One of the most consequential provisions involved the release of approximately prisoners. While the agreement conditioned their release on their refraining from combat, within weeks, these fighters ranks, reinforcing insurgent capabilities across Afghanistan. Prior intelligence assessments had warned of this outcome, highlighting structural weaknesses in the agreement’s enforcement mechanisms.

Counterterrorism commitments and regional security risks

The Doha Accord obligated the Taliban to prevent Afghan territory from being used to threaten the security of the US and its allies. In practice, however, this provision has proven largely ineffective. The Taliban’s tolerance and facilitation of transnational militant groups, including al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), constitutes a clear violation.

, the leader of al-Qaeda, reportedly lived openly in Kabul before being killed in a US drone strike in 2022, nearly a year after the Taliban assumed power. His presence in the Afghan capital raised questions about the effectiveness of counterterrorism assurances. Additionally, reports that members of Osama bin Laden’s family continue to reside in Afghanistan fueled debate over whether the Taliban have fully met their commitments.

These developments extend beyond Afghanistan. They complicate border insurgencies and compel regional powers to rethink their security arrangements.

Khalilzad’s advocacy and selective framing

Former US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad’s portraying the Taliban as ready to engage constructively with regional actors, including Pakistan, echoes a familiar pattern of misrepresentation. Khalilzad presents the group as cooperative and compliant, claiming any agreement would prevent extremist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and TTP from using Afghan territory to threaten others, with third-party monitoring. In reality, the Taliban’s record under the 2020 Doha Accord tells a starkly different story: promises of intra-Afghan dialogue were ignored, and the group marched unopposed on Kabul, exposing the failures of Khalilzad’s diplomacy.

Khalilzad’s repeated framing of the Taliban as reasonable actors overlooks the broader regional consequences and security risks, while his renewed advocacy for agreements modeled on Doha risks repeating past strategic mistakes where enforcement mechanisms were lacking and accountability is absent. Despite no longer holding a US government position, Khalilzad continues to in Afghan affairs, raising serious questions about his motives, judgment and credibility. The pattern is clear: overstatement, miscalculation and self-serving maneuvering consistently undermine meaningful conflict resolution, leaving the region to grapple with the consequences.

Multiple Pakistan–Taliban agreements

Over the past three years, Pakistan and the Taliban have engaged in several rounds of security dialogue. These efforts included a bilateral agreement guaranteed by the United Arab Emirates, promises made in backed by Turkey and Qatar, as well as follow-up discussions in Istanbul.

Despite repeated diplomatic engagement, none of the agreements yielded the expected results, thereby indicating the Taliban’s continued inability or unwillingness to fulfill their commitments.

Recent Saudi-mediated in Riyadh reportedly stalled when the Taliban rejected the proposed verification mechanisms, reinforcing a consistent practice of demanding recognition and legitimacy without taking responsibility. Pakistan has emphasized the need for enforceable monitoring frameworks, drawing lessons from earlier agreements: trust cannot be extended based on words alone; it must be secured through actual performance.

Regional fallout and security implications

The Taliban’s noncompliance has broader for South and Central Asia. Neighboring countries — including Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian states — face heightened risks of cross-border attacks because of the unregulated movement of militants. Activities linked to the anti-state Pakistan-based militant group were facilitated by the areas under Taliban control, while the presence of al-Qaeda in Kabul complicates regional counterterrorism coordination, exposing significant fault lines in regional cooperation.

Instability also affects economic cooperation. Trade corridors, humanitarian assistance channels and regional integration initiatives depend on predictable security conditions. As a result, the shortcomings of the Doha Accord have become a matter of transnational concern.

The Doha legacy

The Taliban’s consolidation of power also carried significant humanitarian consequences. Communities protesting coercion, resource seizures and governance abuses have faced violent repression. These actions highlight a governance model prioritizing power consolidation over human life, exacerbating instability within Afghanistan.

The Doha Accord failed because it lacked compliance and transparency, illustrating the importance of enforceability in diplomatic agreements. Verification is not a procedural luxury; it is essential for credible security cooperation and sustainable regional stability. Agreements that rely primarily on trust risk creating gaps between formal commitments and actual behavior, allowing the Taliban to consolidate power while projecting an image of compliance and perpetuating insecurity both inside and outside Afghanistan.

The Doha legacy is defined by strategic failure and its cascading effects on regional security. Taliban violations, internal repression and facilitation of militant networks have undermined intra-Afghan peace prospects and South Asian stability. Future diplomatic efforts depend on prioritizing enforceability, transparency and accountability frameworks with measurable performance to prevent further erosion of trust and mitigate the political, security and human costs that have defined the past three years.

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However, in the broader context of national cohesion, its rise also highlights the intricate interaction between Pakistan’s official institutions and its peripheries. While it is true that the PTM expresses valid sociopolitical and humanitarian concerns, a sustainable response to its growth would require a nuanced, reform-oriented and inclusive state strategy. A strategy that would strengthen the integrity of Pakistan’s federation and address the structural inequities that started the movement. 

Colonial legacies to contemporary marginalization of PTM

The Pashtuns’ discontent dates back to the colonial administrative system of the British Raj, which ruled the tribal belt under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (),�� an extremely repressive legal system that denied the Pashtuns due process and political rights. Pakistan inherited this system after British rule ended. Following this, the tribal areas remained semi-autonomous, which were ruled by proxy. The political and economic marginalization of the region that makes up the current Newly Merged Districts (NMDs) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) was solidified by this legacy.

During the (1979-1989), the western borders of Pakistan became strategic rear bases for the anti-Soviet jihad funded by the USA and Saudi Arabia. The resulting militarization and refugee flow were inflicted particularly on the Pashtun population. After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan’s role in the US’s war on terror turned the NMDs into war zones once again.

Military campaigns like , , and were undertaken to combat the terrorists. Though the operations were successful on a larger scale, they also resulted in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), to civilians and destruction of the socioeconomic infrastructure. As localities sought accountability and rehabilitation, this collective��trauma ultimately resulted in��the birth of PTM.

Pakistan’s response to PTM’s security imperatives and democratic accommodation

Pakistan’s engagement with the PTM has oscillated between safeguarding national security along the northwestern borders and maintaining space for democratic expression and dissent, as many of the PTM’s demands undermine Pakistan’s national security apparatus. Bearing in mind Pakistan’s history of political turmoil and regional turbulence, it is challenging to discern the state’s cautious stance towards the PTM from substantive national security apprehensions.

Initially, the military high command accepted the complaints of the movement’s members, taking them as “our own children,” and described their plight as a consequence of decades of militancy and in the old tribal regions. This accommodating stance underscored Pakistan’s readiness to address the populace’s problems by carrying out a procedure of progressive sociopolitical consolidation.��

After the , Pakistan embarked on a far-reaching process of integrating Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in KP and granted complete constitutional, political and legal rights to the tribal citizens. The repeal of the FCR, judicial review and inclusion into the KP Assembly were historical achievements of empowerment.

As part of the 10-year Development Plan, the infrastructure, education and healthcare sectors were made a priority, alongside for young people through Ehsaas, Ba-Ikhtiyar Naujawan and Kamyab Jawan, which opened up employment opportunities in the merging districts. Together, these activities are evidence of a wider vision of Pakistan, to substitute decades of marginalization of the tribal population with inclusion, justice and sustainable development.��

Security, sovereignty and the shifting narrative of PTM

As the movement grew from the peripheries of KP, a northwestern province of Pakistan, and spread to urban centers like Karachi, Lahore and Quetta. Its rhetoric developed into not just confrontational but also into a propagation of an anti-state stance, as heard by their infamous slogan: “Lar ao bar yao Afghan” (“Here and there Afghan are one”). Certain PTM leaders started making sweeping indictments of state institutions, especially the armed forces, and in so doing, destroyed the space for dialogue and fueled perceptions of foreign manipulation.

The incident of 2019, which led to clashes between the supporters of the PTM and security personnel, known as Khar Qamar, was a tragic expression of mistrust and polarization. The of PTM members of parliament Ali Wazir and Mohsin Dawar in 2024, on anti-terrorism grounds, exacerbated the rift between the state and the movement.

After recurrent intelligence warning signs that hostile actors were attempting to penetrate and utilize the expanding network of PTM, the federal government prohibited the movement pursuant to Section 11B of the in 1997. Although human rights organizations, such as and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (), had condemned the move as heavy-handed, the reasoning behind the decision by the state was based on a larger security risk assessment.��

The evolving situation of Balochistan, a southwestern province in Pakistan, shows that legitimate socioeconomic unrest had been exploited by separatist and foreign sponsor networks, which became an important pre-set for the Pakistani state. Similarly, the rhetoric of PTM and its exaggeration by foreign media and antagonistic rhetoric — by undermining the importance of the Durand line and waving Afghan flags in their events — have caused concern that it might be employed as a soft front to damage the functioning of the national institutions, delegitimize anti-terrorism efforts and generate ethnic polarization. This poses a challenge to�� Islamabad in distinguishing between an acceptable civil disobedience and organized subversion, which is especially crucial in a region with external influence and asymmetric warfare.

Reconciling national cohesion and regional inclusion

The PTM phenomenon has been a timely wake-up call about the importance of inclusive governance and equitable development in Pakistan’s peripheries. The 25th Constitutional Amendment, which consolidated the former FATA with KP, was one of the milestones in the of Pakistan. This union officially terminated the century-long rule of colonial-era law and granted millions of Pashtuns full constitutional rights.��

The key challenge after the merger is the effective implementation of the 25th Amendment, ensuring that the constitutional promises are translated into visible improvements in the tribal areas. However, this process has been made tricky due to multiple acts of terrorism, which cut across Afghanistan’s borders into the tribal region of Pakistan and the ethnic politics of PTM. This has been taken advantage of with developmental delays to propagate ethnic division, such as with chants and doubts about the goodwill of the state to work towards inclusive governance and stability in the country.

Rebuilding trust through reform and reconciliation

The state’s strategic mandate is to unify these reforms by making specific investments in government capacity, education, medical services and livelihood recovery within the NMDs. Through long-term structural imbalances, the federation and Pakistan’s border regions can reinforce the social contract. This developmental solution aligns with the overall goals of national security, as inclusive governance is an inherent to radicalization and alienation.

At the same time, reform of the security sector is also a necessity to promote public trust. The normalization of state-citizen relations can be achieved through the gradual demilitarization of the civilian areas and empowerment of the local police and courts. Moreover, the establishment of a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” as sometimes suggested by the PTM and backed by certain quarters of civil society, would be a plausible model for settling grievances without necessarily compromising the institution’s integrity.

This type of commission, based on transparency and inclusiveness, would not only promote reconciliation but also demonstrate Pakistan’s commitment to democratic resilience in post-conflict environments.

Pakistan’s response to the PTM will help shape the future course of its federal democracy, counter-extremism policy and civil-military balance. The way forward, as seen by Pakistan, is an open dialogue and not a confrontation. The PTM has, by all means, brought to the fore some problems that must be addressed, including displacement and post-conflict rehabilitation. The long-term credibility and moral capital of the movement, however, rely on the observance of nonviolence, constitutionalism and national unity. 

To become a positive force, the PTM needs to direct its activism through democratic institutions of Pakistan and mobilize parliamentarians, as well as cooperate with provincial governments in policy formulation. The continued rhetoric augmentation of the military and other state institutions, creating division and hatred against other ethnicities or a repetition of messages that appeal to the enemies of Pakistan, is perilous in diminishing the legitimacy of the very people it supposedly represents.

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On October 12, 2025, a for the Afghan government stated that Afghan forces had conducted retaliatory strikes against Pakistani military targets. Pakistan, in turn, that it had undertaken cross-border counterstrikes within Afghan territory, targeting both Afghan military installations and militant bases allegedly used to launch attacks on Pakistan. Subsequently, on October 15 and 17, Pakistan conducted additional airstrikes in Kandahar, Kabul and Paktika provinces, which struck civilian homes and marketplaces, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians.

Initially, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) remained silent after the October 9 airstrikes, but — following the Afghan retaliatory operations — that Pakistan had exercised its right of self-defense against both the Afghan government and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).��

In December 2024, following a separate set of airstrikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s MoFA had that its operations targeted the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, a nonstate actor, which, along with the TTP, was accused of carrying out multiple terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.��

Pakistan that the Afghan authorities are either unwilling or unable to effectively address the threat posed by these groups, thereby necessitating Pakistan to take measures to protect its national security interests. Nonetheless, these actions have raised serious concerns about their potential illegality and their ability to undermine broader regional stability.

Use of force and the right to self-defense under international law

Under international law, states are generally prohibited from using or threatening to use force in their international relations. This rule is found in of the UN Charter and is considered a (jus cogens), meaning no state is allowed to violate it. However, there are three exceptions to this rule: (1) when a state exercises the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, (2) when a State uses force at the invitation or with the consent of another state and (3) the UN Security Council authorizes the use of force under of the UN Charter. Any use of force outside these exceptions constitutes a clear violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

The justification for Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan relies on the right of self-defense, as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, this right applies only when a state has been subjected to an “armed attack”, and international law sets clear conditions for invoking it: (1) self-defense, whether individual or collective, must be in response to an “armed attack” under international law. 

The Charter does not define “armed attack.” Nonetheless, it is generally believed that an armed attack occurs when the regular forces of one state attack another’s territory, whether by land, sea, or air. (2) The attack must be carried out by a state that is a member of the UN, and (3) the state using the right of self-defense must report its actions to the UN Security Council.

The question arises as to whether the right to self-defense extends to “armed attacks” by nonstate actors operating from the territory of another state. The wording of Article 51 does not explicitly say so, but the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) rulings — including the opinion and the case — indicate that Article 51 applies only to armed attacks by states, unless the nonstate actors’ conduct can be legally attributed to a state.

Nevertheless, some scholars that the right to self-defense includes armed attacks by nonstate actors. These scholars rely on two UN Security Council resolutions adopted after 9/11 to support this view. However, Resolutions and recognize that the right of individual and collective self-defense must be exercised only in accordance with the UN charter, clearly implying that the use of force in self-defense must still adhere to the conditions established under Article 51.��

Particularly, the need to establish a clear link (attribution) between the host state and the nonstate actor responsible for the attack. Because attacks by the TTP cannot be attributed to Afghanistan, Pakistan’s unilateral military operations inside Afghan territory do not meet the requirements of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Therefore, they constitute a violation of the international legal prohibition on the use of force.

“Unable and unwilling” standard

The “” standard suggests that if a state harbors nonstate actors who launch attacks against another state, and if that state either fails to act against them or lacks the capacity to do so, the victim state can claim its right to self-defense. For instance, Pakistan maintains that TTP operates from Afghan territory and has repeatedly urged Afghanistan to address the issue.��

If Afghanistan is either unwilling or unable to confront TTP, Pakistan claims it may resort to self-defense measures against the group. The United States and its allies have previously this standard to justify unilateral military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria, arguing that Syria was unable or unwilling to suppress ISIS activities threatening Iraq. They also argued that their actions were taken at Iraq’s request, which faced an imminent threat from ISIS.

However, this doctrine formal legal status under the UN Charter or customary international law. Instead, it is a unilateral reinterpretation of Article 51, primarily advanced by the United States and some of its allies to legitimize unilateral use of force that would otherwise constitute clear violations of the Charter.

In practice, the “unable or unwilling” standard has been invoked only by a few states so far, typically to justify their unilateral military actions without the consent of the territory’s state or any authorization from the UN Security Council. Similarly, Pakistan’s use of this legally unfounded standard to justify airstrikes inside Afghanistan reflects the same domineering unilateralism that the US and its allies have used against weaker states, bypassing the UN Charter’s explicit prohibition on the use of force.

The recent Pakistani airstrikes

In recent months, Pakistan has conducted a series of airstrikes within Afghan territory, marking a significant escalation in regional tensions and raising serious questions about respect for international law by even postcolonial states. Pakistan previously its December 2024 air operations as lawful measures directed against the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, a nonstate actor along with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — alleged to have orchestrated multiple terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.��

However, following the airstrikes of October 9, 2025, Pakistan refrained from issuing an official explanation. It was only after Afghanistan reportedly launched retaliatory strikes on the night of October 11-12, 2025, that Islamabad released two official statements — one from its and another from .

The military statement warned that if the “Taliban government” failed to take effective action against terrorist groups operating from Afghan soil, Pakistan would continue to exercise its right to defend its people by the persistent neutralization of terror targets. This statement effectively left open the possibility of further cross-border unilateral military operations inside Afghanistan under the pretext of self-defense. 

The MoFA statement also noted that Pakistan has exercised its right of self-defense against the “unwarranted aggression” from the Afghan side. It warned that “any further provocations would be met with an unwavering and befitting response.” Both statements thus explicitly framed Pakistan’s use of force within the broader legal discourse of self-defense, but with little visible effort to articulate a clear legal basis for its actions within the established framework of self-defense under international law.

Pakistan’s justification rests on the argument that Afghanistan has failed to address the threat posed by the TTP, and that such failure demonstrates either unwillingness or inability on the part of the Afghan authorities to prevent their territory from being used as a base for attacks against Pakistan. 

By invoking this rationale, Pakistan clearly seeks to rely on the legally unfounded “unwilling or unable” standard. Politically, these actions also expose Pakistan to charges of hypocrisy. Islamabad has repeatedly similar unilateral military strikes conducted by neighboring states — particularly India — labeling them as and violations of its sovereignty.��

Pakistan’s recent actions mirror the very justifications it has historically rejected, thereby weakening its credibility and normative commitment to international law. Finally, by normalizing the cross-border unilateral use of force against non-state actors inside the territory of another sovereign state under the guise of self-defense, Pakistan risks legitimizing similar actions by other states inside its own territory.

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Malik’s death also points to the shrinking operational space for terrorist groups within Pakistan. While the killing happened in the backdrop of infighting between militants, it also communicates a larger reality. ISKP is increasingly being put on the back foot. The killing of Malik highlights the growing on ISKP’s governance. The group has undergone losses at the leadership level, coupled with sustained counterterrorism pressure, all of which indicate dilution in its operational capabilities, specifically when it comes to carrying out mass influence and operations.

A decreasing safe haven for terrorists

Over the last two decades, Pakistan has waged several counterterrorism operations aimed at gradually disintegrating organized militant networks so that extremist groups are denied safe havens. This first began with (2007–2009), mainly in the Swat region and in the tribal belt, followed by (2009), which pushed back Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) strongholds in South Waziristan.

April 2014 created a turning point for Pakistan with the onset of the phase of , which systematically targeted militant infrastructure, command and cross-border networks in North Waziristan. Capacity-building efforts were further reinforced through (2017), focusing on intelligence-based operations, urban counter-terrorism and the removal of residual extremists. These protracted campaigns attempted to disrupt terrorist sanctuaries and fracture the cohesion of pseudo-legitimate groups like the ISKP.

However, it is that militant infighting in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has weakened ISKP’s command structure and limited its maneuverability more than the operations led by the Pakistani government. Far from projecting strength, the group’s internal conflicts highlight its desperation and decline in Pakistan’s increasingly inhospitable security environment.

The role of other countries��

Pakistan has India of aiding militant groups such as ISKP and TTP with funds and strategic guidance. Thus, allowing them to function as proxies made to destabilize Pakistan’s security environment. In December , Pakistan presented a detailed dossier containing evidence of Indian financing of the groups, their training and their safe havens linked to Indian Intelligence.

These concerns were in the reports of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the United Nations Security Council in , which charted ISKP-TTP linkages and mentioned external facilitation.

Despite this apparent foreign patronage, every important terrorist that has been killed represents a major blow to the terrorist movement, and the death of Malik falls in line with this trend. His killing highlights the fact that ISKP leadership cannot withstand Pakistan’s counterterrorism onslaught that continues to shrink the operational capacity of terrorist groups. 

From the United Nations’ of Pakistan’s frontline sacrifices to senior US generals Islamabad as a “phenomenal partner in counterterrorism,” global voices have kept affirming the role of Pakistan in dismantling ISKP and other similar networks. The trajectory is increasingly evident: the ISKP is on the run. A series of Pakistani operations has reduced the footprint of this group to scattered remnants, disrupted its organizational capacity, and laid bare the external support systems that have tried to sustain it.��

Uprooting terrorism in the region��

In spite of scattered operatives, ISKP’s true sanctuary has never been in Pakistan. The UN Sanctions and Monitoring Committee Report issued in confirms that the group’s organizational hubs and training grounds are located in Afghanistan, where they receive protection and logistical support.��

Pakistan has time and time again warned against the permissive environment Afghanistan maintains and that such an environment emboldens ISKP, TTP and allied groups. From Kunar to Nangarhar, the states for terrorists become a launching pad for cross-border attacks against Pakistan. Thus, the issue of terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan continues to be a central point of tension between the two countries.

In a nutshell, Pakistan cannot eliminate the roots of terrorism on its own; it requires a collective effort by Afghanistan and other neighboring states. After facing more than four decades of war, the responsibility now lies with the Afghan authorities to dismantle terrorist sanctuaries and cut off support networks operating from their soil.

Peace and stability in Pakistan are directly tied to Afghanistan’s security, and by extension, the stability of the wider region and the international community also hinges on Afghanistan’s ability to address this challenge. A unified regional approach, led by Afghanistan and supported by neighbors, is critical to finally uprooting terrorism in South Asia.

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It Can Never Be The Same

Tugnoli explains that the title of his book carries two meanings. First, foreigners continue to view and portray Afghanistan in repetitive, static ways that fail to capture its evolving realities. Second, no photograph can ever replicate the lived experience of being in a place. Looking at an image and living through an event are fundamentally different, and that gap in experience is central to his project.

Tugnoli emphasizes that photography can be seductive in its apparent clarity, yet misleading when it erases the distance between representation and reality. His book tries to remind readers that what they see is only one version of an infinitely more complex world.

Beauty and pain in Afghanistan

Khattar Singh notes that Afghanistan is one of the most photographed regions on earth, yet most images follow clichés — armed men and veiled women. His own 2019 visit to Kabul revealed a far more diverse reality. Tugnoli acknowledges that photographers, himself included, often start with such clichés. But with time, they move beyond them, finding layers of contradiction and complexity. His book deliberately preserves ambiguity, pushing against journalism’s tendency to impose a clear narrative.

He argues that beauty and pain coexist in Afghanistan: the beauty of mountains, traditions and art, and the pain of war, poverty and endless political interference. To ignore either side would be dishonest, and Tugnoli’s photographs seek to hold both in tension.

Life in Afghanistan

Between 2009 and 2015, Tugnoli lived in Afghanistan, returning frequently afterward. This long engagement helped him look past surface images to capture everyday life. He recalls Afghan soldiers dancing during a ceasefire — men who, without context, could easily be mistaken for Taliban fighters. Khattar Singh notes that “Taliban” means “students” in Arabic and Pashto, underscoring how both sides were largely young men. For Tugnoli, this kind of ambiguity is the strength of photography: It allows multiple interpretations instead of forcing a single truth.

He notes that Afghans often lived in ways that defied outside categories altogether, with markets bustling, weddings being celebrated and children attending school even as bombs went off only a few miles away. Such juxtapositions, he insists, show the resilience of ordinary Afghans and highlight how little of their daily existence fits into foreign reporting.

The US Army in Afghanistan

Some of Tugnoli’s most telling images emerged from assignments for The Washington Post. He describes a photograph of the pre-September 11 New York skyline hanging inside the US Army’s base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Initially unremarkable, it later struck him as symbolic of America’s “twisted mission” in the country. The paradox was stark: the United States invaded to kill al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, succeeded after ten years, stayed another decade and departed with the Taliban once again in power. For Tugnoli, the photograph embodied that circular futility.

He describes the base itself as a strange hybrid space: part-fortress, part-small American town. Soldiers watched American football, ate fast food and lived behind concertina wire, disconnected from the country they claimed to be securing. The photograph of New York encapsulated that distance, showing how American memories of September 11 overshadowed Afghan realities.

America’s war

Asked whether misunderstanding led to the Taliban’s return, Tugnoli answers without hesitation: yes. The problem was not just language or culture, but a lack of genuine interest in understanding Afghanistan. Decisions were often made in Washington or behind the fortified walls of UN compounds — enclaves that resembled foreign homelands more than Afghanistan. With overwhelming firepower, occupying forces had no incentive to learn or listen. Their mission, Tugnoli argues, served Western political agendas, not Afghan needs.

Khattar Singh contrasts this insularity with the murals painted on blast walls by Afghan artists like Omaid Sharifi — messages of love and peace that stand as a poignant counterpoint to the war’s brutality. These works of art, Khattar Singh observes, reveal that Afghans did not passively accept foreign domination. They responded with creativity, using color and words to reclaim public space from fear. This tension between military power and human resilience is one of the strongest themes in Tugnoli’s reflections.

Lessons from Afghanistan

Tugnoli believes the central lesson of Afghanistan is that ambiguity cannot be erased. His book avoids simple explanations, preferring to immerse readers in the atmosphere of uncertainty that defined Afghan life. By presenting images stripped of captions and reinterpreted in black and white, he asks viewers to confront instability and contradiction directly.

Rather than delivering “the truth,” It Can Never Be the Same invites reflection on beauty, pain and paradox. Khattar Singh concludes by praising this approach as a profound way to understand Afghanistan — not through answers, but through questions that remain open.

For Tugnoli, photography is most powerful not when it explains but when it unsettles. His hope is that audiences leave the book with questions about war, power and humanity that continue to resonate long after the last page is turned.

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These challenges are deeply interconnected, creating a vortex of instability that not only endangers Afghanistan’s future but also threatens regional and global peace. Stabilizing the country will require more than isolated efforts or rhetorical condemnations; it demands a comprehensive international response, led by US leadership. Such an approach would strengthen regional security, restore America’s moral standing and reaffirm its leadership in peacemaking, aligning with US President Donald Trump’s focus on diplomacy over endless war.

This international effort would also uphold the foundational values of the , including respect for sovereignty and the pursuit of peace through dialogue. When done correctly, this creates a rare alignment of interests and principles — a potential win for Afghans, regional powers and global unity.

The collapse and its drivers

Afghanistan’s current predicament stems from an extremist regime lacking political legitimacy. The Taliban rule by repression, not consent. Democratic institutions have been dismantled, civil society silenced and dissent punished. between the leadership in Kandahar and the Haqqani network further weaken prospects for inclusive governance. Terrorism has resurged under Taliban rule. A 2024 confirms that al-Qaeda, ISIS-K and the Pakistani Taliban have significantly expanded in Afghanistan, with al-Qaeda establishing nine new terrorist camps that year. This tolerance or facilitation of terrorism provides a pretext for continued repression.

Economically, Afghanistan is in freefall. Since 2021, its economy has contracted , according to the World Bank. With increased dependence on foreign humanitarian aid, the Taliban have turned to illicit revenue sources such as drug trafficking, unregulated mining and smuggling. Although a nominal opium ban was imposed in , production shifted to like methamphetamine.��

Meanwhile, of the population lives below the poverty line. Public services have collapsed, inflation is volatile and youth unemployment is rampant. With few options, many Afghans are fleeing — roughly young people annually attempt to cross into neighboring countries. Families in rural areas often resort to selling children into labor or early marriage, and many young men are drawn into extremist groups, creating a cycle of poverty and radicalization.

adds another layer of crisis. The Taliban have issued more than restricting women’s rights. Girls are banned from education beyond sixth grade; women are barred from most employment and public life. This exclusion has gutted vital public services once staffed by women. Mothers now to madrassas for food, exposing them to indoctrination and terrorist recruitment for operations at home and abroad. The suppression of women not only violates universal rights but also deprives the country of critical human capital, feeding into the larger crisis with far-reaching security implications.

These dynamics culminate in a massive humanitarian emergency. As of early 2024, of Afghans require humanitarian aid. Over 3 million Afghans are internally displaced, and about 6 million are refugees. However, aid alone cannot solve a crisis rooted in systemic collapse. Without political and economic reform, the situation will only deteriorate. Afghanistan’s collapse is a closed loop: repression fuels extremism, which erodes economic viability, deepening human suffering and increasing dependency. The Taliban will not reform themselves. Only meaningful external engagement — diplomatic and strategic — can disrupt this cycle.

Diplomatic opportunity and strategic leverage

Despite the Taliban’s firm grip, their regime is fragile, their economy untenable and their global standing nonexistent. This creates a diplomatic opening that the United States and regional actors must seize. Several developments make this moment an ideal time for action.

First, the Afghan people demand that the Taliban change and form an inclusive government consistent with Afghanistan’s international obligations. To that end, civic resistance in the country is ongoing and courageous. Women continue to , and underground schools for girls are growing. Youth activists, journalists and civil society leaders refuse to be silenced. This resilience underscores the population’s desire for inclusive governance and dignity.

Second, regional powers that once tolerated or supported the Taliban are now suffering the consequences. Pakistan faces from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) elements within Afghanistan. Iran is involved in border clashes and . China and Russia are intelligence operations to counter extremism. These countries now recognize that a failed Afghan state threatens them all.

Third, international actors are disillusioned with the Taliban’s to reform. Diplomatic and humanitarian engagement has yielded deeper repression. As hope for internal moderation fades, external stakeholders are more receptive to new strategies.

Finally, is emerging. In regions like Panjshir and northern Afghanistan, former security personnel and grassroots fighters are mounting a challenge to Taliban rule. Although fragmented, their presence signals political dissatisfaction and provides leverage in diplomacy. While peace must remain the primary goal, acknowledging this resistance adds pressure for negotiated solutions.

The United States has a critical opportunity to lead a values-driven strategy involving diplomacy, sanctions, regional cooperation and moral clarity. This does not mean military redeployment but a re-engagement on terms that reflect both American interests and Afghan needs.

A US-led framework for peace

The US should spearhead a United Nations-backed peace process, rooted in global interests and the harsh realities on the ground. Five key pillars can guide this effort.

First, a UN-led political process must be inclusive and Afghan-owned, involving the Taliban, opposition groups, women, civil society and ethnic minorities. The aim should be the formation of a transitional government supported by a multinational peacekeeping force. This body would undertake a constitutional review and lay the groundwork for lasting governance.

Second, the White House should appoint a for Afghanistan to coordinate diplomatic efforts. The US should also take the lead as Afghanistan’s at the UN Security Council and support key recommendations from the 2023 . Coordination between US and would create a coherent strategy uniting donors and regional actors.

Third, the US must pursue faith-based diplomacy to counter the Taliban’s ideological legitimacy. Collaborating with Muslim-majority countries and institutions such as the , the US can promote Islamic principles that support education, human rights and peace. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are to challenge the Taliban’s theological justifications.

Fourth, the US should initiate a regional stability compact that brings together Pakistan, Iran, India, China, Russia and the Central Asian republics. This agreement would focus on non-interference, counterterrorism, refugee repatriation and regional connectivity. Afghanistan could then from a zone of competition to a platform for cooperation.

Finally, until a political settlement is reached, calibrated pressure and support for civil society must continue. Sanctions, visa bans, and withholding should remain tools to penalize repression. However, phased incentives tied to concrete progress could encourage reforms. Crucially, civil society — especially women’s organizations and independent media — must receive robust international support to preserve democratic values under threat.

Why it matters for the United States

Reengaging in Afghanistan is not charity — it is a strategic and moral imperative aligned with America’s national interests. The future of Afghanistan intersects with national security, economic competitiveness, geopolitical influence and ethical credibility.

From a security standpoint, Afghanistan risks becoming a base for transnational terrorism. Al-Qaeda to the Taliban, and ISIS-K is expanding its reach. With diminished intelligence post-withdrawal, the threat is harder to monitor. To prevent future attacks, the US must rebuild partnerships and intelligence networks.

Economically, Afghanistan is estimated to possess in untapped minerals essential for clean energy and technology supply chains. Disengagement hands this opportunity to China. A transparent development framework would benefit both Afghan communities and US national security interests.

Geopolitically, Afghanistan is central to the region where great power competition plays out. A power vacuum benefits China, Russia and Iran. However, this same complexity allows the US to lead a cooperative agenda that fosters stability, infrastructure and shared prosperity.

Morally, the US has a in Afghanistan. More than 2,400 American lives were lost, and over $2 trillion was spent in pursuit of a free and democratic society. Abandoning Afghanistan would not only betray those who believed in that vision but also damage America’s credibility. Leading a peace-focused strategy affirms US values and strengthens its global leadership.

A legacy of peace through leadership

America faces a defining moral and strategic choice: to retreat into the false comfort of disengagement or to lead with clarity, conviction and conscience. Indifference is not neutrality — it is complicity in the erosion of human rights, regional stability and US credibility. Geographic distance shield us from the consequences of instability abroad, especially when it endangers security at home.

Sustainable peace in Afghanistan is not merely a regional imperative — it is a national security priority. Disengagement risks the resurgence of transnational threats, while principled engagement through diplomacy, multilateral cooperation and sustained peacebuilding advances both American interests and global stability. This approach reflects the President Trump has aspired to: ending endless wars through durable, negotiated solutions that preserve US values and strategic aims.

This is not about reliving past missteps but about preventing new ones through responsible and forward-looking leadership. True leadership means rallying others through example and shared purpose. Let history record that the United States chose to lead, not out of guilt, but out of duty, correcting the flawed choices made by successive administrations in pursuing and executing .

Peace does not happen by accident. It must be built — and it begins with a choice. Let us choose wisely.

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Yet even under such oppressive conditions, Afghan women refuse to go down quietly. Instead, they find courageous and inventive ways to resist, and offer hope to future generations of not only Afghan women, but all women. Their struggle is not merely an isolated regional issue — it embodies the fight for women’s rights under authoritarian regimes everywhere.

Taliban restrictions and secret schools

The fundamentalist Taliban regime has systematically and wholly dismantled the hard-won rights of women. Since the 2021 takeover, the status of Afghan women’s rights has to that of pre-2002 conditions — when the Taliban last dominated the country. Two decades of human rights progress were erased overnight.

By early 2023, the Taliban had banned girls from secondary schools and universities, which 1.1 million young women of formal education. The regime also barred women from most kinds of employment, except in highly restricted sectors such as healthcare. The social and economic consequences of these policy impositions have devastated families and pushed them — and especially young women — further into poverty and deprivation.

But Afghan women have responded to these injustices with courage and determination. They refuse to be silenced.

Against Taliban bans, secret schools have become some of the most potent symbols of women’s defiance. These undercover classrooms are by volunteer teachers who educate Afghan girls at the risk of severe punishment. These covert education efforts operate in civilian homes and hidden locations. They teach math, science and literature, and they are under constant threat of Taliban surveillance. For many girls, these makeshift schools represent not just opportunities for education but also a reminder of their inalienable rights to learn and shape their futures.

“Every time I walk to class, I fear I may be caught,” one such student, who attends an underground school in Kabul. “If my education is a crime, it is worth the risk.”��

“We [tell them] that they are not alone.”

Education is not the only front where Afghan women are fighting back. In a further show of resistance, women have begun to lead media initiatives — like Radio Femme, a station to educating Afghan women and advocating for their rights — to empower those subjugated. Broadcasting in Pashto and Dari, Afghanistan’s two official languages, Radio Femme provides critical information on health, education and women’s legal rights. Despite operating under severe restrictions, the station provides Afghan women with invaluable knowledge and a sense of solidarity in an environment where their access to information and community has been systematically cut off.

“Our listeners are women who feel isolated and forgotten. We give them information but also the message that they are not alone,” Hawa, a former teacher who founded the station. The women behind Radio Femme face harassment and threats, yet they persist in their vital work. They have no other option under the brutal Taliban regime.

Social media has become a key means for Afghan women to amplify their voices and share their stories with the world. They leverage platforms like and to expose abuses, organize protests and connect with global supporters. Their digital resistance has effectively raised awareness, but it comes with significant perils.

Online harassment, gendered hate speech and even death threats have become commonplace dealings for Afghan women activists. Within the first year of the Taliban’s return, the for Information Resilience reported a threefold increase in online abuse targeting politically engaged Afghan women. These women live with an ever-present sense of danger — but they refuse to stop fighting.

Beyond the digital sphere, Afghan women have also begun to defy the Taliban’s tyranny through artistic mediums such as art, poetry and photography. Some artists challenge the erasure of women from public life, while others honor the memories of those who have suffered from or been lost to violence and oppression.

Atena, a 23-year-old artist from Herat, paints murals of Afghan women in traditional clothing. “Through my art,” she , “I show the world that we exist and that we are more than victims.”

