently consolidate the very power structures Western policymakers seek to constrain.

For Europe, this creates a strategic dilemma. European governments have traditionally favored diplomatic engagement. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (), the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, represented a major diplomatic effort by European powers to reduce tensions through negotiation. Although the agreement has largely collapsed, it reflected Europe’s broader strategic preference for multilateral solutions.

A disproportionate burden

A sustained US–Iran confrontation places Europe in an uncomfortable position between transatlantic alignment and economic vulnerability. While cooperation with Washington remains central to European foreign policy, the consequences of instability in the Persian Gulf are felt far more directly in European societies than in the US.

Unlike Europe, the US enjoys significantly greater energy independence and geographic distance. European economies, by contrast, remain sensitive to fluctuations in global markets where rising fuel prices and supply disruptions quickly translate into domestic political pressure.

None of this suggests that Tehran bears no responsibility for regional tensions. Iranian regional policies — including support for various armed groups — remain a source of legitimate concern for Western governments. However, focusing solely on military confrontation risks overlooking the broader strategic picture. If escalation simultaneously strengthens hardline actors inside Iran while destabilizing global energy markets, Europe may ultimately pay a disproportionate share of the cost.

For European policymakers, the challenge is not simply how to manage Iran, but how to prevent a geopolitical crisis from evolving into an economic shock that Europe is uniquely ill-equipped to absorb.

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The of caught European leaders off guard. Unlike past foreign interventions, the US did not present a clearly articulated and coherent (an event or action that justifies or allegedly justifies a war or conflict) to its domestic audience, nor did it seek to win the buy-in of its Western allies before initiating hostilities. Instead, the fluidity of Washington’s justification of its war, ranging from stopping Iran from developing nuclear weapons to regime change, to feeling the need to a unilateral Israeli action, stood in contrast with the concreteness of the hard choices confronting Europe.

While Washington workshopped explanations for the war, Europe to formulate a unified response to meet the moment. This initial hesitation gave way to a disjointed set of , with some European governments aligning with the US while others questioned the legality of US–Israeli strikes. , eager not to relive the public backlash that followed its involvement in Iraq, denied the use of jointly-operated military bases in its territory, setting up a with US President Donald Trump. Europe’s scattered posture reflects the challenge of walking a fine line between appeasing the US, its main partner, and becoming a scapegoat for an unpopular war.

Facing difficulties in resolving the war on its own, President Trump called for allies to deploy warships alongside the US Navy to help open the Strait of Hormuz. While France demonstrated a resolve to protect its interests by an aircraft carrier group to the region, there has been a general reluctance among Europeans to . Adding this to the decision of some European countries to close their airspace or prohibit the use of jointly operated bases has fueled Make America Great Again’s (MAGA) long-standing portrayal of Europeans as free-riders, unwilling to stick their necks out to protect shared interests. Though criticism of NATO from the White House is nothing new, comments made by Secretary of State Marco Rubio the alliance’s value are an unmissable signal.

Security squeeze

Despite their reluctance to get involved, the security and economic spillovers of the conflict have become too significant for Europe to confine itself to rhetoric. What began as a joint US–Israeli meant to a few days against the Iranian nuclear program, missile capabilities and leadership has a regional conflict with global implications, grinding on into its third month. Whether or not Europe agrees with the US rationale, the breadth of the war’s impact makes detachment , compelling Europe to stand up for its .Ěý

Europe has often justified its distance in the conflict by that “this is not our war.” However, within days of the US–Israeli strikes, Iranian drones were launched at a UK Royal Air Force base in , and NATO missiles over Turkey.Ěý

Tehran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping has exposed Europe’s dependence on both and imports. The EU had taken to wean itself off Russian oil and gas in the aftermath of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. That progress is now under threat, with rising causing inflation and fuel shortages across various industries. With the spring planting season already underway, European farmers are to access the fertilizer they need at an affordable cost, threatening to drive up food prices.

While the energy squeeze constitutes a problem for Europe, it has proved a boon for Russia.Ěý Moscow is seeing fossil fuel jump to a two-year high, which could serve as a to Ukraine’s intensifying campaign on Russia’s oil export infrastructure. The Trump Administration’s decision to and then a sanctions waiver until May 16 also contributed to Europe’s woes. Given a pass by the US, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin might be increasingly insulated from economic pressure, while European leaders face growing discontent in their electorates.

Turning with the times

These developments underscore how difficult it has become for Europe to insulate itself from the wider repercussions of the conflict. Furthermore, these should serve as a wake-up call to Europe and NATO that blind faith in America can no longer be placed. 

The Trump Administration’s whiplash policy on Ukraine, Greenland, and now Iran is not a one-off incident, but rather evidence of a broader pattern in which Washington is steadily eroding its credibility on the global stage. Although disagreement between the transatlantic allies is to be expected, Europe cannot allow itself to be cowed into joining costly fights because one ally, no matter how important, has made a decision unilaterally. 

Instead, European leaders ought to engage in the war on their own terms, with a unified voice that signals strength. They should continue to resist alignment with the US’ military-first approach. After the White House the UK for being slow to offer help, Europe may find it more palatable to engage the issue on its own terms.Ěý

Europe’s extensive network of military bases and logistics centers, which facilitates US operations in the Middle East, provides the continent with that should be used to prevent further escalation of the war. Europeans ought to strive to push for an end to the conflict; the sooner stability in the Strait is restored, the sooner pressure can be directed toward constraining Russia, while allowing the US to redirect military technology and capabilities back toward Ukraine.Ěý

Europe can monitor activity in the Strait to ensure freedom of navigation and safe transit. To that end, the UK and France on April 17 that they will be spearheading a mission similar to the coalition of the willing to secure maritime trade routes in the Strait of Hormuz. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has readiness to team up with Gulf countries to create alternative energy export routes. Together, these moves represent a constructive step forward supporting the principle of freedom of navigation and improving energy security.Ěý

Stop start

With Washington and Tehran still miles apart in stop-start peace negotiations, Europeans could offer to support negotiations. While America today is not the ally they remember, Ursula von der Leyen emphasized that Europe the world as it is: “The idea that we can simply retrench and withdraw from this chaotic world is simply a fallacy.” Only with a coordinated effort to advance a diplomatic resolution and restore safe navigation does Europe have the chance to prove that the continent can stand as an equal partner.Ěý

The Iran war may not have begun as Europe’s war, but its consequences have become Europe’s problem. The Iran crisis is sapping Europe’s resources and political capital and drawing its attention away from the Russian threat in Ukraine. Europe should seek to drive a wedge between Iran and Russia, isolating the latter. Expediting the peaceful resolution to the standoff in the Strait of Hormuz is the best action Europe can take today. 

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The attacks came after Iranian and American diplomats to make a nuclear deal and have since into a full-blown conflict with several Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). With world war saturating headlines amidst mutual between Israel and Iran, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s over the Strait of Hormuz, and an ceasefire between the US and Iran, surrounding countries are their weapons stockpile while for peace.

Despite the above aggressions, the Trump Administration continues to use the language of restraint. Shortly before the outbreak, Vice President JD Vance announced a “New World Order” on , reiterating the vision laid out in the US National Security Strategy () — released in December of last year — which asserts newfound restraint in European affairs, an alleged “America First” realignment and prioritization of domestic interests.

The message was clear: The US would scale back and loosen its grip on previous transatlantic systems. The administration’s actions have yet to reflect this stated policy.

Great power competition

While speaking to EU leaders at the Munich Security Conference in February, Vance perceived threats from Russia and China and pushed countries to increase their own defense spending — implying a downgrade of great-power confrontation from the American side. But in practice, Washington has hardly disengaged from countering Russian and Chinese influence abroad.

In early January 2026, off the tail end of “,” Trump Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on his own soil and secured Venezuelan oil that would’ve otherwise gone to China — then China to buy it. These actions directly threatened the cited in the NSS.

The pattern continues in the Middle East. Though the decision to American troops from Syria was complementary to the Security Strategy, the US quietly fortified its military proxies and in Al Hasakah, any remaining Russian influence in the country amidst its reconstruction.

Without official involvement in the of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the US still openly to keep Syria’s interim government intact, and even the “former” Ahmad al-Sharaa to the White House late last year. Backlash from the meeting with a man who contributed to killing American troops shed a light on everything but this Administration’s focus on domestic affairs.

President Trump’s Board of Peace has also major controversy — specifically its of government leaders from all over the world to decide on Gaza’s fate and reconstruction after the Israel-Hamas war 80% of all structures in the territory, securing $17 billion in from member countries thus far (while the funds have ).

Forming a handpicked international club to decide on what to do with land in another hemisphere hardly demonstrates domestic focus and adds tension with other global organizations, like the United Nations, which has since its formation.

President Trump’s message to Iranians during the strikes endangered civilians and our troops, regardless of intention. certain death to any Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) militants who do not cooperate also contrasts with the NSS’s to avoid “forever wars,” despite the Administration’s efforts to it.

Retaliation targeted several across the Middle East, including ones in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE. Though the goal is to the 47-year-old Islamist regime and pave the way for liberated civilians to regain control of their country, the US Government is overlooking ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s multiple across the region, who may , endangering local civilians and American troops.

If restraint is America’s guiding doctrine, its actions complicate the narrative and are hardly acts of retreating from global entanglements. As Europe to craft its own independent security strategy, US intervention abroad is a global geopolitical shift.

Whether the above is a newly emerging form of diplomacy or imperialism, one must notice the stark contrast between American actions and rhetoric yet again. This is not a uniquely Trump phenomenon, however, as several American presidents have promised retreat while delivering attacks.

Presidential Patterns

President Barack Obama ran on “endless wars,” but instead drone campaigns and expanded US in Libya and . President Joe Biden’s “ for the middle class” billions of dollars in aid for Ukraine while NATO’s defense. During Trump’s first term, vows to from the Middle East coexisted with escalatory moves such as top Iranian General Qassem Soleimani.

This issue transcends red versus blue, or any simplistic framing of good president versus bad president. It is a blatant fault in American foreign policy — the underlying policy — that seems to repeat itself every four years. Campaign rhetoric gestures towards restraint, recalibration, or domestic focus, but the governing reality reasserts intervention, coalition-building and power projection.

Restraint in rhetoric is not restraint in practice. If America’s current foreign policy is truly one of restraint, as Vance , it is a version that still intervenes and redraws geopolitical lines — calling the premise itself into question. Until American leaders reconcile their words with their actions, “America First” will continue to look less like retrenchment and more like rebranded global management.

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Beyond the visible damage, the conflict offers lessons that go well beyond the battlefield. It forces us to look past simple claims of victory and defeat and ask a harder question: What did this war reveal about power, credibility, dependence and the real cost of confrontation?

The US and Israel: tactical gains, strategic limits

The US appears to have achieved some of its immediate aims, including damage to parts of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s and pressure on its wider military posture through the war and ceasefire process. Yet the broader outcome is less clear. According to Reuters’ summary of the ceasefire, core disputes over uranium enrichment, missiles and regional remain unresolved.Ěý

Meanwhile, Israel demonstrated a sustained ability to strike across the region during the conflict, even as the ceasefire left major political questions unresolved. on continuing Israeli operations in Lebanon outside the truce framework suggest that military reach did not automatically translate into a broader political settlement.Ěý

Europe: between alignment and distance

Some European governments responded with a mix of support and hesitation. Italy, for example, to Sigonella air base for operations related to the conflict and ruled out Hormuz patrols without a UN mandate. That points to a degree of European unease about escalation, even as Europe remains closely tied to the US on security matters.

In practice, that dependence still shapes Europe’s room for maneuver, especially when regional crises affect shipping routes, energy security and the risk of wider military spillover. This does not mean Europe has become strategically independent, but it may give some European governments a little more room to resist American pressure when interests do not fully align.

China and Russia: gaining without engagingĚý

China and Russia benefited without entering the conflict directly. They avoided the military, diplomatic and financial costs of war while watching the US absorb the burden of escalation without securing a decisive political outcome. For Beijing, distance reduced risk while preserving economic flexibility and the appearance of restraint. For Moscow, non-engagement meant that Washington’s attention and resources were stretched without Russia having to assume new obligations.

This is what makes the conflict relevant to the broader shift toward a more multipolar order. The point is not that American power has disappeared; it is that outcomes are increasingly shaped by several competing centers of influence, and rival powers can gain an indirect advantage when Washington struggles to translate military pressure into durable political results. In that kind of system, American power remains significant, but it faces sharper limits and more frequent challenges.

Iran: external position, internal pressure

The conflict also exposed the limits of personalized leadership. US President Donald Trump’s handling of the war drew criticism abroad and at home. Reuters reported that Pope Leo Trump’s threat against Iran as “truly unacceptable,” while other reporting showed that most Americans the war and wanted it to end quickly. These reactions matter because they highlight how the display of force did not produce a clear political mandate, and how personalized foreign-policy rhetoric can weaken credibility as easily as it can project resolve.

From ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s leadership’s perspective, easing some American demands may be presented as a form of resilience. Reuters’ reporting makes clear that the truce did not settle the central American demands regarding enrichment and missile capabilities, thereby allowing Tehran to frame the outcome as endurance rather than surrender.

But any external gain comes with a serious domestic cost. Attacks on Iranian energy and the broader economic disruption caused by the war have increased pressure at home. Over time, those internal costs may prove just as important as any regional advantage.

Ordinary Iranians have also paid a high price. The war has intensified economic pressure, deepened insecurity and damaged basic infrastructure. Evidence of strikes on energy and industrial facilities illustrates how the burden of conflict extends well beyond military targets. 

At the same time, the war may encourage a deeper reassessment of political paths and outside dependence. There are signs of a stronger emphasis on self-reliance alongside caution toward foreign intervention. Whether that becomes a lasting social and political shift remains uncertain, but the experience itself will not be easily forgotten.

The Gulf States: exposed dependence

For the Gulf states, and especially across the Persian Gulf, the war exposed continuing vulnerability. Iranian attacks targeted oil, power and desalination in Kuwait, while a key Saudi oil was also hit. These incidents underline how heavily regional security still depends on external protection, especially from the US.Ěý

That may push Gulf governments toward a more pragmatic regional approach, including a reassessment of how they manage relations with Iran in the years ahead.

At the same time, this kind of disruption may deepen public awareness of what war really costs and may strengthen support for diplomacy in future crises. The war also exposed something deeper than strategy. It showed how easily humanitarian concerns can be pushed aside when conflict becomes politically convenient. Some of those who supported or justified the war did so while minimizing its human cost.

In any future transition, political or otherwise, the role of actors committed to basic ethical standards will matter greatly. Without that commitment, the danger is not only instability but moral erosion.

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Exile has traditionally been understood as a territorial threshold: Once a dissident reaches a democratic state, persecution is assumed to end. However, contemporary authoritarian governance challenges this assumption. Authoritarian states increasingly project coercive power beyond their borders through surveillance, intimidation, cyber operations and pressure on family members. This practice, known as transnational repression, undermines conventional notions of democratic sovereignty and protection.

In classical political theory, denotes exclusive authority within a defined territory. However, transnational repression complicates this framework, as, while authoritarian states may lack territorial jurisdiction in Europe, they can still exert coercive influence within democratic countries. This results in a sovereignty paradox as formal authority remains intact, but informal coercion penetrates borders.

How the Iranian regime’s repression transcends bordersĚý

According to Freedom House’s 2023 on transnational repression, authoritarian governments have carried out hundreds of documented incidents of cross-border repression since 2014, with Iran among the most active perpetrators. Transnational repression takes many forms, including digital harassment, surveillance operations and threats against relatives of activists abroad. The goal is not always physical violence. In many cases, cross-border repressive functions as a form of psychological deterrent.

Domestic and transnational repression are interconnected. The characterizes civic spaces in Iran as “closed,” citing systemic restrictions on journalists and civil society actors. Cross-border intimidation thus extends the logic of internal governance. Where dissent is criminalized domestically, suppressing it abroad becomes a logical extension of that strategy.

Human rights organizations have documented patterns of coercion by proxy. and describe cases in which Iranian dissidents in Europe are subjected to retaliation against family members back home. The UN Special Rapporteur on the landscape of human rights in Iran has similarly highlighted cross-border intimidation practices. Such cross-border coercion poses a substantial challenge to European legal systems built on the concept of territorial harm.

Transnational repression threatens European democracy

However, the responses from European capitals remain fragmented. The of the EU has imposed targeted sanctions on Iranian officials responsible for human rights abuses. Meanwhile, Germany’s of the Islamic Center Hamburg signaled concern about foreign state-linked influence structures. Yet these measures address individual nodes rather than systemic architecture. When exiled dissidents self-censor out of fear for relatives back home, authoritarian regimes achieve deterrence without resorting to overt violence within Europe.Ěý

Parliamentary inquiries in the UK have warned about expanding foreign interference by authoritarian actors, including Iran. The pattern is cumulative: Each unaddressed case reinforces the perception that intimidation carries limited cost. Addressing this challenge requires conceptual and legal adaptation. European states must adopt several practices. These include a move toward harmonized legal definitions of state-linked intimidation, coordinated evidentiary standards for cross-border coercion and structured cooperation between intelligence and judicial authorities. Digital security assistance for high-risk activists should also be institutionalized rather than applied ad hoc. Moreover, Public attribution of foreign intimidation networks can strengthen deterrence.

Ultimately, asylum is not merely a humanitarian gesture. It is a sovereign commitment. If dissidents who sought refuge remain vulnerable to external coercion, the promise of democratic protection weakens. Transnational repression, therefore, challenges the ability of European democracies to defend political freedom within their own jurisdictions. The sovereignty paradox will persist unless liberal states adapt their legal and strategic frameworks to directly confront authoritarian states’ cross-border coercion.

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Economic toll

Unlike Iran, the other Middle Eastern states, especially the six members of the GCC, have strengthened their economic ties with the West. One major example of such economic ties is the one between the EU and the GCC. The 1989 has resulted in over $170 billion in exports and imports between the two sides in 2023.Ěý

Over the past five decades, these countries have also worked hard to attract foreign investors, entrepreneurs, and even wealthy individuals seeking to invest in luxury real estate and opulent lifestyles. To name a few examples of such steps, Dubai a five-year multiple-entry visa for business trips in 2021, and the UAE began five-year residency and renewable 10-year visas to those who own real estate in the UAE valued at $5 million and $10 million, respectively. To attract foreign capital, both and have introduced Golden Residency programs that grant wealthy foreigners, including their families, long-term residencies of ten years or longer.Ěý

States such as the UAE and Qatar have become reliable hubs for travelers reaching their destinations globally. In 2023, an 18.25% share of the UAE’s GDP was through aviation. In practice, this means $92 billion in revenue and 992,000 jobs. It is a similar trajectory for Qatar. In 2025, only Qatar Airways Group reported a 28% over the previous year, surpassing $2 billion. Qatar’s tourism revenue surpassed , up 25% from 2023.Ěý

Saudi Arabia is another Middle Eastern power with considerable financial clout. Its economic reform for the post-oil Kingdom, known as , aims to sector to become not only self-sufficient but also an exporter and global hub for biotechnology. Within this project, other strategies include the mining sector with a focus on minerals, and even the gaming and Esports to host international tournaments, as well as attracting foreign companies to Saudi Arabia. The program is reliant on the non-hydrocarbon sector, comprising foundational pillars namely construction, tourism and tech, which are integral to Saudi Arabia’s economic growth, as the World Bank states, “the non-oil economy’s share of GDP grew from 60 percent in 2015 to 68 percent by 2024”.Ěý

With the risks of collapsed tourism, damaged energy infrastructure and logistics disruptions growing manifold, the Gulf countries face an imminent crisis. Amid the worsening security crisis in the region, all of these countries face a heavy blow, with the looming threat of economic devastation, as they remain heavily dependent on such critical sectors to attract foreign investment and capital while diversifying away from oil exports. Their economic leverage rests on regional stability, which has been put under immense strain due to the volatile situation. 

More alarming is the emerging scenario in which large companies tend to act quickly to secure their assets and withdraw from a conflict zone; however, their return is a slow, cautious process. Consequently, if the war results in the departure of some foreign companies from the region within a few weeks, their return may take months or years, which would be detrimental to the economies of the GCC in the long term.

Ironically, Iran will not face such a risk, as the Islamic Republic has not been a destination for international firms due to sanctions and an inadequate environment that has not been conducive to foreign investment. 

Damaged reputation

Over the past few decades, the Gulf countries have built a reputation as a safe destination. This feature has attracted not only investors and foreign companies but also pensioners and those fleeing high taxation in their home countries. As their reputation is now tarnished by the escalating conflict, it will take a long time to rebuild it and recover from the damage inflicted. During the early stages of the war, Iran hit back hard. Missiles and drones were fired at numerous targets, including , and industrial complexes.Ěý

One small example is the UAE. It to around 240,000 British expats. The US–Israel–Iran war has distressed the majority of expats living across the region. It has gone as far as being by some Western news outlets, such as tabloid Daily Mail, as “â€�Dubai Is Finished’: Expats say they will leave and never come back as tax-free dream is shattered by war and officials begin prosecuting people for posting videos of missiles.”Ěý

Worthy US alliance?Ěý

Except for Iran and Yemen, the US is in some sort of alliance with all states in the region. The closest allies are Israel, followed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan and others. Israel, for instance, has $330 billion in aid, both military and civil, from the US since its foundation.Ěý

The alliance between the Gulf states and the US dates back to the 1940s, when, for instance, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Abdul Aziz Al Saud aboard USS Quincy in 1945. The result was access to Saudi oil for security assurance to the Kingdom. And other Gulf states suit and went into an alliance with the US.Ěý

Fast forward to 2026, although the Gulf countries do not receive US military aid on the same scale as Israel and Egypt, their arms deals with the US are among the largest. Between 1950 and 2024, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE have $182 billion, $40 billion, $35 billion and $34 billion, respectively. These massive purchases have certainly helped these countries defend themselves against Iranian drones and missiles; however, the cost of munitions for them is considerably higher than for Iran, as a Shahed-136 drone costs under $50,000, compared with, say, Patriot interceptor missiles that cost per shot. The ineffectiveness of US military equipment to deter attacks, coupled with US’ waning commitment to uphold its allies’ defense under its security umbrella in the region, propels the Gulf countries to recalibrate their security ties with the US.Ěý

After all, it was never their war to begin with, yet they face dire consequences simply for allying with the US (which now appears more to be a grave liability). Since the beginning of the war, Tehran has justified its attacks on ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s neighbors by claiming that any location in the region hosting a US military presence is a legitimate target. However, most of the missiles and drones thrown at the Gulf states were not precisely aimed at the American bases, either deliberately or due to a lack of precision, as it has been that the Circular Error Probable of Iranian missiles is between 20 and 500 meters. This makes it even harder for states such as the UAE to convince foreigners to stay or even consider returning, once the war is over. Expats, especially those who are attracted by luxury and 0% income tax rate, will hardly be willing to live in a place where even a one percent chance of missile penetration exists, should another round of conflict emerge.Ěý

Post-war scenarios

While efforts were recently made to a peace deal between the US and Iran, with Pakistan acting as a primary mediator, the talks in Islamabad stalled; however, reports are now that the conflicting parties are expected to re-engage in negotiations soon.Ěý

Regardless, for the Gulf countries, there are mainly two outcomes as of now. The first prediction is that the Iranian regime will be toppled and a new Iran will emerge. In this case, the Gulf states can simply claim that the old threat no longer exists. Hence, it will be relatively easier to convince expats and companies that departed in haste to return. And the Gulf states would emerge shaken but ultimately “victorious”, and their alliance with the US would be seen as worthwhile. Their domestic publics would also be less likely to question the rulers’ strategies and policies. However, this scenario appears very unlikely, given ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s position in surviving the war and transitioning to a ceasefire and negotiations, as well as the US stance shifting toward achieving a mere exit strategy.

A second scenario, which is the most likely one to consider, is that the  Iranian regime survives the war, in which case the main losers will be the Gulf countries. Iran, the US and Israel will all claim victory and, to an extent, those claims will be correct. The leaders of these three countries will be able to convince their publics that they have achieved their objectives, at least among those who support their governments’ policies. The new Supreme Leader, whether it is still Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei or a successor in case he is also killed, will claim that they have defeated the US plan to overthrow the regime, and the IRGC, Basij and regime supporters across all strata will buy it. President Trump will tell his MAGA supporters that he has “obliterated” the threat of a ballistic and nuclear Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu will tell Israelis, mainly his supporters, that ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s capability to attack Israel is diminished. 

However, for regional countries such as the UAE, there won’t be a victory narrative to pursue. They will not be able to convince their constituencies by claiming victory, as they have, at best, been defending themselves in a war that was not theirs. The public will be anxious about what the alliance with the US (and in the case of the UAE with Israel) will bring next. The Gulf states will face criticism from their people regarding the alliance with the US and any ties to the state of Israel. History bears witness to this, as public perception in Gulf states has often diverged from government narratives, and state decisions have not sat well with the public. 

The defiance was most noticeable in relation to the alliance between the US and Gulf state leaders, which does not always align with how the Arab public perceives the US and Israel. During the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, a reservations to customers who would like to enjoy their meals while watching Iranian missiles roaring towards Israel. A similar case happened during the Gulf War. On January 18, 1991, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq launched missile attacks on Israel. In his book, The Achilles Trap, Steve Coll writes that five Iraqi Scud missiles hit Tel Aviv and Haifa while Saudi officers and American counterparts were in the coordination center, C3IC, observing the attacks. The Americans were shocked when they saw the Saudi officers cheering the Iraqi strike with Allahu Akbar.Ěý

Now, while the times may differ, similar sentiments persist. Gulf states have to tactfully handle public opinion while simultaneously preventing their economies from falling into the doldrums. Henceforth, the path for the Gulf states is certainly fraught with difficulties on multiple fronts. 

In the end, therefore, it is not the US that loses investors and entrepreneurs, nor is it Israel, which is a startup country with the most powerful military in the region. Iran will not suffer from the mistrust of foreign investors either, as the country has few or no foreign investors, especially Western ones, due to sanctions and an unfriendly environment for foreigners. Tehran has little involvement in the international trade community to worry about losing it. What Iran has never had will not be a loss to Tehran in the post-war period. The real costs will be borne by the Gulf states.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post How the US–Israel–Iran War Costs the Gulf States appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The US has long-standing ties with the Kurds, which date back to the 1970s during the Kurdish rebellions against the Iraqi central government. Following the uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan in March 1991 and the creation of the over the Kurdistan region of Iraq, relations between the Kurds and the US have improved significantly. This relation with the regime change in Iraq in 2023 has further enhanced as the Kurdish fighters play a key role in helping the US open a new frontline in northern Iraq to topple the Saddam regime.ĚýĚý

Similarly, during the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, the US decisively supported the Kurdish figures in Iraq and Syria. The Kurds, with help from the US, played a key role in defeating ISIS in both countries. Hence, this historical partnership has laid the groundwork for Washington to publicly discuss the possibility of using Iranian Kurdish fighters as ground forces in a conflict against the current Iranian regime. 

Trump has sent mixed messages in this regard. On March 5, he argued that he would forces if they decided to launch a military offensive against Iran, describing the idea as positive. When asked whether the US would provide air support for the operation, he declined to give a clear answer, saying he could not discuss that.Ěý

However, on March 7, Trump having Kurdish fighters join the war against Iran. In this regard, he said, “I don’t want the Kurds going in. I don’t want to see the Kurds get hurt, get killed. I told them I don’t want them. The war is complicated enough.”Ěý

There is no clear answer whether the US will finally topple the regime or, at this specific stage, end this war. Hence, the key question is: Why has the Kurdish factor in Iran suddenly become an important topic in the US and Israel’s war against Iran?

In reality, there are many explanations for this. One possibility is that Israel and the US could move toward overthrowing the Iranian regime in Tehran. However, this has not yet been officially and clearly announced by the US. Moreover, Kurdish fighters could be viewed as an effective instrument in this context. In particular, the US and Israel seek to make western Kurdistan a platform for inciting and encouraging a general uprising in the rest of Iran.

Another possibility is that the US might have wanted to use Kurdish forces as a tool to pressure the current Iranian authorities and push them to make greater concessions to Trump’s demands. As he recently said, the aim of the war is “” of the Iranian authorities.Ěý

Fear of abandonment: Kurdish demands for guarantees in any alliances against Iran

The Iranian Kurdish opposition parties are willing to seize the opportunity and ally with the US and Israel against Iran to achieve their historic ambition, manifested in establishing a federal or autonomous region in western Kurdistan. However, they have serious concerns about moving forward with such a policy without concrete guarantees of protection. In particular, the US doesn’t have a clear strategy, and it explicitly argues that the endgame is not regime change in Iran, but the destruction of Iranian military capacities. 

Furthermore, while the US has supported the Kurds at different times, it has also abandoned them on several occasions, leaving them to face existential threats. For example, following the Kurdistan in September 2017, the Trump administration allowed Iraqi federal troops and Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi militias — with direct support of Iran — to attack the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in Kirkuk and disputed areas. As a result, the Kurds lost roughly 40% of the territory that Peshmerga had held.ĚýAt that time, Trump said the US would not take a side.

In January 2026, even though the Kurds were key partners of the US in the war against ISIS in Syria, they were abandoned once again. The Trump administration allowed the former commander of Al Qaida al-Sharia, with his Damascus-led army, to attack the Kurdish forces and take the territory under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As a result, on January 20, , US Special Envoy for Syria, declared that the Kurdish-led SDF’s role as the primary anti-ISIS force had “.”

This background indicates that Kurdish concerns are genuine, as they fear the possibility that the US could once again abandon them. Therefore, before taking further steps, they seek guarantees and assurances from the US. The key demands of the Iranian Kurds are a guarantee that they will not be abandoned in the face of an Iranian threat, in both cases, whether the Iranian regime collapses or remains in place.

This is a very important point, in particular, if the regime survives, it may again crush the Kurds and could even against them as it has done after 1979. Hence, in this case, establishing a no-fly zone in Eastern Kurdistan is crucial to ensure that the Kurdish people are protected. Further, the Kurds seek to convert their military achievements into political gains. Therefore, the US should back the Kurds by guaranteeing support both if the current regime collapses and in advancing their demands for some sort of autonomy.ĚýĚý

Between Iranian threats and proxy attacks: Kurdistan faces rising security risks

In fact, any cooperation between the US and Iranian Kurdish groups against the regime in Iran would have serious implications for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). It is clear that the KRG has sought to reassure Tehran that it would not pose a threat. However, increasing conflict with the US is pushing the Iranian regime to pursue a more aggressive policy in the KRG. In particular, Iran and its proxy militias in Iraq have frequently threatened and targeted the Kurdistan region.

Since the 2020 of Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian military officer who served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran has essentially turned the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) into a battlefield, sending a message to the US, Israel and its allies. Following the of the young Kurdish-Iranian woman, Jina Mahsa Amini, and the outbreak of demonstrations across Iran in September 2023, the country has intensified its attacks against the KRI. As a result, the IRGCĚýĚýthe Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups.Ěý

Iran blames the Iranian Kurds for instigating and sustaining the protests in Iran. Even the head of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s elite Quds Force, , hasĚýĚýan unprecedented ground military operation against Iraqi Kurdistan if Baghdad does not disarm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups on Iraqi soil. Following the 12 days of with Israel in June 2025, Iranian proxies in Iraq hit oil fields and infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. These strikes targeted oil facilities, airports and some military locations.

With the start of the new military operation by the US and Israel against Iran beginning February 28, once again, the KRI turned into a battlefield, and Iran and its proxies are intensively targeting infrastructure in the Kurdistan region. These attacks intensified following reports that Trump spoke with Iraqi Kurdish leaders by phone, urging them to support the Iranian Kurdish opposition. 

In a statement, the KRG strongly reports suggesting the Kurdistan Region is taking part in a plan to arm and send Kurdish opposition parties into Iranian territory. Furthermore, the KRG emphasized that it would not be part of the current conflict, which could expand across the region.ĚýIt reiterated the Kurdistan Region’s stance of avoiding further conflict amid the current regional turmoil.

Hence, it can be argued that if the US pushes Iranian Kurdish opposition groups to participate in a war against Iran, the KRG could face serious and even existential risks, even if it rejects or refuses to support such a policy. 

The Iranian authorities are clearly sending a very serious warning and threatening the KRI in case Iranian Kurdish fighters are involved in the war. On March 6, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Defense Council released a statement that so far, Iran has only focused on US and Israeli bases in the region, as well as opposition political parties operating within the Kurdistan region.Ěý

It added that:

“Should their continued presence and plotting be permitted, or should these groups or [Zionist] regime elements enter the borders of the Islamic Republic through the Region, all facilities of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq … will be targeted on a massive scale.”

Further, the Spokesperson of the Khatam Al-Anbiya, Lieutenant Colonel Ebrahim Zolfaghari, issued a to the Kurdistan region, stating that any attempt by the Kurdistan region to deploy hostile forces in the Iranian border strip will be met with severe action by the Iranian armed forces.Ěý

Hence, in the case of involving the Iranian opposition Kurds in this war, the most dangerous scenario for the KRG would be if the political system in Iran remains in place and does not collapse, and if the US and Israel halt their attacks. There’s no doubt the KRG would face a serious threat, and Iran would do everything to undermine the KRG’s position. 

One of the key instruments that Iran could use, besides directly attacking the Kurdistan region, is using its militia proxies in Iraq and even the Iraqi government led by the Shia parties against the KRG. In particular, since the eruptions of the current war, the Shia militias have intensified their attacks against the Kurdistan region. According to Rudaw News, since the beginning of the war, more than 638 drones and missiles have the Kurdistan Region.Ěý

Therefore, in any scenario where the US pushes Iranian Kurdish fighters to participate in a war against Iran, it should provide clear assurances and guarantees not only to the Iranian Kurdish groups but also to the Kurdistan Region, which could face serious security consequences from such involvement.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The White House had warned that Iranian power plants and energy facilities could be hit if the Strait of Hormuz was not reopened. But by Monday, Trump had paused those strikes after what he called “productive” contacts, even as Iran any talks were taking place. Reuters also that the pause appears to apply only to energy sites, not to wider military targets. That is not a coherent strategy. It is a tactical retreat from one especially dangerous form of escalation.

The limits of military pressure and the tactical retreat

The most telling detail is why Trump pulled back. Reuters also that Gulf Arab states had warned Washington that strikes on Iranian power infrastructure could trigger severe retaliation against energy assets across the Gulf. In other words, the threat to hit power plants did not promise control; it threatened a wider regional breakdown. That matters because it changes how we should understand the original ultimatum. It was not a credible plan for reopening Hormuz. It was a way of shifting pressure away from a military bottleneck and onto civilian systems. When a government cannot quickly solve the problem in the water, it starts looking for leverage on land. Too often, that means ordinary life becomes the battlefield.

That shift should worry anyone who still believes strategy and restraint belong in the same sentence. The Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed, oil is still , and countries like Japan are reserves because the disruption has not ended.

The five-day extension: buying time, not solutions

The five-day extension did not reopen the channel. It bought time in the markets and perhaps time for mediation, but it did not change the underlying fact that the US has not found a workable way to force the strait open without risking . A threat against civilian infrastructure may sound forceful on television, but it does not move mines, widen shipping lanes or create political consent where none exists.

The military problem here is more stubborn than Trump’s rhetoric suggests. Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical , with about 20 million barrels per day of crude and oil products moving through it in 2025, or roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. There are only a limited number of ways around it. That geography is why even some of Washington’s allies have being dragged into a rush to “unblock” it on Trump’s terms.

Allies’ reservations, geographic reality and humanitarian stakes

According to , several allies were unenthusiastic about providing military support, and some conditioned any role on de-escalation rather than war expansion. The problem is not a lack of threats; it is that threats do not solve geography.

This is also where the legal danger becomes impossible to ignore. International humanitarian law attacking or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. That principle matters everywhere, but it carries special weight in the Gulf, where electricity and desalination are not luxuries. They are part of how millions of people get water and keep hospitals, homes and public life functioning.

The EU’s leaders recognized the danger last week when they for a moratorium on strikes against energy and water facilities in the Middle East. That call was not a diplomatic decoration. It was an acknowledgment that this war is edging toward attacks whose civilian consequences cannot be brushed aside as collateral.

Trump’s defenders will argue that the threat worked because it created diplomatic space. Maybe. But even that claim looks thin. Iran publicly denied the existence of direct talks, and Reuters that Tehran has hardened its negotiating position and is demanding far more than Washington appears willing to accept. If so, the five-day pause is less a breakthrough than a holding pattern. It may for a few hours and allow intermediaries to shuttle messages, but it does not settle the central issue. A bluff against power infrastructure is not the same as a maritime solution. It is an attempt to compensate for strategic frustration by raising the civilian stakes.

The drift toward civilian targets and the erosion of strategy

That is what makes this episode larger than one deadline. The real story is not simply that Trump changed 48 hours to five days. It is that the war’s logic has drifted. The pressure is no longer confined to ships, missiles and naval patrols. It is being pushed outward, toward grids, pumps, ports and desalination plants, as if civilian vulnerability can succeed where military coercion has stalled. That is a familiar pattern in modern wars.

When leaders cannot deliver the outcome they promised, they do not always scale back. Sometimes they widen the pain until something breaks. The danger now is that what breaks first will not be the blockade. It will be the line separating war from the deliberate degradation of civilian life.

If the Trump administration were serious about reopening Hormuz, it would be investing its political capital in de-escalation, coalition diplomacy and a realistic assessment of what force can and cannot do in a narrow, mined, heavily exposed waterway. Instead, it flirted with the idea of turning energy and possibly water systems into bargaining chips, then stepped back only after Gulf allies warned that the costs could spiral beyond control. That is not strength; it is an admission that the original approach has failed. And once a war begins leaning on the infrastructure civilians need to live, it is usually a sign not that victory is near, but that strategy is running out.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post When Strategy Fails, Civilian Infrastructure Becomes the Target appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Of course, such personal exposure inevitably brings both insights largely inaccessible to foreigners and also potential biases. Such biases are not necessarily problematic but merely reflect the fact that personal exposure is likely to add to an outsider’s knowledge and also modify their understanding of why they are as they are and see the world as they do. Gaining such cultural insights greatly aids communication. Of course, acquiring such insights by “” is not the same as necessarily agreeing with whatever is revealed. I was a kind of opportunist “barefoot ethnographer,” a participant observer, not a “disciple.”

Nevertheless, with this unusual level of access and understanding over such a long period, I confess to having become somewhat conflicted — the more so over recent years since President Donald Trump first came to power in the US in January 2017 and took a decidedly aggressive stance against Iran, and his subsequent unrestrained joint military attacks with Israel on Iran in 2025 and 2026. On the one hand, who would not want a freer, unrepressed and more prosperous life for ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s 94 million population and both national and regional security and peace for all nations in the Middle East (including Iran and Israel)? But, on the other hand, has the increasing belligerence of Israel and the US towards Iran, culminating in their joint unprovoked mass bombing of Iran in February and March 2026 (an undeclared but de facto imposed war) delivered — or ever likely to — those desirable objectives?

Iranians are conflicted

Having endured decades of imposed wars, international sanctions, economic decimation, pariah status, great hardship, authoritarian government and a suffocating lack of personal freedom, those still in Iran desperately crave a normal, safe, peaceful and hopeful life for themselves and their families. But, does the recent US and Israeli military onslaught against Iran really herald such a change, or is it fools’ gold offered by devils-in-disguise?

The present Iranian population, inside and outside Iran, is very conflicted. Some of their reasons are broadly similar to my own, outlined above. In addition, most Iranians, including, I would gauge, a majority of those thirsting for a change of governance, are also angered not only by being relentlessly bombed but also by the sheer “might is right” arrogance and the megalomaniacal and bloodthirsty anti-Iranian rhetoric and vilification emanating from Trump, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and others in the White House coterie. The Times, noted for its right-leaning pro-US editorial worldview, ran a on America’s Iran War, which noted that Trump’s White House had twisted British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s famous maxim that “Jaw, jaw is better than war, war” to now mean “Jaw, jaw is better for war, war.” Providing copious examples of quotes by Hegseth, Trump and others, the article opined, “You’d be forgiven for thinking that Donald Trump and his staff’s salvoes were culled from a Bond villain.” More on Team Trump’s psycho-dramatics later.

A profile of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s population

The Iranian population today comprises three discernible main worldview groupings. Group 1 are ultra-conservative die-hard Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) regime supporters. One subgroup, amounting in total to some 10% of the adult population, incorporates the vast majority of state and municipal officials, judiciary, senior and middle-ranking military officers, most of the Shia clergy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including their Baseej enforcers. In addition, a larger subgroup includes the relatively uneducated and conservative masses in low-income jobs. The latter sub-group is estimated to be some 20% of the adult population. Following the targeted killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini by US-Israeli bombing on February 28, 2026, vast celebrated the succession of his son, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khameini, as ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Supreme Leader on March 9, 2026.

Group 2 comprises well-educated, Western-oriented 18–35-year-olds, typically living in the Tehran-Karaj conurbation of some 12 million people or in other large cities across the country. This group, which accounts for an estimated 40% of the adult population, are desperate for substantive liberal change in ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s governance, economic reform and rapprochement with the US. They have provided the majority of street protesters against the IRI regime. These have been going on for several years, during which large numbers of protesters have been killed or wounded on the streets by armed IRGC/Baseej forces, or have been jailed, and some even executed. Reported beatings, torture, sexual assault and even murder of arrested protesters are legion. The most egregious period of regime crackdown so far has been over several weeks from December 2025 to February 2026, when many thousands of protesters were reportedly .

Group 3, amounting to an estimated 30% of the adult population, comprises over 35-year-olds with rents, mortgages and families to provide for or elderly parents to look after in an ongoing hyperinflationary economy, all of whom value safety and economic and political stability. These include large numbers of middle-aged veterans of the 1979 Revolution and Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) who survived firstly the hardships and privations of that era and then the decades of Western economic sanctions up to the present. Most of this group, while fed up with years of international sanctions, chronic corruption and economic mismanagement, and yearning for change, veer away from actively deposing the IRI regime unless it is done by nonviolent means and does not involve interference from external forces or interests. Like Group 2, they would greatly welcome a change to a liberal, competent and noncorrupt regime, but not by their openly challenging the IRI regime or engaging in its violent overthrow.

Why aren’t Iranians rising to depose the IRI regime?

As if to demonstrate the Trump regime’s appalling ignorance of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s long history and its contemporary reality, in the days before the US and Israel’s joint blitzkrieg on Iran started in February 2026 and while bilateral negotiations between Iran and Washington were still proceeding, Trump’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, made an astonishing . With a puzzled facial expression and language, he said that the President was “curious” as to why Iran was “not capitulating” to his demands to give up immediately and cease forever all nuclear ambitions and activities (military and civil) and cease backing and using armed proxies to terrorise the region, while having to accept that all US economic sanctions against Iran would remain in place. Or else!!

Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi gave his own succinct and telling : “Curious to know why we do not capitulate? Because we are IRANIAN.” In other words, Trump and Witkoff appeared unaware of a core national characteristic of the cultural and psychological makeup of Iranians, namely an absolute resistance to foreign threats and bullying or any kind of attack on their national identity, sovereignty, territory and self-determination. Such national pride, patriotism and “unto death” stoic resistance served them well during the eight years of the Iraqi-imposed Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) in which Iraq was backed and armed by the US and other Western countries.

With vastly superior military equipment and US backing, Saddam Hussein said he expected to win this war in a few weeks or months, but after eight years, he had to concede a stalemate ceasefire. The same stoic and tough resistance has characterized ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s response to subsequent decades of increasingly harsh international economic sanctions, largely orchestrated by the US. With a 7,000-year history and national survival of Persia ingrained in their culture, today’s Iranians are unlikely to be impressed or swayed by the threats, swagger or attacks (military or economic) from the 250-year-old neophyte USA. Defiance and resistance will be their defining response.

The common reaction to Witkoff’s and Trump’s puzzlement, from the bevvy of seasoned political analysts, historians, Iran watchers, journalists, etc. (e.g., ), was one of initial incredulity at the breathtaking ignorance and naivety of these two most senior representatives of the US government regarding ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s history and US–Iran relations. This was then quickly followed by unrestrained guffaws at such an embarrassing display.

Further embarrassing puzzlement has been expressed by Trump and White House grandees about why the Iranian population has not heeded to rise up and sweep away the IRI regime. In addition to the police, the IRI regime has established an extremely well-organized, well-armed and ruthless internal security system (IRGC plus Baseej militias) to keep the population in line. In contrast, anti-regime protesters and the general population are unarmed, unorganized and lacking in any identifiable national or even local leaders. It is amazing that so many unarmed protesters have nonetheless persisted in challenging the IRI regime for so many years. Many have already paid the price with their lives or serious injury, but to seek to overthrow the regime by force without any weaponry or organization would be doubtless suicide.

In addition, as outlined above, most of the estimated 70% of the adult population who want regime change shy away from engaging in violent overthrow or else recognize its futility without leadership, organization and weaponry. The detailed analysis of the thirst inside Iran for regime change, and the percentage likelihoods of the various scenarios for it happening, provided by my colleague James Denton’s 51łÔąĎ article in early 2023, is still highly relevant. 

In addition, when Iranians hear Trump imploring them to rise up and overthrow the IRI regime, they scoff cynically at the notion that he would ever provide them with any tangible assistance to achieve such an outcome. Even in Trump’s first presidency, he and his then White House team were keen on regime change in Iran. As I wrote in 2018 (pages 234-235) in a on The Alt-Right Anti-Iran Project, “they envisaged this resulting from a popular uprising inside Iran” but failed to understand that, just as when US-backed Saddam Hussein launched his unprovoked war on Iran in 1980, the whole population including those disaffected by the IRI regime responded with zeereh parcham (rally to the flag) patriotism. 

As recently as January 2026, the US Department of Defense (unofficially now Department of War) issued a new National Defense Strategy , which contains (paragraph 2) the following statement: The Department will “no longer be distracted by interventions, endless wars, regime change and nation building.” Iranians ask themselves why, in less than two months, Trump has radically changed his mind, or was this new doctrine intentionally a complete fiction?

Iranians also vividly remember US President George H.W.Bush in 1991, the Iraqi population to rise up against Saddam Hussein with implied promises of US military assistance. No such help materialized, and the Iraqi Marsh Arabs, Shia anti-Ba’athist insurrectionists in Najaf and Karbala, and Kurds in northern Iraq, in particular, suffered . Iranians today take full note of how glib and duplicitous US Presidents can be in sacrificing foreign populations from the safety of the White House. It is unsurprising, then, that they would not be persuaded by Trump’s implied but doubtful promises of practical assistance to overthrow the IRI regime. 

Lack of a credible leader

What about the lack of any political group or popular leader in Iran who could replace the Islamic regime and its Supreme Leader? It is unsurprising that any potential contenders fail to make themselves known, since to do so would invite rapid detention or elimination by the current regime. 

Ah, but have no fear, there is surely a ready-made leader-in-waiting in the person of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Shah, who has been living in comfortable exile in the USA for much of the time since 1979. He was then still in his teens. He has never held any government office or responsibility, but has established a and well-oiled publicity campaign for his return to Iran as the next Shah. The campaign has essentially been to reestablish the Pahlavi monarchy and to reintroduce an imperial style of semi-feudal governance like his father’s. More recently, perhaps sensing such an outdated model just won’t fly with ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s population today, he has raised the possibility of his returning as a constitutional figurehead monarch “at an appropriate time.”

Crown Prince Reza appeals mainly to older Iranians, those old enough to remember the Pahlavi era before 1979. These are mainly Iranian emigrĂ©s abroad and a minority inside Iran who hanker after the pre-Revolution days. Although Reza is well educated, articulate and charming and receives much publicity and airtime in the West, his prospectus suffers from a number of handicaps. 

The outdated “reprise model” of his father’s pre-Revolutionary era is one handicap. Others include his lack of government experience and, apparently, a poor intellectual grasp of the extent and depth of state governance requirements for such a strategically pivotal country as Iran. However, perhaps the most damning criticism is a lack of self-awareness of his controversial personal attitude and conduct in public. In recent years, he has made no secret of his keenness for a post-IRI Iran to return to strong and friendly relations with Israel, which existed during his father’s reign.

While such sentiments are perhaps not in themselves outrageous, unverified videos and photos from 2023 of the Crown Prince and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with arms round each other’s shoulders and beaming faces (since deleted from internet sources), and Reza socializing with Israeli politicos and “big shots” in a Tel Aviv , have been received very badly among Iranians generally. Such behavior demonstrates a shallow regard for the sensitivities of the Iranian people and a preparedness to engage in what many see as inappropriate collaboration with ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s sworn enemy.

Even President Trump, while not unfriendly towards Reza Pahlavi and offering him words of encouragement and photo opportunities, has nevertheless that he does not regard the Crown Prince as a credible new leader for a post-IRI Iran. 

MAGA President Bluto Knuckledragger rules the world

“My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings. Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair.” This famous from Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem in 1818 about the Egyptian pharaonic ruler Ramses II (Ozymandias in Greek) was intended not to idolize the greatness of Ozymandias but rather to warn of the vulnerability of leaders with inflated and narcissistic egos to unnoticed context changes over time and unforeseen developments and events that they cannot control.

Unsurprisingly, President Trump is widely thought of as an Ozymandias figure, given his unrelenting penchant for uttering grandiose and bombastic statements about his own superlative greatness and achievements, contrasted with equally bombastic assertions about the alleged worthlessness or bad character of — well — just about anyone and everyone, from foreign leaders, US politicians, judges, corporate leaders, dignitaries, celebrities, sports stars, film stars, pop stars, religious leaders, journalists, ethnic groups, non-Judeo-Christian religions, particular nationalities, disabled people, refugees etc.

Even a small fraction of such insults and invective would be unbecoming, unprofessional and unacceptable from any person holding even a minor position of responsibility or authority, let alone a President of the US. But, clearly, the Bluto Knuckledragger (the main antagonist of Popeye) personality of this King Ozymandias could not care less.

