The designation conformed to a statement that Biden made to His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the emir of Qatar, during his visit to Washington in late January 2022.  During the visit, Biden had sent a to the US Congress indicating his intention to give Qatar the designation of  a major non-NATO ally. In the letter, the president acknowledged “Qatar’s many years of contributions to US-led efforts in the US Central Command area of responsibility” and recognized that the US had a “national interest in deepening bilateral defense and security cooperation with the State of Qatar.” 

BIden’s designation for Qatar has a historical basis. For years, Qatar has supported US foreign policy objectives. The country has hosted and provided substantial financial support for the Al Udeid Air Base and engaged with the US on issues of strategic importance, including its recent assistance in relocating thousands of Afghans and its ability to serve as an effective mediator in critical situations. The designation 

What Does This Designation Really Mean?  

What are the legal foundations for the designation and its implications for Qatar? Under a federal statute, the US president has the unilateral power to designate a country a major non-NATO ally with the requirement that Congress receive notice in writing at least 30 days before this designation. As aptly noted, the designation alone does not make Qatar a NATO member and thus the collective security obligations and mutual defense benefits under NATO are not applicable to this GCC country.  

Yet, in addition to recognizing the close military ties between Qatar and the US, the designation as a major non-NATO ally ensures defense trade and security cooperation benefits. Qatar is now eligible for loans, research, training, and development, as well as gaining priority access to US military equipment and the ability to bid on certain US Department of Defense contracts. 

In the past, other regional players have benefitted from the designation. Their experience highlights the importance of a military and defense relationship for any GCC state with the US, especially given recent events. For example, Kuwait has benefitted from arms sales through the Foreign Military Sales Program. This the capabilities of the Kuwaiti military and enhanced the country’s security. 

The Biden administration has given $1 billion to the US Army Corps of Engineers and other US companies to build Kuwait’s new defense ministry headquarters. A training initiative, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, enables Kuwaiti students to be trained at US military institutions at a discounted rate.

Capacity building is one of the main incentives for US-Qatar cooperation, which is of great importance to this GCC state. Its defense regime is relatively young and capable of playing an influential role due to the country’s proximity to both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Qatar can also play a key role as a mediator in the region. In the light of the above, the designation as a major non-NATO ally has critical long-term benefits to the country.

The new development also certainly signals closer cooperation between the US and Qatar. Historically, these designations tend to be mutually beneficial. In the case of Qatar, increased engagement with the US promises to strengthen its status as a security leader in the Middle East and benefit both the region as well as its superpower friend.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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He has now spent more than 10 years in Jau Prison, notorious for its ill-treatment of inmates. Khawaja was granted political asylum in Denmark in 1991, later receiving citizenship, but he returned to Bahrain in 1999 during a period of political relaxation and reform. On January 22 this year, more than 100 organizations to the Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, calling for her government to “renew and strengthen efforts to ensure his immediate and unconditional release so he can be reunited with his family and receive much needed medical treatment and torture rehabilitation in Denmark.”

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The letter provides graphic details of the treatment meted out to Khawaja from the moment of his arrest. While blindfolded and chained to his hospital bed, he was tortured by security officers immediately after major surgery to his broken jaw, which “forced the doctor to ask the security officers to stop as it would undo the surgical work.”

Throughout his imprisonment, he has conducted hunger strikes to protest prison conditions, the curtailment of his family’s visiting rights and phone calls, and the removal from his cell of all his reading material. He has declined medical treatment when he can in protest at being strip-searched, blindfolded, and hand and leg cuffed before being seen by medical staff. 

The letter to Frederiksen notes that in a recent call, Khawaja stated that “prison authorities are arbitrarily denying him proper medical treatment and refusing to refer him to specialists for surgeries he requires.” The letter adds: “[D]enying a prisoner adequate medical care violates the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, known as the Nelson Mandela Rules.”

A Reset in Bahrain?

With US President Joe Biden now in the White House — and  emanating from his new administration that human rights, utterly disregarded by his disgraced predecessor, are now on the front foot — the Bahraini government may want to have a reset on its own awful human rights record and its treatment of political prisoners.

Among those pressing for the reset is the New Jersey Democratic Congressman Tom Malinowski. He was unceremoniously  out of Bahrain in 2014 when he was the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor under the Obama administration. Malinowski had had the temerity to meet with the head of the opposition Al Wefaq political society, Sheikh Ali Salman, a move the Bahraini regime deemed was “counter to conventional diplomatic norms.”

Sheikh Salman was subsequently arrested and, in 2018,  to life in prison on charges related to the Gulf feud with Qatar that were transparently bogus. Al Wefaq was outlawed in 2017.

Malinowski may well find a bipartisan ally in Republican Florida Senator Marco Rubio. The senator is on record calling for an end to repression in Bahrain. As he argued in a  to then-President Donald Trump in September 2019 (co-signed by the Democratic senators Chris Murphy and Ron Widen): “Bahrain is a strategic ally in an important region and, critically, Bahrain hosts the United States Fifth Fleet. It is precisely for these reasons that we are so concerned by the government of Bahrain’s concerted efforts to silence peaceful opposition and quash free expression.”

Rubio specifically mentioned Khawaja by name, noting that he and others have been jailed for peaceful protest: “These prisoners are merely representative of the thousands of others who remain locked away for exercising their right to free expression.”

As Biden settles into office, Middle East dictators are nervous. The US president has sent a clear message that the pass Donald Trump gave them to crush dissent with impunity is well and truly canceled. As they strategize on how best to deal with the new norm, sending positive messages will not go amiss.

One such message would be to release Abdulhadi al-Khawaja and the other political prisoners held in Jau simply for calling for the right to speak freely and openly without fear of consequence.

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The decision on April 22 by Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa to restore the individuals may be a first step in what remains a long and difficult road toward dialogue and reconciliation. Bahrain has been wracked by more than eight years of civil unrest that has severely damaged the kingdom’s economy, seen thousands of protesters jailed and nearly 1,000 stripped of their citizenship.

The Gulf island’s main political opposition groups have been banned and their leaders jailed. In June 2017, Al-Wasat, Bahrain’s only independent news site was shuttered, effectively silencing free media. Freedom of expression, too, has been severely curtailed. The human rights activist is currently serving a five-year sentence for tweets that criticized the war in and conditions in the country’s main prison, Jau. Another activist, , is serving a life sentence and , the leader of al-Wefaq, the largest opposition movement, was jailed for 15 years which on appeal was altered to . Other oppositionists and human rights activists are either in prison in Bahrain or in exile in the West.

The vast majority of those affected by the government’s crackdown on dissent are Shia Muslims, the majority indigenous community in a kingdom ruled for more than two centuries by the Sunni al-Khalifa family. Shia Bahrainis have long complained of discrimination in job hiring, housing, education and other facilities provided by the state. They point to a gerrymandered political system entrenching the status quo and the failure of the ruling family to deliver on promises made in 2001 for a more equitable power-sharing arrangement. When those concerns boil over and lead to unrest, the government responds with harsh measures.

Post-Independence

Indeed, the history of Bahrain since it gained independence from Britain in 1971 has been one of persistent cycles of reform and repression, intrinsically linked one to the other. When reform demands go too far and threaten the position of the ruling family, repression kicks in. That in turn becomes excessive and a process of reform begins anew.

Bahrain elected its first parliament in 1973. But after legislators refused to approve a draconian state security law, parliament was dissolved just two years later. The then and still prime minister, Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, together with his brother Isa, the emir, ruled with a firm hand. They were aided by Ian Henderson, a Scotsman who ran the state security apparatus with such ruthless efficiency that he earned the sobriquet “Butcher of Bahrain” from regime opponents.

A in 1981 and an uprising in the 1990s calling for democratic reform led to periods of intense repression. However, the repression eased when the emir died in 1999 and his son, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, succeeded him. Hamad introduced a reform program that saw the state of emergency, in place since 1975, lifted. The state security law was abolished. Political opponents and human rights activists were released from prison, and others were allowed and encouraged to return from exile under a general amnesty. Restrictions on the media were loosened.

In February 2001, a referendum was held in which Bahrainis voted overwhelmingly in support of the National Action Charter, a roadmap toward the . In 2002, Bahrain adopted a new constitution along the lines of the charter’s provisions, with Hamad declaring himself king. For the next several years, though many Shia continued to feel marginalized and discriminated against, the reform agenda was the order of the day, a state of affairs that benefited the country both economically and politically.

Arab Spring

The Arab Spring and the events of February and March 2011 saw the cycle of repression return with a vengeance. Peaceful calls for a faster pace of reform gained huge support in the kingdom across sectarian lines. In a country with an indigenous population of less than 700,000, it is estimated more than 100,000 people took to the streets of the capital, Manama. The ruling family saw the reform demands as a major threat, the most serious it had ever faced. There was good reason for concern: Popular protests had already toppled two Arab strongmen in North Africa.

For its part, Saudi Arabia feared that should the Khalifa family give ground, that would serve to empower its own Shia community, heavily discriminated against and the majority population in the oil-rich Eastern Province adjacent to Bahrain. On March 14, 2011, Saudi Arabia, joined by the United Arab Emirates, sent troops down the causeway linking Bahrain to the Saudi mainland. Demonstrations were crushed and protesters routed by Bahraini security and military forces. Dozens were killed, hundreds wounded and thousands arbitrarily jailed. Torture in detention was widespread with at least two detainees being beaten to death.

King Hamad, facing international criticism, commissioned a tribunal of human rights experts chaired by the distinguished law professor, Cherif Bassiouni. The was, and remains, the only independent analysis of its kind dealing with the events of the Arab Spring, and it is to the king’s credit that he commissioned it.

Bassiouni’s report, released in November 2011, was a damning indictment of how the government had handled what had been a largely peaceful call for democratic reform. The king accepted the report in full and promised to carry out all its recommendations, many of which relate to the police and security forces. Critics argue that in the years since the report, very few of the recommendations have been fully implemented. The government takes the position that most have.

Dialogue and Reconciliation

What is not in dispute is that the regime, citing security concerns, has continued to bear down hard on any form of dissent. Dialogue and trust between the opposition and the ruling family has completely broken down. However, that may be about to change. On April 26, Hasan Shafaei, an official at the Bahraini Embassy in London met with this author. He said that King Hamad wants to “encourage opportunities to create a better situation.” Shafaei is a former activist. In 2002, he was a founding member of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights with Nabeel Rajab and Abdulhadi al-Khawaja. He said that, in his opinion, the opposition had “missed opportunities in the past” and urged it to “take advantage of this goodwill from the king.”

The citizenship restoration decree should be seen as King Hamad’s signal that now is the time to move forward to dialogue. Significantly, included in the 551 were 138 names of individuals who had been stripped of their citizenship and sentenced to between three years and life in a just a few days earlier, on April 16. Though the prison sentences stand, King Hamad could not have stated more clearly that citizenship stripping should not be used by the courts as punishment. It is a step that will not have pleased some within the ruling family, but it is as strong an indication as any that the cycle of repression could end and an agenda of reconciliation begin.

To speed up the process of reconciliation, Shafaei, a human rights adviser to the embassy, said that “more good news was coming.” That could include the release of political prisoners, including Rajab. He noted several recent meetings between the prime minister and a senior religious leader of the Shia community, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ghurifi. Those meetings, this author was told, had the full approval of the ailing Ayatollah Isa Qassim, the highest religious authority for Bahraini Shias. (However, Sheikh Qassim was those who had his citizenship restored by the king after having it revoked in 2016.)

Shafaei also pointed to a new alternative sentencing law passed last year that includes the imposition of community service sentences, house arrest, electronic tagging and attending training and rehabilitation programs. Although it was not a point Shafaei made, the new law has the virtue of helping to deal with serious overcrowding and the consequent poor conditions faced by inmates at Jau Prison.

Ali Alaswad is a senior al-Wefaq politician, now in exile in London. When told of Shafaei’s comments, he played down the significance of both the meetings with the prime minister and the restoration of citizenship. “[King Hamad] wants us to say thank you when their citizenship was taken for no reason.” Alaswad told this author there are 4,500 political prisoners in detention, adding “we will not be happy till they are back home.”

At the same time, though, Alaswad signaled there is room for some optimism. Though al-Wefaq is not willing to enter into a formal dialogue with the government simply on the basis of the king’s citizenship decision, that could change. “Release some political prisoners and we are ready to reconsider. A prisoner release is a good opportunity for dialogue,” he said.

Within that statement lurks the potential to break the long and damaging stalemate that, since 2011, has affected every level of Bahraini society. Should the king follow through on what Hasan Shafaei has called “good news” and release some of the prisoners over the Islamic month of Ramadan, the arduous task of building trust and finding common ground can begin. It will be a sign for all Bahrainis that they can dare to hope there is an end to an awful period in their history. It would be useful, too, to restore Sheikh Isa Qassem’s nationality. Finally, should the release of prisoners include Nabeel Rajab, an internationally-recognized human rights voice, King Hamad will have signaled to the world that he is serious about ending the cycle of repression.

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Last October, ’s Special Criminal Court ������𾱰�� , a popular cleric and outspoken political dissident, to death. This was not an ordinary criminal trial, even considering Saudi Arabia’s liberal use of capital punishment. Among other charges, the prosecutor  to convict al-Nimr of “waging war on God” and “aiding terrorists,” even calling for the cleric to be publicly executed by “crucifixion.” In Saudi Arabia, this rare method of execution  beheading the individual before publicly displaying his decapitated body.

The widely revered Shiite cleric was ultimately convicted of “” the king; waging violence against the state;  “foreign meddling” in the kingdom;  vandalism and sectarian violence; ���Ի��� the Prophet Muhammad’s relatives. However, al-Nimr’s family and supporters  that the ruling was politically driven and insist that the cleric led a non-violent movement committed to  Shiite rights, and democratic reform in Saudi Arabia.