Global solidarity and our responsibility

Afghan women continue to resist oppression, but they cannot fight alone. The international community must act, regardless of past setbacks in dealing with the Taliban. Since the Taliban’s return, the United Nations has $2.9 billion in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, with the United States among the key contributors. However, reports reveal that much of this aid has been diverted into Taliban hands — it offers little relief to Afghan women.

The rollback of US aid programs has only conditions for Afghan women. With the dismantling of USAID, efforts like secret schools, independent media such as Zan Times, and women-led initiatives are now at risk of disappearing entirely.

Individuals and organizations worldwide must push back against policies that threaten Afghan women’s survival, including the dismantling of USAID. Advocacy groups like UN Women, Women for Afghan Women and RAWA are crucial in ensuring resources reach grassroots efforts that provide education, shelter and healthcare. Public pressure is equally critical — urging policymakers to protect existing aid programs, prioritize Afghan women in refugee resettlement and enforce stricter oversight can help prevent further harm.

International aid must come with clear conditions. Funding should be redirected to underground schools, women-led initiatives and verified humanitarian efforts rather than flowing into Taliban-controlled channels. The elimination of USAID programs demands an urgent response to prevent the collapse of crucial support systems.

Policymakers respond to public pressure, diplomatic leverage and media scrutiny. Ensuring aid reaches those who need it most requires legal accountability, strategic funding and unwavering advocacy. Without these safeguards, Afghan women will continue to be systematically excluded from the very assistance meant to protect them.

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A moral groundwork

From its inception, America has framed its defining conflicts as to restore human and divine justice. For example, the Revolutionary War was not just a fight for independence; it was a battle against tyranny and a defense of individuals’ “unalienable rights endowed by a Creator” — a concept deeply influenced by Enlightenment philosopher John Locke. The Revolutionary War established of individualism, egalitarianism and activism, values rooted in both Enlightenment ideals and Judeo-Christian principles that celebrate individual liberty and human dignity.��These secular and spiritual ideals are embedded in foundational American documents such as the and the .

Similarly, the Civil War, while centering on economy and sovereignty, transformed into a moral crusade with President Abraham Lincoln’s opposition to slavery. By linking the war to the liberation of slaves, Lincoln set the groundwork for a United States based on equality and human dignity.

This moral foundation has defined America’s involvement in global conflicts throughout the 20th century. In both world wars, America intervened not merely out of self-interest but out of a sense of duty to preserve democracy, national interests with moral responsibility. President Franklin D. Roosevelt America’s fight against Nazism and fascism as a battle between good and evil, reinforcing the nation’s belief that democracy must prevail globally. Through its wartime efforts, America created a world order in which liberal values could thrive. The United Nations and its are the fruits of that moral American vision whose legacy has defined international order to this day.

The Cold War further emphasized America’s commitment to spreading liberal democracy. In contrast to the communist ideology that elevated the above the individual, America championed the right of every human being to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Democratic and Republican presidents, from to , equally emphasized the importance of this moral vision in the free world’s fight against communism. That philosophical commitment, more than mere technological or economic might, helped America win the Cold War and led to the spread of democratic governance across the world.

The loss of morality

Today, however, US foreign policy is increasingly abandoning its moral vision. This decline stems from a significant in bipartisan support for promoting democracy worldwide. Domestic challenges, along with perceived failures in recent nation-building efforts abroad, have dampened the American public’s and policymakers’ interest in democracy overseas. This shift has triggered an isolationist trend in US foreign policy arguably unseen since .

Because America’s global influence is built on not just military might or economic power, but a , the recent reluctance to follow that path risks undermining a legacy carefully built following WWII. By stepping back from the world stage, America risks creating a power vacuum that authoritarian regimes are eager to fill, leaving a more isolated US vulnerable to new threats in the long term.

When President Barack Obama from supporting democratic uprisings in and , he left in the lurch populations striving for freedom against brutal dictatorships, undermining American credibility. Similarly, President Joe Biden’s from Afghanistan ceded control back to the Taliban, reversing years of progress in women’s rights and civil liberties. Now, President-Elect Donald Trump may for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression when he goes back to the White House in January 2025. US foreign policy risks yet another retreat — one that��could determine the fate of Ukraine’s sovereignty and, by extension, the resilience of democracy in Europe.

If Ukraine falls to Russian aggression, it could much of Eastern and Northern Europe and set a dangerous precedent for the unchecked expansion of the Kremlin’s authoritarianism westward. This scenario would ripple across the region, threatening the democratic security of the Baltic states, the Caucasus and potentially Central Europe, posing the gravest challenge to democracy in Western Europe since World War II.

A collapse of democratic resistance in Ukraine could also to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific. If America and its allies hesitate in Europe, Beijing might seize the opportunity to assert dominance over Taiwan and pressure Japan, while North Korea could feel encouraged to take aggressive steps toward South Korea. The effects could reach as far as India and Australia. Such outcomes would jeopardize decades of democratic progress in the Indo-Pacific and destabilize an entire region critical to global economy and security.

In addition to these risks, a potential US withdrawal from NATO would not only embolden external adversaries but could also fracture Europe internally. This move could empower pro-Russian factions within the European Union to pursue closer ties with Moscow, sidelining pro-democracy and pro-American parties. An eastward European shift would strain Washington and lay the groundwork for a strategic encirclement of the United States.

Given the rise of authoritarianism worldwide, the US must renew its commitment to human rights and democracy. While both Democrats and Republicans may hesitate to champion liberal values abroad, now more than ever, the US needs to reset its moral compass, recommit to its moral foundations in foreign policy, and prioritize the promotion of democratic ideals in the world. This renewed commitment to democracy in foreign policy is essential for preserving America’s global leadership but also critical for keeping the world a freer and safer place.

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In today’s international climate, expecting Western diplomats to calculate that it might be healthier to avoid war than prove a point about who has the right to make decisions for others would be totally illusory. From Washington’s point of view, there are principles that must be applied in the defense of a “rules-based order,” even at the expense of another allied country’s population.

Perhaps the seasoned strategists of DC’s State Department felt that the larger issue of European security was too big a morsel to chew on. In their eyes, the only manageable issue to consider was the right of a particular nation, Ukraine, to adhere to a sprawling and fundamentally incoherent military alliance. They had good reason to insist on this. In their mind, this was the key to maintaining control of what Zbigniew Brzezinski “the grand chessboard.” The risk associated with spending unproductive months seeking to thrash out the mutual security requirements of neighboring, culturally connected nations was clearly not worth taking. By refusing to waste time in pointless discussion, they could seize the opportunity to continue on a well-trodden path by launching yet another one of Washington’s forever wars, another one of those epic conflicts that can carry on for “as long as it takes.”

War may be bad for some, but the war economy is good for anyone in power. That is the lesson America learned during World War II and it has never been forgotten.

In August 2021, the administration of American President Joe Biden finally wound up one of the most recent forever wars in Afghanistan. After 20 years, it had clearly run out of gas. The new Biden administration knew that Ukraine could be the new opportunity to focus on. Nearly three years on, it has become clear to everyone that — just like Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria — the war could not be won by the “good guys.” But winning apparently isn’t the major objective. Keeping a wartime economy going is clearly the top priority.

If, as early remarks by none other than Hillary Clinton, the Ukraine fiasco was strategically planned to create an “Afghanistan situation” for Russia, the war that broke out in Gaza and Israel on October 7, 2023 was on no one’s agenda. Washington didn’t need another headache. It was too busy stoking the fires in Ukraine in its quest to postpone the resolution as long as possible. This time, the value of waging a new forever hot war accrued to a local leader, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu. A prolonged war would have the twofold merit of pleasing a lot of key people in his own government and postponing the inevitable inglorious end of Bibi’s political career.

For authoritative voices inside the Beltway, the successive killing of the two top leaders of Hamas — Ismail Haniya and Yahya Sinwar — tells them the end of the conflict may be in sight. The White House followed up Sinwar’s elimination with this: “There is now the opportunity for a ‘day after’ in Gaza without Hamas in power, and for a political settlement that provides a better future for Israelis and Palestinians alike.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Day after:

An imaginary moment of the future that governments and every other defender of the status quo in times of war has an absolute need to invoke rhetorically as a demonstration of their commitment to peace while doing everything in their power to prevent it from occurring.

Contextual note

Washington’s track record on assessing the dynamics of ongoing wars — how long they might last and when they might end — has never been brilliant. No sooner had Biden expressed his optimism about the sunny day after than his staunch ally, Netanyahu, contradicted him. “Israeli leaders,” Al Jazeera, “had a drastically different message. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the war is ‘not over’ and pledged that Israeli forces would operate in Gaza for ‘years to come.’”

H.A. Hellyer, a geopolitical analyst, dismissed American talks of a day after in Gaza as “laughable,” noting “that the Israelis have made it very clear that they’re not leaving Gaza, that the military presence will remain, so the idea of any sort of political horizon here is just very, very unrealistic.”

So why such disparity of perception between the two allies, Bibi and Biden? One answer might be the American penchant for “hyperreality” that infects the country’s political and social culture, transforming even the average citizen’s perception of the world. Americans simply don’t see the meaning of events in the same way as others, including their ironclad allies, the Israelis. In fact, no two countries share the same vision of history, a fact State Department diplomats would do well to ponder.

For Americans, days are always significant, especially for tracking the ends of wars. The American Civil War ended on April 9, 1865, with the unconditional surrender of General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox. General Ulysses S. Grant and Lee concretized the moment with a dramatic handshake. Adolf Hitler’s suicide on April 30, 1945 put an end to World War II in Europe. A pair of atomic bombs in early August of that year ended the Pacific version of the conflict.

Hollywood war films and most westerns build up to the single dramatic moment — often a showdown — when the villain dies or is humiliated and a brighter future emerges. This pattern of expectations appears to be wired into every American’s mindset as the key to understanding existential dramas. The successive deaths of Hamas leaders Haniya and Sinwar, with the added subplot of Israel’s elimination of Hassan Nasrallah’s in Lebanon, inevitably signaled to Americans that the year-long violent movie was coming to an end.

What Americans fail to recognize is that the Israeli screenwriters were working on a different script, one that derives not from Hollywood screenplays but from the mythology of the Old Testament. Messiahs don’t take over after the death of a villain. They don’t sign peace agreements. As instruments of a divine will, they install a new order. Their mission transcends the kind of everyday human goals associated with the banalities of governance and democracy.

Historical note

 “Forever wars” inevitably produce a curious linguistic paradox. “Forever” evokes timelessness, if not eternity. But for the sake of reasonable, peace-loving political discourse, the same promoters of forever war need to invoke a precise moment of theoretical resolution: the day after. Sadly, neither term — “forever war” or day after — makes any real-world sense.

Take the case of Afghanistan. In 2001, America mobilized NATO, transporting Western troops well beyond the confines of its “home base,” the North Atlantic. Its goal was to rid a remote Asian nation of the dreaded Taliban. On that occasion, America rejected a reasonable proposal to negotiate a solution whereby Afghanistan itself would arrest and try the criminals. The administration of President George W. Bush preferred launching a war that would last 20 years. And what did the day after of that war turn out to be in 2021? The restoration of an even more radicalized Taliban.

In 1967, in the midst of the war in Vietnam that provided the initial template for future forever wars, General Westmoreland and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson began repeatedly “the light at the end of the tunnel.” That was an earlier version of the day after. That war lasted 20 years and ended in chaotic humiliation for America.

The Hollywood treatment of war may appear inspired by Shakespearean tragedy, which always ends with a dramatic death. But William Shakespeare’s tragic characters, even villains like Richard III or Macbeth, have something heroic about them that we cannot help but admire. And the perception of the day after always remains ambiguous. When Hamlet dies, the crown is given not to a Dane, but a Norwegian rival, Fortinbras, whose name, derived from French, means “strong in arm.” In other words, despite Hamlet’s own encouragement (“he has my dying voice”), the day after will more likely be a continuation of a forever war.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

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Politics of terror

For decades, Pakistan has used state-sponsored terror as an instrument to buy geopolitical rent from the United States via Afghanistan. In the past, Pakistan gave operational control to terror proxies to cultivate ground for against India.

However, the strategy of using terror did not last long. On May 2, 2011, the US al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. This incident sowed seeds of distrust between the two nations.

Similarly, Iran Pakistan in the 1971 war against India. However, ideological confrontations have led to distrust and hostility between the parties. Iran also believes that Pakistan is Baloch jihadists to please the West and Saudi Arabia.

Evidently, politics of terror have cost Pakistan heavily, without much reward. The state is clearly weakening, as several signs indicate. The Afghan Taliban’s is being more assertive than it otherwise would be. Pakistan is targeting Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamist nationalist network opposing the Pakistani military. Pakistan’s approach against Afghanistan’s Supreme Council is also telling.

Middle Eastern terror conflicts have increased following Israel’s 2023 invasion of Gaza. Pakistan seems to be negotiating with a few proxies, and allegedly with . These actions may be in order to de-escalate terror attacks in Pakistan and deter the TTP.

The nation may also be seeking openings for security and strategic cooperation with the West. In December 2023, Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir and former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Nadeem Anjum, Washington, DC. The US didn’t show any interest in engaging with Pakistan; it is already locked in multiple fronts from Ukraine to Israel. The nation also believes that TTP is already weakening the ISIS threat.

However, the ISIS in Iran in January paint a worrisome picture of regional security.��The on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March stoked fear of revival of ISIS regional branches, especially in Central Asia.

Islamization and flashpoints

Pakistan’s politics of terror typically end poorly, which complicates its negotiation of geopolitical rent. It suffers from the usual dilemma that comes with terror politics; proxies can be useful for some time, but eventually, their radicalism becomes too extreme.

One can argue that the US, too, had relations with terror proxies. In December 1979, the CIA’s provided arms and logistics to jihadist groups in Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet Union. Unlike Pakistan’s relationship with proxies, however, this was a limited relationship.

Pakistan’s continued engagement with proxies may come from former president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s regime in the 1970s and 1980s. He Sharia Benches in the High Court to align the nation’s legal statutes with Islamic doctrine. His policies brought in officers who wanted to pursue an active Islamic agenda in military matters. A new breed of military thinkers and strategists also emerged. They pushed for a merger of social jihadism with military plans.

Islamization had far-reaching consequences. It led non-state actors, directed by Pakistan’s ISI, to quell opposition to Zia’s pro-Sunni Islamization measures. This in turn the extremist Jaish-e-Mohammad and Soviet jihad groups.

Zia’s radical Islamization continues to permeate the Pakistani Army, which has prevented action against Islamic terror groups such as TTP. The virus of Islamization has removed Pakistan’s ability to think like a rational nation, putting it in a state of poly-crises.

In January, Pakistan witnessed new flashpoints, including Iranian against the Baluch terror group Jaish al-Adl. This attack on the Pakistani province of Balochistan further deteriorated Iran–Pakistan relations.

Pakistan’s response was limited to diplomatic protests and the of Iran’s ambassador. However, Pakistan likewise carried out retaliatory precision strikes against Baluch camps on Iranian territory. This indicates a strategy of deterrence similar to the it used against India in 2019.��

Pakistan does have the option to use force against Iran; it did so in a limited manner on January 17, when it launched a series of air and artillery inside Iran’s Sistan and Balochistan province. The limited strike demonstrated Pakistan’s deterrence capabilities, but terror groups inside Pakistan continue to complicate its situation.

Attacks on Chinese workers

On October 7, Baloch terrorists in the Pakistani city of Karachi conducted a that killed two Chinese nationals. Before that, on March 26, Baloch insurgents conducted a that killed five Chinese workers in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. These are merely the most recent instances of deadly attacks on Chinese nationals. In 2022, a in Karachi killed three Chinese instructors. In 2021, yet another killed two Chinese nationals in the Gwadar region.

These incidents have raised serious questions over Pakistan’s credentials of being a safe investment for China. In defense, China shut its firms and launched a sound into these incidents.

Pakistan is attempting to revive its economic situation and its relations with China, but such incidents might jeopardize long-term Pakistan–China economic relations. The issue of terror attacks paints Pakistan as an unsafe investment, to China and the rest of the world. Regardless, for the time being, China intends to with Pakistan to protect its personnel.

For Pakistan, going full throttle against insurgents raises the concern of a mass insurgency. However, Pakistan has gradually begun cross-border operations in relation to Afghanistan. The consequences may put Pakistan into a severe security headache as the capital of Islamabad is now caught in a twin terror trap with the TTP and Baloch militants. If flared, this situation could heavily impede Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests.

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“Some people don’t want to shoot. They see the enemy in the firing position in trenches but don’t open fire … That is why our men are dying,” said a frustrated battalion commander in Ukraine’s 47th Brigade. “When they don’t use the weapon, they are ineffective.”

Conditioning human beings to kill

This is familiar territory to anyone who has studied the work of US Brigadier General Samuel “Slam” Marshall, a World War I veteran and the chief combat historian of the US Army in World War II. Marshall conducted hundreds of post-combat small group sessions with US troops in the Pacific and Europe, and he documented his findings in his Men Against Fire: the Problem of Battle Command.

One of Slam Marshall’s most startling and controversial findings was that only about 15% of US troops in combat actually fired their weapons at the enemy. In no case did that ever rise above 25%, even when failing to fire placed the soldiers’ own lives in greater danger.

Marshall concluded that most human beings have a natural aversion to killing other human beings, often reinforced by our upbringing and religious beliefs, and that turning civilians into effective combat soldiers therefore requires training and indoctrination expressly designed to override our natural respect for fellow human life. This dichotomy between human nature and killing in war is now understood to lie at the root of much of the suffered by combat veterans.

Marshall’s conclusions were incorporated into US military training, with the introduction of firing range targets that looked like enemy soldiers and deliberate indoctrination to dehumanize the enemy in soldiers’ minds. When he conducted similar research in the Korean War, Marshall found that changes in infantry training based on his work in World War II had already led to higher firing ratios.

How military indoctrination affected US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan

That trend continued in Vietnam and more recent US wars. Part of the shocking brutality of the US hostile military occupation of Iraq stemmed directly from the dehumanizing indoctrination of the US occupation forces, which included falsely linking Iraq to the 9/11 terrorist crimes in the US and labeling Iraqis who resisted the US invasion and occupation of their country as “terrorists.”

A of US forces in Iraq in February 2006 found that 85% of US troops believed their mission was to “retaliate for Saddam’s role in the 9/11 attacks,” and 77% believed that the primary reason for the war was to “stop Saddam from protecting al Qaeda in Iraq.” This was all pure fiction, cut from whole cloth by propagandists in Washington. Three years into the US occupation, the Pentagon was still misleading US troops to falsely link Iraq with 9/11.

The impact of this dehumanization was also borne out by court-martial testimony in the rare cases when US troops were prosecuted for killing Iraqi civilians. In a at Camp Pendleton in California in July 2007, a corporal testifying for the defense told the court he did not see the cold-blooded killing of an innocent civilian as a summary execution. “I see it as killing the enemy,” he told the court, adding, “Marines consider all Iraqi men part of the insurgency.”

War in the age of Iraq syndrome

US in Iraq and Afghanistan (6,257 killed) were only a fraction of the US combat death toll in Vietnam (47,434) or Korea (33,686), and an even smaller fraction of the nearly 300,000 Americans killed in World War II. In every case, other countries suffered much heavier death tolls.

And yet, US casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan provoked waves of political blowback in the US, leading to military recruitment problems that today. The US government responded by shifting away from wars involving large deployments of US ground troops to a greater reliance on proxy wars and aerial bombardment.

After the end of the Cold War, the US military-industrial complex and political class they had “kicked the Vietnam syndrome,” and that, from the danger of provoking World War III with the Soviet Union, they could now use military force without restraint to consolidate and expand US global power. These ambitions crossed party lines, from Republican “” to Democratic hawks like Madeleine Albright, Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden.��

In a at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in October 2000, a month before winning a seat in the US Senate, Hillary Clinton echoed her mentor Madeleine Albright’s rejection of the “Powell Doctrine” of limited war.

“There is a refrain …” Clinton, “that we should intervene with force only when we face splendid little wars that we surely can win, preferably by overwhelming force in a relatively short period of time. To those who believe we should become involved only if it is easy to do, I think we have to say that America has never and should not ever shy away from the hard task if it is the right one.”

During the question-and-answer session, a banking executive in the audience challenged Clinton on that statement. “I wonder if you think that every foreign country — the majority of countries — would actually welcome this new assertiveness, including the one billion Muslims that are out there,” he asked, “and whether or not there isn’t some grave risk to the United States in this — what I would say, not new internationalism, but new imperialism?”

When the aggressive war policy promoted by the neocons and Democratic hawks crashed and burned in Iraq and Afghanistan, this should have prompted a serious rethink of their wrongheaded assumptions about the impact of aggressive and illegal uses of US military force.��

Instead, the response of the US political class to the blowback from its catastrophic wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was simply to avoid large deployments of US ground forces or “boots on the ground.” They instead embraced the use of devastating bombing and artillery campaigns in Afghanistan, in Iraq and in Syria, and wars fought by proxies, with full, “ironclad” US support, in , , , and now Ukraine and Palestine.

The absence of large numbers of US casualties in these wars kept them off the front pages back home and avoided the kind of political blowback generated by the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. The lack of media coverage and public debate meant that most Americans knew very little about these more recent wars — until the shocking atrocity of the in Gaza finally started to crack the wall of silence and indifference.

Proxy wars are no less destructive than other wars

The results of these US proxy wars are, predictably, no less catastrophic than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US domestic political impacts have been mitigated, but the real-world impacts in the countries and regions involved are as deadly, destructive and destabilizing as ever, undermining US “soft power” and pretensions to global leadership in the eyes of much of the world. 

In fact, these policies have widened the yawning gulf between the worldview of ill-informed Americans who cling to the view of their country as a country at peace and a force for good in the world, and people in other countries, especially in the Global South, who are ever more outraged by the violence, chaos and poverty caused by the aggressive projection of US military and economic power, whether by US wars, proxy wars, bombing campaigns, coups or economic sanctions.

Now, the US-backed wars in Palestine and Ukraine are provoking growing public dissent among America’s partners in these wars. Israel’s recovery of six more dead hostages in Rafah led Israeli labor unions to call widespread , insisting that the administration prioritize the lives of the Israeli hostages over its desire to keep killing Palestinians and destroying Gaza.��

In Ukraine, an expanded military draft has failed to overcome the reality that most young Ukrainians to kill and die in an endless, unwinnable war. Hardened veterans see much as Siegfried Sassoon described the British conscripts he was training in November 1916 in Memoirs of an Infantry Officer: “The raw material to be trained was growing steadily worse. Most of those who came in now had joined the Army unwillingly, and there was no reason why they should find military service tolerable.”

Several months later, with the help of Bertrand Russell, Sassoon wrote Finished With War: A Soldier’s Declaration, an accusing the political leaders who had the power to end the war of deliberately prolonging it. The letter was published in newspapers and read aloud in parliament. It ended, “On behalf of those who are suffering now, I make this protest against the deception which is being practiced upon them; also I believe it may help to destroy the callous complacency with which the majority of those at home regard the continuance of agonies which they do not share and which they have not enough imagination to realize.”����

As Israeli and Ukrainian leaders see their political support crumbling, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy are taking increasingly desperate risks, all the while insisting that the US must come to their rescue. By “leading from behind,” US leaders have surrendered the initiative to these foreign leaders, who will keep pushing the United States to make good on its promises of unconditional support, which will sooner or later include sending young American troops to kill and die alongside their own. 

Proxy war has failed to resolve the problem it was intended to solve. Instead of acting as an alternative to ground wars involving US forces, US proxy wars have spawned ever-escalating crises that are now making US wars with Iran and Russia increasingly likely.

Neither the changes to US military training since World War II nor the current US strategy of proxy war have resolved the age-old contradiction between killing in war and our natural respect for human life. We have come full circle, back to this same historic crossroads, where we must once again make the fateful, unambiguous choice between the path of war and the path of peace.

If we choose war, or allow our leaders and their foreign friends to choose it for us, we must be ready, as tell us, to once more send tens of thousands of young Americans to their deaths, while also risking escalation to a nuclear war that would kill us all.��

If we truly choose peace, we must actively resist our political leaders’ schemes to repeatedly manipulate us into war. We must refuse to volunteer our bodies and those of our children and grandchildren as their cannon fodder, or allow them to shift that fate onto our neighbors, friends and “allies” in other countries. 

We must insist that our mis-leaders instead recommit to diplomacy, negotiation and other peaceful means of resolving disputes with other countries, as the UN Charter, the real “rules-based order,” in fact .

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post This Is How America Manipulates People Into Killing appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Already the alacrity of US presidents to impose sanctions on anyone who fails to conform with US policies has persuaded many nations to seek an escape route from the tyranny of the US dollar in global trade. Are American politicians and their media not aware of the damage US foreign policy has wrought on American soft power, which has in the past played an important role in promoting a positive image of the US?”

Your observations highlight several important and interconnected issues regarding the perception of US foreign policy and its impact on international relations and American soft power. Here’s a detailed examination of these points:

1. **Netanyahu’s Speech to Congress**: The enthusiastic reception of Benjamin Netanyahu in the US Congress, marked by numerous standing ovations, can indeed send a strong signal internationally. For many observers, particularly in regions like the Middle East and South Asia, it might reinforce the perception of the US being unconditionally supportive of Israeli policies, including those that are controversial or widely condemned, such as the treatment of Palestinians.
2. **US Wars in the Middle East**: The US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have left deep scars and a legacy of instability in the region. The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 further damaged the US’s reputation, showing perceived failures in strategic planning and execution. These military actions have significantly influenced global perceptions, fostering skepticism and resentment towards American interventions.
3. **Support for Israel**: The strong and often unconditional support for Israel, particularly in the context of actions in Gaza and the West Bank, is a contentious issue. Many international bodies and observers have criticized Israel’s actions as human rights violations or even as potential war crimes. This unwavering US support can alienate other nations and peoples, contributing to a perception of bias and double standards in American foreign policy.
4. **Sanctions and International Reactions**: The US’s frequent use of economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy has prompted a backlash. Countries targeted by these sanctions often see them as coercive and unjust, leading to efforts to create alternatives to the US-dominated financial system. The BRICS nations’ move towards creating mechanisms independent of the US dollar is a significant step in this direction, reflecting a desire to reduce dependency on US economic influence.
5. **Decline of American Soft Power**: Soft power, the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce, has been a cornerstone of American influence since the Cold War. Cultural appeal, democratic values, and the promise of economic opportunity have traditionally garnered international goodwill. However, recent foreign policy decisions, perceived as aggressive or unilateral, have eroded this soft power. Global opinion has been increasingly critical of US policies, from military interventions to economic sanctions and support for contentious allies.
6. **Media and Political Awareness**: Within the US, there is often a disconnect between domestic political narratives and international perceptions. American politicians and media might focus on domestic approval and political gain, sometimes at the expense of understanding or addressing the broader implications of their policies. This inward focus can lead to a lack of awareness or acknowledgment of the negative impact on global perceptions and relations.

In conclusion, the convergence of these factors indicates a significant challenge for US foreign policy. Restoring and maintaining American soft power requires a nuanced and empathetic approach, acknowledging global perspectives, and fostering international cooperation. Awareness and adjustment of strategies in response to these criticisms could help mitigate the damage and rebuild the trust and influence that the US has traditionally enjoyed.

“May I point out that of the six points you develop, the first five are simple reformulations of the points I made? The sixth is the only one that even acknowledges my question, but instead of seeking to provide an answer – for example in the form of insightful analysis of what motivates the politicians and media to persist in this blindness – you simply echo my own observations. You identify the problem as one of ‘inward focus.’ That seems obvious. My question seeks to go further, to understand what in the composition of the US political and media system and the culture contributes to preventing open discussion about this basic problem of perception. By not broaching the question, it is impossible to find answers. Worse, the degree of alienation this produces across the globe appears to be reaching a tipping point that could presage open conflict. No one – except maybe the media – have anything to gain from open conflict. And yet the conditions that may spawn it are becoming aggravated by the day, as the Netanyahu episode illustrates. So, do you have any insight into why the political institutions, including Congress, and the media resist facing a truth that can only work to the detriment of the American people?”

Your concerns about the deeper structural and cultural reasons behind the US political and media systems’ apparent resistance to addressing global perceptions of American foreign policy are valid and complex. Let’s delve into some possible factors that contribute to this issue:

1. **Political Incentives and Domestic Focus**:

• **Electoral Dynamics**: US politicians are primarily motivated by the need to secure votes and maintain political power. This often means catering to domestic audiences and interest groups that have significant influence on elections. Foreign policy decisions that might be unpopular domestically, even if they improve international relations, are often avoided.
• **Lobbying and Interest Groups**: Powerful lobbying groups, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), exert considerable influence over US foreign policy. Their ability to mobilize political and financial support means that many politicians align with their positions, sometimes at the expense of broader international considerations.

2. **Media Ecosystem**:

• **Corporate Ownership and Profit Motives**: Major media outlets in the US are often owned by large corporations with vested interests. Sensationalism, conflict, and stories that appeal to partisan audiences drive viewership and advertising revenue. This can lead to a narrow focus on issues that resonate with domestic audiences rather than nuanced international perspectives.
• **Echo Chambers and Partisan Divides**: The rise of social media and partisan news outlets has created echo chambers where audiences are exposed primarily to information that reinforces their existing beliefs. This limits the scope for critical discussion and understanding of complex international issues.

3. **Cultural and Historical Factors**:

• **Exceptionalism**: There is a deeply ingrained belief in American exceptionalism, the idea that the US has a unique role and moral duty to lead the world. This can foster a dismissive attitude towards international criticism and a reluctance to engage with perspectives that challenge this narrative.
• **Historical Context**: The legacy of the Cold War and the subsequent unipolar moment in the 1990s reinforced a sense of American dominance. Adjusting to a multipolar world where US actions are scrutinized and challenged is a difficult transition for both political leaders and the public.

4. **Structural and Institutional Constraints**:

• **Bureaucratic Inertia**: Institutions like the Department of State and Department of Defense have established ways of operating that can be resistant to change. Policies and attitudes formed during previous administrations can persist, limiting the flexibility to adapt to new international realities.
• **Checks and Balances**: The US political system, with its multiple layers of checks and balances, can slow down policy changes. Even when there is recognition of the need for a shift in foreign policy, implementing these changes can be a protracted process.

5. **Educational and Informational Gaps**:

• **Lack of Global Awareness**: The American education system and media often do not prioritize international education or perspectives, leading to a populace that may be less informed about global issues and the impact of US foreign policy.
• **Narrative Control**: Government and media narratives can shape public understanding and discourse. When these narratives focus on national security and patriotic themes, critical discussions about foreign policy are sidelined.

Understanding these factors helps to illuminate why there is resistance to facing certain truths about US foreign policy and its global repercussions. Addressing these issues would require a concerted effort to reform political incentives, diversify media ownership and content, promote global awareness, and foster a culture of critical engagement with international perspectives. Without such changes, the conditions that exacerbate global alienation and potential conflict are likely to persist.

If I were grading a student, I’d give ChatGPT an A+ for this answer. This should demonstrate that to get anything substantial and formally reasoned from AI requires two things: precision and patience. It means asking the right questions, not once but multiple times by patiently reformulating them. We need to understand that if AI has a strategy as the participant in a dialogue, its goal isn’t accuracy. Instead, it aims at creating the impression of being well-informed.

To coax ChatGPT to the point that it can prove genuinely helpful in producing an answer to a question, the interrogator must repeat and reformulate that question, possibly multiple times. More often than not, AI will tell you what you already know, while adding a few facts and complementary arguments. Now, that might sound like a trivial outcome, but it points to a way in which AI can be a wonderfully constructive aid to education.

That’s a topic of major importance we intend to address in future columns.

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.

*[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51�Թ�, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Outside the Box: The Hardening Truth About Soft Power appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The of NATO’s agenda for the summit were revealed at a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Prague, Czech Republic. NATO will drag its members into the US Cold War with China by accusing it of supplying dual-use weapons technology to Russia. It will then unveil new initiatives to spend US tax dollars on a mysterious “drone wall” in the Baltics and an expensive-sounding “integrated air defense system” across Europe.

But the main feature of this event will be a superficial show of unity to try to convince the public that NATO and Ukraine can defeat Russia and that negotiating with Russia would be tantamount to surrender.

On its face, that should be a hard sell. The one thing that most Americans agree on about the war in Ukraine is that they support a negotiated peace. When asked in a November 2023 Economist/YouGov , “Would you support or oppose Ukraine and Russia agreeing to a ceasefire now?,” 68% chose the “support” option. Only 8% chose “oppose” while 24% chose “not sure.”

While President Biden and NATO leaders hold endless debates over different ways to escalate the conflict, they have repeatedly rejected negotiations, notably in , and , even as their failed war leave Ukraine in an ever worsening negotiating position.

The endgame of this non-strategy is that Ukraine will only be allowed to negotiate with Russia once it is facing total defeat and has nothing left to negotiate with. This is exactly the surrender NATO says it wants to avoid.

Defying the UN Charter “for peace”

As other countries have pointed out at the UN , what the US and NATO are doing is prohibited by the UN Charter. Their rejection of negotiation and diplomacy in favor of a long war they hope will eventually “weaken” Russia is a flagrant violation of the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” that all UN members are legally committed to under . As it says in Article 33(1):

“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”

But NATO’s leaders are not visiting Washington to work out how they can comply with their international obligations and negotiate peace in Ukraine. Quite the contrary, in fact. At a June meeting in preparation for the summit, NATO defense ministers approved a plan to put NATO’s military support of Ukraine “on a firmer for years to come.”

The effort will be headquartered at a US military base in Wiesbaden, Germany and involve almost 700 staff. Some describe it as a way to “” NATO backing for Ukraine, in case former President Donald Trump wins the election and tries to draw down US support.

At the summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg wants NATO leaders to commit to providing Ukraine with $43 billion worth of equipment each year, indefinitely. Echoing George Orwell’s that “war is peace,” Stoltenberg said, “The paradox is that the longer we plan, and the longer we commit [to war], the sooner Ukraine can have peace.”

NATO hasn’t learned from Afghanistan

The summit will also discuss how to bring Ukraine closer to NATO membership. This move guarantees the conflict will continue, since Ukrainian neutrality is Russia’s principal war aim.

As Ian Davis of NATO Watch , NATO’s rhetoric echoes the same lines he heard throughout 20 years of war in Afghanistan: “The Taliban (now Russia) can’t wait us out.” But this vague hope that the other side will eventually give up is not a strategy.

There is no evidence that Ukraine will be different from Afghanistan. The US and NATO are making the same assumptions, which will lead to the same result. The underlying assumption is that NATO’s greater GDP, extravagant and corrupt military budgets and fetish for expensive weapons technology must somehow, magically, lead Ukraine to victory over Russia.

When the US and NATO finally admitted defeat and their forces from Afghanistan in 2021, it was the Afghans who had paid in blood for the West’s folly. The US–NATO war machine simply moved to its next “challenge.” It learned nothing and made political hay out of abject .

Less than three years after the rout in Afghanistan, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin recently NATO “the most powerful and successful alliance in history.” That Ukrainians are to throw away their lives in NATO’s dumpster fire is a promising sign for the country’s future.

In an titled, “The New Theory of Ukrainian Victory Is the Same as the Old,” Mark Episkopos from the Quincy Institute think tank wrote, “Western planning continues to be strategically backwards. Aiding Kyiv has become an end in itself, divorced from a coherent strategy for bringing the war to a close.” He concluded that “the key to wielding [the West’s] influence effectively is to finally abandon a zero-sum framing of victory…”

This was a trap set by the US and UK, not just for Ukraine, but for their NATO allies as well. By refusing to support Ukraine at the negotiating table in April 2022, and instead demanding this “zero-sum framing of victory” as the condition for NATO’s support, the US and UK committed a grave misdeed. They escalated what could have been a short conflict into a protracted, potentially nuclear, war between NATO and Russia.

Turkish leaders and diplomats about how their US and British allies undermined their peacemaking. , and squirmed for a month or two but soon surrendered to the war camp.

How NATO can truly bring peace

When NATO leaders meet in Washington, DC, what they should be doing, apart from figuring out how to comply with Article 33(1) of the UN Charter, is conducting a clear-eyed review of their mission. They should examine how an organization that claims to be a force for peace keeps escalating unwinnable wars and leaving countries in ruin. The fundamental question is this: Can NATO ever truly strive for peace? Or will it always be a dangerous, subservient extension of the US war machine?