Trump’s vast array of pet hates, targets for disparaging remarks and petulant Executive Orders naturally includes anyone who dares to disagree with, contradict or challenge him in any way, or simply stand their ground on what they regard as their own national best interests. So, unsurprisingly, Iran has long been a candidate for his angry invective, petulance and threats, culminating in his 2025 military strikes and current 2026 Operation Epic Fury, otherwise known as the War on Iran.

In the past ten years, there have been many published analyses and commentaries on the source of Trump’s often bizarre emotions and behaviour. For example, Professor Tim Wilson’s in 2026 on Trump as a dangerous liability suggests that his childlike tantrums stem from an arrested development, whereby his adult personality is locked into a permanent state of infantile perception, attitude and behavior. 

The Dangerous Charisma by Professor Jerrold Post, psychiatrist and political psychologist, examines the psychopathology of Trump and his followers, which is highly relevant to his wide-ranging neoimperialist aggression, unsupported territorial claims and bullying against several countries, mainly traditional allies of the US. Most countries trading with the US have also capitulated to his bizarre aggression. Countries (e.g., Canada, Greenland, Denmark, Panama) confronted by his potential land-grab rhetoric are still attempting to negotiate a way out. Venezuela’s historically anti-US authoritarian dictatorship has been left in power following the US short-lived invasion, the extraordinary rendition of President Nicolas Maduro to await trial in the USA and the US effectively taking control of Venezuela’s vast oil industry. Meanwhile, Trump has now an oil blockade of Cuba and threatened to end its 67-year-old communist regime.

However, confronted by an Iran that is not just uncooperative, resistant and noncompliant to US demands but also steadfastly defiant, Trump’s narcissism, delusional paranoia, and fragile and easily wounded ego finally responded in 2025 to Netanyahu’s persistent urging for the US to join Israel in a massive unprovoked and on ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear and other facilities in June 2025 (the Twelve Day War). The further unprovoked preemptive attack in February 2026, but on a much larger scale (Operation Epic Fury), is still ongoing. However, Trump’s apparent ignorance about Iran and its post-World War II history, his lack of grasp of military matters (or perhaps his deliberate dismissal of good advice from the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]), his inadequate war planning, his frequent and often contradictory changing and expansion of the war’s objectives, and contradictory statements from Trump and his Cabinet colleagues have been .

Also characteristically, Trump has continued with his narcissistic, grandiose hyperbole regarding the current war on Iran. Almost every day, he has issued formal statements in such language, or similar statements on his Truth Social online platform or at press conferences or public events, for example, , and his triumphant, if premature, claim “We won! We won!” on . Trump also appears to be unconcerned when US or Israeli missiles inflict mass civilian casualties on ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s cities (e.g., a in Minab). At a Republican conference, he even gloated in “gallows humor” style over the death of nearly 100 sailors when, without warning, the US sank an Iranian warship in open waters off Sri Lanka, some 3,400 kilometers from Iran, with a smirk, “It’s more fun to sink â€�em” than to capture them.

But what about all the sycophants and “yes men and women” that Trump has surrounded himself with as his White House Cabinet and entourage? These, too, fall under the scope of Jerrold Post’s political psychological assessment. Two top officials in particular evidently share Trump’s penchant for displaying a narcissistic, aggressive, bullying, self-congratulatory style: Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who has unilaterally and without Congressional approval retitled his post to that of Secretary of War. 

The armchair comic book warriors

Hegseth has been especially vocal about the Iran War, giving regular briefings extolling the US’s military supremacy, predicting a quick and overwhelming victory, and dismissing ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s military capabilities with contempt. In many ways, Hegseth’s wild anti-Iran has far upstaged that of Trump. For example:

“They are toast, and they know it.”

“We will hunt you down without apology and without hesitation, and we will kill you”.

“This was never meant to be a fair fight; we are punching them while they are down, as it should be”.

The Iranian leaders are “rats in hiding,” and the newly elected Supreme Leader has been “disfigured” by US/Israeli bombing.

On day 13 of Operation Epic Fury, gave a lengthy one-man public statement and press briefing on the war’s progress, seeking to convince an increasingly skeptical American public that early victory was assured with a complete annihilation and capitulation of Iran, and to soothe domestic and global anxieties and markets about growing economic damage. Reaction inside the US and globally has been cool and largely unconvinced.

It is not just Hegseth’s self-aggrandizing, triumphalist language, his repeated exaggerated assertions of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s crushing imminent defeat (now stretched already from one week to four–six weeks or longer) and his bloodthirsty, undiplomatic words that cause increasing skepticism and alarm. Just as telling are his physical presentation, body language and stage performance.

Hegseth always appears immaculate and well-groomed, perhaps reflecting his grounding as a Fox News TV presenter. Although this may be a potential advantage for audience acceptability, in his case, it seems excessive. Rather than cutting the gravitas figure of a cabinet secretary, his square-jawed, clean-cut, lightly tanned, play boy visage makes him look much more like a telegenic model for TV adverts for male grooming products, toothpaste or tanning lotion. Add to this his uncontrolled habit of looking overly earnest and sincere, his dramatic turns of phrase, his dogmatic assertions, his aggressive evangelical delivery and his constant emphatic hand gestures, and he falls naturally into the genre of crusading “hard sell” politico-religious televangelists so popular in the US.

Another unmistakable trait is Hegseth’s barely suppressed, constant bubbling anger. This anger seems to be caused by deep frustrations, particularly relating to his strongly held Christian fundamentalist beliefs and agenda (set out in his book of that name) that he would like to see fulfilled, but which so far seems to elude him. His on this issue involves his seeking to impose on the Pentagon an “onward Christian soldiers” culture that normalizes exclusively Christian ideology and language from a bygone era and sanctifies using America’s military might to achieve notionally superior Christian subjugation or elimination of non-Judeo-Christian religions and nations. The US war program against Iran, which started in 2025, has become Hegseth’s major launch pad for his and fixation to ensure a Messianic return, a second coming of Christ, through declared US supremacy and, as necessary, intimidation, conquest and subjugation of “the other.”

His ethnocentrist, religiocentrist and politically partisan superiority beliefs, agenda and actions also apply to the US Military and the US population overall. This directly rejects the equal rights of all citizens guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution. Hegseth’s White House Colleagues, President Trump, the Republican Party and many of their supporters have raised no complaints or objections about this flagrant rejection of the Constitution that Trump and all his Cabinet have sworn under oath to uphold.

For Hegseth, his knowledge of the history of Iran and its relationship with the US appears to start with the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the “evil Ayatollahs.” No apparent recognition of the CIA’s orchestration (with British involvement) of the against the Shah’s Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Mossadegh, which relegated the Shah to the role of Washington’s puppet — and sowed the seeds of the 1979 Revolution. As the distinguished has put it, “The coup revealed America’s influence and malevolent ambitions in Iran. The immense sense of betrayal that was felt – and cultivated for later generations.”

Deep mistrust of the US government stemming from the 1953 coup continues today, seared into the psyche of every Iranian, and accentuated by Trump’s that any new national political leader of Iran must meet his approval. Trump, the suzerain imperator, sees ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s future only as a US vassal state, and Hegseth seeks to oblige.

Hegseth exudes a juvenile, immature attitude towards governance, international affairs, international conflict and the prosecution of war. His gung-ho jingoistic fervor for battle whenever he addresses audiences betrays the excitement of a 13-year-old armchair “warrior” getting carried away reading Captain America comic books or playing video war games. His vicarious “fantasy hero” exposure to battle avoids him ever being in harm’s way, unlike all the American service personnel sent into the Iran War theater.

Vance also shares Hegseth’s barely suppressed bubbling anger. He rarely smiles and always looks possessed by inner demons and ready to explode. His outrageous televised against Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiyy (a US ally) in the latter’s White House meeting with President Trump on February 28, 2025, with Trump and others egging him on, will surely go down in history as the most disgraceful display of undiplomatic bullying in modern times.

While less vocal than Hegseth on the Iran War, by Vance’s rhetoric and published , he nonetheless shares Hegseth’s militant worldview on Christian fundamentalist supremacy and the importance of the US government imposing this on its own population and the rest of the world. He is reportedly a supporter of the , namely that the state should actively advance Christian supremacy in US society via control of seven key spheres: government, religion, education, family, business, media, arts and entertainment.

Unlike Hegseth, who possesses a very high degree of certitude about his identity and divinely ordained Christian mission, Vance appears conflicted and unhappy with his identity. Born James David Bowman, he first changed his name in 1990–91 to JD Hamel and then again to JD Vance in 2013. It is rare for males to change their surname, although his first surname change appears to have a reasonable justification. However, more than one surname change is extremely rare. There is speculation that he may suffer from some kind of narcissistic delusion of grandeur condition that drives him towards gaining enhanced public and political approval and adulation by reinventing his name to something more memorable, attractive and high-powered.

Hubris, delusion and the illusion of total victory

As many seasoned military and statecraft experts and observers have noted, all the hyperbolic US triumphalism spewing out daily from King Osymandias’s White House regarding a total Iranian defeat may be a tad premature on several major counts.

Beware hubris. The US has failed repetitively to learn from its past strategic mistakes overseas regarding inflated false assumptions that its undoubted massive military superiority alone will guarantee total victory in all respects, e.g., the Vietnam War, Iraq Wars and Afghan debacle. Unleashing overwhelming military firepower may succeed in causing a target country great loss of life, economic and material damage, and even capitulation, but military victory alone cannot win hearts and minds or guarantee long-lasting peace. Total victory also requires ensuring that a defeated enemy retains sovereignty, builds stable governance, rebuilds a strong economy, ensures political and religious freedoms and human rights, and stays at peace with other countries.

When it comes to Iran, the Trump White House has failed miserably to acknowledge the old maxim “know your enemy but know yourself better.” The limited individual and collective self-awareness displayed has been as pitiful as their knowledge and awareness of the Middle East in general and Iran specifically. 

Destructive, damaged personalities and pathological traits also seem to pervade the Trump White House and negatively influence US policy towards Iran. Large-scale field and clinical studies (e.g., Fritzon, Brooks et al, ; and , pages 295–325 and 327–365) have revealed that compared to a normative expectation of some 3% of the general population exhibiting clinically raised levels of psychopathy, when it comes to boardrooms and similar power centers, the prevalence rises to 20%. Could it be even higher among the Trump White House Cabinet and entourage? And, what about the governing groups in Iran and Israel? Perhaps all countries should conduct “due diligence” clinical psychological evaluation of political leaders, just as is often already standard for police and military personnel. Such screening might then encourage “Jaw, jaw” rather than “War, war.”

Perhaps soon the long-suffering Iranian people might finally be able to chant with confidence the Persian New Year invocation “Sad saal beh, az in saalha” — (May the next) one hundred years (be) better than these years.

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Reports that is considering arming Iranian Kurdish groups point toward a familiar and dangerous strategy of proxy regime change — one that rests on a fundamental misreading of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s demographic and political realities and carries potentially catastrophic risks not only for the US, but for the wider region and beyond.

A geographic misunderstanding 

To begin with, the strategy appears poorly informed about ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s internal political and demographic realities. ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Kurdish population represents a relatively small minority of the country’s roughly 90 million people. Most place their numbers between 8% and 10%. 

They are concentrated largely in the mountainous northwest of the country along the borders with Iraq and Turkey, hundreds of miles from the political and economic center of gravity around Tehran. By contrast, the majority of the population is ethnically Persian, around 60%, with a long and deeply rooted sense of national identity stretching back more than two millennia. Two factors further make the idea even more problematic. 

First, most Iranian Kurds are Sunni Muslims in a country where more than of the population is Shia. That sectarian divide is not trivial. Sunni–Shia tensions have shaped Middle Eastern politics for centuries and continue to structure alliances and rivalries across the region. Arming a small Sunni Kurdish minority in the hope of toppling a Shia Persian state suggests a fundamental misreading of the country’s ethnic and sectarian realities by US national security advisers.  

Second, the largest Kurdish population in the region is not in Iran at all but in southeastern Turkey, where Kurdish groups have fought a bitter against Ankara, in the capital of Turkey, for more than 40 years. During the Syrian Civil War, the US armed and supported forces as part of its campaign against the Islamic State. 

Once that mission was largely accomplished and American support began to recede, Turkey intervened militarily to weaken those same Kurdish forces, fearing they would embolden its own Kurdish minority. In other words, Kurdish proxy strategies rarely remain neatly contained within national borders.

Poor strategizing and underestimating 

There is also a broader strategic risk. Attempts to overthrow regimes from the outside often produce the opposite of the intended effect. Rather than weakening the government in Tehran, overt foreign support for insurgent groups could encourage Iranians, many of whom are critical of their own leadership, to rally around the flag in the face of . 

Iran also possesses far stronger state cohesion than many outsiders assume. While the regime faces significant domestic dissent, as evidenced by the in recent months, the Iranian state itself has proven resilient, a war with Iraq, decades of sanctions and sustained external pressure.

The alternative scenario may be even worse. Iran is a country of 90 million people, geographically larger than Texas and California combined, with a complex ethnic mosaic and a long history of regional power politics. If the state were to fragment into civil war, the conflict would almost certainly draw in outside powers. Russia and China, both of which maintain with Tehran, could support competing factions to counter American influence.

History offers few examples where external powers successfully engineer regime change through minority proxies. Far more often, such strategies produce fragmentation, civil war and prolonged instability. Pursuing that path in Iran risks turning one of the Middle East’s largest and most historically cohesive states into the next Syria, only vastly larger and far more dangerous. 

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The Rohingya: an endless exodus

The Rohingya, a Muslim minority from Myanmar’s Rakhine State, were stripped of citizenship and rights by a . Victims of what the described in 2017 as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing,” over 740,000 people to Bangladesh. Today, approximately one million of them in the Cox’s Bazar district, home to Kutupalong, the world’s largest refugee camp. The 2021 shattered any hope of repatriation, fueling a desperate, multi-stage journey toward Southeast Asia.Ěý

This hell begins in Teknaf, on the coast of Bangladesh. There, refugees brave the deadly currents of the Naf River on small, overcrowded boats that frequently . Those who survive fall into the hands of traffickers, who clandestine departures toward the Andaman Sea from hidden mangrove inlets, packing hundreds of people onto fishing vessels to evade the Coast Guard.

Welcome aboard the “ghost” ships

Once at sea, the operational phase known as the “Ghost Protocol” begins. This involves the Automatic Identification System (AIS) — a tactic technically referred to as “going dark.” By switching off these electronic transponders, traffickers eliminate all traceability of the vessel’s route and position. By becoming invisible to radar, the vessels into floating prisons. Deprived of Wi-Fi, traceability and legal protection, refugees are ammassed in fish holds. This lack of connectivity is not a technical limitation, but a deliberate strategy by smugglers to prevent the reporting of abuse and torture used to extort money from families.Ěý

In this technological limbo, the crews themselves invisible slaves, recruited through deception and forced into months of sailing without pay. The of going dark eliminates any chance of assistance: In the event of a breakdown, no signal exists to guide rescuers. Data from 2025–2026 confirms the lethality of the Andaman Sea route: One in five people is missing or dead. With over 600 victims in the past year, the true toll remains tragically uncalculable.

The Junta link: the ship-to-ship operations fueling the airstrikes

Myanmar’s instability has transformed the Andaman Sea into a military corridor disguised as a migration route. The networks Rohingya south toward Malaysia and Indonesia are often the same ones that, through ship-to-ship (STS) operations in international waters, the military junta with sanctioned fuel (Jet A-1). Without these maneuvers, the regime would be unable to power the Chinese-made jets and drones responsible for bombing civilians. Precisely because it is prohibited, the junta must rely on STS operations to bring fuel into the country while concealing its origin.Ěý

Large “mother ships” loaded with crude oil from the Russian Federation or Iran — countries officially under international sanctions — transfer their cargo on the high seas to the Burmese shadow fleet, which operates on behalf of the junta. Once there, the fuel is “” by falsifying documents to make it appear to have originated from legitimate Southeast Asian ports: a proven mechanism that finances authoritarian regimes through these invisible fleets.

Justice at sea: the cynical game of bouncing and reflagging

The tragedy is amplified by “.” In the absence of a coordinated Search and Rescue (SAR) system, such as the one in the Mediterranean, boats are bounced between the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Extreme abuses have been documented, including refugees forced to into the open sea and swim for miles back toward Myanmar under armed threat. Despite the High Seas Treaty () entering into force in January 2026 — adopted by the UN — the protection of human life in Southeast Asia remains a mirage.Ěý

While the treaty aims for transparency, Myanmar’s instability and the region’s fragmented sovereignty allow shipowners to bypass all oversight. By changing flags () with staggering speed, vessels mask their maritime criminal records. By exploiting “shadow states” like the Comoros, Panama or the Cook Islands, they operate within a bureaucratic gray zone. Small island nations become involuntary accomplices in a system that guarantees impunity. International authorities find themselves chasing not physical ships, but “ghosts” that switch identities every time they approach a new port or a refueling operation, making their capture nearly impossible.

While the International Court of Justice in the Hague with the genocide case against Myanmar, the Rohingya tragedy in the Andaman Sea remains the result of a criminal architecture that exploits the physical and digital geography of Southeast Asia. As long as the world permits the existence of a ghost fleet beyond any rules, the sea will continue to be a place of silent violations. To save lives, we must first turn on the radars, enforce on-board connectivity and recognize that every deactivated AIS signal is a potential crime against humanity. Breaking the cynicism of the “bouncing game” is the only way to restore dignity to these people that the world has left invisible for too long.

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The Islamic Republic of Iran came into being when Ayatollah Khomeini other Iranian factions and assumed the role of the revolution’s leader in 1979. Although other groups, such as the Tudeh Party of Iran, the People’s Mojahedin Organization (MEK), the People’s Fedayeen guerrillas and others, helped topple the late Shah of Iran, these organizations were sidelined.

Khomeini established a Shi’a theocracy advocating anti-American and anti-Israeli policies. At the same time, the new regime focused on supporting Shi’a groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah across the Middle East, both politically and militarily. Domestically, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) took over sensitive governmental institutions and gradually its authority in every aspect of the Iranians’ lives, from financial to construction to military sectors. Furthermore, any protest by Iranians was met with violence, where torture and the death penalty systematically used.Ěý

Up to a couple of years ago, very few analysts would have imagined military action of such significant scale against Iran. This happened mostly due to Tehran’s miscalculations and missteps in its long-term strategic plan. These miscalculations have given Iran a horrid endgame. 

Strategic miscalculationsĚý

The first major strategic miscalculations began shortly after the 1979 revolution, driven by the desire to export it. The revolutionaries chose an “anti-imperialist” path and declared themselves pioneers of resistance against the Sunni-American powers. While this gave the Islamic Republic a network of loyal, mostly Shi’a militias, it also turned Iran into a pariah regionally and internationally.

Pursuing an anti-Western path soon brought Iranian support for nonstate actors such as the Lebanese Amal Movement and Hezbollah. This network of alliances grew over time and included many groups, such as Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Iraqi Shi’a militia groups and Yemen’s Houthi movement. As this network (referred to as the Axis of Resistance) grew throughout four decades, Tehran, which was a close US and Israeli ally (before the 1979 revolution), became their archenemy, advocating the annihilation of Israel and suspending all diplomatic ties with the US.Ěý

This axis of resistance required military, political and financial assistance from Tehran to maintain its struggle. For instance, between 2012 and 2018, Iran more than $16 billion supporting the Assad regime and proxy groups in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. These expenses and harsh sanctions directly affected the livelihoods of ordinary Iranians. At the political level, the international community lost trust in Tehran, and the Islamic Republic grew increasingly isolated. Iranians experiencing hardships both at home and abroad gradually grew more bitter and turned to protests. Thousands of Iranians were murdered during the last wave of protests, which began at the end of December 2025, with the official reports around 30,000 killed and human rights organizations more than 7,000 protesters’ deaths.Ěý

Tehran focused and sacrificed much of its resources and finances on its nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions for more than four decades. The nuclear project has been degraded not only by the American bombings during the 12-day war in 2025, but also by Israeli and US and the of Iranian nuclear scientists. As for the ballistic missile part, Iran has fired a good number of them at Israel and other targets across the Middle East; however, they have not been as effective because of airstrikes carried out by Israeli and American warplanes. Iran has no modern jet fighters, insufficient air defense systems, or proper sirens or shelters for its citizens.

Ideological fervor

The Islamic Republic’s adherence to a specific ideology led it to increasingly curtail opportunities for engagement and collaboration, even as other nations sought to maintain open dialogue amid global challenges. Iran pursued alliances with nonstate actors and the building of proxy networks in hopes of regional dominance. The dominance seemed to work when, in the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003, Iran became a significant player. Tehran became further misguided with the success of keeping Bashar Assad in power for more than a decade following the Syrian civil war. 

This alliance slowly following the start of the Israel-Gaza war after the Hamas October 7 attacks on Israel. The conflict dramatically reshaped the regional power dynamics with surprising speed and brutality. Initially, Hezbollah suffered a . Their military capabilities, once considered a formidable deterrent, were severely diminished following a coordinated and sustained offensive. They lost key commanders and crucial supply lines, leading to a significant contraction of their influence and operational capacity. This immediate setback sent shockwaves through the anti-Western alliance.

Following closely on this initial defeat, the long and brutal reign of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad came to an abrupt and chaotic end. Within a single devastating “blitz week,” the remaining loyalist defenses . Facing an overwhelming coordinated assault and internal revolts, Assad lost his grip on the capital and the remaining heartland, forcing him to flee the country and ending decades of dynastic rule. This power vacuum in Syria had immediate and profound consequences for the rest of the region.

With their most reliable state sponsor gone and their primary proxy weakened, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s network of outposts, bases and militias across the Middle East has become much less tenable. The Iranians still have partners in the region, but they are not capable of inflicting a decisive defeat against their enemies. The weakening of their alliance is devastating for Tehran’s ability to project power.

However, Tehran remained determined, at least in rhetoric, to be the dominant regional power and possesses a leverage significant enough to afford intransigence in its diplomatic efforts to reach a deal with the US over the nuclear program. Further, Tehran refused to discuss its ballistic missile program under any circumstances, calling it . This aligned with the unbending rhetoric of IRGC commanders and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This shows they were overconfident that they could play the game as they had for 47 years, which had enabled their survival, with periods of stricter or looser sanctions.Ěý

Fatal consequences

Like a slow-motion game of positional chess, international politics and foreign policy unfold over time. Both sides meticulously develop their resources, secure their core interests, establish a strong structural base with a firm opening and build toward a solid middle game. Then they can aim for a draw if they are unable to win in the endgame. 

Anywhere in the world, it is quite difficult to win a war if the public is not supporting the government. of Iranians cheering the death of Khamenei by dancing on the streets, shooting fireworks and chanting anti-regime slogans prove the limited support the regime has among Iranians, even when under attack by a foreign country.Ěý

Both in June 2025 and since the start of the war, Iran has failed to defend its skies against the Israeli and American fighter jets. Iranian cities proper siren systems, and there are no adequate shelters for people to find refuge in when fighter jets pound the ground.Ěý

Iran made an opening move in its game that contained a few grave mistakes. Their middle game continued with a series of more mistakes, too. By antagonizing the West, being overconfident about its regional proxies and investing in a nuclear program and ballistic missiles instead of proper air defense and addressing its citizens’ grievances, Tehran believed it could beat the whole world. Thus, the prospect of the endgame turned out to be far from victorious for Tehran. 

Even if the Islamic Republic survives the current war, it has been beaten twice at home in less than a year and has taken a great blow at its outposts in the region. Managing its position will be a tough task, as both domestically and internationally, it has little leverage to play with. 

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One of the most consequential of these developments is the weakening of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s regional leverage. Mounting economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and security challenges across several fronts have constrained Tehran’s ability to sustain influence through its proxy networks. This has direct implications for Yemen, where the have benefited significantly from Iranian political and military support.Ěý

A by a UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has highlighted how Iranian support has enhanced the Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities, enabling the group to conduct attacks not only within Yemen but also against regional infrastructure and maritime shipping routes. Should ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s ability to maintain support for the group decline, the Houthis’ operational reach and political leverage will diminish, thereby creating space for new political arrangements to stabilize the country.Ěý

Gulf strategic realignment and opportunities for cooperation

For Saudi Arabia, the evolving regional context presents an opportunity to reassess its Yemen policy. Over the past decade, Riyadh’s approach to Yemen has largely been driven by security concerns, particularly the necessity to counter Houthi expansion and limit Iranian influence along Saudi Arabia’s southern border. While these priorities remain relevant, changing regional dynamics may enable Saudi Arabia to adopt a broader strategy that emphasizes long-term stability over short-term security considerations. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) could play a role in this expansive strategy.ĚýĚý

Although between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have intensified in recent years due to their competing visions over Yemen’s political future, especially regarding the role of the Emirati-backed southern separatists, the wider regional security environment is shifting rapidly. Escalating tensions following the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, which prompted an Iranian retaliation on and in the Gulf, have underscored the interconnected nature of Gulf security.

In this context, current regional instability may paradoxically create an opportunity for cooperation, as heightened security threats often encourage greater coordination among partners who share common security vulnerabilities. The issue of Southern Yemen could therefore transform from a point of divergence into a platform for renewed strategic cooperation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. 

Stabilization prospects in Southern YemenĚý

Despite years of conflict, Yemen’s southern regions have retained relatively security structures and administrative institutions. These local capacities provide a solid foundation for broader stabilization efforts in the region focused on governance reform, economic recovery and institutional development. Through coordinated Gulf support, strengthening such capacities could help create conditions conducive to sustainable stability.Ěý

The past decade of conflict has demonstrated that a military approach alone cannot deliver lasting peace in Yemen. Durable stability in the country will depend on , effective governance and partnerships rooted in local legitimacy. This is particularly important given South Yemen’s strategic geographic location. The region borders the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most vital , through which an estimated 10–12% of global seaborne trade passes via the Red Sea corridor. Ensuring security along these waterways is therefore both a regional priority and a matter of global economic significance.Ěý

Current regional dynamics offer Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the opportunity to expand their role in Yemen beyond short-term security objectives. Moreover, geopolitical developments provide an opportunity for Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to reconcile, thereby contributing to a more stable future for southern Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula.

However, it is vital for southern political actors to strengthen governance performance and demonstrate commitment to inclusive and accountable administration. Yemen’s long-term stability will ultimately depend on political arrangements that reflect realities on the ground and address the aspirations of the country’s diverse regions. 

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In the vacuum of this post-regime reality, a tempting but dangerous narrative has surfaced again from the archives of strategic thinking from the 1980s. This is the belief that the long-term security interests of the State of Israel, the United States and the larger Western alliance are by the balkanization of the Iranian state, or its breakup into its component ethnic and sectarian micro-states. This reasoning is dangerously counterproductive and lacking, as Israel should fear a balkanized Iran more than it wants such a dissolution.

The fragmentation strategy, famously by Oded Yinon in 1982, represents a catastrophic misreading of the 2026 security environment. While the dismantling of a hostile central government might remove a unitary threat, the resulting vacuum would not yield a collection of benign, manageable statelets. Instead, it would detonate a geopolitical dirty bomb that no amount of missile defense or border walls could contain.

The hard realities of 2026 dictate that a fragmented Iran would birth a constellation of nuclear warlords operating outside the logic of deterrence. It will also open a super-highway that enables a resurgent Islamic State of Khorasan (ISIS-K) and Al-Qaeda to reach the Mediterranean. Fragmentation will destabilize the crucial NATO anchor of Turkey through unmanageable refugee waves, and hand the strategic coastline of the Indian Ocean to the People’s Republic of China via a vassalized Baluchistan. Furthermore, the operational paradigm of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which relies on “intelligence dominance” over a centralized adversary, would be rendered obsolete in a chaotic landscape of fifty warring militias.

Consequently, the only viable pathway to regional stability is not the passive observation of a state collapse, but a coordinated US-Israeli Smart Intervention. This is a strategy predicated on the reality that the Iranian regime must change to prevent the catastrophic alternative of a failed, balkanized state. Unlike the model of fragmentation, that is, drawing borders along ethnic or religious lines, a Smart Intervention utilizes absolute air superiority, digital paralysis of the IRGC’s repressive apparatus and legal snapback isolation to facilitate a transition that preserves ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s historical and institutional integrity. A unified, secular Iran is a prerequisite for the model — a framework of strategic cooperation that transforms a former adversary into a regional anchor of stability. The opportunity cost of trading a potential future ally for a guaranteed failed state is a miscalculation that would haunt global security for the next century.

Yinon Paradigm is strategic anachronism in 2026

The Yinon Paradigm comes directly from Oded Yinon’s February 1982 , “A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s.” Yinon, a former Israeli Foreign Ministry official, argued that Middle Eastern states were fragile — glued together only by repression — and that breaking them down into smaller ethnic and religious states was the only way to guarantee Israel’s survival. The logic was simple: A neighborhood busy fighting its own civil wars is too distracted to threaten you.

But trying to paste a theory from 1982 onto the reality of 2026 is a massive mistake. The region hasn’t just changed; it operates on completely different rules now. Yinon assumed that breaking up big states would create weak, contained micro-states that couldn’t hurt anyone. Recent history proved the exact opposite. When central authority collapsed in Iraq after 2003, we didn’t get a quiet partition; we got ISIS erasing borders. When Syria fragmented in 2011, it didn’t create a safe buffer for Israel. Instead, it created a chaotic vacuum that the IRGC used to park advanced missiles right on the edge of the Golan Heights. In 2026, chaos doesn’t contain threats — it incubates them.

The biggest in applying Yinon’s logic to Iran is treating it like an artificial state, similar to Iraq or Syria. Iraq and Syria were modern creations, glued together by colonial powers from different Ottoman pieces. When they fell apart after 2003 and 2011, they cracked along lines that dictators had merely covered up. Iran is different. It is a civilizational state with thousands of years of shared history.

Despite having many ethnic groups — Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, Lurs — the concept of Iran-zamin (the Land of Iran) creates a loyalty that runs deeper than ethnic differences. Western strategists often underestimate this “rally around the flag” effect. Trying to push separatism from the outside usually backfires; it just hands the regime a perfect excuse to claim foreigners want to carve up the motherland. During the protests in 2025–2026 across Tehran, Isfahan and Tabriz, of “We are all together” drowned out any separatist voices. Even with the economy in ruins and political repression high, Iranians want to reclaim their country, not dissolve it.

Why fragmentation hampers Israel

The Yinon Plan was conceived in an era of conventional state-on-state warfare, where the primary threat was a massed Arab armored column crossing the border. In that context, breaking a large army into smaller, feuding militias made sense. Warfare in 2026, however, is defined by precision intelligence, cyber dominance and integrated air defense. Israel’s “” and subsequent defense plans rely on precise, data-driven targeting of enemy centers of gravity. As Israeli defense analysts have , the IDF’s superiority is maximized against a state actor with assets to lose and a hierarchy to target.

Dealing with “50 militias” in a balkanized territory removes the targets. There is no central server to hack, no commander-in-chief to deter and no economy to sanction. The enemy becomes hydra-headed, invisible and immune to the pressure points that Israel has spent decades mastering. The 1980s strategy assumed that chaos targets the enemy; the 2026 reality is that chaos targets the global order, energy markets and non-proliferation regimes upon which the West depends.

The most terrifying variable in the equation of Iranian fragmentation is the status of its nuclear program. Unlike the denuclearized Libya or the nascent programs of the past, Iran in 2026 possesses a mature, dispersed and deeply hardened nuclear infrastructure. Following the 12-Day War in June 2025, Israeli and US strikes parts of this infrastructure but failed to obliterate the technical knowledge or the entirety of the fissile stockpile. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a critical loss of “continuity of knowledge” regarding ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s production of centrifuges and enriched uranium inventories.

In a scenario where the central government in Tehran collapses, command and control over these strategic assets would evaporate. The resulting is the “Nuclear Warlord” scenario: local commanders, factional IRGC leaders or separatist militias seizing control of nuclear sites like Natanz, Fordow or Esfahan to use as leverage or a source of revenue. Graham Allison, a leading scholar on nuclear terrorism, has long that the “loose nukes” problem — the theft or sale of weapons-usable material — is the “ultimate preventable catastrophe.” In a fragmented Iran, the barriers to such theft would be nonexistent.

A fragmented Iran would leave critical nuclear sites in contested territory or under the control of local warlords who view these assets as the ultimate insurance policy or a source of immense wealth. The following table the specific risks associated with key facilities in a fragmentation scenario:

The collapse of the Soviet Union provides a chilling historical parallel, yet the Iranian scenario of 2026 presents unique dangers. The Soviet collapse occurred in a context of cooperative threat reduction with the United States; an Iranian collapse would likely occur amidst civil war and fierce anti-Western sentiment. Rogue IRGC elements, facing the loss of their state privileges, would have a massive financial incentive to sell enriched uranium or weapon designs to the highest bidder — be it a terrorist organization like Al-Qaeda or a state actor seeking a shortcut to the bomb.

David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security that in a state of internal chaos, the government loses the ability to protect nuclear assets. Theoretically, this creates a possibility of non-state actors manufacturing crude nuclear devices. The compartmentalized nature of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s program, designed to survive airstrikes, ironically makes it harder to secure during a civil collapse. There is no central “switch” to disable the program. Instead, a balkanized Iran creates multiple nuclear threshold entities. Israel would effectively trade one nuclear-threshold state for five or six unpredictable entities possessing nuclear materials, none of whom can be deterred by traditional diplomatic or military threats. Furthermore, the IAEA’s monitoring relies on the cooperation of a sovereign host government. Without that legal and logistical framework, the international community would be blind.

Intelligence dominance vs. the chaos of militias

Israel’s security architecture in the mid-2020s has to prioritize intelligence dominance — the ability to deeply penetrate the digital and communications networks of its adversaries. This doctrine was vindicated during the 2025 conflict, where Israel successfully executed strikes against Hezbollah leadership and targeted key Iranian logistics hubs. Operations like the assassination of Hamas leaders in Iran or the disruption of IRGC networks rely on the adversary having a structure: a digital backbone to hack, a hierarchy to map and a chain of command to disrupt.

A unified Iran, for all its hostility, is a known entity with a centralized nervous system. The IDF’s Unit 8200 and the Mossad excel at infiltrating these centralized systems. They can monitor the orders flowing from Tehran to proxies in Lebanon or Syria. Deterrence is possible because there is an address for the return mail; when Iran threatens Tel Aviv, the regime understands the cost. Strategic deterrence relies on the concept of a “return address.” When the Iranian regime acts — via a missile test or a proxy attack — Israel knows where to send the message, whether diplomatic or kinetic. The survival instinct of the regime in Tehran provides a lever for deterrence; the leadership values its hold on power, its economy and its strategic assets.

Balkanization shatters this advantage. Replacing one centralized regime with fifty competing militias, warlords and ethnic separatist groups creates an intelligence environment characterized by “noise” and opacity. Hacking a state’s Ministry of Defense is a fundamentally different challenge than tracking the handheld radios and encrypted messaging apps of dozens of independent militia leaders in the Zagros Mountains.

In a civil war scenario, intelligence collection suffers a severe loss of signal-to-noise ratio. As the volume of threats multiplies, the quality of intelligence degrades, making it exceedingly difficult to distinguish valid threats from background chatter. This chaos exacerbates the “address” problem, undermining a deterrence theory that relies on a rational actor who values their survival and holds assets at risk. Because a militia leader in a fractured Baluchistan or Kurdistan may not value infrastructure or stability in the same way a state does, Israel cannot effectively deter a group that has nothing to lose. 

Consequently, this dynamic creates an overwhelming resource drain, requiring immense operational bandwidth to monitor a fragmented Iran. Instead of focusing on a single nuclear program or a specific Quds Force general, Israeli intelligence would be forced to track simultaneous threats from multiple vectors — including loose nukes, cross-border raids, refugee flows and new proxy alliances.

The argument that Israel benefits from “weak” neighbors is a relic of conventional warfare. In the era of hybrid warfare and asymmetric terror, weak neighbors create safe havens for groups that are far harder to defeat than standing armies. The chaos in post-Gaddafi Libya, which destabilized the entire Sahel region, serves as a stark warning. Israel’s strategic interest lies in a demilitarized, non-nuclear, but a secular and functional Iran — not a Somalia on the Caspian Sea.

Turkey, NATO and the refugee weapon

For Turkey, a critical NATO ally and the gatekeeper of Europe’s southeastern flank, the prospect of Iranian fragmentation is viewed not as an opportunity but as an existential threat. In 2026, Turkey is already approximately 3.3 million Syrian refugees, a demographic reality that has strained its social fabric, economy and political stability. The Turkish economy, while showing signs of recovery with inflation dipping to around 30% in early 2026, remains fragile and highly sensitive to external shocks.

A collapse of the Iranian state would trigger a refugee wave of biblical proportions. Iran has a population of over 90 million. The destabilization of its urban centers — Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan — would send millions fleeing westward toward the Turkish border. Turkish intelligence agencies and the National Intelligence Academy have this potential influx as a top-tier national security risk. Unlike the Syrian crisis, which was managed with significant international aid and a gradual buildup, an Iranian collapse could be sudden and overwhelming. The cost of integrating or managing millions of new refugees would shatter Turkey’s economic recovery. Housing inflation, job competition and social services strain would likely lead to severe civil unrest within Turkey itself.

Beyond migration, the fragmentation of Iran would inevitably reignite the “Kurdish Question” with explosive intensity. An independent or autonomous Iranian Kurdistan (Rojhelat) would be viewed by Ankara as an intolerable threat to its territorial integrity, fearing it would embolden the PKK and separatist movements within Turkey’s own borders.

Historical precedents suggest Turkey would not remain passive. The Turkish military would likely launch cross-border interventions to establish “buffer zones” or dismantle Kurdish statelets, similar to its operations in Northern Syria and Iraq. This would place a NATO member army in direct conflict with various Iranian factions and Kurdish groups. Such a conflict would be a diplomatic nightmare for the NATO alliance. It would divert Turkish military resources away from the Black Sea and Mediterranean, weaken the alliance’s southern cohesion and potentially draw the US into a complex peacekeeping quagmire to prevent a war between its Kurds and its treaty partner (Turkey). The stability of the Turkish-Iranian border — which has remained largely unchanged since the in 1639 — is a pillar of regional order. Removing it invites chaos that NATO is ill-equipped to manage.

The vacuum and the terrorist resurgence

The maxim “nature abhors a vacuum” is nowhere more applicable than in the landscape of transnational terrorism. The collapse of central authority in Iran would create a power vacuum spanning from the Zagros to the Hindu Kush, a vast ungoverned space ideally suited for the resurgence of jihadist groups. As of 2026, has already its growing lethality and ambition. Attacks such as the Kerman bombing in early 2024 and subsequent strikes in Shiraz have highlighted the group’s ability to penetrate deep into Iranian territory.

The IRGC and Iranian intelligence services do not act out of a commitment to global security. Rather, they engage in calculated suppression of rival extremist networks like ISIS-K to protect their own hegemony. Their activity along the Afghan border and within Salafist cells is less about counter-terrorism and more about monopolizing regional militancy. While the regime portrays these operations as a service to global interests, they are fundamentally interterrorist rivalries — a “” between the regime’s state-sponsored proxies and ISIS-K.Ěý

ISIS-K propaganda already frames the Iranian regime as apostate rivals. Consequently, a fragmented Iran would be exploited as a “divine victory” to absorb existing radicalized networks. A foothold in eastern Iran would simply swap one terror architect for another, bringing ISIS-K geographically closer to the Arabian Peninsula and Europe, utilizing the very logistical hubs the Iranian regime has spent decades perfecting for its own global export of terror.

Similarly, Al-Qaeda leadership, much of which has been sheltered or contained under house arrest in Iran, would be unleashed. A chaotic Iran would provide a land bridge connecting jihadist theaters in South Asia (Afghanistan/Pakistan) with the Levant (Syria/Iraq). This “Jihadist Highway” would facilitate the movement of fighters, funds and expertise. The 2025 Homeland Threat Assessment by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other intelligence warn that the threat from these groups remains dynamic and persistent. A balkanized Iran would not be a localized humanitarian disaster. It would be a global security incubator for the next generation of transnational terror, necessitating renewed Western military intervention in a theater larger and more complex than Afghanistan and Iraq combined.

The Baluchistan corridor and the Chinese vassal state

One of the specific fragmentation scenarios often by proponents of balkanization is the independence of Baluchistan — a vast, resource-rich yet sparsely populated region spanning southeastern Iran and southwestern Pakistan. The argument posits that an independent Baluchistan could be a pro-Western ally that checks Iranian power. In reality, the geopolitical dynamics of 2026 suggest that an independent Baluchistan would inevitably drift into the orbit of the People’s Republic of China, becoming a strategic vassal rather than a Western outpost.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) hinges critically on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the crown jewel of which is the port of Gwadar in Pakistani Baluchistan. Beijing has invested tens of billions of dollars into infrastructure in this region to secure a direct energy lifeline from the Persian Gulf to Western China, bypassing the vulnerable Strait of Malacca. In the event of Baluch independence (unifying Iranian and Pakistani Baluch territories), the new state would be economically destitute and desperate for patronage. The West, geographically distant and politically hesitant to engage with a likely unstable tribal confederation, would be outmaneuvered by Beijing. China, with its existing infrastructure on the ground and deep pockets, would step in as the primary patron.

China, utilizing “debt trap diplomacy,” would likely long-term leases on ports and mineral rights in exchange for immediate economic stabilization. The secession of Baluchistan would likely catalyze the total disintegration of the Pakistani state, which remains fundamentally dependent on the province’s vast gas and mineral wealth for its survival. A collapse of this magnitude—involving a nuclear-armed nation of 240 million people — creates a security vacuum that dwarfs existing regional threats and invites unchecked Chinese opportunism.Ěý

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (), under the guise of stabilizing a new state, would likely secure a permanent naval base on the Indian Ocean, effectively encircling India and placing a direct stranglehold on vital Western shipping lanes. Furthermore, this geopolitical shift would grant Chinese industry exclusive control over the region’s massive copper, gold and gas reserves. This will systematically lock Western interests out of a critical global supply chain and cement a new era of resource hegemony.

Hormuz and the global energy pulse

The Strait of Hormuz remains the world’s most critical energy chokepoint with approximately 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption through its narrow waters daily. The current state of the Strait of Hormuz is not one of “security,” but rather a precarious regional hostage crisis maintained by the Iranian regime. The IRGC Navy does not “harass” shipping out of a standard naval doctrine. It engages in state-sanctioned maritime terrorism and extortion, utilizing its proximity to the strait as a primary tool of geopolitical blackmail. While the IRGC operates within a hierarchy, its actions are not “rational” in a defensive sense. Rather, they are the aggressive probes of a predatory actor that weaponizes global energy supply chains to ensure its own regime’s survival.

In a fragmented Iran, the northern coast of the Strait — the entire strategic coastline — would fall under the control of competing local warlords or pirate enterprises. The “Somalization” of the Strait of Hormuz would be an economic catastrophe for the West and the global economy.

Without a state navy to enforce order (or at least provide a singular point of accountability), piracy and extortion would become the primary economic model for coastal militias. Beyond the immediate physical danger, the economic and strategic costs of a lawless Persian Gulf would manifest as a permanent, crippling tax on the global economy. The collapse of a centralized — albeit predatory — security apparatus would cause war risk insurance premiums to skyrocket from their standard rates to prohibitive levels, dwarfing the jumps to 0.5% seen during previous periods of volatility. 

This institutionalized instability would inject a massive, permanent risk premium into energy markets, potentially driving oil prices above $150 per barrel and triggering global recessionary pressures on par with the 1970s oil shocks. Consequently, the United States and its allies would be locked into a perpetual, resource-draining military commitment. To prevent total maritime anarchy, Western navies would have to maintain a high-tempo presence to counter relentless swarms of suicide boats and drone strikes launched from an ungoverned coastline. This “endless constabulary mission” would not only deplete Western treasuries but also critically overextend naval resources, diverting vital assets away from the Indo-Pacific theater and other strategic priorities.

The opportunity cost of peace

The alternative to this dystopian landscape of fragmentation is the “” — a strategic vision proposed by exiled Iranian leadership and supported by various opposition groups for a transition to a secular, democratic and unified Iran. This roadmap fundamentally rejects the premise that Iran is naturally hostile to the West or Israel. It posits that the hostility is a function of the regime, not the nation.

The Cyrus Accords propose:

1. Immediate Recognition of Israel. A post-theocratic Iran would normalize relations with Israel, building on the pre-1979 history of cooperation.
2. Expansion of the Abraham Accords. This includes the integration of Iran into the emerging regional security architecture alongside Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel.
3. End of Nuclear Military Ambitions. A democratic Iran would return to full compliance with non-proliferation norms in exchange for economic reintegration and access to civilian nuclear technology.
4. Energy Stability. Iran would resume its role as a reliable energy supplier to Europe and the West. This will diminish Russian leverage over global energy markets.

A unified, democratic Iran serves Western interests in ways a fragmented one never could. The could be reborn. Historically, Israel’s security was bolstered by ties with non-Arab regional powers (Turkey, Iran). Restoring this axis would fundamentally shift the balance of power in the Middle East, isolating radical Arab rejectionist fronts and creating a formidable bloc against extremism. A capable Iranian state army, purged of ideological elements, would be the most effective bulwark against ISIS-K and drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Furthermore, the reconstruction of Iran — estimated costs range from to up to based on the 12-Day War — would be the largest economic opportunity in the region, driving growth for Western contracting, technology and energy firms. A balkanized Iran offers no such market, only humanitarian aid bills.

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The House has shown the same pattern. A bipartisan War Powers push led by Representatives Ro Khanna and Thomas Massie a test not only of Republican loyalty to Trump but also of whether Democratic leadership would risk a recorded vote that could split the caucus. Even when members publicly invoke the Constitution, many behave as if the vote itself is the threat.

That is the “theater” problem. Congress keeps rehearsing oversight while letting the executive branch set facts on the ground. A War Powers process that begins after thousands of sorties and hundreds of deaths is not a guardrail. It is a postscript.

A strategy built on speed and ambiguity invites civilian catastrophe

The administration’s public case has leaned heavily on urgency and prevention, but urgency is not evidence, and prevention is not a legal blank check. A UN panel was “deeply disturbed” by the on the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls’ school in Minab, southern Iran, which ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s UN mission said killed more than 160 children, with calls for transparency and an investigation. Washington and Tel Aviv can say they did not intend to hit a school, yet intention is not the only standard. International humanitarian law feasible precautions, distinction and proportionality. When children die at that scale, the burden shifts to the attackers to explain what happened, what intelligence supported the target, what safeguards were used and what changes will prevent repetition.

Hospitals have also been pulled into the blast radius. Reuters imagery and reporting the aftermath at the Gandhi Hotel Hospital in Tehran, including residents carrying belongings and visible damage. Al Jazeera’s photo gallery likewise damage at Gandhi Hospital amid the US-Israeli strikes. These are the kinds of incidents that turn policy failure into moral failure. Once hospitals and schools become recurring features of the war’s footprint, claims of surgical precision stop sounding like reassurance and start sounding like evasion.

This is where Trump’s approach is uniquely dangerous. His political style favors maximal threats and minimal disclosure. In war, that combination is not strength. It is volatility. The less the public knows about objectives, target selection and constraints, the easier it becomes for the campaign to expand while accountability shrinks.

Costs are not just dollars; they are capabilities

War Powers debates often get framed as constitutional symbolism. The numbers make the argument concrete. Estimates indicated that the first day of the US offensive through roughly $779 million, about 0.1% of the 2026 defense budget, a staggering sum to spend before Congress authorizes anything. Even if precise accounting varies, the direction of travel is unmistakable: The US is consuming high-end munitions at a high speed.

The more strategically relevant story is what those expenditures do to readiness. The US is shortages of key missiles and interceptors such as Tomahawks and SM-3s amid the ongoing offensive. Shortages do not simply raise the bill. They narrow the menu of choices. As stockpiles tighten, leaders become more likely to “double down” to avoid an ugly pause, more likely to widen the battlefield to chase decisive outcomes and more likely to treat restraint as weakness. A campaign that begins as air strikes can drift into a larger commitment because the political cost of stopping rises as the sunk cost grows.

This is the core indictment of Congress’s passivity. When lawmakers refuse to force an upfront authorization debate, they do not prevent war. They prevent strategy. They hand the executive a blank check, then act surprised when the ink runs out.

Trump’s war-making model is escalation plus impunity

A serious war policy requires three things the administration has not credibly supplied: a clear legal rationale, a defined objective and an off-ramp. The legal debate is not academic. Experts have whether the scale of the operation fits within presidential authority absent congressional approval and noted the limits imposed by international law on the use of force. If the White House believes the operation is lawful and necessary, it should be able to state the rationale plainly, publish supporting evidence where possible and accept independent scrutiny where evidence cannot be made public.

Instead, the administration has relied on assertion. A striking example is the reported gap between the rhetoric of imminent threat and what officials privately told lawmakers. Reports the Pentagon told Congress there was no sign Iran was going to attack the US first, undercutting claims of urgent self-defense. When a war is framed as necessary to stop an imminent attack, but briefings acknowledge no clear sign of one, the policy begins to look less like defense and more like a choice.

This is where Trump is politically exposed. A president who normalizes war without authorization is not merely bypassing Congress. He is hollowing out the accountability mechanisms that protect Americans from executive overreach and protect civilians from unchecked military force. The civilian toll inside Iran and the strain on US capabilities are not separate issues. They are the predictable products of the same model: act fast, disclose little, dare Congress to stop it.

What an actual War Powers response would look like

If Congress wants to prove the War Powers Resolution still has meaning, it has to treat authorization as a threshold, not as commentary. That means a binding requirement for specific authorization for continued hostilities, with defined objectives, geographic limits, time limits and mandatory public reporting on civilian harm. It means independent investigations into incidents like the Minab school strike and the damage to medical facilities, with findings released in a form the public can evaluate. It means funding tied to compliance, not compliance tied to vague promises.

A War Powers vote that comes after the bombs is still better than silence. But if Congress lets this war proceed without authorization, it will be sending a message that the Constitution is optional in wartime, civilian protection is negotiable and presidential discretion is the only policy America needs. That is not oversight. That is surrender.

