Amoss and Olmert view the reported deal as a turning point. The US appears increasingly focused on avoiding economic disruption and regional escalation rather than pursuing earlier goals such as regime change in Iran or the dismantling of Tehran’s broader regional network. For Israel, the consequences extend beyond Iran itself and raise deeper questions about national strategy, diplomacy and relevance.

A perceived defeat for Israeli strategy

Olmert says the agreement reflects Washington’s determination to avoid a wider confrontation. He contends that concerns about global economic stability, particularly the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, pushed the Trump administration toward compromise. In his view, key issues that previously justified confrontation with Iran have largely been set aside.

The result is a sense of strategic disappointment in Israel. Amoss describes the situation as a “disaster” and a “big failure” of Israeli strategy. Nearly three years after the infamous October 7 attacks, Israel still lacks clear resolutions regarding Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran.

The discussion repeatedly distinguishes between tactical and strategic success. Both guests acknowledge Israel’s military effectiveness and intelligence capabilities. However, they argue that operational achievements have not translated into lasting political gains. As Amoss puts it, “We don’t have strategy, we don’t know where we are going.”

Netanyahu and the limits of dependence on Washington

Olmert criticizes Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s management of the US–Israel relationship. Olmert argues that Netanyahu made a fundamental mistake by relying too heavily on Trump and narrowing Israel’s diplomatic options.

Drawing on his experience working with former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Olmert contrasts previous Israeli leaders’ willingness to negotiate forcefully with Washington against what he sees as Netanyahu’s excessive dependence. He argues that Israel has lost leverage by assuming that its interests would automatically align with those of the Trump administration.

The guests also discuss changing perceptions across the Middle East. Regional actors increasingly recognize that major decisions are made in Washington rather than Jerusalem. According to Olmert, this reality weakens Israel’s diplomatic standing and encourages countries to focus their attention on the US instead.

Singh broadens the discussion by highlighting shifting attitudes toward Israel in the US. He notes growing criticism from both the political left and right. Concerns about Palestinian rights, prolonged conflict and Israeli influence on US policy have combined to erode what was once broad bipartisan support.

Regional challenges from Gaza to Lebanon

Then, Amoss examines Israel’s wider regional position. She argues that neither Lebanon nor Syria can be addressed effectively without resolving the situation in Gaza. She states that the region remains trapped in overlapping crises that reinforce one another.

Olmert is particularly critical of US policy toward the Lebanese Islamist paramilitary group, Hezbollah. He argues that Washington missed opportunities to weaken the group more decisively by prioritizing regional stability over military outcomes. Though military operations cannot eliminate ideologies, they can significantly weaken the organizations promoting them.

Both Amoss and Olmert express frustration with what they see as a lack of strategic clarity. Israel remains engaged across multiple fronts while struggling to define long-term objectives. Amoss uses the Hebrew word balagan, meaning “mess” or “chaos,” to describe the situation.

Additionally, Amoss touches on Israel’s declining ability to explain its position internationally. Israeli public diplomacy has become increasingly ineffective as global perceptions harden. The challenge, she suggests, is not simply communication but the absence of a convincing strategic vision.

Competing visions for Israel’s future

Despite their shared concerns, Amoss and Olmert offer different prescriptions for the future.

Amoss emphasizes economic integration and regional connectivity. She points to the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor as a potentially transformative project that could strengthen ties among Israel, India, the Gulf states and Europe. By becoming an essential hub for trade, energy and technology, Israel could regain strategic relevance through cooperation.

Olmert supports greater regional engagement but focuses more heavily on demographic and societal renewal. Rising anti-Semitism in Europe and North America could encourage increased Jewish immigration to Israel. He believes such an influx would bring new energy, ideas and leadership to a society struggling with political stagnation.

The discussion concludes with a notable contrast in outlook. Olmert remains optimistic that the crisis can generate renewal and that Israel can adapt to changing circumstances. Amoss is less convinced, expressing skepticism that large numbers of people will choose to relocate to a country facing persistent security challenges and political uncertainty.

Amoss and Olmert portray Israel at a crossroads. The reported US–Iran agreement serves not only as a test of regional diplomacy but also as a reminder that Israel’s future may depend less on military victories than on its ability to develop a coherent long-term strategy in an increasingly multipolar world.

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On previous occasions, missile were treated as predictable, and stockpiles were estimated within acceptable margins. Furthermore, adversaries were expected to operate within known constraints, as even confrontation followed patterns that intelligence agencies had learned to anticipate.��

Such assumptions are now , not in isolation but across multiple dimensions at once. This is evident in the reported long-range strike toward Diego , regardless of operational outcome, which exposed how fragile those had become. Moreover, a base was positioned deliberately beyond the reach of regional actors only to be secured by distance alone. That distance, however, no longer appears sufficient.

For years, Iran signaled that its missile range was effectively capped at around kilometers. This was not a formal limitation, but it functioned as a strategic . It reassured capitals while preserving deterrence within the region. It created predictability.

The intelligence gap: when strategy lags behind the battlefield

The of wars has now been disrupted. Whether through technological , altered payload configurations, the use of proxy launch platforms, or external assistance, the apparent of reach suggests that prior intelligence frameworks were incomplete. The precise mechanism matters less than the implication. Systems built on those assumptions are no longer reliable.

This is not an isolated discrepancy. Pre-conflict of missile inventories now appear increasingly uncertain. The persistence and scale of launches that stockpiles were either underestimated, better concealed, or continuously replenished despite expectations to the contrary. The growing use of coordinated and missile attacks on shipping and infrastructure, often deployed in waves, has further complicated detection and interception. Air defense designed for more predictable threat patterns are being forced to adapt in real time.