We believe that NATO is an anachronism in today’s multipolar world. It is an aggressive, expansionist military alliance whose inherent institutional myopia and blinkered, self-serving threat assessments condemn us all to endless war and potential nuclear annihilation.

There is only one way NATO could be a real force for peace. It must declare that, by this time next year, it will take the same steps that its Soviet counterpart, the , took in 1991: It must finally dissolve what Secretary Austin should’ve called “the most dangerous military alliance in history.”
However, the population that is suffering under the yoke of militarism cannot afford to wait for NATO to give up and leave on its own. Our fellow citizens and political leaders need to hear from us all about the dangers posed by this unaccountable, nuclear-armed war machine. We hope you will us, in person or online, in using the occasion of this NATO summit to sound the alarm.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post We Need to Challenge NATO’s Insidious War Summit in Washington appeared first on 51�Թ�.

After the Taliban retook power in 2021 with a shockingly rapid advance on the capital, Kabul, Ghani fled the country. His sudden departure damaged his reputation and exacerbated the country’s already precarious situation. Afghans regarded the move as self-centered decision-making and callous, given what became of the country after Ghani left.

Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan’s economy, as per the World Bank, is and heavily reliant on external support. The economy has shrunk by 25% over the last two years. The Taliban’s restrictive policies on women’s education and work are expected to further hinder Afghanistan’s recovery prospects. Additionally, according to the latest Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Index, Afghanistan ranks as the among 177 countries in terms of the status of women. Many Afghans blame Ghani for their misery.

Ghani claims his escape was necessitated by factors outside of his control. It is true that the Taliban’s advance meant Ghani’s safety was at stake. His close circle urged him to flee the country. Despite facing criticism for his actions, Ghani vigorously asserts that he is still Afghanistan’s president.

Ghani is as stubborn a pretender as he was a president

Even as his regime was collapsing, Ghan was high-handed and brooked no compromise. In his mind, the Afghan constitution empowered him to complete his term, so he would complete it. Influential figures like Zalmay Khalilzad, the senior US negotiator with the Taliban, sharply criticized Ghani. In his testimony before the House Foreign iRelations Committee, Khalilzad a last-minute success in persuading the Taliban to avoid entering Kabul and instead engage in discussions with the government to establish a transitional administration. Both sides agreed, but Ghani’s surprising departure led to the swift collapse of the now leaderless Afghan military and police. Apparently, he would rather claim his rights abroad than lay them down during negotiations in Afghanistan.

Ghani found refuge in Abu Dhabi. From this base, he has continued to leveraged any possible platforms, from diplomatic meetings to , to push his agenda. Ghani believes that Afghanistan can function as an economic bridge between West, Central, South and East Asia, and for some reason he seems to think that he has a role to play in developing that. In his podcasts, Ghani actively seeks support from both the Taliban and the broader region.

In on podcast , at the 18-minute mark, Ghani seamlessly transitions from technical discourse to outlining Afghanistan’s political path. He critiques militant groups opposing the Taliban and acknowledges ethnic diversity challenges within his administration. Ghani advocates for establishing a Loya Jirga (a great council of tribal leaders) to focus on the internal dimension of political legitimacy for the Taliban regime and emphasizes the importance of reforms. He aims for measures that could secure minimum acceptance from the people without necessitating unanimous national approval. Ghani promotes the idea that such minimum acceptance from the Afghan populace may pave the way for legitimizing the Taliban by the international community.

So desperate is Ghani to have a role to play in Afghan politics that he, who once fled the country rather than recognize the Taliban, now appears willing to sell his country out to the militants.

Ghani and allies play the influence game abroad

Meanwhile, former Afghan army officials appointed by Ghani are overseas offices, positioning themselves as representatives of the former Afghan National Defense Forces prepared to confront the Taliban. This initiative explores potential avenues and strategically engages with the new US administration, as President Donald Trump’s by floating the a possible US return to Afghanistan while speaking to a crowd in Fort Dodge, Iowa. If Afghanistan garners the attention of the new US administration, significant opportunities for such maneuvers could emerge as a bargaining chip.

With the potential for regional security cooperation on the rise, Ghani highlights Afghanistan’s regional significance and signals readiness to engage with the recently established for cooperation with Kabul. Nonetheless, Iran’s sway over specific Taliban factions presents a challenge to Ghani’s endeavors to initiate dialogue with the group. The region is marked by a lack of trust and duplicity, leading countries to cultivate relationships with all parties both within and outside Afghanistan as bargaining tools to advance their agendas. The regional contact group will encompass all Afghan groups, including Ghani, in the pursuit of inclusive solutions.

The collapse of the government unsettled Afghan elites, leading to their disengagement. However, two years later, these communities are regrouping and actively seeking a leader capable of articulating their concerns. Ghani positions himself as a leader within a specific faction of the Taliban opposition, advocating for reform and actively seeking a role in shaping Afghanistan’s future.

Despite the Taliban’s capture of power in Afghanistan, Ghani still maintains his Twitter profile as of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. All administrative signs, flags, passports and other symbols of authority still belong to the exiled government. Afghan embassies, representatives in other countries and the UN continue to operate and represent the previous government.

Yet this is not the sort of government in exile that dreams of recapturing its homeland from the enemy like Charles de Gaulle did France in World War II. Instead, if Ghani can garner enough attention and support, he may consider playing his last card by joining with the Taliban, a preferable option to fading into obscurity. Such a move could benefit the Taliban by showcasing their tolerance and promoting legitimacy.

Although Ghani faces formidable challenges, the historical transformations in Afghanistan hint at potential advantages for both Ghani and the Taliban should his inclination to cooperate with them come to fruition. While a return to Afghanistan may not align with Ghani’s preferences, it offers a more favorable prospect compared to fading into obscurity in Abu Dhabi. Through astute positioning in negotiations, particularly by considering regional interests, Ghani may move closer to achieving his aspirations.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Ashraf Ghani’s Unscrupulous Bid to Regain Old Power in Afghanistan appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The CAA has proved controversial. Both the foreign press and much of the English-speaking media have accused the act of being anti-Muslim. The US State Department has said that it is concerned about the implementation of the CAA. In response, India’s Ministry of External Affairs has the US statement as “misplaced, misinformed, and unwarranted.”

It is time to take a step back and examine this legislation coolly. In fact, we must ask the operative question about the CAA: Why did the government pass this legislation? 

The dark view of the CAA

Asaduddin Owaisi, the leader of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen party “CAA is meant to only target Muslims, it serves no other purpose.” In his long post on social media site X, this Muslim leader asserts, “Once religion is accepted as the basis of Indian citizenship, the next step is to deny it on religious grounds.” Note that Owaisi’s party wanted the then feudal Hyderabad state ruled by an autocratic Nizam to join Pakistan in 1947, The Nizam’s militia, the Razakars, conducted of the ruler’s own Hindu majority population before Indian troops liberated the long-suffering Telugu, Marathi and Kannada people in his realm.

Kerala’s ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist) has called for state-wide protests as has the All Assam Students’ Union. Opponents take the view that the BJP is weakening the secular character of India. The communists blame the ruling party for practicing the politics of what Indians call “communalism” or what some in the West might call majoritarianism. Opponents of the BJP argue that the party has announced the CAA rules as an opportunistic move to mobilize the Hindu votes just before the election.

Most international outlets such as the Qatari-funded Al Jazeera and the British government-backed BBC have also termed the CAA anti-Muslim. In fact, the BBC’s headline it all, “CAA: India to enforce migrant law that excludes Muslims.”

The context of the CAA

Given the sound and fury generated by the CAA, examining the context behind the parliamentary act becomes critical. The legislation aims at  expediting citizenship for refugees who have suffered as members of persecuted minorities in three neighboring Islamic countries, one of whom is ruled by the Taliban. 

The CAA does not pertain to Muslims who are Indian citizens. The legislation does not exclude a single Indian Muslim from citizenship, making the BBC’s headline far from true. 

All the CAA does is give Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians living in India after having fled from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh a fast track to citizenship. Members of these persecuted minority religions must have migrated to India before December 31, 2014. The BBC a big deal about the fact that “the new law does not cover those fleeing persecution in non-Muslim majority countries, including Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka.” It also says that the CAA does not cover Rohingya Muslim refugees from neighboring Myanmar.

Such arguments are specious because existing provisions allow all refugees to claim citizenship,including Muslims. In 2016, India Pakistani singer Adnan Sami citizenship. The Indian government grants other Muslims like him Indian passports too.

Both the BBC and the State Department could do well to note that the CAA is only emulating the 1990 . The US Congress passed this legislation to facilitate the resettlement of Jews from the former Soviet Union. It was “later expanded to include persecuted religious minorities in other countries, such as Jews, Christians, Baha’is, Sabaean-Mandaeans, and Zoroastrians from Iran.”

India is only offering an expedited path to citizenship to refugees from minority groups who have been subjected to ethnic cleansing, not just discrimination. Afghanistan, Pakistan and even Bangladesh have practiced a conscious policy of exterminating non-Muslim minorities for decades. 

The reality of Islamist South Asian nations

In 1992, Sikhs and Hindus numbered 200,000 in Afghanistan. Even before the Taliban took over a second time, this number had dropped to 500 by 2018. Today, there are practically no Sikhs or Hindus left in Afghanistan. The Taliban views both these communities as pagan kafirs who can be raped, tortured, enslaved and killed. 

The Sikhs and Hindus who lived in Afghanistan for decades have now fled to India as have the handful of Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians. The Taliban did not even spare statues and both the priceless ancient Bamiyan statues of the Buddha. India owes these persecuted people of minority religions in fundamentalist Afghanistan some responsibility. The CAA seeks only to fulfill India’s moral duty. It is hypocritical and self-serving of Islamists and leftists to criticize a profoundly humanitarian legislation.

Pakistan is hardly more tolerant than Afghanistan. When British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan in 1947, the countries signed the , promising minorities equal rights. India has abided by that agreement and given all minorities equal rights. In fact, India gives minorities multiple protections that the Hindu majority lacks. For instance, minority educational institutions are run entirely by their religious organizations and many of them do not admit students of any other religion. This privilege is not available to Hindu institutions that are overseen and even administered by the state. In contrast, Pakistan is an expressly Muslim state where minorities are often raped, killed or forced to convert to Islam.

Innumerable reports have Pakistan’s genocidal treatment of its minorities. During the original sin of the partition in 1947, Pakistan engaged in ethnic cleansing of Hindus and Sikhs, which the state still celebrates. While the Indian state became a secular and democratic entity, Pakistan has become a factory for jihad, exporting violent terrorists around the world. Note that the Taliban was backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistani society has become increasingly more radicalized over time.

Unsurprisingly, minorities in Pakistan fell from 23% in 1947 to 3.7% in 2014. The figure today is even lower. Note that the population of Muslims in India both in absolute numbers and in percentage has grown since 1947. In other words, both the BBC and the State Department appear to be either mistakenly or deliberately maligning India for being anti-Muslim when in reality its policy is guided by the principle of giving refuge to minorities fleeing death and destruction in fundamentalist Islamist nations.

In 1971, India liberated Bangladesh despite opposition from the US. Henry Kissinger famously ignored the “” of his own diplomat who detailed mass rape, brutal torture and mass killings by Pakistani troops. The Indian army chief was a Parsi, a Zoroastrian community that fled from Iran when Islam took root in�� the country. The general commanding troops on the eastern front was Sikh and Indian troops came from a variety of religions, regions and races.

Despite the contribution of such diverse actors in liberating Bangladesh, today this country has become intolerant. Non-Muslim communities are often killed and forced to convert. Their women are frequently raped. In 2001, no less than 200 of them were in a single incident. The United Nations has alarm over the fast-dwindling population of non-Muslim minorities in Bangladesh as a result of de facto ethnic cleansing.��

India’s only concern is to give those who fled before 2014 a long overdue safe haven. Thanks to its reputation as a democratic, tolerant and inclusive society, religious minorities have fled to India for centuries as the cases of the Gujarati Parsis, the Kerala Jews and Syrian Christians demonstrate. Non-Muslims in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh have no place to go other than India. Those who came here before 2014 need a sanctuary. India has done the just and right thing by implementing the CAA, which the BBC, Al Jazeera and the State Department could and should make the effort to understand.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Western Press Gets CAA Wrong: Here Is the Truth About the New Law appeared first on 51�Թ�.

PTI-supported candidates netted a large number of seats. At time of recording, they had 102 seats in parliament (now 93). The number of seats required to form a majority is 169. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML) had won 73 (now 75). Former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) had won 54. The Jamaat-e-Islami ideological party, which has always pushed the Islamist agenda, lost all its seats.

Everything that occurs in Pakistan’s political scene does so under the watch of the corrupt GHQ. Was this election rigged? And can we expect from the new administration?

Is conspiracy at play?

In a fair election, the PTI would be the clear winner. The people overwhelmingly support Khan, seeing him as a challenger of the corrupt establishment. The public has lost faith in their irresponsible government and rejected radical parties.

Many voters believe the election was rigged. If it was, then it was done skillfully. The GHQ did not let the PTI take the majority of seats, which likely would have happened in a fair election. They afforded them less than a majority.

In Pakistan’s electoral process, the initial vote is counted and signed on a paper called Form 45 and the final vote on Form 47. Voters allege the signed document here was quite different from the final result. Thus, many cases are going to the Court of Appeals to contest the result.

Some people believe this situation is a shadow game between the US and China; that Khan is backed by China and the GHQ is following the US. As the expression goes, “Allah, Army and America” have guided Pakistan since independence.

This conspiracy theory may have some merit. While Khan was in power, he did not promote the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Sharif had negotiated. There is no evidence linking Khan to China, as he has never strongly favored them but he certainly favors Beijing over Washington, DC.

Pakistan’s dire situation

Rampant corruption is only one of Pakistan’s terrible problems. The country is politically dysfunctional and economically broken. Employment is scarce, demoralizing young Pakistanis and making them seek opportunities elsewhere. Pakistan has with neighboring India and Afghanistan, as they have had years of conflict and cross-border terrorism.

To escape their economic crisis, Pakistan has once again gone to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for support. Thanks to their history as a frontline state in the Cold War, they will not get much funding from the IMF or the US. China’s debt relief may only be available in small doses, as their own economy is suffering under President Xi Jinping.

Because the government has failed to provide for its people, religiosity and radicalization are increasing across the nation. This opposition, surprisingly, is overwhelmingly coming from Punjabis. In many ways, Pakistan is basically Punjabian — the army, bureaucracy and business class are filled with people from the Punjab region of eastern Pakistan and northwestern India.

Pakistani youths are tired of corruption and want the government to improve the country’s standing with India. In fact, a recent found that 69% of Pakistani youths aged 18-34 favor better relations with India.

Imran, Nawaz and Bilawal

The GHQ opposes Imran Khan. The Muslim playboy and retired cricket champion was once their golden boy. That changed when he gained power in 2018, as he began questioning their orders. In June 2019, then-Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Asim Munir, Khan with proof of his wife’s corruption. Khan responded pettily by removing him from service and refusing to promote him. For this offense, the GHQ sought his removal.

In March 2022, Pakistani and US diplomats held a meeting. Khan took a secretive cipher document from this meeting and it in a public forum, claiming it was proof of a conspiracy against him. This illegal disclosure of state secrets was just one of his misdeeds; he had also abused his power to get private from public gifts and married Bushra Bibi against Islamic law. In October 2023, Khan was sentenced to 24 years in prison, and Bibi received 14.

Times and public opinion change. In 2018, then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was an unpopular politician who could not do anything right. Now he and Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, son of the late prime minister Benazir Bhutto, are back in the public’s good graces.

Pakistan’s future

The next prime minister, whoever that may be, will determine Pakistan’s future. The nation’s new darling, Bhutto Zardari, was highly critical of India, calling their prime minister the “Butcher of Gujarat.” Yet the GHQ brought back Sharif, who wants to improve relations with India. A cabinet with both politicians would be incongruous. Are the GHQ for or against India?

If Pakistan is to correct itself, it must construct a coalition and have a civilian government stabilize the country. If Nawaz becomes the prime minister, he and his family may be able to effectively fix the economy. He will likely try to initiate regular trade with India.

As people say, the GHQ’s motto is “lose all wars but win all elections.” Pakistan’s hatred of India will not improve their economy. Someone in charge needs the courage to decide the state’s best interest — Indian trade is the correct answer. If the new government can get past their hostility, Pakistan might get a sorely needed change. Ending violence against Afghanistan and building trust with them would be another move toward prosperity.

Pakistan’s hyper-Islamic ideology is not enough to support its people’s needs. Once the new prime minister is chosen, we will have to see if a popular resistance movement emerges or another crisis erupts.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Pakistan’s New Election Might Have Been Rigged appeared first on 51�Թ�.

A US-led invasion ousted the Taliban from power in 2001. Despite their removal, they continued to wage a guerrilla war against the Afghan government and foreign forces. Fast-forward to 2021. The world witnessed a seismic shift in Afghanistan’s geopolitical landscape when the Taliban launched a massive offensive and seized control of the country. This resurgence followed the US announcement of its withdrawal, marking the end of a 20-year war. The Taliban declared they would re-establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a statement that would reverberate globally and complex questions about the legitimacy of their rule.

The Taliban assert their legitimacy as Afghanistan’s rightful rulers although they have the support of neither the Afghan populace nor the global community. The organization’s claim to legitimacy is rooted in its ideology, relying on three pillars: its supposed connection to the Afghanistan’s historical emirate, its Pashtun ethnic identity and its adherence to the Deobandi school of Islam.

Rekindling the emirate

The Taliban’s right to rule starts with their self-proclaimed position as heirs to Afghanistan’s historical monarchy, officially called the Emirate of Afghanistan. in 1826 by Emir Dōst Moḥammad Khān, the emirate symbolized unification under Pashtun leadership and staunch resistance against foreign incursions, particularly from the British and Persians. It marked the country’s first independent state, solidifying its borders and identity.

While facing internal and external challenges like the and , the emirate witnessed significant advancements. Constitutions, flags, anthems, a currency, postal systems and even a nascent railway network all marked notable strides during this period. In 1926, the emirate came to an end when Emir Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan a “kingdom” with himself as king. The name change marked a shift to a more modernizing, Western-influenced style of governance.

The Taliban strongly both a kingdom and a republic as incompatible with their Islamic ideology. They view an emirate as the sole licit, authentic political system for Afghanistan. This stance is further bolstered by their adoption of the original emirate’s name, flag and symbols. They see themselves as its rightful successors, inheriting its legacy and its responsibility to safeguard Afghanistan’s sovereignty against foreign influence.

In their narrative, the British, Soviets and Americans as historical invaders and enemies, while their own resistance is a sacred — a struggle for moral correctness. The internationally recognized government and its security forces were illegitimate collaborators in their eyes, puppets of foreign powers. The Taliban strive to establish a pure Islamic state governed by their understanding of Sharia law, with the emirate’s revival serving as a cornerstone of their legitimacy claim.

The horrific obsession of the Deobandi school

Building upon their historical connection to the emirate, the Taliban further bolster their legitimacy with their strict adherence to the Deobandi school of Islam. Born in 19th-century India, emerged as a reformist movement that emphasized strict adherence to the Quran and Sunnah, traditional Islamic practices, and social reform. While not entirely rejecting the four conventional Sunni schools of jurisprudence, Deobandis prioritize the direct interpretation of religious texts. They advocate for a literal, conservative understanding of Islam.

This ideology fertile ground in Afghanistan, particularly among rural Pashtun communities. Deobandi madrasas — colleges dedicated to Islamic study — flourished, educating generations of scholars and religious leaders, including many future Taliban members. The Taliban embraced Deobandi principles as their official creed, shaping their vision for an Islamic state governed by an unwavering understanding of Sharia law.

The Taliban’s specific interpretation of Deobandi principles led them to impose an austere version of Islam in Afghanistan. They music, art, entertainment and for women, viewing these things as incompatible with their morality. Religious minorities, deemed heretical or infidel, faced persecution. While these actions are justified by the Taliban as upholding Deobandi doctrine and defending Islam, they are broadly by Deobandis and the international community.

Crucially, this Deobandi foundation imbues the Taliban’s claim to legitimacy with a unique character. Their fight is cast as a divinely ordained crusade, drawing authority directly from God. This renders modern concepts like democracy and nation-states obsolete in their eyes. They see themselves as instruments of God’s will, liberated from the need for earthly validation through elections or global recognition. This divine mandate, they argue, justifies their actions and grants them unyielding support from their devout followers.

Assimilation, xenophobia and Pashtun identity

The Taliban also draw their legitimacy from their ethnic identity. They are predominantly , members of the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Primarily located in eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan, Pashtuns approximately 42% of the population. For centuries, Pashtuns have not simply inhabited Afghanistan, but have played a role in shaping its destiny, leaving a legacy that the Taliban now weaponize as their birthright to leadership.

Prior to the ascendancy of the Pashtuns, Mongol and Turkic dynasties ruled Afghanistan. The 18th and 19th centuries witnessed the rise of Pashtun like Hotak, Durrani and Bārakzai. Their empires stand as testaments to Pashtun political prowess and influence. The Hotakis challenged the Mughal Empire’s dominance by capturing Kandahār Province from them. The Durranis established an empire stretching from Mashhad in Persia to Kashmir and Delhi in India. The Bārakzais shaped the of modern Afghanistan and founded the emirate.

This legacy forms the bedrock of the Taliban’s narrative. The Pashtun identity they claim suggests an inherent right to rule stemming from ancestral ties and past achievements. They argue that Pashtuns are not merely Afghanistan’s largest minority but the core of its national identity. For the Taliban, the term “Afghan” itself as an synonym of “Pashtun.” (The name, “Afghanistan,” meaning, “Land of Afghans,” first appeared in the 1879 following the .)

Beyond their historical narrative, the Taliban draw heavily on , a deeply ingrained ethical and social code that governs Pashtun life. This intricate tapestry of values, encompassing ������������ٲ���́ (hospitality), ��ə�Բ�����́�ٱ� (asylum), nang (justice), ������á�� (revenge) and ��ú���� (bravery), serves as a cornerstone of their legitimacy claim. They portray themselves as not only rulers, but caretakers of this moral code.

The Taliban that Pashtunwali forms the bedrock of Afghan identity. They propose that other ethnic groups in Afghanistan either share Pashtun ancestry, having assimilated into their cultural sphere over centuries, or have embraced Pashtunwali as their own moral compass. This assertion of cultural hegemony is another vital argument in their narrative, suggesting that their leadership is not merely a political choice, but an imperative for maintaining moral and cultural unity. The Taliban’s ideology is a hybrid and synthesis of the Pashtunwali and Deobandi schools of thought, which complement and reinforce each other.

The Taliban’s emphasis on Pashtun identity breeds xenophobia. Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks face suspicion, and even demonization. The Taliban ignore their legal and cultural systems in favor of a rigid of Pashtunwali and Sharia law. The Pashtuns’ language, Pashto, flourishes in education and government while other languages wither. Representation in these spheres is deeply imbalanced, stoking resentment among excluded groups. The most brutal manifestation of this xenophobia is the Taliban’s use of violence and intimidation, creating a climate of fear that silences dissent. This exclusionary approach sows deep societal fissures, jeopardizing Afghanistan’s fragile unity.

The Taliban’s rule remains at odds with the desires of the Afghan people and the principles of the international community. As long as this fundamental dissonance persists, the question of legitimacy will continue to cast a long shadow over Afghanistan’s future, with profound consequences for its stability and prosperity.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post History, Heritage, Hegemony: The Truth About the Taliban Emirate appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Boys struggle in Afghanistan’s new educational environment

The Taliban have received international criticism for preventing women and girls from attending secondary schools and universities. Still, their severe on boys’ education in Afghanistan have received less attention. Due to the Taliban’s harsh educational , which have resulted in the exodus of qualified teachers and regressive curriculum modifications, boys are too. There is a greater fear of going to school, a decline in attendance and a loss of optimism for the future. Consequently, the Taliban run the risk of producing a lost generation.

Since assuming power, the Taliban’s impact on boys’ education in Afghanistan is detailed in the Human Rights Watch entitled “Schools are Failing Boys Too.” The report highlights regressive curriculum changes, an uptick in corporal punishment, and the dismissal of female teachers, posing a threat to Afghan boys’ education. While global attention has focused on the Taliban’s bans on girls’ and women’s secondary and higher education, the substantial harm inflicted on the male education system has garnered less notice. The report’s author contends that the Taliban’s actions seriously undermine both boys’ and girls’ education in Afghanistan, potentially leaving behind a lost generation without a quality education and the nation’s educational foundation.

Between June and August 2022 and March and April 2023, Human Rights Watch remotely five parents and 22 boys in grades 8 through 12 across the provinces of Kabul, Balkh, Herat, Farah, Parwan, Bamiyan, Nangarhar and Daikundi. The Taliban, in a sweeping move, dismissed all female teachers from boys’ schools. This action left many boys with instructors or no professors at all. Boys now a surge in physical punishment, including public beatings for minor infractions like owning a cell phone or getting a haircut. The Taliban’s removal of subjects like athletics, English, the arts and civics has led to a decline in educational quality.

Worsening economic and humanitarian challenges in Afghanistan are forcing boys to and aid their families. In a landscape with mental health care, boys experience rising anxiety, and other mental health issues. Though the Taliban hasn’t explicitly barred boys from school beyond the 6th grade, their actions still the education of all children. Afghanistan’s of international law, specifically the right to education for all children, is evident. The Taliban’s systemic discrimination against women and girls adversely affects boys, reinforcing negative gender stereotypes and intensifying financial pressure to support their families.

Women and girls’ right to education from an Islamic perspective

The Taliban have made education worse for all children. Still, their exclusion of women and girls from post-primary education is particularly abhorrent.

In Islam, women’s education is as a fundamental and sacred right, aligned with key principles in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted by the Islamic Council of Europe on September 19, 1981, this declaration upholds the sanctity of various rights, including life, property, religion and the intellect. Rooted in the Holy Quran and international human rights law, these cardinal rights, particularly the right to education, are essential to the deen (faith). The Quran emphasizes the significance of intellect (al-aql) as a divine endowment, allowing individuals to make moral decisions and strive for harmony (Q 17:70, 95:4, 2:30–34, 33:72). Reason serves as the basis for distinguishing right from wrong. For girls, education is not only integral to their faith but also pivotal in expanding knowledge, fostering critical thinking, and molding them into exemplary Muslims and community members. It empowers women and girls to harness the blessings bestowed upon them by Allah.

Education is a divine for both genders. The Quran and Hadith leave no doubt that women, like men, must pursue knowledge. With over 800 references to ilm (knowledge) and its derivatives, the Holy Quran underscores its value. Allah commands both men and women to seek knowledge and punishes ignorance. “Read” (iqra) is how the very first revelation to Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) begins: “Read in the name of your Lord, who formed humanity from a blood clot (Q 96:1–5) A basic of Quranic interpretation is that when a commandment is revealed, the feminine gender is likewise encompassed by it, regardless of whether the masculine version of the word is employed. Ignoring this principle undermines fundamental Islamic for women, including prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and almsgiving. The Hadith and Sunnah affirm the obligation for men and women to pursue higher education. By keeping women and girls from going to school, you are stopping them from carrying out Allah’s sacred mandate and interfering with their eternity.

The Taliban’s educational policies violate international law

The Taliban not only defy the laws of Allah, but they also violate the laws of man by denying education to their citizens. The Taliban regime must not overlook its international obligations under international human rights law and customary international law. Afghanistan became a party to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 2003. According to this convention, countries must eradicate stereotypes about gender roles from all levels of education and society.

Corporal punishment in schools also children’s rights, causing dehumanization, needless suffering and detriment to their growth, academic performance, and mental health. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child every child’s right to an education in a violence-free environment, and international law prohibits all forms of corporal punishment. Afghanistan, having adopted the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1994, is committed to ensuring children’s rights to safety, education, and protection from violence.

There are relatively few policy options to deal with the Taliban’s stringent restrictions or prompt behavioral change. The group has shown resistance to international pressure. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Muslim-majority countries have the Taliban to lift their bans, but no tangible changes have occurred, and the likelihood of increased OIC involvement remains uncertain.

International sanctions, thus far, have yielded no apparent results. Afghanistan’s dire situation struggles to garner attention amidst the international focus on issues in Ukraine and Gaza. It’s crucial for the global community to persist in highlighting the Taliban’s mistreatment of oppressed Afghan women and girls.

If the international community is not more forceful, options for Afghanistani children are indeed slim. For example, while offers a secure option for studying at home, millions of Afghan women and girls in remote areas lack internet access.

Governments concerned about the matter must exert pressure on the Taliban to lift their discriminatory ban on women’s and girls’ education and cease depriving boys of a safe and high-quality learning environment. The Taliban cannot flout Quranic directives on the right to education while adhering to an un-Islamic and regressive interpretation. Concrete steps, such as rehiring all female teachers, aligning the curriculum with international human rights law standards, and prohibiting corporal punishment, are indispensable.

The repercussions of the Taliban’s assault on the educational system are palpable now and will cast a long shadow over Afghanistan’s future. The urgent need for an international response to Afghanistan’s education crisis demands both swiftness and effectiveness.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Afghanistan’s Children Need a Change to the Taliban’s Educational Policies appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In this episode of FO° Podcasts, Bilal Rahmani explains exactly how the Taliban are transforming Afghanistan into an oppressive pariah state through rank incompetence and self-enriching policy decisions. Eventually, this downward spiral of corruption and violence could spell an end to the modern borders of Afghanistan. 

Economic stagnation and brutal oppression

Restoring some semblance of normalcy in the Taliban’s Afghanistan has been incredibly difficult. Policy around economic activity shifts on the whims of elder militant leaders. Some days, entire sectors, like women’s beauty salons, are told to close. On other days, crops are simply not allowed to leave the country, killing exports. Operating on this shifting ground has created new risks in Afghanistan’s economy. Business planning has become impossible because the Taliban make economic policy on a whim. 

Land seizures by the Taliban are the most egregious example of a toxic economic environment. The Taliban’s Ministry of Justice is seizing agricultural or housing land en masse and redistributing it to Taliban leaders. These seizures force many Afghans off their land and deprive them of their livelihoods. Furthermore, these warlords are probably the least productive members of society. The land grab is making Taliban leaders rent-seeking parasitical landlords who live off the blood, sweat and toil of ordinary Afghans.

Just as the Taliban are deciding who are the winners in Afghanistan’s economy, they are also anointing the winners in society. The Taliban have deemed Pashtun men as the undisputed top dogs in Afghanistan. Fanatical Islamist policies that interpret the Koran literally deny women education, bar them from jobs, prevent them from traveling alone and reduce them to second-class members of society.

Even when women are given rights by the Taliban leadership — often to appease international organizations or foreign governments — ground-level Taliban members unleash violence and intimidation to ensure that women do not exercise their rights. Fearing for their safety, women are increasingly excluding themselves from normal social activities and living in hiding.

Ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks have also found themselves on the losing side of the new Taliban-led state that dispenses patronage overwhelmingly to Pashtuns. The Taliban are seizing ancestral Hazara and Tajik lands. There is a distinct punitive military character to the land seizures. Taliban leaders do not feel the need to negotiate with their historical ethnic rivals. Instead, they are following medieval tactics and using extreme military force and human rights abuses to take away land from those they consider their enemies.

The Taliban bait and switch and the future of Afghanistan

The Taliban have proved that they are neither competent nor cohesive. They are now targeting Pakistan to win domestic legitimacy. Simply put, the Taliban are using their insurgent tactics to take back their ancestral ethnic Pashtun lands in Pakistan and create Pashtunistan, a new state that reclaims the historic lands of the Pashtuns.

This shift in the Taliban’s paradigm has caught Pakistan napping. Ironically, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) once backed the Taliban. This dreaded military intelligence wanted strategic depth against India and aimed to use Pashtun jihadis in Kashmir. Now that the Taliban are in charge, they do not feel beholden to the ISI. They have turned their guns on Pakistan itself. Alarmingly, Taliban forces have already clashed with Pakistani troops.

Some senior leaders in the Taliban do not want relations with Pakistan to deteriorate. They are resorting to both direct talks and shuttle diplomacy. Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, the ISI chief, Kabul recently to smooth ruffled feathers. In a very public appearance, he told journalists not to worry and that “everything would be okay.” However, Hameed might be putting on a brave face because the more ethnonationalist members of the Taliban fanatically believe in the creation of Pashtunistan.

Just as the Taliban seek to redraw the borders of modern Afghanistan and Pakistan to benefit the Pashtun people, Afghanistan’s many ethnic groups have carved out their own centers of power for self-preservation. Militant rebellions have broken out. Mawlawi Mehdi Mujahid, a Hazara leader, and the National Resistance Front, composed chiefly of Tajiks, have rebelled. So far, the Taliban have been successful at quashing these rebellions. They deploy overwhelming force to quash the rebellion and maintain control over rebel territories. However, rebellions still keep erupting to challenge the Taliban.

Such rebellions will continue. During the Afghan Civil War, Abdul Rashid Dostum created a proto-state for ethnic Uzbek Afghans. With the Taliban repeatedly threatening the lives and livelihoods of ethnic minorities, they are bound to create Dostum-style enclaves for survival. At some point, multiple rebellions might erupt simultaneously and threaten Taliban rule.

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Make Sense of the Taliban-Ruled Afghanistan appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The grand dream of General Zia-ul-Haq, architect of Pakistan’s insurgent strategy, that Pakistan achieve geopolitical dominance in South Asia by facilitating domestic and international jihadist groups never seemed more in focus.

Now using its newfound ally’s resources, Pakistan could set its security problems to rest. The Taliban had adept combat capabilities and resilient from madrasas. They also carried the credibility based on their status as a Pashtun and Islamic group.

Pakistan placed its hopes in the ability of the Afghan Taliban to broker peace between Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban. The Taliban could further assist in fighting Islamic State — Khorasan Province and militant groups in Balochistan and, ultimately, continue its “Global Jihad” in Jammu and Kashmir.

Yet, the dream has been cut short by a rude awakening. The ISI has instead seen its assets tied up in a, major operations, continued and new with Afghanistan.

The Taliban haven’t been Pakistan’s geopolitical silver bullet; they may become one of its greatest existential challenges. Not only does Taliban-controlled Afghanistan pose new challenges to Pakistan’s security establishment, but it directly challenges Pakistan’s territorial integrity by igniting clashes at its border, inspiring insurgency in border provinces and sheltering new security vacuums Pakistan must fill or combat.

The Taliban had already planned their next steps for Global Jihad: pressure the Durand Line border from within Pakistan and from Afghanistan, establish shadow control over border areas and ultimately erase the Durand Line. Through this long-war strategy, the Taliban could expand Afghanistan and finally heal the scars of its colonial wars with the British Empire by regaining lands taken from the nation during the Anglo–Afghan Wars, taking on the mantle of the heroes of the Pashtun people and the saviors of South Asia.

The saviors of South Asia?

In the midst of the Afghan Civil War, Mullah Mohammed Omar founded the Taliban to address issues in their immediate surroundings in Kandahar. It is unknown if Omar and his group of extremist Deobandi Islamic militant scholars saw the future of the Taliban’s exploits then, but their early success certainly prepared the way for a truly meteoric rise. From the Taliban’s very first successful against two pedophilic warlords in Kandahar, they won the hearts and minds of locals for their ability to bring stability and maintain credibility.

It was at this early stage in the group’s operations that a sort of “Taliban Promise” was formed. The group could take control of territory with use of insurgent and guerilla ground tactics in storm-type attacks and defend the territory through its ability to rapidly recruit new units. Then once in control, the Taliban would govern through a mix of Deobandi Islamic principles — adherence to extreme literalist fundamental Islam with specific belief in declaring apostasy — and Pashtun ethnic principles — honor, reciprocity and tribal courts.

Both aspects of the Taliban’s initial Afghan campaign fed into one another, and their identification as Muslim and Pashtun gave them legitimacy and access to fighters while continued territorial control and battlefield success gave their rule legitimacy. This Taliban Promise wasn’t glamorous, but it was something Afghans could predict, expect, understand to some extent and accept as the alternative was being at the whims of a vagrant warlord.

