In part, this is because last week, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon, Citigroup’s Jane Fraser and around 6,000 other business titans visited the kingdom for a three day , the annual Future Investment Initiative dubbed “Davos in the Desert.”

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) also made time to attend a global esports conference in Riyadh together with football legend and other celebrities to launch the first , even though the competition itself does not actually start till next year.

Saudi media has been focussing on MBS’s economic reforms and the , which started on October 28 and is billed as “one of the world’s largest winter entertainment events”. Highlights include , the Ladies Golf European Tour and , “an entertainment boxing match between top tier talents Tyson Fury and Francis Ngannou to create a memorable and an exciting experience locally and world-wide.” No mention, naturally, that one of the leading stars of the season on account of the situation in Gaza, Egyptian comic actor Mohamed Salam.

Keeping up appearances

Of course, the regime has not been able to ignore the situation in Palestine completely. In public fora where the war has been discussed, the Saudi regime, like other governments, has tried hard to present itself as statesmanlike in its approach to the conflict and deeply concerned about human rights and international law.

At the Baker Institute on October 7, veteran diplomat Prince Turki Al Faisal made a blasting both Hamas for its onslaught as well as the long held policies of successive Israeli governments that he said helped lead to the current bloody situation. “I condemn Israel for funneling Qatari money to Hamas, the terrorist group as defined by Israel,” he added.

The only reason Prince Turki would have made this outlandish claim, which has been echoed in , is because MBS ordered him to do so. And that would be because, once again, MBS has been left seething with jealousy after being thoroughly upstaged by Qatari monarch Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who has won for his role brokering hostage releases and Hamas talks, just like he upstaged MBS in 2020 with the Taliban peace agreement.

On October 25 Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi , in English, “I’m pleased to say that Qatar is becoming an essential party and stakeholder in the facilitation of humanitarian solutions. Qatar’s diplomatic efforts are crucial at this time.” For MBS, such accolades from the Israelis bestowed elsewhere are likely to be the hardest aspect of the war so far.

During MBS’s telephone conversation with President Joe Biden — the first in the three years since Biden became President — the Saudi Press Agency that MBS, perhaps trying to reclaim the moral high ground, underscored the need to comply with international humanitarian law and urged a return to the peace process. At the UN Security Council in New York on October 24, the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan for an immediate ceasefire and a lifting of the blockade.

Privately, MBS is a good friend of Israel

As in Western countries, it would be a grave mistake to take pro-Palestinian statements by Saudi and other Arab leaders at face value. As Dennis Ross, a former senior US official involved in Middle East peace talks, wrote recently for , every senior Arab official he has spoken with since the war began is hoping Israel will end Hamas’s rule in Gaza.

As a result, such statements should be seen for what they are: a PR exercise intended solely for public consumption and as a backside-covering exercise against future charges of complicity in Israel’s genocide and ethnic cleansing. Behind closed doors, MBS has long since placed all his chips on Israel and believes — most likely correctly — that his own future and that of Israel are intimately intertwined.

His worst fear now is that, having put all his eggs in one basket, he could see the Israelis somehow manage to lose the war. In order to try and make sure this does not happen, MBS is ready to go to any lengths in private to show support for Israel, whether that means a bloody IDF ground assault in Gaza or ethnically cleansing the Palestinians by ejecting them into Sinai — although, as Maged Mandour explained in Arab Digest’s newsletter, even MBS understands that this would likely amount to the political equivalent of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi slitting his own throat.

Saudi Arabia suppresses pro-Palestinian activism at home

In order to try to persuade everyone in Saudi Arabia to think as he does, MBS has directed the Saudi security apparatus and propaganda machine to work overtime. Any kind of public expression of pro-Palestinian sentiment in the kingdom, whether a tweet, post or video, is banned and liable to lead to .

Saudi Islamic scholars have the population that citizens should stop discussing Gaza. “Leaders,” these scholars say, “know the issue better than you” and “you are not qualified and have nothing to offer… your analyses are burdensome… Trust” MBS.

Spies at the Etidal Centre, Saudi state surveillance , have been instructed to track down as many supporters of Hamas and other Palestinian movements as they can. Those few who are known to be affiliated with Hamas, if they are not already in prison, have long since been expelled from the country, along with many other leading Saudi scholars and thinkers.

Meanwhile, Saud Al Qahtani’s army of electronic flies energetically promotes pro-Israeli accounts, and well-known pro-MBS Saudi media figures like Saud Al Shammari have on Israeli TV laughing and making light of the conflict. As Sami Hamdi in an Arab Digest podcast, Saudi-controlled Al Arabiya News conducted an aggressive with Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal, asking whether he would now apologize to Israel. Regime-controlled social media accounts have strident attacks on the Palestinians, urging Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to stop at nothing to destroy Gaza, even if it means using a nuclear bomb.

As a result, Jared Kushner, son-in-law and former adviser to US President Donald Trump, was able recently to Fox News that Saudi Arabia is “safer” for American Jews than US college campuses.

It would be a mistake however to interpret the total absence of public criticism of Israel as meaning that popular opinion in the kingdom really lies with the Israelis. On the contrary, in reality almost everyone in Saudi Arabia is pro-Palestine. It is safe to say that, if there was freedom in the kingdom, not only would massive demonstrations occur on a scale comparable to what we have seen recently and other countries, but many Saudis would likely be ready to leave immediately and attempt to join Hamas in Palestine.

Choking off all legitimate outlets for pro-Palestinian sentiment may serve MBS’s political goals in the short term, but it also raises the possibility of desperate acts of violence in the kingdom in the future, whether against the government, MBS himself or foreigners living there.

US government recently raised the terror threat in Saudi Arabia to “Reconsider travel,” and US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin has of escalation across the region. “In fact, what we’re seeing … is the prospect of a significant escalation of attacks on our troops and our people throughout the region,” Austin ABC’s “This Week” program.

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Saudi Arabia And Israel Drive A Hard Bargain For Normalization

Tentative Steps Toward a New Saudi-Israeli Relationship

Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East?

The post Popular Support of the Palestinians Is a Problem for MBS appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Their arrest, interrogation, hearings, sentencing and execution all took place in complete secrecy, but Saudi reported that their crime was treason in three forms — high, national and military. Given that both men came from Sunni tribes that are traditional opponents of the Houthis, the suggestion that they actually committed treason in the sense of collaborating with the enemy seems unlikely.

“High treason” as a legal concept does not exist in Saudi Arabia anyway, because there is no such thing in Sharia law, which — despite massive in Islamic institutions in recent years — remains fundamental to the kingdom’s judicial process. While the concept of treason does exist in Sharia, it usually refers to collaborating with the enemy in terms of espionage, but it is carefully qualified and does not automatically lead to execution.

Opposition sources say al-Balawi and Hassan were executed after refusing to bomb civilian targets in Yemen. They may also have been recorded criticizing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). No Sharia court could justify sentencing someone to death for refusing to bomb civilians in Yemen, hence the unspecific treason charges. But as everyone in the kingdom understands, the courts are highly politicized and serve the wishes of the crown prince’s regime.

Old Game, New Gold: What Is Saudi Arabia Planning With Golf?

The point is to send a strong message of deterrence to other would-be dissenters and prevent al-Balawi and Hassan from becoming the crystal in the saturated solution — catalysts for an armed rebellion against MbS.

Saudi Arabia has faced dissension in the military before

There have been several attempts by members of the Saudi armed forces to overthrow the regime in the past. The most famous was in 1969, when members of the Royal Saudi Air Force plotted a against King Faisal. Their plan had been to bomb the Royal Palace in Riyadh, killing the king and other high-ranking princes, before announcing the formation of a “Republic of the Arabian Peninsula.” In the aftermath of the failed plot, around 2000 people, including 28 lieutenant colonels, 30 majors, and around 200 other officers.

Another less spectacular case was in 1990, when a Saudi defected and flew his brand-new F-15 to Sudan. He returned a short time later following negotiations with the Sudanese, supposedly to be pardoned. He was instead imprisoned.

As Arab Digest has in the past, the Saudi army of today is seething with discontent. Dozens of officers and pilots are currently being held in detention. A trickle of military defectors keeps emerging.

In May 2023, despite being subject to a travel ban, former Saudi National Guardsman Muhannad al-Subiani defected and made his way to the UK where he a human rights organization that, while serving in the National Guard, he had witnessed numerous horrific violations of detainees’ and migrants’ human rights, in addition to the smuggling of drugs and weapons.

Even more concerning for the regime was the defection of Colonel Tarek al-Zahrani, who was part of the Royal Guard. The Royal Guard’s job is to protect the King and his close relatives, so MbS is fortunate that al-Zahrani did not try to take more direct action.

The Saudi army is tired, underpaid and unhappy

Some defectors go to the UK, like al-Subiani. Others go to Yemen to fight with the Houthis against Saudi Arabia in a war intended by MbS to last for just a few weeks after it was launched in March 2015. The war has been largely on pause for the past year, but Saudi Arabia still finds itself unable to extricate itself from the situation.

After more than 8 years of fighting, the government has not yet revealed its military losses. (In 2019, the Houthis that 500 Saudi soldiers were killed and another 2000 captured in an operation inside the kingdom. The Houthi claim was not independently verified, and the Saudis declined to comment.)

The war in Yemen does not account for all of the discontent in the army. Saudi soldiers, especially at the lower levels, are generally not treated well. Their salary is much less than elsewhere in the Gulf. It starts at the equivalent of per month, compared to a Kuwaiti soldier’s starting monthly salary of around and a Qatari soldier’s , and the Saudi rank and file receive no special allowances.

Before the public prosecutor decreed that anyone who complained publicly would be punished, on several occasions Saudi soldiers broadcast appealing to the king for financial help. They said that while they were away fighting, their families were facing eviction or repossessions for non-payment of debts.

History shows that a disorganized army and a complete breakdown of discipline have been the conditions for every victorious revolution. However, there are several obstacles preventing the army in Saudi Arabia from becoming the spear tip of the revolution.

Firstly, the military police are extremely active inside the armed forces, looking for any signs of dissent and arresting people like al-Balawi and Hassan.

Secondly, the Saudi army is very small compared to the size of the rest of the internal security forces, which since 2017 has included special forces, the Mabahith secret police and counterterrorism and anti-terror financing units. State security forces are also much better-resourced, with the latest kit and training. Soldiers, on the other hand, complain they have to buy their own boots and food.

Thirdly, although the Saudi army is still nominally arranged hierarchically, in practice all communications between ground forces and senior commanders have to go via the Royal Court. This deliberately makes it impossible to coordinate any large-scale opposition involving multiple units.

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Two Saudi Soldiers Executed as Dissent in the Military Smolders appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The film features a bevy of architects, including Peter Cook, who eloquently and at length expatiate on just how extraordinary and visionary bin Salman’s city of the future is. It prominently features the crown prince himself interjecting pithy insights such as, “Since we have an empty place, and we want to have a place for 10 million people, then let’s think from scratch.”

“Scratch” starts with an initial budget of $500 billion for NEOM, of which has been earmarked thus far for The Line, a futuristic “linear city.” The money is coming from the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund, which bin Salman runs. According to NEOM’s head of , “the first substantial population living on the LINE will be in 2030.” The project’s CEO claims that 20% of NEOM’s infrastructure has already been completed.

Who pays the piper calls the tune

Unsurprisingly, the crown prince’s gigaproject has served as the proverbial honey to flies for Western talent, offering large fees and the challenge of engaging in what the film asserts is “the biggest infrastructure project in history.” As one of the lead architects puts it, “every 40 or 50 years there is this great surgence where state, culture, politics, technology all converge into this singular, amazing unity of form.”

In Mohammed bin Salman’s kingdom, what has emphatically converged is an accumulation of power, previously unseen in Saudi Arabia, in the person of a ruthlessly ambitious prince. Bin Salman has control of virtually all the financial levers and has eliminated any potential challenges from within the ruling family, stripped the religious authorities of influence and imprisoned and executed critics who had dared to challenge him. There is only one client, one voice that the West’s leading architects and city designers have to win over to capture a share of the biggest and most expensive urban project the world has ever seen.

Peter Cook, who argues that much contemporary architecture is bland and boring and sees himself as an iconoclast, has embraced the opportunity with apparently little concern about the outcome: “If it succeeds, it will be the new Babylon, so to speak, and if it doesn’t succeed it will be an interesting phenomenon.”

Cook was asked at a NEOM-sponsored in Venice in May if The Line would be built. He replied, “I’m going to give a very English answer. It’s an interesting possibility. You know, I think they’ll get a bit of it done.” He then went on to say, in reference to the proposed height of buildings designed to parallel each other along a 170 km-long line, “I think—I’m going to speak honestly now, as long as you don’t cut me off—I think higher than 500 meters is a bit stupid and unreasonable. and all our engineer friends will tell you this.”

He opined that 150 meters in height was “quite agreeable.”

Cook subsequently rowed back from the comments, telling the Architects’ Journal, “The discussion of ideas was informal, exploring the different height variables of The Line. After the is built, I may eat my hat and say 500 meters is even more fun!”

Not everyone is so enthusiastic

The former British diplomat Arthur Snell offers a scathing corrective to the narrative of the  Discovery Channel documentary in his . “The Line,” he writes, “remains happily fictitious, no more than an architectural fever dream.”

Snell, the author of How Britain Broke the World availed himself of Google Earth and imagery taken between 27–30 April this year to buttress his argument:

Zoom a bit closer to the ground and you’ll find that there is very little actual Neom in existence. A few isolated resorts and a golf course. No evidence of human habitation, or economic activity. Certainly not what could be called a city.

He notes that a photo posted online, taken in January,

shows a lonely filling station and a couple of fast-food joints, near to an encampment of shipping containers, a familiar sight to anyone who has visited the Gulf, used to house mostly South Asian migrant workers. The existence of the small camp shows that some construction work may be underway, but there is no evidence of a city being built.

Snell decries the indifference of Western governments and business to the egregious human rights abuses of the bin Salman regime, but he reserves his deepest contempt for what he sardonically calls “star architects” who, having

bravely rationalised their dislike of feeding bodies into incinerators, public beheadings and mass starvation in Yemen, along with other inbuilt features of MbS’s Saudi Arabia, don’t need to worry if their crazy designs will ever be built. They can earn astronomical fees dreaming up improbable cities, indifferent to whether a team of mistreated Asian migrant workers may at some future point be killed in their construction.

And there is another inconvenient truth that Peter Cook and his colleagues working on The Line have chosen to ignore. Contrary to bin Salman’s assertion that the space that NEOM and The Line are being built on is “empty,” some of it is in reality occupied by members of the Huwaitat tribe. When the tribe attempted to resist the arbitrary confiscation of the land, the response of the authorities was swift and brutal.

As reported by the London-based Saudi human rights organization , security forces shot Abdul Rahim al-Huwaiti dead in April 2020. He was killed in his home in Al-Khariba in a region of Tabuk province earmarked for NEOM after using social media to protest the eviction of local residents.

Three other members of the tribe were convicted in a specialized terrorist court and sentenced to death. Their appeal was rejected in January of this year. Other Huwaitat have been convicted in the same court and given lengthy jail sentences.

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What Goes Behind the Glitz of MBS’s New Project appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The merger is likely to have significant implications for the game of golf and the way it’s played. More importantly, the merger says much more about Saudi Arabia itself and its rising profile in today’s increasingly money-driven world.

Always about the money

Firstly: what about golf? To be sure, money has always been a big factor in professional golf. Purses in the major tournaments have grown steadily as the sport garnered increasing public interest and more followers. Much of that can be attributed to rising television and streaming audiences around the world. Today, those purses can top $20 million, with the winner taking home as much as $4 million in some tournaments. Saudi Arabia saw the opportunity to get in on the action. Armed with more than $700 billion in investable assets and seizing the opportunity to help remake its image in the world (more on that later), Saudi Arabia had its PIF assemble some of the sports’ greatest names to organize a competitor to the PGA, dubbed , in 2021. The PGA and its members, including such luminaries as Tiger Woods, fulminated over the new league and the generous use of its funds—it allegedly paid golfing great Phil Mickelson $200 million to join LIV—to disrupt and corrupt the legendary game.

But really, how generous could the Saudis be? PIF and the other LIV stakeholders will invest an estimated $3 billion in the new merged entity.

The PGA leadership and those golfers who had stuck with the PGA out of loyalty were left dumbfounded and marginalized after the announcement. Following LIV’s entry into professional golf, they had gone on media and even before Congress and the golfing public to rail against the upstart golf league. After all, LIV’s principal backer, Saudi Arabia, figures prominently on just about everyone’s list of worst human rights offenders, including in the US State Department’s . The latter’s executive summary lists over 15 areas in which major abuses have occurred. And that’s just the executive summary, which doesn’t list the 2018 gangland-style of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The hit was likely ordered by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS).

The PGA banned from its tournaments those players who defected to the new league. It increased the purses of its major tournaments and stepped up its lobbying campaign wherever and whenever it could. In the end, though, it wasn’t going to be able to compete with the deep pockets of the Saudis. Their PIF, rumored to be the world’s second-largest, is fueled by the kingdom’s massive oil reserves and uber-efficient Saudi Aramco’s ability to manage their exploitation well into the next century. The PIF is rich and will only get richer. 

What are they going to do with all that money?

They’re looking to diversify. Sports offer the perfect opportunity. They are popular everywhere and earn lots of money in many different ways. The potential to earn even more is obvious. Enthusiasts around the world have stood by and watched money take over and run—some would argue, ruin—sports. FIFA (the global governing body for association football), automobile racing, tennis, America’s “big four” sports (football, baseball, basketball and hockey), cricket, and even the Olympics are synonymous with big—no, make that astronomically immense—amounts of money.

Is Football a Force for Good or Evil?

Why should golf be any different? There has, after all, always been big money in golf. But the PGA and its European counterpart, DP World, ran a monopoly on professional tournaments. As a member, a golfer could compete. Refuse membership and be prepared to wander in golfing obscurity; otherwise capable golfers were relegated to duffer status. Busting up a monopoly is tough. It requires impossibly large sums of money. Thanks to the Saudis’ PIF and an aggressive investment strategy, the impossible became merely difficult and then, this month, very possible.

Congress may now be inserting itself into the matter. That’s predictable; the US legislature seems to fly into outrage over almost anything Saudi Arabia. Members are calling for investigations and hearings over fears of undue Saudi influence in a “.” Never mind the game was invented in Scotland and is played all over the world, though most of the big-prize tournaments take place in the US. And even though many a past American president has enjoyed the game, it would take a colossal leap in logic to assert that the Saudi-backed merger threatens US national security. Look, however, for the PGA in its new guise to lose its . American taxpayers would be happy with that.

The game of golf at the professional level is forever changed. For that, players, fans, gear manufacturers, advertisers, broadcasters and thousands of golfing clubs around the world can thank Mohammed bin Sultan.

MBS still blazing his own path

MBS, as bin Salman is commonly known, is unlike any Saudi ruler since the kingdom’s legendary founder, King Abdul Aziz al Saud. To be precise, he isn’t yet the kingdom’s de jure ruler, only de facto, while his father, King Salman, still sits on the throne. Setting aside his nation’s incontrovertibly abysmal human rights record, the youthful crown prince launched his rule by first consolidating his power throughout the kingdom. The military, the security and intelligence services, and all its economic arms, including Saudi Aramco, the central bank, et al. are now headed by him or his loyalists. He severely reined in the power of Saudi Arabia’s previously powerful clerical class, including significantly reducing the authority and presence of the muttawa, or religious police. Distribution of power among the senior royals, as had been done ever since Abdul Aziz, ended with MBS. He is now the undisputed and effectively omnipotent ruler of the kingdom.

Having consolidated his rule, the crown prince quickly set out to make his nation a significant player in the world. He is doing so by leveraging the one asset it possesses in abundance, oil, and the steady flow of income it produces. His Vision 2030 plan set a high bar for the kingdom with investment expanding into high tech, solar power, finance and banking, entertainment and sports. He is even building a multi-billion-dollar megacity of the future, NEOM, in the kingdom’s northwest along the Red Sea.

Uber, SoftBank, BlackRock, English Premier League and LIV Golf are all testimony to his success. Additionally, the kingdom will host the FIFA Club World Cup later this year and the Asian Winter Olympic Games in 2029. Last month, the city of Jeddah was announced as one of the preliminary racing venues for the America’s Cup Race, scheduled for Barcelona next year. The kingdom is doubtlessly setting its sights on hosting the World Cup and Summer Olympics at some point in the next 20–25 years. The PGA-DP World-LIV Golf merger now ensures the kingdom’s leadership role in a major international sport. 

Investing in ever-popular sports also enables the kingdom to repair its much-damaged reputation from MBS’s early years of serial human rights abuses, though many of those existed well before he came into prominence and still continue. It’s called sportswashing. The PGA, which had frequently called attention to that record in the two years it went head-to-head with LIV Golf, now has adopted a much quieter and more collaborative tone. Sportswashing, i.e. buying off one’s critics by buying sports teams and leagues, works.

Striking while the wells still pump

Why this investment onslaught? For starters, the kingdom is well aware it sits on a resource of finite utility as the world, and especially the developed world, advances expeditiously toward clean energy. Diversification makes sound financial sense. Perhaps equally important is MBS’s ambition to make his nation a true global power, not a military power but an economic power. It’s already a member of the exclusive G-20, but the crown prince may be setting his sights even higher. The kingdom’s exorbitant wealth provides it with influence even the US and China must envy. If there is any question of that, consider the parade of major foreign leaders to the country in just the last few years: US President Joe Biden (2022), Chinese President Xi Jinping (2022), Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (2022), German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (2022), Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (2019), and Russian President Vladimir Putin (2019). Saudi Arabia is on the map of the great and rising powers (and perhaps the declining ones, too).

So, say the kingdom rises to some major global status. Then what? It is already one of the two most influential countries of the Middle East, along with Iran. Lacking both population and military might, it faces insurmountable obstacles to attain power status equal, say, to America or China. In fact, it must rely on unwritten security assurances from the US—now on shaky grounds, by the way—for its defense.

One might have thought that it would seek to hitch itself to US power both in the region and around the world. MBS, however, seems determined to blaze his own path. Moreover, the decline in US influence in the region as it focuses on great power rivalries with China and Russia bears his reasoning out.

China Hangs Washington Out to Dry in the Middle East

The Saudi-led PGA-LIV merger presents an interesting case study, however, of how the kingdom might make itself a unique global player. Its extraordinary wealth provides it with an inestimable opportunity for insinuating itself into just about any human economic or commercial endeavor. Golf is but one such endeavor in a largely geostrategically insignificant area, though it does command a considerable following around the world. There is no business or nation that does not covet the kingdom’s considerable investment funds in one respect or another. So, in one sense, then, the kingdom already has genuine power.

If money indeed makes the world go round, then count on Saudi Arabia to be one of the globe’s spinners for a long time.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Old Game, New Gold: What Is Saudi Arabia Planning With Golf? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The visit is a sign that China intends to become a new power player in the region, with Saudi Arabia, one of China’s largest suppliers of oil, by its side. On the other hand, it also illustrated the strained nature of China’s relationship with Iran. According to John Calabrese, Director of the Middle East-Asia Project at the Middle East Institute, Xi’s attendance served as a clear reminder “of the frustrating reality that, in substantive terms, China-Iran relations have stagnated.” The visit only served to further exacerbate what “has long been an asymmetrical, limited partnership” continued Calabrese. 

However, the visit “should not be regarded as China no longer being interested in Iran,” Dr. Manochehr Dorraj of Texas Christian University said. “But that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) not only rank as the number one and number two trade partners for China, but they also have the financial capability to invest in the Chinese economy, something that Iran is currently lacking. This is among several factors why the Chinese leadership may prioritize bilateral ties with the Arab World as more significant.” 

Changing times and changing priorities

China’s engagement in the Middle East has steadily grown over years, building alliances with countries that are strong economically and stable politically. Before, the region occupied only a secondary role in China’s foreign policy. 

The two countries released a 4,000-word joint statement that outlined their alignment on everything from security to oil-related issues. The statement will likely worsen Sino-Iranian relations as the language painted Iran as a malignant actor in the region. This makes it appear to be more the work of the kingdom than China.  

Jacopo Scita, a Bourse and Bazar Foundation Policy Fellow concurs, noting it is striking and unexpected that the joint statement “does not reflect the usual, carefully choreographed balancing typical of China’s public discourse on Iran-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations.”

Barbara Slavin, a Stimson Center Distinguished Fellow, agreed that “Xi definitely seemed to be tilting toward the Saudi/Emirati point of view on a number of issues”. 

Dr. Dorraj deemed that China likely agreed to the “wording because Saudi Arabia is a top oil exporter to China and they want Saudi business. At the same time, China is very reluctant to become entangled in domestic affairs or meddle in regional conflicts and prefers stability in the region.” This perhaps explains why they were willing to spend the political capital to mediate a reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia which was announced on 10th.

Where does Iran now fit?

The statement was a message of dissatisfaction that China wanted to convey to Iran, according to Scita. Naturally, Iran was not pleased by the visit or the statement. According to Scita, the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi perceived both “as a detriment to relations and in particular to its “” policy, of which the partnership with China is one of the main pillars.” 

“Raisi understood the reasons for President Xi’s visit but was clearly unhappy because the language of the statement aligned more with Saudi Arabia,” Slavin said. This was evidenced in articles published by hardline Iranian media news outlets that expressed outrage over the visit and the language of the statement, according to Dr. Dorraj.

During the visit, China ensured that it will sell arms to Saudi Arabia without any human rights stipulations. Beijing has been assisting the kingdom with building drone factories and selling long-range missiles to Riyadh, which Iran is already aware of. 

According to Slavin, Tehran is worried about “Chinese willingness to assist Saudi nuclear development and efforts to acquire a full nuclear fuel cycle.” Iran, “is irrelevant in the Saudi Arabia-China relationship and has other partners to rely on for weapons sales,” Dr. Dorraj continued. 

Old country seeks new friends

To add insult to injury, Beijing sent former Vice Premier Hu Chunhua’s visit to Tehran on December 13th. Despite having been recently removed from his post, Chunhua led the delegation to meet with President Ebrahim Raisi.

Dr. Dooraj believes that too much has been made about Chunhua’s involvement. On the other hand, Scita believes that this “implicitly conveys the message that China-Iran relations are subordinated to China-Arab relations.” Slavin agrees, that it’s “clear that Saudi Arabia is much more important to Beijing than Iran.” Despite cuts in oil prices, Iran remains a junior partner compared to Saudi Arabia and the GCC.

Examining China’s foreign policy in the region helps in understanding the subordinate role of Iran. For Scita, it’s classic strategic hedging with a focus on establishing ties with strong economies and stable political systems. 

Calabrese sees “China focused more on Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states in the near term, with an eye towards building its relationship with Iran in the long term if/when conditions allow”. 

Calabrese doesn’t foresee the status quo changing in the near future. Improving relations would require lifting Western sanctions and reopening negotiations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran is unwilling to do. Therefore, China will continue to sideline Iran as it reorients its regional diplomatic strategy.  

Tehran’s place within the Belt and Road Initiative

Tehran still remains valuable for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Calabrese noted that Iran’s location remains “a very important potential node along the BRI.” Dr. Dorraj agrees, adding that Iran is situated along the largest coast in the Persian Gulf with many ports to facilitate the movement of Chinese goods, while also possessing a large consumer base of around 85 million people.

Scita adds that “Iran’s prominent place in the BRI is an unfulfilled potential and it’s preventing Tehran from fully integrating into China’s westward infrastructural and investment projects.” Tehran has yet to fully integrate into the BRI primarily because “sanctions have made it more difficult for China to invest in Iran and there are no signs that Tehran is ready to accept a deal reviving the JCPOA that would provide sanctions relief.” 

In comparison, Chinese investment in Saudi Arabia and the UAE faces no such impediments. This is because “China formally states they are in favor of partnering with ‘Strong States,’” Dr. Dorraj said. In other words, China prefers countries that enjoy political stability and are able to safeguard their relations. 

As China’s vested interests grow in the Middle East, so will the need to protect them. The recent wave of protests in Iran has posed a serious challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. In contrast, Saudi Arabia (and the GCC more broadly) is politically stable, is largely free of domestic unrest, and has a relatively robust economy. All of this is important for Beijing, Dr. Dooraj said. 

Looming questions for the future

On February 14, President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Beijing on an invitation from President Xi Jinping. While some analysts the visit as an that “China-Iran relations are warming,” other experts contended that it was more symbolism than substance. 

For example, Slavin believes that the visit “seemed more like a way for Raisi to get away from his mounting domestic problems, including the protests over the enforced hijab and the sinking Iranian currency.” 

Raisi did not exactly return empty-handed. The Iranian president signed more than 20 cooperation agreements and memorandums of understanding but according to Calabrese, “the documents contained pledges, and nothing more.” “Even the Iranians realize they are junior partners,” Calabrese added.

Jason Brodsky, Policy Director of United Against Nuclear Iran, believes that China will still continue to balance its interests with Saudi Arabia and Iran, former regional rivals. In March, as previously mentioned, Iran and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement in Beijing to restore diplomatic ties after a 7-year rift.

Dr. Dooraj disagrees with the alarmism from many experts who argue that Beijing has essentially moved on from Iran. “China spent political capital to mediate and reconcile ties between both states and demonstrates how effective Chinese diplomacy has been in comparison to the United States,” Dr. Dooraj said. 

Calabrese adds that the Chinese-brokered deal also illustrates “the advantage that Beijing has over Washington in leading on this particular issue, namely a constructive relationship with and positive leverage over Tehran.”   

Let’s not forget, Calabrese said, that “There are six GCC states. There is only one Iran. Of those six Gulf Arab states, the energy and other ties with China have become far more extensive and promising than with Iran, especially because of the latter’s economic and political isolation.” 

For now, Slavin asserts that “Iran is losing ground to the Arabs in terms of Chinese foreign relations.” Beijing’s interests align with Saudi Arabia and the GCC. Nevertheless, China sees no reason to alienate Iran. Therefore, China will continue to maintain ties with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, even it prioritizes one over the other.

[Naveed Ahsan edited this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post President Xi Meets with MBS: What Does This Mean for Iran? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Riyadh seemed to look for opportunities to pass the buck: get its more powerful ally to do the heavy lifting in order to contain the threat from Tehran. But the US did not “cut off the head of the [Iranian] snake” and Saudis were largely alone in their unfriendly business with Iran. Until they decided otherwise in March 2023. The subject of recent Saudi-Iranian détente as well as the likely prospects for their bilateral ties has attracted increasing attention lately. However, most policy experts rarely analyze their earlier rapprochements, why each friendly period in nearly 100 years of their diplomatic history lasted for so long, and when and why things changed. This article addresses this lacuna.

History that projects their trajectory

The in-depth historical account of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia since the 1920s points to a systemic recurrence of friendlier behavior. In my earlier writings on the subject, separate and relatively friendly periods were identified, the first of which evolved in the multipolar world in late 1920s and early 1930s, the second in the bipolar world from 1946 to 1979, and a third which recurred during the unipolar moment – more specifically their détente from 1991 to 1997, and subsequent rapprochement from 1997 to 2007.

In the first friendly phase, Iran and Saudi Arabia were largely associated with a single great power in a multipolar world, the United Kingdom. Their threat environment and corresponding threat perception limited their rivalry. After their initial contacts were established in the mid-1920s two states (at that time, the Kingdom of Persia and the Kingdom of Hejaz, Najd and its Dependencies) concluded and signed the Friendship Treaty in Tehran in 1929. In the aftermath of the treaty, their diplomatic envoys also accorded reciprocal treatment in accordance with the rules of international law. Historians of Saudi-Iranian relations also documented that the Saudi government and city residents warmly welcomed a naval ship from Persia that docked at Jeddah port.  

Throughout this phase, the British regional dominance and common identity of Iran and Saudi Arabia with the British pole reduced the phenomenon of cross-cutting relationships among different axes of conflict that usually exist in the multipolar system. As other great powers played a secondary role in the Persian Gulf, the number of great-great power dyads was reduced, which generally represented a more stable situation for Iran and Saudi Arabia. Any attempt to break this continuity would have resulted in serious trouble. The case of Nazi Germany is illustrative in this regard. Berlin made limited but successful attempts to increase power projection in Iran in the late 1930s and early 1940s. As expected, this gave rise to security tensions, which resulted in the forced abdication of Reza Shah, the swift occupation of Iran by British and Russian troops, and inactive relations with Riyadh.

In the second friendly phase, Iran and Saudi Arabia shared their alliance with a common great power in a bipolar system, the United States, and the tightness of the system made it difficult for them to oppose each other. The in-depth historical account of their diplomatic relations since the 1950s points to a systemic recurrence of friendlier behavior for three subsequent decades. The strength of their collaboration in 1950s was expressed in different arenas, such as converging Saudi-Iranian interests in Egypt after Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew King Farouk in the socialist-republican coup; joint support for Jordan when revolts threatened the continuity of the Hashemite monarchy; and preventing a socialist coup in Lebanon. 

In the 1960s, Iran supported Saudi Arabia in a proxy war against Egypt in Northern Yemen. Two friendly states also signed the Agreement over the Islands of al-‘Arabiya and Farsi, while in the 1970s, Iran and Saudi Arabia were twin pillars of the US axis and were the closest of allies. That relationship was so close that Iran declared a week of mourning when King Faisal was assassinated in 1975.The dominant structural force that prevailed through the three decades or so of close bilateral ties is the bipolar world order of the time, and the fact that both sides allied themselves with the United States. It also explains why Iran and Saudi Arabia feared other revolutionary states that identified themselves with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 

This fear was great enough that it not only drew Saudi Arabia, a Wahhabi Islamist state, and Iran, then a nationalist and pro-secular Shia state, together, but also made them more receptive to Islamic political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Tehran’s departure from the US-led pole in 1979. generated an enormous amount of pressure on both states to significantly alter their behavior. Iran abandoned friendly connections with Saudi Arabia, which maintained an active and strategic relationship with the US, while the Saudis limited friendly connections with Iran because of its messianic refusal to abide by the existing order. New structural realities led to the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in January 1981 and Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s.

Shared threat perception from American unipolarity

In the third friendly phase, a sole superpower in a unipolar world was not restrained from the Middle East and Persian Gulf region in the 1990s and early 2000s. Spreading democracy abroad was a high-priority goal for two successive US administrations since the end of the Cold War. In his 1992 campaign Bill Clinton frequently insisted that the promotion of democracy would be a top priority of his foreign policy. His assistant for national security defined the central theme of Clinton foreign policy as the “enlargement of democracy”. President George W. Bush used military might to try to turn Afghanistan and Iraq to begin with, and later even other states across the Middle East into liberal democracies. He said: “By the resolve and purpose of America, and of our friends and allies, we will make this an age of progress and liberty. Free people will set the course of history, and free people will keep the peace of the world.”

However, political elites in Iran and Saudi Arabia generally disliked what John Mearsheimer calls “a liberal unipole” in which the United States pursues a policy of “liberal hegemony” – making Muslim-majority states in the image of liberal elites in the US. Indeed, there is a problem in Iran and Saudi Arabia with accepting the universality and superiority of liberal ideology that is pursued by the political liberal elite in the West. Additional systemic reason for their relatively constructive relations during this period was unrivaled US hegemony. Iran and Saudi Arabia were fearful and resistant to this pressure from the US in different ways. Not surprisingly, they have pursued a policy of détente from 1991 to 1997 and closer diplomatic ties from late 1990s to mid-2000s.

It is not difficult to find historical validation for this argument. Riyadh and Tehran were exceptionally close between 1997 and 2001. This was the most constructive period of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, during which the Cooperation Agreement and Security Accord were concluded in 1998 and 2001, respectively. At the peak of their collaboration in 2000, the Iranian Minister of Defense, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, new arrangements for collective security in the Persian Gulf that excluded the United States, including the creation of a joint army “for the defense of the Muslim world”. “The sky’s the limit for Iranian–Saudi Arabian relations and co-operation, as the whole of Islamic Iran’s military might is in the service of our Saudi and Muslim brothers,” he said. 

Unsurprisingly, the Saudis balked. They were not ready to sacrifice a long-term security arrangement with the US. Doing so would be akin to Japan entering into a security pact with China while exiting its defense treaty with the US. This also explains why Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with Iran on internal security matters in 2001 that excluded military collaboration. The massive American military presence in the region essentially acted as a stabilizer for Saudi–Iran ties. That it took a scant three weeks for the US to pummel the Iraqi army and overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime did not go unnoticed in Tehran. 

With one side cowed and the other reassured by American military might, Iran and Saudi Arabia pursued cautious policies and preserved dialogue at a high-level. Ali Larijani alone paid four official visits to Saudi Arabia for consultations with Prince Bandar and King Abdullah. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was accorded red carpet treatment and was greeted by the Saudi King at the airport when he arrived in Riyadh in March 2007. The Saudi press hailed Ahmadinejad’s visit as another sign of deepening ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and referred to the two countries as “brotherly nations.”

