Missed opportunities on the global stage

Modi has failed to establish meaningful and assertive interactions with external powers such as the US, UK, France, Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Turkey. He also struggles to address issues with troublesome neighbors like Pakistan and China, who have deliberately intruded into India’s territory. Although he traveled around the globe to promote India’s foreign policy and diplomacy, he to convince foreign powers, including America, that India has been a victim of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism for decades and not the other way around. 

Perhaps due to this, Pakistan — despite being an epicentre of Global Terrorism, including cross-border terror against India for the past many decades — has been adorned as Vice Chair of the Anti-terrorism Committee by the UN Security Council (UNSC), which is an unparalleled paradox.

Additionally, he has not secured a for India in the UN Security Council or membership in other prominent forums like (a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (), the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty () and (an intergovernmental political forum consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US). 

The recent security crisis and the India–Pakistan war have exposed flaws in India’s national security and foreign policy. The terror attack in on April 22, 2025, killed 26 innocent tourists in Baisaran valley of India-administered Jammu and Kashmir, revealing serious lapses in security management and civilian safety. In retaliation, India launched on May 7, 2025, which demonstrated the capabilities of its forces across all three wings. However, the announced on May 10 showed that Modi succumbed to US President Donald Trump’s pressure. The ceasefire benefited Pakistan because India had gained the upper hand in the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict. This event significantly India’s diplomatic landscape. 

In 2014, Modi his tenure with enthusiasm to transform India into a haven for foreign investments by streamlining rules and regulations to make investment easier. However, bureaucratic disputes and a rising middleman culture discouraged his well-planned efforts. An excessive concentration of power within the Prime Minister’s office and among a small group of Indian Administrative Service () officers led to the formation of a confidant coterie. His reliance on this small circle marginalized democratic governance, frustrating senior ministers, party leaders and top officers.  

Governance crisis and administrative decay

The Bharatiya Janata Party () government at the center, along with its own party governments in many states, has failed to control rising prices, poverty, unemployment, law and order, ever-mounting , undue interference by party workers and officials in daily administration and declining morals and increasing promiscuity among party cadres. This indicates a weakening of the top leaders’ control over party members and office bearers. 

The high-profile of a sitting BJP Member of Parliament (MP), Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh, accused of molestation and sexual offenses under the POCSO Act by women wrestlers Vinesh Phogat, Sakshi Singh and other minor girls, has garnered attention. Unfortunately, the First Information Reports (FIRs) lodged against this MP have been . Similar cases against BJP leader (who has now obtained bail) and , “Bum-Bum,” a BJP district president, are particularly concerning. 

Crimes committed by party workers have severely tarnished the party’s reputation, which claims to establish a new culture in the country. Modi has also for the BJP through Electoral Bonds and granted extraordinary favors to billionaires such as Gautam Adani, Mukesh Ambani and others. 

The central government has waived large loans for wealthy businessman, Gautam Adani, while thousands of have gone bankrupt and suffered due to natural calamities. India’s wealthiest industrialist, Mukesh Ambani, enjoys Z+ security by the Indian state along with other VIPs and politicians. Taxes paid by ordinary citizens fund the cost of this security. Ironically, while elites enjoy top security, common citizens often fall victim to crime due to a shortage of police personnel and ineffective law enforcement.

Furthermore, the BJP is the powers of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Election Commission, Enforcement Directorate and Income Tax Department to intimidate politicians with non-BJP affiliations who are facing various criminal charges. This can be seen in like Ajit Pawar, Chhagan Bhujbal, Ashok Chauhan, Hemanta Biswas Sharma, Subhendu Adhikari, Prafulla Patel and many others. These politicians are pressured to join the BJP and support its interests, leveraging these agencies. An ironic aspect is that once these tarnished politicians join the BJP, the cases against them are often withdrawn.

Another serious concern is the declining health of Indian democracy. In a parliamentary system, opposition parties and their leaders play a crucial role. However, the of opposition members from the House to prevent meaningful debates and discussions on national issues, merely to serve the ruling party’s interests, represents a negation or violation of democracy.

Another troubling development that has caused an internal crisis is the ethnic riots in that started last year. Yet, the Prime Minister has not visited the region to ease the suffering of the affected community or to restore the declining confidence in the police and security forces. 

The Indian Army’s (a recruitment model that allows youth to serve in the armed forces for four years) has sparked controversy. Politicians, who do not retire from active politics even in their seventies, face ridicule as young men in their twenties prepare to leave the army after just four years of service. People express about the scheme’s long-term implications, especially given the rising cross-border terrorism from Pakistan and China’s consistent intrusions into Indian territory. Former Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat reportedly the scheme’s merits, and his mysterious death in a helicopter crash highlights his cautious judgment today.

The overemphasis on the Hindu-Muslim also threatens national unity and social cohesion. The use of slogans like “Jai Shri Ram” (“Hail Lord Rama”) to advance the BJP’s political goals has caused alienation among Muslims and other minorities, actions that conflict with the ideals of Lord Ram and India’s diverse culture. The government must stop communal segregation and actively include Muslim and other minority communities in India’s growth and progress.

India’s economy remains , despite grand claims to become the world’s fourth-largest economy and its ambition to reach third place. In 2025, the national debt has sharply increased to approximately $248 billion due to ill-planned spending, misappropriation of funds and large-scale embezzlement. These issues have fostered a parallel black economy that threatens the country’s economic stability.

media agencies are another worrisome aspect of Mr. Modi’s politics. They undermine the principle of democracy by violating the idea that the media serves as the fourth pillar of democracy. News channels based in Noida are mostly labeled as “”, and many consider them biased and sold. The print media in the country does not dare to challenge or hold the government accountable, drawing parallels to the of 1975.   

A call for renewal and accountability

The popularity and support for the BJP have declined, with only minor exceptions in some states. As its foremost leader, Modi cannot escape the responsibility that comes with his prominent role in the party and the country. His advancing age, declining mental focus, the rise of vested interests and the absence of a strong opposition have created obstacles in governance. Additionally, giving undue favors to elites and corrupt elements within the BJP has prevented the leadership from ensuring independent, fair and effective decision-making. These issues have shattered the hopes, aspirations and expectations of the people not only within India but also across the international community. The grand vision of making India the (“world guru” or “teacher of the world”) of ancient times again has proven ineffective, as seen after Operation Sindoor, when none of its allies supported it.

As Modi approaches the end of his likely last term, he must carefully assess his personal shortcomings and reemphasize the BJP’s original promises to build a new culture of honest, fair, corruption-free, responsive and responsible democratic governance — completely different from the previous Congress governments in India. 

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Current Politics of Narendra Modi Exposes the Limits of His Leadership appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Atul Singh: Well, Gary, one of the things that we have to look at when we look at places like Israel and Palestine and India and Pakistan is the nature of history and the nature of competing narratives. Now, as far as India is concerned, this was a cold-blooded Islamist terror attack. Twenty-six people are dead, killed after being asked about their religion.

Gary Grappo: This is up in Kashmir in the Indian—

Atul Singh: This is up near Pahalgam, a terrorist spot, yes. And this is part of a pattern. Islam has used terror as an instrument of state policy. Its leaders have admitted to using terror as an instrument of state policy, and they have sought strategic depth against India, in particular since the loss of Bangladesh in 1971. Remember, there was a 1971 India–Pakistan war. Pakistan came up short, and after it came up short, Bangladesh was formed. Pakistan has pursued a strategy of bleeding India through a thousand cuts. It was General Zia-ul-Haq, the Islamist president, who took over in a military coup and hung Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who initiated it. Lest we forget, it was Bhutto who declared the Ahmadis to be non-Muslims in 1974 and said they would eat grass for a thousand years but get a nuclear bomb. So Bhutto was no saint, but Zia was worse. In fact, it was Bhutto’s intransigence that led to Bangladesh. He was racist; he thought the Bangladeshis were dark-skinned for Muslims. So we can go into a whole eddy, but the bottom line is that Pakistan was founded on the idea that all Muslims of the Indian subcontinent are a separate nation. It was founded on the nostalgia of the Delhi Sultanate, which was a garrison state, as Ishtiaq Ahmed — a noted historian or political scientist at the University of Stockholm, professor emeritus, originally of Pakistani origin — has talked about. He’s talked about a garrison state in the context of post-1947 history, and for Pakistan to inflict damage in India, they have fanned many insurgencies. In fact, in the early days, it was Punjab. There was disaffection there. And then after 1989, it was Kashmir. Now, as far as India is concerned, since 2014, India has been ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party — it’s a Hindu right party. And the Bharatiya Janata Party has thumped its chest and, literally, the prime minister has said he’s got a 56-inch chest and claimed to be the great masters of national security. And they have trumpeted that tourism has replaced terrorism. So this is not egg in their face, but blood in their face. And so they’ve lost a lot of face because they had put in a lot of investment, they had built infrastructure, they had liaised with the Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to get investment in Kashmir. Indian tourists have started going to Kashmir in large numbers, and so for this to happen will have a chilling effect on tourism. So there’ll be less money flowing into Kashmir, so there’ll be more unemployment, and that Pakistan will hope to exploit. They’ve killed tourists, and now kill tourism.

Strategic fallout and historic patterns

Atul Singh: And what has happened on top of that is that they’ve been weighed, measured and found wanting. And mind you, since 2023, Pakistan has been following a policy of targeting Indian army and Indian security personnel in Poonch and Rajouri. That’s in Jammu, the other region, because Jammu and Kashmir are, as you know, twin regions.

Gary Grappo: Right. It’s probably useful to note that Kashmir has long been known as a popular tourist destination, dating back even to the early middle part of the British colonial period. Obviously, during that time, it was quite exotic, but Westerners in particular have looked to Kashmir with aspirations of sometime visiting this place that is somewhat reminiscent of Shangri-La, (Atul laughs) with high elevations, the spectacular mountains, gorgeous lakes, lovely weather. It seems to have it all. And so it’s not unusual that the government of India would put that kind of investment into developing the tourism infrastructure in order to drum up not only foreign tourism but, as you mentioned, Indian tourism.

Atul Singh: Massive domestic tourism. Especially, it was pent-up demand — because for decades, people wanted to go but couldn’t. And now the government said, “Everything’s hunky-dory, you can go,” and everyone went. And tourism in Kashmir was not just British times, Gary. It goes back to Jahangir, who came to the throne in 1605 and would wander off to Kashmir to escape the heat of the North Indian plains. And of course, he was a Mughal emperor who liked his booze, and he’s the one who allowed the British East India Company in. So I don’t want to get lost in history, but he’s the father of the chap who built the Taj Mahal.

Gary Grappo: Aha.

Atul Singh: So Akbar, the only great Mughal emperor, apart from his grandfather who conquered India. So Kashmir has long been regarded as this magical Shangri-La place. And during the attack, what transpired is: There was complacency. It was a complete failure of intelligence — we’ll get to that in a bit — on the Indian side. There weren’t security personnel there in the meadow. There should have been; it was a very popular tourist place. And the response time of the security personnel to get to the spot of massacre was quite high. So once again, a terrorist attack happens in India — remember Mumbai, 2008 — and once again, Indian intelligence and Indian security forces are found wanting.

Gary Grappo: This sounds eerily reminiscent of the Hamas attack on the Israelis on October 7.

Atul Singh: Exactly. Yes, it is eerily similar. The scale was smaller, but they have gone far deeper inland. Hamas, they just crossed the border. Here, if you look at where the attack happened, that’s quite a long way away from the Line of Control. So it is a pretty impressive logistical achievement of the Pakistani army to conduct this attack.

ISI, Asim Munir and Pakistan’s terror networks

Atul Singh: Now, what are the incentives? I always—

Gary Grappo: Just a cautionary note: You said, “Pakistani army.”

Atul Singh: Yeah.

Gary Grappo: But it was a terrorist organization.

Atul Singh: Yes, it was, it was. But the reports that we are getting from people in intelligence and also contacts outside India is that, most likely, the Pakistani army was behind this attack. The balance of probabilities — this is including our British friends — and the reason for it is threefold. Number one, we have to talk about the new Chief of Army Staff, Syed Asim Munir Ahmad Shah. As you know, Pakistan has always had “Allah, Army, America.” And of course, Syed Asim Munir is not like his predecessor, Bajwa. You’ll be surprised to learn, Gary, that he went to a traditional Islamic seminary. He went to the Markazi Madarsa Darul Tajweed, and his father was an imam. So this is not your Scotch-drinking Pakistani patrician landlord general, whose top interests are Scotch, Scotch and Scotch. (Laughs) This is more of a General Zia-ul-Haq kind of figure, alright?

Gary Grappo: Yeah.

Atul Singh: And his family is originally from Jalandhar, which is Indian Punjab. And guess what? He was Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence. Surprise, surprise! (Laughs)

Gary Grappo: Which has a rather extensive history of collaboration with extremist Islamic groups, not least of which was the Taliban during the American period in Afghanistan, much to the never-ending fury of the Americans.

Atul Singh: Exactly. So General Asim Munir — and he’s the chap who had the shortest stint as DG, Director General of ISI, apparently because he exposed the corruption of Imran Khan’s wife, Bushra Bibi. Well, hey ho, there we go; that is what it is. He gave a speech recently which was very telling, very Islamist, very targeting of India. I’ll dig it out and send it. In fact, I’ll try to share it with our viewers in analysis. So, the nature of Asim Munir is important, because he believes that Pakistan needs strategic depth and strength against India, and they cannot let Kashmir normalize, because otherwise it’ll slip out of Pakistani hands. Number two is the Pakistani army’s unpopularity. We know that they have locked up Imran Khan, their most popular leader since Ali Bhutto. Of course, Imran’s blamed America, as usual. Everything is America’s fault. Gary, as you know, you’re omniscient and omnipotent. You are the gods, the great Olympians of today’s times — those of you in the State Department and CIA.

Gary Grappo: The world’s favorite whipping boy.

Atul Singh: Exactly. I meet people at the State Department. I sometimes think, “If only they were as people imagine them to be, they really could do a lot of damage.” (Laughs) But as you know, people are people. And the unpopularity of the Pakistani army is owed to the fact that the country is in an economic crisis, a disproportionate share of resources end up with the Pakistani army. And it’s not just the budget — they have prime land, they have golf courses, they have extraordinary benefits, and their top generals tend to be corrupt and amass massive fortunes. Rumor has it that they’ve sold all their shells to Ukraine. So should there be war with India, they’ll run out of artillery shells. So the Pakistani military is not quite the US military, Gary — and it’s certainly not the British military, especially of colonial or imperial times. So the Pakistani army needed a distraction. And remember that recently they’ve suffered in Balochistan. They’ve had demonstrations by large crowds against them for the first time in their history, houses of generals have been sacked. All of this has happened. How do you unify a country? And look at the kafir — India, run by evil idol worshippers who are running an apartheid regime against our fellow Muslims who rightfully belong to Pakistan, i.e., Kashmir. Good narrative, gets everyone worked up. The only thing holding Pakistan together, as we know, is hatred for India, because it is the “Pure Land,” Pakistan. So they needed something to do to boost their popularity again. And indeed, India’s actions have boosted unity in Pakistan and the popularity of the Pakistani army. Insofar as the attack goes, it has served a certain end.

India’s institutional weakness and complacency

Gary Grappo: There has been a claim on the Pakistani side that this is a response to Indian-inspired attacks by separatist groups in Balochistan and Pakistan. How do you assess those claims?

Atul Singh: Well, look — India may have given some money to these groups, but I doubt Indian intelligence is that competent. Because, again, remember that people end up in Indian intelligence — especially India’s R&AW — when they don’t get what they want. The top choice of everybody in India is the Indian Administrative Service. We have one civil services exam. There’s no separate entry, really, for any of the civil services. So you write one civil services exam. So the chap who hates numbers ends up as the taxman in the Indian Revenue Service. The chap who can barely do pull-ups ends up in the Indian Police Service and can hardly run. And the chap who cannot speak ends up in the Indian Foreign Service. (Laughs) So, to put it politely, it is a Kafkaesque nightmare — to use language that my British friends would use, and that includes the Scots and the Welsh — it’s a clusterfuck, you know. And also on top of that, what happens is that people get in at 28, 29. It’s too late to mold them. People go to R&AW initially from the lower civil services — which is not so much of a problem, but the fact that they are going in because they didn’t get any of the top choices, where you have more opportunities for graft — i.e., corruption — and for power. And then the top positions are held by the IPS, the Indian Police Service. And the only IPS officers who join R&AW, which is the Research and Analysis Wing, or even the Intelligence Bureau, are those who are unhappy. I repeat: those who are unhappy with the cadre they are allotted, meaning they’re allotted Tamil Nadu, and they are from Delhi and they are hating the southern heat. Or they’re from Delhi and they’re allotted Nagaland — my previous state cadre — because you’re allotted a state cadre and you want to come to Delhi for your children’s education. So if you don’t like your cadre, your state, or you don’t like your chief minister, or for some reason you fall out with the local state political bosses, then you flee to a central deputation. So the reality is that unlike the Inter-Services Intelligence, which is the crème de la crème of Pakistan, the R&AW is the slough of the Indian system. So their competence is, shall we say, not dramatically high. So Pakistan blames R&AW after it blames the CIA. And just as the CIA doesn’t have Pakistan as a top priority, so does the R&AW not have Pakistan as a top priority. Their top priority is probably stealing money, which is the top priority of Indian bureaucrats when they cannot… And then, of course, it is getting a posting to the US or UK so that their children can go to top universities like Harvard or Oxford on taxpayer money. So no one even learns Balochi in the R&AW. We have such a crisis. You’ll have the odd man who’s extremely determined and is very motivated, and maybe that’s five to 10%, but generally it’s a dysfunctional organization. So to blame a completely dysfunctional organization for all the evils in Pakistan is slightly tall. I would suspect that the Iranians have had more of a hand in stirring the pot. And they certainly do have an intelligence service that is effective. They are motivated. You have talked about the IRGC as well — very motivated is the Iranian intelligence, just as the Turkish intelligence has memory of an empire. We know that the Turks have a great role to play in Syria, and the Iranians have a great role to play in Syria and their near neighborhood. So I would rather, if I had to just do a logical, cool-headed analysis — and I don’t have inside information here — I’d say, hmm, probably it is the Iranians. Yes, the Indians may have given some money, but the operational ability of Indian intelligence to do much is highly doubtful. So I made the first two points: One, it is Asim Munir, then two, it is the Pakistani army. And number three — and I think this is important — is that Pakistan now wants to go back to using the terror groups again, because it faces a new threat, and that threat is Afghanistan. The Taliban has not accepted the Durand Line. The ISI feels that they are in an extraordinary squeeze, with an aggressive Taliban on its border, with a local Taliban conducting insurgency, with an India that is becoming economically mightier, with Kashmir—

Gary Grappo: Significantly mightier.

Atul Singh: Sorry?

Gary Grappo: Significantly mightier. As I said at the outset, India is now rising to one of the top economies in the world and Pakistan is nowhere near that level. So clearly, they must look on what is happening in India today, particularly with the foreign investment that is now pouring into the country, with great envy and with little, little hope of attracting comparable investment in Pakistan.

Atul Singh: Yeah. So just a wrinkle there: Because Narendra Modi has adopted a policy of Sanatan socialism — I call it Sanatan because the local word for Hinduism is “Sanatana Dharma.” Actually, there was a huge outflow of foreign institutional investors from India last year. The stock market fell, and foreign direct investment was practically zero. So yes, over the last few years, investment has come in, but India will have to correct its path. And should the free trade agreement with the US and the UK transpire — and that will require India to bring in some market-friendly reforms — India will be back in business. But you’re right in over a decade or two-decade or even three-decade span, but not the latest, Gary. There are problems in the Indian economy. And we’ll do a separate issue, separate discussion on that. Very happy to, because that, for me, is the big worry for India: its economics. To go back to James Carville, it’s the economy, stupid. And we have a big population. But still, despite that, we have high growth. Yes, we have local industry. Now we are making a lot of our own missiles, we have a nuclear program that is decent, we are making artillery shells. India will inevitably improve. It’ll never be China. It’ll never be the workshop of the world. But it’ll be significantly better than Pakistan.

Gary Grappo: In their flock with the United States, they are looking at joint production of military aircraft similar to what America has done previously in places like Egypt and in Turkey, including advanced fighter aircraft, radar systems and so forth. And now, with the move of Western technology firms out of China, India is very much in the scope of these companies as a place that is much more friendly, although it obviously faces some challenges, particularly in dealing with the Byzantine bureaucracy of India.

Atul Singh: Exactly.

Gary Grappo: And it has a very capable workforce, very trainable workforce, and so it’s looked at as a place where Western firms, despite some obvious challenges, can do business and be very successful.

Atul Singh: Yes. And certain states of India, in the West and the South in particular, are very market-friendly — the coastal states. So we’ll get to that later. But the third point that I was making was that you have a hostile Taliban in the West — the very Frankenstein’s monster that Dr. Frankenstein created; Dr. Frankenstein being, of course, the ISI — has turned against Pakistan. And you have an India which is strengthening. And the Taliban and India, curiously, are talking to each other. So if you are Pakistan, it is in your imperative to rally people around the Islamic flag. And that attack does that beautifully, because it does upset a lot of the Hindus. Because remember, in the Hindu mind, there is this extraordinary sense of shame and this extraordinary thin-skinned feeling of impotence — because 1192-on, India was first ruled by the Turks, then the Pashtuns, then the Mughals. And of course, Nader Shah from Iran invaded India and slaughtered thousands. I believe it was 1739 — give or take one or two years, 1739 if my memory serves right. And then Ahmed Shah Abdali, a Pashtun, smashed the Marathas in 1761 and allowed the British to take over because they destroyed the most powerful local Hindu power. So in the Hindu mind, there’s this extraordinary sense that we’ve always been beaten. Farsi was the official language of India. We had to pay jizya, we always got defeated, our women always got abducted. We are weak. And now we must turn the clock, and we must be strong. And the Hindu Right takes inspiration from Israel, where the Israelis wanted to create a new type of Jewish man — and indeed, woman — stronger, tougher, aggressive, willing to respond, militarily innovative, with intelligence that was top-notch. And India has never achieved it, because India has many different countries rolled into one. The Tamils have their own script, and the southern Indian languages come from the Dravidian school. The northern languages are Indo-European. Hindi has more in common with German than with Tamil. So India is, in many ways, an ethnic and linguistic zoo. You go to Nagaland, where I served, and it’s basically 99%, if not 100%, American Baptists, and it has prohibition. And then Goa — I was born there — that’s Catholic. And you go to Kerala, and that’s Syrian Christians. And then you go to Lucknow, and the culture is Shia. But then you go to Delhi, and you go to Deoband. And Deoband is Sunni — it’s a theological seminary — and the Taliban follow the Deobandi school. By the time I finish explaining India to your colleagues in the State Department, their heads are spinning, because there are layers after layers after layers. And in such a diverse country, which is fundamentally a colonial state where we’ve inherited everything from the British, and the British created two sets of institutions: one at home in London, and they’re extraordinary; and one for the colonies, and they were to be run on the cheap. So the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service — they’re relics of the empire. They never created this at home; they created this in India. And the Pakistanis have it, and the Bangladeshis have it. The Pakistanis have the PAS, the Bangladeshis have the BAS. And the reality is that the Indian state is fundamentally a flailing state, to use the words of a political scientist; I think he was American. And the reason is: One day you’ll be running agriculture, the next day you may be running culture, the third day you may be running finance. The economist does not head the Reserve Bank of India, an IAS officer does. So at the top, the IAS is the general management, the elite management, the equivalent of the McKinseys. And they run everything from the Surveyor General of India, which should be a military position because you’re looking at maps, to the Director General of Civil Aviation, which you should probably know something about civil aviation. But the chap going to head it is coming from the agriculture ministry.

Gary Grappo: Perfectly logical!

Atul Singh: Yeah, perfectly logical! The Archaeological Survey of India is, of course, headed by an IAS officer, too — and that’s a punishment posting. But they don’t let go of any of the fiefdoms, because the principle that you can have a specialist in charge, a domain expert in charge, is a particularly despicable one. It’ll challenge the top caste that rules India, which is the IAS — the modern caste system. So India is not a professional state. And therefore, neither is Pakistan, nor is Bangladesh. And so, therefore, you have this inability to respond to crises, because people look up, they don’t take decisions at the grassroots: the top-man culture. And under Modi, the Prime Minister’s Office is all-powerful. It has expanded to a historic high. And it’s an open secret in India that if you don’t want to take a decision — an IAS officer wants to screw you over — they send the file to the PMO, the Prime Minister’s Office. It will never come back. So for years now, everybody in intelligence has been telling me that human intelligence in Kashmir has collapsed. And especially the young officers: “Sir, we rely too much on technical intelligence. Sir, things are really bad. No one is talking about it.” There’s a l’affaire du meta in the Indian media, because we are supposed to tell the story that everything is wonderful in Kashmir. We’ve hosted G20 in Kashmir. There are rivers of milk and honey flowing in Kashmir. And the reality is that in Kashmir, number one, the intelligence, especially human intelligence, had collapsed. The Intelligence Bureau was doing a shitty job. The R&AW, many of its agents were, in fact, double agents who were helping get Indian Army officers killed. They didn’t have a clue. The military intelligence as well had — they were marginally, probably arguably, a little bit better, but they don’t have the resources. But they weren’t doing great either. And every paramilitary or every central police organization has its own intelligence… well, yeah, they were complacent. The lieutenant governor is reputed to be incompetent. India has changed Article 370, in which Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh — three different regions — were one state. Now Ladakh is Union Territory, separate. Jammu and Kashmir is one Union Territory, separate. And the lieutenant governor came from Uttar Pradesh. He is a BJP man — a Bharatiya Janata Party man — but he does not have a good reputation within the BJP as someone competent. And he comes from my state, UP — Uttar Pradesh. So, from what I know from my family and my contacts, he wasn’t terribly competent, he likes sycophants and he’s in charge of law and order. And fundamentally, they merged the cadre. Jammu and Kashmir was a separate cadre. Once it became a National Union Territory, there was a general cadre, and you had officers who had served in Delhi suddenly popping up in Jammu and Kashmir. Officers who’d served in Goa, suddenly in Jammu and Kashmir or Ladakh. And they didn’t understand local conditions. So there was a weakening of the state machinery. So all in all, there was institutional decline and complacency over many years, and the government ignored it — just as there were weaknesses on October 7, remember, in Israel. It happened because a lot of reservists were not on duty. Israelis had become complacent. They had automated everything. They never thought that Hamas would be able to manage such a concerted attack. So just as there were many failures there because of complacency and incompetence, the Indian side displayed both as well. And at some point, there has to be a reckoning.

Geopolitical leverage: water and naval power

And this then, you know, takes away the scab of this inferiority complex that Indians have had — that we are militarily inferior, we have been beaten and we never respond in a muscular way. We never did in Mumbai. Before that, in Kandahar, we just went and released extremists who went on to found jihadi organizations that killed thousands. We never crossed the Line of Control in Kargil in the 1999 border conflict. We could have surrounded the hills and starved them, but we didn’t even dare to do that. We sent young men to die. So there’s a lot of this angst and heartburn. And in a way, Modi is now a prisoner of the popular outreach and this sensibility of having been on the losing side of history, culturally and civilizationally.

Gary Grappo: That, Atul, from the perspective of an outsider presents a very dangerous alignment of conditions, because it would appear almost inevitable, based on what you have said, that not only is there going to be an armed response on the part of the Indians, but a pretty forceful one to reassert an image of strength — which they have to project internally, but also externally to the Pakistanis and to the rest of the world — because they do have aspirations of being a global power. And being victimized by this extremist group demonstrates a certain vulnerability, particularly when it has its origins in Pakistan. So what do you anticipate will be the response of India, and what happens after that?

Atul Singh: Well, the most significant thing to remember is that the current government has weakened the military tremendously. And it has weakened the military by bringing in a new policy called Agnipath, the Agnipath scheme, which is that you recruit everyone in the Army, Navy and Air Force for four years, and only a quarter will be retained — supposedly the best. Now, why is it a problem? You may say it’ll create a meritocracy. It is a problem because every other government service offers a permanent job. And because of India’s socialist history and still-feudal society, people crave government jobs. You’ve been in such societies, Gary, so you understand this much better than people who’ve grown up just in America and have just seen American capitalism. And so what this has signaled to the army is that, “We are bottom priority. We don’t matter. We are just armed guards.” And so morale is rock bottom in the Indian military. Right now, in a village, the top priorities go to the local police, then to the central police organizations. And if you don’t get in, then you come to the military, which is frightening. And also the training period is just six months. So what happens is that often people commanders will wait four years to see if someone can be sent for an advanced gunnery course or technical course. Because if you send a soldier away and invest in that person, and that person is not retained; it’s a waste of investment. Luckily, the scheme is new. And so there are lots of old, time-tested and battle-hardened soldiers around. But morale is low and there’s a shortage of officers, too, because ultimately, civil services have all the power and all the glamour, and they can steal money hand over fist. So in Indian society, except for very idealistic people or people who really care about the military, or who just think they won’t get into the civil services, no one really wants to be a military officer. And that is a challenge many militaries are facing — the shortage of officers — not just India. So is the Indian military ready to fight? Well, we don’t know. Maybe, maybe not. India has not increased its investment in the military as it should have, especially given the threat of China on one side, Pakistan on the other and now Bangladesh, which has turned Islamist. And Myanmar, which is up in flames. Every border is active. I don’t think most American viewers and listeners appreciate it. India lives in a very rough neighborhood, right? So now, let’s then get to the other response: the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960. It survived the 1965 war, it survived the 1971 war, it survived the 1999 Kargil border conflict. It has survived all sorts of insurgencies. It survived the Mumbai attacks, which were spectacularly brutal, in 2008. It has survived all these tensions. But now, earlier threatened, the government has said, “We are suspending participation.”

Gary Grappo: And just for our viewers, explain why this agreement, this understanding is so critical to both countries.

Atul Singh: It gives the use of the upper three rivers — I could go through the names of the rivers, but we’ll keep it very simple. The Indus has five tributaries. Punjab literally is the land of five rivers. Some of them begin in China, and they flow into Pakistan. And Pakistan lives off the water of these rivers. The British built canals, and that canal system ensures that Pakistani agriculture produces enough grain to feed a lot of its people. Pakistan’s population has grown fivefold since 1960. And so the waters are very crucial for Pakistan. There’s always been a fear that India could build a dam and start using the water, because India’s population has grown threefold and Kashmir’s population has grown dramatically, too. They need more water. And a lot of people on the Indian side think that this treaty is overly generous to Pakistan and it releases far too much water to Pakistan. It’s like feeding milk to a snake. That’s an Indian metaphor — that snake drinks that milk and then bites you all the time. And so they say, “You know what? Just stop the milk.” And there has been this thinking, but no one has acted on this. And I think India now is at that stage where it says, “Okay, you keep hurting us. What can we do to hurt you?” It’s like, “Maybe we can build a dam in the future. We suspend the water treaty. We can increase and decrease the flow of water — increase it when you have floods, decrease it when you have droughts, build dams, choke you out. And then what? Then let’s see if you conduct terror. Because if you won’t stop, we have to do something.” That is the thinking of the Indian side.

Gary Grappo: That climbs a very dangerous ladder of escalation, because when you threaten the livelihood of a nation, which is what you’re describing in the case of Pakistan and its need for water to sustain so much of its population and its agricultural sector, then—

Atul Singh: It is a feudal society living off agriculture.

Gary Grappo: Yeah. So then you’re talking about casus belli.

Atul Singh: Yes, and so Pakistan says, “Then we’ll treat this as an act of war.” And the reality is that India thinks, “You know what? You’re inflicting war on us anytime at a time and place of your choosing. So we have to do something now.” Ironically, the suspension of this treaty is really popular in Kashmir, because they’ll get more water from the Indus. (Laughs)

Gary Grappo: It’s not ironic at all. It makes perfect sense.