Thus, the Taliban set out from Kandahar, reversing the of Afghanistan, destroying fiefdoms and maintaining a common link to most Afghans through religious and ethnic values. The Taliban’s movement likewise stood in stark contrast to Pakistan’s then main ally, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (not a difficult feat, as he was best known for residential neighborhoods in Kabul, earning him the title “Gulbuddin Rocket-yar”). With no real competitors and an incredibly successful domestic campaign, the group became the de facto future rulers of Afghanistan, gaining Pakistan’s full support by 1994 and even earning from the US in early 2001.

It was only when the Taliban was implicated in the events of 9/11 that the international community’s hope for its success faded. With the façade revealed and the Taliban’s links to international terror organizations like al-Qaeda plain to see, almost all of the group’s bridges with the international community were burned. Then, with the US invasion of Afghanistan and the end of the Taliban government, it seemed the Taliban’s fate was sealed. With no ability to fight against the US military in a head-to-head conflict, Taliban leadership quickly withdrew across the Durand Line to Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal lands.

Pakistan could never let the Taliban fail. The nation had abandoned its previous allies for the Taliban and, therefore, this was Pakistan’s last real chance at creating an insurgent movement to dominate South Asia. Too much had been invested in the Taliban to let them be destroyed by the US military. So, while the US was establishing supply lines through Pakistan for its invasion of Afghanistan, the ISI began the Taliban arms, logistics, intelligence and shelter to ensure their survival.

Double games, double problems

The Pakistani intelligence and security community would not abandon its master plan to fulfill General Zia’s goal of creating and controlling the world’s preeminent insurgent paramilitary group for the domination of South Asia. These were the cards Pakistan had played for over 20 years to this point, and changing strategies was not under discussion. The foundational moves for Pakistan were too consequential to even consider looking back. 

General Zia’s 1979 decision to combat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by funneling international funds specifically into extremist Islam had opened Pandora’s box. Partnering with extremist, the architect of the Global Jihad, created the current pipeline of militants, and dismantling it would be immensely difficult. This was the original “double game” Pakistan had created during the Soviet–Afghan War, supporting US interests by supporting counter-Soviet religious militants in Afghanistan but ultimately damaging US interests by instrumentalizing those militants.

Pakistan’s plan, however, does not seem to have been specifically directed at damaging US national security. The intention was, and always has been, to open the door to extremist militant Islam while directing its violence against Pakistan’s immediate national security concerns. Pakistan would become the champion of Islam in South Asia and lead the Global Jihad against the region’s greatest threat: rival India — Hindustan.

Islamabad’s double game therefore could not end with the US invasion of Afghanistan; it just became more dangerous. The ISI had to directly oppose the US by aiding the Taliban while also maintaining outward support for the US and facilitating its military operations. The stakes were never higher, but in 2021, with the Taliban yet again in control of Kabul and the US still not explicitly pursuing action against Pakistan for its role, it looked as if the double game had been won.

Pakistan’s double game, however, has only created double the problems. Today, the nation remains ensnared by daily insurgent violence and, all under the dark cloud of devastating. The Taliban have not proven to be the magnanimous allies Pakistan had hoped for, and Pakistan’s problems have only grown as a result of its costly partnership with them.

A stark reminder of the enmity now between the two allies is theTorkham Border Crossing seen in February. Pakistani Frontier Corps and Afghan Taliban troops opened fire, wounding one member of the corps and prompting a swift Pakistani diplomatic response to ease tensions.

The documented gunfights between the two militaries in broad daylight at their busiest crossing, however, do not encompass the entirety of their negative interactions. Clashes have died down since February, but smaller interactions like explosions at border points, and drug seizures and illegal crossings still show the Taliban’s continued destabilizing effect on Pakistan.

The Taliban’s active clashes with Pakistan are not even the largest destabilizing factor. The group’s takeover of Afghanistan has proven far more problematic to security because it has given modern insurgency a proof of concept. Insurgents in South Asia and beyond may feel they don’t have to settle for a seat at the table, because if they wait long enough they may own the whole restaurant just as the Taliban seized Afghanistan.

The TTP is the greatest example of this new insurgent impetus. Emboldened by the Afghan Taliban’s victories, it has taken to a new campaign of violence against Pakistani forces and civilians. With no war in Afghanistan, Taliban fighters likewise gain a new purpose and can easily move through Pashtun tribal networks to join a new battlefield.

Pakistan attempted to execute its strategy of controlling the Taliban when it entered into Afghan Taliban-negotiated talks with the TTP, but this quickly failed. Negotiations between the two sides after only a few rounds of talks;Pakistan TTP core leadership, decisively ending the rapproachment, and violence has trended upward since. Now, one need look no further than the front page of Pakistan’s or the TTP’s propaganda websites to see that clashes between Pakistan and the TTP have become a daily occurrence.

Likewise, the drumbeat of attacks by Baloch militant groups like the , the and the has only increased. These groups have also become emboldened by the Taliban’s advances and now conduct gruesome attacks specifically targeting Chinese nationals, like in the, and broader regional critical infrastructure.

This turn of events has proven that although the Taliban are a byproduct of long-term Pakistani national security and intelligence decision-making, the Taliban do not feel they are beholden to Pakistan. Although the ISI sheltered the Taliban from the US, the Taliban are still a grassroots ethno-religious militant movement with its own goals that now challenge Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

With Afghanistan firmly in the Taliban’s grasp, a new double game is beginning in South Asia: a double game that seeks to rewrite the history of British colonial rule.

The New Fight for the Durand Line

Pakistan’s strategy to gain a stronger position in South Asia by supporting militant extremism has turned out to be quite flawed. While it was possible to steer the Mujahideen’s Global Jihad during the Soviet–Afghan War, it does not seem equally possible to direct the Taliban. The success of Pakistan’s strategy of directing militancy during the Soviet–Afghan War was largely due to the Mujahideen being a specifically Islamist militant movement; the interests of both Pakistan and the militants were mostly aligned. However, the Taliban is a hybrid organization that represents both extremist Islam and Pashtun nationalism; as a result, many of the Taliban’s interests run entirely contrary to Pakistan’s. Erasing the Durand Line and retaking the Pashtun land taken from Afghanistan by the British is the largest of these differing interests.

The Durand Line was drawn in 1893 by the British Empire to better administer Afghanistan after its Pyrrhic conquest during the Second Anglo–Afghan War (1878–1880). Learning from theBritish army’s at the hands of Pashtun tribal alliances during the First Anglo–Afghan War (1838–1842), colonial Britain was unwilling to invest too heavily in Afghanistan and sought a strategy that would instead defang the nation.

Abdur Rahman Khan was installed as shah by the British in 1880, allowing him to lead a violent domestic campaign to gain undisputed control of Afghanistan from the powerful Pashtun tribal networks. Then, once the Pashtun tribes had been cowed, it was necessary to permanently debilitate them so their tribal alliances could never rise again to challenge Afghanistan or British India.

Pashtunistan was cut in two by the Durand Line, dividing the lands governed by the Pashtun tribes between Afghanistan and British India. Then, with tribal networks separated by administrative and political borders, there was no way for them to form a cohesive military organization to threaten British control of South Asia again as they once did in theFirst Anglo–Afghan . Furthermore, subjugating and ruling over fractured tribal networks allowed both Abdur Rahman Khan and the British to maintain a high degree of regional autonomy without consulting domestic power brokers.

The British Empire’s scar on Afghanistan was challenged during the Third Anglo–Afghan War (1919), but ultimately maintained when Afghanistan gained independence. When Pakistan was created in 1947, the border was retained and it has lasted ever since.

The Durand Line served a significant strategic purpose during the Soviet–Afghan War, the Afghan Civil War and US–Afghan War which followed. The political boundary allowed combatants in Afghanistan to easily retreat and regroup into Pakistan when in danger and launch sorties from a safer position than from within Afghanistan. Yet, with no current foreign invading force in Afghanistan, Afghan militants no longer have a need for the border.

Militant Deobandi Islam has proven to be the potion Pashtun nationalism needed to revive itself, and now the Taliban are emerging as the champions of Pashtunistan as an entity. Likewise, the Taliban have good reason to reunite Pashtunistan and erase the Durand Line, as doing so would provide them immense domestic and regional legitimacy, potentially cementing their rule.

Gheyrat and izat, the Afghan concept of honor, run deep through the nation’s history and future. Invasion after invasion has instilled within our storied nation a ceaseless, brave resilience to cruelty in the face of insurmountable odds.

Just as all nations who foray into the Graveyard of Empires do, Pakistan is learning this lesson from the inside out. This all converges on the faultline of their shared scar of British colonial rule — the Durand Line — with a promise to restore Afghanistan’s honor at the price of accepting an extreme Deobandi, kleptocratic military state.

Pakistan’s territorial integrity is facing its first true challenge: The Taliban are increasing their influence and violence at an alarming rate, and insurgents are inching ever closer to nuclear capabilities, all as we peer from over the horizon.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The fallout: Unintended consequences of US reaction 

The 9/11 attacks were the deadliest foreign assault ever on US soil, claiming 2,977 innocent lives. At the time, President George W. Bush stated that while American was under attack, the US would undoubtedly win the war that had been waged upon it. For Bush, the notion of American exceptionalism demanded a strong and resolute response to the unprovoked attacks in order to protect national security and prevent future acts of terrorism. The way the US went about its response, however, was deeply flawed and often counterproductive. The legacy of these flawed policies underscores the importance of thoughtful approaches to addressing complex global challenges.

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US launched its “War on Terror,” a multifaceted and global campaign aimed at dismantling al-Qaeda and preventing future terrorist threats. Two primary theatres emerged: Afghanistan and Iraq.

Consequences of the War on Terror and the Iraq War

In Afghanistan, the US invasion aimed to remove the Taliban from power, disrupt al-Qaeda’s core leadership, eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and weaken its ability to conduct large-scale international attacks. While the initial phase of the war achieved these goals, the subsequent years witnessed a protracted conflict with unforeseen consequences. The US effort to stabilize Afghanistan struggled amid insurgency and regional power dynamics.

The primary rationale for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the presence of weapons of mass destruction, but the invasion had broader implications for the region. The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime triggered sectarian strife and unleashed forces that Iraq struggled to contain for years to come.

One of the most significant and unintended consequences of the 9/11 attacks was the emergence of new extremist groups in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for 9/11, was not the only group operating in the region, but its audacious attack galvanized jihadists and set in motion a new wave of militancy. Afghanistan and Iraq became epicenters of violence and instability where new extremist groups could thrive. The region saw the rise ISIS and others who exploited the power vacuums created by the conflicts. These groups posed significant not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but also globally.

Iran watched the developments in Afghanistan and Iraq with a mix of apprehension and opportunism. The fall of Saddam Hussein ultimately shifted the balance of power in Iraq in favor of that country’s Shiite majority. Iran sought to capitalize on this by cultivating Shiite militias and political groups in Iraq, effectively increasing its influence in the country. The Bush administration’s inclusion of Iran in the “” further strained US-Iran relations. These tensions would later play a role in Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities and regional proxy conflicts. Today, remains one of only four countries the US has designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Hard lessons: Military choices undermine soft-power efforts

The US engaged in diplomatic outreach to build international support for its counterterrorism efforts. This involved seeking cooperation from regional and international partners, including NATO countries. However, trust issues and concerns about US motives hampered diplomatic efforts. The perception of US in the Iraq War eroded trust among traditional allies and regional actors.

These trust issues spilled over to the battlefield. The US managed to form alliances such as the “Coalition of the Willing” to share the burden of combat operations and provide legitimacy to their interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. When it came to delegating responsibility to its partners, however, the US chose to dominate the planning and execution of military actions. This approach led to the perception that the coalition was in name only.

The US invested in public diplomacy efforts to improve its image and engage with Middle Eastern populations after its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. These initiatives to win hearts and minds, promote American values and counter extremist narratives included cultural exchange programs, educational scholarships and English-language teaching. The US also sought to counter extremist narratives through various media outlets and information campaigns, including the creation of Arabic-language media such as the satellite television channel Alhurra and Radio Sawa. These outlets faced credibility issues and struggled to compete with established regional media organizations.

Doubts about US motives undermined the impact of many of these efforts, and this skepticism carried over to the superpower’s efforts to promote democratic governance and human rights in the region. The thinking behind the US policy was that addressing political grievances would help counter extremism; however, the efforts were met with accusations of hypocrisy, particularly because the US continued to support authoritarian regimes that were allies in the War on Terror. The absence of weapons of mass destruction also undermined the legitimacy of the Iraq War and fuelled anti-American sentiments across the Middle East, leading to protests and strained diplomatic relations.

One of the most controversial aspects of the War on Terror was the use of extra-legal renditions and enhanced interrogation techniques, including torture. Techniques such as waterboarding, stress positions and sleep deprivation were employed on detainees at various detention facilities, including and in Iraq. These practices undermined the moral high ground the US sought to occupy, sparking global outrage with critics arguing that they violated international law and human rights standards.

Some Middle Eastern governments, particularly those with close ties to the United States, in the rendition of individuals suspected of terrorism. These countries allowed US intelligence agencies, including the CIA, to detain and transport individuals through their territory or airspace. This cooperation often raised concerns about complicity in practices that violated international human rights standards, including the use of torture. , for example, was used as a transit point for the rendition of suspected terrorists. Jordanian intelligence agencies were known for their involvement in interrogations that raised concerns about torture and human rights abuses.

The legacy of the 9/11 campaigns: Human suffering and moral failure

The prolonged military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced a militarized approach to counterterrorism, which inadvertently led to collateral damage and civilian casualties. The wars led to widespread displacement, with of Afghans and Iraqis forced to flee their homes. Internally displaced persons and refugees faced dire conditions, lacking access to basic necessities and enduring harsh living conditions. Between 2002–2003, public of the US was less favorable in the Middle East than elsewhere around the world. By 2022, regional opinion found that more than half the respondents agreed that the United States has become an unreliable partner and that the region should reorient its attention towards Russia and China as partners.

The human cost of post-9/11 war zones is estimated to be nearly . While the figure represents an approximation that includes both direct casualties as a result of war, many others — especially children — lost their lives due to the reverberations of war, including devastation brought on by economic impacts and the spread of diseases.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq also resulted in significant casualties among US military personnel. Over American soldiers lost their lives in post-9/11 war operations, while many more were wounded in combat operations. Deployments to combat zones also took a toll on the mental health of US service members. The exposure to combat stress, traumatic experiences and multiple deployments contributed to high rates of PTSD and other mental health issues among returning veterans.

The US Department of Veterans Affairs, responsible for providing healthcare and benefits to veterans, faced challenges in meeting the needs of a large and growing veteran population. Reports of long wait times, inadequate mental health services and bureaucratic inefficiencies raised concerns about the quality of care provided. From 2001-2011, the US government spent nearly providing medical care and disability benefits for nearly 650,000 Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans as a result of injuries sustained during their tours.

FO° Talks: Make Sense of Afghanistan With Thomas Barfield: Part 2

Given all this, it is imperative that US policymakers internalize the profound lessons offered by the flawed foreign policies following 9/11. These lessons underscore the need for nuanced, well-considered approaches that prioritize diplomacy, international cooperation and respect for human rights as fundamental cornerstones of effective global engagement. Dealing with terrorist attacks presents an inherently challenging landscape, one where policymakers must resist ideological rigidity and instead adopt pragmatic, thoughtful strategies.

The complexity of the modern world demands a flexibility of thought and an openness to nuanced solutions that can adapt to the evolving nature of global threats. Such an approach acknowledges that while security remains paramount, it should not come at the expense of civil liberties, human rights or long-term stability. Achieving a balance between security and the preservation of democratic values is a delicate but essential task for policymakers navigating the post-9/11 world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Ripple Effect: 9/11’s Profound Impact on the Middle East appeared first on 51�Թ�.

On a breezy October day, a kite-flying day, my cousin Kader surprised me with a visit. He looked much older than I remembered, his hair thinner, his once smooth face now lined with worry. He was a well-known political writer who had worked for the Ministry of Education before the Spring Revolution. He was also known for his short stories.

For generations, his family had been one of the most important families in Kabul. Kader looked at me with his deep-set black eyes and spoke in a frantic voice, ‘Bar, you must leave immediately. The National Security and Russian soldiers are now searching house to house. They’ve already searched half of your neighborhood and they won’t stop.

You must come to my house immediately. It’s the only place that will be safe for you now.’

I did not know what to think. Things were so bad now, I wondered if I could trust my own cousin. He could have given in to the Communists, or he could be telling me this because they were holding someone in his family hostage.

I hated the Russians for making me doubt him, and I hated myself for doubting him.

‘Tashakor (Thank you). I’ll be okay,’ I assured him. ‘I have a hiding place that the National Security will never find.’

But he was adamant. ‘You must come to my house. It’s the only place that will be safe for you now.’

‘I need time to think,’ I said, deflecting his request.

‘There’s no time!’ he said.

I told him, ‘I have to think of my wife and children, my father and mother. I’m the only one who can take care of them.’

‘You won’t be much use to them dead,’ he said.

‘That is true, Kader. But before I leave my family and go to your house, I must speak with my father.’

Kader just sighed. ‘God be with you.’

That night I lay on the floor, unable to sleep. I could hear the National Security guards in the street outside my house shouting at people, ‘What is the password for tonight?’ If there was no response, there would be the sound of gunfire and I would flinch as if the bullet had ripped through me.

As soon as the sun appeared, I went up to my father’s bedroom where he spent most of his time since losing his leg years before. I told him about Kader’s visit. ‘Things have changed,’ I said. ‘Every house is being searched now. They will even search the general’s house. I can no longer hide from these crazy people.’

‘So, you think you should go stay with Kader?’ Baba asked.

‘We don’t know who’s honest anymore,’ I replied. Then the words I had dreaded saying for so long escaped my lips.

‘The time has come for me to leave.’

Baba didn’t say anything at first. This unsettled me because my father was never at a loss for words. When he finally did speak, his voice was weak. ‘I was afraid it might come to this,’ he said. ‘I’ve spoken with Abbas. He agreed that when the time comes, he would go with you. I will get word to him. You can leave tomorrow at first light.’

When I told my mother, who I called Babu, her body shuddered, but her lips were silent. My mother had a habit of never sitting still when she was nervous. First, she paced back and forth in the room. Then she walked from one room to the other. Then from one house in our compound to another.

She returned to our living room and continued pacing back and forth until I could take it no longer.

‘Sit!’ I told her. But she never sat. My wife Afsana was asleep in another room with our two children. I couldn’t find the tongue to tell her. But I knew I must.

‘Afsana?’ I called, waking her.

‘Baleh? (Yes?)’

‘It’s not safe for me here anymore…I must leave tomorrow.’

‘What do you mean?’ she asked, panic rising in her voice.

‘Kader came to see me. Things have become too dangerous now. Abbas is coming for me in the morning. He’ll make sure I get out safely. I’ll send for you and the children as soon as

I can.’

A painful silence followed. Afsana started to speak, but stopped. She knew there was nothing she could say or do now. We both lay awake all night.

As dawn approached, I went to say goodbye to my father.

He was sitting up in bed staring at nothing, his books and newspaper lying next to him, unread.

‘Ah, the time has come,’ he said. He seemed to be searching for something else to say; some last words of wisdom, some final advice from father to son. When he finally spoke, he spoke slowly, the words sticking in his throat, ‘Take care of yourself.’

I could not do this. ‘I won’t leave without taking you and Babu. I can’t leave without Afsana and the children,’ I said.

‘We’ll all go together!’

He was silent for a moment, his eyes never leaving my face. ‘Nay, you know that’s not possible,’ he said.

‘I can get friends to help us. They can take all your things.

We’ll go to Jalalabad. Everything will be all right.’

‘Nay, Bar. It is not practical. I’m too old and weak to be moved. The Russians won’t bother Babu, or Afsana, or the children. We’ll be safe here. If we try to leave, none of us will survive. Things are very bad, but I still have my house and my writings. But it is true, you are no longer safe here, so you must leave to save yourself. Let’s pray that in a few months, things will change.’

‘If that is your wish,’ I gave in.

‘Say goodbye to me now,’ Baba said. ‘I’m afraid you won’t see me again.’

‘How can you say that?’ I protested, feeling the pain of those words as though he were already dead.

He looked at me with sad, knowing eyes. ‘My father said the same thing to me just before I left for Paris,’ Baba said. ‘It was the last time I saw him.’

[Extracted from Red Sky Over Kabul: A Memoir of a Father and Son in Afghanistan by Baryalai Popalzai and Kevin McLean. Published by Speaking Tiger Books, 2023.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Red Sky Over Kabul: A Memoir of a Father and Son in Afghanistan appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were both spectacular tactical successes, but the strategy was muddy. President George W. Bush had no intention of committing the US to nation-building. However, he made it all but impossible to avoid nation-building by destroying existing power structures. The US found itself in a situation where withdrawal would have led to a power vacuum that bad actors could have occupied again, defeating the raison d’être of the invasions.

An idiotic ideological policy

The US followed a fanatical policy of de-Ba’athification. Ideological American neoconservatives excluded all Ba’ath Party members from public roles. This removed not only party elites but also rank-and-file civil servants such as policemen, firefighters and teachers. Note that they were not ideological Baathists but had become members of the party to make their lives easier in an authoritarian society. This extremely unwise de-Ba’athification policy led to social chaos and sectarian violence ensued. 

After decades of persecution, Shias exacted brutal revenge on Sunnis. Their numbers had always been greater but Sunnis had been the dominant minority under Saddam Hussein. With Hussein gone, the Iran-backed Shias now had their chance. Shia dominance led to a push back and the Islamic State emerged on the back of Sunni resentment. 

Iraqis were far from nostalgic for good old Saddam. Yet they could not forgive the US for the new Shia-Sunni bloodbath and Hobbesian anarchy that claimed thousands of lives and ruined the economy. An insurgency against evil Uncle Sam became inevitable.

The trouble with insurgencies

Insurgencies are nearly impossible to suppress with an army of any size. Britain, an experienced imperial power, found putting down insurgency in Northern Ireland hard enough. The US is institutionally unsuited for and inexperienced in running an empire. Trying to put down an insurgency in a much larger country on the other side of the world was a task beyond Washington, DC.

Although the events unfolding were unambiguously an insurgency, the Bush administration insisted to the public that what was going on was a war against terrorists. Al-Qaeda’s presence in Iraq was proffered as evidence for GWOT. In reality, al-Qaeda was there because the US had created the vacuum for it to flourish. Al-Qaeda saw the insurgency as an opportunity to kill American soldiers and continue waging jihad.

In 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded the even more extremist “al-Qaeda in Iraq.” The central al-Qaeda leadership’s control over this group was tenuous. It was unable to prevent Zarqawi from conducting brutal killings, not of “infidel” Americans, but of Iraqi citizens. This morphed into the Islamic State and swept not only across Sunni Iraq but also Sunni Syria, which was ruled by the Shia Assad clan.

The World This Week: The Middle East’s Thirty Years’ War

The US was unprepared to deal with this unraveling of the tapestry of the Middle East. Eventually, the insurgency in Iraq took a toll on the US and sapped its will to continue the good fight in the sands of the region.

Torture and the soul of America

Despite the horrors of war in the Middle East and Afghanistan, the US was geographically separated from them. However, the GWOT had a profoundly corrosive influence on American democracy itself.

Americans have long had a horror of torture. They prohibited it in their founding documents and vigorously prosecuted the crime after World War II. During the GWOT, US personnel tortured prisoners for information. They had orders to use “any means necessary” and “enhanced interrogation techniques” became a euphemism for torture.

As torture became normalized, it seeped into the wider culture. Unsettlingly, a majority of Americans under the age of 35—those who came of age during the war—now find torture acceptable. For earlier generations of Americans, it was and is unthinkable.

Disaster can make nations turn against even their most cherished principles. After the Romans saw their army annihilated by Hannibal at Cannae, they turned to human sacrifice out of desperation. The 9/11 attacks had much the same psychological effect on Americans. Their country had been attacked, and Americans were ready to do anything in response.

Glenn had the mortifying experience of seeing his fellow CIA officers carry out orders from the president which they knew were against the law. What they were doing was not merely immoral and illegal, but it represented the breakdown of the rule of law. In the US, it is the law, instituted by the people, that rules—not the whims of individual men. This principle was violated repeatedly during the war with officers choosing to obey illegal orders rather than refusing them.

Laws are meaningless unless there is a culture of respect for them. Torture had created a culture in which political loyalty mattered more than the law. One can trace a direct line from the erosion of the values of democracy and legality during the Bush years to the notorious attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021.

A hit to America’s international influence

American neoconservative hawks had hoped that invading Iraq would cow down Iran. This revolutionary Shia power would be less disruptive and aggressive in the region. The mullahs of Tehran would learn the consequences of going too far. 

Sadly, this strategy could not have backfired more spectacularly. Today, Iran’s power extends across the region. Now that Saddam, Iran’s Sunni archrival, is gone, Iran has little to stop it from building and extending its network of Shia allies. Not only have Tehran’s mullahs now expanded their influence in Iraq, but they have also strengthened ties with Lebanon’s Shia militant group Hezbollah, Assad’s Syria and even Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Syria itself is a casualty of the Iraq war. Sunni insurgent groups based in Iraq destabilized the country, attempting to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad. In the eyes of fanatical Sunnis, Assad is a Shia Alawite and hence an infidel. Weakened by soaring temperatures, prolonged droughts and failed harvests, Syria was already fragile. The uneasy coexistence of its religious and ethnic minorities shattered when the Islamic State rose, precipitating a bloody civil war.

Assad committed numerous human rights excesses to stay in power. He has clung on to office in Damascus thanks to Iran and Russia. Now, he is being invited back to the table by other Arab autocrats. Israel, with Lebanon and Syria on its northern borders, has been sounding alarm bells for a while. Clearly, US power in the Middle East stands weakened.

How 9/11 and the War on Terror Shaped the World

In Europe, both the 2003 Iraq War and the GWOT went down very poorly. Europeans saw this US-led war without UN-approval as overreach by hubristic superpower. Emerging powers such as Brazil, India and China were uncomfortable with this invasion as well. In brief, the US attracted the ire not only of much of the Muslim world but also a majority of the world. In retrospect, the Iraq War was a historic blunder.

Eye off the ball

As an intelligence officer, Glenn studied al-Qaeda in much detail. This shadowy organization was not a worldwide empire, but a loose coalition of a few hundred people. There are no more than a few thousand jihadi terrorists in the world at any time. They are a real and present danger, but not one that should consume the majority of the forces and public attention of the world’s largest power. Counterterrorism should be the domain of highly skilled professionals, who can eliminate or capture terrorists with minimal fanfare.

The US armed forces, the largest military apparatus that humanity has ever seen, spent 20 years molding itself as a counterterrorism force while ignoring the elephant in the room: China. In a world where America is once again faced with a peer rival, it has no business spending this amount of attention on smaller issues, dangerous though they may be. Glenn takes the view that only after President Joseph Biden has now finally cut Afghanistan loose will the military be able to reshape itself for an intense conventional war.

During the GWOT, the CIA, too, was reshaped into a counterterrorism tool. It spent two decades integrating with special forces. However, the CIA was never supposed to be a paramilitary organization. It is an intelligence organization. The CIA’s mission is to detect and predict threats, not merely to assist the military for counterterrorism operations. The Agency’s institutional culture must recover this focus if it is to continue to carry out that mission effectively.

Even on the counterterrorism front, the GWOT created unbalanced priorities. Glenn argues that the Bush administration ignored the intelligence community’s repeated warnings about the magnitude of the threat posed by domestic, white nationalists. They insisted that Islamist terrorism was to be considered the top threat. The focus on Islamic terrorism likewise diverted the necessary attention and resources from the growing cyber threats, a vulnerability which either lone or state-sponsored actors could exploit.

Will American Democracy Perish Like Rome’s?

On top of all of this, the myopia about terrorism and the politicization of threat assessments has prevented Republican administrations from taking adequate steps to address the dangers of climate change, which poses a much more credible threat to the US homeland than any enemy army.

All of this comes on top of a profound restructuring of the Republican party. The party has always had a strong isolationist faction, but this was controlled by an internationalist establishment that has been mostly defenestrated. The Iraq War discredited the neoconservatives and created a culture of lawlessness, paving the way for the ascendancy of the brash, populist and frankly authoritarian faction in dominance today.

The Iraq War and the GWOT have conspired to produce a situation in which America has largely been caught with its pants down in the Pacific. China has been building up while the US has been distracted and divided. Thankfully, Washington is waking up to reality now, but the situation may be much more manageable if the US had reacted earlier and with greater vigor.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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So, why did I choose to make Britain home?

Firstly, because it is a very pleasant place to live. Britain has parks, libraries, museums, theatres and a very high level of culture. Secondly, it has been an intellectually stimulating place to live. Britain has world-class universities, excellent media and lively public discourse. In the sciences, it may not be able to match the US, but the land of Isaac Newton still punches far above its weight. Finally, Britain has been a good place for business. British pluck is well known. This is the nation that stood up to Nazi Germany when the rest of Europe crumbled and saved democracy on the continent.

Yet this place that I have made my home is no longer marching to the broad sunlit uplands. Sadly, the sun has indeed set on the British Empire. 

The British can thank Brexit for this sunset. This vote to leave Europe will go down the annals of history as the biggest political hara-kiri in the country’s recent history.

Core systemic challenges 

After World War II, Britain lost its empire but retained its seat at the top table. After the 1956 Suez Crisis, the UK has been a loyal ally of the US. The Brits have followed the American lead on Afghanistan, Iraq and now the Russia-Ukraine War.

Yet this “special relationship” is not keeping the British economy afloat anymore. High inflation, high tax, low growth, low wages and, alarmingly, now define the economy. According to The Economist, Britain’s economic record since 2007 near the bottom among peer countries.

After World War II, Britain introduced the cradle-to-grave welfare economy. Clement Attlee’s Labour government introduced the National Health Service (NHS) that the British have come to treasure. Yet this national treasure is in . Waiting times for patients have been going up. Junior doctors have that they will be going on strike. No less than “819,000 operations, procedures and appointments in England have been , adding to the 7.5 million people waiting to start routine hospital treatment.”

The welfare system is simply not working anymore. The UK does not have the economic growth to pay for it anymore. Even the NHS is collapsing. The truth is that generations who have not worked and lived off the welfare system are draining the economy. The UK simply cannot afford to keep subsidizing those who do not work. Sir Humphrey Appleby’s suggestion to cut off all social security to those who turn down two job offers might not be such a bad idea.

Flawed tax structure

With an aging population and increasingly fewer people paying taxes, the government is under pressure to balance the books by increasing tax rates on those who do pay. If you earn £50,271 ($64,620) to £125,140, then you pay 40% of that income to (HMRC) department. If you earn over £125,140 ($160,910), then the government takes 45% of every extra pound you make.

Add value-added tax (VAT), national insurance and other taxes and you find that the tax figure climbs to well above 60% of your income. With such high taxes, why should anyone work?

The UK has not only decreased the incentive to work but it has also made it less attractive for capital to remain in the country. is 40% on the value of an estate above £325,000 ($417,760). This tax has to be paid immediately, even before probate is granted. (“Probate is the legal right to deal with someone’s property, money and possessions (their ‘estate’) when they die,” according to the .) Such a high inheritance that has to be paid immediately ensures that many inheritors sell off properties just to pay the HMRC. 

The UK’s English-speaking cousin across the Atlantic is far less punitive when it comes to what the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) calls the estate tax. This tax only kicks in when you cross $12,920,000. It is not just the US that is liberal on inheritance taxes. In 2004, the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament, abolished the inheritance tax and the gift tax through a unanimous vote.

The UK has even hobbled the City of London, once a rival to Wall Street but now reeling under a law that treats the gains of fund managers as income. In contrast, the US treats these gains as carried interest. This is the term used to describe a share of profits earned by general partners of private equity, venture capital and hedge funds. In the US, fund managers pay a top 20% federal tax rate on carried interest, rather than regular federal income tax rates of up to 37%. Naturally, fund managers no longer want to incorporate funds in the UK.

As if these taxation measures were not foolish enough, the government has delivered a coup de grâce. A Conservative government, which is supposedly pro-free market, abolished the VAT refund for foreign tourists. For decades, rich travelers—Arab, Russian, Chinese, Indian et al.—have shopped till they dropped in London and other parts of the UK. From January 1, 2021, these foreign tourists have had to pay taxes on their purchases. This makes London a less attractive destination as compared to Paris or Milan. Harrods, Selfridges and Bicester Village once teemed with foreign tourists but now attract sparse crowds even in the middle of the summer.

The British economy is in a deep crisis. Once the Industrial Revolution and British Empire made the UK rich, powerful and prestigious. Only the memories of Raj Britannica remain now. The economy is in the gutter, the middle class is in pain and the country’s leaders have no vision for the future. This blessed green island nation I call home is not so blessed anymore.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Sun Has Now Set on the British Empire appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In part one and part two of this discussion, we explored the history of Afghanistan, covering ground until the collapse of the US-backed democratic government. In this final part, Barfield talks about what has happened after American troops have left and postulates what we can expect in the future.

Ashraf Ghani’s government spectacularly failed to keep the country together after the rather chaotic and hurried American pull-out from Afghanistan. Within just a week, the Taliban took over almost all of Afghanistan’s cities. Even Kabul fell without much resistance. 

Barfield explains that this pattern repeats throughout Afghanistan’s history. When a regime fails, its support evaporates and victors walk into the capital without much bloodshed. This creates the illusion that they hold absolute power. Many regimes that began this way ended up in the same manner, falling to the next set of troops that marched in.

Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic state going through much strife. Yet despite all of its political instability, Afghanistan is not on the verge of breaking up. Barfield argues that, if the country had to implode, it would have done so already. Afghanistan has survived despite its long history of instability and civil wars. 

In Afghanistan’s culture, ethnicity and nationality are two quite different things. There is no strong desire to create ethnic states. Rather, groups jockey for position within the loose mutli-ethnic state. �������ھ������’s extensive familiarity with Afghan ethnic politics enables him to dispel some popular, but inaccurate, Western assumptions about how “Pashtun,” “Tajik” or “Hazara” identity work.

For now, the Taliban are in charge. However, we do not know for how long. Also, it is important to analyze what they are trying to accomplish.

In some ways, the Taliban’s treatment of women has been even more oppressive than it was during their prior rule in the 1990s. They have instituted a complete social separation between men and women. Even in other conservative Islamic states like Iran, women are not excluded from the economy as they are now in Afghanistan.

Simultaneously, Afghanistan’s society is less receptive to this sort of imposition. Before the US invasion, the share of the population living in cities was around 10%. That number has now tripled to about 30%. What’s more, women are far more educated after 20 years of liberal governance than their mothers and grandmothers. These women will certainly have a hard time swallowing the Taliban’s new norms.

So, is Afghanistan headed for a crisis? It seems likely, but it is not clear what form this crisis will take. Afghanistan’s food insecurity is worrying, and the regime may not be able to moderate itself enough to cooperate with foreign aid—even from Pakistan. If the government has to seize large amounts of food from local farmers, it could undermine its own support.

If support for the Taliban falters, what possible alternative could replace them? Plausibly, the first place to look would be factions within the Taliban itself. Local groups could split from the hardline leadership over the women’s issue if they reason that the economic hardship is too great. Without the common enemy of the US, there is less that now unites the Taliban, and no telling what could happen when push comes to shove.

Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History published by the Princeton University Press. You can buy the book .

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In the first part of this discussion, we talked about the history of Afghanistan’s monarchy. In this second part, Barfield talks about the civil wars that have shaped Afghanistan over the last 50 years.

The communists saw themselves as the successors of the modernizing King Amanullah Khan. After overthrowing President Daoud Khan, they attempted to institute socialism. They found themselves unable, however, to impose order on the country.

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev decided to intervene. Despite misgivings, Brezhnev-led Moscow invaded Afghanistan in the hope to clean house and declare victory. The Soviet 1979 invasion turned into a ten-year slog that left one million Afghans dead. When the final Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989, they left behind a friendly leader in place. The former Soviet ally Mohammad Najibullah held on till 1992, but the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 sealed his fate.

Najibullah negotiated a deal with the anti-communist mujahideen rebels. What resulted was a situation where communists and Islamists shared power along ethnic lines, rather than ideological ones. However, warlords soon came to control the country and the country disintegrated into savage civil war.

The chaos destroyed the mujahideen’s reputation as victorious jihadis. The Taliban arose out of the southern city of Kandahar and with Pakistan’s backing took over much of the country, pushing back the warlords. In 2001, the Taliban found its control over Afghanistan threatened because of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC.