However, Saudi Arabia was getting more fearful from the new American posture in the Middle East than from its promotion of liberal democracy. With a pending American exit from Iraq by 2011., Tehran was assured of having more space to expand its influence and growing proxy network. Iraq was no longer an occupied, neutral or buffer state between Riyadh and Tehran. Instead, it tilted towards Iran on all major regional issues. Iraqi Shia militia groups also grew bolder, and were free to carry out mortar attacks across the border with Saudi Arabia. 

Hence, the exit of Saudi Arabia’s security blanket left them worried about American commitment to maintaining the regional order. That worry amplified when President Barack Obama announced a new East Asia Strategy—also known as the Asia Pivot—in 2012. With this shift, the central role of the US in the Middle East was additionally marginalized. Iran and Saudi Arabia were left to fill the vacuum. While Saudi Arabia felt more vulnerable with the Arab Spring in Bahrain and Yemen, Iranian interests in Syria were under threat. It was a perfect setting for them to return to hostile relations.

Shared preference of pluralization and multipolarity

With changing international order, two regional rivals found themselves in matching mode again in the 2020s. In addition to what they commonly opposed in late 1990s and early 2000s, there is an alternative order for Iran and Saudi Arabia that better fits their international ambitions today. It is about their shared preference for polarization and multipolarity of the international system where their voices can be heard or where they can move from the “periphery” of international politics to the “center”. 

Iran has decided to pursue more independent foreign policy more than four decades ago. Saudi Arabia has chosen a similar path only recently. Although Riyad has long been a US ally, its neutral stance on the crisis in Ukraine, strategic partnership with China, close relations with Russia, exposure to BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, underlines an important shift to new balancing behavior in a new world order where Russia—and China—are equally important. 

Moreover, beyond a neutral stance on the war in Ukraine or a closer partnership with Beijing and Moscow, there emerge other assertive foreign policy paradigms with broader regional implications. Among others, Saudi special relations with the US have grown colder. Iran’s long-held official view that collaboration with Saudi Arabia is subject to new arrangements in the Persian Gulf that exclude the US or reduce Saudi dependency on Washington have not changed. This gives Tehran a reason to engage with Riyadh. Given their newly born mutual preference for multipolarity, including their common objection to liberal international order in previous phases, conditions for a Saudi-Iran rapprochement were already set.

Their matching polarity with great power(s) has accurately foreshadowed the friendly course of Iran–Saudi ties over the past 100 years. The nature of this relationship is likely to follow the same pattern in the future as well.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Saudi-Iranian Rapprochements Are Not New: Here’s a History appeared first on 51�Թ�.

So far, the US has counted on its position of domination in the Middle East. Its military bases dot the region and oil is still denominated in dollars. Money from this region has long flowed into American stock markets, startups, universities and foundations. In particular, the US-Saudi relationship has been special. This deal signals that this relationship has soured. China might just have seduced the Saudis from US arms.

The US-Saudi Back Story

Appropriately, the US-Saudi romance began on Valentine’s Day (February 14) in 1945. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt King Abdul Aziz Al Saud on the battleship USS Quincy and the rest is history. Since then, Americans have provided the Saudi royal family with protection in return for access to their oil.

The fabled US-Saudi romance has been fading in recent years. The US is now and the Middle Kingdom has Uncle Sam as the biggest importer of Saudi oil. It is only natural that the economic center of gravity for the Saudis has moved east. Note that Chinese President Xi Jinping in Saudi Arabia on a historic visit three months ago. For the Saudis, is now their “number one trade partner, a major tech supplier, a long-term energy customer, and a comprehensive strategic partner with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.” Both economically and geopolitically, Saudi Arabia no longer finds the US reliable.

Since 2018, a number of Americans have turned against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) when his operatives allegedly killed journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. To add insult to injury, this killing took place in the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul, scandalizing international opinion. On his campaign trail, US President Joe Biden promised to make Saudi Arabia a “” state. This infuriated MBS. When Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine and sent oil prices skyrocketing, Biden humiliatingly ate his words and visited Saudi Arabia for a famous fist bump. MBS turned a deaf ear to the president’s requests to increase oil production. Instead, he cut production, much to Biden’s chagrin.

There were earlier pinpricks that irked MBS. He did not like Barack Obama’s 2016 Iran Deal—Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—or the president’s support for the so-called 2010 Arab Spring (it kicked off in December). For MBS, the US could no longer be relied upon to protect the House of Saud (meaning, he himself) any longer. As it would to many an absolute monarch or all-controlling autocrat, Biden’s also sounds dangerous to MBS’s ears.

The Saudi-Iran Back Story

Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran have a checkered past. They have both jockeyed for influence in the Islamic world. The Saudis are the custodian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. They have used their oil money to fund Wahhabi Islam around the world from Bosnia to Indonesia.  In contrast, Iran is a revolutionary power run by mullahs. They have won brownie points for standing up to imperial Uncle Sam and remained steadfast in their support of the Palestinian cause. Israel’s constant fist-shaking at Iran boosts their street cred among Muslims around the world.

As long as Iran was a monarchy, both Saudi Arabia and Iran were American allies. They exported oil to the West and made vast fortunes. In 1979, revolution erupted in Iran. Few remember that that same year gunmen took over the Grand Mosque at Mecca in Saudi Arabia, an event that has come to be known as “the siege of Mecca.” Several hundred armed —Arabs as well as American and Canadian converts—overpowered the guards, shut down the gates, took 100,000 hostage and proclaimed that the savior Mahdi had arrived to cleanse the Muslim world from the corruption of the West. Troops overpowered the jihadis but the specter of an Iran-style Islamic revolution has haunted the House of Saud since.

Saudi Arabia backed the Sunni-ruled Iraq under Saddam Hussein against Iran in their 1980-88 war. Relations remained tense until 1998. The reformist Mohammad Khatami became president.  Both countries signed a general cooperation agreement in 1998 and a security cooperation agreement in 2001.

Al Jazeera us that Saudi security chief Ali Shamkhani signed a significant agreement with Iran. In 2001, he was defense minister and played a major role in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia closer. The Saudis awarded him “the Order of Abdulaziz medal, the highest award offered by the kingdom, in the early 2000s.”

In 2016, all these efforts were washed away. Saudi-Iran relations were already strained because of a that killed thousands. Then, the Saudis executed Ayatollah Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a towering Shia leader. Mobs attacked Saudi diplomatic missions. In response, Saudi Arabia broke off relations with Iran.

Note that Saudi-Iran interests clash in many theaters. Both countries have been at loggerheads in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq for many years. There is also visceral mutual dislike. With its memory of an empire, Iran sneers at the Saudis as uncouth upstarts. With its suspicion of revolution, the Saudis see Iranian mullahs as scheming plotters. 

Economically, Saudi-Iran interests clash as well. Saudi oil giant Aramco a record profits of $161.1 billion for 2022. Iran has the world’s fourth-largest oil reserves but sanctions prevent it from selling on the global market. If sanctions ended, Iranian oil would depress prices and reduce earnings for Saudi Arabia. No Saudi leader would like that to happen, especially MBS.

Enter the Dragon

Yet heightened tensions are not in the interests of either country, so the Saudis and Iranians have made up for now. They are both increasingly aligned to China, which relies on its energy on the Persian Gulf. In case of any war, the US will be fine but Xi’s “ of steel” would rust quite quickly. With no energy resources, the Chinese military might simply not have the fuel to sustain a major war. Hence, China is keen to calm the waters in this part of the world.

Under Xi, China is keen to play a bigger role in the world. It sees the US-led postwar order as unjust and against its interests. Therefore, it has the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Unlike the US postwar order, Chinese ideas are inchoate. Beijing relies on cliches far too much but they are certainly playing the realpolitik game.

The Russia-Ukraine War has demonstrated that US interests are not aligned with either Saudi or Iranian interests. The Saudis want to keep the price of oil high and are nervous about Biden’s talk of democracy. The Iranians feel scorned after Donald Trump scuppered JCPOA and Biden’s lack of ability to reinstate it. They are supplying drones to the Russians and rumors persist that some of these flying machines are really made in China but smuggled through Iran. Both the Saudis and Iranians now need the Chinese, giving them leverage. Xi’s diplomats have exercised that leverage and emerged as the biggest winners from the Saudi-Iran deal. The US is still top dog by a long way, but there is a new dog in the Persian Gulf and it is likely to stay.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Why Saudi Arabia and Iran Are Making Out Now appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In early January, the oil price trend was already upwards. Investors were cautiously optimistic about the global economy. In Europe and the US in particular, governments were rolling back COVID-related restrictions. By early February, Brent was around $90 per barrel with no hint of a war premium. Even when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, Brent crude rose to $98 per barrel. The war premium turned out to remain modest. 

Two weeks later, the Russia-Ukraine War caused oil to rise to a year-high closing price of $128. In early June, oil reached another closing peak of $123. In retrospect, the oil cartel looks to have made a mistake at its by increasing oil production.

Since then, oil prices have been volatile but trended downwards. Some have described this as a battle between OPEC+ and major central banks. The former wants oil prices to rise while central bankers aim to stamp out . Today, a consensus has emerged that they were slow in to inflationary pressures. The challenges central banks faced were exacerbated by the war-related surge in energy prices, especially prices.

Oil-producing economies want to keep prices up. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) aims to keep the of the price of Brent oil at $100 per barrel. Therefore, OPEC+ decided to oil production by two million barrels per day on October 5. In practice, output dropped only by a million barrels per day. Note that the initial of criticism of the OPEC+ decision, especially from Washington, has died away almost completely.

A Surge in Attacks: Houthi Rebels Exploit Oil Infrastructure

READ MORE

On December 4, OPEC+ did not cut production again for two key reasons. First, it may be factoring in the on importing oil by sea from Russia and the related on Russian oil. Both of them came into effect the following day. Second, MBS may not have wished to risk pushing up the price of crude just on the eve of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s .

It seems that as we head into 2023, oil prices will trend downwards. So far, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been willing to sell crude oil to economies observing the EU . OPEC+ might reconvene in January or February instead of June 4 as scheduled to review crude oil output. 

OPEC+ has reduced its estimate for the first quarter of 2023. However, it estimates that demand will rise by 2.25 million barrels per day by the end of the year. OPEC+ is banking on Chinese growth experiencing an uptick. With China abandoning its zero-COVID policy, this may transpire and, should that happen, demand for oil will inevitably increase.

OPEC+ is hoping for the Federal Reserve to engineer a soft landing of the economy. It is extremely uncertain if this will happen. Even the Fed “isn’t comfortable whether there’s going to be a recession next year.” OPEC+ is also hoping for “a resolution of the tensions in Eastern Europe.” This is unlikely. The NATO chief has already pointed out that Russia is “planning for a long war” and peace is not quite around the corner.

In brief, 2023 will remain challenging for OPEC+. In the words of , “unpredictability is the new normal.” Yet it is likely that oil prices will move above MBS’s floor of $100 per barrel in a year from now.

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Oil: the Year Just Passed and the Year Looming Ahead appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The term hegemony of masculinity, which was first used by , describes the social hierarchy that tends to validate the superiority of masculinity over feminine, and is founded on historical precedent or adheres to societal norms. It defines a male-dominated social structure that denies females with feminine traits the right to participate in public life. Tragically, this hegemony leads to a heteronormative social structure and the predominance of heterosexism in Islamic doctrines.

The Destiny of Pakistan’s Totalitarian Proxy Regime in Afghanistan

READ MORE

The political discriminatory ideologies of apartheid have been widely employed in several fields of social science ever since first articulated it. is the systematic discrimination of individuals based on whether they were born a man or a woman. Gender-apartheid and the term sexism are connected through historical and cultural roots, which are still tangible in the modern world. 

With six sections and 30 articles, the UN General Assembly approved the on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1979. This treaty emphasizes and puts into practice the rights of women and girls around the world. It protects them in areas like discrimination, policy measures, the defense of fundamental freedoms and rights, sex-role stereotyping and prejudice, prostitution, political and public life, representation, nationality, education, employment, health, economic and social benefits, law, marriage, and family life. It has since been ratified and adopted by one hundred eighty nine states. However, despite having the pact in 1980, gender discrimination still exists in Afghanistan under the Taliban’s rule.

The Taliban runs a de facto government that is not officially recognized. They are centered on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, and have close ties to the terrorist group . On August 15, 2021, the Taliban took back , and since then they have ruled Afghanistan with an Islamic system based on the Deobandi school. The Taliban progressively began to implement their ideologically-based teachings throughout the nation; among them, the Taliban are passing anti-feminine legislation and marketing them as Islamic teachings through their media apparatus. Their curriculum is dominated by masculinity and violates the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

The Taliban’s Motivation

In the 1948 , the UN lists the right to an education as one of the most important human rights. This is a cosmic and global right, not one that is exclusive to a place or location. Everyone is entitled to a high-quality education, regardless of their race, color, ethnicity, country, or gender. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes the value of education, which includes tolerance, community, and mutual understanding among all people, as well as the right to be educated.

Afghanistan Is Losing Faith in the Taliban

READ MORE

In opposition to international values, the Taliban regime has denied Afghan girls and women the chance to enroll in schools and institutions. The Taliban government may be utilizing the education of Afghan women as a tool to pressure Western democracies to embrace them. However, It is evident that nothing has changed to date, despite the fact that sanctions against the Taliban’s administration have gotten tougher.

Under the Taliban government, women no longer play an active part in society. At the cabinet, provincial, or municipal levels, no women have been appointed by the Taliban. In actuality, the Taliban rule has usurped the social lives of women and, by relegating them to the private sphere, has diminished their stature. The Taliban regime’s workforce is patriarchal and sexist in this sense. It might be argued that patriarchy has a significant impact on the Taliban’s administrative structure.

The Taliban bureaucratic system’s gender-centricity cannot be boiled down to a call for recognition. In fact, one of the tenets of the Deobandi school, which forms the Taliban ideology, values that the public sphere should be gender-centric. As a phenomenon, work is considered to be man-centered. The that permits women to work in a setting where there is no chance for conversation with males is the only area where the Deobandi school has shown flexibility so far on women’s right to employment. According to this, the Taliban’s manifesto has a clause that is said to support the barring of women from bureaucratic roles.

Consequences of Gender Apartheid Policies

The Taliban’s anti-women policies diminish the idea of women as fully human beings. Women are denied citizenship rights and are not regarded as social contract signatories under this system. Due to the Taliban regime’s treatment of women, Afghan society has regressed both politically and economically. A political setback is the absence of women in the public sphere, the centralization of Afghan bureaucracy, and its concentration on the position of the man as well as the political exclusion of women from these positions.

Women have less economic influence under the Taliban government. The Taliban system makes women into workers with very low human capital, little incomes, and limited opportunities for growth in the workplace by denying them the access to study. Women who work as men’s employees won’t advance because they lack the capacity to handle affairs. On the one hand, this economic paralysis of women contributes to the inefficiency of half the people of the society, and on the other, it causes the economic paralysis of the entire nation.The Taliban administration imposed gender segregation and patriarchal control on Afghan society by defining women in the private sphere. Afghanistan’s radicalization eventually will only lead to disaster and the emergence of a radical generation. [ edited this article]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post One Of The Taliban’s Monumental Ruins: Gender-Apartheid Policies appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The original intentions  of , the founder of the modern Olympics, were to promote internationalism and humanity. However, sports have continuously been used as a platform to promote nationalism. For instance, who can forget how the USSR and USA turned the 1980s Olympics into a Cold War battleground? If war is an extension of politics, then organized sports can be seen as a substitute for war and a bloodless theater for national competition.

This year, the FIFA World Cup has announced Qatar’s arrival on the international stage. It has become the first Arab and Muslim country to organize an event of such magnitude, This has added to its prestige and soft power globally and, especially, in the Islamic world.

Money Rules the World

The 2022 World Cup in Qatar comes after the 2018 World Cup held in Russia. Though both host nations are light years away from democracy, this did not matter for FIFA. Almost immediately after the nomination of the organizers, there were multiple allegations of corruption. There was suspicion that the Qatari government bribed FIFA so their country could be hosts.

The Greatest Show on Earth

READ MORE

According to , 16 of the 22 voting members of the FIFA Executive Committee that chose Russia and Qatar are now under investigation for some form of corruption or wrongdoing. Allegations emerged that FIFA benefited from a $400 million TV rights deal with Al Jazeera, Qatar’s state broadcaster. Apparently, this deal came just 21 days before the decision to award the World Cup to Qatar. 

The French Connection

In recent years, particularly under French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s, ties between France and Qatar grew closer. In November 2010, Sarkozy, Michel Platini, the former head of the European football association (UEFA), and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, had a now infamous . This led to Platini changing his mind and voting in favor of Qatar hosting the World Cup. FIFA’s president at the time Sepp Blatter has since admitted this was a mistake. FIFA should not have awarded Qatar the World Cup.

The Qatari government would later buy Paris Saint-Germain, France’s most famous football team. Flush with money, the club has bought players like Kylian Mbappe, Neymar and Lionel Messi. The Qatari government has also increased its stake in a French media group, and bought the television rights for Ligue 1, France’s top league. France has also developed closer trade relations with Qatar. 

The Franco-Qatari collaboration continues. According to , the National Assembly ratified an agreement between Qatar and France. It turns out 220 French police officers will work with local officers in Qatar during the World Cup. The French Interior Ministry declared, “France’s ambition is not to deploy a large number of units, but to provide high-level expertise and specialized operational support.” It seems likely that France has profited from this arrangement.

Human Rights Abuses, Boycott and More

After Qatar won the 2022 FIFA World Cup bid, the government began constructing the necessary infrastructure to host the tournament. Workers from poorer Asian countries often worked in unimaginable conditions. As far back as 2013, several European newspapers, including The Guardian, Norwegian magazine Josimar and Danish daily Ekstra Bladet repeatedly reported on abuses against migrant workers. They even uncovered cases of . In February 2021, also reported that more than 6,500 workers from India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka had died in the last 11 years. Many of them had died on World Cup construction sites.

All these revelations have cast a dark shadow over this tournament and FIFA. Tragically, Football’s apex body has embraced Qatar wholeheartedly and ignored all human rights violations.

In recent years global brands have focused their communications on socio-political causes. Advertisements are no longer just about the products, they are also about important brand values. When it came down to the World Cup, many companies faced a difficult choice: do they associate with Qatar?

According to , several companies have already announced they are boycotting the event. The ING Group, a major financial and banking services group that sponsors the teams of the Netherlands and Belgium, has decided it will neither accept any tickets nor be involved in any related promotion of the World Cup. Another company that is a baggage service provider, GLS, sponsors the Belgium team. It said, “we believe that a commercial use of the 2022 World Cup in the context of the human rights situation would be better not to take place.” The company is also not using ticket allocations for customer promotions and not engaging in any advertising campaigns in Qatar.

Brands like the national lottery Danske Spil and the bank Arbejdernes Landsbank, sponsors of the Danish Football Association, agreed to forgo their paid placement on the team’s training gear for human rights messages during the World Cup. 

The companies involved with the Qatar World Cup are facing a backlash. Football fans have kicked off a visual criticizing the brands participating in the event. Today, such action may seem relatively ineffective. In the long run, brands that have taken a strong stance against Qatar might have much to gain, especially if unpleasant events occur  during the tournament.

Nevertheless, at the end of this year, we will witness probably the most expensive sports event in history. Qatar’ would have spent about $220 billion on infrastructure and communication apart from bribes funded by its ample oil and gas reserves. The 6,500 who died will not be forgotten though and the FIFA Qatar World Cup will always remain tainted.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Journey to the World Cup: 6,500 Deaths and $220 Billion appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Texas shale phenomenon brought a huge surge in oil production in the US. We were producing about 6-7 million barrels per day (bpd) in the early 2000s. That jumped up really quickly and reached 13 million bpd by 2021. That’s the most oil any country has ever produced. I think the highest the Saudis have ever gotten was 12.4 bpd in 2020. 

OPEC, of course, watched this development. It first dismissed increased American oil production as a flash in the pan. Increasingly, over the years, OPEC became alarmed. Shale was basically stealing their market share. Shale captured almost 5 million barrels a day of OPEC’s market share. 

Shale and European Energy Security

READ MORE

To be fair, OPEC was not necessarily losing market share. The oil market was growing thanks to Chinese demand but OPEC was not capturing the growth. The OPEC nations were holding their production steady. And, at times, they were actually cutting production to prop up prices. Every time OPEC did that, US shale would swoop in and grab more market share as the ultimate free rider. This shale monster was growing and growing and OPEC didn’t really have an answer. 

Shale was basically undercutting OPEC, no matter what it did. If OPEC would cut production, the US would ramp up shale production and dampen the price increase OPEC was chasing. And then if OPEC tried to punish the market and punish producers with a big price war by flooding the market with extra production, shale investors would stop investing, those oil wells would decline naturally. And then the price wouldn’t drop as far.

Saudi Arabia Hugs Russia to Take Back Control

The shale sector was difficult for OPEC to cope with. It was making OPEC a lot less effective. And the Saudis found themselves largely alone. Their market power seemed to be evaporating. They needed another big producer to try and regain their influence over the market. Russia was the obvious choice. It was the world’s number two producer and exporter. By 2016, after various discussions and overtures, Russia began cooperating with Saudi Arabia and OPEC. Russia also brought along a couple of other allies with Kazakhstan being the most important one.

It was US shale that led to the formation of OPEC+ and this organization has since been going strong. The OPEC+ countries cut oil production by over two million barrels just before this year’s US midterm elections. This October cut was really extraordinary. Saudi Arabia has never pushed OPEC to cut production when the incumbent US president did not want it to. This time, US President Joe Biden wanted an increase in oil production. He wanted lower gasoline prices at the pump because American consumers believe that the president controls them.

Joe Biden’s Saudi Arabia Visit to Meet Mohammad bin Salman

LISTEN NOW

Instead, it is the Saudis who have the most influence over gasoline prices. They can increase production and lower gasoline prices, making them a non-issue for an American president. In the past, the Saudis obliged Barack Obama and Donald Trump. When the Saudis obliged Obama, the late King Abdullah was in charge. Under King Salman, equations with the Democrats have changed. The Saudis were willing to oblige Trump but decided to hurt Biden by cutting production and increasing prices.

It is clear that Saudi Arabia and OPEC value their oil market cooperation with Russia. The cartel has become more disciplined with Russia on board. Under Saudi-Russian dual leadership, OPEC+ has become stronger. Before the invasion of Ukraine, the Saudis had more to gain from this partnership. After the invasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin is really the big winner. OPEC+ provides him the best stage for geopolitical influence. He seems to revel in the fact that he’s managed to shoehorn himself into this tight US-Saudi relationship.

The US and Saudi Arabia Drift Apart

The Saudis are unlikely to jettison Putin despite US pressure. They are making a point of making diplomatic visits and taking the Russian president’s calls. In contrast, they made a show of rejecting Biden’s calls last year. The Saudis seem to be signaling to Washington that there are consequences for spurning their Gulf Arab partners. Disagreements between the US and the Gulf states date back at least to the Arab Spring.

As shale production went up, the US did not worry too much about such disagreements. There was a feeling that we’re self-sufficient in oil. That gives us a free pass on not having to cater to our Middle East allies, at least to some of their demands. It turns out that the US motorist is just as exposed to global oil prices as ever. The Gulf oil exporters still remain the global price makers.

Oil Realpolitik Has Returned With a Vengeance

READ MORE

Saudi Arabia has spare capacity. That is the gap between how much a country actually produces and how much it could potentially produce if it went flat out and opened all the taps. Spare capacity makes Saudi Arabia special. It gives the Saudis their swagger on the geopolitical stage. They can always tap spare capacity in case of a natural disaster such as a hurricane or an earthquake. They can also do so in case of a political upheaval such as an invasion or an embargo. 

In the past, the Saudis leveraged spare capacity in concert with the US. When Washington wanted to invade Iraq or sanction Iran, Saudi Arabia unlocked its spare capacity to release extra oil into the global market. So in my classes here at Rice University, I used to say that the Saudis protect the US motorist from US foreign policy. After this October that might not be true anymore.

Saudi Arabia is now behaving differently. Biden campaigned on making the Saudis a pariah. Well, once he was elected, Saudi spare capacity was less available to the US. We had a really fast post-COVID recovery in oil demand and we had this big oil price shock. And we had OPEC+ basically saying that we’re just going to stick to our plan of drip-feeding oil to the global market by increases of 400,000 barrels a day. As a result, oil prices rose all the way up to $130 a barrel.

Unlike in the past, Saudi Arabia did not bring its spare capacity into play. Not only Biden but also Emmanuel Macron and Boris Johnson asked the Saudis to pump more oil. They refused. They claimed that the market was well supplied and that the price spikes were due to geopolitical risks or under-investment by producers afraid of climate action or some kind of a boomeranging pandemic. So they held that spare capacity in abeyance. 

Here in the US, Biden had to deal with high prices in an election year by releasing supplies from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (), the world’s largest supply of emergency crude oil. The US consumes nearly 20 million barrels per day and the SPR is estimated to be over 700 million barrels. This is not how things are meant to work. In the past, the US was always able to tap Saudi spare capacity. This time, Biden went to Saudi Arabia but the Saudis refused to help.

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Saudi Arabia and Russia Have Now Teamed Up in OPEC+ appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Arab Spring in 2011 was the latest disappointment in a longstanding Arab quest for freedom. Democracy was set back years by the failings of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 2013 military coup in Egypt. The rise and fall of the Islamic State, which took Sunni Islamism to its most extreme and fanatical edge, damaged the wider appeal of political Islam in the region for years to come. These disasters have led to widespread disillusionment with both democracy and political Islam, leaving an ideological vacuum at the heart of the Arab revolution.

However, as Mao Zedong said, a revolution is not a dinner party and so these setbacks should be regarded not so much as a failure but as a false start. Given the continued deterioration in the region’s socioeconomic and political fabric and the grim economic it seems inevitable that sooner or later the Arab Spring is going to return, raising the question when it does, what kind of narrative or ideology will be driving it?

Pan-Arabism Again

Pan-Arabism could be the answer. This ideology envisages different Arab states as one political entity and has been around for a while.  So, the new version of pan-Arabism will be different to that of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s, which led to the 1967 . In this war, Arab states joined hands to take on Israel but came up woefully short. The new 21^st Century model will be an updated one relevant for a globalized, digitalized world.

Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East?

READ MORE

The Islamic State has already shown how this can be done. It used new leadership techniques, narratives and technology to reinvent . Like the Islamic State, pan-Arabism also seeks to transform society and establish a new transnational Arab identity. Both offer a romantic notion of the future that elicits an emotional rather than a rational response from the people. The Islamic State envisions a world based on a perverse interpretation of Islam that is brutally spartan and exclusionary. Pan-Arabism has the potential to offer a bottom-up, big tent ideology, which could easily absorb other already existing groups.

The Islamic State used the malaise in Arab and Western societies to boost its appeal and used savage violence as theater to achieve its grisly goals. In contrast, pan-Arabism holds out the promise of positive change and . Its appeal lies primarily in the notion of a pan-Arab identity and Arab unity which Arab intellectuals and elites have always found attractive. At its core is the belief in an Arab “super culture” extending across the region from North Africa to the Gulf, albeit with many variances under that umbrella.

One Nation That Cares About Palestine

Pan-Arabism promises to put Palestine at the top of the agenda again. Public opinion surveys have consistently shown that Palestine remains an important issue among ordinary people in the Arab world, even in countries which signed the with Israel. 

Palestine and Israel: A Bloody Saga

READ MORE

The 2019-2020 , a public opinion survey across the Arab world conducted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar found that 88% of all Arabs polled opposed recognition of Israel. Significantly, 81% of respondents supported the idea that the many and varied Arab peoples constitute a single nation. Only 16% agreed with the statement that “the Arab peoples are distinct nations, tied together by only tenuous bonds.”

Beyond the romantic vision of Arab unity, pan-Arabism is remarkably non-ideological about how society should be organized, leaving the door open for other ideas and inputs. This relative pragmatism gives pan-Arabism a protean quality that enables it to be many things to many people. Crucially, it makes pan-Arabism an ideology most opposition groups can rally around, fromintelligentsia and artists to jihadis and the Muslim Brotherhood. This gives the ideology its political potency.

In the 1960s, Arab leaders publicly espoused pan-Arabism because they thought it would help them retain power. In reality, they only paid lip-service to pan-Arabism because adopting it would have put their own positions at risk. Today, Arab leaders still pay pan-Arabism lip service but, at the same time, they invest heavily to counter its appeal.  Leaders use their own narratives as well as  top-down, state-sponsored, hard-edged nationalism to consolidate power as seen recently at events like Saudi Foundation Day, UAE Commemoration Day and Sisi’s pharaonic shenanigans.

During the Arab Spring, people protesting did not demand the boundaries that divided the Arab states to dissolve. In retrospect, it now appears to have been a mistake. Since then, it has become clear that the Arab dictators and the Israeli Occupation of Palestine are interlinked. It is almost impossible to tackle any of them individually without tackling them all simultaneously and collectively. For example, democracy in Egypt was by Israel and the Gulf countries, and Israeli occupation of Palestine continues with Egyptian support. Meanwhile, Gulf autocrats depend on Egypt’s repression of democracy and political Islam to maintain their own domestic power base, and the Egyptian military dictatorship is fueled by Gulf petrodollars. This is the Gordian knot that defeated the Arab Spring revolutions.  Pan-Arabism has the potential to cut this knot, which the Islamic State failed to do.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Pan-Arabism Returns to the Middle East appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In the context of the Arab Spring, where popular uprisings brought down various regimes in the Middle East, the fall of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was the most spectacular in the region.

Muhammad Mursi, from the Muslim Brotherhood party, was elected as the first civilian president of Egypt in June 2012. Yet his short year in office did not bring about a radical in Egypt’s foreign policy, due to the effort to avoid provoking counterproductive reactions under the new government. Despite this, certain nuances Mursi introduced revealed a moderate commitment to reshaping some features of Egyptian foreign policy. In contrast to the close ties between Hosni Mubarak’s regime and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey became preferred allies, as they supported the revolution and the subsequent political transition, with Doha providing $8 billion in economic aid.

On the one hand, the new post-revolutionary government was keen to show its to play a responsible role in international affairs, maintaining the peace agreements with Israel, and thus securing its annual $1.5 billion in aid from Washington. In addition to this, Mursi was the first Egyptian president to travel to Tehran after 33 years, to participate in the 16th Non-Aligned Summit in August 2012, signaling a moderate to balance the relationship with Iran. On the other hand, one of his first steps was to open Egypt’s border with Gaza to bring relief to its inhabitants, showing the usefulness of his good communication with Hamas in Gaza, in stark contrast with  the Mubarak regime. It helped the US achieve a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in November 2012.

Al-Sisi’s arrival and the reconfiguration of Egyptian foreign policy

The reforms undertaken by the new government, coupled with various internal disputes concerning the new constitution put forward by the Muslim Brotherhood, led to a coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Under the new headed by al-Sisi, the link with Saudi Arabia was not only re-established but was intended to create a huge political and economic dependency.

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE and Kuwait, provided Cairo with $12 billion in economic aid, rising to $42 billion in the following years. Among the reasons why these Petro monarchies were interested in supporting the new al-Sisi government, it is relevant to mention the fact that they shared a common interest in putting an end to Arab Spring governments in the region and opposing the Muslim Brotherhood, declared to be a terrorist movement. In payment for their support, Riyadh demanded unwavering subservience to Saudi leadership and its regional objectives.

Egypt under al-Sisi has shown its to Saudi Arabia by joining the boycott of Qatar initiated in June 2017, as well as by transferring sovereignty over the islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia. Likewise, concerning Libya, which has been without a stable unified government since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, Egypt is one of the main supporters of General Khalifa Haftar, who has installed a self-proclaimed government in Tobruk against the government in Tripoli, which is supported by Qatar and includes the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. For Cairo, along with the UAE, the elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood is a priority governing both its domestic and foreign policy.

Egypt’s growing dependence on Riyadh and its impact on its quest for regional leadership

The heavy dependence of Egypt’s  current foreign policy on Arab financial help constrains the nation’s in the region. Besides, there is a need to maintain unwavering US support for Egypt, which remains strongly dependent on his alliance and cooperation with the two main allies of the US in the Middle East: Israel and Saudi Arabia. This is also coupled with the cooperation between Riyadh and Cairo on the Palestinian dossier, of great value to Israel, as well as the common interest in curbing Iran’s growing influence in Sudan and Eritrea.

Nonetheless, the points of friction are multiplying. Egypt supported maintaining the , who was subjected to an intense wave of protests calling for his ouster in December 2018, whereas Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed the idea of resolving the crisis by seeking a reliable successor to al-Bashir, such as Sudanese intelligence chief Salah Gosh. That solution would allow Riyadh to continue to peacefully deploy its influence in the Horn of Africa.In conclusion, Egypt’s in its vacillating foreign policy lies in its aspiration for leadership and its limited capacity to develop it. Egypt has lost its historical potential for leadership, but it has also lost the capacity to come up with the kind of  initiative that could restore it. This is a source of  frustration widely felt in a nation with a strong nationalist sentiment. The current regime under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, while trying to maintain an image of leadership in an instrumental sense, with a view to confirming its legitimacy, is too afflicted by its evident weakness and dependence to be able to decisively influence events in the Arabian region.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Egypt’s Foreign Policy Under Al-Sisi and Its Relationship with Saudi Arabia appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Unveiled earlier this year, the prominent new mural inside Riyadh’s Al-Yamamah Palace — the seat of the Saudi Royal Court — is worthy of comment.  It depicts King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in the center, the omnipotent Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman Al-Saud (MBS) is on his right, the far less prominent Prince Turki bin Salman Al-Saud on his left.

Within Saudi Arabia, the mural has stoked a debate over the most probable line of succession in the event of the 86-year-old king dying.  Notably, suggestions have emerged that a future “King MBS” might be willing (or might have been asked by his parents) to appoint Turki as his heir apparent.  On paper, such a scenario isn’t particularly implausible, nor even controversial. MBS’s own sons are too young for such a role. After MBS, Turki is the eldest of the sons of Fahda bint Falah Al-Hathleen, King Salman’s notable .

Money, not succession, is the point

In some respects, however, the rumor mill might be missing the main point.  After all, guessing who is the crown prince seems futile. An increasingly could delay the anointment of his successor. Instead, MBS could just play the waiting game until he is strong enough to make one of his own sons the crown prince.  In doing so, he will be taking another leaf out of Abu Dhabi’s Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, (MBZ)’s book, where everyone in the innermost sanctum is patiently until MBZ anoints his favored son Khalid as his successor, seeing off any of his uncles.

The mural is perhaps better understood as another layer of evidence indicating that it is actually Turki, rather than any of Fahda’s ostensibly higher profile sons, who has emerged as MBS’s right-hand man. Fahda’s third eldest son, Khalid bin Salman Al-Saud, is for defense after serving as to the US. Her fourth eldest, Bandar bin Salman Al-Saud, is of the Royal Bodyguard and is responsible for the personal security of both King Salman and MBS. Unlike his brothers, Turki seems to have quietly assumed control over the family’s private fortunes. He is also being discreetly positioned as one of the kingdom’s most important interlocutors with foreign investors.

Notably, Turki is understood to have already taken over the management of King Salman’s personal real estate portfolio. He served as the guarantor of and is associated with several entities owning King Salman’s various overseas properties.  He also served a as chair of the Saudi Research and Media Group before MBS plucked him out to take the helm of the , the personal treasures of the family, in 2015.

Turki’s financial dealings

Though founded in 2008, Al-Tharawat assumed importance in January 2016 as part of MBS’s post-oil diversification masterplan. This masterplan is known as the (NTP) and was part of the renowned .  Significantly, the NTP has focused heavily on supporting private sector growth in strategic areas. The NTP’s goal is to the share of the private sector in the GDP from 40 to 65%.

In this context, Turki’s Al-Tharawat had begun to expand rapidly. It is increasingly referred to in Saudi Arabia as a sharikat takatul, a “conglomerate corporation,” and was initially compared to some of the biggest Gulf merchant family-owned companies in Dubai and Bahrain, including the , the and the .  Al-Tharawat has invested in a number of domestic real estate, construction, agricultural, medical and IT projects. It has also been linked to a series of contentious Saudi air industry investments.

Back in 2014, Al-Tharawat had already acquired a majority stake in a small . Turki took over as chairman of this bank, which then went on to serve as one of two placement agents for a new shariah-compliant aircraft leasing fund.  In turn, this fund had solicited a $100 million investment from Airbus. The fund was then supposed to purchase 50 Airbus aircraft and then to Saudi Arabia’s national carrier, Saudia. These aircraft formed a third of Saudia’s fleet.