At the same time, the expansion of maritime in the Red Sea and surrounding corridors has demonstrated how quickly conflict can extend beyond traditional battlefields. shipping has been rerouted around conflict zones, insurance costs have risen, and naval deployments have increased. In some areas, shipping traffic has sharply , yet no single actor fully controls the escalation dynamic. These developments reflect not just tactical , but a broader shift in how pressure is applied across domains. Each of these trends points to the same conclusion, as the war is evolving faster than it is being understood.

Furthermore, when intelligence lags behind reality, strategy becomes . Decisions are made on shifting assessments rather than a stable understanding. Under such conditions, escalation is not always intentional. It emerges from , misreading, and compressed timelines. This aforementioned structural uncertainty is being amplified by political inconsistency 

The perils of strategic ambiguity: when signals fail to constrain

In recent weeks, Washington has moved between signaling and preparing for expanded engagement. Statements suggesting de-escalation have been accompanied by continued military positioning and readiness. The coexistence of caution and coercion within the same strategic posture does not create flexibility but ambiguity.

However, at this level is not stabilizing as it complicates coordination and incentivizes worst-case assumptions for allies and adversaries, respectively. Additionally, in the case of the conflict itself, it narrows the space in which de-escalation can be credibly . When words and actions diverge, signaling ceases to function as a constraint.

The result is not one of controlled pressure, but cumulative . An instance in this regard constitutes Israel’s operational approach, symbolizing a parallel dynamic. The expansion of the battle-space to include infrastructure, proxy networks, and indirect targets may generate short-term tactical advantages. But it also increases the number of in play as each additional domain introduces new risks, new actors, and new pathways to escalation. Therefore, expansion is often treated as leverage as it frequently reduces control for all practical purposes.��

This volatility is further by the growing role of real-time intelligence systems and automated analysis tools. While these technologies accelerate data processing, they also compress decision timelines. Leaders are required to act faster, often on incomplete or rapidly changing information. The speed of interpretation has , but the stability of understanding has not. As a result, decision-making becomes more reactive, not more informed.

On a different note, the conflict is no longer confined to direct military exchanges. infrastructure and maritime routes have become central to global energy and to the logic of escalation. Threats surrounding the of Hormuz, disruptions in the Red Sea, and the of desalination and energy networks are no longer peripheral concerns. They are central to how escalation is being conducted. This is how wars expand without formal declarations.

At the same time, more actors are being drawn in indirectly. The UK’s of its regional posture following heightened tensions illustrates how quickly geographic distance is losing its protective value. European states may not seek direct , but they are increasingly exposed through energy dependence, trade flows, and strategic vulnerability.

Beyond control: when war outruns its structures 

Exposure is expanding faster than control. This is evident in the growing role of external support networks, whether , logistical, or informational, further the landscape. The conflict is no longer defined solely by its principal actors. It is shaped by a broader ecosystem that is more difficult to track and even harder to manage. This diffusion makes escalation less visible, but more unpredictable. The most dangerous phase of a war is not when it becomes more intense. It is when it becomes less intelligible.

Such a threshold is approaching. When intelligence become uncertain, when political signaling becomes inconsistent, and when operational boundaries expand faster than they can be managed, the conflict begins to lose its structure. It does not collapse into chaos. It becomes unpredictable.

As for , it alters the nature of risk. In predictable conflicts, escalation can be managed, even if imperfectly. In unpredictable ones, miscalculation becomes more likely, reactions accelerate, and feedback loops tighten. Actions taken for may be interpreted as preparation for escalation. Defensive moves may trigger offensive responses.

War ceases to be guided by strategy and begins to be driven by momentum. The assumption that this remains controllable depends on the belief that the systems managing it are still keeping pace, which is not the case. War is no longer just being fought. It is outrunning the intelligence, leadership, and structures meant to contain it. When such is the case, even powerful states lose control over outcomes they believe they are shaping.

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The latest war has also dealt a potentially fatal blow to our already battered democratic institutions. It’s a war neither by Congress nor by the public. Instead, it was launched by a president who refuses to submit to the law or heed the will of the people, claiming in true authoritarian fashion that he is the law, and that he alone embodies the popular will.

Such has, however, been decades in the making, a predictable result of longstanding imperial impunity. Yet we may rapidly be approaching a point of no return. Even US President George W. Bush, in launching his catastrophic of choice in the region, sought to manufacture consent and the case before the United Nations. Today, there is neither the pretense of legality nor of legitimacy.

The costs associated with this latest criminal war, measured in human lives; the misappropriation of national resources and the erosion of the rule of law will only continue to mount. Yet there is also a less visible, less immediate price tag for such wars. If the history of in the region offers any guide, the full bill will likely not become apparent for months, years or even decades. When it finally arrives, however, it will carry a familiar name: blowback.

For that reason, it’s important at this moment to recall the lessons Washington appears determined to forget. From Afghanistan to Iran, Iraq to , the record is unmistakable. Yet as long as the that grips this country’s political establishment remains unchallenged, the same cycles of escalation and reprisal will undoubtedly persist in the years to come, threatening to once again draw the United States (and much of the world) ever deeper into the abyss of forever war.

Oil and the engine of empire

While the post-September 11 “war on terror” is often invoked as the starting point of US militarism in the Middle East, the roots of conflict there stretch back nearly a century. The violence and instability unleashed after the attacks of September 11, 2001, represented less a rupture with the past than a continuation of long-established patterns of US policy. The seeds of the forever wars had, in fact, been planted decades earlier in the oil-rich soil of the region.