Atul Singh: Yeah, from Chenab, from Jhelum. So yes, it is a ladder of escalation. It will take a lot of time to really make a difference — to build the dams, to build the pipes, divert water. They can pipe it out, actually. That’s the cheapest way. But the reality is that India is embarking on this because it is militarily less expensive and less risky for the government. Yes, it could also use its navy, which is far superior, to blockade Pakistan. And that is a scenario, too. That’s scenario two. Scenario one: Choke off the water. Scenario two: Use your navy to block off energy imports and just block off their exports. Just do something higher-impact, lower-casualty. That is the new thinking in India. And number three, which is the Israeli suggestion — and you will laugh at this — the Israelis say, “Why don’t you start conducting selective elimination of the top leadership of the Pakistani military?” Which is what they do in Iran. (Both laugh)

Gary Grappo: They have the intelligence and precision to carry it out in the fashion Israelis have.

Atul Singh: Exactly, exactly! So maybe we’ll say, “Why don’t you do it for us, and we’ll give you the money?” (Both laugh) So Israel keeps marveling at the fact how, “If Asim Munir is a problem, you can kill his child.” This is literally what an Israeli friend suggested. “You can take a pistol — you have to inflict damage, after all, and establish deterrence.” You can see the Israelis think a little bit quicker than the Indians. (Gary laughs) And the reality is that all of these three might be on the cards, but India is not in a position to conduct targeted assassinations. We do not have the capabilities. The state is flailing; the structure of the state, that needs reform. We can’t do that. The Navy — possibly, yes, definitely. And the first two retaliations under the Narendra Modi government were by the Army and Air Force. In Balakot, for instance, when the last attack happened. And maybe it’s the Navy’s turn. That could happen. And I’m sure that the Pakistanis have their own scenarios to inflict pain. And they need the war more than us.

China, drones and the manufacturing squeeze

Atul Singh: And there’s another dangerous scenario: Remember that China does not like the stock of manufacturing going from China to India. You wouldn’t if you were China, Gary. You would come up with your own response. It’s a chessboard with many players moving pieces, and even the chessboard itself changes. (Gary laughs) So let’s say you’re an ambitious People’s Liberation Army general. Let’s say you go to Xi Jinping and say, “You know what? The Indians are bothering the Pakistanis. We can give them 10% of our drone production” — not even other stuff. China is the factory of the world. The Chinese can arm Pakistanis. If the Chinese put troops on the Line of Actual Control — LAC — they put troops because both borders are contested with Pakistan and with China. So let’s say they put troops on the Line of Actual Control — boom. Alright, India will have to put troops there. And let’s say they supply Pakistan with drones, not even artillery. Let’s assume it’s just drones. That’ll be a huge problem for Indians, because India cannot match the production — 70% of the drones, apparently, according to some reports, are produced by China. China produces an extraordinary number of drones. And if they arm Pakistan, they could trap India within the subcontinent, because they don’t want India to emerge as a power in Asia. Just as the US fears the rise of China, China fears the rise of India. So Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap applies in the global context to the US and China, and in the Asian context to China and India. And that would be a nightmare, because the Pakistanis could conduct strikes. And Islamic radicalization within India has created a number of what you call sleeper cells. And remember, there are radical Muslims from Kerala, the most educated state of India, who ended up in the Islamic State — volunteered and went to the Middle East and fought. Remember — I think it was just a few years ago — there was an entire Love Jihad gang busted. The chap is in jail now. And the whole idea was that Muslim men, who tend to spend more time in the gym in India — you look at all the film stars: Shah Rukh Khan, Aamir Khan, Saif Ali Khan — they’re all basically of Pashtun origin. They’re all short, they are two feet tall. They are not like the tall Pashtuns of Afghanistan or northwest Pakistan. They don’t look like Imran Khan. But they have Pashtun origins. But they all tend to marry Hindu women, because the middle-class Hindu boys are too busy cracking competitive exams. They are geeky, they are weedy. And Muslim women are kept under wraps — they don’t come out, in the Indian social setting in particular. But the Hindu women are professionals — they are doctors, they are nurses, they are out and about. And the taxi drivers, the mechanics, the motorcycle riders, the gym boys with their tight T-shirts and big muscles often tend to be Muslims. Often they end up seducing and then marrying these women. And then, once women are involved, they will say, “Yeah, if you convert, it’s just nominal.” But before you know it, they convert. And I heard a tape of this person who’s now in jail talking about, “Oh, you’re converting — you’re just targeting girls of lower caste. I need you to convert girls of Brahmins and the other upper caste.” Because remember, the Indian social system, being such that if you marry outside your caste — in urban areas, that’s happening a lot — but even that is frowned upon, at least in rural areas. So one community doesn’t want you to marry out, and the other community — and I was told this by a very dear friend of mine — that the maulvi gives you a prize if you marry out and you get someone to convert. So that is also going on. That’s not huge, but that touches upon the insecurity of a lot of the Hindu middle class — that we are girly boys, we are vegetarian surrender monkeys, and the Pashtuns are more manly, taller, handsome, fairer than us — and they get our girls. Of course, it goes back to Alauddin Khilji. And Khilji is a derivative of “Zalkhai,” which I was told means “the abductor of women.” And he literally went around abducting or kidnapping all the beautiful local Rajput princesses for his harem. So this goes back 800 years ago. So again, there are layers within layers and memories. 

Gary Grappo: The historical roots of the animosities between the two religious groups, Hindu and Muslim, and the two countries—

Atul Singh: Not just two! The Sikhs have an even worse experience of Islam, because their gurus were killed. So Islam has, shall we say, a rocky past, a rocky relationship with other communities everywhere, but especially in the subcontinent. But then amongst Muslims, there’s this feeling that, “The BJP has pushed us out. We don’t matter. They don’t have a single Muslim Member of Parliament. We are excluded politically, and we have to hit back.” So there is this strong animus. And so the ISI has built a number of small cells which it could activate, and in fact, this is what the Mossad keep talking about. They say, “You could have a five-front war. You could have Pakistan. You could have China. You could have attacks on your coasts, which the Bombay and Mumbai attacks proved are very vulnerable. You could have an insurgency.” Let’s say you have 200 million Muslims. Let’s say 1% of them are radicalized — that’s just two million. And let’s say 1% of that 1% actually can do stuff — that’s 20,000. But 20,000 is still a big number.

Gary Grappo: Very big number.

Atul Singh: So if they blow up power plants, if they derail your rail tracks, if they poison your towns’ water supply, you’ll be stretched. You’ll be at breaking point. And we are not even talking about Bangladesh, which has turned against India recently, after Sheikh Hasina has left. It’s now far more radical than it was, the current government doesn’t really have control. Nepal, which has fallen into the communist arc of influence; Bhutan, where the king and I were at Oxford together — a very good chap — but he’s having to gingerly navigate both India and China; Maldives, which has turned more radical Islamic — that is not far from us; Sri Lanka, which, yes, also in the recent past allowed the Chinese to build a port at Hambantota. And so India is scared of the “String of Pearls” that may be used to choke it. The Chinese are scared of the Indians fighting for Anglo-Saxon masters, as they did. Remember the sack of Beijing and Lord Elgin II. Lord Elgin I brought back the Elgin Marbles from the then-Ottoman Empire, and they are in the British Museum proudly — as the British will tell you, they’ve preserved them well. And Lord Elgin II, the son — a Scotsman indeed — went off to Beijing with his Indian troops and sacked the Summer Palace. And the Chinese have not forgotten that. (Laughs) So the Chinese are scared that the Indians may yet again fight for Anglo-Saxon masters.

Gary Grappo: Well, they’re not quite Anglo-Saxon, but it’s not too far-fetched when India now looks at this new relationship — the so-called Quad — that includes the United States and India, Australia and Japan.

Atul Singh: But the US is seen as an Anglo-Saxon power, although—

Gary Grappo: Of course. And I’m sure Austria is as well. And so that leaves Japan, which now has a very cozy relationship with so-called Anglo-Saxon nations, particularly the United States and Australia. And now there’s India, that’s in the mix again.

Atul Singh: It grates on Chinese sensibilities. Please finish your point.

Gary Grappo: Well, the point is that this is a very new development in South Asia. I say “new” in terms of the longer stretch of history, where you have four disparate countries coming together, not yet in a military pact, although three of the four do have a military pact—United States, Japan and Australia. And the Indians, increasingly warming to a quasi-soft, technology-oriented military relationship with the United States, appreciating the superior technology that they’re going to get from the US and the rest of the West, which they’re not going to get — certainly from Russia, which can hardly afford to export even bullets these days, and of course, nothing from China. And so this is a critical relationship, but it hasn’t moved into the traditional Western alliance that the United States has with Japan, with Australia, with its NATO allies. Although, I think deep within the heart of many Americans — and now I’m thinking of the traditional — this administration is hard to predict — would probably love to see that kind of a security relationship with India.

Atul Singh: Yeah, absolutely. And that makes China insecure. So when the Chinese are acting — and remember, India is in a bind with China, as is the US — because India imports a lot of stuff from China.

Gary Grappo: Absolutely.

Atul Singh: It’s economically dependent on China. So, so many of the things India makes, from solar panels to electric cars, the ingredients are all coming from China. So India is in a bind. China is a frenemy in some ways. But China then is propping up Pakistan. The CPEC — China–Pakistan Economic Corridor — and the port in Gwadar. The idea for China is to tie India down in South Asia so that India doesn’t get too big for its boots. So we are in a very tricky geopolitical cocktail, where everyone feels the squeeze in a different way. And I’ve already explained the squeeze Pakistan is feeling. So you’ve got a lot of cats on a hot tin roof. It remains to be seen what transpires. (Laughs)

Gary Grappo: And summer’s not even here yet!

Atul Singh: Exactly, exactly.

US mediation in the face of nuclear danger

Gary Grappo: Well, to close out this subject of this recent rise in tensions when it looks like military action is imminent, is there a role, and is there a mediator? Like, is there a role that a mediator can play in lowering tensions, at least at the moment — the most proximate cause of tensions — to avoid something truly no one would want to contemplate? And if so, who might that be? If you look at the major powers, it ain’t going to be China. The Europeans probably don’t have the heft — they certainly have the interest in seeing this conflict moderated — so who’s that going to be? And can a mediator be helpful here?

Atul Singh: So, two things. India is traditionally averse to mediation between India and Pakistan because of the history. Because it was banned by the United Nations when it took the matter in 1948 to the United Nations instead of finishing the military operations, which it could and would have won at that stage. They could have taken all of Kashmir. They didn’t. And Pakistan changed the demography of Kashmir. And in Kashmir, what happened is that Pakistan-inspired Islamist jihadi terror groups changed the demography of Kashmir, and, in fact — I forgot to say this — they have been changing even the demography of Poonch and Rajouri, the border districts, over the last two, three years in a very concerted way. They target Hindu and Sikh minorities, then they flee. Over a period of time, the district becomes completely Muslim. So ironically, the Indians didn’t do that, and they felt they were always blamed, despite the fact that they had acted in a far more equitable manner than the Pakistanis in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. So Indians lost complete faith in Europe. They saw Europe and, of course, the US, partly because of Cold War alliances, as too beholden to Pakistan.

Gary Grappo: Yeah.

Atul Singh: And the narrative in Europe, even the use of language — that “militant groups” attack — that upsets the Indians. Because, come on, it’s an Islamist terrorist attack. People have been asked whether they are Muslim or not, and if they cannot recite the Kalma — or Kalima, as you would call it in traditional Arabic — they are shot. And in fact, a Christian said, “I’m a Christian. Don’t kill me. I’m not Hindu. I’m not Sikh. I’m not Buddhist.” And they said, “Well, look at what you’re doing in Palestine,” and they shot him anyway. So the reality is, Europe has absolutely no political perches in India at all. If the Europeans say, “We’ll mediate,” the Indians will say, “You can go fuck yourself,” — not in as many words. But there’s a real animosity to European mediation. With the US now changing its policy — and I have a friend who’s Republican, who says that India is the new frontline state against Islamism and communism. And he thinks that the US — obviously, he’s Texan, he’s a Republican — should get India to act robustly. And that is one end of the spectrum. The Pentagon and others, they want closer security ties, you said, with India to counter China. So with that, there are perches. And the US has the ability to mediate, but it’ll have to be a bit deft, and it will have to offer a sweet trade deal to have leverage in India, because India needs a trade deal. And now, with the tariffs, India could hurt very badly. So the US has the ability to mediate, but it would have to be deft and make sure that it understands Indian sensibilities.

Gary Grappo: And how would Pakistanis see an American mediation effort?

Atul Singh: I think the Pakistanis need the International Monetary Fund. You have a lot of leverage against the Pakistanis. (Laughs)

Gary Grappo: Oh yeah — 25% of the vote. (Atul laughs) If they want that next IMF bailout, yeah, they’re going to have to have the Americans.

Atul Singh: Yeah. And remember, all their kit is American. You can just stop upgrading kit and stop sending them spares. So you have a lot of influence. Asim Munir may still offer namaz — or prayer, salah — five times a day, and might remember his imam father preaching jihad against the infidels, and may still resent America and, of course, the Indians. But at the end of the day, he’s become chief. He knows the realities of his army. He’s not going to stand up to the Americans. And the Chinese cannot bail Pakistan out. Ultimately, it is the IMF. So the US has a lot of leverage in Pakistan and can use it. And the US has some leverage against India. And the US, despite all the decline, despite everything, is the only player that can mediate. But it has to be deft about it and not trample sensibilities.

Gary Grappo: And this is where the current US administration would be challenged. You really have to have an appreciation for the nature of this conflict. Yes, there was a devastating terrorist attack by jihadists, with which Americans, of course, can sympathize greatly. But the level of tensions are far, far deeper, and the complexities you’ve just outlined over the course of this discussion are virtually infinite. And that’s where I think this deftness is really critical in understanding that this is just not another conflict; this is something very different. And kid gloves are going to be necessary if you’re going to be able to successfully ratchet down tensions here and avoid an ugly military confrontation.

Atul Singh: Yeah. And one more thing we have to remember is that the reality is that neither side wants all-out war.

Gary Grappo: Correct.

Atul Singh: And so they want — what’s the term — an off-ramp. They want a ramp they can take and something that’ll save face for both parties.

Gary Grappo: Absolutely.

Atul Singh: Do you think Narendra Modi wants war? Absolutely not. After the Agnipath scheme, a war may be tricky. And Asim Munir knows he runs a bankrupt country.

Gary Grappo: Yeah. And it’s important to remind all of our viewers that we are talking about two nuclear-armed states.

Atul Singh: Yep.

Gary Grappo: And there is no individual on either side who wants to see this escalate to a point where one side may feel pressured, so threatened, to resort to the use of a nuclear weapon. And both sides understand that very, very clearly. This is—

Atul Singh: On that note, maybe I will differ a little bit. Because I think Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is really low.

Gary Grappo: Oh, yeah. Their thresholds are different.

Atul Singh: And India has a no-nuclear-first-strike doctrine. So India is not going to use nuclear weapons first. But Pakistan keeps threatening to, because that’s what gives it leverage. And fanatics in Pakistan — the graduates of the madrasas who have now infiltrated the army — the top man has gone to a madrasa, right?

Gary Grappo: Yep.

Atul Singh: So they, unfortunately, are talking a lot about using tactical nukes. So it’s not that both sides don’t want to use it. One side, increasingly, is open to using nukes, at least tactical nukes — and that is something to throw in the calculus. Because the old assumption, when you had the Scotch-drinking generals running Pakistan — let’s say Pervez Musharraf, right? The chap liked tennis. His top priority was Scotch, Scotch and Scotch, and then tennis came a distant second, okay? He certainly didn’t want nuclear weapons. Yeah, he wanted an advantage, he took the Kargil heights and yada ya. But I think what you said held absolutely true then. Now, we are not so sure that there aren’t people who are willing, and who make this assumption that, “Yeah, we have nothing to lose,” because Pakistan has gotten poorer, it’s gotten more desperate. Its population has increased, it is an extremely fractious society. The most popular leader, Imran Khan, has been locked up. The Pakistani military now has put the Sharif family and the Bhutto family in charge, both of whom are extraordinarily corrupt. The Sharif family is notorious for making tons of money. They are businessmen. The Bhuttos, the less said, the better. Bilawal Bhutto was known at Oxford for sex, drugs and rock and roll. There are tabloid reports of orgies that he used to conduct back in the day — that may or may not be true, who knows? But the point is that he speaks Urdu with an English accent; he’s completely not credible. So what the military has done to Pakistan is that because the democratic escape valve isn’t there for the tension to get out, because the state has not provided things like schools, hospitals, basic services, the population has swung and turned to the mullahs and the madrasas. And there’s a millenarian element in Pakistan. And Pakistan could very easily, in five, ten, 20 years — if it doesn’t implode — go the Iran way. So the calculus doesn’t hold that neither side wants nuclear weapons. I think if it’s an American diplomat, if it is an American politician, if it is anybody in Europe who’s thinking about these issues, or elsewhere in the world — even if it’s someone Chinese listening to our conversation — they have to bear in mind that the risks here are really high. And remember, because India is nationalist now, India will respond. In an earlier era, India would have restrained. And I think in India, their preferred response is as little war as possible. Because remember, Modi is Gujarati and his home minister is Gujarati: Amit Shah. They don’t come from military backgrounds, they don’t come from military families. No one in their family has ever served in the military, as far as I know. They are not geared for military conflict. But they understand water because they come from an arid region. So their favored method would be: stop the water.

Gary Grappo: Good point. Well, I think we’ve come up on our time here before we got into the great power discussion. And we’ll save that for a part two. But thank you so much for giving us these insights, sharing these insights. Confrontation between these two very, very large, heavily armed countries has great import — not only within the region, but globally.

Atul Singh: Thank you, sir. Thank you for the conversation.

[ edited this piece.]

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The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has 293 seats. This is less than the BJP held alone in the previous Lok Sabha (303) and much less than the alliance as a whole did (353). Clearly, the BJP is now in a weaker position and Modi is not quite as powerful as before. He has been prime minister since 2014 and the undisputed top dog in Indian politics. Now, Modi’s top dog status is under threat.

There are four key reasons why the BJP has fallen short in these elections. First, the party ran a poor campaign which ignored key issues that concerned Indian voters. Second, candidate selection was poor, and the party over-relied on turncoats while ignoring popular local leaders. Third, Modi alienated core voter groups that are traditionally loyal to the BJP. These groups felt taken for granted and sat the election out. Lastly, Modi failed to sufficiently extend the party’s appeal to voter groups traditionally outside of the BJP.

Ultimately, all four factors come back to a first cause: Modi has attempted to run the BJP from the top down. Instead of balancing the concerns of leaders, members and voters in each state, Modi tried to campaign on a national brand that centered on his own personality and achievements. This presidential style played poorly in a party with a strong tradition of internal democracy and grassroots organization. Modi has filled his cabinet with career bureaucrats that only answer to him instead of politicians that have their own followings. Instead of mobilizing all the forces of the BJP — which is still by far the most powerful political force in the country — Modi’s small circle of apparatchiks isolated itself and lost a sense of what voters really wanted.

The last two months have demonstrated that the Modi-led BJP is running out of steam. Opposition leaders such as Indian National Congress (INC) chief Rahul Gandhi, Shashi Tharoor and Mahua Moitra have been hammering Modi and the BJP in the Lok Sabha. Because it lacks the votes in parliament, the government has had to withdraw key bills. However, the Modi government has still not learned its lesson and has no clear plan for the future. Furthermore, no feedback loop exists and Modi is increasingly out of touch with the new realities of Indian politics.

The BJP’s campaign was not only poor but also tone-deaf

In 2014 and 2019, the BJP successfully sold a positive message of growth and development that galvanized voters. This year, its messaging got bogged down in identity politics, focusing on irrelevant Hindu–Muslim culture war issues such as which meats people eat and what ornaments women wear on their wedding days. The BJP thus ignored more vital issues like economic distress and mishandled numerous entrance , alienating voters.

What issues do matter to Indians? It is an oft-cited of elections that “it’s the economy, stupid!” The universality of this truth may be fairly doubted. Still, it holds true in most elections, and the 2024 Indian elections were no exception. In the years leading up to the election, India faced several economic setbacks.

In 2016, Modi announced his now-infamous demonetization scheme. The government 500- and 1000-rupee banknotes from circulation. Modi hoped that removing large bills would hamper organized crime and force businesses to conduct exchanges electronically, thus preventing them from avoiding taxes. Instead, the move wreaked havoc on India’s vital informal sector and on small businesses that relied on cash. The scheme may have wiped out as much as 1% of India’s GDP and cost over 1.5 million jobs.

The demonetization fiasco is a great example of the growing out-of-touchness of the Modi administration. Had party leadership consulted more closely with small business leaders, it would have understood how vital the cash economy was for this vital sector. Instead, it arbitrarily rolled out a policy that decimated millions of small businesses around the country.

The Modi government deserves much credit for rolling out the much-needed goods and services tax (GST), which made India an economic union like the EU for the first time after independence in 1947. Yet it is also true that the government implemented the GST suddenly and arbitrarily (on July 1, 2017 — India’s financial year begins on April 1), giving no time for businesses to adapt and causing many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to go bankrupt. As per the , “the multiple rate structure and an enforcement framework using onerous reporting requirements for businesses place[d] a huge compliance burden on businesses especially SMEs and [had] a negative impact on the economy.”

From 2020, India also struggled through the COVID-19 pandemic. Although India eventually in inoculating the majority of its population, the vaccine rollout was . Several nationwide froze the economy for a total of 74 days, with additional lockdowns in many states. These lockdowns were arbitrary. Bureaucrats changed conditions every few hours, leading to nightmarish results for citizens and businesses.

Demonetization, GST and COVID shrank the economy. Businesses closed and unemployment soared. For example, the number of unincorporated enterprises from 63.3 million in 2016 to 5.03 million by the middle of 2021, only recovering to their previous levels in 2023. That meant over a hundred million lost jobs in that sector alone.

India currently faces an unemployment rate of , and many economists believe the real figure is much higher. India’s population is growing, but the economy is not growing fast enough to employ of young people entering the job market every year. Also, growth is increasingly jobless, and fast growth alone may not solve the jobs problem.

In recent history, Indians have looked to the public sector for jobs. Under socialism, these jobs were prized. Although they make up only of the job market, public jobs continue to hold symbolic value for struggling Indians. However, there is an acute of openings in the public sector and scarce jobs have resulted in protests by angry youth.

In an unpopular , the government made military service temporary. Now, volunteers join for four years and only 25% of them will be retained. If they get wounded or killed, it is unclear whether their families will get pensions or benefits. This scheme has cost the BJP votes among castes and communities with a tradition of military service.

In India, huge numbers of applicants compete for a relatively tiny number of positions. Of course, this is often frustrating, but one can at least content oneself when the selection process is fair. Recently, however, a spate of leaks has compromised the integrity of civil service exams in many states. In February, hundreds of candidates appearing for these entrance exams in Lucknow. They had good reason to do so. Exam papers appeared on social media platforms before the government conducted the exams. The Uttar Pradesh (UP) state government was forced to the examination and it has not been the only state to suffer this embarrassment. Between 2015 and 2023, nearly 70 of paper leaks have taken place across India.

The BJP’s campaign neither addressed the exam leaks issue nor provided potential solutions. Indians understand that their young nation is emerging from poverty and that prosperity will not come easily. Yet they need to know that their government is aware of their needs and that it has a plan to address them. Instead, the BJP campaign ignored their concerns and focused on irrelevant culture war issues. Modi about the opposition pandering to Muslim vote banks, claiming they intended to give public sector jobs slotted for members of poor Hindu castes away to Muslims. He baited voters with references to Muslims as “infiltrators.” This turned off an electorate that religious antipathy and wants progress, not infighting.

In 2014 and 2019, the BJP ran smart campaigns that gave it an advantage over its opponents. It successfully leveraged Modi’s , made effective use of and commanded a solid . After ten years in power, the party seems to have lost its edge.

Modi’s charisma and his spirited campaigning did little to save candidates whom the party fielded with no consideration to their background and track record, especially in UP. Commentator Sanjeev Singh remarks that the BJP lost 10 to 15 of the state’s 80 Lok Sabha seats simply due to the massive of its chosen candidates.

This time around, the opposition used social media more deftly than the BJP. The BJP merrily repeated the slogan “char sau paar” — “400 plus” — to indicate its high hopes for a blowout result. The opposition the slogan on its head and stirred voters to action by warning that, if the BJP won more than 400 seats, the party would change the constitution. The BJP top brass to reassure voters that they had no plans to do so, but the damage was done.

Finally, the party organization had grown lax compared to previous years. The widespread that Modi could win any election and that “400 plus” was inevitable encouraged BJP voters to stay at home.

The BJP sidelined grassroots politicians in favor of bureaucrats and turncoats

The BJP has been a mass-based party that rose as the INC lost its mass base and turned into a dynastic fiefdom. Along with its parent organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the BJP is a cadre-based organization. Neither the RSS nor the BJP was designed to function as a one-man crew. Modi has fostered a personality cult within the BJP, and the party has organized an internal election since 2014, the year Modi became prime minister. Party members that Modi and his number two, Home Minister Amit Shah, kept tight control over candidate selection. The system has ossified from the top down, and talent is not rising through the ranks.

Worse, Modi has surrounded himself with sycophants. Officers of the heaven-born Indian Administrative Service (IAS) in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) are more powerful than cabinet ministers.

Many ministers are ex-IAS officers like Ashwini Vaishnaw and could not win even a municipal election. Vaishnaw’s handling of Indian Railways, with tracks and increasing as service drops, has been an embarrassment. Vaishnaw has tried and failed to present an image of success by publicizing the premium Vande Bharat lines, which most of the population do not use. Voters sense that ministers like Vaishnaw are shallow social media phenomena and not representatives of a bona fide constituency. They declined to support more of Modi’s flash-in-the-pan, manufactured politicians at the polls. 

Modi even gave tickets to undeserving children of IAS officers like Nripendra Mishra whose son Saket Mishra lost a seat the BJP would have otherwise won. Modi has no children and has a reputation of abstaining from nepotism. However, he has allowed his ministers and bureaucrats to make nepotistic choices. Voters the BJP for nepotism.

Nothing just gormint servants touching feet of their "colleague" minister

Just like IPS used to do with Mayawati and Mulayam

Mr Vaishnaw being from urban educated civil services background should have reprimanded the first person who did this

— Comrade Muji (Muji ka Parivar) (@mujifren)

In addition, the BJP has given tickets to turncoats from other parties. Kripashankar Singh from heading the Mumbai unit of the INC to running for the BJP in Jaunpur, UP. Naturally, he the seat. In Maharashtra, Ajit Pawar a faction of the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), a party founded by his uncle Sharad Pawar, to join the NDA. The NCP contested four seats in Maharashtra and only one. Voters found these Machiavellian alliances unconvincing because they had no ideological justification.

Meanwhile, the opposition Modi’s “washing machine” in which corrupt politicians were forgiven in exchange for their loyalty.

Not only did Modi stuff the party with nonentities who do not command the loyalty of the rank-and-file, but he pushed popular local leaders out. has it that Modi and Shah have been gunning for Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, who is charismatic and popular. Apparently, Adityanath sent a of 35 candidates to the BJP national leadership, but not one of them got a ticket for any of UP’s 80 Lok Sabha seats.

As a result, many BJP and RSS refused to campaign, and many loyal BJP supporters declined to vote. Why should they work for turncoats while their own leaders sit on the sidelines?

Modi’s shrinking inner circle is out of touch with up-and-coming talent. Indeed, it feels threatened by young blood. So, instead of making organic promotions from within, Modi and company cobbled together a motley crew of administrators, relatives and turncoats. Needless to say, they inspired nobody.

The BJP alienated core party followers and RSS members

Poor messaging and faulty candidate selection are tactical errors. But the rot runs to the strategic level as well. Simply put, the Modi cabinet has become so out of touch that they have forgotten who actually votes for their party. The end result: the BJP alienated the individuals, castes and movements that form the core of its voter base.

We have already described how the BJP alienated party workers by sidelining local leaders. It bears noting that this was no mere blunder, but a symptom of something deeply wrong within Modi’s approach. Traditionally, the BJP is a grassroots party. In each state, local leaders command the loyalty of sections of the populace that have a long-standing relationship with the party and trust them to promote their interests. The party has a culture of local democracy, unlike the INC, which is always led monarchically by a scion of the Nehru–Gandhi dynasty. Modi attempted to graft a leader-centric style of politics onto the BJP and run it from the top-down. He thought that he could build a platform on national issues and ignore sectional interests. Thus, core constituencies felt ignored. They punished Modi by staying home on election day.

Hindi-speaking forward castes — particularly Brahmins, Rajputs and Banias — make up the backbone of this Hindu nationalist party. These affluent castes support a disproportionate amount of India’s tax burden. (Just of India’s population pays income taxes.) Modi’s administration has raised taxes in order to pay for its ambitious infrastructure development projects and welfare schemes. The bureaucrats who make these decisions are not politicians and thus feel no pressure to please their constituents. Forward caste voters thus feel that their loyalty is being punished as Modi robs Peter to pay Paul. They send their children to private schools and make use of private healthcare. Why should they supply Modi with funds and votes in return for nothing?

The Modi administration has alienated Rajputs in particular. was once the warrior aristocracy of central and northern India. Although they number just 12 million, they are a key BJP constituency and have been loyal to the party since its inception. Rajputs resented Modi’s sidelining of Adityanath, who belongs to their caste. To make matters worse, in March, Parshottam Rupala, a member of Modi’s cabinet, Rajputs by insinuating that they broke bread with the British colonizers.

Rajputs still retain their old aristocratic disdain for businessmen and look with diffidence upon Modi, Shah and Rupala, who hail from the mercantile, coastal state of Gujarat. They feel no loyalty for a Gujarati party elite that disrespects them and treats them, not as constituents, but as footsoldiers who will vote for whom they are told. So, Rajputs in key BJP stronghold states like Rajasthan, Haryana and above all sat the vote out.

Another key constituency is the RSS. The RSS, whose name translates to National Volunteer Organisation, is the source from which the BJP sprung. This Hindu nationalist organization originally founded the BJP and still largely defines its ideological makeup.

The RSS is a truly popular movement. It boasts millions of members, among whom the most dedicated are the pracharaks, unmarried young men who dedicate their lives to the organization to win hearts and minds by preaching, demonstrating and organizing social relief programs. The RSS distributes food to the poor, help build homes and participate in disaster relief. During the COVID-19 pandemic, they distributed masks and hand soap. These efforts have won them widespread popularity. Often accused of being Hindu fascists — since, at their founding in 1925, they modeled themselves on Italian dictator Benito Mussolini’s Blackshirts — the RSS is in many ways more like the Boy Scouts or the Knights of Columbus. They are the BJP’s backbone and spiritual heart.

Notably, the RSS headquarters is not in Delhi but in Nagpur, Maharashtra. The RSS has an independent power base that must be respected but the BJP forgot this  basic point. The Modi administration has distanced itself from the RSS. Jagat Prakash Nadda, Modi’s appointee as BJP president, virtually declared the BJP independent from the RSS in a May 2024 . This statement alienated millions of traditional RSS/BJP workers.

Note that Nadda is himself a sycophant with no significant popular base. Once again, one of Modi’s out-of-touch cronies was speaking to the cameras, not to the people. Distancing the party from a controversial right-wing organization may sound good to the Westernized English-speaking press, but it betrayed an utter lack of understanding of the sentiments of the average BJP voter.

Modi had hoped to earn the gratitude of conservative Hindus by the Ram Mandir, a Hindu temple in Ayodhya, UP. In 1992, Hindu rioters destroyed a mosque supposedly built atop a demolished temple during the reign of Mughal Emperor Babur. The temple’s construction was expensive and annoyed residents of the sacred city. Too many people lost their homes and did not get adequate compensation. Modi’s favorite bureaucrat. Nripendra Mishra, the notorious IAS father of the earlier-mentioned Saket Mishra, was in charge of building the Ram temple and did a truly awful job. 

Modi insulted Hindu organizations like the Vishva Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal by telling them not to attend the inauguration of the Ram temple. He invited film star , whose wife is an opposition MP, to the ceremony but Lal Krishna Advani, the prime mover of the temple construction movement and his political godfather. Many traditional BJP voters were disgusted by Modi’s behavior.

