In the Middle East, however, the metaverse continues to be embraced by governments with enthusiasm. Israel has opened its first metaverse in South Korea. Saudi Arabia has been engaged with companies such as The Sandbox, for long-term collaboration. Saudi Arabia has even opened the region’s first metaverse to provide training in the new technology. Scholars that NEOM, the planned smart city in Tabuk Province,  is building “the first metaverse that actually is a metaverse.” 

In February 2023, global professional services firm KPMG announced that it would establish a Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Saudia Arabia with the aim of speeding up the application of the metaverse in the country as well as the wider Middle East and North Africa region. 

KPMG will be collaborating with a broad collection of including Microsoft, Ericsson and Metakey. Microsoft will be responsible for providing the gaming platform and infrastructure; Ericsson will utilize its 5G technology and network; Metakey will be in charge of creating 3D objects.

Virtual tourism, services and more

The metaverse technology is set to transform the global competitiveness of companies, and Saudi Arabia is embracing this vision. Spearheading the initiative is the Royal Commission for AlUla, which has a captivating metaverse experience. Users can now virtually explore and interact with the Tomb of Lihyan, Hegra’s largest tomb, providing a unique glimpse into the country’s rich history.

Egypt has also embraced the metaverse revolution, its first city called , inspired by its ancient civilization that continues to attract numerous tourists each year. The virtual city combines elements of ancient Egyptian culture with a futuristic touch, commemorating the 100-year anniversary of the discovery of King Tutankhamun’s tomb.

Notably, the Metaverse Tunisian Summit took place in 2022, emphasizing the region’s growing interest in this technology.

Countries like the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar have shown serious interest, with Dubai and Abu Dhabi being selected as the first global cities to launch within by Metaverse Holdings.

Various sectors are jumping into the metaverse bandwagon. Qatar Airways introduced the platform, offering customers a virtual reality experience. Users can now explore the airline’s premium check-in area and even tour the interior of their aircraft cabins, enhancing the travel experience.

Virgin Mobile Kuwait emerged as the first telecommunications company to its position in The Sandbox, a virtual game environment. 

The UAE’s Thumbay Group aims to bring innovative healthcare solutions to the virtual realm, while the Ministry of Health and Prevention has established a customer happiness service center within the metaverse. Furthermore, the UAE’s Ministry of Economy has opened its third office in the metaverse, offering services such as consumer protection, trademark and patent services, and industrial designs.

In with Multiverse Labs and the Sharjah Commerce & Tourism Development Authority, the UAE has launched Sharjaverse, the world’s first government-backed metaverse city. This ambitious project features a “” for official document processing and aims to boost the country’s digital economy and local tourism. The minister even announced that the UAE’s economic progress will now be measured using the Gross Metaverse Product (GMP) metric, replacing the traditional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) metric.

Digital authoritarianism on the horizon

The rest of the Middle East has seen a surge in the adoption of digital technology despite disparities in access. While countries like Yemen struggle with slow internet and limited smartphone usage, wealthier Gulf Cooperation Council nations pioneer the adoption of advanced tech like 5G. Gulf states have rapidly acquired the status of premier digital superpowers in the region.  

However, during the World Economic Forum, the UAE’s Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence warned about the concept of “” in the metaverse. He called for international standards to prohibit such acts. However, human rights activists have criticized the proposal as a veiled attempt at censorship.

The emergence of digital totalitarianism appears increasingly likely as well. We may see countries such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and the UAE themselves strategically with other formidable digital authoritarian superpowers, including China and Russia.

The stage is set for a high-stakes power play in the digital realm, where the rules for global dynamics are being written in the Middle East. The debate surrounding international standards for the metaverse will likely intensify as more countries and organizations grapple with the ethical and social implications of this emerging digital frontier.

[Naveed Ahsan edited this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Water World: Is Climate Change Driving Our Future Out to Sea?

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Burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that trap heat in the atmosphere, making them major contributors to climate change. On the other hand, high industrial activities, alongside rapidly increasing populations, put growing pressure on energy demand.

The Example of Qatar

Qatar has made remarkable economic achievements over the past few decades. Yet Qatar is facing a trade-off between boosting its economic growth and lowering its carbon dioxide emissions. Its strategic mandate to boost economic development, along with other areas related to sustainability, makes Qatar an interesting country to analyze.

The World Bank defines Qatar as one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita. Its economy is highly dependent on oil and gas production, which for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of export earnings and 70% of government revenues. The country is also a major player in liquefied natural gas. Nonetheless, Qatar’s high dependence on fossil fuels has resulted in an in the CO2 emissions level when compared to global averages.

To combat the rising carbon emission percentages and lower environmental pressures, Qatar is introducing strict policy measures to achieve sustainable development through four central pillars: economic, social, human and environmental development. While many disruptions have occurred over the past few years, including fluctuations in oil and gas prices, economic downturns and a deadly pandemic, nobody expected an economic blockade.

The Diplomatic Rift

In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cut diplomatic relations with Qatar. They prohibited Qatar-registered planes and ships from utilizing their airspace and sea routes, and the Saudis also blocked Qatar’s only land border.

This point is of particular importance as the deterioration in relations among the Gulf neighbors urged Qatar to rethink its sustainable development goals while meeting local demand. At the beginning of the blockade, the country relied heavily on importing several commodities, especially food items. Later, it accelerated initiatives and programs to diversify the economy and reduce reliance on imports.

Achieving carbon neutrality is also factored into all Qatar’s initiatives. For example, by the end of 2022, Qatar aims to deliver the first carbon-neutral FIFA World Cup in the history of the event. All stadiums and infrastructure are subjected to rigorous sustainability standards. Several air quality monitoring stations and extensive recycling programs are being introduced, along with the construction of the eight stadiums that will be used during the football tournament.

Qatar has since become much more independent across several sectors, including food production and transport, making it a case study on how to transform challenges into opportunities for growth.

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This was also evident with total carbon emissions. According to my own analysis, carbon emission per capita fell by 13% as of 2018 from a historical record in 2000. Since then, total carbon emissions have increased as the economy has grown but at a slower rate, meaning that Qatar is undergoing expanding relative decoupling. In the 2008 to 2018 period, a 1% change in GDP resulted in a fall of CO2 emissions, from 0.65% to 0.44%. This drop is very relevant to Qatar as several measures have been applied, particularly over the last 10 years, to reduce emissions.

A Reduction in Emissions

While Qatar’s total emissions have declined over recent years, policies to increase energy efficiency, diversify the energy mix by introducing more renewables, support technological development to improve energy efficiency in a desert climate, and implement energy demand management programs to maintain the same trend of decline and achieve climate change objectives have been increasingly crucial.  

The heightened pressure caused by the blockade on Qatar is now over, but what is needed are more synergies and collective efforts across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to stimulate economic diversification and minimize carbon emissions. Member states of the GCC are sharing multiple environmental, social and economic factors that should incentivize them to cooperate to meet their climate change objectives and economic development goals.

*[Saad Shannak is a scientist at Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute, part of Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) in Qatar. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the university’s official stance.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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During the past two years alone, six women have had their lives taken by either their male kin or other men. The women have been reduced to mere statistics thrown around to point out the rise of killings, without investigating the cause of their murder or providing insight into these high-profile cases.

Around the World, Femicide Is on the Rise

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The Family Protection Law, which was passed by Kuwait’s national assembly in August 2020, for the establishment of a national family protection committee. This committee would put measures in place to tackle the spread of domestic violence. The law stipulates that those taking part in the family protection sector should undergo the necessary training. It also calls for the activation of a domestic violence shelter, which would offer rehabilitation and advisory services to survivors of domestic violence.

At the time, these measures were  as a victory, one that abolished Article 153, which treated honor killings as a misdemeanor with a maximum three-year prison sentence and/or a small fine for the perpetrator. Experts argued that Article 153 all but  honor killings. Yet despite being passed more than a year ago, the Family Protection Law remains nothing but merely ink on paper. The failure to protect women from being victims of domestic violence continues unabated.

Violence Against Women

The absence of such protection is what  Farah Hamza Akbar’s life. In April, Farah was gruesomely killed by a man she had previously filed two cases against for kidnapping and attempted murder. The perpetrator, Fahad Subhi Mohammed, who had been stalking the victim but was not known to her or her family, crashed into Farah’s car, kidnapped her and her two daughters. He stabbed Farah in the chest before dumping her body in front of a hospital, leaving her there to die.

Dana Akbar, Farah’s sister and lawyer, shared a  on social media saying she had warned the prosecutor several times that her sister’s life was in danger. According to Akbar, her sister’s perpetrator attempted to kidnap and harm Farah on multiple occasions. He was detained twice but released on bail each time. Mohammed was out on bail when he killed Farah.

The heinous crime sent shockwaves across Kuwait, resulting in a large  during the height of summer in the holy month of Ramadan. Protesters called for reforming existing laws, putting in place better protection mechanisms for victims of violence and actually enforcing the Family Protection Law.

The debate following Farah’s death served to amplify the anti-sexual harassment movement that was brought into prominence early in the year by Ascia al-Shammari. The influential fashion blogger posted a powerful venting her fury about the horror of being car chased by men, a common form of harassment in Kuwait. She called for a mechanism to report sexual harassment, saying “it is a necessary step in this country … So I don’t understand when you say you are against it.” The video went viral on social media platforms, provoking many women to comment and leading to “culturally sensitive” conversations about sexual harassment and gender-based violence.

Following Shammari’s video, a social media awareness campaign dubbed  (I will not be silent) was launched by medical doctor Shayma Shamo. It served as a virtual safe space that gave women the opportunity to share anonymous testimonies of harassment or abuse, encouraging more women to speak up.

Empty Promises

But the outrage that took place and the different hashtags only resulted in empty promises made by several members of parliament. Former MP Yousef al-Fadhala, who resigned from parliament in April, a government-sponsored mobile app designed to document and register instances of harassment. MP Abdulaziz al-Saqabi for an amendment to the penal code, adding punishments that include up to a year in prison and a fine of 3,000 Kuwaiti dinars ($9,940). Lastly, MP Abdullah al-Mudhaf adding punitive measures to the penal code, with a three-month window for the executive branch to activate these laws.

Almost eight months later, none of the proposals has been acted upon. However, in late September, the minister of commerce and industry and the chairman of the Public Authority for Manpower, Abdullah al-Salman, directives to end discrimination in the private sector and criminalize harassment in the workplace. While this step is long overdue, it is a promising one toward establishing a safer work environment for women. Yet there remains much to do.

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A recent  from the male-only Women, Children and Family Affairs parliamentary committee suggests that femicide is not a legislative issue but a societal one. The committee added that preventing violence against women is the responsibility of the government. This muddled and inadequate response, especially when Kuwait is witnessing a disturbing increase in femicide, is not nearly enough.

Despite having a vocal parliament and a free press, in comparison to its Gulf neighbors, Kuwait lags behind when it comes to enacting legislation to protect the lives of its women. More than one year and six lives later, we still see the offhand attitude in parliament and society toward violence against women, a convenient way of condoning this tragedy without condemning and holding accountable those responsible.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The shaky pillar is the Gulf monarchies’ reliance on a powerful external ally that, in the of Middle East scholar Roby C. Barrett, “shares the strategic, if not dynastic, interests of the Arab States.” In the first half of the 20^th century, the allies were Britain and France. Since then, the US has taken on the role. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, the revered founder of the United Arab Emirates, implicitly recognized Gulf states’ need for external support. In a to a book in 2001, he noted that the six monarchies that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) “only support the GCC when it suited them.”

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Going forward, question marks about the reliability of the United States may be unsettling. Yet the emerging outline of what a future US approach could look like is not all bad news for the region’s autocratic regimes. There have been to dial down regional tensions and strengthen regional alliances. The factors driving this are the uncertainty over the US role in the region, the unwillingness of GCC states to integrate their defense strategies, a realization that neither China nor Russia would step into Washington’s shoes, and a need to attract foreign investment to diversify the Gulf’s energy-dependent economies.

Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and his Emirati counterpart, Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, are headed to Washington this week for a tripartite meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The three officials intend “to discuss accomplishments” since last year’s establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE “and other important issues,” Blinken . The Israeli Foreign Ministry those other issues include “further opportunities to promote peace in the Middle East” as well as regional stability and security, in a guarded reference to Iran.

Good News for the Gulf

From the Gulf’s perspective, the good news is also that the Biden administration’s focus on China may mean that it is reconfiguring its military presence in the Middle East. The US has  some assets from the Gulf to Jordan and withdrawn from Saudi Arabia, but it is not about to pull out lock, stock and barrel. Beyond having an interest in ensuring the free flow of trade and energy, Washington’s strategic interest in a counterterrorism presence in the Gulf has increased following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August. The US now relies on an “over the horizon” , for which the Middle East remains crucial.

Moreover, domestic US politics mitigate toward a continued, if perhaps reduced, military presence, even if Americans are tired of foreign adventures. This is despite the emergence of a Biden doctrine that deemphasizes military engagement. The focus of US foreign policy is also now on Asia rather than the Middle East.

Various powerful lobbies and interest groups — including Israelis, Gulf states, evangelists, and the oil and defense industries — retain a stake in a continued US presence in the region. Their voices are likely to resonate louder in the run-up to crucial midterm elections in 2022. A recent Pew Research concluded that the number of white evangelicals had increased from 25% of the US population in 2016 to 29% in 2020.

Similarly, the fading hope for a revival of the Iran nuclear deal, from which former US President Donald Trump withdrew in 2018, and the risk of a major military conflagration makes a full-fledged US military withdrawal unlikely. It also increases the incentive to continue major arms sales to Gulf Arab countries.

That’s further good news for Gulf regimes against the backdrop of an emerging US arms sales policy that the Biden administration would like to project as emphasizing respect for human rights and rule of law. However, that de facto approach is unlikely to affect big-ticket prestige items like the F-35 fighter jets promised to the UAE.

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Instead, the policy will probably  to smaller weapons, such as assault rifles and surveillance equipment that police or paramilitary forces could use against protesters. Those are not the technological edge items where the US has a definitive competitive advantage. The big-ticket items with proper maintenance and training would allow Gulf states to support US regional operations. Examples include the UAE and Qatar‘s role in Libya in 2011 and also the UAE in Somalia and Afghanistan as part of peacekeeping missions.

Nothing to Worry About

In other words, the Gulf states can relax. The Biden administration is not embracing what some arms trade analysts define as the meaning of ending endless wars such as Afghanistan. “[E]nding endless war means more than troop withdrawal. It also means ending the militarized approach to foreign policy — including the transfer of deadly weapons around the world — that has undermined human rights and that few Americans believe makes the country any safer,” a group of experts in April.

There is little indication that the views expressed by these analysts, which stroke with thinking in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, are taking root in the policymaking corridors of Washington. As long as that doesn’t happen, Gulf states have less to worry about.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Youth activism and empowerment have a rich history in Yemen. Youth activism became a bustling part of civil society during the Arab Spring of 2011. At that time, demonstrations at change squares and protest camps gave young Yemenis a place to meet and discuss their hopes and demands for human rights. A number of youth-led organizations were founded, carrying out advocacy, media reporting and monitoring. 

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As the regime led by Ali Abdullah Saleh came to an end in 2012, the transitional government that took over Yemen made incredible steps to engage youth populations in the national dialogue. A technocratic  was formed in 2014 that “drew heavily from youth leaders,” many of whom were given a generous amount of access to decision-makers. The institutional progress made during this time has since been abandoned. However, the spirit of Yemeni youth activists lives on in the actions of youth leaders today. 

Yemen’s war has spared no one, not even its children. The in the country worsens as fighting continues between the internationally recognized, Saudi-backed Yemeni government and Houthi rebels. The war has resulted in the complete breakdown of government services and the destruction of critical infrastructures, such as hospitals, schools and roads. 