Direct American involvement began in the previous century, during the years between World War I and World War II. By that point, petroleum had become not merely a valuable commodity but a for sustaining a modern industrial economy. The vast oil reserves discovered in the US had propelled the American economy to global prominence and played a decisive role in fueling the Allied during World War I. Yet policymakers in Washington understood that domestic reserves were finite. As petroleum became synonymous with power, economically, militarily and politically, the US increasingly turned abroad to secure new sources.

The Middle East emerged as a critical frontier in that search, drawing the region ever more tightly into the orbit of an expanding American empire. In 1933, Company of California secured an exploratory concession with the conservative monarchy of Saudi Arabia. The agreement created the Arabian American Oil Company, laying the for the 1945 US–Saudi oil-for-security that would become central to Washington’s future influence over the region’s geopolitical order.

Over the years, the insatiable thirst for oil only drew the US ever deeper into the region. By 1953, American intervention assumed more overtly coercive forms. That year, in coordination with British intelligence, the CIA orchestrated the of Mohammad Mossadegh, ��������’s popular prime minister, who had committed a cardinal sin in the emerging Cold War years. In 1951, he presided over the nationalization of his country’s oil industry in an effort to return sovereign control of its resources to the Iranian people by wresting them from the exploitative grip of the Anglo-Iranian Oil , the precursor to .

Despite his rather than communist credentials, a fact understood in Tehran, London and Washington, Mossadegh would then be cast as, at worst, a dangerous proxy of the Soviet Union and, at best, a threat to regional stability (as in, American hegemony). The coup that followed ended ��������’s fragile democratic experiment, secured to Iranian oil for Western companies, and restored the Shah of Iran to power. His regime would then be sustained by a steady outward flow of oil and a nearly endless of US weaponry. With CIA backing, his secret police, , would terrorize and torture a generation of Iranians.

Yet Washington celebrated this new arrangement, claiming that Iran had been transformed into an “ of stability,” and a cornerstone of the “ strategy,” in which Washington would outsource regional Cold War policing to compliant authoritarian allies in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Such subversion of nationalist movements and support for despotic monarchies, as well as the increasingly unequivocal of Israel, would generate intense backlash. Among the most visible early expressions of that was the oil crisis, demonstrating how US policy in the Middle East could reverberate domestically.

But the first unmistakable case of blowback arrived in 1979 with the . In that country, discontent had been simmering beneath the seemingly stable façade of the Shah’s rule for years. When the monarchy collapsed after months of protests and repression, the Islamic Republic would fill the political vacuum, drawing on the theological language of and the political rhetoric of to the Shah, the US and Israel.

In the US, those developments were largely stripped of their historical context. Americans were instead cast as the innocent of irrational fanaticism. Why do they hate us? was the refrain that echoed across the Western media and the answers offered rarely confronted the long history of intervention and exploitation. Instead, they defaulted to a supposed with Islam, which was portrayed as inherently antagonistic to “Western values.”

Such explanations obscured an uncomfortable reality — that the US had repeatedly undermined democracy across the region (as well as in of the world) to advance its own interests. As a Pentagon commission report in 2004 , the problem was not that people “hate our freedoms,” as Bush had reductively , but that many “hate our policies.” In other words, the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon in Washington were the ultimate, if deeply disturbing, expression of blowback.

Revolution and counterrevolution in the Persian Gulf

Those widely resented policies from Washington were reinforced by its overreaction to the 1979 upheaval in Iran. That country’s new leader, , sought not only to transform Iranian society internally but envisioned the Islamic Republic as the opening move in a broader anti-imperialist struggle across the Middle East. For Washington and its reactionary regional allies, the specter of such potential revolutionary contagion posed a profound threat.

In January 1980, in an attempt to contain the Iranian regime, US President Jimmy Carter articulated a new foreign policy position that placed the US on a collision course in the region. The declared the Persian Gulf a “” of the US, warning that any attempt by an outside power to gain control would be repelled by “any means necessary, including military force.” In that fashion, Washington asserted an explicit claim to a protectorate thousands of miles from its shores. The US, Carter made clear, was prepared to send soldiers there to ensure uninterrupted access to oil.

The strategic reorientation that followed proved violent and far-reaching, while marking a shift away from and as the principal theaters of Cold War conflict. As historian Andrew Bacevich observed in his , America’s War for the Greater Middle East if you were to measure US involvement by the number of troops killed in action, the transformation was striking. From the end of World War II to 1980, almost no American soldiers were killed in the region. Since 1990, however, virtually none have been killed anywhere except in what Bacevich termed the “Greater Middle East.”

Measured in American lives alone, the subsequent costs would number in the thousands. Measured in civilians killed across the region, the toll would be . Over the past several decades US-led or -backed wars have contributed to the deaths of of people and the displacement of of millions more, producing one of the most devastating population catastrophes since the end of World War II.

Proxy wars and the escalation trap

The American shift toward the Middle East ensured that the US would become deeply entwined in a cascade of conflicts. As regional actors moved either to defend a fragile status quo or exploit the upheavals that followed, Washington began instigating new conflicts in the region.

In the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein the new government in Tehran on ideological and strategic grounds. The emergence of a revolutionary Shi’a state next door threatened his Sunni-dominated regime that ruled over a Shi’a majority in Iraq. At the same time, Saddam sought to what he perceived to be Iranian weakness, pressing longstanding revanchist claims to the oil-rich borderlands of southwestern Iran.

Saudi Arabia viewed these developments with . In the Saudi capital of Riyadh, policymakers feared that revolutionary ����’i���� might threaten the of the kingdom’s Sunni Wahhabi monarchy. The call for a Shi’a revolution also raised concerns about unrest in its oil-rich Eastern Province, where Shi’a workers faced economic and near colonial conditions. Similar anxieties reverberated across the other Gulf monarchies.