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Right now, that audit matters. The US says it diplomacy with Iran, with indirect talks in Oman restarting after the June 2025 Israel-Iran conflict and subsequent US on Iranian nuclear sites. At the same time, US force posture around Iran has visibly : a carrier strike group, additional destroyers and an expanding mix of aircraft at regional bases. Even when officials insist the goal is “leverage,” a buildup is still a buildup — and it changes incentives on all sides.

Freedom as framing

American officials often speak about Iran in the language of solidarity. During recent unrest, Washington again reached for familiar lines about with the Iranian people and supporting their rights. The sentiment is understandable. It is also politically convenient: it turns a complex society into a single moral symbol, and it allows coercion to be sold as compassion.Ěý

The problem is not that freedom is an illegitimate concern. It is that the freedom frame, on its own, does not tell you what tools will actually help. When the loudest policy instrument is — sanctions, threats and military positioning “support” can become something else: a signal to Tehran that outside powers are investing in escalation, and a signal to Iranian activists that help is coming in the form of confrontation they do not control.Ěý

When violence is already unfolding in the streets, external cheerleading can harden the state’s security logic and raise the stakes for protesters. And when the crackdown is used to justify military options, the public is asked to believe a comforting fiction: that force will punish rulers while sparing society. 

Logistics speak louder than slogans

War talk is dramatic. Logistics is boring. But logistics is what makes wars possible — and what makes them last. In recent weeks, open-source tracking, satellite imagery and official statements have to a broad US effort to “set the theater” in the Middle East. Reuters the arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln and supporting warships in the region. Whatever the administration’s intent, a buildup of this kind expands the menu of credible military options.

Around that wider picture, a more specific claim has circulated: that C-17 cargo traffic into the region has to unusually high levels. The exact number is disputed and does not need to carry the argument. The point is what such a surge would mean. Strategic airlift is not a photo opportunity. It is how you move munitions, air-defense components, spare parts, fuel bladders, engineering gear, medical capacity and the mundane necessities that turn “options” into executable plans.Ěý

A posture built for “deterrence” can quickly become a posture built for action. Once assets are in place, the threshold for using them drops — not because leaders become reckless overnight, but because the system rewards readiness. If you have paid the political and financial cost of deploying, you are more likely to reach for the deployed tool when diplomacy stalls. 

Negotiations under the shadow of force

The United States and Iran returned to indirect talks in Oman in early February. The Associated Press a process focused, at least formally, on the nuclear file, with Tehran seeking sanctions relief and Washington pressing for broader constraints. Both sides have incentives to keep the channel open. Neither side trusts the other enough to make the first large move.Ěý

In that environment, “diplomacy plus pressure” is sold as a balanced strategy. But balance is not guaranteed. The pressure side tends to grow faster than the diplomacy side, especially when domestic politics rewards toughness and punishes compromise. 

When talks are paired with visible deployments, diplomacy can look less like a route to de-escalation and more like a stage-setting exercise: negotiate if you accept our terms; if you do not, the machinery is already in motion. Even if that is not the intent, it is the message that is received. 

The result is a familiar spiral. Tehran reads the buildup as preparation for an attack and doubles down on survivability. Washington reads Tehran’s hardening as proof that pressure must increase. The space for genuine bargaining shrinks, and the probability of miscalculation rises. 

A recent reminder of who pays in war

It is tempting to about “limited strikes” and “surgical options.” The June 2025 Israel-Iran conflict should have killed that temptation. In those 12 days, civilians in both countries learned a lesson that strategists often abstract away: modern war bleeds outward. UN human rights officials that Israeli strikes and evacuation orders drove large-scale displacement, with many fleeing Tehran.Ěý

The Evin Prison strike, which occurred on June 23, 2025, during the 12-day war, underlined the same point. Reuters Iranian officials saying at least 71 people were killed there, including staff, detainees and visiting family members. Human Rights Watch later called the an apparent war crime, arguing it struck a civilian facility with no evident military target.Ěý

On the Israeli side, Human Rights Watch Iranian missile strikes that hit civilian areas, causing deaths, injuries and displacement. None of this is surprising. It is what happens when states trade fire at scale. It is also why the claim “we will only hit the regime” rarely survives with reality.

Some politicians tried to wrap that conflict in emancipatory language. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement while talking about regime change; women’s rights observers warned that co-opting a grassroots struggle to justify external aggression can backfire, an internal movement with a foreign military campaign. Meanwhile, Iranian women and activists were left navigating a landscape that was both more violent and more securitized.Ěý

That is the pattern worth underlining. When outside powers promise liberation through coercion, they often hand domestic hardliners their favorite tool: a security narrative. The immediate victims are civilians. The longer-term victims are the political spaces that dissent needs in order to survive. 

The Maduro template: law-and-order language, military reality

In January 2026, a US operation ended with the of Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro, framed as law enforcement with military backing and condemned abroad ( in a UK Parliament research briefing). Critics it abduction. Venezuela is not Iran, but the method travels: moral urgency and legal packaging can make force look procedural. Iran should not be the next test case.

What a pro-Iranian-people policy would actually avoid

None of this requires romanticizing Tehran or ignoring Iranian state violence. It requires separating two questions that are too often fused together: whether ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s political order is unjust, and whether American coercion is therefore democratic. 

A policy that genuinely prioritizes Iranians would do the opposite of what escalation does. It would reduce the likelihood of war. It would treat civilian harm as central, not as collateral. And it would be honest about the record: wars sold as moral interventions do not reliably produce freer societies, especially when the intervening power defines freedom as compliance. 

That starts with discipline: if negotiations are real, deployments should not outrun them. Washington should state what it is deterring — and what it is not — and define “limited” for the civilians who would bear it. There are tools other than threats: a narrow, verifiable nuclear deal with reciprocal relief; humanitarian carve-outs and back channels that cool the theater; and support for independent information flows without turning protest into a proxy battlefield. Freedom is a powerful word. But in Iran policy, the revealing one is “pressure” — and pressure, paired with logistics, ends in rubble and displacement.

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Yet many who uphold the right of armed resistance against occupation have questioned the timing of this operation. In the aftermath, Israel’s onslaught razed much of Gaza, killing thousands of civilians in what many international experts and institutions have described as war crimes and acts of . and Hamas’s hoped-for strategic gains failed to materialize. While some argue that such a move was inevitable, Hamas’s decision reflected a desperate strategic gamble under the pressure of prolonged Israeli siege and occupation in choosing that moment, as three key dynamics show.

Local Palestinian dynamics

Hamas appeared to bank on a groundswell of rebellion across the Palestinian territories — that an attack from Gaza would spark parallel upheaval in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and even among Palestinian citizens of Israel. In practice, that “simultaneous uprising” never materialized. Instead, Israel swiftly tightened its grip on the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, Hamas’s political rival, from the , and any grassroots protests were met with , particularly in cities like and .

Israeli forces, emboldened by the war atmosphere, carried out the most intense West Bank in decades, including frequent raids into cities and refugee camps and a sharp escalation of settler violence. According to the UN and Palestinian health officials, Israeli troops or settlers have killed West Bank Palestinians since October 7, violence at a scale since the . This included deadly new tactics, such as the first in the West Bank in 20 years and army attacks.

Rather than stretching Israel’s forces across two fronts, Hamas’s attack left the West Bank populace isolated and suffering historic repression. Far from rallying to Hamas’s side, the local dynamics turned grimly against Palestinian interests: Israel’s security apparatus “” the West Bank with military closures and , while the world’s attention remained fixated on Gaza’s plight. In short, Hamas misjudged the capacity for a synchronized revolt — October 7 found Palestinians internally fractured and vulnerable, not primed for a united uprising.

This miscalculation even extended to Israel’s own society. Prior to October, Israel had been wracked by internal divisions with mass protests over Netanyahu’s . Hamas may have assumed Israel was politically weakened. Instead, the attack produced a “rally around the flag” effect.

Within days, bitter political rivals united in an emergency war cabinet; Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and opposition leader Benny Gantz formed a wartime on October 11, 2023. The usual fractures in Israeli politics closed overnight. In effect, Hamas’s timing reversed any advantage from Israel’s domestic discord — it prompted Israel’s most cohesive and rapid mobilization in years.

Hamas’s secret planning

If the local Palestinian reaction was weaker than Hamas anticipated, one reason lies in how the operation was planned. Ultra-secrecy was Hamas’s priority in the run-up to October 7. For years, a small coterie led by (Hamas’s ex-Gaza chief) and (One Hamas’s military leaders for over 20 years) plotted the assault in a strict, compartmentalized fashion. This clandestine approach achieved tactical surprise — Israel’s vaunted intelligence was indeed blindsided — but it came at the cost of broader coordination.

Hamas did its own allies or many within its ranks. Reports indicate that Hamas’s political leadership and external allies like Iran and Hezbollah were largely kept out of operational details. While some Iranian and officials may have been aware that Hamas was preparing some form of escalation, they were reportedly not briefed on the scale or timing of the October 7 assault. Initial US likewise found that some senior Iranian leaders were “surprised” by Hamas’s unprecedented attack. In essence, Hamas went into this major war largely alone, having isolated itself in pursuit of maximum operational security.

This lack of coordination had predictable consequences. Within Gaza, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad did join the fighting, but the absence of synchronization with the West Bank or with Hezbollah (on Israel’s northern border) meant Hamas forwent opportunities that might have stretched Israel’s defenses.

Hamas hoped for a cascading multi-front war — envisioning unrest in the West Bank and possibly a heavier Hezbollah engagement — but none of that came to fruition. By not notifying fighters in the West Bank ahead of time, Hamas ensured operational secrecy but lost a chance to ignite parallel action.

Internally, this bold operation also laid bare ideological rifts within Hamas. The timing and scale of the attack were decided by the Gaza-based leadership without broad consultation, reflecting a more maximalist line. It ran counter to the more measured approach that Hamas’s political bureau (in exile) had signaled in recent years (for instance, via a 2017 accepting a Palestinian state on 1967 borders).

In launching the October 7 assault unilaterally, Hamas’s hardliners sidelined any dissenting voices — but they also deprived themselves of consensus. The result was a spectacular military surprise achieved by a “narrow circle” of plotters, but little ability to capitalize on it politically. In strategic terms, Hamas faced the war largely alone — not only because of its operational choices, but because regional and international actors have consistently failed to provide meaningful support for Palestinian self-determination.

Regional realities

Hamas also failed to account for the regional geopolitical timing. The attack was presumably aimed at upending a burgeoning Israel-Sunni Arab rapprochement — notably, it came as Israel and Saudi Arabia were inching toward a historic . Indeed, in the immediate aftermath, Riyadh did pause its US-brokered talks with Israel and instead opened communications with Iran.

On the surface, Hamas achieved one goal: the Saudi–Israeli normalization was put ” and the issue of Palestinian statehood was thrust back onto the agenda of Arab states. However, this regional fallout was not a strategic gain for Hamas. Crucially, the Middle East of 2023 lacked any robust anti-Israel alliance or “resistance axis” willing to intervene on Gaza’s behalf.

The trend before October 7 was one of Arab states prioritizing their own detentes and interests — not preparing a joint front against Israel. Countries like Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia issued condemnations of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and rallied humanitarian aid, but none moved to confront Israel militarily.

Even Iran, despite its fiery rhetoric, calibrated its actions to avoid direct war till April 2025. Tehran’s leaders were caught off guard by Hamas’s operation and, rather than launching into the fray, they worked to prevent escalation — for instance, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s President and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince held their first-ever call to contain the crisis and avoid a . This underscores that Hamas struck at a time when the region’s power centers were in a normalization mindset, not a war footing against Israel.

The limitations of Hamas’s regional support were most evident on Israel’s . Fears of a full-scale second front with Hezbollah proved unfounded. While Hezbollah did exchange fire with Israeli forces in the weeks after October 7, it pointedly restricted its engagement to a low-intensity level — targeting military outposts near the border but avoiding major operations that would invite all-out war.

Hassan Nasrallah, ±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s ex-leader, ultimately chose caution: Lebanon’s dire domestic situation and the risk of massive Israeli retaliation made a full entry into the war unlikely. Hamas had counted on more. Its officials publicly urged allied groups to do more — as one Hamas leader, , said in late October, “We appreciate [±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s actions] … But we need more … We expect more”.

Those pleas fell on deaf ears. Hezbollah and Iran clearly calculated that expanding the war was not in their interest, despite their rhetorical support for Palestine. In the end, Hamas’s timing couldn’t have been worse regionally: the attack came when Arab states were exploring peace deals and rivals were reconciling, and when even the “Axis of Resistance” preferred a limited show of support or over the risks of regional conflagration.

Hamas hoped to break the momentum of Arab–Israeli normalization, and while it did stall it temporarily, it had no regional alliance to replace that momentum with. Instead, the war solidified a US-led regional security stance (US military assets surged to the Eastern Mediterranean) and left Israel’s neighbors wary of entanglement, which only heightened Israel’s freedom of action in Gaza.

A high-price gambit with little strategic payoff

Analyzing three key layers — local, intra-Palestinian and regional — a pattern emerges: every contextual window was closed in October 2023. Hamas chose to strike when the Palestinians were internally divided and easily suppressed outside Gaza; when Hamas’s own planning isolation undermined broader coordination; when the regional geopolitical climate favored rapprochement over resistance; and when global powers were poised to side with Israel instantly.

This convergence of unfavorable factors made October 7 a strategic blunder despite its initial tactical success. Instead of exploiting adversary weaknesses, Hamas’s attack ended up amplifying the asymmetry of power it faced. Israel seized on the attack as a pretext to intensify its long-standing campaign of collective punishment and mass violence in Gaza, facing little international restraint.

Yet the trajectory of the war eventually revealed the limits of Israel’s coercive power. By the time was reached on October 9, 2025, Israel’s prolonged campaign had failed to achieve its core strategic objectives, undermining its image as an actor capable of imposing military solutions. The war reinforced Israel’s identity as a settler-colonial regime systematically violating international law with impunity — a perception that may carry lasting political costs if it once again violates the ceasefire.

To be sure, from Hamas’s perspective, the attack was born of desperation. Years of blockade, stalled diplomacy, expanding Israeli settlements and repeated provocations had convinced Hamas that no better moment was coming. Hamas leaders have that they had no other options and understood the grievous costs but were willing to pay the price to jolt the status quo. They point out that the operation did succeed in returning the Palestinian cause to global attention and momentarily disrupted Israel’s regional integration.

Such assertions underscore a grim truth: for Hamas and many Palestinians, any moment to challenge a decades-long occupation would carry terrible risks, and waiting might only mean enduring more oppression. In that sense, some contend that Al-Aqsa Flood was a necessary gambit, mistimed or not, to remind the world of Palestine’s unresolved plight.

Yet acknowledging that desperation does not negate the strategic reality. The outcome of October 7 speaks for itself. By striking when it did, Hamas triggered a response that has devastated Gaza and dramatically weakened Palestinian positions, with no equivalent gain in sight. Different timing or better coordination might have produced a different balance — for example, had regional conditions been more favorable or international opinion less one-sided, Hamas might have retained more leverage post-attack.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Economic cold war?

Khattar Singh begins by asking whether Trump’s tariffs mark the start of an economic cold war. Moran doubts this, pointing out that the policy is riddled with uncertainty. Some tariffs face legal challenges, and Trump himself has a history of walking back duties when they risk fueling inflation. While Trump sometimes frames tariffs as inherently good, Moran insists he is pragmatic enough to avoid market chaos or consumer backlash.

Moran highlights three questions to watch: which countries will get exemptions, which will strike free trade agreements and how courts will ultimately rule. For now, no one, including Trump, can say exactly where tariff policy is headed. This unpredictability makes life difficult for businesses, as seen with the failed 500% tariffs on Chinese imports that raised costs but produced no concessions from Beijing.

Does Trump want a deal?

On tariffs as a negotiating tool, Moran stresses the volatility of Trump’s approach. Duties could fall if parties reach agreements or rise if talks collapse. But Trump’s frequent public reversals mean even his advisors lack clarity. Moran recalls that the extreme tariffs on China hurt the US economy and consumers more than they pressured Beijing, underscoring the limits of this strategy.

Is Trump uniting BRICS?

Khattar Singh presses Moran on whether tariffs could backfire by pushing BRICS nations closer together. Moran concedes there is some risk: Resentment could bring members “slightly closer.” However, he doubts a 10% tariff would overcome deep divisions. India and China remain at odds, while Iran and the United Arab Emirates also clash. He predicts that as BRICS grows in influence, its geopolitical fractures will become more apparent.

The BRICS plan to set up their own payment system outside the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication has become especially controversial. Initially framed as a sovereignty tool, it now allows Russia to dodge sanctions. Moran warns that without guardrails, the system could facilitate dangerous activity. Washington, he argues, will grow increasingly alarmed, and Trump may try to use tariffs to block its expansion.

Trump and India

Moran singles out India as a vital partner. He sees potential for a bilateral trade deal with New Delhi and hopes for a deeper US–India alliance, especially given shared concerns about China. Defense is central here. Moran criticizes India’s reliance on Russian systems, citing ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s failure to stop Israeli attacks with its S-300 missile systems. He argues this is a “wake-up call” for India and urges the country to purchase US-designed systems instead.

Khattar Singh counters that US MIM-104 Patriot systems have struggled in Ukraine and that India’s Russian-made S-400s performed effectively against Pakistan. Still, he notes India’s growing trust in the United States, pointing to its purchase of Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopters.

A US–India trade deal

Turning to economics, Moran distinguishes between what a Trump–India deal might look like and what it should. Trump’s fixation on the Harley-Davidson motorcycle company complicates negotiations, while issues such as manufacturing and IT services remain sensitive. Yet Moran insists that bilateral engagement with India is far more practical than attempting to juggle hundreds of simultaneous agreements.

He allows that multilateralism with BRICS could serve US interests in some cases, but stresses that internal divisions make bilateral deals the safer path. For India, alignment with Washington on trade and defense could strengthen both nations’ positions in the global order.

The future of AI

Khattar Singh and Moran agree that AI will define the next economic era. Moran points to the UAE’s aggressive push to become an AI hub and warns against leaving the field to China, whose advances he identifies as potentially disastrous. He argues the US should not try to handle AI challenges alone.

Khattar Singh notes India’s vibrant AI ecosystem, from widespread use of ChatGPT to national investment in research. Together with the US and the UAE, India could anchor an AI partnership. By contrast, the European Union’s regulatory environment discourages innovation. As Moran bluntly notes, “None of these AI companies are European. Zero.”

Are Americans paying for tariffs?

In closing, Khattar Singh asks whether tariffs ultimately hurt Americans. Moran’s answer is a resounding yes. Economists are right, he says, that tariffs raise domestic costs. The effect depends on scale — targeted tariffs like those on Chinese aluminum in 2018 were manageable, but sweeping 500% tariffs would devastate consumers and industry.

Trump himself is inconsistent, sometimes framing tariffs as leverage, other times as revenue. That inconsistency suggests tariffs will not disappear quickly. Moran ends by stressing that the US needs competitive partners. While not excluding Europe, he doubts the old transatlantic alliance can deliver innovation. For him, the future lies in closer ties with India — on defense, trade and especially AI.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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51łÔąĎ Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch, a veteran of the Turkish capital of Ankara and the Middle East, explore Syria’s dramatic upheaval and its regional consequences. The conversation highlights the fall of the Assad dynasty, the ascent of new Sunni leadership and the recalibration of regional power involving Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Strategic shifts in the region

Ruch opens by stressing that Syria is undergoing profound strategic changes. He recalls predicting a decade ago that the old Syrian order would collapse, though he did not foresee such rapid change. He lists key developments: the collapse of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s land corridor to the Lebanese Shiite military group Hezbollah, Turkey’s renewed influence, Russian and American hesitation and the re-emergence of energy projects such as a long-discussed Qatari pipeline through Turkey to Europe. These shifts, he argues, will shape not only the Middle East but also West Asia and Europe, especially regarding refugees.

The fall of the Assad regime

Singh summarizes the dramatic recent events: former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, ending 54 years of Ba’athist rule. The Alawite minority, dominant since 1970, has lost power, while Sunnis, led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the head of the former Islamist military group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), seized Damascus in a lightning ten-day offensive. Turkey’s intelligence chief prayed with Julani in the Umayyad Mosque, underscoring Ankara’s backing. Celebrations erupted across Sunni communities, from Pakistan to Bangladesh, marking the symbolic return of the Umayyad Mosque from Shia to Sunni hands.

Historical burdens and Turkish ambitions

Singh asks about Syria’s troubled past. Ruch traces its modern shape to the Sykes–Picot agreement and subsequent French mandate. He notes that outside powers have long dictated order in the region, from the Cold War to the Arab Spring. He emphasizes Turkey’s central role today, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, intelligence head İbrahim Kalın and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan projecting power rooted in Ottoman legacy. Turkey’s ambitions rest on military strength, economic reach and religious conviction. However, Ruch notes Arab mistrust persists, recalling how Egyptian women during the Arab Spring dismissed Turkish claims of returning.

New balances and fragile alliances

Ruch argues that Julani’s victory is significant but unstable. The challenge lies in power-sharing among Sunnis, Arabs, Kurds, Druze and Alawites, with mediation from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar. He cites the risk of fragmentation: Lebanon may split, Druze may seek Israeli protection, Kurds resist HTS and Alawites retreat to Russian-backed enclaves. Regional powers must negotiate a new balance, while outside actors such as Russia seek to preserve bases in Tartus and Latakia. The 2012 Geneva Communiqué, Ruch believes, still offers a guiding roadmap.

Turkish grooming of HTS and Western involvement

Ruch attributes Julani’s success to Turkish grooming over at least four years, with HTS supplied and trained through Turkey. He estimates HTS commands around 30,000 fighters and speculates that Gulf or even Western funding contributed to the group’s rise. Turkey also relies on the Syrian National Army, effectively an extension of its military, to pressure Kurdish forces.

Ankara’s strategic aim is to establish a 30-kilometer buffer zone free of Kurdish fighters, possibly with US President Donald Trump’s backing. Singh adds reports that Assad’s army collapsed partly because soldiers were unpaid, while Julani benefited from foreign funding. Ruch notes Western efforts to rebrand Julani, once hunted with a $10 million US bounty, into a suit-wearing political leader named Ahmed al-Sharaa, raising doubts over whether this transformation is cosmetic or substantive.

The wider geopolitical picture

The conversation turns to broader dynamics. Ruch highlights Christian minorities’ anxiety, Alawite resentment and the risk of revenge killings. He stresses that justice mechanisms will be essential to avoid cycles of violence. Regionally, he underscores rivalry among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt for Sunni leadership. Iraq, he suggests, could mediate despite its limitations, recalling its role in the 2023 Iran–Saudi rapprochement. Israel, meanwhile, destroyed Syrian air defenses and sought to prevent a hostile Sunni coalition.

While normalization with Gulf states advanced under the Abraham Accords, Ruch doubts lasting peace without a Palestinian state. He warns that, absent such a resolution, hostility will fester and could erupt in future crises as severe as the infamous October 7 attack on Israelis in 2023.

The broken map

Singh and Ruch agree that Syria, as once defined, will not return. The Humpty Dumpty metaphor looms over their discussion: the old order is shattered and cannot be rebuilt. Whether Julani and his Turkish patrons can forge an inclusive and durable framework remains uncertain. Regional rivalries, sectarian divides and unresolved grievances threaten renewed instability. Yet the stakes are immense: the future of Syria will ripple across West Asia, Europe and the balance of global power.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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These systems do not want peace because their survival depends on sustained conflict. This is why diplomatic summits, ceasefire deals and foreign interventions consistently fail: they target symptoms, not causes. If the problem is structural, then so must be the solution. Peace in the Middle East will not come through negotiation. It will come through a civilizational shift, and it demands three acts of moral courage.

The first is capitalist liberalization. Every individual must gain the right to produce, to trade and to own. No government has the right to command his labor, confiscate his earnings or dictate his future. Capitalism is not a system of greed. It is the only system that recognizes the moral right of a person to live for his own sake.

The second is cultural conservatism. A society cannot survive without roots. When families collapse, when traditions vanish, when morality fades into relativism, chaos follows. A rational culture does not erase its past. It protects what gives life meaning, not by coercion, but by conviction.

The third is institutional transformation. No regime that survives by crushing liberty, spreading violence and fueling sectarian hate can remain in power without destroying the future. People must not reform such systems. They must replace them. Political freedom requires new institutions built on justice, law and individual rights.

This is the foundation of what I call Conservative modernism. It rejects both Islamic totalitarianism and secular technocracy. It affirms that peace cannot exist without liberty, and liberty cannot exist without moral strength. This is not a policy. It is a philosophy.

Sectarian wars and the legacy of doctrinal politics

We cannot understand the Middle East’s political instability apart from the theological and sectarian divides embedded within Islam itself. The — originating from a dispute over the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad — has long outgrown its historical moment to become the structural backbone of regional conflict. This divide was never merely theological; it became during the first Islamic civil wars and later into full-fledged state ideologies during the rise of rival empires like the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate and the Shia Safavid dynasty.Ěý

These empires did not merely represent competing political centers — they embodied competing claims to spiritual authority. In modern terms, regimes seeking to legitimize their power through religious division have hardened, institutionalized and weaponized these doctrinal fault lines rather than letting them fade. 

The legacy of these doctrinal wars lives on in today’s proxy conflicts, from Yemen to Syria, Iraq to Lebanon. Iran, as the self-appointed guardian of the Shia cause, has instrumentalized this divide to its revolutionary ideology through paramilitary proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq and Syria.Ěý

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, while less overtly ideological, have with their versions of sectarian patronage and security alignments. The result is not simply a clash between states, but a doctrinal cold war that perpetually destabilizes the region through religious identity and existential fear.

Political Islam, once unleashed as the doctrine of the state, does not merely challenge liberty — it annihilates the very concept. Its metaphysical certainty surpasses even the most dogmatic ideologies of the West. It does not see disagreement as an error. It brands it as blasphemy. What follows is inevitable. The state becomes paranoid. It cannot rest. It must constantly search for new traitors to purge. Reform becomes a crime. Dialogue becomes apostasy. There can be no middle ground, no compromise — only absolute control.

In this system, truth belongs to the ruling sect alone. To think differently is not a mistake — it is treason. The state no longer governs; it sanctifies itself. Power fuses with theology. Rule becomes divine command. And from that moment, every act of dissent becomes a threat to the sacred order. No regime built on this logic can tolerate peace. Peace implies coexistence. It suggests that another version of truth might exist. But in sectarian totalitarianism, there is only one truth — and only one authority to speak it. The heretic becomes more dangerous than the foreign enemy, because he corrupts the system from within. That is why these regimes live in constant fear of internal betrayal. They do not govern citizens; they hunt them.

Colonial powers did not build the modern Middle East into nations. They it into fragments. They drew their borders without reason. National identities remained shallow. In this vacuum, sectarian ideology offered a seductive substitute. It gave rulers a way to seize power without earning it. They did not ask for the people’s consent. They claimed divine authority instead.

Theocrats wrapped themselves in clerical robes to escape accountability. In Iran, the doctrine of placed unchecked political power in the hands of a cleric. Ayatollah Khomeini did not rule as a man — he ruled as a voice of God. Sunni radicals followed the same path. Groups like ISIS declared caliphates not to govern, but to sanctify tyranny. These regimes do not fear criticism, because they do not answer to men. They answer to the metaphysical fiction they claim to represent.

Islamic regimes use a dangerous illusion. They raise the banner of anti-Zionism not to unify but to distract. They Judaism and Israel as the ultimate enemy, hoping to forge a sense of solidarity across sectarian lines. But the truth remains: no propaganda can erase centuries of hatred between Sunni and Shia, between Salafi and Sufi, between Arab and Persian, between Turkic and non-Turkic. The hatred runs deep, and it does not disappear when leaders shout slogans against Israel.

This is not unity. It is manipulation. Anti-Zionism becomes a tool to dissent at home. It channels public anger away from corruption, poverty and tyranny, and toward an invented external enemy. It does not heal division; it hides it. The regimes that use this tactic know they cannot survive on truth, so they survive on scapegoats. But lies do not last. The cracks widen. The rhetoric grows louder, while the people grow poorer.

This is the real engine of Middle Eastern conflict. Not just land. Not just oil. It is the battle for the right to define God’s will — and to use that claim as a weapon. No treaty will break this system. No ceasefire will fix it. If regimes like Iran continue to export sectarian revolution as a matter of policy, the region will remain trapped in endless war. Peace will never begin on a battlefield. It begins in the mind. We must name doctrinal tyranny, expose it and defeat it. Only then can the Middle East escape from the chains of sacred war and step into the realm of civil peace.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution

The 1979 was not simply a change of regime; it was a civilizational rupture that produced a theocratic state with an unprecedented mission: to restructure the Islamic world according to the vision of Shiite clerical rule. ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s revolution claimed divine authorization through the doctrine of Vilayat al-Faqih. This doctrine, enshrined in ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s constitution, granted religious elites not only domestic supremacy but also a global mandate.Ěý

Article 154 explicitly that the Islamic Republic was duty-bound to “support the just struggles of the oppressed” worldwide. This ideological euphemism laid the legal foundation for regional insurgencies, proxy warfare and transnational terror networks. This new paradigm made ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s foreign policy an extension of messianic doctrine.

The Islamic Republic institutionalized this transformation of ideology into action by creating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (), and specifically its external wing, the , which carried out the mission of exporting the revolution. These were not simply elite military units but ideological vanguards — armed missionaries designed to reshape the region in Tehran’s image.

The IRGC and funded Shia militant factions during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, inside Iraq, creating the blueprint for what would later evolve into militia-state fusion. As early as 1982, Iran establish Hezbollah in Lebanon, embedding its revolutionary DNA in a new Shia militia that would grow into the region’s most sophisticated paramilitary movement.Ěý

But Iran did not confine its ambitions to its sect. Tehran built connections with Sunni groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran and its allies bypassed doctrinal differences when they faced a shared strategic enemy in Israel and the West, proving that ideology would bend to power.

Of all ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s ideological exports, Hezbollah remains the most enduring and institutionally complete. Born in the rubble of Lebanon’s civil war, ±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s 1985 founding manifesto allegiance to ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Supreme Leader and its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. As Massaab Al-Aloosy has, Hezbollah evolved into a uniquely hybrid entity — a terrorist organization, political party and social welfare provider. This model of Islamic fascism does not simply mimic the authoritarian features of 20th-century totalitarian regimes. Instead, it integrates them with theological absolutism.Ěý

In ±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s worldview, the enemy is not merely political dissent or a foreign occupier. It is ideological impurity. Its of martyrdom, strict sectarian loyalty and rejection of pluralism form the core of an authoritarian theocratic identity, where the sect and the imamate define the sacred political community.

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s reach and pragmatism allowed it to overcome sectarian lines when necessary. Nowhere is this clearer than in its alliance with Hamas, a Sunni group originally rooted in ideology. Initially antagonistic due to theological differences, Hamas gradually embraced ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s vision of resistance as its conflict with Israel intensified. Iran financial aid, smuggled weapons, supplied tactical training and built tunnel infrastructure that allowed Hamas to survive and militarize Gaza.Ěý

By the mid-2000s, especially after the group’s electoral victory and its, Hamas began to mirror ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s revolutionary language, re-framing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a divine struggle, not a solvable territorial dispute. Its leaders visited Tehran, received IRGC guidance and adopted a media strategy aligned with the broader.

This model of revolutionary partnership extended to Yemen, where Iran found a new ideological canvas in the , also known as Ansar Allah. Originally a local revivalist faction rooted in, Iran helped morph the Houthis into a more radicalized, Twelver-aligned militia. The group’s , “Death to America, Death to Israel,” is lifted directly from ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s revolutionary chant. By the 2010s, Iran supplied or engineered sophisticated missile and drone capabilities for the Houthis. These weapons the group to strike deep into Saudi Arabia and threaten global commerce in the Red Sea.

The of Saddam Hussein in 2003 provided Iran with its greatest strategic opening since 1979. Iraq, long a bulwark against Iranian expansion, became a vacuum of fractured authority in which Iran could embed deeply rooted proxies. The US-led dismantling of the Iraqi state allowed Tehran to co-opt existing militias such as the and new ones like Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.Ěý

All these militias pledged spiritual allegiance to ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Supreme Leader. These groups infiltrated Iraqi security institutions, won parliamentary seats and turned Iraq into what I call a militia democracy. What distinguishes them from conventional insurgents is their ideological DNA. Rather than acknowledging themselves as part of a civil war, they present their struggle as resistance to Sunnis and Western imperialism.

Syria’s civil war further deepened ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s ideological project. Though the ruling Alawite regime under Bashar al-Assad does not follow mainstream Shiism, its geopolitical vulnerability made it an ideal ally. As protests spiraled into war, Iran intervened with billions in military aid, deploying not just IRGC troops and Hezbollah fighters, but also recruiting tens of thousands of Afghan Shia fighters from the impoverished Hazara population into the.Ěý

These fighters, lured by salaries and promises of martyrdom, became part of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s transnational jihad. Syria thus became the geopolitical artery of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s vision: a corridor of power from Tehran through Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut to the Mediterranean. Iran entrenched what many call the by establishing an ideological, financial and logistical presence in Syria.

Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria are no longer just battlefields. They are proving grounds for a new form of tyranny. These lands have become ideological laboratories, where fanatics test how far they can bend reality to fit a totalitarian creed.

Islamic socialism

The ideological machinery of post-1979 Iran introduced a new hybrid: . While the term may appear contradictory at first glance, it captures the unique fusion of theological absolutism with populist redistributionism. Islamic socialism is an economic-political framework that retains the authoritarian hierarchy of religious fascism, complete with doctrinal obedience and paramilitary enforcement.Ěý

At the same time, it borrows heavily from socialist structures such as centralized welfare, state control over key industries and class-based grievance politics. Just as European fascists in the 20th century adopted socialism to win popular support while retaining autocratic control (e.g., the Nazi “Strength Through Joy” ), the Islamic Republic has developed a theology of resistance economy. Here, economic hardship is not only tolerated but sanctified as martyrdom against global injustice. In this model, people must endure poverty collectively, heroically and violently rather than overcome it through liberal development.Ěý

Shiite theology provides the foundation for this socialist-fascist hybrid, on concepts of suffering, resistance and collective martyrdom. Shiism glorifies the mustadĘżafÄ«n, a group that Islamic texts frame as the downtrodden destined for divine justice. Khomeini’s revolutionary rhetoric this religious concept into a political-economic category, portraying the global poor — and particularly the Shia masses — as victims of Western imperialism.Ěý

Economic disparity is not a result of governance failures or global markets, but of cosmic injustice. Similar to how Nazi ideology peasant sacrifice and national suffering as the price of destiny, the Islamic Republic elevates economic deprivation into a moral calling. It framed subsidy cuts, sanctions and austerity as acts of loyalty to a divine cause.

Crucially, leaders do not just impose the model of Islamic Socialism from above; they enforce it through tribal structures and sectarian identities. It replaces civic institutions with kinship loyalty and doctrinal submission. In the Iranian-led axis, traditional tribal instincts are not suppressed but weaponized. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shia militias in Iraq all demonstrate this structure. 

War footing as the foundation of economic life

These groups offer not only salaries and protection, but welfare, housing and education — all contingent upon ideological alignment and collective loyalty. They systematically erase individualism. One’s worth is not measured by merit or autonomy but by one’s allegiance to the sect, the tribe and ultimately, the martyrdom cause. This mirrors how Italian fascism and German Nazism pre-modern collectivism to erase individuality and convert citizens into functionaries of myth, soldiers of a destiny beyond themselves.

In these theocratic-socialist regimes, the individual disappears as a political subject. Rather than a bearer of rights, the person becomes a vessel of duty — primarily to the sect, then to the Supreme Leader. Ideological training begins early, often in religious schools controlled by paramilitary arms of the state or proxy groups. These institutions teach loyalty not just to God but to the revolutionary cause. 

The regime trains the youth, like those in Nazi Germany’s, not to think but to serve and sacrifice. ±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s and ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s indoctrination programs illustrate this well. Here, Islamic Socialism becomes a mechanism for total identity control: dictating what to believe, what to fear, who to love and who to kill. Welfare is no longer a civic right — it is a weaponized privilege, allocated according to sectarian discipline and revolutionary usefulness.Ěý

Moreover, this system depends on a dual moral economy: one inward-facing, promoting solidarity, and one outward-facing, glorifying hostility. Internally, Islamic Socialist leaders teach their communities to see themselves as pure, righteous and chosen. Externally, however, the world is divided into oppressors and enemies — whether they be the West, secular liberals, Sunni rivals or Zionists. 

The state’s leaders direct the economic and military engines toward this perpetual war footing. ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s leaders speak not of GDP growth but of jihad of production and economic resistance as if commerce itself were warfare. People allocate resources not to produce prosperity but to sustain ideological conflict. They Nazi Germany’s approach by fusing industry, propaganda and violence into a single war-making machine.

The myth of the Promised Land

Islamist regimes have spent decades weaponizing one of their most enduring myths: the belief that Israel seeks to fulfill a biblical prophecy by expanding its territory. According to this myth, Israel aims to restore the so-called Promised Land, stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates. Islamist leaders and propagandists frequently this claim in Friday sermons, regime media and militant manifestos.Ěý

The narrative serves both psychological and strategic purposes by fostering a sense of perpetual victimhood among Muslim populations and justifying preemptive violence. However, no formal Israeli policy — past or present — has ever such a fantasy. This contradiction between perception and reality is not an accident. It is the product of Islamic fascism.

Arab and Islamic leaders never admit that the biblical Promised Land in the Old Testament covers far less territory than Islamist propaganda claims. While and do reference land covenants, these verses are highly symbolic, varied in interpretation and not presented as a modern political blueprint. The more expansive version — suggesting Israeli claims over half the Arab world — is a misreading or deliberate distortion.Ěý

Even within Jewish religious scholarship, there is no consensus on whether the land covenant is literal, spiritual or eschatological. More importantly, Israel, as a modern state, has never built policy around these verses. The secular Zionist movement that founded Israel drove its actions with political pragmatism, not theological maximalism. The Declaration of Independence, for instance, contains no reference to religious prophecy as a legal or territorial foundation for the state.

Prominent biblical scholars have repeatedly argued that the Promised Land verses do not apply to modern statecraft. Walter Brueggemann, a leading Old Testament theologian, that the land promises in Genesis and Ezekiel symbolize divine fidelity and human obligation. Ezekiel 47:13–23 outlines a limited, region-specific territory tied to historical tribes, not a universal conquest map. Jewish exegetes widely the Nile to Euphrates phrasing in Genesis 15:18 as covenantal poetry, not a literal border plan. Contemporary Jewish religious institutions and Israel’s Chief Rabbinate have never endorsed any policy derived from these verses.

Oslo Accords and the recognition of a two-state framework

Israel’s territorial policy shows a consistent pattern of contraction and compromise, not expansion, contrary to the myth of expansionism. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Israel accepted the1949 rather than pressing beyond. In 1967, during the , Israel captured territory (including Sinai and the West Bank) but returned the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1982 under the.The (1993–1995) and subsequent negotiations all recognized the concept of a two-state solution, even with territorial compromises. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza, dismantling settlements without a peace agreement.Ěý

These historical milestones disprove the idea of a consistent theological or messianic territorial agenda. Even in contentious areas like the West Bank, Israeli officials and lawmakers debate expansion according to legal and political frameworks rather than divine mandate.

Regimes like Iran and ideological movements like Hezbollah and Hamas the Abraham Accords as an existential crisis. The accords, signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, were a public rejection of the expansionist myth. They demonstrated that Arab nations — particularly those with strategic awareness — do not believe Israel is seeking to fulfill some ancient prophecy. These are not naïve regimes; they signed normalization agreements based on economic cooperation, technological exchange and geopolitical calculations.

The path forward

Real peace in the Middle East requires structural change. This approach rejects the shallow cycle of summit diplomacy and short-term ceasefires. Structural change demands a civilizational shift: leaders must dismantle sacralized politics and stop using religious narratives to justify power. This isn’t Western-style secularism but a deliberate separation of divine claims from state rule. Only through this shift can the region build lasting peace — rooted not in utopias or despair, but in economic freedom, cultural cohesion and strong institutions.

offers a clear alternative to ideological extremes. It doesn’t fuse them. It escapes them. Unlike secular technocracy, which often alienates traditional societies, conservative modernism respects the cultural depth of the Middle East and promotes practical reform. It builds on Enlightenment ideals like individual liberty and economic autonomy while honoring civilizational continuity.Ěý

Its foundation rests on three pillars: economic liberalism, cultural conservatism and institutional reform. It doesn’t force secularism, nor does it permit theocracy. Instead, it preserves spiritual identity while disarming messianic violence. It respects tradition without falling into tribalism, and religion without surrendering to religious absolutism.

offers a powerful historical model within this framework. Mustafa Kemal AtatĂĽrk launched it in the early 20th century as a bold top-down effort to secularize Turkey. He abolished the Ottoman Caliphate, replaced Islamic law with Western legal codes and built a civic nationalism rooted in republican values. Kemalism stands as one of the few successful cases in the Islamic world where state institutions stripped religion of political power without erasing faith itself. Yet, the project also imposed authoritarian control, censorship and bureaucratic rigidity.Ěý

Today, the Middle East can draw lessons from Kemalism — not as a complete solution, but as a foundational blueprint. It shows how nations can curb clerical authority without destroying religious life and how civic nationalism can overcome tribal and sectarian divides by building loyalty to the state.

Kemalism needs a complement. Its authoritarian legacy demands correction through the principles of libertarianism, which counters centralized coercion. Many in the Middle East misinterpret libertarianism as a Western indulgence or a form of moral anarchy. In truth, it is a philosophy of restraint — placing clear limits on state power. 

Within conservative modernism, libertarianism protects individual dignity from being sacrificed for national unity. It upholds free association, freedom of speech, private enterprise and personal conscience as essential pillars of post-sectarian societies. When paired with Kemalist reforms, libertarianism softens the state’s edges and makes room for civil liberties to thrive where ideological control once prevailed.

This fusion directly targets what I call the tribal complex — the web of kinship, patronage and sectarian loyalty that cripples modern statehood across the Middle East. In tribal systems, the individual never stands alone; he serves as a proxy for his group, bound by blood ties and religious allegiance. Tribal logic dictates political loyalty, economic access and legal protection, leaving little room for citizenship or merit. 

This is the real enemy of peace: the absence of a civic concept of the individual. Kemalism dismantles tribal structures through land reform, education and militia disarmament. Libertarianism then builds the culture of self-ownership and economic agency needed to prevent tribalism’s return.  

Conservative modernism demands a profound psychological transformation. Middle Eastern societies must abandon the mythology of martyrdom and embrace the everyday heroism of building families, businesses, schools and institutions. Peace begins when people stop seeking symbolic sacrifice and start pursuing tangible contribution. The new citizen must become a rational actor — focused on dignity through property ownership, child-rearing and value creation. Economic liberalism, in this vision, goes beyond material systems; it launches a moral revolt against fatalism.

Turkey’s potential role in reshaping the Abrahamic framework

Turkey holds the key to securing lasting peace in the Middle East through its integration into the Abrahamic framework. Turkey is a historic power. Unlike the Gulf monarchies that are dependent on petroleum dollars and foreign support, Turkey possesses the internal civilizational strength to lead. Its NATO membership, industrial capacity and nuanced relationship with Islam give it a unique ability to balance religious heritage with strategic logic. Including Turkey in the Abraham Accords would shift the regional balance. It would show that ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s ideological barriers are not only penetrable but also collapsing. 

Turkey’s participation would also redefine Muslim solidarity, moving it away from perpetual hostility toward Israel and shared goals in economic growth and technological progress. A regional alliance among Turkey, Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia could create a new peace axis and weaken ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s grip on ideological leadership.

The Islamic Republic of Iran remains the greatest single barrier to sustainable peace. This is not merely because of its actions, but because of its doctrine. One cannot reach a lasting agreement with a state that must, by its very ideology, destroy its negotiating partner to remain legitimate. Any peace built upon negotiation with such a regime is a ceasefire with a time limit. We must replace the Islamic Republic not through foreign war, but through internal transformation.

Regime change imposed by foreign powers breeds dependency and resentment, as seen in Iraq. Instead, change must emerge from within Iranian civil society — through education, economic empowerment and ideological detoxification. This requires long-term investment in civic literacy, especially among the youth. Only a population that understands the moral and civic basis of pluralism can dismantle a system built on sectarian fear. Empowered with economic agency and a desacralized worldview, Iranians themselves can — and must — be the agents of transformation.

A stable society must depoliticize religion without erasing it. Secularism is not atheism or cultural erasure — it is a safeguard. By limiting the political misuse of faith, secularism protects mosques, churches and synagogues as spaces for moral reflection, not power. To end partisan abuse, sectarian violence and theocratic repression, states must build a legal firewall between belief and authority. In this separation, both faith and civic life can thrive.

To summarize the core prescriptions proposed throughout this work, the following principles outline a structural roadmap for achieving sustainable peace in the Middle East:

• Depoliticize religion by enforcing constitutional secularism that protects faith while preventing its weaponization.
• Embrace economic liberalism to dismantle tribal patronage and foster individual autonomy.
• Redefine conservatism as civil order, family cohesion and moral continuity — not authoritarianism.
• Promote education reform rooted in critical reasoning, pluralism and civic ethics over sectarian indoctrination.
• Foster internal regime change in Iran and similar regimes through economic empowerment and ideological detoxification.
• Reject foreign invasions, supporting revolutions that emerge organically from educated and self-actualized societies.
• Integrate Turkey into the Abraham Accords to establish a strong axis of pragmatic, non-apocalyptic Islam.
• Normalize ties with Israel as a regional partner in trade, security and scientific advancement — not as a messianic threat.
• Fuse Kemalism with Libertarianism to combine institutional reform with civil liberty and crush the tribal complex.
• Replace martyrdom cultures with economic liberalism that prioritizes life, dignity and opportunity.
• Establish conservative modernism as the only viable doctrine suited to Middle Eastern reform.

[ edited this piece.]

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Breaking from negotiations, Trump’s tariff salvo was an attempt to address simmering tensions in the Indo-US relationship by leaning on Pakistan through an oil deal and tariff concessions. Was this sudden shift a product of Trump’s ambitious economic agenda, or a mask for strategic signaling and transactional politics in this trade affair?

The latter seems likely, given America’s history of using deliberately exhaustive trade talks as a strategic tool to exert pressure on other nations, extract concessions or advance broader strategic objectives.

The deal

India was negotiating a Bilateral Trade Agreement () with the US, which began in February. By April, an had been drawn, reflecting US priorities of reducing India’s trade barriers and addressing its $45.7 billion goods trade deficit. From February to July, negotiations grew tense as India refused to liberalize or open up its agricultural and dairy sectors to US markets. India also pressed for , including lower US duties on steel (50%) and aluminum (25%), and preferential access for labor-intensive exports such as textiles, gems, jewelry and IT services. In return, India signaled willingness to provide the US greater market access.

However, apart from these two sticking points, India also US demands for reduced tariffs on auto components and acceptance of US Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, prioritizing its domestic industry and the campaign. Similarly, regarding non-tariff barriers, the US India’s Quality Control Orders (QCOs) and import regulations, which it viewed as barriers to market access for US goods. However, India defended them on the grounds of consumer and domestic industry safety.ĚýĚý

Trump’s negotiation style

The negotiations thus offered potential gains for both sides, but the costs and contentions were high. It made them intense and rigorous, conditions ill-suited to Trump’s negotiating style. The US’s negotiating approach under Trump, specific to trade and tariff issues, has been unconventional and rushed. 

A recent deal with Vietnam was concluded hastily under pressure. The US exploited Vietnam’s trade surplus and export dependence, using tariff threats and prolonged talks to secure concessions. Despite months of negotiation and goodwill gestures, such as liquified natural gas (LNG) deals, Vietnam ended up facing a and transshipment penalties — far less favorable than its proposed 0% reciprocal tariff.Ěý

Similar tactics were seen with countries like Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and many more. These examples illustrate Washington’s tactics of achieving win-win trade deals, even with allies and partners, demonstrating how transactional diplomacy now colors their trade relations. 

However, a closer look suggests that economic or trade calculations do not solely drive these deals. The US is using these trade deals as geopolitical tools — deliberately exhaustive negotiations to push countries toward aligning with its strategic objectives.

Economic attrition diplomacy

Economic attrition diplomacy involves leveraging prolonged trade negotiations to pressure a counterpart into aligning with geopolitical goals, often by creating economic uncertainty or exploiting asymmetric dependencies.

Vietnam’s case illustrates this. The US Hanoi to cut reliance on Chinese industrial goods and curb transshipments, directly serving its anti-China agenda. The negotiations were lengthy, with multiple rounds reflecting prolonged and exhaustive talks to force Vietnam to concur with the deal, leaving it little room to maneuver.

The cases of Indonesia and Japan are also noteworthy. The US pressured Indonesia to align its anti-China goals, primarily due to Indonesia’s attempt to diversify trade with members, and a investment deal with China made in November 2024.Ěý

In the case of Japan, Trump their bilateral relations by escalating dramatically: threatening 25% tariffs, then actually imposing them on Japanese goods, including automobiles, effective August 1. This was an unprecedented move against a US ally. Japan, burdened by its trade surplus and alliance status, yielded partial concessions under tariff threats and geopolitical pressure.Ěý

South Korea, too, faced a tariff of 25% in July, and ended up with a 15% “reciprocal” tariff, effective August 1. The US sought geopolitical advantages from Korea, pressuring it to increase dependency on US purchases, specifically F-35 fighter jets. Although no deal was finalized, South Korea greater market access for US goods, as well as defense commitments to avoid higher tariffs.Ěý

These tactics reveal that US trade negotiations often serve a larger purpose: pushing countries to align with its under the guise of economic bargaining. These echo Washington’s action from five years ago, when it used diplomacy against China. The US attempted to curb China’s technological rise by targeting firms like Huawei, pressured China on issues like intellectual property theft and signaled strength to its own allies.Ěý

During trade negotiations, the US repeatedly escalated tariffs and introduced complex demands, including structural changes to China’s economy, prolonging the uncertainty and pressuring China. Subsequently, China yielded partial concessions, providing the US with some limited success.