The BJP also estranged ideologically friendly parties in various states. In Maharashtra, the BJP’s unnecessary schism with the local Hindi nationalist Shiv Sena cost the party dearly. In Tamil Nadu, the religiously oriented AIADMK is a natural ally and ran as part of the NDA in 2014 and 2019. In 2024, the BJP decided to go it alone. BJP state president Kuppuswamy Annamalai exacerbated the split with against the AIADMK. The BJP just 11% of the vote, the AIADMK 20%, and neither won a single seat with the opposition sweeping all 39 constituencies.

Modi forgot to keep main supporters and key allies happy. He acted like the BJP was his personal fiefdom. Modi assumed that party members and workers, Rajputs, Brahmins, Banias, Hindu groups and the RSS would vote for him automatically. In a nutshell, Modi forgot that he was the head of the BJP, not the INC.

The BJP underperformed among poor castes

Modi failed to heed his own party because he was trying to expand beyond his traditional base and attract a wider set of voters — the poor. He thought he could gain a voter base so wide that no particular interest group inside or outside the party would have any sway over him.

Yet Modi was not successful. Of course, some of the poor did vote for him; it is impossible to win an election in India without at least some of the poor. Yet Modi did not win the poor over in nearly the numbers he had hoped. Why?

The most basic reason is that, to attempt to reach out to the poor as a voter base, the BJP attempted to play a game that everyone else was already playing. The BJP’s traditional middle- and upper-class voter base knows why it votes for the BJP. They are invested in the part. But why should the poor vote for the BJP? Modi a dole of grain or rice, free cooking gas, new bank accounts, maybe even cash transfers. Who cares if Rahul Gandhi offers even ?

It is true that Modi has built infrastructure at record pace. It is also true that Infrastructure projects are impressive and will pay dividends for decades down the line. Modi’s government presided over unprecedented economic growth. Yet unemployment is still . To the unemployed, growth is just a number in the newspaper or, worse, the reason prices are rising.

So, neither welfare nor development have won over the poor. Token reforms do not win elections — especially not when those reforms are paid for by squeezing the traditional party base.

“Is that the thanks I get for feeding you and treating you so well?” complained the Shepherd.

“Do not expect us to join your flock,” replied one of the Wild Goats. “We know how you would treat us later on, if some strangers should come as we did.”

—

Populism is not a game the BJP was built to win.

For all its Sanatan socialism, the BJP also performed poorly with poor populations, especially Muslims and Dalits. India’s Muslim community is largely , and many of them benefited greatly from Modi’s infrastructure development and poverty alleviation projects. Further, Modi instant divorce, a deeply unfair traditional practice that allowed Muslim men to abandon their wives simply by uttering the word “divorce” three times. He has made the lives of poor Muslims, especially women, considerably better. Yet he has not reaped political support in return.

Instead, Muslims perceive the Hindu nationalist BJP as anti-Muslim. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, which a fast track to citizenship only to non-Muslim refugees from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, reinforced this perception. And in the lead-up to the election, Modi did himself no favors. He indulged in rhetoric that made Muslims appear threatening. And of course, though the Ram Mandir affair underwhelmed Hindus, Modi’s construction of a Hindu temple on confiscated mosque grounds infuriated Muslims, who then voted en masse against the BJP.

Modi also lost the sizable Dalit constituency. Prior to Independence, Dalits occupied the lowest rank in India’s caste system, performing menial labor. India’s constitution abolished the caste system and established an affirmative action system wherein Dalits would fill reserved positions in the bureaucracy and educational institutions. The INC a rumor that the BJP planned to do away with these reservations if it got enough seats in parliament to amend the constitution. Dalit voters responded in droves and rejected the BJP.

It did not make sense for the BJP to abandon Dalit reservation. That would have meant political suicide and few, if any, parties would engage in such an act. Yet the rumor stuck. This shows the extent of the disconnect between the BJP and the poorest of the poor.

In Uttar Pradesh, Muslims and Dalits joined together with Yadavs to back the dynastic left-wing Samajwadi Party and the INC. Together, they 37 seats. The BJP hemorrhaged 29. Note that Uttar Pradesh is by far India’s most populous state and commands 80 out of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha. It is a miracle that the BJP is still governing without winning in the state. Next time, the party may not be so lucky.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Truth About Narendra Modi’s Unexpected Electoral Flop appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

India’s elections operate in five-year cycles. In 2019, the Modi-led BJP won 303 seats and formed the government on its own. Modi emerged as an all-powerful leader who ran the country like a CEO. This time, the BJP won 63 fewer seats than in 2019. More importantly, Modi had declared “Abki Baar, 400 Paar” (“This Time, Over 400”) and set a target of 400 seats for the BJP. Clearly, Modi and the BJP fell quite a bit short.

The Modi-led BJP is part of a coalition named the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which has many smaller regional parties. Alone, the BJP falls short of the magic figure of 272 in the Lok Sabha, but the NDA coalition has won 293 seats, enabling the BJP to form a government. As a result, Modi has won a historic third term. Only Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, won a third term as prime minister before; Modi has definitely made history.

However, Modi’s victory is Pyrrhic. He set expectations so high that the reduced NDA majority feels like a defeat. How did India’s popular high-flying, first backward caste prime minister come crashing down to earth?

In a nutshell, the Modi government lost touch after ten years in power. The BJP — literally the “People of India Party” — was a grassroots movement for decades. Note that the opposition Indian National Congress (INC), is a top-down dynastic party. It is ruled by the Nehru family with fifth-generation Rahul Gandhi, Jawaharlal’s great-grandson, in charge. Also, the INC ruled India for most of the period from its independence in 1947 to Modi’s historic victory in 2014. In contrast, the BJP has a long tradition of internal party democracy.

The BJP is a Hindu nationalist party, which was largely formed by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, literally National Volunteer Organization). They have been called India’s fascist khaki shorts but they are really the Hindu version of Jesuits. Largely single men, disproportionately from humble Brahmin families, spend their lives as community organizers. They are headquartered in Nagpur, a city in western Maharashtra that is geographically almost the center of India.

Historically, the BJP has relied on the RSS cadre to turn out the vote. This ground game has given the party an organizational edge in Indian politics. Modi’s popularity led him to sideline the RSS, state-level BJP leaders and even local party workers. Emulating the Nehru family model, Modi began appointing favorites and former bureaucrats to top positions such as ministers in his cabinet and chief ministers of BJP-run states. In short, Modi, his number two, Home Minister Amit Shah, and the BJP president Jagat Prakash “J. P.” Nadda have grown out of touch with their own party base. This top-down model cost the BJP heavily in these elections, particularly in the north and the northwestern Hindi heartland of Rajasthan, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh (UP). 

In a move reminiscent of Aesop’s “Goatherd and the Wild Goats,” Modi ignored his traditionally loyal upper caste base to make populist overtures to the lower castes. Modi offered them a cereal dole (five kilograms of wheat or rice every month), cooking gas and other goodies. However, Rahul Gandhi promised rather generous monthly cash transfers. All parties are now engaging in a race of competitive populism that the Modi-led BJP can’t win. So, the BJP lost some lower caste and class votes while alienating the middle and upper castes and classes, who pay most of India’s taxes.

Modi alienated upper castes and state parties

In UP, the most populous Indian state, and neighboring Rajasthan, Modi turned off upper-caste Rajputs and Brahmins with his high-handed style of leadership. For example, he declined to give tickets to the candidates chosen by popular UP Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, a Rajput, and instead ran outsiders and even turncoats from other parties. Rajasthanis and UP walas disapprove of the Gujarati elite ordering them around like peons. So, many of them stayed home when it came time to vote.

Local party leaders feel that they have no opportunity to move up, as Modi and Shah have filled the top spots with bureaucrats. While they may not have exactly turned against Modi, they were less incentivized to whip up their voters very enthusiastically. The Modi government’s new Agnipath scheme — army soldiers are recruited for only four years and only 25% of them are retained — proved enormously unpopular in these states, which provide large numbers of large soldiers. The fact that the Modi government did not follow a consultative approach angered many traditional BJP voters who sat out the elections in protest.

Modi, Shah and Nadda not only got the Hindi heartland strategy wrong but they also erred in their southern strategy. In Maharashtra, home of India’s financial capital, Mumbai, the BJP earned enormous ill will by turning against its ideological cousin, the Shiv Sena. This Marathi Hindu nationalist party that venerates Chhatrapati Shivaji, the local leader who began the demise of the mighty Mughal Empire, has been a natural BJP ally for decades. Note that the RSS headquarters are in Maharashtra too. So, this family feud cost the BJP dear. The BJP compounded this error by welcoming highly corrupt local leaders into the party and losing credibility as a result.

In Tamil Nadu, the BJP could have entered an alliance with All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), a local party that has historically been a part of the NDA. Instead, the BJP decided to fight the elections alone. As a result, both the BJP and the AIADMK were wiped out in the state. 

In short, Modi falsely believed that he was so popular that he could rely on his national brand to win votes without relying on the RSS, state party leaders, local BJP workers, regional parties and caste constituencies. The disappointing result has proven Modi’s presidential model of politics wrong.

Modi underperformed among lower castes and classes

In Modi’s defense, he has presided over ten years of competent administration, infrastructure investment, India, and economic success. Why did India’s poor not vote en bloc for the prime minister? Yes, 810 million Indians are getting free food grains and many others have benefited greatly from Sanatan Socialism, which is Modi’s version of the socialism India adopted after 1947. This means less theft by intermediaries and more targeted delivery of benefits. However, this does not mean more jobs. Economic growth rates might be high but so is unemployment. In fact, Modi’s 2016 demonetization of high currency notes destroyed small industries and the informal sector, worsening the jobs crisis. Hence, many poor voters whose expectations have risen in the last ten years turned away from Modi.

The lives of Muslim voters, many of whom are poor, have improved under Modi’s administration. In particular, Muslim women have benefited from Modi’s welfare programs and banning of triple talaq, the practice by which a Muslim man could divorce his wife by saying “divorce” thrice. Yet Modi’s inflammatory anti-Muslim rhetoric turned off Muslims who overwhelmingly voted strategically for candidates best placed to beat the BJP.

Simultaneously, the INC-led opposition appealed brilliantly to Dalits, the lowest castes in Indian society. Since independence, India has expanded a constitutionally enshrined policy of affirmative action to promote social justice in a historically stratified society. The opposition spread the rumor that the BJP would change the constitution and roll back reservations in government jobs and educational institutions. No political party in India would dare do such a thing because demography is destiny in a democracy. The Dalits and the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) — who are poor, but not quite as poor as the Dalits — form a majority of the vote, and the BJP does not want to commit political suicide. Yet the charge stuck.

In UP, the OBCs and the Dalits have had a fraught relationship. After independence, the INC used to rely on the Brahmin-Muslim-Dalit (BMD) alliance to win votes in North India. Over time the Brahmins left for the BJP, the Muslims started voting for regional parties and the Dalits flocked to their own parties. Thanks to the INC and the Samajwadi Party allying in UP, the Muslims, Yadavs (arguably, the most powerful of the OBCs) and Dalits voted together for the first time in decades. The Samajwadi Party won 37 and the INC six out of UP’s 80 seats. They had won five and one respectively in 2019. The BJP fell from 62 to 33 seats in UP in these elections. The Bahujan Samajwadi Party, a Dalit party in UP, went from ten seats in 2019 to zero this time around. Whoever wins UP has a good shot at running India and the BJP lost in India’s most populous state.

Modi is still prime minister but losses in UP and Maharashtra are big blows. His power not only in the country but also within the party is now greatly diminished.

What happens next?

What does this result mean for Modi, for the BJP, for India, and for its international partners and adversaries?

For the moment, there will not be a major policy shift. Modi has kept his cabinet unchanged, although Nadda will step down as party president. The government though weakened will carry on much as usual for now. However, the party will go through a period of soul-searching. The RSS and the BJP still have a strong will to power. They are already seeking to improve feedback loops and communication with various stakeholders. Obviously, this includes business leaders. More open channels could potentially prevent missteps like Modi’s poorly thought-out  2016 demonetization mentioned earlier.

The third Modi government is likely to push public infrastructure investment less aggressively. While this investment is necessary and will pay dividends for decades into the future, it also has a tendency to crowd out private investment. In Modi’s third term, there should be greater private investment and even consumption, creating new opportunities for US, Japanese and other foreign businesses. The French luxury sector, as well as Swiss businesses —  following Bern’s recent massive free trade agreement with Delhi — are also likely to do well in India.

Also, India will need to look for new sources of arms imports because Russia and Israel are both preoccupied with their own wars. France is likely to emerge as a big supplier, as it places fewer restrictions on its arms than the US does. 

China may see a weakened Indian government as an opportunity to put further pressure on India in the Himalayas or the Maldives. Conversely, China may also decide that now is the time for »ĺĂ©łŮ±đ˛ÔłŮ±đ. This decision lies with Beijing and we will have to watch the smoke signals at Zhongnanhai carefully.

As far as Modi is concerned, he remains prime minister for now. However, political leaders both in the BJP and in other parties will be out for his blood. The INC may woo away one of Modi’s coalition partners by offering the leaders of regional parties the position of the prime minister. The INC has broken coalitions before and regional leaders might want their names in the national history books, even if they become prime ministers for just a month or two. 

The bottom line is that Indian democracy is far healthier than what many Western and Indian pundits proclaim. These observers had been sounding the alarm bells about Hindu fascism and democratic backsliding in India. Many treated a Modi supermajority as inevitable. However, Indian voters proved these Chicken Littles wrong.

Like Indira Gandhi, Modi is a powerful prime minister, but he is not powerful enough to control elections. Indian voters have shown they remain in charge. Furthermore, BJP leaders, workers and voters have shown that Modi is not even in charge of his own party. Today, as it has for three quarters of a century, India’s big, messy democracy is still going strong.

[ edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Making Sense of India’s Mammoth Elections and Their Startling Results appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

This year’s election is historic for J&K, as it is the first national election since the revocation of Article 370, a constitutional provision that granted the territory significant autonomy from Delhi.

What is Article 370?

When India attained its independence on August 15, 1947, the area today comprising Jammu and Kashmir, along with Ladakh and other areas administered by China and Pakistan, was a separate kingdom. Kashmir’s king, Hari Singh, intended to rule independently. However, Pakistan saw the Muslim-majority kingdom as its natural territory and attempted to incorporate it by force. In response, Singh opted to sign an instrument of accession with the Dominion of India, allowing Indian troops to enter Kashmir’s capital, Srinagar. 

Under the of the instrument of accession, the government of India controlled defense, external affairs and communications, while Jammu & Kashmir would control all other sectors. The newly independent India codified this arrangement by adopting Article 370 to its constitution. The measure also granted temporary special status to the territory and allowed it to have its own flag and constitution.

As an Indian state under Article 370, J&K suffered from a violent for almost 30 years. Islamist militias resented Indian rule and sought secession. The violence deterred economic activity, especially tourism, which this picturesque mountainous region relies on heavily. A powerful local elite monopolised what resources there were and left most of the population.

What has changed since the termination of Article 370?

In 2019, the Modi government terminated Article 370. The state was split into two union territories, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. The change was a breath of fresh air for Kashmir. It broke the stranglehold of the local elite and allowed law enforcement to crack down on Islamist militias. Since then, the lives of ordinary Kashmiris have changed dramatically. The union territory has seen almost no large-scale incident of lawlessness since 2019. Tourists are returning, and the biggest problem for many resorts is not having enough space for all of the visitors. Development projects are now moving at a fast pace. For example, in 2022, J&K the Chenab Bridge, the world’s highest rail bridge.

Now that they are richer, people are also happier. The ongoing Israel–Hamas war, which has seen so much destruction in Gaza, has enflamed anger among Muslims worldwide. Kashmiri Muslims are no exception. Yet, this anger has not translated into action against the Indian state. People seem to be content with the current arrangement.

How will the 2024 elections go in Kashmir?

One might have expected the BJP to capitalise politically on all this success in the union territory. Yet, although the administration has made great progress over the last five years, the BJP party apparatus has not kept pace. The nationally dominant party did not set up adequate machinery to push its messages and whip up votes. It seems to have entered the 2024 election in J&K largely unprepared. In three constituencies — Anantnag-Rajouri, Srinagar and Baramulla — the BJP did not even bother to field candidates.

The three parliamentary constituencies belong to areas that have traditionally opposed the Indian state. The BJP may have concluded that while anti-Delhi sentiment has gone latent, it may not have entirely disappeared. So, instead of fielding candidates, it tried to put its support behind local parties it deemed acceptable. Yet the move seems more like an afterthought than a bona fide strategy.

Still, J&K is now at a potential inflection point. Kashmiris, Muslims, Hindus and others alike, have the ability to put the past behind them and change their voting patterns by moving away from old sectarian lines to focus on issues that matter for the union territory as a whole. Tomorrow, we will see if this process has begun.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Spotlight on Kashmir — When Will We Witness Voter Realignment? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

For most of its history since independence in 1947, India has been ruled by the Indian National Congress (INC) party. Leadership of the party passed from father to daughter to son to son’s widow to grandson as the INC has dominated Indian politics for 40 years. During the rule of the Nehru dynasty, India maintained close relations with the Soviet Union and followed socialist policies, without the bloody purges of its big brother. 

The INC first lost power in 1977 and opposition parties came to power in coalitions but the grand old party of Indian politics could always stage a comeback. In 2014, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) triumphed and the INC-led coalition lost power. Since then, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has presided over a blossoming economy and is still exceedingly popular. The BJP is now the dominant party in the country like the INC.

Modi is widely expected to win the 2024 election. If he does, he will become only the second prime minister in Indian history to win three elections. Jawaharlal Nehru did so in 1951–1952, 1957 and 1962. Given the BJP’s likely victory, what can we expect from a third Modi term?

What to expect from Modi III

The Modi government will probably take steps to address slow job generation, especially in the manufacturing sector. In the past, poor physical and power infrastructure limited India’s ability to boost this sector. Today, the roadblocks are high cost of capital, labor and land. Another challenge facing the Modi government is the poor civic management of India’s cities. Presently, Indian cities are difficult to live in due to congested roads, crazy high air pollution and a lack of clean drinking water.

The Modi government would also have to tread carefully in its relations with foreign partners. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau recently blamed India for the assassination of a Canadian citizen in British Columbia. Similarly, the US believes that India was involved in an attempt to murder an American citizen. In India’s eyes, the two assassinated gentlemen were Sikh terrorists advocating the dismemberment of the Indian state. Both immigrated from India, the Canadian on a false passport.

Despite the diplomatic tiff, Washington and Ottawa are keen to maintain close ties with Delhi. They want to bring together all democracies in the Asia-Pacific to create a united front against China. However, India is more diffident about the West. Modi may keep the US at arm’s length, instead engaging closely with middle powers on bilateral terms. The government may also prefer a transactional foreign policy rather than a values-based one.

India’s troubled neighborhood

China is India’s northern neighbor and is indeed a threat.China disputes Indian territory in the Himalayas and has seized Aksai Chin, which India claims as part of Ladakh. India may no longer be able to rely on trade deals and economic relations to keep the peace with China.  India needs to reassess its defense architecture to deal with China.

Myanmar is currently in the midst of a civil war. In the past, militias based in Myanmar have caused trouble in the northeastern Indian states of Manipur and Nagaland. India may need to fortify its border to prevent the spillover of the Myanmarese civil war into India.

Nepal, which traditionally has close ties with India, is now trying to balance relationships with both India and China. India’s challenge is to keep Nepal firmly in its sphere of influence and prevent the expansion of Chinese influence in a country where the local communist party has become quite powerful.

Maldives recently asked India to remove its 89 soldiers and support staff. The country is growing increasingly Islamist and hostile to India. China will be all too happy to step into the vacuum but Maldives is in India’s sphere of influence. As in Nepal, India will compete with China for influence in Maldives.

Finally, relations between India and Pakistan have been deteriorating due to Islamabad’s sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. As Pakistan’s economy goes into free fall, Modi may have the opportunity to improve relations by securing a Pakistani pledge to discontinue these operations.

Modi certainly has his work cut out for him. Rising to these challenges will be crucial for the success of his third term.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The complex demographics of the Indian subcontinent, where country lines are blurred and communities converge, are at the core of the issue. Bangladesh shares a long, porous border with India across which both people and goods easily pass. The NRC threatens to upset the balance between the two neighbors.

To date, India has not executed its census scheduled for 2021 nor compiled an updated National Population Register, which is supposed to be the toward expanding the NRC. Additionally, in 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly that the BJP had no plans for a nationwide NRC. However despite this statement, Modi’s recent move to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), providing pathways to citizenship for non-Indian religious minorities, suggests a nationwide NRC scheme could be in the works. 

Initially introduced in the state of Assam, the NRC is to be implemented nationwide, to India’s Union Home Minister Amit Shah of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP vowed to drive out all “illegal immigrants” before the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. The goal might sound nice for an election campaign, but does a nationwide NRC actually hold water?

The dark side of the NRC

In Assam, the NRC procedure has been a complete disaster. The Supreme Court of India received petitions from multiple Assamese organizations asking for a revision of the draft NRC. The high court put the process on hold. The state’s BJP-led administration themselves have to accept the current NRC draft as well, claiming that some names were erroneously included or excluded throughout the process.

An overwhelming amount of bureaucratic red tape and corruption will follow the already protracted process when people begin appealing to the Foreigner Tribunal (FT) to fix their NRC status. In the case of a nationwide NRC, this will be a living nightmare. A few years ago, Supreme Court senior advocate Sanjay Hegde on the measure, “How do you go about this entire exercise with a population of 1.25 billion people,” he asked, speculating that “700 to 800 million people may not even have birth certificates.”

The most bizarre issue, though, is that the nationwide NRC, which aims to identify the nation’s “true citizens,” will ultimately force Indians without documentation to apply through the CAA procedure by claiming to be Afghan, Pakistani or Bangladeshi.

The nationwide implementation of the NRC could also have far-reaching consequences for relations between India and Bangladesh. The two countries have had a historically complicated relationship, oscillating between harmony and conflict. A nationwide NRC could undo it all.

India has previously that NRC is an internal matter and that Bangladesh has nothing to worry about. This intentionally delusional promise is not feasible as public and media discourse in India generally equates “” to “Bangladeshis.” There are still no clear guidelines on what will happen to the so-called “infiltrators,” but it does not take much to conclude that their eventual fate will be eviction to Bangladesh.

The prospect of mass deportations from India is a grave humanitarian and diplomatic challenge. Bangladesh is already burdened with Rohingya refugees who are unlikely to be repatriated back to Myanmar. Despite already having the ninth-highest population density in the world, Bangladesh is currently hosting Rohingya refugees living in camps and is in no position to receive further arrivals. 

Friends to enemies?

Beyond the deportation issue, nationwide enforcement of the NRC could have a widespread impact on sectors such as trade and security as well as people-to-people exchanges.

India–Bangladesh relations seemed to enter a golden age in 2023 when bilateral trade was valued at and India invited Bangladesh to the G20 summit; however, steps taken towards the NRC could also be steps taken away from Bangladesh. Any contention related to the NRC risks pushing Bangladesh further towards China, its largest trade partner. India risks losing Bangladesh, an emerging hub of connectivity important for its Act East Policy aimed at improving relations and connectivity with Southeast Asian countries. 

Furthermore, the potential displacement of millions could create fertile ground for radicalization and extremism. It’s no surprise that many people in Bangladesh harbor due to India’s alleged meddling in its internal matters, decades-long related to the Teesta River and by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF). This issue has created an atmosphere of public disdain and scorn directed towards India time and time again. The CAA and NRC are fanning the already burning flames of contempt between the two nations.

The last time the issue of immigrants gained such significant momentum was in 1979 in Assam, when tensions boiled over and resulted in the deaths of more than of Bengali origin. Already enraged by CAA regulations, anti-Indian blocks in Bangladesh will see a nationwide NRC as further attacks on Islam, especially if the deportees are primarily Muslim. This may become the stick to target the Hindu population in the country. India’s curious case of xenophobia will pull Bangladesh into its dirty politics.

The BJP government must realize NRC is not an internal issue anymore if it risks causing a transborder humanitarian crisis. The mass deportations or the establishment of prison facilities for people classified as “illegal” is highly concerning and goes against India’s values as a democratic and humanitarian country. India must consider whether compiling a list of the country’s citizens is really worth the benefit if it comes at the cost of families being split apart, people being uprooted from their homes and vulnerable populations becoming stateless.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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It turned out that elements close to the top of the Indian government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi were aware of my arrival and had decided to “invite” me on a tour. Eventually, they told me that they were dissatisfied with the image the American media presented of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The Modi people wanted to show me “what India is really like,” and what the BJP government was seeking to accomplish.

They insisted that they were not intolerant, much less the fascistic, anti-Muslim nationalists some observers were describing them to be. Those were the biased criticisms of the anglicized, socialistic English-speaking Congress party elites with whom foreign journalists interact. For three weeks, they took me all over western and northern India and gave me better entrĂ©e to the corridors of power than most senior diplomats could ever hope to obtain. They showed me how India’s power elites, both BJP and Congress party supporters, see India, as well as what the Modi government wants for the country. 

India’s national self-image is changing

For a thousand years, India was ruled by Muslims, like the Mughals, and later by the British. Hindus were powerless subjects. But Modi’s BJP government sees India as a Hindu nation. This is the concept of Hindutva, a view of Indian society and government, first enunciated during India’s struggles for independence against the British, which has guided the BJP since 1989.

Hindutva considers the Hindu religion as the basis of Indian culture and society. This is a powerful nationalistic break from the millennium of colonial subjugation and from the first sixty years of Indian independence, in which India embraced a secular, civic nationalist identity.

The Congress-party opponents of the BJP consider this concept of Indian society and government to be a dangerous betrayal of India’s multicultural, tolerant and socialist post-colonial democracy. A majority of Hindus seem to feel empowered by Hindutva, however. Modi and the BJP consistently win substantial support at the polls and in , and Modi’s reelection in 2024 seems likely.

Hindutva strikes me as a powerful resurgence of national pride, but nationalism also can foster dangerous intolerance. Human Rights Watch that there has been an increase in protests against alleged government human rights violations since Modi’s election and that government use of violence to suppress dissent has also increased. The BJP dismisses such criticisms: “The BJP is at least as democratic as the corrupt and totalitarian Congress party and the Gandhis,” I was told repeatedly by BJP supporters. 

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India is a rising world power

One sees evidence of India’s economic dynamism everywhere. Partially finished new highways and skyscrapers loom overhead even as cows continue to sit placidly in the middle of major roads. Most educated Indians see themselves as citizens of a nascent world power. I was told repeatedly that “over 250 million” Indians have risen from extreme poverty in recent years, the BJP supporters intimating that this was due to Modi’s economic liberalism and industrial policies. The United Nations Development Programme presents a more nuanced picture, showing a decline in poverty that, while indeed impressive, began long before the BJP came to power. 

Many Indians do feel that India’s bureaucratic sclerosis continues to slow economic development. Yet the World Bank now India 63rd in its 2023 “Ease of Doing Business” report, up from 140th in 2014. When I was there, I sensed a country defining itself more by a burgeoning world-class economy than by timeless squalor, pre-modern stasis and colonial bureaucracy.

An Indian Entrepreneur Talks Growth, Regulation and Corruption

Much of India’s media expresses a simplistic, jingoistic nationalism due to pressure from the BJP according to government critics. Old ways of thought die hard, too: I heard many statements about how Russia remained a “trustworthy friend” and that the US was predatory and had sided with Pakistan for over sixty years.

These are vestigial echoes of a defensive, postcolonial, anti-Western, Congress-party-led India. The power elites with whom I met proudly highlighted India’s growing confidence as a global power. India is involving itself in the geopolitics of the and the , to set global standards for semiconductor chips, a world-class space program and its arms purchases as it develops its own arms production industry. 

Many of the foreign policy experts with whom I spoke now consider India’s top strategic priority to be counterbalancing China. India’s leadership in the “Global South” or the non-aligned movements, participation in the BRICS organization (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and increasing involvement in Indo-Pacific military maneuvers and in US-centric organizations such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue all seek to strengthen India as a nascent, independent global peer to the US, China and Russia, but above all they seek to counterbalance China. This is why Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar of India as a “south-western power” — part of the Global South — but with “very strong bonding” to the West and to Western norms.

India has long sought a seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The UN is nearly unreformable, though, and as a result, the world’s powers will slowly create alternative arrangements to address some of the problems of global governance. The G7 grouping of the world’s richest democracies has taken on increased strategic importance following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. One can thus expect India to pursue, and probably achieve, G7 membership, making a “G8.”

The death of Hardeep Singh Nijjar signals new audaciousness from a rising India

Nothing shows more strikingly India’s new bold and assertive attitude than the recent incident that occurred between New Delhi and Ottowa over the death of Hardeep Singh Nijjar.

Nijjar, a Canadian citizen, had been active in Sikh separatist politics. He organized an among Sikhs resident in Canada on the independence from India of a new Sikh “country” named Khalistan. In June, Nijjar was in British Columbia. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau the killing had been an assassination, planned by India.

FO° Exclusive: Indo–Canadian Tensions Signal New Indian Assertiveness on Global Stage

India, of course, denies having assassinated Nijjar, but for years has him as a “terrorist.” India him of conspiring to organize a terrorist attack in 2018. India says that Trudeau has made his accusation in order to curry domestic political favor among Canada’s large Sikh population. It is likely, however, that Canada is telling the truth, given the diplomatic costs to Canada’s international standing of making spurious allegations about assassination and Trudeau’s explicit references to “credible allegations” collected by Canada’s intelligence agencies. The countries mutually expelled diplomat to show their anger. Relations between Canada and India have never been worse. 

More significant than the tensions between India and Canada, however, is what the assassination says about the “stronger” India of Prime Minister Modi and about the Indian intelligence service’s apparently more aggressive role in India’s foreign policies.

“They need to understand that this is not the same India,” Vineet Joshi, a senior BJP official. India now, he asserted, “is much stronger under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi.”

India’s foreign intelligence organization is the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Its mission is the same as those of the American CIA, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, or Britain’s MI6: to collect foreign intelligence on countries of strategic interest. But the RAW, like these other organizations, also conducts “covert actions.” Traditionally, the RAW has carried out covert operations against targets, including Sikh terrorists, within or near Indian territory. These operations are reputed to have included assassinations, but Nijjar’s assassination would be the that the RAW is believed to have committed in a Western nation.

States often believe that covert actions offer them solutions to otherwise intractable problems. They believe that there will be no political cost because the actions are “covert.” The reality, however, is that most covert actions are eventually traced to the service that conducts them. When they become publicly known, they cause significant unintended negative consequences — just as we are observing with India’s likely assassination of Nijjar. 

It is too early to know whether the “benefits” of the RAW’s assassination of Nijjar — eliminating an individual threatening India’s political integrity — outweigh the damage to India–Canada relations, to India’s standing and influence in the world and the possible increased hostility of India’s long-disgruntled Sikh population in consequence. Nijjar’s death, however, surely signals that India sees itself as “stronger” and freer to pursue its objectives unilaterally than at any time since Indian independence in 1947.

The event illustrates how India is now flexing the sometimes-obtuse muscles of a superpower. It also reveals a significant global expansion of the RAW’s covert actions, transgressing international and democratic norms in pursuit of what India considers vital national interests.

A newer, bolder India moves into the future

I never so much as glimpsed the Himalayas during my three weeks in India. Instead, I saw an India that will soon be the world’s third-largest economy, that is proud to now be the fourth nation to land on the Moon and that is playing a progressively large and confident role in international affairs. I saw an India that seeks influence in the “Global South” and closer relations with the West to counterbalance China. I saw an India that is struggling to overcome its colonial and socialist bureaucratic legacy and historical hostility to the West. I saw an India that, as it recently demonstrated, is ready to pursue its perceived national interests globally in spite of the costs.

It seemed to me that the BJP, in its efforts to free India of the harmful effects of a thousand years of foreign domination and three generations of socialist torpor and crony leadership, risks alienating its non-Hindu populations and sliding into intolerant majoritarian rule and a strong-man system of government. We will have to see.

