51吃瓜

Washington鈥檚 systematic destruction of Iraq is the root cause of the current crisis, not sectarianism.

Barely a month after US President听Barack Obama听听滨谤补辩鈥檚 election as heralding a 鈥減eaceful, unified and prosperous future,鈥� the country again verges on civil war. As the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) sweeps toward听, calls for military action gather momentum. In one听commentator鈥檚听: 鈥淲e have a responsibility to those whose democracy we created.鈥� The patronizing arrogance of this statement is surpassed only by its utter detachment from reality.

滨谤补辩鈥檚 鈥溾�� is ranked 113^th out of 167 countries; its government is the third most dysfunctional and seventh most听听of any in the world. Incapable of its citizens with听water, food and electricity, authorities in Iraq routinely rape, torture and murder听听鈥� with the United States鈥� full听and frequent听. The 鈥渄emocracy we created鈥� is a fantasy. Our true 鈥渞esponsibility鈥� now is two-fold.

First, unless and until we, as citizens of Western states, acknowledge and denounce the complicity of our governments in the butchery and plundering of Iraq, the self-perpetuating cycle of domestic bloodshed and foreign militarism will continue unabated and unabashed. This in no way exonerates Saddam Hussein, 滨谤补辩鈥檚 current elite or other local and regional forces. All are culpable. Yet such actors, whether clients or opponents of Western power, all operate in structural conditions produced primarily by that power. Failure to grasp this is to fundamentally misunderstand the object of analysis.

Second, we must offer our full and unconditional support to those Iraqis still struggling against domestic and foreign oppression for a different kind of politics. Only Iraqis can generate progress for their country. The greatest contribution we can make to their cause is to amplify their voices.

Contextualizing the Current Crisis

听is nothing to do with any 鈥渓ong-simmering war between the Shi鈥榠te and Sunni strains of Islam.鈥� However dogmatically repeated, such听听remain historically illiterate and empirically unsustainable. This crisis is political, not sectarian 鈥� although it has of course become structured along such fault-lines. It is, moreover, indissociable from decades of Western interventionism, beginning with听 colonialism. However, the US response to Saddam鈥檚 1990 invasion of Kuwait is of more direct relevance.

Far exceeding 鈥渃ontainment鈥� of their听erstwhile , US policy severely degraded the Iraqi state鈥檚 capacity for civil governance, caused death and suffering on a mass scale, and tied religious and ethnic identities to material survival. The structural not only for 滨谤补辩鈥檚 2006-08 civil war, but for the current crisis, were thereby created.

The US-led coalition听knew听濒颈迟迟濒别听补苍诲听cared听even less听about Iraq prior to the invasion. Those then entrusted to run the country were incompetent and corrupt in equal measure.听Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), spoke no Arabic and had no Middle East experience.听

A massive bombing campaign was launched. Targeting听 infrastructure, this has now virtually uninterrupted for听23 years. The 2,000 tons of depleted听听dropped on Iraq caused vastly 听cancer rates, child mortality and birth defects. An extraordinarily harsh听 regime听further reduced Iraq from a state with a reasonably high standard of living and advanced modern infrastructure to a nation barely clinging onto听.听Life expectancy听 from 65 to 58 between 1987-95, as Iraq fell from 54^th to 127^th on the United Nation鈥檚 development index. 听directly caused at least 1 million deaths, including 500,000 children. For听, near-starvation diets, countless diseases and severe psychological trauma became the norm.

Professor听Marc Bossuyt, an authority on international legislation, the sanctions as 鈥渦nequivocally illegal under existing human rights law.”听Dennis Halliday, the former assistant secretary-general of the United Nations, them 鈥済enocide, … a deliberate policy to destroy the people of Iraq.鈥滱s formal institutions weakened, a 鈥溾�� of personal connections developed. Familial, tribal and religious听听became the primary source of food, medicine and income. These later听 into听the听sectarian militias听that drove the 2006-08 civil war, creating today鈥檚 fractured landscape.

That such affiliations gained importance at the expense of a unified national identity was, therefore, a direct听听of the political economy produced by sanctions and deepened after the 2003 invasion. ISIS is but the latest tragedy to emerge from this context.

2003: The Destruction of Iraq, Continued

听on civil war commonly cites weak states, state collapse, poor leadership and unequal access to resources as major causes of conflict. Such factors, introduced or deepened under sanctions, were greatly exacerbated under the US-led occupation. Indeed, having already spent the previous 12 years eradicating any possible social or institution foundation for its hubristic vision of 鈥渄emocracy,鈥� the US and its allies now destroyed all remaining vestiges of a functioning state or cohesive society.

In terms of leadership, the US-led coalition听 濒颈迟迟濒别听补苍诲听 even less听about Iraq prior to the invasion. Those then entrusted to run the country were incompetent and corrupt in equal measure.听, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), spoke no Arabic and had no Middle East experience. A 24-year-old, fresh from university, managed滨谤补辩鈥檚 market. America鈥檚 major Iraqi partner,听, was a convicted embezzler, known conman and sectarian ideologue 鈥� reportedly a 听for听prime minister. Such figures 鈥渢he largest war profiteering in history,”听as $23 billion of 鈥渞econstruction鈥� money was pocketed by multinational corporations and local kleptocrats, smugglers and militias 鈥� increasing such actors鈥� power听vis-a-vis听the formal state.