Aggressive attrition driven by frustration

Unlike other countries that faced standard coercion from the US with only tariff threats, India was hit with multiple salvos — tariffs, penalties and an embrace of Pakistan. The reasons were clear: the Russia factor, trade with Iran and India’s non-compromising posture during trade negotiations.

This aggressive attrition behavior is motivated by geopolitical frustration, something the US is familiar with acting on. In the 1930s and 1940s, US economic attrition against Japan, driven by frustration, culminated in the of 1941, contributing to the escalation of World War II. Negotiations were prolonged. The US demanded Japan withdraw from China and Indo-China, while Japan sought recognition of its territorial gains, creating a deadlock with no progress.Ěý

A similar situation is unfolding between the US and India today, where the former harbours geopolitical suspicion over India’s relationships with Iran and Russia, alongside deadlocked trade demands. These factors have likely fueled frustration and driven the US to send a strong strategic message by escalating risks and attrition, perhaps setting an example on the global stage.

Unconventional transactionalism: India must reassess its strategy

India must read the negotiating table more carefully and patiently, adopting measured and mixed negotiating styles instead of a confrontational approach, which at times frustrates the US. 

As India looks toward the prospect of a mini-deal by September-October, it should aim for strategic prolongation — progress with limited concessions — rather than dragging talks with no real progress. This will create more room for negotiations and reduce US frustration to some extent. 

India must also leverage its geopolitical value and diversify its trade relationships with Europe and other countries. This will strengthen India’s bargaining position, soften US demands and deter extreme measures. 

A similar approach saved South Korea from higher tariffs despite having no deal with the US, as South Korea adopted strategic prolongation, used measured negotiation tactics offering room via concessions and resisted hasty or pressured deals. 

India must remember that Trump is a master at playing unconventional transactional cards, where deals are more important than relations. India should demonstrate that an agreement is in progress and that there is something on the table, rather than leaving it empty.

[ first published a version of this piece.]

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51łÔąĎ’s Video Producer & Social Media Manager, Rohan Khattar Singh, talks with Abdullah O Hayek, an independent Middle East analyst and peace fellow at Young Voices. Hayek assesses ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s potential deployment of sea mines in the Strait of Hormuz. He covers the immediate consequences for global shipping and energy markets. He also examines the nation’s capital, Tehran’s, strategic aims, the credibility of the regime’s threat, and the economic, diplomatic and military costs Iran faces.

Disrupting a critical energy chokepoint

Hayek stresses that mining the Strait of Hormuz would instantly threaten one of the world’s most vital energy arteries. The waterway is extremely narrow — less than two miles wide in certain areas — and carries 18 to 20 million barrels of oil and over a billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas (LNG) each day. This amounts to about 20% of global seaborne petroleum and roughly a quarter of all LNG traded internationally.

Even without detonations, the detection of mines triggers a freeze in tanker traffic as maritime insurers withdraw coverage. Hayek estimates that a small mining campaign halts flows within a week and that clearing a safe corridor takes a month or longer. This causes an immediate and severe energy crisis.

Oil prices spike from $70 to $150 per barrel, hitting Asia’s major importers — China, India, Japan and South Korea — with rationing, higher fuel costs and industrial slowdowns. Gulf producers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can offset only about half the lost supply. Beyond energy, freight rates surge, supply chains from electronics to agriculture suffer and vulnerable economies face recessionary pressure.

Asymmetrical maritime deterrence

Hayek frames ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s approach as part of a broader asymmetrical deterrence strategy that already includes proxies, drones and missiles. Sea mines extend this into maritime warfare. US intelligence recently observed Iranian vessels loaded with mines after US strikes in June, though none were deployed. Hayek sees this as deliberate signaling — a show of capability intended to raise the global costs of escalation.

Historical precedent reinforces the threat: During the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, mining the Gulf sharply drove up oil prices. Domestically, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s parliament passes a near-unanimous, symbolic resolution to close the Strait, underscoring internal unity behind this maritime narrative. Regionally, such a move warns Gulf states and US bases of Tehran’s ability to disrupt their energy lifelines at will. Globally, it aims to strengthen ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s position in nuclear or sanctions talks.

A credible and diverse arsenal

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s mines need to be taken seriously. Hayek cites estimates of 5,000 to 6,000 mines in the country’s arsenal, including bottom, contact, acoustic, pressure-sensor, drifting, limpet and rocket-assisted types. This variety, he argues, makes the Gulf “a living hell” for shipping. Even partial mining can be nearly as effective as a full closure, as the threat alone deters operations.

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s naval capabilities, including midget submarines, fast attack boats, drone swarms and missiles, complicate clearance operations and heighten risks for countermine forces. Hayek’s conclusion is unequivocal: Iran has the means, geography and intent to create serious disruption.

The costs of escalation

Hayek also outlines why Iran may hesitate:

• Economic costs: Mining the Strait effectively cuts off its own oil exports — 1.5 to two million barrels per day — much of which goes to China. For an already-sanctioned economy, losing this revenue is “economic suicide.” Short-term price spikes do not compensate for lost volume.
• Diplomatic costs: Major customers like China, India, Japan and South Korea condemn the move. Even Russia may caution against it as short-sighted. Gulf states could accelerate alternative pipelines and LNG routes, permanently eroding ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s leverage.
• Military costs: A closure attempt justifies a broad US-led military response, potentially resembling the 1991 coalition against Iraq. Such action could inflict civilian casualties, damaging ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s domestic legitimacy and fueling regime-change sentiment.

Washington’s calculus

Turning to US politics, Hayek notes US President Donald Trump’s longstanding opposition to new wars and emphasis on ending existing conflicts. Within the Make America Great Again movement, there is strong resistance to direct intervention, even in the face of Iranian provocations. Hayek argues that deploying US troops to Iran would be “Iraq 2.0” — a decade-long conflict with global and domestic consequences.

Instead, Hayek recommends that Washington equip regional allies to manage the crisis, resorting to military measures only if diplomacy fails. Iran, he warns, is “the most difficult hardened adversary” the United States has faced. It has a tricky blend of population size, missile capability, drones and asymmetrical naval tactics that complicates any conventional campaign.

Regional power and the question of regime change

Hayek states his personal support for regime change in Tehran but insists it should come from within, led by Iranians themselves. Iran continues to wield regional influence through asymmetrical tools while remaining an international pariah, isolated economically and diplomatically. Total collapse appears unlikely in the near term, though economic crisis, severe inflation, mass protests, elite divisions and major military losses could open a path to change.

Hayek cautions that foreign intervention only strengthens the regime’s image and rallies nationalist support, as seen during the June conflict. The most plausible path to change, he argues, is sustained domestic protest and strategic patience from global powers.

To conclude, Khattar Singh notes that Iran still sees itself in an ongoing struggle with regional and global powers. The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the broader Middle East remain volatile despite pauses in open fighting. Hayek’s analysis underscores that while mining the Strait could give Iran short-term leverage, the long-term costs — economic, diplomatic and military — risk being devastating for both Tehran and the global economy.

[ edited this piece.]

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In Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan, the war disrupted cross-border trade, triggered fuel shortages and intensified humanitarian and security concerns. These cascading effects prompted Pakistan’s National Security Committee (NSC) to convene on to assess not only the strategic and defense implications but also the broader humanitarian fallout threatening socio-economic stability and communal harmony in its most vulnerable western frontier.

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest and geostrategically most sensitive province, shares a long and porous (562 miles) with Iran, making it acutely susceptible to the ripple effects of regional conflicts. The recent Israel-Iran war not only destabilized the Middle East but also cast a long shadow over Balochistan, intensifying existing sectarian sensitivities within Pakistan’s diverse social fabric.Ěý

As a predominantly Sunni nation with a significant Shiite minority (approximately of the population), Pakistan found itself grappling with the dangerous spillover of sectarian propaganda, targeted violence and renewed proxy activity. The deep-rooted religious and cultural bonds between Shiite communities on both sides of the border amplified these tensions, particularly as someone deliberately wove religious symbolism and sectarian rhetoric into the war narrative.Ěý

Security analysts warned that such polarization could provide fertile ground for militant outfits like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), potentially reviving separatist propaganda under the banner of a “Greater Balochistan.” In this highly combustible environment, the intersection of external conflict and internal fault lines poses a serious threat to Pakistan’s national cohesion and border stability.

Baloch activism in response to provocation

Throughout the military confrontation between Iran and Israel, reports have emerged of various activities conducted by Baloch militants in ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Sistan-Balochistan province. During a at the University of Sistan and Baluchestan, students responded with backlash after Daneil Asadullah, a member of the university’s Islamic Association and an agent of the security forces, made insulting statements against the Baloch people.Ěý

Maulvi Tayyeb Ismail Zahi, son of Maulvi Abdul Hamid, in response to the messages and requests of the people following the conflict between Israel and the Islamic Republic, a story on his Instagram page, emphasizing the dignity, unity and readiness of the Baloch people and called for strategic patience and prayers for the good and glory of the homeland. The anti-regime Baloch activist is campaigning to bring joy to the Baloch people of Giyeh (Nikshahr) and to convey their message to the rest of the world.

Following concerns about the expansion of Baloch activities, the checkpoint, deployment of Special Forces and increased have been implemented at the entrance to Zahedan. This city has been subject to increased security control due to the sensitive location of the main centres of the IRGC, intelligence and command of the forces. In continuation of the revolutionary movements, the Sarbaz-Mehristan axis was closed by Baloch militants.Ěý

The Baloch people are blocking the route of military forces and taking control of traffic in various areas. The Baloch Revolutionary Youth closed the Pahra Niskhahr, Chabahar road to control the entry and exit of military forces. According to reports, , Khamenei’s representative in Fahraj, was eliminated by the Baloch people while fleeing. Reports indicate that Baloch Insurgent groups are efforts to eliminate government officials in Balochistan. This was the fourth regional attack by the Baloch on government forces after the start of the Israel-Iran war.

Implications for Pakistan’s border security

The recent conflict between Israel and Iran in the Middle East has had profound implications for Pakistan’s border security, particularly in the restive province of Balochistan. Although a ceasefire has temporarily halted hostilities following US-led mediation, the escalation of tensions has renewed concerns over the security of the , a critical maritime chokepoint connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Had Iran proceeded with its threat to close the Strait, it would have severely disrupted global trade and oil supplies to the Western world, while also impacting Pakistan. Such a closure would have driven up global oil prices and exacerbated Pakistan’s inflation, currency depreciation and energy shortages.Ěý

The conflict particularly intensified in Balochistan, where a significant portion of the population relies on the informal trade of oil and other commodities. This situation highlights the region’s vulnerability to regional instability.

The recent ceasefire between Israel and Iran offers a critical opportunity to halt the immediate conflict and prevent further destabilization across West Asia, South Asia and beyond. While this pause in hostilities provides much-needed relief, the underlying tensions and risks of escalation remain significant. It is imperative that global powers, including the US, Russia, China, Pakistan, the OIC and the EU, build on this moment of calm to pursue sustained diplomatic engagement and collective action. 

Establishing a neutral UN-led peace forum to facilitate dialogue, addressing root causes such as economic sanctions, religious extremism, proxy warfare and curbing sectarian rhetoric are essential to fostering lasting stability. Maintaining the ceasefire and providing humanitarian support will be crucial to preventing a return to conflict and safeguarding regional and global security. Failure to capitalize on this fragile peace could lead to renewed violence with far-reaching consequences for global stability.

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Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Defense visit to the United States, his direct with Chief of Staff of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Armed Forces Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi and the diplomatic visit of Saudi Foreign Minister to Moscow all reflect Saudi Arabia’s growing interest in regional conflict de-escalation and strategic diversification. These moves signal Riyadh’s willingness to engage with multiple actors to avoid further confrontation and to support a more stable regional balance.

Riyadh’s active diplomacy

The recent trip by Prince Khalid bin Salman to Washington, where he met with US President Donald Trump, marked one of Riyadh’s most significant diplomatic moves following the Iran-Israel hostilities. Reports byĚýandĚý indicate that the meeting focused on the regional security environment, the end of the Gaza hostilities and the issue of prisoner releases. In a public statement, Khalid bin Salman emphasized the importance of preserving regional stability and security. The timing of this meeting — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s own visit to the White House — underscored Saudi Arabia’s ambition to position itself as a constructive diplomatic actor.

From Tehran’s point of view, the meeting could be interpreted as a signal that Saudi Arabia seeks to avoid further escalation. The improvement in Iran–Saudi relations, especially following the China-brokered of March 2023, has created space for cautious diplomatic engagement. Riyadh increasingly recognizes that prolonged tensions with Iran could jeopardize not only regional stability but also its own ambitious economic transformation programs, such as (the set of goals released by the administration of President (then Prime Minister) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2010 and 2011). Trump’s remark that Iran may be open to negotiation — despite conflicting with the reality of the recent strikes — may partly reflect diplomatic pressure from Saudi Arabia to encourage dialogue over confrontation.

One of the most notable developments after the conflict was a direct phone conversation between Prince Khalid and Major General Mousavi. As reported by , the conversation addressed bilateral military issues and regional security concerns. This marked the first formal contact at this level between the two militaries in recent years and demonstrated Riyadh’s evolving willingness to open channels of communication with Tehran, even in the aftermath of heightened tensions.

While the missile strike by Iran on the in Qatar triggered condemnation by Gulf Arab states, there was notably no significant diplomatic fallout. Instead, diplomatic channels remained open. This suggests a regional preference — particularly in capitals like Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi — for crisis management rather than a return to prior confrontational policies. For Iran, this outreach signifies a shift in how Saudi Arabia is approaching regional diplomacy: one that includes Iran as a necessary interlocutor, not an adversary to be isolated.

Leveraging Moscow’s potential

In parallel with Khalid bin Salman’s visit to the US, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan traveled to Moscow to hold talks with Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. This move illustrates Riyadh’s effort to diversify its strategic partnerships and hedge against overdependence on the United States. According to Russian sources, the talks focused on enhancing bilateral ties and addressing Middle Eastern developments. A from President Vladimir Putin to the Saudi king earlier this year also reaffirmed the importance of Saudi-Russian cooperation.

The visit took place amid growing concerns in Riyadh over Israel’s unilateral military actions and perceived lack of restraint, which many Gulf states believe destabilize the region. Russia’s close relationship with Iran, particularly in the military and political domains, allows it to serve as a valuable intermediary. For Saudi Arabia, engaging Moscow is both a balancing act and a way to reinforce its own agency in shaping the post-conflict environment. From Tehran’s perspective, Riyadh’s outreach to Russia suggests a broader willingness to distance itself from US-led pressure strategies and consider multipolar solutions to regional challenges.

Regional anxiety over Israel’s conduct

To understand the current recalibration in Gulf foreign policy, one must consider shifting attitudes toward Israel’s role in the region. Following the recent conflict, many Gulf Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, have expressed unease over Israel’s aggressive posture in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and now Iran. There is a among Gulf states that Israel’s increasingly aggressive posture makes it an unpredictable actor capable of dragging the region into broader conflicts.

This growing discomfort stems in part from historical experiences, such as the from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its departure from Afghanistan, which have shaken confidence in Washington’s commitment to regional security. As a result, Gulf countries are exploring ways to reduce their strategic dependence on the US and seek a more balanced regional framework — one that includes Iran rather than excluding it.

These diplomatic developments present an opening for Iran to further stabilize its regional position. With its strategic geography, educated population and resilient infrastructure, Iran remains a key player in any future security architecture. The March 2023 agreement, brokered by China, has laid the groundwork for increased bilateral engagement, including military dialogue. The recent between Khalid bin Salman and General Mousavi illustrates this potential.

From Riyadh’s perspective, engaging Iran supports its broader goals of economic diversification and regional stability. Major development projects such as Vision 2030 depend on a stable Persian Gulf, unthreatened by escalation in areas like the Strait of Hormuz. For this reason, Saudi Arabia’s diplomacy increasingly emphasizes risk reduction, dialogue and pragmatic regionalism.

Iran, in turn, has an opportunity to present itself not only as a resilient actor but also as a cooperative one. The ability to rebuild damaged infrastructure and maintain deterrence, coupled with strategic outreach to neighbors, could reframe ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s image in the Gulf. Statements from and assessments from international bodies like the suggest that ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear capabilities remain intact and can be recalibrated within non-militarized frameworks, though the Trump administration that.

Toward a new Gulf equilibrium

Saudi Arabia’s active regional diplomacy and ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s strategic patience signal the potential for a new phase in Gulf relations. While mutual suspicions remain, both sides recognize the unsustainable nature of zero-sum competition. The inclusion of Russia and potentially China as diplomatic interlocutors further supports the move toward multipolar regional governance.

What emerges is the possibility of a Gulf security framework grounded in mutual interest, economic integration and strategic restraint. In this evolving context, Iran and Saudi Arabia could serve as pillars of a more balanced Middle East order — one defined not by rivalry, but by cooperative crisis management and long-term stability.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Core motivations behind Israeli actions

1. Existential threat. Israel regards the Islamic Republic of Iran as a fundamental, long-term threat to its survival. This belief is rooted in ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s open hostility, support for anti-Israel proxy groups, and ongoing nuclear ambitions. While Iran claims its nuclear program is defensive, Israel sees it as a direct challenge to its existence.
2. Political survival and personal legacy. Netanyahu’s leadership is under intense pressure at home, with growing protests and the threat of corruption charges if he loses office. In his eyes, a successful military campaign could reinforce his position and define his legacy.
3. Combating terror and regional destabilization. Israel presents itself as taking on what the West won’t: challenging a radical regime that funds terror groups and exports instability across the Middle East. This, in Israel’s framing, is about neutralizing not just Iran but its entire proxy network.
4. Rallying domestic unity. In a country bitterly divided over judicial reforms, religious military exemptions and political polarization, war acts as a temporary unifier. Netanyahu’s critics, however, argue that the timing is convenient — war distracts from internal dissent.
5. Shifting alliances and strategic autonomy. Having abandoned hopes of European support, Israel is laser-focused on securing American backing. It sees the United States as its only indispensable ally and is acting accordingly.

Israel’s multi-layered strategy against Iran

Israel’s short-term military goals are to:

• Strike nuclear facilities. Israel’s immediate objective is to degrade or destroy ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear infrastructure, with reports already suggesting nuclear-targeted strikes have taken place.

• Decapitate military leadership. Israel is systematically eliminating senior Iranian commanders, aiming to cripple Tehran’s ability to respond coherently and quickly.

Israel’s medium- to long-term goals include:

• Regime change. Although not openly stated in diplomatic circles, regime change is a desired outcome. Israeli leadership sees this campaign as the beginning of that process.

• Fragment Iran. The most ambitious version of Israel’s strategy envisions Iran fractured into ethnic and regional enclaves, much like post-civil war Syria — Baluchis secede, Iranian Azerbaijanis unify with Azerbaijan, Kurds establish autonomy or independence.

• Collapse through internal pressure. Beyond bombs, Israel is counting on relentless economic pain — unemployment, inflation and widespread disillusionment among ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s youth — to eventually bring the regime down from within. The idea is that a society pushed to the brink will revolt.

• Create a more liberal Iran. The long-term vision is a secular Iran, possibly led by a Western-leaning youth movement. A post-clerical Tehran would focus on trade and growth — “commerce, not chaos” — benefiting regional stability and Israel’s strategic position.

Doubts, risks and global implications

Is a regime change realistic? Critics, including UK intelligence agency MI6, call the idea of toppling the Iranian government through airstrikes and assassinations “delusional.” While urban elites might be disillusioned, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s rural, conservative base — and more importantly, its armed forces — remain loyal to the regime.

The strikes may have blowback. Far from weakening Tehran, Israeli strikes may actually rally domestic support around the regime. Many Iranians, regardless of ideology, might resent foreign attacks, especially from Israel, which is widely condemned in the region for its war in Gaza.

Across the Atlantic, the US is walking a tightrope by offering air defense support to Israel but stopping short of direct strikes on Iran. While political pressure in Washington to back Israel remains high, the administration of US President Donald Trump is wary of being pulled into another Middle Eastern war without a clear exit strategy.

Other global powers sit on the sidelines. Europe is unlikely to back Israel militarily, especially amid outrage over its actions in Gaza. Russia is preoccupied with Ukraine but might make a quiet deal with Israel to stay out of Iran in exchange for concessions elsewhere. China wants Iranian oil but lacks the naval power to intervene far from home.

So, despite regional escalation risks, a global conflict remains improbable in the short term. But proxy wars, oil disruptions and economic ripple effects are all very much on the table.

Israel’s domestic fault lines and strategic memory

Israel itself is not without problems. The country is deeply divided over religion, governance and civil-military relations. While war might rally short-term unity, prolonged conflict risks deepening these internal fissures. Protests, especially among reservists, could reignite if public support wanes.

Any talk of regime change in Iran revives painful memories of past Western interventions — especially the 1953 US/UK-backed coup that removed the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. That event ultimately helped fuel the 1979 Islamic Revolution. °Ő´Ç»ĺ˛ą˛â’s Iranian regime still invokes that betrayal to justify its distrust of the West.

Where might this go?

This episode could lead to a temporary de-escalation. Both sides could eventually pause the conflict to claim political wins: Iran to protect its leadership and wealth, Israel to showcase operational success.

The fighting could escalate into a broader war. Iran could target US or European assets, ignite regional tensions in the Gulf or activate proxies like Hezbollah or the Houthis. Global oil markets would be the first to feel the shock.

This conflict could see a prolonged stalemate. Months of inconclusive fighting may drag on, sapping both economies and fueling domestic unrest, without delivering strategic breakthroughs for either side.

Final reflection

The future is murky. What’s unfolding is more than just a clash between two nations — it’s the unraveling of an old order. The post-Sykes–Picot map of the Middle East is dissolving, with fragmented states, emboldened non-state actors and a rising risk of a regional war with no clear end.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Denuclearization or Regime Change — Why Did Israel Strike Iran? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Someone in your neighborhood puts up a sign: This Homeowner Is Armed and Dangerous. The next night, the thugs break into the houses on either side, not even bothering to test whether the homeowner in the middle has a gun or knows how to use it. They just leave that house alone.

Question for you: do you buy a gun?

Maybe you don’t believe in guns. So, do you consider putting up a similar sign even though the most dangerous item in your house is a nail clipper? The evidence seems clear. Even just the threat of retaliation is enough to dissuade the would-be attackers. Your life and the lives of your family are on the line.

This is the dilemma facing many countries around the world, except that the gun in this analogy is a nuclear weapon. Countries without nuclear weapons — Libya and Yugoslavia — experienced attacks that eventually led to regime change. Countries that possess even just a few warheads — North Korea and China — have managed to deter states with malign intent.

Iran, a country that has put up a warning sign in its window without fully committing to acquiring the ultimate deterrent, was recently bombed by both Israel and the United States. A tenuous ceasefire now holds in this conflict. The Trump administration imagines that it has destroyed ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear program. It also believes that it can now put more pressure on Iran to give away its nuclear weapons program at the negotiating table.

But the obvious takeaway for Iran after the recent attacks is that it’s certainly dangerous to semi-covertly pursue nuclear weapons, but it’s perhaps even more dangerous not to have them. If nuclear powers don’t suffer devastating bombing campaigns, insecure nations conclude that they best acquire a nuke as quickly as possible.

It’s not just Iran. Other countries are drawing similar conclusions about how to survive in an international environment where collective security — the global equivalent of the police — is falling apart as quickly as a fence in a hurricane.

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s complex

Guns can be used for different things — to hunt, to hit clay targets, to massacre children at a school.

Likewise, nuclear complexes can serve very different purposes. Iran has long maintained that its nuclear facilities are for the production of energy, medical isotopes and so on. But a country doesn’t need to enrich its uranium to 60%, as Iran reportedly has done, to achieve these peaceful goals. Nuclear power requires an enrichment level of . Weapons-grade uranium, meanwhile, is 90%.

The Obama administration, with a number of international partners, negotiated a with Iran that capped the level of enrichment at 20% and began diluting ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s uranium stockpiles to 3.5%. The Trump administration the United States out of the agreement. The enrichment level of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s uranium not surprisingly began to creep upwards.

Iran has maintained two underground enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow. These were two of the targets of US bunker-busters. The 14 bombs the United States dropped on these targets might be expected to have returned Iran to the pre-nuclear stone age. And that’s certainly what the Trump administration has claimed.

But US President Donald Trump is quick to claim victory even in the throes of obvious defeat (remember COVID, Afghanistan and the 2020 election?). According to an in the Defense Intelligence Agency, the recent US attack set Iran back “maybe a few months, tops.” The Trump administration dismissed this assessment as a leak from “an anonymous, low-level loser in the intelligence community.”

But the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Grossi, the DIA report: “The capacities they have are there. They can have, you know, in a matter of months, I would say, a few cascades of centrifuges spinning and producing enriched uranium, or less than that.” Even Iranian officials, speaking privately about the attack, were surprised that the damage was not as great as they’d anticipated.

Even if the capacity to enrich uranium had been destroyed, the US and Israeli attacks couldn’t root out the knowledge of these processes from the minds of the Iranian scientists, or the desire to acquire nuclear weapons from the Iranian population as a whole. According to a poll from June of last year, nearly of Iranian respondents favored the country going nuclear — this after nearly two decades of public opinion opposing the weaponization of the program.

Memo to both the United States and Israel: it’s not just ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s political leadership that wants nukes. In other words, regime change is not going to resolve this nuclear question. ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s complex.

Future negotiations?

Considering Trump’s cancellation of the Iranian nuclear accord back in 2017, diplomacy wouldn’t seem to be top on the administration’s agenda. But it wasn’t diplomacy per se that Trump rejected, only diplomacy associated with the Obama administration.

As late as the Friday before the US attack, even as Israel was continuing its own bombing runs, the Trump administration was conducting secret talks with Iran. According to :

Among the terms being discussed, which have not been previously reported, is an estimated $20-30 billion investment in a new Iranian non-enrichment nuclear program that would be used for civilian energy purposes, Trump administration officials and sources familiar with the proposal told CNN. One official insisted that money would not come directly from the US, which prefers its Arab partners foot the bill. Investment in ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear energy facilities has been discussed in previous rounds of nuclear talks in recent months.

That sounds a lot like the that the Clinton administration pursued with Pyongyang, with South Korea largely footing the bill for the construction of reactors that could power North Korea’s civilian sector. Those reactors were never built, and North Korea went on to assemble its own mini-arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Iran has said that it would consider returning to the negotiating table at some point after it receives guarantees that there will be no future attacks. Without much trust among the various sides, it would be hard to imagine Iran forever renouncing a nuclear option or Israel forever forswearing attacks on Iran, even if they both make rhetorical commitments for the purpose of restarting talks.

Trump the opportunist

There is much loose speculation that Donald Trump is an isolationist, an anti-militarist, a believer in spheres of influence. The US attack on Iran should dispense with such nonsense.

Donald Trump is a political opportunist. He takes positions — anti-abortion or pro-crypto — based, not on principles, but on how much they will boost his political (and economic) fortunes.

On foreign policy, Trump has raised opportunism to the level of a geopolitical doctrine. He has talked of steering clear of military conflicts in the Middle East, but then the opportunity presented itself to strike against Iranian targets effectively risk-free (because Israel had already secured the airspace). He has against corruption in Ukraine and declared President Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator,” but then the opportunity presented itself to sign a minerals agreement with the government in Kyiv.

Trump has no problems negotiating with religious fundamentalists. He gets along just fine with Sunni absolutists in the Middle East, and he would probably be hard-pressed to explain the religious differences between the Sunnis of Saudi Arabia and the Shia of Iran. If an opportunity presents itself to negotiate a deal with Iran, Trump may well take it — mostly because he can then call himself the person who really vanquished that country’s nuclear “threat” (take that, Obama!).

Meanwhile, Trump continues to make it more likely that countries around the world will invest in their own nuclear weapons programs.

At home, despite some about the lack of any need for new nuclear weapons, Trump is adding nearly to the budget for nuclear weapons. And his plan for a “golden dome” will only encourage other nuclear powers to spend more to evade such heightened defenses Such dangerous one-upmanship was, after all, the rationale for the dearly departed Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.

Trump’s reluctance to provide assurances to allies that the United States will come to their defense in case of attack has poked huge holes in the nuclear umbrella that hitherto covered much of Europe and Asia. Now, European politicians are about building out their own nuclear capabilities — with the French arsenal at its center — and conservatives in South Korea have also begun about establishing a nuclear deterrent.

And the rest of the world? The Iranian parliament has begun the country’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Only one other country has exited the treaty — North Korea — and only a handful of countries are not parties to it (Israel, India, Pakistan, South Sudan) If Iran goes, there may well be a rush to the exits, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which have made noises about the nuclear option.

Nothing speaks louder than Trump’s actions. He exchanged “love letters” with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un (nukes), is a big fan of Vladimir Putin (nukes) and has indicated that he has more respect for China (nukes) than Taiwan (no nukes). On the other side of the nuclear fence, he has bombed Iran, threatened Venezuela and Cuba and discussed the possibility of taking over Greenland and Canada.

I’m no advocate of nuclear armaments. But if I were Canadian, I might start thinking that a reputation for niceness just doesn’t cut it in TrumpWorld. A couple of nuclear-tipped ICBMs, however, would send a message that this White House more readily understands.

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Nine days after Israel’s strikes, the US launched its own military operation, , targeting ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s key nuclear sites at Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz. The strikes, intended as both deterrence and containment, have allegedly caused significant damage to ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear infrastructure, though Iran has claimed there is only superficial damage.Ěý

Several Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) analysts have Iran shifted their uranium reserves before the strikes. Notably, US Vice President JD Vance has that 400 kg of uranium was unaccounted for post-strike, raising alarms about ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s next moves.

However, the real question is not about the strike’s effectiveness. It’s about whether this will truly force Iran into a corner or if it is merely a symbolic victory.

Israel’s evolved counter-proliferation strategy

Israel has adopted a strategy of disruption and paralysis against adversaries who choose to go nuclear, posing a strategic threat to the country — a plan that came to be called the in the 1970s.Ěý

The origins of this doctrine trace back to 1962 with , when Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, targeted German scientists helping Egypt develop long-range missiles via letter bombs, abductions and threats to their families. Though covert and controversial, it successfully stalled Egypt’s rocket program.

In subsequent years, the doctrine evolved to preemptively target any hostile state’s nuclear program, preventing them from acquiring nuclear weapons via counter-proliferation efforts. 

This doctrine was vividly demonstrated in 1981 with , when Israeli jets destroyed Iraq’s Osirak reactor, and again in the 2007 , which eliminated a nascent Syrian nuclear facility. Both Operations aimed at decisive, overt action to ensure adversaries never reached nuclear capability.

However, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear challenge forced Israel to recalibrate this doctrine. Unlike the degrading or paralyzing nuclear programs of Syria and Iraq, Israel has opted to delay and disrupt ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear program without employing overt offensive measures. 

The reason is simple: geo-economic and strategic considerations. And the key historical factor in these considerations? The United States. 

The US factor between Israel and Iran Ěý

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s cannot be overlooked, as it has the world’s second-largest natural gas and third-largest oil reserves. There are strong concerns that it could also block the , a narrow waterway that transports 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas, increasing the price of petrol to $100 per barrel. While blocking the Strait has the initial potential to spike oil prices, it has a limited capacity for consequences to the West and could harm its own interests, analysts.Ěý

The threat of Iran instead lies in its extensive proxy network and decades of sustained asymmetrical warfare. The October 7 attacks on Israel are an of its proxy war involvement.Ěý

Therefore, the US knows that balancing and moderating conflict with Iran must be part of its plans to ensure regional stability in the Middle East, as a weak Middle East would present economic and security challenges to the US’ geopolitical influence and economy. 

But this, historically, has not always been a successful venture for the US. 

The failures of the historic approach to Iran Ěý

The US’ long-standing strategy in the region began with offshore balancing and containment, seeking to prevent any one power from dominating the oil-rich Gulf. Its first major operation was organizing ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s in 1953, which overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was leaning toward the Soviets.

Through the 1960s and â€�70s, Washington helped Israel strengthen its regional presence while invoking the to justify military interventions against communist threats, such as the 1958 Lebanon deployment under . Post 1979, with the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the , there was a shift toward assertive containment that extended to the between 1982-84. This strategic assertiveness became central to US policy in the region.Ěý

The Iran-Iraq War was a power struggle for Gulf dominance, not just a territorial conflict. ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Islamic Revolution signaled the rise of the Shia crescent, alarming Saddam Hussein and threatening US regional influence. To counter ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s growing power and prevent any single actor from dominating the Gulf, the US-backed Saddam with military and economic support. The US overlooked Saddam’s , human rights violations and use of chemical weapons.

But when Saddam Kuwait in 1991, kicking off the Gulf War, the American gamble backfired. Washington’s attempt to balance Iran through Iraq had inadvertently empowered a regional threat and weakened its own position. This was perhaps the first US failure in the Middle East and the beginning of the long-term instability in the region. In response, the US introduced a broader policy of in 1993 to curb both Iraq and Iran.

Though tactically effective in coercing both Iran and Iraq, dual containment proved strategically flawed in the long term. It weakened Iraq but allowed Iran to expand its influence via Shia groups, even as proxy conflicts continued. Meanwhile, the rising US military presence, especially in Saudi Arabia, extremist and terror sentiments, culminating in Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack and the 2003 Riyadh bombings, where Westerners were targeted. Sanctions and regime change tactics yielded no significant impact on either country, revealing Washington’s faulty geopolitical assessments and superficial understanding of regional dynamics.Ěý

This fractured Middle East policy has undergone necessary makeovers in recent years, like weighing more on diplomacy and limiting itself to security issues, but it still hinges on limited strategic gains and therefore, risks.

To avoid a full-scale war with Iran, the US turned to covert means. In 2006, it launched a first-of-its-kindcyber offensive, , which targeted ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear infrastructure. While this move by the US sought to derail ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear ambitions without triggering direct conflict, many analysts that the core objective was to persuade Israel to use means other than the direct and conventional against Iran. The Operation significantly influenced Israel’s security apparatus, as barely a year later came the purported of Iranian nuclear scientist Ardeshir Hosseinpour, followed by a series of assassinations of key .Ěý

In 2016, the (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) sought to curtail ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. It was put forward to ease regional tensions, foster economic relationships and deepen US influence in the Middle East. Israel opposed it, fearing economic relief would empower Iran to upgrade its security systems and proxies, and importantly, clandestinely develop nuclear weapons, thus limiting covert options.Ěý

Despite this opposition, the JCPOA came into effect in January 2016. It did limit Israel’s opportunities to carry out covert offensives, as noted by a significant statistical post-2016.Ěý

In 2018, with Trump’s withdrawal from the deal, the US reimposed sanctions and escalated pressure on Iran. Israel resumed its covert operations, such as its alleged June 2020 on ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear sites, and its most complex and significant operation — the 2021 assassination of , the chief of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear program.

Why Israel paralyzed Iran in Operation Rising Lion

Following the October 7 attacks on Israel and the collapse of the Assad regime, the Middle East entered a renewed phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the Trump administration shifted from maximum pressure to a more diplomatic approach towards Iran. The new strategy had two objectives: to push Iran to its nuclear program to ensure regional security and secure a diplomatic and media win by introducing a stronger alternative to the JCPOA.Ěý

However, Iran insisted on limiting — not dismantling — its nuclear program while demanding sanctions relief, creating a deadlock. Trump Iran, “There will be bombing,” if a deal wasn’t reached, escalating tensions further.

This caused Israel great anxiety on two counts. One, it feared that the talks were buying Iran more time, as by March 2025, Iran had uranium enrichment. Within a few weeks, it could initiate the process to develop nuclear weapons, which would then take just a year to complete. Two, it feared that the US might rush a compromised or weak deal to claim diplomatic success. According to , the Mossad struggled to convince the US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steven Charles Witkoff, of the risks of re-negotiating with Iran. This contributed to its growing distrust in the negotiation process and prompted a reassessment of its military posture toward Iran.

Israel has now made a few things clear: it no longer aims to simply disrupt ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear program but wants to paralyze it as it did with Iraq and Syria. 

While 2024’s struck several of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s strategic and military sites, the operational scope was limited on the nuclear front, with one minor nuclear research facility in ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Parchin being targeted.Ěý

However, in Operation Rising Lion, Israel aggressively struck key nuclear sites. While effectiveness was one startling difference, several reasons forced Israel not only to shift its operational scope but also to take strategic risks with regional stability. One: cut short ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s time-buying tactics. Two: force Iran back to the negotiating table under pressure. And three: weaken its strategic position to the point of conceding to US demands and surrendering its nuclear ambitions. 

While some tactical goals were achieved by Israel, broader strategic successes will only be possible if Iran fully abandons its nuclear ambitions. Although a regime change is an option, the US is likely to prioritize regional security and stability, for now. 

Operation Midnight Hammer has not deterred Iran

Following Israel’s lead, the US launched targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, intended as both deterrence and leverage in negotiations.

However, will the US actually transform this tactical success into strategic gains by pushing Iran to negotiate a new plan or by dropping its nuclear obsession? The answer is no. 

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s fixation on nuclear weapons is deeply linked to its identity and national pride, which can be reduced through coercion but not entirely abandoned. Trump’s efforts to do so complicate new negotiations and ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s obsession is evident: it did not aim to import a nuclear bomb but to develop its own. 

With 400kg of uranium missing after US strikes, JD Vance has asked the burning question, “Can Iran enrich the uranium to weapons-grade level and can they convert that fuel into a nuclear weapon?” He raises genuine fears that Iran may pursue a nuclear weapon directly, bypassing diplomacy and brinkmanship entirely — a move reminiscent of North Korea. 

The limited effectiveness of the US attacks, which reportedly set ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s program back by only a few months, underscores the folly of symbolic actions without long-term planning. Iran, undeterred from its nuclear ambitions, has since escalated threats, including moves to close the Strait of Hormuz, heightening global energy and security concerns. 

These security fears could threaten the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Iran, especially as the US–Israeli relationship remains far from its goals. 

In effect, the US military gamble may have exacerbated the Middle East’s tensions rather than neutralizing them, with ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear trajectory still firmly in motion.Ěý

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The fragility was built into the halt to the hostilities from the outset, starting with differences over whether the halt constituted a ceasefire. Iran rejects the notion of a ceasefire, even if it has agreed to halt the hostilities. Iran has insisted from day one of the Israeli assault that it would only stop retaliation for Israeli strikes once Israel halts its attacks.

A most fragile ceasefire

As far as Tehran is concerned, that is what Iran is doing in response to Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s labeling the halt of hostilities as a ceasefire. “As Iran has repeatedly made clear, Israel launched war on Iran, not the other way around. As of now, there is ” on any ceasefire,” ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on X.

“However, provided that the Israeli regime stops its illegal aggression against the Iranian people…we have no intention to continue our response afterward,” Araghchi added. Even so, an Iranian missile fired at Israel minutes after the halt of hostilities went into effect, and Israel’s destruction of a radar in northern Iran in response demonstrated the halt’s fragility and provoked .

Bowing to Trump’s demand that Israel restrain itself, Netanyahu Israeli fighter jets making their way to other Iranian targets.

Trump’s anger outburst indicated the degree to which the president can stop Israel from violating the ceasefire by striking at will whenever it feels that Iran is raising its head by, for example, attempting to rebuild its nuclear programme or replenish its missile arsenal.

Israel has consistently insisted that it has the right to strike whenever it feels that is warranted, as it does in Lebanon, despite the November 2024 ceasefire with Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Shiite Muslim militia, and Syria.

“For Israel, the risk is you have to sit and watch as some targets appear that you would have wanted to strike but now can’t,” said former senior director for Middle East affairs at the US National Security Council, Michael Singh.

“Maybe they have to watch as Iran tries to rebuild its nuclear programme. And they have to now put a lot of trust and hope in the United States to be able to deliver some kind of diplomatic agreement that preserves the gains that you have made militarily,” Singh added.

Singh put his finger on the pulse with Iran determined to rebuild its nuclear programme and likely still in possession of of uranium enriched to 60% purity. The uranium, if further enriched, would be enough for nine nuclear warheads.

To be sure, the US and Israeli attacks have caused substantial damage to ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear infrastructure, despite questions about the degree of damage and the whereabouts of the highly enriched uranium. The uranium, if further enriched, would be enough for nine nuclear warheads.

Also, unclear is to what degree the US and Israeli strikes have impeded ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s ability to enrich, leaving aside whether Iran would want to further enrich the 410 kilograms. Iran has consistently denied wanting to have nuclear weapons. An initial US Defence Intelligence Agency assessment, denounced by the White House as “flat-out wrong,” concluded that the US strikes at three Iranian nuclear facilities core components of the country’s nuclear program and likely only set it back by months.

Iran is down but not out

Even so, Esmail Baghaie, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesman. conceded that the US and Israeli strikes had “badly damaged the country’s nuclear programme. “,” Baghaie said without going into detail. Meanwhile, a growing body of Iranian voices suggests that the strikes, coupled with the near-collapse of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s forward defence strategy based on non-state allies in Lebanon and Palestine and former President Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, make nuclear weapons ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s best option to reestablish deterrence.

Iran’s potential withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could embolden those who advocate for developing nuclear weapons.

Fuelling fears that Iran may opt for development of nuclear weapons, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s parliament approved a bill to with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear watchdog. The bill, which must be approved by Iran’s unelected Guardian Council to become law, stipulates that any future IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear sites would need approval by the Supreme National Security Council.Ěý

The bill “talks about suspending, not putting an end to the cooperation,” Baghaei said. The spokesman said restoring cooperation would depend on IAEA recognition of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s “inalienable rights” in accordance with the NPT, including the right to enrich uranium up to 3.67%, and that the “security and safety” of the country’s nuclear sites and scientific community is guaranteed.

In addition to the damage caused by the US and Israeli strikes against nuclear installations, Israel has said it killed 14 Iranian nuclear scientists during the 12-day war. There is bound to be resentment in Tehran for these killings. Further threatening the sustainability of the halt of hostilities is the fact that ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Axis of Resistance may be down but is not out.

A senior political official of the Houthi militant group in Yemen said that they are by the Israel and Iran halt of hostilities, asserting they would continue their attacks “until the aggression against Gaza stops and the siege is lifted.” The Houthis could provoke a breakdown of the ceasefire by targeting the US Navy and international shipping in Gulf waters.

In the same vein, it is hard to determine to what degree Israel may have diminished ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s ballistic missile arsenal and ability to replenish it. Nevertheless, Iranian missile barrages highlighted weaknesses in Israel’s air defences, causing significant damages when they evaded the multi-layered anti-missile system.

Similarly, Israel struck at Iranian multiple non-nuclear targets, including police, cyber police, Basij militia, state television, and Red Crescent Society headquarters, the entrance to Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison, a power grid in the northern part of the Iranian capital, and a natural gas processing facility and gas refinery in Bushehr Province.

The strikes demonstrated Israel’s ability to hit whatever it fancies, including targets that could significantly impact the Iranian rulers’ grip on power as well as the degree of its intelligence penetration of Iran. Iran this week on charges of spying for Israel after earlier executing another three. Iran allegedly has arrested 700 people on suspicion of collaborating with Israel. So far, there seems to be no threat to the Iranian regime’s grip on power though.

The Israeli principle of overwhelming force is unlikely to work

The strikes followed a long familiar Israeli pattern that operates on the principle that sledgehammers and overwhelming force will whip opponents into submission. It’s a pattern applied to the Palestinians for decades that has failed to produce results. So far, there is no indication that it has worked in Iran despite Messrs. Trump and Netanyahu’s veiled assertions that this approach has worked.

The halt of hostilities is likely to remain fragile, even if it leads to a resumption of US-Iranian negotiations, given that there is no indication that Iran will bow to Trump’s demand that Iran “unconditional(y) surrender” and give up its right to enrich uranium to 3.67%.

In The Hague, Trump said that US and Iranian officials would meet next week but, convinced that the US strikes had “obliterated” ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear program, downplayed the significance of a formal agreement with the Islamic Republic. In doing so, Trump appeared to signal that the US would be hardline in the talks

“We’re going to talk to them next week, with Iran. We may sign an agreement. I don’t know. To me, I don’t think it’s that necessary… I don’t care whether we have an agreement or not,” Trump said. The president insisted that the US would not allow Iran to rebuild its nuclear programme. “We won’t let that happen. Number one, militarily we won’t,” Trump said.

Trump’s dismissal fuelled fears that a resumption of Israeli Iranian hostilities may be inevitable. The threat of revived hostilities was compounded by the absence of any suggestion that Iran would agree to restrictions on its missile programme. Even, so Trump appeared to offer a carrot by indicating that he would not from buying oil from Iran, saying Tehran needs the money “to put that country back into shape.” This small carrot might not be enough.

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That actually might make some sense. But no one now expects sense to be made in a world run by mad dictators.

Days before US President Donald Trump decided to fall into the role of the 21st century’s Adolf Hitler and solidify Netanyahu’s role as his Benito Mussolini, I attempted to get some clarification on the official cause of the war the new Mussolini and Hitler had launched via a coordinated Pearl Harbor-style attack on June 13.

On the fundamental argument used to justify the most desperate geopolitical decisions of the 21st century, I addressed the following prompt to ChatGPT.

“We hear it mentioned frequently that Iran wants to destroy Israel. But has that specific intention been explicitly stated or is it just politicians and journalists expressing an interpretation of the official intentions?”

ChatGPT obliged with this response.

“This is a crucial and often misunderstood topic. The claim that �Iran wants to destroy Israel’ is widely repeated in media and political discourse, but the basis for it deserves careful scrutiny.

1. Official Statements from Iranian Leaders

Iranian leaders, particularly Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have made numerous provocative and hostile statements about Israel over the years. However, whether these statements explicitly call for Israel’s destruction in a military sense is debatable and often hinges on translation and context.

Ahmadinejad’s 2005 Statement

The most cited example is Ahmadinejad’s 2005 statement, often reported in the West as calling for Israel to be �wiped off the map.’ This phrase became a media catchphrase, but the original Persian phrase

more literally translates to: �This regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time.’

This phrasing, while deeply hostile to the regime, can be interpreted as a political statement against Zionism or the Israeli government rather than a literal military threat to annihilate the country or its people. Even prominent Israeli figures and scholars, like former Mossad head Efraim Halevy and Middle East historian Juan Cole, have pointed out the nuances in that translation.

Khamenei’s Position

Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly referred to Israel as a �cancerous tumor’ and stated that it will not exist in the future. In 2015, he published a document titled �Palestine,’ in which he called for a �referendum among the indigenous population of Palestine, including Jews, Muslims, and Christians’ to determine the country’s future — implying a post-Zionist solution. He explicitly opposed the killing of Jews or military genocide, while continuing to advocate for the end of the Zionist regime.

So, the official line seems to envision the end of the Israeli state as a Zionist regime, but not necessarily through direct military destruction.

2. Rhetoric vs. Policy

There is a significant gap between rhetoric and actual policy:

• Iran supports Hezbollah and Palestinian factions opposed to Israel, clearly challenging Israeli interests.
• But Iran has never directly attacked Israel (except through proxy conflicts), despite decades of hostile rhetoric.
• Israeli military planners treat ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear ambitions as a strategic threat, but this is largely pre-emptive, based on perceived potential rather than declared intentions to launch nuclear attacks.

3. Interpretations and Media Framing

Western and Israeli politicians, particularly those favoring a hawkish stance on Iran, often summarize Iranian rhetoric as a desire to �destroy Israel’. This serves political goals: rallying public opinion, justifying defense budgets, and shaping foreign policy.

The media frequently echoes this interpretation without always exploring the original language or historical context, reinforcing the simplified narrative.

Summary:

• Iran has expressed hostile views toward Israel’s government and Zionism, calling for its end as a regime.
• Iranian leaders have not explicitly called for the mass killing of Israeli civilians or a military destruction of Israel.
• The phrase â€�destroy Israel’ is largely an interpretation of rhetorical, ideological, and geopolitical opposition, often amplified or simplified in media and political discourse.

If you’d like, I can show examples of key statements in Persian and English with annotations.”

I confirmed my interest in examining those examples. ChatGPT obliged.

“Great — let’s examine some key statements by Iranian leaders, focusing on original Persian phrasing, literal translation, and context, followed by interpretative notes.

🗣️ 1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005)

Original Persian (Oct 26, 2005):
«امام �رم�د این ر�یم اشغالگر قدس باید از ص�حه ر�زگار مح� ش�د.»

Literal Translation:
�The Imam said: This regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time.’

Context:

·         He was quoting Ayatollah Khomeini, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s revolutionary leader.

·         The statement came during a conference titled â€�The World Without Zionism.’

·         No military action was proposed; the focus was ideological opposition.

Interpretative Note:
The phrase �مح� ش�د’ (maḥv haved) means �be erased’ or �vanish,’ but not necessarily by violence. Critics say the phrase suggests genocide; defenders argue it expresses a belief that the Israeli regime will collapse or be replaced, akin to the Soviet Union.

🗣️ 2. Ali Khamenei (Twitter post, 2014, and repeated in 2015 publication)

Original Persian:
«اسرائیل 25 سال آینده را نخ�اهد دید.»

Literal Translation:
�Israel will not see the next 25 years.’

Context:

·         Tweeted in 2014 after Netanyahu warned against the Iran nuclear deal.

·         This statement was widely interpreted as a threat of destruction.

Interpretative Note:
Khamenei later clarified that he was referring to the demise of the Zionist regime, not the physical destruction of people. He wrote in his 2015 booklet �Palestine’ that armed resistance and a referendum among the indigenous population (including Jews) was the path forward.

🗣️ 3. Ali Khamenei, �Palestine’ (2015 Booklet)

Original Persian:
«ما راه‌حل مسئله Ů�لسطین را جنگ نظامی نمی‌دانیم… ما پیشنهاد همه‌پرسی برای ساکنان اصلی سرزمین Ů�لسطین داریم.»

Literal Translation:
â€�We do not consider military war as the solution to the Palestine issue… We propose a referendum for the original inhabitants of Palestine.’