[ first published a version of this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post India Is Growing Confident in Its New Role as a Powerful Nation appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

For anyone who wants to explain away India’s conduct at the United Nations as an act of national interests, there is more to consider. India is sliding deeper into Hindu — as opposed to a diverse Indian — nationalism, diminishing its ability to be a long-term partner for Western nations.

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India’s slowing economic growth, declining investment in its military capabilities and social unrest have prevented the country from modernizing its army and fulfilling its strategic goals. But it is the ideology of its current leaders that is jeopardizing the notion of India as a dependable partner of the US in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Instead of investing in human capital and health care, the focus of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has been on history through crowdsourcing. Instead of further opening the Indian economy through policies and reforms that would boost growth, and regulatory policies are rising. India is slipping on the global freedom and democracy indices, with Freedom House downgrading it to “.”

“Undivided India”

Leaders of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) continue to mobilize India’s majority Hindus to vote for it by targeting religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians. They describe Hinduism as an Indian religion, while Islam and Christianity are denigrated as “foreign” faiths transplanted onto India’s soil. Extremist Hindu leaders, including some from the ruling party, have even gone so far as to call for against 200 million Indian Muslims. 

A 2021 Pew Survey on “” demonstrated that tolerance for other faiths remains strong within Indian society. But a larger number of the majority (Hindus) now see religion as the core of their identity and support calls for a Hindu rashtra (state). This creates a dilemma for relations between India and other countries.

For example, Pushkar Singh Dhami, the chief minister of the state of Uttarakhand, which borders Tibet and Nepal, was embroiled in controversy for something he posted on Twitter six years ago. The showed a map claiming South and Southeast Asia as part of an “undivided India,” known as Akhand Bharat. In December 2021, an Indian broadcaster the entire region from the Middle East through South and Southeast Asia as belonging to Akhand Bharat, representing the reunification of territories influenced by India during ancient times.

This undermines India’s projection of itself as a pluralist and open society, where minorities were respected, not just tolerated. For six decades after independence in 1947, India’s pluralism created a groundswell of respect, goodwill and admiration throughout the free world. Even India’s non-alignment during the Cold War did not interfere with its positive image. Most Americans appreciated Indian democracy and diversity and showed understanding when poverty-ridden India preferred not to side with the United States against the Soviet Union.

Things Have Changed

But things have changed since the end of the Cold War. India has made significant progress in reducing poverty. For two decades, there has been talk of India as a rising power. Americans have expected India to boost its economic growth, modernize its military and play a bigger role in confronting China. In 2010, President Barack Obama relations between India and the United States as the “defining partnership of the 21^st ł¦±đ˛ÔłŮłÜ°ů˛â.”

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That desire keeps getting thwarted by India’s leadership, particularly Prime Minister Modi and his allies in the BJP. Thus, India’s economic growth has slowed down, even before the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and is unlikely to recover quickly. More significantly, India continues to expand trade with China, $125 billion in 2021. This is despite China’s military on India along their disputed border. That should lay to rest the expectation of India confronting China anytime soon.

Moreover, the commitment to democracy, human rights and liberal values, which made India a natural Western partner, appear under increasing threat.

Americans who have spent the last few years praising India also need some appraising of India. It might be time to acknowledge that India’s performance has been underwhelming to merit the kind of expectations that have formed the basis of recent US policy.   

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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As is well known, various factors contribute to a nation’s development. The most fundamental is the availability of food and water for the population. Here, India has had some success since its independence in 1947. In health care and education, India can and must do better. India also needs to improve safety and security for its citizens and improve the rule of law. The factor most important for India’s development is perhaps transportation because it has the greatest multiplier effect on the economy. As a result, transportation has the greatest potential to improve the lives of ordinary citizens.

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Transportation infrastructure, such as railways, roads, air traffic and waterways, are the arteries of a country’s economy. The German economy was built on the backbone of an outstanding railway system and the legendary autobahn. The US is knit together by a crisscrossing network of freight trains, interstate highways and airports. Advanced economies like Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and the Netherlands are known for their evolved infrastructure.

In recent years, China has set the standard for implementing infrastructure at a scale and speed unprecedented in history. Most economists credit spectacular rates of economic growth to Chinese investment in infrastructure. India is betting that building good infrastructure will boost growth, create jobs and raise the standard of living for hundreds of millions.

Railway and Highway Infrastructure

According to a 2018 by NITI Aayog, the premier policy think tank of the Indian government, 59% of all freight in India is transported by road, 35% by railways, 6% by waterways and less than 1% by air.

On March 31, 2020, India’s railway track length stood at and, on March 31, 2019, the length of national highways was . Per 100 square kilometers, India has more railway tracks and highways than countries like the US and France. This does not necessarily mean India is doing well. South Korea and Japan have over four times the highway length per 100 square kilometers.

Instead of the density of infrastructure per unit area, density per population size seems to be the more accurate metric. When it comes to infrastructure per million people, India fares very poorly. For instance, Indonesia’s population is merely 20% of India’s, but its highways are twice as long as India’s. South Korea’s population is a tiny 4% of India’s, but its highways are thrice as long as India’s. The top two stars on the infrastructure front are the US and Australia, followed by Japan and France.

India’s highway network is inadequate for the country’s needs. Highways comprise of India’s total road networks but carry a staggering of total road traffic. This means that not only do they suffer high wear and tear, but transportation continues to be a big bottleneck for the economy. It is little surprise that India is finally investing in transport infrastructure.

After independence in 1947, India underinvested in infrastructure. Two centuries of colonial extraction had left the country with limited resources and almost unlimited public needs. In its early years of independence, India struggled to feed its masses. There was little money to build railways, roads, ports, airports and transport infrastructure.

India also lacked the expertise to build such infrastructure at scale. Planners, engineers and skilled labor were all in short supply. The nation did not have enough knowledge of transport technology either. There was another challenge in a densely populated democratic country. Infrastructure projects result in the displacement of large numbers of people. Many resist, others negotiate hard and still, others approach their local politicians who start resisting these projects to win votes.

India’s varied geography also imposed daunting challenges for developing infrastructure. Largely flat countries like Australia and France could focus on railways, which run twice as long as their roads. Mountainous countries like South Korea and Japan have built more roads than railway lines. While plains and plateaus in India are crisscrossed by railway lines, roads are the means of transportation in its extensive mountainous regions.

A New Focus

Over the last 20 years, India’s focus has shifted to roads. This under the coalition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Although this government lost the 2004 election, NDA’s vision set in motion transport infrastructure development. In 2014, the BJP-led NDA returned to power and accelerated the building of highways across the country.

NDA-initiated highway construction was kickstarted by the , a project connecting India’s four biggest cities: Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata. This economic growth. Since NDA returned to power, India has embarked on , an ambitious project to connect the entire country through a network of highways like the fabled interstate highway system of the US. Even remote regions such as the and will be covered.

In the past, India did not measure highways as per international standards. This meant their growth could not be measured and compared easily. To quote management guru Peter F. Drucker, “If you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it.” Since 2018, the of highway length in India has been aligned with international standards. While impressive figures on the growth of national highways have been published, their interpretation now is clear and consistent.

There has also been a steady increase in highway construction rates. In March 2021, it reached . For the 2020-21 financial year — India’s financial year begins on April 1 and ends on March 31 — road construction averaged . In 2014-15, the rate was 16.61 kms/day. Six years on, the road construction rate has almost doubled and is the fastest India has achieved since independence. The credit goes to Nitin Gadkari, the minister for road transport, one of the star performers of the NDA cabinet. In March, he claimed that India had secured the for fastest road construction.

India’s Evolving Waterways Make a Big Splash

The oldest civilizations have originated and flourished near major rivers for a simple reason. They provide fresh water, a fundamental human need. Rivers also provided an easy way to travel and transport goods before the advent of roads and railways. Even today, commercial transport of goods via rivers, lakes and oceans continues to cost less than via land. While container ships regularly carry goods across the high seas, most countries no longer use their rivers very well. The US, Australia, Japan, Russia and China are among the few countries that use their rivers and inland waterways well. 

India has 116 rivers. Potentially, these could provide 35,000 kilometers of waterways and should be tapped. The government set up the Inland Waterways Authority of India in 1986 for “development and regulation of inland waterways for shipping and navigation.” In spite of tremendous cost advantages, waterways’ commercialization received little attention over the next 30 years. In 2016, the NDA declared across India as national waterways, a quantum leap up from five. By 2020, the government 12 of these waterways. The journey to suitably develop the remaining 99 will be a long and expensive one. However, this investment will cut logistics costs tremendously in the long run and boost India’s competitiveness.

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Gadkari points out that the in India is 18% of the total cost of production. For China, this figure is 8-10%. Notably, waterways account for 47% of total transportation in China, compared to 3.5% in India. As waterways develop, so will commercial activity along their banks and lead to job creation.

India has another major underutilized natural resource. It has a long coastline of spread across 14 states. To develop ports and coastal transportation, the government has launched the project. This could achieve what the Golden Quadrilateral did for roads in the past. By 2025, the government aims to increase the share of waterways transportation from 3.5% to 6%, reducing logistics costs, boosting exports and generating .

The Road Ahead

About of India’s population is under 25 years of age and many of them need jobs. Employed young people are more likely to send their children to school. They are likely to eat better and live longer. So far, India’s growth rate has not exceeded the job creation rate. For social and political stability, the government needs to create jobs. 

While India’s economy continues to grow, the pace of growth does not match the employment needs of India’s young population. Building infrastructure is one of the best ways to generate employment because of its massive multiplier effect in an emerging economy like India. The country needs competent ministers and bureaucrats with domain expertise such as Gadkari. Key ministries overseeing power and finance in New Delhi and India’s state capitals should emulate this model.

Along with building infrastructure, India must reform its arcane laws of colonial and socialist heritage to boost economic activity. The government must also reform education and vocational training in collaboration with industry to raise the skills of the workforce, improve employability and increase productivity. This is a tall order, but if India can get its house in order, then domestic and foreign investment would flow in. Then, the country would finally be able to join the Asian tigers as one of the world’s fast-growing economies.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Such attention to a state election is surprising. West Bengal is not the richest, the largest or the most populous state in India. Yet it has always been an important part of the country. The British started the colonization of the Indian subcontinent by winning the Battle of Plassey in 1757. Calcutta, or Kolkata as it is now called, was the capital of British India for more than a century. Of course, West Bengal did not exist then. Bengal was the name of the British province and included modern-day Bangladesh, Bihar and Orissa then.

History Matters

It was Bengali intellectuals such as Raja Rammohan Roy, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, Swami Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore who led the first Indian cultural renaissance. The founder of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the forerunner of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was , a Bengali. , the founding father of Indian communism and the founder of the Mexican Communist Party, was Bengali too. So was Subhas Chandra Bose, India’s iconic freedom fighter who defeated Mahatma Gandhi’s candidate, in the party elections of the Indian National Congress.

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Suffice to say, Bengal has played a larger than life role in the political and cultural life in modern India. Yet it is important to remember that this region has always sung to its own tune. Whenever a Delhi-based empire weakened, Bengal was the first province to sound the bugle of independence. Since independence, West Bengal has continued this timeworn tradition. Iconic chief ministers of West Bengal, such as Bidhan Chandra Roy and Siddhartha Shankar Ray, dealt with powerful Indian prime ministers such as Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter Indira Gandhi as equals.

The first sustained challenge to the Congress party came from West Bengal. It was here that the communists won a historic electoral victory in 1977 and remained in power until 2011. Bengal has thrived on an us-versus-them mindset vis-à-vis the national capital, New Delhi. Bengalis believe they have been wronged by New Delhi and have to retain their independence from India’s overbearing capital. In this narrative, West Bengal is the last bastion standing against the invaders from the north, and this is the essence of Bengali pride.

Mamata Banerjee overthrew the longstanding communist government in 2011 and has been in power since. She is a feisty leader whom her admirers call “Didi,” a Bangla word for elder sister. This spinster in Kolkata has taken on the bachelor in New Delhi and won. Fittingly, a doing the rounds on social media adapts Asterix to Indian political lore: “One small state of Ben-Gaul still holds out against the invaders. And life is not easy for the Gow-Man believers who make the camps of Fascism, Hindutvam and Religious Extrememum…” Other variants spoke about Ben-Gaul holding out against the all-conquering North Indian invaders and their emperor, “Modius.”

How Ben-Gaul Knocked out the BJP?

Before the election, many deemed Banerjee’s victory in West Bengal unlikely. Two BJP members of parliament confidently told one of these authors that their party was headed to a victory. Banerjee’s All India Trinamool Congress, abbreviated as TMC, was facing local anger. Many the TMC of “misgovernance — including corruption, nepotism and high-handedness— seemed” to have put the party in peril. The BJP was promising Bengalis rapid industrialization and high growth after years of economic stagnation.

Banerjee’s right-hand man, Suvendu Adhikari, decamped to the BJP, as did many other key party members. In fact, Adhikari went on to defeat Banerjee in , her own constituency. When the dust settles, it is clear that the BJP had reasons to be confident. Yet India’s ruling party led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi was stung by Didi’s ferocious counterpunching and was eventually knocked out. What happened?

First, the BJP did not announce a local chief ministerial candidate. It did not promote any “son-of-the-soil Bengali leader” and even mighty Adhikari was left to play a supporting role to Modi. In India’s largest state of Uttar Pradesh (UP), this strategy had worked. In West Bengal, the strategy backfired. The mother of one of the authors grew up in Kolkata and presciently remarked that Modi’s speeches in Hindi would not go down well among a people with immense linguistic pride. Modi did not even use an interpreter to translate his speeches into Bangla. Banerjee portrayed herself as the local Didi and slammed the BJP as outsiders insulting Bengali pride and even identity. It turns out that her narrative resonated with the voters.

Second, the local BJP leaders acted sycophantically. This was not in keeping with the Bengali traditions of local leaders acting as equals of leaders in New Delhi. Bengalis feared that the BJP would reduce West Bengal into vassal status. The historic suspicion of Gujaratis and , the trading castes who once collaborated with the British, also kicked in. Modi and his chief aide, Amit Shah, are both Gujaratis. When local leaders invoked the two national leaders repeatedly as Modiji and Amitji, they offended Bengali sensibilities and triggered old suspicions.

Third, the BJP failed to take into account the legacy of India’s first cultural renaissance. This intellectual, social and cultural movement that began in the late 18^th century and continued till the early 20^th century continues to shape the Bengali ethos. It challenged pernicious customs such as caste, dowry and sati, the burning of wives on their husband’s pyres. Inspired by secularist, modernist and humanist ideals, Bengali intellectuals set out to modernize not only Bengali but also Indian society. Middle-class Bengalis have long seen themselves as “bhadralok,” well-mannered persons. Modi himself constantly pays homage to , a charismatic Bengali spiritual figure. Yet he was unable to appeal to the bhadralok legacy of West Bengal. Too many Bengalis saw Modi as peddling a revanchist version of Hinduism that they had fought hard to reform.

A case in point is the BJP’s crusade against the consumption of beef. Unlike much of India, meat eating has never been taboo in the Bengali tradition. Even saints have not ordained against eating meat or fish. West Bengal remains one of the few states where beef is freely sold. The BJP used strategies that worked elsewhere in states like UP and Bihar. The party failed to keep its finger on the unique Bengali pulse that beats to a more self-proclaimed liberal rhythm. The caste-based politics by the BJP had limited success, as did the specter of moral policing as under UP’s hardline Hindu chief minister, Yogi Adityanath.

Fourth, the BJP’s narrative of local Hindus getting subsumed by Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants failed against the TMC’s narrative of New Delhi reducing Kolkata to feudatory status. Under Banerjee, Bangladeshi has increased and caused unease among many voters. Yet there is a strong linguistic and regional identity in West Bengal. The partition of 1947 has not cast such a bitter memory as in Punjab. Bangladesh itself broke away from Pakistan in 1971 on linguistic grounds. Bengali pride trumped Hindu identity at least this time around.

Fifth, Banerjee deserves much credit for campaigning with great energy and a clear message. West Bengal has done well in reducing and achieving higher agricultural growth than in the rest of the country even if overall economic growth has been low. Also, Banerjee’s schemes for the rural poor and women have won her much support. Modi has won a majority of the women’s vote because of his last-mile welfare programs. Here, Banerjee won most of the women’s votes in a fundamentally matriarchal society that worships the goddesses Durga and Kali. 

Finally, there is a politically incorrect point that analysts often overlook. One of the authors is Bengali and can attest that bhadralok culture has prized learning over wealth. In part, this might have been a defense mechanism to cope with the poverty the British inflicted on this part of the world. In part, this might be a reaction to the Marwari pursuit of wealth by collaborating with the British. To this day, many Bengalis distrust Gujaratis and Marwaris, whom they see as money-grubbing soulless creatures. The older generation still professes wistful love for the old multinational firms that dominated Kolkata till the 1970s such as Burn Standard, Andrew Yule and Balmer Lawrie. 

Arguably, the Bengali distrust of money has led to low growth in the state. The Bengali diaspora around the world wax lyrical about the preservation of their distinctive “Bangaliyana” and how they are culturally different from the rest of India. Yet, unlike Gujaratis, very few Bengalis invest in their home state. They invest in West Bengal only when they return to retirement in Kolkata. Like many cities in Italy, Kolkata is becoming a city of geriatrics with the young leaving in droves for jobs elsewhere.

Even in 2021, Bengalis tend to be employees, not entrepreneurs. They flock to all parts of India and indeed much of the world to work as doctors, lawyers, accountants, academics, administrators and more. In the last few years, startups have taken off in India, including economic backwaters like Kerala and Odisha. Yet West Bengal still lacks any meaningful startup culture.

The BJP’s constant championing of development, industrialization and growth might have rubbed off this deep-seated suspicion of entrepreneurship, business and wealth in the Bengali psyche. It did not help that Modiji and Amitji were Gujaratis spouting Hindi in a state that is proud of its distinctness from India. As mentioned earlier, the province of Ben-Gaul has historically been the first to secede from pan-North Indian empires. No wonder Didi beat Modi.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The article claims that this initiative constitutes the government’s response to the foreign tech companies’ refusal “to comply with data and takedown requests from the government related to protests by Indian farmers that have made international headlines.” In other words, the Indian government wishes to control the content that may be allowed to appear on these platforms.

Why Are India’s Farmers Protesting?

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But we also learn that it isn’t simply the response to a specific event, such as the farmers’ protests, but a matter of principle. It involves rewriting the rules of India’s democracy. “The rules would also compel companies to remove content that undermines security, public order and �decency of morality,’” The WSJ reports.

Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Undermine:

Express ideas or facts that, however sincere truthful, are deemed dangerous because they challenge a government’s official narrative, the only one permissible for public dissemination.

Contextual note

Since the beginning of the “global war on terror” in 2001, governments across the world have regularly appealed to the theme of “national security,” applying it to oppose anything that might vaguely embarrass them. Prime Minister Modi’s government has boldly added the much broader categories of “public order” and “decency of morality” to the mix. States in the past that have actually managed to accomplish that kind of behavioral control have generally been referred to as fascist. While it may seem abusive to apply that term to any democratically elected government today, the similarity of such policies with those practiced by fascist regimes from the past should be obvious. 

Nations that seek to apply such policies today should only deserve to be called “aspirationally fascist.” Given the availability of communication technology to even the humblest among us, the effective repression of expression and enforcement of morality applied to an entire population would immediately undermine any nation’s pretension of democracy. We should ask ourselves if Modi is serious in his demands. The difficulty of achieving those goals in the era of global platforms appears to be insurmountable. If it were to succeed, it would imply dismantling one of the givens of the globalized economy and the stoutest pillar of any democracy: the free circulation of ideas.

In its reporting on the same topic, Business Insider on the immediate challenge to the Indian government represented by the farmer protests. It describes the government’s initiative as an attempt “to pressure the firms into sharing data related” to the protests. If this is true, the aim would no longer appear to be the mere prevention of unfavorable discourse disseminated through the media. It would imply the harnessing of data produced by these foreign platforms for surveillance purposes. That would then serve the state to crack down on elements suspected of subversion or threatening the public order.

This would seem to contradict the idea that the government’s aim is simply to censor subversive ideas. Instead, its aim would be to partner with the social platforms to gain access to their data and metadata. This would serve, not to suppress certain ideas, but to suppress the people who express those ideas.

Modi may simply be casting his lines in all directions at the same time, unconcerned with the type of fish he may reel in. It could be compared to the Trumpian foreign policy notion of “maximum pressure” to make the adversary bend. In Modi’s case, it is directed at the platforms to convince them to take some action that he finds acceptable — it doesn’t really matter which. He appears to be giving his victims the choice between applying his criteria of censorship, which means banning specific content, or quietly handing him the data they collect, which will make it possible for India to identify and punish the culprits. At the same time, by personally threatening the employees of the platform, Modi is showing that he means business, much like Donald Trump and Mike Pompeo when they imposed sanctions on the officials of the International Criminal Court to discourage them from investigating the US and Israel.

The WSJ reveals the deeper ambitions of the Indian government concerning the surveillance of social media. It cites a member of the government who “said the rules would require platforms to track and store records of specific messages as they traveled among users.” This would have radical implications, defining user privacy in the use of social platforms as a relic of the past. The threats against employees of the platforms demonstrate the conclusion The WSJ has reached: “The Indian government appears ready for a fight.”

Historical Note

Narendra Modi’s government appears to see this as a possible historical turning point. India’s rivalry with China, at least in terms of soft power, has been defined in many people’s minds as the contest between the world’s two powerful but highly contrasted nations that can be called billionaires (in terms of population). One is an autocracy and the other a democracy. One ambiguously carries the heritage of Western colonization; the other defies it. 

Seen as competition, it has turned out not to be a truly fair fight. China has obviously been progressing exponentially in its economic and military influence, whereas India seems to be handicapped by its confusing democratic institutions and traditions, coupled with its incomprehensible and ungovernable demography. The traditionally conflictual relationship that has prevailed between the two nations has recently been exacerbated not just by India’s unfocused economic orientations — illustrated by the complexity of the debate around the farmers’ protests — but also with regard to contested borders, where some recent skirmishes have taken place.

The WSJ article offers a curious hint that Modi’s government may be seeking to emulate China: “The big difference between the earlier history and where we are now is that China has done just fine without those companies.” Coming from Modi’s government, this sounds either like an expression of envy or the resolution to mobilize all its forces to go to battle with the social platforms, applying the logic of China which has peremptorily curtailed their freedom to operate.

The fact that Facebook and Twitter are banned in China has enabled the emergence of Chinese non-global equivalents such as Weibo and Renren. Modi would appear to be dreaming that something similar could take place in India, though the government’s ability to control what happens on such networks as effectively as the Chinese seems more than unlikely. Modi may simply be citing the Chinese case to frighten the American owners of the dominant platforms.

The WSJ presents Modi’s gambit as a negotiating stance. The prime minister believes he is in a position to “threaten the tech companies’ future in a market of more than 1.3 billion people that, since they are locked out of China, is the key to their global growth.” The article cites Jason Pielemeyer, the policy director of the Global Network Initiative, focused on human rights: “In a market the size of India, it’s hard to take the nuclear option, which is to say, â€�We’re not going to comply, and if you block us, we’ll call your bluff or accept the consequences.’” 

At the same time, The WSJ reveals what may be the truly “noble” underlying motive of the Indians, one we should all applaud. It’s a motive that sounds far more generous and respectful than either threats against American tech companies or the desire to emulate China’s policy of social control. “Officials have said the government wants to protect small Indian businesses, secure user data and allow room for India’s own tech firms to grow,” The Journal reports. 

So, which one is it: the emulation of China’s surveillance society and despotic control of the media or a democratic encouragement of small businesses? Because India is a democracy, all that will only become clear in the next election, in 2024. Only three years to wait for the moment of clarity. Isn’t that what democracy is all about, waiting for the next election in the hope that the truth will then become manifest?

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Why Are the Indian and Chinese Economies Decoupling?

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As per the , 41.5% of Indians are employed in agriculture. Another are dependent on it. This has implications for Indian politics. Support of farmers is critical to winning elections. Agriculture is to India what the military-industrial complex is to the US. Politicians promise goodies and operate elaborate patronage systems in rural India to secure votes.

The chaos, unruliness and terrible state of Indian cities can partly be explained by the disproportionate doling out of subsidies to rural areas. This leaves little money for urban infrastructure, which is almost invariably ramshackle across the country. Most state governments in India are headed by rural politicians. Even Karnataka, which is home to Bengaluru, the information technology capital of the country, is no exception.

The Biggest Reform Since 1991

With such powerful vested interests, hinting at reform is a tall proposition. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has done the unthinkable. It has state control over agricultural markets. Opposition parties are protesting because they represent rural power who are deeply upset. By freeing farmers from such power brokers, the Modi government has ushered in a brave new era both for Indian politics and the economy. 

A little bit of context is essential to understand the true implications of this move. Until now, farmers were forced to sell their produce to agricultural produce market committees (). They are dominated by rural politicians and local bigwigs who . For decades, farmers got pitiably low amounts while consumers paid ridiculously high prices. The middlemen who run APMCs pocketed the difference.

At a time when GDP has been shrinking and COVID-19 has been barely tackled, the Modi-led government has introduced the most significant economic reforms since 1991. In that historic year when the US fought Iraq in the Gulf War and the Soviet Union fell, India liberalized its economy and ushered in an era of high growth. The liberalization of agricultural markets will boost farm incomes significantly. With about 60% of India’s population on agriculture and allied activities, this move will increase domestic demand and bolster Modi’s political base. In addition to this, Modi is also pioneering a scheme inspired by Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto’s work that seeks to better define the of the farmers.

Other Major Measures

Apart from agricultural liberalization, the Modi government has instituted other far-reaching reforms. It has simplified longstanding that held back manufacturing. The Modi government has also curbed the flow of into India’s nonprofits. Many of them have been opponents of the Modi government and its policies. Now, these nonprofits stand weakened, leaving the BJP in a stronger position.

Another development has strengthened the BJP. For decades, Bollywood has been a bastion for opponents of the ruling party. Recently, the film industry has been in trouble. The death of a small-town actor has put the spotlight on nepotism and corruption in Bollywood. Some key figures are now under . As a result, Bollywood’s criticism of the BJP has become muted in some quarters but more in others. Bollywood’s target is a section of the that it deems to be sympathetic to the BJP’s brand of politics.

Such is the BJP’s domination that its ambitious legislative agenda has escaped public scrutiny and effective opposition. In June, these authors sent out a brief that explained how the ruling party needed just seven more members of parliament to control the 245-member Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the parliament. Now, the BJP has achieved that control and its MPs are ramming through reforms their party deems fit.

Foreign correspondents working for big media outlets in New Delhi who frequent the Khan Market have failed to understand the major implications of recent moves. The Modi-led government has embarked on a new chapter. The legislative reforms it is pushing through are ambitious, far-reaching and potentially transformative. While COVID-19 is ravaging the country and China is making threatening moves on its border, India has bet boldly on big reforms. The BJP might reap a rich political harvest as a result.

Yet even as it seems all smooth sailing for the BJP, the ruling party faces a big risk. Voters expect it to govern well. So far, several key reforms and policy initiatives have failed miserably. India’s colonial-era bureaucracy has built toilets and opened bank accounts because these did not threaten its power. In contrast, measures that threatened bureaucratic privilege, such as manufacturing reforms or indirect tax reforms, have been quietly scuttled.

If India’s powerful bureaucracy tries similar tricks with the latest set of reforms, the ambitious Modi government might finally turn on the purveyors of red tape themselves.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Indian Government Is Not Letting a Pandemic Go to Waste appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

What Lies Behind India’s Bold Bet on Kashmir?

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Since then, India has been brought down to its knees by over the CAA, which aims to give fast-track citizenship to religious minorities of India’s three neighboring countries — Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. About 19 people have in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India’s most populous state, according to police estimates. More than 5,000 people are reportedly in . The economy of UP has been hit particularly hard, with businesses millions of rupees owing to a stand-off between the police and the people.

The government has residents of India’s eastern states — Assam, West Bengal and Meghalaya — as well as those of UP, from using the internet because of fears of unrest. Taking a leaf out of China’s playbook, the government is closely monitoring social media activities. Opponents of the CAA are being through CCTV footage, video and photos. Dissidents are being arrested. Even old people are being of their homes on accusations of fomenting disorder.

The government has imposed section 144 of the 1860 Indian Penal Code in large parts of the country. This colonial-era law public gatherings of more than four people and has long been an instrument of oppression. The police are firing upon innocent people who are protesting or just gathering together. Their only crime is to belong to a particular religious community. India, the world’s largest democracy, has degenerated into a police state and the situation does not seem to be getting better.

Does the CAA Violate the Indian Constitution?

The Citizenship Amendment Act to give fast-track citizenship to religious minorities who have been persecuted in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh because of their religion. These include Hindu, Sikh, Jain, Buddhist, Parsi and Christian communities. If people belonging to these five faiths furnish proof that they migrated to India before December 31, 2014, they would be eligible to receive Indian citizenship within six years. People of other religions (read: Islam) from these three countries can seek Indian citizenship only after proving that they have been resident in India for at least 12 years.

Protests have erupted across the country to oppose the CAA, even though the objective of the act is to protect religious minorities. Students and young people are opposed the legislation strongly. Reports that the opposition has fueled violence and local goons incited protesters do not seem to be accurate.

The mass movement against the CAA is fueled by the blatant exclusion of Muslims under the act. Protesters allege that the CAA is a of India’s secular social fabric and the act goes against the very tenets of the country’s constitution. They also allege that the act deliberately excludes Muslims so that the government can send back Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan. Some even allege that the government is plotting to put Muslims into detention camps just as US President Donald Trump is doing to Central American migrants on the US-Mexico border. Like the US, India fears mass migration. After 1947, millions immigrated from modern-day Bangladesh and Pakistan. In particular, East India experienced a surge of immigrants not only in 1947, but also in 1971 when Indian troops liberated Bangladesh.

Indian Home Minister Amit Shah has the government’s decision to include non-Muslim religious minorities under the CAA. His argument is singular: the Islamic republics of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan openly discriminate against religious minorities. Therefore, India must open its door for those persecuted in these countries. Shah points out that Pakistan and Bangladesh, a country born out of Pakistan, reneged on the 1950 Nehru-Liaquat agreement that secured the rights of minorities in India and Pakistan. Both of these Muslim-majority countries have persecuted minorities relentlessly.

India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) claims that the CAA is an instrument to protect minorities does not quite ring true. The act could have included persecuted religious minorities from all neighboring countries, not just Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. To assume that the Uighurs in China or Ahmadiyyas in Pakistan are not being persecuted is fallacious. The CAA is clearly an attempt to consolidate votes through a pro-Hindu, anti-Muslim agenda.

Shah gave a telling response when he was questioned by the media on the blatant exclusion of Muslims in the CAA. “We brought in Tibetans, Bangladeshi Muslims and Sri Lankan Tamilians during their time of need. We can’t bring in everybody,” he said.

Shah does not understand or could care less about the fact that excluding people based on religion in a citizenship act goes against India’s secular ethos. India has always given shelter to persecuted people, irrespective of their religion or race. However, this image of India has changed over the last five years. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the BJP has tarnished India’s secular reputation.

Opponents of the CAA state that the act violates Articles 14, 15 and 29 of the constitution. According to Harish Salve, India’s former solicitor general, the CAA does not key tenets of the constitution and cannot be overturned in a court of law. Article 15 of the constitution restricts the government from discriminating against Indian citizens. The Indian government can frame policies that discriminate against foreigners on any ground, including religious ones. If that is true, then the CAA does not violate the constitution.

The Register of Citizens, But Who Counts as One?

The BJP has consistently argued that the CAA does not affect Indian citizens and it will not take away citizenship from legal residents of the country. Yet millions do not believe the government. Despite repeated assurances from top BJP leaders, protests are underway throughout India. People are concerned not only by the CAA, but also another policy of the Indian government that is closely linked to the CAA: the implementation of the National Register of Citizens (NRC).