Because the Taliban would not give up Osama bin Laden to the US, President George W. Bush launched an invasion of Afghanistan. Most of the country sided with the US and troops of the Northern Alliance captured Kabul within a few weeks. 

The US established a democracy but the leaders Washington installed inspired little confidence. Elections occurred but there was little connection between politicians and the people in a country with little tradition of democracy. Assured of US backing, politicians had little to fear and stole the money generously coming from Washington. Misgovernance and corruption were rife. In this strange US-created democracy, politicians did not need popular support and made no attempt to win it.

Within a few years, the people of Afghanistan realized that no reform was in the offing. Presidents behaved like kings, ruling selfishly from palaces in Kabul and siphoning away the foreign aid.

Barfield explains that there are two kinds of corruption. Some leaders use money to buy power. Others, like those in Kabul, used power to buy money. What was left at the end was a state sucked dry of all authority, which enriched a few men who fled the country when their game was up.

Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History published by the Princeton University Press. You can buy the book .

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Make Sense of Afghanistan With Thomas Barfield: Part 2 appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In the first part of this discussion, we dive into the history of Afghanistan. According to Barfield, the real problem for the democratic regime was simple: Afghans had never reached a consensus on what direction their country should take.

From its founding in 1823, Afghanistan’s monarchy was primarily concerned with centralizing power. Its goals were political, not ideological. The monarchs waged war across Afghanistan to subject the different tribes to their rule. They managed to retain power and independence despite the British Empire ruling British India to their east and dominating Iran to their west.

This does not mean that Afghanistan avoided British influence altogether. In 1928, King Amanullah Khan toured several Western capitals, including London, and returned to introduce reforms that would modernize his nation. His attempt to impose modernity resulted in a civil war. A period of unrest followed. Amanullah fled into exile and two of his successors were killed.

When the dust settled, young Mohammed Zahir Shah became king. Real power resided in his uncles’ hands though. The new regime bid adieu to modernity and let Afghans carry on as before. This settlement ended up keeping the peace in Afghanistan for 50 years. Some modernization of Afghanistan inevitably occurred, but the bigwigs in Kabul did not rock the boat with a reformist ideology. Their concerns, like those of the early Amirs, were more pragmatic.

In 1973 Daoud Khan, the prime minister, conducted a bloodless coup and ended the monarchy. Although he declared himself as president, he was a close relative of the monarch and was perceived more or less as another king. Khan consolidated power by suppressing right-wing Islamist forces but underestimated the strength of the Afghan left.

In 1978, Khan tried and failed a mass arrest of communists. This precipitated a coup by communist elements in the military, bringing an end to his rule.

�������ھ������’s Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History is published by the Princeton University Press. You can buy the book .

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Make Sense of Afghanistan With Thomas Barfield: Part 1 appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In Paris, I saw American tourists striding around in their shorts and sandals, cameras slung around their necks, staking out positions in cathedrals and museums. I listened to my mother’s commentary on what she considered their boorishness and insensitivity. In my 11-year-old mind, I tended to agree. I’d already heard the expression “the ugly American”—although I then knew nothing about the prophetic with that title about US diplomatic bumbling in southeast Asia in the midst of the Cold War—and it seemed to me that those interlopers in France fit the term perfectly.

When I got home, I confided to a friend (whose parents, I learned years later, worked for the CIA) that sometimes, while in Europe, I’d felt ashamed to be an American. “You should never feel that way,” she replied. “This is the best country in the world!”

Indeed, the United States was, then, the leader of what was known as “the free world.” Never mind that, throughout the Cold War, we would actively support dictatorships (in Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, among other places) and actually overthrow democratizing governments (in Chile, Guatemala, and Iran, for example). In that era of the G.I. Bill, strong unions, employer-provided healthcare, and general postwar economic dominance, to most of us who were white and within reach of the middle class, the United States probably did look like the best country in the world.

Things do look a bit different today, don’t they? In this century, in many important ways, the United States has become an outlier and, in some cases, even an outlaw. Here are three examples of US behavior that has been egregious in the etymological sense, three ways in which this country has stood out from the crowd in a sadly malevolent fashion.

Guantanamo, the forever prison camp

In January 2002, the administration of President George W. Bush established an offshore prison camp at the US Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The idea was to house prisoners taken in what had already been labeled the “Global War on Terror” on a little piece of “US” soil beyond the reach of the American legal system and whatever protections that system might afford anyone inside the country. (If you wonder how the United States had access to a chunk of land on an island nation with which it had the frostiest of relations, including decades of economic sanctions, here’s the story: in 1903, long before Cuba’s 1959 revolution, its government had granted the United States “coaling” rights at Guantanamo, meaning that the US Navy could establish a base there to refuel its ships. The agreement remained in force then, as it does today.)

In the years that followed, Guantanamo became the site of the and even of individuals the US took prisoner in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries ranging from to . Having written for more than 20 years about such US torture programs that in , I find today that I can’t bring myself to chronicle one more time all the horrors that went on at Guantanamo or at CIA “black sites” in countries ranging from Thailand to Poland, or at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, or indeed at the Abu Ghraib prison and Camp NAMA (whose motto was: “No blood, no foul”) in Iraq. If you don’t remember, just go ahead and google those places. I’ll wait.

Thirty men remain at Guantanamo today. Some have never been tried. Some have never even been charged with a crime. Their continued detention and torture, including, as recently as 2014, punitive, brutal for hunger strikers, confirmed the status of the United States as a global scofflaw. To this day, keeping Guantanamo open displays this country’s contempt for international law, including the Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Convention against Torture. It also displays contempt for our own legal system, including the Constitution’s “” clause which makes any ratified international treaty like the Convention against Torture “the supreme law of the land.”

In February 2023, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, became the first representative of the United Nations ever permitted to visit Guantanamo. She was horrified by what she found there, The Guardian that the US has

a responsibility to redress the harms it inflicted on its Muslim torture victims. Existing medical treatment, both at the prison camp in Cuba and for detainees released to other countries, was inadequate to deal with multiple problems such as traumatic brain injuries, permanent disabilities, sleep disorders, flashbacks and untreated post-traumatic stress disorder.

“These men,” she added, “are all survivors of torture, a unique crime under international law, and in urgent need of care. Torture breaks a person; it is intended to render them helpless and powerless so that they cease to function psychologically, and in my conversations both with current and former detainees, I observed the harms it caused.”

The lawyer for one tortured prisoner, , reports that his client “suffers from traumatic brain injury from having been subjected to ‘walling’ where his head was smashed repeatedly against the wall.” He has entered a deepening cognitive decline, of which the “symptoms include headaches, dizziness, and difficulty thinking and performing simple tasks.” He cannot sleep for more than two hours at a time, “having been sleep-deprived as a torture technique.”

The United States, Ní Aoláin insists, must provide rehabilitative care for the men it has broken. I have my doubts, however, about the curative powers of any treatment administered by Americans, even civilian psychologists. After all, two of them personally the CIA’s torture program.

The United States should indeed foot the bill for treating not only the 30 men who remain in Guantanamo but others who have been released and continue to suffer the long-term effects of torture. And, of course, it goes without saying that the Biden administration should finally that illegal prison camp—although that’s not likely to happen. Apparently, it’s easier to end than decide what to do with 30 prisoners.

Unlawful weapons

The United States is an outlier in another arena as well: the production and deployment of arms widely recognized as presenting an immediate or future danger to non-combatants. The US has steadfastly resisted joining conventions outlawing such weaponry, including cluster bombs (or, more euphemistically, “cluster munitions”) and landmines.

In fact, the United States deployed cluster bombs in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. (In the previous century, it dropped of them in Laos alone while fighting the Vietnam War.) Ironically—one might even say, hypocritically—the US 146 other countries in condemning Syrian and Russian use of the same weapons in the Syrian civil war. Indeed, former White House press secretary Jen Psaki that, if Russia were using them in Ukraine (as, in fact, ), that would constitute a “war crime.”

The US has now sent cluster bombs to Ukraine, supposedly to fill a crucial gap in the supply of artillery shells. Mind you, it’s not that the United States doesn’t have enough conventional artillery shells to resupply Ukraine. The problem is that sending them there would leave this country unprepared to fight (and hypothetical) major wars as envisioned in what the Pentagon likes to think of as its readiness doctrine.

What are cluster munitions? They are artillery shells packed with many individual bomblets, or “submunitions.” When one is fired, from up to 20 miles away, it spreads as many as 90 separate bomblets over a wide area, making it an excellent way to kill a lot of enemy soldiers with a single shot.

What places these weapons off-limits for most nations is that not all the bomblets explode. Some can stay where they fell for years, even decades, until as a New York Times editorial , “somebody—often, a child spotting a brightly colored, battery-size doodad on the ground—accidentally sets it off.” In other words, they can lie in wait long after a war is over, sowing farmland and forest with deadly booby traps. That’s why then-Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon once spoke of “the world’s collective revulsion at these abhorrent weapons.” That’s why 123 countries have signed the 2008 on Cluster Munitions. Among the holdouts, however, are Russia, Ukraine, and the United States.

to National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the cluster bombs the US has sent to Ukraine each contain 88 bomblets, with, according to the Pentagon, a failure rate of under 2.5%. (Other sources, however, suggest that it could be .) This means that for every cluster shell fired, at least two submunitions are likely to be duds. We have no idea how many of these weapons the US is supplying, but a Pentagon spokesman in a said there are “hundreds of thousands available.” It doesn’t take much mathematical imagination to realize that they present a real future danger to Ukrainian civilians. Nor is it terribly comforting when Sullivan that the Ukrainian government is “motivated” to minimize risk to civilians as the munitions are deployed, because “these are their citizens that they’re protecting.”

I for one am not eager to leave such cost-benefit risk calculations in the hands of any government fighting for its survival. That’s precisely why international laws against indiscriminate weapons exist—to prevent governments from having to make such calculations in the heat of battle.

Cluster bombs are only a subset of the weapons that leave behind “explosive remnants of war.” Landmines are another. Like Russia, the United States is not found among the 164 countries that have signed the , which required signatories to stop producing landmines, destroy their existing stockpiles, and clear their own territories of mines.

Ironically, the US routinely donates money to pay for mine clearance around the world, which is certainly a good thing, given the legacy it left, for example, in Vietnam. to the New York Times in 2018:

“Since the war there ended in 1975, at least 40,000 Vietnamese are believed to have been killed and another 60,000 wounded by American land mines, artillery shells, cluster bombs and other ordinance that failed to detonate back then. They later exploded when handled by scrap-metal scavengers and unsuspecting children.”

Hot enough for ya?

As I write this piece, of my country’s population is living under heat alerts. That’s 110 million people. A heatwave , where 16 Italian cities are under warnings, and Greece has closed the Acropolis to prevent tourists from dying of heat stroke. This summer looks to be worse in Europe than even last year’s record-breaker during which heat killed people. In the US, too, heat is by far the greatest weather-related killer. Makes you wonder why Texas Governor Greg Abbott eliminating required water breaks for outside workers, just as the latest heat wave was due to roll in.

Meanwhile, New York’s Hudson Valley and , including its capital Montpelier, were inundated this past week by a once-in-a-hundred-year storm, while in South Korea, workers raced to rescue people whose cars were trapped inside Cheongju tunnel after a torrential monsoon rainfall. Korea, along with much of Asia, expects such rains during the summer, but this year’s—like so many other weather statistics—have been literally off the charts. Journalists have finally experienced a sea change (not unlike the in surface water temperatures in the Atlantic Ocean). Gone are the tepid suggestions that climate change “may play a part” in causing extreme weather events. Reporters around the world now simply state that that’s our reality.

When it comes to confronting the climate emergency, though, the United States has once again been bringing up the rear. As far back as 1992, at the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, President George H. W. Bush resisted setting any caps on carbon-dioxide emissions. As the New York Times then, “Showing a personal interest on the subject, he singlehandedly forced negotiators to excise from the global warming treaty any reference to deadlines for capping emissions of pollutants.” And even then, Washington was resisting the efforts of poorer countries to wring some money from us to help defray the costs of their own environmental efforts.

Some things don’t change all that much. Although President Biden reversed Donald Trump’s move to pull the US out of the Paris climate accords, his own climate record has been a combination of two steps forward (the green energy transition funding in the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, for example) and a big step back ( the ConocoPhillips Willow oil drilling project on federal land in Alaska’s north slope, not to speak of Senator Joe Manchin’s , the $6.6 billion Mountain Valley Pipeline for natural gas).

And when it comes to remediating the damage our emissions have done to poorer countries around the world, this country is still a day late and billions of dollars short. In fact, on July 13th, climate envoy John Kerry a congressional hearing that “under no circumstances” would the United States pay reparations to developing countries suffering the devastating effects of climate change. Although the US did (at least in principle) support the creation of a fund to help poorer countries ameliorate the effects of climate change at the UN’s COP 27 conference in November 2022, as Reuters , “the deal did not spell out who would pay into the fund or how money would be disbursed.”

Welcome to “solastalgia”

I learned a new word recently, . It actually is a new word, created in 2005 by Australian philosopher Glenn Albrecht to describe “the distress that is produced by environmental change impacting on people while they are directly connected to their home environment.” Albrecht’s focus was on Australian rural indigenous communities with centuries of attachment to their particular places, but I think the concept can be extended, at least metaphorically, to the rest of us whose lives are now being affected by the painful presences (and absences) brought on by environmental and climate change: the presence of unprecedented heat, fire, ; the presence of deadly rain and flooding; and the of ice at the Earth’s poles or on its . In my own life, among other things, it’s the loss of and the almost infinite sadness of rarely seeing more than a few faint .

Of course, the “best country in the world” wasn’t the only nation involved in creating the horrors I’ve been describing. And the ordinary people who live in this country are not to blame for them. Still, as beneficiaries of this nation’s bounty—its beauty, its aspirations, its profoundly injured but still breathing democracy—we are, as the philosopher Iris Marion Young , responsible for them. It will take organized, collective political action, but there is still time to bring our outlaw country back into what indeed should be a united community of nations confronting the looming horrors on this planet. Or so I hope and believe.

[ first published this piece.]

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Widely seen as giving China a grip on Qatari gas, the deal is as much a commercial agreement as it is a security arrangement. It acknowledges China as the Gulf state’s foremost export market and gives China a stake in protecting Qatar.

Qatar is not alone in giving China preferential access to its energy reserves. So do other major Gulf exporters, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for whom China has become their foremost market.

Qatar has close ties with the US

The difference is that Qatar’s energy dealings with China are embedded in a policy that broadly aligns the Gulf state with the United States, emphasizes the Gulf state’s utility as a go-between, and avoids ruffling feathers.

In contrast, Saudi Arabia and the UAE stress their independence, on occasion counter or distance themselves from the policies of the United States, the region’s security guarantor, and sometimes poke the US in the eye.

Last month, the contrast was on full display. While UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed raised eyebrows as the only to attend the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani flew under the radar a week later when he Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

Bin Zayed “has made a sport out of the Biden administration’s efforts to repair the relationship” between the United States and the UAE. “Of course, from his own perspective, Bin Zayed has proved himself a loyal partner to the United States time and again, but of late has had little to show for it,” said scholars Jonathan Lord and Airona Baigal.

In a further illustration of the contrast, Qatar arranged a between a senior Venezuelan and US official last month to improve strained relations resulting from the United States’ recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s legitimate president and US sanctions against the South American state.

Officials said the talks could lead to a prisoner swap.

“Getting involved in Venezuela is a high-reward/low-risk . By offering its services, Doha is consolidating its emerging reputation as a global diplomatic go-between, helping Washington in several particularly politically sensitive areas,” said Eldar Mamedov, a Brussels-based foreign policy expert.

A seemingly unlikely candidate to mediate in a region with which it has no ethnic or religious affinity, Qatar was well-positioned because it had neither joined a large number of governments recognizing Guaido nor adhered to the sanctions. Qatar’s refusal failed to upset Washington.

Similarly, Qatar hosts a Taliban office at the United States’ request. Hosting facilitated the 2021 negotiated US withdrawal from Afghanistan and since then. With the withdrawal underway, Qatar, like the UAE, provided significant logistical assistance.

Furthermore, Qatar, at times, between the United States and Iran and serves as a postman relaying messages between the two countries.

At the same time, Qatar, unlike the UAE, has not emerged as a for Russians seeking to circumvent US and European sanctions, including Russia’s Wagner Group, or suspected criminals and corrupt officials.

As a result, the US has sanctioned Emirati rather than Qatari companies for violating US sanctions on and Iran. Moreover, Emirati freewheeling has landed the UAE on the of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering watchdog.

Furthermore, Qatar has ensured that it is less dependent on Chinese telecommunications technology that the United States fears could give China access to US technology embedded in American weapons systems and other security projects.

Last year, the US rewarded Qatar, home to the largest US military base in the Middle East, by awarding major non-NATO ally .

UAE and Saudi Arabia do not love the US the same way

To be sure, the and have been helpful, most recently negotiating prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine. In the past, the UAE contributed troops to support the United States in Afghanistan.

The different Gulf state approaches are rooted in Qatar’s response to the failed 3.5-year-long UAE-Saudi-led economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state. The embargo was lifted in early 2021 without the Gulf state caving in to demands that would have put Qatar under Emirati and Saudi tutelage.

During the boycott, Qatar significantly tightened its security relationship and cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism finance.

As a result, Qatari perceptions of relations with the United States differ from the Saudi and Emirati experience.

Ali Shihabi, a Saudi commentator with close ties to the Saudi ruling elite, noted that the kingdom “has over the years, from its infancy before the Second World War to a more self-confident G-20 country secure in its place in the world today.”

Saudi attitudes have been compounded by perceptions that “the US security umbrella has been weakened as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned… (That) convinced Saudi leaders that they had to look elsewhere to guarantee their security,” Shihabi said. He was referring to a US refusal to come to the kingdom’s aid when Iran in 2019 attacked Saudi oil facilities. He was also referring to a US cutoff of arms and ammunition sales because of the Saudi intervention in Yemen.

Emirati officials similar complaints about US reluctance to respond to Iranian-inspired attacks.

In the same vein, Karen Elliot House, an expert on the kingdom, quoted a Saudi minister as saying in March in a closed-door conference: “You tell us not to talk to Russia, your opponent, but you are talking to Iran, our opponent. You say don’t buy Chinese weapons. ‘Do you have an alternative,’ we ask? ‘Yes,’ you say, ‘but we can’t sell it to you.'”

Another minister told the gathering, “You said you were behind us in our war in Yemen, but you proved a no-show.”

House, referring to Bin Salman by his initials, added, “The Crown Prince is making a virtue of relying less on a reluctant US to protect his nation… MBS is skillfully playing a t of great power poker to benefit Saudi Arabia.”

Even so, North America remains a primary investment target of Emirati and Saudi sovereign wealth funds. Last year, the US$829 billion Abu Dhabi Investment Authority between 45 and 60% of its investments to North America.

[ first published this piece.]

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The Taliban’s ban on women’s access to work and education is just the latest example of their inability to reform or moderate. If the international community once held any realistic hope that the Taliban might soften their extreme policies, that hope has now evaporated.

The cowardly escape of President Ashraf Ghani along with The Doha signed on February 29, 2020, paved the way for the final collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021. The country was plunged back into an age of repression.

Afghanistan now faces an escalating political and humanitarian crisis. NATO member states, the UN, and other humanitarian organizations have been sending aid in an attempt to mitigate the Taliban-created disaster. Since 2022, Afghanistan has received approximately in aid.

The international community continues to push the Taliban to form an inclusive government, respect human rights, and prevent the spread of terrorism. Yet, engaging with the Taliban in hopes of moderation is futile—because moderation itself contradicts their core ideological principles.

The Taliban’s Ideological Foundations

The Taliban are not merely a military movement; they are a radical Islamist and Pashtun dominated tribal group whose ideology is �� around three core pillars: their ends, ways, and means.

End Goals: The Islamic Emirate and Absolute Obedience

The Taliban pursue two overarching goals: one in this life and one in the afterlife. Their vision for the afterlife is simple—to enter heaven. In this world, their primary objective is to enforce their own interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) by establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Under this system, an Emir or supreme leader rules absolutely, and all citizens are expected to obey without question.

The Taliban construct their legal framework through a selective and self-serving application of Islamic jurisprudence, using sources such as traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, juridical consensus, reasoning by analogy and benevolence.

Mullah Haibatullah, the Taliban’s supreme leader, has been explicit about his commitment to absolute Sharia rule. Addressing the United States, he :

“You have used the mother of all bombs, and you are welcome to use even the atomic bomb against us, because nothing can scare us into taking any step that is against Islam or Sharia.”

The Taliban also �� their dominance through ethnic oppression, particularly targeting non-Pashtun groups like the Hazaras. Their leaders enforce , a tribal code emphasizing patriarchal control, revenge, and honor, which further entrenches social division and gender subjugation.

Understanding these ideological end goals is key to deciphering the Taliban’s policy decisions and long-term ambitions.

How the Taliban Maintain Control: Suppression, Exclusion, and Fear

The Taliban enforce their ideology through elimination, exclusion, and submission. Their mandates eradicating any resistance against the IEA—by force if necessary. Maulawi Mujeeb Rahman Ansari, a Taliban ally, openly :

��“Anyone who opposes the current government should be beheaded.”

Following these directives, the Taliban have hundreds of extrajudicial killings since 2021. In Daikundi province, Taliban fighters�� eight Hazara civilians, including children as young as six. In Panjshir, Hasht-e Subh Daily�� that the Taliban executed 27 people accused of having ties to the National Resistance Front. The IEA consistently favors annihilation over dialogue.

Beyond outright violence, the Taliban have established a system of exclusion and repression. Their ruling consists of 33 men—30 of whom are Pashtun, with only token representation for Tajiks (two members) and Uzbeks (one member). This structure excludes Afghanistan’s , reinforcing Pashtun dominance.

Citizens are treated as�� . The Taliban �� dress codes, personal grooming, and religious practices, enforcing their version of Islam on every aspect of life. Those who fail to comply face brutal consequences.

Women, in particular, have been reduced to second-class citizens. Under the Taliban’s , women belong in the home—to cook, bear children, and serve men. As a result, the Taliban have:

• Banned�� women from education and employment.
• Imposed mandatory full-body coverings (burqas).
• Prohibited women from traveling without male chaperones.

When women protest, the Taliban respond with gunfire. Civil society organizations and political groups have been systematically . The IEA tolerates no opposition.

The Taliban also reject modern institutions such as democracy, elections, and human rights. Mullah Haibatullah has these concepts as “anti-Sharia.” Instead, the Taliban prioritize religious education, converting secular schools into madrasas. Their goal is clear: to �� Afghanistan’s liberal institutions and replace them with an extremist Islamic order.

Resources and Financial Backing: How the Taliban Sustain Themselves

The Taliban are well-funded and have a steady supply of recruits, largely from impoverished, uneducated Pashtun communities. Before toppling the Afghan government in 2021, they �� an estimated 60,000 core fighters and 140,000 auxiliary members.

Financially, the Taliban rely on two primary income sources: domestic taxation and foreign support. Between August and November 2021 alone, they collected million in taxes. Other revenue streams :

• Illegal opium cultivation and drug trafficking
• Illicit mining and resource extraction
• Extortion and unlawful taxation

��In 2020, NATO estimated that the Taliban $1.6 billion from illicit activities.

During their insurgency, the Taliban received extensive foreign funding. A Combating Terrorism Center report in 2021 that they benefited from financial, logistical, and technical aid from neighboring and Gulf countries, private donors, extremist groups, and al-Qaeda. The Taliban are among the wealthiest extremist organizations in the world.

The Taliban will not change��

Many in the international community hoped that the Taliban, having learned from their past mistakes, would moderate their governance after reclaiming power in 2021. This belief was naive.

During their first reign (1996–2001), the Taliban’s refusal to surrender Osama bin Laden after 9/11 led to their downfall. After their defeat, they to have softened their fundamentalist stance. This was a deception—designed to mislead both the Afghan people and the world.

The Taliban are a product of a rigid, absolutist ideology. Democratic governance, human rights, and scientific progress threaten their existence. Their leaders understand that survival depends on adhering to radicalism, not moderation.

What the International Community Must Do

The world now faces a choice:

1. Continue engaging with the Taliban, thereby legitimizing and strengthening their regime.
2. Support democratic opposition groups, including political activists, ethnic representatives, women leaders, and the younger generation.

To counter the Taliban effectively, the international community must:

• Attach strict conditions to any aid.
• Ban free travel for Taliban officials.
• Limit direct engagement with the IEA.

Over time, these measures will weaken the Taliban’s grip while increasing the international community’s leverage.

The world must stop waiting for the Taliban to change. They won’t.

[ and edited this piece.]

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First, the crazy idea, once expressed and shared publicly, begins to influence the thinking of those who have the power of decision-making or at least those with power over the implementation of real outcomes.

Who are these people? They tend to be either diplomats or military strategists. In some cases they are academics or even media celebrities. When some in either of these groups begin toying with one or even multiple crazy ideas, those ideas stop seeming crazy and can provide the groundwork for reaching some form of resolution. They may literally open an Overton window.

The second way a crazy idea may play out is more subtle. Its very craziness can set the stage for imagining other crazy ideas, one of which may point towards an unforeseen resolution. In this age of increasingly standardized discourse—not to say propaganda—this could prove to have a salutary effect.

Most people agree there is no lack of conflict in today’s world, the most egregious being the war in Ukraine. But there is a growing litany of others worth considering: trade wars, supply chain conflict, cultural conflict, generational clashes, class war, ethnic and religious confrontations, ideological standoffs, currency competition (dollar hegemony, crypto vs. fiat currency), competing economic priorities surrounding the climate crisis. The list expands exponentially as one moves from the global towards the local.

The context of today’s Crazy Idea

Topic: the war in Ukraine.

This week in Vilnius, Lithuania the leaders of NATO will meet to deliberate presumably on two topics:

1. The state of the war, which, despite official denials, no one can legitimately deny is a proxy war between NATO, led by the US, and Vladimir Putin’s Russia,
2. Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO.

From NATO’s point of view, the real stakes are Russia’s influence in the world; from Russia’s, they are its regional security. NATO claims the conflict is about Ukraine’s sovereignty and nothing else. Russia claims it’s about the denazification of Ukraine and the security of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine. Those official formulations on both sides reflect only one small aspect of the real issue, which is geopolitically complex.

 No one can predict at the beginning of this week how NATO will assess the state of a war that appears to be increasingly unfavorable on the ground to the NATO-Ukrainian cause. Will this provoke a timid move towards conciliation of a doubling down of NATO’s commitment with the risk of edging ever closer to nuclear confrontation?

It appears that the conference will seek to arrive at a definitive consensus on the principle of admitting Ukraine into NATO, but only after a formal peace is achieved. Because for the moment there is no prospect for negotiation of a peace deal, the idea of Ukraine joining NATO, even if unanimously approved, remains something of a pipe dream. What will Ukraine look like after a peace deal? Will it even exist as a viable political entity? So long as no serious discussions about discussions of peace are underway, that question has no meaning.

�մǻ岹��’s Crazy Idea

A crazy idea is one that no one in politics or the media dares for the moment to enunciate, even if the thought may have crossed some people’s minds. Crazy ideas tend to be simple in their basic formulation. If taken seriously and ultimately implemented they acquire several degrees of complexity, but the basic idea becomes the driving force behind whatever solution emerges.

The basic form of today’s crazy idea is that NATO decides not just to admit Ukraine to NATO but also Russia.

That sounds preposterous, and it is preposterous, given the attitudes of the major actors. But as I pointed out last week, there are two historical precedents, in 1954 and 1999. On both of those occasions the Moscow government – the USSR in the first case, Russia in the second – expressed a desire to be part of NATO.

Why it may not be so crazy

The two historical precedents, both categorically refused by the US, demonstrate that the status of such an idea can be described as objectionable but not unthinkable. That’s an important distinction. If the right people are allowed to think freely about it, it can potentially become viable.

If both Russia and Ukraine were invited to join NATO, it would have an effect similar to what happened after the initial creation of NATO in 1949. It would eliminate the risk of armed conflict between any two nations in the organization and would thus guarantee Ukraine’s security and eliminate Russia’s perception of NATO as an existential threat. Borders could be redefined, as required, in a spirit of mutual respect and.

Though the US has never looked kindly upon Russian integration into Europe because it would threaten the balance of economic power that since World War II has been massively skewed in favor of the US, Russia’s association with European security could pull it away from China, serving to isolate the Beijing and break up the growing alliance between the two historical superpowers.

Why it’s just crazy enough not to be taken seriously

Foreign policy experts in the US have studied the theory elaborated more than a century ago by the British geographer and politician, Halford Mackinder. As an original geopolitical thinker at the height of the British empire’s extension across the globe, Mackinder described the Eurasian landmass as “the world island” and resoundingly announced his heartland principle: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world.

In his 1998 book The Grand Chessboard, President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was deeply familiar with Mackinder’s theory, designated Ukraine as an “important space on the Eurasian chessboard.” In other words, foreign policy wonks in Washington have long understood that, even as an ally, a greater Europe that could include Russia would constitute Mackinder’s Heartland. It would be far too powerful in relation to the US, militarily and economically, and thus constitute a far greater threat to US hegemony than a rising China, or even—as we’re seeing now—a close alliance between China and Russia.

In other words, the US has a holy fear of the very idea of Russia’s integration into Europe. It has consistently seen Ukraine, rather, as the key to preventing Russia from coupling with Europe.

In contrast, Europeans have been aware of the economic advantages of having a strong relationship with Russia. Germany in particular is now discovering the crippling effects of the US putting in place an new iron curtain cutting it off not only from trade with the East, including restrictions on trade with China, but especially the cheap energy that was a key to the efficiency of German industry.

If they were free to speak their minds, Europeans might well be in favor of the crazy and verboten idea of integrating Russia into a vastly expanded NATO. They may even think that the US would see this as ultimately advantageous. But whatever they think, if indeed they do think after being trained for seven decades to keep their thoughts to themselves, they are not about to express it.

It would not be crazy to suppose that some Europeans, especially those of Old Europe led by Germany and France, are thinking that the more European nations there are in NATO, the easier it will be in a not-too-distant future for Europe to take the reins of NATO, define its own security framework and thereby weaken the influence—which is currently more like domination—of the US.

I’ll repeat what I’ve just said: it would not be crazy to suppose Europeans are thinking along these lines. But it would be absolutely bonkers to suppose that the US is not intent on stopping any move in that direction.

Europe currently has no margin of maneuver, but in a multipolar world intent upon limiting the power of US hegemony, that margin of maneuver could increase and allow for a new configuration of the geopolitical order in which Europe could play a balancing role between the US and China. In today’s world that seems utterly unthinkable, to the point that no sane person other than someone writing a column about crazy ideas would dare to evoke it. But an Afghanistan-style end to the Ukraine war, whether it occurs later this year or 19 years down the line, might end up providing the conditions that could allow that kind of configuration to fall into place.

An appeal to our readers

We at 51�Թ� believe that it is incumbent on all of humanity, including our authors and readers, to think about and eventually propose unorthodox and even manifestly illogical approaches to apparently insoluble conflicts. For that reason, we invite you to submit well-reasoned Crazy Ideas that we will regularly publish.

We only ask that your submissions respect the format of this one, with the following four-part structure:

1. The context of today’s Crazy Idea
   Background on the who, what, when and why that justifies imagining a crazy idea.
2. �մǻ岹��’s Crazy Idea
   A concise formulation of the idea with eventually a paragraph clarifying its meaning.
3. Why it may not be crazy
   An explanation of the factors that make it worth considering, even if it appears utterly unlikely to be applied.
4. Why it’s just crazy enough not to be taken seriously
   Here is where you help readers to understand the redoubtable obstacles to achieving it and the utter unlikelihood of its ever being implemented.

With a bit of luck, the great decision-makers of our crazy world will discover your suggestions and begin to mull them over, eventually integrating them into the sort of modes of thought that could change the world we live in for the better.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post A Crazy Idea Aimed at Achieving Peace in the World appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Afghanistan’s Taliban regime had given refuge to Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. They planned and executed terror attacks against the US from their base in Afghanistan. In spite of US demands for extradition, the Taliban hosted al-Qaeda leaders. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, which killed more than 3,000 innocent people on US soil, the gloves came off. The US invoked NATO’s Article 5, calling all allies to its defense, an invocation unprecedented in history. The NATO allies, in cooperation with the local Northern Alliance, took Afghanistan by storm.

Bin Laden, who had expected a decadent, pluralistic and materialistic United States simply to fall over after an attack like 9/11, must have been sorely surprised by the ferocity of the US response. The allied invasion destroyed Taliban rule in just six weeks and inaugurated a new era in Afghanistan.

Trapped in Afghanistan

However, bin Laden escaped and this prolonged the US presence in Afghanistan. Soon, an Islamist insurgency led by the remaining elements of the Taliban broke out. President George W. Bush understood from the start that nation-building was an unrealistic goal and promised not to engage in it. However, the US soon found itself unable to pull out of Afghanistan.

The decision to remain was influenced by the assessment, which Carle regards as flawed, that al-Qaeda remained as a potent force in Afghanistan. The intelligence community sincerely believed that al-Qaeda continued to be a coherent and organized global existential threat to Western democracy. Carle points out that it is implausible that a secret resistance of any such magnitude would be able to maintain such hierarchical discipline, especially in such a fragmented country as Afghanistan.

The US had no plausible plan for victory, but felt compelled to stay. The cost of leaving, thereby enabling terrorists to regroup and tarnishing America’s credibility as a world power, was just too high. But it was a fool’s errand. Afghanistan is simply not a nation. It is a region populated by numerous ethnic groups, over whom the Pashtuns exert a dubious suzerainty. Pakistan, which has a sizable Pashtun population of its own, has a vested interest in keeping Afghanistan weak. It supported the Taliban chiefly to achieve strategic depth against India and to keep the influence of rivals like Iran and India weak in Afghanistan.

The Iraq Blunder

Building an Afghan nation was already impossible, but it was more than impossible by the diversion of resources toward Iraq, starting as early as the autumn of 2002.

Why, we must ask, did the intelligence community see Saddam as such a vital target? The Arab socialist dictator was no natural ally of al-Qaeda. He held many of their operatives in prison, and tortured them. Even still, the US administration managed to convince itself of a connection between the two.

At the time, terrorism concerns focused on state sponsors or state-like sponsors of terrorism: Libya, Iran, Pakistan and the Palestine Liberation Organization. US intelligence failed to recognize that al-Qaeda was a new type of threat, searching instead for a state as a culprit.

While Saddam had occasionally allowed terrorist factions to operate in Iraq, there was no evidence of coordination between the Ba’athist government and al-Qaeda’s high command. US intelligence officials mistakenly made the connection between Iraq and Afghanistan and neoconservative ideologues seized up this assessment. Ironically, this connection became reality when the US roped both unrelated wars into a single “Global War on Terror.”

American leadership did indeed have valid concerns that Saddam, who had previously pursued nuclear weapons, might seek them again and potentially use nuclear or biological weapons against Israel. The administration perceived Israel as an island of democracy, which America had a sacred duty to defend. Beyond security concerns, though, neoconservative elites in Washington saw Iraq as an opportunity to create an Arab democracy that would reshape the Middle East. As per their utopian vision, Iraq would serve as a beacon of democracy and, quite implausibly, as an example to Iran of what happens when a regime goes too far. In the end, the Iraq that emerged was much more amenable to the Islamic Republic’s interests than Iraq of Saddam Hussein. The Shias in Iraq are now under Tehran’s influence.

US leadership was mistaken on many points, but it was not simply irrational. The threat posed by international terrorism was real, and Americans had died. Perhaps, though, a more targeted, counterterrorism approach carried out by intelligence operatives and special operations teams might have better served the US administration. Washington needed a scalpel instead of a sledgehammer.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The War on Terror: 22 Years On appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The G7 did indeed dedicate a to Afghanistan, and the parties agreed in condemning the Taliban’s suppression of fundamental rights. However, it could not be more of an understatement to say that the G7’s response to the Afghan crisis could have been more assertive. Alongside their critique of the Taliban’s conduct, the G7 also underscored a need to maintain continuous and direct dialogue with them, balancing its condemnation with engagement. This was an attempt to reflect the complexity of the international response required in this volatile situation, but it raises questions about the commitment of the international community to the well-being of the Afghan people.