Interpretative Note:
Khamenei frames the issue as anti-Zionist, not anti-Jewish. His vision appears to be post-Zionist — the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state, but not necessarily the elimination of its Jewish inhabitants.

🗣️ 4. Recurrent Metaphor: �Cancerous Tumor’

Original Persian (various speeches):
«ر�یم صهی�نیستی غده سرطانی است.»

Literal Translation:
�The Zionist regime is a cancerous tumor.’

Interpretative Note:

·         This metaphor is inflammatory and dehumanizing.

·         However, it targets Zionism, not Judaism.

·         It’s a metaphor often used to argue for â€�surgical removal’ (i.e., regime change), which leads to diverse interpretations, including military action or political isolation.

Summary Table

Conclusion:

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s official rhetoric unequivocally rejects the legitimacy of the Israeli state as a Zionist project, but explicit calls for physical destruction or genocide are not found in the official language. The language is radical, ideological, and symbolic, but also strategically ambiguous, allowing room for both deniability and mobilization.

Would you like me to include references to Iranian media or political sources to back these translations further?”

I followed this up by the following prompt: “Iranian assemblies have quite often been seen chanting a phrase translated in English as �Death to Israel’ or �Death to Jews.’ Since the two ideas are very different, it’s important to understand which is the official chant shouted in the presence of politicians.”

“You’re absolutely right to draw a sharp distinction between �Death to Israel’ and �Death to Jews’ — the two have radically different implications. Understanding the original Farsi phrases, their historical context, and how they’re used is essential for clarity.

✅ The Common Official Chant: �Marg bar Isra’il’ (مرگ بر اسرائیل)

Translation:
�Death to Israel’ or more literally, �Death upon Israel.’

This is the standard phrase chanted in political demonstrations, Friday prayers, and official state gatherings, especially on occasions like Quds Day (Rooz-e Qods) and anniversaries of the revolution.

It is often chanted alongside:

·         “Marg bar Amrika” (مرگ بر آمریکا) — â€�Death to America’

·         “Marg bar Engelis” (مرگ بر انگلیس) — â€�Death to England’

⚠️ What About �Death to Jews’?

The phrase �Marg bar Yahud’ (مرگ بر یه�د) — �Death to Jews’ — is not an official chant in Iran, and there is no documented case of it being used by top leadership in state-sanctioned settings. In fact:

• Iranian leaders, including Khamenei, have repeatedly said they distinguish between Zionism and Judaism.
• Iran has the largest Jewish population of any country in the Middle East outside Israel (roughly 8,000–10,000), and the Jewish community has a seat in ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s parliament.
• Khamenei’s office has published statements saying â€�We are not anti-Semitic’ and distinguishing Jews from the â€�usurping Zionist regime.’

📢 Examples from Public Events

In Friday sermons or protests, the chants typically go:

مرگ بر اسرائیل
مرگ بر آمریکا
مرگ بر انگلیس

These are coordinated and often encouraged by the regime, but they target states and governments, not peoples or religions per se.

đź“Ś Summary

🧭 Conclusion

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s government and official assemblies do chant â€�Death to Israel’, which is directed at the Zionist state and its policies — not at Jewish people as an ethnic or religious group. While the slogan is undeniably aggressive and symbolic of deep hostility, it is not the same as — nor does it include — a genocidal or anti-Semitic slogan like â€�Death to Jews.’”

My conclusions

I don’t know how many Western politicians and journalists I’ve heard in the past week explain the necessity to attack Iran and overthrow its regimes because it has threatened to destroy not just Israel but Jews. Many of them insist equally that once Iran destroys Israel with a newly acquired nuclear weapon it will go on to attack Europe and the US. Republican Ted Cruz, challenged by conservative political commentator Tucker Carlson, was perhaps the most and extreme: “That’s who Iran wants to kill, is all the Jews and all the Americans.” Earlier this year, Congressman Jared Moskowitz submitted a affirming that ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is a credible threat to the United States and an existential threat to Israel and other allies and partners in the Middle East.”Ěý

While it is legitimate to suspect a possible hidden intent behind any government’s or politician’s words, most of these commentators claim to know that intent, even when, like Cruz, they demonstrate their ignorance of the country, the population and its culture, a fact Carlson highlighted (“You don’t know the population of the country you seek to topple?”). For the past three and a half years, Western commentators and politicians have similarly produced endless accounts of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s never expressed intentions to recreate the Soviet empire and send his tanks through the streets of most European capitals.

If this wasn’t about justifying war — a potentially nuclear war in both cases — we might chalk up this kind of gratuitous invention of other people’s thought processes simply to these commentators’ and politicians’ taste for hyperbole. The media plays its own role in this tragicomedy, preferring alarmism to cold analysis.

It’s worth noting the title of an published by The Guardian this weekend by Aluf Benn, editor-in-chief of the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz: “Iran is the enemy Netanyahu has always wanted to destroy. Even from their bomb shelters, most Israelis support his war.”

Before drawing conclusions about the designated enemy’s hidden intention, we need to ask ourselves, with a sense of objectivity: “Who wants to destroy whom?”

In times of war, it is usual, when asking this question, to reflect on who took the initiative in the race to destroy the other. What complicates this case is the fact that the initiators were both Israel and the US, who colluded on Israel’s June 13 attack and again on this weekend’s illegal act of war by the US. Shouting slogans calling for the death of another nation, as the Iranians have done for decades, is the emotional expression of an unrealistic wish. Dropping bombs and assassinating leaders is, quite simply, an act of massive destruction.

However one assesses the success or failure of Trump’s brazen attack, it is difficult to imagine that the rest of the world is not now convinced that both Israel and the US are definitive rogue states, and deserve to be treated as embarrassing pariahs by even those nations that have maintained the status of loyal allies.

The worst is yet to come.

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com.Ěý We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.Ěý

[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51łÔąĎ, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorialĚýpolicy.

The post Outside the Box: ChatGPT Examines a Lie That Has Plunged the World into WWIII appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In civil society spaces, limited discussions on the intersection of gender and nuclear weapons exist. The few discussions that do take place on the disproportionate harm caused to women and girls from nuclear weapons use and testing, as well as the persistent of women in decision-making processes regarding nuclear weapons. Moreover, conversations around nuclear weapons remain highly gendered, with socially constructed framing the willingness to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons as inherently . This male-centric narrative has not only marginalized diverse voices and reinforced gender stereotypes but also impeded progress toward broader nonproliferation and disarmament goals, overlooking how nuclear proliferation reinforces power dynamics that deepen inequalities.Ěý

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s repression of women’s rights

On September 16, 2022, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s “” police stopped and arrested 22-year-old Mahsa Amini for not complying with the regime’s harsh hijab laws, and she later died in custody. In response to Amini’s unlawful death, protests led by women against the Iranian regime’s repressive laws in Tehran. Two years after Amini’s death, the Iranian regime continues to on women’s fundamental rights. In September 2024, a UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission increased crackdowns on women’s rights activism in 2024. Specifically, even as mass protests subsided, the regime’s authorities enacted harsher measures, such as the death penalty, to eliminate activism that advocates for fundamental human rights. In 2024, Iran reportedly 901 individuals, including activists protesting the regime’s repressive hijab laws and death penalties.Ěý

Iranian authorities also implemented even harsher measures to crack down on women who refuse to comply with the regime’s hijab mandates. In April 2024, Tehran’s police force implemented the “” (meaning light in Persian) plan, which allows the state to deploy police officers throughout Iran to arrest women who the police deem as not abiding by the veiling laws. State officials also sought to expand measures to increase surveillance to monitor hijab compliance. For instance, according to the UN Fact-Finding Report, the regime the use ofdrones to surveil compliance with the veiling laws.

What would it mean for Iranian women if Iran becomes a nuclear-armed state?

A central premise of this discussion is that, when a state acquires nuclear weapon capabilities, it can alter its domestic politics. One of the drivers behind a state pursuing nuclear weapons is using such weapons as “ to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests.” This motivation suggests that nuclear weapons can provide the regime’s leadership with greater political grasp and legitimacy. In ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s case, this may mean that the state might use the rhetoric that it acquired the bomb to protect Iranian citizens from its adversary Israel – as the Supreme Leader of Iran had claimed back in — thereby suppressing dissent among state officials and giving the state a tighter grip on all aspects of domestic governance. This would give the Iranian state greater power to enforce its repressive measures more effectively.

Because Iran is a to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its acquisition of enough fissile material to produce nuclear weapons would be a violation of the treaty. As a result, the international community could potentially additional sanctions, isolate the state diplomatically or even subject it to military action — all measures that would the marginalized communities of Iran, particularly Iranian women and girls, as they are more vulnerable to the impacts of economic sanctions and forced displacement.

Furthermore, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it could wield increased leverage over the international community, using its nuclear capabilities as a shield against external pressure. The regime could implement further restrictions on international development agencies and aid workers who aim to provide Iranian women and girls access to education and healthcare. Pakistan is an of how nuclear weapons can empower regimes and cover up human rights violations and development. Since acquiring nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan has used its status as a to bolster its international legitimacy and shield itself from external scrutiny. Pakistan’s military has used its nuclear arsenal, initially justified as a against India, to consolidate power byĚý leveraging the threat of external enemies to maintain control.Ěý

, a region divided between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, has particularly manifested the abuse of nuclear weapons through its nuclear testing. Balochistan has also been marked by extreme poverty and human rights abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention and the suppression of nationalist movements. The military has justified these actions as critical to national security, thus evading both domestic and global accountability. Due to military resistance to reconciliation and development efforts, Balochistan remains underdeveloped. This case suggests that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it could similarly use them to suppress development initiatives and human rights efforts, making it even harder for the international community to intervene effectively.Ěý

Policy implications for the international community

The ultimate goal for groups such as the (UN permanent members) should be to establish an agreement like the (JCPOA), a landmark between Iran and the P5+1, which includes the United States. Under the agreement, Iran agreed to deconstruct much of its nuclear program and allow international inspectors increased access to its nuclear facilities. The significant deal forced Iran to halt the development of weapons-grade fissile materials. In 2018, the US from the agreement. Unfortunately, in the backdrop of the current conflict in the Middle East, of which Iran is a key actor as it backs groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, a formal diplomatic agreement like the JCPOA is unlikely to come to fruition.Ěý

Nevertheless, the international community should aim to seek informal deals in the interim, not only focusing on limiting ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear capacity but also on protecting human rights. Thus far, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, met with officials in Tehran and reported that Iran has agreed to uranium enrichment at 60%. Though this doesn’t ease the broader concern of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear program, as once enrichment reaches 20%, it becomes to continue enriching it to the weapons-grade level of 90%, Grossi’s meeting was still a step in a positive direction.

Similarly, another step in the right direction was when officials from the UK, Germany and France engaged in with Iran; the parties agreed to diplomatic dialogue in the future. More recently, at the 2025 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Tehran “delivered a conciliatory message to Western leaders,” suggesting that it is nuclear weapons; the West should hold Iran accountable for this declaration.

The international community must seize every opportunity to integrate human rights, particularly the treatment of women and girls, into discussions on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. By incorporating these issues into informal agreements and confidence-building measures, states can address the immediate threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program and lay the groundwork for broader dialogue and agreements that prioritize the protection of fundamental rights. Of course, the international community would need to provide Iran incentives to halt its nuclear program and alter its domestic policies. Such incentives could include sanctions relief, which might be attractive to Iran as it currently faces a economy. Furthermore, the international community must reiterate to Iran that if the country adheres to the NPT, its rights as a signatory of the treaty will be respected, which includes providing the state with the necessary support for civilian nuclear programs.

The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to repress the fundamental rights of its citizens. As this treatment continues, the international community, including individuals and groups in both the policy and civil society spheres, must integrate conversations about Iranian women’s rights into broader security issues. Furthermore, when conceptualizing gender and nuclear weapons, it is not enough to focus solely on the disproportionate harm caused to women and girls by nuclear weapons use or the gendered narratives in policy spaces. It is key to examine how nuclear proliferation enables repressive regimes to consolidate power further and deepen gender inequalities. Integrating a human rights framework into the discourse on ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear program is essential to addressing both the immediate security threats posed by Iran and the long-term impacts on Iranian women’s fundamental freedoms.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorialĚýpolicy.

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Given the central role the United States has played in global politics since the end of World War II, we observers of history need to be regularly reminded of the lens through which the US foreign policy establishment sees the world. Every lens magnifies some elements and distorts others. A key part of 51łÔąĎ’s vocation is not only to expose its readers and contributors to the effects of the different lenses, but also to develop our collective understanding of how those lenses reflect and refract our perception of global reality. Mine is obviously very different from Gary’s or the State Department’s.

In a piece we published earlier this month, with the title, “The Middle East 2025: The Good, the Bad and the Tragically Ugly,” Gary offered us a wide-ranging review of the key dramas unfolding across the Middle East, North Africa and West Asia. The former diplomat sounded a note of guarded optimism when he observed that “the region remains as full of opportunity as it is fraught with external and internal political tension and conflict.” His dominant tone, however, is pessimistic: “Some of the region’s struggles are as far from resolution as they’ve ever been.”

Returning to the Beltway lens, US politicians possess a set of shared ideals, which they wield as if they were holding in their hand the gavel of universal justice. “Democracy” and “human rights” are the prominent concepts that permit State Department officials and pundits alike to categorize other nations and groups as being either “on the right side of history” or the wrong side. An extreme degree of wrongness places them in an “axis of evil.” Less radically, Gary calls the evildoers “the region’s troublemakers” and identifies them as: “Iran, Russia and the Islamic State.”

But all is not well even among those who are spared the epithet of troublemaker or wheel on the axis of evil. Summing up a problem that he sees as broadly undermining democratic governance throughout the Middle East, Gary offers us this truism: “Publics remain dissatisfied with their governments, almost none of which are accountable to their people.”

°Ő´Ç»ĺ˛ą˛â’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

ĚýAccountable to the people:

The basic principle of democracy that founds its theoretical moral legitimacy; also, the principle that can conveniently be discarded by ensuring that the kinds of people who are elected will never be held accountable for the worst collective decisions they irresponsibly make, including the overthrow of democratic leaders or foreign countries, waging and funding illegal wars and supporting genocide.

Contextual note

Gary finds one occasion to trot out the predictable bromide identifying Israel as “the Middle East’s lone democracy.” In his mind, it’s clear that if Israel is a democracy, it must be “accountable to the people.” Gary reminds us, however, that in practice, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is accountable not to the people as a whole (including Palestinians), nor even to the Jews, but to “right-wing factions” that now have “unprecedented influence in the Knesset.”

Israel’s proclaimed status as “lone democracy” deflects attention from the easily observed fact that it is an apartheid state openly conducting ethnic cleansing and systematic genocide. I agree that like “democracy” itself, those accusatory epithets are only “words,” which means they are “debatable,” designed, some will say, to “confuse the issue.”

In the nation’s moral system, thanks to the dogma of the first amendment of the US constitution, speech is free; words demand no accountability. Acts do, but for that accountability to be applied we must agree on the meaning of the words. The fact that observed acts can be dismissed as “mere words” brings home the real message: that accountability will always be elusive, especially when attempting to accuse a “lone democracy.”

Apartheid, ethnic cleansing and genocide have an unquestionably negative connotation. That may explain why in an article about the current state of play in the Middle East, Gary never alludes to them. Instead, like Monty Python, he looks at “the bright side of life” in Israel. “Israel’s superior military prowess, technology, intelligence and firepower,” he tells us, “paired with indispensable support from America produced positive results across the region.”

It continues as Gary finds the persuasive words to make us believe. “For now, however, the ongoing negotiations between Tehran and Washington are an unambiguous good.” Really, Gary, I have to stop you there. Unambiguous? Just before this we learn that “it is almost inevitable that Israel, with the likely assistance of the US, will attack the Islamic Republic.” In a short space we jump from “unambiguous good” to “inevitable” transcontinental war! In such a case, I wonder if the survival of humanity hasn’t itself become a highly ambiguous proposition.

This is where the question of whether governments are effectively “accountable to their people” arises. We may legitimately wonder whether the problem is confined, as Gary seems to suggest, to the Middle East. Some would claim there’s a serious problem of accountability within the US itself, the beacon of democracy. It may soon be time for some new populist leader to stand up and campaign on the slogan, “Make America Accountable Again.”

Historical note

After noting that the strength of “Iran has been significantly diminished while that of another, Israel, has been elevated,” Gary reveals how the groupthink at the State Department and among US allies functions, especially when applied to judging the positive or negative features of unfolding events. “From the perspective of the West and its moderate Arab allies, all of this is good news.”

The keyword here is “moderate,” an epithet that has been routinely applied not only to autocratic regimes allied to the US but also to groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria and elsewhere in the region. As economist Jeffrey Sachs recently, the CIA’s operation Timber Sycamore, ordered by President Barack Obama, was launched to arm and train Syrian rebel groups fighting against dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime during the Syrian Civil War. Its principal objective consisted of aiding extremist, jihadist factions opposed to Assad. Syria’s current leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who overthrew the Assad regime last November, historically worked for both al-Qaeda and ISIS. Thanks to Timber Sycamore, those officially designated terrorists received indirect support from the US, who conveniently referred to the jihadist groups it supported as “moderate rebels.”

Every US regime has had to play a difficult and decidedly ambiguous role concerning the sides to back in recent wars in multiple Middle East countries. Gary respects that ambiguity, which has typically consisted of US presidents, independently of their party affiliation, aligning with every position taken by Israel while at the same time officially endorsing the idea, or vaguely formulated intention, of implementing a two-state solution. It’s something of a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde situation, in which the good doctor attempts to play the role of an honest broker and the alter ego becomes an accomplice in atrocities. Gary dutifully reminds us that “Israel and Netanyahu bear their own share of the responsibility.” But at the same time, he studiously avoids mentioning the object of that responsibility: genocide or, at the very least, massive and persistent war crimes. Every recent State Department has done the same.

And he sticks to the script concerning the desired outcome with this undoubtedly accurate assertion: “Accepting the inevitability of a Palestinian state, as more than 100 foreign governments already have, would dramatically alter the political landscape, positioning Hamas and its extremist supporters as the enemies of peace.”

The real paradox — to the point of manifest absurdity — lies in the fact that the US has consistently used its veto at the UN Security Council to oppose every proposed resolution to grant statehood to Palestine. There’s no sign that that is likely to change under President Donald Trump.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51łÔąĎ Devil’s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Khosrow Isfahani: I always mix it up myself as well. 

Atul Singh: (Laughs) Came from Isfahan. So, Khosrow, what a pleasure. What an honor. Welcome.

Khosrow Isfahani: Thank you, Atul, for your kind introduction. That was just beyond and above. Thank you very much. Happy to be with you.

Atul Singh: Happy to introduce an Iranian, ha! Farsi was the official language of India for 800 years. And today, we will be discussing ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Axis of Resistance. I repeat: yes, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Axis of Resistance. And the topic of the podcast is “±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Axis of Resistance Is in Shambles: What Next?” So, without further ado, Khosrow, tell us: What is this Axis of Resistance?

Khosrow Isfahani: So, the ayatollahs in Tehran who run this rogue state — that from the get-go of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 has gone head-to-head with neighboring countries and international powers — have constantly found themselves in a jam, constantly fearing for the continuation of their rule over this nation of 90 million people. One of the pillars of their security doctrine, their response to outside threats as they perceive it, has been the Axis of Resistance. What is Axis of Resistance? It is a network of terrorist groups — and sometimes they are called militant groups — and allied states that, most of the time, are allied against the United States as well. Who are the members of this Axis of Resistance? Let’s start with ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s neighbors. In Iraq, you have the Hashd al-Shaabi — the Popular Mobilization Units, the PMU, or sometimes PMF. You have Houthi rebels in Yemen. You have smaller militia groups that are highly controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC. The small militant groups under its banner are Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun. The first one is made up of Afghan refugees that the IRGC forced into submission and into serving its wars abroad with the promise of citizenship. And Zainabiyoun is made up of Pakistanis.

Atul Singh: Are both of these populations Shia? Are the Afghans Hazaras?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Atul Singh: Or are the Afghans Hazaras, and the Pakistanis Shia refugees from Pakistan?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And in both cases, these are marginalized people who try to find refuge or some pocket of safety in Iran. And when they arrive in Iran, they face persecution from the state. They are barred from using banking services, accessing education, healthcare services. And this sinister state that the Islamic Republic is uses this fertile ground for recruiting these poor souls, to make them into soldiers for its adventurism around the region.

Atul Singh: Now, as I understand it, Bashar al-Assad — who’s now deposed, he has fled — he was an Alawi, an Alawite. He was Shia. The Houthis are Ismailis, if I’m correct — they are also Shia. So in a way, this is ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Shia Crescent, extending all the way from Israel’s border to Hazara territory in Afghanistan.

Khosrow Isfahani: So yes, there is an ideological element to the creation of the Axis of Resistance, but—

Atul Singh: Religious, I would say, even more than ideological.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, yes, that would be a fair framing of it. But when you look at the Palestinian groups that have aligned themselves with the Islamic Republic, you would find groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the General Command — that was a leftist group with leftist agendas, not at all religious, that literally has been one of the linchpins of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s network of terror near the Israeli border.

Atul Singh: So it’s not just religion — it’s broader than that. But in the Palestinian case, that’s perhaps because Israel has backed them firmly, and no other Arab state is doing so right now.

Khosrow Isfahani: In the case of Iran and its relations with Palestinian groups, it’s not about the Palestinian people or religion. It’s just that the Islamic Republic sees Israel as its eternal enemy. As a mortal enemy that’s either the Islamic Republic or Israel should not exist for this war between them to end. That’s constantly present in the propaganda of the Islamic Republic. So anyone who is fighting against Israel the Islamic Republic sees it as an ally.

Atul Singh: And they join the Axis of Resistance.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Ideology vs. realpolitik: ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s security doctrine

Atul Singh: So, alright, I understand now what is the Axis of Resistance. But what purpose does it serve? What is ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s security doctrine?

Khosrow Isfahani: So let me just add two points about what the Axis of Resistance is, and I promise I will answer that question as well. In addition to these groups, Syria under Bashar al-Assad was one of the main pillars of the Axis of Resistance. And the crown jewel of the Axis of Resistance used to be Hezbollah in Lebanon. These two main elements in the Axis have been reduced to rubble over the past couple of months, as well as Hamas, as well as the ouster of Assad from Syria, which has changed the whole region’s face. But back to your question: What purpose did the Axis of Resistance serve? It is a combination of, again, ideology and the realpolitik of this ideologically-driven authoritarian state that we have in Iran. So after the Islamic Revolution, we had an extended eight-year war between Iran and its neighboring country, Iraq. It was a brutal war. Hundreds of thousands of people on both sides were killed.

Atul Singh: 1980 to 1988 — Saddam Hussein on one side, Ayatollah Khomeini on the other side.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And during this period, Iran and its leaders found themselves isolated. The war comes at the heels of the hostage situation — forces allied with the Ayatollah Khomeini taking American diplomats in Tehran hostage for over a year. It comes at the same time that Khomeini is exporting the Islamic Revolution around the world. So when there is a war, when Iran is under attack, no one is willing to sell weapons to Tehran. So in response, the Islamic Republic has developed a multi-pronged defense strategy. A core element of it — they took a page out of the Soviet book — they have moved the periphery of the war away from mainland Iran. They describe it as “strategic depth” in Iranian defense language.

Atul Singh: Well, Pakistan also obsesses about strategic depth, and that is why it has funded and supported first the Mujahideen and then the Taliban: to have security in its backyard and an ally against India. So that seems to be a common obsession.

Khosrow Isfahani: And to a great extent, it has been effective for a rogue state like the Islamic Republic that has constantly, over the past four decades, sought WMDs. It has kept this regime in power and safe from outside aggression, to a great extent. So one is this Axis of Resistance, that was one of the main pillars of the Islamic Republic’s security doctrine. The other two is self-sufficiency through development of conventional weapons. What are the examples of that? The ballistic missile projects, the drone projects. These have been ongoing since the inception of the Islamic Republic.

Atul Singh: And these are conventional weapons?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And over the past couple of years, we have seen the Islamic Republic exporting these weapons to other countries, including Russia, which has used the Iran-made weapons for war crimes against the Ukrainians. So when you look at the wider map of the world, you see the footprint of Iran whenever there is death and destruction. Let’s get back to our main topic.

Missiles, drones and nuclear threats

Atul Singh: There’s also the WMD program. That’s also part of the security doctrine.

Khosrow Isfahani: Exactly. Since the days—

Atul Singh: And that basically means the nuclear program?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes.

Atul Singh: Also, I suspect chemical, too?

Khosrow Isfahani: There have been aspirations of acquiring chemical weapons. At some point during the Iran–Iraq War, one of the senior IRGC commanders even was looking into making a laser weapon that can shoot laser beams from space at adversaries and destroy countries. So they have looked at every possible scenario.

Atul Singh: Did they succeed?

Khosrow Isfahani: No. That was very cartoonish of him.

Atul Singh: Was he reading too many science fiction novels?

Khosrow Isfahani: I am assuming that’s where the root of that idea was. But on a more serious note, the Islamic Republic has sought weapons of mass destruction. There has been concerted efforts within the Islamic Republic’s establishment to create nuclear weapons. Over the years, there have been periods that this program has been put on pause, but it has always been at least on the back burner. And in recent weeks, with the collapse of the Axis of Resistance, the Islamic Republic has been left with two options when it comes to maintaining its security: One is expansion of its conventional weapons programs. Over the past couple of months, they have seen multiple tests and drills inside Iran where new drones were unveiled. Allegedly, ballistic missiles were tested. These are all signaling to the world that “we are still in the game, we are not bowing out and we are pursuing all these options.” At the same time, a couple of weeks ago, in negotiations with European counterparts, Iranian diplomats for the first time — I emphasize, for the first time — threatened their counterparts that Iran might change its nuclear doctrine. Over the years, they have stuck to this talking point that Iran doesn’t seek a nuclear weapon. But now they are openly saying that they might make their leap. So we are facing this new reality.

Collapse of the Axis and economic strain

Atul Singh: I see. So that’s the security doctrine: Basically, have deterrents in the form of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, move the locus of conflict away from the Iranian heartland, have a strong periphery which acts as the outer wall — the outer wall of a fort — to defend Iran and secure the great Islamic Revolution of 1979. Now, all of that makes sense. However, as you yourself pointed out earlier, the Axis of Resistance has collapsed. Hamas is weak.

Khosrow Isfahani: Its operational capabilities have been reduced.

Atul Singh: Yeah, Hezbollah has been decapitated. The leadership at least has been decapitated. And Bashar al-Assad is cooling his fine derrière in icy Moscow. So how is Iran coping with the new reality?

Khosrow Isfahani: It’s doubling down on the two programs. One: the expansion of the conventional weapons program.

Atul Singh: Such as drones, missiles and now, of course, a greater show of force.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. We have had multiple drills inside Iran that they are trying to project an image of power and control, that nothing has changed and Iran is still capable of sending off if there is war. Literally not a single week passes without a senior Iranian military official telling the press that if there is aggression against Iran, it will face a decisive response. So that’s one element. And on the other hand, there is the threat of acquiring a nuclear weapon. As I mentioned earlier, they are constantly buzzing about making the leap for a nuclear weapon. And I just want to remind you: A senior Iranian official a couple of years ago described that Iran might act like a cornered cat. “It doesn’t want a nuclear weapon, but if you corner a cat, you cannot predict what it does next.” As broken as that rationale is, and as somber as that image would be for the world, this is the mindset of the ayatollahs ruling Iran.

Atul Singh: Right. So the ayatollahs might be cornered cats and might want to spend a lot of money on programs and defense, but the big question arises: Where is the money coming from?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the main source of the money that Iran has for its military expenditure is its revenue from oil and gas exports. The main customers of that: China. Syria used to be a customer, but the payments weren’t on time. Same with Iraq. So that’s where the money is coming from.

Atul Singh: So China is sending the money that is keeping aloft Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. But the issue is, a large portion of this money is not being spent on anything. The ayatollahs are constantly in fear of a protracted war, of a foreign attack, so they are saving this money for that possible attack — and at the same time, lavishly spending it on weapons development. And at the same time, a lot of them — and their children — are living lavish lives in Iran, while the rest of the country is suffering in absolute poverty.

Atul Singh: So in a way, the ayatollahs have become the new Shah of Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: I wouldn’t go down that road, and I wouldn’t make that comparison.

Atul Singh: They did throw a huge party in Persepolis — $800 million on god knows what.

Khosrow Isfahani: Again, different time, different context. So I wouldn’t compare these two rulers with each other in any form or shape.

Atul Singh: You know, I mean, I come from India. The Taj Mahal was built for an Iranian woman, and it caused famine and arguably death of thousands if not millions. So we are used to Iranian opulence!

Khosrow Isfahani: If I were to compare the approach of the ayatollahs to the economy and how they are wasting the resources of a very proud nation, it would be what the North Korean dictators are doing. Nothing trickles down to the people. People suffer, they stay in power.

Civil unrest and the war on women

Atul Singh: Excellent. And I guess it is that suffering that is causing increased frequency of civil unrest in Iran? We’ve had news about women protesting, we’ve had news about young people protesting. If Iran is using its scarce cash on military expenditure and in corruption, then will this lead to an intensification of this unrest?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the thing is, over the past couple of years — mostly, we can mark from 2016, 2017 — we have seen a shift in Iranian society. In the past, we have had multiple cycles of protests, but they were happening in cycles that there were gaps between them — around 10 years. When you look at the years after 2016, the gap is not even a year. So, people are on the streets over water shortage, fuel shortage, food shortage, food crisis.

Atul Singh: Wasn’t there a big protest over fuel prices in 2019?

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. In 2019, the government of so-called reformist President Hassan Rouhani increased fuel prices three times overnight.

Atul Singh: Why?

Khosrow Isfahani: Because they argued they cannot subsidize fuel anymore. Some economists—

Atul Singh: They were subsidizing their own RMs.

Khosrow Isfahani: There you go. And spending the riches of this country on their adventurism abroad. So in 2019, when they tripled fuel prices, people took to the streets. And in response, they killed 1,500 people. That’s a lot.

Atul Singh: Not by the standards of Joseph Stalin, or even Saddam Hussein.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, but that was the longest period of time. And again, they were in an olden age. In 2019, if you kill 1,500 people in less than a week in the darkness of an absolute nationwide Internet shutdown, that’s a nightmare. I lived through that. I was on the ground in Iran reporting those events.

Atul Singh: And you were under a huge threat of life and limb, I suppose?

Khosrow Isfahani: Absolutely, like every other journalist who is doing their job. And after 2019, we have seen a reoccurrence of these types of protests in Iran. After that, we had protests against water shortage, which again was brutally suppressed. And recently, in 2022–2023, we had the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which was triggered by police killing this young woman from ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s persecuted Kurdish minority over showing too much hair. Over 500 were killed.

Atul Singh: She wasn’t even wearing a bikini.

Khosrow Isfahani: She was very — if you see the photos of her before this incident, everyone would describe it as very modestly covered. So it shocked the whole nation.

Atul Singh: Some Iranians I know have called it — and you as well have called it — a war on women.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And it didn’t start with the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini. It has been a war that has been ongoing since 1979, with the inception of the Islamic Republic. This regime has a three-pillar ideological system. One of them is animosity toward the West, specifically the US; hatred of Israel — it’s irreconcilable — and this unending war against women. It started with oppressing women into wearing very, very conservative clothing — forcing them to wear the hijab, firing people from their jobs, arresting them, sentencing them to lashing, denying them access to services, and it’s continuing. And to mark that continuation, despite the lies that ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s chief propagandist, Zarif, would like—

Atul Singh: Javad Zarif.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes, the former foreign minister and current aide to the president.

Atul Singh: He went to school with the father of a friend. And my friend’s father — who’s passed away — didn’t have very many pleasant things to say about him.

Khosrow Isfahani: Not any. I cannot think of a single person with a shred of dignity who would have anything nice to say about Javad Zarif. This man has whitewashed crimes of the Islamic Republic — crimes against humanity, war crimes of this regime — over the past four decades, nonstop.

Atul Singh: He’s a smooth operator, to give the devil his due.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. That makes him a more dangerous actor compared to his predecessor who died in a helicopter crash recently.

Trump, deterrence and future scenarios

Atul Singh: I see. So let’s discuss the new world we live in, you and I are sitting in Washington, DC. Donald Trump is back in the White House. As of today, he has issued 37 executive orders, and things are extremely uncertain. The Pentagon jargon: Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous — VUCA. We very much are in the VUCA world. So what lies ahead for Iran now?

Khosrow Isfahani: So, on one end, we have an Iranian establishment in its entirety swearing absolute revenge against President Trump after the killing of IRGC Quds Force Commander, the Islamic Republic’s chief terror operator, Qasem Soleimani. The Islamic Republic, its Supreme Leader and the civilian government have sworn that they are going to kill the president. The official website of the Supreme Leader has published posters saying that President Trump should be killed and assassinated.

Atul Singh: As revenge for killing Qasem Soleimani who was killed in Baghdad, and in the eyes of many Iranians, was a hero.

Khosrow Isfahani: And in the eyes of many, a murderous war criminal who had the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent people on his hands — people in especially Syria. He was the commander that led the bloody crackdown that the Islamic Republic, Russia and the deposed Bashar al-Assad led against the uprising of the Syrian people for justice and liberty in their country.

Atul Singh: So in particular, a lot of Sunnis — who form the majority of Syria — were targeted and tortured and killed.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. And he was responsible for a lot of that.

Atul Singh: Okay. So let’s come back to Trump. Yes, so on the one hand, they want Donald Trump dead.

Khosrow Isfahani: Yes. But at the same time, they are extremely afraid of a second-term President Trump in office. The first term didn’t end well for the Islamic Republic. It was marked with the maximum pressure campaign.

Atul Singh: Well, he threw out Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran.

Khosrow Isfahani: Which many experts believe was a flawed agreement that didn’t include ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s regional activities and missile program under the JCPOA, the nuclear deal.

Atul Singh: Yes, JCPOA is the full form, yeah.

Khosrow Isfahani: —expanded its missile and drone program. It enriched its militants — the network of militant groups across the region. So yes, in his first term, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, reimposed strict sanctions against the Islamic Republic. And as one very knowledgeable economist back in Iran at the time told me, President Trump was like a lion having Iran by its back, biting the back of the neck of the ayatollahs, rendering them incapacitated, unable to make any moves.

Atul Singh: Well, I think Donald Trump would love that image. He’s got blonde hair and he fancies himself as a lion. The ayatollahs would be, you know, the bisons or the wildebeests, or whatever you want to call them.

Khosrow Isfahani: That’s the analysis of this very senior, experienced economist at the time I knew.

Atul Singh: Excellent. I mean, he will certainly be appointed in the Trump White House. You should send his name over to the Donald.

Khosrow Isfahani: So that’s one thing that the ayatollahs are afraid of. But more importantly is that over the years, the clerical establishment in Iran has almost successfully gamed all presidents in the US. The two parties had become predictable for the ayatollahs in Tehran. They knew how they can play their cards to remain in this sphere of safety without being too limited. But with President Trump, they don’t know what would be the consequences of their actions. So right now, literally today, the Iranian Supreme Leader delivered a speech about the possibility of negotiations with “the enemy.” He said that “when you negotiate with the enemy, you should remember who you are negotiating with — but you may proceed.” Some have seen this as a signal from the Ayatollah for negotiations with the US. But the issue is: With a regime like the Islamic Republic, whatever negotiation you clinch, whatever deal you achieve, it would amount to nothing but kicking the can down the road. It’s not going to change the behavior or the ideology of this regime that has been the largest state sponsor of terrorism around the world. It’s not going to change the behavior of a regime that has been responsible for death and destruction around the Middle East. And it’s not going to change the behavior of a regime that constantly kills and oppresses the people under its rule.

Khosrow Isfahani: So what you’re saying is, Donald Trump would be unwise to negotiate with the Iranian regime, and what you’re implying is that he should kill the beast he has by his jaws.

Khosrow Isfahani: So, I’m going to quote, actually, the two-term president Hassan Rouhani in the book The Secret War with Iran. Ronen Bergman, when he’s talking about the McFarlane affair — Iran purchasing weapons from Israel with the US being in the middle and a lot else going on in the background — there is a specific chapter in this whole affair that I believe has remained true: During these negotiations, Hassan Rouhani was a senior security official within the Islamic Republic’s structure. He travels to France to meet with different stakeholders in the McFarlane affair. And sitting down with one of the officers negotiating the deal, he tells them that, “You don’t understand the ayatollahs in Tehran. You show weakness, and they exploit it. If you show strength, they would abide.” There is a direct quote — the conversation has actually been recorded by an intelligence officer who was in the room — and he says: “You should tell them that if you cross this red line, this specific military target can be hit and will be hit. And if you do that, the ayatollahs would change their behavior.”

Atul Singh: You’re sounding like Bibi Netanyahu.

Khosrow Isfahani: I’m quoting a two-term president within the Islamic Republic.

Atul Singh: (Laughs) Rouhani is sounding like Bibi Netanyahu. So what you’re saying is, paradoxically, Trump’s hardball tactics might yield some results with Iran?

Khosrow Isfahani: So the thing is, a very wise friend a couple of months ago told me that there is connective tissue between diplomacy, military action and sanctions. These don’t exist in the void. And any administration in the US would be wise to use the wide array of — and all the tools at its disposal — for containing a rogue state like the Islamic Republic and re-establishing deterrence in the Middle East.

Atul Singh: On that note, great to have you, Khosrow. We learned a few things. Obviously, we’d love to have you back on a vast area of issues — not just on the Middle East, because you have much broader interests — but also civil society, journalism, how geopolitics is shaping up worldwide. And we look forward to seeing you very soon.

Khosrow Isfahani: Thank you, Atul. Thanks for having me.

Atul Singh: Thank you.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Podcasts: ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Axis of Resistance Is Now in Shambles. What Next? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Josef Olmert: Hello. This is going to be our ninth and last episode in the current series about Syria. And I need to start with a methodical comment, I should say, because people ask me, knowing that’s going to be the last episode in this series, as to, “Why didn’t you talk enough about that issue or about this issue?” And obviously, Syria is a complicated, diversified and very important country. There’s so much to talk about, so I promise that I will talk more about certain aspects of the Syria situation in another series or in a couple or three more video presentations later on, and I will announce it to my followers on Facebook, on YouTube and all that. So this will happen.

Western media and grounded reality

Now, about what has happened in Syria recently, I have to again and again emphasize the fact that the media in the West — I have to say it. It’s not a campaign I conducted against the media in the West, but I want my watchers, my listeners, my followers to know what really is going on in Syria. There are lots and lots and lots of troubles between Sunnis and Alawis. Mostly the Alawis are now the victims. And the videos that come out from Syria — and they are authentic, they are authentic — are very bad, are very disturbing and should arouse concerns about what really is happening. Also, there are videos that show clearly that despite the image that the leaders of the new regime, particularly Ahmed al-Sharaa or al-Julani, are trying to portray about moderation or a more realistic approach, there are signs of attempts to enforce religious behavior. You see more and more women with the hijab in a lot of the videos, as opposed to before. And there are stories about the enforcement to do so and so on. And of course, the problems between the Turks and the Kurds in the northeast of Syria continue to simmer. So there are lots of issues that put together form a picture of a very fluid, unstable situation in Syria that doesn’t necessarily come to the attention of the world media. And it should, because we need to know what’s going on. Otherwise we shall be again surprised, like we were surprised so many times before, or at least those who were surprised — not everybody was as surprised. So today, in our last episode of this series, I would like to make some very concrete comments about what’s happening and will happen in Syria in the foreseeable future.

Elections and representation

And let’s start with the question: What government is Syria? Is the current guys that are in Damascus — al-Julani or Ahmed al-Sharaa, the people around him — are going to be the government of Syria? Or there might be elections? I would say that we cannot see or foresee — and that’s maybe a prediction — a situation whereby Syria will be conducted by a group of people that were not elected for a period of time that will be more than, say, a few months or so. It’s not that Syria has a tradition of elections. They used to have elections in Syria. There were elections in 1949, 1954 that were relatively democratic. But they don’t have a tradition of elections. So if this group of people, if this coalition of Islamic or Islamist groups, will continue to rule Syria without elections, there will be troubles. There will be also troubles if there will be elections, and the results will be the usual in some Arab dictatorships — of the 99%. There’s not going to be 99% in the real elections in Syria. You know, it used to be under Hafez Assad, under Bashar Assad. And you know, Hafez Assad was elected president for seven years, the term was, and it was like 99.96%. And then seven years later, it was 99.97%. And people asked me at that time, “What’s going on?” I said, “Look, he’s become more popular — from 99.96 to 99.97.” But we know, of course, this was elections. So we’ll see what happens about that. My prediction is there won’t be real elections in Syria that will be democratic on the basis of one person, one vote. And if there will be elections, there will be sham elections. Real elections in Syria should reflect the cleavages of society according to religious, ethnic and other divisions. I’ll say, to some in surprise, “Look, in Iraq, there were relatively free elections after the fall of Saddam. Under the American supervision, but they were more democratic than any time in Iraq before and maybe in most Arab countries at any time.” And what they showed was the role of local forces, of ethnic groups, of religious divisions as part of the overall new political fabric. Civil wars in countries like Iraq or Lebanon or Syria brought about a real breakup of society according to bases of loyalty that were primordial, traditional. And at the time of conflict, people went back to the original basis of their social and therefore political loyalties. And that was reflected, at least in the case of Iraq, in the results of elections. So if there will be real elections in Syria, there should be representation for people representing different regions, even within the Sunni community. And there are differences between Hama, Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. There are many differences. Regionalism is very significant. There will have to be representation for the various communities: the Kurds; the Druze; the Alawis, of course, they should be represented; the Ismailis, which is a Shia sect; the various Christian groups. And there are quite a few: Armenians, Assyrians, alongside the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholics of Syria and others. The Turkmen — there are lots of Turkmen people in the north of Syria, more than what people know about, over a million. It’s a large group of people. And the Turks will take care and they will be represented. So that remains to be seen, and that will be a test. So to sum up this point, there are not going to be real democratic elections in the foreseeable future. And if there will be elections, and the results will be the usual 90-whatever, you know it was sham elections. Real elections will show all those divisions that I talked about. They will have to show them if they are really real.

Islamization and social tensions

Islamization will be significant, even if these people claim to be more moderate, which is very logical for them to say and do and very clever politically, because they need to show a nicer face in order to be able to then talk to other governments and ask for economic aid or any of those, or political aid, diplomatic aid, diplomatic support. There will be definitely an Islamization in society that again will create issues with the religious minorities. Arab Sunnis in Syria are 55 to 60%. That means 40 to 45%, definitely around 40, are not Sunni Arabs. And any Sunni Islamization process that will be enforced from above is bound, therefore, to cause troubles. Very obvious it’s going to happen.

Regional relations and internal divides

When we talk about foreign relations of Syria, obviously Iran is out of the game. The question is the level and the depth of Turkish support to the new regime and influence over it. And we talked a lot about the Turkish part of all this. Iraq, neighboring country, Sunni Arab minority. Will they be encouraged by the new regime in Damascus? Possibly. Not necessarily going to happen. My prediction: will not be a major factor. More important is the connection between the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. That could be a much bigger problem for both the Syrians and the Iraqis. The Druze in the south will not like to separate themselves in any formal way from the Syrian state. Never mind what some agitated Israelis have in mind about that. It’s not going to happen. But I can see, and I believe it will be, an informal Israeli zone of influence in parts of south Syria bordering with Jordan as well, inhabited by the Druze of the Jabal, of the mountain, that will make sure, from their perspective, because of their interest, that the border will not become a zone of hostilities between any government in Damascus and Israel. And that will be a difference from what it was when the Assad regime was so much dominated by Hezbollah, the Iranians, that tried to turn the Syrian side of the Golan Heights into a zone of conflict with Israel. And what Israelis are doing in Syria or have done in Syria to destroy any presence of hostile elements in those areas of Syria was intended to make it easier for the local forces that are there to keep stability along the border, which will be their interest. The real problem will be between the regime in Damascus and the Alawis. Killing Alawis in the streets now, of cities in Syria which are not Alawi-dominated, is terrible. It’s one thing, though. Trying to invade the mountains and really take over the entire mountainous region of the Alawis and then enforce a regime upon them would lead to a bloodbath, to a real major bloodshed. It hasn’t yet happened. Hopefully, it will not happen. But then the question is, what will be the representation of the Alawis in the new regime, in the new parliament that will be in any body of influence in the country? It will be very small. And you can’t ignore a certain percent of the population if you adapt to this. Also the 2% of the Ismailis — about 50% that are closer to Shia Islam than to Sunni Islam.

Sectarian dynamics, regional influence and outlook

And, of course, the question of the relation between Syria and Lebanon. In a famous speech in 1976, when Hafez Assad justified the Syrian invasion of Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war at that time, he said in simple words, Syria and Lebanon is one country, is one nation. That’s the typical Greater Syria approach that was adopted by the Ba’ath regime, even though originally, it is the approach of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party of Antoun Saadeh, the SSNP, that was mistakenly in French called the PPS. It’s not the right acronym in Arabic. The Syrian regime now will have to let the Lebanese conduct their affairs by themselves, and they will have to leave Lebanon for itself. Lebanon will have its own problems. We don’t talk about Lebanon now. They elected a new president, he talks a lot about changes, and all this remains to be seen. We always have to take with a grain of salt what Lebanese politicians say, particularly after they are elected. But that remains to be seen. So Syria and Lebanon will not be one country, one nation. And that also depends on the Iranians. If Iran is not allowed to move anymore from Iraq via Syria to Lebanon, the Iranian influence in Lebanon will have to be weakened, and will be weakened. And it will be not totally destroyed. There are Shias that are always supporters of Iran — many of them — but it will be decreased dramatically. And it also depends on Israel, how Israel would tolerate or not any attempts to recreate connection between Syria and Lebanon that would have also adverse repercussions on the border between Lebanon and Syria. Now we come to the last point about this — foreign affairs — and this is the role of the powers. Russia is out of the game. There are talks about, if vacuum created by the absence of Russia, China will move in. Remains to be seen, I doubt it. There’s an opening here for other countries. The question really is, who would fill the vacuum? Mostly, initially, it will be by Turkey. But the Turks cannot do in Syria what everybody said that they intend to do. They don’t have the funds, the financial resources, the economic resources rather, to reconstruct Syria. That will have to come from the Gulf countries, which as of now keep their hands off. They’re very careful and will remain careful for time to come. And, of course, the role played by the US. What will the Trump administration do? Surely, they have to make sure that the Kurds’ virtual autonomy in the northeast will be maintained, but to try and do it in a way that will prevent Turkish–Kurdish war. That remains to be seen. I doubt whether the Trump administration will invest too much money in Syria or at all. So we are going back to the EU. Somebody will have to put some money because Syria is a ruined, destroyed country after all those years of civil war. And if you don’t rehabilitate, reconstruct, rebuild Syria, there will not be stability there. Doesn’t matter who rules the country. As of now, we hear statements from the Europeans about the desire to accommodate themselves to the new regime. And al-Julani shows how moderate he is, and visits by the German and French foreign ministers and all this. But in the meantime, no money is coming, and money will be the key here. I will leave you with that, because we can go on and on like this. But the picture coming or emerging — isn’t that the main point? Syria is in a very bad situation. Rehabilitating, rebuilding a country after such an atrocious civil war is not a simple matter. And even if you can establish some political institutions that will be considered representative, to rebuild the relationship between the various communities is another story altogether. The same problem in Iraq. We have the same problem in Lebanon. We have the same problem in Libya. We shall have troubles in Syria. We shall have troubles by Syria. We shall have troubles connected with Syria. And therefore, there will be more talks from me, more presentations, but not immediately. I will let you know when we shall do more. So I will leave you with that. Sometimes people like an end to a story like this to be a happy end. The history of Syria over 100 years is not a happy history. I have no reason to believe that we are witnessing now a dramatic departure from traditional Syrian history, unfortunately. Thank you, my friends.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 9 — Predicting Syria’s Future appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Gary Grappo: Thank you very much, Atul, and for your flattering introduction. And it’s always a pleasure to be with you and to talk about what’s happening in the world as we speak. And in today’s interview, we’ll be obviously talking about the Middle East, where the situation remains quite fluid and very dynamic.

Atul Singh: What is this new geopolitical landscape we are talking about? How is it different to the old one? And when does this new era begin?

Gary Grappo: Well, the fundamental problems of the Middle East are unchanged. We have governments that are largely, widely unpopular. We have an extensive amount of oppression, particularly in the Arab countries; we have continuing instability in several of the countries, with militia groups quite active, terrorist organizations quite active; and we still have the ongoing problem, of course, of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, although the tenor of that has changed considerably as well. But what has changed is the dynamic. Over the course of the last several months, of course, we have seen significant diminishing of the capabilities of Hamas in Gaza. We had a ceasefire that lasted almost two months and is now finished, and Israel has relaunched both its ground and air campaign against Hamas in Gaza. We can get into the details of that and what that may portend. Further to the north, we have a largely decimated Hezbollah. Israel, by dint of cleverness and truly impressive technological innovation and then massive air attacks, was able to eliminate at least the top two, if not top three, levels of the Hezbollah organization in southern Lebanon, while at the same time decimating its arsenal of weapons, although not entirely destroying it. And so it presents much less threat to the people of Israel. At the same time, we finally — after waiting almost two years — we have an actual government in place with a president and a prime minister in Lebanon. The Lebanese people, for the first time, will have a government that appears committed to addressing the real challenges that that country is facing, both on the political front and most especially on the economic front. We can get into what to anticipate as that moves forward. Probably one of the most significant developments has been the fall of the Assad regime. Father and son lasted some 53–54 years and ruled with an iron fist, including over the last ten or 12 years during the Syrian civil war. They saw the complete devastation of the Syrian economy, deaths that ran into the hundreds of thousands, and huge numbers of Syrian refugees fleeing to Jordan, Turkey, even to Europe and Lebanon. It was then replaced with a government which initially showed some positive signs of moving forward, despite its jihadist heritage — actually quite steeped in jihadism. But we’re now seeing what I refer to as a default position in the Middle East. And that is, you see a change in government, hopes and expectations are high, and then cracks begin to appear. In this particular case, we are seeing an increase in the number of Assadists — that is, remnants of pro-Assad forces — attacking Syrian government forces, and those are leading to some actually quite pitched battles and to the exacting of revenge against the Alawite minority in the western and northwestern parts of Syria, with fairly large numbers of fatalities. There were also reports of some Christians being killed as well — not, at least from my perspective, unanticipated at all. And then finally — and we can get into other elements — but the situation in Iran has dramatically changed as a result of two Israeli attacks: in April of last year and then in October. That has greatly diminished the capability of the Iranian regime to protect itself from future attacks, providing Donald Trump with a potential, perhaps, of maybe reaching some kind of a negotiated solution with respect to ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear weapons program. So that’s the lineup. We can talk also, if you’d like, about what’s happening in Yemen right now. There’s certainly been an uptick in the last five days of activity there as well.

