From a distance, the message is unmistakable: Ethiopia is ascending.

Yet beneath the skyline, another story unfolds. One that is less visible, less photogenic, but far more consequential. It is a story not of towers, but of people. One of children who to read by age . Of hospitals . Of doctors earning than a month. Of a state that builds monuments faster than it builds .

This contrast is not accidental; it reflects a strategic choice about what development is meant to look like —  and whom it is meant to serve.

The human cost of Ethiopia’s development model

Despite its urban renaissance, Ethiopia invests strikingly little in the foundations of human development. Public health spending stands at roughly of GDP, far below the already country average of 1.2% and less than half the pledged under the African Union’s Abuja Declaration. Per capita health spending has in real terms, falling to around per person in 2024 as inflation and currency erode nominal budget increases. The result is a health system stretched to the edge of viability.

The workforce numbers tell the story starkly. Ethiopia has 1.2 health professionals per 1,000 people —�� barely a of the World Health Organization’s minimum threshold for universal coverage. , diagnostic equipment, essential drugs and trained staff scarce across much of the country. Even in Addis Ababa, a city of five million, public health infrastructure thin. Outside the capital, access rapidly.

Education fares little better. Learning poverty —�� as the inability of a ten-year-old to read a simple text —�� around 90%. Primary school completion is roughly and adult literacy close to 50%, stark gender and regional disparities. According to the World Bank’s Human Capital Index, a child born in Ethiopia today is expected to reach only of their productive potential under current health and education conditions.

These are not abstract statistics; they translate directly into lost growth, weakened resilience and heightened instability. A young, undereducated and unhealthy population cannot anchor a durable middle-income transition, no matter how tall the buildings that surround it.

Infrastructure, debt and global comparisons

What makes this trajectory especially striking is how sharply it diverges from development experiences elsewhere. , , and more recently, all began from positions of deep poverty and institutional fragility. None started with skyscrapers. Each began instead with mass , primary and inclusion. In South Korea, universal preceded industrial take-off. In Vietnam, near-universal health insurance productivity gains. In Rwanda, community-based healthcare coverage rates above 90% long before Kigali’s convention centre reshaped the skyline.

In these cases, infrastructure followed human capital, not the reverse.

Ethiopia’s approach inverts that sequence. Billions of dollars —�� much of it borrowed —�� into high-visibility projects with limited immediate social returns. Chinese financing dominates, for roughly 60% of new investment projects, in transport, real estate and energy. restructuring agreements with Beijing since 2020 the strain this model imposes. Meanwhile, clinics go , schools are and frontline workers are demoralized.

Yes, Beijing’s checkbook builds skylines, not social contracts. If Horn states trade welfare for prestige projects, they hand strategic leverage to outsiders while hollowing out domestic resilience.

Future prospects and the importance of human capital

This imbalance has foreign policy implications that extend well beyond development metrics. Ethiopia sits at the of the African Union, diplomatic weight across the Horn of Africa. Its choices regional norms. A development model that spectacle over welfare risks, normalizing a version of “success” that is brittle and socially exclusionary. It also Ethiopia’s relationships with Western partners, multilateral lenders and humanitarian agencies increasingly on governance, equity and human security.

The contradiction becomes sharper when is factored in. The war in Tigray and ongoing instability in Amhara and Oromia have millions and already fragile social systems. Conflict health facilities, schools and vaccination programs. Yet even as reconstruction needs mount, capital to be channeled into prestige projects rather than systemic recovery.

There is a deeper irony here. Ethiopia’s ambition to be a regional power rests ultimately on people, not structures. Diplomatic influence, economic resilience and national cohesion all depend on human capability: Skyscrapers do not vaccinate children; smart corridors do not train midwives; airports do not repair trust between the state and its citizens.

None of this is to deny Ethiopia’s right to aspire, nor to dismiss the value of infrastructure. Roads, energy and urban renewal matter. But development is not an architectural competition. It is a social contract. When public resources are finite —  as they always are —  choices reveal priorities.

The current pattern risks entrenching inequality and eroding legitimacy. Urban elites benefit disproportionately, while rural and conflict-affected communities fall further behind. Health workers strike, teachers leave and young people emigrate. The social return on investment narrows even as the physical footprint expands.

There remains, however, a window for recalibration. Ethiopia possesses a large, youthful population, a strategic geographic position and deep historical legitimacy. Redirecting even a fraction of mega-project spending toward universal health coverage, quality schooling and social protection would yield dividends far exceeding those of any single tower. International partners stand ready to support such a shift, not as charity, but as a shared interest in a stable and capable regional anchor.

Development, at its core, is not about height. It is about depth. Ethiopia’s future standing —  at home and abroad —  will be determined less by how high its skyline climbs than by how firmly its people are supported beneath it.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Divisions within the Tigrayan ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), are now so deep, and the accusations being traded so vitriolic, there is a real possibility of their differences being settled on the battlefield. To many outsiders, this may come as a surprise. Tigrayans have managed to endure hardship and war for generations but have a reputation for using careful, lengthy debates to settle internal disputes.

Tigrayan fault lines

The rifts within Tigray can be traced back to how the 2022 war ended. Although the Tigrayan forces were not defeated, they only held on by their fingertips. They ran low on ammunition and were driven out of key strongholds. Eritrean troops captured areas of northern and western Tigray, while Ethiopian and forces — indigenous people of Ethiopia’s central highlands — held parts of the south.

The signed in Pretoria and Kenya reflected the reality on the ground. The Tigrayan team handed responsibility for the security of all Tigray over to the Ethiopian army, and required its troops to surrender their heavy weapons and disband. Politician , the Tigrayan team leader, went on to head the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (). After such a bloody conflict, the peace agreement proved a bitter pill for Tigrayans to swallow. The agreement inevitably caused differences within the TPLF.

At the TPLF’s core was the Marxist–Leninist of Tigray. Though authorities said it was dissolved in 1991, few citizens believed it really was. The TPLF old-guard grew up with its principles of , which required all members to accept, without question, the decisions of the organization’s ruling body. Under the strain of divisions over the peace treaty and the outcome of the war party, unity is severely strained and the rifts are now public.

Two factions have emerged. , chairman of the TPLF, leads one side while Getachew and those involved in the TIRA lead the other. Author Gerrit Kurtz outlines the background to this clash in the publication :

“Long-simmering tensions within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) broke out into the open in August 2024. The party leadership around President Debretsion Gebremichael now stands apart from key TPLF officials in the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) around its President Getachew Reda. Each side considers the other an illegal entity. The division has stirred up fears of renewed violence in northern Ethiopia. The split occurs in a context in which the economic and social situation in the northern highlands remains dire, the legacy of the devastating war four years ago that was only stopped by the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2022. … At the same time, it is unclear how much support the TPLF still commands among the population at large in Tigray. Last year, the TIRA violently on an opposition rally in Mekelle. As a legacy of the war, many people are traumatised and focus on their own survival, especially the almost internally displaced persons (out of a pre-war population of around six million). Tens of thousands of young people are leaving Tigray each year in search of better livelihoods, according to the TIRA. Others become criminals.”

As Kurtz concluded in his October 2024 article, “the status quo is untenable.” This has proved accurate. Both Debretsion and Getachew’s factions have released each other — unheard-of behavior in the ruling party. Both now attempt to win over public opinion in Tigray and the support of Tigray’s troops and officers. and the have done this in Tigrinya.

Major divisions threaten rehabilitation

Here are some of the issues that divide the factions:

• Debretsion’s faction tends to originate from northern Tigray and represents the party’s old-guard. Getachew is from the south and has more support in Tigray’s regional capital, Mekelle, as well as from younger technocrats.
• Senior military officials have become embroiled in a lucrative gold trade sold via Eritrea and Sudan. This trade undermines unity and encourages corruption.
• Substantial quantities of aid from the United States and other donors were diverted and sold on the open market. As a result, the United States Agency for International Development and the World Food Programme their assistance for several months in 2023.
• The TPLF leadership believed Getachew is too close to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Debretsion is seen as having made his peace with neighboring Eritrea, a former enemy that still holds areas of Tigray.
• Senior members of the TPLF are determined to have federal authorities continue officially recognizing their party. This may seem like a technical issue, but it is considerably resonant. The party has valuable assets in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, and beyond that could be forfeited.

These differences come as Tigrayans struggle to overcome the aftermath of the 2020–2022 war. Hundreds of thousands remain displaced from their homes and in serious hardship. As news organization reported from Tigray, “Tigray’s regional interim administration has announced plans to facilitate the return of displaced people. However, the plan is estimated to require $2.1 billion and the political will to return the displaced people.” Any form of internal conflict, let alone a civil war, would put this rehabilitation at risk.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial��policy.

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At the heart of the conflict is the , a hydroelectric project on the . Ethiopia’s dam construction has angered Egypt, which sees it as a threat to its water supply. The Nile is crucial for Egypt, providing nearly all its water resources. While Ethiopia argues that the dam is solely for electricity generation and won’t significantly impact water flow, Egypt still needs to be convinced. This dispute has deep historical roots, reflecting long-standing power dynamics between the two nations.

The region’s history is marked by conflicts and shifting alliances. In the 1970s, Cold War dynamics played out in the Horn of Africa, with the United States and Soviet Union supporting opposing sides. The between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977–1978 was a significant event, resulting in a Somali defeat that still resonates today. These historical conflicts have shaped current relationships and tensions between countries in the region.

Countries of the Horn of Africa. Via Zeremariam Fre (CC BY-SA 4.0).

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister has ambitious plans for his country, including rebuilding the capital and reestablishing Ethiopia’s access to the sea. This vision includes developing a port in a move that has angered Somalia. Ethiopia’s potential recognition of Somaliland has further complicated regional dynamics. Meanwhile, Eritrea’s relationship with Ethiopia has cooled.

Involving outside powers adds complexity to the situation. Egypt has begun providing military support to Somalia, potentially countering Ethiopia. The United Arab Emirates plays a significant financial backer in the region, though its exact strategy remains unclear. Other external powers, such as Turkey, India, China and the United States, also have interests in the area, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.

Precarious stability and the global implications of African tensions

The ongoing civil war in Sudan and the instability in South Sudan contribute to the region’s overall volatility. These conflicts have drawn in various international actors, each with their own agendas. The situation in Sudan, in particular, has the potential to impact the broader regional dynamics, especially given its strategic location and historical ties to both Egypt and Ethiopia.

Despite having a significant military presence in Djibouti, the United States is currently preoccupied with other global issues. This relative disengagement from the Horn of Africa’s tensions could allow other actors to fill the power vacuum. A solid mediating force is necessary to avoid escalating regional conflicts.

The situation in the Horn of Africa resembles the complex alliances and tensions that preceded World War I. The interconnected nature of the conflicts, the involvement of multiple regional and global powers and the potential for rapid escalation are concerning parallels. The region’s strategic importance, particularly in maritime trade and geopolitical influence, makes these tensions globally significant.

Looking forward, the stability of the Horn of Africa remains precarious. The combination of historical grievances, current political ambitions and resource disputes creates a volatile mix. The role of external powers, particularly China and the United Arab Emirates, will be crucial in shaping future developments. As global attention remains focused on other crises, the risk of overlooking the simmering tensions in this critical region could have far-reaching consequences for regional and global stability.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Making Sense of Rising Tensions in the Horn of Africa appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Ethiopia is the most populous nation in East Africa. In the 20th century, it faced economic troubles and civil war between communist and non-communist forces. Today, it is quickly developing, building infrastructure and factories. Much of the capital for this development comes from foreign partners, especially China, whose ambitious Belt and Road Initiative has focused on this core of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s industrial sector now employs millions of people, and Ethiopians are growing more prosperous. Yet it is not rosy for everyone; indeed, any development this large and fast will have uneven effects on the human lives involved in it.

Three women, three lives

It is easy to misunderstand industrialization in Ethiopia and China’s growing involvement. Made in Ethiopia takes a look at these developments through the lives of three women: a factory worker, a local farmer and a Chinese factory director who is charged with filling no fewer than 30,000 jobs.

The documentary takes a close and long look at the period between 2019 and 2023. It raises profound questions about what is fair and for whom in Ethiopia’s growing factory towns. These characters struggle to defend their own wellbeing in a rapidly changing, chaotic world. The trade-offs materialize in the concrete struggles of people’s lives. Still, people fight and they persevere.

Watching the characters navigate tricky terrain inevitably makes you reflect on how challenging it is to build prosperity for all.

Making a film in a tumultuous time

I am an Emmy-nominated Ethiopian American anthropologist and filmmaker. I served as an executive producer of the documentary along with Anna Godas, Oli Harbottle, Susan Jakes and Roger Graef.

First-time directors Xinyan Yu and Max Duncan shot the film over the course of four years, through both the pandemic and a civil war. I was living in Ethiopia when this film was shot and remember when Max and Xinyan started this journey. Ethiopia was in a very different place than it is now. The directors captured a particularly dynamic few years and indeed the pandemonium of a country that is rapidly accelerating towards the future.

The filmmakers had unprecedented access to the Eastern Industrial Zone (EIZ) in Dukem, Ethiopia. Dukem is a farming town that is home to the largest and first Chinese industrial park in Ethiopia. Located 40 kilometers outside of Addis Ababa, the EIZ is considered the benchmark for the development of industrial parks in Ethiopia and was established to accelerate the process of industrialization and job creation financed by Chinese investors.

Made in Ethiopia screens today in Washington, DC, which is home to the largest population of Ethiopians outside of Ethiopia. There, the film finds its largest Ethiopian audience yet and hopefully an even larger audience of global development policymakers.