Condemnations without action

The G7’s first perspective reflects the G7’s commitment to uphold the international order based on the rule of law. This commitment is paramount in resisting unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, as exemplified by Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons. It should also be crucial in countering other forms of lawlessness that can destabilize the international order, such as those currently unfolding in Afghanistan.

Through addressing the issue of Afghanistan under Taliban rule, the G7 had a prime opportunity to manifest its resolute determination to repudiate such actions and uphold the rule of law. Afghanistan must transition from a Taliban regime imposed at the point of a sword to a representative, lawfully installed government, encompassing all echelons of Afghan society. Regrettably, the dialogue on strategic measures to aid this transition was bleak.

Does the Future Belong to the Taliban?

Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, the country has been plunged into a state of lawlessness that directly violates the principles upon which the international order stands. Reports of women being denied basic rights, minority groups facing persecution, and a lack of inclusivity in government structures are not only troubling but represent a blatant disregard for the rule of law. It was the responsibility of the G7 to stand united and address this crisis. Failure to act would not only compromise the credibility of the international order but also perpetuate the suffering of millions.

One of the most distressing consequences of the Taliban’s rule is the blatant violation of. For nearly two years, women and girls in Afghanistan have been denied access to education and basic freedoms. The implementation of a gender apartheid which confines women to their homes is a gross violation of human rights and a setback for gender equality worldwide. The Taliban’s actions demonstrate a clear and present danger to the international order, because lawlessness within a member of the international community can indeed become a new normal if left unchallenged.

The issued by the G7’s foreign ministers did voice a robust opposition against such repressive practices. However, it is insufficient for a multitude of reasons. While their vocal opposition to oppressive practices marks a positive first step, it is crucial that these words be underpinned by tangible actions and strategic policy initiatives that can catalyze substantial, meaningful change.

Furthermore, the G7’s primary focus on diplomatic endeavors and economic sanctions falls short of addressing the multifaceted challenges that Afghan women routinely face. In order to formulate a genuinely impactful response, it is imperative to incorporate an element of inclusivity, ensuring that the unique voices and perspectives of Afghan women are taken into account.

One Of The Taliban’s Monumental Ruins: Gender-Apartheid Policies

Only with a sustained, long-term commitment, bolstered by active collaboration with international organizations and a comprehensive strategy emphasizing the primacy of women’s rights and gender equality, can the G7 make significant strides in effectuating the deeply needed change in Afghanistan. This necessitates expanding the scope of their efforts beyond conventional diplomacy and sanctions, thereby unlocking the potential for transformative progress in this critical area.

The absence of an inclusive government in Afghanistan poses a significant challenge to stability and progress. A sustainable peace and future for the country can only be achieved through a government that represents the interests and aspirations of all Afghan citizens. The G7, as a collective voice of influential nations, could have exerted pressure on the Taliban to foster inclusivity and ensure that minority rights are respected and protected. Unfortunately, the issued statement from the G7 does not live up to this vital mandate. The international community would do well to take a more assertive stance in advocating for a truly inclusive governance structure in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan issues placed on the sidelines

The second perspective emphasized the G7’s mission to strengthen outreach to the Global South. The group sought to demonstrate its contributions to the issues that concern these nations.

Afghanistan, as part of the Global South, is a test case for this commitment. The G7 had a moral responsibility to ensure that the plight of Afghans, especially the most vulnerable, is not ignored. However, the shift of attention towards the “Global South” was mainly aimed at the influence of Russian and China. Thus, only a limited number of nations within the Global South were invited, and unfortunately, this meant that the issue of Afghanistan received scant attention.

Addressing Afghanistan’s issues would not have been just about resolving a single country’s crisis, but about reaffirming the values that the G7 represents and that the world needs. It should have been about demonstrating that the international order, based on the rule of law, isn’t just a concept but a practice that can, and should, be upheld even in the most challenging situations.

As the host of the G7, Japan held a unique position to drive the agenda and focus attention on pressing global issues like the Afghanistan crisis, which impacts global security, precipitates a humanitarian crisis, and affects regional stability. Given its strategic location in Asia, Japan’s security interests could be influenced by instability in Afghanistan. Additionally, Japan’s historic role in fostering international cooperation could have been leveraged to unite G7 nations in advocating for an inclusive government in Afghanistan, ensuring the rights of all citizens are respected. Unfortunately, the latest G7 meeting overlooked this opportunity.

The G7, therefore, should have taken a more robust stance on the situation in Afghanistan. It was incumbent on the G7 to leverage its combined influence to push for the restoration of women’s rights, the establishment of a legitimate government, and the protection of minority rights. The G7’s statement seemed strong towards ensuring that girls and women are once again allowed to attend schools and colleges, but a statement alone is not much unless it is followed by action.

In summary, as we navigate these tumultuous times and upon the conclusion of the summit, it is imperative for the G7 to prove that the international order it upholds extends beyond the boundaries of its member states. It must demonstrate that its commitment to the rule of law and its outreach to the Global South are not just theoretical constructs, but actual policies that have meaningful, practical impacts. In doing so the powers will affirm their role as a beacon of hope and a pillar of stability in a world that desperately needs both.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post More Talk Than Action From the G7 on Afghanistan appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Potential for Mediation in Afghanistan 

Afghanistan was once the venue for the . The British Empire and the Soviet Union jostled for influence here. Today, external articles are involved too. Pakistan, the US, India, Iran, Russia, Turkey, China and the EU are involved in one way or another in Afghanistan. There are many organizations, regions and ethnic groups jostling for power as well.

With so many actors in the conflict, Afghanistan needs a neutral mediator. In the past, the likes of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran have tried to mediate but failed because they were unable to remain neutral. Qatar, however, is a neutral player in Afghanistan and its efforts deserve a closer look. 

Complicated Past but Profitable Future

Earlier mediation efforts by Qatar did not prevent the Taliban’s dramatic takeover in Afghanistan but Qatar’s leverage is considerable. Economic factors, neutrality, security, branding, and friendly connections with conservative Islamists make Qatar uniquely positioned to be a successful mediator. 

In the last two decades, Qatar sought to make an impact on the international stage by playing mediation roles since it lacks political clout and military power. Accordingly, Qatar authorities have demonstrated an ability to perform third-party dispute settlements and have also proved themselves to be successful local and worldwide investors. Qatar’s economic success has made them a major player on the global energy scene, heightening their importance in the eyes of public and private sectors  around the world.

Qatar’s foreign policy aim is to position itself as the champion of Arab diplomacy in the Arab and Islamic world, particularly the Middle East. Doha, Qatar’s Capital, sees itself as a beneficent mediator in all disputes. In addition, Qatar is not a member of any group in the Afghanistan conflict. This implies that Doha has no commercial ties to the Afghanistan war, which has earned Qatar the trust of other prominent actors in the conflict. 

Qatar has been heavily engaged in Afghanistan in recent years, using its advantage of historical experience to position itself as a key participant in several mediation procedures. They also established a modality for dispute resolution, which is called the Qatari Model of Conflict Resolution (QMCR). It is through this model that Doha has engaged in different conflict resolution processes in Middle Eastern and North African nations—as well as in the failed Afghanistan peace process.

Even though Qatar’s goal of ending the Afghanistan conflict has not yet been achieved, there is still potential that Doha can be successful in mediation efforts to resolve the newest phase of the crisis in Afghanistan.

A Breakthrough Plan for Qatar

The following seven steps can help Doha achieve success in ending the half-century conflict in Afghanistan. 

Step 1: The most important reason for Doha’s advantage in the Afghanistan peace process is Qatar hosting the Taliban. Many of the group’s leaders have lived in Qatar over the last 20 years and the group’s political office has long operated out of the country.

However, this could raise concerns about partiality and Qatar’s role in the conflict since the Taliban is an extremist and terrorist group. Therefore, Qatar should work to assure the people of Afghanistan and anti-Taliban groups of its intention to support a secure Afghanistan and to adopt an inclusive citizen-oriented democratic set-up. Qatar should open offices of the Taliban’s oppositions abroad, particularly an office for the National Resistance Front in Doha. This would lay the groundwork for building trust and direct talks between the conflicting factions.

Step 2: The nature of hostilities varies by location. Afghanistan’s history, culture, identity, and narratives are distinctly different from those of the Arab world, like Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Sudan. The lack of a clear definition of the relationships among ethnic groups and an effective government structure has caused the crisis to be extended. Therefore, mediation to define a social contract and build trust among the leaders, elites and intellectuals of Afghanistan will help solve the ongoing crisis. 

Step 3:  Doha has often used a checkbook approach, or financial leverage, during mediations. However, this is a potential challenge in the Afghanistan context. Doha’s financial assistance to the Taliban and the republic government often resulted in a short-term or shaky peace, like the temporary in 2020. However, Qatar’s leadership can use its clout to join the US and NATO as a hard leveraging factor through likely military means, alongside checkbooks. To mediate, a combination of financial and military leverage is required in Afghanistan given the Taliban’s ideological and rejectionist nature. 

Step 4: Since , US representatives have visited the Taliban in their Qatar headquarters, but the Qatari government has attempted to keep these visits private to the public. Doha thought it could break the ice between the Taliban and the USA by not publicly revealing the agenda or the significance of the meetings. However, Qatar’s covert approach to talking to the Taliban resulted in a lack of trust in Doha in parts of Afghanistan and anti-Taliban organizations. Therefore, Qatar should begin open negotiations instead.

Step 5: Since Doha’s aim is to bring all stakeholders to the table, the Qatari government should also use the QMCR approach both in and outside Afghanistan. For example, Doha even attempted to bring Iran and US officials to the table to talk about Iran’s nuclear .

Step 6: The QMCR model also faces challenges because of criticisms of Qatar’s approach to Afghanistan society. Many feel that Qatar has closer ties to Pashtunwali and the Taliban than the Persianized Tajiks because of Qatar’s allegiance to Salafi and Deobandi Orthodoxy. Some in Afghanistan also believe that Doha’s foreign policy strengthened the Taliban. To distinguish Qatar as a neutral player, it must gain the trust of its critics.  To do this, Qatar must be sensitive to the complexities of the socio-political fabric of Afghanistan. This is vital for ending the Afghanistan conflict.

Step 7: Qatar can also forestall future conflict in the new Taliban-led Afghanistan. This entails building trust between conflicted parties, which Doha must understand cannot be done overnight. QMCR’s major priority should be to reduce conflict between the National Resistance Forces, other anti-Taliban fighters, and the Taliban in various districts of Afghanistan.

The Best Way Forward 

Considering the half-century conflict in Afghanistan has domestic and international dimensions, Qatar has the opportunity to play an effective role as a powerful mediator. This can bring major achievements for Afghanistan, but also for Qatar’s foreign policy interests.

Qatar has projected its mediation capacities as part of its foreign policy brand, but its mediation efforts in international diplomacy have largely been unsuccessful. Establishing lasting peace is not only  important to end this  long-term crisis in Afghanistan, but Qatar can regain its reputation as a successful mediator.

Ultimately, the Qatar conflict resolution model must make adjustments while retaining its core principles. If the government of Qatar adopts this new approach to this complex crisis, it stands a strong chance of success.

[edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Between Success and Failure in Afghanistan: Advice for Qatar appeared first on 51�Թ�.

At least the Russian president and his state-run media make no of his regime’s with Wagner. The American government, on the other hand, seldom acknowledges its own version of the privatization of war — the of private security contractors it’s used in its misguided , involving military and intelligence operations in a staggering .

At least as far back as the through World Wars and , the and , and the first , “contractors,” as we like to call them, have long been with us. Only recently, however, have they begun playing such a large role in our wars, with an estimated of them directly involved in combat and intelligence operations.

Contractors have both committed horrific abuses and acted bravely under fire (because they have all too often been under fire). From torture at prison in Iraq to interrogations at the detention camp, from employees of the private security firm Blackwater on unarmed Iraqi civilians to contractors a U.S. base under attack in Afghanistan, they have been an essential part of the war on terror. And yes, they both killed Afghans and some who had worked as escape from Taliban rule.

The involvement of private companies has allowed Washington to continue to conduct its operations around the globe, even if many Americans think that our war on terror in , , and elsewhere has ended. I tried looking for any kind of a survey of how many of us realize that it continues in and elsewhere, but all I could find was pollster Nate Silver’s of “lessons learned” from that global conflict, as if it were part of our history. And unless respondents were caring for a combat-wounded veteran, they tended to look unfavorably on sending our troops into battle in distant lands — so scratch that as a lesson learned from our forever wars. 

None of this surprises me. American troops are in significant numbers, nor are crowding the waitlists at backlogged Veterans Affairs hospitals as would be the case if those troops had been the only ones doing the fighting.

At points during this century’s war on terror, in fact, the U.S. used more civilian contractors in its ongoing wars than uniformed military personnel. In fact, as of 2019, according to Brown University’s Costs of War Project, which I co-founded, there were than troops in the U.S. Central Command region that includes Afghanistan, Iraq, and 18 other countries in the Middle East, as well as Central and South Asia. As recently as December 2022, the Pentagon had about deployed throughout that region, with concentrated in Iraq and Syria. To be sure, most of those workers were unarmed and providing food service, communications aid, and the like. Even more tellingly, of them were citizens of other countries, particularly ones.

In 2020, retired Army Officer Danny Sjursen an interesting explanation for how the war on terror was then becoming ever more privatized: the Covid-19 pandemic had changed the Pentagon’s war-making strategy as the public began to question how much money and how many lives were being expended on war abroad rather than healthcare at home. As a result, Sjursen argued, the U.S. had begun deploying ever more contractors, remote drones, CIA paramilitaries, and (often abusive) local forces in that war on terror while U.S. troops were redeployed to Europe and the Pacific to contain a resurgent Russia and China. In other words, during the pandemic, Washington placed ever more dirty work in corporate and foreign hands.

(Not) Counting Contractors

It’s been a challenge to write about private security contractors because our government does anything but a good job of counting them. Though the Defense Department keeps of how many civilian contractors it employs and where, they exclude employees contracted with the Central Intelligence Agency or the State Department.

When Costs of War first tried to count contractor deaths by searching official government sources, we came up short. The spouse of a gravely wounded armed contractor directed me to her blog, where she had started to compile a list of just such deaths based on daily Google searches, even as she worked hard caring for her spouse and managing his disability paperwork. She and I eventually lost touch and it appears that she stopped compiling such numbers long ago. Still, we at the project took a page from her book, while adding reported war deaths among foreign nationals working for the Pentagon to our formula. Costs of War researchers then estimated that had been killed in our wars in the Middle East as of 2019, or about more than the U.S. troops who died during the same period.

Social scientists have tried to extrapolate from reported contractor deaths in order to paint a picture of who they were while still alive. They believe that most of them were white veterans in their forties; many were former Special Forces operatives and a number of former officers with college degrees).

Limited Choices for Veterans

How do people of relative racial, economic, and gendered privilege end up in positions that, while well-paid, are even more precarious than being in the armed forces? As a therapist serving military families and as a military spouse, I would say that the path to security contracting reflects a deep in our society between military and civilian life. Although veteran unemployment rates are than those in the civilian population, many of them tend to seek out what they know best and that means military training, staffing, weapons production — and, for some, combat.

I recently spoke with one Marine infantry veteran who had completed four combat tours. He told me that, after leaving the service, he lacked a community that understood what he had been through. He sought to avoid social isolation by getting a government job. However, after applying for several positions in law enforcement agencies, he “failed” lie detector tests (owing to the common stress reactions of war-traumatized veterans). Having accidentally stumbled on a veteran-support nonprofit group, he ultimately found connections that led him to decide to return to school and retrain in a new profession. But, as he pointed out, “many of my other friends from the Marines numbed their pain with drugs or by going back to war as security contractors.”

Not everyone views contracting as a strategy of last resort. Still, I find it revealing of the limited sense of possibility such veterans experience that the companies employing them are large corporations servicing the Department of Defense through activities like information technology support, weapons production, or offers of personnel, both armed and not.

The Corporate Wounded

And keep in mind that such jobs are anything but easy. Many veterans find themselves facing yet more of the same — quick, successive combat deployments as contractors.

Anyone in this era of insurance mega-corporations who has ever had to battle for coverage is aware that doing so isn’t easy. Private insurers can maximize their profits by holding onto premium payments as long as possible while denying covered services.

A federal law called the (DBA) requires that corporations fund workers’ compensation claims for their employees laboring under U.S. contracts, regardless of their nationalities, with the taxpayer footing the bill. The program grew exponentially after the start of the war on terror, but insurance companies have not consistently met their obligations under the law. In 2008, a by the Los Angeles Times and ProPublica found that insurers like Chicago-based CAN Financial Corps were earning up to 50% profits on some of their war-zone policies, while many employees of contractors lacked adequate care and compensation for their injuries.

Congress called on the Pentagon and the Department of Labor to better enforce the DBA in 2011, some companies continued to operate with impunity vis–à–vis their own workers, sometimes even failing to purchase insurance for them or refusing to help them file claims as required by law.  While insurance companies made tens of millions of dollars in profits during the second decade of the war on terror, between 2009 and 2021, the Department of Labor insurers of those contracting corporations a total of only $3,250 for failing to report DBA claims. 

Privatizing Foreign Policy

At its core, the war on terror sought to create an image of the U.S. abroad as a beacon of and the . Yet there is probably no better evidence of how poorly this worked in practice at home and abroad than the little noted (mis)use of security contractors. Without their ever truly being seen, they prolonged that global set of conflicts, inflicting damage on other societies and being damaged themselves in America’s name. Last month, the Costs of War Project reported that the U.S. is now subcontractors Bancroft Global Development and Pacific Architects and Engineers to train the Somali National Army in its counterterrorism efforts. Meanwhile, the U.S. intervention there has only helped precipitate a further in terrorist attacks in the region.

The global presence created by such contractors also manifests itself in how we respond to threats to their lives. In March 2023, a self-destructing drone at a U.S. maintenance facility on a coalition base in northeastern Syria, killing a contractor employed by the Pentagon and injuring another, while wounding five American soldiers. After that drone was found to be of Iranian origin, President Biden ordered an airstrike on facilities in Syria used by Iranian-allied forces. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin , “No group will strike our troops with impunity.” While he later expressed condolences to the family of the contractor who was the only one killed in that attack, his could have more explicitly acknowledged that contractors are even more numerous than troops among the dead from our forever wars.

In late December 2019, a contractor working as an interpreter on a U.S. military base in Iraq was by rockets fired by an Iranian-backed militia. Shortly afterward, then-President Trump ordered an that killed the commander of an elite Iranian military unit, sparking concern about a dangerous escalation with that country. Trump later , “Iran killed an American contractor, wounding many. We strongly responded, and always will.”

I can’t believe I’m saying this, but Trump’s tweet was more honest than Austin’s official statement: such contractors are now an essential part of America’s increasingly privatized wars and will continue to be so, in seemingly ever greater numbers. Even though retaliating for attacks on their lives has little to do with effective counterterrorism (as the Costs of War Project has made clear), bearing witness to war in all their grim diversity is the least the rest of us can do as American citizens. Because how can we know whether — and — our shadowy, shape-shifting wars “work” if we continue to let our leaders wage an increasingly privatized version of them in ways meant to obscure our view of the carnage they’ve caused?

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The eloquent general goes on to share his insights on the complex political and military situation in Afghanistan over the past 20 years. He served twice in the country and shares his rich insights here. The Canadian Defence Attaché also speaks about Iraq, the rise of ISIS, the Syrian civil war and Qasem Soleimani of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He shares many lessons relevant for military members, diplomats, and all students of history, geopolitics and international relations.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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That past, though seemingly distant, is still shaping the world we live in. Those legendary generals and admirals are, of course, long gone, but the geopolitics they practiced at such a cost still has profound implications. For just as Washington encircled Eurasia to win a great war and global hegemony, so Beijing is now involved in a far less militarized reprise of that reach for global power.

And to be blunt, these days, China’s gain is America’s loss. Every step Beijing takes to consolidate its control over Eurasia simultaneously weakens Washington’s presence on that strategic continent and so erodes its once formidable global power.

A Cold War Strategy

After four embattled years imbibing lessons about geopolitics with their morning coffee and bourbon nightcaps, America’s wartime generation of generals and admirals understood, intuitively, how to respond to the future alliance of the two great communist powers in Moscow and Beijing.

In 1948, following his move from the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, Secretary of State George Marshall launched the Marshall Plan to rebuild a war-torn Western Europe, laying the economic foundations for the formation of the NATO alliance just a year later. After a similar move from the wartime Allied headquarters in London to the White House in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower helped complete a chain of military bastions along Eurasia’s Pacific littoral by signing a series of mutual-security pacts — with South Korea in 1953, Taiwan in 1954, and Japan in 1960. For the next 70 years, that island chain would serve as the strategic hinge on Washington’s global power, critical for both the defense of North America and dominance over Eurasia.

After fighting to conquer much of that vast continent during World War II, America’s postwar leaders certainly knew how to defend their gains. For more than 40 years, their unrelenting efforts to dominate Eurasia assured Washington of an upper hand and, in the end, victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War. To constrain the communist powers inside that continent, the US ringed its 6,000 miles with , thousands of jet fighters, and three massive naval armadas — the 6th Fleet in the Atlantic, the 7th Fleet in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and, somewhat later, the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf.

Thanks to , that strategy gained the name “containment” and, with it, Washington could, in effect, sit back and wait while the Sino-Soviet bloc imploded through diplomatic blunder and military misadventure. After the Beijing-Moscow split of 1962 and China’s subsequent collapse into the chaos of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, the Soviet Union tried repeatedly, if unsuccessfully, to break out of its geopolitical isolation — in the Congo, Cuba, Laos, Egypt, Ethiopia, Angola, and Afghanistan. In the last and most disastrous of those interventions, which Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev “the bleeding wound,” the Red Army deployed 110,000 soldiers for nine years of brutal Afghan combat, hemorrhaging money and in ways that would contribute to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In that heady moment of seeming victory as the sole superpower left on planet Earth, a younger generation of Washington foreign-policy leaders, trained not on battlefields but in think tanks, took little more than a decade to let that unprecedented global power start to slip away. Toward the close of the Cold War era in 1989, Francis Fukuyama, an academic working in the State Department’s policy planning unit, won instant fame among Washington insiders with his seductive phrase “.” He argued that America’s liberal world order would soon sweep up all of humanity on an endless tide of capitalist democracy. As he put it in a much-cited essay: “The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident… in the total exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives to Western liberalism… seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture.”

The Invisible Power of Geopolitics

Amid such triumphalist rhetoric, Zbigniew Brzezinski, another academic sobered by more worldly experience, reflected on what he had learned about geopolitics during the Cold War as an adviser to two presidents, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. In his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski the first serious American study of geopolitics in more than half a century. In the process, he warned that the depth of US global hegemony, even at this peak of unipolar power, was inherently “shallow.”

For the United States and, he added, every major power of the past 500 years, Eurasia, home to 75% of the world’s population and productivity, was always “the chief geopolitical prize.” To perpetuate its “preponderance on the Eurasian continent” and so preserve its global power, Washington would, he warned, have to counter three threats: “the expulsion of America from its offshore bases” along the Pacific littoral; ejection from its “perch on the western periphery” of the continent provided by NATO; and finally, the formation of “an assertive single entity” in the sprawling center of Eurasia.

Arguing for Eurasia’s continued post-Cold War centrality, Brzezinski drew heavily on the work of a long-forgotten British academic, Sir Halford Mackinder. In a 1904 essay that sparked the modern study of geopolitics, Mackinder that, for the past 500 years, European imperial powers had dominated Eurasia from the sea, but the construction of trans-continental railroads was shifting the locus of control to its vast interior “heartland.” In 1919, in the wake of World War I, he also that Eurasia, along with Africa, formed a massive “world island” and offered this bold geopolitical formula: “Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World.” Clearly, Mackinder was about 100 years premature in his predictions.

But today, by combining Mackinder’s geopolitical theory with Brzezinski’s gloss on global politics, it’s possible to discern, in the confusion of this moment, some potential long-term trends. Imagine Mackinder-style geopolitics as a deep substrate that shapes more ephemeral political events, much the way the slow grinding of the planet’s tectonic plates becomes visible when volcanic eruptions break through the earth’s surface. Now, let’s try to imagine what all this means in terms of international geopolitics today.

China’s Geopolitical Gambit

In the decades since the Cold War’s close, China’s increasing control over Eurasia clearly represents a fundamental change in that continent’s geopolitics. Convinced that Beijing would play the global game by US rules, Washington’s foreign policy establishment made a major strategic miscalculation in 2001 by admitting it to the World Trade Organization (WTO). “Across the ideological spectrum, we in the US foreign policy community,” two former members of the Obama administration, “shared the underlying belief that US power and hegemony could readily mold China to the United States’ liking… All sides of the policy debate erred.” In little more than a decade after it joined the WTO, Beijing’s annual exports to the US grew nearly five-fold and its foreign currency from just $200 billion to an unprecedented $4 trillion by 2013.

In 2013, drawing on those vast cash reserves, China’s new president, Xi Jinping, a trillion-dollar infrastructure initiative to transform Eurasia into a unified market. As a steel grid of rails and petroleum pipelines began crisscrossing the continent, China ringed the tri-continental world island with a chain of — from Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, around Africa’s coast, to Europe from Piraeus, Greece, to Hamburg, Germany. In launching what soon became history’s largest development project, 10 times the size of the Marshall Plan, Xi is consolidating Beijing’s geopolitical dominance over Eurasia, while fulfilling Brzezinski’s fear of the rise of “an assertive single entity” in Central Asia.

Unlike the US, China hasn’t spent significant effort establishing military bases. While Washington still maintains some in 80 nations, Beijing has just one military base in Djibouti on the east African coast, a on Myanmar’s Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal, a in eastern Tajikistan, and half a dozen small outposts in the South China Sea.

Moreover, while Beijing was focused on building Eurasian infrastructure, Washington was fighting two disastrous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in a strategically inept bid to dominate the Middle East and its oil reserves (just as the world was beginning to transition away from petroleum to renewable energy). In contrast, Beijing has concentrated on the slow, stealthy accretion of investments and influence across Eurasia from the South China Sea to the North Sea. By changing the continent’s underlying geopolitics through this commercial integration, it’s winning a level of control not seen in the last thousand years, while unleashing powerful forces for political change.

Tectonic Shifts Shake US Power

After a decade of Beijing’s relentless economic expansion across Eurasia, the tectonic shifts in that continent’s geopolitical substrate have begun to manifest themselves in a series of diplomatic eruptions, each erasing another aspect of US influence. Four of the more recent ones might seem, at first glance, unrelated but are all driven by the relentless force of geopolitical change.

First came the sudden, unexpected collapse of the US position in Afghanistan, forcing Washington to end its 20-year occupation in August 2021 with a humiliating withdrawal. In a slow, stealthy geopolitical squeeze play, Beijing had signed massive development deals with all the surrounding Central Asian nations, leaving American troops isolated there. To provide critical air support for its infantry, US jet fighters 2,000 miles from their nearest base in the Persian Gulf — an unsustainable long-term situation and unsafe for troops on the ground. As the US-trained Afghan Army collapsed and Taliban guerrillas drove into Kabul atop captured Humvees, the chaotic US retreat in defeat became unavoidable.

Just six months later in February 2022, President Vladimir Putin massed an armada of armored vehicles loaded with 200,000 troops on Ukraine’s border. If Putin is to be believed, his “special military operation” was to be a NATO’s influence and the Western alliance — one of Brzezinski’s conditions for the US eviction from Eurasia.

But first Putin visited Beijing to court President Xi’s support, a seemingly tall order given China’s decades of lucrative trade with the United States, a mind-boggling $500 billion in 2021. Yet Putin scored a that the two nations’ relations were “superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era” and a denunciation of “the further expansion of NATO.”

As it happened, Putin did so at a perilous price. Instead of attacking Ukraine in frozen February when his tanks could have maneuvered off-road on their way to the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, he had to wait out Beijing’s Winter Olympics. So, Russian troops invaded instead in muddy March, leaving his armored vehicles stuck in a 40-mile traffic jam on where the Ukrainians readily more than 1,000 tanks. Facing diplomatic isolation and European trade embargos as his defeated invasion degenerated into a set of vengeful , Moscow shifted much of its exports to China. That quickly raised bilateral to an all-time high, while reducing Russia to but another piece on Beijing’s geopolitical chessboard.

Then, just last month, Washington found itself diplomatically marginalized by an utterly unexpected resolution of the sectarian divide that had long defined the politics of the Middle East. After signing a infrastructure deal with Iran and making Saudi Arabia its , Beijing was well positioned to broker a major between those bitter regional rivals, Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. Within weeks, the foreign ministers of the two nations sealed the deal with a deeply symbolic — a bittersweet reminder of the days not long ago when Arab diplomats paid court in Washington.

Finally, the Biden administration was this month when Europe’s preeminent leader, Emmanuel Macron of France, for a series of intimate tête-à-tête chats with China’s President Xi. At the close of that extraordinary journey, which French companies billions in lucrative contracts, Macron announced “a global strategic partnership with China” and promised he would not “take our cue from the US agenda” over Taiwan. A spokesman for the Élysée Palace quickly released a pro forma clarification that “the United States is our ally, with shared values.” Even so, Macron’s Beijing declaration reflected both his of the European Union as an independent strategic player and that bloc’s ever-closer economic ties to China

The Future of Geopolitical Power

Projecting such political trends a decade into the future, Taiwan’s fate would seem, at best, uncertain. Instead of the “shock and awe” of aerial bombardments, Washington’s default mode of diplomatic discourse in this century, Beijing prefers stealthy, sedulous geopolitical pressure. In building its island bases in the South China Sea, for example, it inched forward incrementally — first dredging, then building structures, next runways, and finally emplacing anti-aircraft — in the process avoiding any confrontation over its functional capture of an entire sea.

Lest we forget, Beijing has built its formidable economic-political-military power in little more than a decade. If its strength continues to increase inside Eurasia’s geopolitical substrate at even a fraction of that head-spinning pace for another decade, it may be able to execute a deft geopolitical squeeze-play on Taiwan like the one that drove the US out of Afghanistan. Whether from a , incessant naval patrols, or some other form of pressure, Taiwan might just fall quietly into Beijing’s grasp.

Should such a geopolitical gambit prevail, the US strategic frontier along the Pacific littoral would be broken, possibly pushing its Navy back to a “” from Japan to Guam — the last of Brzezinski’s criteria for the true waning of US global power. In that event, Washington’s leaders could once again find themselves sitting on the proverbial diplomatic and economic sidelines, wondering how it all happened.
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I found the background to the rushed US and allied exit from Afghanistan revealing, but also incomplete. I was in Washington, as the ambassador of the EU, in 2009. Barack Obama was then president. He announced to assembled ambassadors that he planned to dramatically increase US troop presence in Afghanistan. This so-called was supposed to wrest back control of the country from the Taliban.

Obama was motivated by a desire to strengthen the US global military position. He also wanted to make Afghanistan a human rights respecting democracy. At the time, Obama’s policy seemed overambitious to me. George W. Bush had tried a troop surge in Iraq. This 2007 surge had similar goals to the 2009 one and had failed.

Peril tells us that Joe Biden, who was Obama’s vice president at the time, was totally opposed to the surge. But Hillary Clinton, the then secretary of state, and Robert Gates, the then secretary of defense, and American generals favored the surge. They prevailed.

When Trump took over, he wanted to get US troops out of Afghanistan as quickly as possible. But inertia and lack of focus on his part meant that Trump never actually managed to achieve his goal.  It fell to Biden to implement this part of the Trump agenda, in the same manner as he is implementing the Trump policy on China.

The US withdrawal was a botched job. Afghans who had loyally served the allies were abandoned. Woodward and Costa offer no explanations for this abandonment.

Their book does offer an insight into Biden’s style of negotiation with the Congress. He is tough and relentless in his pursuit of a deal. He was, and is, determined to put money in the pockets of working class Americans . Biden has been so good at achieving his goals that his stimulus bills may have contributed to demand-led inflation in the US.

The book also examines the fateful days that led up to the storming of the US Capitol on January 6. Did Trump’s incitement of violence and his attempts to overturn the popular vote add up to a crime for which he could be convicted in a court of law?

I believe the answer is to be found in the speech made by Senator Mitch McConnell, the Republican leader of the Senate, after the second attempt to impeach Trump had failed. Describing what happened on 6 January as a “disgrace” and an “act of terrorism”, he Trump “practically and morally responsible.” Yet he voted to acquit Trump. McConnell took the view that “by the strict criminal standard, the President’s speech probably was not incitement.”

After all he has done, Trump still leads many Republican polls. The peril to American democracy comes from kind and decent Americans, who are putting cultural and party loyalty ahead of the interests of democracy in America.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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I take the view that the conflict arose from the expansion of to ex-communist countries in breach of initial promises to Moscow. The unstated aim was to block any attempt by Russia to reemerge as a major world power. The list of new NATO members after the Cold War includes the former East Germany, three former members of the Soviet Union and five former members of the Warsaw Pact. 

It is also well known that some de facto powers in the US have a private financial interest in the war industry. President Dwight Eisenhower, who was Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Chief of Staff of United States Army, knew what he was talking about when he warned citizens in his farewell address in 1961 to “guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.” Eisenhower predicted that “the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” 

An enemy has its uses

It is well known that warmongering think tanks in Washington pushed to arm Ukraine after the Russian occupation of Crimea. Many Washington, DC strategists believe that the lesson of American defeats in the Middle East is that the US must sell arms without sending soldiers. That benefits shareholders, creates jobs and keeps America as the dominant superpower.

Private geopolitical and economic interests for the foreign conflict need a favorable internal political situation, something I discuss in my forthcoming book Constitutional Polarization: A critical review of the U.S. political system. When the country was under internal construction during the 19th century, it had no foreign policy. 

The issues at that time were territorial expansion from the thirteen independent colonies, the structure of new territories and states and the layout of their boundaries. Only since the early 20th century, when the United States established fixed continental borders and became internally organized as a more stable federation, has it been able to pursue an independent foreign policy. 

However, American foreign policy is heavily clouded by the ineffectiveness of the domestic political system. The constitutional formula for the separation of powers between a legislative Congress and an executive President with only two political parties tends to produce deadlocks. They often lead to legislative paralysis, frequent government shutdowns and presidential impeachments. 

Only existential threats make bipartisan cooperation possible. Only then do the White House and Capitol Hill work together. This proved to be the case during both World War II and the Cold War. The call for war in the 1940s, the “” in the 1950s and its second edition in the 1980s were accompanied by popular feelings of fear and national unity, as well as low electoral participation and widespread political apathy. 

In contrast, during the last thirty years of relative peace, unresolved internal political issues and new demands have emerged on all sorts of issues: health, climate, immigration, race, religion, gender, sex, family, education, gun control and voting rights. These  have caused mass mobilizations, protests, confrontations and partisan polarization. External fear has been replaced by internal anger. 

An external enemy helps political leaders

When President Bill Clinton was under siege from Republicans on all sides, he confessed, “I would have preferred to be president during World War II” and “I was envious that Kennedy had an enemy.” President George W. Bush also longed for such a past when he launched the fight against a new “” and Islamist terrorism that, according to his nonsensical logic, “followed the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism.” 

President Barack Obama was paralyzed by the suspicion that ending those wars might open up too many divisive domestic issues. It was President Donald Trump who started the withdrawal of troops from the Middle East and the first president in many years who did not start a new war; as a result, he faced an inner hell. 

President Joe Biden and the Democrats know that the Republicans will block any initiative on economic, social and cultural issues in the House of Representatives. To attract their cooperation in this context of yet another divided government, the Democrats may adopt a belligerent foreign policy. A bipartisan foreign policy could satisfy the geopolitical interest of expanding NATO, containing Russia and making money for the American defense industry. 

The US faces a constant dilemma between internal anger and external fear. This constantly creates political tension. This tension is resolved when faced by a transparently bad foreign enemy. Russia plays this role perfectly today. In the past, the Soviet Union, its earlier avatar, played the same role.

Yet, we are not living the nationalist hysteria of the Cold War, but a flimsy bad copy of it. Security and military chiefs, including William Burns, the former ambassador to Russia and current CIA director, and General Mark Milley, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, remember Eisenhower’s warning. They are more aware of the human costs of war than politicians who are worrying about the next election. Hence, both Burns and Milley have no overriding interest in another long-running conflict and are pushing for peace negotiations. It remains to be seen if the politicians let them succeed.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Although Americans are now focused on the mission in Ukraine, the non-Western world is still in a state of shock over President Joe Biden’s shambolic retreat from Afghanistan in August 2021. It followed two decades of tragic and ultimately meaningless engagement inaugurated by Bush in 2001 and cluelessly prolonged by Barack Obama and Donald Trump. This ongoing string of events over the first two decades of the century has convinced the populations and even the governments of the global South that the US decline is well on its way.