What Are Youth Doing?

Although the war is not over, Yemeni youth activists are building support for their number one : peace. They are combining humanitarian initiatives with development components to create a sustainable approach to peacebuilding. This advocating for small businesses like food carts and home-delivery kitchens, using skills in social media to raise awareness for public health and safety issues, and designing graphics to show how to avoid contaminated water or where landmines may be located. 

Youth activists are creating a culture of trust and community, especially among vulnerable populations where networks of support might have otherwise collapsed during the conflict. In the event that funding no longer sustains humanitarian aid, these programs and businesses will continue to support Yemenis. Through the creation of opportunity and family support, Yemeni youth are keeping alive the fabric of society necessary to achieve long-term stability. 

The youth empowerment initiatives that Yemeni activists organize similarly seek peace. The most immediate goal of these initiatives is to offer an alternative to fighting in the conflict. These initiatives champion the of youth empowerment: for young people to develop skills, awareness and opportunities that will positively impact their lives toward a future they have chosen. 

Yemeni youth activists are combating unemployment and providing livelihood , protecting young people from conflict and further polarization and also maintaining security. These activists have shown great adaptability and  in presenting an alternative future to young people where they are able to have agency over their lives. 

Involving Young Yemenis

Those in positions of power should not wait until the conflict is over to integrate young Yemeni leaders into the peacebuilding process. Integral work is being done by young activists every day. Not involving this group in the political process further marginalizes and silences the voices of community members suffering from the conflict. Yemeni youth are the future of the country and should have consistent access to decision-making. 

Engaging youth in peacebuilding  “serves to address their feelings of fear, isolation, hopelessness, stigmatization, and in turn, contributes to the overall security of the community.” Young leaders will not only be able to feel a sense of agency over their own lives but over the peace process as well. They become active players in their nation’s history rather than passive victims of war. When they become the leaders of Yemen, they will have developed the necessary skills to care for the people of Yemen. 

The war has blocked all forms of for Yemeni youth, a critical space to share their ideas. It is essential that leaders and international actors do not silence them altogether. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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No doubt, MBS will not have forgotten revelations about Emirati attitudes toward Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s strategic vision of the relationship between the two countries. This was spelled out in  by Yusuf al-Otaiba, the UAE ambassador in Washington and a close associate of MBZ, which were leaked in 2017. The emails made clear that UAE leaders believed they could use Saudi Arabia — the Gulf’s behemoth — and Mohammed bin Salman as a vehicle to promote Emirati interests.

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“Our relationship with them is based on strategic depth, shared interests, and most importantly the hope that we could influence them. Not the other way around,” Otaiba . In a separate email, the ambassador told a former US official that “I think in the long term we might be a good influence on KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia], at least with certain people there.”

A participant in a more recent meeting with Otaiba quoted the ambassador as referring to the Middle East as “the UAE region,” suggesting an enhanced Emirati regional influence. In a similar vein, former Dubai police chief Dhahi Khalfan, blowing his ultra-nationalist horn, in Arabic, “It’s not humanity’s survival of the strongest, it’s the survival of the smartest.”

To be sure, Mohammed bin Zayed has been plotting the UAE’s positioning as a regional economic and geopolitical powerhouse for far longer than his Saudi counterpart. It is not for nothing that it earned the UAE the epitaph of “Little Sparta,” in the words of former US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis.

Windows of Opportunity

No doubt, smarts count for a lot. But, in the ultimate analysis, the two crown princes appear to be exploiting windows of opportunity that exist as long as their most powerful rivals, Turkey and Iran, fail to get their act together. The Saudis and Emiratis see the Turks and Iranians as threats to their regional power. Both Turkey and Iran have far larger, highly educated populations, huge domestic markets, battle-hardened militaries, significant natural resources and industrial bases.

In the meantime, separating the wheat from the chaff in the Gulf spat may be easier said than done. , a Gulf analyst, notes that differences among Arab states have emerged as a result of regime survival strategies that are driven by the need to gear up for a post-oil era. The emergence of a more competitive landscape need not be all negative. Saif warns, however, that “left unchecked … differences could snowball and negatively impact the neighborhood.

Several factors complicate the management of these differences. For one, the Vision 2030 plan for weening Saudi Arabia off its dependence on the export of fossil fuel differs little from the perspective put forward by the UAE and Qatar, two countries that have a substantial head start.

Saudi Arabia sought to declare an initial success in the expanded rivalry by revealing last week that the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the airline industry body, had opened its  headquarters in Riyadh. IATA denied that the Saudi office would have regional responsibility. The announcement came on the heels of the disclosure of Saudi to create a new airline to compete with Emirates and Qatar Airways.

Further complicating the management of differences is the fact that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are likely to compete for market share as they seek to maximize their oil export revenues in the short and medium term. This is particularly before oil demand plateaus and then declines in the 2030s.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, economic diversification and social liberalization are tied up with the competing geopolitical ambitions of the two princes in positioning their countries as the regional leader. Otaiba signaled MBZ’s ambition in 2017 in an email exchange with Elliot Abram, a neoconservative former US official. “Jeez, the new hegemon! Emirati imperialism! Well, if the US won’t do it, someone has to hold things together for a while,” Abrams wrote to the ambassador, referring to the UAE’s growing regional role. “Yes, how dare we! In all honesty, there was not much of a choice. We stepped up only after your country chose to step down,” Otaiba replied.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas

Differences in the ideological and geopolitical thinking of the princes when it comes to political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood reemerged recently. Differing Saudi and Emirati approaches were initially evident in 2015 when King Salman and his son began their reign in Saudi Arabia. This was a period when Mohammed bin Zayed, who views political Islam and the Brotherhood as an existential threat, had yet to forge close ties to the new Saudi leadership. At the time, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, barely a month after King Salman’s ascendancy, an interviewer that “there is no problem between the kingdom” and the Brotherhood.

Just a month later, the Muslim World League, a body established by Saudi Arabia in the 1960s to propagate religious ultra-conservatism and long dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, a conference in a building in Mecca that had not been used since the banning of the brothers. The Qataris, who have a history of close ties to the Brotherhood, were invited.

After King Salman and his son came to power, Saudi Arabia adopted a harder approach toward Brotherhood-related groups as Mohammed bin Zayed gained influence in Saudi affairs. The Muslim League has since become Mohammed bin Salman’s main vehicle for promoting his call for religious tolerance and inter-faith dialogue. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are portraying themselves as icons of a socially moderate form of Islam that, nonetheless, endorses autocratic rule.

Last week, the kingdom signaled a potential change in its attitude toward Brotherhood-related groups with the broadcast of an interview with Khaled Meshaal, the Qatar-based head of the political arm of Hamas. The interview was aired on Al Arabiya, the Saudi state-controlled news channel. Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist group that controls Gaza, maintains relations with Iran and is viewed as being part of a Brotherhood network. Meshaal called for a resumption of relations between Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian movement.

In 2014, Saudi Arabia designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. This was part of a dispute between Qatar, a supporter of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, which had all withdrawn their ambassadors from Doha. The Saudis were particularly upset by the close relations that Hamas had forged with Iran and Turkey, Riyadh’s main rivals for regional hegemony.

A litmus test of the degree of change in Saudi Arabia’s attitude will be whether it releases scores of Hamas members. These members were arrested in 2019 as part of Saudi efforts to garner Palestinian support for then-US President Donald Trump’s controversial peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Quoting the Arabic service of Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency, Al-Monitor reported that Al Arabiya had  from broadcasting a segment of the interview in which Meshaal called for the release of the detainees.

Despite Differences

The Saudi–UAE rivalry and the ambitions of their leaders make it unlikely that Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed will look at structural ways of managing differences. This includes areas like greater regional economic integration through arrangements for trade and investment and an expanded customs union. The latter would make the region more attractive to foreign investors and improve the Gulf states’ bargaining power.

In the absence of strengthening institutions, the bets are on the crown princes recognizing that, despite their , “it doesn’t make sense for either one of them to let go of the other.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Yet as restrictions ease and economies pick up pace, the sense of normality that many hope for is one of the few luxuries energy producers cannot afford. In the race to comply with mounting political pressure to reduce carbon emissions while simultaneously securing their energy futures, the Sino-Gulf alliance may become the new center of gravity for global energy markets.

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The pandemic has undoubtedly cast a dark shadow on energy. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently that energy demand will not return to pre-pandemic levels until 2023 in its most optimistic outlook or 2025 in the case of a delayed economic recovery. However, a return to pre-COVID demand does not necessitate a return to pre-crisis growth. Predicted growth in demand between 2019 and 2030 is estimated at 4% in the delayed recovery case, compared to 12% in a COVID-free world.

Nevertheless, the pandemic has also highlighted the importance of a reliable and accessible electricity supply. The IEA that the electricity sector, whose demand outpaces other fuels, will support economic recovery and account for 21% of global final energy consumption by 2030. This push for electricity is widely driven by the various global emission reduction targets, increased use of electric vehicles and heat sources in advanced economies, and greater consumption from emerging markets.

Leader of the Pack

Of the countries driving this growth, China is leading the pack and is predicted to be the main driver of energy demand over the next decade. Following his for an “energy ���𱹴DZ��ܳپ��Dz�,” President Xi Jinping has sought to reposition China as a key player in global energy markets. While the Chinese are currently the world’s consumers and producers of coal-fired electricity, Xi’s to make China carbon neutral by 2060 means that energy demands are increasingly being met via renewables.

China is predicted to account for of global renewable expansion, leading in the realm of nuclear power, biofuel production and will account for almost half of globally distributed photovoltaic power. In addition to this, Chinese demand is also predicted to account for 40% of global electricity sector growth by 2030, up from 28%. It was as a consequence of East Asia’s growing appetite for clean energy that, in 2016, global electricity investment outpaced that of oil and gas for the first time in history.

However, as with everything, there will be winners and losers. While electricity is on the up, sluggish global oil demand has led to falling oil prices. With demand predicted to in the 2030s, there is a growing urgency for Gulf Arab states to diversify as oil becomes more of a burden than a blessing. Yet, in their hurry to claim their stake in the new energy world order, Gulf countries may begin to look east rather than west for a friend to rely on.

China and the Gulf

Sino-Gulf relations are not a new occurrence. As the world’s importer of oil and natural gas, these two commodities dominate Chinese trade relations and have been the basis of the Saudi-led Gulf alliance. The Gulf Cooperation Council supplies over of China’s oil imports, with Saudi Arabia topping the list, accounting for of the oil import total. Nevertheless, in a world that is increasingly turning its back on oil, GCC states and China may increasingly look to each other to secure their respective energy futures.

From the establishment of the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in 2004 to the China–GCC Strategic Dialogue in 2010, Sino-Gulf relations have grown from strength to strength. As such, it was hardly surprising when China gave the GCC a starring role in its Belt and Road Initiative. Announced in 2013, this global infrastructure project that seeks to boost physical connectivity, financial integration, trade and economic growth has become the core pillar of China’s increasingly active foreign policy approach under Xi.

During the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the CASCF in 2014, Xi about the Gulf Arab states as “natural cooperative partners in jointly building” the BRI. This set the stage for a of multi-billion-dollar investments and agreements between China and the Gulf states, advancing the Belt and Road Initiative in the Arabian Peninsula and deepening economic ties.

Chinese investment activity in the Gulf has followed the “” Sino-Arab cooperation framework. This features energy cooperation as its central axis, investment and infrastructure, and accelerating breakthroughs in three high-tech sectors, namely aviation satellite, nuclear energy and new energy. However, there is no doubt that the BRI aims primarily to strengthen this central pillar of energy cooperation. Aptly described as “oil roads,” the initiative will enable China to establish the necessary infrastructure, transport and refinery facilities needed to secure its energy future and keep GCC coffers full.

These ambitious plans will be of greater significance in the years to come. Despite the economic and energy market turmoil triggered by the pandemic, Sino-Gulf relations show no signs of . Rather, the pandemic may have made way for a greater mutual dependence between China and the Gulf states. This is particularly true for the GCC, whose economic wellbeing depends heavily on the revival of global oil markets. China may prove to be the answer to Gulf ministers’ prayers, stimulating growth by providing a guaranteed revenue stream for the region’s main export, no doubt stabilizing GCC economies.

Beyond the energy sector, however, the two regions offer a wealth of investment opportunities that will likely deepen relations, particularly as the GCC economies realize their various diversification plans. The synergies between the GCC’s “v�������Dz�” and China’s BRI are extensive, thus acting as a major point of collaboration. The two are already in the final stages of the long-awaited China–GCC free trade agreement, a move that would no doubt propel economic cooperation and open the doors to a vast array of trading opportunities. Saudi Arabia has already taken active steps to consolidate this BRI-vision cooperation by various agreements and memorandums of understanding with China. Riyadh has since the BRI to be “one of the main pillars of the Saudi Vision 2030,” consequently making China “among the Kingdom’s biggest economic partners.” 

Closer Partners

It is thus clear that, willingly or unwillingly, recent global events have further pushed China and GCC into each other’s arms. Sino-Gulf relations can be expected to gain serious traction in the next few years, especially in the realm of energy cooperation, which is likely to continue to spearhead this strategic alliance as a sector of great mutual importance. Meanwhile, as China seeks to entrench itself in the Gulf, it may find itself caught in the middle of the regional power struggles that threaten stability, namely the Iran-Saudi rivalry. President Xi, however, shows no intent of mixing business with politics, as seen in his recent regional , which saw him visit both Saudi Arabia and Iran among others.

Nevertheless, if China wishes to grow its presence in the Gulf, ensuring regional peace will undoubtedly become a priority for Beijing. Chinese neutrality may be exactly what is needed to defuse regional tensions and maintain a level of accord that keeps the feud below boiling point. Yet despite Sino-Gulf relations taking center stage in the near future, China will not be replacing the United States as the dominant foreign power in the Middle East any time soon. Beijing’s focus on economic rather than political matters makes China, to use the of Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, “not necessarily a better friend, but a less complicated friend.”

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After almost four years of severed ties, in January led to the subsequent lifting of the blockade against Qatar and the formal restoration of relations. The resolution of the dispute is a positive regional development. However, it remains fragile because the issues that sparked the rift in the first place were never resolved.

It is therefore unlikely that the Gulf reconciliation will usher in a new beginning or bring about a return to pre-crisis normalcy. Deep-rooted mistrust between the Gulf countries, ongoing rivalries between them, divergence in their policies and geostrategic competition in Africa could trigger the next diplomatic crisis among member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Sudan’s Attempt to Play All Sides

Most Arab and sub-Saharan African states tried to resist pressure to join the anti-Qatar coalition and delicately maneuver their way into neutrality. These states were uneasy about their move because they feared that the Arab quartet would use their economic might against them. As a result, some African states cut or ties with Qatar.

Financial in Africa has helped GCC states capitalize on their geostrategic location, increase their food security and advance their diplomatic and security goals. By offering substantial economic , they have been able to bolster peace agreements between warring factions. Some GCC states have achieved notable success, growing influence and African allies that support their policies. Sudan is a case in point. In 2019, Saudi in Sudan were estimated at $12 billion, the UAE at $7 billion and Qatar at $4 billion, as per the Sudanese Bureau of Statistics. 

Due to Saudi Arabia’s large investments, Sudan the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen in 2015 by Rapid Support Forces and severing diplomatic with Iran. However, Bashir’s relationship with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi began stalling in the last few years of his rule. As part of the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s regional efforts to counter what they considered political Islam, Bashir was expected to root out Islamists in Sudan. However, since Islamists were deeply in Sudan’s government, he could not risk alienating them and did not oblige.