Since the October 15 ruling, high-ranking political and religious authorities in and international human rights organizations have sought to pressure the Saudi Arabian leadership into sparing al-Nimr’s life. Demonstrations demanding that the death sentence be revoked have been held in ,��,�� and the , underscoring the international sensitivity surrounding al-Nimr’s imprisonment and death sentence.

While many experts doubt that the authorities will actually carry out the execution, it is important to take stock of the political context in which the Special Criminal Court issued the death sentence.

Saudi Arabia’s Restive Shiite Minority

Saudi Arabian Shiites have long complained of state-sponsored discrimination and human rights abuses by conservative Sunni authorities.  to Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabian Shiites “face systematic discrimination in , , justice, and .”

© Shutterstock

In early 2011, anti-government protests erupted in the district of Saudi Arabia’s , which is home to nearly all of Saudi Arabia’s 3 million Shiite citizens and nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply. Throughout 2011-12, al-Nimr was a leader in these protests, in which activists demanded the release of the “” — a reference to nine political prisoners who had been detained then for some 16 years.

���ڳٱ����,�� ���Ի��� forces entered to help quell a non-violent Shiite uprising in the tiny island kingdom, Saudi Shiites expressed solidarity with their Bahraini counterparts. This prompted officials in Riyadh to fear that growing Shiite dissent could trigger a crisis in the strategically vital Eastern Province, which borders several other countries with sizeable Shiite populations. So between March 2011 and August 2012, the Saudi government waged a harsh crackdown on Shiite protestors, killing over 20, injuring several and detaining over 1,000 others, including 24 children.

Following the shooting of four Shiites in the Eastern Province in November 2011, al-Nimr spoke at one of their funerals. “We are determined to demand our legitimate rights by peaceful means,” he . Al-Nimr, who had already been detained several times by that point, had called for peaceful resistance to the ruling monarchy on numerous other occasions, despite Riyadh’s allegations that the cleric incited violence.

On July 8, 2012, Saudi security forces ,�� ���Ի�������l-Nimr after  with his bodyguards. Amnesty International  the arrest and described the cleric as “an outspoken critic of the policies and practices of the Saudi Arabian authorities affecting the [Shiite] community, including detentions without charge or trial, and excessive use of force against protestors.”

Al-Nimr’s trial began in March 2013.  to the Saudi Press Agency, the judges claimed that the cleric was “insistent” and “stubborn” during the trial. Al-Nimr did not deny the charges levied against him, yet he maintained that he never incited violence.

Daesh and Saudi Arabia’s Domestic Environment

Anti-Shiism has����s a pillar of the Wahhabi brand of Islam ever since founded the movement in the 18^th century. By inciting violence against Shiites in the and beyond, Saudi Arabia’s political leadership has maintained the alliance with the kingdom’s hard-line Wahhabi religious establishment (which views all Shiites as “heretics” and holds notoriously intolerant views of Christians and Jews) that led to the formation of the modern-day state of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

However, the rise of (or the “”) in Iraq and Syria — combined with the threat of violence from Daesh sympathizers inside Saudi Arabia — has put the government in an interesting position of having to defend its Shiite citizens from the rigidly anti-Shiite group.

�ٲ������’s capacity to increase Saudi Arabia’s sectarian temperature was  last November, when three Saudis and one Qatari linked to Daesh used machines guns and pistols to kill five Saudi Arabian Shiite worshippers in the Ahsa district of Dalwah. In contrast to the government’s traditional role of promoting anti-Shiite bigotry, Saudi authorities  the following day by shutting down Wesal TV, which had broadcast programs that labeled Shiites as “rejectionists.” Later than month, Saudi Arabian security forces  three of the four men responsible for the attack ���Ի������� Daesh-linked cell consisting of 77 members (three came from , and , while the rest were Saudi Arabian nationals) that stored the weapons used in the Dalwah attack.

The threat from Daesh and its sympathizers in Saudi Arabia poses a new security and ideological challenge for Riyadh, which previously faced an al-Qaeda  from 2003-06 that killed hundreds of Saudi Arabians. Yet the authorities’ response to this new menace has not been well received among certain conservative circles within the kingdom.

The official position of Saudi Arabia — a key Arab member of the -led military campaign in Iraq and Syria — is that Daesh and the Damascus regime must be simultaneously defeated.

Bashar al-Assad © Shutterstock

However, some Saudis are not sold. By taking military action against Daesh while not striking against ’s forces, they say, Saudi Arabia is aligning itself with Iran, Syria and ��������ԴDz�’s Hezbollah. Some hard-line Saudis believe that Daesh deserves Riyadh’s support for serving as a Sunni bulwark against Iranian-backed governments in Baghdad and Damascus. Even some Saudi Sunnis who are opposed to �ٲ������’s ideology and fearful of the group’s agenda object to the bombing of Sunni Arabs combating the Alawite-led regime in Syria.

Within this context, the Saudi Arabian government’s treatment of al-Nimr serves to communicate that while Riyadh channels greater resources toward the threat of Sunni extremism, the monarchy has not abandoned efforts to crush all forms of Shiite dissent in the restive Eastern Province. It is part of an effort by the government to prevent Daesh from exploiting a perception within hard-line Wahhabi circles that Riyadh is becoming “soft” on Shiite activism at home and abroad.

A Shiite Backlash on Saudi Arabia’s Borders

But that strategy comes at a cost. Al-Nimr’s prosecution and death sentence have triggered an outcry among Shiites across the Middle East, leaving little doubt that al-Nimr’s execution would worsen the violent state of sectarian unrest in the region.

Iran’s religious establishment, in particular, has harshly condemned al-Nimr’s sentence. Conservative ayatollahs — including Jafar Sobhani, Hossein Nuri-Hamadani and Naser Makarem Shirazi — have  Riyadh that al-Nimr’s execution would produce “unpredictable results” and that “such cruel actions will have consequences.” Iran’s FarsNews Agency quoted Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi, who  Saudi Arabia’s leadership, as saying: “[T]he execution of this scholar of religion will result in tough and serious repercussions, and it will cost you dearly.”

Bahraini Shiites have  protests in solidarity with al-Nimr that resulted in clashes with local police. Militant Shiite factions in the island kingdom have also mobilized in response. Last August, Saraya al-Mukhtar — an organization that has pledged solidarity with its Shiite counterparts in Saudi Arabia — ����n assault near a Bahraini military base, citing al-Nimr’s imprisonment as the motivation.

The group also issued threats on Facebook against US troops stationed in Bahrain, proclaiming that Washington’s support for the ruling Saudi Arabian and Bahraini monarchies makes the U.S. a legitimate target if al-Nimr is executed. On August 10, the group  Saudi nationals in Bahrain with a poster warning that “harming [al-Nimr] means every single Saudi national will enter our country in a coffin.”

The following October, the group claimed responsibility for attacks in Sanabis and Aker. “The occupying mafia of Al Saud and Al Khalifa,” it  in a statement referring to the Saudi and Bahraini monarchies, will “face consequences for the death sentence.” Three days later, the Shiite faction  to the attacks as “revenge of the Faqih [a scholar in Islamic jurisprudence] Nimr” ���Ի��� that the violence targeted the “ranks of the enemy occupier,” referring to Saudi Arabia.

Bahraini officials have  over pictures of al-Nimr that Shiites had plastered on walls to demonstrate solidarity with the cleric. Unquestionably, officials in Manama must be concerned about security risks in Bahrain as well if al-Nimr is executed.

© Shutterstock

��������ԴDz�’s has not been silent about al-Nimr either. The day after al-Nimr was sentenced to execution, the Lebanese resistance movement  the ruling as “unfair and politically charged.” In an earlier release, the group ���� statement, saying: “The continued detention of this great scholar and prosecuting him for natural political activities comes while such rights exist for every individual and every scholar and expression of ideas and views is a natural right of all individuals, underlined by all international regulation and divine faiths.”

Protests against al-Nimr’s death sentence were also  outside of Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. Ibrahim Bader al-Deen al-Houthi — the brother of Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the ���Ǵ� ’s Shiite rebels —  in an online commentary: “We warn Saudi Arabia against … harming Sheikh al-Nimr in any way.” He also  that: “[I]f the Saudi authorities execute al-Nimr, it will be a criminal act that will not go unanswered.”

Shiite militias — including Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (“The Battalion of the Sayyid’s Martyrs,” or KSS), Kata’ib Hezbollah (“Battalions of the Party of God”) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (“League of the Righteous”) — have ����s well. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s political wing, in particular,�� that Saudi Arabia would face “consequences” for the verdict. Previously, KSS praised Bahraini Shiite militant groups’ attacks in the island kingdom, and Kata’ib Hezbollah (not the Lebanese group) ����ssaults against US armed forces in Iraq, citing Washington’s support for the Bahraini government during the Shiite uprising of 2011 as justification.

Saudi Arabia and Iran’s Rivalry

The flames of sectarian violence have wreaked havoc across the and Arabian Peninsula. Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen continue to serve as sensitive proxy battlegrounds in Saudi Arabia and Iran’s geopolitical rivalry.

Riyadh has backed Sunni forces in these countries with the intention of countering Tehran’s influence in the Arab world, which grew substantially after ’s regime fell in 2003. The country played a pivotal role in sending its youth into Syria to wage a “holy war” against the secular Alawite regime in Damascus and its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah.

�ٲ������’s rise to power in 2014, however, demonstrated that Riyadh’s sectarian foreign policy has backfired against the kingdom’s interests. Interestingly, while Saudi Arabia and Iran maintain opposing interests in Syria and Iraq’s political futures, the two states share a common interest in defeating Daesh, which controls swathes of Iraqi territory near both countries’ borders. Recent diplomatic overtures between Riyadh and Tehran, following the 2013 election of the moderate Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, have prompted speculation that the mutual threat of Daesh will pave the way for a thaw in Saudi Arabian-Iranian relations.

Yet if a rapprochement between the two rivals is in the works, al-Nimr’s execution would surely derail it. If Saudi Arabia executes al-Nimr, which would make him the  Muslim cleric to receive the death penalty in the kingdom, Iranian officials would have to respond in some form, as the Islamic Republic fashions itself as the heart of modern day Shiism. Additionally, new threats to Saudi Arabia will arise from other countries on its borders, as various groups who revere al-Nimr would feel obligated to strike against the state or its interests abroad.

Within the oil-rich Eastern Province, there is a possibility that Saudi Hezbollah (which is also distinct from the Lebanese group) could reemerge as a force capable of wreaking havoc, posing graver security challenges for the ruling monarchy. Indeed, in the late 1980s, Saudi Hezbollah bombed energy infrastructure in the kingdom and waged an  campaign that targeted Saudi Arabian diplomats in Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey, in response to the ���Ǵ� hundreds of Iranian pilgrims who traveled to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj in 1987 and the beheading of four Saudi Hezbollah members.

As officials in Riyadh decide what steps to take toward al-Nimr, they must be cautious about the possibility of Shiite militias carrying out future attacks against the ruling monarchy. Indeed, reports have surfaced of Shiite militants striking first against Saudi security forces in the Eastern Province. If true, al-Nimr’s execution would only serve to exacerbate the dangerous state of relations between the Sunni monarchy and the kingdom’s 3 million Shiites at a time when Saudi Arabia faces a growing security threat from Daesh in Iraq and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen.

Ideally, Saudi Arabia’s authorities will conclude that they must spare al-Nimr’s life to prevent sectarian unrest from further escalating in eastern Saudi Arabia and the greater Middle East. Until that decision is made, al-Nimr’s fate will hang like a sword of Damocles over the region’s already volatile geopolitical environment.

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In April, China and Bahrain celebrated the 25^th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. While many have documented Beijing’s ties with Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, China’s relations with the Kingdom of Bahrain — the Gulf’s smallest country — remain undocumented.

China’s growing relationship with Gulf Arab countries has been in the media spotlight over the past few years. Despite their relatively late start in the game, the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members have successfully developed several areas of collaboration with China. Although China’s relations with Bahrain have been largely undocumented, they have developed well beyond diplomatic and political affairs.

Late Beginnings

China’s ties with Bahrain began late. As with many other Gulf nations, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not forge official ties with the Bahraini government mainly because during its early years, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, China’s communist government was fundamentally against monarchies — which the Gulf had. The Chinese government also perceived these countries to be puppets of the West. It was only in 1971, with hostility toward Soviet infiltration of the Gulf in the wake of British withdrawal, that China chose to accept US policy in the region and shifted to strengthening ties with the newly independent states.

Mohammed Mousa Mohamed Ali Binhuwaidin has that the first official contact between China and Bahrain took place soon after the kingdom’s independence on August 14, 1971, when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai sent a letter to the Emir of Bahrain, Sheikh Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa, congratulating him on his country’s independence.

Nevertheless, Bahrain did not reciprocate China’s recognition and remained aligned with the West and Saudi Arabia’s position. As a result, the two countries remained politically isolated from each other until, due to pressure from other Gulf states, Bahrain established formal diplomatic ties with China on , quickly followed by the establishment of embassies in the two countries as well as regular diplomatic visits.

Growth of Economic Ties

Soon after, in order to strengthen economic ties, the Sino-Bahraini Committee for Economic, Trade and Technological Cooperation was founded in 1990. On September 13, 2013, reported that the trade volume between Beijing and Manama had reached more than $1.5 billion, and forecast further growth. This makes China the non-GCC market for Bahraini exports, while it is one of the top two importers into the kingdom.