The NRC is what it sounds. It sets out to create a nationwide register of all legal citizens of India. Its guidelines are yet to be made public. However, the government has already started creating detention centers for illegal immigrants who fail to come on the NRC. Many people who immigrated to India in 1947 and 1971 do not have a passport or other documents to prove citizenship. There is a real risk that many people living in India since 1947 or 1971 might be identified as illegal immigrants if they are Muslim. Members of all other communities have a backdoor to Indian citizenship through the CAA if they are left out of the NRC. Muslims do not, and there is a real risk that they might become aliens in their own land.

The NRC has already been implemented in India’s northeastern state of Assam. In September 2019, 1.9 million people were from the NRC list, of whom several were Hindus. They have a pathway to citizenship under CAA, but Muslims are not so lucky.

So far, there is no clarity on when the NRC will into force throughout the country. Modi on recent promises made by his ministers when he said the NRC would stay restricted to Assam. It seems that protests have rocked the government into a tactical retreat, at least for the time being.

Over the last few weeks, the Modi government has been under a lot of , internally and internationally. Still, it seems determined to conduct a nationwide survey of citizens. On December 24, 2019, the government that it would conduct the 16th census of India in 2020 and 2021, and update the National Population Register (NPR).

The NPR is a list of usual residents, who have lived in a local area for the last six months or more. The NPR database includes information such as name, father’s name, mother’s name, gender, date of birth and marital status. The NPR was brought in by a previous BJP-led government in 2003 after the 1999 war with Pakistan. Unlike the census that paints a picture of the status or condition of residents of India as well as overall population trends, the NPR will contain the demographic and biometric details of every Indian resident at the national, state, district and village level. Many are concerned that the NPR is the NRC by another name.

The government is setting aside 35 billion rupees ($490 million) for the census and NPR at a time when the economy is in the doldrums. Many find this this disturbing. The NPR was last updated in 2015 and linked citizen’s data from the Aadhaar, India’s biometric ID system. It seems wasteful and unnecessary to spend scarce resources on the NPR at this point in time.

Shah has tried to by claiming no one will have to furnish any documents for getting on the NPR. Officials have added that data from the NPR will not be used to create the NRC. Furthermore, the NPR will not result in the revocation of anyone’s citizenship. Yet concerns refuse to go away and far too many people feel uneasy by the idea of the register.

Identity Politics and Vote Banks

The CAA, the NRC and the NPR have set the BJP government and the Indian National Congress party on opposite sides of a deep divide. The BJP wants to consolidate the Hindu vote. It is important to remember that the silent Hindu majority harbors a fear for other religions, particularly Islam. Bitter memories of Muslim conquest and discrimination live on. The memory of the partition of British India into India and Pakistan is a living one. The ethnic of Hindu minorities in both Pakistan and Bangladesh irks many Hindus. People also resent the politics of appeasement by the opposition. This involved cozying up with Muslim clerics in return for these mighty men of god delivering the vote of their community. It also involved turning a blind eye to Bangladeshi immigrants who invariably vote against the BJP. The BJP preys on such sentiments to consolidate its Hindu voter base.

In consolidating its voter base, the BJP forgets that India differs from Pakistan and Bangladesh precisely because the country protects minorities. Unlike Pakistan or Bangladesh, India is a secular country. More Muslims live in India than either Pakistan or Bangladesh.

Furthermore, the Hindu identity is not a monolith. In Assam, people are protesting not on religious but ethnic lines. The Assamese fear that the CAA will the effect of the NRC by granting citizenship to Hindu Bengalis. Already, the Bengalis are outnumbering the local Assamese in many parts of Assam. They want an end to immigration — Muslim or Hindu.

Since 1971, Bangladeshis have poured into India’s border states of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. Local inhabitants have been swamped by newcomers in many districts. In Tripura, the local tribes fell into irrelevance once Bangladeshi Hindus flooded in. Its demography changed and Bengali is now the state language. The example of Tripura demonstrates that the concerns of the Assamese are not entirely unwarranted.

In West Bengal, fears of the NRC and the CAA have given the Trinamool Congress (TMC) the opportunity to shore up its Muslim vote. TMC leader Mamata Banerjee has long turned a Nelson’s eye to immigration from Bangladesh because Bangladeshi voters are loyal to her party and to her. As chief minister of West Bengal, Banerjee is refugee settlements and issuing identity cards to illegal immigrants.

Immigration is an important issue for India because its growing population already puts pressure on scarce resources. As seawaters rise and Bangladesh sinks, its people have little choice but to flee across the border just like their Mexican counterparts. Concerns regarding illegal immigration are genuine and have to be addressed. However, the CAA and the NRC do not seem to be the answers. India already has multiple records such as ration cards, voter cards, driving licenses, income-tax ID and, of course, the famous Aadhaar. The ridiculous duplication in keeping simple records makes people doubt if the most recent efforts will achieve anything except for alienating and sidelining Muslims.

In recent times, many have compared Narendra Modi to Indira Gandhi, the dictatorial Congress leader of the 1970s and 1980s. She locked up her opponents, promoted her son and proclaimed an “Emergency” to rule by fiat, not by law. This period is recorded as the dark blot on Indian democracy. Many argue that we are living in another form of Indira’s period of Emergency. The police are up students and throwing grenades in higher educational institutes. The government is news channels to black out dissenting political opinions. Many are ending up in jail. Indian democracy is ailing again.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In April, this author called Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s economic record abysmal. Yet he has now been re-elected with a thumping majority. His ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has increased its from 282 to 303 of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of Parliament.

Not since Indira Gandhi of the Indian National Congress has the country had such a powerful leader. So, what does Modi’s victory mean for India and the world?

THE VIEW OF THE FOREIGN PRESS

Newspapers and television channels from the Anglo-Saxon world are not thrilled with the outcome of the election. They have long viewed the BJP with suspicion and Modi with hostility. His resounding victory has aroused unusual pathos in London, New York and elsewhere.

has deemed Modi’s victory as “bad news for India and the world.” It sees Modi as yet another nationalist populist demagogue who is pro-business, anti-minority and untruthful. The Guardian sees the BJP as a conservative, misogynistic and upper-caste party. As per this venerable left-leaning British publication, the victory of the Modi-led BJP is “bad for India’s soul.”

, the center-right British magazine of 1843 vintage, appositely eschews the spiritual language of its left-leaning counterpart. Yet even it cannot avoid spiritual references. The Economist features a photo of Modi meditating in saffron in the stunning backdrop of the snow-capped Himalayas. Calling him a “half Olympian god and half kung fu wizard,” it pays tribute to Modi’s charisma but says he is “a vessel of anger.” Unlike The Guardian that curiously reposes faith in the Nehru dynasty and exhorts it to rethink its strategy, The Economist argues that the BJP’s “opponents aided their own defeat.”

published an editorial by the noted novelist Pankaj Mishra. He claims that Modi has seduced India with envy and hate. The writer passionately argues that Modi won thanks to “violence, fake news and resentment.” Mishra aptly diagnoses why Modi won. He points out that India is “a grotesquely unequal society” riven “by caste as well as class divisions” where dynasties dominate both politics and Bollywood. In such a society, Modi’s humble roots are seductive to ordinary voters.

Mishra astutely observes that Modi has exploited the resentment against India’s “metropolitan ruling class.” This class has “such Godlike aloofness” that it leaves most Indians stranded “in history while itself moving serenely toward convergence with the prosperous West.” Modi’s “rhetoric of meritocracy and lusty assaults on hereditary privilege” is intoxicating to India’s toiling and suffering millions.

The writer damns Rahul Gandhi, the grandson of Indira and the leader of the Congress party, as “a live mascot of India’s defunct dynastic politics and insolvent ideological centrism.” He bemoans Modi’s unleashing of the Nietzschean “men of resentment” with their “whole tremulous realm of subterranean revenge, inexhaustible and insatiable in outbursts.” Mishra blames Modi for the “savage assault on not just democratic institutions and rational discourse but also ordinary human decency.” Modi’s victory makes him “fear the future.”

THE SENTIMENT AT HOME

Even as the foreign press largely takes the view that Modi’s election might not entirely be a good thing, most people at home are trumpeting the dynamism of India’s democracy. To his credit, Gandhi has conceded defeat. So have other parties. A vast majority of observers agree that the Indian elections were free and fair. For all its faults, the world’s largest democracy seems to be more functional than Brexit-ridden Britain or the deeply-divided US, homes to The Guardian, The Economist and The New York Times.

Of course, many Indians worry. Most Muslims feel marginalized and are rattled by Modi’s second victory. Many of India’s finest public servants fear the further decline of the country’s fragile institutions. Others worry that Modi’s incompetent cronies might drive the economy into deep recession. Some fear war with Pakistan or even China. And a few worry that the country might split apart.

There are good reasons for such worries. Yet they are dwarfed by one big issue. Indians have voted against their metropolitan elite. In its fulminations, the foreign press forgets that Modi is the first backward caste prime minister of India who began life as a chaiwala, selling tea by the railway station. Voters resonate with this. They no longer identify with Gandhi, the fifth-generation, half-Italian scion of an incorrigibly corrupt dynasty.

Mishra is right about Rahul Gandhi’s uselessness. The dynast lost his parliamentary seat of Amethi, hitherto an impregnable family fiefdom. However, Mishra fails to realize a key phenomenon sweeping the country. Indians no longer buy into the myth of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister and Rahul’s great grandfather. Unlike George Washington or Nelson Mandela, Nehru did not hand over power to a successor. India’s dapper leader blundered horribly on China and was responsible for India’s catastrophic defeat in 1962. Yet he failed to resign and died in office. Finally, Indians are questioning his legacy not only vis-à-vis China, but also the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter and Rahul’s grandmother, threw every opposition leader and independent journalist into jail when she declared the in 1975. Rajiv Gandhi, her son and Rahul’s father, had his name dragged through the mud in the . In the age of WhatsApp, Facebook and YouTube, powerful videos showing the murky past of the Nehru dynasty have reached millions, often spiced up with rumors, exaggerations and even untruths.

This is in stark contrast to the time when this author was growing up. Back then, the legend of the Nehru dynasty ran strong. It was perpetrated through an elaborate network of patronage. Humanities departments in Indian universities and the English-speaking media supported the dynasty overtly or covertly. The leading humanities school was suitably named Jawaharlal Nehru University. Many leading academics and journalists in India were dynasts themselves. They identified with the Nehru family and scorned the rough-edged upstarts from small towns who spoke English with an absolutely godawful accent.

To borrow an idea from Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, the Nehru family benefited from cultural hegemony for decades. This author remembers fellow schoolchildren offering prayers to members of the Nehru clan. Sadly for Rahul Gandhi and the Congress party, deference to dynasties has declined fast. They may still command wealth and power, but Indians want ladders of upward mobility. Modi symbolizes this desirable ladder while Gandhi personifies the hated glass ceiling.

Many Indians delight in the fact that Modi is a bachelor with no children and does not promote his family. This makes him immune from what they call the “Dhritarashtra syndrome,” a term named after a character in India’s greatest epic, The Mahabharata, who was blind and blindly loved his son. Nepotism is the bane of Indian society, and the spiritual bachelor with few worldly attachments has powerful appeal.

It is important to note that almost all relatives of this author have voted for the BJP even when they do not like Modi. They cannot stand the prospects of the “weak, vacillating and vacuous” Rahul Gandhi as prime minister. The foreign press misses the intensity of this emotion against entrenched privilege in a country where more than 65% of the population is .

THE MESSY AND MIGHTY CHALLENGES AHEAD

As in the days of Indira Gandhi, this election has been a presidential election, not a parliamentary one. Like Indira, Modi believes in a strong and expansive state. This author has termed his economic policy as one of “Sanatan socialism,” a pun on Sanatan dharma that devout Hindus use to describe their faith. Like Nehru’s Fabian socialism, Modi’s Sanatan socialism is failing too.

The agricultural sector is in a funk, industrial production is declining, small enterprises are dying, jobs are vanishing and even consumption is falling. The government may trumpet healthy growth figures that seduce the International Monetary Fund, but it hides the painful reality that the economy might have contracted. As the author observed last month, the huge informal economy has collapsed.

Once, James Carville coined the term, “.” In 1992, it led to George H.W. Bush’s defeat and Bill Clinton’s victory in the US. In 2019, it had no effect on Modi. That does not mean it will not affect him in 2024 or later. Indians still repose faith in Modi and have great expectations. They want prosperity, jobs and justice. It is impossible for any elected government to deliver them without reforming India’s crumbling postcolonial apparatus of the state.

More than 15 years ago, this author resigned from civil service because of “the corruption, inertia and inefficiency” in the government. Since then, matters have got worse. Selection, training and evaluation of bureaucrats have ossified. Sycophancy, not competence, determines upward mobility in government. As a result, policy briefs are written awfully and laws are drafted terribly.

In fact, India functions through rule by law instead of rule of law. India has one of the worst police-population ratios and millions of pending cases lie pending in the courts. When Modi was elected in 2014, Kiran Bedi and a few other citizens, including this author, petitioned his government to institute long overdue police and judicial reforms. Till date, Modi has not cared for reforms. Instead, he has played political football with the and interfered in an ad hoc manner in the functioning of the .

In 2019, India is increasingly a land of irreconcilable incongruities. It talks tough but Indian defense forces are still . Many of its politicians and citizens dream of world power status but the country faces a , of which it has far too few in the first place. The privatization of education, health care and public services is proceeding at an alarming pace. The Indian bureaucracy continues to be exploitative and extractive. If one is not in the government then one is up against it unless, of course, one can buy it.

Modi’s way out of this morass has been to rule like a strongman, riding roughshod over admittedly highly imperfect institutions. It is eerily reminiscent of Indira Gandhi who began the post-independence decline of Indian institutions. In his first term, Modi’s cabinet was full of pygmies. Like Indira, he is fond of sycophants and has appointed one as the governor of the Reserve Bank of India. There is real fear that his second term might be more of the same, or much worse.

Indira weakened India’s economy, eviscerated her own party and, as mentioned above, decimated the nation’s institutions. She perpetuated a personality cult, which led a crony to declare, “Indira Is India, India Is Indira.” Even Shashi Tharoor, a palace poodle of Rahul and a Congress MP, could not resist calling Indira . Those unfamiliar with The Mahabharat might be interested to learn that Duryodhan was the epic’s grand villain and the son of Dhritarahtra.

With Prime Minister Modi’s resounding victory, one hopes history is not repeating itself either as a tragedy or as a farce. India cannot afford another Indira. It needs efficient, accountable and robust institutions, not more dynastic worship or another personality cult.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Narendra Modi Wins Again as India Rejects the Nehru Dynasty appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The CVoter Tracker, an opinion survey of voters, found that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s popularity dipped after his first year in office. A significant 63% of those surveyed found his government to be anti-poor and anti-farmer. As Modi completes five years in office, his popularity is touching an all-time high despite repeated stories about India’s economic woes.

In April 2014, when the coalition led by the Indian National Congress was in power, the top two issues people cared about were corruption and inflation. Six months after Modi won the 2014 elections, unemployment emerged as the most important issue for Indian voters. Till January 2019, this remained the case. Yet voters seem to be less concerned about it right now. What happened?

The explanation is best delivered through an analogy. Imagine you are suffering from many ailments and many parts of your body are aching terribly. You go to a doctor and list down all the problems: headache, stomachache, backache, knee pain, twisted ankle, spondylitis, tennis elbow and a few more aches. But before the doctor begins treating you for all symptoms, you ask him to do something about your backache because you claim it’s killing you. When you go to meet the doctor next, you request relief for knee pain, and the next time you beg relief from spondylitis. All this time, you are suffering from a chronic migraine that refuses to go away, but other pains push it into the background. That is precisely what has happened to the Indian voter’s chronic unemployment problem.

The answer may lie in public perception. Almost 42% of the people who mentioned unemployment as a problem felt that Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) would solve the problem. In contrast, only 13% believed that the Congress party would be able to do so. Also, 53% of the people surveyed believe that their quality of life would improve in the next 12 months. Only 17% were pessimistic and believed otherwise. This high index of optimism is working in favor of Modi and the BJP.

THE PULWAMA EFFECT AND POPULIST SOPS

The most important factor in the ongoing election might turn out to be the attack on Indian troops in Pulwama. It is an emotive issue that resulted in a national outpouring of grief. Modi’s bold airstrikes won popular acclaim and boosted his popularity. Mainstream media oxygenated the entire episode. As a result, people seem to be willing to forgive Modi’s policy failures as honest mistakes of a risk-taking, dynamic prime minister.

In the past, security has not played much of a role in Indian elections. Manmohan Singh was re-elected as prime minister despite the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Terror strikes and security issues have, for the most part, remained a non-issue in CVoter Tracker data. Before the Pulwama attacks, the recall rate of these issues was a mere 3%. This has risen to a high of 26%. It seems India might be changing. For the first time, security issues are competing with bread and butter ones in India’s post-independence history.

At the start of 2019, 37% of the people surveyed believed their living standards had improved over 12 months, while 31% felt they had declined. The BJP had lost elections in three states in the Hindi heartland: Madya Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Rajasthan. There was real fear that Modi would lose like Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the BJP prime minister from 1999 to 2004. The specter of 2004 was haunting the party 15 years after it unexpectedly lost the election.

Modi is an arch pragmatist and decided to go on a populist spree. He gave reservation to economically backward upper-caste families, a measure designed to retain the traditional vote base of his party. Money for farmers, targeted cash transfers to the poor and a budget full of goodies for different sections of society soothed frayed nerves of voters.

By March 7, 2019, 45% people reported improved living standards and only 22% said these standards had declined. On the same date, 51% respondents said they were very satisfied with the working of the Modi government in contrast to 36% on January 1. The combination of populist benefits for voters and patriotism post-Pulwama boosted the fortunes of Modi. In fact, his personal popularity ratings doubled between January 1 and March 7. People repeatedly contrasted Modi’s bold action to Singh’s lukewarm response to the Mumbai attacks more than 10 years ago. The fact that Modi is the first Indian prime minister to attack Pakistan in its own territory, on its own sovereign soil, since Indira Gandhi has worked strongly in his favor.

RAHUL GANDHI, MODI’S BEST FRIEND

At the start of 2019, Rahul Gandhi’s stock seemed to be rising. This fifth-generation heir of the Nehru family had gone around the world to elite universities such as Berkeley and the London School of Economics. His party, the Indian National Congress, had won three state elections in the Hindi heartland. Hearteningly, his approval rating was 23% on January 1. Recently, his approval rating has plummeted to 8%.

Just as Pulwama worked in Modi’s favor, it has worked against Gandhi. Indians no longer trust the Congress party on national security. Most Indians believe that the party has been soft on Pakistan since 2004. Its inability to guarantee security during its time in power and its perceived softness on terror has come back to haunt Congress in 2019.

The BJP has been very clever in its electoral strategy. It has portrayed the 2019 election as a binary choice between Modi and Gandhi. This bipolar choice has resulted in people favoring the 56-inch chested Modi to the weak, inarticulate and ineffectual Gandhi. It has led many pundits to remark that Gandhi is Modi’s best friend. And there is more than an element of truth in that comment.

BANANA PEELS STILL REMAIN

In India, factor has been running strong in elections for the last two decades. Politicians are rarely able to meet people’s expectations. So, people vote in the opposition to punish the government. The Modi government is not exempt to this powerful phenomenon. On January 1, 27% wanted to vote it out. By March 7, this number had dropped to 20%, a still significant figure.

Even as the anti-incumbency number has dropped for the government, the number of undecided voters has risen from 42% to 47%. This is evidence of a polity in flux. These voters could swing either way by the time they enter the polls. This is the most worrisome fact for the BJP. If these voters started blaming Modi for their economic woes, then he too could end up with the same fate as Vajpayee.

In 2014, people voted for a non-Nehruvian management of the economy. They wanted less control by the Indian state, which had spectacularly mismanaged the economy. However, demonetization as well as imposition of the goods and sales tax increased the heavy hand of the state. In fact, many have come to believe that Modi is obsessed with increasing tax revenue to exclusion of everything else. This has strengthened the inspector-raj infamously created by Congress.

In fact, the BJP has made no structural or institutional break from the past. It is just seen as a cleaner and more efficient version of the Indian National Congress. Prime Minister Modi offered no new ideas about governance or the economy. For the last five years, the government has launched one scheme after another and initiated many welfare measures, but the sentiment on the street is negative. Consumption has fallen, investment remains low and controversy rages around unemployment figures. Economic woes might still cause the undecided voter to flip into an anti-incumbent one.

In 2014, the BJP ran as an opposition party enjoying the anti-incumbency factor. Today, it faces an opposition that has come together to unseat it from power. Furthermore, India’s democracy follow the first-past-the-post Westminster model. Victory in 543 distinct seats decides who forms the government, not the winner of a pan-national election. It is well within the realms of possibility that Modi’s BJP might fall short of the magic figure of 272 seats in the Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of parliament.

A final factor weakening the BJP is not unemployment of the masses, but the unemployability of a large number of its members of parliaments. Many of its MPs are “good-for-nothing” and have relied on the goodwill for Modi to get elected. More than external injury, the BJP faces the clear and present danger of severe “internal bleeding” that might damage its chances. Like the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the BJP is a cadre-based party. The communists lost power and relevance once their cadres rotted and lost touch with the people. The BJP faces a similar risk as its cadre and elected representatives seem to be following the communist path.

*[Click here to read the five-part series.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Understanding the 2019 Indian Elections appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

If democracy was all about elections, then, in the words of Victorian poet Robert Browning, “God’s in his Heaven / All’s right with the world!” Yet, despite the extraordinary logistical exercise of mindboggling attention, not all seems right in 2019.

THE EVAPORATION OF GREAT EXPECTATIONS

In 2014, India voted for Narendra Modi. Analyzing his victory, this author argued that Modi had “been elected to ensure economic growth, increase employment, lower inflation and lift millions out of poverty.” Many, including this author, were tired of the Indian National Congress-led government. Its dynastic political model reserved all plum positions for members of a few select families. Its economic model was characterized by red tape, patronage and corruption. Such a political economy rewarded money and muscle, leading to a and a collapse of the rule of law.

After years of misrule, people voted in the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 with great expectations. After all, Modi promised “achche din” (good days) and “sabka saath, sabka vikas” (economic development for everyone). For a “48 per cent of children under the age of five are stunted due to chronic undernutrition, with 70 per cent being anemic,” Modi’s promise of prosperity was seductive even to this author.

It turns out that Prime Minister Modi has not been the economic messiah Indians were waiting for. Instead of rejecting the economic model of the Congress party, he has embraced it with the zeal of a new convert. Just as Indira Gandhi unleashed bureaucratic socialism on the country, Modi has launched a new model of “Sanatan socialism.” The Modi version of the Indira Gandhi model relies on direct financial transfers and private provision of services to the people. For example, it does not focus on publicly-run primary health centers in villages like Rwanda or Vietnam. Modi’s Sanatan socialism has opted for the American insurance-based health care model. Worryingly, this choice presents grave risks of fraud, inflation and poor outcomes for a country where hundreds of millions are wretchedly poor and private health care providers are notoriously rapacious.

While it is too early to pass judgment on Modi’s health insurance scheme, his five-year economic record is nothing short of abysmal.

First, he imposed demonetization on the country in a most disastrous manner. It took 59 circulars for the Modi government to implement such an ad hoc draconian measure. Starting from the circular, these were drafted sloppily and caused complete chaos in the economy. Small closed down by the thousands because they ran out of cash. Farmers suffered too and the sale of rice to rural markets dropped by 61%. In the state of Tamil Nadu alone, over closed down, leading to nearly 520,000 people losing their jobs in the financial year 2017-18.

Second, Modi’s implementation of the goods and services tax (GST) unleashed further mayhem upon the economy. Bureaucrats working in India’s finance ministry have told this author countless tales of incompetence of Arun Jaitley, Modi’s finance minister. One of them went so far as to say that Jaitley never reads files and signs off on whatever his underlings send him. This might be an exaggeration, but elementary mistakes on the website suggest some fire behind the smoke. It is no exaggeration to say that Jaitley launched GST spectacularly incompetently. This tax was levied suddenly in the middle of a financial year with confusingly varying rates and ridiculous reporting requirements. Many small businesses that had survived demonetization did not survive the imposition of GST.

Third, Modi interfered in the functioning of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the country’s central bank, in a most unseemly manner. Raghuram Rajan and Urjit Patel, two governors who were economists, in succession. Undaunted, Modi appointed an officer of the elite Indian Administrative Service (IAS) that controls the commanding heights of the Indian state. This IAS appointee had a degree in history, not in economics, but this did not bar him from becoming the top dog of the RBI. Reportedly, this highly unqualified appointee is a poodle of the prime minister.

More importantly, this new RBI boss is going against his eminent deputy and advocating a . This measure could stimulate the economy before the end of the election and would help Modi win, but it carries the risk of sparking off inflation. Furthermore, this Modi lackey has made the RBI on many ailing banks and is asking them to start lending again. He is doing so at a dangerous time.

As this author observed in 2018, India is in the middle of a major financial crisis. Therefore, this policy makes no sense. To add insult to injury, despite the financial crisis, the State Bank of India (SBI) has converted its loan to Jet Airways into to bail out the beleaguered airline. In 2010, when the SBI bailed out Kingfisher Airlines, it incurred huge losses. It is an open secret that the SBI is repeating its bailout blunder because of pressure from the Modi government. By allowing the SBI to proceed with such shenanigans, the RBI is inflicting immense damage on both the financial sector and the economy.

Such is the state of affairs that even high priests in the sanctum sanctorum of the government are worried. A number of BJP leaders and IAS officers are scathing about the RBI’s loss of independence in private even as they observe omerta in public. The data leaking through about the economy is not as silent as these high priests. It reveals that are scarce, is increasing and new investments are at a .

STRONG-MAN INCOMPETENCE

Many are quietly making the argument that India is experiencing economic contraction and its dodgy figures fail to account for the country’s huge informal economy. To understand this argument better, let us assume India’s formal economy was $100 and the informal economy was $50 in 2017. Remember, this informal economy does not show up in GDP figures. If the GDP grew by 10% in 2018, it would mean the new GDP would be $110. If the informal economy collapsed at the same time, the new real economy has gone down from $150 to $110. Falling and anemic 0.1% industrial production lend weight to this argument. And if an economic contraction is on, then there is no one other than Modi to blame.

Modi’s incompetence is not limited to the economy. is up in flames. continue to leak. Interference in institutions is par for the course. Not only the RBI but the (CBI) has also become a plaything for those in power. Like Indira Gandhi, Modi is damaging institutions. This is weakening the fabric not only of democracy but also of the Indian state itself.

Tellingly, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has bloated to the point of obesity and tells all ministries what to do. Most ministers are courtiers who spend nearly all their time genuflecting to the prime minister. In hushed tones, many call the prime minister paranoiac. They say he does not want anyone competent in his cabinet because he fears the emergence of a rival. There might be some truth to those whispers. When Modi was first elected, he appointed the uncultured as minister of culture, put the uneducated in-charge of India’s education system and gave other nincompoops ministries they knew nothing about. As a result, most ministers just kowtow to the PMO, leaving Modi to run the show almost singlehandedly with an iron hand.

Last year, one of Modi’s own ministers confided in this author and bemoaned that the prime minister ran “a one-man government and a two-man party.” The second person who matters in Modi’s party is Amit Shah, the current president of the BJP. Shah is a controversial figure to say the least. A foreign diplomat once called him “Modi’s bandobast man” — a fixer for the prime minister.

Modi and Shah have ridden roughshod over other leaders in the BJP, appointing state chief ministers as well as party presidents with scant regard to local sentiment. In the last five years, the BJP has changed from a cadre-based party into a personality cult. Media and social media have helped in the process. Most recently, Modi interviewed on Zee television , not a critical journalist. This development is unhealthy for India’s democracy.

FEAR OF DYNASTS, CRIMINALS AND OLIGARCHS

Despite Modi’s spectacular incompetence, many still reluctantly prefer him to others. The reason is simple. The Congress party is the fiefdom of the Nehru family. The half-Italian Rahul Gandhi is a fifth-generation scion who grew up in a modern-day palace. He has dashing debonair looks, but is the butt of ridicule for being a . His sister is charismatic, but she married a man who is fighting charges and is reputed to be .

Other in the Indian National Congress, such as Jyotiraditya Scindia, Sachin Pilot, Gaurav Gogoi and Deepender Singh Hooda, are all children of powerful fathers. A few years ago, this author met a young Brahmin from Rajasthan who is an alumnus of India’s famous St. Stephen’s College. He said that he liked the secularism of the Congress, its inclusive heritage and its ideological suppleness, yet he had no option but to join the insular BJP because the Congress was a closed club for members of the lucky sperm club. To be fair, other parties like the Samajwadi Party of Uttar Pradesh or the Biju Janata Dal of Odisha are similar, but the Congress is the pioneer and preeminent purveyor of dynastic politics.

This leads to tensions in modern India. Today, the country has more than young people under the age of 25. They want opportunity. They desire social mobility. Therefore, many identify more closely with Modi who began as a chaiwala than with the princelings of the Congress. Besides, the grand old party of India lacks the energy it did under Indira or Rajiv Gandhi. Its regional leaders are increasingly tempted to emulate Mamata Banerjee. She left the Congress to become the chief minister of West Bengal and is touted as a potential prime minister of a national coalition.

Some argue this weakening of the Congress and emergence of regional parties might be a good thing. A coalition government would lack the rapaciousness of the Congress and the majoritarian authoritarianism of the BJP. However, dysfunction and a clash of egos is a distinct possibility. India’s regional leaders are monarchs of their respective states, and all of them might want to be primus inter pares after the election.

More than instability, Indian democracy’s greatest challenge is the entry of criminals into politics. Of India’s 541 current members of the lower house of parliament, 186 have criminal cases and 112 have serious registered against them. The serious cases are “related to murder, attempt to murder, disturbing communal harmony, kidnapping, and crimes against women.” Needless to say, many such politicians have fat wallets as well. Milan Vaishnav has written a book about in politics, explaining why crime pays in India. If one cuts through his Americano jargon, Vaishnav blames a lack of inner party democracy, ignorant voters, identity politics and weak institutions.

The simplest explanation is perhaps India’s size. More than 1.3 billion Indians are represented by a mere 545 members of parliament. In contrast, the UK’s 66 million people are represented by 650 MPs. It is not humanly possible for any candidate to knock on doors and meet people in person to win a seat in India. Marketing is the name of the game and costs big money. So, the brand identity of a dynasty helps. For political entrepreneurs, crime pays. It provides muscle, money and even mass support. India is now not the land of Mahatma Gandhi, but of mafia don Mukhtar Ansari.

This politics of criminals in India has a strong symbiosis with an economy of oligarchs. The current election is estimated to cost , a figure that beats the obscene figure for the 2016 American election. Those who fund the candidates expect returns on investment. After winning elections, politicians dutifully reward their backers. Once they have earned good returns, these backers fund future campaigns. Some of them turn into oligarchs. And wealth miraculously transfers from public to private hands, enriching them for their business acumen. Indian elections perpetuate this vicious cycle and arguably benefit oligarchs more than the people.

Modi was elected on the promise of changing India’s rotten system. Instead, he has embraced the system to concentrate power in his hands. The opposition is too corrupt, divided and incompetent to offer a compelling alternative. The 2019 elections offer slim pickings. As one witty friend remarked, Indians can vote for “an idiot or someone who thinks everyone else is an idiot. The only good thing is that they can vote.”

*[Updated: April 25, 2019, at 22:30 GMT]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Indians Must Choose Between the Devil and the Deep Sea appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Once upon a time, not a very long time ago, the Indian economy was mired in the . The notorious starved the economy of oxygen, perpetuating pernicious poverty by imposing Soviet-style economics through a colonial bureaucracy. Pertinently, bureaucrats, not businessmen or entrepreneurs, decided what would be produced, which company would produce it and even when would it do so. The result was not quite an unmitigated disaster but close.

The story of Indian growth after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 is now almost a cliché. India mortgaged its gold, went with a begging bowl to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), opened up its economy and, voila, the economy boomed. Today, Indian newspapers crow incessantly about ever higher growth figures. If one were to believe them, a wave of vikas, the Indian term for development, is sweeping this ancient, time-worn land.