Breaking through conventional thinking

The film reminds me that the power of cinema lies in its ability to take an audience into your mind’s eye. The film calls on all who see it to consider what lies beyond the binaries of technocratic frameworks.

Recently, The New York Times the headlines “Why It Seems Everything We Think We Knew About the Global Economy is No Longer True.” People are coming to understand the limits of conventional thinking in policy circles. We need new perspectives on growth, development and the global economy. Long-form storytelling enables us to delve deep into local communities’ experiences. Everyday people on the ground understand things that Washington- and London-based think tanks and international institutions easily ignore.

To be sure, this is not the first time we have realized that reality is complicated. Chimamanda Adichei us about the danger of a single story and Michel-Rolph Trouillot how perception can distort reality in his tour de force Silencing the Past. Yet we need many reminders because it is so easy to get stuck in lazy thinking, stereotypes, soundbites and echo chambers.

Made in Ethiopia invites audiences to practice perceiving the more complicated layers of China’s expansion into Ethiopia. The film aims to give the viewer a more rounded understanding of what is going on and what exactly might make for a better life for ordinary Ethiopians.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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“Competition over limited water resources is one of the main concerns for the coming decades,” a study published in Global Environmental Change in 2018. “Although water issues alone have not been the sole trigger for warfare in the past, tensions over freshwater management and use represent one of the main concerns in political relations between… states and may exacerbate existing tensions, increase regional instability and social unrest.”

The situation is beyond dire. In 2023, it was that upwards of three billion people, or more than 37% of humanity, faced real water shortages, a crisis predicted to dramatically worsen in the decades to come. Consider it ironic then that, as water is disappearing, huge dams — more than of them — that require significant river flow to operate are now being built at an unprecedented pace globally. Moreover, dams are being constructed in legally protected areas like national parks and wildlife reserves. There was a justification for this, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) some years ago. Such projects, it believed, would help battle climate change by curbing carbon dioxide emissions while bringing electricity to those in the greatest of need.

“[Hydropower] remains the largest source of renewable energy in the electricity sector,” the IPCC in 2018. “Evidence suggests that relatively high levels of deployment over the next 20 years are feasible, and hydropower should remain an attractive renewable energy source within the context of global [greenhouse gas] mitigation scenarios.”

The IPCC acknowledged that unceasing droughts impact stream flow and that climate change is unpredictably worsening matters. Yet its climate experts still contended that hydropower could be a crucial part of the world’s energy transition, arguing that an electric dam will produce seemingly endless energy. At the same time, other renewable sources like wind and solar power have their weather- and sunlight-bound limitations.

A crack in the dam logic

Well-intentioned as it may have been, it’s now far clearer that there is a crack in the IPCC’s appraisal. For one thing, recent research suggests that hydro-powered dams can create an alarming amount of climate-altering greenhouse gas emissions. Rotting vegetation at the bottom of such reservoirs, especially in warmer climates (as in much of Africa), releases significant amounts of methane, a devastating greenhouse gas, into the atmosphere.

“Most of this vegetation would have rotted anyway, of course. But, without reservoirs, the decomposition would occur mostly in the atmosphere or in well-oxygenated rivers or lakes,” Fred Pearce in the Independent. “The presence of oxygen would ensure the carbon in the plants formed carbon dioxide. But many reservoirs, particularly in the tropics, contain little oxygen. Under those anaerobic conditions, rotting vegetation generates methane instead.”

While also seriously harms the climate, methane emissions are far worse in the short term.

“We estimate that dams emit around 25% more methane by unit of surface than previously estimated,” says Bridget Deemer of the School of Environment at Washington State University in Vancouver, lead author of a highly-cited on greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs. “Methane stays in the atmosphere for only around a decade, while CO2 stays several centuries, but over the course of 20 years, methane contributes almost three times more to global warming than CO2.”

And that’s hardly the only problem dams face in the twenty-first century. At the moment, Chinese financing is the most significant global driver of new hydropower construction. China has invested in the creation of at least dams in 74 countries. Each project poses its own set of environmental quandaries. But above all, the heating of the planet — last year was the warmest in human history and January 2024 the hottest January on record — is making many of those investments look increasingly dubious.

On this ever-hotter globe of ours, for instance, a drought in Ecuador has all too typically impacted the functionality of the Amaluza Dam on the Paute River, which provides of that country’s electricity. Paute was running at 40% capacity recently as its river flow dwindled. Similarly, in southern Africa, water levels at the Kariba Dam’s reservoir, located between Zambia and Zimbabwe, have fluctuated drastically, impairing its ability to produce consistent energy.

“In recent years, drought intensified by climate change has caused reservoirs on all five continents⁠ to below levels needed to maintain hydroelectric production,” Jacques Leslie in Yale E360, “and the problem is bound to worsen as climate change deepens.”

Even in the United States, the viability of hydropower is an increasing concern. The Hoover Dam on the Colorado River, for example, has been impacted by years of drought. Water levels at its reservoir, Lake Mead, continue to , raising fears that its days are numbered. The same is true for the Glen Canyon Dam, which also holds back the Colorado, forming Lake Powell. As the Colorado dries up, Glen Canyon may also its ability to produce electricity.

Driven by dwindling water resources, the global hydropower crisis has become a flashpoint in the far reaches of Northern Africa, where the creation of a giant dam could very well lead to a regional war and worse.

A crisis on the Nile

The lifeblood of northeastern Africa, the Nile River, flows through 11 countries before emptying into the Mediterranean Sea. Measured at 6,650 kilometers, the Nile may be the longest river on Earth. For millennia, its meandering waters, which run through lush jungles and dry deserts, have been irrigating farmlands and providing drinking water for millions of people. Nearly of Egypt’s 109 million people live within a few kilometers of the Nile. Arguably the most important natural resource in Africa, it’s now at the epicenter of a geopolitical dispute between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan that’s brought those countries to the brink of military conflict.

A major dam being built along the Blue Nile, the river’s main tributary, is upending the status quo in the region, where Egypt has long been the preeminent nation. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD for short) is to become one of the hydroelectric dams ever constructed, stretching more than 1,700 meters and standing 145 meters tall, a monument many will love and others despise.

There’s no question that Ethiopia needs the electricity GERD will produce. Nearly 45% of all Ethiopians lack regular power and GERD promises to produce upwards of 5.15 gigawatts of electricity. To put that in perspective, a single gigawatt 876,000 households annually in the United States. Construction on the dam, which began in 2011, was 90% complete by last August when it began producing power. In total, GERD’s cost is expected to eclipse , making it the largest infrastructure project Ethiopia has ever undertaken and the on the African continent.

It will not only bring reliable power to that country but promises a culture shift welcomed by many. “Mothers who’ve given birth in the dark, girls who fetch wood for fire instead of going to school — we’ve waited so many years for this — centuries,” Filsan Abdi of the Ethiopian Ministry of Women, Children, and Youth. “When we say that Ethiopia will be a beacon of prosperity, it starts here.”

While most Ethiopians may see the dam in a positive light, the downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan (itself embroiled in a devastating civil war) were never consulted, and their officials are indignant. The massive reservoir behind GERD’s gigantic cement wall will hold back cubic meters of water. That means Ethiopia will have remarkable control over the flow of the Nile, giving its leaders power over how much access to water both Egyptians and Sudanese will have. The Blue Nile, after all, provides of Egypt’s freshwater supply.

As it happens, fresh water in Egypt has long been growing and so the country’s leadership has taken the threat of GERD seriously for years. In 2012, for instance, Wikileaks obtained internal emails from the “global intelligence” firm Stratfor that Egypt and Sudan were even then considering directing the Egyptian Special Forces to destroy the dam, still in the early stages of construction. “[We] are discussing military cooperation with Sudan,” a high-level Egyptian source was quoted as saying. While such a direct attack never transpired, Stratfor claimed that Egypt might once again lend support to “proxy militant groups against Ethiopia” (as it had in the 1970s and 1980s) if diplomacy were to hit a dead end.

Unfortunately, the most recent negotiations to calm the hostility around GERD have gone distinctly . Last April, the embittered Egyptians to the lack of any significant progress by conducting a three-day military drill with Sudan at a naval base in the Red Sea aimed at frightening Ethiopian officials. “All options are on the table,” warned Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry. “[All] alternatives remain available and Egypt has its capabilities.”

Seemingly unfazed by such military threats, Ethiopia plans to finish building the dam, claiming it will provide much-needed energy to impoverished Ethiopians and limit the country’s overall carbon footprint. “[GERD] represents a sustainable socio-economic project for Ethiopia: replacing fossil fuels and reducing CO2 emissions,” the Ethiopian embassy in Washington has .

GERD, however, falls squarely into the category of being a major problem dam — and not just because it could lead to a bloody war in a region already in horrific . Once filled, its massive reservoir will cover a staggering 1,874 square kilometers, making it more than three-quarters the size of Utah’s Great Salt Lake (after it started to ).

Unfortunately, GERD never underwent a proper environmental impact assessment (EIA) despite being legally required to do so. No EIA was ever carried out because the notoriously corrupt Ethiopian government knew that the results wouldn’t be pleasing and was unwilling to let any roadblocks get in the way of the dam’s construction, something that became more obvious when upwards of indigenous Gumuz and Berta natives began to be forced from their homes to make way for the monstrous dam.

Publicly coming out against the dam has proven a risky business. Employees of International Rivers, a nonprofit that advocates for people endangered by dams, have been harassed and received in response to their opposition. Prominent Ethiopian journalist , a critic of the dam and the government’s actions concerning it, was imprisoned for more than four years under draconian anti-terrorism laws.

Electric water wars

While GERD has created a dicey conflict, it also has international ramifications. China, which has played such a pivotal role in bankrolling hydropower projects globally in these years, has provided to help the Ethiopians build transmission lines from the dam to nearby towns. Since it has also in Egypt, it’s well-positioned, if any country is, to help navigate the GERD dispute.

Military analysts in the United States that China’s involvement with the dam is part of a policy meant to put the US at a distinct disadvantage in the race to exploit Africa’s abundant rare earth minerals from the of the Congo to the lithium deposits in Ethiopia’s hinterlands. China, the world’s “ debt collector,” has indeed poured money into Africa. As of 2021, it was that continent’s largest creditor, holding of its total debt. The growth of Chinese influence internationally and in Africa — it has large infrastructure projects in African countries — is crucial to understanding the latest version of the globe’s imperial geopolitics.

Most of China’s African ventures are connected to Beijing’s “Belt and Road ,” a program of this century to fund infrastructure deals across Eurasia and Africa. Its economic ties to Africa began, however, with Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s in the 1950s and 1960s for an “” alliance that would challenge Western imperialism.

So many decades later, the idea of such an alliance plays second fiddle to China’s global economic desires, which, like so many past imperial projects in Africa, have significant downsides for those on the receiving end. Developing countries desperately need capital, so they’re willing to accept rigid terms and conditions from China, even if they represent the latest version of the century’s old colonialism and neo-colonialism that focused on controlling the continent’s rich resources. This is certainly true in the case of China’s hydropower investments in places like Ghana’s Bui Dam and the Congo River Dam in the Republic of Congo, where multi-billion-dollar loans are backed by Congo’s crude oil and Ghana’s cocoa crops.

In 2020, the US belatedly inserted itself into the GERD feud, to cut $130 million in aid for Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism efforts. The Ethiopians believed it was to the dam controversy, as they also did when, in June 2023, the Biden administration directed USAID to halt all food assistance to the country (upwards of ), claiming it wasn’t reaching Ethiopians, only to months later.

The dispute over Ethiopia’s enormous dam should be a warning of what the future holds on a hotter, drier planet, where the rivers that feed dams like GERD are drying up while the superpowers continue to jockey for position, hoping to control what remains of the world’s resources. Hydropower won’t help solve the climate crisis, but new dam projects may lead to war over one thing key to our survival — access to fresh, clean water.

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Over the past decade, mobile money has emerged as a dominant force, particularly in regions like sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South Asia grappling with inadequate infrastructure in credit markets, commonly referred to as “institutional voids.” These voids impede access to financial products and services, hindering the growth of businesses and limiting economic productivity. The study by Agarwal and Assenova shows how mobile money platforms, through unique features and mechanisms, effectively fill these institutional voids, fostering financial inclusion and economic development.

“Mobile money platforms help out in places where credit information is missing and infrastructure isn’t well developed,” said Agarwal, the paper’s lead author. “Mobile money platforms provide alternative data and fill for the infrastructure gap, causing positive spill-over effects on economic activity for various players in the market.”

Mobile money boosts financial inclusion in three critical ways

Named after the Swahili word for “money,” M-Pesa’s expansion into Ethiopia signifies a transformation in the financial landscape. These platforms stand out by not only capturing economic value but also creating it, disrupting existing industries and expanding market transactions. The distinctive features of mobile money platforms include data-driven business models, distributed value creation and “network effects,” where the value of the service increases for both users and service providers on the platform as more people use it.

The authors argue that these features empower mobile money platforms to address institutional voids in credit markets in three critical ways.

1. Creating a digital record of financial activities.

First, they verify users by assessing digital data on the platform. Mobile money operators play a pivotal role in providing alternative means for lenders to assess creditworthiness, especially for people lacking established credit history. By creating a digital record of users’ financial activities, platforms like M-Pesa enable lenders to make informed decisions on loan approvals. “These platforms create a digital record of users’ financial activity, such as their recent transactions — data that can help lenders make decisions on whether someone is able to pay back a loan,” Agarwal explained.

2. Simplifying access to financial services.

Second, they offer simplified access to financial services. Through their decentralized networks, mobile money platforms connect various financial services and products from partners like banks. This one-stop-shop approach fills gaps caused by limited access points, such as bank branches, in emerging economies, facilitating the distribution of financial products. “Mobile money is providing a one-stop-shop to access a whole range of financial services,” Agarwal said.