Meanwhile, with occupying forces numerically听听of maintaining order, central authority and civil governance utterly collapsed. The disastrous听鈥�诲别-叠补鈥檃迟丑颈蹿颈肠补迟颈辞苍鈥澨齪rogram, furthermore, fired hundreds of thousands of teachers, doctors, bureaucrats, police officers and soldiers overnight. This not only deprived the new state of anyone of possible use, skill or experience but 鈥� in disproportionately affecting听听鈥� set the stage for 滨谤补辩鈥檚 civil war. With former听听officers and soldiers joining the current uprising, the link between these conflicts and the legacy of 2003 is undeniable.

The sectarianization of Iraq was further compounded by the new听. With American and Iraqi elites jointly responsible, this embedded communal divisions into the legislative and institutional architecture of the state. The present insurgency directly contends this听听of Sunni exclusion. To claim that the litany of errors and abuses 鈥� both before and after 2003 鈥� has no connection with current events, as听听has done, is either disingenuous or deluded.

On the contrary, the US-led destruction of Iraq has been sustained, systematic and methodical. Indeed, so comprehensive was the incompetence of the occupation that 2003 arguably represents the purposeful听听of the genocide perpetrated under sanctions. Should this language make us uncomfortable, realpolitik suggests similar conclusions. A permanently pliant and unstable entity requiring the constant application of Western power would be entirely consistent with nearly a century of imperial policy. The current crisis emerges from, and threatens to perpetuate, precisely this legacy.

Rethinking ISIS

While the authoritarian and sectarian policies of the incumbent prime minister,听, are undoubtedly the most proximate causes, attempting to abstract the present conflict from the legacy of听听is, as demonstrated, utterly fallacious. The uprising has taken in the same听cities and provinces听and is composed of the same social factions as the civil war. It has also been radicalized by extreme regional Islamist groups 鈥� forces that had听no 听in Iraq before 2003.

To claim that the litany of errors and abuses 鈥� both before and after 2003 鈥� has no connection with current events, as听Tony Blair听has done, is either disingenuous or deluded.

However, ISIS 鈥� brutal as it is 鈥� is only one faction within a broader听, which to a large degree represents听a uprising听against the violent, oligarchic and exclusionary state built by the US and inherited by Maliki and his cronies. This internal diversity explains why many are听听to cities 鈥渓iberated鈥� from state control and听听between factions.听Local 听supply most of the fighters. Many, until a few weeks ago, were听peaceful 听with an anti-sectarian and democratic agenda. They were听arrested, tortured and murdered听by the , and have been forced into taking up common arms with ISIS only through such brutality.

This state violence represents the continuation of policies under the US-led occupation. Indiscriminately labeled 鈥�,鈥� Sunni political opponents were systematically targeted by death squads, who were trained by the听听for the Iraqi government or run by private firms such as听. Such criminalization of dissent 鈥� of which the monolithic label of 鈥淚SIS鈥� is a part 鈥� is intended to force opponents into the violent and sectarian logic imposed upon Iraq by its own elites and imperial power. These actors seek to produce a particular kind of threat, against which the application of military power can be legitimized.

With the medicine the same as the disease, a self-perpetuating cycle of violence easily escapes the control of its original architects 鈥� requiring yet more force. Despite Obama鈥檚 words about political reconciliation, further US military action would simply continue and escalate this cycle. There is no reason whatsoever to believe that, against all precedent, it would bring Iraq anything other than more destruction.

Breaking the Cycle

For any signs of hope, we must look to ordinary Iraqis鈥� long history 鈥� often forgotten and violently suppressed 鈥� of struggling for human dignity, basic rights and representative state institutions. This struggle, always waged against both domestic and foreign oppressors, began in 1920. A nationwide, cross-sectarian and popular uprising against colonial rule was shot, bombed and gassed by听British . The Iraqi听Communist Party, similarly, long a locus of secular opposition. Its members were slaughtered by Saddam, using a list of names provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Following 2003,听听turned Iraq into a neoliberal playground. Yet听criminalized 听still struggled for the rights of听Iraqi . Their听听continue to risk their lives for this cause.

As the Middle East rose up in 2011,听听across Iraq called for an end to sectarianism, corruption and state assassinations, a withdrawal of American troops, and jobs, security and essential amenities. They were answered only with听听and听听by Western media. The current uprising emerges from this decades-long criminalization and persecution of legitimate dissent. Yet many Iraqis continue to resist this logic.

Groups such as the听Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative听听grassroots organizations across the country, which听attempt to hold the state to account through independent institutions, run听candidates in provincial elections and听demand听human, labor and political rights for all 滨谤补辩鈥檚 citizens. Today, they call for the immediate supply of food, water and housing to those displaced,听听unambiguously that: 鈥淎ny international or US military intervention will only increase and reinforce the negative effects Iraq has suffered over the past decade.鈥�

That there are Iraqis still prepared to risk their lives for their own rights and the rights of others shows that, despite everything, this other history still lives, and may yet contain the seeds of an alternative future. If this sounds naive, it is far more so to look toward either 滨谤补辩鈥檚 current kleptocracy or Western states for liberation. Both have repeatedly demonstrated that their only interest is in 滨谤补辩鈥檚 wealth, not its well-being. Progress in Iraq will come from below, from popular struggle, or not at all. It is to this struggle and no other that we should lend our voices and our will.

The views expressed听in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect听51吃瓜鈥檚听editorial policy.

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