It is pertinent to note that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was elected in 2014 on the promise of vikas. If that promise has been fulfilled, then he should be in pole position to win the 2019 election that is now just a few months away. Yet not all is well in South Block, the fabled British-built resplendent office of the prime minister.

Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has lost elections in three states. Its chief ministers have been booted out, including Shivraj Singh Chouhan, a backward caste leader like Modi whom many have touted as a future prime minister. While the BJP is underplaying its losses, the defeat has been seismic. So much so that it has brought in reservation for supposedly poor upper castes, much like Vishwanath Pratap Singh, the politician who replaced Rajiv Gandhi as prime minister in 1989 and earned his claim to fame by reserving a percentage of government jobs and seats in universities for backward castes.

WHY IS BJP LOSING DESPITE VIKAS?

The answer might be best expressed in the of James Carville, Bill Clinton’s campaign strategist: “The economy, stupid.” As many know, there are lies, damned lies and statistics. In India’s case, rosy growth figures fail to capture acute pain on the ground. Modi has dragged the economy screaming and kicking through two major disruptions.

The first disruption was demonetization that Modi declared out of the blue on November 8, 2016. The following year, the asked an economic analyst to look at the data of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and called it “a failure of epic proportions.” The prime minister declared demonetization to rid the economy of black money, wealth accumulated through avoidance of taxes. No less than 99% of this money came back to the banks making a mockery of Modi’s declaration. Instead of curbing the black economy, Modi’s ad hoc measure sucked liquidity out of the market, wrecked small businesses and destroyed employment in the country.

Furthermore, Modi failed to reform any of the underlying causes that lead to corruption. It is a well-known secret that India’s colonial-era laws and socialist-era legislation are utterly out of sync with ground realities. If these laws were truly imposed, the Indian economy might grind to a halt in a day. Modi neither repealed key outmoded laws nor reformed ones, ensuring that doing business in India necessitates creative interpretation, if not transgression, of the law.

If the law is an ass, the bureaucracy is worse. This colonial-era construct has always had the “.” It is repressive and extractive in its DNA. It seeks to rule, not to serve. It is a very blunt instrument to achieve policy goals. During demonetization, the bureaucracy confounded citizens with repeated that attained notoriety for their muddled thinking and poor drafting. It is fair to say that the Modi government has been going around in circles ever since and the economy has unsurprisingly gone for a toss.

The second disruption to the economy was the imposition of the goods and services tax (GST). Initially, this was an idea of the Indian National Congress party and Modi opposed it as chief minister of Gujarat. However, he adopted it with great gusto as prime minister and pushed it through despite much opposition. In more ways than one, the GST is a jolly good idea. However, the devil lies in the details. The GST legislation was drafted with what is often termed “gulabi English and jalebi logic” with a convoluted multiplicity of rates and filing of numerous returns. Simplicity, clarity and certainty, the hallmarks of good legislation, were conspicuous by their absence.

If poor drafting was not enough, bureaucratic bungling added to the misery of the small trader. Like Indira Gandhi, another strong prime minister and the grandmother of Congress leader Rahul Gandhi, Modi believes in ruling through pliant bureaucrats with no domain expertise. These worthies have imposed such strangulating red tape through the GST that small businesses are struggling to survive, if they have not already gone bankrupt.

Entrepreneurs and businessmen complain that they have spent more time their innocence to an instead of running or growing their business. The government is simply delaying refunding small businesses the money that is theirs, creating a dire cash flow crisis that is driving them to despair. Remember, it is small and medium enterprises that provide most of the jobs in the country. Amazon, Google or Infosys hire a handful of people by comparison. And by squeezing the smaller players, Modi’s bureaucrats have destroyed jobs in the country.

BUT WHAT ABOUT THE IMPRESSIVE ECONOMIC FIGURES?

India’s growth figures are indeed impressive and have finally ahead of China’s. Even if has boosted these figures, they are still impressive. Despite the buoyant figures, there are flies in ointment.

The Indian economy has long suffered from the Lord Voldemort problem. For the few who have not read Harry Potter, Voldemort is the Dark Lord or He Who Must Not Be Named, a most fearsome archvillain. Voldemort is the reigning deity of India’s black economy that some economists estimate to be as high as . To put this into perspective, agriculture and industry put together form 39% of GDP. The share of both India’s central government and 29 state ones is 27% of GDP.

Historically, this informal sector has never showed up in direct taxes or other . However, its strength has been indirectly reflected through real estate prices and consumption figures for cars, white goods, gold and more. Tellingly, car sales remained subdued even during . Indians typically buy cars during this festival of lights and companies tried to lure them with hefty discount sales. Two months ago, these did not work because of “weak buyer sentiments, higher insurance cost, vehicle price hike and liquidity crunch.”

A key unmentioned reason for declining car sales is the dire state of the black economy. When we speak to traders, businessmen and entrepreneurs, they offer the same view. They tell us that the informal sector is in deep trouble and many do not know how long they can stay afloat. Some may say this is good news in the long run. Having said that, this pressure on the informal sector is causing severe structural dislocation in the economy and causing pain to millions across the country.

Pertinently, traders have been a core support group of the BJP and could well turn against the ruling party. So could others who are struggling to find jobs or make ends meet. Additionally, are declining, banks are in bad shape and are “facing more downsides than upsides.”

Democracies tend to be unforgiving of economic pain, which spells trouble ahead for Modi and the BJP.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Economic Pain Spells Trouble for Modi and BJP appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

South India has a different historical memory to the rest of the country. Neither the Mauryan Empire of ancient times, nor the Mughal Empire of medieval times ruled the south entirely. Only under the British Empire was the south knit together with the north politically. In a discussion on the forthcoming elections conducted by Yogendra Yadav and Sanjay Kumar of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) and this author, the south is perhaps where we disagree most.

For this series, we have to thank for inviting us to air our views, even though he failed to keep his word and publish my work. As a result, 51łÔąĎ has agreed to publish me.

THE YADAV CRYSTAL BALL FOR SOUTH INDIA

Yogendra Yadav argues that the national parliamentary elections in the south cannot be on the presidential pattern as in the north. Here, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) cannot project Prime Minister Narendra Modi against Rahul Gandhi, president of the Indian National Congress. This means the election will perforce revolve around regional issues and local personalities.

Yadav points out that the BJP has low stakes in the region. It won a mere 22 seats in the south, of which 17 came from the state of Karnataka alone. In Yadav’s estimation, the BJP will continue to be a marginal player in this region. In the state of Tamil Nadu, M. Karunanidhi, the longstanding leader of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), is dead. So, is his bitter rival Jayalalithaa of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). The DMK and AIADMK have dominated Tamil Nadu for decades. Neither the Congress nor the BJP have been able to hold sway in this most proud of southern states. Yadav argues that the BJP’s attempt to acquire the AIADMK in the post-Jayalalithaa era has failed spectacularly. The anti-BJP DMK seems to be in the ascendant after two terms of AIADMK rule.

As per Yadav, the BJP might fare a bit better in the state of Kerala. Here, it is stirring primal passions over the controversy over the Sabarimala Temple. This might lead to a breakthrough in electoral representation in Kerala. However, the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system is likely to lead to higher vote share, but not necessarily seats in the national parliament.

He argues that the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) might not fare well in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Chandrababu Naidu, the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh and leader of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), is forging a against the BJP. Telangana Chief Minister K. Chandrashekar Rao of the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) has declared he is “” and hit out at both national parties. For Rao, both the Congress and the BJP centralize power in New Delhi instead of delegating it to the states. Therefore, he is trying to create a national third front of regional parties to challenge the two dominant national players and this might play out well with his voters.

Yadav predicts that the BJP might lose its hold on Karnataka as well. In the for the state legislative assembly, the saffron party won 104 seats and emerged as the largest party in the state. However, the Indian National Congress with 80 seats and Janata Dal (Secular) with 37 seats combined to keep the BJP out of power in Karnataka. It is important to note that the BJP did not get the highest vote share. It managed only 36.3% of the vote as compared to 38.1% for the Congress party. In the forthcoming national elections, the BJP faces a coalition of Congress and Janata Dal (Secular), making a landslide defeat a distinct possibility because the latter garnered 18.3% of the vote.

Yadav estimates that the Bharatiya Janata Party might lose five to 10 seats in the south. This means that it is likely to win a mere 10-17 seats in this part of the country, making it a marginal party in the south.

YADAV IS RIGHT ON BIG PICTURE, NOT ON DETAILS

It is hard to disagree with the broad thrust of Yadav’s analysis. However, the devil lies in the details and pollsters know that fine margins lead to victories or defeats. The Congress party is certainly likely to gain seats, but this is unlikely to occur in Karnataka. Instead, it will gain a boost in Kerala and Telangana.

In Kerala, there is a big upswing in support for the BJP. CVoter Tracker reveals that the BJP might win 17% of the vote, but it needs a further 5% swing to win a single seat in the state. This is possible but not probable. More importantly, the BJP is rising in Kerala by whittling away the vote share of the communist-led Left Front. This is deeply ironic because it is in Kerala that the first in the world assumed office in 1957. Yet the FPTP system means that the BJP will not benefit from this increased vote share. Ironically, it will only help its national rival, the Congress, to sweep the state. As per CVoter Tracker data, the Congress would gain eight seats and allies of its United Progressive Alliance (UPA) another four. A gain of 12 seats for the Congress-led UPA would definitely shake up politics in Kerala.

In Andhra Pradesh, Naidu’s dumping of the BJP and embracing the Congress will lead to a loss of 18 seats for the NDA. Yet life is never uninteresting in Indian politics. Another regional party the YSR Congress Party (YSRCP) is going hammer and tongs at Naidu. Although YSRCP has declared that it will not ally with the Bharatiya Janata Party, politics makes and the situation in Andhra Pradesh might not be as cast in stone as it seems.

There is another pertinent point most pollsters forget. First, the BJP has long had a powerful presence in both Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. In 1998, the party polled in the parliamentary elections. The Naidu-led TDP won 12 seats as compared to 22 won by the Congress. As a result, the canny Naidu entered an alliance with the BJP for the 1999 elections. It is important to note that the BJP sacrificed Banjara Hills in Hyderabad for Raisina Hill in New Delhi. Simply put, the interests of the local BJP leadership were sacrificed at the altar of gaining power at the national level.

The same story holds true in Telangana. The BJP was the first major party to demand the creation of a separate state but shelved this demand because of pressure by TDP, which wanted an undivided Andhra Pradesh. As a result, the Rao-led TRS was able to take up the battle flag dropped by the BJP and ride to power on the back of his unremitting campaign for the new state of Telangana.

Most analysts forget that the BJP polled more than the TDP in the 17 seats in Telangana. The BJP’s alliance with the TDP and abdication of the Telangana cause was pure hara-kiri. It contested a mere 15 out of 119 assembly seats and five out of 17 national parliamentary ones, handing the region on a platter to the TDP along with its own sacrificial head. Local BJP leaders still bemoan this historic blunder.

Five years after 1999, the TDP lost in Andhra Pradesh and took down the BJP-led NDA government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The Congress and the TRS now emerged as big winners in 2004 at the national and regional level respectively. In 2009, the Naidu dumped the BJP and, as a result, the TDP suffered a humiliating defeat. In 2014, the BJP made amends by striking up an alliance on better terms, but Rao rode to power on the euphoria of the creation of the new state of Telangana. That euphoria might have worn off and things might take an interesting turn not only in Andhra Pradesh, but also in Telangana.

STICKY WICKET IN KARNATAKA AND THE TAMIL NADU GOOGLY

Yadav makes a valid point but forgets one thing. The Old Mysore region is very different to the rest of Karnataka. The Janata Dal (Secular) commands overwhelming support in the Old Mysore region but is a spent force elsewhere. This means that its alliance with the Indian National Congress might not lead to such an advantage in the forthcoming polls for the national parliament. The recent by-elections for three seats to the parliament demonstrated that the BJP increased, not just retained its vote share.

In fact, CVoter Tracker data reveals that the UPA coalition of Congress and Janata Dal (Secular) in Karnataka would command a staggering 57% lead in Old Mysore, wiping out the BJP entirely. However, the BJP commands a 50% plus vote share in two out of six regions and has a vote share near or above 40% in three out of six regions. As of now, the UPA stands to win 21 out of 28 seats in Karnataka, but there has been a recent swing in favor of the BJP and it might fare better than Yadav estimates at the elections for the national parliament.

Yadav and this author largely agree on our predictions for Tamil Nadu. Yet it is important to remember that this is a state in flux. Both Karunanidhi and Jayalalithaa are dead. In a film-obsessed state where all its towering leaders for nearly five decades have come from the film industry, superstar is apparently poised to enter politics. This has set the cat among the pigeons in Tamil Nadu, leaving both the DMK and the AIADMK in a tizzy. Such is Rajinikanth’s popularity that he could very well become Tamil Nadu’s next leader, but it is also possible that his popularity might not translate into seats.

The reason Tamil Nadu matters is because its leaders played kingmakers in New Delhi from 1996 to 2014. Until Narendra Modi’s resounding victory over four years ago, the 39 seats in Tamil Nadu combined with 42 in West Bengal made them the de facto swing states for India. These two states rendered Uttar Pradesh (UP), India’s most populous state with 80 seats in the national parliament, redundant. The regional parties that dominated UP could not match the savvy operators of the southern and eastern coasts.

By winning 73 out of 80 seats in UP, Modi was able to keep the late Jayalalithaa out of NDA even though they had a perfectly harmonious relationship. In 2019, Tamil Nadu might be back in the spotlight. But neither the Congress nor the BJP matter in this state on the southeastern tip of India. Regional actors will battle it out for dominance and the winner might well decide to support either national party in New Delhi. The next Tamil leader might again be the nation’s kingmaker.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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As election fever heats up, pollsters in India are debating outcomes. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen once wrote about “,” and I have entered an argument with Yogendra Yadav and Sanjay Kumar of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS).

I must thank Shekhar Gupta of who invited us to in “the spirit of healthy disagreement.” Since then, Gupta seems to have . Therefore, I am publishing my argument on 51łÔąĎ.

THE WEST IS THE CRADLE OF THE BJP

The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has close ties with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS translates in English as the National Volunteers’ Organization and is controversial to say the least. Many, including the , describe it as a right-wing, Hindu nationalist organization that is “the ideological fountainhead of the BJP.” Tellingly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was a full-time RSS worker before he became a politician.

Most people forget that the RSS was born in Nagpur. In 1950, published a remarkable paper on the organization that is now prescribed reading in most universities. As he observed, the founder of the RSS was a Marathi Deshashtha Brahmin from Nagpur. The American scholar failed to point out that Marathi Brahmins nearly replaced the Mughal Empire in the 18th century before the British took over. Even today, Nagpur, a historic town in the western Indian state of Maharashtra, continues to be the headquarters of the RSS.

Therefore, it is little surprise that Maharashtra and Gujarat have been strongholds of the BJP. Modi, the first backward caste prime minister of India, was the chief minister of Gujarat for 13 years before he captured power in New Delhi. For a party that won merely two seats in 1984, the landslide victory in 2014 represented a . Needless to say, western India voted almost en bloc for the BJP.

THE YADAV CRYSTAL BALL FOR THE WEST

The eminent pollster Yadav estimates that western India is likely to witness a business-as-usual election with a small dent in the BJP tally. In 2014, it won all but six seats in this region. Things have certainly changed since.

Gujarat has experienced rural unrest with a prominent agrarian community agitating to gain advantage of India’s controversial . As per this policy, a certain percentage of government jobs are reserved for communities designated as backward or oppressed. As if trouble in Gujarat was not enough, farmers in Maharashtra marched 180 kilometers to Mumbai to against the Bharatiya Janata Party. Shiv Sena, the party’s coalition partner in the state, has turned into a and is fighting the BJP for supremacy. In , the BJP is battling “disgruntled partymen and impatient allies” as the state chief minister’s health fails.

As per Yadav, the BJP will contain its losses. He opines that Gujarat may be restive, but it will end up voting for a Gujarati prime minister. Shiv Sena might make up with the BJP and their coalition is likely to win in Maharashtra. As per Yadav, the BJP could limit its losses to 15-20 in this region.

ALLIES, NOT BJP LOSING IN THE WEST

The CVoter Tracker is revealing numbers different to what Yadav predicts. Although it is too early to make firm predictions with parties still jostling and alliances yet unformed, it is clear that the vote share of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has fallen from 54% to 43.8% in October. In the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, this would lead to the BJP winning 50 instead of 53 seats. That does not seem to be a significant figure, but there is a sting in the tail.

So far, Shiv Sena has been a part of NDA. CVoter Tracker has assumed it might part ways with the BJP. In that scenario, it would suffer a catastrophic loss of as many as 14 seats. There is a real risk that this regional party might be decimated and even their bastion in Mumbai might fall. Yadav’s estimate about seat loss for the BJP applies more to the Shiv Sena. As of now, the NDA would lose seats, but the BJP, the biggest party in this coalition, is escaping with a minimal loss.

In the long run, Shiv Sena’s potential meltdown might be good news for the BJP. The two parties have been described as frenemies. They are both battling for the same core support base. Shiv Sena is based on both Hindu identity and . This focus on regional identity is a problem for the BJP, which is trying desperately hard to be a national party. The BJP has been trying to sublimate Marathi pride into Hindu pride and has outsmarted Shiv Sena so far.

Led by Devendra Fadnavis, the shrewd chief minister of Maharashtra, the BJP has been stealing Shiv Sena’s clothes as well the opposition’s. Most recently, he has been appealing to the , traditionally supporters of the Indian National Congress and local strongman Sharad Pawar. Shiv Sena is a fiefdom of the Thackeray clan that has been weakened by a family feud. Its dynastic leadership has become disconnected with its supporters and Fadnavis is taking advantage of it.

Goa sends only two members of parliament to New Delhi. Even here, the BJP might be in a better position than what Yadav estimates. The key state is Gujarat, though. This is Modi’s home turf where he earned his chops as a potential national leader. In 2017, the opposition mounted a rather strong challenge to the BJP here. Yet this strong showing disguised the fact that the BJP won 49% of the votes in comparison to 41% for the Congress party. It resulted in the former winning 99 seats, primarily in urban conglomerations, while the Congress won 77 seats, largely in rural areas.

In 2014, all 26 of Gujarat’s members of parliament belonged to the BJP. CVoter Tracker estimates that 55% of Gujaratis are likely to vote for the BJP in the national elections, with 38% opting for the Congress. It appears that the pull of the son of the soil cannot be underestimated. Gujaratis draw great pride from the fact that Modi is the first full five-year term prime minister from this coastal state. This makes it quite possible that 26-0 might be the BJP-Congress score in Gujarat once again, giving the ruling party a big boost in its home turf of western India.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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As India goes to the polls in 2019, election fever has hit the country. Two of India’s pollsters, Yogendra Yadav and Sanjay Kumar of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), differ starkly in their assessments about the fortunes of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Shekhar Gupta of invited these two gentlemen to in “the spirit of healthy disagreement.” I joined that conversation and the invitation to me. Since then, Gupta seems to have and, therefore, this author’s side of the argument is appearing on 51łÔąĎ.

THE ART, NOT SCIENCE OF OPINION POLLS

Opinion polls are a treacherous climb even under fair weather. After all, they are based on a miniscule sample of voters, susceptible to several errors and products of judgment, not exact scientific methods. Still, when done well, opinion polls tend to be within range of each other.

For instance, the Centre for Voting Opinion and Trends in Election Research (CVoter), which this author leads, and CSDS do not differ greatly in their predictions for the states of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan. In Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, a narrow victory for the Indian National Congress, while CSDS forecasts a for the BJP. In Rajasthan, both CVoter and CSDS envision for the Congress and defeat for the BJP. The only difference is that CVoter foresees a landslide win, while CSDS anticipates a slimmer margin.

While differences between CVoter and CSDS might be marginal, these two organizations differ dramatically with . He opines that the BJP is staring at a loss of nearly 100 seats from its 2014 tally. Yadav takes the view that the BJP would gain a few seats in the east, losing many in the west and the south. In Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, the BJP is likely to lose its current hold. The same holds true for the rest of the , a term analogous to the Bible belt in the US.

CVoter and CSDS estimate that Yadav is erring on the high side. Therefore, this author will examine the eminent pollster’s prognostications, region by region, starting with the east.

Yadav argues that the east of India is the only region that offers the BJP a growth opportunity. In 2014, the BJP won a mere 11 seats of 88. Since then, opinion polls have indicated growing support for the party. In Odisha, the increased support base has come at the expense of the Congress. On the other hand, the BJP has snatched support away from the Left Front coalition led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in West Bengal.

Yadav concludes that the BJP will be a force to reckon with in eastern India. The key question for 2019 is whether it can convert its votes into additional seats this election. The first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system left behind by the British can often be unkind to parties with significant vote shares. An increase in votes may not necessarily lead to the same corresponding increase in seats. Despite the pitfalls of FPTP, Yadav estimates that the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) will win an additional 20 seats in the east.

This author largely agrees with Yadav’s observations when it comes to the eastern part of the country. The latest CVoter Tracker forecasts a gain of 24 seats for the NDA in the east, a mere four seats more than the eminent pollster’s estimate. As per the data of CVoter Tracker, the NDA has increased its vote share from 24.2% in 2014 to an estimated 36.2% in October 2018, a massive upswing of 12%. Curiously, this vote share is not coming at the cost of the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The UPA vote share has gone up from 19.3% to 19.7% during the same period. What is going on?

THE LEFT IS BEING LEFT OUT

The key development in the east is that the NDA is taking away votes from the Left Front. The communists have always claimed to lead national parties but, in reality, have led regional parties with two bases: the southern state of Kerala and the eastern giant West Bengal. The NDA is shifting the electoral landscape in eastern India and emerging as the only credible challenger to Mamata Banerjee, the chief minister of West Bengal and leader of All India Trinamool Congress (TMC). As a result, the Left Front is getting left out.

Once, West Bengal was the bastion of the Left Front. From 1977 to 2011, the communist-led Left Front ruled the state. To put this in perspective, this government outlasted the collapse of the Soviet Union by 20 years. Now, the TMC and the NDA are duking it out in a two-horse race. As per CVoter Tracker data, the former is polling at 41% while the latter at 31%. If identity politics grows and communal polarization increases, then Muslim votes could shift from the Congress to the TMC even as Hindu votes might move from the Left Front to NDA.

This could lead to 35% voting for NDA and 45% opting for TMC, which might give all 42 seats in West Bengal to the TMC. However, this is unlikely. As per CVoter Tracker data, the NDA is poised to win nine seats because its voters will have a majority in some constituencies in the state. Although the TMC might command a 10% lead is for the state as a whole, this lead varies dramatically in the state’s five regions.

The TMC leads the NDA by 21% in the north border regions and by 13% in deltaic region, but its lead narrows to about 5% in the northern hills and is merely 2% in the southern plains. In the highlands, it is the NDA that leads TMC by about 3%. This region comprises districts like Jhargram and Purulia, where the TMC is understandably accusing the NDA of joining hands with Maoists for electoral gains. Were there to be a vote swing in just two of the five regions of West Bengal, a 21-21 tie between the TMC and the NDA is not outside the realms of the possible, even though it is not very probable.

The NDA may still trail the TMC in West Bengal, but its fortunes are burning bright in Odisha. Southwest of West Bengal, the state of Odisha has long been dominated by Biju Janata Dal (BJD), a regional party led by Naveen Patnaik. Like many parties in India, the BJD is a family fiefdom. Chief Minister Patnaik is the son of Biju Patnaik, a larger-than-life figure who made his name as a pilot in World War II and the post-independence conflict in Kashmir.

In Odisha, the NDA is polling 38% while the BJD is flailing at 33%. As in the northeastern Indian states of Tripura and Assam, the NDA might be about to win big in Odisha. Of course, there is always the possibility that the BJP makes a realpolitik deal with the BJD. Patnaik could join the NDA and retain his throne as a regional satrap to the BJP. Odisha demonstrates that the east is turning saffron — the color of the Buddha, Hindu priests and, most pertinently, the BJP.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Is the BJP Rising in Eastern India? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a three-term prime minister of India, died on August 16. Even Pranab Mukherjee, his long-term political foe, to Vajpayee, saying “India had lost a great son and an era had come to an end.”

Vajpayee’s death has triggered an outpouring of emotion. An avalanche of obituaries has appeared that recount his charm, wit, oratory, warmth and statesmanship. Sadly, most commentary has been hagiographical.

Most people have forgotten the reason Vajpayee is most significant for independent India. Like the African National Congress, the Indian National Congress assumed power on August 15, 1947. It retained power for decades even when it declined into a dynastic fiefdom of the family of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister.

Eventually, the Congress party lost power after Indira Gandhi locked up her opponents, muzzled the press and damaged democracy. When that happened in 1977, a former Congress member took the helm. Before Vajpayee first took charge in 1996, the big boss of every single non-Congress government was a former party member.

In contrast, Vajpayee began his career in the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the predecessor of the current ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). When Vajpayee kicked off his career in the early 1950s, Nehru was at his best. These were times when the first Indian prime minister was dazzling both the masses at home and audiences abroad.

Like Nehru, Vajpayee was a , a Hindu caste. Unlike Nehru, Vajpayee was a poor Hindi-speaking Brahmin, not a rich English-spouting one with cadences polished at Harrow. While Nehru’s writings and speeches are almost exclusively in English, Vajpayee was the finest Hindi orator in Indian politics for decades who managed to make his name as a as well.

Like Nehru, Vajpayee’s time in office was historic. He conducted nuclear tests, formally declaring India as a nuclear power. He rolled back the inefficient and asphyxiating Indian state, to over 8%. He invested in infrastructure, launching the Golden Quadrilateral highway network project to connect major industrial, agricultural and cultural centers of India. To his credit, Vajpayee also launched a national literacy mission to reduce India’s infamous illiteracy.

Not all went hunky dory for this legendary orator though. He suffered the ignominy of releasing hostages to the Taliban when a plane was hijacked from India and taken to Kandahar in Afghanistan. The border conflict over Kargil cost many Indian lives as Vajpayee’s government recovered territory taken over by Pakistan.

Yet Vajpayee lasted a full term in office, becoming the first non-Congress prime minister to do so. Even the historic 1977 government had lasted merely three years before collapsing due to ideological differences and petty personal squabbles. Most people regarded Vajpayee as a decent prime minister with a strong cabinet, and many were surprised when his BJP government lost power in the 2004 election.

It turned out that the key reason Vajpayee lost was because by the middle classes, the BJP’s historic base, fell significantly. It is a fear that haunts the BJP even today as it prepares for the 2019 election.

VAJPAYEE’S LOSS LED TO RISE OF MODI

When the Congress party returned to power in 2004, it was nominally led by Manmohan Singh. The real power behind the throne was wielded by Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born daughter-in-law of Indira Gandhi who was now the matriarch of the Nehru family. Her loyalists were ferociously opposed to the policies of the Vajpayee government. Arjun Singh, a key vassal of the Nehru family, went so far as to argue for a “” of the administration.

Even though the Congress-led government enjoyed the fruits of Vajpayee’s policies in the form of strong economic growth, it proceeded to dismantle the orator’s legacy swiftly and surgically. The Nehru loyalists increased government expenditure through populist handouts, gave fresh powers to India’s famously corrupt bureaucrats, and created a by directing banks to lend money to cronies. Corruption reached astronomical levels and a famous headline in , “nine years, nine scams,” deservedly stuck.

Not content with dismantling Vajpayee’s legacy, the Congress-led government treated him like an untouchable. He was deemed to be a “mukhauta,” the Hindi word of mask for hardline elements of his party.

To be fair, Nehru loyalists confined Narasimha Rao, a Congress prime minister who liberalized the economy in 1991, into the dustbin of history too. Their overriding goal was to create a mythology around the Nehru family and prepare the path for Rahul Gandhi to take over the family throne.

This triggered a reaction within the BJP. After all, Vajpayee has been a member of parliament for decades. He was friends with many of the denizens of Lutyens’ Delhi, as the ruling elite of India who live in palatial colonial buildings are popularly known. In light of the strength of his relationships, hardliners in the BJP accused Vajpayee of pandering to the Lutyens’ cabal.

Yet the BJP stalwart’s friendship with the Lutyens’ cabal proved fickle and, once he lost power, Vajpayee was treated as a mere Hindi-speaking upstart. Lutyens’ Delhi painted the poet as a feckless tool of the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the parent organization of the BJP. The RSS decided it was time for a true blue ideologue’s ascension who was resolutely opposed to the Lutyens cabal, paving the path for Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

It is important to remember that Modi was a pariah, nationally and internationally, after the . If Vajpayee had not been in power then, Modi would have most certainly have been dismissed from office that year. For decades, the Congress had stymied the growth of opposition parties in India’s numerous states by dismissing their governments, using Article 356 of the Constitution of India. A Congress-led government would have most certainly relieved Modi of his duties in 2002. Having a BJP government in Delhi proved to be Modi’s life insurance.

Yet the loss of the BJP in the national elections of 2004 worked in Modi’s favor. Even as his party lost control of the country, the Gujarat strongman retained control of his state. There was also an interpersonal equation that worked in his favor. Reportedly, Vajpayee was not terribly fond of Modi. Therefore, many analysts surmise that Modi would not have gone very far in a Vajpayee-led BJP. With the poet statesman out of the way, Modi had more room to grow.

More importantly, Vajpayee’s loss led the RSS to conclude that centrist politics did not pay and the BJP had to move further to the right. Also, out went the age of amiable statesmanship, in came the era of street-smart guile.

It was now time to replace a Brahmin poet with a subaltern trader, a consensus builder with a populist strongman and a bon vivant with a stern puritan. It was time for Vajpayee’s political demise and the rise of Modi.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Atal Bihari Vajpayee Paved the Way for Narendra Modi appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Ever since the (BJP) rode to power in 2014, there has been growing unease within ’s academic community, where the last vestiges of the Nehru dynasty are alive and kicking. The sense of frustration with the new government has only heightened with a series of controversial appointments to some of India’s finest universities and academic institutions. If one scrutinizes the political and ideological backgrounds of these men, they cannot help but notice that the new government has started to refashion the country’s intellectual discourse—discourse that has marginalized those who find themselves on wrong side of the ruling establishment.

These whose only merit lies in their ideological proximity to . Some of them even publicly declared their allegiance to Modi or the BJP well before the 2014 general election, praising him in their writings and speeches. So, it should come as no surprise that these very people were generously rewarded for their loyalties once the BJP took over the reins.

Past Assaults on India’s Academia

This isn’t the first time that the autonomy of India’s academic institutions has been compromised. One only needs to be reminded of the days when the Indian National Congress (INC) ruled India and when the Communist Party of India ran the states of West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura.

Ramachandra Guha, a distinguished historian, claims that the Indian left has consistently interfered in university appointments in both Kerala and West Bengal. In fact, in West Bengal, the left-wing government of Jyoti Basu had acquired such an astonishing degree of control over that no critic of Marxism stood a chance of becoming the vice-chancellor of Calcutta University, let alone holding a senior faculty position.

Congress, which ruled independent India for over four decades—only briefly interrupted in the late 1970s—had a history of meddling with university appointments. It is no less guilty than the incumbent BJP-led government of violating academic autonomy and of attempting to turn India’s universities into vehicles of indoctrination. If the Nehruvians, the left-liberals and the doctrinaire Marxists had a field day when governments favorable to them were in power, it is the right-leaning academics and reactionaries who are now basking in the patronage of the ruling party.

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This is the sad state of affairs in India, one that that does not augur well for higher education and research in the country.

The state of university education in India

The debate over academic autonomy is this: What purpose should a university serve? Is a university merely meant to manufacture graduates and professionals for the job market?

Sadly, that is what India’s best institutes and universities have degenerated into: Factories producing hundreds of thousands of graduates year after year with scarcely any concern for promoting cutting-edge research or stimulating innovation. This is testified by the country’s abysmally poor showing in the leading world  for 2015, with not a single Indian university featuring in the top 100. If that isn’t disappointing enough, another recent study states that in research, a country whose per capita income is almost half of India’s. If these studies aren’t a wakeup call, what will be?

