Will Colombia See a #MeToo Revolution?

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The most critical step the government can take during this unstable time is to address inequality in access to the formal economy, education and land ownership that has been the underlying cause of conflict in Colombia for decades.

Most Unequal

While poverty fell from 49.7% in 2002 to 27% in 2018, Colombia remains one of the world’s 15 . Those with fewer economic opportunities, particularly in rural areas, are more likely to enlist in rebel outfits since these armed groups offer clothes, food, money and accommodation. For example, in Colombia make up 10% of rebel fighters despite having no real connection to the conflict. Economic opportunity has shown to be one of the best deterrents of violence: As the economy continues to grow, violence has gone down. In 2018, the number of homicides reported in Colombia was at its since the start of the civil war in 1964.

A lack of opportunities in the formal economy has limited growth while . Only 35% of those employed contribute to the pension system, and only 30% of the population above the age of 15 have a debit card, much lower than the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average of 80%. Because of large regional discrepancies in development, the government should consider differentiating the minimum wage by region and age. This can create more job opportunities depending on the needs of Colombia’s different regions, which are as diverse geographically as they are economically. Reducing non-wage labor costs can stimulate job creation by reducing the economic burden on employers. Simplifying the procedures for registering a business can further help new companies establish themselves and aid job creation.

Addressing educational inequities will also improve formal employment. Some  with postgraduate education are employed formally, where only 9% of those without any education are employed. Colombia spends less than the OECD  per capita on education, and having a more equitable education system is paramount. According to Andrea Arevelo, a biotechnologist in Colombia, “Despite the fact that there is more space in private universities versus public ones, most people can only apply to public schools because they can’t cover the high cost of tuition in private universities.”

Increasing funding for lower-income regions should be a priority to help reduce educational inequality. The government should also add more incentive-based programs like  that provide financial rewards to parents who keep their kids in school.

Closing the Gender Gap

However, overall educational advancements in Colombia have not completely benefited women. While women have higher tertiary educational attainment levels than men, they have lower levels of formal employment participation, higher levels of unemployment, lower wages and less access to quality jobs. Better training for women in the formal economy is a start:  is at 12% compared to 7% for men. Increasing women’s political participation can further close the gender gap in Colombia.

While other South American nations like Brazil and Argentina have recently had female leaders, Colombia has yet to elect a female president. In 2000, the government implemented a law requiring a 30% female quota on electoral lists. However, this has yet to make a significant impact at the highest level, with just two female governors elected in 2019. Improving economic opportunities for women can help level the playing field by bettering access to campaign financing.

Lastly, implementing the land reforms discussed during the  between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerrillas is necessary to reduce inequality. “A lot of the inequality today in Colombia is a result of unequal land ownership. Currently, there is a massive concentration of land, especially in rural areas. That makes it difficult for people to develop their own small business or agricultural business,” says Fabio Acero, a management consultant based in Bogota.

Progress has been made, but as of 2019, only a quarter of the 7 million hectares of land the government planned to formalize in accordance with the peace agreement have been  Unequal land distribution among a small elite was a key driver of the Colombian Civil War in the 1960s and remains a major contributing factor to inequality today.

It is often a misconception that violence is the cause of poverty. It is true violence perpetuates poverty — conflict reduced economic growth in Colombia by a third in 2018. But economic inequality in Colombia, as in many countries, is the cause, not the result, of conflict. For example, the first two chapters of the 2016 peace agreement discussed land redistribution and equal political participation instead of focusing on diplomacy. Social and political reforms are the key to reducing economic inequality and achieving a more peaceful future — a key that the country’s leaders have in their toolbox. 

*[51�Թ� is a  partner of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Inequality Is a Barrier to Peace in Colombia appeared first on 51�Թ�.

What will this look like in practice? One only needs to look as far as one of the United States’ closest allies in the hemisphere, Colombia, for a glimpse of the challenges that await Trump’s successor.

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Colombian politics has its own Trump-like figure. His name is Alvaro Uribe Velez. Elected in 2002, Uribe governed for eight years as a conservative politician. His aggressive military campaigns against the country’s guerilla groups brought long-sought stability and security to much of the country and transformed him into a for many Colombians. But his presidency was also marred by controversy. He has been accused of facilitating widespread human abuses, and drug .

Despite — or perhaps because of — this dual legacy, Uribe has remained a central figure in Colombian politics since leaving the presidential palace. He continues to serve as the leader of the country’s ruling political party, the Democratic Center, and sat as a senator until summer 2020 when he pending the results of a criminal investigation against him.

The influence Uribe continues to wield on the Colombian political scene should serve as a warning to whoever succeeds Trump in the Oval Office. In Colombia, Uribe’s willingness and ability to mobilize broad swaths of the population to support his interests has proved a challenge for governance by opposing politicians.

Former Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos experienced this firsthand in 2016 as he tried to sell the people a to end the country’s 60-year-long civil war with a guerrilla group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). As the most visible and vocal of the deal, Uribe consistently belittled both Santos as a politician and the peace he negotiated with the FARC. “Peace yes, but not like this” became his cry in public speeches, interviews and perhaps his — and Trump’s — favorite platform, . His vitriolic attacks played a part in Colombians’ rejection of the peace deal in a national referendum, a humiliating defeat for Santos.

Trump May Still Influence US Politics

The small margins of this year’s US presidential election suggest that a Democratic successor to Trump will have to confront a former president with a similarly devoted following as the one Uribe has maintained in Colombia. Trump is unlikely to bow graciously out of politics. With a large base that continues to support him, he could still influence politics informally, by calling on his followers to engage in (possibly violent) .

The president’s continued popularity among Republican voters may also force the GOP to maintain its current far-right policy positions to retain voters in future elections. The election of a QAnon conspiracy to the House of Representatives confirms that Trump’s influence reaches beyond the presidency.

Indeed, Democrats are not the only ones who should be worried about Trump’s continued influence after leaving office. Uribe’s handpicked successor in the 2018 presidential election, President Ivan Duque, has struggled to govern under the shadow of the former leader. Like the US, Colombia today is deeply polarized. Though Duque and his allies hold a in the Senate, distrust and frustration with the government sent 200,000 Colombians to the streets of the country’s major cities in protest last year.  

But Duque’s reliance on support from Uribe’s hardline followers has effectively precluded him from building bridges with his opponents, lest he be seen as abandoning Uribe’s legacy. Unable to fully satisfy either camp, Duque’s approval rating has languished far 50% for most of his presidency.

Confronting the Legacy

Republicans will face a similar challenge if they wish to maintain Trump’s base while also trying to repair the deep divisions that he has sown among US society.

It may seem extreme to compare the United States to Colombia, a country that has teetered on the edge of collapse and conflict for over 60 years. But the reality is that the US is also a post-conflict country. Our civil war may have ended in 1865, but events in 2020 — the partisan reactions to the coronavirus pandemic, racial tensions following the extrajudicial killings of black Americans, and a presidential vote that remains too close to call three days after the election — have proved that the legacy of the violence and the polarization it sowed persist today.

Whoever succeeds Donald Trump must confront this legacy head-on. But as Colombia shows, doing so with Trump in the background will be far from easy.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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For starters, it is the first time that a former president has been deprived of personal liberty in Colombia, a country where more than one recent head of state has questionable records, such as . Secondly, since March, Colombia has been in lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which means that individuals are for the most part already confined within their residences. Moreover, as former president and senator, Uribe doesn’t go anywhere in Colombia without a substantial security apparatus.

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Thirdly, the former president is well known both nationally and internationally, which translates to extremely low flight risk and one that could have been addressed by merely confiscating his passport. Adding to the controversy of the supreme court’s order is the fact that, as recently as last year, individuals who pose actual security and flight risks, such as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) leaders Ivan Marquez and Jesus Santrich, were not preemptively detained despite probable cause and ended up fleeing Colombia to set up a .

Lastly, Uribe should be presumed innocent until proven guilty, like any other citizen, as in Article 29 of Colombia’s Constitution. However, it seems that given his high profile and political history, the supreme court is treating the former president differently. This is problematic for the rule of law in Colombia.

Irregularities in the Process

Under Uribe’s presidency, Colombia’s security was largely restored, narco-terrorism was fought head-on by the national government, numerous FARC leaders were , over a thousand drug traffickers were extradited to the United States, and large paramilitary groups demobilized under the auspices of the . Uribe’s work and legacy, much of which was implemented in close coordination with the United States at the time, is also recognized internationally. One of the global voices against Colombia’s former president’s house arrest is US Vice President Mike Pence, who, on August 14, , asking that Uribe be allowed to “defend himself as a free man.”

Given his former status as senator, Uribe’s case, which happens to be against , had Colombia’s supreme court as its original jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 235 of the constitution. Specifically, this case began in 2012 when Uribe filed a legal complaint against Cepeda accusing him of paying bribes to imprisoned criminals in exchange for testimony that would incriminate the former president and his brother for paramilitary activities during Uribe’s time as mayor of Medellin and governor of Antioquia. In 2018, an election year in Colombia, the supreme court flipped the accusation and with allegedly paying witnesses to testify in his favor and against Cepeda.

Since its inception, the process against Uribe has been overly politicized and marred by irregularities, including the admission of illegally obtained wiretap recordings as evidence in the case. Over 20,000 were made to Uribe’s cellphone, under a judicial order that was supposed to tap Congressmember Nilton Cordoba, not the former president. Making matters worse, as soon as the analyst from Colombia’s attorney general’s office in charge of the wiretap realized that the cellphone belonged to Uribe and not Cordoba, he notified his superiors. However, the illegal interceptions for nearly a month and were eventually submitted to the supreme court as evidence.

There is a history of animosity between the former president and members of Colombia’s supreme court of justice due to alleged of the court’s premises as well as judges’ phones by the security services during Uribe’s presidency. Compounded by the evident lack of procedural guarantees for a fair trial, shortly after he was placed under house arrest and triggered a jurisdictional change. His case has now been on to Colombia’s attorney general and a lower court, in which Uribe expects a less politicized and more fair trial.

The Need for Judicial Reform

Although Uribe’s house arrest remains in force until a new judge takes over the case and decides whether to revoke or maintain the preliminary detention, public outcry has been heard throughout the country. The most salient example of an institutional double standard is the recent case of FARC commanders like who were never placed under house arrest pending trial as part of the 2016 peace process and then escaped to . Observing this precedent, the judicial measure against Uribe is disproportionate, particularly since the former president has attended all of his court hearings as scheduled and been responsive to judicial inquiries.

Finally, the controversy around the judiciary’s handling of Uribe’s case has rekindled the calls for in Colombia. Reforming the country’s complex judicial branch seems for many to be the only way to rescue the institutional mechanisms, which are currently failing within the Colombian justice system. In this time of uncertainty, the alternative of carrying out judicial reform would give a new direction to the presidency of Ivan Duque and would provide a unique opportunity for Colombia to emerge institutionally strengthened.

One of the main issues with Colombia’s judicial system is that the country has not one but three top courts: the supreme court of justice, the council of state and the constitutional court. Another problem lies with the fact that the members of both the supreme court and the council of state select their membership themselves, without much executive or legislative oversight, albeit in with Article 231 of the constitution. Having such a closed and endogamous nature has led to judicial malpractice and corruption in Colombia’s judiciary, such as the infamous “” scandal that saw supreme court judges abuse their independence to derail cases and stifle investigations by the attorney general in exchange for hefty bribes.

While Alvaro Uribe’s case is likely to drag on for months, there is a higher likelihood that the process will have a lower profile and a more balanced outcome now that it has left the supreme court’s docket. Nevertheless, the judicial branch will now be increasingly seen as a politicized institution, and there are important voices in the country calling for both a consolidated supreme judiciary and a more transparent selection process for its members. Already in a bind due to the pandemic and its socioeconomic fallout, Colombia’s government must now address growing calls for constitutional reform in an increasingly polarized political climate.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Can Colombia’s Former President Get a Fair Trial? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Several reasons are behind the president’s low popularity, including the perception among his supporters that Duque is not governing with enough assertiveness; an outsized focus on foreign policy and a series of faux pas in that realm; unpopular economic measures and macroeconomic indicators; and a growing support for the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which Duque’s party fiercely opposes.

In recent months, President Duque has faced a string of widespread protests airing diverse grievances across major cities — from calls to protect sharks along Colombia’s coastlines to those demanding the elimination of ESMAD, a riot-police squad responsible for the death of 18-year-old during the protests. Although Duque’s administration has begrudgingly engaged in dialogue with some of the protest leaders after days of public pressure, his government is standing by most of its agenda and moving forward with policy decisions.

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However, and openness to dialogue with the opposition have let down many of his supporters, both in politics and among civil society. The fact that Duque didn’t simply stick to his guns and dismiss the protests as a Maduro-orchestrated plot frustrated some of the more heavy-handed members of his own party.

The same happened when he removed his former minister of defense after it was made public that new cases of “” — the so-called “false positives,” referring to the killing of civilians by Colombia’s military to inflate the numbers in the war against the guerillas — have allegedly occurred and that the Colombian army had in a bombing campaign against FARC dissidents.

Foreign Policy, Economics and Peace

Another driver behind President Duque’s low approval rating is the fact that he has spent a good amount of time engaged in overseas diplomacy, both on the economic and political fronts. During the early months of 2019, Duque spent a significant amount of time and resources focused on the political situation in Venezuela, which might have been better spent dealing with the situation of Venezuelans in Colombia, whose numbers are estimated to have surpassed .

