51³Ô¹Ï

On March 1, the Kurdish Workers’ Party () announced a ceasefire and laid down arms the Turkish government. Given the long of broken ceasefires and failed peace talks, this development feels familiar.

To understand today’s situation, one must examine the historical context of the conflict. The PKK was founded in 1978 by Abdullah Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô, who still leads the party from prison. Many the PKK a “militant Marxist-Leninist” terrorist group. However, a significant segment of the Kurdish population sees Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô as a morally gray figure and one of the few who has fought for the freedom of Kurdistan.

The PKK’s roots in both Turkey and Syria

The PKK’s struggle extends beyond Turkey. In 1962, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad 120,000 Kurds of their citizenship, disenfranchising them and barring their participation in elections. The Syrian government implemented the Arab Belt , a program in the 1970s that resettled Arab populations into historically Kurdish regions along the Turkish border, displacing thousands of Kurds and undermining their regional influence.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, the PKK launched a military campaign against the Turkish government and Kurdish groups like the Village Guards. In 1985, Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô fled to Syria, where the PKK built military camps with Syrian support. The group’s increasingly militant tactics led the US to it a terrorist organization in 1997. Turkey had already labeled the PKK a terrorist group, despite its domestic roots. In 1995, the US Congress military aid to Turkey due to reports of human rights abuses, escalating tensions further.

In 1998, Turkey and Syria signed the Protocol, ending Syrian support for the PKK and shutting down its camps. Following this, Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô fled.

Authorities first Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô in Italy for entering the country on a false passport and due to a German arrest warrant. Turkey tried to him via Germany, but Italy refused. Germany declined to press the issue, fearing retaliation from PKK sympathizers after Italian Kurds protested in Rome. Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô stayed in Athens, against the wishes of the Greek government. He then sought asylum from multiple countries, the EU, the Hague, and the International Criminal Court, all unsuccessfully. Greece sent him to Nairobi, Kenya, where he stayed at the Greek Embassy. Fourteen days later, Turkish intelligence arrested him as he attempted to fly to the Netherlands.

Southeastern Turkey remained under emergency rule until 2002. In 2004, the election of pro-Kurdish democratic parties new hope. Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô attempted to negotiate a ceasefire during this period, but mistrust led to repeated failures. The PKK declared a ceasefire in 2004, only to break it in 2005. Subsequent peace attempts from 2009 to 2011 and 2012 to 2015 followed similar patterns.

The Turkish government inadvertently made Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô an even bigger Kurdish star by forcing him back into Turkey and charging him with treason and . Additionally, to the European Court of Human Rights, Turkey did not allow him to have a fair trial. Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô has been in jail ever since, and some of that time has been in complete isolation.

Erdoğan hopes to capitalize on the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire to gain Kurdish support

This brings us to the present day. Nearly fifty years into the conflict, with Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô still imprisoned and his influence enduring through various Kurdish political parties, the dynamics remain precarious. The current ceasefire is overshadowed by President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan’s authoritarian grasp on power. Since becoming president in , following his tenure as prime minister beginning in 2002, ErdoÄŸan has transformed Turkey’s parliamentary system into an executive presidency, consolidating authority in ways that have raised concerns of dictatorial rule.

Now, as he faces the potential end of his political tenure, Erdoğan is pursuing constitutional changes that would allow him to remain in power. To succeed, he needs more parliamentary support than he currently commands—particularly from Kurdish constituencies. In this context, the PKK’s decision to lay down arms may inadvertently bolster Erdoğan’s efforts to secure the votes necessary for extending his rule. The ceasefire could therefore shift power dynamics in Erdoğan’s favor, reinforcing rather than restraining his ongoing drive to consolidate authority.

This shift inadvertently strengthens ErdoÄŸan’s hand by creating a vacuum in Kurdish representation, possibly deepening his authoritarian control. By dissolving its armed struggle, the PKK risks relinquishing vital leverage against a regime that has shown little interest in genuine peace or democratic governance. If the PKK’s transitional phase is perceived as a sign of weakness, it may embolden ErdoÄŸan to distance himself further from meaningful dialogue, using the dissolution as justification for oppressive measures against the Kurdish population.

PKK’s surrender and what it means for Erdoğan

The PKK its 12th Congress from May 5 to 7, 2025, in the Medya Defense Areas, a PKK stronghold located in the mountainous regions of northern Iraq. The leadership emphasized the congress’s importance in response to “Call for Peace and Democratic Society.” Delegates from various branches attended, with posters of Ö³¦²¹±ô²¹²Ô throughout the venue.

If ErdoÄŸan succeeds in changing the constitution, this could pave the way for uncontrolled power dynamics comparable to Russia, where a singular dictator maintains dominance. The inherent instability of ErdoÄŸan’s regime, entrenched with an authoritarian desire to maintain control, renders any ceasefire fragile and susceptible to collapse.

ErdoÄŸan is now down an obstacle, with no enemy that can make it complicated for him to dominate. Even if the ceasefire holds, he is under no obligation to reciprocate and may use the opportunity to implement constitutional changes that tighten his grip on power. If he fails to secure enough votes, his successor may not honor the agreement. The ceasefire could collapse at any moment. There are too many variables at play, none of which are guaranteed, and ErdoÄŸan may still take repressive action, possibly leading Turkey in the same direction as Russia, with one person holding unchecked power.

Another variable: What happens if he doesn’t win? Will his replacement honor the agreement, given it was done to keep ErdoÄŸan in power? Turkey and the PKK may not see a successful ceasefire.

As the Kurdish struggle for rights and autonomy continues to confront insurmountable obstacles, the shift initiated by the PKK’s 12th Congress could inadvertently enable ErdoÄŸan to further solidify a dictatorial power. The ball remains in Turkey’s court and there is no one else that can play.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.