3. Establishing a massive network of users.

Third, these platforms leverage network effects to speed up their growth, allowing them to quickly expand and reach millions of new users who previously didn’t have access to banking services. M-Pesa has more than 51 million customers across seven African countries. This not only enhances financial access but also serves as a bridge to established financial groups like banks, credit unions and microfinance institutions, facilitating credit access for individuals and businesses alike.

“These loans help individuals and small businesses expand their growth and enhance their productivity. In the absence of credit, small businesses cannot grow,” Agarwal said, highlighting the deficiencies in traditional financial systems.

Policy reforms can broaden financial inclusion and sustain growth

To reach these conclusions, the study delved into the impact of regulatory changes that allowed non-banking entities, including mobile network operators and fintech start-ups, to introduce mobile money platforms. Analyzing data from more than 71,000 adults before the reforms in 2014 and some 80,000 adults after the reforms in 2017 across 78 countries, the authors discovered that initially, only 11% had access to formal financial services. Post-regulatory changes, mobile money usage increased and access to credit from formal financial institutions rose significantly, with the reforms leading to a 22% rise in the likelihood of borrowing.

“The increase was even more significant for women, the poorest individuals and those with limited education,” said Agarwal, indicating that mobile money platforms have played a crucial role in broadening financial service access in emerging and developing economies.

The research carries significant implications for policymakers and regulators. The findings suggest that regulatory reforms welcoming new entrants into the financial services sector can potentially boost financial access. “By enabling the launching of these platforms, governments can promote more collaborations between mobile money platforms and traditional financial institutions, thereby fostering innovation and co-creation in the financial sector,” said Assenova. “This provides more products and services on the rail of mobile money, so policymakers can contribute to sustainable growth and development.”

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Story of a Dam

A large recent African success is Ethiopia’s . Built on the Blue Nile about 40 kilometers east of Sudan, Ethiopia completed the of filling the reservoir for this huge dam in August last year. Two out of its 13 turbines are now operational, generating 750 megawatts of electricity. Ultimately, the dam is expected to produce more than 5,000 megawatts, which will more than double Ethiopia’s current output.

The construction of the dam is a triumph for Ethiopia. Neighbors Egypt and Sudan opposed the construction, fearful that the dam would reduce their share of the Nile waters. Their fears may be misplaced. The purpose of the dam is to generate hydroelectric power. It might change the timing of the flow of waters downstream but is unlikely to divert much water from the Blue Nile.

The Grand Renaissance Dam is a great Ethiopian triumph. The project was estimated to cost $5 billion. Given Egyptian hostility, international donors turned shy. Ethiopians dug into their own pockets to build this dam. In 2011, when dam construction began, Ethiopia’s GDP was a mere . To put matters in perspective, the country decided to spend 15.65% of its GDP to build one single dam.

The entire country pitched in for the dam effort. The common women and men of Ethiopia bought bonds to fund the dam. The government persuaded employees to contribute a portion of their incomes to the project. Critics suggest that there was a fair degree of arm-twisting and this is probably true, but it is fair to say that Ethiopians saw this dam as a national project.

Impressively, the majestic wall of the dam was constructed without external funding. It is certainly true that China has pitched in to help construct the dam. In the US, China’s role has stirred . Chinese companies have undertaken some of the construction work. In 2013, China provided Ethiopia a “loan of $1.2 billion USD in 2013 to build power transmission lines connecting the dam with nearby towns and cities.”

Yet it is important to remember that this impressive dam is fundamentally an Ethiopian achievement. It is a great example of a very African success.

Educating the Poorest

At the other end of the continent, many poor pupils are let down by South Africa’s education system.  Amnesty International, on this “broken and unequal” system, reported that it was “characterized by crumbling infrastructure, overcrowded classrooms, and relatively poor educational outcomes, is perpetuating inequality and, as a result, failing too many of its children, with the poor hardest hit.”

Even in such a system, a rare success has blossomed in an impoverished community. Bulungula College, an independent school in rural Eastern Cape, has become the first school in the district to achieve a . This college was set up by Bulungula Incubator, which was founded in 2006. Then, “only one parent in the local Xhora Mouth community had passed matric.” In this community, “an average of six people from the community matriculate each year, and 95% of school learners from the area do not pass grade 12.”

In 2022, all 36 learners in the class of 2022 passed the matric examinations. Mthandwa Sincuba is the principal of the college. He hit upon the strategy of extra classes. In his words, “From the beginning of the year, we started with extra classes from 6am until 9pm. We also had weekend classes.”

Under Sincuba’s leadership, Bulungula College also takes a progressive approach. It provides students with better services, has a strict policy against corporal punishment, provides support to children from families that struggle to provide adequate nutrition, offers birth control to all girl students and encourages those who become pregnant to stay on in school until and after they give birth.

This extraordinary project was the brainchild of David Martin. He was walking along the coast in 2002 when he came across a beautiful site by a stunning river. Martin fell in love with the area and the people. They were desperately poor but he worked with the community of Nqileni village, establishing Bulungula Lodge at the river mouth.

Once the lodge was open for business, tourists came to stay in one of the most beautiful parts of South Africa. Today, Martin has transferred Bulungula Lodge to the local community, who now run it themselves and improve their living standards. Bulungula College is part of the same project and is a classic example of a small but significant African success story.

Examples in Every Town and Village

Many think that only outside advisers and external funding can transform poor communities. This is untrue. Almost every country in Africa has local successes that emerged from individual and community initiatives.

Three simple examples where Africans have spent their own money to make a material difference to their lives are:

• the bicycle (now, the scooter),
• the sewing machine, and
• the mobile phone.

Each of these goods has increased income, information and security, transforming millions of lives in the process. The success of the bicycle and now the scooter has been well documented. They provide a cheap way of transport in this vast continent. Similarly, the sewing machine is a raging success. It has provided millions of women livelihood.

Mobile phones are now found across the continent. East Africa has been a leader in , thanks to the ubiquity of these phones and African ingenuity. The system is a world leader in mobile banking. It enables customers to transfer cash as well as shop for products and services. They can also withdraw cash by visiting an agent, typically their local corner shop, or transfer it to others from their phones.

Even the much-maligned gun—the curse of mankind—has helped the continent. African leaders adopted this weapon to resist colonization and Ethiopians beat off Italian invaders in the . On March 1, 1896, African soldiers used guns better than their European counterparts, achieving a historic victory that still fills the continent with pride.

For all the ingenuity in Africa, the question as to who coughs up the cash for the investment the continent needs is tricky. Undoubtedly, funding from the World Bank and the African Development Bank is helpful. Private non-African companies, whether Western, Chinese or Indian, have a role too.

Yet the most important role is perhaps that of the African Diaspora. In 2016, the World Bank estimated remittances crossed that year. Of these, over $440 billion went to developing countries and Africa comprised a small but significant percentage. In November 2022, the World Bank published a report on remittances and estimated that remittances to Africa in 2021 surged by 16.4% to reach . In the same year, aid to Africa was . 

Remittances reach beneficiaries directly. They are often sent to family members, Hence, they are better directed, suffer far less leakage and have a much bigger multiplier effect than aid. In other parts of the world internal savings and remittances have had a much bigger impact than aid. Africa’s people are no different from anyone else in the world. Like many other places in the world, including the US and the UK, they are building their own futures despite their politicians. Over time, African solutions to African problems can resolve Africa’s problems. The many successes are a living testament to that possibility.[ edited this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Peace in our time?

The peace deal was brokered in November 2022 in and. These agreements allowed for a ceasefire, aid flows and the deployment of African Union-led monitors who would oversee the re-establishment of Ethiopian government authority over Tigray.

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the party that dominates the region, promised to its fighters within 30 days under the agreement. That was signed on November 2. It has still not been completed, at least in part, because the text contained the provision that this would “depend on the security situation on the ground.”

As Patrick Wight wrote, the subsequent Nairobi agreement “states that disarmament of the Tigray Defence Forces’s heavy weapons “done concurrently with the withdrawal of foreign and non-ENDF (Ethiopian National Defence Forces) from the region.” What a “concurrent” disarmament of TDF and withdrawal of Eritrean troops looks like in practice is anyone’s guess. It would be positive if this means the alarmingly rapid disarmament provisions agreed to in Pretoria will be delayed.

It has been the Eritreans that have been holding up progress. At the end of December there were eyewitness reports of Eritrean forces leaving Tigrayan towns. “Eritrean soldiers, who fought in support of Ethiopia’s federal government during its two-year civil war in the northern Tigray region, are pulling out of two major towns and heading toward the border, witnesses and an Ethiopian official,” Reuters.

Others are less certain. Tigrayan refugees that the Eritreans remain in parts of the region. Tigrayans have photographs of Eritreans in Tigrayan cities on Twitter, including Adwa.

Meanwhile, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has been claiming “victory” for his forces over the Tigrayans. “My pride has no bounds”, he said in his New Year. But the Eritrean leader is taking no chances. He is reported to be dissident Ethiopians in case his relationship with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed goes sour.

Afwerki previously used foreign troops to threaten neighboring leaders with the use of force. In 2011, the United Nations reported that Eritrea was behind a “massive” attack on an African Union summit in Addis Ababa, using Ethiopian rebels. It would be wrong to assume that a similar attack is now on the cards, but training dissidents could be a tactic to maintain pressure on Ahmed.

Maintaining tension and instability across the Horn of Africa has been a tactic the Eritrean leader has used consistently since capturing Asmara, the Eritrean capital, in 1991. Since then, Afwerki has led his country into no fewer than eight – from Somalia to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

How will Europe and the US respond?

US President Joe Biden has been assiduous in attempting to end the fighting in Tigray. Biden appointed special envoys to the Horn of Africa as soon as he came to office. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken went out of his way to Ahmed during the US-Africa summit in December. He raised the question of peace with Ahmed as well as the ending of the Eritrean troop presence in Tigray. Some wags have suggested that the peace agreements signed in Pretoria and Nairobi were so closely linked to Washington’s efforts they should be termed “US solutions to African problems” – clearly, a play on the phrase “African solutions to African problems.”

Who Can Resolve Ethiopia’s Catastrophic Conflict?

The key question now is whether sufficient progress has been made to lift the American and European sanctions against Ethiopia. They were introduced to try to end the war. In the of Jeffrey Feltman, the former US special envoy to the Horn: “The United States and the European Union hoped that, combined with emergency humanitarian assistance, punitive measures such as the threat of sanctions and the withholding of development aid would halt the atrocities and move the parties from the battlefield to the negotiating table.”  While the two parties did come to the negotiating table, it is unclear if the peace in Tigray is sustainable.

After two years of war, Ethiopia’s economy is said to be on the verge of collapse. The country nearly $20bn for its reconstruction. The EU Foreign Affairs Council is due to meet Brussels on January 23 and one of the issues on their agenda is the possible unfreezing of hundreds of millions of euros pledged in aid to Addis Ababa. Since 2021, the EU froze nearly $210m in aid to Ethiopia, following the draconian blockade Addis Ababa imposed on the Tigray region. The money is badly needed and it is not yet clear what strings the Europeans may attach to the lifting of sanctions.

For Eritrea, the picture is clearer: Washington has no time for Afwerki and is likely to keep the president under pressure. Afwerkid is already so isolated that it is unlikely that he cares greatly about western attitudes. He prefers to rely on his Arab neighbors, China and possibly Russia for international support. Eritrea will keep playing its game of promoting Ethiopian rebels to retain relevance in the region. This is bad news for Ethiopia and prospects of peace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Yet the African Union brokered agreement is odd. It fails to mention one of the key participants in the conflict: the government of Eritrea. This is extraordinary since the Eritreans have tens of thousands of troops battling the Tigrayans. The agreement just one oblique reference to Eritrea’s role. Article 3/3 states that: “This Permanent Cessation of all forms of hostilities shall include…subversion or the use of proxies to destabilise the other party or collusion with any external force hostile to either party.”

The word “Eritrea” is never mentioned, yet the reality is that this war was primarily the brainchild of Isaias Afwerki, Eritrea’s unelected president and the region’s strongman. It is at his behest that conscripts have been rounded up and sent to fight in neighboring Ethiopia.

The Highway from Hell and House to House Conscription

All along the B30 highway – deep inside Tigray – Eritreans troops are under siege, fighting for their lives. The road links the western city of Shire, the sacred site of Axum and the historic town of Adwa, scene of the famous Ethiopian victory over the Italians in 1896. Today it has become the Highway from Hell, with beleaguered Eritrean and Ethiopian forces under constant from Tigrayan ambushes.

Some will wonder why Eritreans are inside Ethiopia at all. On March 21, 2001, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Eritrean troops would be withdrawn. Yet 20 months later the Eritreans are still fighting on Ethiopian soil.

Eritreans in the diaspora tell of friends and families terrified into giving up their children to go and fight, and of Afwerki’s notorious security forces going door-to-door to search out the few remaining young men and women who can be taken away for “National Service”. Many will never return.

There are first-hand accounts of men as old as 70 being forced into conscription. Families that resist are put out onto the streets – with anyone coming to their aid facing the same humiliating penalty. Eritrean hospitals are reportedly overflowing with wounded soldiers who have been ferried back from the front. Some can hardly cope with the dead and dying.

Ethiopian divisions transferred to Eritrean

It now seems clear that while the fighting is inside Ethiopia, it is Eritrea that is pulling the strings. The Daily Telegraph that Ethiopian troops had been transferred to Eritrea as the current offensives were erupting on August 26.