The US responded by doubling down on support for the remaining pillars of its regional order, Saudi Arabia and Israel, while seeking to contain and roll back the perceived threat posed by Iran. Still interpreting regional upheaval through the prism of the Cold War, US policymakers also expanded their involvement elsewhere. In Afghanistan, the CIA launched the largest covert operation in its history, channeling weapons and to the Afghan mujahideen resisting the Soviet Union’s occupation of that country that began in December 1979.

The Soviet intervention itself was shaped by the shockwaves of the Iranian Revolution. Leaders in Moscow feared a militant Islam on their southern flank that might embolden within Muslim-majority regions of the Soviet Union.

In Iraq, the US publicly tilted toward Saddam Hussein while simultaneously engaging in illegal weapons sales to Iran, with the funds received being rerouted to bankroll another American-backed in Nicaragua. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Civil War, worsened by Israel’s 1982 of Lebanon, created the conditions for the rise of , which presented itself as a defender of marginalized Shi’a communities against Israeli military aggression and .

By 1986, after escalating regional violence and spill-over, US President Ronald Reagan took a step that paved the way for what would, in the next century, become Washington’s “War on Terror.” In April of that year, Reagan launched in the dense heart of the Libyan capital of Tripoli on the home of Libyan leader , holding him responsible for acts of non-state terrorism abroad, including support for from the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Irish Republican .

That operation marked a significant escalation in the region and its justification would later be formalized as the : the claim that Washington could wage preemptive war anywhere against any state accused of supporting terrorism inside its country or outside its borders. That doctrine was no less illegitimate, illegal or dangerous in the 1980s than it would become two decades later. As political activist Daniel Ellsberg then — a point he would continue to press throughout his life, including after President Barack Obama ordered on Libya in 2011 — it seemed that the US had “adopted a public policy of responding to state-sponsored terrorism with U.S. state-sponsored terrorism.”

In each instance, deeper involvement in the region produced deeper backlash. The US-backed Afghan jihad helped give rise to in 1988 and paved the way for the Taliban’s of power in 1996 and the 20-year American war in Afghanistan. The of the 1980s set in motion a chain of events that culminated in the of 1991, which laid the groundwork for the criminal 2003 US of Iraq. The instability that followed not only expanded ��������’s but contributed to the emergence of the . In Lebanon, the power vacuum that Hezbollah came to fill resulted in the 1983 barracks in the Lebanese capital of Beirut, the deadliest day for US Marines since Iwo Jima in World War II.

The lesson not learned

The pattern is difficult to ignore, despite our government’s persistent efforts to do so. Many of the actors Washington came to identify as its principal adversaries emerged either in direct response to US policies or had themselves once been cultivated by Washington in pursuit of short-sighted strategic aims. In case after case, conflicts initiated or intensified by the US appeared to subside, only to reemerge in new, more volatile forms. Intervention produced instability; instability served to justify further interventions; and the cycle only repeated itself thereafter.

There is little reason to believe that US President Donald Trump’s war against Iran will prove any different. By now, the historical record should make that clear, which is why we must oppose the violence being carried out in our name, as it is wrong, criminal and immoral. We must oppose it for our common humanity, but also for our own sake.

After all, history tells us one thing: When we wage unjust wars that terrorize distant populations in far-off lands, the violence rarely remains confined there. Sooner or later, in one form or another, it returns. Violence begets violence, and imperial war has a way of back upon those who initiate it. We reap what we sow; the chickens, in time, invariably come home to roost.

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The of caught European leaders off guard. Unlike past foreign interventions, the US did not present a clearly articulated and coherent (an event or action that justifies or allegedly justifies a war or conflict) to its domestic audience, nor did it seek to win the buy-in of its Western allies before initiating hostilities. Instead, the fluidity of Washington’s justification of its war, ranging from stopping Iran from developing nuclear weapons to regime change, to feeling the need to a unilateral Israeli action, stood in contrast with the concreteness of the hard choices confronting Europe.

While Washington workshopped explanations for the war, Europe to formulate a unified response to meet the moment. This initial hesitation gave way to a disjointed set of , with some European governments aligning with the US while others questioned the legality of US–Israeli strikes. , eager not to relive the public backlash that followed its involvement in Iraq, denied the use of jointly-operated military bases in its territory, setting up a with US President Donald Trump. Europe’s scattered posture reflects the challenge of walking a fine line between appeasing the US, its main partner, and becoming a scapegoat for an unpopular war.

Facing difficulties in resolving the war on its own, President Trump called for allies to deploy warships alongside the US Navy to help open the Strait of Hormuz. While France demonstrated a resolve to protect its interests by an aircraft carrier group to the region, there has been a general reluctance among Europeans to . Adding this to the decision of some European countries to close their airspace or prohibit the use of jointly operated bases has fueled Make America Great Again’s (MAGA) long-standing portrayal of Europeans as free-riders, unwilling to stick their necks out to protect shared interests. Though criticism of NATO from the White House is nothing new, comments made by Secretary of State Marco Rubio the alliance’s value are an unmissable signal.

Security squeeze

Despite their reluctance to get involved, the security and economic spillovers of the conflict have become too significant for Europe to confine itself to rhetoric. What began as a joint US–Israeli meant to a few days against the Iranian nuclear program, missile capabilities and leadership has a regional conflict with global implications, grinding on into its third month. Whether or not Europe agrees with the US rationale, the breadth of the war’s impact makes detachment , compelling Europe to stand up for its .��

Europe has often justified its distance in the conflict by that “this is not our war.” However, within days of the US–Israeli strikes, Iranian drones were launched at a UK Royal Air Force base in , and NATO missiles over Turkey.��

Tehran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping has exposed Europe’s dependence on both and imports. The EU had taken to wean itself off Russian oil and gas in the aftermath of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. That progress is now under threat, with rising causing inflation and fuel shortages across various industries. With the spring planting season already underway, European farmers are to access the fertilizer they need at an affordable cost, threatening to drive up food prices.

