51吃瓜

Almost every day, political, economic and social issues of global significance affecting thousands of people worldwide come to the fore. These developments provide ample material for thousands of international TV news channels and websites. Under these conditions, important developments occurring in different parts of the world may not receive the attention they deserve in the international media and may be lost amid the chaos. In short, the global agenda is so intense that this turmoil can best be described by the phrase 鈥渆verything solid melts into air,鈥� used by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the Communist Manifesto to characterize the destructive and rapidly transformative power of capitalism.

Among developments lost amid the busy global agenda is the ongoing process in T眉rkiye over the past year aimed at ending the Kurdistan Workers鈥� Party (PKK) movement and ultimately achieving a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue.

The human cost of the Kurdish conflict

The PKK, founded in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah 脰calan, launched an armed struggle against the Turkish army to establish an independent Kurdish state. Since its first attack in 1984, thousands of Turkish soldiers and Kurdish militants have lost their lives. The clashes between the PKK and the army have affected not only the warring parties but, more significantly, the civilian population, and it goes without saying that the Kurds have paid the heaviest price.

As a result of the intensified clashes in the , thousands of Kurdish villages were forcibly evacuated and their inhabitants were subjected to compulsory migration to the cities. This event alone has been one of the historically profound developments that changed the rural-urban population balance of the country and shaped the population structure and spatial fabric of today鈥檚 metropolitan cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.

It is also necessary to mention the thousands of Kurdish citizens who were and spent their lives in jails because of the Kurdish issue. Among them, politicians, writers, artists and academics are, of course, at the forefront. Thousands of Kurds were also forced to leave Turkiye because of this issue and lived in exile, mostly in European countries, with most of them dying without ever returning to their homeland.

It may be considered a secondary consequence, but it should still be noted that the Kurdish issue has been a controversial topic in Turkish social sciences, a taboo that it has been considered in one鈥檚 best interest to avoid if possible. This has naturally prevented the subject from receiving the research it deserves in academic circles. Academics who refused to heed this and wrote on the subject have the price. This price has ranged from years of imprisonment to the loss of one鈥檚 job.

Ultimately, the greatest price and sorrow have undoubtedly been paid by Turkish and Kurdish mothers and fathers who have buried their young children due to the conflicts. Any attempt to summarize how important and structural the Kurdish issue is for the Turkish state and society would undoubtedly fall short.

The political breakthrough

Efforts to end the armed conflict of the Kurdish movement and resolve this issue within a political framework have been attempted in recent years but have failed. The most recent of these initiatives, launched in 2012 and named the 鈥�,鈥� ended in great disappointment in 2015.

Following talks between state officials 鈥� primarily from the National Intelligence Organization and Members of Parliament (MPs) from the pro-Kurdish Peoples鈥� Democratic Party (HDP) party of 脰calan, who is on Imrali Island 鈥� a of understanding was drafted and read out at Dolmabah莽e Palace on February 28, 2015. However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an later stated that no such agreement existed, and the attempt to resolve the Kurdish issue through politics ended in a major fiasco.

Subsequently, investigations were launched against the Kurdish representatives involved in this process, and some were sentenced to prison. At the same time, pressure on other Kurdish actors also increased. The period between 2016 and 2024 was generally a difficult time for Kurdish politicians, intellectuals and activists. 

Then, on October 1, 2024, on the opening day of the new term of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), Devlet Bah莽eli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 鈥� considered the main focus of Turkish nationalism 鈥� the seats of the People鈥檚 Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), the main representative of the Kurds, and shook hands with them. However, in previous years, the same Bah莽eli had for the closure of the HDP, the Kurdish party that preceded DEM.

Naturally, Bah莽eli鈥檚 gesture surprised almost everyone, but it was interpreted as a sign of goodwill and a desire for peaceful politics from Bah莽eli, who is known for his politeness. However, the truly groundbreaking step, perhaps a watershed moment in Turkish history, came on October 22, 2024. In his weekly group speech, Bah莽eli essentially for 脰calan to come to Parliament, call for the dissolution of the PKK and then take advantage of the right to hope (which would secure his release from prison). This was truly a revolutionary statement. It was a radical change in rhetoric that shocked everyone, as it opened the door to amnesty for the 鈥渢errorist leader鈥� whom Bah莽eli had called a 鈥渟eparatist leader鈥� for years.

Everyone familiar with Turkish politics knows that if anyone other than Bah莽eli, an absolute Turkish nationalist, had made this call, an investigation would have been launched the very next day on charges of 鈥渄ividing the country and the nation.鈥� That is precisely why only MHP leader Bah莽eli could make this proposal regarding 脰calan, who plays a key role in resolving the Kurdish issue.

Erdo臒an welcomed Bah莽eli鈥檚 bold call, and the isolation imposed on 脰calan was . From that day onward, visits by state officials and representatives of the DEM Party to 脰calan became more frequent. As a result of these meetings, on February 27, 2025, 脰calan for the laying down of arms. This was the first time the PKK had come so close to disarmament, and it was the biggest step taken to date in the process towards a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue.