The Afghanistan debacle, followed strategically by the stated mission of weakening Russia via a proxy war in Ukraine that Biden promises will last “as long as it takes,” have undermined global trust in US foreign policy and the ideology in whose name acts. Despite growing evidence that a multipolar world is now emerging, destined to replace the unipolar hegemony of the US, Americans still believe in their mission that consists of guiding every region of the world to embrace Superman’s ideal of imposing “the American way.”

Reuters has just published an by Idrees Ali bearing the title: “U.S. defense secretary aims to reassure Mideast allies, deliver tough message.” Americans still believe that the best way to “reassure” is to act “tough.” Ali cites the former head of American forces in the Middle East, Retired U.S. Marine Corp General Frank McKenzie, who explains that “the region is significant to the United States in part because of China’s growing role.” The Middle East was once deemed significant because of Saddam Hussein’s dreaded (but inexistent) weapons of mass destruction, as well as the threat posed by terrorist organiations — first Al Qaeda and then ISIS — all of which were present in the region. Now it’s China, a nation located thousands of kilometers away.

The Pentagon’s Love of Threats

A close reading of this quote reveals two things: not only the growing paranoia of the US with regard to China, but also the profound indifference of the US to the fate of the region and its people. The problem that concerns the US isn’t war, terrorism, poverty, dictatorial regimes, repeated refugee crises and gutted economies. No, the problem identified by the US is “China’s growing role.” Is roleplay really the top priority in a world faced by far more consequential crises? 

A second quote from Mackenzie throws more light on the core of US policy. In his praise for US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s decision to visit the region, Mackenzie explains: “I think this trip is an excellent example of an opportunity to continue to tell people in the theater (region) that they remain important to us,””

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Theater (of war):

In the language of the military, a place where destruction is wrought and people die for the sake of a strategic cause often decided by people at a considerable distance from the stage.

Contextual note

Hoping readers might not notice the effect of Mackenzie’s vocabulary, Reuters took the liberty of inserting a gloss that translates “theater” as “region.” We mustn’t put two and two together and understand that Americans think of this populated region essentially as a “theater of war.” But that is clearly what Mackenzie meant. Unless we suppose his vision of the Middle East is as a place to put on plays by Shakespeare, Molière, Tennessee Williams or even the Syrian playwright, Mamdouh Adwan.

Mackenzie cites Austin’s visit as proof of the fact that the “people in the theater…remain important to us.” What sense does he have of what is “important” for the people? Ali offers this explanation: that “Austin is poised to send a clear message on the need for Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to respect human rights, underscoring Washington’s concern on the issue.”

The Permanent State of Emergency in Egypt

But how real is that concern? Two short paragraphs later Ali reminds readers that following the 2013 coup that put Sisi in power, “there has been a long crackdown on political dissent that has swept up liberal critics as well as Islamists.” The coup was supported, if not engineered by the US, who, for the past decade has shown little serious concern about Sisi’s track record on human rights, apart from at one point symbolically withholding “small amounts of military aid to Cairo.” Austin’s mission appears to be focused on preparing to theatrically deliver what in diplomatic language is often called “stern words.” Just the kind of thing an actor does on the stage of a theater.

Ali concludes the article on a curious note by highlighting the “mistrust toward the United States” felt by “some in the Middle East,” a mistrust that he tells us has been building since 2011, when “President Barack Obama’s administration abandoned the late Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak after a decades-old alliance.” He also cites Biden’s “chaotic withdrawal” from Afghanistan in 2021 that raised further questions in the broader region about Washington’s “concern” for the people.

Historical note

Washington has never abandoned its belief in its mission to control strategic regions, however distant they may be from the US itself. Some see this as inevitable after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, an event political analyst Francis Fukuyama’s proclaimed to mark the “end of history.” But history did not end in 1991. And since that date, the US progressively found itself faced with trying to understand what the rest of the world already knew: that history is not some providential plan heralding the emergence of the US as what Madeleine Albright called “the indispensable nation.”

Instead, history exists as a permanent tangle of complex and always shifting interactions between –

at the grass roots or micro level –  human agents and –  in terms of trade and exchange at the macro level –  between the various types of political organizations and power structures that inevitably emerge at different epochs. Humans have a talent for producing such structures in a vast variety of configurations, as the late David Graeber and David Wenger pointed out in their book, The Dawn of Everything. Political organization fulfils the aim of making collective life possible in every locality or region. The nation state that now accounts for all inhabited land on earth is simply the most recent historical example of that kind of collective realization.

Western civilization, now guided from North America, has always sought to represent itself as the emerging end point of an inexorable historical process that embodies the idea of an ultimate societal ideal. Fukuyama’s End of History specifically cites and claims to update Georg Wilhelm Friedrich von Hegel’s dialectical theory of history. Karl Marx transformed Hegel’s concept into what he called dialectical materialism, that described a series of class struggles leading to global communism. Even Martin Luther King’s famous remark that ““the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice” echoed Hegelian thinking.

Charles Darwin himself was influenced by Hegel’s mode of thought. Darwin conceived of  evolution as the survival of the fittest. His biological theory spawned the political ideology of “Social Darwinism” that prepared the terrain for Hitler’s racist view of history.

Hitler’s extreme example at least served to discredit specifically racist versions of the Darwinian thesis. But social Darwinism persists in non-racist form at the core of liberal capitalist ideology. It treats the past – including that of one’s own people –as merely a prelude to the present, felt to be an emerging ideal resulting from eras of competitive success.

In such a perspective, both the natural and political environments are thought of essentially as theaters, if not of war, then of cutthroat competition. That may be the ultimate lesson to be drawn from Secretary Austin’s staged visit and former General Frank McKenzie’s theatrical allusion.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Unfortunately, much of the existing research published by Indian and foreign scholars covers only the Indian side of Kashmir. The POK has somehow escaped a careful and critical analysis due to lack of initiative by the mainstream media and the narrative of Indian aggression built and sustained by external powers. The only broadcasting any information concerning the conditions in POK is the India Meteorological Department, and still, it only relays the weather forecast. The atrocities, human rights violations, ethnic cleansing and annihilation of Indian culture have all been swept under the rug, and have ultimately failed to raise alarm concerning the actions of the Pakistani military. 

Han and Hindu Nationalism Come Face to Face

The Strategic Significance of Gilgit and Baltistan 

The region of Gilgit Baltistan (GB) connects the Xinjiang region of China to Pakistan, providing China with easy access to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This scenario weakens India’s position of power in both maritime and continental affairs. With presence in , a port city that is “strategically located at the apex of the Arabian Sea and at the mouth of the Persian Gulf,” China will not only be able to monitor the area, but will also severely limit India’s  retaliation options during wartime. The modern day economic progress only sustains due to large scale manufacturing and impeccable human capital, and Pakistan has neither. Hence, Gwadar is unlikely to become a trading hotspot, or even a significant cargo hub.. 

Furthermore, the GB  region has  historically fallen  on the trade route, by which Indian culture reached Central Asia and beyond. Not having a physical presence in GB imbibes a parochial  mindset and limits India’s  political influence to South Asian geopolitics. Currently, Indian trade with Central Asia is minuscule due to a variety of reasons, but the most significant inhibitor is a nonexistent land route. This is also the primary reason why Indian involvement in Afghanistan was so minimal, even though India’s  concerns in the conflict were much more immediate than other countries who intervened.

The GB region is also home to a treasure of glaciers which sustain Pakistan’s surface water-based economy. This region is also home to massive due to the presence of the Indus River and its many tributaries. The controversial of 1960 negotiated under the World Bank awarded a whopping 80% of water rights to Pakistan, robbing India of any edge when it comes to the hydrography of the subcontinent. These losses are of extreme importance, given India’s dependency on the area as a vital water source. 

What Lies Behind India’s Bold Bet on Kashmir?

China’s Long Game Strategy

In May 2022, China announced that it plans to connect the Chinese city of Kashgar with , the capital of Uzbekistan and the largest city in Central Asia, via railways. This strategic development is meant to ensure China’s continued rise as a global superpower. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is of the opinion that its presence in the Pacific is not enough to replace the US as global leader. Hence, China is actively connecting its hinterlands to more industrial areas. Using these new railways connecting Kashgar to Tashkent, China will be able to reach Turkey and Europe more easily by avoiding its vulnerability in the IOR. For these reasons, the GB region is critical to Chinese expansion. 

China is also aware of the fact that, notwithstanding their quest for expansion, the geography of the IOR cannot be defied, and will remain the primary economic and geopolitical theater of warfare for the eastern side of the continent. In the words of 19^th century naval thinker Alfred Mahan, control over the IOR is “the key to the .” As of today, the new land routes being constructed are not designed to carry large amounts of cargo. This means that for now, China will continue to conduct trade via routes in the IOR. 

China is actively executing a twin strategy in the GB region. Its first goal is to establish a connection with Persia, and its second, more long-term goal is to encircle India, denying it any strategic depth. As part of this strategy, the “” created between China and Iran plays a very important role. 

China’s push into West Asia is driven by its need for energy security as well as its long term quest to replace the US as global hegemon. A land route, via GB, is the most profound way of asserting its global role. Indeed, there are other factors at work in China’s persistent push towards Iran; however, China’s avid quest to increase land-based connectivity suggests that the main intent of the Chinese  is to perturb India. 

The Chinese are also looking to use Pakistan as a base to extract resources out of Afghanistan, and the (BRI) is a vital part of that strategy. The BRI, the developing modern version of the Silk Road, intends to connect China to all major economic centers of Asia, Africa and Europe via maritime and land routes. It broadly defines five of investments in connectivity, policy coordination, unimpeded trade, financial integration and connecting people. 

Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Strategic Genius, Arrogant Overreach or Something Else?

Several believe that “India is set out to replace China,” and thus must be mitigated. Within the GB region, China sees an opportunity to ensure that India is weakened and less likely to take action against China’s continued threat. 

Unsurprisingly, Chinese investments in Pakistan are above $60 billion, providing China with a major influence in Pakistan’s administration of the GB region. According to from June 2022, Pakistan was seriously considering the lease of the GB region to China to pay off its “mounting debts.” However, Pakistan’s primary hesitation in finalizing this agreement is the fear that after empowering China, the United Nations (UN) will discontinue all financial assistance being provided to Pakistan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For all of these reasons, it is imperative that India prevent the fate of the GB to be decided by such avaricious powers.  

 War on the Horizon?

In June 2020, reports indicated the presence of Chinese transport and at the Skardu air base, increasing fears of a possible two front war along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, an Indian union territory. These reports however, were not verified by the Indian government or military.

Considering Chinese investments in Pakistan, it is likely that China will station its  troops in the GB region at Skardu airbase even during peacetime. The dispute of 2020, in which Indian and Chinese soldiers fought using fatal hand-to-hand combat, also sparked concerns of impending war. Even more alarming are reports that Pakistani soldiers have been spotted consorting with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops , indicating a worrisome synchronization between the two hostile nations.

Many speculate that if India had not lost control of the GB region, the region would not have become a breeding ground for terrorism, and could have prevented thousands of casualties. Furthermore, India would have had a convenient land corridor to Afghanistan, sitting just 20 km away from Central Asia. It is also possible that the of 1962 could have been averted, or at least could have had a different outcome. India’s past mistakes will continue to haunt the nation in next two decades if the subcontinent’s political map remains the same. 

Governments Must Recognize the Importance of the Youth

India has tried to establish alternative routes to Central Asia via Chabhar, an Iranian port city, by joining it with a railway line to Afghanistan and then crossing into the Central Asian Region (CAR). However, Afghanistan’s volatile history threatens the security of these routes, and India cannot afford to become dependent on a regime as brutal as the Taliban. Therefore, India’s best alternate route still lies in the GB region, a region of immense strategic value involving three nuclear-armed powers. 

India’s potential for economic stability relies on its access to critical materials, including precious stones and rare earth minerals. The CAR is full of critical materials, enough to sustain a global from fossils to clean energy. Between 1850 and 2015, India has contributed only of global carbon emissions. However, India’s expected economic boom will undoubtedly contribute to a rise in per capita and historical carbon emissions, both consequences which the CAR offers solutions to. 

Another vital resource that is abundant in the GB region is the availability of  freshwater. The Indus river system, Pakistan’s primary source of water, has major tributaries located in the India-controlled territory of Kashmir. This region also has some of the largest glaciers on the planet outside of the polar regions. The Upper Indus Basin (UIB), situated in Gilgit, is home to many small streams that flow from the melting glaciers, and have the potential to generate  50,000 GW of hydroelectricity. Access to this incredible power source provides a colossal advantage to whichever nation controls the region at the time.

For India, water security is likely to become a major issue in upcoming decades. Several reports by the UN and Indian government agencies have concluded that India is likely to face severe water shortages in the upcoming decades. The mismanagement of major bodies of water in Indian cities, rapid and poorly planned urbanization and uncontrolled population growth is only adding fuel to an already dire situation. 

Plastics Threaten the Himalayan Environment

In 2019, the Indian government’s public policy think tank, NITI Aayog, found that nearly 60% of cities in India have already run out of ground water. Even more threatening to the impending water crisis in India are China’s plans to over the Mabja Zangbo, the main tributary to the Ganges River. India is currently facing many major threats to water security – but will this increasing tension escalate into a full-blown water war?

India and China are poised to have an increasingly competitive relationship in the upcoming decades, and Gilgit and Baltistan will indeed be a recurring aspect of contestation. China will do everything in its power to ensure its control over Gilgit and Baltisan. For India, I believe that the most  prosperous future lies in the reintegration of the upper Himalayan region, which has water, navigable land routes and strategic significance far beyond any other region of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

In 1963, Pakistan ‘gifted’ to China the , an area ofJ&K rich in water potential and other resources, in an effort to secure a powerful ally in future conflicts. The Shaksgam Valley is home to 242 glaciers, and is known as the third most glaciated region in the world, after the North and South poles. 

In 2021, China unveiled plans to construct the world’s largest polysilicon in a green oasis of the Taklamakan Desert, located in the western part of China. It is estimated that the production of a single 30 cm silicon wafer (used to make valuable microchips) requires approximately 10,000 liters of fresh water, for which China will rely on the oasis. When completed, China will reap great benefits from the facility as they cheaply manufacture microchips for itself and the rest of the world. While China also faces water scarcity, its occupation of Tibet provides it with control over much of the liquid veins throughout Asia. 

In the next few decades, India will need Central Asia to source energy and other resources more than ever before. China is already taking advantage of these resources, as it has been in the process of building a from Turkmenistan to Xinjiang since 2010. If India intends to become a truly influential power over the  POK,including the regions of the GB and the Shaksgam Valley, it must take critical action to regain access to much -needed resources. 

As early as 1904, British geographer underlined the importance of Eurasia and the CAR. Perhaps it was India’s strategic blindness, bureaucratic hassles, nonexistent national security measures, or isolationist attitude as a result of repeated invasions which culminated into the loss of the GB region. Whatever the reasons were, India’s neglect of the resource-rich region  was a critical mistake that has haunted the nation for decades. 

India must shed its habit of disregarding national threats until the damage has been done. In order to right our past mistakes, we need to prepare to use all means possible to reintegrate the region of Gilgit Baltistan. [ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Resource Frenzy: Will India and China Make War? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Sure, I hung up my military uniform for the last time in 2005. , I’ve been writing articles for TomDispatch focused largely on critiquing that same MIC and America’s permanent war economy. I’ve written against this country’s and wars in and , its weapons systems, and its of warriors and . Nevertheless, I remain a lieutenant colonel, if a retired one. I still have my military ID card, if only to get on bases, and I still tend to say “we” when I talk about my fellow soldiers, Marines, sailors, and airmen (and our “guardians,” too, now that we have a Space Force).

So, when I talk to organizations that are antiwar, that seek to downsize, dismantle, or otherwise weaken the MIC, I’m upfront about my military biases even as I add my own voice to their critiques. Of course, you don’t have to be antiwar to be highly suspicious of the U.S. military. Senior leaders in “my” military have , whether in the Vietnam War era of the last century or in this one about “progress” in Iraq and Afghanistan, that you’d have to be asleep at the wheel or ignorant not to have suspected the official story.

Congress Gives the Nod to the Military-Industrial Complex

Yet I also urge antiwar forces to see more than mendacity or malice in “our” military. It was retired general and then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower, after all, who first warned Americans of the profound dangers of the military-industrial complex in his . Not enough Americans heeded Ike’s warning then and, judging by our near-constant state of warfare since that time, not to speak of our ever-ballooning “defense” budgets, very few have heeded his warning to this day. How to explain that?

Well, give the MIC credit. Its tenacity has been amazing. You might compare it to an invasive weed, a parasitic cowbird (an image I’ve ), or even a metastasizing cancer. As a weed, it’s choking democracy; as a cowbird, it’s gobbling up most of the “food” (at least half of the federal discretionary budget) with no end in sight; as a cancer, it continues to spread, weakening our individual freedoms and liberty. 

Call it what you will. The question is: How do we stop it? I’ve offered suggestions in the past; so, too, have writers for TomDispatch like retired Army Colonel and retired Army Major , as well as , , and among others. Despite our critiques, the MIC grows ever stronger. If Ike’s warning wasn’t eye-opening enough, enhanced by an even more powerful speech, “,” by Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1967, what could I and my fellow TomDispatch writers possibly say or do to make a difference?

Maybe nothing, but that won’t stop me from trying. Since I am the MIC, so to speak, maybe I can look within for a few lessons that came to me the hard way (in the sense that I had to live them). So, what have I learned of value?

War Racketeers Enjoy Their Racket

In the 1930s, Smedley Butler, a Marine general twice decorated with the Medal of Honor, wrote a book entitled . He knew better than most since, as he in that volume, when he wore a military uniform, he served as “a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism.” And the corporate-driven racket he helped enable almost a century ago by busting heads from the Caribbean to China was small-scale indeed compared to today’s thoroughly global one.

The New Cold War’s Thriving Arms Race

There’s an obvious lesson to be drawn from its striking endurance, never-ending enlargement, and distinct engorgement in our moment (even after all those lost wars it fought): the system will not reform itself.  It will always demand and take more — more money, more authority, more power.  It will never be geared for peace.  By its nature, it’s authoritarian and distinctly less than honorable, replacing patriotism with service loyalty and victory with triumphant budgetary authority.  And it always favors the darkest of scenarios, including at present a with China and Russia, because that’s the best and most expedient way for it to thrive.

Within the military-industrial complex, there are no incentives to do the right thing.  Those few who have a conscience and speak out honorably are punished, including truth-tellers in the enlisted ranks like and . Even being an officer doesn’t make you immune.  For his temerity in resisting the Vietnam War, , a retired Marine Corps general and Medal of Honor recipient, was typically dismissed by his peers as unbalanced and of questionable sanity.

For all the talk of “mavericks,” whether in Top Gun or elsewhere, we — there’s that “we” again (I can’t help myself!) — in the military are a hotbed of go-along-to-get-along conformity.

Recently, I was talking with a senior enlisted colleague about why so few top-ranking officers are willing to speak truth to the powerless (that’s you and me) even after they retire. He mentioned credibility. To question the system, to criticize it, to air dirty laundry in public is to risk losing credibility within the club and so to be rejected as a malcontent, disloyal, or even “unbalanced.” Then, of course, that infamous between the military and giant weapons makers like Boeing and Raytheon simply won’t spin for you.  Seven-figure compensation packages, like the one current Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin gained from after his retirement as an Army general, won’t be an option. And in America, who doesn’t want to cash in while gaining more power within the system?

Quite simply, it pays so much better to mouth untruths, or at least distinctly less-than-full-truths, in service to the powerful. And with that in mind, here, at least as I see it, are a few full truths about my old service, the Air Force, that I guarantee you I won’t be applauded for mentioning. How about this as a start: that the production of F-35s — an overpriced “Ferrari” of a fighter jet that’s both too complex and remarkably successful as an — should be canceled (savings: as much as $1 trillion over time); that the much-touted new isn’t needed (savings: at least $200 billion) and neither is the new (savings: another $200 billion and possibly the entire Earth from doomsday); that the KC-46 tanker is seriously and should be canceled (savings: another $50 billion). 

Who Will Stand Up to the US Military?

Now, tote it up. By canceling the F-35, the B-21, the Sentinel, and the KC-46, I singlehandedly saved the American taxpayer roughly $1.5 trillion without hurting America’s national defense in the least. But I’ve also just lost all credibility (assuming I had any left) with my old service.

Look, what matters to the military-industrial complex isn’t either the truth or saving your taxpayer dollars but keeping those weapons programs going and the money flowing. What matters, above all, is keeping America’s economy on a permanent wartime footing both by buying endless new (and old) weapons systems for the military and in a bizarrely Orwellian pursuit of peace through war. 

How are Americans, Ike’s “alert and knowledgeable citizenry,” supposed to end a racket like this? We certainly should know one thing by now: the MIC will never check itself and Congress, already part of it thanks to impressive campaign donations and the like by major weapons makers, won’t corral it either.  Indeed, last year, Congress shoveled more than the Biden administration requested (more even than the Pentagon asked for) to that complex, all ostensibly in your name. Who cares that it hasn’t won a war of the faintest significance since 1945. Even “victory” in the Cold War (after the Soviet Union imploded in 1991) was thrown away. And now the complex warns us of an onrushing “new cold war” to be waged, naturally, at tremendous cost to you, the American taxpayer.  

As citizens, we must be informed, willing, and able to act. And that’s precisely why the complex seeks to deny you knowledge, precisely why it seeks from its actions in this world. So, it’s up to you — to us! — to remain alert and involved. Most of all, each of us must struggle to keep our identity and autonomy as a citizen, a rank higher than that of any general or admiral, for, as we all need to be reminded, those wearing uniforms are supposed to serve you, not vice-versa.

I know you hear otherwise. You’ve been told repeatedly in these years that it’s your job to “support our troops.” Yet, in truth, those troops should only exist to support and defend you, and of course the Constitution, the compact that binds us all together as a nation.

When misguided citizens genuflect before those troops (and then ignore everything that’s done in their name), I’m reminded yet again of Ike’s sage warning that only Americans can truly hurt this country. Military service may be necessary, but it’s not necessarily . America’s founders were profoundly skeptical of large militaries, of entangling alliances with foreign powers, and of permanent wars and threats of the same. So should we all be.

Citizens United Is the Answer

No, not that “,” not the case in which the Supreme Court decided corporations had the same free speech rights as you and me, allowing them to co-opt the legislative process by drowning us out with massive amounts of “speech,” aka dark-money-driven propaganda. We need citizens united against America’s war machine.

Understanding how that machine works — not just its waste and corruption, but also its positive attributes — is the best way to wrestle it down, to make it submit to the people’s will. Yet activists are sometimes ignorant of the most basic facts about “their” military. So what? Does the difference between a sergeant major and a major, or a chief petty officer and the chief of naval operations matter? The answer is: yes.

An anti-military approach anchored in ignorance won’t resonate with the American people. An antiwar message anchored in knowledge could, however. It’s important, that is, to hit the proverbial nail on the head. Look, for example, at the traction Donald Trump gained in the presidential race of 2015-2016 when he did something few other politicians then dared do: dismiss the Iraq War as wasteful and stupid. His election win in 2016 was not primarily about racism, nor the result of a nefarious Russian plot. Trump won, at least in part because, despite his ignorance on so many other things, he spoke a fundamental truth — that America’s wars of this century were horrendous blunders.

Trump, of course, was anything but anti-military. He of military parades in Washington, D.C. But I (grudgingly) give him credit for boasting that he than his generals and by that I mean many more Americans need to challenge those in authority, especially those in uniform.

Yet challenging them is just a start. The only real way to wrestle the military-industrial complex to the ground is to cut its funding in half, whether gradually over years or in one fell swoop. Yes, indeed, it’s the understatement of the century to note how much easier that’s said than done. It’s not like any of us could wave a military swagger stick like a magic wand and make half the Pentagon budget disappear. But consider this: If I could do so, that military budget would still be roughly $430 billion, easily more than China’s and Russia’s combined, and more than seven times what this country spends on the State Department. As usual, you get what you pay for, which for America has meant more weapons and disastrous wars.

Has the US Always Been at War?

Join me in imagining the (almost) inconceivable — a Pentagon budget cut in half. Yes, generals and admirals would scream and Congress would squeal. But it would truly matter because, as a retired Army major general once told me, major budget cuts would force the Pentagon to think — for once. With any luck, a few sane and patriotic officers would emerge to place the defense of America first, meaning that hubristic imperial designs and forever wars would truly be reined in because there’d simply be no more money for them.

Currently, Americans are giving the Pentagon all it wants — plus some. And how’s that been working out for the rest of us? Isn’t it finally time for us to exercise real oversight, as Ike challenged us to do in 1961? Isn’t it time to force the Pentagon to pass an audit each year — it’s failed ! — or else cut its budget even more deeply? Isn’t it time to hold Congress truly responsible for enabling ever more war by voting out military sycophants? Isn’t it time to recognize, as , that sustaining a vast military establishment constitutes the slow and certain death of democracy?

Just remember one thing: the military-industrial complex won’t reform itself. It just might have no choice, however, but to respond to our demands, if we as citizens remain alert, knowledgeable, determined, and united. And if it should refuse to, if the MIC can’t be tamed, whether because of its strength or our weakness, you will know beyond doubt that this country has truly lost its way. [ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In March 2021, the Kamal Khan Dam finally after years of setback on the lower Helmand. Naturally, it was met with animus in Iran. In 1973, the two signed the . The agreement guaranteed Iran with a monthly allocation of water from the river. But Tehran insists that its neighbor has consistently failed to hold its end of the deal.

According to Kabul, the dam was built to solve many of the region’s vast infrastructural and agricultural challenges, such as providing in the Nimruz Province with a steady supply of water and electricity. However, Tehran has attempted to halt its construction for years, maintaining that it would interrupt the water supply that feeds the Hamoun wetlands. 

The Destiny of Pakistan’s Totalitarian Proxy Regime in Afghanistan

At the inauguration, former President Ashraf Gani , “Afghanistan would no longer give free water to anyone, so Iran should provide fuel to Afghans in exchange for water.” Not long after, the country came under the control of the Taliban. 

In late , Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned his counterpart, Afghanistan’s Amir Khan Muttaqi, that prohibiting Tehran from its rightful access to the Helmand River will only cause further strain to an already splintered relationship. President Ebrahim Raisi, too, urged serious action. 

This article will attempt to address the following question: Is Afghanistan legally permitted to divert the natural course of the Helmand River? Before we begin, let’s underscore the key elements of this bilateral accord.

An Overview of the Helmand River Treaty

According to the Helmand River Treaty of 1973, Afghanistan must deliver water from the Helmand River to Iran at a rate of 22 cubic meters per second per annum (normal water year) with an additional four cubic meters per second for “goodwill and brotherly relations.” This would supply Iran with an annual average of 556,000 acre-feet or 820 million cubic meters under normal conditions. 

But although the treaty guarantees Iran’s access to the Helmand River, Article V gives Afghanistan full rights to the remaining water supply. Article V begins by stipulating Iran’s rightful allocation as specified in the previous articles. However, it continues by stating that Afghanistan, “shall retain all rights to the balance of the water of the Helmand River and may make such use or disposition of the water as it chooses.” 

Afghanistan Is Losing Faith in the Taliban

The final paragraph of the article emphasizes that Iran is only entitled to the specified amount of water agreed upon, irrespective if  “additional amounts of water may be available” and “be put to beneficial use.” 

Thus, Afghanistan unequivocally has unilateral rights over the remaining water supply of the Helmand River. This means that it has the power to implement agricultural, hydroelectric, and reservoir projects as it sees fit. 

Afghanistan’s sole responsibility is not to pollute the water or take any action that will deprive Iran of its water right entirely or partially. Article V must be read along with Article II (Iran water rights), III (monthly distribution), and IV (i.e., climate change). An argument based on the first paragraph of Article V without considering the context of the treaty and its other provisions will end in unreasonable conclusions.

No Harm, No Foul

That the Helmand River Treaty permits Afghanistan the right to pursue developmental projects over the remaining waters is incontrovertible. However, the question remains whether the development of dams or canals is permissible under customary international law. 

Under the Taliban, Afghanistan’s Madrassas Increase and Harbor Terrorists

The Helmand River is considered to be an international or transboundary watercourse. The two neighbors are therefore legally obligated to share the river’s waters. The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and the no-harm rule is regarded as the cornerstones of international water law and were included in the UN Watercourse Convention in . 

According to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, all states are obligated to “use an international watercourse in a manner that is equitable and reasonable vis-a-vis other states sharing the watercourse.” The no-harm requires states not to cause significant harm to other states. More precisely, “ countries should not use their territorial waters in ways that cause damage and undesirable impact to downstream co-riparian countries.”

Indeed, states have an equal right to an equitable share of a shared river. But the term “equitable” must not be confused with “equal.” Every state has the right to use water equitably but is not entitled to an equal share of the water. Therefore, under customary international law, it is permissible for Afghanistan to develop projects on the Helmand River, so long as they do not cause significant environmental damage to its neighbor. 

It should be stated that without clearly understanding the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, any activity will be deemed a violation. Such astrict is neither supported by state practice nor by case law.

Appeal to the UN to Protect Hazaras in Afghanistan

To conclude, neither the Helmand River Treaty nor customary international law denies Afghanistan the right to construct Kamal Khan Dam. It is not a violation of the two aforementioned components of international law. Instead, the Helmand river treaty gives Afghanistan an absolute right to use the remaining water of the Helmand River as it chooses.

What Needs to be Done?

Clearly, the passage of the Helmand River Treaty in 1973, has not led to any peaceful resolution between Iran and Afghanistan. The terms of the agreement have repeatedly been violated, according to Tehran. But Kabul has always insisted that these claims are baseless. 

Iran has complained before that the proper allocation of water was not delivered to them. But these complaints were made at a time when the Helmand River Basin was under drought which severely reduced the river’s water flow. Nonetheless, this must be addressed.

Before, the construction of Kamal Khan Dam, Iran wasn’t ready at all to build these three joint hydrometric stations. It was only agreed upon in the 21st meeting of commissioners (October 2019) when Afghanistan was about to inaugurate Kamal Khan Dam. Kamal Khan Dam is a regulatory dam that diverts/regulate the water of the Helmand river. Before the construction of the Kamal Khan Dam, the water of the Helmand river was flowing to Iran uninterrupted.

To solve this impasse, Afghanistan and Iran must: jointly determine places of delivery and construct joint hydrometric stations as defined under Article III of the treaty. Joint hydrometric stations will settle the issue of the amount of water that is required to be delivered to Iran. Each issue has been addressed by the Helmand River Commissioners who’ve convened at least twenty-five times in the past 20 years.��

Iran has always been against the building of joint hydrometric stations. The reason is that Iran had been receiving more water during normal and above-normal water years. The construction of joint hydrometric stations would regulate their water share more strictly.

An agreement was reached to build joint hydrometric stations in the 21st meeting of the Joint Committee of Commissioners of Helmand River. However, it remains only on paper. Similarly, in August 2022, Afghanistan and Iran again agreed to a timeline for the construction of joint hydrometric stations. But experience shows that it will take years to complete.

In the meantime, Iran should stop digging wells and installing heavy-duty water pumps along the river. Iran has expanded its irrigation and installed pumps through which it diverts 26 million cubic water annually to Zahedan. Such projects will only increase Iran’s water demand. Furthermore, Afghanistan should register the Gowd-e-Zera lake as an international wetland as it is considered to be a part of the Hamouns. [Naveed Ahsan edited this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The term hegemony of masculinity, which was first used by , describes the social hierarchy that tends to validate the superiority of masculinity over feminine, and is founded on historical precedent or adheres to societal norms. It defines a male-dominated social structure that denies females with feminine traits the right to participate in public life. Tragically, this hegemony leads to a heteronormative social structure and the predominance of heterosexism in Islamic doctrines.

The Destiny of Pakistan’s Totalitarian Proxy Regime in Afghanistan

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The political discriminatory ideologies of apartheid have been widely employed in several fields of social science ever since first articulated it. is the systematic discrimination of individuals based on whether they were born a man or a woman. Gender-apartheid and the term sexism are connected through historical and cultural roots, which are still tangible in the modern world. 

With six sections and 30 articles, the UN General Assembly approved the on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1979. This treaty emphasizes and puts into practice the rights of women and girls around the world. It protects them in areas like discrimination, policy measures, the defense of fundamental freedoms and rights, sex-role stereotyping and prejudice, prostitution, political and public life, representation, nationality, education, employment, health, economic and social benefits, law, marriage, and family life. It has since been ratified and adopted by one hundred eighty nine states. However, despite having the pact in 1980, gender discrimination still exists in Afghanistan under the Taliban’s rule.

The Taliban runs a de facto government that is not officially recognized. They are centered on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, and have close ties to the terrorist group . On August 15, 2021, the Taliban took back , and since then they have ruled Afghanistan with an Islamic system based on the Deobandi school. The Taliban progressively began to implement their ideologically-based teachings throughout the nation; among them, the Taliban are passing anti-feminine legislation and marketing them as Islamic teachings through their media apparatus. Their curriculum is dominated by masculinity and violates the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

The Taliban’s Motivation

In the 1948 , the UN lists the right to an education as one of the most important human rights. This is a cosmic and global right, not one that is exclusive to a place or location. Everyone is entitled to a high-quality education, regardless of their race, color, ethnicity, country, or gender. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes the value of education, which includes tolerance, community, and mutual understanding among all people, as well as the right to be educated.

Afghanistan Is Losing Faith in the Taliban

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In opposition to international values, the Taliban regime has denied Afghan girls and women the chance to enroll in schools and institutions. The Taliban government may be utilizing the education of Afghan women as a tool to pressure Western democracies to embrace them. However, It is evident that nothing has changed to date, despite the fact that sanctions against the Taliban’s administration have gotten tougher.

Under the Taliban government, women no longer play an active part in society. At the cabinet, provincial, or municipal levels, no women have been appointed by the Taliban. In actuality, the Taliban rule has usurped the social lives of women and, by relegating them to the private sphere, has diminished their stature. The Taliban regime’s workforce is patriarchal and sexist in this sense. It might be argued that patriarchy has a significant impact on the Taliban’s administrative structure.

The Taliban bureaucratic system’s gender-centricity cannot be boiled down to a call for recognition. In fact, one of the tenets of the Deobandi school, which forms the Taliban ideology, values that the public sphere should be gender-centric. As a phenomenon, work is considered to be man-centered. The that permits women to work in a setting where there is no chance for conversation with males is the only area where the Deobandi school has shown flexibility so far on women’s right to employment. According to this, the Taliban’s manifesto has a clause that is said to support the barring of women from bureaucratic roles.

Consequences of Gender Apartheid Policies

The Taliban’s anti-women policies diminish the idea of women as fully human beings. Women are denied citizenship rights and are not regarded as social contract signatories under this system. Due to the Taliban regime’s treatment of women, Afghan society has regressed both politically and economically. A political setback is the absence of women in the public sphere, the centralization of Afghan bureaucracy, and its concentration on the position of the man as well as the political exclusion of women from these positions.

Women have less economic influence under the Taliban government. The Taliban system makes women into workers with very low human capital, little incomes, and limited opportunities for growth in the workplace by denying them the access to study. Women who work as men’s employees won’t advance because they lack the capacity to handle affairs. On the one hand, this economic paralysis of women contributes to the inefficiency of half the people of the society, and on the other, it causes the economic paralysis of the entire nation.The Taliban administration imposed gender segregation and patriarchal control on Afghan society by defining women in the private sphere. Afghanistan’s radicalization eventually will only lead to disaster and the emergence of a radical generation. [ edited this article]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Taliban is largely considered a pariah by the international community. No country has officially recognized the Islamic Emirate as the legitimate Afghan government or normalized diplomatic relations with it. As the Taliban seek solutions to its severe credibility problem, the group is largely out of touch with the basic needs of the Afghans. The country is still riddled with major problems: half of its population are on the brink of and terrorist attacks targeting as well as minorities are a regular occurrence.