During the height of Juan Guaido’s momentum to gain power in Venezuela in 2019, Duque hosted Guaidó and their Chilean and Paraguayan counterparts at the iconic border city of Cucuta for a communications operation featuring mountains of much-needed aid for Venezuela and a concert. In the frenzy of it all, Duque talked about the imminent . A year later, said transition has yet to happen.

During his year in office, President Duque has made and spearheaded regional efforts — time that might have been better spent focussing on domestic issues.

The national economy has been another controversial front for the president. According to the latest numbers from Colombia’s National Statistics Bureau and despite studies that suggest that the national GDP will keep growing, the has risen to approximately 10%. Additionally, despite for average citizens, in December he passed a , known as the Law of Economic Growth, that lowers the income threshold for tax payers while decreasing duties and royalties for enterprises.

Lastly, there is the peace process. It is no secret that President Duque has overlooked and sought to alter some, if not all, of the commitments underwritten by the Colombian state during the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos. According to , 57% of the laws related to the peace accords are yet to pass congress, and Duque’s vocal attacks against the Special Peace Jurisdiction system are accompanied by his inability to address the security concerns of ex-FARC members. The last on Colombia’s peace process presented to the UN Security Council concluded that 2019 has been the deadliest year for demobilized guerilla members.

This development (or lack thereof) is worrisome for the more than 6 million Colombians who voted to ratify the final agreement in the 2016 referendum and for those who support it nowadays. A notes that, even though 67% of Colombians still believe in dialogue with armed groups, almost the same percentage feels that the implementation is going astray. Trust in both the government and the guerrillas is very low.

In the Shadows

His first year in office has not been kind to President Duque. Beyond the many individual themes that he has addressed, there is both national and international consensus that Duque’s government lacks a unique, defined flavor. While President Santos focused his policies and his personal image around the peace process, as Alvaro Uribe had done with his seguridad democrática, Duque has not yet adopted a banner for himself. His policies lack a defined direction.

This identity vacuum is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, his detractors find it impossible to differentiate him from Uribe and his party, an association that won Duque the presidency in the first place. However, now that , the strong association might represent a liability for Duque. “The young leader needs to emerge from his sponsor’ shadow,” wrote .

President Duque’s lukewarm policies have also , which has complained of his lack of a follow-through on bold campaign promises and of his . Amidst the November 2019 protests that paralyzed Colombia, Fernando Londono, a senior figure belonging to the most radical wing of the Democratic Center party, went as far as to suggest openly that Duque : “Someone has to govern, and if President Duque does not want to, if he is busy in the many conversations he has, someone has to be in charge.”

In short, Ivan Duque’s historically low popularity accounts for his inability to convince both his voters and his opponents of his agenda. Until he is able to set his priorities and give his presidency a distinctive character, the prospect of President Duque escaping the shadow of his predecessors will elude him.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Their presence was fierce and determined, yet modest — protesters focused on the women’s cause were only a small part of the thousands of citizens, women and men, that have paralyzed the main urban centers of the country since the protests erupted on November 21, defending, among other causes, the peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

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While a historic step was recently made with the election of the first female mayor of Bogota, , who also happens to be a lesbian, there is still a long way to go. In today’s Colombia, the growing movement for the protection of women’s rights lacks force and is still overshadowed by other more prominent but equally important social issues. Nevertheless, the question remains: Will Colombia ever experience a #MeToo revolution?

An Ongoing Tragedy

Data show that the cause of women is a critical issue in Colombia. According to the , 33% of Colombian women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced physical and/or sexual violence from an intimate partner at least once in their lifetime. In the latest , which measures inequality in reproductive health, empowerment and the labor market, Colombia is ranked 98 out of 187. Despite recent efforts by government agencies, such as by the Medicina Legal, 90% of the nearly 34,600 cases that it considers as femicide have .

There is a human face and a family story behind each case. Every month, a casual reader of Colombia’s press encounters several cases of gender violence, often involving minors. The cases of Yuliana Samboni, Natalia Ponce and Rosa Elvira Cely are some of the most infamous in recent years and have become national symbols of the fight for women’s rights. Yuliana, a 7-year-old girl from one of Bogota’s marginal neighborhoods, was kidnapped and killed by Rafael Uribe Noguera, a wealthy and accomplished architect, now serving a 51-year sentence. In Natalia’s case, she was attacked by a stalker, who on her face, causing a tragic disfiguration.

Rosa was 35 years old back in 2012 when she was found raped, stabbed and impaled in Bogota’s national park. After her death, some called for the death penalty for her killer, Javier Velasco, who was later sentenced to 48 years in prison. But some, including Bogota’s secretary of government, blamed the victim. In a that has since been retracted, the secretary suggested that it was Rosa’s decision to go out with Velasco for drinks. Victim-blaming is not uncommon in Colombian society, but the fact that a government official was openly taking part in it caused outrage.

All of the crimes inflicted on these women sparked national debates and had repercussions in Colombia’s legislation. Yuliana’s smiling face is a recurrent sight at every protest, including the recent ones. The 2016 is named after Natalia Ponce and has made acid attacks a special type of crime carrying a harsher penalty. And, in Rosa’s name, in 2015 congress passed a historic but controversial , by which the criminal charge for femicide was created. For the first time in Colombia’s history, femicides are measured and made visible.

Despite these advances, it is still difficult to speak of a Colombian #MeToo movement. Female-oriented activism is still a minority voice among the demonstrators, even if in the last few weeks more and more Colombians from all political fronts and causes have been . No concrete demands were made of President Iván Duque regarding women’s rights, maybe also because feminism is a controversial topic in a country that has profound Catholic roots, remnants of machismo and few women in the political and cultural sphere. For instance, there are only 56 (22%) in the 258-strong body.

Social Change and Accountability

Unfortunately, in Colombia, the defense of women’s rights among the general public is often limited to cyberspace. Hashtags like #YoTambién (“MeToo”), #LibresDeViolencias (“FreeFromViolence”) and #NiUnaMenos (“NotOneLess”) have been in the spotlight of social media channels like Twitter in recent years, with dozens of women telling their stories. Likewise, the “El violador eres tú” (“You are the rapist”) has become widely popular.

The increasing number of women engaged in the trend is encouraging, but by itself insufficient. Unlike the cases of Harvey Weinstein, Kevin Spacey and others, Colombia has not yet seen major consequences for allegations made against high-profile men. For instance, in 2018, journalist Claudia Morales claimed that she was once sexually abused by a boss whose name she for fear of retaliation, although it is strongly suspected that she meant ex-President Álvaro Uribe. Most people questioned the timing, not the nature of the announcement. In the end, nothing happened.

Likewise, the sexual harassment charges made when he was running for mayor of Bogota had little to no impact in his campaign, despite his stand as a leftist, progressive candidate.

All in all, the fight for women’s rights has become increasingly prevalent in today’s Colombia, as demonstrated by advances in matters such as legislation. Nevertheless, it is also an ongoing battle with plenty of unresolved social and political issues that need a grassroots shake-up. A widespread, powerful Colombian #MeToo movement — which seems to be slowly underway — will require a deep questioning of what it means to be a woman in a traditional South American society.

It will also need to involve more citizens, both men and women, in ways that transcend the web and have a transformative societal impact. Only then, when reading about Yuliana, Natalia and Rosa, will Colombians not have to say, #MeToo.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Will Colombia See a #MeToo Revolution? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In the final years of the peace talks that took place in Havana, Cuba, between 2012 and 2016, and especially during the preparation for the FARC’s transition from insurgency to a political party and its reincorporation to civilian life, within the armed group. One was led by Rodrigo ���DzԻ��ñ��, known as Timochenko, with a clear will to move into the political arena. The other was the militarist wing led by Luciano Marín, aka Iván Márquez, which viewed the peace agreement with the Colombian government with mistrust and contemplated a return to armed struggle.

These differences became more evident as the implementation of the peace accord advanced, with several difficulties and delays on the government’s side, especially after the arrival to power of the current president, Ivan Duque, in 2018. The non-fulfillment of several agreements on the governments side —��according to the , after two and a half years, 31% of the agreements have not yet been actioned — and the pressure to secure justice for war crimes committed by the armed group in the course of the decades-long conflict fostered mistrust among military commanders.

A Fracture

Márquez and his right hand in the Caribbean Block of the FARC, Jesús Santrich, are currently subjects of an investigation��for alleged involvement in ��conducted after the signing of the accord, meaning a violation the non-repetition of criminal acts — a key element of the agreement. Currently, FARC combatants are not prosecuted by the ordinary justice system, and the (JEP) was created for the investigation of war crimes and other atrocities committed during the armed conflict. This means that many of them would either not go to jail at all or serve a maximum of five to eight years. However, in case of recidivism or failing to attend the JEP hearings, former combatants lose all their benefits and can face sentences of up to 60 years.

Although neither of the two men has been prosecuted at the time of the announcement, they had already missed their citations by JEP, widening the divide with Timochenko. After the video was released, the JEP authorized the attorney general to process the rebels through the regular courts and not the transitional justice system as was agreed in Havana.

Smaller dissident rogue groups were being formed by lower ranking leaders such as Gentil Duarte in various regions of the country, but no top member of the (its highest command structure) has openly deflected the peace process. Márquez will now have to convince leaders like Duarte to join him. What will he offer? The end goal of such an alliance is not clear, as these groups already have weapons, territorial control and established drug routes. What will they do now that they aren’t already doing? Gaining a political halo could be the only clear gain for these rogue criminal groups.

On the other hand, now comes the struggle between the leaders of the political wing who remained within the transition process and the new dissidents. Both sides are pressuring former combatants to join their respective sides, and many are deciding between the path of legality —��despite the non-fulfillments and delays of several parts of the agreement —�� or whether they return to armed struggle.��Currently, who laid down their weapons are still in the reincorporation process under the leadership of Timochenko. The official data of Colombia’s Reincorporation Agency puts the number .

A New Type of Warfare?

At the same time, according to several sources (including military intelligence), the , and some analysts suggest that the that kept up the drug trafficking were coordinated with individual FARC commanders. While there is no proof of this beyond the cases of Márquez and Santrich, there are nearly who have rearmed in smaller rogue groups, including the faction led by Márquez.

However, Márquez’s announcement contains a clear of an alliance with the other main guerrilla group still active in Colombia, the National Liberation Army (ELN). This could mean a bigger threat, as an alliance between the dissident wing of the FARC and the ELN can change the current status quo of armed actors in several regions of the country where there is still a current readjustment of structures after the peace accord.��For the last two years, guerrillas and organized crime groups such as the — the biggest organized crime structure in the country also known as the��Gulf Clan — have been dividing their areas of influence and occupying previous FARC zones around the country.

Márquez announced that the faction will change its methods and stop targeting the local population or even soldiers, who, like the guerrillas, come mostly from peasant and lower-class families. The FARC stated that it will target the political, economic and military elites of the country.

For some, this could be a return to the idealistic guerrilla warfare of the 1960s Cold War era, but those who know Márquez better can expect something more than just emulating the glory of old times and the romanticism of the struggle. In the 21^st��century, with access to advanced weaponry, even a small armed faction can become a serious concern for the country. It could also mean a new time of tension in the cities, instead of open confrontation in the field, reviving the seen in Colombia in the 1990s and the first years of the 21^st century. Many are expecting a new era of asymmetrical confrontation.

An Element of Tension

The alliance with the ELN carries not only a national impact, but has also created tensions with the government of President Nicolás Maduro in neighboring Venezuela. As has been stated by several sources within both the media and the Colombian government, the . Its commander, Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, aka Gabino, and members of the ELN’s central command like the former negotiator Antonio García and Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo, aka Pablito, who lead the strongest structure of the ELN, operate across the border between Colombia and Venezuela.

Colombian intelligence reports estimate nearly 1,000 ELN men and nearly 600 FARC dissident combatants . There are no clear statistics, however, and reports suggest the numbers could be even higher. Not all fighters are Colombian, as Venezuelans are also being recruited.

Venezuela’s position regarding the FARC has been ambiguous, especially during the tenures of Álvaro Uribe and Hugo Chávez. Venezuela’s ties with the Colombian guerillas are undeniable, yet in these times of the war against terror, Caracas doesn’t openly admit that it supported the armed group. On the other side, in moments of crisis, Venezuela’s intervention has been useful for dialogue between the Colombian government and the guerrillas. In order words, the neighboring countries are not fully enemies despite the tensions, nor are they allies despite their contributions to the peace process.

Currently, the current administrations both in Caracas and Bogotá are close to their predecessors’ ideologies and, consequently, hostile to their respective neighbors. Maduro’s position is crucial in order not to create more tension in the bilateral relations or increase concerns for the Colombian government regarding what happens in Venezuela. The refugee crisis is escalating in the region, giving Colombia a leading role against Maduro’s embattled regime. While many dismiss a possible clash among the two countries, numerous ongoing crises and provocations could escalate to a breaking point.