The signing ceremony was held in London where Turki formally announced the fund’s launch. In June 2015, MBS stated at the Paris Air Show that the leasing deal had been finalized, claiming he himself had been its “mastermind.” Significantly, the arrangement soon generated opprobrium, including a rare implicit criticism of the ascendant MBS. 

The financial dealings for Turki and Al-Tharawat are wide-ranging and intricate. Comparing them to the merchant family-owned conglomerates is misleading. Therefore, astute observers, both inside and outside Saudi Arabia, have instead begun likening Al-Tharawat to Bahrain’s Premier Group, which is owned by and is understood to manage King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa’s private domestic and international investments. They also draw comparisons with Abu Dhabi’s Royal Group, which is seen by some as representing the private business interests of MBZ and his other full brothers. 

The activities of Al-Tharawat clearly reveal that Turki has emerged as his family’s money man and is second only in power to MBS.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Turki bin Salman Is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Money Man appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Tragic Tales of the Father and the Son

London-based this week published a of the arrest and disappearance of the son of a prominent conservative cleric, who himself was arrested in 2016 and subsequently disappeared.

The organization had this to say: 

“ALQST has learned of the arrest on 14 August 2021 of , son of the preacher who has been forcibly disappeared since 2016. Abdulwahhab, who was arrested previously in June 2017, had received a phone call from the Saudi authorities asking him to go to the Naif College for National  Security in Riyadh, supposedly to have the electronic tag removed from his ankle. However, as soon as he arrived he was informed that he had to spend the remainder of his sentence, amounting to eight months, in prison.”

Abdulwahhab al-Dowaish was originally arrested in 2017 after an argument with an official at the Interior Ministry to whom he had gone to seek the release of his father. In the course of the argument Abdulwahhab told the official: “We love our father dearly; either release him or put us in prison with him.” The following day, a number of civilian cars surrounded Sulaiman al-Dowaish’s family home, where all his children lived. Abdulwahhab was then arrested and forcibly disappeared for three months, after which his family were able to visit him in prison and saw he had clearly been tortured. A source told ALQST that Abdulwahhab was tortured and forced under duress to make confessions, and because he was in such poor physical condition he was moved to the prison hospital for treatment before being returned once again to the main prison.

Abdulwahhab was subsequently put on trial on charges including support for Islamic State (IS) and holding extremist ideas, although the Public Prosecution failed to produce any evidence for this. He was released before his trial began in March 2018, and was sentenced in September 2020 by the Specialised Criminal Court, Saudi Arabia’s terrorism court, to three and a half years in prison with eighteen months suspension, to be followed by a travel ban of similar duration.”

ALQST notes it still does not know where Abdulwahhab is currently being held.

The World This Week: Something is Rotten in Saudi Arabia

READ MORE

Abdulwahhab’s father was allegedly brought before MBS in chains and beaten by the crown prince. The cleric was a staunch supporter of the ruling family but fell spectacularly out of favor in 2016 after he published a series of tweets. Ramzi Kaiss writing for the Washington-based human rights organization Democracy for the Arab World Now () describes what to Sulaiman al-Dowaish in detail:

“In the tweets that apparently provoked his abduction, Dowaish about the dangers of individuals providing “their spoiled sons” with “excessive powers and responsibilities without accountability and oversight.” It was, perhaps, a not-so-subtle reference to King Salman and his son, MBS, who at the time was amassing newfound political power after being by his father, a year earlier, as the minister of defense and deputy crown prince. By 2017, MBS was crown prince.

After being detained in Mecca, Dowaish disappeared. According to an eyewitness, he was soon flown to Riyadh, where he was taken, handcuffed and chained, to the office of MBS himself. According to MENA Rights Group’s sources, Mohammed bin Salman forced Dowaish onto his knees and began to personally assault him—punching him in the chest and throat, and berating him about his tweets. Dowaish, bleeding excessively from his mouth, lost consciousness.

Dowaish was then kept in an unofficial detention facility located in the basement of a royal palace in Riyadh. According to ALQST’s , the basement of this palace had been used to imprison and torture high-ranking Saudi officials and rival members of the royal family, by MBS’s own entourage. Maher al-Mutreb and Saud al-Qahtani, two members of the notorious “” hit team responsible for the murder of journalist and other Saudi dissidents, were in charge of running the secret prison and personally oversaw the torture of Dowaish.”

The Spoiled Son with a Taste for Blood

ALQST, while continuing to demand answers on the fate of Sulaiman, has called on the Saudi authorities to release his son immediately and unconditionally and drop all charges against him.

But as with other cases, MBS and the supine judicial system that answers to him will pay no heed to the call, particularly as Western governments themselves have chosen to largely ignore his multiple abuses, the most widely publicized of which was to order the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.

Although the Biden administration that the president raised the Khashoggi case and other human rights violations with the crown prince, human rights activists have argued that all that Biden achieved with his meeting with MBS was to further embolden the crown prince.

Indeed a Saudi doctoral studying at Leeds University had a previous sentence of three years dramatically increased.  Her crime was posting comments critical of the regime on a website on the internet. Salma al-Shehab had returned to the kingdom on a holiday when she was arrested. On 9 August, the appeals court sentenced the 34-year-old mother of two young children to 34 years in prison. As if this was not enough, the court ordered that, after her release, this lady would face a 34-year travel ban.

On August 15, numbers that executions in the first six months of 2022 hit 120. A record 81 were executed in a . This is the largest number in the history of the kingdom. That number is greater than the total number of executions of the last two years, making a mockery of Saudi promises to limit executions. It raises questions about what exactly did Biden’s meeting with MBS actually achieve.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Saudi Arabia: The Story of the Missing and the Executed appeared first on 51�Թ�.

This aggressive response of MBS is unprecedented in US-Saudi relations. It demonstrates that MBS has consolidated his power within the kingdom. It also reveals how high oil prices have given MBS much economic clout. He now clearly believes that Saudi Arabia doesn’t need the US in the same way his predecessors did.  If anything the shoe is on the other foot. Biden is heading into midterms that his party is likely to heavily because of surging inflation driven by high energy costs. The American president needs MBS to pump more oil.

Rising Oil Prices Boost Saudi Economy

The latest economic forecasts have put more wind in MBS’s already expansive sails. London-based Capital Economics estimated that Saudi Arabia’s GDP might have grown by 10% in the first half of 2022 thanks to high oil prices. In their words:

“The oil sector has sustained its strong momentum. Production rose from 10.36mn bpd in April to 10.42mn bpd in May, translating into growth of 22.9% y/y….  Looking ahead, the prospects for the oil sector look very bright. The decision by OPEC+ to raise its output quotas by 50% in July and August will provide an additional boost to Saudi production. And if, as we expect, OPEC+ removes the shackles of quotas beyond September, Saudi Arabia is one of the few members that will be able to capitalise and we think that output will reach a record high by late-2023.

Capital Economics says the economy, and particularly the private sector, will be further boosted by the loosening of fiscal policies now underway and the distinct possibility of a  The VAT tax rate was tripled in 2020 to 15%. This increase was to shore up government finances under strain because of the then low oil prices.

Biden and MBS hit an impasse on the issue of human rights. That is immaterial. In truth, human rights was not a for the US president. What is significant is that Biden and BMS issued a  shared communique on the economic quagmire in which Lebanon is currently stuck.

As reported by :

In a joint statement, the two men “noted the importance of forming a government and implementing structural and global reforms in politics and economy so that Lebanon can overcome its crisis and not constitute a launchpad for terrorists, drug trafficking and criminal activities which threaten its stability (and) the region’s security.”

Using the King Salman Relief Center the kingdom $36 million in humanitarian aid to Lebanon in March. That was followed in April by the full restoration of that had ruptured over critical comments by Lebanese politicians over the Yemen war.

The Lebanese Economic Crisis

Since 2019, Lebanon has endured a complex economic and financial crisis, deepened by political deadlock, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the Beirut Port explosions in August 2020 and now the global food and fuel crisis. As the has highlighted, the ongoing political paralysis is destroying “key pillars of Lebanon’s post-civil war political economy.”  It cites the collapse of most basic public services and the flight of young Lebanese from a failed country in a colossal brain drain.  Both these phenomena will inflict further damage going forward. “Meanwhile,” the report acidly notes: “the poor and the middle class, who were never well served under this model in the first place, are carrying the main burden of the crisis.”

The comic Keystone Cops quality of the current situation emerged yet again on in a farcical judicial matter. Ghada Aoun is the presiding judge in a case against Riad Salameh, the governor of Lebanon’s central bank Banque de Liban (BDL). Aoun attempted to haul BDL’s big boss Salameh in front of court. Aoun first sent state security officers to storm Salameh’s residence in El Metn, a posh neighborhood in Rabieh, an upscale northern suburb of Beirut. When the officers did not find the governor at home, Aoun packed them off to the BDL offices in central Beirut. Again, they did not find Salameh.

The Aoun gambit did accomplish a couple of things. First, it rebuked the current caretaker prime minister Najib Mikati who called the incident a “raid for show.” Second, it led to a three-day strike by outraged BDL employees. The head of the BDL union declared: “We refuse to be treated with militia-like methods. We are not defending Riad Salameh but rather this institution, and these methods are unacceptable to us.”

The bank employees join several other strikers, among them university lecturers and public sector employees. In a broken country, gallows humor is now the order of the day. L’Orient Today summed up the current situation brilliantly:

“Do you need an “Ikhraj Eid” (extract of civil registry)? Sorry, it’s not possible. Do you need a passport? Sorry, it’s not possible. The public sector is collapsing as employees continue in their fifth week of an open-ended strike. Everyone is striking… The problem is that they are still being paid in lira. It is the government’s cowardly strategy of reducing the sector’s headcount through attrition. Expenses will definitely drop, but so will revenues. Where are the thinking heads? And they say they want to approve the 2022 budget! With what numbers? More made up ones.”

Lebanon is hurtling to disaster and time is running out.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Saudi Arabia and Lebanon: A Tale of Two Economies appeared first on 51�Թ�.

There was great interest in, and much speculation about, the outcome of US President Joe Biden’s July visit to Saudi Arabia. Once it moved from “will he, won’t he” to “yes, he will,” it gave rise to a cottage industry of op-eds, analyses, and roundtables. There was much talk about Biden and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) making up with the US, Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. Aramco increasing oil production, Israeli security gaining primacy and the US leading the creation of a so-called Middle East Defense Alliance, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Israel—and, crucially, what the US and Saudi “asks” of each other might be. 

In the end, the meeting’s outcome was modest, but critical—it re-established a direct line between the White House and the Saudi leadership (read MBS). This was most likely the optimum result for this administration—not a relationship overhaul or reset, but a recognition that functionality must win out and thus communication at the top was restored.

The US-Saudi Relationship Was Never in Danger

Contrary to public perception, the fundamental relationship was never actually in peril.  Granted, certain elements came under pressure, especially due to respective domestic political considerations, and personal tensions over difficult issues such as human rights, press freedoms, the Yemen conflict and the Khashoggi murder that played out on the international stage.

As is the case for all new incumbents, Biden’s initial focus was to set himself apart—by some distance—from his predecessor, as much for his international as for his home audience. His was a particular mission to return the US to the more stable and reliable foreign policy upon which the world had come to depend. However, in the Middle East, his challenge was different. The leadership in Saudi Arabia had fully embraced former president Trump, while in the West, political watchers had waited in vain for the crown prince’s brash style to be tamed by the weight of office. But MBS was never socialized by his position of power, leaving the incoming Biden administration to shift gears and, in the eyes of Democrats, course-correct to a more traditional approach towards the Kingdom.

Biden’s assertive attitude towards Riyadh—from campaign through to entering the Oval Office—was more to address Democrat concern over Trump’s turning a blind eye towards behavior considered morally questionable by the US political left than it was to chastise the Gulf state. His pressing priority was to show moral strength to his party, and he made a series of decisions that set him on a collision course with MBS. His early announcement that he would speak only to King Salman, citing protocol, was a clear snub to MBS. Biden intended to deliver a message: we are going to play by the rules, and we expect you to do so too. In February 2021, the White House did two things. First, it released the on the Istanbul murder of Jamal Khashoggi. The report found that MBS had personally ordered the assassination of the Saudi journalist Adnan Khashoggi. Second, the White House halted US support for offensive operations in Yemen and suspended sales of specific weapons to Saudi Arabia.

MBS Plays Hardball

In response, MBS took his own hard line, which was intended to show both the Saudi population and international leaders that Riyadh’s policies will not be determined, or unduly influenced, by the US. He was striking out and his sentiment was widely shared by many Saudis and others in the Gulf. MBS was the personification of the feeling that Washington no longer calls the shots in the Middle East. With the advantage of youth, MBS basically shrugged his shoulders at Biden and said “whatever” as evidenced in his interview with in March.

The US calculus towards Saudi Arabia changed when Russia invaded Ukraine. The US and its European allies sought to respond to Russian aggression even as oil prices spiraled to around $140 per barrel. Rising oil prices left Biden with little choice other than to reach out directly to MBS after attempts to do so by National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan failed. Sullivan was unable to persuade the Saudi leadership to increase production and offset crippling price hikes. 

MBS’s’ well-publicized to take Biden’s “oil call” in March was something of a pinnacle moment. It not only inflamed personal animosity between Biden and MBS, but it also impressed upon both of them the necessity to dial things down and work together for the sake of their mutual national interests. Buoyed by a combination of high oil prices and the fact that he was feted by French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, MBS must have felt vindicated that Biden wanted to visit. Global events had forced another gear change in the White House: Biden succumbed to realpolitik and met MBS in Riyadh, fist bump and all.

Convergent Interests

But underneath the public spat and the personal tensions, the multifaceted dimensions of bilateral ties—defense, trade, finance and investment—continued at pace, and in both directions. The trade volume between the two countries reached close to $25bn in 2021, a 22% from 2020. There was a significant rise in non-oil exports from the Kingdom to the US. Now, Biden is slowly thawing on defense sales with whispers that restrictions may be reconsidered in the near future. Some might point to the need for more oil on the market to combat high gasoline prices as a driving force, while others note a broader strategy to push Arab-Israeli security cooperation to counter Iran, particularly now that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) seems to be dead. Earlier this year, the US allowed the sale of Patriot missiles and anti-ballistic defense systems to Riyadh following Houthi attacks against the Kingdom. If the shaky, but still holding, recently extended truce in Yemen becomes a permanent ceasefire, the scope of US weapons sales to Saudi Arabia may broaden yet again.

While the Biden-MBS meeting drew most media attention, and many analysts, including your authors, rolled their eyes at the suggestion of yet another so-called Arab NATO project, the Jeddah visit did lay down some tracks towards developing a multilateral regional security framework. Instead of focusing on the harder security elements such as air and missile defense, the US and Saudi Arabia will seek to bring onboard the members of the by engaging with them at different times, paces and spaces on softer security issues in a bid to work towards greater multilateral security integration, but with no precise end date in mind.

By doing so, the Biden administration is continuing a long-held tradition of trying to develop a regional security architecture that incorporates Israel—following the success of the Abraham Accords—and advances Israel’s long trek to normalization of ties with Arab states. If successful, it would, on the one hand, allow the US to remain central to regional security and, on the other, reduce its level of commitment, as regional partners increasingly share the burden.

There is no question that the US would like to spend less time and energy on helping manage regional affairs, particularly given its focus on China. Its pursuit of a new regional security architecture bringing together ‘like-minded’ states to work collaboratively is a long-term project that may benefit from the catalyst of technological leapfrogging that could spur quicker and more comprehensive cooperation. But there can be no doubt that its success will only be realized if Washington shows unwavering commitment and constantly reassures regional leaders that they are valued and are never to be forgotten. Fist bumping with MBS may have stuck in Biden’s craw, but he knew that it was a necessary step to not only to open up critical communications between the White House and the Saudi leadership, but also to serve as a milestone in galvanizing regional partners into a security framework to meet the challenge of Iran in a post-JCPOA era.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post President Joe Biden, Crown Prince MBS and Realpolitik appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The case, which was first exposed by Private Eye in 2016, relates to a UK government deal to provide communications services to the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), which were delivered by a now defunct unit of Airbus called GPT Special Project Management. The Serious Fraud Office has prosecuted  the case. It claims GPT paid other companies, which were then used to bribe senior Saudi officials, including Prince Miteb bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, former head of SANG, in order to secure the contracts.

Opening the defense case at Southwark Crown Court, Barrister Ian Winter QC described the structure of the government-to-government deal, which dates back to the late 1970s, as a “fiddle” that enabled members of the Saudi royal family and the British government to “deny having any knowledge of [the payments] at all”. Winter went on to say: “This indictment does not begin to plumb the depths of what the UK government has been involved in since the late 1970s.”  The case promises not only to cast new light on the depths of UK-Saudi relations, but also to overshadow a much more recent Saudi deal with Airbus struck by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) for the exclusive benefit of himself and his line of the family.

MBS’s Murky Business Empire

Little public information is available about how the Salman clan runs its business empire. MBS is believed to oversee it personally and his full brother Turki and mother Fahda bint Falah bin Sultan al-Hithlayn are also involved. Fahda, who is never seen in public, was restored to Saudi society without comment in 2018 after being by MBS for two years. Turki’s main role is to introduce Western companies to the crown prince and he deliberately keeps in the background.

Outside Saudi Arabia, the family controls three Luxembourg-registered companies—, and —about which very little public information is available. Inside Saudi Arabia, their principal business vehicle is of which Turki bin Salman is the chairman.

Tharawat Holding Company has business interests inside Saudi Arabia in diverse sectors including construction, real estate, health, education, sports development, food and beverage, aquaculture, telecommunications and natural resources management. It is also suspected of having made a fortune out of defense contracts linked to the Yemen war. Before he was kidnapped and returned to Saudi Arabia against his will, a dissident Saudi prince told Arab Digest that, when the war started, Tharawat diversified its foreign partnerships into military materiel and the Salman clan enriched itself immensely via inflated arms contracts arranged by Turki.

“[Salman’s branch] are behind things inside the country and the Saudi public knows about it” said the prince. “MBS operates his business by bringing his special people and he is in control of the Royal Court. The younger brothers are making money, especially Prince Turki bin Salman. He has no official position—just a businessman —but MBS gives his brother some deals. Turki works for them.”

In September 2015, an anonymous grandson of Ibn Saud published a letter calling for the downfall of the Saudi king in which he warned that large sums of money are being embezzled by the inner circle of the royal family. The stated that $160 billion (SAR 600 billion) was taken by the leadership with a further $100 billion (SAR 375 billion) allegedly going directly to MBS and his brothers, Turki, Khaled, Nayif, Bandar, and Rakan.

Power and Wealth to MBS, His Sons and Brothers

The dissident prince also said Turki told him that MBS intends to change the current system of succession in the Saudi Kingdom to one based on primogeniture so that MBS’s own son will inherit the throne after him. “Turki told me we will be like Bahrain and Jordan where MBS will be king and then his son will be his successor’” said the prince.

“When MBS becomes king, he wants to put one of his children as crown prince, he wants it in his family, Salman’s family, so he will appoint his son as crown prince although he is only a little baby. He has one son called Salman. MBS wants to put him on the crown in the same way as the monarchies of Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, or England do, to keep the throne for his blood. Either MBS will put his son directly as crown prince or he will first appoint one of his brothers and then his son.”

One business deal the Salman clan are known to have been involved in is arranging the financing for a new fleet of Airbus planes for Saudi Arabian Airlines, the flagship carrier of Saudi Arabia. In 2018 The Wall Street Journal published an into how the clan uses businesses connected to the government to make their fortunes. The story explains in detail how, when MBS came to power, he helped re-engineer the original plan.

As per the original plan, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) would have purchased 50 new planes directly from Airbus for Saudi Arabian Airlines. MBS has dumped that deal for a far more complex deal involving a newly established company called International Airfinance Corp (), which manages an Islamic finance fund called ALIF and is part-owned by an Islamic bank based in the Dubai International Financial Centre called Quantum Investment Bank in which Tharawat acquired a 54% stake. MBS’s brother Turki is the chairman of this bank.

Despite concerns raised about the deal—Saudi Arabian Airlines did not solicit bids from any other companies—and the fact that the Serious Fraud Office in London was at that time already investigating an Airbus subsidiary for corruption involving the Saudis, Airbus agreed to invest $100 million in ALIF on the condition that the fund would buy only Airbus planes. On June 23, 2014, Airbus and IAFC held a “signing ceremony” in London to announce the new fund. The IAFC tells us Turki hosted this ceremony.

In 2015, after King Abdullah died, the plan changed yet again into an even more convoluted chain of transactions. Instead of being sold directly to the Saudi government, the jets would now be sold to ALIF, which would in turn rent them to the state-owned Saudi Arabian Airlines, which has subsequently been rebranded as . Note that this convoluted deal helps Tharawat ending up as a beneficiary. As one government official , “at the end it went to Tharawat, who got others to finance it, and made huge profits without risking any of their money.”

On August 5, 2015, the anonymous opposition Saudi Twitter account Mujtahidd tweeted that the list price for 30 A320 and 20 A330-300 Airbus planes was $8 billion (SAR30 billion), but the amount budgeted was $12 billion (SAR 45 billion). The budgeted price is 50% more than the listed price, meaning $4 billion could be going into the pockets of MBS, Turki and their brothers. The original tweet is no longer available as Mujtahidd was hacked a month later and all its tweets were erased. Mujtahidd also wrote that MBS financed the deal with a Saudi government guarantee, on condition that Saudi Arabian Airlines paid Tharawat 150% of the agreed price.

The deal was finalized by MBS during a 2015 visit to France and not long after, at a gathering in a Saudi palace, he took credit for it. MBS claimed that the transaction demonstrated his success in balancing the Saudi state’s financial interests with his family’s interests. MBS said, “I am the mastermind behind this deal.” Depending on what happens next with the Serious Fraud Office’s case now unfolding in Southwark Crown Court, MBS’s cherished deal could yet come unstuck.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Saudi King Salman, His Sons and Airbus appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Biden called Saudi Arabia a during his presidential election campaign. He has since effectively boycotted MBS because of the crown prince’s alleged involvement in the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. MBS has denied any involvement in the killing but accepted responsibility for it as Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler.

A Symbolic Visit to the UAE

MBS waited for his 86-year-old father to from the hospital before traveling to Abu Dhabi to offer his condolences for the death of United Arab Emirates (UAE) President Khaled bin Zayed and congratulations to his successor, Mohamed bin Zayed, the crown prince’s one-time mentor. MBS used the composition of his to underline his grip on Saudi Arabia’s ruling family In doing so, MBS was messaging the international community at large, and particularly Biden, that he is in full control of the kingdom no matter what happens.

The delegation was made up of representatives of different branches of the ruling Al Saud family, including Prince Abdulaziz bin Ahmed, the eldest son of Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, the detained brother of King Salman. Even though he holds no official post, Abdulaziz’s name topped the Saudi state media’s list of delegates accompanying MBS. His father Ahmed was one of three members of the Allegiance Council not to support MBS’s as crown prince in 2017. The 34-member council, populated by the many parts of the Al-Saud family, was established by King Abdullah in 2009 to determine succession to the throne.

MBS has detained Ahmed as well as Prince Mohamed bin Nayef, the two men he considers his foremost rivals, partly because they are popular among US officials. Ahmed was detained in 2020 but never charged, while bin Nayef stands accused of corruption. Ahmed returned to the kingdom in 2018 from London where he told protesters against the war in Yemen to address those : the king and the crown prince.

Abdulaziz’s inclusion in the Abu Dhabi delegation fits a pattern: MBS appoints to high office the younger relatives of people detained since his rise in 2015. Many older powerful royals were arrested in a mass anti-corruption campaign that often seemed to camouflage a power grab. A consultative government among members of the ruling family has now been replaced with one-man rule. MBS probably takes pleasure in driving the point home as Biden mulls a pilgrimage to Riyadh to persuade the crown prince to end his opposition to increasing the kingdom’s oil production and convince him that the United States remains committed to regional security.

The MBS and Joe Biden Dance

So far, the crown prince not only rejected US requests to help lower oil prices and assist Europe in reducing its dependency on Russian oil as part of the campaign to force Moscow to end its invasion of Ukraine but also refused to take a from Biden. Asked a month later whether Biden may have misunderstood him, MBS an interviewer. “Simply, I do not care.”

Striking a less belligerent tone, Mohammed Khalid Alyahya, a Hudson Institute visiting fellow and former editor-in-chief of Saudi-owned Al Arabiya English, noted this month that “Saudi Arabia laments what it sees as America’s wilful of an international order that it established and led for the better part of a century.” Alyahya quoted a senior Saudi official as saying: “A strong, dependable America is the greatest friend Saudi Arabia can have. It stands to reason, then, that US weakness and confusion is a grave threat not just to America, but to us as well.”

The United States has signaled that it is shifting its focus away from the Middle East to Asia even though it has not rolled back its significant military presence. Nonetheless, Middle Eastern states read a reduced US commitment to their security because Washington has failed to robustly to attacks by Iran and Iranian-backed Arab militias against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is not to mention the Biden administration’s efforts to revive a moribund 2015 international with Iran.

Several senior US officials, including National Security Advisor and CIA Director Bill Burns, met with the crown prince during trips to the kingdom last year. Separately, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin the crown prince. In one instance, MBS reportedly at Sullivan after the US official raised Khashoggi’s killing. The crown prince reportedly told Sullivan that he never wanted to discuss the matter again and that the US could forget about its request to boost Saudi oil production.

Even so, leverage in the US-Saudi relationship goes both ways. Biden may need Saudi Arabia’s oil to break Russia’s economic back. By the same token, Riyadh, despite massive weapon acquisitions from the US and Europe as well as arms from China that the US is reluctant to sell, needs Washington as its security guarantor. MBS knows that he has nowhere else to go. Russia has written itself out of the equation, and China is neither capable nor willing to step into the shoes of the US any time soon.

Critics of Biden’s apparent willingness to bury the hatchet with MBS argue that in the battle with Russia and China over a new 21^st-century world order, the US not only needs to talk the principled talk but also walk the principled walk. In an editorial, The Washington Post, for whom Khashoggi was a columnist, that “the contrast between professed US principles and US policy would be stark and undeniable” if Biden re-engages with Saudi Arabia. Yet, with oil prices soaring and inflation rising, interests might trump values and a Biden-led US might kiss and make up with an MBS-led Saudi Arabia to attain its realpolitik ends.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Heady Days appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Netflix’s first original film in Arabic, Perfect Strangers, has become more of a controversy than a hit in regions like Egypt and the Middle East. This is due to its featuring a character that comes out as gay to his friends as they dine together. Although the movie doesn’t show any explicitly homosexual scenes, it has provoked strong reactions against the streaming giant, as some citizens said the movie homosexuality and immorality.

Released last January in 190 countries, Perfect Strangers, set in Beirut, is directed by Lebanese Wissam Smayra and stars actors such as Egypt’s Mona Zaki, Lebanon’s Nadine Labaki and Jordan’s Eyad Nassar. It’s the story of seven close friends who decide to play a game of “true or false” around the dinner table, exposing the intimate secrets that can be found on their cell phones. The friends agree to show every call, text and voice message to one another. The narrative reveals the occasional betrayal among some of the couples, and, at a critical point, one message has the effect of outing one of the friends as gay.

If it wasn’t for the Arabic language spoken by the actors and some Arab food served at dinner, ‘Perfect Strangers’ would look like a Hollywood movie. The plot, with its twists and turns and the dialogue, follows the classic model that the US studios have used for decades. The cinematography and art direction evoke the studio productions shot in L.A. in the 1950s. The characters are all good-looking and embrace modern western “values.” The women drink, are sexually nonchalant (one even takes off her underwear under the table) and are not shy about  revealing their infidelity. While the men check for porn on the internet and talk about money and profit.

With all these Hollywood stereotypes, one might think that the film could harness some of the soft power of the American film industry and seduce Arab viewers with a piece of entertainment of the kind that has charmed audiences even in China and Russia, places where homosexuality is also a taboo. The soft power of Hollywood films, playing on its ability to seduce rather than coerce, has opened many doors for the United States in the world. For instance, in the 20^th century, served as a tool convincing neutral countries to support US foreign policy against the Soviet Union. 

In the 21^st century, during a political and diplomatic crisis between Iran and the US, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences chose the then First Lady Michelle Obama to reveal the winner of Best Picture of 2013, Argo, Ben Affleck’s movie about six Americans who escape the 1979 Embassy takeover. Because the movie had an enormous appeal to Middle East audiences, theIranian military sought to congratulate Mrs. Obama for revealing the “real nature” of the award, based on political, not artistic criteria. In other words, Iranians realized how the most famous cinema award was used as a soft power tool by the US government.

Perfect Strangers may be less seductive and displays poorer production values than ‘Argo’. But in Arab countries, it’s far more controversial, if only because it evokes cultural taboos that may be too strong to break even by Hollywood’s tried and tested soft power prowess. When I watched the movie, I immediately questioned some gay friends living in countries like Egypt, Turkey, and Lebanon. Some of them have spent years in very secret homosexual relations with other men and women. What I’ve heard from them is that the Netflix production caused more pain than relief, since they had to act as if they were as ashamed and offended as their furious relatives with the availability of the movie in their culture. It’s a well-known fact that homosexuality is so strong a taboo that their families haven’t a clue about their son’s and daughter’s sexual orientation. This means they feel very comfortable freely attacking it and accusing the Western world of exporting cultural products that “stimulate those behaviors.”

For decades, Hollywood productions have been successful in Arab countries, but most of the time, the key to success was their ability to adapt the content and it into languages like Farsi, to insert local jokes and avoid cultural taboos. But Netflix’s strategy was risky and clever at the same time. Its first Arab movie was a co-production by Dubai-based Front Row Filmed Entertainment, Egypt’s Film Clinic and Lebanon’s Empire Entertainment. Shot in Lebanon with Arab actors, it didn’t go through local censors and was labeled as a non-family audience film only for the region. 

Thanks to this strategy, it was screened in many countries in the region, unlike Marvel’s ‘Eternals’ and Steven Spielberg’s ‘West Side Story’, banned respectively for having the first gay superhero and, the second, for having a transgender character. And despite (or because of) the controversy, Perfect Strangers has ratings for number of views in the Middle East, with a famous Egyptian actress like Elham Shahin going public to defend the movie, saying “there’s absolutely nothing wrong with it”, while, a member of Egypt’s House of Representatives, asserted that Netflix should be banned from Egypt. But the controversy itself might have paid handsome dividends, since the movie sat at the top of the region’s streaming chart for February. Here’s yet another consequence of Netflix’s strategy in the region. According to the Egyptian film critic and programmer,, no other entertainment conglomerate has ever shaken upsocial politics and posed such a threat to patriarchy, though it must be said that artistic freedom – another conquest attributable to Hollywood’s soft power – is still far from being a reality in the Arab world.

This isn’t the first time that cinema has been used in Egypt as a soft power to seduce the public to accept more liberal and modern values. With a more discreet and subtly artistic attempt, award-winning Egyptian director Youssef Chahine has in the past circumvented government censorship with films exploiting the themes of sex, homosexuality, drugs and political criticism. In movies like Return of the Prodigal Son (1978) and (1989), women with masculine traits and men with mortal hatred of their own repressed desires were ways the director found to evoke homosexuality. The filmmaker, who won awards in western festivals such as Cannes and Berlin with his art films designed for smaller audiences, attempted to undermine antigay culture in his country but proved unsuccessful. Perhaps this time, decades later and with a much bigger budget, Netflix can achieve a better result in the quest to make other people’s sexuality a perfectly acceptable characteristic among imperfect strangers.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Can Cinema’s Soft Power Change Antigay Culture in Arab Countries? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Unthinkable: War Returns to Europe

READ MORE

The immediate answer is there are very few today outside of Russia itself, hence the large rise in gas prices witnessed lately. Over the medium term, however, Libya and Algeria have ample opportunity to increase their supplies to the EU.

Supplies From Libya and Algeria

Libya boasts proven gas reserves of 1,500 billion cubic meters (bcm). Its production is a modest 16 bcm. Algeria has 4,500 bcm of proven reserves and 20-25 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of unconventional gas reserves, the third-largest in the world after the United States and China (and Argentina whose proven reserves tie with Algeria). How much gas that could produce is anyone’s guess, but we are speaking of a figure in the tens of bcm.

Algeria today produces 90 bcm, of which 50 bcm were exported. Another feature of Algeria is the huge storage capacity — 60 bcm — of the Hassi R’Mel gas field, its oldest and largest compared with the EU’s storage capacity of 115 bcm.

Pierre Terzian, the founder of the French energy think-tank Petrostrategies, out that four underwater gas pipelines link these two producers directly to the European mainland: the first links Libyan gas fields with Italy; the second Algerian gas fields to Italy via Tunisia; the third Algerian gas fields to southern Spain; and the fourth the same gas fields to southern Spain via Morocco.

The latter has been closed since November 1, 2021, due to deteriorating relations between Algeria and Morocco, but this has not affected the supply of gas to the Iberian Peninsula. Algeria also has two major liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals, which adds flexibility to its export policy. Its exports to France and the United Kingdom are in LNG ships.

The leading cause of the current crisis is structural as, according to Terzian, EU domestic gas production has declined by 23% over the last 10 years and now covers only 42% of consumption, as compared with 53% in 2010. That decline is the result, in particular, of the closing of the giant Groningen gas field, which is well underway and will be completed by 2030.

Europe has done a lot to expand the gas transmission grid among EU countries, but some major gas peninsulas remain. In 2018, it was suggested that connections between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe needed developing. Spain boasts one-third of Europe’s LNG import capacity, much of it unused, and is connected to Algeria by two major pipelines that could be extended.

As Alan Riley and I four years ago, the “main barrier to opening up the Iberian energy market’s supply routes to the rest of the EU is the restricted route over the Franco-Spanish border. Only one 7-bcm gas line is available to carry gas northwards … The main blocking factor has been the political power of Electricité de France, which is seeking to protect the interests of the French nuclear industry.” An Iberian solution, we added, would not only “benefit France and Spain, but also Algeria, creating additional incentives to explore for new gas fields and maybe kick start a domestic renewables revolution,” which would encourage a switch in consumption from gas to solar in Algeria.

Germany, the Netherlands and Italy

Germany, for its part, has never put its money where its mouth is with regard to Algeria. In 1978, Ruhrgas (now absorbed in E.ON) signed a major contract to supply LNG to Germany. Germany never built the LNG terminal needed to get that contract off the ground. So far, it is the only major European country to have no LNG import terminals, although it can rely on existing facilities in the Netherlands and Belgium.

In 1978, the Netherlands also contracted to buy Algerian gas. Algeria dropped the contract in the early 1980s because of Germany’s refusal to go ahead. Later in the 1980s, Ruhrgas again expressed its interest in buying Algerian gas, but the price offered was too low and because Ruhrgas wanted to root the gas through France, which insisted on very high transit fees. By discarding Algerian gas, Germany has tied itself to Russian goodwill.

Italy, like Germany, a big importer of Russian gas, has positioned itself much more adroitly. In December 2021, Sonatrach, Algeria’s state oil and gas monopoly, increased the amount of gas pumped through the TransMed pipeline, which links Algeria to Italy via Tunisia and the Strait of Sicily at the request of its Italian customers. This followed a very successful state  by Italian President Sergio Mattarella to Algeria in early November. On February 27, Sonatrach  it could pump additional gas to Europe, but contingent on meeting current contractual commitments.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information..

Relations between the Italian energy company ENI and Sonatrach are historically close because of the important role played by the Italian company’s founder, Enrico Mattei, in advising the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria in its negotiations with France, which resulted in the independence of Algeria in July 1962.

The pursuit of very liberal energy policies since the turn of the century by the European Commission overturned the policies of long-term gas and LNG purchase contracts, which were the norm in internationally traded gas until then. Yet security of supply does not rest on such misguided liberalism. New gas reserves cannot be found, let alone gas fields brought into production if producers and European customers are, as Terzian points out, “at the mercy of prices determined by exchange platforms which have dubious liquidity (and can be influenced by major players).” This is an attitude, he adds, “that borders on the irresponsible.”

German energy policy has mightily contributed to the present crisis. It has blithely continued to shut down the country’s nuclear plants, increased its reliance on coal in the electricity sector and with that a consequent increase in carbon emissions.

Serious Dialogue

When considering Caspian gas as an alternative to Russian gas, I would add another country, Turkey, which has a very aggressive and independent policy as a key transit for gas. However, few observers would argue that such a solution would increase Europe’s security.

Engaging in serious long-term strategic dialogue with Algeria would provide Spain and the EU with leverage. This could help to build better relations between Algeria, Morocco and also the troubled area of the Sahel. When trying to understand the politics of different nations, following the money often offers a good guide. One might also follow the gas.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Iberian Solution Could Offer Europe More Gas appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Water World: Is Climate Change Driving Our Future Out to Sea?