Although Bahrain has fewer natural resources compared to other Gulf states, the country offers China a way to access untapped consumer markets for its exports, as well as lucrative investment opportunities. 

Seeing the economic prospects in Bahrain, Huawei Technologies Co Ltd, one of China’s major telecommunication companies, its Middle East headquarters from Dubai to Manama in 2009. The company claimed that Bahrain offered the most favorable business environment in the Gulf, highlighting its attractive policies for foreign direct investment. This also led to 18 Chinese commercial agencies, including the Bank of China, opening in Bahrain.

To facilitate the growth of economic links between Beijing and Manama, the Bahrain-China Joint Investment Forum (BCJIF) was in 2010, co-organized by the China Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) and Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI). The BCJIF seeks to promote investment initiatives and advantages between the two countries by identifying opportunities to enhance financial cooperation in finance, real estate and banking, and to open up new prospects with regard to mutual advantage.

In addition, China is playing an increasingly significant role in several of Bahrain’s major construction and infrastructure projects. In January 2014, for example, Chinese construction companies signed an agreement with the Bahraini government to help build 40,000 new residential units across the country.

In February, the Bahraini government announced its to open a vast, China-themed mall similar to that of Dragon Mart in Dubai. The project, known as “Dragon City,” will be managed by real estate agency Cluttons, part of the $3.2 billion mixed-use Diyar Al Muharraq development project.

According to Harry Goodson-Wickes, head of Cluttons Bahrain, the mall will offer retail space for both Bahraini and Chinese businesses. Dragon City is expected to be operational by the third quarter of 2014.

Beyond Economic Relations

In more recent years, China’s ties with Bahrain have expanded beyond economic relations. In mid-2013, a Chinese painting and calligraphy exhibition, hosted by the China International Culture Communication Center, was held in Manama, featuring over 70 works from more than 30 renowned contemporary Chinese artists. Bahrain has participated in the Arabic Arts Festival, an annual event celebrating artistic traditions from across the Arab world, in China.

Earlier this year, a representative from Bahrain’s tourism ministry met with Chinese Ambassador to Bahrain Li Chen to discuss the prospect of further cooperation in the tourism sector. Officials from the two countries also in March to discuss the preparatory stages for the opening of a Confucius Center at the University of Bahrain, along with other matters related to education. Annually, the Chinese Scholarship Council offers full for Bahraini students who wish to study abroad in China. The program was founded by China’s Ministry of Education and aims to increase mutual understanding between the two nations.

Manama, Bahrain. Copyright © Shutterstock. All Rights Reserved

According to the Chinese in Manama, throughout the past decade over 20 students from Bahrain have studied at different universities across China. It is reported that at present there are seven Bahraini students completing their education in China. While stimulating cooperation is not a simple process, a strong focus on culture and education might strengthen the bonds between China and Bahrain.

As the Middle East becomes increasingly important for Beijing, the Chinese are expected to strengthen their relationship with the Bahraini government in the coming years. Although Bahrain has fewer natural resources compared to other Gulf states, the country offers China a way to access untapped consumer markets for its exports, as well as lucrative investment opportunities. Bahrain could potentially serve as a hub for economic expansion in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia.

China’s Support of Political Stability in the Gulf

China also acknowledges that many Gulf countries, including Bahrain, are distancing themselves politically from the United States. Engaging in new relations with China, an economic power that lacks aggressive history in the region and is one of the permanent members of United Nations Security Council, offers Gulf countries a bargaining chip with the US.

Furthermore, on the issue of political stability, China’s position largely corresponds to that of the Bahraini and Saudi governments. Through its strong support for Bahrain’s sovereignty and political stability, China has conveyed an indirect message to Iran that it does not support any instability in the Gulf, a stance that appears to be much appreciated by Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Last September, during King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa’s to China, the two countries publicly announced a commitment to increase trade volume and other areas of cooperation. Therefore, it can be expected that the growth of positive relations between China and Bahrain will continue over the next few years.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Over one year ago, Casper Wuite and I became published authors when our book, , was released. An incredible feat for the two of us aside, the revolts that swept the Middle East and North Africa from December 17, 2010, have certainly been the most seismic event of the 21st century so far. Indeed, as we mentioned in the book, the impact of the revolts will continue to be felt for decades.

A Primer

Looking at the uprisings from the other side of the tunnel as 2014 is in full swing, one can see results that have failed to meet the initial optimism that activists and analysts both rightfully envisioned.

Tunisia continues to see political uncertainty with  set to become the new caretaker prime minister. His task will be to form an interim government that will satisfy all parties — a formidable challenge for a country that not too long ago was dubbed the model for Arab nations coming off a political transition.

The National Constituent Assembly in Tunisia has struggled to agree upon a comprehensive draft constitution that is accepted by all actors, while terrorist attacks — once unthinkable in the tiny Maghreb nation — and  have been a reoccurring nightmare. Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Uprisings, is in a state of flux. Beyond civil unrest in  in December 2013, lawmakers have  as the assembly struggles to agree upon a constitution that is deemed satisfactory by Islamist and secular parties.   

In Egypt, the so-called "deep state" has made a comeback as the military is back on the scene after a coup d'état against an Islamist president who forcefully imposed his — and his party's — controversial and authoritarian policies upon resilient Egyptians. Egypt's military rulers, under the face of interim President Adly Mansour, have brought back much-hated and oppressive laws, including a controversial curbing of protests as well as a recent state of emergency. Aside from the mass arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters that have been criticized by , youth activists of the 2011 uprising were recently handed  — the imprisoned blogger Alaa Abdel Fattah was one of them.

The spirit of Tahrir Square, which donned the colors of the Egyptian flag and brought down a long-standing military dictator in Hosni Mubarak, has indeed faded into the abyss. Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were certainly not the right leaders for Egypt as they upheld their own dictatorial and inexperienced policies at the expense of everyday Egyptians.

However, neither is the repressive military under General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi — the same military that countless Egyptians stood against on many occasions one year prior. If Tunisia is in a state of flux, Egypt's so-called "revolution" has taken more than two steps back. Should Sisi run for office — as  — all eyes would turn towards revolutionary groups to see if they would accept such an outcome, even if it comes via the ballot box.  

Meanwhile, Libya's government has failed to enforce a solid security strategy, while arms trade and proliferation are a significant concern for Mediterranean countries and sub-Saharan Africa. The vast majority of militias that were involved in the civil war did not disarm and have since sought to challenge the state's security forces. Weapons from Libya have even made their way to West Africa and the Levant. In fact, these same militias managed to destabilize neighboring Mali and drag the country down into its own conflict. Alarmingly, Tripoli's inadequate security policy meant that the country's prime minister, Ali Zeidan, was recently  by extremists.

Tribal militias had even managed to block 80% of Libya's oil exports for months on end, while the country's daily output plummeted severely throughout 2013.

The demise of Libya's security situation has a number of implications not only for the wider region, but also for everyday Libyans as threats of a second civil war are not farfetched.

If the Libyan government fails to curb armed militias — of nearly a few thousand — and secure the abundance of weapons throughout the country, Libya will not progress economically. Libya is in dire need of investment and infrastructure as the country needs to be rebuilt. It is quite clear that foreign companies will think twice about investing in a nation that is severely unstable. The outcome will be a likely increase in unemployment and, as a result, the Libyan people will grow more and more restive. For southern Europe, this will mean an increase in migrants sailing across the Mediterranean.   

Yemen's transition in a post-Saleh era is still marred by corruption, violence and drones. President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi — who was elected in a farcical one-horse race in February 2012 after a GCC-led transition agreement that forced Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down — is overt regarding US drone strikes in Yemen. In fact, when visiting Washington, D.C. in September 2012, Hadi praised and all but welcomed the attacks by stating: "."

Aside from the moral implications of US drone warfare, Yemen's security situation is clearly of core concern to regional states as well as the international community. Any rise in terrorism-related activity in Yemen has the potential to impact upon Western interests in the Gulf but also abroad, as  in 2009 showed. However, a "zero margin of error" is definitely a false assertion by President Hadi when a  can be mistakenly hit by a drone strike. Hadi is simply a new face for an old, corrupted regime.

Bahrain's al-Khalifa family continues to rule with its oppressive hand. The Gulf kingdom's Shi'a majority has a right to stand up against the state when it fails to cater for all its citizens. Indeed, Manama's human rights record is nothing short of atrocious.

With arbitrary arrest and military-style trials of civilians, Bahrain has managed to present its political unrest as a sectarian issue with Iran at the forefront. While Iran does hold its own agenda over the nation's unrest, a sectarian-led explanation for Bahrain's uprising is far from the truth.

The majority Shi'a population are wrongfully discriminated against and treated as third-class citizens. With all moral issues of human rights abuse aside, Bahrain should empower its Shi'a populace to reduce the much-warranted grievances against the Khalifa family. A united population is imperative for economic growth and social cohesion.  

As civil war in the Levant approaches its third anniversary, it is Syria which is perhaps the most heartbreaking story of what Marc Lynch had dubbed the "" — a term which he himself admitted was not an accurate assessment of the region's uprisings. As battles rage on between forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and armed opposition fighters — consisting of Syrians and non-Syrians, including Islamists, Salafists and the drowned-out voices of secularists — it is the innocent bystanders of the war who have to bear the brunt of both sides' brutality, unending violence, and unyielding stance.

While NATO hit the trigger alarmingly fast in Libya without giving diplomacy a thorough try, the international community has failed to diplomatically bring about peace in Syria. As hopes of a ceasefire in the upcoming Geneva conference fade, the civil war sees no end in sight as innocent men, women and children watch their lives being torn apart on a daily basis.

The Fruits of the "Spring"

Indeed, Syria is the tragedy story of the so-called "Arab Spring," with  having been killed by Assad loyalists and armed opposition fighters. However, while the third anniversary of Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation has passed, it is worthwhile to assess the Arab Uprisings in a "then" and "now" fashion.

As each nation's uprising or political unrest differed in terms of its specific causes and outcomes, it is imperative to look upon the countries on an individual basis and evaluate how they have progressed from 2010/11 until now, while also providing suggestions for each nation on a social, political and economic basis.

What will follow as 2014 surges forward is a series of articles which tackle exactly that — on Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, as well as Morocco, Algeria and Jordan. Such a comprehensive analysis of these nations is necessary as the fruits of the "Spring" have not been met — at least not yet.     

*[This article was produced in partnership with the .]

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Gulf states are lining up as targets for criticism by international trade unions and human rights groups for their treatment of foreign workers. Qatar, long in the firing line after its winning bid to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022, was recently joined by Abu Dhabi as a result of projects to build world-class museums, luxury hotels and a campus for New York University.

Dubai is likely to be next in line after its winning bid to host the 2020 World Expo, which is expected to generate $7 billion in construction projects.

A comparison of the media fallout as well as campaigning by trade unions and human rights groups of Qatar and Abu Dhabi highlights the power of the World Cup and soccer. This puts the onus of responsibility on sports associations, including FIFA, for ensuring that hosts meet international standards of human rights.

As a matter of principle, there is little news in the abominable conditions of foreign workers in the Gulf where they often constitute a majority of the population. This writer wrote his first report on the plight of foreign workers in the region in 1976. Vast realms have been written since.

The Independent focused several years ago on the UAE. Yet it took Qatar’s winning of the World Cup to put the issue on the agenda, with any number of groups and government organizations since seeking to get on the bandwagon.

Britain’s The Guardian ensured that it moved even further up the agenda with a series of recent reports on workers in Qatar involved in World Cup-related projects. In contrast to those reports, revelations in The Guardian’s sister publication, The Observer, about workers’ conditions on Abu Dhabi’s Saadiyat (Happiness) Island have had a more muted fallout than those about Qatar.

Workers’ Rights in the Gulf

Yet Abu Dhabi is not just about the arts and education, of which there are far more restrictions on academic freedom than in Qatar; although this is not to suggest that the Gulf state is a beacon of freedom of expression, research and the press.

Abu Dhabi, too, is about sports. FIFA has organized in recent years several tournaments in Abu Dhabi, while the International Cricket Council (ICC) moved its headquarters in 2005 from London to Dubai. The UAE would like to see others follow suit.

While Gulf states compete for topping the list of where workers’ conditions are worst, Abu Dhabi and the UAE compare unfavorably to Qatar not only when it comes to academic freedoms.

Besides cracking down on research institutions and activists and barring critical researchers from entering the country, the UAE also has the dubious distinction of being the world’s only government to hire an army of at least 800 Africans and Latin Americans, who are parked outside the capital for the eventuality of major labor unrest or a popular revolt – an indication of how far it is willing to go to keep the ruling family in power.

In a bid to avoid joining Qatar and Abu Dhabi in the firing line, Bahrain — already on the defensive for its brutal suppression of a 2011 popular uprising and its ongoing crackdown on majority-Shiite Muslim activists that has led to the continued incarceration of scores of athletes — recently announced that it would adopt Gulf labor standards. These include banning the confiscation of workers’ passports and ensuring timely payment of wages.

Abu Dhabi: A Worker's Paradise?

While Qatar has acknowledged the need for change and problems with implementation and enforcement of existing workers’ rights, Abu Dhabi has sought to project itself as a workers’ paradise.

"The UAE has built the world's greatest labor camp, complete with manicured cricket grounds, a chess center, a multilingual library with works by Ayn Rand and Barack Obama, the UAE's first multi-denominational prayer hall, film screening rooms, tug-of-war competitions, a coffee shop and landscaped grounds. Regular government press releases show groups of smiling dignitaries who have come to admire the Saadiyat Construction Village, while promotional videos show smiling workers playing cricket in spotless whites," The Guardian reported, noting that a majority of workers on Saadiyat lived in what can only be described as appalling conditions.