One source at Ethiopian Airlines told The Daily Telegraph that the country’s flagship carrier has been chartering dozens of flights to ferry soldiers and weapons up north to the frontline. Flight data showed a significant uptick in unscheduled domestic chartered flights last month, which flew in the direction of Lalibela, a key logistics hub for the Ethiopian army near the frontline. On just one day, September 1, at least eight Boeing 737s with a capacity of 180 soldiers and four Canadian made De Havilland Dash 8-400 with a capacity of 90 appeared to set off for Lalibela.

This is very much in line with what Alex de Waal on October 7: “About 30 [Ethiopian National Defense Force] ENDF divisions relocated from Amhara and Western Tigray into Eritrea last month, placing themselves under Eritrean overall command.” This is exactly as Afwerki would wish it to be. His is the hand that will guide the region’s reconstruction, if the Tigrayans can be eliminated. 

Just prior to the war commencing in November 2020, Afwerki brought his closest political and military advisers together for an intense discussion on how to . The president told them that the country had to accept that it has a small and not very viable economy and a lengthy Red Sea coast, which Eritrea cannot patrol on its own. He is reported to have suggested that some sort of “union” with Ethiopia might be possible, at least in terms of economic co-operation and maritime security.

War has been Afwerki’s ever since Eritrean independence in 1993. He has fought all his neighbors – from Sudan to Djibouti – and sent Eritrean troops as far as the Congo. As Asia Abdulkadir, a Kenyan analyst put it to : “War is the way for Afwerki to stay involved in Ethiopia’s politics” and peace is simply not an option as long as the TPLF are still around, she said. 

How Afwerki responds to Wednesday’s peace agreement is hard to predict, but he is unlikely to end the plotting that has been his modus operandi for the past five decades.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Of these, the conflict in Ethiopia is probably the most burning issue. The forces from Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region are toward the capital, Addis Ababa, and panic is beginning to spread. The US has warned its citizens to leave now, saying that it will not the evacuation from Afghanistan. Britain has the warning while putting troops currently serving in Kenya on to assist.

Ethiopia’s Heavy Hand in Tigray Sends a Message

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The Somali situation has remained unsolved since the collapse of the last central government with the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. Sudan’s struggle to overthrow the military who have power is critical but unlikely to spill over into neighboring states.

From the of the war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region in November 2020, there were warnings that the conflict could lead to the collapse of the country, with catastrophic consequences for the region. The day after the war began, Johnnie Carson and Chester Crocker, both former US assistant secretaries of state for African affairs, put their names to a signed by some of America’s best-informed Africanists, warning that the conflict might lead to the “fragmentation of Ethiopia,” which would be “the largest state collapse in modern history.”

They suggested the consequences could be catastrophic, and their concerns are worth quoting in full:

“Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen. As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.”

Their warning was prescient. What began a year ago as the invasion of the northern region of Ethiopia has spread across large areas of the country. of the fighting show areas across Ethiopia held by Tigrayan forces or fighters of their allies, the Oromo Liberation Army.

How Did the Tigray War Begin?

This is by no means simply a war between the Ethiopian government and Tigray. The conflict began with an attack on Tigray by Ethiopian federal forces, militia from the Amhara region, supported by invading troops from Ethiopia’s northern neighbor, Eritrea, as well as forces from Somalia. The Tigrayans had ruled Ethiopia for 27 years until being ousted by the current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, in 2018. The animosity between them was predictable.

The Tigrayans, smarting from their loss of power, attempted to defy the new Ethiopian prime minister. They resisted attempts to remove heavy weaponry from the Northern Command (headquartered in Tigray’s regional capital, Mekelle, which they controlled). These weapons guarded northern Ethiopia (and Tigray, in particular) against any Eritrean attack. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) mobilized their citizens to block roads and prevent their removal.

However, the position of the Eritreans and Somalis requires some explanation. Tensions between Tigray and Eritrea can be traced to the liberation movements of the 1970s. Back then, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) had an uneasy alliance, working together to fight the Ethiopian government. This culminated in 1991 with the simultaneous fall of Addis Ababa and Asmara. The EPLF support to the TPLF in the assault on Addis Ababa and then gave close protection to the TPLF leader, Meles Zenawi. But this alliance hid ideological and tactical disputes.

The TPLF came to power, ruling Ethiopia via the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. By 1998, this relationship had ruptured and Eritrea and Ethiopia a bitter war that ended in 2000, leaving some 100,000 people dead. A peace agreement was signed in Algiers, but, much to the fury of Eritrea, Ethiopia to accept the border drawn by the boundary commission established by the treaty.

In response, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki collaborated with the Somali Islamists of al-Shabab and Ethiopian guerrilla movements in a failed attempt to oust the Tigrayan rulers of Ethiopia. However, in 2018, internal factors finally saw the TPLF lose their grip on power in Addis Ababa, to be by Abiy Ahmed.

Enter the Eritreans

Ethiopia’s Abiy and Eritrea’s Isaias believed they shared a common enemy in the Tigrayan military and political leadership. A series of initiatives led to an end to in 2018 between Eritrea and Ethiopia, a conflict that had simmered since the 1998-2000 border war. In a series of nine joint meetings by the Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders, they a joint strategy to rid themselves of the Tigrayans. It is instructive that their final visits were held at the military bases of Eritrea and Ethiopia.

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Abiy canceled scheduled elections, arguing they could not be held because of the coronavirus pandemic. But his mandate had and the Tigrayans said he had no right to act in this way. They with their own elections, despite being instructed by the federal authorities not to. The last straw came when Abiy sent General Jamal Muhammad to take of the Northern Command at the end of October 2020, only to have the TPLF put him on a plane back to Addis Ababa.

The federal government and the Tigray regional authority were clearly on a collision course. Exactly what happened on November 4 last year is , but broke out at the Northern Command base in Mekelle, which the TPLF took control of. Tigray was under attack from the north, east and south, with reports of drones, possibly supplied by the United Arab Emirates, fired from the Eritrean port of Assab in of the Ethiopian government’s war effort.

This is not the “law-enforcement operation”  by Abiy. On November 6, 2020, he  in a tweet that operations “by federal defence forces underway in Northern Ethiopia have clear, limited & achievable objectives.” Six months later, this was hardly a plausible assessment. It had evolved into a full-scale war, which the Ethiopian government and its allies appeared to be winning. After an artillery bombardment of Mekelle, Abiy could rightly claim that his forces were in “” of Mekelle. He said that the army’s entry into the city marked the “” of the conflict with the TPLF.

From Defense to Offense

In reality, the Tigrayans had pulled their forces out of the cities and had headed to the countryside and the mountains to conduct a guerrilla war — just as they had done before 1991. Mekelle had fallen, but the Tigrayan administration had ordered its forces to withdraw before the attack.

The UN, in a secret report, the war would become an extended conflict, characterized by irregular warfare. This is indeed what has transpired. By April 4, 2021, Abiy that the fighting was far from over. Capturing the cities had not ended the war. Then, in June this year, the Tigrayans burst forth from the countryside, their capital, Mekelle, by the end of the month. Instead of leaving matters there, they continued pushing south, taking cities until Addis Ababa itself felt under threat, even though the Tigrayans are still many miles away.

The United States and European Union have been working with the African Union in an attempt to end the fighting. The US has imposed sanctions on Eritrea for its role in the war and threatened to extend these to Ethiopia and Tigray. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo has acted as a mediator, Mekelle as well as Addis Ababa. He has had limited success.

The burden of resolving this conflict now rests on the shoulders of Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta. Whether he can succeed where others have failed remains to be seen.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Earlier this year, Italy hosted the first ever Italy-Africa Ministerial Conference in Rome. Held at the cavernous travertine-laden��Farnesina headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the meeting was attended by high-level delegations from over 40 African countries.

In his closing remarks, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi underscored his intention of broadening political and economic ties with the African continent, by for a “future in which Africa is seen not as the greatest threat—as some demagogues would have it—but as the greatest opportunity.”

The conference, which is intended to be a biennial affair, and Renzi’s visits to sub-Saharan Africa (the first ever by a sitting Italian premier) reflect the Italian government’s commitment to reinvigorating the relationship.

Mutual Benefits

Italy has been late to realize the mutual benefits that��can accrue from a more robust partnership with Africa. Even though it is the world’s eighth largest economy, and Africa’s sixth or seventh most significant trading partner, Italy’s postwar political engagement with the continent has been , and commercial exchanges are below their potential.

Other countries have realized much sooner that regular high-level political dialogue featuring targeted discussions about trade and development could spur investment. China and India, for example, both hold triennial summits with African leaders, whereas the United States holds the biennial US-Africa Business Summit. The French arrange an annual Africa-France Summit, Japan regularly organizes the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, and Turkey has periodically spearheaded summits with continental leaders.

What accounts for Italy’s laggardness to date?

Italy’s insularity and relative economic underdevelopment explains Italian officialdom’s comparatively low level of engagement with Africa post-World War II. Political instability wrought by constant changes in government—63 since 1945—also stunted long-term strategic thinking at la Farnesina.

Moreover, at varying times and to varying degrees, Italy’s former colonial possessions—and their relationship with Rome—were beset with problems, some of their own making, others attributable to Italy. As a result, for most of the postwar period, Italy, unlike Britain or France, could not use its former colonies as a launch pad for strengthening political and business ties elsewhere on the continent.

Understanding the factors impeding closer ties between Italy and the sub-Saharan African countries with which it had historical ties requires understanding the nature of Italy’s postwar exchanges with Eritrea (an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941); Somalia (Italian Somaliland comprising most of modern-day Somalia was a colony from 1889-1941, it continued to be ruled by the Italians under a United Nations trusteeship until 1960 when, at independence, it was conjoined to British Somaliland); and Ethiopia (occupied, but never fully pacified, from 1936 to 1941).

ERITREA

The Italian community in Eritrea was mostly nestled in the picturesque capital, Asmara. Initially a settlement of a mere 150 inhabitants, Asmara was officially founded as a town when the governor of the then Ethiopian Mereb Mellash province, Ras Alula, opted to make it his new capital. When it fell under Italian rule, Asmara blossomed. In a bid to turn it into Africa’s “Little Rome,” the Italians expended significant resources to modernize the city’s infrastructure and to beautify it with Art Deco architecture for which it is renowned to this day.

The colony’s most prominent Italian businessmen made Asmara and its environs their home. These included figures like Barattolo, who got his start in the textile sector, opening a single factory employing a mere 200 workers and eventually growing his business to around 10,000 workers.

Emma Melotti was certainly the region’s most prominent female��entrepreneur. After her husband’s passing, she took over his namesake brewery, and under her sapient stewardship, Melotti came to dominate the Ethiopian market through a network which enveloped even remote villages. Melotti was also available throughout the region, being sold in Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen and Kenya.

Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation

The first snag in relations between Eritrea and the Italian community—principal propulsor of relations—emerged soon after Eritrea was re-conjoined to Ethiopia under a federal arrangement in 1952, as mandated by United Nations (UN) Resolution 390 (V). Previously Ethiopian, then colonized by the Italians, and after World War II a British protectorate, Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia upon the condition that Eritrean institutions bequeathed by the British—such as the legislature and courts—would continue to function unimpeded.

This resolution of the Eritrean issue via federation—though temporary it later turned out to be—occurred in spite of competing formulas floated by other states at the UN. Among those opposed to the federal arrangement, for instance, was Italy. Though Italy’s post-World War II government may have been post-fascist, it was not postcolonial.

Rome favored a solution where Eritrea remained an Italian colony; and barring that, advocated that Italy continue to administer Eritrea under UN trusteeship. Ultimately resigned to the fact that neither of these proposals would garner sufficient support, Italy called for Eritrean independence. Indeed, during this time, Ethiopia and Italy financially supported rival (and armed) groups—pro-union on the one hand, pro-independence on the other.

Ethiopian diplomats secured a diplomatic coup by obtaining sufficient international support for the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation, but the same imperial government also helped sow the seeds of the two countries’ eventual separation.

In a pique of royal obstinacy and heavy-handedness, and only 10 years after consummation of the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation, Emperor Haile Selassie, unwisely going against the counsel of some of his advisers, forcibly dissolved the federal arrangement. His decision subsumed Eritrea into the unitary Ethiopian state and gave further impetus to Eritrean agitation for secession.

The Derg

The beginnings of armed resistance, and the consequent instability in Eritrea, began to hinder Italian (and, indeed, all) commercial activity. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)—a precursor to today’s governing Eritrean People’s Liberation Front—for instance, regularly engaged in extortion by levying “taxes” on agricultural land concessions run by Italians.

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The coming to power in 1974 of Ethiopia’s military government, the Derg, in 1974, made the business environment particularly inhospitable for Italians; most private enterprises were nationalized and expropriated. The Derg’s decision to close all foreign consulates in Eritrea, including the Italian consulates in Asmara and the port town of Massawa, further hastened the Italian exodus.

In one particular act of ruffianism, Derg functionaries went so far as to break into the then vacated Italian consulate in Asmara and temporarily occupied its premises. The final nail in the coffin of a continued Italian presence in Eritrea was the then province’s envelopment by civil war throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

ETHIOPIA

In Ethiopia, much like Eritrea, the “vanguard” of Italo-Ethiopian ties were Italian residents. The Italian community thrived due to its industriousness and ingenuity. Its prosperity, however, was also enabled by Haile Selassie’s injunction prohibiting retribution against Italians who had not committed war crimes.

Among the most successful businessmen entrepreneurs were Mario Buschi, who was involved in public works and ran a company with boats for hire on Lake Tana, source of the Blue Nile; or Mezzedimi, the Italian architect responsible for designing a number of buildings that��came to dominate Addis Ababa’s postwar urban landscape, including the UN Economic Commission for Africa’s sprawling Africa Hall.