President Duque scaled the situation by contacting Venezuela’s interim president, Juan Guaidó, who is currently defying Maduro’s regime, and asked for his support in controlling Colombian guerrillas on Venezuelan territory. To make matters worse, several Colombian high-ranking officials and members of the cabinet have accused the Maduro regime of backing the new armed groups and the ELN guerrillas as a way to destabilize Colombia. Maduro has reacted by ordering military drills along the border.

On September 8, SEMANA magazine published an��article��that revealed Bolivarian National Intelligence Service documents dated August 9, with evidence of internal orders to provide logistical support and training to “red groups.” According to SEMANA, these alleged “red groups” are in fact Colombian guerrillas. It is important to recall that the date on the documents is two weeks before Márquez’s announcement of the new rebellion. Did the Venezuelan intelligence have privileged information?

 Fragile Implementation

Where does this leave the embattled peace process? Not everything should be viewed from an apocalyptic perspective. As already mentioned, the vast majority of the ex-combatants are still active in the reincorporation process, and there is a chance for the Colombian government to send a powerful message by strengthening the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization as well as other entities in charge of implementation. This might complement the pressure of the expected military response to this not-so-new and expected threat.

Whether these new developments will derail the peace process and complicate regional politics will largely depend on the Colombian government’s response. The situation is escalating: Local elections are coming up in October, and two candidates from different political parties have already been killed. Political participation is one of the keys of the Havana agreement and will become a test for President Duque as well as for the FARC’s political aspirations to win seats across the country; while its chances are not very high, several alliances could make it possible in some areas. Duque will have to protect the voters and candidates as well as prevent any intrusion or indirect interventions of armed actors or neighboring countries.

Last year, the presidential election was the most peaceful in the country’s recent history. It would be catastrophic to face a violent voting season just a year later. Can these new dissidents, plus the border crisis and the remaining armed actors, sabotage what was gained in the peace agreement?

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Colombians are just beginning to recover after a , planted by the country’s last remaining guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), detonated in the capital city of Bogotá on January 17. The blast, which killed 21 people and injured dozens during a promotion ceremony at the General Santander police academy, evoked for many the fear of the “”��of the 1990s, when bombs indiscriminately planted by guerrillas and drug traffickers wreaked havoc on the Andean nation. Amidst renewed fear and the desperate search for what motivated the bombing, Colombians may be forgiven if they missed the news of another car bomb that weekend, an ocean away in Northern Ireland.

While Colombian authorities were busy picking shrapnel from their streets, Northern Ireland faced a horror of its own when a car bomb planted by Irish Republican Army (IRA) outside a courthouse in Derry (also known as Londonderry) on January 19. While no one was killed in the blast, the parallels between the bombings occurring in the same weekend — both carried out by members of organized rebel groups, both in countries trying to recover from decades of conflict — are striking. So as the Colombian government coordinates its response to the Bogotá bombing, it should look to Derry as a warning: Peace, even after 20 years, is not guaranteed.

It would not be the first time Colombia looked to the Irish for cues. The Good Friday Agreement, which ended decades of Northern Ireland’s Troubles in 1998, served as a model for Colombia’s most recent peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country’s oldest and largest guerrilla group until its demobilization in 2016. Former Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos has about��how the improbable peace between the British and the IRA inspired his own quixotic peace negotiations. “I was in Belfast seeing how people are still trying to reconcile and it has been a great inspiration for me and for the peace process in Colombia,” he said in November 2016.

Irish politicians, trade unionists and human rights activists also played a more in the peace process with the FARC, traveling between Belfast, Bogotá and Havana, where the negotiations were held, to share best practices and lessons learned from the Northern Irish process.

While Northern Ireland’s peace agreement may have served as a model for Santos, what happened after its ratification should instill trepidation among Colombians. Violence did not end as the agreement went into effect, as IRA dissidents refused to accept the compromises made by their party leaders at the negotiating table. This violence helped foment political polarization, and anti-agreement politicians have tried repeatedly to various aspects��of the deal. This situation should sound familiar to those in Colombia, where ��continue to rule parts of the countryside, and where voters rejected an initial peace deal by less than one percentage point.

Today, the sectarianism that drove the Irish conflict continues to flourish. There are ��segregating communities in cities like Belfast than when the Good Friday Agreement was signed. The power-sharing agreement between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the (Republican) Sinn Féin in the Northern Irish Assembly that served as the cornerstone of the 1998 peace deal . Disagreements over legislation forced the government into gridlock in January 2017, and the continuing impasse has left Northern Ireland without a functioning parliament for over two years.

Finally, Britain’s impending exit from the European Union threatens to the Good Friday Agreement by reestablishing a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which is part of the EU. This year’s car bomb in Derry is only the most apparent example of how fragile Northern Ireland’s peace remains, over 20 years after the conflict officially ended.

Of course, many Colombians don’t need to look across the Atlantic to know that peace is not guaranteed. Killings are in many areas of the country, where community leaders and activists are assassinated for supporting implementation of the Havana peace accords. But for others, the bombing in Bogotá may have been a wake-up call. The country’s leaders must think carefully about how to respond to the ELN’s attack. The Colombian government has already ��with the rebel group, but it cannot lose sight of its commitments to peace with the FARC.

As the Derry bombing illustrates, halting implementation of the peace accord today would set Colombia up for continued violence decades from now. The Colombian government must never stop working to maintain and build peace. Colombia — and Ireland — already have too many victims.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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During the months of August through October of last year, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas transformed into a law-abiding political party. Giving up their weaponry and triggering the demobilization of combatants as agreed upon in the Havana peace accords, Latin America’s longest-active rebel group entered Colombia’s democratic scene as a refashioned political force. But the transformation wasn’t wholehearted. At the FARC’s first congress as a political party in September 2017, the majority of militants, led by key members of the governing body, voted in favor of maintaining the group’s acronym under a new name — the .

Two years after the decisive peace accords were signed in Bogotá, FARC party cadres occupy eight seats in the Colombian congress, out of the 10 that were agreed upon in the Havana peace deal. Meanwhile, the majority of foot soldiers are being reintegrated into civilian life through spread throughout the countryside. However, ideological divides within the guerilla group continue to exist within the political party and now threaten the future of the FARC. When it comes to the implementation of the peace deal, the now-political cadre of the FARC can be broadly divided into two groups, the skeptics and the optimists.

The skeptics, like , , and Hernán Darío Velásquez (known as “El Paisa”) believe that the Colombian government will not uphold the of the Havana peace deal. Therefore, this group of former combatants, who belong to the more militant sectors of the FARC political party, is hedging its bets by maintaining readiness to go back into clandestine economic activities and guerilla warfare at any time.

On the other hand, the optimists, including the Rodrigo ���DzԻ��ñ�� (known as Timochenko), and , are much more committed to the success of the Havana process and to a full transition into political life. Likewise, the former combatants are far less willing to go back to the guerilla camps in the jungle. Thus far, this sector of the FARC has complied with the law and kept up its end of the peace agreement through regular appearances before courts and commissions.

During the political party’s foundational conference, when the group’s cadre and members were choosing a new name for their political movement, the skeptics prevailed over the optimists in their effort to maintain the instead of choosing a brand new party name. Ivan Marquez and other leading skeptics opposed the name New Colombia, championed by the optimists, because they argued that maintaining the name FARC would make it easier to transition back into a guerrilla formation if ultimately necessary.

Schism

The schism within the FARC, which is palpable today, has been in place since the passing of former commander-in-chief, , in 2011 during a military offensive in the early years of Juan Manuel Santos’ presidency. The election for Cano’s successor led to a clash between FARC leaders Ivan Marquez and Rodrigo ���DzԻ��ñ��, a rivalry that was still evident when the FARC leadership was discussing what former combatants would do following the demobilization. Even though would ultimately become FARC’s commander, Marquez remained a hardline member of the FARC’s secretariat and would gain important allies within the guerilla’s cadre. Eventually, Marquez became the FARC’s second-in-command and would lead the guerilla delegation during the years-long Havana negotiations.

Over this summer, a handful of left-wing leaders throughout Colombia — including the presidential runner-up Gustavo Petro, as well as Senators Ivan Cepeda and Aida Avella — strongly urged Ivan Marquez to take up his seat as senator at the swearing-in ceremony on July 20. However, Marquez to become the FARC’s political leader in congress. A few weeks before the ceremony, Marquez left Bogotá and joined former FARC combatants in southern Colombia, citing the fear of prosecution after the arrest and extradition process advanced against his close ally Jesus Santrich on , which happened to be one of the guerrillas’ preferred financing methods.

Even though Marquez led the��, he is a vocal critic of the ongoing implementation of the peace deal. Marquez argues that the government is not holding up its end of the bargain, which is why he moved to the southern Caquetá department in the Amazon region to join with other FARC leaders. Moreover, throughout Colombia’s southern departments, such as Caquetá, Putumayo and Nariño, there are several camps for combatants demobilized as part of the peace process amongst whom Marquez feels at home, as well as that never demobilized and are still militarily active.

While some claim that Marquez hides for personal safety, and others argue that he should be arrested, on September 22, Marquez and “El Paisa” sent a letter to the Colombian senate. In it, the discontented FARC leaders outlined the reasons for their hiding, voicing their mistrust of the current administration, claiming that the government is not meeting its financial obligations toward demobilized guerillas, and explaining what they call the “betrayal” of the Havana process.

What’s Next?

Naturally, have become a subject of discussion in Colombia’s political circles. This issue is particularly contentious given that FARC cadres have to respond to the country’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), an ad hoc court that was created as part of the Havana peace accords. Even though Marquez has regularly sent written statements to the court via his lawyers, he has not appeared before it himself. However, the same cannot be said of Marquez’s close associate “El Paisa,” who has refused to appear before the JEP court system.

It is no secret that Ivan Marquez maintains communications with dissident guerrilla groups that have refused to participate in the peace process from the outset. Moreover, it is possible that he might be aiding in the structuring of new guerrilla fronts along Colombia’s Caribbean coastline, along the Magdalena River valley or along the southern . Given that Marquez was the commander of the FARC’s Caribbean block for several years, and that he has powerful allies in neighboring Venezuela, there is widespread speculation surrounding his activities, whereabouts and future plans. At this point, Ivan Marquez is the most prominent FARC leader operating along the margins of the Havana framework. Thus, all former combatants and dissidents who are unhappy with the implementation of the Havana agreement see in Marquez a willing fighter who prefers the guerilla camps to the halls of congress.

Thus far, FARC politicians in congress are keeping up their end of the Havana accords and actively participating in Colombia’s democratic process, in spite of the fact that President Ivan Duque’s party has been very hostile to the implementation of parts of the peace process. On the other hand, while figures like Ivan Marquez, and “El Paisa” have stated their intentions of complying with the accords, their actions suggest otherwise.

President Duque, who prides himself in being a law-and-order leader, is no fan of the Havana deal. Yet Duque is well aware of how delicate the unfolding situation is and has stated that he is considering the issue of an arrest warrant against Marquez if the FARC leader does not comply fully with the terms of the peace deal. Nevertheless, as long as Marquez remains in hiding, issuing an arrest warrant would guarantee that the FARC leader goes back in clandestine activity, further emboldening the skepticism of dissident guerrillas throughout Colombia and creating more uncertainty around the country’s unstable peace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Numerous countries and regions across the globe are experiencing the consequences of mass migration waves due to violent conflicts, food insecurity, climate change and economic crisis. More specifically, countries like Syria and Venezuela are remarkable examples of migratory crises currently unfolding on both sides of the Atlantic. Just as remarkable, however, has been the struggle faced by neighboring governments in dealing with the effects that the refugee influx has had on the domestic political landscape of the destination countries.

Over the last five years, an estimated have fled their country in what has now become South America’s largest migratory crisis in the modern era. Domestically, Venezuela is suffering from a between August 2017 and August 2018, rendering the local currency, the bolivar, effectively worthless. Additionally, massive food shortages due to issues with the commercial supply chain and foreign exchange have led to what is referred to as the “,” by which the average person living in Venezuela has lost approximately 20 pounds in weight over the last few years. Therefore, scores of desperate Venezuelans decide to undertake a days-long journey, in many cases by foot, leaving behind their country in search of the most basic necessities like food and medicine.

Venezuelans have been departing their country for almost two decades now. The first wave of emigration consisted of the country’s elite, who started leaving Venezuela when the leftist President Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999 and changed the constitution. The second wave, which expanded to include larger sectors of the country’s middle class and cultural sector, came in 2006, when Chavez was re-elected for a third term. Then, the migratory wave of recent years was set off after the passing of Chavez in 2013, the following ascension of Nicolás Maduro to the country’s presidency and the dramatic decrease in international oil prices — oil being the backbone of Venezuela’s economy.

While those who left because of Chavez were mostly members of the country’s aristocracy and business elite, the resounding failure of the so-called under the leadership of President Maduro has forced working-class Venezuelans to flee in the most dramatic of circumstances. The fact that working and middle-class families are walking from all corners of Venezuela toward the Colombian and Brazilian borders, mainly to the international bridges that connect with the city of Cúcuta, is particularly important because these social groups previously formed the bedrock of the Chavista movement.

Tragically, the government that they once supported turns its back on them today, and it is up to international institutions — such as the International Organization for Migration, the Organization of American States, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Refugee Agency — to record their stories and provide them with assistance. No official aid or information has been given by the Venezuelan government despite thousands of frontier crossings being reported every day.

