51吃瓜

The Iraq conflict is the American war that never ends and will never go well.

I wanted to offer a wry chuckle before we headed into the heavy stuff about Iraq, so I tried to start this article with a suitably ironic formulation. You know, a听诲茅箩脿-惫耻-all-over-again kinda thing. I even thought about telling you how, in 2011, I contacted a noted author to blurb my ,听We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People, and he presciently declined, saying sardonically: 鈥淪o you’re gonna be the one to write the last book on failure in Iraq?鈥�

I couldn’t do any of that. As someone who cares deeply about this country, I find it beyond belief that Washington has again plunged into the swamp of the Sunni-Shia听mess in Iraq. A young soldier now deployed as one of the 1,600 non-boots-on-the-ground there might have been eight years old when the 2003 invasion took place. He probably had to ask his dad about it.听After all, less than three years ago, when dad finally came home with his head 鈥� high,鈥� President Barack Obama听补蝉蝉耻谤别诲听础尘别谤颈肠补苍蝉 鈥渨e鈥檙e leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq.鈥� So what happened in the blink of an eye?

The Sons of Iraq

Sometimes, when I turn on the TV these days, the sense of seeing once again places in Iraq I’d been overwhelms me. After 22 years as a diplomat with the Department of State, I spent 12 long months in Iraq in 2009-10 as part of the American occupation. My role was to lead two teams in 鈥溾�� the nation. In practice, that meant paying for schools that would never be completed, setting up pastry shops on streets without water or electricity, and conducting endless propaganda events on Washington-generated themes of the week (鈥渟mall business,鈥� 鈥渨omen’s empowerment,鈥� 鈥渄emocracy building鈥�).

We even organized awkward soccer matches, where American taxpayer money was used to coerce reluctant Sunni teams into facing off against hesitant Shia ones, in hopes that, somehow, the chaos created by the American invasion could be ameliorated on the playing field. In an afternoon, we definitively failed to reconcile the millennium-old Sunni-Shia divide we had sparked into ethnic-cleansing-style life in 2003-04, even if the score was carefully stage managed into a tie by the 82nd Airborne soldiers with whom I worked.

In 2006, the US brokered the ascension to power of Prime Minister听Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia politician handpicked to unite Iraq. A bright, shining lie of a plan soon followed. Applying vast amounts of money, Washington鈥檚 emissaries created the听, or Sons of Iraq, a loose grouping of Sunnis anointed as 鈥渕oderates鈥� who agreed to temporarily stop killing, in return for a promised place at the table in the New(er) Iraq. The 鈥減olitical space鈥� for this was to be created by a massive escalation of the American military effort, which gained a particularly marketable name: the听.

The staggering costs of all this 鈥斕�$25听billion听to train the Iraqi army,听$60听billion听for the reconstruction-that-wasn鈥檛,听$2听trillion听for the overall war, almost听4,500听Americans dead and more than 32,000 wounded, and an Iraqi death toll of more than听190,000听(though some estimates go as听high听as听a听million) 鈥� can now be measured against the results. The nine-year attempt to create an American client state in Iraq failed, tragically and completely.听

I was charged with meeting the听Sahwa 听in my area. My job back then was to try to persuade them to stay on board just a little longer, even as they came to realize that they’d been had. Maliki鈥檚 Shia government in Baghdad, which was already ignoring American entreaties to be inclusive, was hell-bent on ensuring there would be no Sunni 鈥渟ons鈥� in its Iraq.

False alliances and double-crosses were not unfamiliar to the Sunni warlords I engaged with. Often, our talk 鈥� over endless tiny glasses of sweet, sweet tea stirred with white-hot metal spoons 鈥� shifted from the Shia and the Americans to their great-grandfathers’ struggle against the British. Revenge unfolds over generations, they assured me, and memories are long in the Middle East, they warned.

When I left in 2010, the year before the American military finally departed, the听听on the ground should have been clear enough to anyone with the vision to take it in. Iraq had already been tacitly divided into feuding state-lets controlled by Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. The Baghdad government had turned into a typical, gleeful third-world kleptocracy fueled by American money, but with a particularly nasty twist: They were also a group of autocrats dedicated to persecuting, marginalizing, degrading and perhaps one day destroying the country鈥檚 Sunni minority.

US influence was fading fast, leaving the State Department, a small military contingent, various spooks and contractors hidden behind the walls of the billion-dollar embassy (the 听in the world) that had been built in a of imperial hubris. The foreign power with the most influence over events was by then听, the country the Bush administration had once been determined to take down alongside Saddam Hussein as part of the Axis of Evil.