Such commercial activity occurred in spite of what were often lukewarm political ties between the two countries. Closer postwar relations between the two governments were inhibited for several reasons.

In the first instance, stalled negotiations over payment of reparations hindered the establishment of closer ties. Italy reneged on its obligation to pay Ethiopia $25 million for war damages and moral harm, as laid out in the 1947 Treaty of Peace. Indeed, at one point, the negotiating positions of both parties seemed irreconcilable. The Italian government maintained that it owed Ethiopia no money, because any moral or physical harm caused by Italy’s five-year occupation of the country was supposedly outweighed by public works the Italians had built. Ethiopia countered that Italy’s egregious war crimes warranted that it pay above and beyond the $25 million stipulated by the peace treaty.

Giuliano Cora, an Italian journalist who at the time commented on the absurdity of this diplomatic impasse, rhetorically asked: “Do we really have to compromise our situation and our future in this region for want of $25 million?” It appears that the Italian government was prepared to do so.

Ultimately, Italy secured the better bargain. Addis Ababa agreed to a lower figure of $16.3 million and the payments occurred under the guise of “technical and financial assistance” for the construction of a dam not far from the capital and a textile mill in the town of Bahir Dar. No mention was ever made of reparations.

Even with this hurdle cleared, another remained: restitution of the 1,700-year-old Axum obelisk, which the Italians had plundered during the occupation. To placate Addis Ababa, Italy offered to build a hospital or an interstate road, in exchange for the uncontested “right” to retain this concrete reminder of its colonial past. Here, too, Italy conveniently forgot that the 1947 treaty mandated the obelisk’s return.

The saga finally ended in 2005 when Italy bore the costs of surgically slicing the obelisk into three parts, so as to have it transported back to Axum in three trips aboard an Antonov plane. Ironically, it was Silvio Berlusconi’s center-right government (whose governing coalition included neo-fascists) that made amends.

Italy still retains other important wartime loot, most importantly a portion of Ethiopia’s prewar Ministry of the Pen archives that appears to be within the custody of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This issue has been forgotten by both sides. The government of Ethiopia ought to try��.

Haile Selassie’s imagination

The most curious stumbling block to closer postwar Italy-Ethiopia relations, however, was the delay by Rome in extending an official invitation to the emperor to visit Italy. The Ethiopian monarch fervently wanted to revisit the country he had last seen in 1924 as regent. His trip had been perennially postponed due to a disagreement over a number of issues, including negotiations over reparations and the Axum obelisk; as well as the impolitic decision by the Italians, at one point, of scheduling Haile Selassie’s visit for shortly after the planned visit of ���dz���������’s president, at a time when the two countries were at loggerheads over disputed land.

Perhaps no two countries captured Haile Selassie’s imagination as much as Italy and France. The monarch’s fondness for the French is easy to comprehend. Haile Selassie was Francophone, and after an early traditional Ethiopian church education, schooled by a Guadeloupian physician and a Francophone Ethiopian Capuchin monk. But what to make of his affection for Italy on both an emotive and psychological level?

After all, it was Italy that��had unseated him, and it was in Italy that his first daughter, Princess Romanework, and two of her sons had died after having been captured by the Italians.

According to Italian historian Angelo Del Boca, Haile Selassie reputedly confided to Giulio Pascucci-Righi, the Italian ambassador accredited to Addis, in 1970:

“I owe nearly everything to Great Britain. The British gave me a place to live when I chose to go into exile, and they brought me to my homeland. All the same, as it may seem, the Ethiopian people have no love for Great Britain. Only two countries are our friends and understand us. Those countries are France and Italy. I hope that my successors will keep the faith [with regard to] this two-fold constant.”

The likelihood that the emperor’s words reflected the Ethiopian people’s state of mind after a . His pro-Italian gestures soon after the war ended could, in theory, be attributable to a desire to play off the Italians against the British.

British forces had fought together with Ethiopian patriots to dislodge the Italians and had remained behind after Ethiopia’s liberation. It is possible that Haile Selassie wanted to guard against Britain’s accumulation of undue influence in Ethiopia, and the risk that having gained such influence, Britain would wield it to declare Ethiopia a protectorate. But the words spoken to Ambassador Pascucci-Righi were purportedly spoken in 1970, years after the threat of falling under Britain’s sway had passed.

Regardless of whether the words spoken privately to the ambassador were accurately recounted by him, clearly the emperor’s attachment was heartfelt. First, because he persisted in sending signals, at times subtle and on other occasions explicit, to the press and visiting Italian officials that he was eager to receive an invitation to visit Italy.

Enemy Country

A further example of the emperor’s sympathy for Italy occurred in the 1960s when, having dispatched a delegation to Italy, the imperial government secured a loan from a consortium of Italian banks (with the facilitation of the Italian government). The Ethiopian government submitted the loan to the senate for final approval. The Ethiopian senate, whose members included several veterans of the Italian-Ethiopian war, rejected the loan’s terms because they considered the interest rate unduly onerous.

The emperor initially responded to the senate’s recalcitrance by claiming ��è����-����������é and rebuking legislators for still treating Italy as an “enemy country.” Ultimately, in relenting, the emperor resorted to what Cambridge historian Christopher Clapham has termed a familiar imperial stratagem employed by Haile Selassie in the face of insurmountable political opposition to a deal: professing ignorance as to its details. The loan was never disbursed for want of the senate’s approval.

The incident bore an uncanny resemblance to an earlier loan negotiation between Italy and Ethiopia. In 1889, Ras Makonnen (the emperor’s father and duke of Harar), visited Italy to conclude a loan agreement on behalf of his cousin, Emperor Menelik II. Upon his return to Ethiopia, Ras Makonnen was castigated by courtiers for having agreed to a loan with interest rates that were deemed usurious, several courtiers went so far as to impugn his patriotism.

Indeed, of the 235 Italian concessions existing in Somalia at independence, comprising more than 45,300 hectares of land, most were devoted to bananas. During their colonial suzerainty over Somalia, and for several decades following independence, Italy gave preferential treatment to banana imports from Somalia by imposing higher tariffs on those imported from other countries.

When Haile Selassie’s trip to Italy finally occurred, the emperor was received with all the pomp and pageantry reserved for Italy’s most illustrious postwar guests. Perhaps the most evocative scene of the trip was described by the Italian daily, Il Giorno, which wrote of the emperor, with his diminutive figure, standing erect in an open state vehicle side-by-side with Italian President Giuseppe Saragat, accompanied by a phalanx of fully-mounted cuirassiers whose horses’ hooves click-clocked on the Roman cobblestones as the pair majestically made their way to the Quirinale Palace.

In the run-up to, and after, the emperor’s 1970 visit, official Ethiopian-Italian ties were on an upswing. Following the 1974 revolution, commerce suffered another prolonged denouement; this time caused by the military government’s nationalization of private enterprises and, later, the country’s descent into an all-consuming civil war.

SOMALIA

In post-independence Somalia, as was the case in Ethiopia, some leaders harbored an affinity for Italy, which encouraged continued engagement. ���dz���������’s one-time minister of planning and international cooperation, Ahmed Habib Ahmed, in words that were somewhat similar in spirit to those reportedly uttered by Haile Selassie, remarked: “[Though] I studied in France, ‘my world’ is Italian; the French are distant to me.”

Several decades post independence, Italian commercial involvement in Somalia centered upon agriculture. The Italians set up cotton, sugar and banana plantations and, after 1929, the year in which worldwide cotton prices collapsed, focused mostly on bananas. Bananas eventually became ���dz���������’s most significant export.

Indeed, of the 235 Italian concessions existing in Somalia at independence, comprising more than 45,300 hectares of land, most were devoted to bananas. During their colonial suzerainty over Somalia, and for several decades following independence, Italy gave preferential treatment to banana imports from Somalia by imposing higher tariffs on those imported from other countries.

Italy further bolstered its political position in Somalia by tilting in its favor in territorial disputes (this policy may not have been adhered to consistently given the frequent change in governments in Rome).

Almost immediately after independence, in the early 1960s, Somalia pressed territorial claims on Ethiopian-controlled territory inhabited primarily by ethnic Somalis. It did the same with regard to lands inhabited mostly by ethnic Somalis in neighboring Kenya and Djibouti, avowedly announcing pursuit of a Greater Somalia encompassing all ethnic Somalis.

Somalia lent pressure to its irredentist claims by supporting armed militias who made frequent forays into Ethiopia, where they were pursued back into Somali territory by forces led by General Aman Andom—an Eritrean who was an interesting historical figure in his own right; in charge of Ethiopian counteroffensives against Somalia, and later, briefly, head of state after Haile Selassie was toppled, before he too suffered the same unceremonious fate.

All-Out War

In the late 1970s, Somalia and Ethiopia actually fought an all-out war over the ethnically Somali Ethiopian Ogaden province. Italy maintained an outward veneer of neutrality, but leaned toward Mogadishu, surreptitiously allowing it to purchase military helicopters, trucks and light weaponry on the Italian market. The support emanated, in part, from the fact that since Somalia had been Italy’s longest-held colony, it was treated with some affection. Beyond that, it is reasonable to surmise that Italy’s support for Somalia may have emanated, at least in part, from lingering bitterness over the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation—a solution to the Eritrean question which Italy had strenuously opposed.

Aside from official institutional ties, for many years Somalia also benefited from another sort of linkage with Italy: the sympathy and support of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Promotion of commercial interests and mobilization of investment in postwar Italy were not the sole province of the government, but of political parties too. The PCI, and its competitors, jockeyed for influence at home and abroad, by supporting foreign regimes they deemed to be their ideological brethren.

Following the 1969 Somali revolution, the PCI extended cultural and technical assistance and invested in the country through Italian labor unions and affiliated entities. It provided Mogadishu with expertise and machinery to help bolster the Somali construction and agricultural sectors. Italturist, the PCI’s travel and touring company, was also tasked with arranging facilitation tours for Italian tourists in Somalia.

The Italian community in Somalia thrived as a result of the good political ties between Italy and Somalia. As was the case in Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, the Italians benefited from the protection of Siad Barre, ���dz���������’s post-revolution strongman. Barre inveighed against any harm befalling the Italians and expressed his sympathy toward Italians on more than one occasion, such as when he declared: “I have said, and have repeated, that for us Somalis, Italians are not considered foreigners; and this is a privilege which we have not extended to any other community.”

At one point, Barre even assured the Italians that he was “no Gadaffi.” In saying so, he was communicating to the Italians that he would refrain from following in the footsteps of the Libyan leader who had nationalized the property of Italian settlers after Libya gained its independence from Italy.

But such sweet-talking aside, as Barre fell under the Soviets’ orbit and he increasingly moved his country to the left, ideology trumped his apparent affection for Italians and a spate of nationalizations followed. The local branches of the Banca di Roma and Banca di Napoli, multiple insurance firms and AGIP—the precursor to today’s oil conglomerate, ENI—were among the Italian firms affected.

Though some firms and small factories were spared, the damage was done. Italian companies and most of their expatriate personnel left the country, never to return. Once Somalia spiraled into civil war, even the small Italian community that had faithfully remained behind returned to Italy.

Italy’s engagement with countries in the Horn of Africa was peripatetic. In Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country, relations were frequently rocky. Disputes arose over Eritrea and the implementation of commitments undertaken by Italy at the end of World War II by signing the 1947 Treaty of Peace; more generally, it appears that for several decades Italy struggled to come to terms with the fact that the colonial era had ended.

Italy’s focus on other geopolitical priorities, Ethiopia and ���dz���������’s adoption of economic policies that were inimical to an Italian presence, and their enmeshment in civil wars also minimized Italy’s engagement with the Horn and, by extension, other African countries.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In Addis Ababa, Ethiopians should be feeling excited. The city has proudly and successfully debuted the first metropolitan rail line in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, the nearly 800 kilometer train from ’s capital city to the port of Djibouti , which should expand global market integration and trade throughout Ethiopia.

Nevertheless, there is no peace. As many as by police and military forces across the country since November. Protests against the “master plan” to expand the city of Addis into the surrounding Oromo region have been met with violent retaliation by government forces.

The latest recent round of unrest began over three weeks ago when students in Ginci staged demonstrations in response to the clearing of a stadium and a nearby forest for development by foreign investors. According to reports on social media, Ethiopian authorities responded with disproportionate force, which then triggered mass demonstrations and more police killings across the country.

In April 2014, between nine and 47 students participating in similar demonstrations sparked by a plan to incorporate the surrounding Oromo area into the rapidly growing capital city.

The government claims that it only wants to expand the provision of services, but protesters say that this will lead to displacement of farmers in the name of “development.” The , however, is far closer to the fears of the Oromo than to the claims of the government. At the same time, both can be correct: If this new metro line happens to expand through your farmland, you have gained a service, but also lost your traditional means of sustenance.

The Oromos, by far the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, have long been oppressed by a predominately ethnic Tigre-led government. Oromo civil society and political organizations are banned by the government, which equates Oromo nationalism with terrorism.

Historical Context

Emperor Menelik II is praised by many Ethiopians for successfully fighting off the Italians and playing a pivotal role in ensuring that Ethiopia became the only country to successfully resist the European “scramble for Africa” at the end of the 19^th century. The Oromos view Menelik II less kindly, however, as he simultaneously expanded his kingdom to incorporate the territory of the southern ethnic groups and strategically moved the capital city to the middle of this newly conquered territory.

Today, residents of Addis Ababa still speak Amharic, an entirely different language than in the Oromo communities just outside the city in every direction. It is an imposed language, and the Oromo people still insist on calling the city by its original Oromo language name, Finfine.