Good Neighbors

Over the last several years, the brunt of the Venezuelan crisis has fallen on the shoulders of neighboring Colombia. Nevertheless, this issue affects most countries throughout the Western Hemisphere, including Brazil, Ecuador, Chile and Peru.

Colombia — the frontline of the Venezuelan migrant crisis given the 2,341 kilometers of shared border between the two countries — has welcomed approximately from its struggling neighbor in recent years. However, Colombia’s open arms policy, which has included the issuing of special humanitarian visas and work permits, has substantially transformed the social landscape of major cities such as Cúcuta, Bucaramanga, Cali, Medellín and the capital Bogotá. The sudden introduction of a million economic migrants into Colombia has led to a spike in informal work, has depressed wages in major cities, stressed the country’s health-care system and has unfortunately led to an increase in criminal activities such as petty theft, human trafficking, smuggling and underage prostitution.

Certainly, many Venezuelan migrants choose to stay in Colombia, because they have family in these countries. They expect that they will be able to return home soon and often don’t have the resources to go any further, finding comfort in the cultural similarities shared by all four countries. For instance, Peru is currently estimated to be hosting , while Ecuador has taken in amongst its population of just 15 million.

Nevertheless, many refugees seek to continue on to other destinations, such as Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Panama, the United States or even Europe. Responding to this reality, many of the affected countries have restricted the entry of Venezuelans into their territory. Brazil’s government, for instance, has reinforced its border controls and frontier security. Panama, Peru and Ecuador have also tightened their border security and have that enter the country illegally. Meanwhile, important public figures in the region and the world, such as Pope Francis, have exhorted churches, civil society and charitable organizations to aid migrants and refugees, particularly those suffering from severe malnutrition and chronic illnesses.

In recent weeks, with the accession of Ivan Duque to Colombia’s presidency, the rhetoric against Caracas has become increasingly assertive. Political leaders throughout the region, from Argentina’s President Macri to Ecuador’s President Moreno, have intensified the international campaign to relocate the region’s refugees according to the capacities of each country and condemn the systematic violation of human rights in Venezuela. Simultaneously, in a burden-sharing effort, most of the countries have agreed to grant special visas and work permits to those Venezuelans who have legally settled within their territory.

Sharing the Burden

The economic and social stress that has been set off by the amount of Venezuelan migrants currently working below the minimum wage throughout Colombia’s and Peru’s labor market is unsustainable. Therefore, working groups have been organized through multilateral institutions, such as the Andean Community and the OAS, specifically to discuss burden sharing when it comes to aiding Venezuelan refugees and migrants. Thus far, the has made some progress on this issue as countries negotiate quotas of how many of the millions Venezuelan migrants they are willing to welcome into their country. If the exodus continues, the staggering amount of Venezuelan refugees spread throughout the Western Hemisphere could the total of 6 million that have fled from war in Syria.

Unfortunately, the magnitude of the Venezuelan migrant wave has even led to small outbreaks of xenophobia in some parts of Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. However, leading figures in the region do not hesitate to remind Colombians, Peruvians and Ecuadorians that not too long ago, it was them who fled to oil-rich Venezuela in search of better opportunities. At this moment, the future of Venezuela remains uncertain and, at least for now, countries throughout the region have maintained an open doors policy toward migrants. Nevertheless, at the current pace of migration, the impatience of politicians in the region might lead some of them to close borders.

Meanwhile, in Venezuela, the Maduro regime is in denial and looks the other way as the amount of abandoned houses and apartments throughout major cities has skyrocketed due to migration and hyperinflation. The administration has also denied the veracity of the dramatic footage recorded by journalists of thousands of migrants crossing the frontier. President Maduro is so tone-deaf to this reality and defiant of international pressure that he was recently shown cooked by a celebrity chef during a stop-over in Turkey, the video unleashing immediate condemnation across the world.

Yet in spite of his incompetent and authoritative leadership, Maduro has proven to be extremely resilient. He has managed to co-opt the national military through a web of corruption and drug trafficking, has played on the weaknesses of a divided political opposition, and has maintained political ties with countries like China, Russia and Turkey. Outside of Venezuela, the exiled opposition struggles to present a unified front, with negotiations breaking down on several occasions. And no one seems to truly want a foreign military intervention — at least for the time being.

*[Updated: October 16, 2018, at 22:00 GMT.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The inauguration of Ivan Duque as Colombia’s new president took place on August 7, on what was an extremely windy afternoon in the capital city of Bogotá. The inclement weather seemed fitting given the current political climate. Duque’s swearing in ceremony marks the rise to power of the Democratic Center —��until now a major opposition party. During the ceremony, the head of Colombia’s senate and one of the most radical members of the Democratic Center, Ernesto Macias, delivered a fiery speech that lauded the party’s founder, former President Alvaro Uribe, and accused the outgoing president, Juan Manuel Santos, of leaving behind a country overrun by criminal groups.

This polarizing episode, which featured chants of “Uribe, Uribe!” and a standing ovation to the former president, comes on the heels of a quickly unraveling political saga. On Friday, July 20, new members of congress took their seats, including, for the first time in the country’s history, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the form of five senators and five representatives under the newly created (also FARC).

However, the new president’s troubles do not stem from his political archenemies. Rather, pressure comes from within his own party ranks, whose members are openly attacking the independence and legitimacy of the country’s judicial branch.

Bombshell Accusations

On July 24, Colombia’s political scene was shaken by the announcement that former president and current senator, Alvaro Uribe, was being summoned by the country’s supreme court to answer questions on witness tampering and bribery charges. Specifically, Uribe and fellow congressman Alvaro Hernan Prada are being accused of bribing several individuals, particularly a current inmate in Colombia’s prison system, in order to extract exculpatory statements before a court. The main witness in question is Juan Guillermo Monsalve, who had previously testified alongside one of Uribe’s main political enemies, Senator Ivan Cepeda, against the former president and his brother, Santiago Uribe, on charges of .

For years, Uribe’s inner circle has been entangled in a web of judicial proceedings, focused mostly around his brother, who is currently in the middle of trial for his alleged leadership role in a paramilitary death squad known as the Twelve Apostles. However, before July 24, Alvaro Uribe himself had never personally been targeted in such a serious and damning way.

The bombshell accusations against Colombia’s most powerful man who has ushered his anointed protégé, Ivan Duque, to the country’s presidency, even led Uribe to initially submit a from his post in the senate (which he subsequently withdrew on August 1) — a dramatic step given that he won more votes than any other senate candidate in the country.

Simultaneously, over the last two weeks, Uribe and his lawyers have led an all-out media offensive claiming that the charges against him are part of a political hit job orchestrated by political enemies. The gravity of the accusations against Uribe put President Duque in a serious bind. The new president, who tried to strike a conciliatory tone during his inaugural speech, must choose between respecting the independence of Colombia’s judiciary and standing by the innocence of his political mentor (whom Duque has defended for years). Thus, Duque’s actions over the coming weeks could drive a wedge between himself and his long-time political mentor.

If Duque were to break with Uribe, the former president’s allies like Ernest Macias would take this as an unforgivable political betrayal. This was already the case with President Santos, after his election under the Uribe banner in 2010. Santos, who broke with Uribe over the peace talks with the FARC rebels, was able to survive this political breakup with his predecessor and the country’s right-wing political base.

But he paid dearly for this rift during the 2016 referendum on the FARC peace deal, which was narrowly defeated thanks in large part to right-wing opposition. Moreover, as Macias’ speech on August 7 demonstrated, Democratic Center loyalists will never forgive Santos and will always stand by Uribe. Walking away from Uribe would present similar challenges for Duque because he would lose the support of Uribe’s Democratic Center, which was founded in 2013 by the former president as an opposition to Santos. Even if all the other parties within Duque’s congressional coalition remained loyal to him, his majority would be substantially slimmer without the Democratic Center, making it much more difficult to enact his domestic agenda. Most importantly, by turning his back on Uribe, Duque would draw ire from the base that elected him under the banner of the Democratic Center.

A Degree of Independence

Conversely, walking away from Uribe could also give Duque a degree of independence that he has never before enjoyed as a politician. President Duque could distance himself from his warmongering mentor and announce that he will not seek to alter the Havana peace accord that the Democratic Center had previously threatened to tear to shreds. Duque could pursue a moderate political agenda that would be welcomed by many, maybe even some skeptics within the political ranks of the FARC.

The new president’s first step in demonstrating his independence could be to ask congress to stop limiting the power of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, which was set up as a key mechanism of the FARC peace deal to process criminal charges against former combatants using a reduced sentencing scheme. Such a position would certainly face pushback from some major parties within Duque’s congressional coalition, especially among Uribe allies, while it would likely be supported by a large number of center-left parties.

If President Santos was able to win over the minds and hearts of moderate Colombians by sliding toward the center and pursuing an uphill battle for peace, President Duque could also win over a centrist base by protecting the FARC peace deal at the expense of his more right-wing political base.

Over the coming weeks, Duque will have to choose a path, and his choice will send a clear signal on whether Uribe will survive this latest political storm. Meanwhile, if Uribe overcomes the judicial and political challenge before him, he will likely remain the most powerful figure in Colombia for years to come. However, if he is found guilty and has to serve any type of sentence, it would mark a new era for Colombian politics and for the country’s social fabric.

Duque will need to prepare for both eventualities and faces a difficult decision. In the meantime, the leaders of the Colombian opposition would be wise to maintain open dialogue with the incoming president, making it clear that there is an alternative to Uribe, should the new president decide to turn his back on him. Duque, much like his country, finds himself at an important crossroads and must seriously ponder a future without Alvaro Uribe.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On August 7, the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos — Colombia’s peacemaker — comes to an end after two terms in office. Santos, who turns 67 on August 10, has stated in numerous interviews that he will not remain active in Colombian politics. He says that he wants to devote most of his time to his family, limit his work to speaking engagements and maybe teaching. However, many interpret this intention to not interfere with Ivan Duque’s incoming administration as an attempt to contrast himself with his own predecessor, Alvaro Uribe, who is still active on the national scene.

A son of Bogota’s upper class, President Santos had a distinguished academic career, completing graduate studies at both the London School of Economics and Harvard University. He spent years in the private sector, first as a representative of the Colombian Coffee Growers Federation in the UK and then as deputy director of one of his country’s largest newspapers, El Tiempo.

Santos first entered politics during the 1990s, when he served as minister of foreign trade in the César Gaviria administration and later as minister of finance and public credit under Andrés Pastrana. Ironically, President Santos’ real rise to the public spotlight came when he served as minister of defense for the Uribe administration during its intense military campaign against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. In fact, Santos never held elected public office, either in the executive or legislative branch, until his election to the presidency in 2010.

Over the last eight years, Colombia’s economy underwent major transformations. For his first term, from Uribe: GDP was growing at approximately 4%, the unemployment level reached a single digit, inflation did not surpass 3.8% and foreign investments were pouring in, particularly in the petroleum industry. During Santos’ first term, Colombia signed free trade agreements with South Korea, Costa Rica and the European Union. However, his tenure saw a great deal of mass strikes that affected key economic sectors, such as airline pilots, university students, farmers, teachers, truck drivers and federal employees within the judicial branch. Nevertheless, his great gamble began in 2012, when his government started formal negotiations with the FARC and the president broke ranks with his key political ally, former President Uribe.

The negotiations with the FARC polarized Colombia for years, leading to a contested election in 2014. In that election, Uribe’s Democratic Center Party ran on a platform against the peace talks and managed to outperform President Santos’ re-election bid during the first round, before losing to a pro-peace bloc that coalesced around Santos in the second round.

Second Term in Office

During his second term, Santos had to deal with the economic fallout caused by the collapse of global oil prices, which led to a steep devaluation of the Colombian peso, a decrease in foreign direct investment and an increase in inflation. Meanwhile, President Santos signed even more free trade agreements, with Israel and Panama, and leaves office in 2018 with fairly advanced negotiations toward agreements with Turkey and Japan. Nevertheless, in the era of Brexit and Donald Trump’s America First rhetoric, the mixed economic results brought about by Santos’ free trade frenzy are the subject of great debate and have even led Duque to state that he will not sign any new free trade deals.

Santos’ government also approved a that brings Colombia up to international standards in terms of respecting patents and protecting intellectual property, particularly in the tech sector and creative industries. Simultaneously, Santos substantially enhanced transit infrastructure, more than doubling the amount of paved roads throughout the country, thus enhancing education metrics nationwide and closing the wealth gap between Colombia’s urban rich and rural poor.

On the political front, Santos realized the dream of many Colombians through the implementation of the peace deal with the FARC signed in Cuba in 2016, which ended five decades of conflict and won him the Nobel Peace Prize — despite the setback when a popular plebiscite voted down the original terms of the agreement. Some of the key issues within the agreement then had to be renegotiated and approved by congress.

As part of his social reconciliation agenda, Santos ushered through congress major pieces of legislation such as the Victims’ Law, which seeks to restitute land rights to minorities that have been disenfranchised politically and economically throughout decades of conflict. Likewise, Santos signed the Statute of the Opposition, which gives minority and opposition parties a more active role in national politics. Under Santos, congress also created the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) — a transitional justice mechanism that is part of the peace accords and allows former combatants to be tried expediently while benefiting from reduced sentencing in exchange for full collaboration with this special court. Parallel to the JEP, the Santos government passed the Submission Law, which gives reduced sentencing to criminal groups that turn themselves in freely and collaborate with judicial investigators.