The message is clear: Gulf states have long gotten away with sub-standard living and working conditions as a result of the international community, including sports associations. They have, at best, paid lip service to globally accepted standards and their own professed values. While Gulf states promise change and reform of their labor laws and regulations, they fail to put their money where their mouth is.

To Qatar’s credit, the Gulf state — unlike the UAE — has engaged with trade unions and human rights groups. That engagement has given it some degree of the benefit of the doubt. The proof, however, will be in the pudding.

Because of the FIFA World Cup, Qatar has taken the heat of the focus on workers’ conditions in the Gulf. That hardly makes the circumstances of foreign workers in the UAE less onerous or lessens the onus on international sports associations to uphold universal values. For the Gulf states, the litmus test will be implementation and enforcement rather than adoption of lofty principles and showcases to keep critics happy.

*[Note: James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture at the University of Würzburg, and the author of  blog.]

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In a bid to reassure Gulf states worried about a US-Iranian rapprochement and critical of American Middle East policy, the Obama administration has opted to back Saudi efforts for regional hegemony through greater integration of Gulf military capabilities in the framework of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).    

The United States-backed Saudi blueprint would effectively establish the kingdom as the region’s military superpower and first line of defense, while allowing the US to balance its commitment to the region with its goal of pivoting towards Asia. But it risks splitting the GCC, which was established to enhance Gulf security.

Giving Saudis What They Want

Speaking at a think-tank dialogue just a stone’s throw away from Bahrain’s restive Shiite neighborhoods, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel made this move on his first visit to the Gulf since last month’s agreement between the United Nations Security Council's permanent members – the US, China, Russia, Britain and France – plus Germany and Iran, aimed at resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. 

Hagel handed Riyadh what it wanted: a first step towards a union of the GCC member states – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman – with the kingdom as the dominant power.

In doing so, Hagel went beyond seeking to reassure Saudi Arabia and its closest allies within the GCC that Washington's rapprochement with Iran would not be at the expense of the energy-rich, fragile Gulf autocracies. The US also wanted to show that it would remain committed to its defense umbrella for the region, despite focusing increasingly on Asia.

Confidence between the US and Saudi Arabia, home to a fiercely anti-Shiite puritan interpretation of Islam, has eroded as a result of Saudi opposition to the Iranian agreement because of the prospect of Shiite Iran reintegrating into the international community and emerging as a power house, capable of rivaling the kingdom.

Saudi confidence has been further undermined by American support for the popular uprisings in the Arab world; failure to provide Syrian rebels with the arms needed to defeat the regime of embattled President Bashar al-Assad; inability to force a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and an increased US focus on Asia rather than the Middle East and North Africa.

Saudi concerns have sparked a series of critical statements of US policy, and persuaded the kingdom to demonstratively refuse to join the UN Security Council when it was elected to a seat.

Fear of Being Swallowed    

By laying out a series of steps to put the GCC, in which Saudi Arabia is by far the most powerful member, rather than individual Gulf states at the centre of US defense policy, Hagel effectively endorsed Saudi calls for a union of Gulf states. This is a move that, so far, has been thwarted by fears among some of its smaller members that they would be swallowed by their big brother.

Indeed, the Saudis failed in their initiative in the last year to forge a union with Bahrain, where Saudi and UAE troops have been based since the brutal squashing of a 2011 popular uprising to bolster the regime.

In a rare public statement against Gulf union, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi al-Ibrahim, a one-time representative of a separatist movement, confronted his Saudi counterpart, Nizar bin Obaid Madani, in no uncertain terms.

"We absolutely don’t support [the] Gulf union. There is no agreement in the region on this… If this union materializes, we will deal with it but we will not be a member. Oman’s position is very clear. If there are new arrangements for the Gulf to confront existing or future conflicts, Oman will not be part of it," he said.

Al-Ibrahim suggested that the Gulf’s major problems were internal rather than external and should be the region’s focus. Last year, Ahmed al-Saadoun, at the time speaker of the Kuwaiti parliament, rejected a Gulf union, saying that as a democracy Kuwait could not unite with autocratic states.

Barely a hundred meters from where he spoke, police vehicles and machine-gun mounted armored vehicles patrol the perimeter of the Shiite neighborhood of Karbad. Graffiti on its walls reflects the area’s mood. Slogans include: "Down with King Hamad"; "Martyrdom is our habit"; "Our goal is toppling the regime"; and "We bow only in front of God." A local resident said: "This will never end. It’s gone too far. Reform is the only way out."

Saudis Pleased, But Not Smaller Gulf States

Hagel couched the new US approach in terms of "strategic agility" and "wise deployment of our influence." The US would help the GCC integrate its missile defense capabilities, he added, by emphasizing the GCC as a “multilateral framework that is the best way to develop an inter-operable and integrated regional missile defense.”

This would include missile defense in annual meetings of US and Gulf air force commanders and officials; making missile defense, marine security and counterterrorism-related sales to the GCC as a group rather than to individual member states; and instituting an annual US-GCC defense ministers conference. Hagel said the first such conference should be held in the next six months.

Saudi officials, endorsing Hagel’s proposals, said the defense secretary had understood the kingdom’s needs and, in doing so, had supported their effort to achieve a Saudi-led Gulf union. "This fits our agenda perfectly," one official said.

Integrating regional defense as a step towards a union is likely to prove easier said than done, due to more than just political resistance by smaller Gulf states. The GCC for one has no mechanism to make military purchases, despite its members having signed a joint security agreement a year ago. Even if it did, Gulf states would likely squabble over every detail of the acquisition.

In addition, smaller Gulf states are hesitant to rely on Saudi Arabia for their defense not only for political reasons, but also because of the kingdom’s checkered military record. Saudi Arabia was unable to defend Kuwait against Iraq’s 1990 invasion of the Gulf state. More recently, Saudi troops had a hard time confronting Houthi rebels on the other side of their border in the north of Yemen.

"The Omani foreign minister’s remarks were unprecedented. Other Gulf states may not say publicly no, but they certainly won’t buy into it," said an analyst from one of the smaller Gulf states.

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Recently, Bahrain has been making progress not only in the realm of business, but also in matters of international affairs. Prior to the Dubai Airshow this past November, his Highness Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashid al-Maktoum, vice-president and prime minister of the UAE and ruler of Dubai, received King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa of Bahrain and his delegation. A number of issues of common interest, specially regarding the situation in the region, were discussed between the two rulers.  

The king of Bahrain also met with representatives of the British government about the possible sale of Typhoon fighters, according to UK Defense Secretary Philip Hammond. According to , the secretary described the discussions with the king as "very fruitful” and stated that he hoped the Gulf nation would make “a decision to join the Typhoon family soon."

Dismissing any possibility of the deal being endangered over concerns about Bahrain's human rights record, Hammond explained that the deal has "nothing to do with the internal situation. Jets are about external defense of the country and allowing Bahrain to contribute to the defense of the Gulf Cooperation Council member states."

Following this wave of positive partnerships, Egypt and Bahrain to reinforce security cooperation. In an article from the Gulf Daily News, it is stated: "The pledge came as Interior Minister Lieutenant-General Sheikh Rashid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa was received by Egyptian Prime Minister Dr. Hazem Al Beblawi." Beblawi thanked Bahrain for its support "which reflects the historical ties between the countries." 

Sheikh Rashid said that Egypt will remain the strategic hub of the Arab world, and that the security and stability of Egypt is an Arab and Muslim goal. He hopes Bahrain and Egypt will continue to work together to confront the many "criminal conspiracies" in the region.

Promoting a Positive Image Internationally

According to , a geopolitical research center, the foreign policy implications of these meetings should be read within the context of an attempt by the Bahraini government to promote a positive image internationally. After recent government clashes with the country's Shi’a community, the Bahraini government seems set on establishing a higher degree of perceived stability, at least in the short-term.  

This move towards stability comes both in the form of increased trade/diplomatic relations, and in an explicit communications strategy endorsed by the Bahraini cabinet. The government may be looking to quiet things down internally, too. see the charges the government recently brought against two senior Wefaq figures as a pressure tactic in preparation for an eventual settlement with the opposition.

According to the , on November 17, the Bahraini cabinet met to discuss how to pursue “fair global and media recognition of the real progress Bahrain has achieved in politics, economics, social affairs and human rights.”

As a result of this meeting, all ministries and governmental bodies were instructed to compile and publish a list of all the good things they have done. The meeting also addressed a number of issues related to attracting big business to Bahrain, especially in the telecom sector, by mitigating the fears of instability. 

Not by chance, then, preliminary talks towards a deal between Bahrain and British Telecom started in November. According to , BT has discussed the possibility of establishing its regional headquarters in the kingdom. No decision has been made yet, but if a deal is reached, the UK firm would provide new services not offered by Bahrain's existing telecommunication operators.

It is not simply a matter of image, then. The cabinet's latest push can be seen as a response to the strain placed on Bahrain’s economic growth by instances of civil unrest. The Bahraini financial sector is still recovering from the rapid decline it experienced after the global financial crisis. The Bahrain Stock Exchange Index has still not recovered to anywhere near the 1,918.56 pre-crisis level, and its growth has largely stalled over the last half year, bringing it to a current value of around 1,200.  

The government is worried that perceived instability might be serving as a deterrent to economic growth and FDI. This worry is compounded by a perception in the Gulf that the US’ reconciliation with Iran will be at the expense of its relationship with the Gulf monarchies. Despite this, Bahrain still supported the deal to curb Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 

It is important to note that this push toward an image of stability is largely coming from the government's executive level, which is predominantly populated by individuals with close ties to the ruling family. Shi’a representation is extremely limited at this level. The executive branch of the Bahraini government is attempting to portray an image of Bahrain as a stable, polity circumventing other institutions, which would rather voice Shi’a concerns.The Bahraini parliament is one of these institutions which is still trying to let the voice of the Shi’a people be heard.

While Shiites are the second largest Muslim sect globally – after Sunni Islam – in Bahrain they are the majority. The population is now on the order of 58% Shi’a and 42% Sunni, but this is dramatically changing. According to the , the oppositional al-Wefaq and other political activists have accused the regime of “running an unfair and sectarian-based campaign against the Shiite community by ensuring that more Sunni foreign nationals are given the Bahraini nationality, while Bahraini activists are stripped of theirs unlawfully.”

These facts portend future problems even if Bahrain's image does improve in the short-term. Chief among them is a growing civil unrest that is slowly dividing the country and a lack of transparency from the government. It is difficult to solve deep-seated historical issues with better PR.

*[A version of this article was originally published by .]

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The United States and Saudi Arabia have a long-standing alliance, sealed in oil since the 1930s. Even though this relationship has experienced ups and downs – due to the oil embargo in 1973 and 9/11 – Saudi Arabia is still the cornerstone of Washington’s strategy in the Middle-East.

Recently, however — especially under the Obama administration — there has been a feeling in Saudi Arabia about a widening gap between the two countries when it comes to foreign policy. Despite his renowned  in Cairo, Barack Obama has failed to make his mark in the Middle East, and has been at a deadlock on several issues: Palestinian statehood; the 2014 Afghanistan withdrawal; the Iraq War; and now the Syrian crisis.

 by Washington’s unwillingness to back a crackdown on Bahrain’s Shiite rebellion — the latter is ruled by a Sunni monarchy and is an ally of the kingdom. In another development, the US recently suspended part of its financial assistance to Egypt, while Saudi-Arabia and other Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have pledged  with roughly $12 billion in financial aid.

The major disagreement, however, revolves around two countries: Syria and Iran. Linked with the Sunni-Shiite conflict, the Saudis are wary of diplomatic developments between the US and Shiite-majority countries – first and foremost Iran – which could put into question the regional balance of power. While all elements indicated a likely attack on Syria after the use of chemical weapons in August 2013, Obama decided not to intervene, to the great displeasure of the Riyadh.

Furthermore, the Saudis are worried about the current negotiations between Iran and the US over Tehran’s nuclear program, which may end Iran’s isolation in the international arena. In fact, Saudi Arabia is perceived as the main US proxy in the region whereas Iran has chosen – and in part was forced to choose – a more independent foreign policy path since the 1979 Revolution.

Iran also has a rooted military culture, reinforced by a nuclear program, whereas the Saudis usually rely on external assistance. Saudi military weakness was made evident by the recent difficulties the kingdom encountered in putting down the Houthi rebellion in Yemen. The kingdom’s rulers do not want a return to the Shah’s era, when Iran was the main ally of the “twin pillar” strategy of the US in the Middle East throughout the 1970s.

A Symbolic Decision or a Real Foreign Policy Shift?

Saudi Arabia’s unprecedented  on October 18, 2013, to decline their non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) came as a big surprise to many. Indeed, over the last two years, Saudi Arabia had been ardently lobbying to obtain this seat as a non-permanent member.

In a , the foreign ministry explained that Saudi Arabia had no other option but to turn down Security Council membership “until the body is reformed and enabled, effectively and practically, to carry out its duties and responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security.”

Beyond the initial surprise, Riyadh’s decision was applauded in several places. The UNSC’s perceived incapability on reaching a consensus over the Syrian war has been criticized by many countries. , ����nd  claimed to understand the Saudi standpoint. Many Arab countries and the  have saluted the decision.

However, beyond the symbolism of the act, is there a real possibility for a different Saudi foreign policy, marked by less reliance on the Americans? As explained by : “My sense is that they are still committed to US security assistance. What are their other options?”

With regards to Syria, Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, director general of the Saudi Intelligence Agency, has been lobbying the Russians for months to let go of Bashar al-Assad. First, he offered $15 billion in weapon contracts. Then, he proposed a great deal between Russia and the OPEC countries. But Russian President Vladimir Putin did not want to interrupt his support for Assad.