Dominance of ethnic minorities by northern rulers continued under the reign of King Haile Selassie and later under the communist military junta of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Under Mengistu’s regime, known as the Derg, political dissidents were commonly murdered in the streets. The memory of such horrors persists in the consciousness of the Ethiopian people.

The militias of the major ethnic groups in Ethiopia united in opposition to the Derg, which eventually led to the current single-party “democracy” and the establishment of Meles Zenawi as the head of state. The ethnic militias united against the Derg with the impression that they would each have their own state upon the downfall of the regime.

The reality, however, is that these promises were broken and other ethnic political organizations that helped to overthrow the Derg were banned by the Zenawi government. The newly established Ethiopian People’s Republic Democratic Front (EPRDF) was, in fact, just a new name for the Tigrayan People Liberation Front (TPLF).

Meles Zenawi and EPRDF

The EPRDF saw capitalist development “for the good of the people” as the only way forward for a country long marred by a history of famine. This has meant the construction of largescale dams and effectively giving away large swaths of land to agricultural investors, displacing traditional peoples who used these lands for grazing and who depended on seasonal flooding to grow staples.

The initial cause for the recent demonstrations is effectively the same, where “development” comes into conflict with human rights and the preservation of traditional ways of living. Meles illustrated his policy by implications of the Gibe III dam by saying: “They don’t want to see developed Africa; they want us to remain undeveloped and backward to serve their tourists as a museum.”

As in Joseph Stalin’s five-year plan, the EPRDF’s Growth and Transformation Plan takes a dogmatic approach to “economic development” as defined by foreign investors and creditors. Ethiopian growth is in the double digits, even as El Nino conditions have led to famine across the eastern portion of the country.

No Disturbing the Status Quo

The EPRDF argues that disturbances of the status quo are an impediment to the mission of development and, as such, demonstrations can justifiably be met with violence. As one Ethiopian stated, “The government treats riots and peaceful protests the same way and because they are treated the same, they always end the same.”

The government is correct in its belief that the worst thing for the people of Ethiopia would be a loss of political stability. It only takes a quick glimpse at the crisis in neighboring or across the Red Sea in to understand what predicaments can result when sectarian tensions align with political instability. As tensions grow between Ethiopia’s ethnic states, the risks of catastrophic political crisis are also much greater.

Ethiopia has the right of “free speech” written into the constitution, but as everyone in the country will tell you, there’s a big difference between what the government does and what it says it does. The detainment of the on terrorism charges serves as a good example of the results of speaking out against the government. Fortunately, these bloggers achieved significant media attention, which eventually put enough pressure on the government to allow them .

Protests throughout the expansive Oromo region have little chance of being documented. We will never how many people have actually been killed over the last few weeks. To the government’s credit, maybe some of these killings were an unfortunate result of an appropriate use of force by police trying to put an end to rioting. Without a free press, however, we will never know and we cannot simply take the government’s word at face value.

The EPRDF is wrong to believe that it can use power, force and fear to remain in government forever. Ethiopia’s young people are overcoming the fear of political opposition that has long meant certain death or imprisonment under the Derg and, to a lesser extent, under the EPRDF. More and more young people, who account for a huge proportion of the country, are learning to organize via social media, realizing that the “democracy” they live under is a farce.

Young Ethiopians watched as their peers in gathered in Tahrir Square time and time again to bring about Hosni Mubarak’s downfall. While it is now easy to see the Arab Spring as a failure, the aspirations for democracy and justice in the face of oppression have not waned, but strengthened and will continue to spread.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The number of electoral democracies mushroomed in Africa over the past two decades — a far cry from the days when incumbents would postpone elections for as long as it pleased them. But does the increase in electoral democracies in Africa correspond with a wider space for civil liberties, accountability, transparency and respect for rule of law on the continent? What are the factors that militate against smooth and peaceful elections in Africa?

Even though we should expect irregularities in some of the elections, the continent will pull through. Any disputes will be resolved through African Union��mediation and pressure from the United Nations and international development partners — mainly the United States and the European Union.

The recent vote��in Zambia on January 20 marked the beginning of a flurry of elections that will last throughout 2015. Elections in Africa excite political observers and this year’s are no exception. The highlights are expected to be: Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Guinea, South Sudan, Nigeria, Central African Republic and Burundi.

Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso: Stability at Stake

The October polls will be ’s first presidential election since the disputed election��of 2010, which led to widespread violence and the eventual removal, by force, of then-President Laurent Gbagbo. Gbagbo had lost to his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, and he refused to concede defeat. At least 3,000 people were killed in the post-election violence.

The task this year for the Ouattara administration will be to hold a free and fair election, without a repeat of what we saw in 2010/11.

For , the presidential election scheduled for November will be the first since the overthrow of the country’s long-time military dictator, Blaise Compaore,��in a popular uprising in 2014. Compaore seized power in a 1987 coup, when he assassinated��Thomas Sankarathen, the military ruler at the time. Burkina Faso has been predominantly under military rule since gaining independence from France in 1960, under its former name Upper Volta.

The transitional��government faces a daunting task of holding democratic elections in a country where��civil society, media and state institutions have been weakened over many decades. The tens of thousands of Burkinabés, who thronged the streets of Ouagadougou to oust Compaore, will be watching closely to ensure their revolution is not stolen at the polls.

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Guinea, South Sudan and Nigeria: Polls in Troubled Times

The presidential election in will be the first since the election of President Alpha Conde in 2010, which ended military rule in the West African country. A volatile political landscape, a broken economy, insecurity and the Ebola virus have posed great challenges to authorities in Conakry. Logistics and other costs of holding elections have added another layer of financial burden on the cash-strapped Conde administration.

, a country still mired in war and political impasse, had its��general elections scheduled��for July 2015, but it has since postponed them until 2017. Corruption, tribalism and nepotism, coupled with political rivalry between President Salva Kiir and then-Vice President Riek Machar, culminated in civil war in December 2013.

War and food shortage have threatened the very existence of Africa’s youngest nation since. While the 2015 vote has been postponed, the main challenge in 2017 will be to conduct an election that will be accepted by these two arch rivals.

President Goodluck Jonathan of has failed to contain a violent extremist insurgency that��threatens to not only end his political career, but also destabilize and eventually break up the Nigerian state. Jonathan has elbowed his neighbors and looked to foreign powers for help. He has found worthy but insufficient support in the United States, Britain��and France which, together with other countries, have given military and security assistance to not only find the more than 200 missing schoolgirls — who were abducted by Boko Haram in��April 2014 — but also advise on how to defeat the Boko Haram insurgents. Their efforts have not produced any tangible results thus far.

President Jonathan’s political survival will be at stake when Nigerians head to the��polls. If he is defeated, youth unemployment, economic inequality and the Boko Haram insurgency will be largely to blame.

The election is a two-horse race pitting the incumbent president, of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), against the former military ruler, Muhammadu Buhari, who hails from��the All Progressives Congress (APC). The two men are no strangers to Nigerians. While Buhari was accused of gross human rights violations during his tenure as military ruler, Jonathan’s presidency has been marred by his apparent lack of control over official corruption and his failure to mount credible military pressure against Boko Haram. Whoever wins the election will inherit the twin evils: insecurity and corruption.

War Torn Societies at the Ballot Box: Central African Republic and Burundi

The nightmare for all stakeholders is the general election in the (CAR), which is tentatively scheduled for August. However, there is��no specific date in sight, due to��the ongoing conflict in the country.

The election is a desperate attempt at turning around CAR’s political crisis, which is the root cause of the violence. Any miscalculation in the election would only risk renewed tensions and escalation in the central African nation.��While the ceasefire agreement between the warring factions — Anti-Balaka and the former Seleka rebels — announced in Kenya on January 28 offers a glimmer of hope, it may do little, if anything, to bring about an immediate end to deep-rooted and widespread violence between the CAR’s Christian and Muslim communities.

With the support of leaders from the East African sub-region, President Pierre Nkurunziza of is likely to have his way in a��controversial bid for another term in office. The ambiguity of the 2005 constitution on the question of presidential term limits does not help the political situation in Burundi. Nkurunziza’s third term bid risks endangering the fragile peace in the east African nation, whose devastating 12-year civil war ended in 2005.

Togo and Ethiopia: Outcomes Are Forgone Conclusion

The opposition in are up against a 48-year-old presidential dynasty of the Gnassingbe family. President Faure Gnassingbe, who inherited power from his late father in 2005, is widely expected to win the election scheduled for March. Gnassingbe won the elections in 2005 and in 2010, both of which were dismissed by the opposition as rigged.

The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party in will maintain its strong grip on power after the parliamentary election in May. The EPRDF, which is widely criticized for intimidating opposition politicians and for muzzling the press and free speech, has tightened its censorship in the run-up to the election.

Elsewhere, elections in Benin, Chad, Comoros, Egypt, Lesotho, Tanzania and Sudan will all be worth watching. Somaliland, which is yet to be accorded international recognition, also plans to hold a general election. Even though the National Electoral Commission (NEC) of Somaliland is poorly equipped and has just begun to prepare, opposition politicians have warned against postponement, as this would risk plunging the already fragile country into political turmoil.

Elections in Africa come with enormous security and political risks. Weak state institutions; tribal and religious divides; possible interference by incumbents in the work of electoral authorities; the possible use of security forces by incumbents to threaten their political opponents; and rigged elections are among the leading challenges. Safeguards such as truly independent electoral authorities; political neutrality of the armed and security forces; an independent media; strong civil society; and proper voter education will ensure free, fair and transparent elections and increase the credibility and acceptability of election results to political contenders.

The world will be watching as these African countries take turns to go to the polls.

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Background

, a militia, originated as a radical Islamist movement seeking to create a “Greater Somalia.” In 2006, it became a militant wing of�� Islamic Courts Union (ICU) to fight Christian-majority forces during the transitional government.��Ethiopia ousted the ICU and al-Shabab splintered off into the south, organizing suicide bombings and assaults on Ethiopian forces. This was a morphing period for the group, which created factions to become a territorial guerrilla movement. Today, al-Shabab is designated as a organization.

Though nationalist in origin, al-Shabab has widened��its scope. In June 2010, it��coordinated a suicide bombing that killed 74 people gathered to watch the in��Kampala,. Al-Shabab has also been of��helping����carry out operations in��. Its��most significant transition occurred��in 2012, when it����with����as an affiliate cell. This move strengthened the��belief in��an international����movement.

Al-Shabab’s main opposition are ���dz���������’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia () forces, both backed by the United Nations. In a January 2009 attack on the TFG, al-Shabab ��three ministers. AMISOM has regularly sent forces to Somalia since the Uganda bombing, which raises belief that the former is defending the TFG. Al-Shabab has carried out attacks against AMISOM forces to combat this assistance.

Al-Shabab is by tithes, extortion and external donors. Its��economy flourished in 2008 after it��seized the port city of Kismayo, which enabled the group��to rake off��revenues from charcoal exportations. In October 2011, a Kenyan-led assault on Kismayo liberated the port of��al-Shabab fighters. This is believed to have taken away $35-50 million per year from��its��. However, al-Shabab still��makes considerable income through smuggling imported sugar into Kenya.

Why is Al-Shabab Relevant?

Recently, AMISOM forces were able to recapture many al-Shabab territories. This led to a drop in the group’s popularity and funding —��the��two pillars of a terrorist organization. These losses, along with reduced funds and recent infighting, have created an increasing�� of confidence��in Somali citizens to volunteer and donate to al-Shabab.

Al-Shabab is��funded��by tithes, extortion and external donors. Its��economy flourished in 2008 after it��seized the port city of Kismayo, which enabled the group��to rake off��revenues from charcoal exportations. In October 2011, a Kenyan-led assault on Kismayo liberated the port of��al-Shabab fighters. This is believed to have taken away $35-50 million per year from��its��revenue.��

International jihad, however, has helped recruit a different demographic. Under a��broad mission of waging a war against “,”�� al-Shabab��is able to gain support for attacking foreigners. The group��has been able to recruit not just young Somali boys, but foreigners, young girls and even clan elders. Many Westerners have been recruited from places such as London and��Minnesota, raising fear of threats to the West. With more foreign support, al-Shabab’s��existential threat is recognized on an international scale.

However, while the merger with al-Qaeda proved successful in helping adapt its��propaganda and recruitment strategies, some al-Shabab members want to����on domestic issues rather than an “international struggle.” In 2013, leader Ahmed Abdi Godane created a faction to fight ideological opposition to al-Shabab’s��new mission. The attack on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall in September 2013 was seen as Godane�� his authority.

The question is whether��al-Shabab can emerge from these internal rifts into one coherent and nuanced ideology. This may prove to be the group’s main obstacle to survival.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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After the September 2013 siege at Westgate Shopping Complex in Nairobi — a brazen operation that saw four kill at least 67 civilians — international attention refocused on the threat of , an militant organization in . Less than three weeks later, forces raided a compound in the group’s stronghold of Barawe. They targeted a Kenyan national described as an al-Shabab “��and operational planner.”

In the following months, additional operations focusing on the organization’s leaders unfolded, with suspected drone strikes in the vicinity of Barawe in����2013 and����2014 eliminating top commanders. However, the most significant move aimed at degrading al-Shabab’s destructive capabilities came when the Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a peacekeeping force,����the integration of 4,000 Ethiopian soldiers under its command on January 22. Through this measure, AMISOM fulfilled a post-Westgate United Nations����to increase overall troop levels in Somalia.

While Ethiopian forces had been����on Somali soil since late 2011, the additional manpower spurred the resumption of AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) incursions into al-Shabab territory. Since March, the combined forces captured at least nine towns, including key areas such as��,�� and�� — al-Shabab’s first major losses since September 2013.

