On August 13, the United Arab Emirates agreed in principle to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for suspending the annexation of portions of the West Bank. This US-brokered deal reflects years of growing ties between Israel and Gulf states that have long rested just below the of official relations. Saudi Arabia has shared , Bahrain has for peace and the UAE has deals with Israeli defense companies. For their part, Qatar previously commercial ties with Israel and Oman has Israeli leaders over the years. Although their means and motivations differ, it is clear that Gulf-Israeli relations are rising.
Israel-UAE Deal: Arab States Are Tired of Waiting on Palestine
Yet one Gulf state rejects this trend: Kuwait. According to Al-Qabas, a Kuwaiti newspaper, government sources that 鈥�Kuwait maintains its position and will be the last country to normalize with Israel.鈥� Beyond Kuwaiti officials, analysts and academics, few have addressed Kuwait鈥檚 position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
Adam Hoffman and Moran Zaga in February that Kuwait is 鈥渢he only Gulf state that opposes even discrete normalisation with Israel.鈥� In January 2019, Giorgio Cafiero that 鈥�Kuwait has become the one GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] state that refuses to see warmer ties with Israel as prudent.鈥� Even White House senior adviser Jared Kushner said to Reuters that Kuwait is 鈥渙ut there taking a very radical view on the conflict to date in favour of the Palestinians.鈥�
Why does Kuwait take a different approach to Israel compared to its Gulf neighbors? Kuwait鈥檚 democratic institutions, historical ties to Palestine and pan-Arab ideals are three factors that lead both its government and society to reject normalization.
Parliament and Parlors
Kuwait鈥檚 most unique aspect is its semi-democratic institutions. The national wields significant power and channels public sentiment against normalization. Notably, Speaker Marzouq al-Ghanim Israeli Knesset members in 2017 as 鈥渙ccupiers and murderers of children.鈥� Parliamentarian Osama al-Shaheen in late April 2020 that 鈥�Kuwait is against any cultural, political, or social normalization with the 鈥榋ionist entity.鈥欌�� This statement is emblematic of the relative autonomy of Kuwait‘s political opposition and their position in parliament. As of August 18, 39 of Kuwait鈥檚 50 parliamentarians a statement stressing their view against normalization with Israel.
In addition to the formal institution of parliament, Kuwait鈥檚 distinct political is also reflected in diwaniyya. These gatherings in parlors attached to homes represent the intersection of political campaigning and social commentary in Kuwait. Diwaniyya are more autonomous from government oversight than other Gulf majlis gatherings, resulting in a more free exchange of ideas. Among the Gulf publics, Kuwaiti civil society has been most able to pressure the government against normalization.
Palestinian Community
Another factor that distinguishes Kuwait is its link to one of the Gulf鈥檚 largest Palestinian communities. Beginning with immigration in the 1940s, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians settled in Kuwait and ties improved after Yasser Arafat founded Fatah while living in the country from 1959. However, Arafat鈥檚 of Iraq鈥檚 invasion of Kuwait in 1990 degraded relations severely, resulting in the expulsion and exodus of most of Kuwait鈥檚 400,000 Palestinian residents.
Ultimately, relations improved in 2013 when the Palestinian Authority opened an embassy in Kuwait City. During a recent international conference, Palestinian Ambassador Rami Tahboub Kuwait as 鈥減roactive in supporting the Palestinian cause.鈥� Today, around 80,000 Palestinian remain as an integral aspect of Kuwait鈥檚 normative commitment to Palestine.
Pan-Arab Solidarity
Perhaps the strongest aspect of Kuwait鈥檚 position is that its leaders, especially Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, dedicated to Arab nationalism and Muslim solidarity. Kuwaiti officials have been more forceful in their condemnation of Israel than their Gulf peers. In July 2018, Mansour al-Otaibi, Kuwait鈥檚 ambassador to the United Nations, Israeli use of force 鈥渁gainst unarmed Palestinian people鈥� as 鈥渨ar crimes and crimes against humanity.鈥� In February 2019, Kuwait鈥檚 deputy foreign minister, Khaled al-Jarallah, was to affirm that a group picture taken during the Warsaw security conference, in which Kuwaiti and Israeli representatives were part of, was not indicative of normalization.
Kuwait has also broken from Gulf consensus toward American peace initiatives to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Kuwait the 鈥淧eace to Prosperity鈥� workshop in Bahrain in June 2019. Members of its parliament the gathering as 鈥渃onsecrating the occupation, imparting legitimacy onto it, and charging the Gulf and Arab states with the expenses and burdens of installing it.鈥� Following US President Donald Trump鈥檚 unveiling of the so-called 鈥渄eal of the century,鈥� Ghanim criticized the plan and theatrically dropped it into a 鈥渄ustbin of history.鈥�
A Steady Stance
Kuwait completely rejects the expanding cultural, diplomatic, economic and security ties characterizing broader Gulf–Israeli relations. Arguments related to divergent threat perceptions are insufficient to explain Kuwait鈥檚 exception considering it has historically been just as, and perhaps even more, vulnerable to jihadi and Iranian as its southern neighbors. What makes Kuwait unique is its democratic tradition, historical links to Palestinian political movements and the commitment to pan-Islamic and Arab nationalist ideals.
The Kuwaiti exception holds two implications for the study of international politics in the Middle East. First, Kuwait reveals that small states can wield sizable ideational power in international institutions. Second, Kuwait challenges a recent that 鈥淎rab states have lost interest in the Israeli-Palestinian issue because there鈥檚 a whole host of other things going.鈥� When analysts address Arab-Israeli relations, it is important to explore the causes and qualities of states鈥� distinct approaches. As its Gulf neighbors warm to Israel, Kuwait stands out.
The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.
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