Seeing that his endeavors have failed, according to media reports, Bandar had the audacity to  with regards to the security of Russia’s 2014 Sochi Olympics, implying that Chechen groups acted more or less under Saudi guidance. However, that was a dramatically exaggerated claim, and former KGB spymaster Putin did not fall for it. Consequently, Saudi-Russian discussions have reached a stalemate.

European Support

The hypothesis of obtaining support from several European countries on Syria through military intervention is thus more likely, as  openly supported military action after the recent chemical weapons attack. The controversial NSA spying allegations prompted tensions between the United States and EU countries, particularly with France and Germany.

However, it is doubtful that European countries would intervene in Syria without American and Russian approval. The 1956 Suez War humiliation – when the US and the Soviet Union pressured France and the UK to withdraw their forces – is still present in the minds of European politicians. Even if French President Francois Hollande favors a military operation, he is more a Mollet than a de Gaulle, known for his strong and independent foreign policy and “politique de grandeur.”

Thus, the Saudis can probably count on official support from different European countries in the realm of public discourse, but not for a military intervention in Syria. In practice, Saudi Arabia would be more likely to obtain endorsement from EU countries, for example, regarding a reform of the UNSC than explicit support with regards to the Syrian crisis.

Can Saudi Arabia Demarcate Itself From America’s Stand?

Most US analysts are skeptical about the depth of the current tensions. Saudi Arabia needs American military support as there is little chance of finding an alternative ally in the region which is as strong and reliable as the US has been. Some that Saudi Arabia could cause trouble to the US in the Middle East through a number of ways: by applying pressure on the oil market, encouraging Bahrain to shut US bases in Manama, and voicing support for popular unrest in Palestinian territories. Currently,  to put pressure on the White House — if Iran does not put an end to its nuclear program.

Americans know they have to reassure the Saudis about Iran and Syria. US Secretary of State John Kerry  the US’ inflexibility about Iran’s nuclear program, considered as a key concern to Riyadh. In his most recent visit to the country on November 4, Kery as being: “…very, very important to all of us. The Saudis are really the senior player in the Arab world together with Egypt.”

Moreover, both countries have strong economic links which are difficult to break. The US is Saudi Arabia’s ����nd Saudi represents a key US export market in the Middle East. In mid-October, the ����nnounced that it was planning to sell weaponry worth $10.8 billion to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. ����rgued in this context: “Saudi State entities and large companies prefer to deal with firms they know. It is not easy to suddenly change… in response to short-term political considerations.”

The strong business links extend to many areas, including nuclear energy. A Saudi official : “This is just a political rift and doesn’t mean that it will affect the private or public business.” Most of the rulers have been educated in the United States, which further strengthens ties between businessmen and statesmen from both countries.

It could be a dangerous game for Saudi Arabia to distance itself from the US. They are a strong ally in protecting the kingdom from intrusion in its internal affairs. If the United States decides to criticize Saudi Arabia more firmly on its human rights record, as several countries did at the , the stability of the Gulf monarchies could be seriously undermined.

In his most recent book, , Christopher M. Davidson offers an insight into the predicaments that Gulf states will have to face in the foreseeable future. He argues these countries have solely bought time with petrodollars and prominent investments in welfare and the public sector, but that this is not sustainable. The repressive response to social protest cannot be indefinitely covered up, especially since the Arab Uprisings.

It is better for Saudi Arabia to maintain good relations with the US which does not challenge the kingdom on its repressive state policies and human rights abuses. This is realpolitik: It is not easy to replace a long-term ally like the United States.

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The bargain between rentier states and their populations is simple: the government ensures the financial well-being of the people, and the people do not rebel or try to influence political decisions of the state.

In an article for International Relations of the Middle East entitled, “,” Giacomo Luciani, one of rentierism’s most prominent thinkers, wrote that because the relationship between rentier states and their people involves money flowing from the government to the people in the form of entitlements — instead of from the people to the government in the form of taxes — rentier regimes are “financially independent of society… autonomous (that is unaccountable).”

Rentier state theory, therefore, asserts that a population’s political loyalty can be commoditized and purchased. Today’s examples of rentier states include Gulf nations such as Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Oman, where governments reap massive international revenues — rents — from oil exportation, and thus have the financial resources necessary to buy off their citizens.

But political scientist Michael Herb noted in “,” that monarchs in Iraq, Libya and Iran have been toppled despite increasing oil revenue. In addition, problems within rentier states are beginning to surface, such as diminishing returns in citizen gratitude for state benefits, discontent engendered from inevitably unequal rent distribution, and encouragement of expressed dissention as regimes buy off opposition voices to keep them quite.

The traditional definition of rentierism, therefore, is simply wrong. At best, the supposition that the Gulf citizenry is merely being bought off is a gross generalization of a complex process, one in which Gulf monarchies have strategically used their petrodollars to meet the needs of their people.

Using Qatar to Reframe the Concept of Rentierism

One such need is a national narrative, or myth, where both the citizens and polity take part. Using Qatar as a case study, the crafting of a national narrative can be seen especially during the tenure of the recently-retired Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani.  writes that Qatar, during this time, created “a set of symbols based on Qatari tradition and heritage that justified [the emir’s] rule as a natural extension of the country’s cultural history and national tradition.”

Two examples of how Qatar deployed oil rent to achieve this narrative are the construction projects of the Abdul Wahhab Mosque and the Museum of Islamic Art. In addition, Qatar has created a unifying vision of the future by investing in facilities for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Most construction costs involved in these projects have not been disclosed, but one can safely assume the bills were not cheap.

Abdul Wahhab Mosque asserts Qatar’s national religious identity within the greater Islamic community. The Museum of Islamic Art provides citizens with a sense of culture and heritage, a rightful place in the history of the Arab world. The FIFA World Cup thrusts Qatar into the global limelight, giving Qataris pride for their country and injecting them with a sense of responsibility to represent their country well on the international stage.

The date of the World Cup is highly significant. The year 2022 is no small leap into the future. Given today’s hyper-connected world where long-accepted realities seem to become obsolete at record speed, Qatar’s focus on preparation for an event nine-years away is a bold statement that things in 2022 will not be significantly different than they are today — at least not when it comes to politics.

The example of how Qatar implements oil wealth to create a national narrative, shows that the financial transaction between the state and citizenry involves more than the state merely handing out checks for the citizens’ tacit approval.

A Regime’s Legitimacy

It disproves another paradigm of rentierism stated by Luciani, that “the authoritarian rentier state does not need to refer to a ‘national myth,’ because it is supported by a rent accruing from the rest of the world and does not need to impose taxes on the domestic economy.

Another deconstruction of rentierism was made by Gwenn Okruhlik, who pointed out in an article for  that “wealth generated through oil receipts is a catalyst for opposition to the state, rather than a tool to placate dissent,” because it is “distributed inequitably… and provides potential dissenters with the resources necessary for mobilization against the regime.” She uses Saudi Arabia as a case study where neglect of the eastern provinces, led to riots and dissent within the Shi’a community.

As Herb observed: “Gulf Arabs… think that they themselves, as citizens, own the oil, not the ruling families.” It is therefore evident that, despite being significantly less transparent than Western governmental finance, oil rent distribution in Gulf nations is monitored with interest by Gulf citizens.

If they believe that oil rent has been distributed justifiably, only then will citizens of rentier states consent to their regime’s legitimacy.

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The logic is simple enough, right? In black, we have the Shi’a with the king being Iran. In the white, we have the Sunnis with the king being Saudi Arabia. The rest of the pieces on this Middle East chessboard include everyone else between the Euphrates and the Nile, fighting it out to keep their respective king alive. Not quite!

The Iranian Revolution in 1979, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, was a turning point in modern Sunni-Shi’a relations in the region. Many Sunni Muslims actually supported and came out on the streets in favor of what was taking place in Tehran at first, but over the years this has gradually turned into apathy and to its current state of resentment. Arab media led by the likes of Al Jazeera, rightly or wrongly, drilled it into the minds of the Arab masses that there was a "Shi’a" Safavid regime intent upon taking over the Arab lands. The only staunchly "Sunni" country opposed to Iran was Saudi Arabia, and thus, the two kings of the modern battle rose to their thrones.

The Origins of the Sunni-Shi’a Divide

For years, we have been fed the same narrative that at the heart of the battle for the Middle East are two warring camps, hell bent on winning this game of chess that began over 1,400 years ago in the Arabian Peninsula after the demise of Prophet Mohammed. Although this is not completely wrong, it is most certainly a simplified and extremely selective analysis of history.

The succession to Mohammed pitted the Shi’as on one side, who wanted his cousin and son in law, Ali bin Abi Talib, to take over against the Sunnis who, on the other side, wanted his companion, Abu Bakr, to rule.

Since its inception, this schism has without doubt had painful and fatal consequences, including the little known mass conversions of the once Fatimid-ruled Shi’a Egypt by the Sunni Ayubid dynasty led by Salah al-Din (Saladin), beginning around the year 1171, as well as the once Sunni Iran by the Safavid dynasty beginning around the year 1500.

This battle has transcended time and manifests itself today, most notably in the battles for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. What do these Middle Eastern countries have in common?

A sizable, yet not overwhelming number of inhabitants hailing from both sides of the board. But is it really as simple as that, or are we being naive to think that simply having both Shi’a and Sunni in close proximity will inevitably result in a showdown?

For many years, the hostility between Shi’as and Sunnis has taken on an increasingly political core; although it inevitably gets cloaked in a guise of being about religious differences. This, of course, is advantageous to political elites on both sides, who would otherwise struggle to mobilize the masses had they tried to sell the battle based purely on the economic gain and longevity of the upper echelons of society.

Bahrain

This was very evident in the tiny gulf island of Bahrain, which saw mass protests flare up in 2011. The events there were an entirely peaceful wave of protests and civil disobedience against the Sunni monarchy of King Hamed Al-Khalifa. Protestors demanded equal representation, and human rights and political freedom for the country as a whole and, in particular, for the majority Shi’a population. It is imperative to note that while most protestors came from a largely Shi’a background, countless Sunnis who acknowledged the continuous tyranny bestowed upon their own country also came out in unison to call for an end to the suppression.

Over time, the Bahraini police force, largely made up of men imported from the Indian sub-continent, were summoned to brutally crack down on demonstrations that began to threaten the very survival of the monarchy. At one point, reported that more than 100,000 protestors had amassed around the Pearl Roundabout monument in Manama, calling for an end to the rule of the Al-Khalifa monarchy — in fact, by now they were calling for the king’s head.

It is at this point that the sectarian propaganda power play really came to the fore. Bahraini media began its blatant attempts to discredit the protestors as Iranian lackeys — a common pattern by Arab regimes since its inception by Saddam Hussein during the 1991 uprisings in Iraq — and even began accusing Shi’a Muslim hospital staff of selectively treating the wounded based on sect. This has since been completely refuted by numerous sources, including Sunni Muslims at hospitals who worked tirelessly alongside their Sh’ia Muslim compatriots. Nevertheless, the Al-Khalifa regime had played their sectarian trump card, but with debatable success.

All this while the supposed bastions of democracy in the West were doing little, if anything at all, to champion the democratic goals and aspirations of the Bahraini people. One certainly has to consider the important trade and military ties, such as the stationing of the US Navy’s 5^th fleet on Bahrain's shores.

Syria

Syria is yet another case in point. The Syrian Army, whilst dominated by members of Bashar Al-Assad's Alawite sect in and amongst the top ranks, is actually compromised of a Sunni majority in the rank and file with estimates of around . Thus, in the Syrian armed conflict, we either have a people who do not actually realize that they are Sunni Muslim and going out to fight other Sunni Muslims, or this could be explained more reasonably as a political battle and, perhaps increasingly in Syria’s case, one between secular and religious fundamentalist ideologies.

If the sectarian narrative was correct, then half of the Syrian army would have at least defected by now and the regime would not last a week under such circumstances. This did not happen. Another factor with regards to the battle currently taking place in Syria is that the majority of the religiously driven rebels, such as many members of Jabhat Al-Nusra, are not actually Syrian. They originate from countries afar as Chechnya and Afghanistan and have come to Syria to fight what they see as the heretical Alawite regime. Thus, if we were to take the foreign imports out of the equation, including the Shi’a militias such as Hezbollah flooding into Syria from Iraq and Lebanon to support the secular Assad regime and protect the various religious Shi’a shrines, then the battle would take a far less sectarian appearance.

Iraq

One can use the modern Iraqi state as another example of why the Sunni vs Shi’a narrative does not necessarily hold true. Sunnis and Shi’as have historically — and even to this day, although to a lesser extent — lived side by side, intermarried, formed businesses together and generally led a unified existence. It was normal that Sunnis and Christians, for that matter, would partake in Shi’a Muslim rituals of mourning during the Islamic month of Muharram. In fact, if you were to ask many Baghdad residents of a bygone era, they would tell you that they honestly did not know what sect their immediate neighbors adhered to, and neither did they care for that matter. To this day, Iraqis consider inquiring or asking questions to this regard as aeib (rude). It simply did not matter, and why would it?

Tales of a time where you could enjoy the famed Iraqi Mazgoof style fish on the famous Abu Nuwas street with a Sunni, Shi’a or Christian friend and still be none the wiser, still evokes a sense of pride amongst Iraqis. There is a popular saying that Iraq has only seen two just rulers in its history: Imam Ali bin Abi Talib and Abd Al-Karim Qassim. The former was introduced above and the latter was a Sunni Muslim by definition, yet raised by a Shi’a Muslim mother from a Feyli Kurdish background. Both were widely seen to have worked solely for the people with little or no interest in any self-benefit.