These new laws and the JEP jurisdiction are key as Colombia seeks to overcome its history of violence because they offer the remaining dissident guerillas and drug-trafficking groups a way out. While some of these legal mechanisms are permanent, such as the Statute of the Opposition, others are temporary and could be overturned prematurely, particularly given President Duque’s hawkish stances. Nevertheless, they do offer a political grace period before any future government might decide to embrace a zero tolerance policy once again.

On the international front, Santos’ agenda focused on bringing Colombia onto the global political scene and building new bridges worldwide. In this regard, the government opened numerous embassies of countries like Australia, Turkey, Hungary, the United Arab Emirates and Austria. Moreover, Santos was one of the main promoters of the Pacific Alliance, a regional integration initiative alongside Chile, Peru and Mexico. Most recently, he reached major international milestones with the country’s accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as the incorporation of Colombia as NATO’s global ally. This improved international standing has resulted in a substantial decrease in the number of countries that require an entry visa for Colombian nationals, most notably the EU’s Schengen area.

The Great Gamble

In spite of his many achievements, Santos recognizes that his administration had shortcomings and that he could have done more. The outgoing government has been unable to make any substantial progress in talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN) — a small guerrilla group still active in some regions of the country — and the process is likely to come to a halt under the next president. Similarly, Santos’ administration was tarnished by scandals, most notably the that engulfed parts of South America and delayed important infrastructure projects in Colombia, such as regaining the navigability of the Magdalena River and completing the Sun Route highway.

Likewise, there was a substantial increase in the cultivation of , and violence directed toward social leaders in rural regions of the country. On foreign policy, President Santos was unable to deal comprehensively with the crisis in neighboring Venezuela. With having entered Colombia during the last few years, the incoming President Duque will certainly have to address this issue.

Ultimately, Juan Manuel Santos leaves the Nariño Palace as in Colombia’s modern history. However, by many accounts, he leaves the country better than he found it. Once the dust settles, history will look kindly upon the peacemaker’s great gamble for peace. It is now up to Ivan Duque to decide whether he will protect and build upon Santos’ still-fragile peace or whether he will give into the warmongering passions of his most radical political base.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Back in January, I wrote an article for 51�Թ� in the run up to the presidential in election in Colombia titled “Will Colombia’s Next President Overcome the Challenges of Peace?” In it, I argued that the controversial peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed by President Juan Manuel Santos would be the determining factor of the 2018 presidential election. Likewise, I wrote that former Vice-President German Vargas Lleras would successfully manage to occupy the country’s right-wing political space and win the presidency given the young age and relative inexperience of then-Senator Ivan Duque.

Back then, Duque, of the Democratic Center Party, had just been elected candidate of a right-wing coalition. However, even Duque’s political godfather, former President Alvaro Uribe, seemed to be skeptical about his prospects and had met on several occasions with Vargas Lleras. Nevertheless, this particular scenario did not play out. Duque’s successful incarnation of the Colombian hard-right forced Vargas Lleras to embrace a center-right position, ending up in fourth place during last Sunday’s first electoral round.

Without a doubt, the first round of Colombia’s presidential election on May 27 demonstrates the unmatched power and influence of former President Uribe on the national political scene. Eight years after his presidency, now-Senator Uribe is still the most powerful individual in the Colombian political scene. He had led a successful campaign against the original terms of the 2016 peace accord with the FARC. More recently, Uribe transformed a junior senator, Ivan Duque, into the leading candidate for Colombia’s presidency in the second electoral round to be held on June 17.

After months of climbing in the polls, particularly in recent weeks, it should not be surprising that Duque, representing Colombia’s hard right, is the leading candidate in the runoff. Even though some of his followers were hoping that Duque would be elected in the first round, which would have required him obtaining over 50% of the vote, the wide spectrum of five major candidates makes this feat nearly impossible.

On the other hand, facing Duque’s right-wing coalition is Gustavo Petro, who represents Colombia’s hard left. A former member of M19, a guerrilla group that demobilized during the 1990s, Petro has risen to become Colombia’s most prominent left-wing political figure. Though Petro remains profoundly unpopular with large sectors of the population given his personal background and poor performance as mayor of Bogotá, the era ushered into Colombia by the peace deal with the FARC is opening up new political possibilities.

Traditionally one of Latin America’s most conservative and right-leaning countries, Colombia hasn’t had a prominent left-wing leader in decades. However, this reality could be starting to change. Even though Petro’s advance to the second round is indeed historic, the Colombian electorate is not about to reward a candidate even remotely associated with any of the guerrilla groups involved in the country’s decades-long civil war by handing him the nation’s highest office. Undoubtedly, Petro will temper his rhetoric as the runoff approaches and will seek to seduce centrist voters, but the vast majority of these will stay home, and most will vote for Duque.

The most interesting element of the first round results is that center-left candidate Sergio Fajardo secured a very close third place. Falling short by fewer than 300,000 votes behind Petro, if talks of a coalition between Fajardo and centrist candidate Humberto de la Calle had not fallen through a few months ago, this ticket would have most likely made it to the second round and on to the presidency.

Nevertheless, given that all three centrist candidates — Fajardo, De la Calle and Vargas Lleras — failed to secure a place in the second round, right-wing Duque is best positioned to form a broad coalition and win the presidency. The only way that Petro could win the presidency on June 17 is by convincing a broad sector of the electorate that Duque and his political godfather Uribe are too hawkish, particularly when it comes to the FARC peace deal. However, even though this might be true, Duque’s campaign is very aware of this criticism and will most likely seek to moderate its tone.

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A spate of elections will make 2018 decisive for Latin America. As the world marches toward a more conservative and even authoritarian future, this year’s presidential elections — in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Paraguay and Costa Rica — will determine whether the region will follow suit, and to what extent. Venezuela will head to the ballot box in May, but evidence suggests the vote will be far from free.

The election season is already underway. Leading the pack, voters in Costa Rica on April 1 backed the centre-left former cabinet minister, Carlos Alvarado Quesada, who decisively beat a conservative evangelical pastor, although polls had the two candidates neck and neck. Paraguay’s election is the next, slated for April 22. But it isn’t easy to tell where the continent is headed, amid a rise of alternative candidates and a widespread frustration with the political establishment.

“The big question is what will happen to Brazil and Mexico, both in economic and in political terms,” says Mauricio Tenorio, professor at the University of Chicago specializing in Latin America, referring to the two countries in political crisis that have both seen an escalation of anti-establishment views. But those events, Tenorio explained, cannot be seen in isolation from the rest of the world: “What happens will depend a lot on what happens in the United States, while in Brazil, it will depend a lot on China.”

Meanwhile, each nation has very specific local issues to worry about, as they set their route for the next few years. In Mexico, tensions in the business community are high on the agenda as the leftist leader Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a veteran candidate with two presidential campaigns behind him, leads in the polls; he is trailed by the lesser-known establishment candidate, José Antonio Meade. In Brazil, while it is still unclear who exactly will run in October, there are hopes an election could help ease long years of economic and political crisis. However, Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right anti-establishment politician, has ignited fears of an even bumpier road ahead. Meanwhile, ahead of Colombia’s pending election in May (a second round will take place in June if no candidates reach a majority of votes), questions about the peace deal with the FARC are setting the tone.

The Outsider Uptick

While people in Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the three biggest countries in the region, face tough questions about the direction of their future, the rise of anti-establishment politicians in Mexico and Brazil reflect the poor track record of the political establishment in addressing voters’ issues. In recent years, both countries, alongside many others in the region, have been tainted by corruption allegations, wiping out citizens’ little remaining trust in their governments. One of the most striking incidents involved the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht, where high-ranking executives admitted to bribing politicians in 10 Latin American countries.

According to the 2018 regional report on Latin America from (BTI), a survey conducted by the Latinobarómetro in the region’s 18 countries (excluding Cuba, Haiti and Jamaica) showed that “46% of respondents believe politicians had lost their credibility and would most likely never recover it.” The scandals can help explain the appeal of anti-establishment politicians. The BTI report, published this month, suggests that widespread dissatisfaction is fueling a race to the extremes of the voting spectrum in the region, where “Authoritarian — even autocratic — solutions for pressing problems are an increasingly popular option.” It also points to voter disillusionment as a widespread trend: “Brazil is not alone in its malaise — almost everywhere in the region there is a marked decline in approval ratings for democracy.”

But while the conservative parties are gathering steam, support for leftist ideas continues unabated, as shown by López Obrador’s strong fan base in Mexico. In Brazil, meanwhile, a recent survey by points to a resurgence of leftist ideas, such as supporting gay rights and the belief that poverty reflects a lack of opportunity. Support for social policies have likely made former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva the in this year’s elections in Brazil, even after his arrest on April 7 following a corruption conviction many of his supporters believe is unfair. Though his party affirms he is still their candidate, it is very unlikely he will run.

Creeping Conservatism

But regarding economic policies, a veer toward conservative ideas is evident. The election of Mauricio Macri in Argentina in 2015 was the first sign of this tendency, which was later confirmed by a string of subsequent elections in the region. In 2016, Peru elected banker Pedro Paulo Kuczynski, who recently resigned amid corruption allegations. And in 2017, Sebastián Piñera won the elections in Chile, replacing Michelle Bachelet’s leftist government.

“This is a new tide that changes what happened in the 10 previous years, the so-called ‘pink tide,'” says Rafael Ioris, a professor of Latin American history at the University of Denver. The “pink tide” swept populist left-wing leaders into office across the region in the course of two decades, with Hugo Chávez’s rise to power in Venezuela in 1998 and Lula da Silva’s election in Brazil in 2002.

In Brazil, the “pink tide” broke without elections. Lula’s successor Dilma Rousseff was impeached in 2016, substituted by her Vice President Michel Temer, a veteran center-right politician, who pushed for more conservative policies such as an overhaul in the labor and pension legislations. So all eyes are on this bonanza election year to see if Latin American voters will continue to back the market-friendly trend started by Argentina’s Macri, or whether there will be a swing to even more conservative views, echoing a pattern underway elsewhere with Brexit in the United Kingdom, the election of Donald Trump in America and Austria’s right-wing coalition government under Sebastian Kurz. The rise of Brazil’s Bolsonaro, who has been second in the polls for months, is leading some to believe the status quo in Brasília will face the same surprise Washington did in November 2016.

The last political cycle lifted tens of millions out of poverty in many countries across Latin America. But the challenges of a stagnant global economy seem to have put the social policies that championed that change into question. Mounting corruption allegations delivered powerful blows to the political establishment that saw through this transformative period. It is unclear what this new political tide will bring. As the BTI report stresses, “structural transformation takes time and patience, which many citizens no longer have to spare.”

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After finally seeing the end of the longest internal armed conflict in the Western hemisphere, Colombia is set to elect a new congress on March 11 and a new president on May 27. The 2018 elections cycle will be a response to the with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), signed in 2016, and its aftermath. Pro-peace politicians and skeptics are currently neck and neck in the opinion polls. Important criteria for voters include��individual candidates address current public concerns such as corruption, unemployment and security, as well as a strategy for negotiations with Colombia’s second largest insurgent group — the National Liberation Army (ELN).

The upcoming elections will mark the first time in Colombian history that former FARC combatants will hold seats in both chambers of congress and participate in presidential elections. Even though the peace accord automatically grants them five seats in both houses for two terms (until 2026), it remains to be seen whether they succeed or succumb to the same fate as Pablo Escobar’s foray into politics.

Peace Skeptics

Although most outsiders applauded President Juan Manuel Santos for signing the peace deal with the FARC (which won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016), his legacy in Colombia remains controversial. The main criticism has been leveled against a decision to grant immunity to the former guerrillas and allowing them to participate in political life — moves that were rejected by ordinary Colombians in a nationwide referendum. Wary of further objections, the Santos administration sought congressional approval rather than turning to the public to vote on amendments to the deal. It is hardly surprising that a by the pollster Invamer found that almost 70% of Colombians think that the peace agreement has been poorly implemented.

It would also be unwise to criticize Colombians for having such a dim view of the peace process. According to , about 7.7 million Colombians have been internally displaced by conflict-related violence since 1985. Additionally, the FARC performed more than 23,000 selective assassinations between 1981 and 2012 and 27,000 kidnappings between 1970 and 2010. According to the 2013 report, the group is also responsible for an additional 11,000 deaths or injuries resulting in amputations.

Finally, it’s by no means lost on the Colombian public that while the FARC has transitioned from guerrilla army to political party, it still uses the same acronym. The cosmetic name change from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia to People’s Alternative Revolutionary Force is supposed to reflect the group’s determination to actively participate in political life. “We have entered legal politics because we want to govern,”��said Iván Márquez, a member of FARC’s secretariat. Since then, the group has launched its political campaign and endorsed Rodrigo ���DzԻ��ñ��’s (or Timochenko, as the group’s former leader is known) presidential bid.

Both moves can be compared to Pablo Escobar’s aspirations for political power. Despite earning billions of dollars from exporting cocaine — a trade that ensured his place on Forbes’ richest list for seven consecutive years — the former head of the notorious Medellin Cartel dreamt of becoming Colombia’s president. With his increasing wealth, Escobar successfully ran for public office and even became a member of the lower house of congress. However, his political career was a short-lived strategic error. Being in the public spotlight meant Escobar had no choice but to confront his violent background, which eventually led to the revoking of his congressional seat. Thanks to their amnesty, FARC’s leaders have no such worries regarding their political careers.