The Gulf dispute put Bashir in another uncomfortable position. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar were all key investors in Sudan and he could not afford to alienate any of them. Therefore, Bashir took the safest route of remaining while offering to between the opposing sides.

The Sudanese leader’s reaction to the Gulf rift was not surprising. Historically, he cooperated with all regional powers, never fully aligning with any of them. His hands-off approach and ability to easily switch from the role of an army leader to an advocate of political Islam, enabled Sudan to simultaneously ally with rival GCC camps. It seems that Bashir’s key goal was to benefit economically from all Gulf states.

Sudan Under the New Transitional Government

Unfortunately for Bashir, Sudan’s economy collapsed, nationwide erupted in December 2018 and none of his Gulf allies came to his rescue. The GCC states were probably influenced by growing uncertainty regarding Bashir’s future. Their goal was to protect their investments, not Bashir. Without GCC financial support, the Sudanese president found his days in power numbered.

In April 2019, Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed a that ended three decades of Bashir’s rule and led to the creation of a Transitional Military Council (TMC). The GCC duo promptly promised a staggering in aid to support the TMC. However, growing international pressure pushed the TMC to sign a power-sharing agreement with Sudan’s pro-democracy movement. The TMC transferred to a sovereignty council for a transitional period. Elections to usher in a civilian-led government are in late 2023 or early 2024.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have vested interests in backing the Sudanese military and ensuring it maintains control of the political transition. Consequently, they continue to offer economic and humanitarian to Sudan. In return, the TMC has supported their war efforts in Yemen and, more recently, in Libya.

After the 2019 revolution, Sudan temporarily with Qatar, accusing it of supporting Islamists. Qatar had a close relationship with Bashir’s former ruling National Congress Party that drew the ire of the TMC. However, Qatar has since rebuilt its influence by supporting Sudan’s  from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST). In October 2020, Doha that a peace agreement had been brokered between the transitional government and rebel forces. Qatar has also provided much-needed relief.

Sudan remains a country of great economic and security importance to the world. It has an abundance of natural resources. The African Development Bank Group estimates that approximately 63% of Sudan’s land is but only 15-20% is under cultivation. This offers vast investment opportunities in agriculture. Sudan is also strategically located on the Red Sea just south of the Suez Canal, a key shipping passage for world trade.

Major Challenges and Future Scenarios

Sudan’s transitional government recently set its for 2021, which include a focus on the economy, peace, security, foreign relations and the ongoing democratic transition. However, the challenges facing the transitional government are dire. Foreign debt has risen to over and inflation has crossed . The country faces massive and chronic of bread, fuel and foreign currency. Sudan is in the throes of a complex power struggle between civilians and the military. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)  Sudan’s water security. Sudanese and Ethiopian troops have clashed at the border. If this was not daunting already, Sudan has registered nearly confirmed cases of COVID-19, as of April 9.

In response to some of these challenges, the transitional government has instituted seismic constitutional . After nearly three decades, the US Sudan from the SST list in January, eliminating a major hurdle to debt relief and bringing an end to the country’s isolation from global financial systems. However, the transitional government remains under pressure to deliver quick economic wins. If it fails, power may shift back toward the military. In these tough circumstances, the transitional government’s success and Sudan’s democratic future depend on outside financial support.

For Sudan, the Gulf crisis served as a minor inconvenience. The revolution and Sudan’s removal from the SST list are more significant developments. GCC states are now encountering a growing number of new regional and international players who are looking at Sudan with increased interest. This could very well cause a shift in Gulf–Sudan relations.

Although GCC states have a shared strategic interest in Sudan’s stability, this takes a back seat to alliances that promote the individual interests of these Gulf countries. They are all trying to increase their regional influence and are turning post-revolution Sudan into another theater of GCC rivalry. Given Sudan’s fragile economic and political situation, it needs financial support. Economic forces played a major role in the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime and will determine the survival of the transitional government.

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Not only impressionable opinion-makers have fallen for the prince’s charm. In 2017, MBS  the reader poll for Time’s person of the year with an astonishing 24% of the vote. Second place, at 6%, went to the magazine’s eventual pick for its cover, the #MeToo movement, while Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau garnered a mere 4%, Pope Francis 3% and then-US President Donald Trump 2%.

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Of course, not everyone has been enthusiastic about the talented Mr. bin Salman. In 2015, three months into his new position as defense minister, MBS launched an air war in neighboring Yemen. Tens of thousands of Yemeni civilians have died, and the country has been plunged into a humanitarian nightmare. The war, which has become a quagmire for the Saudi-led coalition, has not exactly made a lot of friends for MBS.

Two years later, shortly before he mesmerized Friedman in Riyadh, Mohammed bin Salman  a number of his wealthiest rivals in a set of rooms at the Ritz-Carlton in the Saudi capital. There he subjected the sheikhs and businessmen to interrogations and torture that resulted in one death and the hospitalization of 17 others. The Saudi leadership called the extortion of billions of dollars from the rich prisoners an anti-corruption campaign, but it was really a way for MBS to consolidate his power through brute force.

“He is a psycho,” a relative of one of the detainees  of MBS. “He has spite. He wants to break people. He doesn’t want anyone to have an honorable name but him. He is a devil, and the devil is learning from him.”

Shortly before the Ritz-Carlton “sheikhdown,” Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi fled the country for the United States. As a Washington Post columnist, he then took aim at the policies of the Saudi government and those of MBS in particular. While the Saudi prince “is right to free Saudi Arabia from ultra-conservative religious forces, he is wrong to advance a new radicalism that, while seemingly more liberal and appealing to the West, is just as intolerant of dissent,” Khashoggi  in a column from April 2018.

That intolerance for dissent was on full and tragic display a few months later when Khashoggi walked into the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul to get papers to marry his Turkish fiancée and never came out. A government-dispatched death squad strangled the journalist and dismembered his body.

The Saudi government initially denied that Khashoggi had been killed. Then it claimed that the killers were rogue elements. The kingdom eventually put 11 unnamed individuals on trial for the crime, charged eight of them and handed down five death sentences that it subsequently  to 20 years in prison.

After Khashoggi’s murder, the Trump administration  sanctions on 17 Saudi officials. But even though a  implicated MBS in the assassination, he didn’t face any consequences. Indeed, Trump continued to praise the Saudi prince as if nothing had happened.

“It’s an honor to be with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, a friend of mine, a man who has really done things in the last five years in terms of opening up Saudi Arabia,” Trump  at a June 2019 breakfast with MBS at the G20 meeting in Tokyo. “I want to just thank you on behalf of a lot of people, and I want to congratulate you. You’ve done, really, a spectacular job.”

This week, the Biden administration  an earlier US intelligence report on the assassination of Khashoggi that concluded that Mohammed bin Salman approved the killing. The administration  some new sanctions against certain Saudi officials and instituted a “Khashoggi ban” against 76 unnamed individuals associated with the killing. That ban can also be  to any foreign officials who harass or harm journalists or activists.

Still, the Biden administration has declined to sanction MBS himself. Like Tom Ripley in the novels of Patricia Highsmith, Mohammed bin Salman is a confidence man, a possible serial killer and an all-around psychopath with a taste for the high life. Highsmith described the protagonist of “The Talented Mr. Ripley” and four other novels as “suave, agreeable, and utterly amoral.” Although he often comes close to getting caught, in the end, Tom Ripley gets away with murder every time. Will that be the fate of the talented Mr. bin Salman as well?

The US-Saudi Relationship

The alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia initially made sense, at least at a basic economic level. In February 1945, when Franklin D. Roosevelt  with King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud on a Navy destroyer in the Suez Canal, the US president wanted to secure a homeland for Jewish refugees in Palestine. Although the Saudi king was not enthusiastic, he was willing to forge a partnership around oil. Saudi Arabia had recently discovered what promised to be very lucrative fields, and the US needed a reliable oil supply to finish off World War II and begin a post-war recovery.

Saudi Arabia still has a lot of oil, but the US doesn’t need it anymore. From a high of two million barrels of crude a day in May 2003, US imports  to a mere 100,000 last December. For a period of time in January, for the first time in 35 years, the United States  any Saudi oil at all. Because of its own fossil fuel production, increased imports from countries like Canada, and greater reliance on renewables, the US is simply no longer dependent on the Saudis.

Take oil out of the equation and the alliance becomes untenable. Saudi Arabia is a dictatorship with fewer political and religious freedoms than, say, Iran, which the US routinely castigates for its human rights violations. The kingdom has been a destabilizing influence in the region, for instance through its war in Yemen and its earlier embargo of Qatar. Moreover, Saudi Arabia promotes a conservative version of Islam, Wahhabism, that has squeezed out more liberal variants of the religion all around the world. The country has also generated even more extremist ideologies, like the jihadism of Osama bin Laden and his followers.

In an investigation of the links between the Saudi government and the 9/11 hijackers, the FBI found some  of collaboration, through the Saudi Embassy in Washington, but the agency has been divided on whether that evidence is conclusive. The name of the relevant embassy contact, Mussaed Ahmed al-Jarrah, was even  revealed last May, but it’s not likely that the Saudi government will allow him  as part of the lawsuit mounted by families of the 9/11 victims.

It’s not the only case in which the Saudi government has been implicated. A lawsuit in Florida alleges that the kingdom could have  an attack by a Saudi air force officer in 2019 at a naval air station in Pensacola that left three US sailors dead.

The US government has generally looked the other way when it comes to these obvious disqualifications for a strategic partnership. It’s not just oil. The Saudis have proved to be useful partners in various causes over the years. They provided financial support for the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan. They’ve been a bulwark behind conservative regimes in the Middle East, such as Egypt, which the United States has misinterpreted as a stabilizing influence.

And then there’s Iran, with which Saudi Arabia has long battled for influence in the greater Middle East. Part of the rivalry is confessional — Iran is predominantly Shia, while Saudi Arabia is predominantly Sunni. The tensions are also political since the Saudis tend to prefer conservative, pro-Western regimes, while Iran favors governments and movements that are at least skeptical of the West if not outright hostile. But the competition often boils down to geopolitics, with the two countries trying to influence countries and leaders regardless of their religion or political leanings.

Because the United States decided 40 years ago, with a big assist from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to do everything it could to constrain the new Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia became an essential partner. In 2015, the Obama administration challenged the cornerstone of this partnership with the Iran nuclear deal. Trump swung in the opposite direction to make the kingdom the fulcrum of a region-wide peace plan.

President Joe Biden is now trying to “recalibrate” the relationship. It has  “all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales,” but that leaves open the possibility of supporting defensive operations, whatever those might be. It has put a hold on half a billion dollars in military assistance but is  which deals can go through under the category of “defensive” weapons, like missile defense systems.

In his initial discussions with the kingdom, Biden also raised issues of human rights and the assassination of Khashoggi. At the same time, however, the administration has tried to preserve the overall relationship by effectively pardoning MBS. King Salman is 85 years old, and he’s not in good health. With MBS set to take over, the United States doesn’t want to alienate a powerful future monarch. Mohammed bin Salman is aware of his leverage. He will act accordingly.

Dealing with Ruling Assassins

The Biden administration this week announced sanctions against senior Russian officials over the poisoning of dissident Alexei Navalny. In 2019, the European Union imposed sanctions on Iran for its involvement in the assassination of two Iranians in the Netherlands. After the 2017 assassination at the Kuala Lumpur airport of Kim Jong Nam, who was North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, Malaysia closed its embassy in Pyongyang and imposed a travel ban on the country.

None of these moves has doomed bilateral relations. The US still engages with the Kremlin, most recently by extending New START. The EU is pushing hard for a resumption of the Iran nuclear deal. Malaysia  its embassy in Pyongyang last year.

Part of the reason why such extrajudicial murders generate sanctions but not a full quarantine of the perpetrating countries is the widespread nature of these offenses. Among its many “targeted killings” by drones, the United States assassinated the head of Iran’s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, outside the Baghdad airport at the beginning of 2020. Israel has routinely killed its opponents all over the world, including a Libyan embassy employee in Rome, an Egyptian nuclear scientist in Paris, a Brazilian colonel in Sao Paolo and a Canadian engineer in Brussels. Syria might or might not have been behind several assassinations in Lebanon, including leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. None of these countries has suffered geopolitically for these acts.

The talented Mr. bin Salman, in other words, killed his most prominent critic because he knew he would get away with it. Even if the Biden administration decides for entirely pragmatic reasons not to sanction the Saudi prince, it should definitively stop all military support to Riyadh, even weapons considered “defensive.” After all, if Saudi Arabia feels more secure behind a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, it will be more likely to direct aerial attacks against its opponents.

It’s the nature of geopolitics that a few psychopaths are going to become the leaders of their countries. But that’s no reason for the United States to give these “talented” men the weapons to consolidate their power.

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He has now spent more than 10 years in Jau Prison, notorious for its ill-treatment of inmates. Khawaja was granted political asylum in Denmark in 1991, later receiving citizenship, but he returned to Bahrain in 1999 during a period of political relaxation and reform. On January 22 this year, more than 100 organizations to the Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, calling for her government to “renew and strengthen efforts to ensure his immediate and unconditional release so he can be reunited with his family and receive much needed medical treatment and torture rehabilitation in Denmark.”

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The letter provides graphic details of the treatment meted out to Khawaja from the moment of his arrest. While blindfolded and chained to his hospital bed, he was tortured by security officers immediately after major surgery to his broken jaw, which “forced the doctor to ask the security officers to stop as it would undo the surgical work.”

Throughout his imprisonment, he has conducted hunger strikes to protest prison conditions, the curtailment of his family’s visiting rights and phone calls, and the removal from his cell of all his reading material. He has declined medical treatment when he can in protest at being strip-searched, blindfolded, and hand and leg cuffed before being seen by medical staff. 

The letter to Frederiksen notes that in a recent call, Khawaja stated that “prison authorities are arbitrarily denying him proper medical treatment and refusing to refer him to specialists for surgeries he requires.” The letter adds: “[D]enying a prisoner adequate medical care violates the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, known as the Nelson Mandela Rules.”

A Reset in Bahrain?

With US President Joe Biden now in the White House — and  emanating from his new administration that human rights, utterly disregarded by his disgraced predecessor, are now on the front foot — the Bahraini government may want to have a reset on its own awful human rights record and its treatment of political prisoners.

Among those pressing for the reset is the New Jersey Democratic Congressman Tom Malinowski. He was unceremoniously  out of Bahrain in 2014 when he was the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor under the Obama administration. Malinowski had had the temerity to meet with the head of the opposition Al Wefaq political society, Sheikh Ali Salman, a move the Bahraini regime deemed was “counter to conventional diplomatic norms.”

Sheikh Salman was subsequently arrested and, in 2018,  to life in prison on charges related to the Gulf feud with Qatar that were transparently bogus. Al Wefaq was outlawed in 2017.

Malinowski may well find a bipartisan ally in Republican Florida Senator Marco Rubio. The senator is on record calling for an end to repression in Bahrain. As he argued in a  to then-President Donald Trump in September 2019 (co-signed by the Democratic senators Chris Murphy and Ron Widen): “Bahrain is a strategic ally in an important region and, critically, Bahrain hosts the United States Fifth Fleet. It is precisely for these reasons that we are so concerned by the government of Bahrain’s concerted efforts to silence peaceful opposition and quash free expression.”

Rubio specifically mentioned Khawaja by name, noting that he and others have been jailed for peaceful protest: “These prisoners are merely representative of the thousands of others who remain locked away for exercising their right to free expression.”

As Biden settles into office, Middle East dictators are nervous. The US president has sent a clear message that the pass Donald Trump gave them to crush dissent with impunity is well and truly canceled. As they strategize on how best to deal with the new norm, sending positive messages will not go amiss.