Compare that to the Iraqis’ views of their government today: stories of immorality and corruption that would make even the devil wince and the dots begin to add up. Many Sunni Muslims accuse Iraq’s government of being a totally sectarian regime with only Shi’a interests at heart. Now, anyone with any idea of the make-up of the Iraqi government or political system would know this to be a half truth at best, for many positions are occupied by Sunni ministers.

This fact in connection with certain developments in the recent in the Sunni Anbar province against perceived persecution, shows another flaw in the simplistic Sunni vs Shi’a narration. For one, there were many Shi’a Muslim tribes showing solidarity. Although sections of the protestors did not greet them with a warm embrace, many did. Secondly, whilst there were documented cases of sectarian chanting and public speaking at the protests, as well as on some of the countless satellite channels now swamping Iraq, there was largely an attempt by the organizers to portray an inclusive heart at the core of the protests.

Finally, when Sunni Muslim government officials, such as Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq, tried to attend and take part in the protests (ironically aimed at the very government he is part of), the protestors gave him the now legendary Iraqi shoe and slipper treatment and chased him out. The fact that in the middle of the now supposedly sectarianized Iraqi society we had Sunni protestors physically attacking a Sunni government official, once again shows the flaws of the accepted Sunni vs Shi’a narrative.

Many are quick to point out that during Saddam Hussein’s rule, there was seldom any intra-Islamic or religious friction in Iraq. In reality, this is just an illusion at best. While Saddam did clamp down on any fighting between the many religious sects and factions that make up Iraqi society, he engaged in it himself and only managed to keep a lid on the pressure cooker of tensions and animosity that he created — until it exploded and wreaked its havoc across Mesopotamia following the American-led invasion in 2003.

*[Note: Read the on September 6.]

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Syria has become a proxy war to shift the balance of power between Sunnis and Shi’ites in the Middle East. The struggle over the future of the country was not always a sectarian one; the revolution started as a united battle among the people against a dictatorial regime. In the beginning, Syrian rebels made immense gains and President Bashar al-Assad’s fall was “inevitable.” However, as the conflict became increasingly sectarian, progress deteriorated for the Syrian opposition. Some predict that Assad could at least hang onto power for another year.

For the Sunnis, who make up the majority of the Syrian population, the bloodshed ends with the demise of Assad. For Alawites, who follow an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam, the fate of their community is intertwined with that of Assad’s. A post-Assad Syria could reflect grim consequences for the Alawites. Unless the Syrian opposition guarantees the protection of the Alawites in a post-Assad Syria, the Alawites see themselves as having no choice but to continue to fight for the Assad regime, and by extension their survival. 

The Bahrainization of Syria

One scenario that the Alawite community could see become a reality after the fall of the Assad regime is the Bahrainization of Syria, where the likely new Sunni-dominated government would try to marginalize the Alawites. A post-Assad Syria could resemble Bahrain, where the ruling Sunni al-Khalifa family actively seeks to weaken the influence and power of the Shi’ite-majority population through structural discrimination.

According to a new study by the , the Bahraini government suppresses its Shi’ite civilians at the public, economic, and political level. The likelihood of economic advancement and mobility is low for Shi’ites because of discrimination practiced by their predominantly Sunni employers. Shi’ites on average are lower-paid than their Sunni counterparts and tend to have less-skilled occupations. The government tends to exclude Shi’ites from prominent political posts, especially in the security sector. Additionally, the al-Khalifas manipulate the municipal and parliamentary elections in order to assure that Sunni Bahrainis remain in control of the political system. To further hinder Shi’ites from the political sphere, the government launched massive surveillance over Shi’ite communities to monitor underground political activity, persecuting anyone suspected of engaging in politics.

This is also, to some degree, how Syria appeared during the Assad family's rule. The Assad regime, although mostly Alawite, is not an Alawite regime and did not encompass the same sectarian fervor projected by the al-Khalifas. Instead, nepotism runs rampant in the House of Assad, as evident by the . The economic corruption and political suppression impacted Sunnis and Alawites alike. Before Syria became a proxy war between Saudi Arabia, Iran, al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, many Alawites were actually a part of the rebellion against Assad. Now, the Alawite community is collectively targeted by the opposition — not for supporting Assad, but for simply being Shi’ites. One popular chant among the more religious and extreme rebels reflects this new sectarianism: “The Alawite to the coffin and the Christian to Beirut.” This sectarian divide is likely to continue after the fall of Assad, if a new Sunni-dominated transitional government potentially mirrors the al-Khalifa family’s marginalization of the Shi’ites.

Many Alawites are holding onto the Assad regime not because they support him, but because they are afraid of the alternative. A “Bahrainization” of Syria that transforms the Alawites into a second-class citizens living on Sunni territory is a frightening, but likely scenario. A post-Assad Syria could lead to severe collective persecution of the Alawite community and a mass exodus from the country.

Exodus of the Alawites

As a minority sect, there are only a few choices for where the Alawites could go. Iran, who has been helping arm Assad’s forces, would be the most welcoming to the Alawites. However, considering that Persians are not Arabs and Arabic is not spoken in Iran, it would be difficult for the Alawites to start a new life somewhere so foreign. Lebanon and Iraq, the only other Shi’ite strongholds, face immense sectarianism. Just as the emigration of Palestinians into Lebanon led to a devastating civil war, the acceptance of the Alawites — who are even more contested than the Palestinians — would only lead to more civil unrest. In Iraq, sectarian tensions are even more violent and regular.

The Alawites could become the new Kurds. Or, considering the strong role the Syrian Kurds play in securing the Assad regime, the Alawites may find a home in Kurdistan, the unofficially recognized Kurdish territory spanning form northern Iraq and Syria to western Iran and south-east Turkey. The Syrian Kurds are likely to retreat into the Kurdish region after the civil war, and it would not be farfetched to presume the Alawites may follow them. The Kurds, diverse in their religious beliefs from Christianity and Zoroastrianism to both Shi’ite and Sunni Islam, boast a strong ethnic pride. Although they may sympathize with the Alawites and grant them a safe haven, they would still remain isolated from Kurdish society.

There is one scenario where the Alawites could have semi-autonomy over their own land, for their own people. As Ghassan Dahhan argues on , the demise of Assad may lead to an Israel-Alawite alliance. The Golan Heights, before being captured by Israel in 1967, belonged to Syria. Today, the Golan Heights hold a large Syrian Druze population. Israeli Chief of Staff Benny Gantz has already suggested the Israel Defense Force is prepared to resettle thousands of Alawite refugees. The move threatens Assad, whose survival largely depends on fear mongering the Alawites into accepting the potential aftermath of regime change, in order to keep them fighting against the rebels. The Sunni Arab world, however, would use the new Alawite Golan Heights as a scapegoat for their hatred toward Israel and could be a new target for extremist Islamist groups. Additionally, the new Sunni government would probably try to recapture the territory, which would only invite new bloodshed between the Alawites and the Sunnis.

Ultimately, there are no good options for the Alawites if they choose to leave Syria after the fall of Assad. Unlike Sunni Syrians who found refuge in neighboring Arab states, the Alawites have little options to find refuge. Wherever they go, an exodus would only widen the Sunni-Shi’ite divide.

Guaranteeing Protection of the Alawites: Part of the Solution

Factoring protection of the Alawites into a political solution will not only ensure that the Alawites are not persecuted and expelled in a post-Assad Syria, but also expedite an end to the civil war. The Alawites have everything to lose with the fall of the House of Assad. Their survival depends on Assad. Many who now fight for Assad were once pro-revolutionaries before Islamic extremists joined the struggle against the regime and pitted Sunnis and Shi’ites against one another.

If the opposition supports a political solution that guarantees the protection of the Alawites and ensure moderates take the lead in a new transitional government, Assad’s support-base would be undoubtedly weakened. Even if he were to reject a political solution, the opposition with the backing of the Alawites could begin to sway the balance of power in Syria and force regime change. It will also appeal to Western states, who are wary that arming the rebels could exasperate the sectarian conflict.

National reconciliation, which the Syrian opposition has recently proposed in its , will help restore the revolution to a battle between a dictatorship and its people, Sunni and Alawite alike, fighting for a freer Syria. A democracy, which the opposition hopes to instill, is just as much about protecting the rights of the minority as it is about representing the majority, after all.

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India’s relationship with the Middle East — which Indian policymakers refer to by the perhaps more geographically correct, official United Nations term of "West Asia" — is driven by the cold, hard logic of realism. In the context of the civil society upheavals that are ongoing in many nations of the greater West Asian region, India’s foreign policy establishment is devoting no small amount of effort to understand their country's role in a politically unstable, but exceedingly important, area of the world for Indian interests.

Further, the debate and intensity of work undertaken to understand and define India’s role in West Asia is now the full-time focus of a range of Indian think-tanks and institutes that, like their counter-parts in Europe and North America, are vying to influence the perspective of their nation’s questioning policymakers. In the near future, it is quite conceivable that Gateway House, the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, and the Jamia Millia Islamiya university’s Centre for West Asian Studies, will be regarded by international observers as just as important external-to-the-region sites of debate and analysis on West Asia and North Africa, as their peers in Washington DC, London, Paris, and Brussels.

The Arab Monarchies

Of particular importance to India in West Asia is its enduring energy needs — perhaps as high as 70%, including a significant amount from Iran — that originate from the region. The Indian navy’s ongoing strategic concerns involve access to the Persian Gulf and the western Indian Ocean. Indian naval forces are playing an instrumental role in the international effort to guarantee the safety of navigation from piracy off the coast of eastern Africa in the Gulf of Aden.

Also, India’s rivalry with Sunni-majority Pakistan — whose manpower has been organized through the Fauji Foundation that is linked to the powerful Pakistani military and deployed as enforcers to be used against restive, mainly Shi'ite populations by Gulf Arab Sunni monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain — is an ongoing saga. Pakistan’s reported willingness to serve as a nuclear weapons supplier of last resort to Saudi Arabia in the event that Iran armed itself with nuclear missiles, is also a lingering question that complicates India’s geo-political arrangements in the region.

India’s relationship with the Arab countries of the Gulf is complex, however, and is not easily diminished by Pakistan’s genuine affinity for the Sunni monarchies that dominate the Arabian Gulf. The West Asian monarchies of the Arabian Gulf are an important site of labor for an estimated 6 million Indians. With the nation's growing population that is in dire need of employment, remittance money that is sent back from Indian nationals becomes exceedingly important. Indian laborers in West Asia, particularly in the Gulf Arab countries, are also sometimes mistreated, denied wages, or sexually abused — belying the darker aspects of international labor migration.

India’s burgeoning entrepreneurial class also views West Asia as a potential bull market, with the prospect of the country’s exceedingly competitive tech industries finding ready sales and investment in the Gulf Arab states.

The Pariah States: Iran and Syria

Also important, but less vital to India’s existential needs, is its relationship with international pariah states such as Iran and Syria; both of whom have turned to India as a market for their sanctioned energy exports, and as a potentially powerful advocate in the halls of international organizations as a leading member of the recently-maligned, but still important, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) nations. India, which continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the Bashar al-Assad government, could yet — even if it is unlikely in the current state of Syria's civil war — work with Russia and China to engage with anti-Assad states within the international community, and to broker a ceasefire that leads to a transitional government in Syria.

Beyond the potential role of India in the machinations of global diplomatic intrigue, the presence of 150 Indian soldiers participating in the longstanding United Nations peacekeeping deployment to the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria, presents a difficult choice to Indian policymakers over the need to weigh international commitments against the safety of its troops.  

India’s diplomatic relationship with Iran, the object of a considerable amount of consternation from the United States and the European Union, is a source of tension with the West. It is a means for India to negotiate a position as a necessary interlocutor between the West and the Islamic Republic. The partially Indian-financed construction of the Iranian port of Chabahar, which mirrors the Chinese financing of Gwadar port in Pakistan — although it may promise to extend Indian export markets into Central Asian countries such as Afghanistan — adds another point of contention between it and the United States.

The issues over New Delhi’s relationship with Tehran notwithstanding, India is also looking to aggressively purchase US weapons and engage with the United States’ navy in the Indian Ocean and West Asia — a potential long-term security relationship that will impact India’s engagement in the Arabian Gulf and complicate its position vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic.

An Enduring Presence

India’s relationship to West Asia is complex and will increase in the coming years. A significant amount of India’s economic development will be spurred by energy resources originating from West Asia. In protecting these interests in the region, India’s military presence, particularly its navy, will maintain a greater presence in the West Asian region. The exertion of Indian influence through naval force in the areas of West Asia that border the Indian Ocean is most likely to be engaged through international efforts, as was done in its participation in anti-piracy operations in East Africa and the Gulf of Aden.

Indian entrepreneurs will also continue to view West Asia as a potentially lucrative market for their investment, diversifying India’s economic interests in West Asia beyond securing energy resources, and as a site of unskilled labor migration for remittances. West Asia, especially the Arabian Gulf, can expect the enduring future presence of India. 

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Security related issues and natural resources are of core concern for Western nations in the Middle East and North Africa. As uprisings and civil wars have raged on, accusations of double standards have often been lamented upon the US, UK, and France.

While the US has supported the right to peaceful protest in nations such as Egypt and Tunisia, and militarily backed anti-Qaddafi rebels in Libya with NATO, they showed reluctance to support civil political movements in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Strategic geopolitical interests — such as the presence of the US Navy’s 5th fleet in Bahrain and the important shipping lane called the Strait of Hormuz — essentially dictate US foreign policy in the Gulf. It is for this reason that the US continues to support the Bahraini and Saudi Arabian monarchies despite the repression of their populations.