With this call, diplomatic traffic regarding the resolution of the Kurdish issue intensified. This process, dubbed 鈥溾�� by the Turkish government, was referred to as the 鈥淧eace Process鈥� by the Kurdish side. Thus, an irreversible path had been embarked upon.

Steps toward peace

While talks between the parties continued, S谋rr谋 S眉reyya 脰nder, a member of the Kurdish delegation who was respected by all sides, on May 3, following a sudden heart attack. His death deeply saddened many people. The Speaker of the Assembly and other party leaders issued condolence messages. Bah莽eli 脰nder鈥檚 funeral. His grief was evident.

On May 12, 2025, a development took place that would be considered a turning point in the Kurdish issue: the PKK organization that it had dissolved itself and ended its armed struggle. Following this, Bah莽eli issued a in the language preferred by the Kurds, addressing 脰calan as the 鈥渇ounding leader鈥� and thanking him. Bah莽eli continued to surprise with his bold steps.

Then, on July 11, 2025, the PKK its weapons in a ceremony attended by a group of 30 militants. This ceremony was the most concrete sign that the PKK issue and the years of conflict had come to an end. Following this development, a commission was established within the Assembly, comprising representatives of the ruling and opposition parties, to draft the relevant bills for the legal reforms necessary to resolve the Kurdish issue. Chaired by Numan Kurtulmu艧, Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye, the commission held its on August 5, 2025.

The commission began by hearing from civil society organizations, individuals and government officials involved in the issue, and had heard from nearly 100 individuals by December 4. Subsequently, the commission members discussed Imrali Island to meet with 脰calan.

The parties on the commission showed hesitation regarding this visit, which would be highly symbolic in terms of the state publicly acknowledging 脰calan as an interlocutor for the first time. Some shared the view that the public could interpret this as 鈥渢he state going to 脰calan鈥檚 feet鈥�, which could be problematic. (In fact, such an interpretation is technically impossible, because 脰calan has been imprisoned since 1999. Therefore, meeting with a prisoner is only possible by visiting him in prison. Otherwise, this person would have to be released from prison.) 

The ruling party was also hesitant about this, but Bah莽eli once again paved the way. On November 18, he , 鈥淚f the parliamentary commission does not agree to this visit, if everyone insists on playing the three monkeys, I will openly say that I will take three friends with me, I will not hesitate or shy away from going to Imrali with our own resources, I will not refrain from sitting face to face [with 脰calan] around a table.鈥� Erdo臒an endorsed this statement, and, finally, the committee decided that the representatives selected to meet with 脰calan would travel to Imrali.

However, the opposition parties in the commission (except for the DEM Party) 鈥� primarily the main opposition party, the Republican People鈥檚 Party (CHP) 鈥� send representatives to the Imrali delegation. It should also be noted that there was hesitation about whether the CHP would participate in the commission during its formation.

In a written statement explaining its decision not to send a representative to the delegation meeting with 脰calan, the CHP cited repressive policies such as the ongoing detention of mayors and the case seeking to close the CHP. It was also noted that the meeting could easily be conducted online. The CHP鈥檚 decision not to send a representative to the meeting with 脰calan is of critical importance because, as a result of being the main opposition party, it is the most likely to come to power in the event of a change of government in Turkiye following the elections. Therefore, it serves as a precursor to the extent to which it can take bold steps towards resolving the Kurdish issue and produce realistic policies on this matter.

It is clear that a peace process that excludes 脰calan is not possible, and no new leader to replace him has yet emerged among the Kurds. Therefore, it is impossible to resolve the PKK issue and build peace while still referring to him as the 鈥渢errorist leader.鈥� For this reason, Bah莽eli has changed his rhetoric and prefers to use the title 鈥渇ounding leader鈥� for 脰calan. Meanwhile, the CHP stated that it would continue to participate in the commission and contribute to the process. On October 26, the PKK in a statement made from Kandil that it had withdrawn all its forces from Turkiye.

What comes next

The developments recorded regarding the resolution of the issue, which has been a century-old problem for Turkiye and involves the struggle for Kurdish identity and the constitutional recognition of Kurds, are as follows:

First and foremost, it is necessary to discuss at length Bah莽eli 鈥� who is described as Turkiye鈥檚 Frederik Willem de Klerk (former president of South Africa who worked with Nelson Mandela to end Apartheid), who initiated this process and who holds the title of Ba艧bu臒 as the leader of Turkish nationalism 鈥� and to examine why he may have resorted to such radical rhetoric and policy changes.

Knowing which potential legal regulations and changes are likely to be essential is also important, as is understanding the parties that oppose this process and their main arguments. Finally, we must examine how the public approaches this process and, of course, the possible developments and probabilities. However, that is best left for another day.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.