Blank Ballots

Despite the fact that the peace agreement cannot be reversed until at least 2030 (in October 2017, Colombia’s constitutional court determined that the next three governments the accord commitments), the election campaign will be almost all about it. A recent indicates that the Partido Liberal (18%), which supports the peace deal, is garnering the same level of support as the Centro Democrático (CD, 16%), which rejects the accord. Additionally, similar to other parts of the world, independent candidates in Colombia with no apparent affiliations to traditional political parties are proving very popular (21%). Their popularity is strengthened by the findings of the latest , which suggests that only 10% of Colombians trust established political movements. What is more, 20% of Colombians said they will cast a in the presidential elections.

While the above opinion polls suggest that it is hard to predict who will win the next parliamentary elections, it nevertheless seems that CD, represented mainly through the ex-president Alvaro Uribe, is the most organized. The No campaign, which opposes the peace deal, is also particularly adept at mobilizing crowds and convincing people to turn out in high numbers on election day. It’s an altogether different story than President Santos’ Partido Social de Unidad Nacional (U Party), which is currently languishing at 8% in the polls.

The leftist Polo Democrático Alternativo is tipped to benefit the most from the U Party’s declining popularity, especially if it can convince undecided voters to support them. Polo Democrático Alternativo’s hand is further strengthened by the support it receives from indigenous tribes, Afro-Colombians, farmers and other social groups that have largely been ignored by the current government. The last big player is former President’s Vargas Lleras’ center-right, pro-peace Cambio Radical party, which has steadily gained popularity since its establishment in 2006. predicts that the FARC party will receive only 0.5% of the popular vote.

The race for the presidency is more open. Thanks to a constitution that forbids a��third consecutive term, we already know that neither incumbent President Santos nor Uribe can run. In keeping with the parliamentary elections, many candidates have started to explore ways to broaden their appeal through political coalitions and running as independents. Recent also suggest that focusing solely on the peace accord will not be popular. The successful candidate must address other concerns such as corruption (20%), the economy and unemployment (20%), combating terrorism (10%) and improving security (10%). Additionally, he or she must provide a concrete proposal for how the government should handle the implementation of the peace accord and possible negotiations with the ELN.

President Santos’ center-right coalition won the last two elections with promises of more equitable growth and the end of internal conflict. However, his critics say that instead of focusing on governance, he spent too much time, energy and political capital on accommodating a criminal group. As a consequence, his fell to 24%, a significant decline compared to 75% in 2011. It’s highly unlikely that his U Party will not endorse any candidate for the upcoming race.

Gustavo Petro, the leftist former mayor of Bogota and former member of the now-defunct M-19 rebel movement, currently with 22% support. He portrays himself as an anti-establishment��candidate and successfully attracts young people and those who do not trust traditional parties. Other candidates include Sergio Fajardo, the liberal former mayor of Medellin. His center-left electoral Coalición Colombia (which includes Partido Verde and Polo) supports the peace process and has built its campaign around anti-corruption and clientelism that plagues the Colombian public sector. Finally, there’s Centro Democrático’s Ivan Duque, a critic of the peace deal who is targeting the same groups that helped win the No vote in the referendum.

Flirting with Politics

The FARC’s flirtation with politics may become a curse rather than a blessing. Pablo Escobar’s example shows that being in the spotlight does not necessarily wipe the slate clean. However, his case also demonstrates that hunger for political power can be unstoppable. There is no doubt that the FARC has already achieved much more than Escobar. It can legally participate in political life and has been granted amnesty and seats in both chambers of parliament for two terms. However, Escobar’s dramatic fall from political grace should serve as a warning.

Last month’s further demonstrate the FARC’s lack of . This is particularly the case for its leader, Rodrigo ���DzԻ��ñ��, who recently polled the among the presidential candidates (1.6%). It’s safe to say that Timochenko will not be the next president of Colombia. After two terms in Congress, the FARC should also assess its achievements in politics. It might be more practical to move into business rather than meddle in the political sphere.

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Colombia’s presidential elections, set to take place in the summer of 2018, the country’s first since the signing of the 2016 peace agreement in Havana, will be a test of Colombians’ acceptance of both the peace process and of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group’s transition into politics. Although the Colombian people have longed for an era of peace, the process that finally ended five decades of conflict�� significantly polarized the country, both socially and politically.

On January 29, rebels following recent bombings that left seven policemen dead and injured 47 civilians. If Colombia wishes to maintain social and political stability, the next president will have to tread carefully between a passionate electoral base opposed to the peace agreement and a population that seeks healing through reconciliation.

The 2018 elections will be the first to include the newly baptized ,��formed from the demobilized FARC. Former FARC commander Rodrigo ���DzԻ��ñ��’s candidacy for president will also be the first time in over 50 years that Colombians will engage with FARC actors in a political, rather than insurgent, capacity.

Colombians have mixed feelings about the peace agreement negotiated by President Santos, and they in a popular referendum in 2016. This was as much a testament to how out of touch Santos is with the Colombian public as to popular concerns with the peace agreement itself. As a result, there is little public support for candidates who actively favor the Havana agreement, now so closely associated with the unpopular Santos. Unsurprisingly, no candidate wants the peacemaker’s endorsement.

While a number of Colombians view the Havana accord as much needed closure of a tragic and violent chapter in the country’s history, many still retain a profound disdain for, and suspicion of, former FARC members, even with the group’s transition into democratic politics. President Santos’ political opposition has successfully exploited this social tension by playing up the public’s fear that the country will be ��now that former Marxist guerrillas have entered the political arena. Just a handful of FARC party representatives in the national congress, key right-wing political figures argue, could lead the country down a path similar to Venezuela’s.

This dynamic has paved the way for former Vice President Germán Vargas Lleras to emerge as the strongest presidential candidate. Running as an independent, Vargas Lleras is seen as an opposition figure who will stand up to the . This is a serious challenge for former president and Democratic Center Party head Alvaro Uribe, who led the successful “No” campaign against the Havana agreement. After months of anticipation, Uribe and the Democratic Center finally announced on December 10, 2017, that Senator Ivan Duque would be the party’s presidential candidate. However, despite the strength of Uribe’s endorsement, Duque is widely regarded as too young, and the party’s base views him as soft on many key issues.

This leaves the field wide open for Vargas Lleras, who will likely become the default candidate for Colombia’s wide center-right base and attract the support of Uribe’s constituents during the second round of presidential voting. With the remaining center-left and left-wing parties too numerous, divided and unpopular, it is difficult to see Vargas Lleras facing a serious left-wing challenger.

Whoever becomes Colombia’s next president will face significant challenges, including the monumental job of guiding a divided population into a new era of peace. In many ways, Vargas Lleras is not the president Colombia needs, but he seems to be the president most Colombians want: a straight-talker, grandson of a former president and, most importantly, highly critical of the FARC.

But the risk of Vargas Lleras’ no-nonsense approach is that the country’s social and political polarization will become so entrenched, former FARC guerillas will be pushed out of mainstream politics and back into the jungle, restarting another cycle of violence. To avoid this, Colombia — both the political elite and the general population — must accept and formalize political space for these former guerrilla soldiers. Whether they do so will decide the future of the country’s fragile peace.

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If the United States government was intent on choosing an ineffective and damaging response to the crisis in Venezuela, it need only use its foreign policy toward South and Central America during the Cold War as a blueprint. Potentially pre-empting the nascent anti-Maduro, Organization of American States coalition that his trip to the region sought to anneal, Vice President with an all-encompassing sanctions-based prescription to modify the behavior of the Maduro regime. This was likely meant as a more reasonable alternative to President Trump’s suggestion of .

Yet both of these suggestions are unwelcome in a continent afflicted by the memories of excessive intervention by the United States. Maduro’s attempts to impose autocracy have provided the United States with a historic opportunity to pursue a course salutary to Venezuelan society while improving its reputation. It should orient its foreign policy decision with this history in mind.

The situation Venezuela finds itself in today was predictable, attributable to policies pursued by the “Bolivarian” administration of Hugo Chavez. Powered by record oil profits, Venezuela was able to engage in the well below market price; Chavez and his successor, Nicolas Maduro, compounded these polices with the nationalization of private business and the creation of cheap government supermarkets.

Unsurprisingly, the collapse in oil prices meant that the goods subsidized so munificently by the Chavez regime could no longer be provided in the same quantity. Corruption, debt and wholesale nationalization continue to prevent Venezuela from responding to the economic crisis. Though a robust political opposition exists, it has been blocked from meaningful reform by a packed with pro-Maduro judges.

Knowing that the mass majority of Venezuelans from an economy for which they hold Maduro responsible, Pence’s threat of broad-based sanctions are both tone deaf and counter-intuitive. A full-scale sanctioning of Venezuela’s oil industry would decimate the already dilapidated economy and send it into shock. This would allow Maduro to shift the blame from his administration to the “imperialist” United States. With an approval rating consistently , it’s hard to see how a policy that causes further suffering would help.

Maduro doesn’t need the United States to be unpopular. A negatively perceived intervention by the US government, however, would boost his popularity by lending credence to his claims of US meddling. For the most applicable reference, a half century, full-scale embargo failed spectacularly to change the behavior of socialist Cuba, a country that Venezuela has attempted to mirror since 1999. While an embargo-reminiscent policy toward Venezuela would be unwelcoming, the mere suggestion of military intervention is a non-starter. Even in instances where the stated goals of the United States were met, the overall effect on the country in question was less than positive.

Old Habits

The invasion of Panama in 1989 to oust Manuel Noriega, , was touted in the immediate aftermath as a success by then President George H.W. Bush. However, the consequences include suing of the for postwar looting, a ranging from the hundreds to the thousands, and a denunciation of the United States by most members of the . Just as the Trump administration does not have the cache with the international community to risk further damage to its reputation, the people of Venezuela cannot risk the chaos that would follow even a “successful” military intervention.

Clandestine support for military opposition to Maduro should be discarded in the same vein. The Venezuelan military was able to easily quash an attempted military revolt by Captain Juan Caguaripano and other��. If the United States were to pursue a strategy of arming and encouraging rebellion against the Maduro regime, it might want to look at several realities. A reservoir of armed, pro-government vigilante groups, known as colectivos, are in place to protect the Maduro government, willing to murder civilians opposing him. Promoting counter-Maduro vigilantism would undoubtedly tear at the seams of Venezuelan society to a point of no return. US Cold War policies supporting in El Salvador, Nicaragua and have left those countries enveloped in a cycle of violence; the attainment of US goals for those countries hasn’t remedied .

So for what result should the United States aim to achieve? The most auspicious outcome, out of the four outlined as likely by the , is quoted as follows: “A split within Maduro’s inner circle, the establishment of a stable and united political opposition lead[ing] to credible elections under a new National Electoral Council (CNE), monitored by the Organization of American States (OAS) and other observers and backed by a Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) with new members selected in accord with the current Constitution.”

Power Grab

So how would the fracturing of Maduro’s inner circle start? At the heart of the Maduro government’s power grab is the creation of its rubber-stamp . This is where direct US action should focus any initial, punitive action as it is the visible symbol of Maduro’s arbitrary power. Sanctions specifically hitting every member of the Constituent Assembly along with those close to Maduro will focus specifically on those that are inherently autocratic. Unlike extensive sanctions that hit the Venezuela’s oil sector (and by that extension its economy writ large), . More importantly, the impact wouldn’t result in added suffering for the Venezuelan populace.

As a prerequisite to ending these sanctions, the US should require the Maduro regime to to allowing direct humanitarian aid to reach the Venezuelan people. Otherwise, Maduro would continue to pay a personal price for entrenching autocracy while being a visible barrier to the flood of necessary supplies. Directly goading OAS member states to involve themselves in the aid effort would strengthen the visibly beneficial US effort. Neighboring Colombia, for instance, has temporary granted legal status to some . Regardless of the outcome, this would have the salutary effect of aligning the Venezuelan populace with the United States.

Venezuela has chronic problems beyond its current crises. However, the United States has an opportunity to push the country in a direction so that the people of Venezuela have a chance to institute the change they have demanded and voted for. Since the foundation for a working government is there, the Trump administration should work with it. It neatly coincides with an “America First” repudiation of nation building from scratch. With the , the policy it chooses should capitalize on this short-term consensus in the event that this chance proves ephemeral. Impacting the region for the better while improving its image will pay dividends. With that said, Cold War foreign policy should remain where suitable: as a blueprint for what not to do in South America.

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Venezuela has the in the world. But since the , it has struggled to maintain a steady profit. To ensure economic stability, the government resorted to below its marginal price, selling its and using oil infrastructure as . This inevitably resulted in the dramatic currency that destroyed domestic business.

President Nicolas Maduro has pursued the late ’s Bolivarian revolution, continuing policies of nationalizing large segments of the economy and promoting expensive welfare programs, leading to the country’s economic collapse. Venezuelans are no longer willing to comply with the government’s socialist revolution and are responding in protest.