The European Union’s (EU) interests in the region are dominated by concerns over security issues, migration, and natural resources. With southern Europe’s close proximity to North Africa, political unrest and conflict in Libya, Tunisia, and even Morocco was, and continues to be, particularly worrisome for the EU. The unrest in Tunisia, between December 2010 and January 2011, infamously prompted the French foreign minister to  sending French police to Tunisia in order to crush the uprising against long-time ally Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali.

As the EU continues to struggle with the economic crisis, political unrest in North Africa would likely result in further illegal migration to European states. In addition to migration issues, there are concerns over the smuggling of weapons and drugs from North-West Africa to Europe. Furthermore, any bolstering of extremist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Al-Sharia threatens the security of natural resources in Algeria and Libya, which would undoubtedly send shockwaves throughout Europe with increased oil and gas prices.

In sum, the EU desires a stable region to ensure strong economic and trade relations with their southern neighbors. It also wants to ensure that security issues do not spill over to Europe or lead to mass migration to its member states.

Beyond the United States’ strategic interests in the Arabian Peninsula with regards to natural resources and counterterrorism, particularly with Yemen’s Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Washington’s other core concern in the Middle East is the security of Israel.

During his first term, US President Barack Obama failed to make any progress with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as talks collapsed in 2010 over a settlement row between Tel Aviv and Ramallah. Throughout his time in office, the president has repeatedly stressed America’s commitment to Israel’s security. With the appointment of Secretary of State John Kerry, the US president is expected to once again try and bring the Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table.

, vice president of the Institute of Peace and Development, speaks to 51�Թ�’s  and  about Western double standards, socioeconomic development in North Africa and the role of the EU, and the future of the US-Israeli relationship.

Abul-Hasanat Siddique: Does the United States hold double standards by backing democratic reform in select nations, while supporting autocratic regimes in countries like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain? 

Yana Korobko: The politics of double standards is the basis of the American strategy in the Middle East, which works for its own benefits. In what concerns Syria, the American administration is silent because any harsh gesture from the side of the White House will lead to a new splash of violence in the region, which Israel does not wish for; neither does it want the instability, which it might trigger off in the neighborhood.

Washington’s reaction concerning the protests in Yemen was only demonstrated through the prism of what they might mean for the fight against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Saudi Arabia.

Bahrain is the location of the US Navy’s 5th fleet. The loss of control over Bahrain means the loss of control over the Strait of Hormuz. There is no doubt that the US defense base in Bahrain is strategic to American foreign interests.

Concerning the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it does not matter whether protests occur there from time to time. The US does not intend to pay any public attention to them as long as Riyadh remains America’s strongest ally in the Gulf. Therefore, Washington adopts individual behavior in each given case and is not reluctant to change the existing status quo in the Gulf if that is in America’s favor.

Manuel Langendorf: Considering the rise to power of Islamist movements in countries like Egypt and Tunisia, how do you think this phenomenon has influenced Arab-Western relations?

Korobko: With the rise to power of Islamist governments, their relations with the West have become, indeed, ambivalent. On the one hand, the region is strategically important for Washington, not only in terms of economic interests, but also taking in account that Israel, a vital US ally, is located there. On the other hand, such US political partners like Egypt and Tunisia are playing a contradictory role now. And Washington has to deal with a religious dictatorship in accordance to a scenario that is different from what the one they expected.

Under these circumstances, the US is developing a new politics in the Middle East with new rules and diplomatic tactics, which would be more precautious, as the dialogue with the Islamist governments is grounded on a strong base of traditional Islam; that is what the majority of the Arab populations voted for. Therefore, if Washington aspires to promote democracy in the Middle East, it should not do so regardless of the religious factor but, first and foremost, by taking it into primary consideration, as it is becoming much more influential in the US-Arab relations than ever before.

Langendorf: Has the rise of Islamist movements, in several cases replacing secular dictatorships, influenced interfaith dialogue between Western states and the region? 

Korobko: The interfaith dialogue has always been a strong tool for developing tolerance between the different continents on the cultural level, as its chief principle is comprehension despite all differences: religious, social, and political. Consequently, the interfaith dialogue will go on regardless of the current policy-making transformations. It’s between people, and not political programs.

Langendorf: In light of energy imports, and legal and illegal immigration from North Africa, what is your view on the EU’s past policies over these issues?

Korobko: For many years, Europe has been interested in the immigrant’s labor, which is beneficial both for the employers and the employees. That is why, until recent times, EU countries have not been actively opposing the flows of immigrant workers coming from outside of Europe. However, with the adoption of the so-called “New Integration Strategy in the Mediterranean” (1992), the immigration policies of European states have become governed by quotas. The quotas reduced the annual number of migrants and due to security reasons, this figure only increased over time.

The threats to security became real at different levels. It is, on the one hand, the protection of the host states and their citizens, and on the other hand, the safety of migrants (low salaries, long working hours, and no health assurances). Nowadays, European migration legislation is facing new realities, which cannot be easily and completely subordinated only to regulation by single states. They need a complex approach within international cooperation.

Siddique: What should the EU do to help encourage socioeconomic reform in North Africa? Will genuine change in the Maghreb help reduce migration to Southern Europe?

Korobko: Probably the only state in North Africa that has been able to offer both stability and introduce some light manifestations of democratic reforms in return for EU aid is Morocco. With its European outlook and close economic and commercial connection with EU states, Rabat highly values its privileged status with Brussels. To ensure this cooperation continues fulfilling the common objectives, it should be adjusted to the most urgent needs of the Moroccan society, notably:

• Development of social policies
• Economic modernization
• Institutional support
• Good governance and the protection of human rights
• Environmental safety

Certainly, the aid given by the EU to Morocco has accelerated the reforms inside the kingdom. So far, however, they have been implemented with extremely small steps, or not implemented at all. Only if a serious attitude is adapted towards democratization will there be a reduction in migration flows coming from the African continent to the EU, and thus the regional situation will stabilize.

Langendorf: Regarding the United States, how do you see the future of US-Israeli relations?

Korobko: The recent visit of President Obama to the Middle East commenced with a reassuring speech concerning the unchanging role of Israel as a firm and solid partner of the US in the region. This means that the previous policy line of US-Israeli relations is likely to continue during Obama’s second term. With help of America’s good services, negotiations between Israel and Palestine have a chance to be renewed. However, the main question is not the reopening of talks, but their effectiveness. Sometimes, the whole negotiation process serves only one aim: the adjournment of the final resolution if it serves the purposes of the involved parties. As history shows, preserving the whole Middle East in suspense gives Washington an uncommon advantage of controlling and dominating every single pulsation of the region.

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On that day, February 14, 2011, there was a sense that things would change. The energy of the crowd was electric and contagious. The frustration that had built up for years unfolded in the form of peaceful protests in Pearl Square — the revolutionary space that had housed hundreds of thousands of Bahrainis for months, and had been subsequently destroyed by authorities. On that day, February 14, 2011, history repeated itself in Bahrain, as the sources of power repressed the majority through the forceful dispersion of protests, extra judicial killings, the use of imported tear gas, arbitrary arrests, and systematic torture.

Despite the hollow gestures of "reform" initiatives and the expensive public relations image that the Bahraini regime has paid for in the halls of power in Washington and Europe, the change in Bahrain since February 14, 2011 has not occurred through some generous bestowment by the regime. Rather, the change has been brought about by the masses disenchanted with the rhetoric of empty promises. Despite the absence of international support for the demands of dignity, justice, and human rights, the spirit of Bahrainis has sustained the uprising.

Despite the abundance of American arms and Saudi Arabian soldiers, Bahrainis today, refuse to yield. From the seventeen-year-old boy, who lost his eye sight as a result of tear gas, to the young elementary student expelled from school for making a political statement, to the prisoners of conscience locked away in jail cells for expressing themselves in the face of a repressive regime, today's Bahrain will not give up.

*[This article was originally published by .]

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The Arab Uprisings have changed the political landscape in the region and created a new reality for the international community. Earlier, “a soft bigotry of lowered expectations in the West and among Arab elites,” assumed that democracy was not possible in the region. Stability was championed over democracy using the specter of an Islamist threat as an excuse to promote strategic interests. Arab countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to popular aspirations. Arab populations, in turn, saw their governments as corrupt, secular puppets of Western power. Anti-Western sentiments were rife.

The Arab Uprisings will herald a more equal relationship between Arab countries and the West. Regardless of whether regimes have changed or not, Arab countries will reflect popular sentiment to a greater degree and will be more aggressive in asserting their sovereignty.

Implications for the International Community

After two years of uprisings, the emerging political order in the Middle East is marked by considerable shifts of power both within individual countries as well as at the regional level. Some old actors remain, some new actors are emerging, and some others are fading away.

The US

The United States face a situation where some of its key allies in the Arab world have been ousted. Their influence and position in the region is being reevaluated. “The dilemma for the United States and its allies has been and is to maintain existing working relations with the Palace for shared concerns on trade and security while recognizing that they will have to pay homage increasingly to citizen movements, which at their core demand more influence on the affairs of the State.”

Core US interests in the region are threefold: natural resources; security for Israel; and counter-terrorism and regional security measures. US interests in natural resources are largely unaffected. Oil-rich Gulf kingdoms remain intact. “So far the [uprisings have] caused minimal disruptions of the oil market because Gulf producers, principally Saudi Arabia, have made up for supply losses from Libya… Nonetheless, these events pose the question of how much disruption from such events can the market absorb before the repercussions are widespread.” If political upheaval spreads and affects the Arabian Peninsula, the global markets for natural resources could turn highly volatile.

Israel’s security is a core concern for the US. The election of an Islamist Egyptian president backed by the Muslim Brotherhood puts into question the US relationship with Egypt. It also creates uncertainty over the Egypt-Israel peace treaty.

“The [uprisings have] called into question Israel’s relative stability of the past several years. In Egypt, the prospect now is for a popular government more critical of Israel. There is no question that the Egyptian public is hostile to Israel, believing that Israel has not maintained its part of the treaty.”

The US faces a dilemma with a new Egyptian government that will not be as compliant as the Hosni Mubarak regime. The diplomatic relationship with Egypt has been thrown into question. As President Barack Obama declared: “I don’t think that we would consider [the new Egyptian government] an ally, but we don’t consider them an enemy.” The relationship between the US and Egypt has so far not faltered and it is in the best interests of both countries to maintain stable diplomatic ties. However, as stated by former Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amr Moussa, “the era of ‘yes sir’ has to come to an end.”

Counterterrorism in the region is an ongoing policy goal for the US. Drone attacks targeting Al-Qaeda members continue in Yemen. Bahrain is a key ally for Washington because it allows the US to counter Iranian influence. It is for this reason that, for all the talk of supporting democratic reform, the US continues to support the Bahraini Sunni monarchy despite its repression of the Shi’a population.

Read the final excerpt from The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction on February 4, 2013.

The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction is available to purchase at . A paperback version is available at the store.

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For liberal America, it is becoming harder and harder to sell the almost painfully trite and stale cliché that one must pick “the lesser of two evils.” The simple fact is that, for advocates of human rights and equality, a vote for Barack Obama requires a number of back-peddling explanations and heartfelt apologies, not least of which regarding the broader Arab and Muslim world.

In a in 2009, Obama stated that the “cycle of suspicion and discord” which defines American-Muslim relations “must end.” Seeking a fresh start, Obama boldly claimed his desire to build a new relationship: “one based on mutual interest and respect; one based on the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition.”

But from the onset of Obama’s presidency, the broader Arab and Muslim world has been exposed to a violent uptick in American imperialism. From North Africa to Afghanistan, Obama has not merely continued the belligerent policies of the Bush Administration; he has greatly expanded violent measures and seized all opportunities to entrench American dominance.

Drone Attacks

Though initially started by the Bush Administration, the use of US drones has skyrocketed under Obama’s command, namely in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. Though this is one point on which Republican candidate Mitt Romney and President Obama agree, found majorities in 17 of 20 countries across the world disapprove of drone strikes.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism people killed by drones on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border since 2004, were civilians. In other words, drone use in Pakistan has a roughly 34% failure rate. From 347 drone strikes as of October 10, 2012, the Bush Administration was responsible for a mere 52, with the Obama Administration for the remaining 295.

According to , the targets of drone attacks are chosen based on “patterns of merely suspicious activity by a group of men.”

The drone program has also resulted in the extra-judicial killing of at least three American citizens. In September 2011, claiming that they were both Al-Qaeda commanders, in a drone strike in Yemen. They were both American citizens who had never been legally charged with terrorism. Two weeks later, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, the 16-year-old son of al-Awlaki, .

United Nations Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson, into the legality of the US drone program, the existence of which “the Obama Administration… will neither confirm nor deny.”

Imperial Spring

In February 2011, Obama , commending Hosni Mubarak’s decision to step down from the presidency. Just a few months after hundreds of thousands of brave Egyptians peacefully toppled the three decade long dictator, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was punishing pro-democracy demonstrators with , the very same square that had been branded the throbbing heart of the revolution.

Notably absent from Obama’s speeches of praise and encouragement was an official apology for propping up Mubarak for the prior three decades. Much the same ingenuity marked American support for the Tunisian revolution.

Tunisia and Egypt, however, were at least lucky enough to garner the nominal support of the United States, while , Bahrain, and elsewhere were quickly crushed or quelled by American-backed autocracies.

In the case of Bahrain, the parking lot of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet, a Saudi and American-backed Sunni monarchy freely imposes its suffocating will on a restive Shiite majority that accounts for at least 70% of the total population. Although the ongoing unarmed rebellion began at almost the same time as the Egyptian Revolution, with calls for almost identical demands, the official American response has been vastly different.