READ MORE

Burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that trap heat in the atmosphere, making them major contributors to climate change. On the other hand, high industrial activities, alongside rapidly increasing populations, put growing pressure on energy demand.

The Example of Qatar

Qatar has made remarkable economic achievements over the past few decades. Yet Qatar is facing a trade-off between boosting its economic growth and lowering its carbon dioxide emissions. Its strategic mandate to boost economic development, along with other areas related to sustainability, makes Qatar an interesting country to analyze.

The World Bank defines Qatar as one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita. Its economy is highly dependent on oil and gas production, which for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of export earnings and 70% of government revenues. The country is also a major player in liquefied natural gas. Nonetheless, Qatar’s high dependence on fossil fuels has resulted in an in the CO2 emissions level when compared to global averages.

To combat the rising carbon emission percentages and lower environmental pressures, Qatar is introducing strict policy measures to achieve sustainable development through four central pillars: economic, social, human and environmental development. While many disruptions have occurred over the past few years, including fluctuations in oil and gas prices, economic downturns and a deadly pandemic, nobody expected an economic blockade.

The Diplomatic Rift

In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cut diplomatic relations with Qatar. They prohibited Qatar-registered planes and ships from utilizing their airspace and sea routes, and the Saudis also blocked Qatar’s only land border.

This point is of particular importance as the deterioration in relations among the Gulf neighbors urged Qatar to rethink its sustainable development goals while meeting local demand. At the beginning of the blockade, the country relied heavily on importing several commodities, especially food items. Later, it accelerated initiatives and programs to diversify the economy and reduce reliance on imports.

Achieving carbon neutrality is also factored into all Qatar’s initiatives. For example, by the end of 2022, Qatar aims to deliver the first carbon-neutral FIFA World Cup in the history of the event. All stadiums and infrastructure are subjected to rigorous sustainability standards. Several air quality monitoring stations and extensive recycling programs are being introduced, along with the construction of the eight stadiums that will be used during the football tournament.

Qatar has since become much more independent across several sectors, including food production and transport, making it a case study on how to transform challenges into opportunities for growth.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

This was also evident with total carbon emissions. According to my own analysis, carbon emission per capita fell by 13% as of 2018 from a historical record in 2000. Since then, total carbon emissions have increased as the economy has grown but at a slower rate, meaning that Qatar is undergoing expanding relative decoupling. In the 2008 to 2018 period, a 1% change in GDP resulted in a fall of CO2 emissions, from 0.65% to 0.44%. This drop is very relevant to Qatar as several measures have been applied, particularly over the last 10 years, to reduce emissions.

A Reduction in Emissions

While Qatar’s total emissions have declined over recent years, policies to increase energy efficiency, diversify the energy mix by introducing more renewables, support technological development to improve energy efficiency in a desert climate, and implement energy demand management programs to maintain the same trend of decline and achieve climate change objectives have been increasingly crucial.  

The heightened pressure caused by the blockade on Qatar is now over, but what is needed are more synergies and collective efforts across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to stimulate economic diversification and minimize carbon emissions. Member states of the GCC are sharing multiple environmental, social and economic factors that should incentivize them to cooperate to meet their climate change objectives and economic development goals.

*[Saad Shannak is a scientist at Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute, part of Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) in Qatar. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the university’s official stance.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post How Qatar Manages Economic Growth and CO2 Emissions appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Evolution of National Security in the UAE

READ MORE

The killings, ordered by then US President Donald Trump, have served to exacerbate the severe security challenges the government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi already faces. The PMF, without al-Muhandis’ leadership, is becoming increasingly splintered, threatening even more insecurity for ordinary Iraqis who are trying to recover from nearly two decades of war and terrorism.

Growing Security Challenges

Security is a prerequisite for the prosperity, welfare and economic development of any society. However, as long as Iran continues its extensive influence over Iraq and uses Iraqi territory as a venue to play out its conflict with the United States, security cannot be achieved.

After the assassinations of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, the PMF appeared to be even more aggressively pursuing Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s strategic goal, namely the  of all US troops from Iraq. The US Embassy, the Baghdad Green Zone and US military bases have been repeatedly targeted by PMF militias. The US responded in kind and  PMF positions in various parts of the country, further an already fragile security situation.

Meanwhile, al-Kadhimi, viewed by his critics as catering to Washington,  the US for violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching unilateral operations inside the country. At the same time, he faced strenuous demands from the Americans for his government to do more to stop PMF attacks on US targets.

The withdrawal of foreign military forces had been  by the Iraqi parliament just two days after the high-profile assassinations. Following the US–Iraqi strategic dialogue that launched in June 2020, the US evacuated some of its bases that have been in place since 2003, handing them over to the Iraqi army. But a final withdrawal agreed to be completed by the end of last year has , and the remaining 2,500 US troops have stayed on, no longer in a combat role but rather to “advise, assist and enable” the Iraqi military.

This quasi-exit was met with a stern reaction from the PMF, who threatened to treat the US forces as aggressors if they did not withdraw completely from Iraq. “Targeting the US occupation in Iraq is a great honor, and we support the factions that target it,” was how a for one of the PMF militias put it. Such threats underline the risk of further confrontations between the militias and the US and the potential for more insecurity for ordinary Iraqis.

The targeting of Baghdad’s airport on January 28, with at least six rockets landing on the runway and areas close to the non-military side, causing damage to parked passenger planes, underlines just how fragile the security situation remains.

The PM and the PMF

The conflicts over differences between the PMF and the government are another reason for growing insecurity in the post-assassination period. The PMF has a competitive relationship with the prime minister’s government, and this competition has only intensified over the past two years. PMF groups consider al-Kadhimi to be pro-US, seeking to reduce the influence of Shia militant groups in Iraq.

Initially, in March 2020, major Shia factions  his nomination, accusing him of being inordinately close to the US. The Fatah Coalition, composed of significant Shia groups close to Iran, later accepted his candidacy. Still, tensions remain as al-Kadhimi strives to strike a balance between Iran on the one hand and the US and its allies on the other.

The prime minister believes that the PMF should  the political stage. He also believes that the PMF should be freed from party affiliation and be fully controlled by the government. This would mean that their budget would come from the federal government and not from private sources or other states. In this regard, al-Kadhimi is seeking to strengthen government control over  to fight corruption and smuggling.

The crossings are used by militias, including those reportedly active at Diyala’s border crossing into Iran. If the government effectively controls these vital channels, financial inflows from smuggling, which strengthens the militias, will decrease in the long term while federal coffers will directly benefit.

The dispute between the PMF and the prime minister escalated in May of last year when police  Qasem Mosleh, the PMF commander in Anbar province, over the assassination of a prominent Iraqi activist. In response, the PMF stormed and took control of the Green Zone. Al-Kadhimi, not wanting to escalate the conflict, found no evidence against Mosleh and released him after 14 days.

In November 2021, al-Kadhimi himself was targeted in an  attempt following clashes between various Iraqi parties during protests against the results of the parliamentary elections. Despite its failure, an armed drone attack on the prime minister’s Baghdad residence presented a disturbing development for contemporary Iraq and was attributed to a PMF militia loyal to Iran.

Internal Struggles

The assassination of al-Muhandis had a huge impact on the PMF. He was a charismatic figure able to mediate more effectively than anyone else between various Iraqi groups, from Shia clerics in Najaf to Iraqi government politicians and Iranian officials. After his death, the militia groups in the PMF face internal division.

The PMF’s political leadership, including its chairman, Falih Al-Fayyadh, has  to present itself as committed to the law and accepting the authority of the prime minister. In contrast, two powerful PMF factions, Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, have taken a hardline stance, emphasizing armed resistance against US forces. Tehran’s efforts to mediate between the leaders of the two factions and the Iraqi government have yielded few results.

Meanwhile, internal disagreements over the degree of Iranian control caused four PMF brigades to split off and form a new structure called , or Shrine Units. Their avowed intention is to repudiate Iranian influence while supporting the Iraqi state and the rule of law.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information..

Another divide in the PMF has  between groups such as Kataib Hezbollah on the one hand, and Badr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Saraya al-Salam on the other, due to poor relationship management by Kataib Hezbollah in the PMF Commission after Muhandis’ death. While it is unsurprising that a number of critical PMF functions like internal affairs and intelligence are controlled by Kataib Hezbollah given that Muhandis founded the group before assuming the PMF’s leadership, he managed to exercise control in a manner that kept other factions onboard.

But Kataib Hezbollah’s imposition, in February 2020, of another one of its commanders, Abu Fadak al Mohammadawi, to succeed al-Muhandis on the PMF Commission alienated key groups such as Badr and Asaib. Clearly, a severely factionalized and heavily armed PMF continues to pose a significant security threat in the country.

the assassinations on January 3, 2020, Donald Trump said of Soleimani that “we take comfort knowing his reign of terror is over.” Two years on from the killing of the IRGC general and the PMF boss, ordinary Iraqis beset by violence and insecurity take no such comfort.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner of 51�Թ�.]

The post Iraq Still Feels the Consequences of US Assassinations appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In recent years, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially the UAE, have recognized that trusting foreign governments, such as the United States, cannot offer them the best possible protection. The US has had a presence in the Persian Gulf since the 1990s and the Gulf Arab countries have relied on it to provide security. However, events in recent years have shown that the Gulf Arab states cannot rely solely on Washington.

Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East?

READ MORE

Such developments include the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan amid the US withdrawal; the US pivot to Asia; the US retraction of most advanced missile defense systems and Patriot batteries from Saudi Arabia; and the lack of a US military response to threats, missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil bases by the Houthis in Yemen.

This has encouraged the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf to pursue security autonomy. The UAE, in particular, has sought to transform its strategy from dependence on the US and Saudi Arabia to a combination of self-reliance and multilateral cooperation.

Self-Reliance Security Strategy

Although the UAE is an important ally of America in the Persian Gulf, over recent years, the US has sought to push the Emiratis toward security. Sociopolitical events in the Middle East over the last decade following the Arab Spring of 2010-11 have made it clear to the UAE that the primary goal of ensuring national security, in addition to benefiting from international cooperation, should be the use of national facilities and resources.

Hosni Mubarak’s ouster from Egypt during the Arab Spring protests and the reluctance of the US to defend him as an ally — which led to the rise of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood — further demonstrated to Abu Dhabi that it should not exclusively depend on the US for security assistance. Thus, the UAE began to develop a professional army.

The UAE‘s self-reliance strategy is divided into different branches, but most of all, its military security efforts have been given the highest priority. The UAE‘s determination to create an independent and professional military is evident from its years of investment in the defense industry.

Indeed, security is a top priority for the United Arab Emirates, and defense spending continues to make up a large portion of the national budget. The UAE’s defense typically accounts for 11.1% to 14% of the total budget. In 2019, the UAE’s defense spending was $16.4 billion. This was 18% more than the 2018 budget of $13.9 billion.

The UAE has invested heavily in the military sector and defense industry in recent years. In November 2019, the UAE formed the EDGE Group from a merger of 25 companies. The company has 12,000 employees and $5 billion in total revenue. It is also among the top 25 advocacy groups in the world, ahead of firms such as Booz Allen Hamilton in the US and Rolls-Royce in the UK.

EDGE is around five clusters: platforms and systems, missiles and weapons, cyber defense, electronic warfare and intelligence, and mission support. It comprises several major UAE companies in the defense industry, such as ADSB (shipbuilding), Al Jasoor, NIMR (vehicles), SIGN4L (electronic warfare services) and ADASI (autonomous systems). The main of EDGE is to develop weapons to fight “hybrid warfare” and to bolster the UAE’s defense against unconventional threats, focusing on electronic attacks and drones.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

The UAE has also come up with detailed plans to improve the quality of its military personnel, large sums of money each year on training its military recruits in American colleges and war academies. It also founded the National Defense College; most of its students are citizens of the UAE, because of its independence in military training. In addition, in 2014, the UAE introduced general conscription for men between the ages of 18 and 30 to increase numbers and strengthen national identity in its military. As a result, it gathered about 50,000 people in the first three years.

Contrary to traditional practice, the UAE’s growing military power has made it eager to use force and hard power to protect its interests. The UAE stands ready to use military force anywhere in the region to contain Iran’s growing influence and weaken Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Participating in the Yemeni War was a test of this strategy.

The UAE‘s military presence in Yemen began in March 2015. It a brigade of 3,000 troops to Yemen in August 2015, along with Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Arab countries. Over the past five years, the UAE has an ambitious strategic agenda in the Red Sea, building military installations and securing control of the southern coasts of Yemen along the Arabian Sea in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Socotra Island. Despite reducing its military footprints in Yemen in 2019, the UAE has consolidated itself in the southern regions. It has continued to finance and impart training to thousands of Yemeni fighters drafted from various groups like the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite Forces, Abu al-Abbas Brigade and the West Coast Forces.

The UAE‘s goal in adopting a self-reliance strategy is to increase strategic depth in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Thus, along with direct military presence or arms support for groups engaged in proxy wars, it affects the internal affairs of various countries in the region, such as Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and Libya. With its influence, the UAE can turn the tide in its favor in certain areas.

Multilateralism Security Strategy

The United Arab Emirates faces a variety of security in the Middle East, and addressing them requires cooperation with other countries. Currently, the most significant security threats in the UAE are: countering Iranian threats and power in the Middle East, especially in Arab countries under Iranian influence, such as Yemen, Syria and Lebanon; eliminating threats from terrorist groups and political Islam in the region, the most important of which — according to the UAE — is the Muslim Brotherhood; and economic threats and efforts to prepare for the post-oil world.

In its multilateral strategy, the UAE seeks to counter these threats with the help of other countries in the region or beyond. It has used soft power through investments or providing humanitarian aid, suggesting that economic cooperation is more important than political competition and intervention. In this regard, the UAE has cooperated with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Britain and France, as well as normalized relations with Israel.

On August 13, 2020, the UAE became the first Gulf state to normalize relations with Israel. The UAE‘s goal in normalizing relations with Israel is to counter threats from Iran and the region. The Abraham Accords have not only a security aspect, but also an economic one. Following the signing of the accords, on October 20, 2020, the US, Israel and the UAE the establishment of the Abraham Fund, a joint fund of $3 billion “in private sector-led investment and development initiatives,” aimed at “promoting economic cooperation and prosperity.” In addition, it outlined a banking and finance memorandum between the largest banks in Israel and Dubai, and a joint bid between Dubai’s DP World port operator and an Israeli shipping firm for the management of Israel’s Haifa port.

Through the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates seeks to invest and transfer Israeli technologies to the UAE through mutual agreements. The UAE has discovered that Israel is one of the bridges to the US economy and high technology. If the UAE intends to have an oil-free economy in the future, Israel may be the best option to achieve this by pursuing a strategy of multilateralization.

UAE relations with Turkey also have a multilateral dimension to reaching common security goals. The two countries had good relations until the Arab Spring protests ties between them. Abu Dhabi and Ankara began to defuse tensions after a phone call in August 2021 between UAE Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The nations mainly have differences around issues in Libya, Syria and Egypt. The UAE is trying to resolve its disputes with Turkey by investing in the country.

Turkey is the largest backer of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. The Turks claim the UAE participated in the failed coup of July 2016 against the Turkish government. Nonetheless, the UAE wants to end frictions with Turkey and has attracted Ankara by investing and increasing commercial ties. The Turkish lira has depreciated in recent years and Erdogan’s popularity has plummeted due to mismanagement in Turkey. Erdogan will not miss this economic opportunity with the UAE and welcomes Emirati investments. In this way, the UAE will likely easily resolve its differences with Turkey.

The current tendency to use force is contrary to traditional Abu Dhabi policy, yet increasing the strategic depth of the UAE is one of Abu Dhabi‘s most achievable goals in its strategy of self-reliance. This plan is the exact opposite of multilateralism. Unlike the use of force and hard power, Abu Dhabi seeks to achieve its objectives by using soft power, investment and humanitarian aid. In this situation, the tactical exploitation of economic cooperation takes precedence over political competition and military intervention in the region.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Evolution of National Security in the UAE appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Since 2005, as part of a power-sharing agreement, the Iraqi presidency has been set aside for a Kurd. Within the Kurdish community itself, the post has been informally reserved for a candidate of the PUK. Meanwhile, the speaker of parliament is held by a Sunni and the job of prime minister by a Shia.

Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East?

READ MORE

The two main Kurdish parties have also agreed that in return for the Iraqi presidency being earmarked for the PUK, the KDP takes nearly all significant positions within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This includes the positions of president, premiership and the deputy of parliament as well as several ministries within the Iraqi federal government.

Losing Support

Recently, the KDP has made political gains and the PUK has lost significant support since the 2018 elections. Currently, the KDP has 31 members in the Iraqi national council, while the PUK has only 16. This has led the KDP to eye the position of the Iraqi presidency. If the party insists that President Salih should not be elected again, it could lead to a significant change of the political map of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Both the PUK and KDP have lost the trust and confidence of the public. This was particularly reflected three years ago in the last parliamentary election when only around 40% of registered voters participated. The PUK and KDP have lost over 700,000 voters in the Kurdish region itself. Their legitimacy is declining day after day and smaller parties are emerging. This is because citizens do not believe the people and parties in power are competent enough to represent them and or deliver the basic services they need.

The KDP is strongly against the reelection of Salih because, in 2018, he ran for the presidency without the blessing of Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP; he went on to beat Barzani’s candidate, Fuad Hussein. Today, if the PUK and Barham Salih the presidency again, it would have significant implications on intra-party, Kurdish, federal and regional politics.

The KDP has nominated Hoshyar Zebari as their candidate to challenge the PUK’s Salih, according to . Zebari served as the Iraqi finance minister from 2014 to 2016 before he was  from his position following a secret parliamentary vote of no-confidence over alleged corruption and misuse of public funds. At the time, Zebari denied the allegations against him and said they politically led, and he was later cleared of charges.

The KDP wants the PUK to nominate a new candidate. Currently, it appears that the PUK is leaning toward Latif Rasheed, a former Kurdish minister in Baghdad and a close relative of the Talabani family as an alternative person for the presidency should Salih not win the support he needs when parliament votes on February 5.

The KDP claims that Salih has not succeeded in resolving the political differences and disagreement between the KRG and the federal government of Iraq. The budget for the Kurdistan Regional Government has also not been settled. It is hoped that Salih can find a solution to the economic and monetary between Erbil and Baghdad.

Salih Is the Only Real Candidate

There are currently five people who have nominated themselves for the job. Yet it is clear that the only powerful candidate is Barham Salih and the others are only competing against him to enrich their resumes and or undermine the position of the presidency.

Across Iraq, Salih is known for his international and diplomatic experience and for being a politician with a vision. It was during his premiership that the KRG had boomed with a strong economy that saw the development of real estate. Hundreds of thousands of people rebuilt their homes, students went abroad to continue their studies and many others started small entrepreneurial projects thanks to his good governance and meritocracy.

During his time as prime minister of the Kurdistan region between 2009 and 2012, Salih laid the foundations for several strategic projects, namely the American University of Iraq in Sulaimani, the airport, the new University of Sulaimani campus and the Hawari Shar, one of the greatest national parks in Iraq. Salih has also built many strategic projects like the underground water and sewage system of Sulaimani, along with dozens of other useful initiatives. Salih is widely known among the Kurdish people for his dedication to working in the public interest.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

At a regional , many anticipate that Salih’s presidency will play an important role in maintaining Baghdad’s balance between the United States and Iran. On the one hand, Salih has a good working relationship with the Iranians and speaks Farsi. On the other, he has maintained a decade-long relationship with influential figures in Washington. The hope is that Salih will strive to minimize the damage done to Iraq as a result of the rivalry between the US and Iran. The election of Salih, in terms of person and approach, is a crucial step toward stability in the new government. The hope is that he will play a more positive and engaged role and fulfill the expectations the Iraqi people have of him.

Barham Salih has also strongly advocated for the rights of the ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq and is a great defender of the , which has given the Kurds certain rights. Salih has a good reputation and has political experience. He is also well known for his integrity, righteousness, fairness and loyalty to the homeland.

The president’s role is to serve as a symbol for the country. Their job is to represent Iraq’s sovereignty, safeguard the constitution and preserve its independence, unity and security. Many believe that Salih’s reputation, political demeanor and balanced stance enable him to implement these tasks of the presidency.

Salih is a politician and can lead Iraq as a mediator, rather than a nationalist, sectarian and or populist. If he is given a second chance as president, Salih could deescalate the existing tension and dispute between Erbil and Baghdad, and among Shia factions as well. After all, he was once the protégé of the late Jalal Talabani, the president who united Iraq and prevented further conflict. Hence, Salih meets the qualifications that the people and also his regional allies would prefer in an Iraqi to become a president. As it stands, Salih has the best chance of retaining his position, but not without encountering many challenges.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Why Barham Salih Deserves a Second Term in Iraq appeared first on 51�Թ�.

However, after signing the deal, the government in Madrid never formalized its political and diplomatic position regarding Moroccan over Spain‘s former colony in Western Sahara. A geopolitical matter of vital importance for Morocco, the question of Western Sahara remains an unhealed wound in the relationship between Madrid and Rabat.

Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East?

READ MORE

In 2021, this wound was reopened after Spain, in a somewhat secret and irregular move, welcomed Brahim Ghali, secretary-general of the Polisario Front, a nationalist movement seeking independence for Western Sahara vis-à-vis Morocco. On top of the fact that Ghali is wanted in Spain for crimes against humanity, rape and torture, among others, he is also a staunch enemy of the government in Rabat.

This politically embarrassing situation, a product of a diplomatic miscalculation by the Spanish government, created a feeling of betrayal in Rabat. Morocco quickly conveyed its discomfort, considering Spain’s harboring of Ghali a challenge to the kingdom’s sovereignty and interference in an internal state matter. Thus, Morocco issued a warning that continuing to host Ghali would have consequences.

Spain in North Africa

Despite these warnings, the government in Madrid decided not to make any political or diplomatic overtures to Morocco, declining to resolve the misunderstanding in a consensual manner. Therefore, in a way, the Spanish government forwent its diplomatic relationship with Morocco and disregarded the important role that Rabat has always played as a critical partner in the fight against illegal trafficking and terrorism stemming from the Maghreb and the Sahel.

Though the relationship between Morocco and Spain has lived through ups and downs, the tensions last year felt much different. Through relaxation of its military controls, Rabat‘s threat became a reality in May 2021 when Morocco effectively opened its border with Ceuta, a Spanish enclave and autonomous city located on the African continent, which made it easier for waves of irregular to reach Tarajal beach. Around 8,000 people, including more than 1,500 estimated minors, tried to cross the Spanish-Moroccan border on foot and by swimming to enter Spanish soil illegally.

As crude as it may seem, this political move by the government in Rabat, using Moroccans and Africans in general as a weapon against Spain, is not new. For years, Morocco has used this modus operandi as a diplomatic weapon to pressure and obtain concessions from its European neighbor. However, there has not been such a mass arrival of people, especially such a high percentage of minors, to the Spanish border in recent history.

The diplomatic crisis last May led to authentic moments of chaos and siege along Ceuta‘s border, making the passage of many of these immigrants to the European territory possible. Through its actions, Rabat sent a message without palliatives and the Spanish government to back down from political moves, such as open invitations to regional nationalist leaders.

The Existential Issue of Territorial Integrity

Morocco’s red lines related to Western Sahara have been drawn, and the kingdom has reiterated that interferences with its national sovereignty will not be tolerated. The crude political response at the Spanish border of Ceuta represents the harshness of Rabat‘s diplomatic relations, choosing, yet again, to weaponize its population.

Spain needs Morocco; indeed, Europe needs Morocco. Rabat is a crucial partner in Africa, especially given the many challenges in the region. However, Spain and the European Union should not allow the pressure and blackmail from their North African neighbor to stand because they embolden others. Spain and the EU should impose strict red lines on Morocco as well as clear and intelligent economic sanctions concerning development, education and health funds.

Political, and diplomatic issues can be resolved with class and delicacy without cheap blows and without trivializing despair and compassion. For this, Spain needs to reach a rapprochement with Morocco the status and future of Western Sahara.

Energy and Copycats

In tandem with Morocco’s migrant valve vis-à-vis Spain, Algeria started leveraging its gas valve to counter France’s escalation on matters like issuing visas to Algerian citizens. In this latter issue, Spain and Morocco, neither of whom are particularly close with Algeria, are collateral damage to the Paris-Algiers feud whether in the form of declining pipeline or a higher power bill.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Since these episodes toward the middle of last year, the same playbook has been used by Moscow’s client in Minsk, who has fostered a migrant cul-de-sac along the EU’s Polish border. In doing so, Russia and Belarus are feeding the euroskeptic spirits the Visegrad countries and beyond, which are particularly sensitive to migration and border sovereignty issues. Moreover, Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin are playing good cop, bad cop on the issue of Europe’s gas supply by offering both threats and assurances that further highlight the EU’s vulnerable dependency on external providers when it comes to energy.

On the migration front, the European Union needs to reinforce its external borders and FRONTEX agency, particularly within the Schengen area, and formulate a common framework to tackle both migration quotas and allocation throughout Schengen member countries. Not only is the migrant in places like Spain, Greece, and Poland a human tragedy, but it is also increasingly a geopolitical lever weaponized by Morocco, Turkey, Belarus and other adversaries to destabilize the EU and bolster internal chaos to the benefit of figures such as Viktor Orban, Geert Wilders, Santiago Abascal, Marine Le Pen, and Eric Zemmour.

Whether nuclear, solar or wind, a common and comprehensive European defense framework urgently requires a holistic approach that tackles the issue of energy independence, in addition to that of border security, particularly in an increasingly hostile and multipolar neighborhood.

Building Solutions Where Possible

Along the Maghreb, one of the best solutions would be a new pragmatic and flexible bipartisan agreement between Spain and Morocco. An agreement that commemorates the golden jubilee of the Tripartite Agreement provides a firm solution to the Western Sahara dispute in a framework that benefits coexistence in the region and maintains collaboration in critical matters such as the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and human trafficking.

In the same way, Spain and the EU must encourage the good behavior of Morocco with humanitarian aid and fruitful commercial relations to definitively close the post-colonial wound that sometimes reopens between the two countries.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post From the Maghreb to the East, Poking the EU Has an MO appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Biden’s New Culture of Brinkmanship

READ MORE

Carter considers his time in office to be peaceful, but his says otherwise. Under his one term as president from 1977 to 1981, the US was still instigating conflicts across the world. The most notable was the Iran-Iraq War, which the US, the Soviet Union and their allies were heavily involved in by supporting the Iraqis.

Causing Trouble

The , a publication of the Peace Worldwide Organization, labels the US the world’s worst troublemaker. The evidence for this is clear.

First, the US at least 750 military bases in around 80 countries. It also has more than 170,000 troops stationed in 159 countries. Second, in 2016, The Washington Post that the US has tried 72 times to overthrow governments of sovereign nations between 1947 and 1989. These actions were in clear violation of the UN Charter. Third, the US continues using economic against numerous countries to force their leadership to bow to Washington’s demands.

The worst example is Iran, which the US has sought to use a policy of “maximum pressure” against. Sanctions are also in clear violation of the UN Charter and affect civilians more than the political leaders they seek to squeeze. These unwarranted interventions in Iran have brought pain and suffering to people in a country that is not known for its human rights.

The US, meanwhile, is known well as a country that pays lip service to human rights, democracy and peace. It talks about a lack of democracy in some nations but favors tyrannical rulers in others. This includes countries like Bahrain, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The US today is the world’s only superpower, and with such power comes great responsibility. If the US is truly interested in human rights, democracy and peace, then it too must change its actions. It must begin by complying with the UN Charter and respecting international law. Washington must right its many wrongs — particularly in the Middle East — not because it is forced to do so, but because it is the right thing for a world in which peace can prosper. For this to become a reality, there are a number of areas for the US to consider.

Never Forgotten

The first area is addressing the US relationship with Iran. In the 1980s, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the United States and its European provided assistance to Iraq when it leader, Saddam Hussein, ordered the of chemical weapons against Iranian troops. Most victims of that attack in 1988 died instantly, while many others are still from the consequences. Some survivors of the chemical warfare now struggle to find inhalers in Iran, which is scarred by sanctions. The US should acknowledge the role it played in the war and provide reparations for the injuries and damage it caused. 

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Today, the draconian sanctions the US has placed on Iran has deepened a rift with the European Union, Russia and China, all of which signed a nuclear agreement with Tehran in 2015. The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 under US President Donald Trump led to the reintroduction of crippling sanctions that have hurt the Iranian middle class and the poor, causing hardship and death.

Washington must lift its unlawful sanctions, which Trump introduced to bring Iran to its knees. The US thinks that Iran is meddling in the affairs of countries like Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and that a policy of “maximum pressure” will force it to rethink its foreign policy. The Trump administration used this as an excuse to pull out of the nuclear deal, despite the Iranians complying with all of its obligations under the JCPOA. The US under President Joe Biden should also comply with the JCPOA by rejoining the agreement and lifting sanctions.

In the long term, a détente between the US and Iran could pave the way for the Iranians to forgive the 1953 coup d’état against the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh. During the Cold War, a US-orchestrated led to the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh. He was replaced with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the brutal last shah of Iran, who himself was overthrown in the 1979 Revolution. In a country struggling under US sanctions, memories of the coup have never been forgotten.

Lies Over Iraq

Iraq is another country where US actions have not been forgotten. If you attack anyone without being provoked, any court with an ounce of justice would require you to repair the inflicted damage. Relations between nations work in the same way. If a nation harms another without provocation, the aggressor is expected to repair the damage caused.

In 2003, under the false pretext that the Iraqis had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ties with al-Qaeda, the US under President George W. Bush invaded Iraq. The result was the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his government, the destruction of infrastructure, the death of hundreds of thousands in the years to come and the displacement of 9.2 million Iraqis.

The US invasion inevitably led to the rise of radical groups like the Islamic State (IS), which in 2014 seized territory in Iraq and Syria. The that American taxpayers paid for the Iraq War could have been well spent in the US on addressing poverty, building high-speed rail networks or repairing infrastructure. Instead, the dollars were spent on bombs and bullets to counter insurgents like IS.

When Iraqis led by Iranian General Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Mahdi al-Muhandis formed a resistance against IS militants and expelled them from Iraq, many people were jubilant that their country was freed. Instead of congratulating Soleimani and Muhandis for the role they played, the US violated Iraq’s territorial integrity. In a US drone strike at Baghdad airport in January 2020, both men were assassinated in violation of international law. The US action was not only , but it also puts all foreign diplomats in danger by setting a precedent for other countries to assassinate enemies.

There are two ways the US can make up for its illegal actions of 2003. First, holding those responsible to account for the invasion and human rights violations would show the world that the US is serious about the rule of law. That includes the likes of Bush and his accomplices, who lied and betrayed the trust of the American people, as well as security and military personnel who went beyond the rules of war. Holding such persons to account would restore respect for the US across the world by demonstrating that no one, not even the president or American soldiers, is above the law. Second, providing reparations for the loss of Iraqi and American lives, the injuries caused, the people displaced and the property destroyed is essential.

Famine in Yemen

Yemen is another place where bombs have destroyed the country under the watchful eye of the Americans. In 2015, a Saudi-led coalition supported and armed by the United States, Britain and France began indiscriminatingly bombing Yemen in response to a takeover by Iran-backed Houthi rebels. The destruction of Yemen has led to accusations of war crimes by all parties involved. It has also resulted in 5 million people being on the brink of and millions more facing starvation.

The US must promptly stop all military and intelligence support to the coalition. As the one nation with such political power, the US must work on bringing the combatants together by implementing the that calls for respecting “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”

As citizens in a free world, we must assume responsibility for our political leaders’ actions. First, as a bare minimum, we should realize that the problems we cause for others, sooner or later, will come back to haunt us. The example of US support for the mujahideen during the 1980s in Afghanistan is well known. Second, electing the right political leaders who strive for freedom and peace will not only benefit people in faraway lands, but also in the US itself. Instead of taxpayer dollars being spent on weapons, cash can be reinvested into our society to educate children, improve access to health care and do much more.  

United, we can put “maximum pressure” on the US to become a leader in creating a world free from war, oppression and persecution.

*[The author is the founder and president of , a non-religious, non-partisan and charitable organization in the United States that promotes freedom and peace for all. It recently released its Civility Report 2021, which can be downloaded .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post US Foreign Policy in the Middle East Needs a Rethink appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything?

READ MORE

But times have changed. Three recent presidents — Barack Obama, Donald Trump and now Joe Biden — have made efforts to distance the US from its endless, exasperating entanglements in the Middle East. Those efforts had distracted the United States from its principal challenges in the world — China and Russia — and sapped it of its military, economic and political might and influence. America received very little in return on its investment. Furthermore, years of US involvement in the region had also fractured the American public’s support for the more critically important role it must play in anchoring the international order.

Enter the Others

Downgrading America’s involvement in the Middle East isn’t necessarily a bad thing. For decades, many in the Middle East and in the US had argued that the region’s problems must be tackled by the governments and people of the region. Outsiders can play a supporting role, but the tough decisions can only be made by the governments themselves. That may now be happening.

But handing off the task of addressing the region’s manifold challenges got off to a poor start. Neither the US, nor the international community, nor the states of the Middle East seemed able to solve the conundrum of the region’s three failed states.

Then, starting around 2015, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman started ordering others around — imposing a blockade on Qatar, detaining the Lebanese prime minister, jailing courageous dissidents and largely harmless millionaires, ordering a hit job on journalist Jamal Khashoggi and jumping into the Yemeni Civil War. And it all went bad, very bad in fact. Additionally, it provoked other would-be movers and shakers to get in the act, including the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, China, Russia and even Israel. And not always with good intent or positive results.

After years of misdirection, however, governments now seem to be taking a more sober and responsible approach that could prove genuinely beneficial for the region. For starters, they have embarked on a simple approach: dialog. They are talking about their problems, especially those between and among one another. Dialog leads to understanding, which can lead to shared interests. Ultimately, to be effective, dialog must lead to compromise. That involves the inevitable give-and-take that allows nations, especially those close to one another, to live and thrive in peace and prosperity.

It’s a Start

One of the most encouraging initiatives may be the most unexpected: dialog between the Middle East’s two major powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and hosted by perhaps the most unlikely state, Iraq, unquestionably the region’s most conflict-ridden for decades. The issues are many between these two historic rivals, separated by a narrow gulf on whose name neither seems able to agree. But the larger gulf lies in their differing views of the other, their competing religious sects — the Saudi uber-conservative Wahhabi Sunni Islam vs. Iran’s clerically-led, conservative Shia Islam — perceptions of the other’s role and intentions in the region, their wealth, and relations with and ties to the broader international community, almost non-existent in the case of Iran.

One especially neuralgic issue for both is their respective roles in the Yemen War. It is now abundantly clear that the Saudis’ overwhelming military power, bolstered by the US and some European nations, cannot defeat the Houthi rebels. Nor can it end either the war or even its costly intervention in it. The Saudis need help. Enter the Iranians, who have been supporting the Shia-affiliated Zaydi Houthis in this war since 2013. With ideology and much-needed weapons and funding, though much less than what Saudi Arabia has expended, the Iranians have empowered the rebels to the point where they are now an established power in a future Yemen, whether unified or bifurcated.

So, the two regional powers are talking it out. The Saudis want out of the war, but they also want reliable security along their southwestern border. The Iranians want a Shia power on the Arabian Peninsula, but preferably one at peace.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Yemen may be the most immediate challenge for the two states. But there are others. More broadly, Saudi Arabia and Iran need to reach a modus vivendi in the region. On-again, off-again formal relations, menacing behavior toward each other’s oil and shipping interests, and verbal assaults do little more than increase the temperature in a region plagued by heat, literally and figuratively.

Brothers Reconcile?

Saudi Arabia has also launched a campaign to repair the frayed relations among its Arab neighbors. Last week, Mohammed bin Salman week began a PR  to demonstrate a new and improved political environment. In a swing through the neighboring Gulf states of Oman, the UAE, Bahrain and, most importantly, Qatar, he seems to be trying to rebuild what once had been the region’s preeminent multilateral organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Mohammed bin Salman single-handedly fractured the Gulf alliance when he imposed his 2017 blockade on Qatar, joined by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. It backfired. Qatar remained in the good graces of the US, drew the political and military support of peripheral power Turkey and earned the support of Iran. Consider it the young prince’s on-the-job training in global as well as regional politics. He is now devoting particular attention to Doha in the hope of what yet we aren’t quite certain. But this repair work and goodwill tour cannot help but create progress.