One such message would be to release Abdulhadi al-Khawaja and the other political prisoners held in Jau simply for calling for the right to speak freely and openly without fear of consequence.

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A good deal of credit for the breakthrough goes to Kuwait’s ruler, Emir Sheikh Nawaf. Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Ahmad Nasser al Sabah that “Based on Sheikh Nawaf’s proposal, it was agreed to open the airspace and land and sea borders between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Qatar.” Al Sabah that Sheikh Nawaf had spoken with Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. According to AP,  “The conversations ‘emphasized that everyone was keen on reunification,’ and would gather in Al-Ula to sign a statement that promises to ‘usher in a bright page of brotherly relations.’”

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By way of background, on June 5, 2017, the Arab quartet diplomatic relations with Doha and imposed a land, sea and air blockade based upon contested accusations that Qatar supported Islamist extremist groups. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also objected to Qatar’s relations with Iran. As a result, with some exceptions, notably to allow Qataris into Saudi Arabia to perform the Islamic hajj pilgrimage, Qatar’s only land border has remained closed, thus denying the import of products ranging from food to medical supplies to construction materials.

The rift with Qatar also resulted in the separation of families, especially those who had intermarried on both sides of the border. In addition, Saudi Arabia prohibited Qatari planes from flying over its airspace, which forced its national airline to take longer and more costly routes. It has been that Qatar pays up to $100 million in annual fees to fly over Iran.

The Saudi decision to end the embargo is a major step forward, but it must be followed by additional initiatives by the other nations that had backed the boycott of Qatar. This was acknowledged by the UAE’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, who that while Abu Dhabi hopes to restore Gulf unity, “We have more work to do and we are in the right direction.”

Essentially, while ending the rift among the Gulf nations is important for the region, it also establishes new realities and opportunities for the Biden administration. It will enable the new administration to develop even closer relations with Qatar and set the tone for warmer than previously predicted relations with Saudi Arabia.

Beginning in 1992, Qatar has developed close military ties with the United States and is now the location of US Central Command’s Forward Headquarters and the Combined Air Operations Center. Qatar the strategically important Al Udeid Air Base, which is staffed by more than 10,000 American service personnel and strike force aircraft used in campaigns against the Islamic State. Improved US-Qatari relations will enable the two nations to build upon their efforts against terrorism. In fact, as the White House website points out, President Donald Trump Emir Tamim in January 2018 for efforts “to counter terrorism and extremism in all its forms.” Washington is also grateful to Doha for hosting a Taliban mission, thereby facilitating the Afghan peace talks. The Biden administration may also work with Qatar in at least four additional areas.

Following up on the UAE and Bahrain reaching normalization deals with Israel sets the stage for Qatar to play a larger role in pursuing Israeli-Palestinian peace. Qatar is quietly humanitarian support for Palestinians in Gaza, which helps in keeping that conflict more manageable and could enable Doha to serve as an intermediary to deal with the wider conflict.

Similarly, Qatar maintains good relations with both the United States and Iran. President-elect Biden and his top foreign policy officials have their hope that a new treaty can be worked out with Iran, one that builds on the nuclear pact negotiated by the Obama administration and then rejected by the Trump White House. Qatar is in a unique position to facilitate these diplomatic efforts. Significantly, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif that he hopes reconciliation in the Gulf “contributes to the stability and political and economic development for all peoples of our region.”

Qatar has also expressed its support for a number of other top priorities enunciated by the Biden administration, including dealing aggressively with and distributing to get the COVID-19 pandemic under control. Improved Gulf relations can also help Saudi Arabia to build warmer ties with the Biden administration than might otherwise have been the case.

Joe Biden has called for a reevaluation of US relations with Riyadh during the Trump administration, which began when Donald Trump chose to visit Saudi Arabia as his first overseas destination as president and then extended to , a lax view of the war in Yemen and virtually Saudi leaders for their role in the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. In sum, while the final details of the deal that has been under discussion for several months is still in flux, it has the potential to shape a more positive agenda for the Biden administration.

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Over the past three decades, Belarusian domestic politics has been defined by its predictability. Despite the emergence of opposition candidates around election time, President Alexander Lukashenko’s grip on power was such that there was only one outcome. Yet, as with so much of 2020, life as Belarusians know it has been turned on its head.

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While the has been called into question, a mixture of political complacency and COVID-19-related turmoil has breathed new life into Belarus’ opposition movement. Beyond disputing Lukashenko’s winning margin in July’s poll, hundreds of thousands of ordinary Belarusians have taken to the streets calling for change. Mostly born after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this generation does not regard the stability offered by Lukashenko as an asset. As they see it, state control of Belarus’ economy and society is incompatible with their aspirations.

Lukashenko’s response to what has effectively become a matter of life and death for his regime has fluctuated between incoherency and heavy-handedness. The president’s disappearance from the public gaze at the start of the unrest, coupled with the disproportionate use of force against demonstrators, suggests that he did not seriously consider the possibility of mass protests. Continued police brutality and opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s make it difficult to use “external forces” as justification for the crackdown.

“Family” Comes First

Much like , the Gulf states have relatively young populations, particularly Saudi Arabia, where of citizens are under the age of 35. Many have benefited from to higher education systems that have grown exponentially since the early 2000s, both in terms of state and private universities. With this in mind, the region’s political elites can use the lack of meaningful opportunities for so many Belarusians to underscore the importance of their development plans and national visions.

Designed to meet the specific needs of Gulf countries, these strategies nevertheless have several objectives in common. In an effort to counter faltering prices and technological obsolescence, the region is attempting to diversify its dependence on oil and gas revenues by facilitating in different industrial sectors. Doing so also requires the greater incorporation of indigenous populations into national workforces at the expense of expatriate workers. In this respect, Kuwait’s plans to drastically offers a glimpse into the future shape of the Gulf’s workplaces. While never explicitly mentioned in strategic documents, the Gulf states anticipate that encouraging their own populations’ development will offset opportunities for the type of political dissent that’s currently gripping Belarus and which almost a decade ago.

The Gulf’s rulers have no appetite for an , a scenario that some warn is a distinct possibility thanks to COVID-19. Accordingly, local development opportunities will continue to be encouraged during these chastened times. When it comes to wider political participation, Kuwait will remain something of an outlier for the foreseeable future.

The Gulf states’ responses to COVID-19 also merit consideration. Once dismissed by Lukashenko as an ailment that can be treated with , Belarus was among the last in Europe to enact lockdown measures. While it remains to be seen what impact will have on infection rates, a spike in cases could be used by Gulf states to justify their no-nonsense approaches to tackling the virus. Qatar, for example, was one of the first to completely lock down all but the most essential public services. The country’s return to normal rests on the with a four-phase reopening plan.

Don’t Annoy Next Door

International reaction to the political crisis in Belarus has so far been muted, with presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and China’s Xi Jinping for Lukashenko’s re-election. For its part, the European Union’s response has been cautiously led by the likes of Lithuania and Poland. Their approach reflects two important points. First, the protests are highly internalized and not about pivoting Belarus further East or West. Second, direct support for the opposition risks a Ukraine-type scenario whereby Moscow directly intervenes to safeguard its interests.

Point two is of particular relevance to the Gulf states, whose economic ties with one of Russia’s closest allies continue to grow. Cooperation between Belarus and the United Arab Emirates is a case in point. According to , the volume of trade between both countries amounted to $121 million in 2019, up from $89.6 million the previous year. Minsk has also made regarding joint manufacturing opportunities and the re-export of products to neighboring markets.

Saudi Arabia undoubtedly has the most to lose from antagonizing Russia in its own backyard. Last April, the kingdom 80,000 tons of crude oil to Belarus. This purchase, first of its kind, not only reflects Minsk’s determination to lessen its reliance on Russian supplies, but also happened against the backdrop of faltering demand and an oil price war between Moscow and Riyadh. Since then, both sides have brokered a designed in part to ensure that OPEC+ members respect industry-saving production cuts.

Accordingly, the “softly, softly” approach currently being employed by the EU’s eastern flank provides a blueprint for how the Gulf states should continue to manage their responses to the Belarus crisis. Not only does it offer the best chance of maintaining economic relations irrespective of the final outcome, but it also keeps regional oil supplies in still uncharted waters at a time of great uncertainty in global markets. Antagonizing Russia with even the most tacit support for Belarus is, put simply, too risky a proposition.

Belarus’ unfolding crisis is ultimately about replacing an unmovable political leader and system that have dominated the country for decades. In a region defined by its own version of long-term political stability, a similar scenario among Gulf states is unpalatable. Fortunately, the region still has resources at its disposal to prevent this from happening and protect much-needed economic victories in new markets. While always important, the Gulf’s indigenous populations are increasingly being reconfigured as the most essential features of the region’s future prosperity and stability.

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Sovereignty: International Courts and Tribunals

Sovereignty is a legal concept that expresses the power of a country participating in the international system to exercise great and perpetual authority over its territory. To uphold this, the post-war international legal order created a variety of institutions for the resolution of disputes among nations. These range from “traditional” practices to a multiplicity of international courts and tribunals, each operating within their own specialized regime. In response to the economic and diplomatic, Qatar has used both to exercise effective control over its territory.

From an international law perspective, Qatar’s sovereignty has been expressed through the initiation of legal action against the blockading countries: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. In doing so, Qatar has chosen a strategy of filing multiple claims before various international courts and tribunals. These include the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other fora.

Based in The Hague, the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and, as such, at the epicenter of the international legal order. Still, the court does not have mandatory jurisdiction over all disputes arising between two or more states. Rather, according to the ICJ Statute, states must have a concrete legal basis to introduce a case.

In June 2018, Qatar instituted proceedings against the United Arab Emirates in the ICJ under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). In doing so, Qatar requested the court to order provisional measures to protect Qatari citizens expelled from the UAE after the commencement of the blockade in June 2017.

On July 23, 2018, the ICJ issued its order on provisional measures requiring the UAE to: (1) allow families with mixed nationalities to be reunited; (2) give Qatari students in the UAE affected by the measures the opportunity to complete their education or obtain their educational records if they wish to continue studies elsewhere; and (3) grant Qataris access to tribunals and other judicial institutions. After this ruling, the UAE filed its own request for provisional measures relating to actions that Qatar had filed before the United Nations’ CERD committee and elsewhere. On June 14, 2019, the ICJ denied the UAE’s request for provisional measures. A date for a hearing on the merits of the Qatar v. UAE case has not yet been set. 

In addition, the blockading countries have brought forward a separate action in the ICJ under Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation regarding a decision of the council of the ICAO, challenging their closure of airspace to Qatari traffic. In June 2018, the council issued a ruling that was largely in favor of Qatar’s complaint. The public hearings in the blockading states’ appeal of the ICAO decision were held before the ICJ in December 2019 and a final decision is pending.

Sovereignty: Other Means to Peaceful Resolution

Apart from courts and tribunals, international law provides for a category of dispute settlement methods that include mediation, together with negotiation, conciliation and inquiry. These means of peaceful settlement of international disputes are mentioned under Article 33 of the UN Charter.

Mediation involves the participation of a third party with the aim of helping parties to the dispute come to a commonly agreed solution. Given the nature and rather informal character of the mediation process, it is exclusively up to the disputing parties to resolve the dispute. To assist, Kuwait has played a visible role in trying to mediate a solution to the blockade and recently reiterated its commitment to do so.

Qatar has also taken multiple steps to protect the rights of its citizens at the political, diplomatic and legal levels. At the level of politics and diplomacy, there are two possible approaches: bilateral and multilateral. Bilateral action involves engaging in direct dialogue with the governments of the blockading countries. The state of Qatar can also raise issues before the relevant multilateral international political fora, such as the institutions of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the UN General Assembly. In this respect, Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani raised the issue of the blockade before the General Assembly, most recently at its opening session on September 24, 2019. 

Initially a political crisis, the blockade against Qatar has been increasingly played out over multiple legal disputes. The hope is that the law will also provide a bridge for the resolution of the political issues. 

*[Dr. George Dimitropoulos is an associate professor at the College of Law at Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the university’s official stance.]

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The leading economies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates both showed weaknesses. In the case of the UAE, the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), a measure of the prevailing direction of economic trends in the manufacturing and service sectors, fell below the 50 mark for the first time, an indication of contraction in those sectors. That, combined with a 6% year-on-year drop in real estate prices led by a weak  sector and private sector credit growth that slowed to its lowest point in three years, is a marker of concern.

Of growing concern, too, for the Emiratis is Expo 2020. The exhibition is slated to launch in October of this year and run through to April 2021. Cancellation of the event, which is now a distinct possibility, would have a big negative impact on Dubai, where it was hoped it would help float an already troubled economy. 

In the Doldrums

Regarding the Saudi economy, Capital Economics’ Jason Tuvey notes that “the downturn deepened in Q4 of last year and, while the worst has probably now passed, the downside risks to the outlook are mounting.” He acknowledged that though the worst was probably now over, growth in 2020 will be subdued, saying that “we have pencilled in GDP growth of 1.3% this year. Our forecast is well below the consensus and the risks are increasingly skewed to the downside.” Chief among those is the price of oil which, as a result of the failure last week from OPEC+ to secure a production limit and the Saudi decision to launch a price war with Russia, has now fallen to below $40.

The religious tourist market in Saudi Arabia has been undercut, with the annual Umrah pilgrimage  — a blow for the time being to the country’s audacious plans to hike  all types of tourism as part of its Vision 2030 project. Included in the plan is the goal of turning the kingdom into one of the top five tourist destinations in the world, creating 1 million new jobs in the process. Along the way, tourism is supposed to generate 10% of the Saudi GDP. Those were always lofty aims, unlikely to be fully realized. COVID-19, though its effects may not be long-lasting, has put a dent into those plans just as the Saudis were poised for take-off.

Qatar, which had previously ridden out the economic impact of the feud with its Gulf neighbors, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, is now “in the doldrums.” As Capital Economics puts it, “activity in the non-hydrocarbon sector remains weak. The recent credit boom has passed its peak. Activity in the real estate sector is sluggish. The number of properties sold in December fell by 17% y/y and real estate prices declined by more than 8% y/y — prices are over 25% below their 2015 peak. And the Markit PMI fell back from 49.4 in December to 48.7 last month. On a positive note, tourist arrivals jumped in December close to levels last seen before the blockade was imposed in mid-2017.” But, as elsewhere in the Gulf, tourist numbers will decline as the epidemic continues to spread. And should the coronavirus linger, even the 2022 FIFA World Cup could be in jeopardy.

Terrific Pummeling

Both Oman and Bahrain, the weakest of the Gulf Cooperation Council economies, continue to feel the hurt from low oil prices. Bahrain’s ongoing political impasse and the drain on the economy of a heavy security commitment aimed at keeping its majority Shia Muslim population cowed has not helped. Even Kuwait, which ended a  with Saudi Arabia over a shared oil field, has suffered from weak investment in the private sector.

In the short term, Middle East equity markets have taken a terrific pummeling from the global impact of COVID-19. According to  the markets took a combined $77-billion hit in the week beginning February 24 as oil prices slumped to their worst performance since 2008. The Saudis were the biggest losers, dropping $41.7 billion, while shares of Saudi Aramco dropped to their lowest level since the initial public offering in December last year.

But will the additional burden of the coronavirus have a long-lasting impact on the already ailing Gulf economies? That’s the $64-billion question. Pessimists suggest that as the virus wends its way through the world, the Gulf states will be hit hard, particularly as several of them, the most powerful, are built on hydrocarbons. There are others, however, who argue that the voice of pessimism is too strong. They point to the fact that China now appears to have contained COVID-19 and that the number of new cases is rapidly falling.