The world has heard numerous success stories of Indians going abroad and making a name for themselves—the likes of Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella and Google CEO Sundar Pichai are all too familiar. But if there is anything to blame for this so-called brain drain, it is the appalling state of Indian universities and the higher education policy that have turned them into islands of mediocrity, when they should have been cultivated as oases of excellence where new ideas are incubated and bold experiments undertaken. The situation is made even worse with most Indian universities becoming victims of identity politics and bureaucratic interference.

However, these are not the only ills that cripple the country’s university system. Funding is another major issue. Many universities receive the bulk of their cash from the (UGC), an agency that is vested with the twin responsibilities of providing funds and maintaining standards in institutions of higher education in India. Avenues for alternative sources of funding do exist, but few Indian universities have taken the initiative to exploit them to the fullest.

Perhaps they could learn a few lessons in fundraising from some of America’s finest universities like and Princeton, both of which receive from their alumni. These donations can be a vital source of capital for any university. These funds can be used to meet the growing infrastructural requirements of colleges and for organizing academic seminars and workshops.

It is high time India’s universities figured out ways to get their alumni to contribute to their alma mater in a meaningful way.

Universities also need to reform their fee structures and bring them in sync with the times, so they have a substantial pool of resources dedicated to creating world-class research facilities for young scholars. India still has universities where annual barely reflect the rate of inflation.

Some of these measures may prove to be unpopular in a country like India, where protests erupt at the slightest mention of reform. But when have reforms ever been supported by everyone in society?

Going to the Dogs

The purpose of a university is to promote public good through teaching and research. To achieve these objectives, it is imperative that they are insulated from the vicissitudes of electoral politics.

Many attempts have been made to rob Indian academic institutions of autonomy and freedom. The Modi government is only carrying forward the legacy bequeathed to it by past administrations. Seen in that context, it is unsurprising that some of the government’s cronies have been rewarded with plum posts as vice-chancellors and directors of India’s premier universities and academic institutions.

The left-liberal intelligentsia, groomed in the classic Nehru tradition of secularism, socialism and democracy, is now getting a taste of its own medicine. And at the same time, universities are going to the dogs.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In India, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) the Delhi state assembly elections, winning 67 seats out of 70, with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) securing the remainder. The elections were held on February 7 and the results announced on February 10.

Amazingly, the BJP’s chief ministerial candidate, Kiran Bedi, from the Krishna Nagar constituency, a party bastion since 1993, by over 2,000 votes. AAP Chief Arvind Kejriwal is expected to take his as Delhi’s chief minister on February 14.

Whether one likes Kejriwal or not, there is no denying that this is a pivotal moment in his political career, and a testament to his dogged efforts to return to politics after he resigned from the post in frustration over stalled anti-corruption legislation in 2014. This latest win clearly suggests that Delhi’s voters were keen to give Kejriwal another chance.

So why did the AAP win so overwhelmingly, especially after his abrupt abandonment of the post? I spoke with several voters across Delhi on the eve of the parliamentary elections. Most of them who voted for the Aam Aadmi Party in 2013 were miffed that Kejriwal resigned. They believed he had become power-hungry, despite all his pretentions to good government. Although they agreed that he did good work as chief minister, many viewed his resignation as an act of desertion. It was clear from the start of the latest election that Kejriwal was in for a rough ride. But he handled the difficult phase rather masterfully.

I recall a discussion with an AAP spokesperson in 2014 while covering the Haryana state elections. He said that the AAP would not contest the Haryana polls and would instead focus on Delhi. This was one of the most pragmatic decisions the party took since its inception in 2013. Similarly, Kejriwal that he was mistaken when he resigned after only 49 days, which is a rare occurrence in Indian politics.

The BJP’s cautious approach to the Delhi elections worked in the AAP’s favor. If Delhi had gone to the polls within six months of Modi’s stunning victory in the 2014 general elections, it would have been a very different story, with a likely happy ending for the BJP. The party’s delay in going ahead with the elections gave the AAP time to pick itself up and be seriously competitive.

It is no secret that the Delhi BJP has been mired with and . The absence of a strong, unifying leader in the organization’s city branch prompted it to rush Bedi into the race for chief minister. Until her induction into the party, the BJP wasn’t even sure who to select to run for the post. The party’s central leadership took control to ensure that the fragmented Delhi unit did not thwart any chances of victory. Indian Prime Minister Modi remained the face of the campaign in Delhi and the BJP tied Bedi’s campaign to him. Political posters across the city featured her and Modi. The party “” Delhi BJP Chief Satish Upadhyay and did not field him in the elections.

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But Bedi was brought in too late. Her arrival caused more in the BJP’s already fragmented organization. Bedi had a reputation of being a no-nonsense police officer, and some in the party perceived her as . Similarly, voters saw Bedi’s introduction as a last-gasp move rather than a carefully crafted strategy.

However, her arrival was met with some positive responses. For instance, several female voters told me that she would improve women’s safety in Delhi. Even the AAP acknowledged that Bedi was “the strongest face the BJP has put up.”

But the AAP successfully framed her candidacy in a negative light. I saw AAP posters on several auto-rickshaws in the city her last-minute membership in the BJP as opportunistic. Whether or not one agrees with them, the posters achieved what the AAP wanted: many voters saw Bedi’s joining the BJP as a calculated move.

But what does this result mean for the BJP and Indian politics in general? Should the Delhi election be seen as a decline in Prime Minister Modi’s leadership and popularity?

I don’t think so. Modi’s “honeymoon” period as prime minister will go on for a while despite the setback in Delhi. However, the AAP’s victory has showed the BJP is not invincible. Its loss in this election will embolden regional parties. The BJP cannot rely on the “Modi wave” alone to win future elections.

The BJP has resembled the Congress Party since coming to power. Just like Sonia and Rahul Gandhi control the Congress, Modi and BJP President Amit Shah seem to have the last word on everything.  Power concentrated in Modi and Shah’s hands could lead to dissent and discontent within the party rank-and-file.

Modi’s performance as prime minister has not been that spectacular so far, but he needs more time. The BJP’s rout in Delhi should serve as a good wake-up call. If Modi doesn’t deliver what he promised, people will vote him out.

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On the day of his landslide election as India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi : “I want to make the 21^st century India’s century. It will take ten years, not very long.” However, as the hoopla over his stunning triumph fades, the constraints on his policy agenda are becoming clearer. This does not mean that Modi is destined to fail in advancing the country’s prospects. But the pace and scope of the transformations will be more encumbered than the supporters who liken Modi to powerful Hindu or publish hagiographic of his childhood would care to admit. As one observer : “Modi will need the powers of one of India’s multi-limbed deities to meet the expectations of investors and his nation.”

The Effects of Inflation

A major constraint that weighs on Modi is the need to break the chronically-high inflation rate. In the 2009-13 period, food inflation for industrial workers ran at an annual average of , with general inflation at . These levels are among the highest in the emerging markets and they are, in important measure, a function of the government’s profligate social welfare as well as significant supply in the agricultural sector.

High levels of persistent inflation have had several key consequences. First, they have sharply decreased the country’s pool of funds available for investment. The gross domestic savings declined from a high of 36.8% in 2007-08 to 30.8% in 2011-12 as households sought to preserve their wealth by purchasing real estate and gold. Second, they eroded much of the real value of the nominally-impressive gross domestic product (GDP) gains that India enjoyed over the past decade, which for a while made the country the darling of global investors.

Climbing back to these high growth rates will prove more difficult than many Indians envision, especially since much of this growth resulted from a unique : a surge of global capital fleeing unusually low interest rates in advanced countries and pouring into the emerging markets of Asia in search of higher yields. As interest rates start to edge higher in advanced nations, capital will begin to  India and other markets. Indeed, a World Bank earlier this year warned that a sudden rise in long-term interest rates in the US and Europe could cause capital flows to emerging markets to contract by as much as 80%.

Within India, the requirement to combat persistent inflation will necessitate tight monetary policies. On May 30, the head of the central bank  his intention not to cut interest rates until inflation is tamed, an action which in turn will curtail investment levels by a corporate sector that is already carrying high levels of .

All of these constraints will frustrate the famously impatient Modi in the months ahead. Yet he may still be able to harness the dynamics of Indian federalism to his agenda. 

Add to this the “El Nino” metrological phenomenon, which could cause a below-normal this year, leading to lower agricultural output and higher food prices. A business association in India  the effect could end up cutting 1.75% from the growth rate.

Goods and Services Tax

Another economic factor that is impinging on Modi’s agenda is India’s lack of a unified national market, a condition that inhibits economies of scale and depresses GDP growth. During his campaign, Modi came out in support of a nationwide goods and services tax (GST), which is India’s version of the value-added tax. If he is able to enact the GST, it would replace the fragmented system of indirect taxes the central government and the states currently levy at different stages of the supply chain. A  by the National Council for Applied Economic Research in New Delhi estimated that a comprehensive GST would increase GDP by 0.9 to 1.7%. Moreover,  bank believes: “The introduction of the GST is a key reform measure that could have immense macro implications for India’s growth potential.”

But the road to the GST might be littered with the same political constraints that impeded Modi’s predecessors. His smashing electoral victory means the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) gets to call the shots in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament. But the BJP’s national rival, the Congress party, is still able to wield control in the Rajya Sabha (Council of States), parliament’s upper chamber, whose assent is also needed for important legislation.

This may not be a problem on the GST, since Congress has supported it in the past. However, the fate of other parts of Modi’s agenda will turn on whether Congress decides to play a constructive role while in opposition. The record of the BJP, while sat in the opposition benches in recent years, was largely one of tawdry partisanship. Its disruptive tactics frequently shut down legislative proceedings, derailing harmed important items on the national agenda and making the last parliament the least in history. The feisty Sushma Swaraj, who led the BJP caucus in the last Lok Sabha and is now the foreign minister in Modi’s new government, contributed to this state as much as anyone.

Even if the Congress party decides not to follow the BJP’s obstructionist example, Prime Minister Modi’s initiatives could still be frustrated by India’s federal system. Chief ministers, as the leaders of the states are called, have immense powers, including in the realm. Moreover, they are often able to impede policy action at the national level.

Two examples suffice to demonstrate this point. Mamata Banerjee, the firebrand politician who serves as West Bengal’s chief minister, has emerged in recent years as what one observer calls: “A one-woman wrecking crew of the national government’s policy initiatives.” Two years ago, she was  in forcing then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to beat an ignominious retreat on opening up the country’s huge retail sector to foreign companies, an act that would have had a  economic impact if it had been allowed to go forward. She also  a water-sharing treaty, which was supposed to be the highlight of Singh’s landmark visit to Bangladesh in September 2011, as well as a  to create a national counterterrorism center a year later.

On the other side of the country, Modi as chief minister of Gujarat helped  efforts to enact the GST, which he now says he supports, and  a diplomatic initiative aimed at resolving the long-running dispute over Sir Creek — a 60 mile-long patch of marshland dividing Gujarat and the Pakistani province of Sindh.

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Land Acquisition

Modi has promised a keen focus on reviving dozens of infrastructure projects that have been entangled, in some cases for years, in bureaucratic red tape. to the new Global Competitiveness Report put out by the World Economic Fund, the ramshackle condition of Indian infrastructure is the most problematic factor for doing business in the country. In terms of the quality of overall infrastructure, the report ranks India 85^th out of 148 countries — for reference, China is ranked 48^th. Added to this, a new  by the International Monetary Fund finds that a slump in infrastructure development is an important contributor to India’s current growth slowdown.

However, in India’s federal structure, state administrations play a major role in infrastructure projects, especially in the land acquisition process but also in environmental clearances. A new  conducted by the J.P. Morgan financial group finds that more than half of the country’s largest infrastructure projects are: “…stuck because of state-related issues. [Moreover,] 46% of these projects were stalled on account of land acquisition — the single biggest constraint — which is a state subject. And [another 9% are delayed] on account of contractual and legal issues related to individual states. So these are constraints over which the central government has no jurisdiction.” The report concludes: “Any new central government will therefore have much less leverage in debottlenecking projects than is being presumed.” A  by Credit Suisse makes the same point.

The land acquisition act passed by parliament in 2013 promises to exacerbate things further by substantially increasing project development costs. One real estate expert  that the law will push up land prices so far that: “…many infrastructure projects might eventually be rendered unviable and the private sector — already not too interested in partnering with the government in wake of delays and regulatory complications — might be even further discouraged from considering any potential partnership with the government in [public-private partnership] projects.”

Another expert  that, under the new law: “It is likely that land acquisition itself will end in all of urban, and most of rural, India.” This view is echoed by a senior official overseeing industrial policy in the central government, who it is now “virtually impossible” to acquire land for major infrastructure projects.

Emulating the Modi Model

All of these constraints will frustrate the famously impatient Modi in the months ahead. Yet he may still be able to harness the dynamics of Indian federalism to his agenda. A group of five states in the northern and western parts of the country — Chattisgarh, Goa, Gujurat, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan — are now under BJP control. Given its strong showing in the neighboring states of Maharashtra and Haryana in the recently-concluded parliamentary contests, the party should also do well enough in the state legislative elections scheduled later this year to form the new governments in these two states. If this occurs, a “Saffron economic bloc” will emerge, in which a quarter of the Indian population is governed by administrations looking to emulate the economic model that Modi crafted when he ran the show in Gujarat.

Three points stand out in this model, which other state leaderships would do well to copy.

First, Modi made his initial mark by  Gujarat’s broken electricity sector. As result, it is now one of the few power-surplus states in the country and the promise of reliable electricity is a major factor for why it has become a magnet for foreign investment and industrial development.

Second, many experts believe the anarchic laws governing the Indian labor market have stifled the growth of labor-intensive manufacturing, something which should be a huge advantage for the country. Under Modi, Gujarat instituted a more flexible interpretation of these laws. A new Goldman Sachs report  that if the rest of India did the same, the result would be the creation of some 40 million new manufacturing jobs over the next decade, and that an even more basic reform of labor regulations would lead to 110 million jobs during that period.

Third, there is a  consensus in New Delhi on the need to amend the recently-passed land law. In the interim, however, the Saffron bloc should look to a new  commissioned by the central government, which lauded the system of land and environmental approvals in Gujarat.

The emergence of a Saffron bloc would be a powerful countervailing force vis-Ă -vis the other elements of the Indian system that will hem in Modi. Its success also would have a potent demonstration effect for the rest of the country.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Foreign policy seldom occupies an important position in political agendas during electoral campaigns, and 2014 in India is hardly any different. The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) prime ministerial candidate has, however, evoked a little more interest from various sections. One reason for this abnormal curiosity is that anything Narendra Modi does attracts attention.

Another reason is the refusal by the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States to grant Modi a diplomatic visa because his alleged role in the 2002 Gujarat riots makes him an even more interesting prime ministerial candidate, especially given his apparent popularity with large swathes of the Indian people. Conversely, the Gujarat chief minister has enjoyed much success in his foreign visits to China, Japan and Singapore.

Modi himself has said little about the shape his foreign policy would take but his actions as chief minister belie a strong emphasis on trade, particularly with Asia and the countries of the Indian Ocean rim. Yet commercial links alone do not dictate foreign relations and, in this era of the global village, Modi must think on several interconnected factors that will affect the security and esteem of India.

Structural Issues

The making and study of foreign policy is beset with difficulties at several levels. First, there are structural issues — despite scores of its own languages, India is predominantly an English-speaking state and moves in Anglophone circles. The dominant views in this system are set by the US and, to a lesser extent, Britain.

This is largely due to the presence of hundreds of well-staffed and well-funded think-tanks who see the world through Anglophone eyes. Issues such as non-proliferation, global warming and terrorism are defined, unchallenged, by American interests. Multilingual historians are often surprised by the diversity of debate in other languages, even when there is broad national consensus.

The Anglophone discourse is a result not of some master conspiracy, but of a failure to empathize with rationalities other than one’s own. India’s best response to the present situation would be to open its own national archives to  and encourage its universities to produce policy experts in the plethora of fields that governments usually interfere in. A narrative informed by the history of Indian policymaking is the first step in generating superior inputs to current policymakers.

A second challenge India faces in its international relations is infrastructure: the lack of energy, transportation, public safety, health, and a sound legal system make the country  to foreign investment.

It is telling that an Egypt still recovering from the turmoil of the Arab Spring saw more tourists in 2013 than India did. Though infrastructure does not strictly fall in the realm of external affairs, it makes an enormous difference in attracting valuable partners and forming strong ties with them.

A third question Modi must ponder on is the structure of , the stick or hard power of foreign policy. What sort of force structure is required for the nature of tomorrow’s conflicts?

With the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia, it is unlikely that India’s neighbors will engage in 20th century-style conflicts over land with India. Rather, they will rely on asymmetric warfare and/or well-trained fast and mobile units with heavy firepower, good lines of communication, and a high degree of stealth. India will need to be able to deploy force in a variety of theatres — maritime anti-piracy operations, mountainous border engagements, thrusts across the desert and others.

Remedying these fundamental deficiencies will give India a stronger hand, despite its understaffed Foreign Service, with which to project its views and defend its interests in the international community.

Central & South Asia

A state’s immediate neighbors are always of the greatest concern. India has seen its influence slip considerably in recent years or, at least, has had its impotence exposed. With smaller states who can pose no military threat on their own like the Maldives, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, India must be generous in its development aid and facilitate closer ties via education, cultural exchanges and easier travel regulations.

However, India must be careful to avoid the tail wagging the dog — preferential treatment must be reciprocated by good faith. Modi must see to it that Indian officials do not come off as overbearing and condescending to the neighborhood as they have been  of in the past. Instead, they must walk that fine line between arrogant regional power and regional locus of power.

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan will shift some of the  of keeping the Central Asian country free from Taliban rule onto India. It is more logical for Afghans to fight the Taliban for their own country than for India to follow in the erroneous footsteps of imperial Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

India must act in concert with other regional powers with  — Russia and Iran — to help Afghanistan repel the Taliban and rebuild its society and economy. Any less of a commitment would irredeemably jeopardize Indian economic and security interests. The challenge would be to strangle the Taliban’s flow of aid from Pakistan. Modi must keep international attention and condemnation on Pakistan’s aid to the Islamists in Afghanistan, while cobbling together a coalition to provide military and financial aid to the non-theocratic forces in Kabul.

Iran can be another important regional partner for India. Both countries have somewhat similar interests in Afghanistan, and Iran is also the last stop on the proposed International North-South Trade Corridor (INSTC) that would connect the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea and serve Turkey, the Caucasus, Afghanistan and . Iran would be a vital partner in this project as well as in providing security to Afghanistan against the Taliban.

Although Iran does not look to India as a major , there are, nonetheless, several projects of bilateral interest that India must push to develop quickly. Among these are the much-talked about development of Chabahar port, its attendant road, rail and pipeline infrastructure, and oil and gas pipelines between the two countries. Modi must put Iran toward the top of his foreign policy agenda not only to capture a new, post-sanctions Iranian market, but also for the ripple effect the INSTC can have for trade in the region.

Over the years, Pakistan has elevated itself from a nuisance to a threat with its support of terrorism from behind its nuclear shield. Endless summits have failed to silence the guns in Kashmir, let alone bring peace to the region. In fact, all evidence still points to support of terrorist cells by various arms of the Pakistani government, while men like Malik Ishaq and Hafiz Saeed roam free.

At this low juncture, one option left to Modi is to  and downgrade diplomatic relations to the consular level. In the past, India has shown itself as too willing to talk regardless of provocations and dishonored commitments by the other side. A concerted effort to highlight, internationally, Pakistan’s links to terrorism must be mounted. India must try to throttle foreign aid to Pakistan or affix conditions that demand aid be sanitized from contact with terrorism via sub-contractors, finance, labor and so on.

Any talks that do take place between the two states must only be via a third party. Modi must be bold — but not reckless — and explore other strategies to put pressure on Islamabad, be it via Afghanistan, Balochistan or along the Line of Control (LoC).

*[Read the final part . A version of this article was originally published on Jaideep Prabhu’s .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The Congress party has ruled India for the bulk of the period since independence. For the last decade, it has been in power in the form of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a coalition it forged with like-minded parties.

Today, Congress faces a challenge from a reenergized Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Narendra Modi. The Indian elections are historic. After decades of venal corruption, nauseating nepotism and staggering incompetence, the Nehru dynasty might finally be ousted from office.

Ten Years of Monumental Misrule

The UPA took over from the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 2004 with India's gross domestic product (GDP) growing at a robust 7.9%. The Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led NDA had initiated reforms in infrastructure and other key sectors. Manmohan Singh became prime minister and there were hopes that high economic growth would continue because he gets credit for the 1991 reforms. Instead of further reforms, the UPA announced one populist scheme after another, creating a crypto-socialist economy for the 21^st century.

Under the UPA, patronage has increased to unprecedented levels. Even The Economist, the 1843 English publication which opposed India's independence for 104 years and that has long favored the Congress party, estimates that $4 billion to $12 billion were taken as by the UPA. This does not account for the loss to the Indian exchequer, of which the bribes are a mere fraction. The Indian GDP grew at a measly 4.7%, while inflation averaged over 10% during the last quarter of 2013. This means real GDP growth was in the negative. Unsurprisingly, unemployment is rife in India. Thanks to the UPA, the Indian economy is in a mess.

India's security is also in disarray. The country's defense forces are short on equipment, lack officers to the tune of 12,000 to 15,000, and suffer poor morale. Off the record, India's intelligence services bemoan the fact that there has been no prime minister as disinterested in their work as Singh. Foreign policy has been a mess and there is a singular lack of vision about India's role in the world. Chinese incursions into Indian territory have been ignored and India has not stepped up to the plate in Afghanistan.

The Prince vs. The Tea-seller

There have always been two Indias. Anglicized elites, who largely inherit power, believe themselves to be superior to the hoi-polloi. The middle-classes and the masses, who speak the vernacular, struggle for basic necessities. This election is a battle between the patricians who want to cling on to power and the plebeians who want change. The choice is between two candidates who are like chalk and cheese. As The Economist writes: "Mr Gandhi would ascend to office as if by divine right. Mr Modi is a former teaseller propelled to the top by sheer ability."

Rahul Gandhi is the great grandson of Nehru, India's first prime minister. He has never held any executive position. As a legislator, he has not proposed a single piece of legislation over the last decade. In a staggering demonstration of arrogance, he has appeared in just one so far. This was universally agreed to be an unmitigated disaster, raising questions not only about his experience and competence, but also about his ability and intelligence.

Modi comes from a backward caste. As mentioned earlier, he has humble origins. He is serving his fourth term as chief minister of Gujarat and has an impressive record in office. Three of his achievements are particularly impressive.

First, in a country with decrepit infrastructure, Modi has grasped the fundamental importance of focusing on power, irrigation, roads and ports for the Indian economy.

Modi appointed Manjula Subramaniam, a remarkable woman, to reform Gujarat's power sector. At that time, the Gujarat State Electricity Board (GSEB) was racking up massive losses and the state had a power deficit. Subramaniam improved morale, restructured debt to secure lower interest rates, renegotiated contracts with power plants to get cheaper prices, and plugged leakages in distribution. Distribution to rural areas improved dramatically with the launch of a scheme named Jyotigram, which means lighted villages. Now, the 18,000 villages of Gujarat have access to uninterrupted supply.

Most importantly, Modi took Subramaniam's advice and broke up GSEB. In 2003, the Gujarat government created a holding company, a power generation company, a power transmission company and four distribution companies. As of 2012, Gujarat ""

Modi's irrigation reforms were no less path breaking. Around 70% of Gujarat is arid and semi-arid. His administration undertook a two pronged approach. Provision of water through dams, check dams, and the interlinking of rivers increased dramatically. Conservation of water through use of drip irrigation and other improved technology have meant that an additional 1.5 million hectares are now farmland. Agricultural growth in Gujarat has been 10.97% in the first decade of this century, in contrast to measly national rates of for the same period.

When Modi came to power, Gujarat's roads were in dire state. The World Bank that the Gujarat State Highways Project "improved 1,900 kilometers of roads, reducing travel times by 10 percent." Numerous studies have noted that safety, employment and access to both education and health care have improved in Gujarat thanks to better roads. Ports have come up in Gujarat as well and a notes the state has "the distinction of handling the maximum non-major cargo traffic in India."

Modi's policies have led to Chinese style double-digit growth rates for Gujarat. He has slashed red tape, introduced flexible labor laws, and successfully wooed investment. Such is Gujarat's allure that Ratan Tata, the former TATA boss, India's most respected industrial house, remarked: "You are stupid if you are not in Gujarat."

Gujarat accounts for 17.2% of India's fixed capital investment, 15.6% of the value of production, 20% of industrial output, and 22% of the country's exports. It is little wonder that Indians from other states are immigrating to Gujarat for employment.

Indians are sick of living in darkness, potholed roads, chronic unemployment and bureaucratic oppression. Modi offers a glimmer of hope to millions of Indians who yearn for better governance, improved infrastructure and a fair shot at life.

Secularism, Socialism and Scotch

As expected, Modi has many powerful enemies. The din of allegations against him is sometimes deafening. India's so-called secular leaders have long pandered to clerics for the Muslim vote. These secular leaders allege that Modi abetted the 2002 Gujarat riots, while staying silent about the 1984 pogrom of Sikhs that was led by the Congress. It is important to note that the courts have given Modi a clean chit.

Furthermore, the number of Muslims below poverty line from 31% in 2004-05 to 7% in 2011-12 in rural Gujarat. The same number for urban Gujarat fell from 42% to 14.6%. Muslims have fared far worse in the states run by the Congress and other so-called secular parties.

Arvind Kejriwal is Modi's latest left-wing critic. He was in power for 49 days in Delhi where he overthrew a notoriously corrupt Congress government. Kejriwal made his name opposing the Congress but has now trained his sights on Modi. He is a Chavez-style populist who promises freebies such as cheap electricity and free water to the people. He also promises to curb corruption by creating an elaborate new bureaucracy. He opposes Modi's economic model and is trying to occupy the space left vacant by the Congress.

Other socialists and communists have a Pavlovian opposition to enterprise and a fixation with government intervention. Modi is offering an alternative to the Nehruvian state and that is upsetting those in a country, which Nehru's daughter deemed socialist in 1976 after a of dubious validity.

Foreign correspondents in India and its anglicized elite socialize over scotch in expensive locales in cities like Delhi and Mumbai. Many of these still harbor imperial attitudes and disdain people with rural and vernacular roots. The rough-hewn cadences of Modi jar with their snobbish sensibilities. They are giving the Congress a clean chit for decades of misgovernance, while attacking Modi even on his incontestably impressive economic record. Clearly, the tea-seller is threatening India's incumbent elite to evoke such a vitriolic response.

In Search of a Leader

India has muddled through a decade of despair. In much of the north, there is no order, leave aside rule of law. Under the Congress, Delhi achieved the dubious distinction of becoming the . Sonia Gandhi has been de facto prime minister, wielding and reducing the constitutional position of the prime minister to a joke. India is looking for someone to lead and Modi is, by far, the best option in a generation and more.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Narendra Modi: India’s Prime Minister in Waiting? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

As India gears up for an election increasingly difficult to predict — one in which the controversial Narendra Modi, the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) prime ministerial candidate, heads off against Rahul Gandhi, the 43-year-old scion of the country's most famous political dynasty — pundits' predictions of victory engage the insatiable public demand for electoral clues.

But what role do the most historically marginalized in the Indian state play in the 2014 Indian elections, almost 70 years after independence?

The dominant narrative of the "world's largest democracy" is that of a shiny, modern and new India. Visiting heads of state spend their time "wooing" the country's businesses and foreign investors, longing for facilitated access to India's investor-friendly states, while even the director of the London School of Economics (LSE) has proclaimed it as a country of promise, from where "the world looks different."

Religious violence, poverty, impunity and widespread human disenfranchisement have seemingly vanished from the lexicons of a world eager to capitalize, and of a country bent on asserting its global relevance.

Electoral Economics

Structurally, the first past the post system that allows voters to choose between people rather than only parties means that central issues, including those of women's empowerment and human rights, have become victims of an electoral format ever more centered around personality. However, it is the voice of the people that places gross domestic product (GDP) and a hope for change solidly at the center of intense campaigning.

Despite its impressive economic transformation over the past 25 years — per capita income has nearly quadrupled compared with 1991 — and amid a yawning gap between rich and poor, India's many constituencies, with their varied geopolitical agendas and priorities, seem to be coalescing over economic hopes of continued growth.

Modi's rags-to-riches story — his spectacular journey from selling tea at a railway station — resonates loudly with the aspirations of a largely rural population, and provides a crucial juxtaposition with the Congress party's "princeling" candidate.

As societal behaviors shift from traditional community ties, such as caste and religion, to more transparent ones of geo-location and economic status, the historically sharp Muslim-Hindu divide seems less relevant now as a younger India votes less on a sectarian impulse and more on economic and material security.

But the criteria for growth are still subject to a massively diverse set of geopolitical priorities. While other peripheral states, including Kerala and Orissa, have leveraged their political weight opportunistically by looking outward and aggressively courting investment in industry, the northeast has remained handicapped by its lack of connectivity and adverse security situation. The latter, in particular, has led the Indian government to overreact to the slightest perceived threat, be it legitimate civil disobedience movements born of economic grievances or migration into the region. 

In the northeast, communal identities remain strong and, until recently, their interests have often been at cross-purposes to the mainstream. For instance, Manipuri calls to repeal the (AFSPA) — which forbids the prosecution of soldiers without the rarely-given approval of the central government, so troops often enjoy effective immunity from prosecution — have been countered in Delhi, citing the security of its citizens. 

But what we have seen now, in the run-up to the 2014 Indian elections, is the intersection of economic growth in India and the development of the northeast.

Managing the Northeast

If you scratch the surface of popular concepts about India, a hegemonic, ethnically exclusive, urban core will be revealed. Away from the sensitivities of those dwelling and thriving in the capital and other industrial hubs, three underreported internal armed conflicts — those on the borders in Manipur and in Kashmir, and the Naxal conflict in India's heartland — continue to simmer.

Issues of impunity and accountability are so pervasive and cyclical in nature, that one marvels at the ease with which candidates proclaim "progress." The assumed legitimacy of the state belies the sensitivities of minorities, who find their identities at odds with such a convenient homogeneity.

To be economically, and socially, sustainable, India's growth story needs to be inclusive. The northeast — which includes the states of Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Nagaland and Sikkim, and covers 262,179 sq. km of the country — remains the least developed. This comes despite distinct advantages, including resource-rich and fertile farmland, proximity to Bangladesh and Myanmar, and an entry point for the Southeast Asian markets.

However, the  has a mere ten airports (seven of which are in Assam) and, while the region stands below average in comparison with the rest of India in socioeconomic indicators, its literacy rates are above the national average. Moreover, the 2013 racially-motivated murder of  in New Delhi is demonstrative of deep societal cleavages that still exist, particularly between the northeastern states and the mainstream.

But the region is growing in electoral importance: increased connectivity, trade, tourism, migration and investments in infrastructure are boosting its growth and helping to transform it into an economic hub. Boasting an average of a 9.95% growth, compared to the 8% growth of India as a whole, is indicative of future opportunities.

Both  and Gandhi have invested more time in wooing these constituencies in their respective electoral campaigns than would have been deemed necessary in the past.

However, in a country of India's scale, federalism is often seen as the key to successful democracy, and what the federalist model has been successful in avoiding is an overt political domination to the direct detriment of minority and indigenous ethnic groups.

India's state boundaries have placated most national minorities by transforming them into majorities in their own states. This conscious perpetuation of majority-minority rule has led to disparate opportunities, human dignity, and development between those at the center and those on the periphery.

At the crux of it all is power. These divides are manifested in the relationships between the powerful and the disenfranchised, between the men and women and, perhaps least visible, between those who have historically wielded power, and those who have historically had power wielded over them.

So is it really enough to merely recognize the economic potential of the region, while neglecting to tackle the more nuanced relationships between center and its borders?

Power and Privilege

It is not merely the incorporation of northeastern quotas in Indian institutions and politics that will pave the way for the next prime minister. Though the Indian political system has rendered MPs unimportant, it has balanced the positions with significant access to power to execute local contracts and, in short, get rich.

Despite surpassing development indicators that the Western world is still struggling to achieve — a female president, a Dalit leader — India's experience demonstrates that access to positions of power does not correlate with an end to discrimination against traditionally marginalized groups.