And not to be outdone, the Gulf’s other power, the UAE, has  on its own diplomatic repair mission. Like the Saudis, the Emiratis want to lower the temperature in the Gulf, and their position as the region’s prime economic entrepôt gives them special heft. The UAE’s ties to the US, still the unquestioned but now quiescent power in the Gulf, also lend special weight.

Could It All Be for Naught?

Looming over all of these laudable efforts, however, is Iranian behavior in the region. All eyes are now on the recently restarted talks over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna, Austria. Following a near-six-month hiatus at Iran’s request, the P5+1 group and Iran renewed negotiations to reinstate the JCPOA — aka the Iran nuclear deal.

But it is the critical non-dialog between the US and Iran — the two countries are still not meeting face-to-face but rather communicating through the intermediation of the other P5+1 countries — that bears the most serious watching. Unless they can agree on a way forward that puts Iran’s nuclear weapons potential well into the very distant future while also lifting America’s onerous and inescapably crippling sanctions on the Islamic Republic, the heat in the Middle East will become white hot.

Judging from the US State Department’s uncharacteristically downcast semi-official  of the first round of the negotiation restart, there is cause for concern. Iran’s counterproductive, albeit predictable, maximalist opening gambit soured the P5+1, even China and Russia. Negotiators met again last week. Unless there is a greater attitude toward compromise, however, pessimism will win out. Positions will harden. And more extreme (and dangerous) measures will become viable.

President Biden has reiterated the US pledge that Iran will not get nuclear weapons. But neither he nor his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, will state what the consequences of failed talks might be.

Israel, however, is not so coy. Recent Israeli  confirm that the military option is very much in play. As if to put an even finer point on the matter, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin  Jerusalem late last week for meetings with his Israeli counterpart, Defense Minister Benny Gantz. Both men are retired top generals of their respective armed forces and will have discussed military and other options.

Military action would be an unspeakable disaster for the Middle East. But so would a nuclear-armed or even nuclear-capable Iran. Even an approach that stops short of armed conflict will impose extraordinary hardship on the region, certainly prompting other states to consider acquiring nuclear weapons and further isolate Iran.

It would be unfair to place the entirety of the burden for the success of these talks on Tehran. However, unless Iran understands the futility of its mindless pursuit of nuclear weapons, no effort at fostering understanding elsewhere can temper the region’s mercury-popping political heat.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything?

READ MORE

After years of conflict that have caused one of the biggest migration crises since World War II, it is clear that the Assad government, with the support of Russia and Iran, will maintain its grip on power. The question now is what a post-war Syria will look like with President Assad and his regime still in office.

In order to understand what may lie ahead, it is necessary to understand the origins of the Assad family, their Alawite background and their influence on Syrian identity over the past 50 years.

The Alawite Community

The two largest sects in Islam are Sunni and Shia. Both sects overlap in most fundamental beliefs and practices, but their main difference centers on the dispute over who should have succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as leader after his death in 632. Today, 85% to of Muslims are Sunni and around 10% are Shia. Sunnis live in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia and Pakistan. Shias are largely located in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan, with significant minorities in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Alawites, although not doctrinally Shia, especially venerate Ali ibn Abi Talib, one of the earliest Muslims and the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet. Shias consider Ali to be the first imam and rightful successor to Prophet Muhammad, while Sunnis see him as the fourth rightly-guided caliph who made up the Rashidun Caliphate. Before the French took control of Syria in 1920, members of the Alawite community themselves to be Nusayris. The French “imposed the name ‘Alawite,’ meaning the followers of Ali,” to emphasize the sect’s similarities with Shia Islam.

Syria is ruled by Alawites, but the community itself is a minority making up around 12% to 15% of the pre-war Syrian . Sunnis account for the majority of the country.

The Rise of the Alawites

After Syria attained independence in 1946, the Alawite community began to play an active role in two key areas: political parties and the armed forces. On the one hand, the Baath party, founded in 1947 by Arab politicians and intellectuals to integrate Arab nationalism, socialism, secularism and anti-imperialism, “more attractive to Alawites than the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni religious organization” founded in Egypt with a large base in Syria.

Furthermore, Alawites and other minorities continued to be in the military due to two main factors. First, middle-class Sunni families tended to despise the military as a profession. Alawites, on the other hand, saw the army as an opportunity for a better life. Second, many Alawites, due to their difficult economic situation, could not afford to pay the fee to exempt their children from military service.

The Alawite presence in the army culminated in a series of coups in the 1960s. Supporters of the rising Baath party were a minority in Syria at the time. As scholar Rahaf Aldoughli , the regime embarked on a course of “rigorous state-nationalist indoctrination to consolidate Baathist rule and establish” its popular legitimacy. Among other efforts, “the Baathists sought to manipulate tribal and sectarian identities, seeking patronage by” upgrading the status of previously marginalized groups. This included the Alawite community.

The last coup d’état in Syria was carried out by General Hafez al-Assad, who had been serving as defense minister and was an Alawite. His actions brought the minority to power in November 1970. Three months later, Assad became the first Alawite president of Syria.

Once in , “his project centered on homogenizing these diverse [marginalized] Syrians into a single imagined Ba’athist identity.” More broadly, Aldoughli adds, the overall aim of “nationalist construction was to subsume local identities into a broader concept of the ‘Syrian people,’ defined according to the state’s territorial” boundaries.

The Sectarianism of the Syrian Civil War

Shortly before the outset of the US-led war on terror, Hafez al-Assad died in 2000. His son, Bashar, took over the reins and continued in his father’s footsteps. This included policies of coopting the religious space and portraying a moderate Islam under the guise of a that sought to curb Islamism and blur religious differences. Despite these efforts, the confessional fragmentation of Syrian society provided a factor of tension and instability for a state that ultimately never succeeded in addressing these differences in the political arena.

The Arab Spring consequently arrived in Syria at a time marked by a crisis of of secular ruling parties such as the Baath. The crisis of governability meant the secular balance imposed by the regime in society began to crack, exposing anger around the Alawite minority’s overrepresentation in the state apparatus and the Sunni majority’s underrepresentation. The result was anti-government protests that began in March 2011.

Ultimately, the ensuing sectarianism of the Syrian conflict only makes sense if we also incorporate the affecting the region. On the one hand, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iran are the Assad government’s main supporters and are interested in propping it up. On the other hand, Sunni actors such as the Islamic State group, the al-Nusra Front and Saudi Arabia want the government to fall.

That has failed. After 10 years of war, military forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad have retaken the vast majority of Syrian territory with the support of Iran and Hezbollah. As a result, both repression of the Sunni-dominated opposition and the strengthening of the Alawite community in the state apparatus are likely to remain part of a post-war Syria. How the Sunni majority reacts to the fact that Assad and the Alawites remain at the center of Syrian politics is unknown.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Assad Family Has Been Shaping Syria for 50 Years appeared first on 51�Թ�.

How Date Farming Helps Yemenis on Soqotra

READ MORE

Until now, the negotiations have reportedly revolved around two main issues. The first is the restoration of diplomatic relations between both countries. Bilateral ties were cut off in 2016 when Saudi Arabia executed Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, a Saudi dissident who was a Shia cleric, and protesters in Tehran stormed the Saudi Embassy in retaliation. The second topic of discussion is the Yemen War, which entered a new phase with the 2015 Saudi-led intervention against Houthi rebels who had taken over the Yemeni capital, Sanaa.

For more than one year, the Saudis have been looking for a way out of Yemen. The enormous economic costs of the conflict became more when oil prices fell as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdowns.

Even after the recovery of the hydrocarbon market, the fact remains that six years of war have not brought Saudi Arabia any closer to its two major goals in Yemen: reestablishing Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and constraining the Houthis’ influence. Furthermore, US President Joe Biden, while not as tough on the kingdom as promised in his election campaign, has been less with Saudi Arabia than his predecessor, Donald Trump.

Who Are the Houthis?

The Saudis often present the Houthis as little more than Iranian puppets. Iran’s official is that the Houthi movement only receives ideological support from Tehran. Both narratives are inaccurate, to say the least.

The Houthis are a homegrown movement that successfully the Yemeni government’s military offensives from 2004 to 2010 without any external assistance. Hussein al-Houthi, the movement’s early leader and from whom its name is derived, was an of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and was influenced by its symbolism and ideology. His brother and current leader of the movement, Abdel-Malek al-Houthi, has also his admiration for the Islamic Republic.

The first credible of Iranian military support for the Houthis date back to 2013. Until 2016, weapons transfers were largely restricted to light arsenal. In the following years, Tehran started to supply the Houthis with increasingly sophisticated missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components. Furthermore, a contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards on the ground has been Houthi fighters. The Yemeni movement’s capacity to key strategical interests within Saudi Arabia, such as oil extraction facilities, pipelines and airports, cannot be understood without accounting for Iran’s role in the conflict.

At the same time, and contrary to Saudi claims, the Houthis are largely independent from Iran. Their territorial expansion in 2014 was politically built on its Faustian bargain with the former Yemeni president and arch-rival, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the unpopularity of the Hadi government, which was backed by Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, most of the Houthis’ current arsenal has not been sourced from Iran. It has rather been acquired in the local — which is well-connected to the Horn of Africa’s smuggling routes — in battle or as a result of the of governmental military units to the Houthis. Before the war began, Yemen was already a country with small weaponry, coming only to the US in terms of weapons per capita.

According to the official Saudi narrative, the Houthis necessitate Iranian help to maintain their military effort. While this is most likely the case when it comes to the group’s capability to strike targets within Saudi territory, an abrupt end of Iranian military assistance to the Houthis would make little difference in Yemen’s internal balance of power.

What Saudi Arabia and Iran Need to Do

Saudi Arabia needs to come to terms with the fact that its attempt to impose a military solution in Yemen has failed. It has done so because of counterproductive airstrikes, support for unpopular local actors and a misunderstanding of internal dynamics. If Yemen has become Saudi Arabia’s quagmire, this has little to do with Iran’s limited support for the Houthis.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Iran, for its part, should understand that its claims of non-interference in the Yemen War have gained a farcical nature over the years, as growing evidence has piled up on Iranian–Houthi ties. Iranian leaders cannot impose on the Houthis an end to attacks against Saudi territory. However, they can decisively constrain them by stopping the flow of UAV and missile technology to the Houthis, as well as ending their military training on the ground. In conjunction with this, Iran can support the direct Houthi–Saudi talks that began in late 2019.

For Saudi–Iranian negotiations to bear fruits in relation to the Yemen conflict, both sides need to show a realistic appraisal of Iran’s role in the war. It comes down to acknowledging two key facts. On the one hand, Iran has leverage over the Houthis because of its military support for the group. On the other hand, this leverage is inherently limited and cannot be used to grant Saudi Arabia a military victory in Yemen.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The price tag of €17 billion ($19.1 billion) means that Dassault Aviation, which exists to supply France itself, has for the first time sold more equipment to six foreign countries than to the French armed forces. Macron may think of it as an act designed to spread the lethal wealth, making the world a more equitable place — at least as far as lethality is concerned.

The New York Times Manages the Unknown

READ MORE

Some human rights organizations in France that have taken the time over the past six years to notice what Mohammed bin Salman was up to in his chosen approach to the use of lethal weapons (which include bone saws for use in Saudi consulates) dared to criticize the encounter. Unfazed by the reproach, Macron had the perfect , quoted by Le Monde: “What’s good for French women and men, I will ardently defend.”

Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

What’s good (for):

Anything that produces cash, whether in moral terms it serves the cause of good or evil or just the multiplication of consumer goods.

Contextual Note

Anything Macron ardently defends is by definition part of France’s defense policy. In the land of “liberté, égalité, fraternité,” the “liberty” of French women and men to earn their salaries by producing lethal weapons is fundamental. It sustains the liberty of their bosses and politicians — skilled at what could be called diplomatic marketing — to sell those weapons to despotic regimes across the globe. This, in turn, promotes the “equality” (of class) and the “fraternity” (of culture) shared by wealthy business leaders, successful French politicians, bankers and foreign despots. As Voltaire’s Pangloss would say, “all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.”

Unlike US President Joe Biden, who, bullied by moralists at home, refuses to talk to the Saudi crown prince, treating him as an international pariah, Macron has earned Mohammed bin Salman’s undying respect. And he has done so in the name of what’s good for the French people. He is of course riffing on the, “what’s good for General Motors is good for the United States,” but he has the good sense to associate it with democracy rather than the corporate oligarchy Americans have adopted as their form of democracy. The US is, after all, the land in which “.”

Le Monde appears to accept as a fatality Macron’s logic that focuses on “jobs created in France by this unprecedented purchase order.” By the same token, when Adolf Hitler took the unprecedented initiative of launching Auschwitz or George W. Bush building the Guantanamo prison, they were creating jobs.

Neither does the French journal critique Macron’s claim that it is all about their common commitment to fight terrorism, a pretext that over the past two decades has served to legitimatize ever brutally authoritarian policy of both liberal democracies and the world’s worst tyrants. The fact that Saudi Arabia has consistently encouraged terrorism and appears, at some level, to have facilitated the 9/11 attacks, doesn’t seem to bother Macron. After all, tyrants with stable governments have the same need as liberal democracies to ensure their security against malcontents tempted by terrorism.

Macron has another argument to explain his intent to develop good relations with Mohammed bin Salman, when he claims that “one might decide, following the Khashoggi affair, not to have any policy in the region … but I believe that France has a role to play. It doesn’t mean we’re complacent or that we are willing to forget. It means we must be a demanding partner, but we must keep the dialogue open and remain engaged.” What France is “demanding” can be measured in billions of euros.

Just to bring home the point that cynicism trumps moral scruples, Macron insists that the current standoff between Mohammed bin Salman and Joe Biden could be “good for” France (creating “favorable opportunities”). If the Biden administration finds itself obliged to demonstrate a new-found sense of moral sensibility after four years of Donald Trump’s brazenly naked cynicism, that provides a pragmatically cynical European country with a significant occasion to exploit.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

In the article, Philippe Ricard, Le Monde’s correspondent in Dubai, allows himself a touch of irony aimed at deflating Macron’s pretentions. He cites Macron’s own lame attempt at self-serving irony as he asserts, “Saudi Arabia organized the G20 over a year ago and I haven’t noticed that many powers have boycotted the G20.” Seizing the opportunity, Ricard comments, “Mr. Macron failed to specify that the meeting, in November 2020, was held by video conference, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.”

In fairness to Le Monde, by quoting Macron’s shoddy justifications for his good relations with totalitarian regimes without reframing them, Ricard knows that most of the paper’s relatively sophisticated French readers will understand the hypocrisy. The typical Le Monde reader gets the message. Unlike most Americans, the French have been trained not to take most political discourse at face value. Politics is never about sincere expression. This capacity to deconstruct political discourse may be the last remnant of the ancient European educational tradition, where the study of rhetoric was a major component of the liberal arts curriculum.

Historical Note

Emmanuel Macron typically used one other somewhat more substantial rhetorical tool to justify his rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. He insisted on pleading on behalf of Lebanon, a nation suffering from a deepening crisis, literally a failed state, thanks in part to the refusal of Mohammed bin Salman to assist a fellow Arab nation that has impertinently failed to follow his orders on multiple occasions and, more recently, openly criticized the Saudi-led war in Yemen. Macron is cleverly using the historical relationship between France and Lebanon, despite its admitted ambiguity, to affirm a moral position aimed at humanitarian assistance.

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, as the West set about divvying up the spoils, Lebanon became effectively a French protectorate. Now, following Joe Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and his conscious distancing himself from Mohammed bin Salman, Macron sees an opportunity for France and perhaps Europe to assume a more proactive role in a Middle East that is no longer as clearly attached to the American empire.

Mandated by the League of Nations following World War I, according to the terms of the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, France assumed control of what was then the region of Syria. France immediately sought to separate Lebanon from Syria to ensure the existence of a state with a Christian (Maronite) majority. This led to friction in the following decades but turned the newly created state of Lebanon into a zone known for its diversity and tolerance and its strong ties to France. All that changed, of course, after the creation of the state of Israel in Palestine (formerly controlled by the British), especially after the fiasco of the Suez crisis in 1956 that resulted in a major humiliation for France and the UK, while opening the door to mounting US influence in the region.

Al Jazeera Macron as asserting that France and Saudi Arabia together “want to commit ourselves to supporting the Lebanese people and therefore do everything possible to ensure that trade and economic reopening can take place.” The article concludes that “there’s no doubt that a new page has been opened in the relationship between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.”

Al Jazeera’s Zeina Khodr notes that Macron’s initiative “will help revive brotherly relations.” There may be neither liberty, nor equality in Saudi Arabia, but Macron apparently has done something to promote fraternity in Lebanon, a country that was once known for that virtue. This could prove to be a minor moment in what is turning out to be a series of acts that signal a major historical shift in the region. In the absence of the US as the indefectible ally of Saudi Arabia, Sunnis and Shias may begin seeking to rediscover their own sense of fraternity.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Macron Promotes Fraternity in the Middle East appeared first on 51�Թ�.

How Will the UAE Cope With Growing Environmental Insecurity?

READ MORE

Exposure to extreme heat can be fatal for those who have no access to air conditioning. Apart from being a direct threat to human life, the effects of climate change and high temperatures have the potential to spill over and impact all sectors of the economy.

It has been long understood that economic activity and climate conditions are related. This relationship between the climate and the economy has defined the magnitude and scope of markets in several countries, including in the Middle East. In 2020, the World Economic Forum concluded that climate change is ranked as the biggest risk to the global economy.

The Climate and the Economy

While greenhouse gases have no geographical boundaries, their impact differs significantly across the globe. A paper published in Nature that under current climate policies that are on course for an average temperature rise of 2.9˚C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century, the world’s most vulnerable countries would suffer an average GDP loss of around 20% by 2050 and in excess of 60% by 2100. In the Middle East, Sudan is expected to suffer the most: Its GDP is projected to drop by around 32% by 2050 and by more than 80% by 2100 as a result of climate change.

One sector in the economy that would struggle the most is agriculture. Exposure to high temperatures could cause losses to agricultural production as heat stress negatively affects plant growth and animal productivity. Over time, heat stress is likely to increase vulnerability to disease and reduce dairy output. According to a 2018 UNDP report, crop production in the Middle East region is expected to drop by 30% in case of 1.5˚C-2˚C warming by 2025. Additionally, extremely high temperatures might aggravate an already bad situation in this sector.

On the one hand, agriculture is the largest consumer of water in the Middle East, using between 78% to 87% of all resources. Higher temperatures will add more stress to irrigation schedules in terms of both frequency and amount. On the other hand, farming activity and businesses could be wiped out as they do not contribute significantly to the regional economies, whether in terms of GDP or exports, in proportion to the amount of resources it uses. This translates into a potential risk of economic instability and disruptions in the food supply chain.

Similarly, the tourism sector in the Middle East would lose a significant share of the market due to climate change. In 2018, contributed $270 billion to the region’s GDP, or around 9% of the economy. In the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as of 2020, the tourism sector had, on average, a 13% share of the GDP. Although the pandemic has slowed down travel, the sector is now attempting to recover.

The impact of climate change on the sector could be irreversible. In Jordan, the , which used to attract some 1.5 million visitors every year, now welcomes just a few thousand after it had shrunk by almost a third due to low rainfall and high temperatures. Alexandria, in Egypt, home of one of the Seven Wonders of the World as well as a , faces flooding, building collapse and loss of life as a result of sea-level rise.

Furthermore, some of the driest countries in the region suffered from flooding as a result of sudden heavy storms. For , Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia, was hit by abrupt storms that killed 30 in November 2018. Long periods of dry weather increased fire risks in Algeria, which suffered devastating that took 90 lives in August.

The Impact on Energy Systems

Energy systems are no different than the tourism and agriculture sectors in terms of susceptibility to climate change. For example, energy demand for space cooling will rise due to average temperature increase. In 2015, it was estimated that 80% of total in the Middle East is used for cooling systems. These countries face challenges meeting growing energy demands, particularly during the summer months, and they could experience frequent grid failures and subsequent power blackouts.

Power shortages and blackouts would in turn cause negative societal and economic impacts. Cooling systems are necessary to sustain life during extremely high temperatures, and blackouts could significantly affect the everyday activities of the local populace.

Given the negative impact of high temperatures, in order to combat growing greenhouse gas emissions, GCC policymakers should consider an integrated climate change policy that helps enable decision-makers to allocate natural resources in a sustainable and integrated manner as well as achieve net-zero carbon emissions. The Middle East and other countries around the world must factor climate change into their strategic planning in order to secure economic development alongside a climate-resilient economy. Unfortunately, the concept of integrated climate policy is relatively new to Middle Eastern countries in particular.  

Lastly, and most importantly, GCC members and other countries in the region have launched climate change initiatives to reduce emissions and adapt to high temperatures. For instance, at the end of October, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa of Qatar unveiled the national environment and in an effort to mitigate climate change impact. Under the plan, the country hopes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by 2030.

Other targets include reducing groundwater extraction by 60%, reducing daily household water consumption by a third and the doubling of desalination via reverse osmosis as well as prioritizing high yield and sustainable agriculture production by driving more than 50% improvement in farmland productivity.

The initiative emphasizes the importance of balancing the different goals and interests among resource consumers. This will improve security and accelerate the transition toward a climate-resilient economy as well as drive climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies for Qatar, the Middle East and the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy or HBKU’s official stance.

The post What Does 60˚C Mean for the Middle East? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In 2001, a US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan to dismantle al-Qaeda and search for its leader, Osama bin Laden, who were harbored by the Taliban government. The presence of foreign troops sent al-Qaeda militants into hiding and the Taliban were overthrown.

How 9/11 and the War on Terror Shaped the World

READ MORE

In declaring his war, Bush gave the international community an unequivocal : to either be “with us or against us in the fight against terror.” In 2003, he took this a step further. He leveraged his power and convinced US allies that Iraq was a state sponsor of terror and its president, Saddam Hussein, had developed weapons of mass destruction, which posed an imminent threat. It wasn’t long before the world found out that this narrative was constructed by the White House as the Bush administration was determined to attack Iraq. The results were devastating: hundreds of thousands of Iraqi , the of over 9 million civilians and the political mayhem that continues to this day.

It has been argued that Islam has been conflated with terrorism not only in the media, but also in much of the political discourse. As a direct result of the war on terror, show that an attack by a Muslim perpetrator receives 375% more attention than if the culprit was a non-Muslim.

As these patterns grew with time, countries started to employ their deterrence capacity under the guise of the “war on terror,” only to undermine those who were resisting regimes or seeking self-determination. This was seen in countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Even Russian leader Vladimir Putin, in 2001, quickly persuaded Western leaders that his country faced similar threats from Islamists and was dealt a carte blanche to crack down with brute force on insurgents and civilians alike.

The foreign occupation of Afghanistan ended in August 2021. After 20 grueling and miserable years, the US pulled out from Afghanistan amidst a Taliban takeover, setting a range of events into motion. Chaos filled Kabul Airport as scores of people were desperate to leave the country. The IMF Afghanistan’s access to hundreds of millions in emergency funds due to a “lack of clarity within the international community” over recognizing a Taliban government.  

The war led to irreparable damages and hundreds of thousands of Afghans paid with their lives. The US spent over on the conflict and had of its soldiers returned in body bags. Today, starving families in Afghanistan are their babies for money to feed their children and the world only looks on.

To understand how we got here, I spoke to Anas Altikriti, a political analyst, hostage negotiator and the CEO of , an organization aimed at bridging the gap of understanding between the Muslim world and the West. In this interview, we discuss America’s handling of the occupation and examine Afghanistan’s next steps now that the Taliban has assumed authority in the country.

The transcript has been edited for clarity.

Kholoud Khalifa: Joe Biden has received a certain amount of backlash from both sides of the aisle for withdrawing abruptly from Afghanistan. What do you make of his decision?

Anas Altikriti: Looking from an American perspective, I believe Biden had no choice. We tend to forget that the president who actually signed the agreement to leave Afghanistan was Donald Trump and his deadline was May of this year. Technically, you can state that Biden was carrying out a decision made by his predecessor. However, in reality — and I think that this is what’s important — any American president would have found it extremely difficult and utterly senseless to carry on a failed venture. Afghanistan and Iraq were utterly horrendous mistakes. If not at the point of conception and theory, the implementation was horrid.

However, from a purely analytical political point of view, Biden had absolutely no choice. The fact that he was going to come in for so much criticism, and particularly from the American right, is no surprise whatsoever. I would like to assume that Biden’s administration had the capacity to foresee that and to prepare for that, not only in terms of media, but also in terms of trying to argue the political perspective. Although in America today, I don’t think that is really useful.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

So, generally speaking, I’m not surprised by the fact that he got attacked, because ultimately speaking, on paper, this was a defeat to the Americans. It was a defeat to the Americans on the 20^th anniversary of 9/11, the day in which the idea started to crystallize in terms of those who wanted to see American basis spread far and wide, and the whole intermittent 20 years has been nothing but an utter and an abject failure. Thousands of American troops have been killed, but on the other side, probably more than a million of Afghan lives have been absolutely decimated — either killed or having to flee their homes and live as refugees elsewhere. The cost has been absolutely incredible, and for that, I think the Americans can contend with themselves, as history will judge this to be a failed attempt from start to finish.

Khalifa: What are your thoughts on the Taliban as a political actor in today’s geopolitical landscape?

Altikriti: Well, we’ll wait and see. There is no question that from the military point of view, the Taliban won. They achieved the victory, and they managed to expel the Americans and to defeat them not only on the ground, but also at negotiating. For almost the past 12 years, there had been negotiations between the Taliban and the Americans either directly or indirectly, whilst at the same time, the Taliban had been fighting against the American presence in Afghanistan and never conceding for a moment on their objective that they wanted a full and complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. That, itself, is something to be taught at political science departments across the world, and it has definitely affected my own curriculum that I teach to students.

Negotiations, as well as being backed by real power, are things that have proven to be extremely beneficial and quite successful in this particular time. Now, that might be easy in comparison to catering to a nation of 40 million that have been devastated for almost three generations — from oppressive regimes to conflicts, to wars, to civil war, to occupation, to absolute and utter devastation to the rise of violence, ideological militancy, to all sorts of issues that have ravaged that nation.

Governing Afghanistan is going to be a totally different kettle of fish. It’s not the same as fighting. You can say that actually fighting a war from mountain tops and caves is relatively easy in comparison with the task ahead. Whether they’re going to be successful or not is something that we wait to see, and I hope for the betterment of the Afghan people that they will be.

The reality is the Taliban have won and in today’s world, they have the right the absolute right to govern. Hopefully, within the foreseeable future, the Afghan people will have the choice to either hold them to account and lay the blame for whatever economic failures, for instance, or otherwise.

This struggle between nations and their regimes is a continuous one. Thankfully, where we live, in the West, that struggle is mostly done on a political plane. So, we fight politically and we hold our politicians accountable through the ballot boxes. That is not present in many, many developing countries. Afghanistan is definitely a country that needs to find its own model as to how to govern and how to create that kind of balance between people and regime. I think it is utterly hypocritical from the West to prejudge them and hold them to ransom via mistakes that happened in the past. Every administration commits mistakes of varying sorts. Our own government in the UK is now being investigated by an independent inquiry staff as to how it dealt with COVID and whether some of its decisions led to the death of thousands of people. So, mistakes can happen.

The West needs to contend with why they left Afghanistan after 20 years of absolute misery and suffering no better than when they came to it in 2001. That’s a question that the West, including the UK, need to ask themselves before passing judgment on to the Taliban.

Khalifa: You mentioned something very interesting. You said we’re waiting to see and we cannot judge them right now. Do we see any hints of change? Has today’s Taliban changed from the Taliban of the pre-US occupation? For example, the Taliban issued a public pardon on Afghan military forces that had tried to eradicate them.

Altikriti: Well, the hints are plenty and the hints are positive. The fact that the Taliban, as you put it, issued that decree that there won’t be any military trials or court marshals being held. The fact that from the very first hours, they said that anyone who wants to leave could leave and they won’t stop them, but that they hope everyone will stay to rebuild Afghanistan. I think from a political and PR point of view, that was a very, very shrewd way to lay out the preface of their coming agenda.

The fact that Taliban leaders spoke openly, and I’ll be honest, in quite impressive narratives and discourses to foreign media — to the BBC, to Sky — and, in fact, took the initiative to actually phoning up the BBC and intervening and carrying out long and extensive interviews. This has never happened before. We could never have imagined that they sit with female correspondents and presenters and spoke freely and openly. Also, the fact that they met with the Shia communities in Afghanistan at the time when they were celebrating Muharram and assured them that everything was going to be fine.

I think a big part of whether Afghanistan succeeds or not lies in the hands of the West. For instance, in the first 24 hours of the Americans leaving in such a chaotic manner, which exemplified the chaos of the Taliban as we know it, the IMF said that funds to Afghanistan would be withheld. Therein begins that kind of Western hegemony, Western colonization that I believe is at the very heart of many problems in what we termed the Third World or the developing world.

The fact that sometimes nations aren’t allowed to progress, they aren’t allowed to rise from the ashes, they aren’t allowed to recover, they aren’t allowed to rebuild, not because of any innate deficiency on their part, but because of the international order that we have today in the world. We have so many restraining legal organizations — from the UN downwards, including the IMF and the World Bank — that hold nations to ransom. Either you behave in a particular way or we’re going to withhold what is essentially yours. It’s an absolute travesty, but unfortunately, this goes across all our radars. There is very little response in terms of saying, hang on, that is neither just nor fair nor democratic.

If you really, really want the betterment of Afghanistan and Afghan people, countries should be piling in, in order to afford help, to afford aid and to make absolutely sure that the Afghan people have everything they need in order to rebuild for the future.

But, unfortunately, the opposite is happening. We’re tying the nation’s hands behind its back and saying, we’re just going to watch and see how you do in that boxing ring, and if you don’t fare well, that will be justification for us to maybe reintervene in one way or another sometime down the line.

Khalifa: After seizing the country, the Taliban promised an inclusive government, with the exception of women. Yet the current government only comprises Taliban members. What are the chances that they deliver on forming an inclusive government?

Altikriti: I’m sort of straddling the line between being an academic and an activist, and I have a foot in both, so it’s sometimes a little bit difficult. However, I would suggest that when the Conservative Party in Britain wins an election, it’s never assumed that they include people from the Labour Party or Liberal Democrats in their next government. The same goes in America: When the Republicans win an election, you can’t reasonably ask or expect of them to include those with incredible minds and capacities from the Democratic Party — you simply don’t.

So, the hope for inclusivity in Afghanistan needs to take that into consideration. The Taliban are the winning party — whether by force or by political negotiations — and therefore, they have the right to absolutely build the kind of government they see fit. For them to then reach out to others would be an incredible gesture.

But I think it’s problematic and hypocritical if the West doesn’t allow the winning party to govern. If after some time it doesn’t manage to, then maybe you’d expect it to reach out to others from outside its own party or from outside its own borders and invite them to come and help out. But that’s not what you expect from day one.

The fact that they haven’t done what many people expected, and I personally have to say I feared would happen, and it hasn’t. So, until we find that media stations closed down, radio stations barricaded and people rounded up — and I hope none of that will happen, but if it does, we hold them to account.

Khalifa: Imran Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan, says the international community must engage with the Taliban, avoid isolating Afghanistan and refrain from imposing sanctions. He says the “Taliban are the best bet to get rid of ISIS.” What’s your view on that?

Altikriti: If we’re looking back at their track record, they were the ones who managed to put an end to the civil war that broke out after the liberation from the Soviet Union. I mean, for about five to six years, Afghanistan was ravaged with a civil war, warlords were running the place amok. I remember an American journalist said the only safe haven in Afghanistan was something like a 20-square-meter room in a hotel in the center of Kabul. The Taliban came in and created a sense of normality, once again in terms of putting an end to the civil war. There remained only one or two factions that were still in resistance, but otherwise, the Taliban managed to actually bring Afghanistan to order.

It was only after 9/11 and the US intervention that returned the country back into a state of chaos. So, if we’re going to take their track record into consideration, then it’s only fair to say that they do have the experience, the expertise and the track record that shows that they can bring some semblance of normality and peace.

Now, obviously, we understand that Afghanistan is not disconnected from its regional map and from the regional politics that are at play, including the Pakistani-Indian conflict. It’s no secret that the Taliban were looked after and maintained by the Pakistani intelligence. I understand from the negotiations that were taking place since 2010 that there was almost always a member of the Pakistani intelligence present at the table. So, it’s not a secret that Pakistan saw that in order to quell the so-called factions that represented the mujahideen, the Taliban were its safest bet.

In that sense and from that standpoint, you would suggest that the Taliban are best equipped. Much of what was going on in Afghanistan was based on cultures, traditions and norms that Americans were never ready to embrace, understand or accept. That’s why they fell foul so many times of incidents, which could have been easily appeased with only a little bit of an understanding and of an appreciation of fine cultural or traditional intricacies and nuances. The Taliban wouldn’t have that issue.

So, you would suggest that what Imran Khan said has some ground to stand on. It’s a viable theory. But everything that we’re talking about will be judged by what see is going to happen. But before we do that, we need to allow the Taliban the time, so that when we come to say, listen, they fail, we have grounds and evidence to issue such a judgment.

Khalifa: I want to shift to the US. So we know that there was a US-led coalition, and its presence for over 20 years in Afghanistan and in the Middle East led to very little change in the region. You already alluded to that at the very beginning. The US spent trillions of dollars and incurred the highest death toll out of the coalition members. What has the US learned from this experience?

Altikriti: I think that’s the question we should be focused on. I fear that it has learned virtually nothing and that’s very worrying. Just like we were passing pre-judgments on the Taliban, we need to do the same everywhere. If that’s the kind of ruler that we’re using to judge a straight line, it’s the same ruler we need to judge every straight line.

We heard the statements that emerged from Washington, and to be perfectly honest, very, very few were of any substance. Ninety-nine percent, and this is my own impression, were about America looking back and how they let down the translators and the workers in the alliance government and left them at their own fate. The tears were shed, both in the British Parliament as well as the American Congress, which actually shows that these people didn’t get it. They didn’t get it and that is what worries me the most.

If something as huge as Afghanistan and what happened — this wasn’t a car crash that happened in a split second. This was something that was led over the course of the last 17 years and definitely since President Trump signed the agreement with the Taliban in 2020. This should have been a time for politicians and analysts to actually read the situation and read the map properly. But it seems that they never did and they never bothered to see if there was any need or inclination to take lessons from it.  

I’m yet to come across a decision-maker, a lawmaker, a politician, a senior adviser to come out and say there were horrendous mistakes carried out by the occupation and by the other alliance governments that led to this, and as a result, we need to learn what to do and not do in future. But there is this arrogance and pride that forbids us from doing so, and as such, they’re inclined to make the same mistake time and time and time again.

Khalifa: Given that the so-called war on terror, and more specifically the occupation in Iraq, was an utter failure, what is the probability in your opinion that America will engage in another foreign intervention?

Altikriti: From a purely political view, I find this extremely far-fetched in the foreseeable future. The reasons being that Americans had to endure bruising at every single level and because of the crippling economic crisis. So, it’s extremely difficult to launch an intervention or military intervention in the way that we saw in Iraq, Afghanistan or Panama in the next two to three years. But the thing is, often, American politics is driven by corporate America.

I mean, we talk about the trillions spent, but like someone said in an article I read in The Washington Post, that those trillions were more than made up by American corporations, by American oil, by getting their hands on certain minerals in Afghanistan. Even the drug trade itself, which Britain and America thought they would quell, it was actually the Taliban who brought it under control, who actually went around and burnt the poppy seed farms. The West reinvigorated that tradeline and stabilized it. Therefore, as a friend of a friend tells me, he says many of those who were scrambling for airplanes in Kabul Airport were poppy seed farmers because they knew that they had absolutely no future under the Taliban.

So, once we count the trillions incurred by the taxpayer, we forget that there is another side that you and I probably don’t even know that is gaining riches at the expense of the Afghans.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

The beast now is to try out new weapons. Lockheed Martin and others will always have a vested interest in trying out the new technology, and what’s better than to try it out in real-life situations? If I was to speak to any modern, contemporary, 30-something-year-old military analysts, they’d laugh me off because I’m speaking about a bygone age. We’re talking now about wars where we don’t involve human beings. I mean, in terms of the assailants, they’re flying drones, and there’s an intelligence level to it that I can’t fathom nor understand.

Another aspect that no one is talking about almost is the privatization of militaries. We’re coming now to find brigades, thousands of troops that are mercenaries, people who fight for a wage. Now, this is the new way to fight wars: Why would Britain employ some of its brightest and youngest when it could pay £100 a day to have someone else fight wars on its behalf? And this is now becoming a multibillion-dollar industry. It first started out as a reality in Iraq, when we had the likes of Blackwater who were guarding the airports, presidential palaces and government officials. You’d try to speak to them only to realize they were from Georgia or Mozambique or elsewhere, and they don’t fall under the premise of local law. Therefore, if they kill someone by mistake, you can’t take them to court and that’s the contract you sign. That is where I think the danger lies.