Balancing past and present

Since the capture of Kabul, the Taliban to win some credibility on the international stage by presenting itself as the only force capable of stabilizing and uniting Afghanistan after twenty years of civil conflict. This is an old narrative that the radical group promoted when they first rose to power in 1996.

The Destiny of Pakistan’s Totalitarian Proxy Regime in Afghanistan

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However, since a mere dusting operation of the old playbook is unlikely to work in the current circumstances, the Taliban has signaled an interest in doing things differently this time. Its foreign policy outlook seems to fall somewhere between abiding by and shaping.

The Taliban still sticks to the idea of isolating  Afghanistan at a global level. The leadership believes the country’s detachment is a viable tool to preserve the regime’s stability and longevity. 

In its previous ruling experience, the Taliban had limited, rudimental knowledge of international politics and showed minimal interest in establishing basic diplomatic relations with external actors. Their victory over the Afghan regular forces and the experience of dealing on an equal footing with the US in the Doha talks have further emboldened the regime.

However, although the Taliban aims to continue its isolationism, the trauma of the regime’s fall in 2001 and the two-decade-long foreign occupation afterwards have prompted them to evaluate alternative strategies for its agenda. 

Afghanistan Is Losing Faith in the Taliban

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For over twenty years, the Taliban has sought a comeback, and now that the Islamic Emirate is in place again the radical group is determined to prevent a second overthrow. Recent events demonstrate a more mature, pragmatic foreign policy and one that makes greater use of diplomacy.

Back to the drawing board

Since Kabul’s takeover, the Islamic Emirate has sought to cultivate with several state and non-state actors. High-ranking figures in the Taliban hierarchy – the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Maulvi Amir Khan Muttaqi and the acting Deputy Foreign Ministry Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai – are a few examples. 

Aside from meetings with foreign state officials, the Taliban has also been in dialogue with prominent humanitarian agencies. Most recently, the Taliban held talks with the Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, and the Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegation in Afghanistan Eloi Fillion.

There is a two-pronged goal for these engagements: cleansing the Taliban’s tarnished image while building diplomatic credibility. 

First, the radical group seeks to draw a wedge between itself and the widespread perception of the Taliban as a movement driven by an uncompromising, strict Islamic morale. Second, the Taliban aims to secure diplomatic capital and gain political legitimacy in the global arena. 

Under the Taliban, Afghanistan’s Madrassas Increase and Harbor Terrorists

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The Taliban aims to reshape its former image as a violent and extremist regime.By publicly displaying its willingness to play by the rules, the Taliban attempts to cast itself as a trustworthy partner in the eyes of the international community.

While it remains to be seen whether these efforts stem from a genuine spirit of cooperation or a pragmatic calculus, it is undeniable that the Taliban’s diplomatic campaign has improved their international standing..  If successful, the group could be endowed with a number of high-priced gains. Gaining control over the overseas frozen Afghan assets and securing full travel mobility for senior Taliban figures are among the most sought-after rewards.

Until September 2022, the bulk of the reserves of Afghanistan’s Central Bank –$7 billion – were detained by the US-based financial institutions. Then, Washington half of the frozen Afghan assets to a joint Swiss-Afghan trust fund, known as the Afghan Fund 

The fund was designed to support Afghanistan’s Central Bank and is inaccessible to the Taliban . However, chances to funnel funds into Afghanistan while eluding the Taliban’s oversight look grim. As Graeme Smith, a Senior Consultant at the International Crisis Group, “the Taliban have proven they will block efforts to circumvent their government, and aid experts warn that parallel structures cannot substitute for Afghan state institutions.”

Appeal to the UN to Protect Hazaras in Afghanistan

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The freezing of funds, the weapons embargos, and the UN travel ban on dozens of Taliban officials are among the longest-running measures to keep a lid on the group. Travelwaivers were occasionally  approved to allow the participation of high-profile Taliban representatives in third-country forums

Thelack of on the terms for extending the travel ban exemption for 13 Taliban officials led to its suspension. Whether the UN will  use thetravel to coax the regime into making  meaningful concessions remains an open question. Although the Taliban has e shown strong resilience against pressures to compromise, their ambition to continue  its diplomatic machine maybe a cause for change.

The moment of truth on the horizon

While the Taliban has made some impressive gains, the Afghan political landscape still remains in flux. The Taliban neither exercise capillary control across all the rural districts nor do they have a monopoly of power over the different non-Pashtun ethnic groups. 

Pockets of resistance scattered across the country continueto the Taliban’s rule. Ejections of local leaders who bandwagoned with the Taliban in their rise to power are becoming more frequent. The result is a gradual weakening of the radical group’s clout and a thinning of its ranks. However, although some cracks are opening from within, they still the most powerful actor on the ground.

The Taliban-Occupied Afghanistan Threatens Global Security

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Nations around the world still look at the Taliban with skepticism, but the pragmatic needs to prevent Afghanistan from becoming once again a sanctuary for international terrorism, to keep a lid on the drugs trade, and to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people have turned the Taliban into a near-indispensable actor. The radical group banks on the fact that no matter its status within  the international community, regional and global powers will continue to seek its cooperation to tackle these pressing security concerns.

However, two main problems remain. First, the Taliban have taken few steps in managing the country’s serious security concerns. Its verbal assurance still rings hollow and the same pathologies that tainted its past rule – such as targeted killings of Tajiks and Hazara, enforced disappearing, and extortion practices – seem to be present today. As the UN recently, the Afghan humanitarian condition looks grim and the Taliban struggles to meet basic international standards for human rights and respect for minority groups. 

Second, the Taliban’s endgame is quite elusive. While it seeks to legitimize its leadership by adopting state-resembling rhetoric and posture, the regime’s long-term ambitions and foreign policy trajectories remain hard to predict.

Although it is debatable if the latest developments reflect agenuine or , the Taliban is determined to do whatever it takes to prevent its brand-new regime from experiencing a second failure. The old playbook based on neutrality and balancing posture remains the bedrock of the Taliban’s foreign policy compass, especially when it comes to fending off the pressure of external forces. 

However, acknowledging the vast costs of diplomatic isolationism has prompted the radical group to do things differently this time and to seek minimal approval from foreign observers. While it is too early to tell if the Taliban’s recalibration will help the regime’s credibility, it is clear that it is capable of adjusting its foreign policy outlook to serve its evolving strategic interests better.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Toward a New Foreign Policy for the Taliban? A Timid Thaw in the Afghan Great Cold appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The idea of withdrawal, in a different sense, returned to the news last week when the Progressive Caucus committed to recommending engaging in a process that would permit withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. Their party, the Democrats, called foul, accusing them of the crime of propagating Russian propaganda and compromising the noble march to an American victory in Ukraine to which the Biden administration was committed. Ashamed of their evident impudence, the same progressives decided on withdrawal. Barely 20 hours (and not 20 years) after releasing their letter, they decided to withdraw the recommendation.

In a to the press Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal retracted the contents of the letter issued the previous day. It began with this sentence: “The Congressional Progressive Caucus hereby withdraws its recent letter to the White House regarding Ukraine,””

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Withdraw:

Attempt to erase an embarrassing event from history, a common temptation of politicians in cultures that have every reason to be embarrassed by their history

Contextual note

The word withdrawal has always had a special place in US culture. The two examples cited above already provide a radical contrast. The Biden administration’s act of withdrawal referred to removing troops committed to a military operation. Such withdrawals usually occur in foreign lands, where the case for being there is often contestable. Congresswoman Jayapal’s version of withdrawal belongs to the domain of law, specifically contract law. It concerns a proposal that suggests a formal commitment. Because proposals have not become acts, they can be withdrawn with no legal consequences. That does not, however, mean there will not be other consequences, both political and moral.

The word withdrawal figures prominently in two other important areas of interest in contemporary US culture: banking and drug addiction. In banking withdrawal signifies recovering money that one has deposited. This is a legitimate, voluntary act of management of one’s private property, nothing to be ashamed of. In the case of drug addiction, withdrawal is the opposite of a voluntary act. It refers to the painful process of deprivation when something one formerly depended on disappears.

In all these cases withdrawal signifies a radical change in the status quo. It often contains an association with pain. In the cases of military withdrawal or withdrawal of a proposition, shame may attach to it. The shame may be such that the best thing to hope for after the withdrawal is to stop thinking about why it took place, to erase it from memory, eliminate it from public discourse.

The problem is that not everyone forgets. History has a way of making its claims and coming back to bite the forgetful. By the end of 2021 US media had stopped wondering or worrying about the fiasco of the summer in Afghanistan. But it was still a visible part of his legacy. What could be done? Strategists know that the best way to get the media and the people to forget about a shameful past war would be to engage in a new one defined by its moral purpose. The Biden administration then realized that with a little prodding, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin – the man Americans other than Donald Trump love to hate – might provide the perfect pretext as he was massing troops along the Ukrainian border. Situations like that can be routinely avoided through a traditional device called diplomacy. The Russians even proposed a plan in December. But playing polite with Russia will always be bad for electoral politics at home.

The strategy worked. Afghanistan disappeared into the shadows of poorly digested history. Ukraine emerged to mobilize Americans’ sense of global purpose. And the media complied. In response to Putin’s initiative in December, ABC news called the plan “sweeping” as a means of dismissing it. But the point of diplomacy is not to accept or reject a plan, but to negotiate its terms so they appear less sweeping.

During a recent trip to India, I discovered that Biden ’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan remains fresh in the memory of the average informed citizen. That fiasco has come to symbolize American indifference to the people it claims to assist. In contrast, for Americans that memory has been superseded and in effect canceled by this year’s engagement in a new war that conveniently restores the image of a nation always focused on other people’s needs.

The great songwriter Cole Porter acknowledged this aspect of US culture in the lyrics of his song, “It’s all right with me.” In the refrain of a song about a man seducing a woman he included these two: “There’s someone I’m trying so hard to forget/ Don’t you want to forget someone, too?” Whether it’s love or war, forgetting is always an efficient way out. That may help explain why Americans have no time for history. They’re always looking forward to the next affair and seeking ways to forget the last one.

Historical note

Ever since the first day of Russia’s invasion on February 24, history has been absent from the media’s accounts. Not because no one has been keeping track of events in Ukraine over the past 30 years. Rather because the media has been, as Cole Porter said, “trying so hard to forget” the same stories it had actually covered over the past eight years.

During that period from 2014 to 2021, there were no romantic illusions about Ukraine’s pristine democratic virtues and its commitment to the vaunted “rule of law” by which Western governments swear, even when invading other sovereign states, as President George W Bush did in 2003. The illusions about Ukraine’s political purity and unimpeachable benevolence have only emerged since the Russian invasion.

In the days following the 2014 coup, the BBC what it called the “sinister” trends accompanying the Maidan revolution. These included “ troops with dubious iconography” described as “the most organized and the most effective” actors in the coup. In August 2014 an in Foreign Policy, a publication hardly given to echoing Putin’s propaganda, noted that “Pro-Russian forces have said they are fighting against Ukrainian nationalists and ‘fascists’ in the conflict, and in the case of Azov and other battalions, these claims are essentially true.”

In 2018, a Reuters by Josh Cohen began with this sentence: “As Ukraine’s struggle against Russia and its proxies continues, Kiev must also contend with a growing problem behind the front lines: far-right vigilantes who are willing to use intimidation and even violence to advance their agendas, and who often do so with the tacit approval of law enforcement agencies.”

Forgetting these and other examples of recent history reported frankly and honestly by Western media suddenly became a duty of the very media that once proudly produced and broadcast them. The Western governments now involved in promoting Ukraine’s resistance and the media themselves began trying hard to forget. And they succeeded. They could count on the ingrained indifference of the citizens of a consumer society to anything that resembles historical truth.

We will shortly be War in Ukraine, Making Sense of a Senseless Conflict by Medea Benjamin and Nicolas Davies. The authors have helpfully presented a thorough and in-depth account of all the essential background the average citizen will need to understand, first,  that there is a history behind the Ukraine war and, second, what that history includes. Chomsky’s and Prashad’s book looks through the history of US policy since the Cold War that provides further insight.

Acknowledging that history is real may be the hardest task for Americans. A history that includes slavery and genocide of the native population is better forgotten than remembered. When reminded of it, Americans prefer to just call that the irrelevant past. What is relevant is the noble causes we embrace today, such as deploying our weapons to inflict as much damage as possible on Russians.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post A Tragic and a Comic Withdrawal in the News appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Recent developments seem undesirable for the Pakistani establishment, which had high hopes for a negotiated settlement between Islamabad and the TTP. After two rounds of official negotiations, Pakistan seems to be opting for a military solution. In April 2022, the Pakistani military carried out a against TTP hideouts in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. As per the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) representative, these killed 20 children and 47 civilians. Tweets by the UNICEF representative caused in western capitals because sleeping children died.

It seems that what appeared a victory last year is turning out to be a strategic blunder. Pakistan has empowered the Afghan Taliban and, in the process, the TTP as well. Now, how can Islamabad protect its security interests threatened by the TTP? Can Pakistan counter the strategic insecurity emanating from its western client state led by its protégé, the Taliban?

Peace Talks Do Not Promise Long Term Peace

As per Atul Singh and Tabish Forugh, “the Taliban provide inspiration, ideology, organization, support, and expertise to Islamic fundamentalists from around the world and especially in South Asia.” The TTP is a more extreme version of the Taliban. Inspired by their cousins in Afghanistan, the TTP wants to establish a similar fundamentalist Islamist form of governance in the tribal areas across the border in Pakistan. Recently, it has unleashed attacks on Pakistani cities and towns.

The Taliban-Occupied Afghanistan Threatens Global Security

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This was to be expected. The TTP has the support of the Taliban. The two organizations share the same extremist ideology and have similar long term goals. The TTP has become very active this year. On April 2, it kicked off , an offensive that will include “martyrdom attacks, ambushes, bombings, counter-attacks, targeted attacks, laser and sniper attacks.”

Pakistan has responded both militarily and diplomatically. On May 9, a Pakistani arrived in Kabul to have talks with the TTP leadership. It was the third attempt by Pakistan’s leadership to negotiate with the TTP. The Pakistani side was led by Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed who spoke directly with Noor Wali Mehsood, the TTP chief. These talks were mediated by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s Acting Interior Minister and the leader of the Haqqani Network. Haqqani has long been a close Pakistani ally.

The talks were a protracted affair. The parties took a break and reconvened. On May 18, they announced a ceasefire. The TTP promised to halt its attacks on Pakistani soil while Islamabad released 30 high-level TTP from its prisons. 

For all these tangible results, most analysts take the view that these talks are unlikely to lead to long term peace. Both sides have such contradictory long term goals that it is just a matter of time before dissolve into conflict.

Implications for the US and India

The US is now focused on Ukraine. It has abandoned Afghanistan and taken its eye off the security situation in South Asia. The Taliban is now supporting terror groups with similar extremist Islamist ideology. One of them is its old ally, . As per the UN Sanction Monitoring Team Report, al-Qaeda operatives have already found safe havens and have started bases in Afghanistan.

The US must recalibrate its Afghanistan policy given the increased terror activity in the region. The TTP and al-Qaeda represent the tip of the iceberg. The Taliban is likely to export terror first to Central and South Asia, and then to Europe and the US itself. 

As a non-Muslim nation, India ranks high as a target for Islamists. A nation of kafirs is always a good target for jihad. For centuries, Pashtun tribesmen swept down from their mountain strongholds to raid the plains for gold and women in wave after wave of jihad. Therefore, India has to form a more robust policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Already, there have been in Kabul but India needs to have clarity about its long term strategic goals.

Pakistan now has a client regime in Afghanistan. However, it faces a TTP problem. Also, the Taliban itself is divided. Islamabad does not have it all its own way. Furthermore, the Hazaras face violent persecution, if not ethnic cleansing and genocide. The Tajiks are also being hunted down. Both the US and India can play a major role in supporting persecuted groups and containing the Taliban as well as its extremist jihadi allies.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Has Pakistan Made a Strategic Blunder By Backing The Taliban in Afghanistan? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In March 2022, the two leaders met for the first time in Kandahar, the traditional hub for the Taliban. Today, the Haqqanis and Kandaharis are jostling for pole position. Unknown to most outside Afghanistan, these two factions have irreconcilable political agendas rooted in two mutually exclusive interpretations of Islamic governance. Both timeworn interpretations have their fanatical adherents, which makes not only compromise but also dialogue difficult.

The Haqqanis see their leader as a caliph. Hence they have given him the title of khalifa. The Kandaharis refer to their boss as the leader of the faithful. Hence, he goes by the title amir al-mu’minin. This seemingly minor difference in their titles is a big deal. The Haqqanis are universalists who see their big boss as a potential, if not real, leader of all Muslims. The Kandaharis are satisfied with creating a pure Islamic emirate in their region and do not have pretensions to world domination.

What Is the Significance of the Haqqani-Kandahari Meeting?

The meeting in Kandahar revealed that the Taliban’s factional politics had reached the point of no return. Unable to agree upon sharing power, a civil war between the Taliban factions is inevitable. Both camps are powerful enough to challenge the other’s ambition of dominating the national scene completely.

Interestingly, as the group continues to disappoint its regional backers, the chances of a foreign mediator settling the Taliban’s internal division are slim. Last September, Pakistan’s chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency traveled to Kabul to force Haqqanis and the Kandaharis to come to a power-sharing caretaker administration. Notably, the mediation of the ISI chief produced more division than harmony.

For now, it seems that the Taliban lacks political maturity and capacity to avert prolonged internal division. Given the structural and political differences of the caliphate and the emirate,  the future of Taliban governance depends on how the fight between the Kandahari and Haqqanis plays out.

What is an Emirate, What is a Caliphate and Why is it a Big Deal?

In Islamic political litreature amir al-mu’minin is a nominal title given to persons in command of particular aspects of Muslim affairs.  The caliph, however, is the title given to the Prophet’s successors. This leader is in control of the Islamic ummah’s political structure.

The amir al-mu’minin was first used to refer to the second Islamic caliph, Omar ibn al-Khattab. Prophet Mohammad’s successor and first caliph, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq, was not called amir al-mu’minin. The term caliph, khalifa in Arabic, is used to describe someone who is authorized by the majority of the Muslims as the successor of the Prophet and the four rightly guided caliphs: Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman, and Ali. Many Muslims believe that the administratiive and governance model in Medina under the first four successors of Prophet Mohammad, known as the Rashidun caliphs, put  Islam on the path to greatness and purity.

Historically, restoring the caliphate gained momentum among various Islamic movements in the early 20^th century following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In retrospect,  the nostalgia for reestablishing the caliphate emerged in response to political decay and civilizational degeneration in the Islamic world. Like any other Islamic religious concept, the difference between the amir and the caliph dates back to early periods of Islam.

Since the collapse of the Durrani Empire and the emergence of the modern state of Afghanistan in the late 19^th century, Pashtun tribal leaders and the monarchs have titled themselves as amirs. Amir Dost Mohammad Khan (1826–63), Amir Shir Ali Khan (1863 to 1879) and Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (1880–1901) are three famous examples.

Since the caliphate has a universal political and ideological implication, none of the rulers of Afghanistan dared to call themselves khalifa because the title would have implied being in charge of Muslim affairs across the Islamic world.When the Ottomans were around, this claim would have been challenged because the sultans in Istanbul were regarded as the rightful caliphs. In recent years, Saudi Arabia saw itself as the rightful leader of the Sunni Muslim world and Afghanistan’s leaders shied away from taking their patrons on.

What Lies Ahead for the Taliban?

According to Islamic historical references, the caliphate is a dynastic governing entity. The Haqqanis are aware of the historical connotations and political implications of calling their leader the khalifa or the caliph. In the Emirate of the Kandahari Taliban, power and leadership can be passed from one individual to another who satisfies their specifications. The Haqqanis do not meet them.

Given the history of rivalry between southern and eastern tribes of Afghanistan’s Pashtuns, the Haqqanis would never become amir al-mu’minins. The Kandahari Taliban rightly consider themselves as the founders of the emirate, leaving the Haqqanis with no option but to go rogue, declare a caliphate and claim the leadership of Islamic ummah.

As the Haqqanis consolidate power in Kabul, the structural and organizational distinctions between emirate and caliphate are useful to understand how the two factions of the Taliban will conduct themselves in Afghanistan, the region, and the world. They also help anticipate the different threats the world faces from various factions of the Taliban. 

The Kandahari-led Taliban are orthodox Hanafi Muslims with a tribal mentality whose ultimate aim is to establish an Islamic state in Afghanistan, dominated and governed by Pashtuns. The Haqqani group, on the other hand, follow a  transnational jihadist ideology. Its ultimate aim is to unify all Islamic movements under a single Islamic caliphate, a goal previously pursued by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The Haqqanis’ aspiration of establishing a caliphate is based on the resources and network they built during the anti-Soviet jihad project. Their base lies in the largely ungoverned territories on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. While the Haqqanis maintained symbiotic relations with the Kandahari Taliban throughout the so-called “Global War on Terror,” they used this time to build and deepen relationships with other Islamic militant groups in South Asia. Since the Haqqanis are in a position of power, the support they command in the region provides them with a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the Kandahari-led Taliban.

The pace at which Haqqanis are consolidating their power in Afghanistan makes it a matter of time before they become the dominant faction within the Taliban. Once that mission is accomplished, the Haqqanis will establish the Islamic Caliphate by Afghanistan as the capital and become the patron of all terrorist organizations worldwide. If history can tell us anything, any form of a Taliban-led and dominated government in Afghanistan threatens regional and global peace, and a caliphate led by the Haqqanis even more so.

(This article was edited by Contributing Editor Tabish Forugh.)

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Caliph v The Emir al-Mu’minin: Which Islamic Model of Statehood Will the Taliban Adopt? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

30 April 2022

To: H.E. António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General

CC:H.E. Ambassador Barbara Woodward, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN and President of United Nations Security Council

H.E. Ambassador Federico Villegas, Permanent Representative of Argentina and President of United Nations Human Rights Council

Excellencies,

We are writing this letter to express our grave concern about the escalation of violence targeting the Hazara Shia communities in Afghanistan. We are writing to demand your immediate action to address these targeted attacks, which can amount to crime against humanity, and when taken together, constitute an act of genocide. We believe the persistent and deliberate campaign of violence against the Shia Hazara community in Afghanistan requires an urgent and coordinated response by the United Nations and the international community.

On April 19, 2022, a high school and an education center in a Hazara neighborhood in West of Kabul, Afghanistan were bombed, killing and maiming scores of school children. The next day, an attack on a Shia Hazara mosque in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif was bombed, killing thirty one  and injuring eighty seven worshipers attending prayers during the holy month of Ramadan. Local reports, however, indicate a much higher level of casualties. Another mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif was also attacked on the same day and in the same manner, killing and injuring dozens. On April 28, two explosions targeting civilian mini-buses in Mazar-i-Sharif killed at least eleven and wounded at least eighteen Hazaras. On the same day, five Hazara miners traveling in a civilian passenger car were stopped and shot dead in Samangan province.

While terrorist attacks such as the last week’s horrific attacks on Sufi Mosques in Kunduz and Kabul provinces continue to affect civilians throughout Afghanistan, the attacks on Hazaras represent a pattern in recent years that target Hazara-Shia mosques, schools, education centers, public gatherings, sports clubs, public transports, and even maternity hospitals. In the first six months of 2021 UNAMA recorded 20 deliberate attacks against the Hazara ethnic group, resulting in around 500 civilian casualties. The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), an affiliate group of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), claimed responsibility for most attacks, including recent incidents in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, although perpetrators have not claimed responsibility for some attacks.

Residents, observers of Afghanistan, and international human rights groups have raised constant concern about such a growing trend of targeted violence against Hazaras. In October 2021, after a series of attacks on Shia Hazara mosques in Kunduz and Kandahar, that killed and wounded hundreds, Human Rights Watch characterized the attacks as “designed to spread terror and inflict maximum suffering, particularly on Afghanistan’s Hazara community.” The statement highlighted that “[t]he numerous attacks targeting Hazaras amount to crimes against humanity, and those responsible should be brought to justice.” 

In May 2021, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) called on the Afghan government and the international community to consider the Hazaras as a “population at risk of war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing or genocide”. In July 2021, Genocide Watch issued an emergency warning for Afghanistan, stating, “The Hazara religious minority is a portent of an approaching genocide.” In August 2021, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum issued a similar statement underlining the risk of genocide against Hazaras in Afghanistan.

Hazaras have a long history of persecution in Afghanistan at the hands of state and non-state actors such as the Taliban and other extremist groups. This history and recent events align with the warning factors of mass atrocity crimes that the United Nations identified in the 2014 Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes.

The return of the Taliban to power has made the Hazaras more vulnerable and subject to increased violence. On August 19, 2021, Amnesty International released a report documenting the Taliban’s targeted attacks against Hazaras and called the group responsible for the “brutal massacre of Hazara men” in Ghazni and Daykundi provinces. Since coming to power in August 2021, the Taliban forcibly removed hundreds of Hazara families from their homes and villages in Helmand, Uruzgan, Daykundi, and Balkh provinces. This is compounded by the Taliban history of brutality against the community, including massacring thousands of Hazaras in Mazar-i-Sharif (1998), Bamyan (2001), and Zabul (between 1996 and 2001).

In January 2022, following its report on Afghanistan, the UK Parliament’s House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations and Defence established a bi-cameral and cross-party inquiry team on the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The report stated that “The Hazaras have a long history of suffering state persecution on both ethnic and sectarian grounds.”

Following these most recent attacks targeting Hazaras in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, human rights groups and officials in the international community, including The UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan Richard Bennett, expressed concerns about these “targeted attacks on  Hazaras”, and called for “immediate investigation and accountability” to “end such human rights violations.” Similar statements of condemnation and calls for action have been made by special representatives and Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the EU, Sweden, Norway, and Canada. Afghanistan’s diplomatic missions to the UN and in many countries in Europe, North America, and South Asia also expressed concerns and demanded immediate international attention to attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructures in Afghanistan, particularly in Hazaras and Shia communities.

However, more must be done to protect the Hazaras in Afghanistan, especially by the United Nations. Thus, we, the undersigned group of intellectuals, academics, human rights, media, and civil society activists from Afghanistan and around the world, urge the United Nations to take immediate actions addressing human rights situation of the Hazaras in Afghanistan, and adopt appropriate measures to protect the community against risks of genocide and crimes against humanity. We urge you to:

• Call a special session of the United Nations Security Council to discuss, as matter of urgency, the situation of the Hazaras and adopt a resolution ensuring that the community will be protected against such heinous targeted attacks;
  
  
• Call for a special session of the United Nations Human Rights Council to discuss and address the ongoing genocidal attacks on Hazaras, and work to prevent such atrocities and bring the perpetrators to justice;
  
  
• Launch an immediate investigation into the targeted killing of the Hazara and Shias in Afghanistan, and use instruments under the international law to address and put an end to the perpetual killings of Hazaras;
  
  
• Request the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan to collect and publicize substantiated information relating to grave violations of international human rights law, including breaches of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide committed against the Hazaras;
  
  
• Request UNAMA and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan to submit a special report on the situation of Hazaras identifying urgent and practical measures to protect the community against targeted attacks and mass atrocities.

Sincerely,

1. Dr. , Former Chairperson of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
2. , Former Chairperson of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
3. Dr., Ambassador, Afghanistan Mission, Geneva,
4. , Charge d’Affaires, Afghanistan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York
5. Dr. Abbas Farasoo, University of Melbourne, Australia
6. Dr. , University of Pennsylvania, USA
7. Dr. , Sheffield University, UK
8. Dr. Dawood Rezai, Legal Scholar, Canada
9. Dr., University of Coimbra, Portugal
10. Dr. , Monash University, Australia
11. Dr. , Texas Christian University, USA
12. Dr. , Carleton University, Canada
13. Dr. Humaira May Rizayee, Hazara rights activist, UK
14. Dr., University College London, UK
15. Dr. , Lecturer & Fellow, Stanford University, USA
16. Dr. , Zayed University, UAE.
17. Dr. , La Trobe University, Australia
18. Dr. , University of Pittsburgh, USA
19. Dr. , American University of Afghanistan/University of Minnesota, USA
20. Dr. , Kanazawa University, Japan
21. Dr. , SOAS University of London, UK
22. Dr. , University of Ottawa, Canada
23. Dr. , Associate Fellow, London School of Economics, UK
24. , Journalist, UK
25. , PhD Candidate, Ryerson University, Canada
26. , Former Diplomat, USA
27. , University Lecturer, Canada
28. , Fellow, New York University, USA
29. , Attorney, USA
30. , Fellow, Yale University, USA
31. , PhD Candidate, Oxford University, UK
32. , PhD Candidate, Fiji National University, Fiji
33. , Chairman of Gilgamesh Foundation, Brussels
34. , Non-resident Fellow, New York University
35. , former diplomat, Canada
36. , Publisher and Founder, Hasht-e-Subh  Daily, Afghanistan
37. , Reagan-Fascell Fellow, National Endowment for Democracy, USA
38. , American University of Afghanistan/The New School, New York
39. Tabish Forugh, Democracy Activist and Contributing Editor at 51�Թ�, USA
40. , Human Rights Activist, Canada
41. , Publisher and Founder, Daily Etilaat-e- Roz, Afghanistan
42. , Former Diplomat of Afghanistan to the UN, USA.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Nostalgia for the Pashtun Indian Empire

Historically, Afghans had always swept down the Khyber Pass to loot or conquer India. India’s administrative and diplomatic elites often enjoy walks in the majestic Lodi Gardens of Delhi. Today, the name Lodi might not mean much but the Lodi Dynasty ruled much of India in the 15^th  century. They were not just Afghans, they were Pashtuns. of the Ghilzai tribe. Among other things, the Lodis founded the city of Agra.

The First Battle of Panipat that every Indian reads about in history textbooks took place between the Pashtuns and the Mughals who had made their way to the Indo-Gangetic plains from modern day Uzbekistan. In 1526, Babur founded the Mughal Dynasty but the Pashtuns were not finished yet. When Babur died, the Pashtuns regrouped under the extraordinary Sher Shah Suri.

Suri introduced the rupee, revived the ancient city of Pataliputra as Patna, organized the postal system and built the , now known as the Grand Trunk Road connecting Peshawar to Kolkata. This road boosted trade but it also allowed Pashtun troops to move more easily from one end of their empire to another. To safeguard this artery of their empire, Suri settled Pashtuns alongside this road in villages that exist to this day.

Once the Mughals had their day in the sun, the Pashtuns were back. In the Third Battle of Panipat, Ahmad Shah Abdali, better known as Ahmad Shah Durrani in his native land, galloped from Kandahar to snuff out a nascent Maratha Empire. Today, people forget that Abdali was invited by a noted Muslim scholar Dehlavi of Delhi “for the arduous task of restoring the political powers of the Muslims.” Earlier, two Kashmiri nobles had invited Abdali to invade. In , he won a decisive victory in the hard-fought Battle of Shopian and Pashtuns ruled Kashmir until they lost to the Sikhs in .

The Pashtuns might have lost power in 1819 but they never left Kashmir. Thousands of Pashtuns continued to immigrate to the region for trade and some never returned. Even after the 1947-48 invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani-backed Pashtun irregulars, there were over 100,000 Pashtuns in the valley. India magnanimously (some would say foolishly) granted them citizenship in .

After the British crushed the great Indian rebellion of 1857, the descendants of the Mughals have declined dramatically. Their for Central Asia might remain but they recognize that their ancestral homelands are dominated by the Russians and the Chinese. In contrast, many in India see themselves as part of a community that first brought down the Soviet Union and, more recently, has humbled the US. Some of them see Pashtuns as natural rulers not only of Afghanistan and Pakistan but also the whole of Hindustan. This makes the Taliban victory particularly dangerous for India.

Fifth Column Risks and Some Countermeasures

India is a fractious democracy where foreign powers can subvert civil society to cause problems. In some scenarios, they can prey on existing resentments to fan local insurgencies. Pakistan has done so in Kashmir for decades. It also backed the Sikh separatist in Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s. Islamabad has been cultivating fundamentalist Islamists within India as well. Many older friends of the author recall hearing the slogan, “lad ke liya tha Pakistan, hans ke lenge Hindustan,” which means we fought to take Pakistan but we will laugh and take over India.

Now, Islamabad has another ace up its sleeve. In keeping with what it has done in the past, Pakistan can send Taliban fighters across the border into Kashmir. It may already be doing so. On Friday, April 23, the two Pakistani killed by Indian security forces might have been Pashtun Taliban militants on a jihad against India. This is a wakeup call for India’s political leaders and its security establishment.

According to ADGP Jammu Mukesh Singh, 2 militants killed in Sunjuwan encounter on Friday were Pashto speaking. It’s after over 2 decades that some Pashto speaking ultras, possibly from Afghanistan or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, have been found in J&K. I saw last one (Mast Gul) in 1994.

— Ahmed Ali Fayyaz (@ahmedalifayyaz)

As part of facing this resurgent external threat, India has no option but to crack down on fundamentalist pro-Pakistan Islamists within the country. They are not only active in Kashmir but also in much of the rest of the country. Few note that recruits to the Islamic State have come from , India’s most literate state that was first worldwide to elect a communist government to power. Intelligence agencies and police forces have to keep on top of the spread of toxic ideology and sleeper cells in India. Otherwise, the proverbial fifth column could sabotage Indian war efforts in the event of conflict not only with Pakistan but also China.

The two provinces of British India that were partitioned were Bengal and Punjab. In both states, opposition parties are in power. Both states have separatist elements who are a security threat to India. Apart from external threats, India faces internal threats that the Indian government must act on. Perhaps the time has come for India to mandate compulsory military service for two years for its youth. This would increase a sense of unity and prepare the nation for threats to its sovereignty and integrity.

A New Afghanistan Policy

India is currently sending 50,000 tons of to feed starving Afghans. It is also sending coronavirus vaccines and medicines to Afghanistan. For all the goodwill India commands in Afghanistan, New Delhi cannot project power in this landlocked country. Other than Pakistan, Afghanistan’s other neighbors are Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran. Of these Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are most important because Tajiks and Uzbeks are the only two ethnicities who offer a real challenge to the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. In turn, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan still defer to their “Russian older .” Ultimately, to contain the Taliban, India has to develop a working relationship with Uzbeks and Tajiks, the historic rivals of the Pashtuns, and with Russia.

Tajikistan might be indebted to but they get their , oil and remittances from Russia. With the Russian-Ukrainian conflict damaging the economies of Russia and Tajikistan, India has leverage with both countries. At such a time, Indian assistance to both countries and investment in Tajikistan could be tied to helping Afghan Tajiks, who are being targeted by the Taliban.

India must engage Uzbekistan too where it has similar leverage as with Tajikistan. However, the key player to contain the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban is the Shia nation of Iran. The Pashtuns have persecuted the Shia Hazara minority for well over a century. The Taliban is turning the screws on Hazaras who face a threat to their very survival. Iran has suffered immensely because of Donald Trump scuppering the Iran deal. Now, the US is on the verge of resurrecting that deal and India must act, and act fast.

India must import Iranian oil, build a and in Iran, and establish connectivity with the Hazaras in western Afghanistan. If India can back Uzbeks and Tajiks in the north, and the Hazaras in the west, the Taliban will be under pressure. It is likely to look to the east for expansion and, as Atul Singh, Manu Sharma and Vikram Sood argue, could lead the Taliban to create a new Pashtun state on the ruins of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are fragile and artificial states. In 2022, they do not make sense anymore. India must work to break up these states into more natural constituents that are less toxic to the region and the world. Back in 2001, The New York Times was advocating the breakup of Afghanistan. Pakistan has broken up before. In 1971, India liberated Bangladesh. Today, the human development indices of Bangladesh are far superior to Pakistan. The long suffering Balochs and even the poor Pashtuns stranded in Pakistan deserve their own state.

India has a historic opportunity to shape the destiny of South and Central Asia. With its economic growth, military might and agricultural production, India has geopolitical heft. To begin with, India must wield it with countries like France, Australia and Japan to win recognition of Kashmir as a sovereign part of India’s territory. At some point, India has to make a play for Pakistan-occupied Gilgit and Baltistan.With Imran Khan now voted out of power, he and his party are likely to flirt more avidly with extreme radicals in Pakistan and with the Taliban. For them, a jihad against India is on the cards and nuclear war is an . This leaves India with no choice but to focus on containing the Taliban for securing the security and unity of a large but vulnerable country.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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