The Grandsons of Iraq

The staggering costs of all this 鈥斕� billion听to train the Iraqi army,听 billion听for the reconstruction-that-wasn鈥檛,听 trillion听for the overall war, almost听听Americans dead and more than 32,000 wounded, and an Iraqi death toll of more than听听(though some estimates go as as听a听) 鈥� can now be measured against the results. The nine-year attempt to create an American client state in Iraq failed, tragically and completely. The proof of that is on today’s front pages.

According to the crudest possible calculation, we spent blood and got no oil. Instead, America’s war of terror in the dissolution of a Middle Eastern post-Cold War听stasis that, curiously enough, had been held together by Iraq鈥檚 previous autocratic ruler, Saddam Hussein. We released a hornet鈥檚 nest of Islamic fervor, sectarianism, fundamentalism and pan-nationalism. Islamist terror groups grew听听and more听diffuse听by the year. That horrible lightning over the Middle East that鈥檚 left American foreign policy in such an ugly glare will last into our grandchildren’s days. There should have been so many futures. Now, there will be so few as the dead accumulate in the ruins of our hubris. That is all that we won.

Under a new president, elected in 2008 in part on his promise to end American military involvement in Iraq, Washington鈥檚 strategy morphed into the more media-palatable mantra of 鈥渘o boots on the ground.鈥� Instead, backed by aggressive intel and the 鈥渟urgical鈥� application of drone strikes and other kinds of air power, US covert ops were to link up with the 鈥渕oderate鈥� elements in Islamic governments or among the rebels opposing them 鈥� depending on whether Washington was opting to support a thug government or thug fighters.

In the last Iraq War, the Iranians sponsored and directed attacks by Shia militias against American occupation forces (and me). Now, its special operatives and combat advisors fight side-by-side with those听same Shia听militias听under the cover of American air power. You want real boots on the ground? Iranian forces are already there.

The results? Chaos in Libya, highlighted by the听听of advanced weaponry from the arsenals of the dead autocrat Muammar Qaddafi across the Middle East and significant parts of Africa, chaos in Yemen, chaos in Syria, chaos in Somalia, chaos in Kenya, chaos in听South Sudan and, of course, chaos in Iraq.

And then came the Islamic State (IS) and the new 鈥渃aliphate,鈥� the听child听born of a neglectful occupation and an autocratic Shia government out to put the Sunnis in their place once and for all. And suddenly we were heading back into Iraq. What, in August 2014, was initially promoted as a limited humanitarian effort to save the听, a small religious sect that no one in Washington or anywhere else in this country had previously heard of, quickly morphed into those 1,600 American troops back on the ground in Iraq and American planes in the skies from Kurdistan in the north to听south of . The Yazidis were either abandoned, or saved, or just not needed anymore. Who knows and who, by then, cared?听They had, after all, served their purpose handsomely as the听casus belli听of this war. Their agony at least had a horrific reality, unlike the supposed in the听Gulf of Tonkin听that propelled a widening war in Vietnam in 1964 or the nonexistent Iraqi weapons of mass destruction () that were the excuse for the invasion of 2003.

The newest Iraq War features Special Operations 鈥渢rainers,鈥� air strikes against IS fighters using American weapons听听by the Iraqi army (now evidently to be听听by Washington), US taking to the skies from听inside Iraq听as well as a carrier in the Persian Gulf and possibly elsewhere, and an air war across the 听into Syria.

It Takes a Lot of Turning Points to go in a Circle

The听听on the ground these days is tragically familiar: an Iraq even more divided into feuding state-lets; a Baghdad government kleptocracy about to be reinvigorated by free-flowing American money; and a new Shia prime minister being issued the same 2003-11 to-do list by Washington 鈥� mollify the Sunnis, unify Iraq and make it snappy. The State Department still stays hidden behind the walls of that billion-dollar embassy. More money will be spent to train the听听Iraqi military. Iran听听the foreign power with the most influence over events.

One odd difference should be noted, however. In the last Iraq War, the Iranians sponsored and directed attacks by Shia militias against American occupation forces (and me). Now, its special operatives and combat advisors fight side-by-side with those听same Shia 听under the cover of American air power. You want real boots on the ground? Iranian forces are already there. It鈥檚 certainly an example of how politics makes听strange , but also of what happens when you assemble your 鈥渟trategy鈥� on the run.