Khalifa: In 2010, you appeared on Al Jazeera’s “Inside Iraq” alongside the late Robert Fisk and Jack Burkman, a Republican strategist. Burkman described Arabs and Muslims as a “bunch of barbarians in the desert” and the Bush administration as the savior bringing change. With its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, has the US perceptions of Arabs and Muslims changed, and if so, how?

Altikriti: I’d love to have a chat with Jack right now to see what he thinks 11 years on. To answer your question, it saddens me to say that yes, it’s changed, but only because America and American society are so polarized and so divided. It only took Donald Trump to become president or 50% of Americans to defy everything that Trump said. Being anti-Trump meant standing up for Muslims when he issued the Muslim ban for flights. So, people from their standpoint of being anti-Trump said, no, Muslims are welcome. It’s absolutely the wrong way to go on about it. That’s not how we recognize, for instance, that racism is wrong or evil.

However, the fact is that in the past, anti-Muslim sentiments were everywhere and the feelings that Jack Burkman expressed so horribly in that interview were widespread. I personally believe they still remain because 9/11 has become an industry and that industry has many facets to it. Part of it is ideological, part is media, part is educational and obviously part transpires into something that is military or security-based.

We still have Guantanamo. Why is it that the American people aren’t talking about Guantanamo to the extent that they should be? This is something that is on the conscience of every single American citizen — it is paid from their own taxes. Why no one talks about it is simply because no one dares touch the holy grail — the industry of 9/11. It’s a huge, huge problem.

I still believe that those sentiments expressed by Jack back then are still prevalent, but like I said, they were mitigated by the advent of Trump and by his declaration against Arabs and Muslims. This, as well as the highlighting of certain issues by the left in America, such as the gross crimes committed by the Saudi regime and that’s helped in two ways. Firstly, you expose the crimes committed by Saudis, but it’s also cemented that view that Arabs are barbarians.

Khalifa: Afghanistan wasn’t the only country that suffered. Iraq suffered more dire and devastating consequences from the so-called war on terror. What does a future look like for Iraq now that the US has withdrawn?

Altikriti: Oh, very grim, very, very grim. The Americans haven’t withdrawn — they’re less visible. There are current negotiations regarding the next Iraqi government in the aftermath of the elections that we’ve just had, which shows that the Americans are heavily involved.

Iraq is the playground of Iran. So, therefore, any policy of America or Britain or Europe that involves Iran has to have Iraq in the middle.

There are still about three or four American military bases, and from time to time, we hear the news that certain militias targeted this base or that base where Americans lie. Now, the personnel who are there within the bases might carry ID cards as construction workers, advisers, legal experts, bankers or whatever. But ultimately, they’re all there to represent the best interests of the United States. So, America is still there.

However, Iraq is in dire straits. I think the indices that go around every year that show us levels of corruption, levels of transparency, levels of democracy, levels of happiness of people and satisfaction — Iraq is regarded as one of the 10 worst countries on every single level. I think that shows what’s been done to Iraq and what’s been done to the Iraqi people.

The fact is that we have at least 30% of the Iraqi people living as refugees, either within Iraq or outside of Iraq. The fact that in an election only 20% of the people choose to take part.

You have to ask serious questions. You have to say, OK, so when the Americans accused Iran — and I’m a believer that Iran is the worst of all players in Iraq. But you have to ask: So you occupied the country, why did you allow it to happen? So, you can’t just brush it off and say, well, the Iranian militias and its people and its proxy agents in the sun. Well, what were you doing there? So, I think that, again, what has been done to Iraq and to all Iraqis — regardless of their faith, regardless of their sect, regardless of their ethnicity — all of what has happened is a stain. A huge, huge one on the consciousness of everyone in Britain, America, Spain and all the countries that signed up for this and took part in this, everyone has a responsibility to answer.

I mean, obviously, when we spoke about Afghanistan, we didn’t speak about the crimes, the actual crimes that were committed. The one that we come to recognize and know about is the crimes committed by the Australians, where they actually trained the young cadets to shoot at people and kill them to be acknowledged as soldiers. We didn’t talk about that because there are so many of those that were committed. To speak not of Arab and Muslim barbarity, but of Western barbarity — that’s something I think should be discussed.

Khalifa: In Egypt, it was a military coup in 2013 that overthrew a democratically elected government led by the Muslim Brotherhood. In Tunisia, a constitutional change led to the fall of Ennahda, an Islamist party. In Morocco, it was the people who voted out the Justice and Development Party, which ruled the country for 10 years and suffered a massive defeat in September; they went from having 125 seats to only 12. To juxtapose this, in Afghanistan, the Taliban conquered the country overnight from the US, the most powerful country in the world. What message does this send to Islamist parties in the Muslim world?

Altikriti: Only yesterday, I was discussing this with a group of colleagues, and someone repeated a statement that was sent to me by a fellow of Chatham House. He said to me something quite interesting. He said: “Don’t you see that many around the world, particularly young Muslims, will be looking to Afghanistan — and three months ago in Palestine and what happened there — and think to themselves that the way forward is to carry guns.” I said: “Listen, my friend, you’re saying it. I’m not.”

But in reality, it’s unfortunate that many of my own students are saying, “It’s been proven.” I mean, they say, “you academics, you always talk about empirical evidence. Well, here it is: Politics doesn’t work. Democracy doesn’t work. The ballot box does not work. What does work? There you go, you have Taliban, you have the militias. So go figure.” Unfortunately, that is the kind of discussion that I think will dominate the Muslim scene, particularly the political Muslim scene.

For the next few years, I believe, whilst we analyze political Islam and Islamic parties, whether in Egypt, Morocco or Tunisia, that will be the question. Is it a viable argument to say that these parties will have absolutely no chance, either immediately in the short run or in the long run? In Tunisia, they were allowed to run for about 10 years. In Morocco, they were in government for about 10 years. Before that, they were in opposition and they were thriving. But in Egypt, they weren’t allowed to stay for more than a year. So, ultimately, the end is inevitable. So, is it the need to shift and change tactics? It’s going to be quite an interesting and, at times, problematic discussion, but it’s a discussion you need to have.

And last, by the way, on this particular point, the West did not allow democracy, particularly in Egypt and in Tunisia, to exist. We spoke of democracy, we spoke of human rights, we spoke of freedoms, but when they all came to be crushed, the West did absolutely nothing, which told the others well, you know what? They don’t care, there are no consequences, and that is why it is that many, many Muslim youth today will say, well, there’s only one way to go there.

Khalifa: And lastly, what do you believe are the core causes for Islamic extremist groups, i.e., Daesh or al-Qaeda, to still have a foothold in the region, and in your opinion, what is the best way to combat these groups?

Altikriti: Their biggest arguments, and which works well for them, is the fact that democracy failed and that they got nothing from buying into Western values of how to run their societies.

Their biggest argument now will be the Taliban and how they won. So, those are the main standpoints [for] these extremist groups; they lie on people’s frustrations and their feelings that there is no other way out. That’s essentially the argument. I’ve seen it in groups where someone is trying to recruit for that idea. Their bottom line is it doesn’t work. There is no other way — that’s their only argument.

It’s not theological, by the way. People think they are basing it on these Quranic verses or on hadiths [sayings of Prophet Muhammad], but they absolutely do not, because on that particular front, they lose, they have no ground to stand on. [For them,] it’s the fact that, in reality, it doesn’t work — democracy doesn’t work. Human rights doesn’t work. Because ultimately, your human rights mean nothing to those in power. So, killing us is as easy as killing a chicken. It’s nothing. That is their argument.

So, it’s going to be a struggle, it’s going to be a big, big, big struggle for people who want to advocate democracy, want to advocate civil society and diversity. It’s a struggle we can’t afford not to have, we can’t afford not to be in there, because the outcome, the costs will be so hefty on every single part and no one will be excluded.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Legacy of America’s Failed War on Terror appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Intercept authors describe the complex game of cat-and-mouse played between the two leaders, one known for ordering the gruesome murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the other more conventionally engaged throughout his career in a form of organized mass murder called war. Since the responsibility for killing in war is shared across an entire nation’s political structure, and since war is supposedly regulated not by personal command but by “rules of engagement,” Biden and his predecessors, whose policies have led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands, cannot be compared with the kind of bloodthirsty assassin Mohammed bin Salman has become.

The Democratic Party vs. Its Voters

READ MORE

This contrast has created a problem for Biden, who — unlike his predecessor Donald Trump, the ultimate opportunist — has the obligation of consolidating his image as a man of solid moral fiber. Biden has repeatedly insisted that the US must lead by the power of its example rather than the example of its power. He has no choice — in contrast with the abject Trump — but to avoid being seen as the puppet of a Middle Eastern powermonger.

The long and the short of The Intercept’s story is that Biden has adamantly avoided accepting to have a private conversation with the Saudi crown prince. In retaliation, bin Salman has refused to listen to an American president’s predictable requests to expand oil production to ease the tension on global oil prices. There is of course more to the story than that, but the only thing Biden has attempted to explain to the American public is that oil prices have risen “because of the supply being withheld by OPEC.” The fact that Saudi Arabia has a predominant voice in OPEC spared Biden the trouble of mentioning Riyadh itself.

To clarify Biden’s dilemma, Grim and Klippenstein reached out to Ali Shihabi, a man who on Twitter as an author and “commentator on Middle Eastern politics and economics with a particular focus on Saudi Arabia.” Grim and Klippenstein offer a bit more precision, Shihabi “a voice for MBS in Washington.” This became evident when Shihabi : “Biden has the phone number of who he will have to call if he wants any favours.”

Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Favors:

Something people who understand the effective role of obsequiousness and servility in international relations can seek and eventually obtain by simply sabotaging their own ideals to please the person capable of granting favors

Contextual Note

Shihabi turns out to be an excellent stylist when it comes to using irony disingenuously. Grim and Klippenstein quote a statement Shihabi made in response to The Intercept’s request for comment: “Saudi has put a lot of work into getting a cohesive OPEC+ to work over the past 15 months since the crisis that dropped oil futures below zero so will not break ranks with the consensus or Russia on this. Also, the kingdom resents being blamed for what is essentially a structural problem not of its own making in the US which has hampered its own energy production. Finally, I hear that the price of Thanksgiving Turkeys has doubled in the US so why can oil prices also not inflate?”

The capitalized “Turkeys” quip might be a sly (or possibly unintended) allusion to the 2018 murder of Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Everything else in Shihabi’s explanation has some historical merit. But throwing the spotlight on consumer prices in the context of what is perhaps the most “sacred” American holiday is equivalent to giving Biden a quick karate kick in the family jewels.

What can Biden do, other than capitulate to bin Salman and improve the consumer index? Doing so would brand him as weak and cowardly. In the end, Americans and political analysts all over the world are left wondering what the US stands for or is capable of standing for. Because a democratic consumer society’s political system is dependent not on the ideals of good government reflected in its constitution and repeated endlessly by demagogic politicians, or even on the “national interest,” but instead on the reaction of consumers to the prices of the goods they buy, the question must be asked: Who controls US politics?

Is it the people? No, because their dual role is simply to show up to vote every couple of years and to consume on a daily basis. What about the president? No, because presidents are in a constant battle with Congress. So, is it Congress? Not really, because Congress is known for debating everything and accomplishing nothing. The entire superstructure of government functions as a machine to find excuses for maintaining the status quo.

With regard to today’s news cycle, if we are seeking the answer to the question by naming individuals, the best candidates would be Joe Manchin and Mohammed bin Salman, who have demonstrated the power to create situations from which there is no exit.

Historical Note

The key to understanding Biden’s problem with bin Salman is of course neither the crown prince nor the West Virginia senator. It’s Donald Trump. Grim and Klippenstein quote Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, one of the most astute observers of the Middle East in Washington. Parsi “said the move by MBS is aimed at boosting Republicans, whom the crown prince sees as a more reliable ally.”

More specifically, Parsi claims that it isn’t about oil revenues or even the arms sales to the kingdom that Biden had promised to halt on moral grounds but eventually accepted. According to Parsi, bin Salman has long-term geopolitical considerations in mind. “MBS calculates that a Republican president,” according to Parsi, “will reinvest in the idea of dominating the Middle East militarily, which makes the relationship with Saudi Arabia critical once more.”

Parsi further notes that under Trump a new coalition had grown up, bringing together the interests of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel, in lockstep with traditional US policy aimed at dominating the entire Middle East. Trump’s innovation was to delegate some of US power to its unconditionally supported allies Israel and Saudi: “MBS wants to return to the days when Saudi Arabia was fully immune from any criticism and had U.S. support with no questions asked.”

This situation that has resulted in Biden’s helplessness was created by Trump. It highlights the embarrassing decline of US prestige, if not also of US power in the world. Because of the way US democracy has evolved, the national interest — that of the people as a whole — will always be mediated if not dictated by local and corporate interests rather than any expression of the “will of the people.” In an officially decentralized and privatized social and economic structure, all decisions tend to be conditioned by “favors.”

For the politicians and political operators who hope to play their role in Congress or even intervene in the executive branch, getting elected or selected requires not just accepting, but soliciting favors from wealthy corporate donors and establishing what may be called “intimately interested” relations with them.

Trump succeeded at this game because of his talent for letting his personality eclipse the consequences of his politics. His voters and members of his party followed his lead because of his ability to play the role of a “winner.” That meant that Trump could let scoundrels like Mohammed bin Salman have their way while appearing to be the dominant personality in the couple. Biden had no chance. Not only did he not look like a winner, he gave the impression that the only thing he was interested in winning was the election.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

In short, when the Democrats forced Biden’s selection as their candidate in 2020, they did Biden the favor of allowing him to be elected by circumstance (thanks to COVID-19) but did themselves no favors if they really had the hope of using Biden’s presidency to govern the nation.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Biden’s Lost Battle With Mohammed bin Salman appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Algeria and Morocco: The Conflict on Europe’s Doorstep

READ MORE

The revoking of the emergency law does have some positive consequences, namely the  of the infamous “state security court,” which offered no avenue for appeal and was notorious for its harsh sentences. However, these positive  are mitigated by a myriad of repressive laws, heavy use of pre-trial detention, extrajudicial killings and the heavy politicization of the judiciary, which make the state of emergency mostly redundant.

Two Laws

The most notable example of the repressive laws issued by the regime is the 2015 Anti-Terrorism Law. This has a few notable features.

First, it provides a very vague definition of what constitutes terrorism to include acts that affect “social harmony and national security,” an expansion of which allows the Egyptian regime to crack down on dissent and charge activists with terrorism at will. Second, the law provides immunity to the security forces stating that “members of the security forces cannot be prosecuted in case force was used in the line of duty.” Finally, the law gives the president the power to take “necessary measures” in specific geographic areas in response to a terrorist threat, including isolating specific regions, depopulating them and the imposition of curfews for a period of six months, which can be extended.

In addition, on November 1, after the state of emergency was revoked, parliament approved an amendment to the law that expanded the power of the president, giving him the right to designate the security agency responsible for imposing his directives, a thinly veiled reference to assigning the military as a domestic security force to repress dissent.

The consequences of this law are significant. Besides the use of terror charges against peaceful activists, there has been a sharp rise in extrajudicial executions, reaching  alleged killings in 143 shootouts between 2015 and 2020. In some cases, the families of those killed have attested that their relatives were detained at the time of the alleged shootout. The immunity provided to the security forces by this law has emboldened them to commit killings, with no real investigation or consequence.

Another that is seldom discussed is the Law for Protection of Public and Vital Entities. This law, issued in 2014, stipulates that the military is responsible for providing security to public institutions in cooperation with local police forces. The law says these buildings and institutions belong to the military, hence any acts of protest affecting their functioning fall under the jurisdiction of military courts, notorious for harsh sentencing and lack of due process. The definition of vital entities includes roads, bridges, railways, power lines and public institutions, essentially almost all of the public space.

This law was supposed to be temporary. However, in the same  where the amendments to the terror law were approved, it was made permanent. In effect, this permanently militarizes the public space by extending the jurisdiction of military courts to cover most public spaces and transforming the military into a domestic security agency, responsible for the repression of dissent and protest.

Pre-Trial Detention and the Judiciary

The lawful quashing of dissent is also coupled with the heavy use of  methods of repression, the most prominent of which is the application of pre-trial detention. Egyptian criminal law states that pre-trial detention should be limited to six months for misdemeanors, 18 months for felonies and two years for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. In reality, there are a number of cases where detainees  in custody even after they  their pre-trial detention limit. This practice has allowed the regime to arbitrarily detain its opponents for prolonged periods of time on vague charges, with little evidence and in complete disregard of due process.

In addition to this, the regime institutionalized the practice of “,” where once the pre-trial detention period on one charge lapses, the detainee is charged in a new case, with very similar charges. The most notable example is Abdel Moneim Aboul-Fotouh, the head of the Strong Egypt Party, who was  in February 2018. He has remained in pre-trial detention after new  were brought against him in February 2020.

The noose of repression is complete with the heavy politicization of the judiciary, which has been a feature of the regime since the coup of 2013. This is reflected in a number of mass trials, which have shown little regard for due process. The most notable is the  of 735 defendants in the case of Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiya Square sit-in, during which hundreds of protesters were killed by security forces. The final verdict, issued in June 2021, saw the confirmation of the death sentence of 12  Muslim Brotherhood leaders; out of 75 death sentences issued by the lower terrorism court, 31 death sentences were commuted to life in prison.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

The cooption of the judiciary was formalized with the constitutional  of 2019, which gave the president the power to appoint the heads of judicial institutions, as well as stipulating the creation of a higher judicial council — headed by the president — which oversees appointments, promotions and secondments within the judiciary.

The Permanent State of Repression

Hence, the suspension of the state of emergency in Egypt does not signal a real easing of repression, rather, under another guise, its permanence is extended. The amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Law for Protection of Public and Vital Entities made the state of emergency redundant. This, combined with the actual practices of the security forces and judiciary of using pre-trial detention, extrajudicial killings and torture, means that repression has been deeply institutionalized within the state apparatus, in essence turning it into a modus operandi.

One can speculate that the suspension of the state of emergency was a feeble attempt to claim progress aimed at the Biden administration, which  $130 million in aid over human rights concerns. However, the regime’s strategies point to the opposite, namely that brutal repression in Egypt will be a feature of daily life for years to come.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Permanent State of Emergency in Egypt appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Not All Quiet on the Western Sahara Front

READ MORE

The latest episode in this tense relationship between the North African nations took place in August when Algeria severed diplomatic with Morocco. The move came after a series of wildfires swept through the Amazigh-speaking Kabylie region in what Algeria claims was a covert Moroccan operation to bolster the MAK.

For Algeria, this was a delicate time for the government due to an economic crisis exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, political unrest since 2020, and the ill health and subsequent death of the country’s former leader, Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

Tension in the Maghreb

Algeria and Morocco have been antagonistic neighbors since their respective independence from the French. Border discord gave rise to a tenacious rivalry that worsened with the Western Sahara when Algeria became the main supporter of the Polisario Front. This unfinished conflict and the decades-long of the land border between Algeria and Morocco are the most tangible examples of the enmity that keeps the Maghreb divided.

Diplomatic spats and mutual accusations of instigating internal turmoil have been frequent. One area where the tense calm in bilateral relations has been the military. The two countries have engaged in a rapid arms fueled, in Algeria‘s case, by generous hydrocarbon revenues in the first decade of the century. Despite its efforts, Morocco’s military budget has been outstripped since 2006. Only as a result of Algeria‘s economic fragility has Morocco been able to make a significant .

Recent years have been characterized by Morocco’s impetuous diplomatic activity, particularly in the Gulf and throughout Africa. In the face of Morocco’s increased international projection, the Algerians have tried to respond despite the country’s poor economic situation.

In particular, the Algerians have sought to build closer relations with African nations. Algeria has strengthened ties with its traditional ally Nigeria, restarting talks on the construction of the trans-Saharan gas . It has also reinforced cooperation with countries such as Mali and Libya.

Implications for Spain

Europe overlooks North Africa and is separated by mere miles from Morocco. As a result, the Europeans have a direct stake in the tension south of the Mediterranean. The European country most affected by the recent escalation between Morocco and Algeria is Spain.

Taking a position in favor of one party could have on either the security of Spain’s southern border that is close to northern Morocco or the supply of natural gas that it receives from Algeria. This comes at a time when the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean is increasing and the price of gas, coal and electricity is rising.

The of the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline on November 1 has direct implications for Spain since the route was a major source of supply for over two decades. The pipeline also passes through Morocco, which retained part of the gas in exchange for allowing the line to operate via its territory. Morocco used the gas to produce around 12% of the country’s electricity. The Medgaz pipeline is seen as a replacement, which would allow Algeria to get rid of intermediaries and also strike a blow against Morocco.

Yet this will not spare Spain, which has no voice in regional disputes despite its desire to present itself as a strong European country. It is unclear how long this new episode of tension in the Maghreb will play out, but it could have serious implications for Europe.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Algeria and Morocco: The Conflict on Europe’s Doorstep appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Can the Taliban Govern Responsibly?

READ MORE

In a fast-changing environment where international donors are less capable to meet funding requests from humanitarian organizations, the United Arab Emirates has taken a unique approach. The Gulf state’s method, which could be modeled on the logistics of major transnational corporations or a large military logistics operation, provides a glimpse into the future orientation of special humanitarian capabilities.

Establishing a Hub

The establishment of the first UAE hub in 2003 reflected a top-level and very strategic foreign policy judgment by the United Arab Emirates. It leverages the UAE’s highly developed status as a global node for airfreight and transit entrepot activity. It has gained an impressive list of committed partners — from UN agencies and major humanitarian organizations to charities and commercial suppliers of humanitarian-related services.

On this point alone, any regional replicant will find it difficult to duplicate the model exactly. The status of the international hub was reflected by being represented well after its launch and during its transition from a valuable strategic geographic location to an independent official humanitarian crisis response agency within the international community, according to a member of the royal family at the time of its founding. 

The EHC and its widening range of services, no longer only a regional storage hub for faster deployment of humanitarian supplies, but an expanding hub for humanitarian workers heading to the field, has also become more networked into international coordination mechanisms and processes. These national and often highly budget-driven and bureaucratic processes and their informal and formal international coordination are now well established in the EHC modus operandi, reinforcing it as a leading model for contemporary large and rapid humanitarian action.

An example of UAE pre-engagement with the club of donors was in the . The UAE, in 2015, through EHC predecessor institutions, flew selected humanitarian supplies toward the region following cyclone disasters over the past decade. The supplies proved less absorbable than expected. The transit stop was Brisbane, in Queensland, Australia, the location of the Australian government’s main South Pacific logistical base.

Following this natural disaster, the UAE recalibrated its approach. It recognized that even if it was able to act independently, beneficiaries’ interests and international coordination facilitate the path to effectiveness. Notably, aid to the region was used following the UAE’s diplomatic initiative in the South Pacific on climate change and its leveraging of gas and nuclear in the greenhouse debate.

By late February 2020, as the world began to address the spread of COVID-19, the UAE government set out to extend the role of the EHC. The aim of the directive by the Abu Dhabi government was to deploy the UAE’s “medical care capabilities at a time of crisis,” the Emirates News Agency . Its first task was to receive 215 citizens from neighboring countries evacuated from Hubei, China, as the began to interrupt international air travel. The EHC was to serve as a hub, receiving evacuees and providing necessary monitoring and preventive medical care, ensuring “privacy and dignity” throughout the process.

The EHC Today

Operations at the EHC now compliment an image of the UAE as a globalist and progressive international influencer through what some have called the world’s largest humanitarian hub. The additional success of the EHC in 2020 was a product of public and private sector cooperation that manifested the UAE’s foreign policy commitment to delivering and helping others deliver rapid crisis responses. The development of a hub for people affected by the COVID-19 pandemic continues to manifest itself in the role played by the UAE during the evacuation of Afghan refugees in August 2021.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

This support service, directly addressing people in danger, need and fleeing their country will require deep thinking and careful management. Like most sovereign states, the UAE itself, despite its fast-growing capability to balance its interests with the effects of its wealth and financial leverage, will face increasingly larger and more complex judgments about how to respond to incrementally higher demands for aid and human succor. These decisions will always come with distressing media coverage of human and environmental disaster events.

The success of the EHC is based on local capacity to deliver logistical infrastructure, a highly developed transport node and interest by an A-List of global humanitarians for a center close to several disaster-prone regions. These include the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean rim.

It will now need to deal with the deep and difficult policy problem, at least for humanitarians, of where to consolidate infrastructure and resources for rapidly accessible assistance to people suffering under complex situations. Here we will see realist foreign policy and the place and role of humanitarian assistance collide. Other wealthy states in the region will face the same problems under their current models of humanitarian support.

Humanitarian assistance, unless coupled with other incentives, rarely leads to a particular and favorable bilateral policy response. After all, the recipient state captures assistance from many quarters. Assistance by states such as the United Arab Emirates, if routine and on a policy basis more regular than opportunistic, will set a strong floor under the UAE’s global model. But it will be difficult to move from one crisis response to another without some clear “stop/go” decision points that do not appear mercenary.

Inter-Arab aid engagement has not been readily seen in humanitarian relief under the same Western and international media gaze as that of other UN member states. For the UAE, the dilemma stems from a priority to make its contributions visible and to showcase the model exemplified by the EHC. Clearly, realist soft power requires more from actions to provide international humanitarian relief. This is where real strategy concerning the concentration of aid and effective delivery will pave the way for success and emulation.

The Case of Afghanistan

The crisis continuing to expand in Afghanistan is a perfect example of emerging challenges and opportunities for new strategies. A growing need for assistance will not decline in the near future, nor will the need from time to time for states to explain their policy approaches and their prioritization of crisis responses. There is already a focus on the realpolitik of humanitarian support as a tool to advance interventionist global agendas. China’s COVID-19 vaccine aid is a clear example, especially as the breadth of Beijing’s response was undermined by the relatively poor efficacy of its vaccines.   

The model working out Abu Dhabi’s EHC allows states to advance more multilateral-driven crisis response strategies. In the case of the August reception of over 8,000 Afghan refugees, the UAE did not engage in unilateral interventionism. Instead, it responded to rapid coordination of responses to international needs for transport and hosting facilities, allowing an increasing number of Afghan nationals to be extricated during the chaos caused by the Taliban advance into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan.

The UAE offered facilities to house Afghan refugees en route to third countries, such as the United States. It also provided relief to overstretched militaries and civilian organizations in Europe and the US that were overwhelmed by the number of refugees. Facilities such as those found at Abu Dhabi’s EHC proved a more dignified alternative to military bases and public facilities such as town halls, schools, temporary shelters and, in some cases, church-based facilities in the West.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The UAE’s Approach to Humanitarian Assistance appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Addressing Climate Change Impacts on the Sporting Calendar

READ MORE

This, combined with flagging and in some cases stagnant yield increases in soil systems across the world, will soon require sweeping and rapid changes in growing methods. As the global population continues to increase, food production will rise and our methods of growing should change as well.

Better Methods

There are methods available to us today to not only change the way we grow produce for the better, but also increase yields in a smaller space. Vertical farming through hydroponics or aeroponics gives us the opportunity to grow larger amounts of produce in seemingly unavailable spaces. Rooftops and indoor areas such as old warehouses can be used to grow plants that are stacked on top of each other to farm a consistent crop that produces year-round and quickly. Such measures would require less water and energy, are more pest resistant and can help alleviate some of the logistical trouble of transporting produce to and from farms to cities everywhere.

Hydroponics and aeroponics are increasingly popular cultivation methods among both commercial growers and research scientists. They confer several advantages, with the foremost being their water use efficiency. Some studies suggest up to 70% and 95% less water usage for hydroponics and aeroponics, respectively. In a 2015  conducted in Arizona, an extremely dry place in the United States, it was found that hydroponically grown lettuce required 10 times less water as a system than soil-based lettuce crops.

This is particularly important based on the similarities between the climates of Arizona and Marrakech, a city in Morocco. While this study found that energy usage of a hydroponic farm was significantly higher than soil-based farms, this could be nearly completely offset by reducing the amount of supplemental lighting used in favor of currently available solar power technologies.

Another advantage of greenhouse hydroponic production is season independence, where a grower would be able to produce several harvests year-round by shielding the crops from seasonal changes through the use of LED lighting and heating and cooling of the greenhouse space. By utilizing existing ideas for a closed-loop hydroponic system, which can be easily constructed in any area of the world, it is possible to reuse nearly all water and nutrients that are not taken up and transpired by plants.

One  conducted in Indonesia suggested the use of such a system to more actively regulate water usage and increase the cost-efficiency of hydroponic production in a nutrient film technique (NFT) hydroponic system. Water efficiency and full-year production and harvest are attractive, and depending on the design of the greenhouse, pest resistance can be built in as well through the engineering of the facility to not be conducive to insect or microbial population accumulation.

While reusing nutrients and water can be economically and environmentally attractive (in reducing agricultural runoff, one of the main sources of pollution in the world), care must be taken to ensure consistent yield through several cycles of harvest. If not properly treated, reused nutrient solution can accumulate several  (plant-harming) organic acids that are released from the roots of any plant in order to regulate the microbial population of its roots. Studies have shown that the use of activated charcoal can help to mitigate some of the damaging effects of these chemicals, though further research is needed to determine a commercially viable solution.

Another promising area of research in hydroponics and aeroponics is a possible disease resistance conferred by the physical stress of constant flow or aerosolization. One  found that in aeroponic systems, the microbial population of the roots remained almost entirely distinct from the population of the nutrient solution reservoir, suggesting very little, if any, microbial population overlap.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information..

Another recent  attempted to use a chemical intervention solution to mitigate possible E. coli contamination of lettuce crops grown in NFT systems. Though the chemical intervention was unsuccessful, a notable result was the complete lack of colonization of root tissue and no uptake of harmful bacteria into the vegetative tissues of any of the tested crops. Though these studies are recent, they suggest that hydroponics may be much more pathogen-resistant than previously thought, leading to considerably lower contamination risk for hydroponic growers and safer food for consumers.

Benefits Are Many

The benefits of hydroponic and aeroponic farming are many, and emerging technologies are making the ease of access to such systems considerably lower, paving the way for a future generation of amateur and commercial growers to begin to farm in any place, at any time.

Africa has experienced wonderful agricultural and economic growth in some regions, but with current methods, this is not sustainable. At a recent pre-summit event of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) , “Agricultural Transformation for Sustainable and Resilient Food Systems,” there was a discussion regarding the need for change in the direction of agriculture in the future. There is a need for an increase in productivity in the land already used for agriculture, which will then lead to greater and more sustainable economic growth. Increasing productivity through new agricultural technologies would have lasting impacts on farmers, communities, and societies everywhere.

As per a 2020 World Bank , “Harvesting Prosperity: Technology and Productivity Growth in Agriculture,” there is particular weight given to innovation and the need to support this innovation through connection to markets. We believe that using new hydroponic and aeroponic technology as well as vertical farming can increase productivity, foster a closer connection for city residents to their food production and experience continued growth in the agricultural sector.

From Africa to the World

Across the world, we are conducting unsustainable practices and the use of land for agricultural growth. The High Atlas Foundation (HAF), an organization for the lasting and prosperous development of Morocco, has been working to address this problem. It has been following responsible procedures and using new technology to increase efficiency primarily through women and youth-led campaigns. In addition, it has been working to address the problem of climate change through monitoring trees that HAF has planted for carbon offsets.

There is a necessity in not only Africa but across the world to accept and utilize new technology to help increase the productivity of the land we have while also saving our planet. The advent of hydroponics, aeroponics and vertical farming is a great method to try to combat the pressing issue of how we are going to grow plants when there is little water and little surface area. This gives the possibility for many methods of urban farming, including vertical and hydroponics in rooftops and many unused areas that could be used for growing.
 
We only have one world, so being good stewards and living sustainable lives is imperative. Expanding use of the technology of hydroponics and vertical farming can allow the small grower to have much stronger financial gain while also helping alleviate the burden agriculture places on the planet. There is only so much space in the world, but we can always grow up.

*[The authors are interns at the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Future of Farming in Morocco appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Beirushima: What Lebanon Needs to Survive

READ MORE

The interlocking political and banking elites who control the government based on sectarian power-sharing have so far ignored the pain of those affected and the need to have a national strategy of reconciliation and economic recovery. The economic erosion was furthered by the Beirut Port explosion of August 4, 2020. That incident destroyed much of the business area of the downtown. It also further set back the country economically and politically as the current government, headed by Prime Minister Najib Mikati, has been unable to remove impediments to an independent investigation.

The people of Lebanon are suffering. The statistics on , loss of and quality of life, of essential goods, cost of living and health care, and of skilled Lebanese are well known. The security and stability of the country are eroding as the families of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) share the depressing costs of a barely functioning economy.

The Governing Troika

The latest threats and demonstrate the fragility of the civil order as the Shia Amal-Hezbollah alliance, along with their Christian enablers in President Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement — now headed by his son-in-law and presidential aspirant, Gebran Bassil — feel free to ignore demands for change. The march on October 14, 2021, demanding the removal of Judge Tarek Bitar, who was calling current and former officials to testify about their roles in the Beirut Port blast, was the latest opportunity to demonstrate their dominance. This was too much of a provocation for those opposed to the governing troika, which led to bloodshed and a spike in instability. Despite the current calm, that chapter has not been concluded.

More damaging is the challenge that inaction poses on two fronts: to the new government and to the security services. Prime Minister Mikati supports an independent judiciary and an independent investigation into the blast. This could lead to the dissolution of his government, which depends on an agreement with the troika to survive. Hezbollah and company have not shown any concern for the integrity of the state up until now, so there are no assurances that they will tolerate an investigation that might expose some of their own friends.

The LAF and ISF are already struggling to hold together their forces, who have experienced a 90% in their salaries while facing hyperinflation in food, medicines and fuel. Desertion rates are as soldiers look for other employment opportunities. With budgets decreased by 90% due to the currency devaluation, the LAF and ISF have to increasingly rely on external assistance from the United States and others to retain their operational readiness.

Time for Action

All the while, the people are on the sidelines, not able to promote changes that will improve their lives and save their country. At the core is the concern that Lebanon for the Lebanese may become an aspiration more than a reality. To avoid the demise of what was once the educational and intellectual center of the region, it is time for remedial action.

It is time to begin the process of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and move toward a single exchange rate by reducing subsidies and public spending. Work must be done to ensure increased stable power supplies throughout Lebanon. The people’s trust needs to be earned through transparent and credible policies to restore a functioning government.

The international community is clear in its position: Clean elections, implementation of basic reforms, and a robust and sustainable social safety net are central to opening the country to outside support. Only then can Lebanon begin the process of reconstruction and recovery. Now, as the people remember the October 17 demonstrations, it is time to recommit to a process of reform and reconciliation that will provide a basis for Lebanon’s reconstruction.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Lebanon’s Future as an Inclusive Democracy in Doubt appeared first on 51�Թ�.

During the past two years alone, six women have had their lives taken by either their male kin or other men. The women have been reduced to mere statistics thrown around to point out the rise of killings, without investigating the cause of their murder or providing insight into these high-profile cases.

Around the World, Femicide Is on the Rise

READ MORE

The Family Protection Law, which was passed by Kuwait’s national assembly in August 2020, for the establishment of a national family protection committee. This committee would put measures in place to tackle the spread of domestic violence. The law stipulates that those taking part in the family protection sector should undergo the necessary training. It also calls for the activation of a domestic violence shelter, which would offer rehabilitation and advisory services to survivors of domestic violence.

At the time, these measures were  as a victory, one that abolished Article 153, which treated honor killings as a misdemeanor with a maximum three-year prison sentence and/or a small fine for the perpetrator. Experts argued that Article 153 all but  honor killings. Yet despite being passed more than a year ago, the Family Protection Law remains nothing but merely ink on paper. The failure to protect women from being victims of domestic violence continues unabated.

Violence Against Women

The absence of such protection is what  Farah Hamza Akbar’s life. In April, Farah was gruesomely killed by a man she had previously filed two cases against for kidnapping and attempted murder. The perpetrator, Fahad Subhi Mohammed, who had been stalking the victim but was not known to her or her family, crashed into Farah’s car, kidnapped her and her two daughters. He stabbed Farah in the chest before dumping her body in front of a hospital, leaving her there to die.

Dana Akbar, Farah’s sister and lawyer, shared a  on social media saying she had warned the prosecutor several times that her sister’s life was in danger. According to Akbar, her sister’s perpetrator attempted to kidnap and harm Farah on multiple occasions. He was detained twice but released on bail each time. Mohammed was out on bail when he killed Farah.