At least in demonstrations, a death toll that is continuously increasing. For more than 50 days, Venezuelans have been protesting in efforts to overthrow Maduro. Prices have risen and the government does not have enough funds for imports, making even basic necessities difficult to obtain. In 2016, this lack of supply saw into Colombia to buy food and medicine.

There is a major disconnect between the government and its people. The Maduro government has labeled the protesters as the extreme right, and it blames capitalism for fueling their disdain toward the current administration. But many Venezuelans have simply lost faith in the government’s abilities and efforts, and will continue to protest in demand for elections and change.

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Not long ago, South America was a promising continent. Economic growth and unparalleled political stability offered good reasons for optimism. Gone were the coups, and the region welcomed transitions of power through elections.��Now, however, this era of hopefulness feels like a distant memory.

South America’s largest country, Brazil, has gone from boom to bust thanks to years of poor economic decisions. Brazil is battling its worst recession ever. And, in the meantime, congress impeached a president and the electoral justice could oust��.

Meanwhile, Paraguay and Venezuela are experiencing even worse political crises. Currently,��. Facing an economic crisis far worse than Brazil’s, the country witnessed a����over parliament.

In Paraguay, violent protests erupted in the capital city, Asunción. On March 31, demonstrators stormed congress and����after the senate held a vote behind closed doors to allow President Horacio Cartes to run for re-election. One activist was shot dead as the police reclaimed control of the building.

And in Ecuador, a highly disputed presidential election recently��created turmoil. Lenín Moreno, who enjoys the current administration’s support, won a tight race with 51% of votes. His opposition accused his campaign of fraud and demanded a recount.

South America’s Crisis of Representation

Researcher Jorge I. Domínguez, from Johns Hopkins University,����as “the land of the unfree and the home of the coup.” Virtually all countries in the region have experienced a coup d’état and lived under dictatorial rule.

There’s a sense that the levels of official corruption are intolerably high, as evidenced by Brazil’s Operation Car Wash. Every major party has been implicated in the Petrobras scandal, as are most candidates from the 2014 presidential election. And not even our meat, one of Brazil’s most important exports, has been untarnished by plutocratic corruption.

During the 1990s, the impeachments of President Fernando Collor in Brazil and President Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela enforced the notion of widespread corruption. So did the drug money-laundering accusations against former Colombian President Ernesto Samper.

It is only natural, then, that the region would have a cynical relationship with democracy. The fact these fallen leaders presented themselves as “reformists” has only fueled skepticism about new leaders seeking change.

Since 1995, the nonprofit organization����has conducted surveys in Latin America concerning democracy and representation. At first glance, the 2016 report reveals a deep crisis in the region’s democratic regimes.

The organization highlights the problem in the report’s title: “The Decline of Democracy.” Apparently, just one-third of Brazilians prefer democracy to other forms of power. The truth, however, is more nuanced than that.

“For several years, the research we have conducted at USP [University of São Paulo] shows that more than 70 percent of Brazilians want democratic governments. What the����is a deep disenchantment with how the institutions work — especially Congress,” says��José Alváro Moisés, a professor at USP.

Can you blame them?

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Colombia’s big city streets are full of ambulant vendors��offering you anything from chewing gum to a single cigarette to prepaid cell phone minutes. Walking through Bogota’s roads during the first weeks of 2017, you could also purchase a small booklet detailing the��. For the first time in over two decades, the government has updated the��code that now includes significant fines for offenses such as loitering and jaywalking.

This new reality for the average Colombian contrasts starkly with the political corruption currently pervading the government, so it is not just average Colombians who need to revise their code of public conduct. Today, international corruption scandals such as those disclosed in��the Panama Papers have stained the reputation and credibility of the highest echelons of the Colombian political class.

Corruption is an urgent issue that must be tackled if Colombia expects the��with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to succeed in achieving a lasting peace and a robust democracy.

Dark Forces and��Dirty Money��

To many observers, and even some political figures, the implementation and execution of the peace deal��would represent the end of dirty money and dark forces within civil society and politics in Colombia. However, as the dust of armed civil conflict and fratricidal war begins to settle for the first time in half a century, Colombia must tackle the swamp of corruption that has been quietly spreading within the country’s leading institutions.

Recent corruption scandals throughout Latin American have highlighted the importance of a free and robust press as well as the systemic weaknesses and lack of transparency of Colombia’s democratic institutions. For instance, throughout the last two decades, it is estimated that the Brazilian construction giant, throughout a dozen countries in order to secure the construction of public projects.

Another major source of corruption controversies in Colombia is the state-owned petroleum company, Ecopetrol. For instance, a decade ago, Ecopetrol began construction on the ambitious Reficar project to build South America’s largest oil refinery in the coastal city of Cartagena. Today, the project is yet to be completed, has gone over budget by $4 billion dollars, and ongoing investigations point towards mass contracting fraud, possibly .

It is tragic that the FARC has intended to advance its political agenda through violent means for more than fifty years. However, the level of systemic corruption uncovered puts into perspective other deep-seated issues facing the country. Furthermore, the reliance on corrupt practices by mainstream politicians and political parties in Colombia will be a severe impediment to the successful implementation of the peace treaty with the FARC guerrillas.

As part of the peace treaty with the national government, the FARC is set to transition into a democratic political formation—a FARC political party, yet to be officially formed—with representation in Congress and participation in electoral politics. This has sparked contentious debate within Colombia given that the FARC party is����during the next two electoral periods while it completes its transition into national politics. While some politicians argue that this measure is necessary for the FARC to successfully become a non-violent political movement, those who opposed the peace treaty claim that such a concession to the FARC is too generous and undemocratic.

Unfair Advantages

Nevertheless, given its extremely polarizing nature, the eventual FARC party will be held to higher standards and put under higher scrutiny in terms of transparency and financing than Colombia’s traditional political players. The freedom with which mainstream political formations in Colombia utilize dirty money to finance their campaigns and keep their electoral machines running is shamefully evident to all sectors of civil society.

After weeks of mounting public pressure and revelations, President and Nobel Peace Laureate Juan Manuel Santos made a public declaration on March 14, 2017, recognizing the presence of . President Santos stated that he was unaware of said funding at the time and called for those responsible to be punished.

The uneven playing field that will exist between the FARC and mainstream parties in Colombia could jeopardize the proper functioning of the democratic transition agreed to in the peace deal. The transition mandates that all guerrilla fighters convene in specified camps throughout the country to hand over their weapons and begin reintegration��into civilian life, all of this under the supervision of the United Nations.

Simultaneously, mid and high-level FARC officials will go through a special court process where they will confess their illegal activities in exchange for shorter and alternative sentences. Finally, the FARC party commits to non-violent political participation without funding acquired through illegal activity, under the supervision of the competent national authorities. In this regard, the corrupt practices that are part of the machinery of mainstream political parties will represent an unfair advantage over the FARC party and could give the FARC a legitimate reason to cry foul against the government, potentially undermining the negotiated peace itself.

If corruption is not eradicated to level the political playing field, the systemically flawed democratic process will destroy any prospects of a lasting peace. Even though��some ��as part of the implementation of the peace treaty, several members are defecting and hedging their position by staying in place while the process evolves. Some of these are FARC elements involved��in illegal economic activity that could easily morph into drug-financed non-state actors. They include��the ��and����as well as Front 48 and Front 57.

As Colombia traverses a unique and historic moment, the Colombian people must pressure the political class to revise its own code of public conduct and possibly hand out booklets throughout the power halls of Congress. If not, we can expect new non-state actors to emerge either as fully rogue criminal groups or as political proxies for the FARC party. The latter scenario is particularly likely, especially if the future FARC party decides that it needs a dirty political machine to do its groundwork.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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A coordinated attempt by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Kurdish Peshmerga forces supported by US-led coalition air power to liberate Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, from control of the Islamic State (IS) began in October 2016. The outcome of the battle, for better or worse, is certain: it will mark a turning point in the global counter-IS campaign. Furthermore, it could lend credibility to the often-debated effectiveness of the “light footprint” model of operations, which emphasizes regional partner leadership over US intervention when faced with a security crisis.

The United States has faced sharp criticism for its “” strategy, which many point to exacerbating regional civil wars by preventing US forces from intervening and curtailing these conflicts. While the strategy clearly does not fit every situation, Mosul could serve as proof that it does work—on a level much larger than successful “light footprint” operations, including those against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia.

In a region where US policy has been chided for “,” adhering to the “light footprint” model would not only demonstrate a commitment to the strategy’s success, but more critically form a strong base for future improvements in Iraq as the next US administration seeks to prevent a reemergence of extremism. This should include not only military operations, but governance and peacebuilding support amongst various stakeholders in northern Iraq, namely the Sunni tribes, Kurdish people and the Shia militias who help to liberate the city.

Mosul and US Counterterrorism

There are a number of situations that, if not thoroughly accounted, could make Mosul another case of “light footprint” failure rather than the blueprint for further operations against IS. The military plan developed by the ISF is arguably the least complicated aspect of the city’s liberation.

The main challenge is ensuring that the various actors at play their promises to stay within defined operational areas. The ISF and Kurdish Peshmerga roles are clear, but the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has little in the way of direction. Despite an ISF spokesman indicating that the PMF would likely be used the outlying areas of the largely Sunni city in order to minimize sectarian conflict, the Shia PMF sees the recapture of Mosul as a “national and religious duty.” This confluence of actors could lead to troubles after the city has been liberated as groups attempt to use battle merit to justify territorial gains.

The question of Mosul’s governance post-IS still remains largely unclear. Yet it is the resolution of this issue that will likely be the metric by which the success of the Mosul liberation is measured in the long run. The often-discussed Sunni-Shia balance that will factor heavily into any governance agreement has the potential to be hijacked by both the Turkish and Iranian governments to advance their own geopolitical goals as Mosul’s liberation progresses.

Finally, the human toll of military operations is underrepresented next to the above issues. Humanitarian efforts recently became a concern after the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees announced that it may not to handle the maximum number of refugees that may result from the operations being conducted in and around Mosul. IS has that it will attempt to force these civilians into staying to serve as cannon fodder.

The real challenge in Iraq will be ensuring that political and military leadership can effectively reestablish a presence in and around Mosul, and do so in a manner that does not inflame sectarian tensions or otherwise engender the Islamic State’s resurgence in the city.

Philippines, Colombia and Somalia

Providing training and advisement to foreign militaries became a pillar of US counterterrorism policy after September 11, 2001. The Philippines and Colombia represent operations, where according to on the latter, “relatively intact governments found the will and resources to lead such efforts, despite facing severe security, corruption, and long-running socioeconomic challenges.”

The outgoing and incoming US administrations should examine instances of successful of holistic counterterrorism operations such as Colombia and the Philippines while heeding the warnings of Somalia where, despite , long-term counterterrorism efforts have proved strategically ineffective.

US special operations forces (SOF) have been supporting and training Somali National Army units for almost a decade but have yet to permanently defeat the al-Shabab insurgency. Critics to an emphasis on military training and direct action operations over support for the Somali government to build a functioning state that is capable of defending itself from threats and supporting its citizens. Joint Somali-American military operations have successfully targeted al-Shabab leadership and training facilities, yet Somalia looks only marginally better than it did in 2011 when the Federal Government of Somalia control of Mogadishu from militants.

Support for effective governance and a stable economy—two factors that can often help defeat insurgencies—are noticeably lacking in US aid for Somalia. Furthermore, any such provisions are concentrated in the capital Mogadishu, not the southern and central portions of the country, where population-centric counterinsurgency would bolster the military operations to degrade al-Shabab’s control over the regions.

Somalia demonstrates that even a militarily effective counterterrorism strategy cannot truly succeed unless support for governance and conflict resolution is as robust as support for direct action.

A post-operational on US counterterrorism efforts in Colombia emphasized the importance of utilizing civil affairs units in supporting the host nations in governance and development operations over the years following the resolution of a conflict. A reliance on SOF troops is among the policy recommendations. While this may have been the case in Colombia, Iraq certainly requires a more nuanced approach.

The US should employ civil affairs units while involving members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with a history of training police units . Civil affairs troops could provide the necessary interlocution training to develop stable governance and de-conflict amongst rival groups, while effective police would allow the ISF to move on knowing the city remains secure.

Additionally, the Colombia report rejected a focus on short-term projects as these yielded only short-term results. Direct action raids are necessary for any successful counterterrorism operations, but at a certain point, the effort needs to shift to policing, governance and education. These population-centric operations will, in the long term, enable residents to return home with a sense of security and allow the government to effectively resume its duties.

While training ISF units in direct action operations should not cease, the US focus should shift to raising local police units that can take the place of ISF troops in the city. This will make the return to normalcy easier for the Moslawi population.

The RAND report on the Philippines concluded, after conducting interviews with Philippine and American security personnel, that transitioning from a military-centric security presence to a police-centric security model would be critical for internal security once operations against the ASG had concluded.

In 2011, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines was beginning to shift from direct action against ASG to post-conflict governance. US SOF advisors began training the Philippines National Police Special Action Force (PNP SAF) to take over internal security in populated urban areas. Once established, the SAF proved to work both independently and in concert with the Philippine army to ensure the safety of major towns and cities in provinces where insurgents were most active. SOF commanders also set up eight fusion centers for intelligence sharing between US analysts and Philippine police and military units.

This gradual drawback of US “boots on the ground” proved effective, at least in the short term, but as of 2014, ASG has gained a slight boost when one of its main factions to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of IS.