While the energy squeeze constitutes a problem for Europe, it has proved a boon for Russia.�� Moscow is seeing fossil fuel jump to a two-year high, which could serve as a to Ukraine’s intensifying campaign on ��ܲ�������’s oil export infrastructure. The Trump Administration’s decision to and then a sanctions waiver until May 16 also contributed to Europe’s woes. Given a pass by the US, ��ܲ�������’s President Vladimir Putin might be increasingly insulated from economic pressure, while European leaders face growing discontent in their electorates.

Turning with the times

These developments underscore how difficult it has become for Europe to insulate itself from the wider repercussions of the conflict. Furthermore, these should serve as a wake-up call to Europe and NATO that blind faith in America can no longer be placed. 

The Trump Administration’s whiplash policy on Ukraine, Greenland, and now Iran is not a one-off incident, but rather evidence of a broader pattern in which Washington is steadily eroding its credibility on the global stage. Although disagreement between the transatlantic allies is to be expected, Europe cannot allow itself to be cowed into joining costly fights because one ally, no matter how important, has made a decision unilaterally. 

Instead, European leaders ought to engage in the war on their own terms, with a unified voice that signals strength. They should continue to resist alignment with the US’ military-first approach. After the White House the UK for being slow to offer help, Europe may find it more palatable to engage the issue on its own terms.��

Europe’s extensive network of military bases and logistics centers, which facilitates US operations in the Middle East, provides the continent with that should be used to prevent further escalation of the war. Europeans ought to strive to push for an end to the conflict; the sooner stability in the Strait is restored, the sooner pressure can be directed toward constraining Russia, while allowing the US to redirect military technology and capabilities back toward Ukraine.��

Europe can monitor activity in the Strait to ensure freedom of navigation and safe transit. To that end, the UK and France on April 17 that they will be spearheading a mission similar to the coalition of the willing to secure maritime trade routes in the Strait of Hormuz. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has readiness to team up with Gulf countries to create alternative energy export routes. Together, these moves represent a constructive step forward supporting the principle of freedom of navigation and improving energy security.��

Stop start

With Washington and Tehran still miles apart in stop-start peace negotiations, Europeans could offer to support negotiations. While America today is not the ally they remember, Ursula von der Leyen emphasized that Europe the world as it is: “The idea that we can simply retrench and withdraw from this chaotic world is simply a fallacy.” Only with a coordinated effort to advance a diplomatic resolution and restore safe navigation does Europe have the chance to prove that the continent can stand as an equal partner.��

The Iran war may not have begun as Europe’s war, but its consequences have become Europe’s problem. The Iran crisis is sapping Europe’s resources and political capital and drawing its attention away from the Russian threat in Ukraine. Europe should seek to drive a wedge between Iran and Russia, isolating the latter. Expediting the peaceful resolution to the standoff in the Strait of Hormuz is the best action Europe can take today. 

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A blockade built on economic pressure

Khattar Singh opens by asking Sonmez to explain the legal and strategic logic behind the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. She notes that under UNCLOS Article 38, passage through the strait is ordinarily protected even during conflict. The United States, however, justified its actions by designating Iran a “rogue state” and arguing that it had the right to inspect vessels carrying war-sustaining material.

She states that the blockade only became possible after the US first degraded ��������’s military and industrial capacity. She argues that Washington delayed enforcement until it could reduce the risk posed by Iranian air power and ensure that economic pressure would be maximally effective. “The US had to destroy ��������’s critical infrastructure and industries in order to bring ��������’s economy to a standstill,” she says.

The blockade itself was a major logistical operation involving warships, fighter aircraft, helicopters and thousands of US personnel. Sonmez argues that its effectiveness demonstrated how maritime power can still determine the trajectory of modern conflict. Once Iranian exports were interrupted, Tehran rapidly lost economic room to maneuver.

��������’s economic vulnerability

The central theme of the discussion is ��������’s structural dependence on oil revenues. Sonmez explains that oil accounts for roughly 13% of ��������’s GDP and provides the foreign exchange needed to finance imports. Without access to those revenues, the country faces currency devaluation, hyperinflation and industrial paralysis.

The blockade quickly exposed those weaknesses. Iran reportedly had only two to three weeks of storage capacity before it would have to shut down production entirely. According to certain figures, the blockade was costing Iran approximately $435 million per day, including hundreds of millions in lost oil and petrochemical exports.

The domestic consequences were severe. Nearly 12 million jobs or 50% of ��������’s workforce were reportedly at risk, while major sectors such as steel, petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals faced mass disruption. Sonmez argues that this pressure forced Iran to negotiate far sooner than it otherwise would have. “Iran runs on cash generated by oil exports,” she explains, warning that without foreign currency reserves and a currency devaluation, “hyperinflation ensues.”

Khattar Singh notes that ��������’s economy had already been weakened by years of sanctions following the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018. The war compounded those problems, leaving Tehran with shrinking options even before the blockade took full effect.

Regional escalation and China’s calculation

The conversation also explores ��������’s attempt to widen the conflict by targeting infrastructure and bases across the Gulf region. Khattar Singh points out that Iranian strikes hit the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and even Oman, despite Oman’s role as a mediator.

Sonmez believes Tehran hoped Gulf states would pressure Washington to halt the assault once their own energy infrastructure came under threat. Instead, the strategy backfired. Reports suggested that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman favored a tougher US response after damage to regional infrastructure, including disruptions affecting Qatar’s liquefied natural gas capacity.