The heinous crime sent shockwaves across Kuwait, resulting in a large  during the height of summer in the holy month of Ramadan. Protesters called for reforming existing laws, putting in place better protection mechanisms for victims of violence and actually enforcing the Family Protection Law.

The debate following Farah’s death served to amplify the anti-sexual harassment movement that was brought into prominence early in the year by Ascia al-Shammari. The influential fashion blogger posted a powerful venting her fury about the horror of being car chased by men, a common form of harassment in Kuwait. She called for a mechanism to report sexual harassment, saying “it is a necessary step in this country … So I don’t understand when you say you are against it.” The video went viral on social media platforms, provoking many women to comment and leading to “culturally sensitive” conversations about sexual harassment and gender-based violence.

Following Shammari’s video, a social media awareness campaign dubbed  (I will not be silent) was launched by medical doctor Shayma Shamo. It served as a virtual safe space that gave women the opportunity to share anonymous testimonies of harassment or abuse, encouraging more women to speak up.

Empty Promises

But the outrage that took place and the different hashtags only resulted in empty promises made by several members of parliament. Former MP Yousef al-Fadhala, who resigned from parliament in April, a government-sponsored mobile app designed to document and register instances of harassment. MP Abdulaziz al-Saqabi for an amendment to the penal code, adding punishments that include up to a year in prison and a fine of 3,000 Kuwaiti dinars ($9,940). Lastly, MP Abdullah al-Mudhaf adding punitive measures to the penal code, with a three-month window for the executive branch to activate these laws.

Almost eight months later, none of the proposals has been acted upon. However, in late September, the minister of commerce and industry and the chairman of the Public Authority for Manpower, Abdullah al-Salman, directives to end discrimination in the private sector and criminalize harassment in the workplace. While this step is long overdue, it is a promising one toward establishing a safer work environment for women. Yet there remains much to do.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

A recent  from the male-only Women, Children and Family Affairs parliamentary committee suggests that femicide is not a legislative issue but a societal one. The committee added that preventing violence against women is the responsibility of the government. This muddled and inadequate response, especially when Kuwait is witnessing a disturbing increase in femicide, is not nearly enough.

Despite having a vocal parliament and a free press, in comparison to its Gulf neighbors, Kuwait lags behind when it comes to enacting legislation to protect the lives of its women. More than one year and six lives later, we still see the offhand attitude in parliament and society toward violence against women, a convenient way of condoning this tragedy without condemning and holding accountable those responsible.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Wave of Femicides in Kuwait appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Relationship Between Football and Populism

LISTEN

There’s not a country on earth where citizens will not know the name of at least three football teams, wear club regalia and watch, play and bet on football. Around 3.5 billion people some part of the 2018 World Cup, with 1.12 billion watching at least one minute, according to FIFA, the sport’s global governing organization.

With over , football’s faithful following is comparable to that of a major religion, like Christianity (2.38 billion) or Islam (1.9 billion). But, unlike religions, football, like other sports, isn’t expected to make pronouncements on torture, gay rights, labor exploitation, freedom of expression or any of the other moral issues of the day. The trouble is, it does.

Global Society of Inclusion

Football’s moral philosophy seems clear. FIFA expressed its two key directives in its , “Making Football Truly Global: The Vision 2020-2023” as “Fight against Racism and all other forms of discrimination” and “Protect human rights.” To demonstrate its sincerity, in June 2020, England’s Premier League approved football players taking the knee before games to showcase a committed opposition to racism in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd by police in the US.

Other major sports organizations, including the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the National Football League (NFL) in the US, steadfastly refused to allow the gesture, recognizing it would compromise the traditional stance on political and partisan actions. Football was one of the first to adopt a “” to the controversial ritual and remains an enthusiastic supporter despite objections, some from black players. Other sports have grudgingly accepted kneeling, largely as a result of pressure from players. The NFL finally its position last year and the IOC prior to the .

Football continued without compunction. “We remain resolutely committed to our singular objective of eradicating racial prejudice wherever it exists, to bring about a global society of inclusion, respect and equal opportunities for all,” a affirmed in August. “The Premier League will continue to work with our clubs, players and football partners to bring about tangible change to remove inequality from our game.” Yet two recent developments suggest that practical considerations complicate principles.

Eighteen months ago, an attempted takeover of Newcastle United by a consortium collapsed after the Premier League decided that, had the deal been allowed to proceed, Saudi Arabia would have effectively become the club’s owner. The Gulf state would be subject to the league’s . Failure to pass the test means potential buyers can be stopped if they’ve committed an act in a foreign jurisdiction that would be considered a criminal offense in the UK — even if the act is not illegal in their home territory.

The original potential buyers pulled out, the popular assumption at the time being the killing of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018. It was widely reported that Saudi agents were responsible for the murder.

However, it appeared that the real stumbling block was Saudi Arabia’s apparent involvement in a television network that streamed Premier League games. Qatar-based broadcaster beIN Sports had spent billions to acquire territorial rights for the games, but Saudis “” its license and suspended its channels in 2017. Reduced to basics, the deal stalled because of money. So, when the dispute between Qatar and Saudi was settled earlier this year, the deal was revived.

Sportswashing

The completed sale of Newcastle United Football Club to the Saudi Public Investment Fund, which lists as its chair Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely thought responsible for ordering Khashoggi’s murder, has horrified and disgusted critics. Amnesty International has that Saudi authorities are “sportswashing their appalling human rights record with the glamour of top-flight football.” Sportswashing is an attempt by odious political regimes to clean up their international image by associating themselves with prestigious sporting events or competitions.

Amnesty that Saudi Arabia regularly violates human rights in various ways, including using torture as punishment, banning freedom of speech and expression, and subjugating women. The Saudi government denies claims of rights abuses and claims its apparent excesses are designed with national security in mind. Presumably, the Premier League — and perhaps football generally — accepts this.

Saudi Arabia’s Gulf neighbors, all of which have questionable human rights records, have already acquired top-tier football clubs: Qatar Sports Investments owns Paris Saint-Germain; Sheikh Mansour, an Abu Dhabi royal, owns Manchester City. Qatar is scheduled to host next year’s FIFA World Cup.

The timing of the takeover is hardly propitious. In Saudi Arabia, women have essentially the same legal status as children, having to rely on husbands or male relatives to make nearly all decisions in their lives. Much of the workspaces in the territory are gender-segregated. In 2019, Saudi was rated the fourth most dangerous place in the world for gay travelers by magazine, which reported that the country “implements the death penalty for consensual homosexuality under their interpretation of Sharia law.”

Football ostensibly lauds freedom, equality and open-mindedness while indulging insular regimes that encourage practices it officially denounces. In the 1970s, Commonwealth countries prohibited sporting contacts with South Africa, then operating a constitutional racial segregation policy known as apartheid. The Gleneagles Agreement, as it was called, effectively closed down South African sport. Non-Commonwealth nations showed solidarity by supporting the ban, which was relaxed only at the end of apartheid in 1990. No one has dared suggest a comparable ban on the Gulf states.

Freedom or Dereliction of Duty?

But this isn’t the only dilemma football has faced in recent weeks.

West Bromwich Albion player is among an unknown but probably sizeable number of professional football players who are opting not to get vaccinated against COVID-19. Robinson is worthy of attention because he’s contracted COVID twice, survived (obviously) and presumably decided the dangers of the virus are less significant than the potential side effects of the vaccine.

He isn’t, as far as we know, a QAnon affiliate, doesn’t subscribe to any known conspiracy theory and has not aligned himself with anti-vaccination campaigners. He enjoys the support of some teammates and not others. He is 26 and is probably expecting to play competitively for another 10 years, maybe more, if he avoids injury. His decision has drawn the ire of Liverpool manager , who says that footballers “are role models in society.” Currently, 16 to 29-year-olds are the most vaccine-hesitant demographic in the UK and elsewhere; Klopp is 54.

We can only use educated guesswork to divine the reasons so many professional athletes choose not to vaccinate. Their bodies are, in a sense, the tools of their trade and they have presumably made a cost-benefit calculation, recognizing that, given the brevity of the development and trialing of the vaccine compared to other pharmaceuticals, the medium-to-long-term side effects are unknown and, without the benefit of a time machine, unknowable at present.

In the US, the National Basketball Association (NBA), when confronted with a similarly reluctant percentage of players, compelled them to get vaccinated or face suspension without pay. The order worked: 95% of NBA players are now . Football’s governing organizations have eschewed this approach. FIFA instead issued a saying that “We encourage Covid-19 vaccinations.”

Depending on your perspective, this is either an admirable defense of freedom of choice or dereliction of duty. Those who believe the latter are maddened by football’s indecision, if that’s what it is. They consider public health a priority over personal freedom.

If FIFA had blocked the Newcastle takeover, people would probably accuse football of favoritism, pointing to the Manchester and Paris ownerships. If it followed the NBA mandate, people would accuse it of restricting freedom of choice. But football’s own piety invites these criticisms. Other sports see no need to make their moral philosophy so public, at least not as ostentatiously or in such a self-congratulatory manner. Why does football?  

No sport has struggled so painfully and for so long with racism, nor has any sport witnessed spectator violence on a comparable scale or duration. Bribery and corruption were once commonplace in boxing, but a 2015 expose revealed football’s epic history of venality and led to the removal of FIFA president Joseph “Sepp” Blatter.

Child abuse was once thought to exist only in gymnastics, but a recent found that it has been in football since at least the 1970s. Australia’s female players have recently of a” culture of sexual harassment.” 

No other sport in history has been as as football or, alas, manifested so many pernicious, multiform wrongdoings. Football constantly struggles to map its way out of a maze of malevolence. Its visible attempt to occupy the moral high ground is perhaps football’s attempt to place itself above suspicion, making its morality clear to everyone. It’s a bold move, but one with serious drawbacks. It puts football’s hypocrisy in plain sight.

[Ellis Cashmore is a co-editor of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Can Football Find a Way Out of a Moral Maze? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The shaky pillar is the Gulf monarchies’ reliance on a powerful external ally that, in the of Middle East scholar Roby C. Barrett, “shares the strategic, if not dynastic, interests of the Arab States.” In the first half of the 20^th century, the allies were Britain and France. Since then, the US has taken on the role. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, the revered founder of the United Arab Emirates, implicitly recognized Gulf states’ need for external support. In a to a book in 2001, he noted that the six monarchies that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) “only support the GCC when it suited them.”

Taiwan Becomes a Point of Strategic Ambiguity

READ MORE

Going forward, question marks about the reliability of the United States may be unsettling. Yet the emerging outline of what a future US approach could look like is not all bad news for the region’s autocratic regimes. There have been to dial down regional tensions and strengthen regional alliances. The factors driving this are the uncertainty over the US role in the region, the unwillingness of GCC states to integrate their defense strategies, a realization that neither China nor Russia would step into Washington’s shoes, and a need to attract foreign investment to diversify the Gulf’s energy-dependent economies.

Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and his Emirati counterpart, Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, are headed to Washington this week for a tripartite meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The three officials intend “to discuss accomplishments” since last year’s establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE “and other important issues,” Blinken . The Israeli Foreign Ministry those other issues include “further opportunities to promote peace in the Middle East” as well as regional stability and security, in a guarded reference to Iran.

Good News for the Gulf

From the Gulf’s perspective, the good news is also that the Biden administration’s focus on China may mean that it is reconfiguring its military presence in the Middle East. The US has  some assets from the Gulf to Jordan and withdrawn from Saudi Arabia, but it is not about to pull out lock, stock and barrel. Beyond having an interest in ensuring the free flow of trade and energy, Washington’s strategic interest in a counterterrorism presence in the Gulf has increased following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August. The US now relies on an “over the horizon” , for which the Middle East remains crucial.

Moreover, domestic US politics mitigate toward a continued, if perhaps reduced, military presence, even if Americans are tired of foreign adventures. This is despite the emergence of a Biden doctrine that deemphasizes military engagement. The focus of US foreign policy is also now on Asia rather than the Middle East.

Various powerful lobbies and interest groups — including Israelis, Gulf states, evangelists, and the oil and defense industries — retain a stake in a continued US presence in the region. Their voices are likely to resonate louder in the run-up to crucial midterm elections in 2022. A recent Pew Research concluded that the number of white evangelicals had increased from 25% of the US population in 2016 to 29% in 2020.

Similarly, the fading hope for a revival of the Iran nuclear deal, from which former US President Donald Trump withdrew in 2018, and the risk of a major military conflagration makes a full-fledged US military withdrawal unlikely. It also increases the incentive to continue major arms sales to Gulf Arab countries.

That’s further good news for Gulf regimes against the backdrop of an emerging US arms sales policy that the Biden administration would like to project as emphasizing respect for human rights and rule of law. However, that de facto approach is unlikely to affect big-ticket prestige items like the F-35 fighter jets promised to the UAE.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Instead, the policy will probably  to smaller weapons, such as assault rifles and surveillance equipment that police or paramilitary forces could use against protesters. Those are not the technological edge items where the US has a definitive competitive advantage. The big-ticket items with proper maintenance and training would allow Gulf states to support US regional operations. Examples include the UAE and Qatar‘s role in Libya in 2011 and also the UAE in Somalia and Afghanistan as part of peacekeeping missions.

Nothing to Worry About

In other words, the Gulf states can relax. The Biden administration is not embracing what some arms trade analysts define as the meaning of ending endless wars such as Afghanistan. “[E]nding endless war means more than troop withdrawal. It also means ending the militarized approach to foreign policy — including the transfer of deadly weapons around the world — that has undermined human rights and that few Americans believe makes the country any safer,” a group of experts in April.

There is little indication that the views expressed by these analysts, which stroke with thinking in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, are taking root in the policymaking corridors of Washington. As long as that doesn’t happen, Gulf states have less to worry about.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post It’s Not All Bad News for the Gulf appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Algeria to France: No Thanks for the Memories 

READ MORE

Yet within the current situation, an important question arises: How much change can happen with newly elected parliament members when interrelated issues such as governmental corruption, Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs and the presence of armed militias seem less likely to change?

Religion and Politics

To understand what is taking place in Iraq, it is necessary to look back at recent developments. After the dramatic upheaval with the war in 2003, Iraqis witnessed the rise of religious authorities engaging in political activities, which is when the so-called  agenda began to develop. In political theories, scholar Leo Strauss introduced the “theologico-political problem” as an issue of authority — that is, political authority founded on religious revelations. This theory can explain age-old problems and help analyze the dynamics and parameters of political  in the context of Iraq.

One significant issue that exists in Iraqi politics is the dominance of the Shia religious agenda in shaping the country’s affairs. Figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr, Ammar al-Hakim, Qais Alkhazaali and others are in charge. In fact, it is difficult to imagine or predict a change where Sunni or other secular political leaders arise, even within a climate of supervised fair elections.

This “theocratic” model has caused multiple predicaments that have worsened and complicated the existing conditions. It has simply proved dangerous. Such theologico-politicians who claim religious authority can be morally corrupt and disguised in a righteous mask. Yet such figures need to show they follow custom-interpreted religious doctrine. Their goal is to gain popular votes by convincing like-minded Iraqis of the importance of religion.

The consequences have intensified over the years. Theologico-political figures have established their own political parties and armed militias. The presence of militias in Iraq has become one of the most difficult issues to solve, particularly as militants operate autonomously with impunity. They have infiltrated government institutions where they have influence. They also maintain power and funding. Both of these issues make it difficult to dissolve such organized groups.

There has recently been an increase in assassinations, threats and targeting of “new” potential candidates, activists and proponents of change. In 2019, it was that a 700-name list was issued by the Iran-backed Shia militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) to target Iraqi journalists and activists, including those living overseas, who support the ongoing protests.

Iraqis Are Tired

The core problem of this theologico-politics is that its rhetoric is always divisive. In a religiously diverse country like Iraq, people of different faiths and sects should coexist and be considered in the decision-making process. This one-sect politics can never function when its agenda inherently dismisses, discriminates against and persecutes the “other” group.

But Iraqis are tired of this. The majority of Shia-led  oppose the government’s agenda and Iran’s interference in Iraq. The people do not want sectarian ruling anymore. The status quo favors Iran over Iraq’s interests to ensure long-term existence. Protesters have demanded basic infrastructure services and reform of issues exacerbated by Iranian meddling and accompanying governmental failures in all spheres. This includes a failing economy, widespread corruption, deteriorating health care and education systems and, most significantly, rising civil unrest.

In contrast to this new form of dictatorship — theologico-politics — what Iraq needs are conditions that support true liberal democracy, secularity and the separation of religion and state. However, this may seem implausible, especially when speculation over the election results seems more inclined toward the domination of Islamist politics.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post How Theological Politics Affects Iraq appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The United States and its G7 allies have on Saied to appoint a prime minister and restore parliamentary functions. Washington should seriously consider withholding military aid to urge the Saied administration to remain within existing constitutional limits and prevent any potential military crackdown against protesters.

Tunisia and the Gulf

WATCH

The Biden administration should similarly consider revoking Tunisia’s designation as a , which provides it military aid that Saied could use to suppress the opposition. US failure to meet this challenge would represent a severe blow to President Joe Biden’s abroad and would further diminish his administration’s credibility following the fall of Kabul to the Taliban last month.

For international observers of the Arab Spring, Tunisia was initially seen as a “” as the only country that had transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy during that period. However, 10 years after the overthrow of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, economic turmoil and political gridlock have worsened the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and have deeply polarized the Tunisian political landscape.

The current president, Kais Saied, was elected in 2019 as an independent candidate in a . The retired law professor’s appeal was his outsider status and his strident anti-corruption platform. However, he repeatedly clashed with the deeply divided Tunisian parliament, which has no . The Islamist Ennahda party, which is viewed by large swathes of the Tunisian public as and ineffective and has even been accused of two leftwing politicians, currently holds the most seats.

Following months of political stalemate and a worsening COVID-19 spike, Saied invoked emergency powers to dismiss his former prime minister, Hichem Mechichi, freeze parliamentary functions and use the police to target and . Saied has some for his actions given the widespread unpopularity of the parliament.

Consequently, the United States and the rest of the G7 must follow through on its urging a return to constitutional processes. It is essential that they challenge Saied’s increasing anti-parliamentarian actions, especially his reliance on the military to cement his rule, to prevent continued democratic backsliding in Tunisia.

Freedom House has repeatedly warned about an alarming systemic shift toward across the world, something which the Biden administration was aiming to address with its commitment to democracy promotion. However, events like the “” will begin to ring hollow if the United States and its allies do not take a stronger stand against democratic backsliding, such as in the case of Tunisia.

The primary option that is available to the Biden administration and US allies is reducing military aid to Tunisia until Saied enters a dialogue with the parliament. Although President Saied and his supporters have been to such suggestions and a mediation offer by a US Congress delegation has already been , the United States and its allies should increase their efforts to support dialogue.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Crucially, the influential Tunisian General Labor Union now openly Saied’s unilateral plan to create a new constitution, demonstrating that dialogue is necessary to resolve this crisis.

Revoking Tunisia’s major non-NATO ally designation will send a strong message and remove Tunisia’s privileged access to US military aid. The measure would reduce the possibility of Saied continuing to use the threat of military force against protesters, an 2,000 of whom have come out on Sunday in the capital to denounce the president’s power grab.

On September 29, Saied finally a new prime minister, Najla Bouden Romdhane — the first woman to hold that office — and asked her to form a new government, whose main task would be to “put an end to the corruption and chaos that have spread throughout many state institutions.” Despite these positive steps, the United States and its democratic allies should remain vigilant and ensure the crisis in Tunisia is dissolved in a peaceful and democratic manner.

*[51�Թ� is a  partner of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The US Must Keep Tunisia’s Slide Toward Autocracy in Check appeared first on 51�Թ�.

During this time, I have also learned a fair amount about military matters and various weapons systems, because they cost enormous amounts of money that could be put to much better use than killing and maiming people. But also because it’s hard to resist the absurd: The high-performance US F-35 fighter jet — at , the most expensive weapons system in US history — that costs $36,000 an hour to , shoots  and can decapitate pilots who attempt to bail out. There are, as well, the $640 toilet seats, the $7,622 coffee maker and the fact that the US Department of Defense cannot account for $6.5 trillion in spending.

What Is the Ruckus Over AUKUS?

READ MORE

I have also become fairly conversant with the major nuclear arms agreements, and I know what Article VI of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty says (more on this later).

This is a farewell column, so I ask for your indulgence. Having (hopefully) beaten back cancer, I have decided to spend more time with my grandkids and maybe return to my  (I have at least one more in my head). But I would like a last hurrah about what I have learned about the world and politics over that last half-century, so bear with me.

Wars Are Bad and Empire Is Delusional

First, wars are really a bad idea, and not just for the obvious reason that they cause enormous misery and pain. They don’t work, at least in the sense that they accomplish some political end.

The United States has finally withdrawn from Afghanistan and is contemplating getting out of Iraq. Both wars were disasters of the catastrophic variety. If anyone in the Oval Office or the Pentagon had bothered to read Rudyard Kipling on Afghanistan (“” comes to mind) and D.H. Lawrence on Iraq (the “” is worthwhile), they would have known better.

But the illusions of empire are stubborn. The US still thinks it can control the world when every experience of the past 50 years or more — Vietnam, Somalia, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq — suggests it can’t. Indeed, the last war we “won” was Grenada, where the competition was not exactly world-class.

Americans are not alone in the delusion of confusing the present for the past. The  are sending the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and a destroyer to the South China Sea — to do what? The days when Charles “Chinese” Gordon could scatter the locals with a few gunboats are long gone. What the People’s Republic will make of Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s nostalgia for Lord Nelson and Trafalgar is anyone’s guess, but Beijing is more likely to be amused than intimidated by a mid-size flat top and a tin can.

The Same Goes for Cold Wars

China is not conquer the world. It wants to be the planet’s biggest economy and to sell everyone lots of stuff. In short, exactly what Britain wanted in the 19^th century and the US wanted in the 20^th. The Chinese do insist on military control of their local seas, in much the same way that the US controls its east, west and southern coasts. Imagine how Washington would react to Chinese warships regularly exercising off Pearl Harbor, San Diego, Newport News or the Gulf of Mexico.

Are the Chinese heavy-handed about this? Yes, indeed, and they have unnecessarily alienated a number of nations in the region, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Japan. Demilitarizing the East and South China seas would reduce tensions and remove the rationale for Beijing’s illegal seizure of small islands, reefs and shoals in the area. China will have to realize that it can’t unilaterally violate international law through its claims over most of the South China Sea, and the US will have to accept that the Pacific Ocean is no longer an American lake.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Meanwhile, the Russians are coming! The Russians are coming! Actually, no they are not, and it is time to stop the silliness about Russian hordes  on the border ready to overrun Ukraine or the Baltic states. What those troops were doing late last spring was responding to a plan by NATO for a huge military exercise,  Russia is not trying to recreate the Soviet Union. Its economy is about the size of Italy’s, and the current problems stem from the profoundly stupid decision to move NATO eastward. The Russians are sensitive about their borders, with good reason.

We can thank Bill Clinton and George W. Bush for disinterring this particular aspect of the Cold War. Both presidents expanded NATO, and Bush unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and began deploying anti-missile systems in Poland and Romania. NATO claims the ABMs are aimed at Iran, but Iran doesn’t have missiles that can reach Europe and it doesn’t possess nuclear weapons. The Russians would be foolish to draw any other conclusion but that those ABMs are targeting Moscow’s missiles.

NATO has a zombie alliance, staggering from one disaster to another: first Afghanistan, then Libya and now the US is pressing NATO to confront China in Asia (which is unlikely — Europeans view China as an invaluable market, not a threat).

NATO should go the way of the Warsaw Pact, and the US should rejoin the anti-ballistic missile agreement. Removing the ABM missiles might, in turn, lead to reestablishing the, an extremely important treaty from which the US also unilaterally withdrew.

Apartheid Can’t Last Forever

Elsewhere, Israel needs to study some Irish history. In 1609, the native population of what became Northern Ireland was forcibly removed to Connaught in the island’s west and replaced by 20,000 Protestant tenants. Yet now, centuries later, the upcoming census is almost certain to show that Catholics once again constitute a majority in Northern Ireland.

The moral? Walls and fences and apartheid policies will not make the Palestinians go away or cause them to forget that much of their land was stolen.

In the short run, the right-wing Israeli settlers may get their way, just as the Protestant settlers did more than 400 years ago. But history is long, and the Palestinians are no more likely to disappear than the native Irish did. It would save a lot of bloodshed and communal hate if the Israelis removed the West Bank and Golan settlers, shared Jerusalem and let the Palestinians have their own viable state. The alternative? A one-state, one-person, one-vote democracy.

The US should also end Israel’s “special status.” Why are we not as outraged with apartheid in Israel as we were with apartheid in South Africa? Why do we ignore the fact that Israel has  When Americans lecture other countries about maintaining a “rules-based” world, can you blame them if they roll their eyes? Why is it “illegal” for Iran to acquire nukes when Tel Aviv gets a pass?

We Should Really Deal With Existential Threats More Often

The Biden administration is fond of using the term “existential” in reference to climate change, and the term is not an exaggeration. Our species is at a crossroads, and the time for action is distressingly short.

By 2050, some 600 million Indians will have inadequate access to water. Vanishing glaciers are systematically draining the water reserves of the Himalayas, the Hindu Kush, the Andes and the Rockies. While much of the world will face water shortages, some will experience the opposite, as Germans and Chinese recently discovered. Water is a worldwide crisis and there are few blueprints about how to deal with it, although the 1960 Indus Valley water treaty between India and Pakistan could serve as a template.

There is simply no way that the world can tackle climate change and continue to spend — according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — almost $2 trillion a year on . Nor can the US afford to support its empire of bases — some 800 worldwide, the same number as Britain had in 1885.

However, climate change is not the only “existential” threat to our species. Somehow nuclear weapons have dropped off the radar as a global threat, but currently, there are major nuclear underway involving China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia and NATO. The US is spending upward of $1 trillion  its nuclear triad of aircraft, ships and missiles.

Sanctions Don’t Work

Sanctions, as journalist Patrick Cockburn argues, are war crimes, and no country in the world applies them as widely and with such vigor as the United States. Our  have impoverished North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela and Syria and inflict unnecessary pain on Cuba. They raise tensions with Russia and China. And why do we apply them? Because countries do things we don’t like or insist on economic and political systems that we don’t agree with.

Washington can do it because we control the de facto world currency, the dollar, and countries that cross us can lose their ability to engage in international banking. The French bank BNP Paribas was forced to pay $9 billion in fines for bypassing sanctions on Iran. Yet sanctions have almost always failed to achieve their political objectives.

Self-Determination Is Good

Dear Spanish government: Let the Catalans vote in peace and accept the results if they decide they want to go their own way. Ditto for the Scots, the people of Kashmir and, sometime in the future, the Northern Irish. You can’t force people to be part of your country if they don’t want to be, and trying to make them is like teaching a pig to whistle: It can’t be done and annoys the pig.

If You Displace People, Offer Them Refuge (Then Stop Displacing People)

The US and NATO cannot destabilize countries like Afghanistan, Syria and Libya and then pull up the  when people flee the chaos those wars have generated.

Similarly, the colonial countries that exploited and held back the development of countries in Africa and Latin America cannot wash their hands of the problems of post-colonialism. And the industrial countries that destabilized the climate can’t avoid their responsibility for tens of millions of global warming refugees.

In any case, the US, Europe and Japan need those immigrants, because the depressed birth rates in developed countries mean they are heading for serious demographic trouble.

Hypocrisy Is Bad 

The world rightfully condemns the assassination of political opponents by Russia and Saudi Arabia, but it should be equally outraged when the Israelis systematically kill Iranian scientists, or when the US takes out Iranian leaders with a drone attack.

You don’t have the right to kill someone just because you don’t like what they stand for. How do you think Americans would react to Iran assassinating US General Mark Milley, the head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Less Exceptionalism. More Diplomacy.

The world desperately needs an international  to confront future pandemics and must guarantee that it includes the poorest countries on the globe. This is not mere altruism. If countries can’t provide health care for their residents, that should be the responsibility of the international community, because untreated populations give rise to mutations like the Delta variant of COVID-19. Ask not for whom the bells toll. It tolls for us all.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

American  is an albatross around our necks, blocking us from seeing that other countries and other systems may do things better than we do. No other country accepts that Americans are superior, especially after four years of Donald Trump, the pandemic debacle and the January 6 insurrection in Washington. Who would want the level of economic inequality in this country or our prison population, the highest in the world? Is being 44^th on the World Press Freedom Index or 18^th on the Social Progress Index something we should take  What we can take pride in is our diversity. Therein lies the country’s real potential.

Finally, to of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” Amen.

Two and Two and 50 Make a Million

Pie in the sky? An old man’s wish list?

Well, the one thing I have learned in these past 50-plus years is that things happen if enough people decide they should. So, to quote that rather clunky line from Pete Seeger’s “One Man’s Hands,” sung widely during the ‘60s peace movement: “If two and two and 50 make a million, we’ll see that day come ‘round.”

And that’s all folks (for now).

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Lessons From 50 Years of Covering Foreign Policy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Youth activism and empowerment have a rich history in Yemen. Youth activism became a bustling part of civil society during the Arab Spring of 2011. At that time, demonstrations at change squares and protest camps gave young Yemenis a place to meet and discuss their hopes and demands for human rights. A number of youth-led organizations were founded, carrying out advocacy, media reporting and monitoring. 

Chaos Makes a Comeback in Southern Yemen

READ MORE

As the regime led by Ali Abdullah Saleh came to an end in 2012, the transitional government that took over Yemen made incredible steps to engage youth populations in the national dialogue. A technocratic  was formed in 2014 that “drew heavily from youth leaders,” many of whom were given a generous amount of access to decision-makers. The institutional progress made during this time has since been abandoned. However, the spirit of Yemeni youth activists lives on in the actions of youth leaders today. 

Yemen’s war has spared no one, not even its children. The in the country worsens as fighting continues between the internationally recognized, Saudi-backed Yemeni government and Houthi rebels. The war has resulted in the complete breakdown of government services and the destruction of critical infrastructures, such as hospitals, schools and roads. 

What Are Youth Doing?

Although the war is not over, Yemeni youth activists are building support for their number one : peace. They are combining humanitarian initiatives with development components to create a sustainable approach to peacebuilding. This advocating for small businesses like food carts and home-delivery kitchens, using skills in social media to raise awareness for public health and safety issues, and designing graphics to show how to avoid contaminated water or where landmines may be located. 

Youth activists are creating a culture of trust and community, especially among vulnerable populations where networks of support might have otherwise collapsed during the conflict. In the event that funding no longer sustains humanitarian aid, these programs and businesses will continue to support Yemenis. Through the creation of opportunity and family support, Yemeni youth are keeping alive the fabric of society necessary to achieve long-term stability. 

The youth empowerment initiatives that Yemeni activists organize similarly seek peace. The most immediate goal of these initiatives is to offer an alternative to fighting in the conflict. These initiatives champion the of youth empowerment: for young people to develop skills, awareness and opportunities that will positively impact their lives toward a future they have chosen. 

Yemeni youth activists are combating unemployment and providing livelihood , protecting young people from conflict and further polarization and also maintaining security. These activists have shown great adaptability and  in presenting an alternative future to young people where they are able to have agency over their lives. 

Involving Young Yemenis

Those in positions of power should not wait until the conflict is over to integrate young Yemeni leaders into the peacebuilding process. Integral work is being done by young activists every day. Not involving this group in the political process further marginalizes and silences the voices of community members suffering from the conflict. Yemeni youth are the future of the country and should have consistent access to decision-making. 

Engaging youth in peacebuilding  “serves to address their feelings of fear, isolation, hopelessness, stigmatization, and in turn, contributes to the overall security of the community.” Young leaders will not only be able to feel a sense of agency over their own lives but over the peace process as well. They become active players in their nation’s history rather than passive victims of war. When they become the leaders of Yemen, they will have developed the necessary skills to care for the people of Yemen. 

The war has blocked all forms of for Yemeni youth, a critical space to share their ideas. It is essential that leaders and international actors do not silence them altogether. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Young Yemenis Lead the Way for Peacebuilding appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Do we start with the 1967 conflict that resulted in Israel occupying Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, along with the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula? Or do we go back to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War — what the Israelis call the War of Independence and the Palestinians the Nakba, or catastrophe? Or do we need to rewind further back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration, a British of intent for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”? Or do we go all the way to the First Zionist Congress, convened in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897 amidst a wave of anti-Semitism rising across Europe?

The debate about the origins of the conflict goes on to this day. Regardless of the debate, the current situation in Israel and the Palestinian Territories has become unsustainable.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Israel continues its crippling blockade of Gaza and the occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which Palestinians see as the capital of their future state. When Hamas, the Palestinian faction that controls Gaza, fires rockets into Israel, the Israelis retaliate with what has been described by many as a “” use of force. The human rights abuses perpetrated against Palestinians living under Israeli control have led to accusations of apartheid by organizations like and .

The construction of Jewish settlements on occupied Palestinian territory, which is considered under international law, has made a Palestinian state effectively impossible. At the same time, an estimated half of the Palestinian population lives Palestine. Millions of refugees and their descendants — most of whom were exiled in 1948 — are stuck stateless in camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. The wider Palestinian diaspora is scattered around the world.

With the peace process at a stalemate following years of failure, the end to this conflict is nowhere in sight.

In this edition of The Interview, 51�Թ� talks to Avi Shlaim, professor emeritus of international relations at the University of Oxford and author of “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World.” He explains what lies at the core of the conflict, the problem with the peace process, apartheid, US support for Israel and more.

Abul-Hasanat Siddique: At some media outlets, there is often a lack of historical context when it comes to Israel and Palestine. Some readers may think that the conflict began in 2021 with the recent clashes or in 1967 with the Six-Day War. If you had to explain the origin of the conflict, what would you say? Where do the roots lie?

Avi Shlaim: The core and the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the Zionist-Palestinian conflict. This conflict has been going on for over a century. There was one land and two national movements: the Palestinian national movement and the Jewish national movement, or the Zionist movement. Two peoples, two nations and one land. This is what the conflict is about.

In the late 1930s, the neighboring Arab states intervened in this conflict on the side of the Palestinians. They remained engaged in varying degrees until President Sadat of Egypt visited Jerusalem in 1977, signed a peace treaty with Israel and led the trend towards Arab disengagement from the conflict. So, there are two levels to this conflict, two dimensions: the local one, the Jewish-Palestinian, and the interstate level of the conflict.

The great turning point of the conflict was 1948, which Israelis call the “War of Independence” and Palestinians call the Nakba, or the catastrophe. The outcome of this war was that three-quarters of a million Palestinians — more than half of the population — became refugees and Palestine was wiped off the map. These are the real roots of the conflict.

The next turning point was the Six-Day War in June 1967. In the course of that war, Israel trebled its territory. It captured the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank from Jordan and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. From now on, the Arab states had a direct stake in this conflict. They wanted to recover their occupied territories. In 1979, Israel gave back the Sinai Peninsula as the price for the peace treaty with Egypt. In 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel signed the Oslo Accord. The Oslo Accord did three things: the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist, Israel recognized the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people, and the two sides agreed to resolve all their outstanding differences by peaceful means.

Edward Said was the first Palestinian to launch an all-out attack on the Oslo Accord. The reason for this was that the Oslo Accord addressed the 1967 file but not the 1948 file. It was an agreement between Israel and the PLO  about the Palestinian territories captured by Israel in 1967. It did not deal with the roots of the conflict: the rights of the 1948 Palestinian refugees and the collective right of the Palestinian people to national self-determination.

Siddique: There is a long-running debate over whether the solution lies in two states — one Jewish, one Arab — or one democratic state for both peoples. I know your view has changed over time from a two-state to a one-state solution. What led to that?

Shlaim: For most of my adult years, I supported the two-state solution. The two-state solution did not offer the Palestinians absolute justice, but in world affairs, it is very rare to get absolute justice. It offered them relative justice or the most minimal national rights. It took the 1967 borders as the basis for a settlement between Israel, on the one hand, and an independent Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, with the capital city in East Jerusalem. This would have left Israel with 78% of Mandatory Palestine and the Palestinians would have only 22%. So, by signing the Oslo Accord, the PLO made a far-reaching concession and agreed to settle the conflict in return for a very small state alongside Israel.

There has always been, and there still is today, broad international support for a two-state solution. But that doesn’t take account of Israeli actions since 1967.  Israel did not stand still after the victory. Since July 1967, Israel has been building settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. It withdrew unilaterally from Gaza in 2005, but it continues to expand Jewish settlements on the West Bank even as we speak. If Israel had been serious about a two-state solution, at the very least it would have imposed a freeze on settlements to give negotiations a chance. But Israel continued to expand settlements. Settlements are about land-grabbing. Land-grabbing and peace-making don’t go together — it’s one or the other. By its actions since 1967, Israel indicated clearly its preference for land over peace with the Palestinians.