One such optimist is Oilprice.com’s Josh Owens. He notes that China, having successfully , has already started to reboot its economy. Owens writes: “China is getting back to work. And you can be sure that the Chinese government will be doing everything in its power to stimulate growth.” If that is the case, it should be good news for the Gulf’s hydrocarbon producers and their stalling economies. The problem is that no one either in the Gulf or anywhere else knows where the coronavirus is headed nor how big the impact will be. But with reports of cases growing across the region, the economic prognosis, in the short to medium term, is not looking particularly healthy.

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The international response was swift. The United Arab Emirates described the incident as a “sabotage attack,” while the United States immediately blamed Iran. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Norway launched a joint investigation into the attack, concluding that a “state actor” was behind it.

The events triggered a series of dangerous incidents around the Gulf, including two further attacks on tankers in June, the and shooting down each other’s drones, and the detention of and tankers by both sides. Most recently, on September 14, oil facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia were struck in drone and cruise missile attacks. Yemen’s Houthi rebels claimed responsibility, but the US and Saudi Arabia blame Iran. The Iranians deny any involvement in the attack.

The UN General Assembly

As world leaders gather in New York for the 74th United Nations General Assembly, tensions remain high in the Gulf as Iran continues waging its campaign of “maximum resistance” against the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” agenda that a handful of other Western states have been behind to varying degrees. Despite nuclear disarmament and arms control being key aspects of the General Assembly’s agenda, the UN is unlikely to play an integral role in reducing tension between the US and Iran, given the strong-willed nature of these countries.

Nevertheless, it remains the vital interest of all parties to prevent US-Iran brinkmanship from erupting into war, especially one that so directly involves some of the world’s most powerful militaries and has been playing out around the Strait of Hormuz, a highly-strategic chokepoint in the Gulf through which of the world’s oil passes. Any interruption of international shipping through this narrow strait would have a seismic impact on the global economy, as well as a drastic rise in oil prices.

Since May 2018, when the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) over a host of issues, including non-nuclear ones like Iranian conduct in the Middle East (i.e., support for Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen and the Syrian regime) and its ballistic missile activity, the US has re-imposed sanctions on Iran. Such sanctions threaten European businesses that deal with Iran and have resulted in European firms pulling out of the Islamic Republic despite their keenness to enter Iranian markets after the JCPOA’s watershed passage and implementation in mid-2015 and early 2016, respectively.

The Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign has strained the Iranian economy.  With the reimposition of US sanctions, Iran’s GDP contracted by in 2018. Additionally, at the start of last year, Iran’s crude oil peaked at 2.8 million barrels per day (bpd). By March 2019, that dropped to 1.1 million bpd.

Although Tehran stuck to its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA by practicing a policy of “strategic patience” that rested on the assumption that European countries could circumvent US sanctions from excessively harming Iran’s interests, Iranian officials have concluded that such an approach has not succeeded. Consequently, Iran has gradually pulled back from its commitments under the nuclear deal. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani recently announced that Iran has begun working on “” of faster centrifuges, a direct violation of the deal.

Within this context, Iran has left the West worried over its nuclear plans as it looks East to Asian countries to export its oil. Giorgio Cafiero, the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based political risk consultancy group, describes the strategy’s economic aspect, saying, “Given that a number of countries, most importantly China, are still buying Iranian oil, it seems difficult to imagine the US policy aimed at bringing Iran‘s oil exports to zero as proving successful.” As many experts see it, Washington’s maximum pressure agenda maxed out over the summer, raising questions about what else the US could do outside of military action to pressure Iran into changing its conduct.

With the Iranian government undeterred by US actions, the burden of maintaining what is left of the nuclear deal rests with European partners and their efforts to ease the blow of US sanctions on Iran. This comes at an especially difficult time as the United Kingdom deals with the Brexit saga and right-wing, populist and nationalist governments in mainland Europe challenge the EU’s capacity to promote global cooperation.

The efforts to incentivize Iran to uphold its end of the bargain under the JCPOA have been unsuccessful, given the country’s recent nuclear developments. Addressing the European role in the tensions since the 2018 pullout, Cafiero says, “Because the US dominates the global banking industry, European states have been unable to chart an independent course in relation to Iran and the nuclear deal.”

A War of Words

With rising tensions between the US, Europe and Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members have effectively found themselves in the crossfire during this summer’s series of detained and attacked tankers. That said, it is important to recognize that Saudi Arabia’s approach vis-à-vis Iran has not been subdued.

Last year at the 73rd UN General Assembly, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir condemned Iran, : “Iran continues its terrorist activities and hostile behavior. The kingdom expresses its support to the new American strategy in dealing with Iran … Achieving peace and stability in the Middle East requires deterring Iran‘s expansionist and subversive policies.”

Similarly, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed cited Iran’s “nefarious” interventionist policies, attributing it to the region’s escalation in violence. In his address last year, “Certain countries, particularly Iran, are prone to attacking the security of the region, spreading chaos, violence and sectarianism.”

The Iranian side also traded bellicose rhetoric at last year’s General Assembly, foreshadowing the rise in tensions that erupted a year later. President Rouhani harsh statements directed at the United States. He said that “by violating its international commitments, the new US administration only destroys its own credibility and undermines international confidence in negotiating with it.” He also condemned the rhetoric launched against the Iranian regime, describing it as “ignorant, absurd and hateful … filled with ridiculously baseless allegations.”

As the parties gather for this year’s UN General Assembly, the rhetoric and addresses are somewhat unpredictable, especially after US President Donald Trump recently fired John Bolton, his third national security adviser since 2017. Bolton, known for his hawkish foreign policy on Iran — which included pushing for regime change and war — was a chief proponent of the maximum pressure strategy. However, to a source close to Bolton, Trump and his now-former national security adviser were at odds over the president’s apparent suggestion of lifting sanctions on Iran as a negotiating incentive.

With Bolton’s departure, Washington’s foreign policy toward Iran might become less hawkish. Additionally, there is the possibility of American and Iranian diplomats coming together at the negotiating table, with speculation about Trump meeting with Rouhani.

That said, the recent attacks targeting Aramco facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia, which resulted in the state-owned oil company’s production being halved, may cut the prospects for diplomatic outreach between Washington and Tehran. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s tweet attributing the strikes to Iran raises questions about whether hardline figures in the Iranian regime may have provoked the perpetrators to carry out these attacks, with the aim of derailing any potential diplomatic outreach between the US and Iran in the aftermath of Bolton’s ouster.

The Iranian leadership’s rhetoric at the General Assembly will be highly informative in terms of understanding Tehran’s approach to dealing with the Trump administration. Depending on if and how US foreign policy shifts, as well as how suspicious Tehran regards any potential change in Washington’s Iran strategy, the Islamic Republic may continue its criticism of the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia, as it has done during previous UN gatherings.

Moreover, the other address to keep a close eye on at this year’s assembly is the UAE’s, given its recent of support for Trump’s maximum pressure campaign. This comes at its realization that continued backing of the increasingly hostile US approach toward Iran may lead to a war in the Gulf, in turn jeopardizing the UAE’s own regional interests.

Notable examples of Abu Dhabi’s shift in Iranian foreign policy include its cautious response to the May 12 tanker attacks, labeling them as “sabotage” by a “state actor” but not directly pointing fingers at Iran. Additionally, the UAE initiated diplomatic to Iran in July. Whether or not these shifts will be reflected publicly at the UAE’s General Assembly address remains to be seen.

Overall, with this buildup of tensions involving such strong-willed countries that lack permanent status in the UN Security Council (UNSC), it is unlikely that the United Nations will be able to foster any sort of multilateral rapprochement.

If anything, the UN will most likely just pay lip service to the mounting tensions in the Gulf and verbally demand a de-escalation.

*[ is a partner institution of 51�Թ�. Updated on September 24, 2019: An earlier version of this article contained comments by Karen Young, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, which have been removed at her request.]

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More than four millennia have passed since the two armies clashed over one city state’s attempt to steal water from another. But while the instruments of war have changed, the issue is much the same: whoever controls the rivers controls the land. And those rivers are drying up, partly because of overuse and wastage, and partly because climate change has pounded the region with punishing multi-year droughts. 

Syria and Iraq are at odds with Turkey over the Tigris-Euphrates. Egypt’s relations with Sudan and Ethiopia over the Nile are tense. Jordan and the Palestinians accuse Israel of plundering river water to irrigate the Negev Desert and hogging most of the three aquifers that underlie the occupied West Bank.

According to satellites that monitor climate, the Tigris-Euphrates basin, embracing Turkey, Syria, Iraq and western Iran, is losing water faster than any other area in the world, with the exception of northern India.

Dammed Up Tensions

The Middle East’s water problems are hardly unique. South Asia — in particular,  — is also water-stressed, and Australia and much of southern Africa are experiencing severe droughts. Even Europe is struggling with some rivers dropping so low as to hinder shipping.

But the  has been particularly hard hit. According to the Water Stress Index, out of 37 countries in the world facing “extremely high” water distress, 15 are in the Middle East, with Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia heading the list.

For Syria and Iraq, the problem is Turkey and Ankara’s mania for dam building. Since 1975, Turkish dams have reduced the flow of water to Syria by 40% — and to Iraq by 80%.  According to the  up to 50% of the country’s agricultural land could be deprived of water, removing 124 million acres from production. 

Iran and Syria have also built dams that reduce the flow of rivers that feed the Tigris and Euphrates, allowing saltwater from the Persian Gulf to infiltrate the Shatt al-Arab waterway where the twin rivers converge. The salt has destroyed rich agricultural land in the south and wiped out much of the huge  for which Iraq was famous.

Half a century ago, Israel built the National Water Carrier canal diverting water from the Sea of Galilee, which is fed by the Jordan River. That turned the Jordan downstream of the Galilee into a muddy stream, which Israel prevents  from using. Jordanian and Syrian dams on the river’s tributaries have added to the problem,  of the Jordan by 90%. 

And according to the World Bank, Israel also takes 87% of the West Bank aquifers, leaving the Palestinians only 13%. The result is that Israeli settlers in the West Bank get access to 300 liters of water a day, leaving the Palestinians only 75 liters a day. The World Health Organization’s standard is 100 liters a day for each individual. 

Other conflicts loom in the Nile basin. At 4,184 miles in length, the Nile River is the world’s longest, traversing 10 African countries. It is Egypt’s lifeblood, providing both water and rich soil for the country’s agriculture. But a combination of drought and dams has reduced its flow over the past several decades. 

Ethiopia is currently building an enormous dam for power and irrigation on the Blue Nile. The source of the Blue Nile is Lake Tana in the Ethiopian highlands. The Egyptian Nile is formed where the Blue Nile and the White Nile — sourced from Lake Victoria in Uganda — converge in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. Relations between Egypt and Ethiopia were initially  over water, but have eased somewhat with the two sides agreeing to talk about how to share it.

But with climate change accelerating, the issue of water — or the lack thereof — is going to get worse, not better, and resolving the problems will take more than bilateral treaties about sharing. And there is hardly any agreement about how to proceed. 

Privatization and Its Discontents

One strategy has been privatization. Through its International Finance Corporation, the World Bank has been pushing privatizing, arguing that private capital will upgrade systems and guarantee delivery. In practice, however, privatization has generally resulted in poorer quality water at higher prices. Huge transnational companies like SUEZ and Veolia have snapped up resources in the Middle East and the global south. 

Increasingly, water has become a commodity, either by control of natural sources and distribution or by cornering the market on bottled water.  is a case in point. Historically the country has had sufficient water resources, but it’s been added to the list of 33 countries that will face severe water shortages by 2040. Part of the current crisis is homegrown. Some 60,000 illegal wells siphon off water from the aquifer that underlies the country, and dams have not solved the problem of chronic water shortages, particularly for the 1.6 million people living in the greater Beirut area. Increasingly people have turned to private water sources, especially bottled water.

Multinational corporations, like Nestle, drain water from California and Michigan and sell it in Lebanon. Nestle, though its ownership of Shoat, controls 35% of Lebanon’s bottled water. Not only is bottled water expensive, and often inferior in quality to local water sources, the plastic it necessitates adds to a growing pollution problem. There are solutions out there, but they require a level of cooperation and investment that very few countries currently practice. Many countries simply don’t have the funds to fix or upgrade their water infrastructure. Pipes lose enormous amounts through leakage, and dams reduce river flow, creating salt pollution problems downstream in places like Iraq and Egypt. In any event, dams eventually silt in. 

Wells — legal and illegal — are rapidly draining aquifers, forcing farmers and cities to dig deeper and deeper each year. And, many times, those deep wells draw in pollution from the water table that makes the water impossible to drink or use on crops. 

Again, there are solutions.  has made headway refilling the vast aquifer that underlies its rich Central Valley by establishing ponds and recharge basins during the rainy season, and letting water percolate back into the ground. Drip agriculture is also an effective way to reduce water usage, but it requires investment beyond the capacity of many countries, let alone small farmers.

Desalinization is also a strategy, but an expensive one that requires burning hydrocarbons, thus pumping more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and accelerating climate change.

We Need a Treaty

As the Middle East grows dryer and populations in the region continue to increase, the situation will get considerably worse in the coming decades.

The Middle East may be drying up, but so is California, much of the American southwest, southern Africa, parts of Latin America and virtually all of southern Europe. Since the crisis is global, “beggar thy neighbor” strategies will eventually impoverish all of humanity. The solution lies with the only international organization on the planet, the United Nations.

In 1997,  adopted a Convention on International Watercourses that spells out procedures for sharing water and resolving disputes. However, several big countries like China and Turkey opposed it, and several others, like India and Pakistan, have abstained. The convention is also entirely voluntary, with no enforcement mechanisms like binding arbitration. 

It is, however, a start. Whether nations will come together to confront the planet-wide crisis is an open question. Otherwise, the Middle East will run out of water — and it will hardly be alone. By 2030, according to the , four out of 10 people will not have access to water

There is precedent for a solution, one that is at least 4,500 years old. A cuneiform tablet in the Louvre chronicles a water treaty that ended the war between Umma and Lagash. If our distant ancestors could figure it out, it stands to reason we can.

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However, after the country’s current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan, became prime minister in 2003, Ankara began capitalizing on its soft-power influence and economic potential in the Arab world. Turkey’s efforts to assert itself as a rising power in the Middle East focused on the important role of religion — in this case Sunni Islam — which served as a common denominator between Turkey and most Arab states.

As the ruling neo-Islamist AKP took major steps to civilianize the country’s politics while embracing neo-liberal economic reforms, many in the Middle East viewed Turkey as a model for progress in the region. From the perspective of certain segments in Arab societies that sought democratic reforms, Turkey offered much in terms of setting an example of how a Muslim-majority country could achieve impressive economic growth and democratize at the same time. Doubtless, the relative decline of the United States as a power in the Middle East following the 2003 invasion of Iraq offered Turkey — along with Iran, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates — an opportunity to partially fill a vacuum in the region’s geopolitical order.

Ascendant Turkey

During the 2000s, as Ankara was focused on establishing solid partnerships across the Arab world, Turkey’s relations with all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — were improving. NATO created the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative of 2004, which sought to develop security cooperation with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE during the alliance’s summit meeting in Istanbul. By 2008, a memorandum of understanding had been , making Turkey the first non-Arab country to be given the GCC’s strategic partner status as talks for a free trade agreement were advancing.

Today, however, the Gulf region is polarized by deep divisions that have served to complicate Ankara’s ties with the Arabian Peninsula’s monarchies. Ultimately, political variables in the equation have positioned Turkey as a relatively divisive actor in the GCC’s geopolitical order. Certain Arab Persian Gulf states fear an ascendant Turkey due to a perceived stemming from the AKP’s model of democratic Islamism. At the heart of this fear is a speculated challenge to the Islamic and divine legitimacy of royal families such as the Al Saud in Riyadh and the Al Nayhan in Abu Dhabi. For Abu Dhabi in particular, Turkey’s role as a haven for Islamist dissidents from GCC states and Ankara’s outright support for certain Muslim Brotherhood-linked factions from the movement’s Syrian offshoot to Hamas have led to a view of Turkey posing a grave threat.