It is important to ensure that the strategy, going forward, emphasizes a balance between collaborative direct action and population-centric counterinsurgency operations in a hybrid Colombia-Philippines model. As the military campaign against IS begins to wane, supporting effective governance in Mosul and Nineveh Province should take precedence for the US. After all, one of the driving reasons behind the Islamic State’s rise in Iraq was by Nouri al-Maliki’s government.

Therefore, it should be a priority to reinstate effective, non-sectarian government in areas formerly controlled by IS. Moderating the post-Islamic State reconstruction effort will likely be more important to the long-term stability of the Iraqi state than the ongoing military operations. It will be crucial to have non-military forces to the inevitable issues that will emerge amongst the various actors in Mosul once the city has been liberated.

It is imperative for the US to shape its post-conflict strategy for Mosul now, funding both government and nonprofit governance and aid initiatives that will be ready to work when Mosul is cleared militarily. Waiting until the conflict has subsided to formulate a reconstruction plan will give external forces time to sectarian tensions and prevent a complete resolution of the violence that has plagued Iraq since 2003, leaving the proverbial wound in Iraqi society open to infection by other extremist groups.

Defeating the Islamic State

To be sure, it is unrealistic to apply the strategy for the Mosul offensive to Raqqa in Syria and other theaters where IS claims affiliates. However, a successful prosecution of the Mosul operations and a stable governance structure in the aftermath would produce lessons that could be adapted to contexts where the US wishes to defeat an enemy while maintaining a minimal troop presence on the ground.

Mosul could also showcase what a united Iraqi front composed of different groups who are often ethnically and religiously at odds with the other are capable of doing, providing the Iraqi state hope for its future.

The above goals are ambitious and, as outlined, the variables that could result in the implosion of the Mosul liberation operations are more numerous and already in play. With the opening skirmishes of the Mosul operations being , the global audience is now front and center to what is a benchmark for the global counter-IS campaign. This, coupled with a media-savvy enemy that seems to be able to on even crippling defeats, could lead to a backlash affecting not just the Iraqi counter-IS effort, but the global US-led push to defeat the group.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In the year of��the , Colombians rejected a landmark peace deal with��. This referendum was held on October 2, Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday. This is not quite the present that the old man would cherish. So, what is going on?

In the��September 4 edition of , this author delved into the history of the Colombian conflict in some detail. For over a century, this tortured land has been blighted by violence and strife. From the Thousand Days’ War of 1899-1902 to��la Violencia��of the 1940s and 1960s to the more recent insurgency of��Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC, this Latin American country of over 48 million has experienced almost incessant civil war.

Like other Latin American countries colonized by the Spanish, Colombia remains a deeply unequal society. This author has pointed out earlier that Latin America is the world’s most unequal region, with the richest 10% owning 71% of the total wealth. In the , the former governor of Antioquia, a region made famous by drug lord Pablo Escobar, “with the exception of Haiti, Colombia is the most unequal country in Latin America, and Antioquia is the most unequal region in Colombia.”

Two centuries ago, none other than Simon Bolivar was complaining about the “aristocracy of rank, office and wealth” that regarded “the lower classes as their perpetual serfs.” Fajardo’s comments echo Bolivar’s and Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr’s words,��plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose—the more things change, the more they stay the same—ring eerily true. To add salt to the wound, inequality in Colombia is combined with a culture of flagrant illegality and rampant corruption. As if this was not enough, the trafficking of narcotics and the unending guerilla conflict have combined to severely sunder the country’s social, political, economic and cultural fabric.

Clearly, the��status quo��in Colombia is untenable. So, why did Colombians vote against the peace deal?

As the vote demonstrates, the country is deeply divided on the issue of a peace deal with FARC. The issues are complex and��. Like all deals, this peace deal was imperfect. Many Colombians detested the special treatment for FARC guerrillas. They believed that the creation of a new law above the law of the land to deal with the guerrillas was simply unacceptable.

The most vigorous opponents of the agreement such as former President Álvaro Uribe viewed the deal as��. They claimed to want peace but they could not accept impunity. As is well known, Uribe’s father was murdered in 1983 and he has always blamed FARC for it. Others have also suffered from the brutality of FARC whether it is killings, kidnappings, explosions, extortions, threats or other forms of violence.

As this author has��, FARC was born after the brutal suppression of reformist liberals during��la Violencia. As in other parts of Latin America, Uncle Sam played a big role in creating the conditions for the birth of FARC. Lauchlin Currie, yet another American economist, deemed that Colombia needed industrial agriculture to supply products to the United States and inaugurated the Accelerated Economic Development (AED) policy. To implement it, legislators drafted a new law providing for the “efficient use of the land.” This law was used by the state to dispossess hundreds and thousands of families of their land.

Under Currie’s infamous AED policy, the state effectively acted as Robin Hood in reverse. It robbed the poor for the rich. Then it used taxes collected from the poor to give subsidies to the rich. Cattle ranchers and big farmers profited, while peasants and laborers suffered enormously. Even the right-leaning Hoover Institution of Stanford University published a book where����that “subordinate ethnic (Indians, Blacks) and class (peasants, rural workers, the urban poor, and segments of working and middle classes) groups” got shafted by Currie’s eminently humane policy.

Such oppression and exploitation inevitably led to a violent reaction. Two idealistic organizations emerged, both of them finding inspiration in the bearded prophet Karl Marx:��Ejército de Liberación Nacional��(ELN) and FARC. Their goal was to fight the good fight for land reform and greater equality. However, guerrillas like philosophers need to eat. They also need to buy guns to fight their good fights. Both FARC and ELN degenerated into armed gangs that lived off extortion and trafficking narcotics. As they tasted power, the guerrillas proved only too human. They shed blood, often gratuitously, and acquired wealth, not infrequently with much cupidity.

Colombia has since been caught in the crossfire between men in guns offering either order or revolution. All parties to the conflict have their hands soaked in blood. As a result, the peace talks that began in November 2012 in the Cuban capital Havana were protracted, tortuous and charged. After all, if Colombia was not such a deeply polarized country, it would not have experienced so much civil war.

As mentioned earlier, the charge against the peace deal was led by Uribe. This is the man who decimated FARC when he was president and, in some ways, paved the path for the Havana talks. For Uribe, FARC’s political participation and amnesty from justice were thin red lines that he was unwilling to allow his country to cross. For him as for many others, this was not a fair peace. This was peace at all costs. Even as erstwhile rivals such as Cuba and the US were����on, many Colombians could not swallow it.

Of course, in such stories the political and the personal are often intertwined. Uribe has a ferocious rivalry with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, who not too long ago was Uribe’s defense minister. It was under Uribe that Santos directed military firepower against FARC,��. Santos waltzing off as a peacemaking statesman might have been too much for Uribe to bear.

The referendum demonstrated that Colombia is deeply divided about the peace deal. Charged discussions in media and social media were proof of the fact that emotions were running high. The result was “a damn close-run thing” and, like Brexit, weather might have played a part. The coasts and outlying provinces voted for the peace deal, while those inland and nearer the capital voted against it. Rain lashed the coasts though, lowering voter turnout there. In fact, this author was informed by Colombian friends glued to the news that turnout in the entire country itself was a measly 38%. These factors certainly influenced the referendum result.

Other factors might have played a role too. Taxi drivers furious with Uber��. Colombia is a deeply devout Catholic country that has centuries of prejudice against homosexuality. In April, the country’s highest court gave��. Santos����and Gina Parody, the minister of education, is openly lesbian. She has been in hot water over��. A handbook that she was championing attracted the ire of many conservative voters.

Many conservative voters see Santos and Parody threatening the sanctity of the family. They are horrified at the mention of lesbian, gay and transgender communities. For them, conflating Marxists like FARC with lesbians like Parody was not that big a leap. They might have voted against the peace deal simply in protest. In any case, Santos’ had dismal approval ratings and was deeply unpopular in the face of a sluggish economy and a lack of jobs. This made a protest vote highly probable.

Interestingly,��. The media was disconnected from ground realities as well. Few saw the result coming and the rejection of the peace deal has sent shockwaves domestically as well as internationally. So, what changes now?

The answer is not much. First, the referendum choices might have been binary but the result is not. No one seems to be in a hurry to go back to war. Both FARC and the Santos government are likely to digest the results and try to push for a deal if not this one. Second, the shock referendum result adds to Colombia’s economic uncertainty. A����is in the offing as oil revenues have fallen. Its future might be in question. The peace dividend and US President Barack Obama’s promised����$450 million assistance are also up in the air. However, the uncertainty is unwelcome but it not debilitating.

Colombia’s referendum result poses one big question though. Are referendums the right way to decide emotive issues, especially pertaining to peace?

The democratic answer is an unqualified yes. However, if people do not understand the complexity of a deal, if passion runs too high, if the people in power are too unpopular, if demagogues take center stage, if not too many show up to vote, and if victory or defeat is an impostor with a razor thin majority in a deeply divided society, then are referendums necessarily the best way forward?

*[You can receive “The World This Week” directly in your inbox by subscribing to our mailing list. Simply visit����and enter your email address in the space provided. Meanwhile, please find below five of our finest articles for the week.]

A Polarized Referendum Puts Peace to the Test in Colombia

© Robi_J

Voters will decide if the negotiated settlement ending decades of conflict with the FARC moves ahead.��

As the sun was setting in Cartagena, Colombia, on Monday, September 26, thousands of national and international spectators, including dozens of world leaders and US Secretary of State John Kerry, gathered to bear witness to a sight that not long ago would have been unimaginable: Timoleón Jiménez, commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country’s largest guerrilla group, signing a peace accord with President Juan Manuel Santos.

The agreement ends 52 years of armed conflict between the two groups that has cost over 220,000 lives and left over eight million conflict victims. As an international witness, I was swept up by the emotions of those around me. Flags waved in the breeze, groups of victims and children sang, and the sunset over the Caribbean seemed a harbinger for a new dawn of peace. Over four years of negotiations had…

Beyond Business Plans: Women Entrepreneurs in MENA

© Petar Chernaev

Greater support for female entrepreneurship will help the MENA region achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region that is more often in the news for bombs and bullets than booming businesses, is experiencing a startup revolution. Nearly six years since the start of the Arab Uprisings, entrepreneurship is on the minds of those as young as 15. With unemployment and underemployment still being key factors in a region that sits on a powder keg, MENA youth are hungry to shape their own future. Alongside them, however, there is an even hungrier demographic that is having their��aha moments: women.

Women entrepreneurs provide the MENA region with an economic opportunity. To understand the issue, it is important to look at the underlying problems. As this author and Casper Wuite explained in��The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, the key catalysts behind the revolts of 2010-11 included poor economic growth, inequality, unemployment…

Yazidi Refugees Tell Their Story

Sharya Camp, Duhok © Siraj Davis

Yazidi refugees reveal tragic and inspirational stories of surviving ethnic cleansing by the Islamic State.

The Yazidi people are an ethno-religious group with aspects of their religion entailing a mixture of Christianity, Islam and Zoroastrianism. They are monotheistic, worshipping one God, but their most holy religious figure is��Sheikh Adi ibn Musafir al-Umawi, who meets all criteria of a prophet but is described by some Yazidis as only a saint. Their holy scripture includes Jesus, Mary, Adam and Eve, Moses, Muhammad and other prophets shared in monotheism.

The Yazidis have resided in northern Iraq/Kurdistan since Mesopotamian times, along with other communities in Turkey, Syria and Armenia. However, as with the Assyrian Christian population, they have been in significant decline due to centuries of persecution, discrimination and violence. According to their narrative, they are survivors of��72 genocidal campaigns��against them. In August 2014, the Islamic State (IS or��Daesh) conducted a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against the…

Make America Debate Again: The Qualifying Round

© WildLivingArts

In��the first presidential debate, candidates failed to provide clues about possible political responses to any of the real questions about America’s future in the world.

Judging from the results of the first “Super Bowl of presidential debates” it would appear that the following three statements, if not true, are at least credible:��Donald Trump is manifestly not qualified to be president;��Hillary Clinton may not be qualified to be president; it isn’t clear what it really means for a person to be qualified to be president.

The first debate somewhat predictably contained very little substance. Instead it danced around the relative weaknesses of each candidate, reflecting the mood of the nation, which appears to be on the verge of deciding which candidate to vote against.

There is no set of established criteria concerning the qualification to be president other than being a natural-born citizen of at least 35 years of age. A lot of people, especially on…

Singapore’s Road to Multiculturalism

Little India, Singapore © LeeYiuTung

What lessons can multicultural Singapore offer America in light of the latter’s ongoing racial and religious tensions?

Raw feelings over race and religion dominate the American political season. The talk is of walls and deportations to keep some out, “extreme vetting” for immigrants of a certain faith, and a debate over whose lives matter that is playing out in mindless violence on the streets.

The conflicting feelings over people of a different race, color or creed cannot, of course, be resolved to any one person’s or group’s satisfaction. But good answers to the divisiveness seem elusive. How can Americans see past their differences and get along?

As an American, I watch from afar where I live in Singapore, one of the most racially and religiously diverse nations in the world. This small country offers an approach. A national poll��released a few weeks ago��found most Singaporeans try to live out multiracial ideals and believe in meritocracy…

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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