The role of China emerges as another critical factor. As ��������’s largest oil customer, Beijing was theoretically positioned to soften the impact of the blockade. Yet Sonmez argues that US pressure on Chinese banks and shipping companies successfully deterred major intervention. Chinese tankers reportedly rerouted away from the strait, while Beijing assured Washington it would not provide weapons or military assistance to Tehran.

For Sonmez, this became the decisive turning point. “The whole thing boils down to economics,” she says. Without Chinese financial or military backing, Iran lacked the capacity to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

Military surprises and political realities

Despite ��������’s economic weakness, the war still revealed unexpected strengths. Sonmez notes that the scale of ��������’s drone and missile arsenal surprised observers and imposed significant costs on US defensive systems. Iranian attacks also continued even after senior military figures were killed.

“The organization ran seamlessly,” Sonmez says, describing how Iranian operations continued despite leadership losses. That resilience complicated assumptions that decapitation strikes alone could cripple the Iranian state.

Still, Sonmez argues that military endurance could not overcome financial exhaustion. She believes Tehran entered negotiations because it needed immediate economic relief and had to preserve the regime’s ability to pay the military and security establishment that keeps it in power.

Khattar Singh and Sonmez close by turning to the broader global economy. Sonmez expresses astonishment that US stock markets rallied during the crisis despite continuing uncertainty surrounding oil prices, private credit markets and heavily valued AI companies. She compares the surge in markets to the dot-com bubble and argues that investor optimism became detached from underlying risks.

Even after the ceasefire reduced oil prices, Sonmez remains skeptical that the underlying structural problems have disappeared. The episode ends with a broader warning that economic fragility, financial markets and geopolitical conflict are now deeply interconnected. Military victories may shape headlines, but the long-term balance of power increasingly depends on who can survive economic pressure the longest.

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Beyond the visible damage, the conflict offers lessons that go well beyond the battlefield. It forces us to look past simple claims of victory and defeat and ask a harder question: What did this war reveal about power, credibility, dependence and the real cost of confrontation?

The US and Israel: tactical gains, strategic limits

The US appears to have achieved some of its immediate aims, including damage to parts of ��������’s and pressure on its wider military posture through the war and ceasefire process. Yet the broader outcome is less clear. According to Reuters’ summary of the ceasefire, core disputes over uranium enrichment, missiles and regional remain unresolved.��

Meanwhile, Israel demonstrated a sustained ability to strike across the region during the conflict, even as the ceasefire left major political questions unresolved. on continuing Israeli operations in Lebanon outside the truce framework suggest that military reach did not automatically translate into a broader political settlement.��

Europe: between alignment and distance

Some European governments responded with a mix of support and hesitation. Italy, for example, to Sigonella air base for operations related to the conflict and ruled out Hormuz patrols without a UN mandate. That points to a degree of European unease about escalation, even as Europe remains closely tied to the US on security matters.

In practice, that dependence still shapes Europe’s room for maneuver, especially when regional crises affect shipping routes, energy security and the risk of wider military spillover. This does not mean Europe has become strategically independent, but it may give some European governments a little more room to resist American pressure when interests do not fully align.

China and Russia: gaining without engaging 

China and Russia benefited without entering the conflict directly. They avoided the military, diplomatic and financial costs of war while watching the US absorb the burden of escalation without securing a decisive political outcome. For Beijing, distance reduced risk while preserving economic flexibility and the appearance of restraint. For Moscow, non-engagement meant that Washington’s attention and resources were stretched without Russia having to assume new obligations.

This is what makes the conflict relevant to the broader shift toward a more multipolar order. The point is not that American power has disappeared; it is that outcomes are increasingly shaped by several competing centers of influence, and rival powers can gain an indirect advantage when Washington struggles to translate military pressure into durable political results. In that kind of system, American power remains significant, but it faces sharper limits and more frequent challenges.

Iran: external position, internal pressure

The conflict also exposed the limits of personalized leadership. US President Donald Trump’s handling of the war drew criticism abroad and at home. Reuters reported that Pope Leo Trump’s threat against Iran as “truly unacceptable,” while other reporting showed that most Americans the war and wanted it to end quickly. These reactions matter because they highlight how the display of force did not produce a clear political mandate, and how personalized foreign-policy rhetoric can weaken credibility as easily as it can project resolve.

From ��������’s leadership’s perspective, easing some American demands may be presented as a form of resilience. Reuters’ reporting makes clear that the truce did not settle the central American demands regarding enrichment and missile capabilities, thereby allowing Tehran to frame the outcome as endurance rather than surrender.

But any external gain comes with a serious domestic cost. Attacks on Iranian energy and the broader economic disruption caused by the war have increased pressure at home. Over time, those internal costs may prove just as important as any regional advantage.

Ordinary Iranians have also paid a high price. The war has intensified economic pressure, deepened insecurity and damaged basic infrastructure. Evidence of strikes on energy and industrial facilities illustrates how the burden of conflict extends well beyond military targets. 

At the same time, the war may encourage a deeper reassessment of political paths and outside dependence. There are signs of a stronger emphasis on self-reliance alongside caution toward foreign intervention. Whether that becomes a lasting social and political shift remains uncertain, but the experience itself will not be easily forgotten.

The Gulf States: exposed dependence

For the Gulf states, and especially across the Persian Gulf, the war exposed continuing vulnerability. Iranian attacks targeted oil, power and desalination in Kuwait, while a key Saudi oil was also hit. These incidents underline how heavily regional security still depends on external protection, especially from the US.��

That may push Gulf governments toward a more pragmatic regional approach, including a reassessment of how they manage relations with Iran in the years ahead.