In 2011, political openings caused by the so-called Arab Spring uprisings brought such tensions between Abu Dhabi and Ankara to the fore. The Egyptian coup of 2013, which toppled an AKP-friendly Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi, was backed by the Saudis and Emiratis who were determined to end Egypt’s brief democratic experiment that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power in the most populous Arab state.

Yet that episode did not bring an end to Turkey’s collaboration with Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the three states’ efforts to back Sunni Islamist rebels fighting the Syrian regime. Nonetheless, Ankara and Riyadh’s agendas began parting ways in Syria after Russia entered the civil war in September 2015, ultimately ending hopes for regime change and prompting Turkey to essentially accept Bashar al-Assad as Syria’s president while shifting its focus toward fighting militants linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Syria.

Qatar Crisis

The defining moment for Ankara’s Gulf foreign policy proved to be the Qatar crisis as it unfolded through May and June of 2017. Despite Erdoğan’s efforts to help the Gulf states overcome their rift, it became apparent early on that the dispute pitted Doha and Ankara on one side, against Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Cairo on the other. Still Turkey was initially apt to remind the Arab Persian Gulf monarchies of their mutual economic and strategic interests that persisted despite the crisis. As on July 21, 2017, “Political problems are temporary whereas economic ties are permanent, and I expect investors from the gulf countries to choose long-term ties.”

But what has unfolded in the aftermath of Turkey’s decisions to provide Doha with strong support throughout the crisis has been a souring of relations between Turkey and some GCC member-states, in particular the UAE. Illustrating such sentiments are the increasingly common of Turkey as a “neo-Ottoman” threat in the Emirati, Saudi and Egyptian press. Likewise, Turkey has pronounced Abu Dhabi guilty of in 2016 as well as supporting the Turkish state’s Kurdish enemies in northern Syria. More recently, in April the between Ankara and Abu Dhabi further pointed to the downward trajectory of Turkey-UAE relations.

President Erdoğan saw the blockade of Qatar as an opportunity for Ankara to display its loyalty to Doha. Significant is that Emir Tamim was the first foreign head of state to call Erdoğan amid the uncertainty of the 2016 coup plot to express solidarity with Turkey’s legitimate government. The Turkish leadership saw the Saudi and Emirati efforts to carry out regime change in Doha as connected to those states’ alleged roles in the 2016 failed coup plot against Erdoğan and the Egyptian coup of 2013.

Damaged Relations

The killing of Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul on October 2, 2018, severely damaged relations between Ankara and Riyadh. Although Turkey and Saudi Arabia were able to maintain a relatively cordial tone after the 2016 coup plot and the Qatar crisis despite both episodes creating a degree of friction in bilateral ties, the Khashoggi saga resulted in a major deterioration in Ankara’s relations with the kingdom’s leadership, namely Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Prior to the murder, most of the anger in Turkey’s press over Gulf involvement in the 2016 coup was directed toward Abu Dhabi, growing anti-Saudi sentiment has been on the rise in the Turkish media since October. Nonetheless, Turkish officials are keen to maintain warm relations with King Salman, that he, unlike MBS, has no blood on his hands with respect to the Khashoggi affair.

As the Gulf crisis has regionalized significantly since its eruption in mid-2017, the escalating violence and worsening chaos in parts of Libya this year has heavily factored into the Gulf dispute, with Turkey aligned with Qatar and Libya’s UN-recognized government against Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and General Khalifa Haftar.

Fearing the emergence of Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups in Libya, the UAE and Egypt acted early on to strengthen Haftar’s position as he was combatting a variety of Islamist militias in Libya. Central to the UAE’s support for Haftar is Abu Dhabi’s paranoia of political Islam in virtually all its forms. The Libyan Civil War quickly became a in Abu Dhabi’s agenda aimed at countering Turkish and Qatari influence in Africa, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood. That Emirati military forces have directly intervened in Libya underscores the extent to which Abu Dhabi is determined to support Haftar and defeat Islamist groups in their quest to seize power.

From the Turkish perspective, Abu Dhabi has played a destabilizing role in Libya by empowering Haftar to the point where he was confident enough to launch his westward offensive on Tripoli in April. The prospects of Haftar establishing a military dictatorship in Libya are alarming, particularly given the commander’s staunchly anti-Turkish rhetoric that mirrors the Egyptian regime’s propaganda against the government in Ankara. In order to counter Haftar’s UAE-backed advance on Tripoli, Turkey has provided drones and armored trucks to forces loyal to Libya’s internationally respected Government of National Accord.

Future Relations

In terms of Ankara’s future relations with the GCC member states, it appears likely that Turkey will maintain a divisive role in the Arabian Peninsula. There are no signs of either the Qatar crisis winding down or Ankara easing its support for Doha in favor of better ties with the blockading states. Furthermore, given the extent to which Turkey has backed Qatar throughout the past two years, there is no reason to expect the parties involved in the crisis to view Ankara as being a neutral mediator capable of bringing both sides toward a resolution.

Notwithstanding these major sources of political friction that shape Ankara’s relations with certain Gulf monarchies, economic ties have their own rationale. Underscored by Turkish companies that still do business with the blockading firms, there remains a widespread in the Arabian Peninsula that economic, trade and investment ties with the Turks must continue, especially with respect to national economic diversification programs. What remains to be seen is whether the political tensions heat up to the point whereby sanctions against Turkey are implemented by the UAE, which would severely harm both the Turks and Gulf Arabs from an economic standpoint.

Looking ahead, the GCC member-states that Turkey is a power to contend with in the Arabian Peninsula. The support that Qatar received from Ankara made a major difference in terms of Doha proving capable of weathering the blockade and remaining defiant of its immediate Arab neighbors. At a time when American power in the Middle East is declining, Turkey has established itself as a pillar of the new security landscape in the Arabian Peninsula. Yet as Qatar’s closest regional ally and as a power widely viewed as pro-Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey will remain a divisive actor in the GCC’s polarized environment.

*[ is a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In June 2017, a group of countries led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates formed a diplomatic and economic blockade against the state of Qatar. Yet rather than bringing Qatar to its knees, the crisis has benefited the tiny Gulf nation in numerous ways. The siege has forced Doha to diversify its relations regionally and globally to gain independence from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s spheres of influence.

Qatar, a gas-rich Arab emirate, has reassured the world that regardless of the embargo, its economy has not been affected and it is ripe for investment. In fact, Qatari citizens have not particularly felt the impact of the blockade. Rather, it is — making up % of the country’s population — who have been hit the most for a number of reasons.

First, at the outset of the crisis in 2017, Qatari employers living in Arab countries enforcing the embargo were deported and forced to put business operations on hold. This meant South Asian construction workers were stranded in the Gulf. Second, foreign workers — especially from South Asia — primarily comprise the blue-collar working class in Qatar, so they were disproportionately harmed when the blockade caused material shortages and closed construction sites. Third, because migrant workers are often paid low salaries, even the slightest increase in food prices can immensely impair their standard of living.

Meanwhile, the state itself has triumphed over the blockade’s economic impact. By November 2018, Qatar was no longer spending any of its financial reserves to offset the embargo’s deleterious effects and, as a result, its economic prospects seem promising.

The Economy and Al-Udeid

Ironically, Qatar owes its current success to the Saudi-led coalition’s economic and diplomatic severance. Had it not been for the blockade, Qatar would not have been so incentivized to fortify its global reputation. While and grants won over many policy officials and academics, Qatar most efficaciously solidified a positive relationship with the US by intensifying America’s military dependence on the country.

In Qatar’s al-Udeid airbase, the US has a forward listening post on Iran, US Central Command operating headquarters and a Gulf-based launching pad to wage its military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The Qataris used the airbase to counter US President Donald Trump’s pro-Saudi foreign policy. Doha to expand al-Udeid’s resources and upgrade Hamad Port for use by the US Navy, all in exchange for a closer relationship with Washington.

Additionally, it was the very embargo intended to incapacitate Qatar’s economy that led to its prosperity and diversification. To compensate for severed economic ties with other Gulf states — including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain — Doha sought innovative ways to attract international business and foreign direct investment (FDI). Now, companies are to operate in Qatar because it has “a legal environment based on English common law, the right to trade in any currency, 100 percent foreign ownership, 100 percent repatriation of profits and a 10 percent corporate tax on locally sourced profits.”

Even pre-existing firms that wanted to maintain their Qatari clientele contributed to Doha’s financial success. These companies had to relocate their businesses to the country, thereby increasing FDI and local jobs in Qatar. Despite the embargo, FDI to Qatar by 4% in 2017, and the number of new companies licensed to operate in in the country by 66% in the same year.

The Saudi-led blockade has also contributed to Qatar’s self-sufficiency. Along with foreign direct investment, the domestic production of medicine and agricultural products has grown significantly.

For example, Qatar decided to����security through��, a company that has become the country’s largest locally-owned fresh dairy and beverage supplier. Driven by the impossibility of importing foods from nearby countries, the Qatari government implemented Baladna and other infrastructure projects to cope with the desert landscape. These initiatives use innovative solutions to transform the arid landscape into fruitful agricultural land, which is much more than what other Gulf states can boast about.

Due to its newfound economic vigor and weighty relationships in the global community, Doha is rising to regional prominence, even threatening Saudi and Emirati hegemony in the Gulf. Equipped with financial stability and independence from its neighbors’ agendas, Doha provided $500 million to , $150 million to civil servants in and additional aid to at the beginning of 2019. Unlike other Gulf states, Qatar does not have to abide by the economic rules of the Saudi and Emirati-led (GCC). Instead, it can undermine this hierarchy by distributing regional aid to places like Lebanon, where Saudi Arabia has been working to counter , an Iran-backed political, military and social organization.

Jamal Khashoggi and Human Rights

Qatar’s uprooting of the status quo is well-timed, thereby increasing the odds of its successful ascension to regional prominence. Surviving its own defamation at the hands of the Saudi-led coalition, Qatar can now bask in the condemnation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has been criticized for the war in Yemen, the incarceration of women’s rights activists and the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Similarly, the UAE clings onto its credibility after a British graduate student, Matthew Hedges, for spying despite the lack of clear evidence. So long as these besmirched Saudi and Emirati reputations persist, Qatar will have the opportunity — not just the financial means — to secure its status as a key regional player.

Of course, no country has a perfect human rights record and Qatar is no exception. In March 2016, a by Amnesty International found that migrant workers building the Khalifa International Stadium in Doha for the 2022 FIFA World Cup had “suffered systematic abuses, in some cases forced labour.” While the country officially amended its sponsorship system for foreign workers , it has still faced from human rights organizations.

Mediating between the US and Iran

Even more surprisingly, the coalition inadvertently pushed Qatar and Iran closer. Fearful of Doha’s openness to Iran, the Saudi-led coalition enforced a trade and travel embargo on the Qataris back in 2017. This led to a loss of imports and the in countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia to all Qatari-registered aircraft. However, the blockade cemented relations between Iran and Qatar as the Iranians made up for lost trade and helped Doha devise new .

Although, amid current tensions between the US and Iran over the failure of the nuclear deal that was agreed in 2015, the embargo has also brought Qatar closer to Washington. Due to lobbying efforts, financial grants and the developments at al-Udeid airbase, the relationship between Qatar and the US has never been better. Uniquely situated in the good graces of both Iran and the US, Qatar could serve as an indispensable mediator between the two. Just recently, Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani placated Iranian concerns about new US military deployments to the Middle East. As by Mark Perry in The American Conservative: “It’s likely, as this writer has been told by senior Pentagon officers, that al-Thani brought just the opposite message: that the new deployments are not a preparation for war, but an attempt to prevent it.”

At the end of May, Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz hosted a triple summit in Mecca for Arab and Muslim leaders. Despite the ongoing embargo, he invited Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani to attend, which was aimed at establishing a diplomatic consensus on regional issues, including Iran. Although the emir did not travel to Mecca, opting to send the Qatari prime minister instead, his unexpected invitation lends credence to the idea that Qatar is an invaluable asset in diffusing tensions between Iran and its adversaries.

Despite lacking the coercive force of a large state, Qatar boasts a trifecta of close relations with Washington and Tehran, influence in US circles and recent negotiating success. In February and March, Doha the longest round of peace talks between the US and the Taliban to date. Although no agreements were finalized, Qatar facilitated unprecedented strides toward peace in Afghanistan, giving Doha the image of a potential peacemaker between the US and Iran.

Two years after the Gulf crisis began, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have nothing to show for their coalition’s efforts to pressure Qatar into surrendering. Rather than folding to its GCC neighbors, Doha has challenged the Saudis and Emiratis. Qatari economic successes, coupled with Saudi and Emirati reputational shortcomings, provide further opportunity for Doha to continue rising to regional prominence.

*[ is a partner institution of 51�Թ�. A previous version of this article incorrectly stated that Baladna raises livestock. Updated: June 12, 2019.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Reporting on the emergency Saudi Arabia organized to rally other Arab nations to its increasingly obsessive cause — the ostracism, if not annihilation of Iran — CNN’s Nic Robertson judges the event an for King Salman and the Saudi regime. Impressed by the fact that the participants agreed to sign the statements prepared by the Saudis, Robertson echoes the sentiments routinely expressed by US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser John Bolton. “Tehran appeared tone-deaf to not one, but two unifying summit communiques urging it to change its behavior,” he writes.

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Unifying:

Achieving the adhesion of a number of individuals or groups to a given position or cause, whether voluntarily, through natural empathy and convergence of interest, through the persuasion of cogent arguments or through wanton bullying based on economic, military or moral coercion

Contextual note

Al Jazeera’s senior political analyst, Marwan Bishara, offered a somewhat different and of the summit’s outcome: “By the end of the meetings, Saudi efforts to put diplomatic pressure on Tehran paid off, at least on paper.”

Robertson’s description of Tehran’s critique as “tone-deaf” seems curious, to the point of sounding tone-deaf itself. In the preceding sentence he claims that Iranian leaders “hit back, criticizing the allegations as ‘baseless’ and accusing Saudi Arabia of promoting an ‘American and Zionist’ agenda.”��Robertson, who is CNN’s international diplomatic editor, presumably considers the use of the word “Zionist” as tone-deaf because in US political culture today, mentioning Zionism is routinely branded anti-Semitic.

But, according to Reuters, Robertson’s description of what the Iranians said : “We see the Saudi effort to mobilize (regional) opinion as part of the hopeless process followed by America and the Zionist regime against Iran.” Would anyone deny that Israel’s regime is Zionist? Does referring to it as Zionist qualify as “tone-deaf”?

Iran’s statement accurately describes the events playing out today, though whether the process is “hopeless” or not depends on how far the US, the Saudis and Israel are prepared to go to achieve their goal. The Saudis are definitely mobilizing regional opinion, and it is part of a process followed by the US and Israel to “confront and isolate Iran,” to quote Bishara. Does Robertson really expect that, having read the reproaches signed by the members of the summit, the Iranian government will “change its behavior” and decide to comply with the dictates of Saudi Arabia? Any serious observer of the Middle East knows that such an expectation is delusional, even if it correctly reflects the official logic of the Trump administration’s agenda.

Robertson’s rhetoric becomes even murkier when he writes: “It would be easy to write the King’s success off as the kind of leverage that only petro-dollars can buy, but the region is deeply divided over many issues — not least a searing rift with neighboring Qatar, which has spent two years under an economic and travel embargo imposed by Saudi Arabia.”