A small island situated snugly between Iran and the plentiful oil fields of Saudi Arabia, the Obama Administration wasted little time in deciding that Bahraini self-determination did not mesh well with American imperial designs in the region.

The month after demonstrations swallowed the small island, in a visit intended the now former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates landed in Bahrain to peaceful anti-government demonstrations that numbered in the thousands. Three days later, to assist the regime in suppressing the unrest, an operation which entailed around 5,000 security forces with tanks and helicopters stormed Pearl Roundabout killing several and injuring hundreds.

Until today, the Obama Administration’s support of the Bahraini monarchy has barely budged. Recently, Bahrain which ban all protest gathering, peaceful or not; a violation of basic human rights which the Obama Administration has condemned innumerable other regimes for in the world.

In Libya, an oil rich country having long toiled under the despotic auspices of Muammar Qaddafi, the United States swiftly participated in a NATO campaign to arm and support rebels in their quest to violently overthrow the dictatorship.

The most horrifying display of bloodshed in the region is presently taking place in Syria, where the United States, though making several passing remarks in condemnation of President Bashar al-Assad’s violent crackdown, ostensibly has yet to adopt an official position.

Through a careful process of selective endorsement, American hegemony is preserved — Obama’s approach, in that sense, functions as a present day Sykes-Picot accord, a project to redraw the borders of dominance and influence in the Middle East. Despite all the praises of democracy and freedom, the United States continues to foster despotic police states in the various Gulf kingdoms, and shields many Middle Eastern regimes with horrible human rights records, not least of which Israel’s ostensibly endless colonization of the embattled remains of historic Palestine.

Israel and Palestine

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always, and will continue, to serve as an insurmountable barrier to reconciliation between the US and the Arab and Muslim world.

In the same 2009 Cairo address mentioned above, Obama set to rectify this source of contention. He stated that Palestinians “endure the daily humiliations — large and small — that come with occupation.” The United States, he proclaimed, would no longer ignore “the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own.”

Despite several highly publicized spats between Obama and Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu, in September 2012 the US Ambassador to Israel to sustain Israel’s security, including the prevention of a nuclear-armed Iran. Former Defense Department official that “what [President Obama] has done for Israel in the area of security is without precedent.”

Unchecked support for Israel has meant the hastened colonization of the West Bank and an airtight siege on the Gaza Strip.

Israeli settlement is so deeply entrenched in the West Bank that carving out a sovereign Palestinian state has become an impossible task. Almost half a million Israeli settlers live in well-guarded settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Small pockets of “sovereign” Palestinian Authority control in cities such as Ramallah, Jericho, and Bethlehem have dissected the West Bank into what are effectively Bantustans.

Few Palestinians still have faith in President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s ability to reach a final peace agreement with Israel, as was demonstrated by that engulfed the West Bank recently in September.

The post-Oslo embers of hope have burnt out, and many Palestinians now see ahead of them a long nonviolent struggle for a single democratic state that respects equality among all its citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliations. In 2011, that the Obama Administration had situated itself “to the right of the most right-wing, pro-settler government in Israeli history,” and that the two-state solution had been “buried by forty four years of unceasing Israeli colonization of the West Bank and East Jerusalem under the benevolent gaze of nine successive US administrations.”

Furthermore, many Palestinian activists are beginning to see the two-state solution as Israeli-imposed apartheid. Though President Obama encouraged Palestinians to abandon violence and model their struggle on the American civil rights movements, one doubts that he will put any pressure on Israel or pledge any meaningful solidarity for a new generation of Palestinians who have switched their sights from territorial liberation to civil rights and freedom in a single democratic entity.

Reimagining the American Role

The exercise of sacrificing swaths of liberal demands by voting for “the lesser of two evils” sustains international inequality and American hegemony at the expense of democracy.

As new information emerges each day that renders American liberal support of Obama and the Democratic Party more and more difficult, the need to imagine a new American political culture becomes more pressing. One that transcends the boundaries of a two-party system which, as , “encourages the American public to vote, but not to participate more meaningfully in the political arena.”

The American public discourse ought to be scrapped and rebuilt from the ground up. The United States desperately needs a third party not compromised by corporate meddling or tired positions on age-old debates. A vote for Obama, while marginally better than one for Romney, is a vote for American empire and of all the injustices that comes along with it: from the extra-judicial killing of American citizens to the co-opting of Arab revolutions; from indifference to its allies’ human rights violations to the ongoing injustice against Palestinians.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Pundits on both sides of the ideological spectrum, in America and abroad, are quick to label President Barack Obama’s policies as complete “successes” or “failures” based on their own political leanings, without much regard to substantive discussions of policy. This is easy because the situation is so complex, rendering prediction and comprehension rare commodities in a market of misinformation and misunderstanding. Nowhere is this truer than in the realm of foreign policy, and especially so in the Middle East and North Africa, where the unfolding of regional events and processes continue to confuse and confound pundits and policymakers alike.

Inheritance of American Imperialism

The US president inherited a legacy of American imperialism in the Middle East, a reality accentuated by the facts of former President George W. Bush’s invasion and occupations of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, neither of which had ended when Obama took office.

Other long-term factors guided Obama’s policy choices: the reality of US dependence on Middle East energy supplies and the military commitments accompanying them, the spectre of jihadi international terrorism, ever-present since 9/11, a special relationship with Israel and a troubled relationship with Iran, internal tensions in the Arab world that were soon to erupt into rebellion and regime change in several countries, and decades-old key alliances with regional powers like Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The point is that Obama should not be seen as a success or failure simply based on how regional events outside of his control unfolded, but rather that he should be judged on how well the US reacted to these events as a victim of circumstance in a quickly changing world.

Ideally, a comparison of how the US dealt with each state and its diverse constituencies on their own terms could be undertaken to figure this out: a country-by-country cost-benefit analysis with objectively quantifiable scores to grade Obama on how well or how poorly he handled each case. Unfortunately, each bilateral political relationship between the US and the states of the Middle East and North Africa could fill a tome. Therefore, this brief analysis examines Obama’s foreign policy performance in the region via four simple dimensions: freedom, justice, stability, and influence.

The US and Freedom

Freedom refers to the foreign policy goal, often stated by incoming American presidents, to spread democratic reform and introduce competitive elections in the region. In this regard, it is difficult to see what Obama has accomplished. Mass uprisings in Iran protesting against the fraudulent elections of 2009 were virtually ignored by the Obama Administration in favour of engaging the Iranian government and attempting to negotiate an end to their alleged nuclear program.

A messy and protracted transition in Yemen from 33 years of President Ali Abdullah Saleh to a Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi led government has also failed to deliver promised changes to the impoverished and marginalized masses of Yemeni society.

The , along with the oil-rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in shuttling between staunch Saleh loyalists and the disaffected opposition forces in brokering the eventual power transfer and avoiding all-out civil war. However, any notion of freedom or democracy maturing in Yemen in the interim is premature.

The Bush Administration’s lofty expectations for a democratic Iraq have long since vanished and been replaced by dysfunctional parliamentary coalitions and extreme insecurity for most of the population. While Obama withdrew US combat troops in December 2011, this has not meant the end of and has certainly not benefited the process of Iraqi democratization. It seems that individual liberty, secular politics, and genuine democracy have not yet quite arrived in the Middle East.

Justice and Ordinary Citizens

Justice can be a broad term, but in this context can be gauged by how fairly these societies have been treated by the US government, especially in the wake of the Arab Uprisings. Tunisia, the first country to undergo revolution and regime change, found American diplomatic and financial aid quickly after deposing Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, despite his decades of close ties with the US and the West. Obama even paid homage to the Tunisian revolution’s democratic struggle in his address in late January 2011, though it must be said that Washington was effectively blindsided by the swift and surprising nature of the onset of the revolution, as were leaders in capitals the world over.

The US initially wavered in welcoming revolutionary change to Egypt, cautiously waiting on the sidelines to see if President Hosni Mubarak would be able to reassert control after protests initially broke out on January 25. When Mubarak was eventually forced to cede power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the US doubled down on the military, continuing to provide billions of dollars in aid and equipment in exchange for a seat at the bargaining table for Egypt’s future. Without a hint of irony, the Obama Administration continued to push prosaically for democratic reform in Egypt while simultaneously entrenching a ruling military unwilling to cede power to the people.

Meanwhile, the US strategy in “leading from behind” with the NATO intervention in Libya succeeded in dislodging Colonel Muammar Qaddafi from power but proved less of a success in terms of rebuilding a fractured society. The burden of reconstruction inevitably rests with the intervening party, and while this does not exonerate Libyan society from adopting its own share of responsibility for the state of disrepair there today, Obama should have realized how central Libya’s post-intervention success would be to the narrative of the Arab Uprisings. Establishing law and order, revitalizing the oil export industry, and strengthening civil society would go a long way towards fulfilling the US responsibility to provide modern-day Libyans with justice.

As the bloodshed continues daily in the seemingly unstoppable Syrian Civil War, one thing is sure: it is doubtful at this point if the US can help to improve the lives of ordinary citizens in any of the Middle East’s troubled post-revolutionary states, let alone those within the decaying dictatorships left standing.

A Stable Region?

Stability: how secure and predictable is life for governments, businesses, and citizens? The biggest impediment to stability is war, and the biggest threat of war in the region for Obama has come from Iranian-Israeli tensions flaring intermittently.

Obama began his term in office by reaching out to Tehran, but a series of national crises within Iran and international developments negating any American-Iranian rapprochement quickly took on a momentum of their own.

With the US election now less than six weeks away, the threat of war between Iran and Israel has reached a . This risk of war has also endangered energy supplies, especially given Iran’s repeated calls in retaliation for US-backed economic sanctions to blockade oil tankers from traversing the , a vital waterway through which nearly 20% of global oil supplies regularly pass.

Terrorism continues to plague governments in the region, and US counter-terrorism operations in Yemen and elsewhere remain hugely unpopular. As the reliance on asymmetric forms of combat increase, most notably with remote-controlled “drone warfare”, airstrikes by these unmanned aerial vehicles in places as far apart as Uganda, Yemen, and Pakistan continue to foster radicalism and perpetuate anti-Americanism as innocent bystanders suffer the most.

The Arab Uprisings have served to undermine regional stability too, with virtually every government in the Middle East and North Africa experiencing some degree of mass protest unthinkable only a decade ago; however, it is debatable how much the US could ever have hoped to “manage” or “control” revolutionary upheaval on this scale, no matter who the US president would have been at the time. Stability ensures hegemony, which is clearly in the US national interest as a secure region nurtures interdependence, facilitates trade, ensures energy flows, cements relationships, and promotes cooperation. Instability risks the Pax Americana.

Influence and the Peace-Process

Influence is a tricky concept to define because it relates to the regional “balance of power” and “distribution of capabilities”, themselves notoriously ambiguous in practice. In other words, can the US government under an Obama Administration exert pressure, mobilize actors, achieve outcomes, and fulfill its objectives in the Middle East?

In terms of building and maintaining a consensus among a core group of states in the region that support American interests, the US maintains positive relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the oil-rich Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt and the North African states, including Libya – despite the recent storming of the US Consulate and to Libya, Christopher Stevens.

Egypt has long been recognized as a central pillar in a US-ordered Middle East, which is perhaps why Obama has deftly courted the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the new Islamist President Mohammad Morsi. Thus far, Egypt has acted largely in line with US interests, maintaining amicable relations with Israel, openly confronting Iran on their own turf, and seeking to broker an end to the Syrian conflict. Whether this continues to be the case remains to be seen.

Moreover, consider the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, one of the thorniest foreign policy issues any US president must eventually approach. In the course of Obama’s entire term, negotiations have never seriously gained any momentum, from Israel’s disastrous Operation Cast Lead campaign in Gaza in 2008-09 to the present impasse on settlements and Palestinian refugees.

Unlike past presidents, Obama never offered draft proposals. Instead, the US allowed the two sides to engage each other fruitlessly in a never-ending game of broken telephone calls, as regional events spiralled out of control and distracted all the relevant actors from a resolution of the final-status issues.

And the Verdict is…

So how did President Obama react to the tumultuous past few years in the Middle East and North Africa?

The pullout from Iraq in 2011 and the planned departure from Afghanistan in 2014 are major developments that deserve some credit. In addition, the killing of Osama bin Laden last year was a massive symbolic victory for the US in the Global War on Terror and against the forces of al-Qaeda.

No matter the outcome, these interventions have drained the US of resources, morale, and reputation in the Muslim world.

What will happen to the post-revolutionary Arab governments remains questionable. The US relationship with Bahrain in particular is emblematic of the balancing act that Obama has been forced to play between freedom, justice, stability, and influence.

The island-nation houses the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, an armada that preserves the balance of military power in the region. However, the Sunni ruling monarchy has suppressed the Shi'a majority’s calls for democracy and dignity, even asking its Gulf neighbours for help in quelling the incipient rebellion, and all under the watchful eye of US foreign policymakers.

The contradiction lies in the fact that US rhetoric touts democracy promotion as a public good, naming and shaming Middle Eastern non-democracies while scandalously forgetting about Bahrain.

There is no guarantee that the Middle East will become a more hospitable place for American interests as a result of Obama’s policies, but he definitely left an indelible impact that will last for years to come. The US president’s continued circumspection is more a legacy of the “hand dealt to him” as opposed to the “hand he drew himself” at the proverbial poker table of world politics and international diplomacy.

By making adjustments to US policy in the Middle East on an issue-by-issue basis and refusing to overreact to any single event or be overwhelmed by any one process, Obama has been able to respond relatively well to these foreign policy challenges.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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