Another problem is that the Israeli so-called security barrier on the West Bank. The wall is not complete yet, but it’s already 650 kilometers long. The Palestinians call it the apartheid wall. The International Court of Justice has ruled that the wall is illegal. Israel would have been perfectly within its rights to build the wall on its side of the 1967 border, but most of this wall is on the Palestinian side. They say that good fences make good neighbors, but not when the fence goes down the middle of your neighbor’s garden! The wall annexes between 8% and 10% of West Bank territory to Israel and the wall goes around East Jerusalem and cuts it off from the West Bank. East Jerusalem has been annexed by Israel. The Palestinians in East Jerusalem don’t have citizenship, they have permanent residence, which is fragile and vulnerable and can be terminated at any moment by Israel.

To sum up, there is no longer the physical and geographical possibility of a viable Palestinian state. All that is left is an archipelago of Palestinian enclaves surrounded by Israeli settlements and Israeli military bases. In other words, Israel, by its actions on the ground, has killed the two-state solution, which was the solution that I used to favor.

Since Israel eliminated this option, what is the alternative? The best alternative I can think of is one democratic state, with equal rights for all its citizens, regardless of religion, gender or ethnicity. I do not regret the shift towards the one-state solution. What is wrong with a one-state solution with equal rights? It is a democratic solution. And what could be a nobler vision than a state that does not discriminate against any group and in which all citizens enjoy the same rights?

Siddique: Marwan Bishara, the senior political analyst at Al Jazeera, has spoken of whether the Palestinians need a Nelson Mandela-like figure. In such a scenario, an Israeli leader would also need to extend an arm. Yet this view doesn’t take into account the friction and opposition in both Israeli and Palestinian societies, nor does it address the influence of US politics and lobby groups. What would need to change for there to even be talk of a one-state solution — a democratic state for Arabs and Jews?

Shlaim: Palestinian leadership has always been a problem. Abu Mazen is a very weak leader: inarticulate, lacking in charisma, and lacking in legitimacy. So, he’s not a very convincing proponent of Palestinian national rights. Sadly, throughout their history, the Palestinians have had poor leadership, starting with Haj Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, then Yasser Arafat and then Abu Mazen. So, that is a problem: poor leadership on the Palestinian side.

But that is not the principal problem, because Abu Mazen is a moderate and the great majority of Palestinians are for a two-state solution — or at least they used to be. After the Oslo Accord was signed, roughly 70% of Palestinians and 70% of Israelis supported a two-state solution. But Oslo failed the Palestinians. The situation now is worse for the Palestinians than it was before Oslo.

What is the obstacle to one, democratic state? The main obstacle is the Israeli government: the Likud and parties further right than the Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu. Under American pressure, in the Bar-Ilan speech in 2009, Netanyahu said he would accept a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside Israeli. Since then, he has gone back on it and he has stated repeatedly that there would be no Palestinian state on his watch — he will oppose a Palestinian state all the way. More importantly, the Likud platform rejects a Palestinian state. The Likud has never accepted the need for a Palestinian state.

Further to the right is Naftali Bennett, the leader of Yamina, who replaced Netanyahu as prime minister in June 2021 at the head of a hybrid coalition. Bennett used to be the head of Yesha, the settlers’ council. He’s a religious-nationalist who fiercely opposes an independent Palestinian state in any shape or form. He used to advocate the outright annexation of Area C, which is 60% of the West Bank. 

In the present Knesset, 72 out of 120 members are right-wingers. This reflects a long-term trend. Israeli society has been moving steadily towards the right ever since the Second Intifada in 2000. Today, not just the government, not just the political elite, but Israeli society in general are strongly opposed to a one-state.

Siddique: You talked about Benjamin Netanyahu and Naftali Bennett, which leads me on to my next question. In 2013, you wrote that Netanyahu is “the double-faced prime minister who pretends to negotiate the partition of the pizza while continuing to gobble it up.” You have talked today about the problems with Oslo, including Edward Said and his criticism of the accord. Since the failure of Oslo, has Israel ever been interested in a peace deal, or has it been focused on eating that pizza and making a Palestinian state impossible?

Shlaim: Netanyahu never concealed his deep hostility to the Oslo Accords. After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the Likud came back to power in 1996 under the leadership of Netanyahu, who set about dismantling, freezing and subverting the Oslo Accord and building more settlements and strengthening Israel’s military power in order to continue to subdue the Palestinians indefinitely. In the last few years, Netanyahu’s message to the Israeli public has been that Palestinian nationalism has been effectively contained and neutralized and that the Palestinians are powerless, divided — with Hamas in charge of Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in charge of the West Bank — and therefore, there is no need to trade land for peace with them. His formula is peace for peace: to offer the Arabs peace in return for peace, without paying any territorial price.

With the help of Donald Trump and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner — who is very close to Netanyahu — Netanyahu was able to implement this policy and it took the form of the Abraham Accords: peace deals between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. These were great foreign policy triumphs for Netanyahu, and he said to the Israeli public: You see, I don’t have to pay any price — there is nothing the Palestinians can do and we are achieving normalization with the Arab world.

But with the escalation of violence in Israel and Gaza in May, this whole conception of peace has collapsed. The Palestinians did not remain passive. They put up robust resistance to the Israeli provocations in Al-Aqsa and the ethnic cleansing in Sheikh Jarrah, the Arab neighborhood of East Jerusalem.

These provocations eventually led Hamas to respond with rocket attacks. The last round of fighting was not confined to Gaza. There was a sense of outrage by Palestinians everywhere. There were also protests on the West Bank, in East Jerusalem, in Gaza, in the diaspora and, most importantly, within Israel itself.

Since 1948, an Arab minority remained inside Israel. Today, they constitute 20% of Israel’s population. These Palestinian citizens of Israel have the right to vote, but they are treated as second-class citizens. In the past, violent clashes only occurred in the occupied territories. Now, for the first time, clashes occurred inside Israel, particularly in the mixed cities of Jews and Arabs like Lydda. This is a kind of incipient civil war. As a result of Israel’s provocations, we got something like a unity intifada in which all Palestinians, wherever they are, are united in the determination to resist Israel’s occupation.

Siddique: Considering that clashes took place inside Israel, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Gaza was the main focal point, does that mean the peace-for-peace policy is unsustainable?

Shlaim: When he was prime minister, Netanyahu didn’t have a peace policy. Netanyahu does not believe in a peaceful solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. He has never believed in a peaceful settlement. He is the proponent of permanent conflict and he is a unilateralist. He thinks that Israel has to remain militarily strong, Israel has to retain the full support of the United States, and then the Palestinians would be impotent to do anything; the international community can criticize Israel as much as it likes, but there will be no practical consequences — no price for the occupation.

That’s his view. He doesn’t have an endgame, he doesn’t have a solution. His solution is Jewish supremacy based on Jewish military force. This is apartheid, because between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, there is one regime: the Israeli regime, which is all-powerful. And one ethnic group dominates the other. This is not a democracy; it’s an ethnocracy. Another word for ethnocracy is apartheid.

So, that is the position today. Both ��’T�������, the Israeli human rights NGO, and Human Rights Watch issued reports recently with that conclusion: that Israel is an apartheid state. To my mind, apartheid in the 21^st century is not sustainable. The focus in world politics has shifted from borders and sovereignty to human rights. That’s what people feel strongly about. If Israel continues to violate on a daily basis the human rights of the Palestinians, and to oppress them, it will gradually lose international support. This is already happening and it’s been happening for some time.

Israel’s savage bombardment of Gaza in May was a real turning point. It provoked protests around the world against the Israeli occupation and it has led to popular public reframing of the conflict. Before it was seen as a dispute between two parties over territory. Now it is seen as a case of racial injustice. The Palestinian cause became strongly linked to Black Lives Matter. In the demonstrations, people carried banners that said, “Palestinian Lives Matter.” There were posters that said, “Palestine Cannot Breathe.” Americans are beginning to see this conflict as similar to the racial injustice at home, where white policemen shoot and kill black people. That’s the way more and more people see the situation between Israel and the Palestinians.

There is also BDS — the boycott, divestment and sanctions — a global, grassroots, nonviolent movement against the Israeli occupation, which has been gathering more and more support and gaining more traction. Israel is really afraid of BDS and it has led a campaign to discredit BDS and its supporters as anti-Semites, which is rubbish. It is important to stress that BDS is a nonviolent movement and that all its main demands are ground in international law: an end to the occupation, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, equal rights for Palestinian citizens of Israel. Far from being an anti-Semitic movement, BDS is an anti-racist movement that espouses universal values of freedom and equality.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

I have been talking so far about the tide of popular opinion that is turning rapidly against Israel. But the position of Western governments has not changed. The position of the United States, Canada and the European Union is still completely biased in favor of Israel. The European Union, in particular, is really hypocritical because, officially, it supports a two-state solution and is committed to Palestinian rights, but in practice, it gives Israel all sorts of trading privileges and advantages. It does nothing to sanction Israel for its illegal settlements or its abuse of Palestinian human rights.

The policies of these Western governments are not going to change in the near future. Twelve European parliaments have recognized Palestine as a state but only one government, that of Sweden. The Irish parliament recently passed a resolution condemning Israel’s de facto annexation of the West Bank. The Irish foreign minister stated that the de facto annexation is just as bad and just as illegal as formal annexation. Ireland may well end up proposing EU sanctions against Israel. Let me point out this: Ireland was the first country to impose sanctions against apartheid South Africa. Today, Ireland is ahead of most other Western governments in its support for Palestinian rights. Today, the Irish flag is flying in Ramallah.

I believe that eventually, governments would follow their publics and modify their attitude towards Israel. America, in particular, may come to reassess its blind and unconditional support for Israel.

Siddique: Can all of these factors — Black Lives Matter, looking at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case of racial injustice, the apartheid label, the BDS movement, international public support, the public reframing of the conflict and political shifts like with Ireland — have an impact for Palestinian self-determination?

Shlaim: Growing popular support worldwide is not going to enable Palestinians to achieve independence and statehood. It is governments who make the decisions and the United Nations, which has overall responsibility for resolving international conflicts. But the actor that counts most in this conflict is the United States. Unless America shows real commitment to Palestinian statehood, it is not going to come about.

Since 1967, the Americans have arrogated to themselves a monopoly over the so-called peace process. They have excluded the Soviet Union and then Russia, the EU and the United Nations. They arrogated to themselves a monopoly over peacemaking. But they never delivered peace, they never pushed Israel into a settlement. The so-called peace process was all process and no peace, yielding no concrete results. It was a charade. In fact, it was worse than a charade because peace talks gave Israel just the cover it needs to continue to pursue its aggressive colonial project in the West Bank.

Americans like to think of themselves as honest brokers, but they are dishonest brokers. They are Israel’s lawyer, and you can’t be both Israel’s lawyer and a mediator. More than this, America is the enabler of the Israeli occupation. Without American support, American money, American military hardware, Israel would not be able to sustain the occupation. America gives Israel money, arms and diplomatic support. In the last 40 years, America has used the veto on the Security Council 42 times to defeat resolutions that are not to Israel’s liking. In effect, Israel has the power of veto on the Security Council. It doesn’t exercise it directly but through a proxy, its little friend, the United States of America. The Palestinians are not going to achieve statehood unless America moves from words about the two-state solution to deeds, to condition its support to Israel on real Israeli moves towards a settlement.

Siddique: Is it time for other nations, such as Arab and European, to join those efforts — so as to not give the United States a monopoly? Would they have an impact if they were part of the talks?

Shlaim: The European Union should be a player in bringing about a settlement, because the EU has real leverage with both parties. The EU is the main source of foreign aid for the Palestinian Authority, and Israel does 35% of its trade with the European Union. Last year alone, the total amount of trade between Israel and the EU was £31 billion [$42.7 billion].

The EU undoubtedly has this leverage with Israel, but it has never exercised it because it is not a unitary actor. It has 27 member countries, some of them are very pro-Israeli like Germany, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. These countries would most probably veto any resolution to impose sanctions on Israel. The EU has been ineffectual both because of its internal structure and because America has sidelined it. For the foreseeable future, it is likely to remain a payer, not a player.

The Arab world should be an important actor in all this because it has a direct stake in what happens in Palestine. Arab states also have a religious stake because Jerusalem is the third holiest city in Islam. But the Arab states have been pretty passive and totally ineffective when it came to the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

In fairness to the Arab states, it has to be pointed out that they have got a clear and unified position on the Palestine question. It was formulated in the Arab League summit in Beirut in March 2002, when a Saudi proposal was adopted unanimously and became the Arab Peace Initiative. The Arab Peace Initiative offered Israel formal peace and full normalization with all 22 member states of the Arab League, in return for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank with a capital city in East Jerusalem. This was the real deal of the century, not Trump’s phony deal. It gave Israel everything it had previously asked for, but Israel had to pay with land for peace. Israel completely ignored the Arab Peace Initiative.

Yet the Arab consensus on the Palestinian issue did not hold. There used to be a pretty general commitment to the Palestinian cause, but since the Oslo Accord when the Palestinians acted independently and signed a peace accord with Israel, the Arab states feel less bound to support the Palestinians. Particularly in the last four years, during the presidency of Donald Trump, the Arabs came under pressure to abandon the Palestinians. Trump’s idea was to have a united front of the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE against Iran. The price that the Gulf Arabs were expected to pay America in return for support against Iran was to ditch the Palestinians. This is what the countries that signed the Abraham Accords have done. They did bilateral deals with Israel, which was a stab in the back to the Palestinians.

Siddique: Have the Abraham Accords killed the Arab Peace Initiative indefinitely — even a tweaked version of it?

Shlaim: No, definitely not. The Abraham Accords have not killed and not modified in any way the Arab Peace Initiative. It remains on the table and the big prize is Saudi Arabia. Israel and President Trump hoped that Saudi Arabia would sign a peace accord with Israel, and that would have effectively been the end of the Arab Peace Initiative. Saudi Arabia, however, did not pronounce on the peace deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. It did not support it publicly nor did it follow suit. The Saudi foreign minister stated that Saudi Arabia remains committed to the Arab Peace Initiative and support for the Palestinians. And the Arab Peace Initiative is still the official position of the Arab League.

Siddique: You didn’t have much faith in Donald Trump’s ability to mediate a peace agreement. The Biden administration has faced criticism over its response to the latest conflict. Progressive politicians in the United States, such as Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib, have spoken out. Do you see hope that Joe Biden’s team would get the Palestinians and Israelis to talk, which they haven’t in many years?

Shlaim: I don’t have much hope in Biden breaking away from the traditional mold of American foreign policy, which is pro-Israeli. The default position of American administrations is to appease Israel. Biden has had a very long career in American politics, and he is one the strongest and most consistent supporters of Israel. He once stated that if Israel didn’t exist, America would help to invent it. He also said, on another occasion, that if he were a Jew, he would be a Zionist. He then corrected himself and said, “You don’t have to be a Jew to be a Zionist. I am a Zionist.” It is even worse than that because he is, by his own account, an unconditional Zionist.

Biden was vice-president for eight years under Barack Obama, which gave Israel a huge amount of aid. Particularly at the end of the administration, they signed a military aid deal worth $38 billion over 10 years. This annual grant of $3.8 billion in military aid is unconditional. Biden was one of the people who always refused to tie American aid to Israel to Israel’s respect for Palestinian human rights and international norms. That is still his position: his support for Israel is unconditional.

One recent manifestation of this was International Criminal Court’s decision to investigate war crimes in the Occupied Territories. Trump had imposed sanctions on the ICC judges because they threatened to investigate Israel. Biden has lifted the sanctions, but he’s still strongly opposed to any investigation of Israel by the ICC. The most disturbing manifestation of Biden’s bias in favor of Israel happened during the May crisis. Two things happened.

First, the Security Council, on three occasions, tried to issue a statement calling for an immediate ceasefire. Biden vetoed all three attempts. All three attempts were supported by the 14 other members of the Security Council. America alone stopped a declaration, a statement in favor of an immediate ceasefire. That tells you a lot. It tells you that Biden looked to Netanyahu, and Netanyahu wanted more time to do even more damage in Gaza. Biden gave him that extra time to do his worst.

Secondly, Biden authorized — without consulting Congress — when the fighting was going on, arms sales to Israel worth nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars, mostly precision munitions to fire on Gaza. In this instance, Biden paralyzed UN diplomacy and empowered Israeli militarism against the Palestinians.

Israel’s latest assault on the people of Gaza, like all its previous wars, inflicted death and devastation on Gaza but left the underlying problems completely unsolved. The use of military force does nothing to resolve what is essentially a political problem. If America takes the lead in resuming peace talks, which is not at all certain, Biden is unlikely to come up with any new ideas.

Biden is no longer representative even of his own party. Progressive members of the Democratic Party are critical of him and his conduct. The congresswomen that you mentioned and Bernie Sanders are now calling for an American arms embargo on Israel. This is unprecedented.

There is another factor at play in America: young, progressive Jews are increasingly disenchanted, even disgusted with Israel. Peter Beinart, who is the leading expert on this, estimates that AIPAC represents maybe 30% of American Jews and J Street roughly 70%. A growing number of young, American Jews are openly critical of Israel, critical of its human rights abuses, critical of the occupation, and they support a two-state solution. So, not only the American public has been turning against Israel, but Jewish opinion in America is also turning against Israel. Eventually, if not immediately, Biden would have to adjust to the new reality at home.

We have to remember that in America, Israel is not a foreign policy issue, it’s a domestic politics issue. The fact that there is such strong support for Israel throughout America, especially among Christian Evangelists, explains why America has been so biased in favor of Israel. But if the landscape in America continues to shift against Israel and in support of the Palestinians, official American foreign policy may eventually follow.

Siddique: That’s an interesting point you mention about Israel being a domestic issue, not a foreign policy issue. One final question for you, professor. For our readers who are interested in learning more about the conflict, which books and/or authors would you recommend?

Shlaim: I warmly recommend Ian Black’s “Enemies and Neighbours: Arabs and Jews in Palestine and Israel, 1917-2017” and Rashid Khalidi’s “The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017.” At the risk of sounding immodest, I would mention my own book, “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World,” a critique of Israeli policy towards the Arab world since 1948. But I should warn your readers that it is 900 pages long! In 1995, I published a Penguin book, a short paperback called, “War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History.” This is an easy introduction to the international politics of the Middle East, including the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

The best book I know on America and the Arab-Israeli conflict is by William B. Quandt and it is called, “Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967.” On the Arab world in general, I warmly recommend a book by Fawaz A. Gerges: “Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East.” This book was published by Princeton University Press in 2018, and it deals with the two main trends in Arab politics: Arab nationalism represented by Gamal Abdel Nasser and political Islam represented by Sayyid Qutb.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Roots of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Houthi rebels based in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, have made advances against pro-government forces in al-Baydha province. They have also pushed southern forces, Salafi factions and al-Islah affiliates out of southern districts. Houthis also claim to have defeated militants belonging to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), who fought alongside tribes, Salafis and pro-government forces.

Securing the Flow of Aid in Yemen

READ MORE

These claims come a year after the Houthis said they had cleared northeast al-Baydha of AQAP and Islamic State (IS) militants. These fighters are said to have moved into Abyan and Shebwa provinces. This has increased instability in areas where government troops allied with President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah face fierce opposition from southern security forces.

Southern Concerns

It has been nearly a year and a half of fighting in the oil-rich province of Mareb between Houthis and pro-government forces. Southerners fear that civilian officials and troops affiliated with al-Islah, a Sunni Islamist party, will withdraw and seek refuge in areas like Shebwa province. In addition, southerners have expressed concern over by AQAP-affiliated from al-Baydha into places like Mudiyah in northern Abyan province, as well as the southwest of Shebwa.

These militants claimed operations against Houthis in and southwest areas of al-Baydha, which border Abyan. The fighting there has subsided, with Houthis claiming control of territory around Homaiqan and areas near Bayhan. Claims of territorial gains by Houthis and have raised the alarm for southern forces, including the Security Belt Units (SBU) in Abyan that fought with pro-government troops. This was particularly the case following the arrest of linked to attacks on the SBU in and Aden.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of Hadi’s government today, and other southern allies believe the movement of forces from al-Baydha and Mareb into Abyan or Shebwa violate the and the 2020 for a coalition government. The build-up of troops without coordination under these agreements is a threat to a more comprehensive deal negotiated by Saudi Arabia to focus on the fight against Houthis across northern territories.

The influx of militants into areas like Mudiya, Abyan and new attacks on in places like Bureiqa in Aden worry southerners. The latter see the conflict expanding beyond clashes with military and tribal forces in Abyan loyal to President Hadi and troops under the direction of Vice-President Ali Muhsin and affiliated with al-Islah. Instead, they believe, the fight is now against a growing number of AQAP militants in the area.

Chaos and Refuge

For southerners, an influx of militants and al-Islah’s ambition to control the oil-rich Shebwa province bring back memories of radicalization and recruitment of Yemenis for the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s and the occupation of southern Yemen by northerners after the 1994 civil war. Islah-affiliated forces have increased their presence around the oil fields of Usaylan in northern Shebwa. They are also pushing to take control of the Belhaf LNG Terminal, which is currently protected by Shebwani Elite Forces that are pro-STC.

While the for autonomy remains excluded from UN-led peace talks, the STC is recognized by the Saudi-led coalition as a legitimate representative of southerners and allied forces charged with securing southern territory “under supervision of the coalition.” Since the Riyadh Agreement was signed, operations to stabilize southern provinces like Aden, Abyan and Shebwa have been obstructed by the and the amassment of Islah-affiliated troops east of Shoqra in Abyan.   

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

The build-up of government forces in Abyan and Shebwa is a result of both a retreat from al-Baydha and and efforts to reinforce troops inside Abyan province. The movement of forces into Abyan in 2020 violated the Riyadh Agreement. Government reinforcements have also escalated tensions with the SBU, further destabilizing this fragile environment.

Now, the retreat of troops from Mareb into northern Shebwa — some deployed to protect oil infrastructure — is seen as aiming to strengthen the presence of Islah and secure refuge in case Mareb City falls to Houthis. Southern forces have asked why government troops are retreating to Shebwa while Houthis advance through Murad and now .

In Abyan, the province is divided into three. First, the STC holds territory west of Shoqra along the coast to Lower Yafa, the border with al-Baydha and Lahj. Second, tribal forces and military units loyal to Hadi, who hails from Abyan, hold areas in northern Abyan bordering al-Baydha. Third, government troops, led by commanders affiliated with al-Islah and Ali Muhsin, hold territory east of Shoqra and along the border with Shebwa.

Official AQAP wires have claimed a number of operations against . Al-Qaeda has reportedly targeted government troops in , but it has yet to claim operations along the coast west of Shoqra. Without confirming specific links between AQAP militants and government forces, southerners are asking how militants can bypass security checkpoints and travel from western al-Baydha to Mudiya and then western Shebwa.

Misdirection and Refuge

Reports of a resurgence of AQAP in southern Yemen have been met with skepticism. As a consequence of escalating media wars, some observers claim labeling individuals as al-Qaeda militants is merely part of the demonization game between rivals. Yet confirmation via official online wires claimed by AQAP not only allows observers to navigate the media wars, but it also points to asymmetric tactics utilized by rivals to create chaos on the ground.

In recent months, AQAP has claimed a number of operations against Houthis in al-Baydha and southern forces in Abyan and Aden. Some operations have only been claimed or assigned to AQAP via social media and news outlets. Dr. Elizabeth Kendall of Oxford University has the current manifestations of AQAP as active, committed, pragmatic and fake. The origin and intent of the “fake” faction are what worries southerners, who view this as an instrument of misdirection in a battle to secure refuge for groups like al-Islah. This is primarily because many of the operations not claimed by AQAP target southern forces in areas of confrontation with government forces affiliated with al-Islah.

The timing of movement by AQAP militants across Abyan and Shebwa, coupled with increasing operations since the death of SBU counterterrorism chief in 2019, adds credibility to claims that the aim is to create chaos and cause the collapse of the Riyadh Agreement. In doing so, the story goes, confrontation would ensue between al-Islah-affiliated forces and southern factions over control of strategic territory in the south. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Chaos Makes a Comeback in Southern Yemen appeared first on 51�Թ�.

This is a myth of epic proportions. Conflict is not war, though wars are a part of conflict. Although wars are typically made up of many battles, a battle is not a war, and a war is not a conflict. Conflicts go on for decades and centuries and evolve, devolve, merges, morph, fizzle out, flares up, expand and shrink geographically, go from hot to warm to cold, and develop into hybrid forms.

360˚ Context: How 9/11 and the War on Terror Shaped the World

READ MORE

The most famous US war that is said to be lost, Vietnam, was actually won. It just took  Vietnam is a free-market country for all intents and purposes, a US ally with an extensive population exchange. All the wars that we claimed as victories were never won in the sense of this black-and-white model that we derive from World War II. Not even World War II was won in the sense of its own model.

It was not a clean cut. There were small pockets of resistance afterward. There are still neo-Nazis in Germany, where the US still has troops. Germany still battles the US on various fronts — political, economical and social. Yet no one says that the United States lost the war against Germany.

Conflict has a four-dimensional, never-ending spectrum that is partnered in a dance with peace. It consists of two bipolar points that are constantly in a fluid twirl together like one of those geospatial screen savers on your Compaq computer in 1998.

The Korean War was never won. The Cold War was . The First Gulf War was only won in the sense that Iraqi troops were pushed out of Kuwait. But the First Gulf War was only a battle within a larger conflict. The Second Gulf War — the Iraq War — consists of about four or more wars that all fall under the same umbrella of conflict.

When you speak to Iraqis, they make a distinction between the Invasion in 2003, the sectarian war and the fight against the Islamic State (IS). The fact that Americans insist on viewing the war in Iraq as a singular monolithic war is sadly due to their lack of attention, detail and the narrow-mindedness of the World War II syndrome.

Those that argue that the Afghan War was lost fail to understand the concept of conflict. The war in Afghanistan was never lost because it never began. It has continued in some fashion for centuries. The actors rotated through, changing names and ambitions. The Taliban may currently lay claim to political power and maintain some level of a monopoly of violence, but that is not universal. They maintain this status because we let them.

Make no mistake about it: There was never a moment in time that the US could not have removed the Taliban from the world map. However, moral obligations hindered this, given the massive number of civilian casualties it would have cost. So no, the Taliban and their cohorts at no point “beat” the US military and its NATO allies.

It may be argued that we failed to train the Afghan army. The same could be said of the  faced with IS, but today. Moreover, we did not fail at training the Afghan people. What the Taliban are confronted with, assuming they maintain power, is the same challenge every government or occupier in Afghanistan has always faced. The difference is that this isn’t the same Afghanistan of two decades ago.

For 20 years, we have vaccinated the Afghan population with concepts of freedom, education, work, opportunities, the English language and liberal thought. All the while, the Taliban showed their true colors by killing innocent people as a matter of policy and without remorse. The Afghans know the Taliban. They do not like them. They may not all be the greatest fans of having US or NATO troops in their country, but  definitively prefer a nation not run by the Taliban.

In the end, the US won the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, making it impossible for the Taliban to operate without making extreme concessions, at the very minimum. This is not to say there will be , but good luck to the Taliban ever surpassing the reach of the Afghan government achieved with the backing of the entire world. The Taliban may have the watches, but .

The Taliban, as we knew them pre-August 31, 2021, will never succeed. Like in Vietnam, the will of the people to have access to equality, justice, information, quality of life, connectivity, travel, education and business opportunities is and always will be greater than the violence-forced power of extremists. America always wins its wars because America is not a country — it is an , and you cannot kill an idea.

*[This article originally appeared on the author’s page.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post How America Won the War in Afghanistan appeared first on 51�Թ�.

That was the story that grabbed headlines at the beginning of August. Hardly a week later, everything had changed. Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, fell to the Taliban and soon the 20-year war would be declared over.

360° Context: How 9/11 and the War on Terror Shaped the World

READ MORE

Though few paid attention to the phenomenon, this also meant that the significance of a commemoration of the attacks, would be radically different. For 19 years, the commemoration served to reinforce the will and resolution of the nation to overcome the humiliation of the fallen twin towers and a damaged wing of the Pentagon.

Redefining the Meaning of the Historical Trauma

In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, politicians quickly learned to exploit the date as a painful reminder of a tragedy that had unified an otherwise chaotically disputatious nation in shared horror and mourning. Ever since that fatal day, politicians have invoked it to reinforce the belief in American exceptionalism.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

The nation is so exceptional in generously providing its people with what President George W. Bush “our freedoms” — and which he identified as the target of the terrorists — that it was logical to suppose that evil people who didn’t possess those freedoms or were prevented from emigrating to the land of the free would do everything in their power to destroy those freedoms. To the degree that Americans are deeply thankful for possessing such an exceptional status, other ill-intentioned people will take exception to that exceptionality and in their unjustified jealousy will threaten to destroy it.

On a less philosophical and far more pragmatic note, the remembrance of the 9/11 attacks has conveniently and consistently served to justify an ever-expanding military budget that no patriotic American, interested in preserving through the force of arms the nation’s exceptional status, should ever oppose. It went without saying, through the three previous presidencies, that the annual commemoration provided an obvious explanation of why the forever war in Afghanistan was lasting forever.

The fall of Kabul on August 15, followed by the panicked retreat of all remaining Americans, caught everyone by surprise. It unexpectedly brought an official end to the war whose unforgettable beginning is traced back to that bright September day in 2001. Though no one has yet had the time to put it all in perspective, the debate in the media has shifted away from glossing the issues surrounding an ongoing war on terror to assessing the blame for its ignominious end. Some may have privately begun to wonder whether the theme being commemorated on this September 11 now concerns the martyrdom of its victims or the humiliation of the most powerful nation in the history of the world. The pace of events since mid-August has meant that the media have been largely silent on this quandary.

So, What About Saudi Arabia?

With the American retreat, the controversy around Biden’s unkept campaign promise concerning Saudi Arabia’s implication in 9/11 provisionally took a backseat to a much more consequent quarrel, one that will have an impact on next year’s midterm elections. Nearly every commentator has been eager to join the fray focusing on the assessment of the wisdom or folly of both Biden’s decision to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan and his seemingly improvised management of the final chaotic phase.

The human tragedy visible in the nightly news as throngs of people at Kabul airport desperately sought to flee the country easily eclipsed the genteel but politically significant showdown between a group of American citizens demanding the truth and a government committed to protecting the reputations of friends and allies, especially ones from oil-rich nations.

The official excuse turns around the criterion that has become a magic formula: national security. But the relatives of victims are justified in wondering which nation’s security is being prioritized. They have a sneaking suspicion that some people in Washington have confused their own nation’s security with Saudi Arabia’s. Just as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt not long ago that plenty of people within the Beltway continue to confuse US foreign policy with Israel’s, the families may be justified in suspecting that Saudi Arabia’s interest in hiding the truth trumps American citizens’ right to know the truth.

To appease the families of 9/11 victims and permit his unimpeded participation in the commemorations, Biden offered to release some of the documents. It was a clever move, since the new, less-redacted version will only become available well after the commemoration. This gesture seems to have accomplished its goal of preventing an embarrassing showdown at the commemoration ceremonies. But it certainly will not be enough to satisfy the demands of the families, who apparently remain focused on obtaining that staple of the US criminal justice system: “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.”

Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, may have shown the way concerning the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. Like MBS, the White House prefers finding a way to release some of the truth rather than the whole truth — just the amount that doesn’t violate national security or tarnish the reputations of any key people. Those two goals have increasingly become synonymous. If the people knew what actual political personalities were doing, the nation’s security might be endangered, as the people might begin to lose faith in a government that insists on retaining the essential power of deciding how the truth should be told.

Here is how the White House the legal principle behind its commitment to unveiling a little more truth than is currently available. “Although the indiscriminate release of classified information could jeopardize the national security — including the United States Government’s efforts to protect against future acts of terrorism — information should not remain classified when the public interest in disclosure outweighs any damage to the national security that might reasonably be expected from disclosure.”

The White House has thus formulated an innovative legal principle brilliantly designed to justify concealing enough of the naked truth to avoid offending public morals by revealing its stark nakedness. Legal scholars of the future may refer to it as the “indiscriminate release” principle. Its logical content is worth exploring. It plays on the auxiliary verbs “could” and “should.” “Could” is invoked in such a way as to suggest that, though it is possible, no reasonable person would take the risk of an “indiscriminate release of classified information.” Later in the same sentence, the auxiliary verb “should” serves to speculatively establish the moral character of the principle. It tells us what “should” be the case — that is, what is morally ideal — even if inevitably the final result will be quite different. This allows the White House to display its good intentions while preparing for an outcome that will surely disappoint.

To justify its merely partial exposure of the truth, the White House offers another original moral concept when it promises the maximization of transparency. The full sentence reads: “It is therefore critical to ensure that the United States Government maximizes transparency.”

There is of course an easy way to maximize transparency if that is truly the government’s intention. It can be done simply by revealing everything and hiding nothing within the limits of its physical capability. No one doubts that the government is physically capable of removing all the redactions. But the public should know by now that the value cited as overriding all others — national security — implicitly requires hiding a determined amount of the truth. In other words, it is framed as a trade-off between maximum transparency and minimum concealment. Biden has consistently compared himself to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Perhaps that trade-off between transparency and concealment is what historians will call Biden’s New Deal.

But the White House’s reasoning is not yet complete. The document offers yet another guiding principle to explain why not everything will become visible. “Thus, information collected and generated in the United States Government’s investigation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks should now be disclosed,” it affirms, “except when the strongest possible reasons counsel otherwise.” Those reasons, the document tells us, will be defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation during its “declassification reviews.” This invocation of the “strongest possible reasons” appears to empower the FBI to define or at least apply not only what is “strongest,” but also what is “possible.” That constitutes a pretty broad power.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

The document states very clearly what the government sees as the ultimate criterion for declassification: “Information may remain classified only if it still requires protection in the interest of the national security and disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security. Information shall not remain classified if there is significant doubt about the need to maintain its classified status.” The families of the victims can simply hope that there will not be too much “significant doubt.” They might be forgiven for doubting that that will be the case.

One September Morning vs. 20 Years of Subsequent Mornings

Twenty years ago, a spectacular crime occurred on the East Coast of the United States that set off two decades of crimes, blunders and judgment errors that, now compounded by COVID-19 and aggravated climate change, have brought the world to a crisis point unique in human history.

The Bush administration, in office for less than eight months at the time of the event, with no certain knowledge of who the perpetrator might have been, chose to classify the attack not as a crime, but as an act of war. When the facts eventually did become clearer after a moment of hesitation in which the administration attempted even to implicate Iraq, the crime became unambiguously attributable, not to a nation but to a politically motivated criminal organization: Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda that back then was operating out of Afghanistan, which was ruled by the Taliban.

The administration’s choice of treating the attack as an act of war not only stands as a crime in itself, but, as history has shown, as the trigger for a series of even more shameless and far more destructive — if not quite as spectacular — crimes that would roll out for the next two decades and even gain momentum over time. Had the 9/11 attacks been treated as crimes rather than acts of war, the question of national security would have had less importance in the investigation. By going to war with Afghanistan, the Bush administration made it more difficult to investigate all the possible complicities. Could this partially explain its precipitation to start a war?

Bin Laden, a Saudi, did not act alone. But he did not act in the name of a state either, which is the fundamental criterion for identifying an act of war. He acted within a state, in the territory of Afghanistan. Though his motive was political and the chosen targets were evocatively symbolic of political power, the act itself was in no way political. No more so, in any case, than the January 6 insurrection this year on Capitol Hill.

Though the facts are still being obscured and the text describing them remains redacted in the report of the 9/11 Commission, reading between the redacted lines reveals that bin Laden did have significant support from powerful personalities in Saudi Arabia, many of them with a direct connection to the government. This foreknowledge would seem to indicate at some level of the state.

On this 20^th anniversary of a moment of horror, the families of the victims quite logically continue to suspect that if a state was involved that might eventually justify a declaration of war by Congress (as required by the US Constitution), the name of that state should not have been Afghanistan, but Saudi Arabia. It is equally clear that the Afghan government at the time was in no way directly complicit.

When the new version of the 9/11 Commission’s report appears with its “maximum transparency,” meaning a bare minimum of redaction, the objections of the victims’ families will no longer be news, and the truth about the deeper complicities around 9/11 will most probably remain obscured. Other dramas, concerning the state of the COVID-19 pandemic, the increasingly obvious consequences of climate change and an upcoming midterm election will probably mean that next year’s 21^st commemoration will be low-keyed and possibly considered unworthy of significant mention in the news.

In 2021, the world has become a decidedly different place than it has been over the past two decades. The end of a forever war simply promises a host of new forever problems to emerge for increasingly unstable democracies to deal with.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post 9/11 and the American Collective Unconscious appeared first on 51�Թ�.