It would indeed have been easier as well as more accurate simply to mention the effect not just of petro-dollars, but also of the power of the US to intimidate nations such as Jordan and Morocco. Refusing to beat around the bush, Bishara calls it “bullying, blackmailing and bribing Arab countries into submission, and allying with outside forces, namely the US and Israel.”

Historical note

Marwan Bishara sees CNN’s conclusion — that the summit, with its aim of “uniting the Arabs against Iran,” was an unmitigated success — as the preferred reading in “certain Western circles.” Robertson paints this as a historical turning point, marked by the “reemergence of Saudi Arabia from pariah to regional power broker again, which is good timing for its key ally, US President Donald Trump, as he doubles down on sanctions and pressure on Iran.” Robertson even suggests that this in some way exonerates Saudi Arabia after the scandalous murder of Saudi journalist . Why? Because the king (he doesn’t mention Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman) has now provided “proof that he at least has clout.” In US culture, clout settles all questions and is all that really counts.

Bishara nevertheless noticed a few important things that Robertson failed to pick up on. For example, referring to the fact that it was billed as a triple summit, Gulf, Arab and Muslim, he writes: “Riyadh’s manipulation of the agenda priorities was so apparent and so preposterous that it prompted some to ridicule its “attend-one-get-two-free” stunt in Mecca.” He also mentions that Iraq and Syria rejected the final statement and Qatar expressed its reservations. Does that merit calling it a “unifying” event?

We also learn, in contrast to Robertson’s claim of total success, that “Riyadh failed to get the OIC [Organization for Islamic Cooperation] to condemn Tehran directly in the final communique.” Bishara goes further to undermine CNN’s reading of the outcome when he writes: “The GCC and the Arab League are more divided and weaker than ever, thanks in no small part to Saudi manipulation of their agendas to serve its own narrow interests and those of its allies.” He also points out that “the Gulf wars and the crackdown on popular upheavals have drastically debilitated much of the Arab region,” seriously diminishing its political and moral clout. Even if much of the Arab world could be united behind a policy dictated by Saudi Arabia, it wouldn’t carry the weight that it did, for example, in 1973, with the creation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

In other words, the “unifying summit” was unified by its window dressing and little more; in Bishara’s words, “a collection of PR stunts that neither alters the balance of power, nor changes matters on the ground… fake unity.” CNN’s Robertson was impressed by the signatures of so many delegates on the declarations, but issuing “condemnation with no power and no strategy to back them up is like issuing bad checks.”

Bishara believes that “Saudi Arabia outsourcing its Iran problem to Washington will prove disastrous for the region.” Robertson and CNN hadn’t even noticed that side of the issue because they want their readers to believe that — unlike Russia and the 2016 US presidential election — there is no collusion between Trump and Saudi Arabia, simply a natural convergence of interests. It’s all about simple commerce: oil on one side, arms on the other. You sell me this and I’ll sell you that. CNN’s video in the article’s web page explains the history of US-Saudi relations in precisely those terms. It’s just the basic rule of good, honest capitalism, nothing complex. Business as usual, win-win.

The rule that applies everywhere, except in Iran, the only nation in the world now to sponsor terrorism, something no Saudi would ever think of engaging in, unless we call murdering a journalist in an overseas consulate an act of terrorism. But that would be unfair because, as Mohammed bin Salman and his spokespeople have explained, it was just some sort of misunderstanding about a mission, or something like that.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, , in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]��

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Kuwait has a high-profile international case on its hands that threatens to harm the country’s foreign investment climate. The case, which has now been brought to the��, coupled with several recent legal complaints from international investors, could damage the country’s business environment and threaten its reputation during a sensitive period for the Gulf emirate.

A Kuwait court wrongly convicted Russian national Marsha Lazareva, a prominent businesswoman in the Middle East, of misusing public funds. She has been����a 10-year jail sentence, with hard labor, in Kuwait’s overcrowded Sulaibiya prison since 2018.

On May 5, a Kuwaiti judge confirmed a lower court decision to drop the conviction against her but set bail at prohibitive $66 million. This, after Lazareva already paid $36 million in bail last year and despite the case against her appearing to have collapsed amid false claims and rampant corruption in the Kuwaiti judicial system.

By��voiding the lower court��ruling but then jacking the bail demand, the judge essentially created a��hostage-for-ransom situation.��Such��judicial actions risk scaring investors��away��at a time when��the al-Sabah royals��are seeking greater foreign investment.

The government’s New Kuwait Vision 2035 aims to transform the country into a global financial, commercial and cultural hub within 17 years, but its success hinges on a significant amount of foreign investment. The Lazareva case raises red flags for foreign investors and could send them fleeing Kuwait. Simultaneously, Kuwait is facing multiple arbitration cases brought by foreign investors.

In July,��attorneys for��Lazareva��issued a����to the state of Kuwaiti based on a 1994 agreement between Russia and Kuwait to encourage and protect investments in each other’s country.��Kuwait��has failed to respond to the arbitration request despite a visit by��Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, ,��in March��during which he addressed Lazareva’s case.

A Spanish investor has also opened an arbitration complaint against Kuwait hinged on a similar Spain-Kuwait bilateral investment treaty. Alcosa Shareholding SL filed a notice of arbitration on April 22 in relation to health services contracts with the Kuwaiti government. In yet another case, a Swiss NGO, the Economic Council of Muslim Countries, commenced an arbitration in 2018 under the Switzerland-Kuwait bilateral investment treaty. Kuwait has yet to assign anyone to this arbitration.

Apart from these two cases, Kuwait is currently facing two other claims with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, one from an Egyptian investor, Almasryia Operating & Maintaining Touristic Construction Co LLC, in relation to a real estate project in the emirate. The other was by Spanish and Italian investors Rizzani de Eccher SpA, Obrascón Huarte Lain SA and Trevi SpA, in relation to a highway construction project. The tribunal in that case ��requests for interim measures.

The ability for plaintiffs to use arbitration is important, especially when considering bilateral investment treaties. Arbitration gives investors a mechanism to present their the case in front of an internationally recognized body that ensures transparency and is not subject to the corruption and family connections that so often influence the Kuwaiti legal system. One of the most appealing features of international arbitration is the cross-border enforceability of awards. For resolving a dispute that spans both borders and legal systems, international arbitration allows all parties to get an unbiased hearing and enforceable decision.

In Lazareva’s case, there is an opportunity for all sides to come to an agreement with a decision on compensation. Kuwaiti authorities recognize that international tribunals hold to international customs and law, and that participation is important to Kuwait’s international standing. Marsha Lazareva’s case is wracked by the corruption of the Kuwaiti legal system. Numerous legal experts from the US, the UK and Russia have urged Kuwait’s rulers to release Lazereva and drop the bail demand.

Global attention to the case is escalating at a time when Kuwait is poised to assume the presidency of the United Nations Security Council in June, potentially undermining its moment in the spotlight. Without moving more boldly to confront and solve these arbitration requests, Kuwait may find itself on the receiving end of a catastrophic drop in foreign direct investment.

*[This article was by Gulf State Analytics, a partner institution of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Kuwait Is Risking a Catastrophic Drop in Foreign Investment appeared first on 51�Թ�.

To quote Amnesty International, 2018 was a “” for human rights activists, journalists and dissidents in the Gulf. The killing of Jamal Khashoggi in particular called attention to Saudi Arabia’s human rights record at home and in Yemen, but all Gulf states continue to restrict freedom of expression, association and assembly. Recent summits involving Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which includes Kuwait, have been noticeable for the absence of human rights on the agenda.

A trend that began last year has so far continued unabated. Marsha Lazareva is, arguably, the most successful businesswoman in the Middle East. For the past 13 years, as the CEO and vice president of KGL Investment, she has developed and managed private equity funds in Kuwait, creating hundreds of jobs in the process. But was it in the spite of all this, or because of it, that she was sentenced to 10 years’ hard labor last year for misappropriating funds and thrown in jail?

Her case has become one of global humanitarian interest. Since Lazareva’s arrest and incarceration in May 2018, high-profile officials and have called vociferously for her immediate release. According to legal experts, the charges on which she was convicted were baseless. And what’s worse, there are murmurings that her detention and conviction were motivated by sexism, racism and envy.

Lazareva’s own record of her trial would seem to bear this out. , a Russian citizen who studied at the prestigious Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, she was “singled out” because she was a woman. Many “racist comments” were allegedly made against her. “In spite of numerous requests by my lawyers,” she said, “the judge denied me full access to all accusatory documents and also denied my calling of all my witnesses.” She further claimed that having told the judge she was feeling unwell, she was instructed to “vomit in the corner at the back of the room.”

Lazareva now shares a cell with seven other woman in the notorious Sulaibiya prison, which has an official capacity of 2,500 prisoners but houses more than 6,000. Her mother has traveled from the US to Kuwait to care for her 4-year-old son, whom she has been prevented from seeing. Her health is in decline. Indeed, Louis Freeh, the former director of the FBI who has joined the appeal for her release, ��that “she’s deteriorating both physically and mentally in this condition, and there’s no reason for it.”

A series of hearings held since her trial have proved inconclusive or been abandoned entirely. A £50 million cash bail put up by Lazareva and Saeed Dashti, who was incarcerated on similar charges of embezzlement, has failed to secure even a temporary reprieve. Lord Carlile of Berriew, QC, who is senior counsel for Lazareva, has since made it known that the “expert auditor” on whose testimony much of the evidence relied has since been charged with the forgery��of the three documents on which he depended during the case.

According to Lazareva’s legal team, her success in Kuwait generated enemies. It was after the lucrative sale of a real estate project in the Philippines to Udenna, a Davao City-based holding company, that the arrest finally came. Though Kuwaiti women are among the most emancipated in the Middle East — Kuwait was ranked first among Arab countries in the Global Gender Gap Report for 2014 and 2015 — the allegations made against Marsha Lazareva, as well as the comments purportedly made by the judge, suggest that sexism and racism may have played a role in her incarceration.

The upshot of this is that relations between Kuwait and the US, a close ally, may be overshadowed. Neil Bush, son of the late former president, has taken a personal interest in Lazareva’s plight, Congress must “take steps to sanction the individuals responsible” if the Kuwaiti leadership does not correct the injustice. Louis Freeh has added that Lazareva is “probably one of the most, if not��the most, prominent female business executives in the mid-East just completely run roughshod over in terms of her basic rights.” In the UK, the US and Russia, the consensus is clear: Marsha Lazareva’s jailing was unjust.

The ball, it seems, is now very much in Kuwait’s court. There are 5,000 international students of Kuwaiti origin in higher education in the United States. Relations have been largely untroubled since the Gulf War. On paper, Kuwait remains a major non-NATO ally of the US and the UK. Now the team of political and legal heavyweights working for Lazareva’s release warn that Kuwait risks losing its support. Equally, it risks losing international investment at a time when it is actively seeking foreign direct investment. And all this, it seems, because Marsha Lazareva was a woman who was too successful.��

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Why Is a Prominent Female Business Exec in Prison in Kuwait? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In 1967, when asked “what sequence of events you would like to see now in the Middle East?” Saudi King Faisal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud swiftly replied, “the extermination of Israel.” Since then, narratives in Saudi Arabia and the other five Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states toward Israel have undergone a dramatic change as, in April 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that “Israelis have the right to their own land.”

Such an upheaval in official discourse has also been accompanied by a gradual and lengthy shift in the policies implemented by GCC monarchies toward Israel. Saudi Arabia contributed with personnel and resources to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The Arab League introduced the in 1945 and the “Three Nos of Khartoum” in 1967: no to peace, recognition and negotiations with Israel. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo against Israel supporters in 1973. All things considered, political relations between the Gulf and Israel have undergone a quiet, yet sweeping, transition.

Although the warming of relations seems to be proceeding at a faster pace only recently, the first clandestine contacts were already underway decades prior. In the 1960s, Israel assisted the Saudis in countering Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s in Yemen, as well as in the 1970s when it Sultan Qaboos of Oman’s efforts to defeat a rebellion in the Dhofar province.

Shifting Sands

Since then, a series of events have incentivized a sharper realignment of interests. The peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), initiated at the Madrid Conference of 1991, led to significant openings: Qatar and Oman established trade offices in Tel Aviv, Israeli government officials visited Muscat and Manama, and the institution of the Middle East Desalination Research Center provided a forum for track II diplomacy among Israel and GCC states.

Progress in Israeli-Gulf contacts suffered a considerable drawback with the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada (uprising) in 2000. Several protests against Israel erupted throughout the Gulf, and Oman closed down Israel’s trade mission in Muscat. Similarly, in response to Israel’s Operation Cast Lead campaign of late 2008 and early 2009 in the Gaza Strip, Qatar also closed the Israeli trade mission in Doha. Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz down an invitation to Washington by pointing out US support for Israel in the intifada.

However, in the midst of Israeli-Palestinian clashes, an impactful took place within the leadership of GCC monarchies. Between 1995 and 2006, all Gulf monarchs except for Oman were succeeded by younger rulers who gradually demonstrated openness to dialogue with Israel. Subsequently, the emergence of Iran as a regional power in the aftermath of the Iraq War paved the way to further consolidation of contacts and exchanges between the various parties.

In March 2002, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud launched the (API) at an Arab League summit in Beirut, Lebanon. The proposal offered full recognition of Israel by all 22 Arab League states in exchange for complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and an “agreed upon” solution to the issue of Palestinian refugees.

The effort was not successful, but it signaled a preliminary opening and, since then, reports of both official and informal contacts have multiplied at an exponential rate. In 2006, in the wake of the Second Lebanon War, then-Israeli Prime Minister with Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s national security adviser, in Jordan to the Shia threat posed by Iran and the Saudis’ ideas for peace. In 2009, Israel lobbied for the United Arab Emirates to host the newly-established International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in exchange for agreement to Israeli presence. The establishment of the Israeli delegation to IRENA marked the first opening of an Israeli representation office in an Arab country in almost 20 years. In 2015, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Emirati senior officials in Cyprus to discuss the countering of Iranian influence.

Not Everyone Is Opening the Door

From to , Emirati and Israeli air forces have taken part in joint military exercises, along with other countries. Israel has reconnaissance drones based in the UAE. In 2018, Bahrain was seeking to normalize relations with Israel, while Israeli media for the first time that the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) met his Saudi counterpart on the margins of a conference in Washington for commanders of US-allied armies. ��Netanyahu, announcing an unspecified breakthrough in Israel’s outreach to Arab states, : “What is actually happening with [the Arab states] has never happened in our history, even when we signed agreements. Cooperation between Israel and Arab states exists in various ways and different levels, though it still isn’t visible above the surface, there is much more than during any other period in the history of Israel. This is a tremendous change.”

Undoubtedly, GCC-Israel relations should not be lumped together as a uniform phenomenon. Oman, Qatar and Kuwait have followed relatively autonomous paths in shaping their dialogue with Israel. has maintained a remarkably solid position against Israel and has deviated from the undercover openings advanced by other GCC countries. In 2018, Kuwait Israel of violating Lebanese sovereignty in its Operation Northern Shield to destroy Hezbollah tunnels, while Bahrain supported Israel instead. Kuwait regularly condemns Israel for human rights violations in various international fora, while it prevents Israeli citizens from flying on its national airline. Moreover, it ruled out co-hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup together with Qatar, as it would entail allowing Israeli citizens into Kuwait.

Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on 6/14/2016 © Roman Yanushevsky / Shutterstock

The constitutional monarchy presents a relatively more liberal political system when compared to its GCC counterparts, which sometimes grants the Kuwaiti parliament an assertive role. Remarkably, the speaker of the national assembly gathered widespread support when he shouted “” at Israeli MPs attending the Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Besides a vocal parliament, an older leadership, Arab nationalism, less pervasive security apparatuses and a history of Palestinian immigration seem to be at the of Kuwait’s behavior.