At the same time, this kind of disruption may deepen public awareness of what war really costs and may strengthen support for diplomacy in future crises. The war also exposed something deeper than strategy. It showed how easily humanitarian concerns can be pushed aside when conflict becomes politically convenient. Some of those who supported or justified the war did so while minimizing its human cost.

In any future transition, political or otherwise, the role of actors committed to basic ethical standards will matter greatly. Without that commitment, the danger is not only instability but moral erosion.

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This content, showing calm streets, active markets, friendly interactions with locals and sometimes even with Taliban members, attempts to present a different image of post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Many groups have participated in the trend, from travel vloggers seeking “unusual” experiences to influencers who attract audiences by going against dominant narratives. For example, an American pornographic Afghanistan at a time when women in Afghanistan are deprived of even their most basic rights is not just a marginal incident, but a clear example of how such images are produced and circulated.

At first glance, these videos may appear to be personal experiences. But that interpretation is dangerously simplistic. What this content presents as “Afghanistan” is not reality, but a constructed version of it, shaped through selection, omission and control. This ultimately contributes to softening the coercive image of the regime and rendering repression more socially acceptable. The issue is not simply truth versus falsehood; it is what is allowed to be seen and what is systematically left out. These portrayals do not merely misrepresent Afghanistan; they circulate what I call “performative safety,” a selective image of “safety” that obscures the exclusion of women, normalizes authoritarian rule and may carry real political consequences.

The Taliban does not govern only through force; it also reshapes how it is seen. Every “peaceful” image, every “calm” video and every “against-the-media” narrative helps reduce the symbolic costs of this system. In this process, influencers, even when they see themselves as neutral, become informal participants in a broader project: turning a repressive system into something that appears livable.

Unequal experiences: safety for whom?

The experience of safety under Taliban rule is deeply unequal. What influencers experience and present as “safety” is structurally out of reach for a large part of the population, especially women in Afghanistan.

While in Afghanistan are detained for minor reasons and subjected to humiliation and violence, women from outside the country can move freely in the same spaces, go to restaurants and even interact casually with Taliban members. This reveals a deep gap in power and in who has the right to be present.

Cases like the visit of an American pornographic actress make this gap painfully visible. At a time when women in Afghanistan are denied education, excluded from most forms of work and restricted in their movement, presenting those same spaces as “safe” or “interesting” is misleading and politically problematic.

What influencers present as “safety” is, in fact, a privilege that is available only to certain bodies under specific conditions within a discriminatory system. It is not a general condition; it is selective. Presenting it as a shared reality distorts the truth.

Within what can be described as a system of gender apartheid, these representations take on a deeper meaning. When foreign women appear alongside Taliban members, joke with them or take photos with their weapons, these images, regardless of intent, contribute to normalizing a system that has pushed women in Afghanistan out of public life. This is not neutrality. It is participation in the production of a political image.

Safety as performance

A key concept for understanding this phenomenon is “performative safety.” In many of these videos, influencers walk through markets, talk to people and describe the environment as calm. But this calm is the result of selective spaces and controlled interactions.

Influencers usually film in places where “normality” can be easily shown, while other elements, such as structural restrictions, social control and especially the absence of women in public spaces, are systematically left out.

In other words, safety is not simply observed; it is staged. It is a scene built through highlighting certain realities and hiding others. This performance shapes not only what is seen but also how audiences understand it. When the dominant image of Afghanistan on social media is calm and tension-free, it becomes harder to recognize deeper inequalities and forms of structural violence. What influencers present as “safety” is therefore not a shared social condition, but a limited and highly political experience.

Normalizing authoritarianism

These representations, whether intentional or not, contribute to the normalization of authoritarian rule. When Taliban members are shown as “ordinary,” “friendly” or even “humorous,” the broader system of restrictions and violence they represent is pushed out of view.

This process makes violence invisible. As a result, authoritarianism begins to appear as part of everyday life rather than something to question. Viewers gradually accept the system as normal rather than critically examining it. Representation becomes a tool of power.

Attention economy and content production

To understand why these representations persist, we need to look at the “attention economy,” a system in which attention is limited and the value of content depends on its ability to attract and hold audiences, not on its accuracy.

In this environment, Afghanistan becomes an ideal subject. Since it is widely associated with war and danger, any content that challenges this expectation, such as by showing “safety,” immediately attracts attention. The contrast between expectation and presentation drives visibility and engagement. like Business Insider’s show that such content performs well precisely because of this contrast.

Digital platforms reinforce this dynamic. Their algorithms promote surprising, contradictory or emotionally engaging content. As a result, creators are pushed toward narratives that generate reactions, even if this means simplifying or distorting reality.

In this context, “safety” becomes a kind of media product, valued not for how accurately it reflects reality, but for how well it can be consumed and shared. The more it contradicts common assumptions about Afghanistan, the more attention it gains. At the same time, complex realities, especially the situation of women in Afghanistan and deeper structural inequalities, are pushed aside because they do not fit easily into short, fast-paced content.

Indirect complicity and ethical implications

Influencers who create these videos cannot be seen as neutral. Presenting a positive image of a system that systematically violates the rights of women is not just a personal choice; it is a political act with ethical consequences. Producing and sharing such content contributes, in practice, to legitimizing a system built on exclusion and control.

This complicity is not necessarily intentional. Many influencers may see themselves as simply sharing personal experiences. But from a sociological perspective, the issue is not intention, but outcome. When influencers remove suffering and inequality from the frame, what remains is an image that makes the existing system appear normal and acceptable.

The key question is not only what is shown, but what is allowed to remain unseen. When repression is removed from view, it is also removed from judgment. Representation, in this sense, becomes an ethical act: it can either expose inequality or hide it. In many of these cases, it clearly does the latter.