Obama hardly can be blamed for all of this, but he鈥檚 done his part to make it worse 鈥� and worse it will surely get as his administration once again assumes ownership of the Sunni-Shia fight. The 鈥渘ew鈥� unity plan that will fail follows the pattern of the one that did fail in 2007: Use American military force to create a political space for 鈥渞econciliation鈥� between once-burned, twice-shy Sunnis and a compromise Shia government that American money tries to 听into an agreement against Iran’s wishes. Perhaps whatever new Sunni organization is pasted together, however briefly, by American representatives should be called the Grandsons of Iraq.

Just to add to the general eeriness factor, the key people in charge of putting Washington鈥檚 plans into effect are distinctly familiar faces.听Brett McGurk, who in听key Iraq policy 听throughout the Bush and Obama administrations, is again the听point 听as deputy assistant secretary of state for Iraq and Iran. McGurk was once the 鈥淢aliki whisperer鈥� for his closeness to the former prime minister. The current American听, Robert Stephen Beecroft, was deputy chief of mission, the number two at the Baghdad embassy, back in 2011. Diplomatically, another听faux听coalition of the (remarkably un-)willing is being assembled. And the听听demanding war in a feverish hysteria in Washington are all familiar names, mostly leftovers from the glory days of the 2003 invasion.

Lloyd Austin, the听听overseeing America鈥檚 new military effort, oversaw the 2011 retreat. Gen. John Allen, brought out of military retirement to coordinate the new war in the region 鈥� he had recently been a civilian advisor to Secretary of State John听Kerry听鈥� was deputy in Iraq’s Anbar province during the surge. Also on the US side, the mercenary听security 听are听, even as President Obama听, without a hint of irony, the ancient 2002 Congressional authorization to invade Iraq he听听as candidate Obama as one of his legal justifications for this year’s war. The Iranians, too, have the same military on the ground in Iraq, Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’s Quds Force. Small world.听听also helps direct Hezbollah operations inside Syria.

America鈥檚 wars in the Middle East exist in a hallucinatory space where reality is of little import, so if you think you heard all this before, between 2003-10, you did.

Even the aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf launching air strikes, the USS George H.W. Bush听is fittingly named after the president who first got us deep into Iraq almost a quarter century ago. Just consider that for a moment: We have been in Iraq so long that we now have an aircraft carrier named after the president who launched the adventure.

On a听36-month 听for 鈥渄estroying鈥� ISIS, the president is already ceding his war to the next president, as was done to him by George W. Bush. That next president may well be Hillary Clinton, who was secretary of state as Iraq War 2.0 sputtered to its conclusion. Notably, it was her husband whose administration kept the original Iraq War of 1990-91 alive via no-fly zones and sanctions. Call that a pedigree of sorts when it comes to fighting in Iraq until hell freezes over.

If there is a summary lesson here, perhaps it鈥檚 that there is evidently no hole that can’t be dug deeper. How could it be more obvious, after more than two decades of听empty 听of victory in Iraq, that genuine “success,” however defined, is impossible? The only way to win is not to play. Otherwise, you鈥檙e just a sucker at the geopolitical equivalent of a carnival ringtoss game with a fist full of quarters to trade for a cheap stuffed animal.

Apocalypse Then 鈥� And Now听

America鈥檚 wars in the Middle East exist in a hallucinatory space where reality is of little import, so if you think you heard all this before, between 2003-10, you did. But for those of us of a certain age, the echoes go back much further. I recently joined a on听Dutch television听where former Republican Congressman听Pete Hoekstra听made a telling slip of the tongue. As we spoke about IS, Hoekstra insisted that the US needed to deny them 鈥渟anctuary in Cambodia.鈥� He quickly corrected himself to say 鈥淪yria,鈥� but the point was made.

We’ve been here before, as the failures of American policy and strategy in Vietnam metastasized into war in Cambodia and Laos to deny sanctuary to North Vietnamese forces. As with IS, we were told they were barbarians who sought to impose an evil philosophy across an entire region. They, too, famously needed to be fought 鈥渙ver there鈥� to prevent them from attacking us here. We didn’t say 鈥渢he Homeland鈥� back then, but you get the picture.

As the similarities with Vietnam are telling, so is the difference. When the reality of America’s failure in Vietnam finally became so clear that there was no one left to lie to, America’s war there ended and the troops came home. They never went back. America is now fighting the Iraq War for the third time, somehow madly expecting different results, while guaranteeing only failure. To paraphrase a young Kerry, himself back from听, who’ll be the last to die for that endless mistake? It seems as if it will be many years before we know.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

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