Ethiopian Forces in Somalia

While the reduction of al-Shabab territories is welcome news for the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and its allies in their battle to eliminate the organization, the inclusion of Ethiopian troops is problematic. Ethiopian-Somali relations have manifested violently a number of times over the past half-century, and Ethiopia traditionally evokes a negative and visceral reaction from the Somali public. More recently, invaded Somalia in late 2006 in order to remove the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which had provided a modicum of stability to the capital, Mogadishu. Ethiopian forces committed a��number of alleged ��until their withdrawal in January 2009.

Al-Shabab, meaning “The Youth” in Arabic, began as a largely autonomous and hard-line youth wing of the ICU, and emerged at the forefront of the anti-Ethiopian occupation around 2006-07 — though other ICU elements either fragmented or escaped. The group effectively exploited the Ethiopian invasion. Al-Shabab rallied many to its cause by presenting the movement as the defender of Somali sovereignty and the community against an arch-rival and a historically nation. Support flowed in, including contributions from the��. While some held religious motivations, many participated less due to an ideological affinity toward al-Shabab’s worldview and more under the banner of����against a hated enemy. As long as Ethiopia was in the country committing perceived abuses, al-Shabab recruiters had a relatively easy task.

Al-Shabab, meaning “The Youth” in Arabic, began as a largely autonomous and hard-line youth wing of the ICU, and emerged at the forefront of the anti-Ethiopian occupation around 2006-07.

Following Ethiopia’s withdrawal, AMISOM forces took over and the Somali government began a slow and uneven process of extending its authority beyond a few city blocks in Mogadishu. A major boon to this project came in October 2011 when Kenyan forces invaded southern Somalia, ostensibly to institute a����zone containing the strategic port of Kismayo.

Ethiopia followed suit along its border, making for a three-way assault on al-Shabab territories; though both nations pursed interests independent of AMISOM. While significant advances did occur, al-Shabab was far from eliminated, and retained the ability to conduct large-scale����in Mogadishu or plan massive operations��such as the siege at Westgate.

Al-Shabab Counters

In this sense, while AMISOM and SNA advances against al-Shabab had����prior to Westgate, the redeploying of Ethiopian troops as a means to address this was a controversial choice, and appeared to provide conditions for the Somali group to recapture a level of public support enjoyed years earlier. To this point, al-Shabab began a messaging campaign highlighting the role of Ethiopia in AMISOM, in an attempt to capitalize on longstanding Somali enmity and delegitimize the peacekeeping mission and, by association, the SFG.

In his first speech since the Westgate attacks, al-Shabab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane focused heavily on Ethiopia in early March, declaring that the country����to divide Somali lands, eliminate sharia law, and rectify its landlocked status by obtaining access to the Somali coast. He also referenced the “��rivalry” between Somalia and Ethiopia — dating back centuries, but amplified by bouts of heavy fighting in the post-colonial era — and called for jihad in response.

Other top al-Shabab leaders issued similar refrains. Spokesman Ali Mohamud Rage��, “We want to remind them [the Somali population] how they [Ethiopia] killed our men, raped our women, desecrated our Holy Quran, and looted our riches, they are here yet again to commit the same crimes,” while urging Somalis to eradicate this “arch enemy from their land.” Hassan Ya’qub Ali, al-Shabab governor of the central Galgadud region, focused on the religious aspect,����that Ethiopia “brought the weapons in the country so they kill the Muslims.”

… in the years since, al-Shabab has unveiled its plan for ���dz���������’s future, replete with harsh punishments and bans on facets of local culture, including public��executions��for suspected informants and��restrictions��on music at local celebrations.

Al-Shabab also utilized anti-Ethiopian rhetoric to secure local support, by demonstrations in various locations under its control. In addition, since February, the organization has publicized a number of clan-based meetings, including members of��,����and��. Following agreements to resist an Ethiopian occupation for the second time in a decade, many of these clans backed up their words with financial donations and fresh recruits.

A New Environment

These statements and actions represent a movement trying to capitalize on some of the same dynamics that aided the rise of al-Shabab, namely the presence of Ethiopian troops on Somali soil. However, the environments of 2007 and 2014 are very different. Some clans have voiced their support, but a nationwide uprising against the “Ethiopian invaders” under the banner of al-Shabab has yet to materialize. At the same time, the movement has been unable to resist encroaching government-allied forces. For example, despite an anti-Ethiopia����in Buloburde in February, AMISOM����control of the town a few weeks later.

Earlier, the level of discontent vis-à-vis Ethiopia largely outweighed the ideology preached by al-Shabab, which was a nascent organization that had yet to impose its governance throughout the Somali countryside. However, in the years since, al-Shabab has unveiled its plan for ���dz���������’s future, replete with harsh punishments and bans on facets of local culture, including public����for suspected informants and����on music at local celebrations. While the organization’s rule provides specific benefits, chiefly in the realm of justice and security, this came at the price of forced adherence to a foreign and conservative ideology.

Today, the inclusion of Ethiopian troops undoubtedly garners an extra degree of popularity for al-Shabab. However, the level demonstrated thus far is unlikely to make a significant difference in the movement’s fortunes, especially in the wake of sustained AMISOM and SNA pressure. In this sense, the costs of living under its rule may now outweigh the costs of allowing Ethiopia to participate in the making of a new future. This is the most telling sign of the current state of al-Shabab, and perhaps the most promising for Somalia.

This is not to say al-Shabab stands on the verge of extinction — in fact, far from it. The inability of the fledging SFG to provide adequate and united governance in newly captured towns is a key factor that will keep al-Shabab pertinent in the foreseeable future, as it will likely only become more overstretched as AMISOM offensives continue. In addition, al-Shabab has demonstrated regional capabilities amid a host of emerging likeminded organizations, charting a course as a significant terrorist operator in the Horn of Africa for years to come.

Nonetheless, the relatively low-key public outcry over the presence of Ethiopian troops, in comparison to previous iterations, is as telling a situation as any that the high-water mark for al-Shabab’s popularity in Somalia has passed. If there is an issue the organization should be more concerned about than the loss of territorial control, it is this inability to recapture public support in the wake of advances by a traditional enemy.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect��51�Թ�’s��editorial policy.

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Radical Islamists killed at least 67 people in Kenya, while dozens are still missing. Annette Weber��talks about the history, structure and ideology of the al-Shabab militia, which is responsible for the terrorist attack in a shopping mall in Nairobi.

Candida Splett:�����dz���������’s al-Shabab militia claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack in Nairobi. What is this group we are talking about?

Annette Weber: The al-Shabab militia was founded in 2006. Back then, it was the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that ruled Somalia from June to December 2006. The ICU’s regime had then been the reason for ���dz���������’s neighbors from Ethiopia to intervene, because they wanted to prevent an Islamist government in Somalia. By many Somalis, that was considered to be an occupation. Al-Shabab’s initial aim was to take action against this Ethiopian occupation.

Splett: What happened in 2007, when the ICU was not in power anymore?

Weber:��Al-Shabab remained existent and kept pursuing the aim of pushing the Ethiopians out of the country. That led to a lot of support amongst the people of Somalia. After the Ethiopians had left the country in 2009, al-Shabab split into two wings. Until today, there are those who are mainly concerned with turning Somalia into an Islamic state and those who want to promote the international jihad.

Splett: To which of the groups do the Nairobi terrorists belong?

Weber:��They belong to the second group: the international Jihadists. Apparently, Somali and Kenyan activists take part in it, but also foreigners with Somali heritage.

Splett:��What are al-Shabab’s motives for the attack in Kenya?

Weber:��First of all, they demand a withdrawal of Kenyan troops from Somalia. When Ethiopia left the country in 2009, African Union (AU) troops took their place. Kenyans came in 2011, at first independent from the AU. Kenya justified its intervention by referring to al-Shabab’s attacks on police officers and the abduction of humanitarian aid workers at the Somali border.

Splett: Is this how Kenya became an enemy in the eyes of al-Shabab?

Weber:��Yes, although more in the eyes of the al-Shabab wing, whose activities are focused on Somalia. It considers itself weakened because of Kenya which now controls the south of the country. With Kenya’s occupation of the harbor city Kismayo, al-Shabab also lost the charcoal trade as an important source of income.

Splett: How does the international wing of al-Shabab justify the attack?

Weber:��As I have said, the aim is that Kenya and other AU countries leave Somalia. The terrorists think that their attacks will have an immediate influence on politics. They refer to the attacks in Madrid, after which Spain withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. This is not really about feeling weakened, which this wing does not so much consider to be the case. More importantly, it is part of the global jihad ideology, that more and more countries become caliphates. A Somali caliphate is an important goal, which they could come closer to, if AU troops left the country.

Splett: So the international wing of al-Shabab has not been weakened?

Weber:��That is correct. As was shown by the attack in Kenya, al-Shabab is very well-connected in the region. Since February 2012, it has been dubbed as an al-Qaeda affiliate. Although this does not mean that it is part of al-Qaeda’s chain of command, it nevertheless has seen an increase in popularity and less trouble with finding financial support compared to previous years. It has to be said that al-Qaeda is very strong in East Africa and has always used Somalia as a training ground for international jihadists. Cooperation does make sense not only for training purposes, but also for sporadic terrorist acts.

*[This article was originally published by����(SWP),��and was translated from German by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On his recent trip to Africa, US President Barack Obama announced his initiative to spend $7 billion over five years to fund an electricity program in sub-Saharan Africa that includes geothermal, hydro, wind, and solar power. Critics have attacked the plan from all directions: and does not involve a long-term commitment; it does not give ; it does not deal with distribution issues; and it does not focus enough on cleaning up conditions that keep the global private power industry in Africa — “poorly enforced property rights, corruption, and patchy enforcement of the rule of law.”

A Much Needed Project

Yet no one denies the need, as nearly lack access to power in sub-Saharan Africa. Ironically, “indoor air pollution from wood stoves now kills 3.5 million people per year, more than AIDS and malaria combined.” In some cases, US regulations will have to be changed to support the initiative because certain environmental rules restrict the US’ Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) from funding projects that emit greenhouse gases. Due to the rural locations of many of those in need, renewable energy, according to the International Energy Agency, “could be the most cost-effective option for expanding energy access in about 70 percent of rural areas in developing countries.” One solution already provided by the US company SKYei, is the installation of mini-grids powered by a hybrid of solar and gas that are inexpensive and well suited to rural areas.

So far, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania have signed up for the first round of projects. Andrew Mayock of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) believes the initial fund of $7 billion, which has already attracted an additional $9 billion in commitments from private sector investors, could grow to $30 billion in energy infrastructure investments annually.

Leading by Example: Morocco and WAPP

While Power Africa moves forward, there are burgeoning opportunities across the continent in Central and West Africa. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), through its West Africa Power Pool (), has made regional power grid access a priority for the next decade. The WAPP intends to integrate the various national power systems “into a unified regional electricity market – with the expectation that such mechanism would, over the medium to long-term, assure the citizens of ECOWAS member states a stable and reliable electricity supply at affordable costs… facilitating the balanced development of diverse energy resources… for their collective economic benefit, through long-term energy sector cooperation, unimpeded energy transit and increasing cross-border electricity trade.”

It should come as no surprise that Morocco is a significant player in WAPP through its close ties to and revived leadership of the Community of Sahal-Saharan States (). More importantly, Morocco is a strong partner for energy development due to its dominant role in Africa when it comes to investing in renewable energies. It has been successful in bringing electricity to 98% of its rural areas and there are strong logistical ties between Morocco and the countries in Central and West Africa.

More Cooperation is Necessary

Trends in energy consumption and production favor a strong regional grid between Morocco and its neighbors to the south. Given the expanding utilization of its national resources for local projects, the region is collectively demanding more efficient and productive investment in all types of infrastructure. With this strong commitment to economic and human development, more reliable energy supplies are a core requirement. Reliable energy is an enabler and multiplier of opportunities across many sectors and is a key driver in attracting foreign direct investment, creating jobs and enhancing stability.

"The development of Africa’s electrical power sector is a prerequisite for growth in other industries. A regular, consistent power supply will do much to attract foreign investment and entice international companies to establish operations in Africa… Power sharing has become more prevalent in the in recent years… [as] neighboring countries have seen benefit on the sharing of electricity… countries with limited or unreliable power generation capacity will now have access to power, without the intensive capital investment required to construct new facilities.”

Despite the fading demand from the European leg of the , which linked renewable energy from the Maghreb to European customers, it is now obvious that, given projected high growth for sub-Saharan Africa, Morocco’s strategic investments in renewable energies and extension of its power grid southward will provide a critical backbone for regional energy distribution. Given the already extensive inputs in power generation and distribution in West and Central Africa, the US should consider broadening its Power Africa program in partnership with Morocco to accelerate the delivery of sustainable energy along the north-south power corridor in the region.

*[This article was produced in collaboration with , and represents the views of the author and not the perspectives of the Moroccan American Trade & Investment Center.]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Each year, on June 20, the United Nations marks World Refugee Day; a time to recognize the contributions of refugees to their communities around the world. 

Refugees are people who are forced to flee their home countries due to political persecution, war, famine, and other causes of forced migration. The moment they cross the borders of foreign lands, migrants are known as "refugees" — a brand that doesn't only degrade their status, but also subjects them to indifference to their basic human needs.

Kakuma Refugee Camp

The Kakuma refugee camp was established in 1991 and is located 95km from Lokichoggio, a town at the Kenya-Sudan border. It is administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and falls under the jurisdiction of the Kenyan government. Kakuma, meaning "nowhere" in Swahili, has been controlled through the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) since the adoption of the Kenya Refugee Act of 2006. The refugee camp is connected with only a highway on the Kenyan northern corridor.