All these achievements have served to enhance is the shiny façade of the state as one of tolerance and egalitarianism, where instead a vacuum of real commitment lies concealed.

According to government estimates, 451 incidents of communal violence were recorded in the first eight months of 2013, compared to 410 incidents in all of 2012. Among these were clashes between Hindu and Muslim communities last August in the Kishtwar town in Jammu and Kashmir, and in Muzaffarnagar in the western Uttar Pradesh state in September. Violence linked to a persistent low-level armed conflict in central and eastern India by the Communist Party of India (Maoist), known as Naxalites, led to the death of 384 people, including 147 civilians, in 2013.

In the aftermath of the well-covered 2012 Delhi rape case, legislation has improved but, despite these important reforms, key gaps remain. For example, Indian law still does not provide adequate legal remedies for "honor killings," or victim and witness protection.

The veneer of a democratic meritocracy is not a new one in India, but it is increasingly one that only the most privileged and misguided can pretend to believe in. As business and political power intersect, we witness the rise of crony capitalism. The idea this meritocracy can continue without explicitly addressing socioeconomic inequality is weakening.

It was precisely the revelations of such inadequacy that provided the impetus of Anna Hazare's 2011 anti-graft movement and partially explains the success of the . So when we see what privilege looks like in India today, it becomes clear that tackling the crass indicators of power disparity, such as wealth or sanctioned discrimination, does not negate the deep discriminations of an unequal society.

India's public discourse tends to sweep the inconvenient truths under the carpet and apply temporary, band-aid measures when the ugly dust of reality reappears. The country's nearly 70 years of independence and democracy has infused its national psyche, the commendable belief that descent-based characteristics such as ethnicity, race and caste should not matter.

Rapid economic growth and revolutionary transformation that undoubtedly revealed a multitude of opportunities for rural and urban alike, means that only the most backward and conservative individuals still believe descent-based discrimination and racism toward, for example, those from the northeast, is condonable.

This façade of egalitarianism manifests as an invisible barrier to India's hopes of transforming into a truly democratic state. The conviction of the elite is not a license to ignore voices telling them it still exists, peripheral as they may be.

The national policy framework, for example the Indian Constitution, that insists on referring to its indigenous peoples as "scheduled tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC)" creates a complicity that does anything but set standards to lead by example. Therefore, it is of little wonder that it is  that almost half the women sexually assaulted in India's capital are from the country's northeast.

What's the Cost?

What this election season has shown us is that for all India's democratic promise, the country's predilection for money politics has led it to neglect its most promising and untapped region.

The government and the private sector need to collaborate on reforms related to investment in agriculture, hydroelectric power and infrastructure, as well as in creating new avenues for vertical growth through market-linked skills development and cross-border trade. It is imperative that these be implemented with the support of those local communities.

But in order to really include the northeast, it will cost the government more than a few tens of millions of rupees. It will require a more nuanced and widespread understanding of the subtle ways in which privilege functions in such a diverse society, along with a commitment to tackle fundamental human rights issues of the region in an even-handed and just manner.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright © . All Rights Reserved

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First, it was the Americans who spoke of a “” to Asia; then, it was the Russians’ turn to consider the region. The Europeans, not to be left far behind, also debated . Now, it seems Narendra Modi, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) prime ministerial candidate for India’s general elections, is also hinting at a pivot to Asia.

Much has already been  about how Modi should order his international relations were he to become Indian prime minister, but less has been said on what he has indicated in dozens of public addresses so far. While assumptions have been made about Modi’s possible weltanschauung (worldview) based on his criticism of Congress’ policies over the past couple of years, they only reinforce stereotypes about the BJP and right-wing politicsĚý(however, calling the party “right-wing” is ).

Modi’s speeches — to the public at large as well as to specialized audiences — indicate a different way of thinking and potentially a new direction for India’s foreign policy. The net effect of Modi’s ideas on how India should conduct itself in the international community may well be considered an Indian pivot to Asia.

At first glance, describing Modi’s foreign policy as a pivot to Asia might seem dramatic, especially amid talk of an American, Russian and European pivot to the region. Besides, India is already in Asia. However, there are several factors that make a “pivot” the most apt term to describe what may be India’s new approach to international affairs.

Cold War Politics

India has seen itself essentially as a Western power; despite its Indic heritage and historical influence in Asia, Indians tend to study, vacation and do business far more in the West than in the East. Westerners also feel less alienated in India than they do further east — familiarity with cricket, curry and Bollywood has made the country more comprehensible to Western sensibilities.

Yet the importance of Asia to India has been expounded from the very beginning. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, declared that with independence, the former colonized countries of Asia would rise again and take their rightful place in world affairs.

Despite the rhetoric, however, Nehru and the next half-century of governments after his death did little to realize this prognostication. Perhaps because of his own education or by virtue of India being a British colony, Nehru led his newly independent country into the Anglosphere, which was then defined by the titanic struggle between the “communist” Soviet Union and the “capitalist” United States, even though India had no quarrel with either power.

Nehru’s need to occupy center-stage in international politics meant he framed his foreign policy in terms of the Cold War, despite repeatedly professing non-alignment. India participated in peace talks over the Korean War, the International Control Commission for Vietnam, and other proxy conflicts between the US and Soviet Union that had little to do with India.

Even after the Cold War ended, India has still followed the Western framework in conceptualizing its region. In 2012, a quasi-governmental group in Delhi penned “Non-Alignment 2.0,” a foreign policy document that continued the Nehruvian legacy of a Western-oriented foreign policy.

The Importance of Trade

Modi has, so far, shied away from commenting on most foreign policy issues that observers are used to hearing from Indian politicians with upward ambition.

Instead, Modi has repeatedly stressed the importance of trade to his foreign policy; each Indian province might have a trade representative to international partners, and an economic delegation will be attached to every diplomatic mission. As chief minister of the western Indian state of Gujarat, Modi has made several trips to Australia, China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, developing particularly close relations with China, Japan and Singapore.

These relations are even more noteworthy when Modi’s other agenda is considered: infrastructure. The dilapidated state of Indian roads, railways, waterways, housing and power have created a bottleneck around India’s economic growth, while analysts have projected the need for at least a trillion dollars of investment in infrastructure over the next five years, if the country is to continue growing. Modi’s response has been to challenge Indians to develop a hundred new smart cities, bullet trains, national broadband coverage and other infrastructural improvements in the next few years.

To deliver on this vision, India will need large investments from foreign partners in terms of finance, machinery and skilled labor. The most suited countries for such assistance are India’s neighbors, who have experience with similar mega-projects and are also able to extend financial aid. In addition to the vibrant economies of Southeast Asia, China is India’s biggest trading partner and Japan has been its largest aid donor since 1986.

Modi has also emphasized the development of manufacturing in the country to provide jobs as well as to spur exports and growth. Part of this strategy relies on better relations with the countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

If Modi can address key issues such as the fear of an Asian hegemon in SAARC and protectionism in ASEAN, India can fuel a regional dynamo. Beyond trade, tourism and education, the countries of the Indian Ocean rim naturally have a far greater convergence with Indian interests than others in terms of climate change, narcotics trafficking, regional security and climate change.

The development of infrastructure and trade in the Indian Ocean region will also ameliorate demographic problems at home. India has long-talked about a “Look East Policy” but done little to deliver on it.

An Indian pivot will develop links between the country’s troubled northeast and its Southeast Asian neighbors, bringing development to the region and hopefully calming demographic friction between Muslims and tribes that erupted in 2012. This fits well with Modi’s strategy of development as panacea — in a country as impoverished as India, it just might be.

Traditional foreign policy analysts may worry that Modi’s approach ignores India’s three largest conundrums: China, Pakistan and the US. This is not the case.

While Modi has made it no secret that he does not expect India’s relations with the US to improve until the Obama administration, thought to be lukewarm toward India, leaves office, it is unlikely that the BJP leader will ignore the world’s largest economy either.

And Pakistan’s Role?

However, Modi may be acting on what many South Asia analysts have realized but are afraid to accept: the road to Islamabad does not pass through Washington. Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in the late 1980s forever changed power dynamics in South Asia.

Since then, Islamabad has been waging asymmetric warfare from behind its nuclear shield. The US has not only been unable to help curtail this cross-border terrorism by Pakistan, but has even been selling Islamabad weapons for its fight against terrorism. India is forced to find a solution to Pakistan’s low intensity warfare on its own, potentially through improving its economic strength and defense manufacturing capabilities.

Similarly, India must face a rising China on its own. Southeast Asia and Japan may be of some assistance, but demographics dictate that any viable balance to Chinese power in the region must be provided by India. Given the massive disparity in military and economic power that exists between the two Asian giants, India’s defense must rely first, as Nehru realized, on its economy and ties in the region.

No doubt, Modi’s response to incursions into Indian territory or to terrorism may indeed be firmer than incumbent Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s, but that would be tactics and not strategy.

Modi’s pivot to Asia would help India augment its internal and regional balancing before taking on greater international responsibility. In this, Modi seems to have paid attention to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin: observe and analyze developments calmly; secure your own position; deal with changes with confidence; conceal your capabilities; keep a low profile; take action; seize the opportunity; and make the best use of the situation.

Nehru’s Cold War-informed non-alignment had its limitations. It remains to be seen if Modi’s Asia-centric policy will pay India more dividends.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In our , we had argued that taxation is the economic glue that binds citizens to the state in a necessary two-way relationship. A citizen’s stake in exercising accountability diminishes if he or she does not pay in a visible and direct way — typically via direct taxes or user fees — for the services the state provides.  

We estimated that a very small percentage of Indians (about 10%) are in this taxpayer accountability relationship with the state. Unless India brings more people into the tax net through some form of direct taxation, the promise of Indian democracy will remain unfulfilled. How should this be accomplished?

Direct Taxation

Four key factors bear upon this question. India is decentralizing. It is rapidly urbanizing. Wealth is increasingly vested and locked up in land and property. And politicians will be highly reluctant to impose direct taxes, especially if they are close to those being taxed. Consider each in turn.

Given India’s size, the chain of delegation from principals (citizens/voters) to agents (their elected representatives) is simply too long for the current system of taxation to serve as an accountability mechanism. In addition, top-down transfers to local governments, whether from centrally-sponsored schemes or state governments, weaken citizens’ engagement and they become less demanding and politicians have fewer incentives to respond to public interests. Hence, an increasing share of public services and local public goods should be provided locally and financed locally, preferably via direct taxes.

The decentralization impulse that drove the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments was appropriately visionary, but the fiscal means to realize that vision have not been provided to local bodies. The large vertical imbalance inherent in the massive mismatch between functions and finances of local governments, especially urban local bodiesĚý(ULBs), violates the principle of “subsidiarity” that is the cornerstone of fiscal federalism. Often, the culprits are state governments and leaders who have deliberately throttled the fiscal powers of ULBs, fearing a loss of political control if ULBs gain financial autonomy. States such as Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan have even abolished the residential property tax.

Second, going forward, decentralization will increasingly be focused on cities. If 50-60% of India’s population will be urban, cities will and should become the vehicle or the governance mechanism for delivering a variety of public services such as primary education and health, water and sanitation, local transportation, and law and order. The taxpayer accountability relationship will then become about urban taxes and urban user fees. Moreover, creating local taxation capacity will serve to strengthen state capacity to provide public goods.

Third, land in general — and urban land and property in particular — is among the biggest sources of wealth in the country, but it has been untapped. The limited data available suggest that total municipal revenues in India account for about 0.75% of gross domestic product, about one-seventh of Brazil’s. ULBs account for about 2% of the combined revenue and expenditure of all levels of the government, less than a tenth of that in advanced countries.

Finally, in India, the closer a government tier is to the taxed and the more direct the representation of the taxed, the less willing it is to tax. Municipal corporations find it more difficult to increase these taxes, perhaps because property owners and builders pay for the campaigns of corporators. Similarly, village panchayats (councils) are unlikely to impose taxes on the very people who might control or constitute them.

Tax Decentralization

Thus, the 14th Finance Commission should take the lead and initiate the process of tax decentralization. It should do so not by fiat, but instead through the provision of incentives to states and local governments.

These incentives would take the form of the center providing additional resources, by way of matching grants (via Finance Commission transfers) for local governments and states that make progress in increasing the number of taxpayers who are brought into the direct taxpayer net and increasing revenues from such direct taxes. For example, the Finance Commission could say that for every Y percent increase in these two variables, central matching grants would increase by X percent. The resources could come by increasing the share of pooled revenue that is distributed to the states (so-called vertical transfers).

The exact incentive mechanism could be designed in several ways. If the view is that state governments are the impediment in preventing financial empowerment of local bodies, the Finance Commission could stipulate that the matching grant from the center would be linked to improved performance by the local bodies, and would be given to these bodies and not to state governments.

An alternative, and less intrusive (on state government authority), approach would be to provide matching grants to the states conditional on improving property tax performance and leave it to state governments via the state finance commissions to determine the subsequent allocations to local bodies.

The light or heavy touch should also apply to the specifics of taxation. For example, if there is a universal view that urban property taxes are the way to go, the Finance Commission can explicitly link the matching grants to performance on additional property taxpayers and property taxes. The arguments for privileging a property tax are several.

First and foremost, it is a direct tax that will be felt by those on whom it is imposed, thereby furthering the accountability objective. It would significantly boost revenues. It is a progressive wealth tax, even when it is uniform and low. It is imposed on a non-mobile good, which can with today’s technologies be relatively easily identified and mapped. It is also a tax imposed on a good (property) whose values can only increase and, therefore, has in-built tax buoyancy. And just as a financial transaction tax would put sand in the wheels of finance, it would do the same for property speculation.

Sustainable Democracy in India

The other variable the Finance Commission has at its disposal is the magnitude of matching grants. If fiscal decentralization is considered important — as we would urge — then the magnitudes set aside for achieving this objective should be substantial. 

However, if additional resources are unavailable, an alternative would be to change the formula for distribution of resources between states (so-called horizontal transfers) to include the performance criteria proposed above, according it a high weight in the distribution formula. This has the downside of being a zero-sum exercise between states that would elicit political resistance from the states that are likely to remain property tax laggards.

The challenges in building effective systems of property taxation will be considerable and local bodies will need assistance from the center and other institutions to do so. One implication is this proposal should be implemented in a phased manner. For example, we could begin with municipal corporations, then municipalities and subsequently nagar panchayats (city councils) and finally village panchayats. Successive Finance Commissions should calibrate the incentive mechanism to take account of past experience. But the end goal must be that nearly all Indians are part of the direct, especially property, tax net. And yes, this should include rural Indians as well.

With India poised to add half a billion people to its urban population over the next four decades, getting urbanization right is critical. In turn, an efficient property tax system is essential for urban revenue generation and service delivery. It may well be essential to sustain Indian democracy itself.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Elections in India are known as a one-of-a-kind festival of democracy, replete with colorful pageantry, flamboyant personalities, and very large numbers. The size of the country’s electorate when India heads to the polls for parliamentary elections later this spring is expected to reach . According to census data, an estimated  are eligible to vote for the first time — a figure larger than the total number of voters that took part in the 2012 US presidential elections.

Elections certainly bring out the best in India’s raucous democracy, but they also expose some of its blemishes. Consider this extraordinary figure:  have criminal cases pending against them. And that is an increase from the previous election in 2004, when "only"  were similarly situated.

In the fight to curb these figures, there have been some positive developments and valiant efforts to raise awareness. The Supreme Court of India recently decided that sitting politicians who are convicted of criminal acts should be removed from office upon conviction — a new practice in India. And for the first time, an anticorruption party vaulted to victory in Delhi’s state assembly. These are certainly bright spots but, if recent state elections are any indication, efforts thus far have barely scratched the surface.

Real change will take significantly more sweeping measures to get to heart of the crime-politics nexus. In India’s electoral marketplace, as in any market, there are underlying supply and demand factors that facilitate exchange. And in this case, politicians with criminal records are supplying what voters and parties demand: candidates who are effective and well-funded.

The Nature of the Phenomenon

A wellspring of information about India’s political class was tapped in 2003, introducing a new level of transparency about India’s electoral aspirants and elected officials. In response to landmark public interest litigation filed by civil society watchdogs, the Supreme Court of India ruled that any person standing for elected office at the state or national level must submit, at the time of nomination, a judicial affidavit detailing his or her financial assets and liabilities, education qualifications, and pending criminal cases.

The disclosures are not without their shortcomings. Crucially, the information is self-reported, which means that in the case of financial details in particular, the accuracy of the affidavits can be questioned. In addition, the data on criminality refers to ongoing cases rather than convictions; due to the vagaries of India’s justice system, it can take decades for an indictment to produce a conviction, if at all.

Nevertheless, the data — taken as a whole — gives a reasonable snapshot of the biographical profiles of India’s most influential lawmakers. And the picture isn’t pretty.

The 15th Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), whose term expires at the end of May 2014, is home to 162 MPs with pending criminal cases. These cases involve a diverse array of charges, both large and small, ranging from mischief to murder and nearly everything in between. If one were to  — those unrelated to electioneering or a politician’s daily vocation such as those involving murder, kidnapping, and physical assault — approximately 14% or 76 MPs face pending cases.

The situation at the state and local levels, though lacking comparable scrutiny, is similar. Roughly  (31%) is involved in at least one criminal case. Again about half, roughly 15%, face serious charges.

There has been no systematic analysis of panchayats (village governments) and urban local bodies, but there is evidence that local tiers of governance are hardly free of criminality. Based on data collected by the , 17% and 21% of municipal corporators in Mumbai and Delhi, respectively, declared involvement in criminal cases.

Why Parties Supply Criminal Politicians

In one sense, the answer to why political parties in India nominate candidates with criminal backgrounds is painfully obvious: because they win. In the 2004 or the 2009 parliamentary elections, a candidate with no criminal cases pending had — on average — a 7% chance of winning. Compare this with a candidate facing a criminal charge: he or she had a 22% chance of winning. Granted, this simple comparison does not take into account numerous other factors such as education, party, or type of electoral constituency. Nevertheless, the contrast is marked.

Of course, the real question is what makes these candidates winnable. At least part of the answer comes down to cold, hard cash — an area in which those who break the law often have a leg up. Election costs in India have grown considerably over the years thanks to a host of factors, including a growing population, a marked increase in the competiveness of elections, and elevated voter expectations of pre-election handouts.

Money does not buy elections in India; what a well-financed campaign buys is viability. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between a parliamentary candidate’s personal assets — a good proxy for financial capacity — and the likelihood of election. Drawing on data from 2004 and 2009, the poorest 20% of candidates, in terms of personal financial assets, had a 1% chance of winning parliamentary elections. The richest quintile, in contrast, had a greater than 25% shot.

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How one-sided has India’s conversation on its government finances become. It is all about , spending, spending. For the (UPA) government, of course, elevated spending, subsidies and redistribution were sacred objectives. But the opening salvo of the great hope of Indian democracy, the (AAP), was to provide free water and power to the not-so-AAM citizens of Delhi, who already enjoy the highest living standards in India. Many of the (BJP) governments in the states have been trying to out-Congress the Congress on a range of subsidies.

The sobering fact is that at the next election, the three main choices on offer are: more of the same spending (Congress); more spending, less corruption (possibly) but also more economic nationalism (AAP); and no less spending, but possibly more market-based reform (BJP). And now, as if to confirm this obsession with spending, a proposal under serious consideration by the BJP would seek to eliminate income taxes altogether.

Revenue and Tax

We must be clear. In poor and unequal India, the level, type, quality and sustainability of spending are vital issues to debate. But the obsession with spending has crowded out discussions on spending’s Siamese twin: revenues and, more specifically, .

Of course, there have been major debates on taxation related to the reform of the (DTC), which would lower transaction costs and rent seeking in taxation; and to the implementation of the goods and services Ěý(), which would undoubtedly be a game-changer, boosting long-term economic growth, creating a common market within the country, increasing compliance, and raising aggregate revenues.

However, these debates have failed to address a central missing element, namely that if spending is about the entitlements of citizenship (at least loosely), taxation is its necessary twin: the obligations of citizenship. Taxation and military service (or some other form of compulsory national service) are two core elements of modern citizenship, with a shared identity or narrative being a possible third, as Isaiah Berlin suggested. Virtually all successful countries have had compulsory national service at some point in their histories, to emphasize the universality of obligations among a country’s citizens.

India has eschewed that path, leaving taxation as the only other obligation that it can demand of its citizens. The obligations of citizenship are the foundations of nation building and democracy. Unless India starts to focus on bringing more and more people into the tax net via some form of direct taxation, the promise of Indian democracy will remain unfulfilled.

What’s Democracy

Why do we say that? Democracy is a contract between the state and its citizens. And that contract has a vital economic dimension: the state’s part of the contract is to create the conditions for prosperity for all by providing essential services and also by protecting the less well-off via redistribution. The citizen’s part of the contract is to hold the state accountable when it fails to honor the contract.

But a citizen’s stake in exercising accountability diminishes if he does not pay in a visible and direct way for the services the state commits to providing. If citizens do not pay — through taxes or user fees — they either become free riders or exit, both of which reduce the accountability of the state. Hence the expression: no representation without taxation. Taxation is not just about financing spending, it is the economic glue that binds citizens to the state in a necessary two-way relationship.

Of course, there are many forms of taxation, but it appears that citizens feel the pinch of taxation most when their incomes or assets are taxed. Especially in a country like India, with limited levels of economic awareness and literacy, indirect taxes are not immediate or direct enough to be perceived by citizens as their contributions to the state.

For that reason, the implementation of the GST — while highly desirable and necessary — will have a limited impact in furthering the broader objective of citizen participation, state building, and democratic accountability. As evidence, economists Tim Besley and Torsten Persson show that countries with a higher share of income taxes in total tax collections tend to have more accountable governments.

How has India been faring in terms of bringing citizens into this participative process? According to detailed taxpayer data, in 2011-12, there were about 33 million individual tax assesses (that is, those who are in the tax net, although they may not all be paying taxes). Since some households will have more than one taxpayer, the total number of taxpaying households in India is about 25 million, assuming an average of 1.3 tax assesses per household. By this metric, 10% of Indian households pay income taxes. Assuming further that about half of all households in India are engaged in agriculture, which is out of the tax net, four out of five Indian households are not part of the income tax-government interaction.

In the absence of cross-country data, we cannot judge if this is a high or low number. But we can track India’s performance over time. In the graph above, we show the rate of growth of individual tax assesses (a measure of how fast citizens are being brought into the tax net), and compare that with the rate of economic growth.

The striking fact is that before the UPA came to power in 2004, tax assesses were growing on average at 16%, but between 2004-05 and 2011-12, they were growing at just under 2.5%. This major slippage that occurred is actually worse when one accounts for the fact that economic growth under the UPA was much faster than it was in the preceding years. We compute that in terms of this metric of tax performance, the UPA government was ten-times (or nearly 1,000%) worse than the previous government in increasing taxpayer participation.

To be fair, this government has been pushing hard to implement the GST but, as we argued earlier, that will not have the same impact on improving the quality of democracy. With such a small percentage of the population participating as , and with progress apparently decelerating, is it any wonder that public economics has become all about spending?

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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It ought to be clear by now that neither the Indian National Congress nor the country's media have any interest in critiquing Narendra Modi, chief minister of Gujarat and a potential prime ministerial candidate for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The regularly manufactured public outrage over a trivial comment about puppies — not to mention his choice of headdress or the color of his kurtas, loosely fitted Indian shirts — is indicative that with the intellectual depths Modi's foes are trolling, it promises to make the election one for the ages. Ironically, it is therefore left to someone more sympathetic to Modi to grill the man that India's middle class seems to want at 7 Race Course Road next year.

It should be noted that officially, the BJP has not declared Modi as their candidate. Modi himself has taken an innovative approach by playing the heir-apparent-in-waiting, so to speak, with his country-wide rallies coupled with his silence on his personal ambitions for 2014. Nonetheless, in the wake of what can only be called his pre-campaign speeches and given the likelihood of his becoming the BJP nominee, it is only right that that we seek answers from him on matters of national importance, forcing him to separate rhetoric from policy.

On the Spot

First, and very importantly in India's present geopolitical environment, what are Modi's thoughts on foreign policy? The BJP claims to be the party with a difference, but as Rajnath Singh said recently, there is little it intends to  in the Congress' steering of the ship of state. Does Modi agree with his party's president, or does he stick to his own  that, for example, Pakistan ought to be responded to in the same way it behaves with India?

A few months ago, in the TV show Aap Ki Adalat, Modi was vague about what that meant. The answer, though, is of great importance to India, not least because of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and its infestation with terrorists. It is easy, sitting in opposition, to mock the Congress-supported Aman ki Asha and advise that Delhi "stop writing love letters" to Islamabad, but what can Indians expect from a Modi-occupied Panchavati (prime minister's residence)?

India's foreign policy extends beyond its aggravating neighbour in the west. What are the Modi's thoughts on India's porous border with Bangladesh and the influx of thousands of illegal immigrants? Where does Modi stand on the Tamil imbroglio in Sri Lanka? Is the fondness between Jayalalitha, Tamil Nadu’s chief minister, and Modi to be taken as his adoption of her views on the matter? Will those form Delhi's official response to the island republic? How does Modi wish to improve relations with India's other neighbors: Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives? The arrogance of India's foreign service bureaucrats has destroyed any warm welcome Indians once had in those states.

Critically, where does Modi stand on India's relations with the superpowers: Russia, China, and the United States?  from Wikileaks indicate that the United States thought Modi's ascendancy would put an anti-American prime minister in power, and Russia has been worried of India's recent drift towards the West in terms of military and commercial trade. China represents not only a worrying trade imbalance, but also a security risk on the border as well as in the cyber domain. What is Modi's proposed course through these treacherous shoals? Furthermore, can Tokyo expect its relations with Gandhinagar to be promoted to the national level? How will Modi play India's cards in the increasingly important Indian Ocean Region?

What little Modi has  on India's external affairs makes no sense to anyone classically trained in international relations. His suggestion that each state have their own representatives to countries they trade with devolves foreign trade relations to states, something that has not worked in the past (remember the US Articles of Confederation?). His belief that India can do without organizations such as the United Nations is questionable; for example, Indian troops in blue helmets can be effective ambassadors of the country too. The forum, if not a positive force, at least acts as a venue for damage control regarding thorny issues such as Kashmir, environmental guidelines, global Internet laws, nuclear policy, terrorism, and R2P interventions. The man from Gujarat seems to limit his view of the Ministry of External Affairs to "trade and Pakistan," a worrying attitude to have as India strengthens ties with countries as far-flung as Australia, Japan, Israel, and the United States.

Second, on security: Modi has certainly ticked off all the boxes on a politician's check-list of terms to spout, such as "zero tolerance." However, this silver bullet does not seem to have solved the problem anywhere in the world. On other issues, like defence production indigenization, Modi has expressed support. Yet that is the same rhetoric we have heard from the Congress for decades; few politicians argue that India must import all its weapons systems, so what exactly does Modi intend to do differently? Then there was, of course, what can only be described as a foot-in-mouth moment at the India Today Conclave, where the Gujarat chief minister proposed that the Border Security Force  solar panels along the border with Pakistan.

Modi, your panels will not stop Pakistani tanks, and nor should the military be deployed for civilian tasks. In addition, an ocean of panels obstructing clear vision of the border might, in fact, aid infiltrators in avoiding detection.

Third, the BJP's likely prime ministerial candidate has also spoken about increased federalism. Like any idea, it has its strengths and weaknesses. For those paying attention to Indian politics, would Modi please clarify what his vision of the idea looks like? India's states already have trouble seeing eye to eye on a variety of issues — water sharing being among the more prominent. In this climate, particularly with linguistically based identities, are strong states and a weak center not a cause for concern?

Fourth, Modi has made good governance the foundation of his political message, and it seems that he delivered on this promise. However, not everyone in the BJP is Narendra Modi, and it remains to be seen how he will act on corruption within his own ranks. Though the Congress Party has drilled to new depths in its corruption, the BJP is no paragon of virtue either, and coming to power only increases opportunities for a little side income. Furthermore, how would Modi deal with corruption among alliance partners whose support would be crucial, especially since the BJP is not expected to secure anywhere close to 272 seats next year?

Fifth, where does Modi draw the line between minority protection and minority pandering. It is undeniable that Congress has been opportunistically pandering to minorities, and this has earned the ire of many not even in the BJP too. Modi has been clear in his actions, if not words, that his regime will not continue this partial treatment, and his opposition to educational scholarships and religious minorities is ample proof of that. 

The issue becomes much murkier when it comes to noise pollution by religious buildings, evangelicalism, and personal law. Matters become even more complex when one considers the deep schisms within Islam, for example, and the different interpretations of shari'a. In addition, not all markers of religious identity are problematic in a liberal, multi-cultural democracy — while marital jurisprudence and certain aspects of the dress code according to shari'a comes under frequent attack, hygiene, ritual obligations, and dietary laws ought not be of concern to outsiders.

Any genuinely neutral humanist would agree that Islamic personal law needs to be rescued from orthodoxy, but what mechanism does Modi have to bring all parties to the table in good faith? Would he dare push for the constitutionally mandated adoption of a Universal Civil Code?

Sixth, the BJP has visibly protested several of Congress' policies — some on administrative differences and others on ideological grounds. The question is, if they have power, what policies will they actually reverse? Will it have the parliamentary mandate? Will it succumb to political pressure and co-opt the questionable legislation? Does it dare touch Article 370? Section 66A? 498A? The Food Security Bill or National Rural Employment Guarantee Act? Will it make Hindu temples autonomous from state takeovers?

As the recent transfer of power in the United States from George W. Bush to Barack Obama has demonstrated, behind much of the chest-thumping of politicians, there usually lies a continuity of policy between different administrations.

At a Twitter conference in Bangalore last year, a senior BJP leader, when asked about freedom of expression and Section 66A, responded that the law was not bad in itself but was poorly implemented; he then proceeded to give an example of a brewery using the Hindu goddess Durga on its logo. Combined with Modi's attempt to ban Jaswant Singh's book on Mohammad Ali Jinnah a few years ago, one wonders if the state machinery would not just be turned around to enforce a different shade of intimidation.

Finally, economics is seen as Modi's strong suit. It would be interesting to hear where he strikes the balance in the Hayek-Keynes (or Bhagwati-Sen, if you wish) debate for India. On the one hand, Modi has worked very hard to attract investors, both foreign and domestic, to his state. But on the other hand, his response to the FDI-suggested reforms was lukewarm.

The (de)merits of the proposal aside, it is evident that a country with India's population and poverty statistics needs both investment and a smidgen of welfare. Ideally, even the welfare would be so structured as to build capability for further growth and reduction of non-revenue generating spending. How does Modi intend to synchronize his economic and human development policy? While he mocked the notion of inclusive growth yesterday in Hyderabad, Modi's own state has not taken as hard a free market line as his rhetoric would have us believe. Modi is too shrewd to believe in a false economic binary like welfare vs. growth, so could we please have something other than rhetoric?

Raising the Game?

Modi has certainly asked a lot of good questions in a spate of recent speeches at the India Today Conclave, the SRCC in Delhi, Bangalore, Fergusson College in Pune, and Hyderabad. His counter offer, however, is not clear. Just because a party is not in power does not mean it has stopped governing — opposition is also a critical role in a democracy and one in which the BJP has failed miserably. Modi has at least put together a cogent critique, but what are his solutions?

It must be remembered that the Gujarat chief minister has not yet been nominated as a prime ministerial candidate. The questions raised herein are in anticipation of that eventuality and also in frustration with the present hype and hoopla around Modi. It must also be noted that Congress has been completely silent about their choice for the prime minister's chair. Perhaps it wants to protect Rahul Gandhi from direct comparisons to a man who has demonstrated far greater results and achievements in public life. As for other contenders, I am still searching in my dictionary for "Third Front."

None of this is to say that Modi or the eventual Congress candidate do not have answers to our questions — on the contrary, they might. One would hope that they would be shared with the citizens in a timely manner. Modi has raised the level of political discourse in India from empty sloganeering to development and governance. It remains to be seen if he can live up to his own standards on a pan-India basis.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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