On the contrary, and have developed considerably closer ties with Israel, in an effort to assert their independence and enhance their geopolitical position as regional players. Oman, in particular, has always tried to maintain a neutral stance in foreign affairs under the leadership of Sultan Qaboos. Hence, through its traditional modus operandi, Oman has sought a balanced approach toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has recognized Tel Aviv’s permanent existence in the Middle East. In 1994, Muscat the first Gulf capital to welcome an Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin. As a result, the sultanate has emerged as a key regional actor capable of and pushing breakthroughs.

Notably, Netanyahu was by Sultan Qaboos in Muscat in October 2018 to “the achievement of peace and stability in the Middle East.” The visit to the Gulf state was the first by an Israeli prime minister in over 20 years. What is more, it saw the of an Israeli leader across Saudi airspace, and it thus involved Riyadh’s approval. Through its typical balancing game, Oman took advantage of the meeting by presenting itself as independent from Iran and by standing out as a regional broker in the eyes of the US government. Accordingly, Omani Foreign Minister Yousuf bin Alawi later for the Trump administration’s “” for Middle East peace and , “Arabs must … try to ease those fears that Israel has through initiatives and real deals between us and Israel.”

Looking at the underlying strategies tying Israel with the other GCC monarchies, a clear logic emerges from the current historical context. Israel, for its part, has been pursuing diplomatic engagement with Arab counterparts even before its own establishment. In 1919, Chaim Weizmann, a Zionist leader and future president of Israel, met with Faisal al-Hashemi, son of the grand sharif of Mecca. Together they signed an agreement, never implemented, in which Arabs would encourage Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine, while the Zionist organization would have recognized a future independent Arab state outside Palestine.

Subsequently, ever since its establishment, Israel has strenuously taken advantage of any opening by Arab countries compatible with its vital interests. , the YouTube account of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office released an amateur video showing a closed meeting with top officials from the Gulf dismissing the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, affirming the primacy of the Iranian threat to regional stability and recognizing Israel’s right to defend itself. The video was quickly removed, but there are few doubts that the publication had occurred by mistake. Clearly, normalization with the most prominent historical allies of the PLO has the implicit consequence of downplaying the question of Palestine and legitimizing the expansionary ambitions of Israeli governments.

Iranian Influence in the Middle East

The actual shift in diplomatic posture has come from Gulf monarchies, in light of profoundly mutated domestic, regional and international contexts. The development of Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, together with the disengagement of the Obama administration from the Middle East, were commonly perceived by the Gulf and Israel, as they discovered each other as potential allies. Specifically, since 2010, unparalleled protests have broken out in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Algeria and Sudan, with relatively smaller turmoil in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

For its part, Iran has many of these uprisings by playing into its revolutionary narrative to preserve and enhance its interests in the region. In 2011, as the events unfolded in various countries, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, : “This is what was always talked about as the occurrence of Islamic awakening at the time of the Islamic revolution of the great Iranian nation and is showing itself today.” Hence, Arab political instability and Iranian support translate into a serious threat for the geopolitical position of Gulf monarchies and for their very own regime survival.

On the international stage, the uncompromising approach of the Trump administration toward Iran has come a long way in bringing Israel and most GCC monarchies together in their quest to counter Iranian influence. Already during the Obama administration, US Secretary of State John Kerry that a “new alignment of interests between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries in the region against Iran presented an opportunity to shuffle the deck.” However, inasmuch as Barack Obama’s foreign policy of any enthusiasm for confrontation with Iran, the Trump administration today fosters and upholds such hostility by Israel and some GCC countries.

Besides the decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, the US government is actively trying to bring Gulf and other Arab countries together to target Iran and US regional presence. Israel is also seeking to partner up, with then-Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman in 2018:��“Who supported Trump’s decision to��withdraw from the nuclear agreement with Iran? Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. … it’s time for those moderate countries to ‘come out of the closet’ and start talking openly. Just like there’s an axis of evil, it’s time for the Middle East to also have an axis of moderate countries.”

More concretely, US President Donald Trump has announced the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA). Dubbed the Arab NATO, the initiative would as “a bulwark against Iranian aggression, terrorism, extremism, and will bring stability to the Middle East.” It would see the participation of the six GCC states, Jordan, Egypt (which has already ) and the US.

Although Israel’s membership has not been officially brought forward, Netanyahu’s government would enormously profit from Israel’s deeper with its Arab counterparts as an unofficial member by providing, for instance, intelligence support. The opportunity is already being seized as Netanyahu attended the Warsaw conference on peace and security in the Middle East in February, together with delegations from all the MESA participants. Once again, the US sponsored the event in an effort to push its toward Iran and to provide a diplomatic forum for Israel and Sunni Arab countries.

Israeli Technology in the Gulf

As a result of such developments, the role of enemy has progressively transitioned from Israel to Iran, allowing for considerable realignment between the Israelis and GCC states. However, Israel does not merely represent a resourceful ally to contrast the regional ambitions of the Islamic Republic. Over recent years, Israeli companies have provided Gulf monarchies with world-class technologies for surveillance, espionage and military purposes, thus contributing to their domestic stability. Since the Arab Uprisings in 2011, Gulf have increasingly cracked down on dissent by their surveillance mechanisms, updating their regime and upgrading their security apparatus. Israeli companies are helping because of the mutual requirement to protect the safety of society from the governments’ perspective.

In 2008, Abu Dhabi’s Critical National Infrastructure Authority $816-million worth of surveillance equipment from AGT international, a firm owned by Israeli Mati Kochavi, in order to monitor extractive infrastructure and public venues. Later, the same company formed a joint venture with Emirati firms to set up an Emirate-wide mass surveillance initiative called “Falcon Eye.” The project will involve a centralized system receiving live feedback from thousands of cameras and sensors installed across the whole of Abu Dhabi.

Israeli high-tech companies were also with repairing a breach into 40,000 Saudi Aramco computers allegedly at the hand of Iranian hackers. In 2014, an Israeli subcontractor to the construction of a high-tech barrier along Saudi Arabia’s border with Iraq. Only , Israeli-founded Verint is allegedly providing Bahrain with systems to monitor many of Manama’s neighborhoods and outlying towns. The IDF, for its part, played an important role in the development of the Israeli cyber security sector, by functioning as a with their numerous intelligence units and advanced training programs.

The Israeli government has also the sector abroad by setting up the National Cyber Security Directorate within the Prime Minister’s Office. On this matter, : “Cyber is a serious threat and a very lucrative business.” Indeed, the rapid expanse of purchasing Israeli surveillance equipment by the UAE only accelerated after the assassination of Palestinian operative Hamas military commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in a Dubai hotel by a Mossad hit team in 2010. The Israelis embarrassed the Dubai police and their advanced CCTV and intelligence system at the time, prompting the UAE to recognize the utility of boosting behind-the-scenes cooperation with the Jewish state.

Arab Public Opinion

In the aftermath of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder in October 2018, Netanyahu how Saudi Arabia “is important for the stability of the world, for the region.” His remarks highlight the strategic value of Gulf-Israel ties in spite of their clandestine nature.

However, Arab public opinion remains largely hostile to normalizing ties with Israel. In various surveys conducted by the between 2006 and 2017, such rejection clearly emerged. In Bahrain, 79% of respondents were against the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East, 51% of Kuwaiti interviewees wished for the weakening of economic relations with Israel in the future, and almost half of Saudi respondents were against the recognition of Israel, even after a hypothetical permanent settlement of all issues regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Notably, a delegation of senior Israeli officials had to their participation to the 2019 Global Entrepreneurship Congress hosted by Bahrain between April 15 and 18. Israel’s economy minister, Eli Cohen, was scheduled to attend, while the deputy chief of Israel’s Innovation Authority had been invited to give a speech. However, they had to pull out following formal by the Bahraini national assembly, minor street protests in Manama and the alleged of a threatening video by a Shia terrorist group. Later instead claimed the visit did take place despite official denials, with Israeli diplomats holding meetings on the sidelines of the conference.

Such developments are highly revealing of the opportunities and constraints of Israeli-Gulf ties. While bottom-up pressures limit the extent of the openings, top-down strategies seek a pragmatic approach by furthering their self-interests. Therefore, the parties will have to keep developing their relationship through informal meetings, public denials, middlemen and foreign subsidiary companies. Such a of official denial and unofficial contact might seem problematic, but it provides considerable benefits to both sides.

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The decision on April 22 by Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa to restore the individuals may be a first step in what remains a long and difficult road toward dialogue and reconciliation. Bahrain has been wracked by more than eight years of civil unrest that has severely damaged the kingdom’s economy, seen thousands of protesters jailed and nearly 1,000 stripped of their citizenship.

The Gulf island’s main political opposition groups have been banned and their leaders jailed. In June 2017, Al-Wasat, Bahrain’s only independent news site was shuttered, effectively silencing free media. Freedom of expression, too, has been severely curtailed. The human rights activist is currently serving a five-year sentence for tweets that criticized the war in and conditions in the country’s main prison, Jau. Another activist, , is serving a life sentence and , the leader of al-Wefaq, the largest opposition movement, was jailed for 15 years which on appeal was altered to . Other oppositionists and human rights activists are either in prison in Bahrain or in exile in the West.

The vast majority of those affected by the government’s crackdown on dissent are Shia Muslims, the majority indigenous community in a kingdom ruled for more than two centuries by the Sunni al-Khalifa family. Shia Bahrainis have long complained of discrimination in job hiring, housing, education and other facilities provided by the state. They point to a gerrymandered political system entrenching the status quo and the failure of the ruling family to deliver on promises made in 2001 for a more equitable power-sharing arrangement. When those concerns boil over and lead to unrest, the government responds with harsh measures.

Post-Independence

Indeed, the history of Bahrain since it gained independence from Britain in 1971 has been one of persistent cycles of reform and repression, intrinsically linked one to the other. When reform demands go too far and threaten the position of the ruling family, repression kicks in. That in turn becomes excessive and a process of reform begins anew.

Bahrain elected its first parliament in 1973. But after legislators refused to approve a draconian state security law, parliament was dissolved just two years later.��The then and still prime minister, Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, together with his brother Isa, the emir, ruled with a firm hand. They were aided by Ian Henderson, a Scotsman who ran the state security apparatus with such ruthless efficiency that he earned the sobriquet “Butcher of Bahrain” from regime opponents.

A in 1981 and an uprising in the 1990s calling for democratic reform led to periods of intense repression. However, the repression eased when the emir died in 1999 and his son, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, succeeded him. Hamad introduced a reform program that saw the state of emergency, in place since 1975, lifted. The state security law was abolished. Political opponents and human rights activists were released from prison, and others were allowed and encouraged to return from exile under a general amnesty. Restrictions on the media were loosened.

In February 2001, a referendum was held in which Bahrainis voted overwhelmingly in support of the National Action Charter, a roadmap toward the . In 2002, Bahrain adopted a new constitution along the lines of the charter’s provisions, with Hamad declaring himself king. For the next several years, though many Shia continued to feel marginalized and discriminated against, the reform agenda was the order of the day, a state of affairs that benefited the country both economically and politically.

Arab Spring

The Arab Spring and the events of February and March 2011 saw the cycle of repression return with a vengeance. Peaceful calls for a faster pace of reform gained huge support in the kingdom across sectarian lines. In a country with an indigenous population of less than 700,000, it is estimated more than 100,000 people took to the streets of the capital, Manama. The ruling family saw the reform demands as a major threat, the most serious it had ever faced. There was good reason for concern: Popular protests had already toppled two Arab strongmen in North Africa.

For its part, Saudi Arabia feared that should the Khalifa family give ground, that would serve to empower its own Shia community, heavily discriminated against and the majority population in the oil-rich Eastern Province adjacent to Bahrain. On March 14, 2011, Saudi Arabia, joined by the United Arab Emirates, sent troops down the causeway linking Bahrain to the Saudi mainland. Demonstrations were crushed and protesters routed by Bahraini security and military forces. Dozens were killed, hundreds wounded and thousands arbitrarily jailed. Torture in detention was widespread with at least two detainees being beaten to death.

King Hamad, facing international criticism, commissioned a tribunal of human rights experts chaired by the distinguished law professor, Cherif Bassiouni. The was, and remains, the only independent analysis of its kind dealing with the events of the Arab Spring, and it is to the king’s credit that he commissioned it.

Bassiouni’s report, released in November 2011, was a damning indictment of how the government had handled what had been a largely peaceful call for democratic reform. The king accepted the report in full and promised to carry out all its recommendations, many of which relate to the police and security forces. Critics argue that in the years since the report, very few of the recommendations have been fully implemented. The government takes the position that most have.

Dialogue and Reconciliation

What is not in dispute is that the regime, citing security concerns, has continued to bear down hard on any form of dissent. Dialogue and trust between the opposition and the ruling family has completely broken down. However, that may be about to change. On April 26, Hasan Shafaei, an official at the Bahraini Embassy in London met with this author. He said that King Hamad wants to “encourage opportunities to create a better situation.” Shafaei is a former activist. In 2002, he was a founding member of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights with Nabeel Rajab and Abdulhadi al-Khawaja. He said that, in his opinion, the opposition had “missed opportunities in the past” and urged it to “take advantage of this goodwill from the king.”

The citizenship restoration decree should be seen as King Hamad’s signal that now is the time to move forward to dialogue. Significantly, included in the 551 were 138 names of individuals who had been stripped of their citizenship and sentenced to between three years and life in a just a few days earlier, on April 16. Though the prison sentences stand, King Hamad could not have stated more clearly that citizenship stripping should not be used by the courts as punishment. It is a step that will not have pleased some within the ruling family, but it is as strong an indication as any that the cycle of repression could end and an agenda of reconciliation begin.

To speed up the process of reconciliation, Shafaei, a human rights adviser to the embassy, said that “more good news was coming.” That could include the release of political prisoners, including Rajab. He noted several recent meetings between the prime minister and a senior religious leader of the Shia community, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ghurifi. Those meetings, this author was told, had the full approval of the ailing Ayatollah Isa Qassim, the highest religious authority for Bahraini Shias. (However, Sheikh Qassim was those who had his citizenship restored by the king after having it revoked in 2016.)

Shafaei also pointed to a new alternative sentencing law passed last year that includes the imposition of community service sentences, house arrest, electronic tagging and attending training and rehabilitation programs. Although it was not a point Shafaei made, the new law has the virtue of helping to deal with serious overcrowding and the consequent poor conditions faced by inmates at Jau Prison.

Ali Alaswad is a senior al-Wefaq politician, now in exile in London. When told of Shafaei’s comments, he played down the significance of both the meetings with the prime minister and the restoration of citizenship. “[King Hamad] wants us to say thank you when their citizenship was taken for no reason.” Alaswad told this author there are 4,500 political prisoners in detention, adding “we will not be happy till they are back home.”

At the same time, though, Alaswad signaled there is room for some optimism. Though al-Wefaq is not willing to enter into a formal dialogue with the government simply on the basis of the king’s citizenship decision, that could change. “Release some political prisoners and we are ready to reconsider. A prisoner release is a good opportunity for dialogue,” he said.

Within that statement lurks the potential to break the long and damaging stalemate that, since 2011, has affected every level of Bahraini society. Should the king follow through on what Hasan Shafaei has called “good news” and release some of the prisoners over the Islamic month of Ramadan, the arduous task of building trust and finding common ground can begin. It will be a sign for all Bahrainis that they can dare to hope there is an end to an awful period in their history. It would be useful, too, to restore Sheikh Isa Qassem’s nationality. Finally, should the release of prisoners include Nabeel Rajab, an internationally-recognized human rights voice, King Hamad will have signaled to the world that he is serious about ending the cycle of repression.

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