51吃瓜

America’s Cold War-era policies won’t work against Venezuela.听

If the United States government was intent on choosing an ineffective and damaging response to the crisis in Venezuela, it need only use its foreign policy toward South and Central America during the Cold War as a blueprint. Potentially pre-empting the nascent anti-Maduro, Organization of American States coalition that his trip to the region sought to anneal, Vice President with an all-encompassing sanctions-based prescription to modify the behavior of the Maduro regime. This was likely meant as a more reasonable alternative to President Trump鈥檚 suggestion of .

Yet both of these suggestions are unwelcome in a continent afflicted by the memories of excessive intervention by the United States. Maduro鈥檚 attempts to impose autocracy have provided the United States with a historic opportunity to pursue a course salutary to Venezuelan society while improving its reputation. It should orient its foreign policy decision with this history in mind.

The situation Venezuela finds itself in today was predictable, attributable to policies pursued by the “Bolivarian鈥� administration of Hugo Chavez. Powered by record oil profits, Venezuela was able to engage in the well below market price; Chavez and his successor, Nicolas Maduro, compounded these polices with the nationalization of private business and the creation of cheap government supermarkets.

Unsurprisingly, the collapse in oil prices meant that the goods subsidized so munificently by the Chavez regime could no longer be provided in the same quantity. Corruption, debt and wholesale nationalization continue to prevent Venezuela from responding to the economic crisis. Though a robust political opposition exists, it has been blocked from meaningful reform by a packed with pro-Maduro judges.

Knowing that the mass majority of Venezuelans from an economy for which they hold Maduro responsible, Pence鈥檚 threat of broad-based sanctions are both tone deaf and counter-intuitive. A full-scale sanctioning of Venezuela鈥檚 oil industry would decimate the already dilapidated economy and send it into shock. This would allow Maduro to shift the blame from his administration to the 鈥渋mperialist鈥� United States. With an approval rating consistently , it鈥檚 hard to see how a policy that causes further suffering would help.

Maduro doesn鈥檛 need the United States to be unpopular. A negatively perceived intervention by the US government, however, would boost his popularity by lending credence to his claims of US meddling. For the most applicable reference, a half century, full-scale embargo failed spectacularly to change the behavior of socialist Cuba, a country that Venezuela has attempted to mirror since 1999. While an embargo-reminiscent policy toward Venezuela would be unwelcoming, the mere suggestion of military intervention is a non-starter. Even in instances where the stated goals of the United States were met, the overall effect on the country in question was less than positive.

Old Habits

The invasion of Panama in 1989 to oust Manuel Noriega, , was touted in the immediate aftermath as a success by then President George H.W. Bush. However, the consequences include suing of the for postwar looting, a ranging from the hundreds to the thousands, and a denunciation of the United States by most members of the . Just as the Trump administration does not have the cache with the international community to risk further damage to its reputation, the people of Venezuela cannot risk the chaos that would follow even a 鈥渟uccessful鈥� military intervention.

Clandestine support for military opposition to Maduro should be discarded in the same vein. The Venezuelan military was able to easily quash an attempted military revolt by Captain Juan Caguaripano and other听. If the United States were to pursue a strategy of arming and encouraging rebellion against the Maduro regime, it might want to look at several realities. A reservoir of armed, pro-government vigilante groups, known as colectivos, are in place to protect the Maduro government, willing to murder civilians opposing him. Promoting counter-Maduro vigilantism would undoubtedly tear at the seams of Venezuelan society to a point of no return. US Cold War policies supporting in El Salvador, Nicaragua and have left those countries enveloped in a cycle of violence; the attainment of US goals for those countries hasn鈥檛 remedied .

So for what result should the United States aim to achieve? The most auspicious outcome, out of the four outlined as likely by the , is quoted as follows: 鈥淎 split within Maduro鈥檚 inner circle, the establishment of a stable and united political opposition lead[ing] to credible elections under a new National Electoral Council (CNE), monitored by the Organization of American States (OAS) and other observers and backed by a Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) with new members selected in accord with the current Constitution.鈥�

Power Grab

So how would the fracturing of Maduro鈥檚 inner circle start? At the heart of the Maduro government鈥檚 power grab is the creation of its rubber-stamp . This is where direct US action should focus any initial, punitive action as it is the visible symbol of Maduro鈥檚 arbitrary power. Sanctions specifically hitting every member of the Constituent Assembly along with those close to Maduro will focus specifically on those that are inherently autocratic. Unlike extensive sanctions that hit the Venezuela’s oil sector (and by that extension its economy writ large), . More importantly, the impact wouldn鈥檛 result in added suffering for the Venezuelan populace.

As a prerequisite to ending these sanctions, the US should require the Maduro regime to to allowing direct humanitarian aid to reach the Venezuelan people. Otherwise, Maduro would continue to pay a personal price for entrenching autocracy while being a visible barrier to the flood of necessary supplies. Directly goading OAS member states to involve themselves in the aid effort would strengthen the visibly beneficial US effort. Neighboring Colombia, for instance, has temporary granted legal status to some . Regardless of the outcome, this would have the salutary effect of aligning the Venezuelan populace with the United States.

Venezuela has chronic problems beyond its current crises. However, the United States has an opportunity to push the country in a direction so that the people of Venezuela have a chance to institute the change they have demanded and voted for. Since the foundation for a working government is there, the Trump administration should work with it. It neatly coincides with an 鈥淎merica First鈥� repudiation of nation building from scratch. With the , the policy it chooses should capitalize on this short-term consensus in the event that this chance proves ephemeral. Impacting the region for the better while improving its image will pay dividends. With that said, Cold War foreign policy should remain where suitable: as a blueprint for what not to do in South America.

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

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