Instability in Israel

Atul Singh: So what you’re saying is part of the warp and woof of the Middle East. The Middle East has been unstable. You can argue that after , once the Ottoman Empire was replaced by the British and French empires, and after they unraveled and left behind nation-states in largely ethnic and tribal territories, the instability has never ended. What’s new? What’s new about this, Gary? How is it different to what transpired earlier?

Gary Grappo: Well, certainly what is new is the character of the conflict between Israel and some of its neighbors. And when I say that, we have to be cautious, because the states that border Israel don’t necessarily present a threat to Israel at all. Certainly not Egypt, not Jordan, not Lebanon and not even Syria, to be quite frank, although Israel is keeping its powder dry with respect to the future of Syria. But we still have the security threats to the State of Israel emanating from Hamas in Gaza and still from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. And then the Iranian regime has not changed at all. There is certainly the realization on the part of the leadership, including that of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, that they do not have the defense mechanisms that they thought they once had, with their so-called Axis of Resistance now as a result of conflicts with Israel. But the fundamental lay of the land, so to speak, in terms of the unpopularity of governments, inability of governments to respond to the needs of their peoples — probably, with the exception, obviously, of the monarchies, which do a much better job in that regard and therefore enjoy a measure of legitimacy that other governments do not have — that all remains the same. And the fear that governments have of their populations, that at any moment streets could erupt over whatever the issue du jour happens to be — whether it’s the Israeli–Palestinian issue, whether it’s the economic situation, whether it’s oppressive government security forces, whether it’s the inability to hold the governments accountable to their people — all of those things still register quite prominently among the peoples of the Middle East.

Atul Singh: Alright, so Gary, what you’re painting is a fundamentally unstable situation. Let’s begin with Israel–Palestine, since you mentioned that is an issue that animates the Arab street, and there’s a tension between the Arab street and the Arab palace on that issue. And of course, we can talk about whether Israel has been just or unjust, whether in its response to the terrorist attacks of October 7, whether they’ve been proportionate or disproportionate. But for me, our deeper concern is the inherent instability we see in Israel itself now. We are speaking just after Bibi Netanyahu and his cabinet have the head of Shin Bet, the internal intelligence agency of Israel. Now, this sort of politicization of intelligence agencies — and indeed the military — has not happened in Israel. Israel has had a fantastic military, a fantastic intelligence and a really cohesive state until quite recently. And now that internal cohesion in Israel seems to be breaking, and that for me perhaps is even more worrying than the usual fault lines everyone talks about.

Gary Grappo: There’s no question that Israel is facing some rather difficult internal political challenges. The specific one that you mentioned on the firing of the head of Shin Bet is overlaid with the quite emotional upheaval over the situation of Israeli hostages who remain in Gaza. Of course, there are some 59–60 of those. How many of them are still alive? I guess the Israelis perhaps may know, but there are most definitely some of them who are not alive today. And so that’s a fault line. 

Atul Singh: Sorry to interject, but I think even the Israelis cannot know for sure, because as of now, we know that they have not quite managed to break Hamas completely. They’ve done a lot of damage, but Hamas has proved more resilient than anyone could have estimated given the disparity in force.

Gary Grappo: Yes. No, Hamas is, despite the devastating losses they’ve suffered in manpower and in weapons and in overall structural cohesiveness of the organization, they’re still standing. And we saw that during the ceasefire, when they made a show of their continued presence in the territory. And Israel knows that, and I think that’s why Israel finally decided that since the ceasefire was obviously not going to move into a phase two — I will just say quite bluntly — there was never any possibility of that happening. It looked good on paper — the phase one, the phase two and the phase three. There was never any chance of moving into phase two. There really wasn’t. And so Hamas still exists as an organization. They are attempting to rearm. It’s going to be difficult because their supply lines have suffered rather dramatic deterioration. They can’t get the supplies in they previously had received, for example, say, from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon or from Iran. So they’re going to be hard-pressed to replace their stockpile of weapons and other material. But they are recruiting quite strongly, as a matter of fact. And I think we have to acknowledge the fact that it’s pretty fertile territory for the recruitment of fighters, given what has transpired since October 7. So their strength is probably back up to at least 20,000 fighters — not nearly with the capabilities that they might have had post-October 7. They’ve lost those veteran fighters — many, many of them. But they’ll get there. And I think that’s why Israel decided to capitalize while it could, in going after this still-less-than-previously-very-capable Hamas fighting force. But to get back to Israel, the issue over the firing of the Shin Bet chief is overlaid with the dissension in the Israeli public over the state of the hostages and whether the government is doing enough or not to secure their release. And then underpinning all of that, if you recall, before October 7, there was quite a bit of attention devoted to what Bibi was trying to do to undermine the authority of the Israeli judiciary, and that still remains so. So we do see a lot of political cracks within Israel internally. And I’ll make the final point — and I know Bibi Netanyahu is very mindful of this — and that is: Israel must decide on its state budget by the end of this month. If they finish the month without a state budget, it effectively means the collapse of the government. They will have to call for new elections, which would take — in Israel, given its election laws — three months. So all of this internal churn is having an impact. And then, of course, there’s all the back and forth over the person Bibi Netanyahu himself and how Israelis view him, how much or not it can be debated. Netanyahu needs war to maintain his position as prime minister. All of that is being debated today in Israel. So yeah, Israel faces its problems within itself, in addition to the external threats.

Lebanon’s prospects

Atul Singh: And so let’s move on from Israel to Lebanon. Lebanon, you mentioned, seems to have greater hope now. But Lebanon still has a fractious, multi-ethnic society, which in the past even struggled to collect rubbish, leave aside deliver other elements of governance. Hezbollah ran a parallel state, which was arguably more powerful than the state itself, at least in the areas it dominated. Is there hope for Lebanon as a state, or are we going to see Lebanon limp along as a failed state?

Gary Grappo: I think there’s more hope today in Lebanon than there has been — most certainly in the last 10 years, maybe in the last 25 years. There genuinely is an opportunity here. Now, Lebanon has been put nearly on its back. Its economy, which was considered a middle-income country at one point, has now been reduced to almost . Most of the country is living at or below that today. The infrastructure has suffered considerably, particularly the neighborhoods in Beirut and in southern Lebanon and in the Beqaa Valley, which is on the east near the border with Syria. So a lot of work needs to be done on the Lebanese economy. But the Lebanese people are some of the most industrious — in fact, I would argue the most industrious people in the Middle East after Israel. And there can be a natural affinity between Lebanon and Israel in terms of how they approach innovation, how they approach business, how they approach development, if they can overcome some of these problems. Now, this is where Lebanon is going to need some help. And I would argue, if I were sitting before Donald Trump, that if you really want to do some good not only for the people of Lebanon and for our interest in Lebanon, but also for Israel, we need to invest in Lebanon. We need to invest in their armed forces. We need to work with the armed forces as closely as we can to ensure they are able to disarm Hezbollah, which is not going to willingly lay down all of its arms. It’s obliged to do that going back to a UN Security Council following the 2006 war. And the terms of the latest ceasefire called for the enforcement of that, as well as the of all Lebanese armed forces north of the Litani River, which is around 20 miles north of the Israeli border. And Lebanon is supposed to — the Lebanese armed forces are supposed to have that responsibility and that authority. It’s uncertain how effectively they can carry that out. They are going to need some help — in fact, considerable help. And this is where I think the West, particularly the United States — I would also argue France and other countries — could help Lebanon. One of the good things is they were finally able to name a , and they have a , both of whom are opposed to Hezbollah. They want to see the ceasefire terms fully enforced. They have taken on that responsibility. It’s just the ability to do that is a bit constrained at the moment. And then finally, I will say that Hezbollah is greatly weakened within Lebanon today. They do not have anywhere near the political stature they once had. Even though they still maintain a sizable presence — not a majority, but a sizable presence — in the Lebanese parliament. There are going to be elections for the parliament, I want to say, in two years. And the hope is that if Lebanon can show some genuine progress, that the Hezbollah presence in the parliament can be even further reduced. Just as an indication, we’re seeing that the level of popularity of Hezbollah, even among Lebanese Shia, is reduced from what it has historically been. So these are important points to consider and offer a genuine opportunity for hope and progress in Lebanon. And we should take stock of that and try to capitalize on that in the interest of Lebanon and overall stability in the Middle East.

Atul Singh: Donald Trump has, I believe, two daughters — or three, probably two, if I remember correctly — and one of them is married to a Lebanese gentleman, and her father-in-law is apparently now mediating. He’s Maronite, and hopefully, if he’s involved, do you think there will be US investment and attention to Lebanon?

Gary Grappo: If he has the ear of Donald Trump, then there is a possibility. Now, I haven’t heard much about what he’s actually doing at the moment in Lebanon. He’s been given some other responsibilities, too, so I don’t know how he’s dividing his time and efforts. Nevertheless, yeah, if you have the ear of Donald Trump, obviously you’re going to be an influential person, and you’re going to be viewed as someone with influence and people will pay attention to you. We haven’t yet seen his influence demonstrated clearly in terms of his relationship with the president vis-à-vis the president’s daughter. You would think he would. So that remains to be seen.

Rising pressure in Jordan

Atul Singh: Moving on from Lebanon to Jordan, we know that the monarchy feels the heat. The King of Jordan has not been terribly enthused about Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza, turning it into a . We know that the majority of Jordan is now Palestinian. We know that Palestinians in Jordan are increasingly in solidarity with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. So from a geopolitical point of view, it seems that Jordan seems to be quite unstable. The king is not getting any younger either. So what lies ahead there?

Gary Grappo: There hasn’t been much attention given to Jordan, and that’s unfortunate, because Jordan is facing some challenges. There is this very restive Palestinian population within Jordan. Estimates vary — anywhere between 60 and 80% of the population of the country. It seems to be in a perpetual economic crisis. They don’t have the natural resource wealth that other countries in the region have, and they are dependent to a great extent on American largesse. The American aid program, if it continues, is quite substantial, and the king needs that, which is why the king — after Donald Trump’s statement about his ambitions for Gaza — was anxious to fly to Washington and meet with the president in order to maybe talk him down from this grandiose plan for Gaza. But he was quite diplomatic about it. It was not confrontational, but also made it clear that this was not something that Jordan would be able to accept. But he knows how to be deferential when he has to be to the United States — and specifically to Donald Trump, who likes that. And so he ended up leaving, having made his point, but not losing Jordan’s status in terms of how it’s viewed in Washington. But it faces continuing economic challenges, which are quite dire — whether it’s unemployment, whether it’s the level of business activity, economic growth, development and so forth. The other problem that many folks have not focused on is the security challenges that Jordan faces, coming not only from the West Bank, where you have the appearance now of these small militia groups that are causing a great deal of instability in the West Bank — confronting settlers, confronting the IDF. There’s some of that also present in Jordan. The Jordanian security forces are quite competent.

Atul Singh: [Are these groups directly tied to Hamas? Or are they more independent, acting on their own?]

Gary Grappo: Both. Some will have some kind of tie to Hamas but don’t take guidance from Hamas. Others may take some guidance from Hamas, and some are entirely independent and are operating on their own. In fact, it’s uncertain the extent to which some of them actually even coordinate their activities with one another, which is why they haven’t been all that effective. And the Israelis have been able to tamp them down as they appear but not eliminate them. The suspicion is that the Iranians may be behind some of this in terms of provoking them, maybe providing them with funds, even weapons that are smuggled in via Syria and Jordan. So it’s all kind of opaque at this point, but it presents problems for Jordan. And there are some interesting reports coming out of Iran that the Iranians view Jordan as a particularly weak point, and that if their efforts to re-establish a link between Iran and Hezbollah through Syria — and that’s not working out so well up to this point — that they may attempt to use Jordan. Now, they’ll find very stiff challenge in Jordan. The Jordanian forces are not to be trifled with. They’re very effective, very capable. They have an excellent intelligence service. They cooperate very closely with both the Americans and the Israelis. So they’ll find the going very tough, but— 

Atul Singh: [Did King Abdullah himself serve in the Jordanian Armed Forces or receive military training?]

Gary Grappo: Hm, I want to say he did, but I can’t be sure. I know his father did, but I can’t be sure about Abdullah. But I think so, be that as it—

Atul Singh: [Well, regardless, the king seems to command deep loyalty from the armed forces. That’s a critical pillar of stability in a region where rulers often take great care to ensure military loyalty.]

Gary Grappo: Absolutely. And the king enjoys their loyalty 100%, which is very important in the Middle East. And they are indeed very loyal to the king and will remain so. And so I have every reason to believe that with the continued cooperation with the Americans and the Israelis, that they’ll be able to thwart any effort on the part of the Iranians. But it’s still a challenge that the Jordanians now have to confront. But I am worried about the internal political stability because of the large Palestinian presence there. I don’t think it’ll turn terribly violent, other than maybe potential pockets in some areas. But nevertheless, it’s something I’m sure the king is very much aware of, and the Israeli and American intelligence services are also quite aware of and trying to provide the king with whatever support he may need. So it’s worth keeping an eye on developments in Jordan.

Can the country of Syria survive?

Atul Singh: Let’s talk about Syria. You’ve already mentioned that it has followed a familiar pattern. And you’ve mentioned the killings of Alawites. You’ve also mentioned the former Assad regime soldiers mounting attacks on the new regime. Of course, we know that Turkish intelligence, MIT, did support the current rulers of Syria. So what happens now with the Kurds, who represent one area and one ethnicity of Syria? The Sunnis — also not just Sunnis who are in the plains in that road going all the way from Damascus to Istanbul, formerly Constantinople — but also the Arabs living by the Tigris and Euphrates. They are different. Those peasants are different to the more urban population. And in fact, arguably, a led to their migration to the cities and triggered the Arab uprisings in Syria. And then, of course, we have the issue of the Alawites, who are along the coasts and who were by the Sunnis under none other than Selim I. And of course, when they ruled, they weren’t particularly kind and loving and peaceful either. So there is a whole cycle of violence there. Can Syria even survive as a country de jure?

Gary Grappo: That may be the ultimate question, and that question has been posed more than once. It’s not coincidence that the centrifugal sectarian forces of Lebanon mirror those almost, in some cases, identically to those in Syria. You have a multiplicity of sectarian groups — whether religious or ethnic — and it makes it very, very difficult to have a unifying identity for Syria, despite efforts by previous regimes to create one. Assad tried to create one, and it ultimately came down to oppression. If you opposed Assad, you ended up either dead or in jail. And that’s how it was enforced. I think al-Sharaa, who is the interim president — we’ll see how long the interim period is — former head of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the jihadist group that emerged victorious after the fall of Assad, he said all the right things, which new Arab leaders often do, with all these wonderful aspirations of Syrian unity and respect for its multi-identities within the country. But the default position is these groups go at one another, and certainly they go after the government. And you mentioned a few of these. But there are Druze down in the south. There are Ismailis who are closer to being Shia, actually, than the Alawites, who were represented in the person of Assad and his father. You had Turkmen up in the very northern part of the country — the remnants of the Turkish population after the fall of the Ottomans. You have the Kurds up in the northeast. And you mentioned a very good point: that the Arabs who typically settle in some of the cities stretching from Damascus in the south to Aleppo in the north have a very different perspective on things than the desert Arabs who live to the east. And also their views on Islam — Sunni Islam. They’re all Sunni, but how they view it, how strongly they adhere to it, where they tend to be more conservative or not, all of that. There are many complexions. And even in the western areas on that main highway that goes from Damascus to Hama, Homs and Aleppo, from city to city, it changes. And those are four very big cities in Syria. That all changes. You have several Christian groups that inhabit the country. And so all of these are pulling at one another. All of these are vying for influence, power, and wealth in a country which — we have to remember — has been destroyed. 80% of its economy has been effectively destroyed as a result of that 12-year civil war. And then you have another six million or so Syrians residing outside the country, who are forming actually a new identity of themselves and of Syria, whether they reside in Jordan or Turkey or Lebanon, or even in Europe. So all of these are pushing and pulling against one another, presenting enormous challenges to the government and the government’s ability to actually govern. And the default position — and that’s kind of a situation where you have the sectarian strains pulling at one another — the government brings down the hammer. That’s what Assad did. And that’s what the predecessors of the Assads did. Although they have had brief experiences with democracy, they didn’t last. They didn’t last.

Atul Singh: [So even when Syria flirted with democracy, it couldn’t overcome those deep sectarian divisions, could it?]

Gary Grappo: Yes, they even tried that! But that’s another point, because let’s bear in mind there are external players in all of that mix. This is not just Syria alone. There’s Lebanon, of course, to the west. There’s Turkey, which is probably the most significant influence today to the north. Iran has not given up on Syria and will try to re-establish its pipeline of weapons of war material and money into Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. There are folks who were greatly affected by the fall of the Assad regime and the collapse of the huge Captagon industry that was resident in Syria. Basically, that’s how the Syrian regime made money. They sell — which is the Middle Eastern equivalent almost of meth — and were making billions. And that’s how the army earned whatever funds it could to support itself. It wasn’t nearly enough, and obviously collapsed very easily. And there are others in the mix. The Iraqis are watching very, very closely what happens. This may present some opportunities for the western Arabs of Iraq to influence Syria as well. And then you have the Americans, the Europeans and the Israelis exerting their influence. The Israelis, by the way, have moved beyond the neutral territory between their borders and have now settled on — I’m talking about military forces — on actual Syrian territory. And they’re going to wait and see how things play out to ensure that whatever result does not present a threat to Israel. And so they have that new buffer zone that they have established.

Atul Singh: Yes, some of the Israelis say that there’s no way they can give it up. And they say that the Druze actually in Syria want Israeli protection. And the Druze are a great buffer zone against a potential fundamentalist Sunni regime in Damascus.

Gary Grappo: That’s 100% correct. Of course, there is a significant, relatively speaking, Druze population in Israel, which does quite well. They do not experience many of the problems that the Israeli Arabs have in Israel, and they’re quite pleased, for the most part, with their status in Israel. And of course, they have their contacts with their brothers in Syria. And it’s a natural affinity that the Druze would have toward Israel. They’re far more trusting of Israel than this new government. And they’re trying to figure it out. They’re trying to feel their way through this new government. They’re not sure exactly how much authority, how much power they will be given. And so it’s not surprising that they’re maintaining pretty close ties with Israel and will find a way to cooperate with Israel if they feel that their interests may be threatened by this new government in Damascus.

Atul Singh: Alright, you haven’t mentioned the Russians. They have Latakia and they have Tartus still, and I’m sure they are not going to disappear quietly into the sun.

Gary Grappo: You’re right. And they don’t have quite the presence they had before the fall of the Assad regime. There are supposedly ongoing negotiations to both their air base at Hmeimim and their naval base at Tartus. The naval base in particular is vitally important for the Russians, and they desperately want to hold on to that. They’ve lost all other influence in Syria today, not only because of the fall of Assad, but of course having to overextend itself in Ukraine, in that misbegotten war. And so they’re struggling. And it’s not clear that the government may necessarily want them, particularly given the close relationship between Russia today and Iran. One thing you can say about the regime in Damascus now is they don’t want the Iranians back. They most definitely don’t want Hezbollah back. And we’re already seeing fighting take place between the government forces of Syria and Hezbollah, which is a very interesting development — and from the purely selfish perspective of the Americans and Israelis — not bad at all. Now, Hezbollah is probably also allying with these pro-Assad factions in the western part of the country, which is something to be watched. And again, Atul, I just come back to all the centrifugal forces at play in Syria, which argue against, unfortunately, the best hopes of the Syrian people after the regime fell.

Egypt: the ticking time bomb

Atul Singh: Alright, let’s move on from Syria, and let’s talk about Egypt, the other neighbor of Israel. One ex-MI6 officer told me that he believes that Egypt could be the ticking time bomb in the region because of its population, because of the of the Nile Delta, and because of persistent youth unemployment and resentment against the regime. He also said that as of now, Sisi is a pretty effective ruler. The military has managed to clamp down pretty hard on the Muslim Brotherhood. And as of now, there is no immediate risk. But the structural problems persist in the economy, and the political problem exists in society, and there is such democratic deficit and a demographic time bomb that Egypt will ultimately implode. What do you say to that, Gary?

Gary Grappo: Egypt is a perfect illustration of the essential problem of the Middle East that I outlined at the outset. And that is the fact that you have unpopular governments, unaccountable to their people and fearful of their people, and maintaining authority through their security forces — essentially oppression — while at the same time the economic and social needs are not being met adequately. And there’s no recourse. And in the case of Egypt, you have very effective internal security forces. They have almost eradicated the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt — ruthlessly, too. And they packed up and left while they could. And those who couldn’t ended up either dead or in jail. And there are a number of jails that are chock-a-block full of former Muslim Brotherhood members. So for the time being, as you mentioned, the problem is contained. But the challenge remains: how do you reconcile a country — it’s the largest population by far in the Middle East — that is unable at the present time to meet the needs of those people? Education, health care, employment and so forth. The government was able to attract money to build this mammoth new capital, which by all accounts is quite impressive, outside of Cairo. Most people cannot afford to live there, only probably the top 10–15%. Even some Egyptians who work there in the government can’t afford to live there. And so that’s presenting problems for the people of Cairo especially, which is the largest city by far in Egypt, if not in the entire Middle East. And then the environmental problems that you mentioned are not going away. They are not going away. If you look at coastal Egypt, which extends considerably south up the Nile, one can foresee in 20 years and in 40 years — I’ve looked at these projections — how the salinization effectively takes over the Nile Delta and even flooding, including in the second-largest city of Alexandria. If you look at the population — Alexandria, Cairo, the Nile Delta — that is a significant percentage of the population of Egypt. I want to say at least a third, it could be even more than that. When they lose their ability to live somewhere that’s livable and also earn an income, what happens? Well, you can have internal unrest. You can have massive refugee flows. And we have seen in the example of the Syrian civil war what happens when that occurs. And my guess is many of those refugees would seek to go to either Turkey — maybe Lebanon, although there’s not much space for them there — but more than likely the southern Mediterranean countries of Europe. And so all of that certainly bears watching, and it further underscores the importance of the Sisi regime to find a way to deflate these growing pressures within his society — outside of the use of his security forces. It also argues for greater investment on the part of the Gulf countries in development in Egypt — particularly creating economic opportunity. You create economic opportunity, and then the options begin to open up. And that hasn’t materialized yet. So that’s the pressure cooker of Egypt today. The pressure is manageable, as you indicated — for now. What will it be like in 10 years? I can’t predict, and I wouldn’t even try to.

The Gulf: A regional ray of hope

Atul Singh: Alright, you’ve mentioned the Gulf countries. So let’s now talk about the Gulf. And the Gulf includes, of course, small countries like Qatar, that punch way above their weight. They have created . Dubai, which is the financial center now of the Middle East, where you now have the in some kind of entente with Israel. You also have countries like Bahrain and Oman, where you were ambassador. And then, of course, the big boys — Saudi Arabia. Now Yemen doesn’t quite come. It is an important place, because the Houthis have proved that they can de facto the Suez Canal. The Bab al-Mandab Strait is de facto unusable, and ships are going around the Cape of Good Hope, just like pre-Henry the Navigator times or Henry the Navigator times. So talk about the Gulf, now that you’ve mentioned the Gulf — and it’s a diverse picture, as listeners can already divine.

Gary Grappo: Yes. Setting aside the case of Yemen, because it’s just — yes, it occupies the same Arabian Peninsula, but it’s not like any of the other Gulf countries. The Gulf countries, unlike the rest of the region, are actually doing rather well economically and even socially. You have cradle-to-grave healthcare systems. You have respectable education systems. The level of extremism and jihadism is very, very low, if it exists at all. And to the extent that it might exist, the security forces are very effective in tamping them down. And most of them are quite active on the regional and international diplomatic scene. You mentioned the case of Qatar, but I think the two major players are Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

Atul Singh: [Yes. They really are the powerhouses of the Gulf now, especially when it comes to diplomacy.]

Gary Grappo: Exactly. Both of them are extraordinarily wealthy countries. On a per capita basis, I’d say the Emirates is probably much wealthier and Qatar wealthier than them all, and are doing lots of things on the international scene to raise their profile. I mean, just take the example of these negotiations over Ukraine. They’re taking place in Saudi Arabia! Who could have imagined such a thing five years ago? 

Atul Singh: Yeah, that’s unbelievable! The Europeans are turning and tossing in complete indignation.

Gary Grappo: Yes. So, back in the day — certainly my day, and up to maybe about five or ten years ago — when you had to do these kinds of negotiations, everyone flocked to Geneva. Now they’re going to Jeddah or to Riyadh, perhaps Doha or even Abu Dhabi. So the Gulf states are doing quite well, and we should all wish that we would find that kind of stability. Obviously, none of them is a democracy, and in all likelihood, they’re not going to be for a very, very long time. But they’re quite stable.

Atul Singh: Including, if I may interject, Saudi Arabia, because some people fear for Saudi Arabia, because Mohammed bin Salman has ruled it with a very strong hand, an iron fist, and there is fear that there might be factions brewing within his own family that might turn against him, lead even to assassination. So there is that fear, as you know, amongst intelligence circles. This is what I hear, both from the Israelis and the British.

Gary Grappo: Yes. And it’s varied from king to king. And I will say it’s certainly present now. But I think one thing that makes this situation in Saudi Arabia different today is that socially, the country is in a much better position. Saudis do not face the kind of restrictions in social interaction and activity that they used to face. When I was there, you had this very distinct segregation of the sexes and there were very few opportunities for people to engage in social activity outside of the home. That has changed! You have America’s Cup regional competition. You have had major tennis tournaments, golf tournaments — even, God help them — American professional wrestling. You’ve had rock concerts. Movie theaters are starting to proliferate. 

Atul Singh: They even have Cristiano Ronaldo with his girlfriend and many children from many different women! (laughs)

Gary Grappo: Yeah, yeah. So they’ve opened the floodgates socially, and that’s reduced a lot of the tension. And that was a brilliant move on the part of Mohammed bin Salman. On the economic side, they’ve created new opportunities. Now, I’ve been reading recently that because of the low price of oil that maybe their coffers will not be as enriched this year as in earlier years. They’re used to that. They’ve faced those times before, and they know how to deal with that. They’ll have to ratchet back their ambitions on the NEOM project in western Saudi Arabia, and they’ll manage to do that. Having said all of that, I will say that despite some concerns that I have on his positions on human rights, Mohammed bin Salman has done a good job of managing that country. The only thing now they’re waiting on is what happens to his father, King Salman. I mean, he’s probably not long for this world. Well, none of us is, but he in particular. And when he becomes the king — he’s effectively behaving like the king now, with some limits — I think we could see even more changes that will be occurring in his country. He seems to have forged respectable relations — sometimes close relations — with other countries, including in the region. He faces this nemesis down in the south, Yemen. He’s managed to extricate his forces from the actual conflict, but the conflict still continues. So he’s done, I have to say, a credible job, first and foremost in maintaining stability and mollifying the population of Saudi Arabia, as have all the other Gulf countries. Oman was facing some economic problems because of oil prices and so forth a few years ago. That’s begun to change. And we’re now seeing some impressive growth figures in Oman. The new sultan has now kind of asserted himself, and we’re seeing his unique imprint in the governance of the Sultanate. All of the Gulf countries seem to be doing very well, or at least respectably, not facing any of the challenges that the other countries in the region are. In fact, they’re seen as a potential solution, including in the conflict in Gaza, with future investment to redevelop, rebuild Gaza, if and when that conflict ends.

Iraq, Kuwait and the shadow of empires

Atul Singh: Alright, so the Gulf is a ray of hope in the region. We’ve covered a number of countries. We’ve got two big former empires left — correct me if I’m wrong, and please chime in and add if I’m missing any major country. Of course, some may say you’ve missed out Kuwait, you’ve missed out Iraq. And we’ve mentioned Iraq. We can talk about Kuwait and Iraq briefly. Perhaps you begin with them. But the two countries that come to my mind are the descendants of the Ottomans and the Safavids, the two great empires of the region. But over to you. Let’s cover Kuwait and Iraq lest we offend anyone. Iraq is very similar to Syria. Both Syria and Iraq were run by Ba’athists. Both were bloody regimes run by minorities. Syria was run by an Alawite family. And of course, we know that Iraq was run by a Sunni family from Tikrit, the Saddam Hussein . He and his boys were terrors, to say the least. Iraq is also multi-ethnic. And few people know Iraq better than Gary. So we have Kuwait and Iraq. Kuwait presumably is doing all right. Iraq — you can tell us more. And then let’s move on. Please move on to Turkey and Iran.

Gary Grappo: I’m not sure I’ll have much to contribute with respect to Turkey. I don’t follow Turkey as closely as I do the Arab countries. But with respect to Iraq, I will say, because of the weakened state of affairs in Iran, that it does present some opportunities to Iraq. It is worth noting that the Iraqi leadership has indicated fairly clearly that it wants the very limited American presence in that country to remain. Now, the various Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq have indicated that if American forces have not withdrawn by the end of this year, they will resume against that American presence, and perhaps an American presence elsewhere, including in the very eastern part of Syria. They certainly have some ability to do that. It’s going to be limited. And I think they understand that, were they to do that, they would find overwhelming response certainly from the Americans and maybe from the Iraqi government itself. It’s unclear how strongly the Iraqi leadership wants to assert its independence from Iran. The Iranians have had so much influence in that country since the departure of the Americans. But the card deck has been reshuffled, and not all the cards are held by Iran today. The Iraqis have a few more than they have had in the past. And so there is some opportunity. We’re seeing new oil investment, for example, in the country. They have resolved some of the problems that they have had previously with their own Kurds up in the north. And so Iraq has something to look forward to, some potential. But again, they are riven by the sectarian problems that have been there ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Very similar to Shia, Sunni, Kurds and to a lesser extent, Christians and other minority groups. And so that remains a very significant challenge for them, particularly given the fact that the way the Iraqi Council of Representatives is established, where seats are apportioned according to sect, various groups are locked in. And that creates a bit of a road jam in terms of maybe getting things done. And we’ve seen in the past demonstrations of younger Iraqis wanting to do away with this system of preferences — to just open it up completely and let Iraqi citizens vote for those they believe best able to serve the interest of the State of Iraq and the Iraqi people. So I would say that Iraq is still a bit of a question mark — potentially in a somewhat better position, but unclear how they might capitalize on that, particularly given some of the internal problems that they have. They are going to need significant foreign investment if they’re truly going to be able to develop their oil potential. We should also mention, given our brief discussion about the problem in Egypt — environmental problems, in the fact that the water flow in the two main rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, has been diminishing over the years. Climate change, one cause. The other is the dams that Turkey has built, and to a lesser extent, Syria. It’s mostly Turkey which has reduced the water flow that reaches Iraq. And it’s something to be aware of because agriculture was a major factor in the Iraqi economy and in the Iraqi employment scene. So all of these are challenges that the government is going to have to face. With respect to Iran, this is the real challenge — certainly for Israel, for the United States and for the West in general. The Iranian government has suffered, over the course of the past year, a series of setbacks they could never have anticipated. They overestimated their own power and influence and they grossly underestimated the capabilities of the Israelis, particularly with the support of the United States. The current state of affairs: They are not able to effectively defend themselves against an Israeli air attack. The one that occurred last October — two waves of the most advanced fighters built by the United States, the F-35, the stealth fighters — their radar systems completely failed to detect them. And as a result, the Israelis were able to carry out their attacks without restraint. They delivered all of their ordnance and on the air defenses that Iran had. And they’re not going to be replaced anytime soon. They were Russian-made, and the Russians are not going to be shipping any military equipment outside Russia.

Atul Singh: Very quick question: There is also the matter of the regime’s popularity at home, which seems to be the biggest risk. Add to that an economic crisis which is worsening, and Donald Trump has been no friend to Iran. In fact, he threw out the that Barack Obama negotiated. So the noose around Iran is likely to tighten. Speaking of internal stability, the other imperial power, Turkey, isn’t doing that well either. There are as we speak in Turkey because Ekrem İmamoğlu, the secular Republican People’s Party’s candidate, was locked up by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regime. Erdoğan has been in power forever, but still, that’s a far more democratic country than a country ruled by mullahs. And in Iran, there’s also the specter of the different minorities resenting Farsi or Fars dominance. The Baluchs don’t like it, the Azeris don’t like it, the Kurds don’t like it and so on and so forth — not to mention the Chinese Sunni minority left. So William Butler Yeats’ — “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold” — certainly seems to be the fear for the Iranian regime.

Gary Grappo: That’s the major challenge of this current regime. And that is, in addition to the external threat that they face from Israel. By the way, in those attacks that occurred in April, Israel took out one of the main factories for the manufacture of ballistic missiles. So ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s vaunted ballistic missile capability has been significantly diminished as well. And this was their final defense. This was intended to be the defense that would protect the Islamic Republic. And those defenses have been greatly weakened vis-Ă -vis any potential attack from Israel. But most especially, if the Americans were to join the Israelis, there’s no way to repel it. And they would suffer devastating losses. And you can be sure that in addition to going after what’s left of the missile forces and other defense areas, they would be going after IRGC camps and doing maximum— 

Atul Singh: Very quickly, explain IRGC to our viewers and listeners.

Gary Grappo: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is basically a military force apart from the Artesh, which is the standard military force: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. That’s the Iranian defense forces under the Ministry of Defense. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reports to the Supreme Leader. And as the name implies, they protect the Islamic Revolution, which is basically the regime. That’s their job. And they do this in many ways. They probably attract more resources on a per capita basis than does the regular military. And they certainly have the ear of the Supreme Leader the way the military forces do not, and so they are given preeminence. And they are seen as a much greater threat to Israel or even to ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s neighbors than the Iranian armed forces.

Atul Singh: So think of them like the of the Roman Empire.

Gary Grappo: That’s a good way to put it, except much larger and very ideologically committed.

Atul Singh: More fanatically. 

Gary Grappo: Yes. And it’s not just them. They have militia groups that work for them, and these are the ones who enforce domestic law in Iran, particularly with respect to religious law — and most especially when it comes to ensuring, for example, that women are covered. These are the guys going around on black motorbikes with baseball bats and nailing women who are not properly covered, enforcing Islamic law.

Atul Singh: Isn’t the use of baseball bats very American? The irony!

Gary Grappo: Yeah, we pretend not to use baseball bats as weapons, but it can be a very effective one!

Atul Singh: Al Capone used it.

Gary Grappo: Yes, yes. It’s not unknown as a very effective, bloody weapon. So these are some of the external threats that Iran is facing. And then one cannot overestimate the challenge they face internally. There is a lot of dissension there. I read some of these various polls that are taken — you don’t know how much to attribute to them — but where popularity now is at or below even 20%. They are almost universally despised — the Iranian leadership in that country — for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the appalling economic situation.

Atul Singh: And no jobs for the youth.

Gary Grappo: No jobs. The Iranian rial continues to fall and explore new depths, and there’s no way that they can shore it up. And add now Donald Trump to the mix. He has now doubled down if not tripled on his maximum pressure campaign and is really exploiting every opportunity in terms of secondary sanctions. And for those who don’t quite understand the nature of US economic sanctions: When the US sanctions a particular nation, organization, business, entity or person directly, that’s primary sanctions. A secondary sanction is going after someone who does business with any of those. So for example, Iranian exports: Iran is putting its oil onto ghost ships. They load them onto tankers in a port in Iran. They’re taken out somewhere not far offshore, out of sight. The transponders are turned off. A ghost tanker shows up — it’s not registered in any country — and they transfer the oil to the ghost tanker, sometimes mixing it with oil from a legitimate oil exporter, maybe Saudi Arabia, maybe the Emirates, maybe Oman, Kuwait, whatever. And then it goes to its final destination, where it’s offloaded. The United States has begun sanctioning the ghost ships when they find them and sanctioning the ports and the refineries who take on that illicit oil from Iran. This has made everybody involved in the illicit import and export of oil very, very wary. And for the first time, the United States is going after ports and businesses in India and in China who are not particularly excited about getting on the wrong side of the law when it comes to the Americans. They do not want to be sanctioned. It’s a death sentence. You can’t do business in dollars. And if you can’t do business in dollars — and it’ll effectively mean euros, too — what are you left with? So those sanctions are going to be very effective. In fact, Joe Biden started toward the end of his administration — I would say October, November, certainly December — and Donald Trump has screwed it down even more tightly. And we’re going to see declining exports of oil from Iran, which is a principal hard currency earner.

Atul Singh: So let me tell you a story. I ran into a former British Special Forces soldier, and he was in the smuggling business. He was earning $20,000 per night for captaining a tanker. And he would take the tanker and he would go to one of these ghost tankers — Iranian tankers — transfer the oil from the ghost tanker into whatever tanker he was captaining, and then sail and offload that oil. And basically, that earned him $20,000 per night for this high-risk operation, shall we say. (laughs) Shall we say, he has a very nice house in England right now!

Gary Grappo: And he’s exactly the kind of people that the Americans are looking for now. These are the kind of people they want to go after.

Atul Singh: So maybe he’s one of the lucky ones who got away!

Gary Grappo: Well, he got out of the business just at the right time, because I think this administration really wants to screw down the lid as tightly as possible. Now, on the positive side — as we all know, it’s been prominently reported in the news — Donald Trump has communicated to the Supreme Leader he’s willing to sit down and begin to end ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear weapons program. The Iranians would be well advised to accept that. I’m not sure they’re going to, to their detriment. This is going to greatly disappoint the people of Iran, who are only going to become more frustrated and more angry with their government. And it’s going to increase the pressure internally on that government. So here you have rising dissent in Iran. You have a growing, acute economic situation in that country which shows no signs of being able to improve itself. And then these external threats that the country faces, without the defenses it previously had expected to rely on. And so the lineup of factors against the current regime in Iran is all very negative. You’d be pretty hard-pressed to find a bright spot. Maybe Yemen. And I tell you, you’ve got to be pretty desperate to look at Yemen as a bright spot. So now they have their relationships with Russia and with China. I will say that China is not going to jeopardize its trade relationship — which is already facing difficulties with the United States — for Iran. They’re not going to do it. They will cut the rope if they have to, when it comes to Iran. Russia, on the other hand, needs Iran, and Iran needs Russia. And so that relationship will probably remain in place and likely even strengthen. But still, the various challenges facing that regime are all bad to abominable, which is why it would be a good idea to negotiate with the Americans and get this out of the way. Remove sanctions. It would change everything. And for what? All they would have to do is cease their nuclear weapons program. I don’t know whether the leadership is willing to concede that.

Atul Singh: The Ayatollah is now aging dramatically and may not last very long. So we have no idea what comes next.

Donald Trump has a real opportunity

Atul Singh: So, let’s talk about Donald Trump. You’ve mentioned him a few times. What is the new Middle East policy of his administration? And what can we expect in the next three and a half years or four years of his presidency? A little less than four years, of course. Now we are in March.

Gary Grappo: Yeah, yeah. I would say that Donald Trump inherited, with respect to the Middle East, probably the most opportunistic set of circumstances that any American president has ever had coming into office. I mean, we’ve covered the various areas of the Middle East, and in almost every respect, it’s an opportunity for the United States. I will say, however, that the Middle East is the place where American ambition goes to die. And we’ve seen that time after time after time. The last genuinely successful American adventure — I’m not sure that’s the proper word for it — in the Middle East was brokering the peace accord between Egypt and Israel. Just going back to Bill Clinton, the collapse of the Camp David in 2000, we’ve seen the efforts on the part of George Bush in Iraq that turned out to be disastrous not only for the region but for the United States. Barack Obama started out nobly, seeking to address the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, also fell on very bad times and he eventually just gave up his hands. His new Secretary of State after Hillary Clinton left, John Kerry, wanted to pick up the ball and thought, “No, he could deliver the goods,” — collapsed, frustrated again both by the Israelis and the Palestinians. And of course, Obama tried to negotiate the , which looked pretty good on paper. It wasn’t certainly a perfect agreement. He was succeeded by Donald Trump, who proceeded to tear it up about a year into his first term as president. And the situation progressed to the point where, at the end of his administration, the situation in Iran had worsened, despite his promises that by tearing up the agreement, it would improve. Don’t forget, we had maximum pressure back then, too. And it did not work to the extent that he had promised. Joe Biden seemed to be doing okay until October 7. And it just exploded — and this was not his fault, obviously. And that’s the whole problem of the Middle East; you can’t control events as President of the United States. And that situation exploded, he cast his lot with Israel, which you had to expect the United States would do. And that only worsened. But on the other hand, it allowed Israel to address other problems, namely Hezbollah. And just lucky with the collapse of the government in Syria and the weakening of Iran—

Atul Singh: Maybe it was related, because they couldn’t rely on Hezbollah this time around. It has been weakened. It was a great opportunity. And with, of course, Turkish backing — MIT backed — you have this group which is now ruling Damascus. So I think it is related to a great degree.

Gary Grappo: Oh, oh, most definitely, the collapse of Hezbollah presented a real opportunity for HTS to go after Assad. And I think there was also the recognition that the Assad regime was a house of cards, that it was not capable of defending itself. And that’s just apparent from how quickly HTS moved from the northwestern part of the country — up in Idlib — all the way down to Damascus in a matter of what, two and a half weeks? And took control of the government. And its previous backers, Hezbollah, quiet, nothing. Syria or Iran, nothing. Russia, nothing. It was Assad — all of them. And he did not have the forces. It wouldn’t have taken much, but he didn’t have that. So Donald Trump comes in as president, and all these problems that earlier presidents have had to contend with are either gone or much diminished. So he has a real opportunity here. I’m pleased that he does not want confrontation with Iran and has offered this opportunity to negotiate. But on the other hand, I don’t think he’s going to shy from a confrontation. Just as in the case of his dealing with Hamas, United States broke protocol, broke precedent, and actually had an official meeting between Americans and Hamas. Never done before, ever! …That we know of. Maybe on the intelligence side, there may have been some. But this was policy people, and they laid all the cards out for Hamas and gave them an opportunity: “Do this, it’s in your interest.” Hamas refused to do it. And now we see Israel going in without constraints and Donald Trump fully behind them, 100%. I don’t think it’ll reach the intensity that we saw perhaps a year or so ago in Gaza, simply because Hamas is not the threat that it was at that time. But it’s going to be long, it’s going to be bloody. We’ll see more loss of life, tragically, innocent life in Gaza. But I think Israel is attempting to go in for the real kill this time. I don’t think they’re going to be successful, but they will wreak havoc, certainly within Hamas and what’s left of Gaza. So you would hope that the Iranian leadership will learn something from that example. That Donald Trump tried to work with Hamas, tried to show them, there’s a way out of this, “You just got to take it.” They refused. And now they will pay a very heavy price. If Iran is listening, paying attention and can set aside some of its ideology and fanaticism, they could find a way out of their predicament. I’m not sure—

Atul Singh: So you expect the Iranian regime to fall, as a number of people do? A number of people are now predicting the end of the Iranian regime by the end of Donald Trump’s term?

Gary Grappo: Well, that would be a wonderful thing, of course. We would certainly like to see that.

Atul Singh: So you’re happy with Donald Trump on at least one thing?

Gary Grappo: No, I… but the mechanism for that downfall is unclear yet. If someone is going to make the case that there will be an internal collapse — that the internal dynamic will force the collapse — I’m very suspicious. That I think would take longer than the next four years. It could happen. And the principal argument against it is because of the commitment and dedication and power of the IRGC. They will defend it to the bitter end, and it will be a very bloody, bitter end. Not the kind of end that happened with the Shah, with the Grand Ayatollah taking off in an airplane and going somewhere, although God knows where he could go. Maybe Moscow. That seems to be the new refuge of tyrants. But that, I think, is a bit far-fetched at the time being. However, I think the clock is ticking on an eventual Israeli attack against Iran, if Iran continues to show that it’s unwilling to negotiate and moves its nuclear development program further down the road toward possible weaponization. It hasn’t done it yet, but it’s building all the infrastructure it could possibly need for it. I think the Israelis will want to capitalize before it’s too late on the vulnerability of the regime, and they will attack. And the only question that remains is: Will the Americans join them? If the Americans join them, it will be a devastating attack on the complete defense structure of Iran. And that could spell the end of the regime in Iran. So what rules after that? Because we’re not sending ground troops. Nor are the Israelis sending ground troops. So the regime collapses. Who takes over? I’ll just throw out one possibility: the IRGC. It becomes a military regime, something like we see in Egypt. They do away with a lot of the religious nonsense that was imposed by the Ayatollahs or the mullahs. They reach some kind of an understanding on their nuclear program, simply because they will have no choice. And you have a military regime, and if they can reach an agreement with the various powers with respect to their nuclear program, maybe the sanctions will be dropped and they can prosper. I think any grand ambitions for a democracy in Iran or anywhere else in the Middle East have to be dismissed, just completely. What do we want most? We want stability. That’s what we want. We want regimes to clamp down on extremist organizations, with the various militias in Iraq and in Syria and elsewhere. And with that, I think everybody — including in the Middle East — will be very, very happy, even if they don’t get to choose who governs them.

Atul Singh: On that note, Gary, we’ve spent a lot of time going over so many countries and coming up with various scenarios. It’s been a pleasure, as always, and we’ll have you back before too long.

Gary Grappo: I look forward to that, Atul. We’ll have to discuss Yemen at this time. I think it’s an interesting case study. It’s a bit of an outlier, but nevertheless is becoming a significant problem area in the Middle East. So perhaps next time we can address the challenge of Yemen.

Atul Singh: Alright, everybody, stay tuned for Yemen next time. Until then, thank you very much, Gary. See you soon.

Gary Grappo: My pleasure, Atul.

[ edited this piece.]

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Glenn Carle: Well, the structure of Atul’s and my discussion today, and thus of the world that we’re trying to address, is to begin with farce and then to discuss hope, and now to move to tragedy.

Atul Singh: It’s a great structure.

Glenn Carle: Yes. Well, such is life, I think, for us all. The Middle East has, all of our lives, been in chaos. It’s long been known by anyone who focuses on the Middle East that it’s a part of what the CIA has called for many, many years, and scholars have, the of Instability, where you have increasing existential climate and environmental factors, apart from human action: falling rainfall, increasing desertification, declining fertility of soil, an uncontrollable demographic bulge — in particular, of young males. It’s young males that create all the trouble in the world. And that’s not a facetious comment, actually. It’s flippant, but it’s also accurate. On top of which are, to use the Marxist framework, the superstructure of political institutions that have been ill-adapted prior to decolonization and since, to address any of these problems, and then being victim of the great power conflict and the pawns thereof. So there’s always been a problem, but the current issues, I think, have become even more acute, clearly because of the last two years, I guess it is already, of the Gaza war. We’ll call it the Gaza war. And before that—

Gaza conflict and the limits of military strategy

Atul Singh: October 7 is when it begins. So it’s not yet two years. October 7, the attack. 

Glenn Carle: Not yet two years, yeah, it’s a year and a half.

Atul Singh: Yeah, so Hamas attacks and then Israel responds.

Glenn Carle: Yeah. But I think the criticism hasn’t extended sufficiently to embrace the destabilizing effects on the entire Middle East of the American invasion of Iraq, which led to the collapse of Syria, much as one might have opposed and disliked the Assad government. And thus to 50% of the Syrian population of 30 million people becoming refugees, more than half of whom now reside largely in Germany, leading to the problems that we just touched upon, at least indirectly, before.

Atul Singh: Glenn, sorry, they reside elsewhere. They reside in Lebanon, they reside in Turkey and, of course, some of them have gone all the way to Germany. So not all of them are in Germany. Half of them are out of the country.

Glenn Carle: No, but about five million of them are in Germany and Europe. Yeah, five of the 12, I think. So, let’s talk about specifically Gaza, and then Syria and then Turkey. And if you talk about Gaza, that means talking about Israel. And I’ll have to be quick. Netanyahu’s policy has been to destroy Hamas. The problem he is confronted, although many deny and disagree with, is the same problem that the United States faced in the way it framed, defined and understood the “War on Terror” — which is, of course, an incoherent concept to begin with. I mean, how do you fight a war against terror? Well, we fought a war against a specific organization or organizations, thinking that there could be, in military terms in the United States, a kinetic — which means a lethal — solution, by killing enough people and breaking up an institution or an organization. It’s true we did largely destroy al-Qaeda and kill a lot of people. But you don’t kill a sociological problem or a political dispute almost ever by using a conventional military. Military strategists and trainers, for all of my adult life — all of our adult lives — have been concerned about the problems of asymmetric warfare. Why did the United States lose in Vietnam? Why did Britain lose in what became the United States? And why do I think Israel has created an unsolvable problem for itself in Gaza? You can’t really eliminate the frustrations of the Palestinians and thus their enduring hostility and actions against Israel, by killing Hamas. And you can’t completely kill Hamas as it is. Gaza has been almost literally destroyed. Dozens of thousands of people have been killed, and Hamas remains extant. The consequences there are that, I think, really, Israel clearly has won a short-term victory and almost certainly will win a medium-term victory. Strategically, existentially, Israel was not threatened prior to October 7 or on October 7, and hasn’t been and will not be threatened now. Also not receiving, I think, adequate attention is what’s happening in the West Bank. Gaza has been destroyed, Hamas has been seriously weakened, Israel’s strategic security is, in some ways, unchanged because they were not existentially threatened prior to the beginning of the Gaza war.