Kakuma is remote; it is a cosmopolitan camp. Over many years, it has developed into a town within another town, since the actual city of Kakuma is also home to non-refugees. The camp's area is defined by a harsh environment in a remote location, coupled with poor infrastructure and low access to essential services, in addition to other underlying causes of poverty.

In the Kakuma refugee camp, tens of thousands of multinational refugees have been warehoused for decades. Refugees are trapped there with one big difference between the camp's residents and those who live in the town of Kakuma: The camp's residents cannot leave without permission from the camp's governing authority.

The refugee camp itself has three major settlement sections. During the early stages of its inception, the Kakuma refugee camp was designed to accommodate South Sudanese refugees fleeing conflict and violence. Over the years, the camp has accommodated refugees from: South Sudan; Sudan; Somali; DRC Congo; Burundi; Ethiopia; Rwanda; Eritrea; Uganda; Tanzania; and Congo-Brazzaville. The camp has also accommodated three Ivoirians, an Iranian, a Zimbabwean, and a Cameroonian.

By mid-May, the total population in Kakuma stood at 150,891, of which 49,767 were refugees of Somali origin. Another 44,395 were refugees from South Sudan. However, by the end of May, the camp's population had already increased to 155,269 persons, according to a UNHCR official report.

Refugees' Voices

In the Kakuma refugee camp, World Refugee Day was commemorated on Thursday, June 20 at the Napata grounds in the camp. At 9am, flags were lifted and dancing and speeches soon followed.

Some views expressed by camp residents are full of bitterness and worries: "I'm in a voluntary prison, I was young when I arrived here 14 years ago," said Elias Wondimu, an Ethiopian refugee in Kakuma. "That has changed now, I don't see any reason as to why we celebrate refugee day. I hate life."  

Refugees in the camp are trapped and their rights to freedom of movement and to obtain employment and citizenship are denied. The UNHCR is supposed to advocate refugee rights, but camp residents strongly feel that the UN Refugee Agency has done little in finding durable solutions.

Sara Hassan, a Somali refugee, said: "I wish I could turn back time. I have lived here since 1994 [and] I was promised resettlement but that turned out to be a dream; many years of waiting. Was my case closed? I don't see real life anymore."

There are no well established structures, and human rights conditions are fragile. Therefore, the exact figures concerning victims of rape and sexual assaults are not registered, despite its rampant occurrences.

Some refugees have the opportunity to go back to their homeland, while others will never have the chance to set foot on their country of origin again. In Kakuma, refugees have strongly encountered the negative impact of warehousing and many lives are being lost in exile. Some refugees will be lucky enough to secure resettlement abroad, while many others who desire the same thing will never get the opportunity. Some even feel discriminated against.

"Are all refugees equal? Some are more equal than others [and] some deserve resettlement, but it's a taboo to Rwandese in Kakuma," said Leah Bugingo, a Rwandan refugee. "I hope there will be change for [future] generations."

In the Kakuma camp, refugees are entirely dependent on humanitarian food aid. Their life consists of constant waiting and dreams of new hope. Under these circumstances, children grow to adulthood and adults grow to old age in this warehousing situation.

As a refugee community leader in Kakuma said: "We're vulnerable, we're voiceless, [and] we're neglected by the UN, the media, [and] the international community, as well by our host government." 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Abuse of the feminine, which is historically abuse of the weak, is a deviant offshoot of the more general human male quest to dominate nature. Nature: this wild power that lacks an endowment of consciousness; this vastness of savagery that makes man feel as vulnerable and powerless as he can be. Indeed, the frail man understood early on that his survival hinged upon his domination of nature. The more he owned and dominated the savage nature, the more powerful he was, the more secure he was. And thus, the battle for domination began. A battle that would be fought only by the males, leaving women out of it for their efficiency in warfare never panned out to be substantial at all. Women are liabilities. And with time, women, seen as devoid of real worthiness to amass power, receded in importance in nation-building and were reneged to the ranks of breeding accessories, tools of procreation for a male higher purpose.

In fact, after Plato, ca. 400 BC, advocated that girls should be brought up on equal terms with boys because their value was of equal worth, the only figure of name and note to demand equality for women was another Greek philosopher, Epicurus, 100 years after Plato. And then after him, not a single human being, not a single current, ideology or train of thought ever mentioned women again until the 18th century when the French Revolution brought an uproar of liberal ideas.

That is a period of 2,200 years of female oppression. Can you imagine? Twenty-two centuries of human civilization and advancement completely devoid of any word on female rights or gender equality.

"Local Customs"

In all these historical instances, in every society everywhere in the world, women, like nature and animals, were considered savage natural resources to be used, ruled and enjoyed by men in service of the higher male purpose of domination and expansion, all at the expense of their own wellbeing. The precept is as old as the Genesis 3:16 put it: "To the women God said: 'I will greatly multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth your children, yet your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you.'" A precept repeated until today in religious ceremonies.

Let’s just say that we are the less lucky ones of the two genders. Freud said it best: “Anatomy is destiny.” And coupled with this fateful biblical destiny, subjugation was forced down all women’s throats as men and their misogynistic laws, misogynistic ideologies, misogynistic societies, and misogynistic ecosystems gave man the superseding power to use and abuse his women at his whim because women were never as effective at domination and expansion as men, and every single woman was forced to abide. After all, isn’t it God’s ordinance?

The strong urge to penetrate, take over, subdue, and explode is almost exclusively male. It is bound up with the desire to overpower in both an intellectual and a sexual sense. And a woman who demonstrates those traits is condemned for insolence and lacking “femininity,” and nobody likes a woman who isn’t “feminine.” As if feminine must mean shackled, obedient and miserable, as opposed to free, strong and loving.

But men refused to understand; it was beneath them. Belief and “local customs” were so interlinked that human dignity, compassion and equality between genders was never allowed to surface. Instead, they chose to understand that it was because of “local customs” that over 80 million women have had their clitorises and labia slashed off and their vulvas sewn shut in order to make them more marriageable and unable to derive pleasure from sex because that is a male right; and thus never be a threat to wander away from their husbands’ cold bed into some more pleasurable environment, and never be a threat to their husbands’ misogynistic societies by having their voices heard.

The same men that chose to understand that it is “local customs” for women to get slapped, punched, raped, abused and generally beaten on a regular basis in case of an affront, and, as it was so proudly said in my country, have spousal abuse be confined to “family matters” and not legal courts because governmental interferences in family matters is ungodly.

Around the World

Did you know that worldwide, 40-70% of all female murder victims are killed by an intimate partner? And that around the world at least one woman in every three has been beaten, coerced into sex, or abused in her lifetime, most often by a member of her own family?

Here are more heartbreaking stats: 107 million females are “missing” from the globe today; every year, at least another two million girls worldwide disappear because of gender discrimination — where men decide that it can be “local customs” that 500,000 girls are routinely kidnapped and trafficked into brothels each year. In some developing nations like Ethiopia, it is “local customs” that families nourish the boys but not the girls because boys need to be strong, while girls, well, don’t. Or how in India, girls from one to five years old are 50% more likely to die than boys the same age, because parents take the boys to the hospital but not the girls. Or how in Afghanistan, a man buys medication for his son but not for his wife because a son is an “indispensable treasure” while a wife is “replaceable.” Or how in China, it is “local customs” for a huge number of sex-selective abortions to be performed to get rid of daughters. Or how in India, bride-burning (punishing a woman for inadequate dowry) takes place approximately once every two hours. Or in Pakistan, in the last nine years, how 5,000 women and girls have been doused in kerosene and set alight by family members or in-laws — or they have been seared in acid which disfigures and blinds them for disobedience. Or how in Lebanon, women can get jailed for 20+ years for "adultery" when framed by the husband while men don’t. But I thought that the Sheikhs said that such issues are “family matters” to be settled at home?

And if she belongs to a society of “higher standing” where laws may be “modern” enough to protect her from abuse, then the man is more civilized, beats her less but still doesn’t think she’s equal. But, in fact, he neglects and demeans her, fills her with insecurities and curtails her ambitions because, God forbid, she may emerge to be stronger or wiser or better than him.

So men choose to understand that it is “local customs” for a woman to have to be less smart than them, but look attractive enough to be desirable to them to want to mate. But not too attractive in order for her not to “lure” sex demands from her moronic boss who works at her firm where she gets paid less than men for the same work, does not rise beyond a certain level, and gets harassed all day long by her oversexed male colleagues.

Probably better to stay home then where nobody will bother her except her ungrateful kids who will grow up to be blasé about her sacrifices, take her for granted, and maybe even hate her because she didn’t let them do coke at 16.

So she tries to be a devoted wife, at least that pays off in integrity, until the day where her sexagenarian husband decides to dump her for someone born in the 90s whose milk glands hadn’t sagged yet. And that is notwithstanding her pap smears, mammograms, hysterectomies, mastectomies, miscarriages, labor pains, childbirth pain, post-partum depressions, episiotomies, stretch marks, body changes, pre-menstrual syndrome, menstruation, menopause, mental hormonal imbalances.

Well what’s not to love. Let’s look at the bright side of things: Thank you for letting us get into the lifeboat first.

I Salute You

In honor of all the women in this world: the sacrificing mothers; the loving sisters; the cherishing daughters; the adoring grandmothers; the beseeching wives; the hopeful single women; the hopeless married women; the beaten females; the cheated women; the cheating women; the jealous girlfriends; the confident and the insecure; the battered and the disfigured; the malnourished and the neglected; the healthy and the admired; the faithful and the unfaithful; the mothers who stay for their kids and the ones who leave without their kids; the rich and the poor matriarchs; the war survivors and the war victims; the abuse survivors and the abuse victims; the female activists; the powerful professionals and the downtrodden prostitutes, I salute you.

In the words of the activist Nicholas Kristof: In the 19th century, the moral challenge was slavery. In the 20th century, it was totalitarianism. In the 21st century, let’s make it gender equality.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Technological innovation and Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) represent a way for developing world nations to foster economic development, improve levels of education and training, as well as address gender issues within society.

Entrepreneurship is crucial for economic development around the world. In countries such as Nigeria, Egypt and Indonesia, micro-entrepreneurs generate 38% of the gross domestic product. Analysis from the World Bank in 2011 indicates that small businesses create a disproportionate share of new jobs. They generate new ideas, new business models, and new ways of selling goods and services.

Wireless technology and ICT infrastructure development is also vital for entrepreneurship and small business development. In many emerging nations, it is a major challenge to gain access to capital and market information. Developing nations specifically do not have functioning infrastructure or much in the way of financial resources.

In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, approximately 29% of roads are paved, barely a quarter of the population has access to electricity, and there are fewer than three landlines available per 100 people. In Indonesia, 75% of the country has household incomes below $2.50 per day. The combination of poor infrastructure and poverty makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to access financial resources and information.

Below is an example of how a basic form of technology – such as a simple mobile phone – has been proved to assist people to communicate with one another, access market information, sell products across geographic areas, reach new consumers, enter mobile payment systems, reduce fraud and crime, and empower women and the disadvantaged.

The Self-Employed Women’s Association (Sewa) in India includes 1.1 million workers who pool their resources to improve their bargaining power. The organisation sends agricultural workers daily SMSs on commodity prices so farmers can determine the best places to sell their products. Those participating say they have been able to market fruits and vegetables over wider areas, and thereby earn higher incomes.

The Ethiopia Commodity Exchange Program (ECEP) has helped entrepreneurs expand their markets. Before 2008, 95% of farmers sold their products in local markets and were not able to access other areas. Transaction costs were high and they had problems getting fair prices due to the lack of market competition. With the advent of the ECEP, agricultural producers gained access to external buyers and were able to negotiate better prices. This boosted their incomes and improved the quality of food products.

The India-based Hand in Hand Partnership (HIHP) enables women to use mobile devices to launch businesses in the technology area. It provides mentorship, training, credit, and technical support.

In Kenya, the Farmers Helpful Network (FHN) gives agricultural producers access to the latest research through their mobile phones. Farmers can ask questions of experts concerning crop rotation, artificial insemination, and crop insurance. This helps them improve their agricultural production and marketing, and increase their overall income.

Access to mobile technology is particularly important for females because there are 300 million fewer women globally than men who own mobile devices. Overall, there is a 21% gender gap in owning a phone worldwide, but this number rises to 23% in Africa, 24% in the Middle East, and 37% in Asia.

Wireless communications also plays an important role in education and training. In Indonesia, the Global Ready eTraining Center program has trained over 1000 students in technology services. Those enrolled get vouchers for a three-month program. More than 95% of the individuals enrolled completed the class, and 75% said the course increased their income as a result of the skills acquired in the program.

A survey undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found that 55% of women around the world earned additional income due to owning a mobile phone, and 41% increased their income and professional opportunities.

Mobile payment systems represent a way to reduce the cost of financial transactions and thereby help entrepreneurs. If people can transfer funds quickly and efficiently, it becomes easier for small and medium-sized businesses to sell their products. This improves the efficiency of the marketplace and removes barriers to growth.

Reducing “friction” is very important in African, Asian, and Latin American financial markets because barriers to financial transactions remain quite high. Only 30% of those who live in developing African nations have bank accounts.

In short, mobile technology offers extensive help on various forms of social and economic development. Wireless communications broaden access to information, improve capital access, overcome geographic limitations, and expand market access.

With mobile phones and tablets proliferating at a significant rate, these communications tools enable women, in this case the disadvantaged, and other individuals to access a broader range of investors, suppliers, and customers. Combined with social media platforms, people can extend their reach through mobile devices and pool resources in meaningful ways.

*[This article was originally published by the blog.]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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