West Bank, demographics and internal Israeli politics

Glenn Carle: But on the West Bank, the same thing is happening, and there are three ways forward: You can expel all of the Palestinians, which is an increasingly plausible solution that the far right of Israel is advocating, both from Gaza and, progressively de facto, from the West Bank.

Atul Singh: You can send the Palestinians from Gaza to Egypt, and you send the Palestinians from West Bank to Jordan, and voilà! We don’t have a problem. That is the thinking of the Israeli far right.

Glenn Carle: Exactly. And medium-term, which is years in duration — what’s medium-term, five years? Ten? Israel will be fine. But that doesn’t address the enduring enmity and hatred that existed before, and that probably guarantees — what it does likely do is destabilize Egypt and Lebanon and Jordan in ways that, long-term, will make the region even more unstable than it is now. And just as Lebanon has been destroyed and Iraq was largely fractured, and Syria has been destroyed, so you might see an exacerbation of all of those tendencies long-term. From the success of the right wing of Israel and the Israeli army to destroy, in many ways, the operational capabilities of Hamas in Gaza and eliminate the Palestinian populations. Also linked to that and Israel is that demographically, you will, in the medium- to long-term future — not ten years, fifteen — have a majority of the Israeli population that is actually Muslim. So Israel has a choice then: Is it a democracy, or is it a Jewish oligarchy? And that’s—

Atul Singh: Very quickly, that’s because 20% of Israel is Palestinian, and they are Israeli citizens. They are not in the West Bank, they are not in Gaza. They are in Israel. And when Glenn is talking about, in the long run, you could have them as a majority, it’s because their birth rates are higher than Jewish birth rates. Although the ultra-Orthodox might just compete with them and make sure that Israel remains Jewish. But the secular Israelis who form the tip of the spear of the Israeli state, they are the ones who serve in Mossad, in Sayeret Matkal, in Shin Bet, in their elite units, whether it’s Yahalom or whatever. They are the ones who are secular, do not generally have many children. Therefore, they are electorally, progressively weaker and weaker. And they are the ones under threat in some ways, because, as we have just observed. within Israel, something big happened. First, the Israeli cabinet decided to Ronen Bar, the head of Shin Bet. That is Israel’s internal intelligence agency. And everyone hears about Mossad, but they should know about Shin Bet. Shin Bet is an extraordinary organization. Shin Bet has some extraordinary officers.

Glenn Carle: The domestic intelligence service. Israel’s FBI.

Atul Singh: Exactly. Eh, a little different. FBI does investigation, Shin Bet does intelligence.

Glenn Carle: Don’t go into the weeds, we’re going to run out of time.

Atul Singh: Yeah. We’ll extend the time this time a little bit because of the ground we have to cover. But Ronen Bar joined the Israeli Defense Forces in 1984. He was an officer in Sayeret Matkal. He was head of Shin Bet’s Operations Division. He became the head of Shin Bet. And he’s a highly educated chap, he’s got aquiline looks, he’s ridiculously fit and good-looking. I’m told by friends who know him that he is a top man. And for the Israeli cabinet to just kick him out — well, kicking out the Shin Bet chief is obviously a political prerogative, but there is due process. And there’s not just the law, but there is convention, there is a certain tenor. And it was done under a cloud. Why? Because there is, as most people who follow Israel closely — and as I was informed this morning by some Israeli friends — the Qatari connection , which is a corruption scandal engulfing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Good old Bibi, that’s his nickname. Now, what has happened is that the nearest political advisors of Bibi were involved in paid jobs promoting the interests of the Government of Qatar. Now, why is this a bit iffy? It’s because Qatar was spending $15 million — or a pretty significant figure — to Hamas, and that’s where the leaders of Hamas stay. And in March 2025, Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar affirmed that the agency was investigating the affair. Now, this is a complex and multifaceted affair, as he acknowledged. And Ronen Bar was then kicked out whilst he’s investigating corruption which involves the Prime Minister. Now the Israeli Supreme Court has stepped in. The Israeli Supreme Court had said, “Hang on a minute, hang on a minute! You can’t just do this!” So they’ve issued an injunction to prevent Bar from being fired by Bibi. So what is happening in Israel is not just the conflict with Gaza, not just the tensions in the West Bank, not just the great successes in Lebanon. What is happening in Israel is a fundamental pull and push on the institutions of the state. It is indubitably true that a lot of Israelis find these institutions elitist, because the people who head Shin Bet, the people who head Mossad, the people who go into Sayeret Matkal tend to be officers who perform very well. Often, they may be from better-educated families. They’re almost invariably secular so far and the religious Jews who have the vote say, “Hang on a minute.” It’s a bit like people turning against elites everywhere and saying, “You can’t tell us what to do.” The difference between Israel and other societies is that this is a society which is, in some ways, a Spartan state. It has hostile neighbors. In many ways, as an MI6 friend said, it’s a modern-day Crusader state amongst a sea of hostile shores. And so if you’re playing footsie with the tip of your spear, with the sword in your scabbard, you’re playing with fire. And that is the fundamental tension within the Israeli society. And of course, there are demonstrations. Of course, people don’t like this. And people say that Bibi Netanyahu needs war to avoid scrutiny, and Bibi Netanyahu does not want any scrutiny. And by kicking out Ronen Bar, he’s postponing the inevitable. That may be true, may not be true. He’s certainly an impressive leader, he has more than nine lives, he’s much more resourceful than a cat. He’s cobbled together one coalition after another. And in democracy, things can get messy. But this is getting really, really, really messy. Of course, remember— Yes, sir.

Polarization and risks of civil unrest in Israel

Glenn Carle: I think the fundamental dynamic that you’re describing, and consequence of the Gaza crisis and the war is: Wars always polarize. And Israeli society is struggling with the ascendancy of its religious far right. So many times I’ve heard — probably many of us have, but certainly I did in Israel — that colleagues of mine or people of whom I had heard were denigrated and characterized by other Israelis as, “Oh, well, he’s not actually Jewish.” Why? Because he was a secular, reformed Jew, as opposed to an ultra-Orthodox. So we’re seeing this polarization.

Atul Singh: Yeah, and you’re right. On the one hand, thousands are rallying for a hostage deal, while there are others who say there can be no deal and we have to go hammer and tongs and destroy Hamas. So you’re absolutely right. The polarization is intense.

Glenn Carle: And I think the consequences are that Netanyahu — aligned with the far right in Israel — has defined the policy and will come to shape the nature of the policies in Gaza and the West Bank for the foreseeable future, and continue the polarization of Israel. And the consequences are much larger than in Israel, though. We’ll see these statements have contributed to— 

Atul Singh: Sorry, carry on. There’s just an anecdote I want to put in when you finish. (laughs)

Glenn Carle: —Have contributed to the cataclysmic collapse of Syria. I won’t go into all the details, and I don’t think I’m capable of going into all the details — there are so many factions involved — but the larger point is that the changes… Ahmed al-Sharaa is the new leader of Syria, someone who’d been relatively briefly a member of what was called al-Qaeda — it wasn’t actually al-Qaeda — but a in Syria, now rehabilitated because he, I think, really was a religious nationalist opponent of the secular regime of Assad. In any event, we now see growing stresses in an already destroyed society, which is Syria. And that will have consequences well beyond Syria itself, as it already has, as we touched upon in Germany.

Atul Singh: Very quickly, to add to this polarization: The polarization in Israel is so intense — going back to Israel — that there are newspaper reports of Ben-Gvir, an Israeli far-right minister, and the Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar almost having a physical confrontation, a . And two or three of Israel’s Special Operations officers told me their biggest fear in Israel is civil war. And they just have to look across the border, just across the Golan Heights, to see the civil war going on in Syria. Now, Glenn talked about broad context, and I’ll just give you one tiny detail. Well, many of the Alawites were loyal to the Assad dynasty, and by the end, it was really a sectarian dynastic regime. It began as a Ba’athist socialist regime which tried to create some idea of a secular Syria. But by the end, it was a sectarian regime — Alawites supporting the Assad dynasties, backed by Iran, a Shia power in the region, and of course, supported by Russia. And some of the Alawite officers loyal to Assad rebelled. The rebellion was forces that are now in charge in Damascus put the rebellion down and then conducted vendetta, killing many Alawites. And remember, the Alawite–Sunni schism goes back to Selim I, when he was them down in 1520 or something like that. And the Shia–Sunni divide is centuries old. So that can always flare up in the region. As Glenn said, that has potential far beyond Syria’s borders.

Syrian Collapse and Turkey’s authoritarian turn

Glenn Carle: I think that’s the relevant concern for us today, or now. Of the roughly 25 million Syrians, 12 million are refugees or more — 5.4 million of whom are in Turkey and Germany and elsewhere. To give it one little sense of the catastrophe that is overflowing and affecting Europe and everywhere else. 72% of Syrians — the entire country — can only literally survive because of foreign aid, food aid and others. Half of all of the hospitals in the entire country no longer function. So the consequence has been not just refugees, but in part, the rise of the AfD, the neo-Nazi far right in Germany and elsewhere. This has both destabilized and empowered Turkey, which is the last thing I’ll talk about. Now, we’ve all heard, I think, about the big headline of the moment, which is that the Erdoğan government has the mayor of Istanbul, who was the likely opponent of Erdoğan in the upcoming presidential election. This is just the continuation of the increasing totalitarian bent of the Erdoğan government and the erosion and destruction — one hopes, not ultimately — of the secular Turkish democracy.

Atul Singh: By the way, the mayor’s name is Ekrem Ä°mamoÄźlu, and he has been a decent mayor. As, indeed — remember — Recep Tayyip ErdoÄźan was. He began as mayor of Istanbul, and he did a decent job, which is why he became prime ministerial candidate. And then, of course, he the constitution and then he became president. And then, of course, in his presidential terms, many terms, he’s built Aksaray the famous 1,000-room exactly on the spot where Mustafa Kemal AtatĂĽrk’s hunting lodge once stood. So, jokingly, many of my Turkish friends call him Sultan Recep Tayyip ErdoÄźan because he’s literally looking back—Ěý

Glenn Carle: He clearly aspires to that level of centralized control.

Atul Singh: Indeed. One quick thing, Glenn — I’ll add and then cede the floor to you. He looks back to the Ottoman Empire for inspiration. He wants to rekindle the Ottoman heritage. He wants Turkey to be a leader of the Muslim world, especially the Sunni world. He speaks out about Palestine and Kashmir. He definitely wants to intervene in neighboring countries, and in Syria, he has. So he’s very much neo-Ottoman. Over to you, Glenn.

Glenn Carle: Yeah. Well, all of us, every country and society, looks to its moment of greatest glory. So the Greeks still think that Pericles is ruling Athens, and the British think that Queen Victoria commands the sun. And the Americans think that we have just stormed Omaha Beach in France. And the Turks think that Suleiman the Great is building more mosques. The consequence of the arrest — and I would argue, in part because of the stresses on everywhere, Turkey in this instance, of what’s happening in the Middle East — are the largest demonstrations in over a decade. And I am pessimistic, because whoever controls the guns tends to win the arguments in a demonstration. And the changes of government in Turkey, which haven’t been peaceful, have come largely from the military, and the military seems to be well under the control of ErdoÄźan at present. What are the consequences larger than this, I would say? As I mentioned, the further cementing of ErdoÄźan’s near-dictatorship. The Middle East is being largely ignored by this administration. The Trump administration said — this is a paraphrase, but this is literally what came out of the White House: “Well, human rights are nice, but we have really nothing to say about the domestic affairs of Turkey,” which means that — also, the US administration will not just turn a blind eye to but will abet whatever the Israeli government does with regard to the Palestinians in the Middle East. And then this has implications also for what the US will do or won’t, and Israel will do or won’t towards Iran, which will affect the entire Middle East, which makes it more likely that with all this instability, Iran will seek a nuclear weapon. And it also is more likely that ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s government could collapse from internal opposition or external stress, which could well be military, by Iran or the US. 

Atul Singh: Or a combination of the two.

Glenn Carle: And the destruction of the current Iranian regime could be a good thing. But any radical change is going to be terribly painful for many, many millions of people, however it plays out. And so the Middle East is in probably the greatest turmoil, even if it’s not immediately apparent, of any time in recent decades.

Atul Singh: Alright, on that note, we’ve come well past our allotted hour. It was lovely to have you all here for the March edition of FO° Exclusive. We will see you next month. Until then, be safe. Greetings, wherever in the world you happen to be.

Glenn Carle: Salaam.

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The Islamic Republic of Iran has a mission to spread Shi’ism in the Middle East, which is why it created the . Their greater goal is to destroy the state of Israel.

An unintended consequence of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was that Iran became a force in Iraqi politics due to democratic elections. The Shia of Iraq and Iran may be very different, but they’re both influenced by Iran.

Iran is connected to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. These three nations were key elements in the creation of the Shia Crescent that encircles Israel with pro-Iranian, Shia-dominated powers. Syria and Lebanon became the main targets for Iranian influence. The Iranians invested heavily in Syria, even sending citizens there — according to rumors, up to 800,000 earned Syrian citizenship. The current and upcoming rulers in Damascus won’t tolerate this for long.

Crushing defeats

Iran turned Syria’s Qalamoun area, the mountains on the Syrian–Lebanese border, into a . Here, long-range missiles were smuggled to the Lebanese Shia paramilitary group, Hezbollah.

Fed up with the arms-dealing, Israel waged a low-intensity war with Syria in 2012. Syria became a major place of Iranian investment, on top of their efforts in Iraq and Lebanon. They sent thousands to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the civil war — not just Shia Iranians, but also people from Afghanistan and other Shia communities. Due to their dire economy, they were investing money they didn’t have, estimated at tens of of dollars.

The downfall of the Assad regime in December 2024 is a disaster for Iranian plans to create the Shia Crescent around Israel. Israeli Hezbollah in Lebanon after 11 months of Lebanese aggression. This defeat was far more devastating than their previous in the 2006 .

The Iranian defeat is resounding. There were elements in Syria who opposed the Iranian involvement and were ready to support Israeli military efforts. The Iranian presence in Syria even caused a rift within the Assad clan. Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s younger brother, was in ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s pocket, while Bashar had his own reservations. Before that, Russia did not like the Iranian involvement, as it viewed Iran as competition to be the dominant force in Syria.

The Russians allowed Israeli activities in Syria, but these were always targeted at the Iranians. The Syrians will not accept a Turkish occupation by President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄźan. The Turks will face problems in Syria, especially in Kurdish areas.

What will happen now?

The Syrians will not allow domination by Sunni-run Turkey. This is a historic rivalry. Iran wanted to use Syria against Israel, but failed.

Will Iran realistically assess the cost-benefit? Will they still be committed to destroying Israel? Or will they realize they’re now under siege and need to be careful?

This could lead to two options: One, they minimize their involvement in Syria and Lebanon. But then, they’ll feel under siege. Two, they speed up their nuclear program to deal with the perceived danger. This might pressure US President Donald Trump to talk to the Iranians. The situation could create conditions for a dialogue, though they would have to make concessions.

[ edited this piece.]

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Leftist observers have long characterized several entities as the “.” This group includes Iran, Iraq’s militia groups, Assad’s Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and more recently Gaza’s Hamas and Yemen’s Ansar Allah (a.k.a. “the Houthis”). They are seen as a collective counterweight to the American Empire’s regional domination. This domination is enforced via Israeli military strength and the Gulf states’ financial heft.

A failed response to Gaza

There is some geopolitical truth to that characterization. While one can debate the strategic wisdom of Hamas’ October 7 attack, many argue it was inevitable. Few options were left available due to the unending of Gaza, the stifling of all diplomatic and non-violent means to resist occupation and expulsion and the of the Palestinians throughout the region, particularly by Gulf monarchies.

Once fighting started in Gaza, feckless Arab regimes did not offer anything useful to the Palestinian resistance — indeed, several continue to with the Israeli state. Yes, Hezbollah launched an effective against the Zionist regime and imposed real costs on Israel’s ongoing aggression against Gaza, as did Yemen’s Ansar Allah. Such responses further highlighted the ineffectual, even hypocritical, complaints lodged by Arab autocrats acting as US allies throughout the region.

However, how much support did Iran, the supposed anchor of this Axis of Resistance, actually offer Palestinians? In their tit-for-tat with the Israelis, Iran demonstrated prowess with ballistic missile technology sufficient to potentially overwhelm Israeli air defenses and trigger catastrophic military and economic losses. But the Iranian regime was not about to go to war for Palestine. Their responses were calibrated to save face, while re-establishing a limited measure of deterrence.

A harsh truth is that the Iranian regime has often treated its Arab allies as kindling, using them to generate smokescreens when necessary. They do this to deflect American and Israeli military designs against their sovereignty. Iran deftly the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq to tie down the US military for years, likely preventing an American attack on Iran under George W. Bush. Similarly, the Iranian regime has long Hezbollah for geopolitical leverage, as they are a useful mercenary force, no matter the expense to broader Lebanese society.

​​±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s attempt to relieve Israeli military pressure on Gaza this past year stands in glaring contrast to the rest of the Arab and Islamic world’s inaction at the state level. Meanwhile, the people of Lebanon, particularly southern Lebanon, can take pride in their support for Gaza.

±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s role in the region

At the same time, is it fair that Hezbollah has operated effectively inside the Lebanese state, in turn preventing Lebanon from being governed normally? Is it right that as Lebanon’s economy collapsed, its politics remain gridlocked by Hezbollah? Is it right that no one was held when the port of Beirut suffered a nuclear-sized because fertilizer was carelessly left in a warehouse for months by Hezbollah, which runs the ports and siphons off tax revenues?

While ±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s militia has proven quite effective in fighting Israel, its political strategy has remained a failure. How strong can Hezbollah be if it continues to paralyze Lebanon? When push came to shove, the group largely chose to answer to ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) rather than the people of Lebanon.

Once the current dystopian conflict subsides, Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon’s south could be reorganized into a national guard or territorial army to defend the country from future Israeli invasions. If Lebanon were a functioning state with a functioning military, that state might also choose to uphold international law and intervene in an attempt to stop the genocide in Gaza — but such a decision belongs to Beirut, not Tehran.

Around the beginning of the Syrian revolution, Arab militia leaders faced a similar choice. Khaled Mashal, the Hamas leader, and Hassan Nasrallah, the now-departed leader of Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad and encouraged him to moderate and compromise with the still peaceful demonstrators. Assad thundered back, in effect stating, “it’s my way or the highway,” demanding they support his crackdown.

On behalf of Hamas, Mashal to obey, promptly moving Hamas’ main office from Damascus to Qatar, where it remains today. As a result, Hamas remained estranged from ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s “Axis of Resistance” coalition for years afterward.

In contradiction, Nasrallah Hezbollah into a needless civil war in Syria, massacring thousands in , , around and elsewhere. ±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s intervention even included the use of in Madaya and Zabadani — where militia members on loan to the Assad regime laid siege to opposition enclaves and mocked their starvation with social media posts of banquets boasting the hashtag “in solidarity with Madaya.”

Before the rebel victory, Hezbollah was admired among both Sunni and Shia populations throughout the Arab world. Still, their intervention on behalf of this ruthless sectarian regime poisoned relations between different religious and ethnic groups for years. Only in recent years did those divisions begin to ease, largely due to how destructive they were throughout the region.

Syria’s past, present and future

As long as Assad was in power, no path forward was open for Syria. He devastated the country instead of relinquishing any control. At least half a million Syrians in the process. Before Assad’s fall, as many as half of all Syrians were — about 12 million in total — scattered throughout the country, Turkey, Germany and multiple other safe havens.

Syria was reduced to a bankrupt narco-state, led by a regime financed by Captagon on international drug markets. Bashar al-Assad’s regime never Israel directly. Syria’s military stopped fighting for its external defense decades ago, including for the liberation of occupied Golan. Like every other Arab military, Syria’s existed only to oppress its own population. That ended when its soldiers voted with their feet and put an end to the oppression.

What now? The Assad regime was brutal and useless to everyone, including Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. From Syria’s perspective, external powers such as Turkey, Russia, Iran, Israel and the United States will happily manipulate or even dismember Syria for their own state or imperial interests. Israel has already underscored that point over the past few days, seizing several villages in Golan’s Mt. Hermon as a “buffer zone” and mounting a punishing new bombing campaign.

However, Syria’s people have agency. Against all expectations and after a lengthy civil war, they recently shattered this brutal regime with astonishing speed, without incurring massive civilian casualties and without significant external support. They put an end to the Iranian regime’s cynical game of defending their own interests in Syria while using Arabs as cannon fodder. By liberating Syria, they shattered the Arab republican dictatorship model of governance.

For the first time in decades, the people of Syria have a chance for a future. Syrians have long had to emigrate abroad to succeed, and many who did so made remarkable achievements. Now, they have an opportunity to build a country that can harness the talents of its people. That alone is worth celebrating today and fighting for tomorrow — but for this liberation to succeed, external powers must exercise restraint and let the Syrian people chart their own future.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The Assad regime recently collapsed after opposition groups like (HTS) and (SNF), by Turkey, launched a military push. At the same time, Russia and Iran this support for Assad. This shift offers a glimmer of hope for a nation scarred by war and oppression.Ěý

With the fall of the Assad regime, Syria has effectively come under the de facto influence of Turkey and Israel. The October 7 events, when Hamas launched a large-scale attack on Israel, further weakened Iran’s and its strategic project aimed at undermining Israel, delivering a significant blow to Iran. The attack triggered a full-scale war, leading to devastating Israeli retaliatory strikes on Gaza and escalating regional tensions.

Additionally, Russia anchored its foothold in the Middle East through a close alliance with the Assad regime and a naval base in Latakia, which gave it access to the Mediterranean. This allowed Russia to project power in the region and counter Western influence directly. The loss of this strategic leverage has diminished Russia’s ability to maintain a strong presence and shape events in the Middle East. 

Turkey and Israel stand to benefit from this new dynamic. They will use their influence to combat terrorist organizations within Syrian borders.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: savior or threat?

Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, established the Assad regime in 1971 and entrenched a model of authoritarian rule centered on the and the military security apparatus. Hafez consolidated power through ruthless suppression. He favored sectarian divisions and had an extensive patronage network. Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000. He initially offered hope for reform but quickly reverted to autocracy. The authorities brutally cracked down on the 2011 Arab Spring protests. The war plunged Syria into a devastating civil war. Assad’s regime, backed by Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, clung to power through scorched-earth tactics. They massively chemical weapons and a campaign of mass terror.

At the forefront of the opposition is HTS. It traces back to al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate that emerged in 2012 during the early years of the Syrian conflict. Initially committed to global jihad, the group rebranded itself as HTS in 2017 under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. It declared a break from al-Qaeda and positioned itself as a nationalist force focused on Syria’s liberation.

Over the years, HTS has transitioned from a shadowy jihadist group to the dominant force in Syria’s northwest. It achieved a level of military and administrative control unmatched by other opposition factions. Its leadership a commitment to inclusive governance and minority rights, but its history of draconian social policies and sectarian leanings undermines these assertions.

Despite its pivotal role in Assad’s ouster, HTS faces challenges in gaining legitimacy. Turkey, the United States and other international actors still designate it as a terrorist organization. This limits HTS’s ability to secure external support. Allegations of corruption, intimidation and arbitrary detention have marred its governance in areas under its control. Moreover, its Islamist orientation raises alarms about the safety of Syria’s minority communities, particularly Alawites and Christians.

The fall of Assad is a blow to Iran and Russia’s regional ambitions

Iran’s intervention in Syria’s civil war after the Arab Spring was critical in sustaining the Assad regime. Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s (IRGC), was instrumental in Iran’s involvement. Soleimani a network of militias, including Hezbollah from Lebanon and other Shiite paramilitary groups from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, to bolster Assad’s forces. His maneuvers in battles, such as the recapture of Aleppo in 2016, not only saved Assad’s government but also cemented ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s influence in Syria.

Iran billions of dollars in Syria, financing military operations and rebuilding infrastructure in areas under Assad’s control. This financial and material backing was coupled with an extensive military presence, including IRGC forces, advisors and bases across Syria. Syria became a conduit for Iranian support to Hezbollah, enabling Tehran to advanced weaponry, including missiles and drones, to its Lebanese proxy. Establishing weapons factories and logistical hubs in Syrian territory allowed Iran to bypass international sanctions and enhance ±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s military capabilities.

The fall of Assad’s regime dismantled the axis of resistance that Tehran painstakingly built. Following the October 7 escalation and the broader war with Israel, Hamas suffered devastating losses, and its leadership, including and , was eliminated. Hezbollah, already stretched thin from years of engagement in Syria, faced intensified Israeli retaliation that crippled its command structure. During this period, Israel Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, dealing a symbolic and operational blow to the group.

Moqtada-al Sadr, a Shiite cleric and leader of the in Iraq, to stand by Assad during his downfall, underscoring Tehran’s waning influence, even among its Shiite allies. Among ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s loyal partners, only the in Yemen remains severely curtailing ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s ability to project power in the region.

Now, Iran faces the prospect of direct confrontation with Israel, which has set its on Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure. The fall of Assad underscores ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s growing vulnerability. Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, may confront the possibility that it could be the next target in a reshaped Middle East dominated by Israeli and Turkish influence.

Russia’s intervention in Syria, beginning in 2015, was a for the Assad regime. Vladimir Putin aimed to stabilize Assad’s rule and preserve Moscow’s influence in the Middle East by deploying airpower and special forces. Russian military support, including the bombing campaigns in Aleppo and Idlib, turned the tide of the war in Assad’s favor. Putin also leveraged diplomatic efforts, such as the Astana peace talks, to secure Russia’s position as a key power broker in the conflict.

Syria was more than an ally for Russia — it was a . The naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Hmeimim allowed Moscow to project power into the Mediterranean to counterbalance NATO’s presence.

Syria represented a symbolic victory for Putin’s broader geopolitical strategy. It demonstrated Russia’s resurgence as a global power capable of challenging the West, especially after the annexation of Crimea and tensions in Ukraine.

The collapse of Assad’s regime undermines Russia’s ambitions in the region. The loss of its military bases jeopardizes Moscow’s ability to counterbalance NATO and maintain a foothold in the Mediterranean.

Alexander Dugin, known as Putin’s “brain,” has that the fall of Assad symbolizes a collapse of Moscow’s ability to shape outcomes in the Middle East. This failure, he argues, is a profound setback for Putin’s vision of a multipolar world where Russia stands as a counterweight to Western dominance.

Moreover, the downfall of the Assad regime questions Russia’s reliability as an ally. It parallels the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s subsequent rise to power. Just as the chaotic exit from Kabul signaled a blow to American credibility, Assad’s fall marks a significant setback for Russia’s regional strategy. For Putin, the challenge now is twofold: to salvage Russia’s position in the Middle East and to manage the domestic fallout from another costly foreign venture that failed.

Turkey and Israel as Syria’s de facto decision-makers

Before Bashar al-Assad came to power, Israel’s relationship with Syria was full of hostility and conflict. Syria, under Hafez al-Assad, Hezbollah in Lebanon and harbored Palestinian militant organizations. Israel captured the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War in 1967, and it has remained a focal point of tension. Syria demands its return, while Israel prioritizes its strategic importance for security.

The 1990s saw limited attempts at peace negotiations, including the and subsequent talks mediated by the US. However, these efforts failed to yield a breakthrough due to mutual distrust and irreconcilable differences over the Golan Heights.

When Bashar al-Assad assumed power, hopes for reform and improved relations with Israel were quickly dashed. Assad’s regime deepened its alliance with Iran. He continued providing support to Hezbollah. Then, the Syrian Civil War entrenched hostility as Assad’s government accused Israel of backing rebel factions.

Israel primarily focused its involvement in the Syrian conflict on countering Iranian influence and preventing the transfer of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) targeted Iranian bases, arms depots, and convoys. IDF has to hundreds of strikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah positions to prevent arms transfers and deter threats near its borders.Ěý

With the fall of the Asad regime, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has it as a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics. It marks a continuation of Israel’s strategic policies aimed at dismantling terrorist organizations and curbing ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s influence in the region. Netanyahu’s celebration is not merely symbolic; it underscores Israel’s proactive stance in shaping the Middle East. Israel sends a clear message that it will not tolerate any actor that threatens its sovereignty or regional stability.

Netanyahu explicitly the new leaders of Syria that they must not emulate Assad’s policies, cautioning that they would face the same fate if they did. Israel’s post-Assad policies should include:

• Preventing the Iranian regime’s entrenchment.
• Securing the Golan Heights to prevent cross-border attacks.
• Collaborating with international partners, especially Turkey, to support a political solution that prioritizes regional security and limits the resurgence of extremist factions.

Turkey has experienced shifting dynamics in its relationship with the Assad regime. Initially, Ankara and Damascus shared a pragmatic relationship during the late 1990s and early 2000s, as both countries sought to resolve border disputes and enhance economic ties. , which led to Syria expelling the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — designated as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, Turkey and Israel — leader Abdullah Ă–calan exemplified this period of cooperation. However, the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 caused a significant rift. President ErdoÄźan openly opposed Assad’s brutal crackdown on protesters and began supporting opposition groups.

Turkey became a key supporter of SNF to bolster their fight against Assad. Turkey’s military operations, such as , and , were aimed at establishing a buffer zone along its southern border. These operations targeted ISIS and Kurdish terrorist organizations. They also indirectly benefited factions such as HTS, which capitalized on the chaos to expand their influence in northern Syria.

In the post-Assad era, Turkey’s ambition to expand its regional influence is evident in its efforts to position itself as a key power broker in Syria. Alongside Israel to shape the postwar order, Turkey has established de facto Turkish-administered zones in northern Syria, complete with Turkish schools, hospitals, and currency.

As a NATO member, Turkey’s active role in Syria enhances the alliance’s presence in the Middle East as it counters Russian and Iranian influence. Ankara’s strategic location and military capabilities make it a pivotal regional player. Turkey aligns its interests with those of NATO while pursuing its national objectives.

Neutralizing Kurdish threats and managing the refugee crisis are central to Ankara’s agenda. Turkey has committed to continued operations aimed at dismantling Kurdish terrorist organizations to ensure that they do not exploit the post-Assad vacuum to establish a foothold near its borders. 

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The US emerged as the global superpower thanks to World War II. In 1945, Europe was in ruins. The war caused widespread destruction in Europe because of the bombing of cities and factories. European powers lost millions of people in the war. Being far from Europe and Japan, the incurred a very low rate of civilian casualties. There was almost no destruction of US infrastructure, with the Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii, as a notable exception. Naturally, the US emerged as the leader of the West. Although the Soviet Union was a US ally during the war, it competed with the US for global hegemony following the Allied victory, a period referred to as the Cold War.

During the Cold War, the US and its Western allies engaged in a brutal global competition with the Soviets and other communist states. Notable confrontations between these two power centers included the Korean War (1950–1953), the Vietnam War (1955–1975) and the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989). Using Soviet influence as an excuse, the US intervened in many countries, including Iran. At the behest of the UK, the US overthrew the first democratically elected government of Iran. Only 26 years after the infamous 1953 coup, the Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah and established ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s independence from both the US and the UK.

The US tacitly supported European imperial and colonial powers when they committed some of the worst genocides in human history. The most notable include the horrendous atrocities committed in Congo, Kenya and Algeria.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the world looked forward to years of peace and prosperity. Although the US proclaimed that this new era was one of peace, it began with the Rwandan Genocide (1994), the Bosnian Genocide (1995), to the present day with the US-backed genocide against Palestinians and the takeover of Syria by al-Qaeda’s affiliates.

The of the Soviet Union did not make the world more peaceful; it worsened it under unilateral US leadership. The fall produced a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. In particular, it released nationalistic, ethical, cultural and self-determination movements in the former Soviet states. It led to social unrest, organized crime, terrorism and corruption. The ripple effects of the fall will “continue to be felt for some time yet.”

After the Soviets were gone, the US no longer faced any serious challenges to its global hegemony. However, the US considered ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s independence from US influence a challenge to its global domination and has supported efforts to undermine the Islamic Republic of Iran. Presently, the US efforts that have unseated Assad of Syria were meant to undermine ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s dominance in the region. 

Recently, reporters saw US President Joe Biden leaving a bookstore with a copy of The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine by Rashid Khalidi in his hand. The book describes the Palestinian struggle for their homeland. “Settler-colonial confrontations with indigenous peoples have only ended in one of three ways: with the elimination or full subjugation of the native population, as in North America; with the defeat and expulsion of the colonizer, as in Algeria, which is extremely rare; or with the abandonment of colonial supremacy, in the context of compromise and reconciliation, as in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Ireland,” Khalidi writes. 

Hopefully, Biden will read this book and realize that instigating the war in Ukraine, enabling Israel’s genocide against Palestinians and aiding al-Qaeda affiliates are immoral.

The US’s prestige is falling worldwide, all it can do is slow the fall

The world is waking up thanks to Iran. The US’s decision to back Ukraine in the war and enable Israel’s genocide against the Palestinians has placed global attention on Iran. In particular, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s support of the oppressed Palestinians has been a popular move. In the US, like around the world, young people with the oppressed Palestinians.

Iran has become so notable for its global standing as a supporter of the oppressed that its archenemy, Israel, admits it. On July 25, Israeli Prime Minister , against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, addressed the US Congress.

Hearing the loud protest outside, he felt frustrated with the protesters, crying in his speech that “Iran is funding the anti-Israel protests that are going on right now outside this building.”

Led by Iran, worldwide, people realize the US is not what it claims to be. The US is not a promoter of democracy or peace but a brutal warmonger with no regard for human rights and international law. Internationally, it has used its veto power since 1970 against UN resolutions concerning Israel, with four in the last year. In November, it vetoed the latest UN resolution calling for a ceasefire in . Recently, it blundered by the rise to power in Syria of HayĘĽat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) formerly part of al-Qaeda.

To stop the US’ destructive behaviors globally, China, Russia, Iran and some other countries have moved away from the US and formed the alliance. More countries are planning to do the same. Within the new alliance, China pushes for more collaboration between countries rather than subjugating them, as the US does.

No supporter of democracy, not even much of a democracy

Globally, people are becoming more aware that the US does not support democracy. Its ventures into other countries in the name of democracy are a ploy to access their resources and wealth. In pursuit of power and wealth, the US has destroyed lives. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen are just a few known examples where millions of innocent people were killed and billions of dollars of infrastructure were destroyed by US-led aggression.

The US is also a very flawed democracy itself. According to a poll from the Harris Poll and the Quincy Institute, around of Americans want the US to pursue peace with Russia. Yet, the US continues arming Ukraine against Russia. Likewise, of Americans disapprove of Biden’s handling of the “Israel–Palestine conflict,” but Biden continues arming Israel. Biden is acting as a dictator, ignoring the will of the people. This is not unique to Biden. US presidents have been getting the US in wars since its inception. Despite its global proclamation as a beacon of democracy, the US has never been a true democracy.

The US presidential system is flawed. The winner of the majority of Electoral College votes wins. In 2000 and 2016, George W. Bush and Donald Trump lost the popular vote but still became presidents because they commanded a majority of Electoral College votes. Furthermore, the US is dominated by two main parties. Third parties are not even on the ballot in many states. Big money in politics also strengthens the hand of the two main political parties.

This means that American politics makes for the strangest of bedfellows. Christian evangelicals voted for Trump despite his chauvinism, infidelity, nepotism, racism and corruption. So did many working-class Americans as well as a majority of white women and Latino men voted for this celebrity billionaire who has given and plans to give tax cuts to the rich. On the other hand, Ivy League elites largely voted for Democrats even if they had misgivings about Kamala Harris.

Giving the rich tax breaks and spending too much on the military-industrial complex has led to the US suffering the highest rate among industrial countries. The US ranks last in outcomes among the ten major developed countries despite spending nearly twice as much — about 18% of gross domestic product — on healthcare than the others. The crisis is also worse than in other Western countries and the country has the highest rate among high-income countries.

As is well known, American interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and other countries led to the expansion of the military-industrial complex. Today, the US sends its poor to war who come back with post-traumatic stress disorder if not wounds or in body bags.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 killed thousands of innocents. Its intervention in Libya caused a civil war that continues to this day. Today, the US is inflicting similar misery on Syria. Together with Turkey and Israel, the US is supporting HTS. Note that HTS is an affiliate of al-Qaeda. The HTS fighters are nothing but terrorists who have innocents, including 12-year-olds and Americans. That is the reason why the US put a $10 million bounty on HTS leader . Yet today the US has supported HTS to get rid of the Assad family, legitimizing the very fighters it has designated as terrorists.

Instead of continuing to support death and destruction, the US should support peace and harmony. First, Washington must stop threatening, invading and harming other countries. This includes stopping support for terrorists like al-Golani as well as dropping sanctions that hurt millions of innocents. Second, the US must stop its proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. A peace deal is in the interest of the entire world. Third, the US must support a free Palestine where Christians, Jews and Muslims can live together in peace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Why is this moment significant? The downfall of the brutal dictatorship that has held Syria in an iron grip since 1971 — first under Hafez al-Assad, and later under his son, Bashar al-Assad — is a moment of triumph for millions of Syrians who have suffered under its rule. Over the past decade, more than 13 million Syrians, or roughly 60% of the population, have been displaced by the brutal repression and the civil war that ensued. Of these, 7 million have fled to neighboring countries or further abroad as refugees. With the Assad regime now toppled, these refugees may now dare to dream of returning to their homeland.

This turn of events also signals a strategic defeat for the “axis of resistance” led by Iran. The axis, which includes Hezbollah (a Shiite militant group based in Lebanon), has relied on a land bridge through Iraq and Syria to maintain its influence in the region. With the fall of Assad, this land corridor is severed, isolating Hezbollah from its Iranian backers and cutting off vital supply lines. This is a significant blow to Iranian and Hezbollah ambitions in the region.

Russia, too, finds itself on the losing side. Despite its military intervention in support of Bashar al-Assad in 2015, Russia has been unable to protect its ally. The fall of Assad puts Russia’s strategic interests at risk, including its naval bases on the Mediterranean coast of Syria, which have served as key outposts for Russian influence in the region.

In contrast, Turkey stands to emerge as the new central player in the region. Turkey has long opposed Assad and has supported various factions in the Syrian conflict, particularly in northern Syria. With the Assad regime weakened, Turkey’s role in shaping Syria’s future becomes all the more crucial. Israel, too, stands to gain from the fall of Assad, as it weakens two of its most formidable regional enemies — Syria and Hezbollah — while simultaneously diminishing ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s influence in the region.

Who are these people?

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a movement that emerged from the remnants of al-Qaeda in Syria. It controls the northwestern region of Syria, along the Turkish border. Over the past few years, with significant assistance from Turkey and Western countries, HTS has made efforts to rebrand itself, trying to present a more palatable face to the international community. Despite these efforts, many Syrians, especially the country’s Christian minority (which makes up around 5-10% of the population), are deeply apprehensive about the possibility of HTS establishing a vengeful Islamist regime. These groups fear that under HTS’s control, they would be subjected to harsh treatment and persecution, given the group’s hardline interpretation of Islam.

However, HTS does not control all of Syria. There are at least three other major militias that hold significant territory. The Kurds of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), particularly the YPG (People’s Defense Units), are one of the most prominent. The YPG is closely linked to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a Kurdish militant group that has been involved in an ongoing insurgency against Turkey. The United States has supported the YPG and its allies in the fight against ISIS, and the group controls northeastern Syria, including areas rich in oil resources.

Meanwhile, ISIS (Islamic State) continues to have a presence in central and eastern Syria, particularly in tribal areas. Despite being defeated as a territorial entity, ISIS remains active as a guerilla force, capable of launching insurgent attacks and destabilizing the region. This ongoing conflict between various militias complicates the situation in Syria, as different factions, often backed by external powers, vie for control of the country’s future.

To be continued…

The future of Syria remains uncertain: will it progress toward an orderly transition, or will it descend further into civil war? One of the key players in this evolving situation is Turkey, which has set its sights on creating a 30-kilometer buffer zone along its border with Syria. This zone would be cleared of Kurdish militias, particularly the YPG, which Turkey views as an extension of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a group it considers a terrorist organization. Turkey’s objective of establishing this buffer zone is difficult to imagine being realized without significant military action and possible conflict with the Kurdish forces.

The role of the United States in the future of Syria is also a pressing question, especially with the potential return of Donald Trump to the presidency. During his first term, Trump advocated for the withdrawal of the small contingent of U.S. troops stationed in Syria alongside Kurdish forces, a position he reiterated recently. If Trump follows through on his desire for disengagement, the U.S. might reduce its involvement, which could shift the balance of power in Syria, leaving Kurdish groups more vulnerable to Turkish aggression and potentially influencing the broader regional dynamics.

Israel’s role in Syria is also evolving, with its military forces advancing into key areas of the country. Israeli forces have deployed to the east and north of the Golan Heights, a strategically important region, particularly around Mount Hermon, which is often referred to as the “water tower” of the region due to its significance in controlling water resources. Israeli forces are now positioned just about 20 kilometers from Damascus, Syria’s capital, raising the stakes and complicating the security situation in the area. Israel’s continued military presence in Syria suggests that it has strategic objectives in play, particularly concerning Iranian influence in the region and the threat posed by Hezbollah and other hostile groups.

Syria’s roadmap for a peaceful transition, which was agreed upon by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Syria’s neighboring states, dates back to June 30, 2012. At the time, the international community seemed committed to finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict, with Didier Burkhalter, the Swiss Foreign Minister at the time, playing a key role in the conference. Yet, over a decade later, this plan seems increasingly distant, as the situation in Syria has devolved into an ongoing war with no clear path toward peace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The Biden years To Trump 2.0: resetting the White HouseĚý

A mix of socio-economic failures and the decline in the US’s geopolitical influence created the conditions for a reset in the White House.

Following Trump’s dramatic exit from power in 2021, the Joe Biden administration embraced a “measured” and retrained strategic response toward global politics. This put pressure onĚýthe US’s position of global influence because of the emerging high-power rivalries the US has with China and Russia. Biden’s foreign policy may have contributed toĚýthe emergence of a strong alliance against theĚýUS between (PRICK).

One of Biden’s greatest international was the Build Back Better World (B3W) plan. The 2021 plan was an international economic development initiative by the G7 countries to counter China’s Belt and Road initiative and stabilize regional economies after COVID-19. However, the plan failed to gain traction and was as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment with much less ambitious goals.

On the domestic front, the Biden White House made other miscalculations. One of these missteps was the economic failure of Biden’s big policies, such as the American Rescue Plan, which led toĚý. Biden’s energy policies were another blunder, experiencing since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. theĚýKeystone XL pipeline put additional pressure on the US energy sector.

Another domestic failure was an increase in theĚýcrime rate. According to , “Violent crimes have dramatically increased during the Biden-Harris administration, according to a recent Department of Justice study that appears to refute consistent claims by the Harris campaign.” Other , such as immigration and rejecting identity politics also influenced voters.

The US’s realpolitik

The US’s realpolitik has two key features: influence and competition with emerging powers. During the Cold War, the US deep state used every available strategy to counter the Soviet Union’s increasing influence. However, one major player in the US realpolitik significantly influenced the US’s approach to global events, sometimes even challenging branches of the deep state.

Two significant presidents during the Cold War were John F. Kennedy and Gerald Ford. To some extent, bothĚýhad a “measured, strategic response” rather than an assertive, strategic response, which in the 1980s with President Ronald Reagan. Kennedy’s hesitation in using the CIA as a significant tool for US foreign policy goals, instead slashing its , created difficulties in steeringĚýUS foreign policy during the initial phases of the Cold War.

Similarly, the Soviet–US détente supported by President Ford was by analysts and Ford’s Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger. The Détente was a strategic failure, with the Soviet Union Afghanistan in 1979. A major setback came when Ford ordered the immediate evacuation of US personnel from South Vietnam in 1975, causing a similar to the disastrous US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. The CIA faced during Ford’s presidency when an investigative journalist exposed the CIA’s Operation CHAOS, which engaged in domestic surveillance of US citizens, in of the National Security Act of 1947.

Following the Cold War, President Bill Clinton attempted to adjust the US’s foreign policy strategy back to a “measured response.” Clinton’s main focus was on policy and . His foreign policy has been described by analysts as the , which favored the promotion of free markets and democratic principles in other countries. To some extent, thisĚýpolicy was responsible for the failure to restore democracy in Somalia, which resulted in the resignation of Clinton’s Secretary of Defence after the failed Operation Gothic Serpent. The Clinton administration also failed in 1993 when it was unable to oust Haiti’s military dictator, Raoul Cedres, and in 1994 when it did not intervene inĚýRwanda to prevent genocide.

These failures share many similarities with those of theĚýBiden presidency. Biden the nuclear deal with Iran, from Afghanistan and made other miscalculations in Europe and the Middle East. Similar to Biden’s predecessors, who embraced a similar foreign policy, these errors caused significant setbacks to the US’s geopolitical position.

Now that Trump will be back in the White House, the US’s foreign policy will be better suited to navigate the ever more complex world order. Trump’s second term promises an assertive response to global and regional crises, making it worth observing how wars in the Middle East and Europe unfold after he assumes office.

Trump’s second term may ease on the trans-Atlantic security architecture and provide more freedom for European countries to make their own security and defense decisions. This new policy contrasts the Biden years, when the US was too involved in European security decisions, leading to friction with European countries, especially .

Some have that US realpolitik is hampered by Ukraine. However, if the US engages in an “assertive, strategic response” to re-building confidence among European nations and shore up European security architecture, the US may be able to check Russian influence.

During Trump’s , his “assertive, strategic response” effectively addressed evolving geopolitical dynamics, keeping China under the radar and Russia in check without straining relations with the US. Similar adjustments are expected in Trump’s second administration, but with a key difference in the Middle East. The space for Iran, which expanded under the Biden administration, is likely to shrink rapidly under Trump. This shift will allow the US to adopt a more assertive stance toward Iran while rebuilding strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

It is unlikely that Donald Trump will eliminate the so-called , which consists of officials embedded within the executive branch of the US government who espouse an ideology that may be contrary to the administration’s. Instead of being completely eliminated, the deep state could be reduced in size, as it plays a significant role in the US’s realpolitik, particularly for any incoming Trump administration. During Trump’s first term, the deep state functioned in a limited yet operational manner. For instance, Trump appointed Gina Haspel, the first woman to serve as deputy director of the CIA and later as CIA director in 2018, despite strong reservations from some senators. These examples suggest that the deep state under a Trump administration could continue to function effectively with minor adjustments.

India–US relations: and upward trajectoryĚý

The India–US is currently on an “upward trajectory,” with the Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership between the two countries recently . The partnership will receive more traction in theĚýTrump Administration. During Trump’s first term, the USĚýunderstood India’s interests much better than theĚýBiden administration, with few exceptions. The Trump administration’s superior understanding of India will help build much-needed trust between the two nations, whose relations have been by US criticism of India’s internal affairs. However, trade between India and the US will not change much during Trump’s second term, given the implications of his America first policy for trade and high tariffs.

When Trump enters office, he has to re-adjust the US’s realpolitik to revive the US’s declining influence on the global stage. The move from a measured to an assertive approach will only come after the realization that restrained and measured approaches lead to significant policy and strategic failures for the US. Biden’s foreign policy failures are the most recent example of this.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The agreement is based on the terms of United Nations Security Council , which ended the previous Israeli assault on Lebanon in 2006. The truce will be enforced by 5,000 to 10,000 Lebanese troops and the UN’s 10,000-strong United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon () peacekeeping force, which has operated in that area since 1978 and includes troops from 46 countries.

The truce has broad international support, including from Iran and Gaza’s Hamas leaders. Israel and Hezbollah were apparently glad to take a break from a war that had become counterproductive for them both. Effective resistance prevented Israeli forces from advancing far into Lebanon, and they were inflicting mostly senseless death and destruction on civilians, as in Gaza, but without the genocidal motivation of that campaign.

People all over Lebanon have welcomed the relief from Israeli bombing, the destruction of their towns and neighborhoods and thousands of casualties. In the Lebanese capital of Beirut, people have started returning to their homes.

In the south, the Israeli military has warned residents on both sides of the border not to return yet. It has declared a new (which was not part of the truce agreement) that includes 60 villages north of the border, and has warned that it will attack Lebanese civilians who return to that area. Despite these warnings, thousands of displaced people have been returning to south Lebanon, often to find their homes and villages in ruins.

Many people returning to the south still proudly display the yellow flags of Hezbollah. A flying over the ruins of the Lebanese city of Tyre has the words, “Made in the USA,” written across it. This is a reminder that the Lebanese people know very well who made the bombs that have killed and maimed thousands of them.

The truce’s success seems unlikely

There are already many reports of ceasefire violations. Israel shot and two journalists soon after the truce went into effect. Then two days after the ceasefire began, Israel attacked five towns near the border with tanks, fired artillery across the border and conducted on southern Lebanon. On December 2, as a UN peacekeeper told CNN that Israel had the truce “roughly a hundred times,” Hezbollah finally with mortar fire in the disputed Shebaa Farms area. Israel responded with heavier strikes on two villages, killing 11 people.

An addendum to the truce agreement granted Israel the right to strike at will whenever it believes Hezbollah is violating the truce, giving it what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “complete military freedom of action,” which makes this a precarious and one-sided peace at best.

The prospect for a full withdrawal of both Israeli and Hezbollah forces in 60 days seems slim. Hezbollah has built large weapons stockpiles in the south that it will not want to abandon. Netanyahu himself has warned that the truce “can be short.”

Then there is the danger of confrontation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese military, raising the specter of Lebanon’s bloody civil war, which killed an estimated 150,000 people between 1975 and 1990. 

So violence could flare up into full-scale war again at any time, making it unlikely that many Israelis will return to homes near the border with Lebanon, Israel’s original publicly stated purpose for the war.

The truce was brokered by the United States and France, and signed by the European Union, Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. France was a colonial power in Lebanon and still plays a leading role in UNIFIL, yet Israel initially rejected France as a negotiating partner. It seems to have France’s role only when French President Emmanuel Macron’s government agreed not to enforce the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against Netanyahu if he comes to France.

The United Kingdom also signed the original truce proposal on November 25, but doesn’t appear to have signed the final agreement. The UK seems to have withdrawn from the negotiations under US and Israeli pressure because, unlike France, its new Labour government has publicly that it will comply with the ICC arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant. However, it has not explicitly said it would arrest them.

Netanyahu justified the truce to his own people by saying that it will allow Israeli forces to focus on Gaza and Iran, and only die-hard “Security” Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir voted the truce in the Israeli cabinet.

While there were hopes that the truce in Lebanon might set the stage for a ceasefire in Gaza, Israel’s actions on the ground tell a different story. Satellite images show Israel carrying out new mass demolitions of hundreds of buildings in northern Gaza to build a new road or between Gaza City and North Gaza. This may be a new border to separate the northernmost 17% of Gaza from the rest of the Gaza Strip, so Israel can expel its people and prevent them from returning, hand North Gaza over to Israeli settlers and squeeze the desperate, survivors into an even smaller area than before.

Syria complicates the conflict

And for all who had hopes that the ceasefire in Lebanon might lead to a regional de-escalation, those hopes were dashed in Syria when, on the very day of the truce, the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a surprise offensive. HTS was formerly the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front. It itself and severed its formal link to al-Qaeda in 2016 to avoid becoming a prime target in the US war in Syria, but the US still brands it a terrorist group.

By December 1, HTS managed to seize control of Syria’s second largest city, Aleppo, forcing the Syrian Arab Army and its Russian allies onto the defensive. With Russian and Syrian jets bombing rebel-held territory, the surge in fighting has raised the prospect of another violent, destabilizing front reopening in the Middle East.

This may also be a prelude to an escalation of attacks on Syria by Israel, which has already Syria more than 220 times since October 2023, with Israeli airstrikes and artillery bombardments killing at least 296 people.

The new HTS offensive most likely has covert US support, and may impact US President-elect Donald Trump’s reported to withdraw the 900 US troops still based in Syria. It may also impact his nomination of Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence. Gabbard is a longtime critic of US for al-Qaeda-linked factions in Syria, so the new HTS offensive sets the stage for an explosive confirmation hearing, which may backfire on Syria hawks in Washington if Gabbard is allowed to make her case.

Arab and Muslim state strategies

Elsewhere in the region, Israel’s genocide in Gaza and war on its neighbors have led to widespread anti-Israel and anti-US resistance.

Where the US was once able to buy off Arab rulers with weapons deals and military alliances, the Arab and Muslim world is coalescing around a position that sees Israel’s behavior as unacceptable and Iran as a threatened neighbor rather than an enemy. Unconditional US support for Israel risks permanently downgrading US relations with former allies, from Iraq, Jordan and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Yemen’s Ansar Allah (or Houthi) government has maintained a blockade of the Red Sea, using missiles and drones against Israeli-linked ships heading for the Israeli port of Eilat or the Suez Canal. The Yemenis have a US-led naval task force sent to break the blockade and have shipping through the Suez Canal by at least two-thirds, forcing shipping companies to reroute most ships all the way around Africa. The port of Eilat filed for in July, after only one ship docked there in several months.

Other resistance forces have conducted attacks on US military bases in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, and US forces have retaliated in a low-grade tit-for-tat war. The Iraqi government has strongly condemned U.S. and Israeli attacks on its soil as violations of its sovereignty. Attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria have flared up again in recent months, while Iraqi resistance forces have also launched drone attacks on Israel.

An emergency of the Arab League in Cairo, Egypt on November 26 voted unanimously to support Iraq and condemn Israeli threats. US–Iraqi talks in September drew up a for hundreds of US troops to leave Iraq in 2025 and for all 2,500 to be gone within two years. The US has outmaneuvered previous withdrawal plans, but the days of these very unwelcome US bases must surely be numbered.

Recent of Arab and Muslim states have forged a growing sense of unity around a rejection of US proposals for normalization of relations with Israel and a new solidarity with Palestine and Iran. At a meeting of Islamic nations in Riyadh on November 11, Saudi crown prince Mohammed Bin-Salman publicly called the Israeli massacre in Gaza a for the first time.

Arab and Muslim countries know that Trump may act unpredictably and that they need a stable common position to avoid becoming pawns to him or Netanyahu. They recognize that previous divisions left them vulnerable to US and Israeli exploitation, which contributed to the current crisis in Palestine and the risk of a major regional war that now looms over them.

On November 29, Saudi and Western officials told Reuters that Saudi Arabia has on a new military alliance with the US, which would include normalizing relations with Israel. It is opting for a more limited US weapons deal.

The Saudis had hoped for a treaty that included a US commitment to defend them, like treaties with Japan and South Korea. That would require confirmation by the US Senate, which would demand Saudi recognition of Israel in return. But the Saudis can no longer consider recognizing Israel without a viable plan for Palestinian statehood, which Israel rejects.

On the other hand, Saudi relations with Iran are steadily improving since they restored relations 18 months ago with diplomatic help from China and Iraq. At a meeting with new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Qatar on October 3, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan, “We seek to close the page of differences between the two countries forever and work towards the resolution of our issues and expansion of our relations like two friendly and brotherly states.”

Prince Faisal highlighted the “very sensitive and critical” situation in the region due to Israel’s “aggressions” against Gaza and Lebanon and its attempts to expand the conflict. He said Saudi Arabia trusted ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s “wisdom and discernment” in managing the situation to restore calm and peace.

The ball is in Trump’s court

If Saudi Arabia and its neighbors can make peace with Iran, what will the consequences be for Israel’s illegal, genocidal occupation of Palestine, which has been enabled and encouraged by decades of unconditional US military and diplomatic support?

On December 2, Trump on Truth Social that if the hostages were not released by the time of his inauguration, there would be “ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East.” “Those responsible,” he warned, “will be hit harder than anybody has been hit in the long and storied History of the United States of America.”

Trump and many of his acolytes exemplify the Western arrogance and lust for imperial power that lies at the root of this crisis. More threats and more destruction are not the answer. Trump has had good relations with the dictatorial rulers of the Gulf states, with whom he shares much in common. If he is willing to listen, he will realize, as they do, that there is no solution to this crisis without freedom, self-determination and sovereignty in their own land for the people of Palestine. That is the path to peace, if he will take it.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Let us review the agenda. The number one problem in the world today, and Trump’s greatest threat, is the climate crisis, which is accelerating its destructive consequences. Trump will undoubtedly promote fossil production, but the Environmental Protection Agency will maintain the protective and preventive regulations established over the past few years, 12 states will continue to apply restrictions on emissions, and large cities will continue to spread renewable energy.

Regarding immigration, this time Trump did not insist on the wall (most of which he while he was last in the White House). In this campaign, he turned to “mass deportations,” which can mean common-sense controls to cross the border, as already agreed with the Mexican government regarding non-Mexicans, or an illusory hunt for individuals without proper documents in neighborhoods, workplaces and family homes, which would not only be savage but logistically unfeasible. In reality, it is to be hoped that Congress will reactivate the bipartisan agreement for immigrants’ legalization and access to citizenship that Trump ordered to be stopped not because of its content but because it would have been approved during the campaign and would have taken away his favorite topic for demagoguery.

As for Israel and Palestine, the biggest problem is that Trump is now prioritizing enmity with Iran, which finances and pushes Hamas and Hezbollah and whose agents tried to assassinate him twice (or perhaps thrice). He will have a hard time resurrecting the Abraham Accords that his Jewish son-in-law negotiated during his first term: exploring again the two-state solution in exchange for diplomatic recognition of Israel by Arab countries. Now, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will only accept it if Trump diminishes his hostility against Iran, where a “reformist” candidate won the presidential election and seems to have appeased the fury.

Regarding Ukraine, Trump boasted that he would “fix it in 24 hours,” but was not very specific. Two days after the election, at the Valdai Forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin rushed to a peace agreement based on the “self-determination” of the people of Donbas in exchange for respecting Ukraine’s borders. Putin also that Russia could restore natural gas supplies through the Baltic to Germany, which Ukrainian agents . A Trump adviser has a plan to defend Ukraine’s neutrality outside NATO for the next twenty years. All this sounds similar to the Minsk Agreements reached a few years ago by Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, which US President Barack Obama ignored.

In the face of Trump’s disdain, the European Union may reinforce internal solidity and external autonomy. Many NATO members are already ceasing to be free-riders on the United States and are fulfilling their commitment to invest at least 2% of GDP in defense. Their number has risen from four to 23 in just six years.

The biggest alarm raised by Trump’s election is that the future of democracy and legal security in the United States may be in jeopardy. Will there be “revenge” against “internal enemies,” and will he go after politicians, judges, generals, officials, journalists and other opponents? He may not need to once the pending court cases are canceled and he has satisfied his obsession with returning to power. The Senate Republican group has already rejected Trump’s nominee to lead it, and the Senate can veto some of his announced appointees. It is worth remembering that in his first term, Trump appointed three Chiefs of Staff in four years and changed most members of the Cabinet, including State, Defense, Justice, Interior and Homeland Security, a tenor of personal instability that is likely to continue.

Some of Trump’s boasts may end in a major ridicule, such as ordering Elon Musk to cut a third of the budget. Incompetence could also sink him in the face of some unforeseen catastrophe, as happened to during US President George Bush’s second term with Hurricane Katrina and to himself with the COVID-19 pandemic. Will Trump be able to maintain a regular daily work schedule in his eighties, or will he, like Joe Biden, be busy only from 10 AM to 4 PM? It is not guaranteed that he will complete four years in good shape.

Ultimately, Trump could also become a chaotic parody of the befuddled White House visitor in the film (1979). As Mister Chance says, “I can’t write. I can’t read. But I like to watch television.” Just like Donald the Returned.

[The author’s first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The only conflict where peace negotiations seem to be on the agenda is Ukraine. In April, both Vice President-elect JD Vance and Senator Rubio a $95 billion military aid bill that included $61 billion for Ukraine.

Rubio recently on NBC’s TODAY Show, saying, “I think the Ukrainians have been incredibly brave and strong when standing up to Russia. But at the end of the day, what we’re funding here is a stalemate war, and it needs to be brought to a conclusion… I think there has to be some common sense here.”

On the campaign trail, Vance made a that the best way to end the war was for Ukraine to cede the land Russia has seized, for a demilitarized zone to be established and for Ukraine to become neutral, i.e. not enter NATO. He was roundly criticized by both Republicans and Democrats who argue that backing Ukraine is vitally important to US security since it weakens Russia, which is closely allied with China.

Any attempt by Trump to stop US military support for Ukraine will undoubtedly face fierce opposition from the pro-war forces in his own party, particularly in Congress, as well as perhaps the entirety of the Democratic Party. Two years ago, 30 progressive Democrats in Congress wrote a letter to President Joe Biden asking him to consider promoting negotiations. The party higher-ups were so incensed by their lack of party discipline that they came down on the progressives like a ton of bricks. Within 24 hours, the group had cried uncle and the letter. They have since all voted for money for Ukraine and have not uttered another word about negotiations.

So a Trump effort to cut funds to Ukraine could run up against a bipartisan congressional effort to keep the war going. And let’s not forget the efforts by European countries and NATO to keep the US in the fight. Still, Trump could stand up to all these forces and push for a rational policy that would restart the talking and stop the killing.

Netanyahu prepares for US support

The Middle East, however, is a trickier situation. In his first term, Trump showed his pro-Israel cards when he brokered the between several Arab countries and Israel; moved the US embassy to a location in Jerusalem that is partly on occupied land Israel’s internationally recognized borders and the occupied Golan Heights in Syria as part of Israel. Such unprecedented signals of unconditional US support for Israel’s illegal occupation and settlements helped set the stage for the current crisis.Ěý

Trump seems as unlikely as Biden to cut US weapons to Israel, despite public opinion favoring such a halt. Additionally, a recent UN human rights showed that 70% of the people killed by those US weapons are women and children.

Meanwhile, the wily Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is already busy getting ready for a second Trump presidency. On the very day of the US election, Netanyahu his defense minister, Yoav Gallant, who opposed a lasting Israeli military occupation of Gaza and had at times argued for prioritizing the lives of the Israeli hostages over killing more Palestinians.

Israel Katz, the new defense minister and former foreign minister, is more hawkish than Gallant. He has led a to falsely blame Iran for the smuggling of weapons from Jordan into the West Bank.

Other powerful voices, National Security Minister and Finance Minister , who is also a “minister in the Defense Ministry,” represent extreme Zionist parties that are publicly committed to territorial expansion, annexation and ethnic cleansing. They both live in illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank.

So Netanyahu has deliberately surrounded himself with allies who back his ever-escalating war. They are surely developing a war plan to exploit Trump’s support for Israel, but will first use the unique opportunity of the US transition of power to create facts on the ground that will limit Trump’s options when he takes office.

A US war with Iran would be catastrophic

The Israelis will doubtless redouble their efforts to drive Palestinians out of as much of Gaza as possible. This will confront Trump with a horrific humanitarian crisis in which Gaza’s surviving population is crammed into an impossibly small area with next to no food, no shelter for many, disease running rampant and no access to needed medical care for tens of thousands of horribly wounded and dying people. The Israelis will count on Trump to accept whatever final solution they propose, most likely to drive Palestinians out of Gaza, into the West Bank, Jordan, Egypt and farther afield.

Israel threatened all along to do to Lebanon the same as they have done to Gaza. Israeli forces have met fierce resistance, taken heavy casualties and have not advanced far into Lebanon. But as in Gaza, they are using bombing and artillery to destroy villages and towns, kill or drive people north and hope to effectively annex the part of Lebanon south of the Litani river as a so-called “buffer zone.” When Trump takes office, they may ask for greater US involvement to help them “finish the job.”

The big wild card is Iran. Trump’s first term in office was marked by a policy of “maximum pressure” against Tehran. He unilaterally withdrew the US from the Iran nuclear deal, imposed severe sanctions that devastated the economy and ordered the of the country’s top general, Qassem Soleimani. Trump did not support a war on Iran in his first term, but had to be of attacking it in his final days in office by General Mark Milley and the Pentagon.

Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, retired Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, recently to Chris Hedges just how catastrophic a war with Iran would be, based on US military wargames he was involved in. He predicts that such a war could last ten years, cost $10 trillion and still fail to conquer the country. Airstrikes alone would not destroy all of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s civilian nuclear program and ballistic missile stockpiles. Once unleashed, the conflict would very likely escalate into a regime change war involving US ground forces in a country with three or four times the territory and population of Iraq, more mountainous terrain and a thousand-mile-long coastline bristling with missiles that can sink US warships.

But Netanyahu and his extreme Zionist allies believe that they must sooner or later fight an existential war with Iran if they are to realize their vision of a dominant Greater Israel. They believe that the destruction they have wreaked on the Palestinians in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, including the of their senior leaders, has given them a military advantage and a favorable opportunity for a showdown with Iran.

Biden could de-escalate the Middle Eastern conflict, but won’tĚý

By November 10, Trump and Netanyahu had spoken by phone three times since the election, and Netanyahu said that they see “eye to eye on the Iranian threat.” Trump hired Iran hawk , who helped him sabotage the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018, to coordinate the formation of his foreign policy team.

So far, the team that Trump and Hook have assembled seems to offer hope for peace in Ukraine, but little to none for peace in the Middle East and a rising danger of a US–Israeli war on Iran.

Trump’s expected National Security Advisor Mike Waltz is best known as a China hawk. He has voted against military aid to Ukraine in Congress, but he recently that Israel should bomb ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear and oil facilities. That would be the most certain path to a full-scale war.

Trump’s new UN ambassador, Elise Stefanik, has led moves in Congress to equate criticism of Israel with antisemitism. She led the questioning of US university presidents at an antisemitism hearing in Congress, after which the presidents of Harvard and Penn resigned.

While Trump will have some advisors who support his desire to end the war in Ukraine, there will be few voices in his inner circle urging caution over Netanyahu’s genocidal ambitions in Palestine and his determination to cripple Iran.

If he wanted to, Biden could use his final two months in office to de-escalate the conflicts in the Middle East. He could impose an embargo on offensive weapons for Israel, push for serious ceasefire negotiations in both Gaza and Lebanon and work through US partners in the Gulf to de-escalate tensions with Iran.

But Biden is unlikely to do any of that. When his own administration sent a letter to Israel last month, threatening a cut in military aid if Israel did not allow a surge of humanitarian aid into Gaza in the next 30 days, Israel responded by doing just the opposite: actually cutting the number of trucks allowed in. The State Department claimed Israel was taking “steps in the right direction” and Biden to take any action.

We will soon see if Trump is able to make progress in moving the war in Ukraine towards negotiations, potentially saving the lives of many thousands of Ukrainians and Russians. But between the catastrophe that Trump will inherit and the warhawks he is picking for his cabinet, peace in the Middle East seems more distant than ever.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Iran isn’t the only nation advancing its nuclear capabilities in recent years. In 2019, the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range land-based missiles, citing alleged Russian violations and China’s non-involvement. The US is also its nuclear arsenal, with to deploy nuclear weapons in more NATO states and proposals to extend its to Taiwan.

Russia, too, has intensified its nuclear posture, expanding nuclear and updating its on first use. In 2023, the nation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limited US and Russian-deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In 2024, it stationed in Belarus. Russia and China have also deepened their , setting China on a path to rapidly expand its arsenal, as nuclear security collaboration with the US has steadily over the past decade.

The breakdown of diplomacy and rising nuclear brinkmanship among major powers are heightening nuclear insecurity among themselves, but also risk spurring a new nuclear arms race. Alongside Iran, numerous countries maintain the technological infrastructure to quickly build nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation would require significant collaboration among major powers, a prospect currently out of reach.

The US detonated the first nuclear weapon in 1945, followed by the Soviet Union in , the United Kingdom in , France in and China in . It became evident that with access to uranium and enrichment technology, nations were increasingly capable of producing nuclear weapons. Though mass production and delivery capabilities were additional hurdles, it was widely expected in the early Cold War that many states would soon join the nuclear club. Israel developed nuclear capabilities in the , India detonated its first bomb in and South Africa built its first by . Other countries, including , , , , and , pursued their own programs.

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968 to curb nuclear spread, led many countries to abandon or dismantle their programs. After the end of the Cold War and under Western pressure, Iraq its nuclear program in 1991. In a historic move, South Africa voluntarily its arsenal in 1994. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1996, securing international security assurances in exchange.

Nuclear proliferation appeared to be a waning concern, but cracks soon appeared in the non-proliferation framework. Pakistan conducted its first in 1998, followed by North Korea in , bringing the count of nuclear-armed states to nine. Since then, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s nuclear weapons program, initiated in the 1980s, has been a major target of Western non-proliferation efforts.

Nuclear ambitions in the Middle East, Asia and Europe

Iran has a strong reason to persist. Ukraine’s former nuclear arsenal might have deterred Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022. Elsewhere, revolutionary Muammar Gaddafi, who Libya’s nuclear program in 2003, was overthrown by a NATO-led coalition and local forces in 2011. If Iran achieves a functional nuclear weapon, it will lose the ability to leverage its nuclear program as a to extract concessions in negotiations. While a nuclear weapon will represent a new form of leverage, it would also intensify pressure from the US and Israel, both of whom have engaged in a cycle of escalating sometimes deadly confrontations with Iran and its proxies over the past few years.

An Iranian nuclear arsenal could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Its relations with Saudi Arabia remain delicate, despite the brokered by China. Saudi officials have they would obtain their own nuclear weapon if Iran acquired them. Saudi Arabia gave significant to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, or even the latter with one upon request.

Turkey, which hosts US nuclear weapons through NATO’s , signaled a policy shift in 2019 when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so.

Middle Eastern tensions are not the only force threatening non-proliferation. Japan’s renewed friction with China, North Korea and Russia over the past decade has intensified Tokyo’s focus on nuclear readiness. Although Japan a nuclear program in the 1940s, it was dismantled after World War II. Japan’s , however, remains measured in months. Despite this, for nuclear weapons remains low, given the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nuclear bombings in 1945 killed more than 200,000 people.

In contrast, around of South Koreans support developing nuclear weapons. South Korea’s nuclear program began in the 1970s but was under US pressure. However, North Korea’s successful test in 2006 and its severance of , and to the South in the past decade, coupled with the of peaceful reunification in early 2024, have again raised the issue in South Korea.

Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, which similarly under US pressure. Any sign of wavering US commitment to Taiwan, together with China’s growing nuclear capabilities, could prompt Taiwan to revive its efforts. Though less likely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea could also motivate countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to consider developing nuclear capabilities.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also had significant nuclear implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently to the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraine’s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered. Zelenskyy later his comments after they ignited a firestorm of controversy. Yet if Ukraine feels betrayed by its Western partners — particularly if it is forced to concede territory to Russia — it could spur some factions within Ukraine to attempt to secure nuclear capabilities.

The war has also spurred nuclear considerations across Europe. In December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer a European nuclear deterrent. Donald Trump’s re-election in the 2024 US presidential election could amplify European concerns over US commitments to NATO, with France having increasingly an independent European nuclear force in recent years.

Nuclear collaboration

Established nuclear powers are unlikely to welcome more countries into their ranks. But while China and Russia don’t necessarily desire this outcome, they recognize the West’s concerns are greater, with Russia doing in the 1990s to prevent its unemployed nuclear scientists from aiding North Korea’s program.

The US has also previously been blindsided by its allies’ nuclear aspirations. US policymakers underestimated Australia’s determination to pursue a nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, including covert attempts to obtain a weapon from the UK. Similarly, the US was initially of France’s extensive support for Israel’s nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

Smaller countries are also capable of aiding one another’s nuclear ambitions. Argentina offered considerable to Israel’s program, while Israel assisted . Saudi Arabia financed Pakistan’s nuclear development and Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist is of having aided Iran, Libya and North Korea with their programs in the 1980s.

The slippery slope to nuclear conflict

Conflicts involving nuclear weapons states are not without precedent. Egypt and Syria attacked nuclear-armed Israel in 1973 and Argentina faced a nuclear-armed UK in 1982. India and China have clashed over their border on several occasions. Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression. But conflicts featuring nuclear countries invite dangerous escalation, and the risk grows if a nation with limited conventional military power gains nuclear capabilities; lacking other means of defense or retaliation, it may be more tempted to resort to nuclear weapons as its only viable option.

The costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals are already steep. In 2023, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states spent an estimated managing their programs. But what incentive do smaller countries have to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely, especially when they observe the protection nuclear weapons offer and witness the major powers intensifying their nuclear strategies?

Obtaining the world’s most powerful weapons may be a natural ambition of military and intelligence sectors, but it hinges on the political forces in power as well. In Iran, moderates could counterbalance hardliners, while continued support for Ukraine might prevent more nationalist forces from coming to power there.

Yet an additional country obtaining a nuclear weapon could set off a cascade of others. While larger powers are currently leading the nuclear posturing, smaller countries may see an opportunity amid the disorder. The limited support for the , in effect since 2021, coupled with the collapse of other international treaties, reinforces the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states. With major powers in open contention, the barriers to nuclear ambitions are already weakening, making it ever harder to dissuade smaller nations from pursuing the ultimate deterrent.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Timeline of escalations

The first significant event in this recent escalation occurred on April 1. On that day, Israel bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria’s capital. This strike killed multiple high-ranking Iranian officials. Israel was targeting ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s growing influence in Syria and the presence of its leaders close to Israeli borders.

Iran quickly retaliated. On April 13, Iranian allies in the Axis of Resistance captured the MSC Aries, a commercial ship linked to Israel. Iran also launched direct attacks on Israeli territory. The Axis of Resistance, which supports Iran in its regional aims, includes Shia groups like the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces, the Syrian government, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. It may also involve Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas.

In response, Israel conducted limited airstrikes on April 19. These strikes hit targets in both Syria and Iran, signaling Israel’s willingness to counter any action that could threaten its security. After this exchange, tensions cooled temporarily. Both sides proclaimed victory, and hostilities reverted to indirect, proxy conflict.

The fragile calm shattered on July 31. On that day, Israeli operatives carried out two major assassinations. The first was Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah military commander, who was killed early that day. Shortly after, Ismail Haniyeh, the chairman of Hamas’s Political Bureau, was assassinated in Tehran. These targeted killings heightened tensions dramatically.

A few months later, Iran struck Israel directly. On October 1, Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles toward Israel, marking an escalation into open warfare. Israel’s response came nearly a month later.

In retaliation for ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s October 1 attack, Israel launched an extensive assault on Iranian targets on October 26. Dozens of Israeli warplanes traveled over 1,300 kilometers from their bases to target critical Iranian facilities. The strikes targeted Iranian air-defense systems, specifically S-300 radar and missile systems, as well as missile factories in three different provinces, including areas near Tehran.

Will Israel and Iran go to war?

51łÔąĎ’s sources suggest that Israeli leaders are planning further strikes. Potential targets could include Iranian oil terminals, missile sites, and nuclear facilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might consider targeting Kharg Island, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s primary oil terminal in the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. Special forces from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) may also conduct further targeted killings, specifically against key personnel in ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iran has made clear that it wants to avoid a full-scale war with Israel or the United States. The US has played a significant role in trying to limit the scope of this conflict. American officials have issued warnings to both Iran and Israel, urging Iran to avoid any large-scale attacks on Israel while also advising Israel not to escalate the situation. However, the US no longer has as much leverage over Israel as it once did. Continued US military aid is not as vital, in Jerusalem’s view, as the destruction of Iran and ±á±đłú˛ú´Ç±ô±ô˛ąłó’s ability to harm Israelis. They see Iran as weak and believe they must strike while they can.

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s proxy forces, designed to provide a buffer around Iran and deter Israel, have shown limited effectiveness. These proxies can carry out attacks and spread fear, but they have been unable to inflict lasting damage on Israel, which has bolstered Israeli confidence. Despite occasional successful strikes, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s allies cannot challenge Israel’s military defenses over an extended period. ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s regime knows that any sustained direct war would push it past the breaking point. Popular resentment against the regime for its repressive religious policies and poor handling of the economy is already high. If the Islamic Republic found itself on the losing end of a foreign war, it would topple.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu also has a precarious political situation. His coalition includes far-right members who advocate for reoccupying Gaza and restoring Israel’s biblical borders. He needs to maintain their political support in order to remain prime minister and avoid pending prosecution for corruption charges. Thus, Netanyahu needs to appeal to this faction, posturing himself as a strong leader capable of resisting Palestinian and Iranian threats. So, he is incentivized to be aggressive, whether or not it is in Israel’s long-term interests.

While Israel may enjoy short- to medium-term security through its aggressive actions, it faces long-term challenges. Its aggressive tack against Iran may push the Islamic Republic to develop a nuclear deterrent as its last defense given Israeli military superiority.

Further down the timeline, Israel faces a demographic risk. Its Muslim population now makes up more than 20% of its citizens, posing a challenge to Israel’s identity as a Jewish state. This trend could reshape Israel’s political landscape — as long as it remains a democracy — by gradually weakening the position of the Jewish majority.

Israeli leadership seems to think it can rescue the country from its precarious position by inflicting a sound defeat on enemies nearby and afar. It remains to be seen how far they will go and whether the gamble will pay off.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Before the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamic terrorism was not well organized. Mohammad Reza Shah, ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s last monarch, laid the groundwork for the rapid growth and spread of Islamic terrorism by severely suppressing progressive and liberal forces in the country.

With liberal and progressive forces weakened, Islamic terrorist forces led by the cleric Ruhollah Khomeini seized control of the Iranian government in 1979 in a massive coup against the inhumane Pahlavi Dynasty. With ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s resources at their disposal, Islamists were able to terrorist organizations in countries across the Middle East.

Iran Supports Islamic Terrorism

The attack on the American embassy and the suicide bombing on the headquarters of the barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983, was a major turning point in how Islamists carry out terrorist operations. 241 US soldiers, 58 French soldiers, and six civilians were killed in the attack on the barracks. The culprits were affiliated with Iran.

These attacks ushered in an age of unending Islamic terrorism. But who is responsible for this disaster?

Inaction from Western governments regarding terrorism, especially from the US, sent a direct message to Iran’s leaders: you are allowed to establish and arm terrorist organizations. Western leaders did not have the determination and courage to respond to the new terrorist threat because they did not recognize or understand the ideological nature of the other side.

After these attacks, a joint plan to attack the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and centers in Lebanon was planned and approved by the presidents of the US and France. However, the US Secretary of Defense lobbied and successfully stopped it, claiming there was no clear evidence of Iran’s role in the previous attacks.

The leaders of the free world, especially the US, continue to be double-minded and indecisive in dealing with Iran and its terrorist regime. This wrongheaded policy created a suitable environment for the growth of Islamic terrorism and turned our world into a less safe place.

The formation of and its September 11 attacks, the rise of and its assault on the — including the abduction and sale of thousands of Kurdish women as sex slaves — numerous terrorist attacks across the West, and the profound sense of insecurity in these nations, culminating in the terrorist attack against Israel and ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s subsequent missile attacks against Israel in April and October 2024, highlight the consequences of failing to address Tehran decisively.

The Appeasement Policy

After almost five decades of toward Iran, the October 7 invasion of Israel by ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s proxy, Hamas, pushed Israel to take a defensive posture and cut off the arms of the Islamic terrorist regime by attacking the source of the satanic ideology: the Islamic Republic of Iran itself.

Unfortunately, the international community and the free world still insist on this appeasement policy. For this reason, Israel is alone in the fight against terrorism, bearing the weight of the world in its struggle against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Poor policy choices concerning Iran’s support of terrorism do not end there. On September 28, the US announced an with Iraq to withdraw American troops from parts of the country. This is likely the beginning of another global disaster produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The withdrawal will mean the complete handover of Iraq to Iran, providing a safe space for Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist organizations affiliated with Iran to hide from Israel by moving to Iraq. If this agreement is implemented, Iraq — with all its riches — will become a hub for the growth and spread of Islamic terrorism supported by Iran.

This will nullify all Israeli efforts to combat terrorism supported by Iran, as well as all Western efforts to create a secure Middle East. If Western countries are not more decisive in dealing with Islamic terrorism, our future will be more uncertain.

History has shown that Iran is the head of a snake. To kill a snake, you have to cut off its head. This is not an endorsement of an all-out war with Iran. Instead, free countries, especially the United States, should support liberation movements in the region. This support should be extended to the Kurds, who may be powerful enough to destroy the Islamic Republic but presently lack international support.

The lack of support from Western countries for the Iranian popular in December 2017 and and the Kurdish Woman, Life, Freedom movement that started in 2022 sent a message to the Islamic Republic that it can carry out its crimes domestically and continue its terrorist activities internationally without fear of retribution.

The West must end the appeasement policy with Iran and crush the snake’s head in Tehran by supporting the progressive and liberal movements of the Iranian people, thereby ending five decades of terrorism fostered by Iran.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Politics of terror

For decades, Pakistan has used state-sponsored terror as an instrument to buy geopolitical rent from the United States via Afghanistan. In the past, Pakistan gave operational control to terror proxies to cultivate ground for against India.

However, the strategy of using terror did not last long. On May 2, 2011, the US al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. This incident sowed seeds of distrust between the two nations.

Similarly, Iran Pakistan in the 1971 war against India. However, ideological confrontations have led to distrust and hostility between the parties. Iran also believes that Pakistan is Baloch jihadists to please the West and Saudi Arabia.

Evidently, politics of terror have cost Pakistan heavily, without much reward. The state is clearly weakening, as several signs indicate. The Afghan Taliban’s is being more assertive than it otherwise would be. Pakistan is targeting Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamist nationalist network opposing the Pakistani military. Pakistan’s approach against Afghanistan’s Supreme Council is also telling.

Middle Eastern terror conflicts have increased following Israel’s 2023 invasion of Gaza. Pakistan seems to be negotiating with a few proxies, and allegedly with . These actions may be in order to de-escalate terror attacks in Pakistan and deter the TTP.

The nation may also be seeking openings for security and strategic cooperation with the West. In December 2023, Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir and former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Nadeem Anjum, Washington, DC. The US didn’t show any interest in engaging with Pakistan; it is already locked in multiple fronts from Ukraine to Israel. The nation also believes that TTP is already weakening the ISIS threat.

However, the ISIS in Iran in January paint a worrisome picture of regional security.ĚýThe on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March stoked fear of revival of ISIS regional branches, especially in Central Asia.

Islamization and flashpoints

Pakistan’s politics of terror typically end poorly, which complicates its negotiation of geopolitical rent. It suffers from the usual dilemma that comes with terror politics; proxies can be useful for some time, but eventually, their radicalism becomes too extreme.

One can argue that the US, too, had relations with terror proxies. In December 1979, the CIA’s provided arms and logistics to jihadist groups in Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet Union. Unlike Pakistan’s relationship with proxies, however, this was a limited relationship.

Pakistan’s continued engagement with proxies may come from former president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s regime in the 1970s and 1980s. He Sharia Benches in the High Court to align the nation’s legal statutes with Islamic doctrine. His policies brought in officers who wanted to pursue an active Islamic agenda in military matters. A new breed of military thinkers and strategists also emerged. They pushed for a merger of social jihadism with military plans.

Islamization had far-reaching consequences. It led non-state actors, directed by Pakistan’s ISI, to quell opposition to Zia’s pro-Sunni Islamization measures. This in turn the extremist Jaish-e-Mohammad and Soviet jihad groups.

Zia’s radical Islamization continues to permeate the Pakistani Army, which has prevented action against Islamic terror groups such as TTP. The virus of Islamization has removed Pakistan’s ability to think like a rational nation, putting it in a state of poly-crises.

In January, Pakistan witnessed new flashpoints, including Iranian against the Baluch terror group Jaish al-Adl. This attack on the Pakistani province of Balochistan further deteriorated Iran–Pakistan relations.

Pakistan’s response was limited to diplomatic protests and the of ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s ambassador. However, Pakistan likewise carried out retaliatory precision strikes against Baluch camps on Iranian territory. This indicates a strategy of deterrence similar to the it used against India in 2019.Ěý

Pakistan does have the option to use force against Iran; it did so in a limited manner on January 17, when it launched a series of air and artillery inside ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s Sistan and Balochistan province. The limited strike demonstrated Pakistan’s deterrence capabilities, but terror groups inside Pakistan continue to complicate its situation.

Attacks on Chinese workers

On October 7, Baloch terrorists in the Pakistani city of Karachi conducted a that killed two Chinese nationals. Before that, on March 26, Baloch insurgents conducted a that killed five Chinese workers in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. These are merely the most recent instances of deadly attacks on Chinese nationals. In 2022, a in Karachi killed three Chinese instructors. In 2021, yet another killed two Chinese nationals in the Gwadar region.

These incidents have raised serious questions over Pakistan’s credentials of being a safe investment for China. In defense, China shut its firms and launched a sound into these incidents.

Pakistan is attempting to revive its economic situation and its relations with China, but such incidents might jeopardize long-term Pakistan–China economic relations. The issue of terror attacks paints Pakistan as an unsafe investment, to China and the rest of the world. Regardless, for the time being, China intends to with Pakistan to protect its personnel.

For Pakistan, going full throttle against insurgents raises the concern of a mass insurgency. However, Pakistan has gradually begun cross-border operations in relation to Afghanistan. The consequences may put Pakistan into a severe security headache as the capital of Islamabad is now caught in a twin terror trap with the TTP and Baloch militants. If flared, this situation could heavily impede Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Covert games on the edge of war

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), one of the longest and most devastating conflicts in the Middle East, covert operations played a critical role behind the scenes. Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, made the calculated decision to support Iran, despite their sworn enmity, to counterbalance the threat posed by Iraq under Saddam Hussein. This strategy was part of Israel’s “periphery doctrine,” which sought to build alliances with non-Arab nations to counter Arab adversaries.

Israel covertly arms to Iran, with US approval to sell unsophisticated weapons. However, Mossad deviated from this agreement, secretly providing advanced, American-made arms to Iran to gain its trust and secure intelligence on Iraq’s main nuclear reactor. This intelligence was crucial for Israel’s Operation Opera in 1981, in which Israeli jets successfully destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor to prevent Saddam from developing nuclear weapons.

The arms trade between Israel and Iran ran smoothly until 1982, when The New York Times exposed Israel’s front company in the US, which was purchasing sophisticated weapons for resale to Iran. In response, Israel shut down its operations in the US and them to London by 1983. Despite the US launching Operation Staunch in 1983 — a campaign to prevent arms sales to Iran — American intelligence largely turned a blind eye to Israel’s ongoing violations of the secret agreement.

This espionage episode underscored three key risks: first, Israel jeopardized its relationship with the US; second, it armed an enemy with advanced weaponry; and third, its strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor during an ongoing war risked escalating the conflict further. Iran retaliated in 1980 by striking Iraq’s nuclear reactors in , though with less success than Israel’s Operation Opera.

Throughout this period of covert arms deals and strategic strikes, the US intelligence community remained largely silent, observing from the shadows. Israel’s calculated gamble in supporting Iran, despite their animosity, paid off in the short term. However, such high-stakes moves in geopolitics carry significant risks, and while Israel’s actions yielded favorable outcomes, they could have easily backfired, altering the course of the war and regional dynamics dramatically.

Mossad’s missteps and misjudgments

Mossad’s assessment of Saddam Hussein went off track. One key example was Israel’s belief that Saddam would deploy non-conventional weapons against Israel during the buildup to the Iraq War, particularly between 2002 and 2003. This conviction ignored the reality that Saddam was struggling for survival and lacked the capacity to follow through on such threats. This miscalculation, along with similar errors by and the American CIA, contributed to heightened insecurity in the region and played a role in the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The invasion destabilized the region further and contributed to the rise of terror groups like ISIS.

Mossad also during the 1973 Yom Kippur War when the agency underestimated the threat of an imminent Arab attack. Israel was caught off guard by the Egyptian and Syrian surprise assault on October 6, 1973. This miscalculation could have had dire consequences if not for a timely intelligence input that helped redirect Israel’s military focus, preventing a potentially catastrophic outcome. Despite these lapses, Mossad’s high-risk strategies have at times been necessary, such as in the recent assassination of a Hamas leader.

In October 2024, within a span of just two days, Israel targeted two high-value individuals. On October 15, Israeli forces struck in Lebanon, killing a top Hezbollah commander in an airstrike. The following day, on October 16, Israel carried out a sophisticated operation in Iran, assassinating Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. The attack, which involved a bomb planted two months earlier in an IRGC-protected guesthouse, was triggered using AI technology once Haniyeh entered the room. Although Israel has not claimed responsibility for the operation, Iran has accused Mossad of orchestrating the assassination. Haniyeh had been a marked target for some time, with Israel labeling him a “dead man walking” and systematically targeting his family members in the months leading up to his death.

For Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this assassination provided a temporary reprieve from mounting political pressure amid the ongoing conflict and deadlocked hostage negotiations. The operation is seen as Israel’s retaliation for the October 7, 2023 attacks, during which Hamas launched a large-scale assault on southern Israel. However, questions remain about the broader impact of Haniyeh’s assassination. Some experts argue that his removal might facilitate more productive negotiations and increase the likelihood of reaching a deal, while others caution that the complexities of such high-stakes operations make the outcome uncertain.

Risky business, deterrence and escalationĚý

The core argument remains: Mossad’s risky tradecraft maneuvers, especially in the context of escalating conflicts, carry the risk of crossing red lines and reducing the space for negotiation — something Israel needs to resolve its hostage dilemma. The issue isn’t about protecting national security interests; it’s about the timing and level of risk Mossad chooses to take, which can sometimes lead to undesirable outcomes. Currently, Israel’s aggressive stance could escalate the conflict and complicate its hostage deal efforts.

There are two perspectives on the risks Mossad is taking. The first suggests that maintaining an offensive posture will deter and weaken the “axis of resistance” (a coalition of anti-Israel groups), forcing them to negotiate and eventually de-escalate. The second perspective warns that prolonging the conflict could dangerously expand Middle East brinkmanship, creating external and internal consequences for Israel.

While a prolonged conflict isn’t in the best interest of the region, it offers Iran a strategic opportunity to pressure the US-Israel alliance, potentially forcing negotiations on Iranian terms. In this context, Mossad may once again engage in high-stakes gambles to weaken ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s proxies politically and militarily. However, Mossad’s actions might also prompt the CIA to intensify deterrence efforts to preserve regional stability, illustrating the fragile balance of power in West Asia.

The historical example of Abu Jihad’s assassination by Mossad in 1988, one of the founders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), had unintended consequences. Rather than weakening Palestinian resistance, it fueled the First Intifada, which lasted until 1993 and resulted in 227 Israeli deaths. Mossad’s assessment seemed to contradict that of Israel’s Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who believed Abu Jihad was a moderate leader who could have restrained Yasser Arafat. According to Israel’s Military Intelligence Chief, Amnon Lipkin, Abu Jihad’s charisma might have prevented Hamas from gaining the significant foothold it did among the Palestinian population. This illustrates the long-term risks of Mossad’s operations, where tactical successes may lead to strategic setbacks.

Iran-Israel conflict: “grey” in the balance of power

The Middle East has faced the complexities of Cold War 2.0 and grey zone conflicts since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 2000s. However, the current grey zone dynamics are more pronounced than ever, suggesting that the region may oscillate between states of “no peace, no war” and periods of heightened conflict. In the near term, the “no peace, no war” scenario seems more likely, which could strategically shift the balance of power in favor of Israel. This shift would not only undermine Iran’s credibility but also set the stage for Israel’s resurgence, reminiscent of the post-1967 Arab-Israeli War period.

Such a reconfiguration of power could encourage more active US involvement in the Middle East, as a weakened Iran and a strengthened Israel open the door to diplomatic and political opportunities that serve both Western interests and regional stability. However, this strategic realignment may also heighten security concerns, disrupting the economic and political potential of Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which rely on stability for growth.

On the other hand, if the region settles into a prolonged “no peace, no war” scenario, security concerns will persist but at more sustainable levels. In this context, Iran could find space to regroup and rebuild its proxy networks. While Israel’s rise and the weakening of Iranian proxies might seem like a strategic advantage, history shows that such situations can lead to the resurgence of these very factions. For instance, the US failure to capture Osama bin Laden during the Battle of Tora Bora in 2001 eventually facilitated the Taliban’s resurgence. Similarly, Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, known as Operation Peace for Galilee, is often seen as a strategic miscalculation that contributed to the emergence of Hezbollah.

This historical precedent suggests that Iran’s weakened proxies could regroup and wage an enduring proxy war against Israel. While this dynamic may disrupt peace and stability, it is unlikely to escalate into full-scale war. Iran seems to have learned crucial lessons about the effective and restrained use of proxy forces, leading to a more cautious approach. Thus, while the potential for conflict remains, the likelihood of another extensive war seems low, leaving the region in a state of fragmented peace.

±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s options and future

Having run out of strategic patience, Iran has escalated tensions by ballistic missile strikes against Israel. These actions are almost certain to trigger a strong retaliatory response. In this volatile situation, Iran faces two main choices.

First, it could engage in a limited war with Israel. While this option risks significant damage to Iran, which is already at a strategic disadvantage, it could also help revive its proxy networks, allowing Tehran to reassert its regional influence.

Alternatively, Iran could pursue backchannel diplomacy to initiate serious negotiations with Israel, seeking to avoid direct conflict. This option becomes more attractive as Israel deals with urgent concerns about hostages, making negotiations a more viable path to de-escalation.

Following Iran’s rocket attack, which may have caused moderate damage in Tel Aviv, Israel has to retaliate. However, this escalation raises concerns about a broader regional war. While the US is advocating for a measured response, Israel prefers a swift and decisive strike. Recent comments by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu suggest that Israel will focus on military targets rather than civilian infrastructure like oil and gas facilities, which Iran has previously targeted. A moderate but effective strike is expected.

Iran’s reaction to Israel’s retaliation will be crucial to watch. Although Israel has received THAAD missile systems for defense, targeting Iran’s military, particularly IRGC sites, could lead to direct confrontation between the two rivals and increase US involvement. A limited strike on key locations could have a similar impact as targeting strategic sites in Iran. Israel’s calculated, swift offensive will be a decisive response, but ±ő°ů˛ą˛Ô’s next move remains uncertain and will be critical in the coming days.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In Gaza, Israel appears to be launching its “” to drive the most devastated and traumatized 2.2 million people in the world into the southern half of their open-air prison. Under this , Israel would hand the northern half over to greedy developers and settlers who, after decades of encouragement from the United States, have become a dominant force in Israeli politics and society. The of those who cannot or refuse to move south has already begun.

In , millions are fleeing for their lives. Israel is blowing thousands to pieces in a repeat of the first phase of the genocide in Gaza. Every person it kills or forces out and every building in a neighboring country it demolishes opens the way for future Israeli settlements. The people of Iran, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia ask which of them will be next.

Israel attacks UNIFIL

Israel is not only attacking its neighbors — it is at war with the entire world. The nation is especially threatened when the world’s governments convene at the United Nations and in international courts to try to enforce the rule of international law. Like every other country, Israel is legally bound by the rules of the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions and other multilateral treaties.

In July, the International Court of Justice ruled that Israel’s occupation of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem since 1967 is , and that it must withdraw its military forces and settlers from all those territories. In September, the UN General Assembly passed a giving Israel one year to complete that withdrawal. If Israel fails to comply, as expected, the UN Security Council or the General Assembly may take stronger measures. These could include an international arms embargo, economic sanctions or even the use of force.

Now, amid the escalating violence of Israel’s latest bombing and invasion of Lebanon, Israel is attacking the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This peacekeeping force’s thankless job is to monitor and mitigate the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Shiite militia and political party in Lebanon.

On October 10 and 11, Israeli forces fired on UNIFIL positions in Lebanon. At least peacekeepers were injured. UNIFIL also accused Israeli soldiers of deliberately firing at and disabling the monitoring cameras at its headquarters, before two Israeli tanks later crashed into its gates, destroying them. On October 15, an Israeli tank at a watchtower in what UNIFIL described as “direct and apparently deliberate fire on a UNIFIL position.” UN missions is a war crime.

This is far from the first time Israel has attacked the soldiers of UNIFIL. The force has the worst death toll of any of the UN’s 52 peacekeeping missions since 1948. Since UNIFIL took up its positions in southern Lebanon in , Israel has UN peacekeepers from Ireland, Norway, Nepal, France, Finland, Austria and China. The South Lebanon Army, Israel’s Christian militia proxy in Lebanon from 1984 to 2000, killed many more, as have other Palestinian and Lebanese groups. In fact, 337 UN peacekeepers from all over the world have trying to keep the peace in southern Lebanon, which is sovereign Lebanese territory and should not face repeated Israeli invasions.Ěý

A full 50 countries contribute to the 10,000-strong UNIFIL peacekeeping mission, anchored by battalions from France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Nepal and Spain. All those governments have strongly and unanimously Israel’s latest attacks, and that “such actions must stop immediately and should be adequately investigated.”

Israel works to dismantle UNRWA

Israel’s assault on UN agencies is not confined to attacking its peacekeepers in Lebanon. The vulnerable United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), staffed by unarmed civilians, is under an even more vicious assault by Israel in Gaza. In the past year alone, Israel has and fired on UNRWA schools, warehouses, aid convoys and UN personnel, killing nearly workers.

UNRWA was created in 1949 by the UN General Assembly to provide to Palestinian refugees after the 1948 (catastrophe). The Zionist militias that later became the Israeli army violently expelled over 700,000 Palestinians from their homes and homeland, ignoring the UN partition plan. They forcibly seized much of the land the UN plan had allocated to form a Palestinian state.

In 1949, the UN recognized all that Zionist-occupied territory as the new state of Israel. The state’s most aggressive, racist leaders concluded that they could get away with making and remaking their own borders by force — the world would not lift a finger to stop them. Emboldened by its growing military and diplomatic alliance with the US, Israel has only expanded its territorial ambitions.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now brazenly stands before the whole world and displays of “Greater Israel” that include all the land it illegally occupies. Meanwhile Israelis openly talk of parts of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Israel has long desired to dismantle UNRWA. In 2017, Netanyahu the agency of inciting anti-Israeli sentiment. He blamed UNRWA for “perpetuating the Palestinian refugee problem” and for its elimination.

After Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, Israel 12 of UNRWA’s 13,000 staff of involvement. The agency immediately suspended those workers, and many countries pulled their UNRWA funding. However, a UN report later that Israeli authorities did not provide “any supporting evidence” to back up their allegations. Since this revelation, every country that previously supported UNRWA except the has restored its funding.

Israel’s assault on the refugee agency has only continued. There are now three in the Israeli Knesset. One aims to ban the organization from operating in Israel, another to strip UNRWA’s staff of legal protections afforded to UN workers under Israeli law and a third to brand the agency as a terrorist organization. Israeli members of parliament are also proposing legislation to UNRWA’s headquarters in Jerusalem and use the land for new settlements.

UN Secretary General Guterres that if these bills become law and UNRWA is unable to aid the people of Gaza, “it would be a catastrophe in what is already an unmitigated disaster.”

The US obstructs resolution

Israel’s relationship with the UN and the rest of the world is at a breaking point. When Netanyahu the General Assembly in New York in September, he called the UN a “swamp of antisemitic bile.” But the UN is not an alien body from another planet. It is simply the world’s nations coming together to try to solve our most serious common problems. One of these problems is the endless crisis that Israel’s actions are causing for its neighbors and, increasingly, the whole planet.

Now Israel wants to ban UN Secretary General António Guterres from even entering the country. AsIsrael invaded Lebanon on October 1, Iran responded to a series of Israeli attacks and assassinations by launching 180 missiles at Israel. Guterres put out a statement deploring the “broadening conflict in the Middle East,” but did not specifically mention Iran. Israel responded by him persona non grata in Israel, a new low in relations between Israel and UN officials.

Over the years, the US has partnered with Israel in its attacks on the UN. It has used its in the Security Council 40 times to obstruct the world’s efforts to force Israel to comply with international law.

US obstruction offers no solution. As chaos grows and spreads and the US’s unconditional support gradually pulls it deeper into the conflict, this policy can only fuel the crisis.

The rest of the world is looking on in horror. Many world leaders are making sincere efforts to activate the collective mechanisms of the UN system. US leadership helped build these mechanisms in 1945 so that the world would never again be consumed by global conflict and genocide after World War II.

A US arms embargo against Israel and an end to US obstruction in the UN Security Council could tip the political power balance in favor of the world’s collective efforts to resolve the crisis.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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