When images turn into risk

Presenting Afghanistan as a “safe” and “accessible” place is not just a matter of perception; it can have real-world consequences. In the attention economy, content that challenges expectations spreads quickly and becomes convincing. As a result, some viewers, especially adventure travelers, may take these narratives as a basis for real decisions.

In this way, the distance between image and action collapses. What begins as digital consumption can lead to physical travel into a complex and unpredictable political environment. Yet such decisions are made in a context with no reliable legal protections, no transparency and no meaningful accountability.

Under such conditions, ordinary individuals without strong institutional or diplomatic support may find themselves in vulnerable, risky situations. Evidence from other authoritarian contexts, including Iran, shows that governments have at times detained and used foreign nationals as tools of political pressure. There are also that the Taliban has, in certain cases, used the detention of foreign nationals as leverage. In a system without accountability, this risk is not simply hypothetical.

The way influencers portray Afghanistan is not a neutral reflection of reality, but a selective reconstruction of it. Through the systematic removal of violence, especially the exclusion of women in Afghanistan, influencers produce an image of a system that appears stable and livable. What they present as “safety” is not a shared condition, but a deeply unequal and political one.

The issue is not just distortion, but its consequences. These images shape perception, perception shapes decisions, and those decisions can lead individuals into environments where basic protections do not exist. In such a setting, even ordinary people can become exposed to serious risks.

Ultimately, the question is not whether these images are “true” or “false.” The question is how they reshape reality itself, what they show, what they hide and whose absence makes the image possible. Representation moves beyond storytelling and becomes part of power, shaping what repression can hide and what the world is allowed to ignore.

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A war measured in displacement

Khattar Singh opens with Lebanon, where the scale of destruction has become impossible to ignore. Zunes points to the displacement of roughly 1.2 million people in a country of just five million, describing a campaign that goes far beyond tactical strikes. Entire towns in southern Lebanon have been leveled, often in areas with little evidence of active combat.

For Zunes, the pattern resembles deliberate devastation rather than incidental damage. “These are not buildings damaged in firefights… this is controlled demolitions,” he says, highlighting how the campaign disproportionately affects civilians. The targeting of infrastructure linked to �������DZ�������’s social services, including medical networks, further blurs the line between military and civilian space. The result is a humanitarian crisis that risks reshaping Lebanon’s social fabric for years to come.

�������DZ�������’s resilience and roots

Khattar Singh and Zunes then turn to Hezbollah itself. Despite the killing of senior leaders and significant operational setbacks, the group remains intact. Zunes provides historic context for the group’s resilience: Hezbollah emerged in direct response to Israel’s 1982 occupation of southern Lebanon, embedding itself within marginalized Shia communities.

Over time, it evolved into more than a militant organization. By providing healthcare, welfare and local governance where the Lebanese state fell short, Hezbollah built a durable support base. That dual role as both militia and service provider helps explain why it can absorb military blows without collapsing.

Zunes also highlights the cyclical nature of the conflict. Efforts to eliminate Hezbollah risk reproducing the very conditions that sustain it. Military pressure, particularly when it affects civilian populations, can deepen grievances and reinforce the group’s legitimacy among its constituents.

Strategic goals, unmet outcomes

At the core of the conversation is the gap between stated objectives and actual results. The United States and Israel entered the conflict with ambitions that included weakening ��������’s regime, curbing its nuclear capacity and dismantling the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The US hasn’t achieved even one of these goals.

The IRGC remains in place. ��������’s nuclear material has not been removed. Instead, Tehran has demonstrated new leverage by disrupting the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global energy flows. A ceasefire, announced on April 16 and mediated by Pakistan, reflects these constraints as much as any diplomatic breakthrough.

Zunes is blunt about the broader pattern. “This kind of pressure… has not eliminated their nuclear program… if anything, it’s strengthened the regime,” he says. Rather than forcing capitulation, the campaign appears to have consolidated hardline power within Iran, undermining earlier internal dissent.

Regional ripple effects

Beyond the immediate battlefield, the war has triggered wider instability. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted supply chains and strained Gulf economies that depend on both exports and imports through the corridor. Even states traditionally aligned against Iran now face difficult trade-offs between security and economic survival.

Khattar Singh notes that Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have experienced the conflict’s consequences more directly. While some remain wary of ��������’s influence, the economic shock has increased the appeal of deescalation. For many, reopening the strait has become an overriding priority.

Simultaneously, tensions persist. Iranian strikes on regional infrastructure have hardened attitudes in some capitals, complicating any unified response. The result is a fragmented landscape in which no actor fully controls the trajectory of events.

Power, politics and unintended consequences

The conversation closes with the political dimension. Both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump face domestic pressures that intersect with military strategy. For Netanyahu, ongoing conflict may delay political reckoning at home. For Trump, the war’s economic and strategic fallout could shape upcoming elections.

Yet the most consequential shift may be inside Iran. Despite earlier protests against the regime, the external threat has rallied segments of the population around the state. Zunes sees this as a familiar dynamic. “People rally around the flag when they’re being bombed,” he observes. External intervention often strengthens the very forces it seeks to weaken.

This leads to a broader conclusion about regime change. Zunes argues that durable political transformation cannot be imposed from outside, but must emerge internally. Historical examples, from Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia, underscore the limits of military solutions in achieving political ends.

If the war has demonstrated anything, it is that escalation does not guarantee control. Instead of collapse, it may produce adaptation. Instead of weakening adversaries, it may entrench them. For policymakers, that raises a difficult but unavoidable question: What happens when the use of force systematically fails to deliver the outcomes it promises?

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A movement built for adaptation

Shaif begins by noting the difficulty of defining the Brotherhood. Founded by a schoolteacher named Hassan al-Banna in Egypt, it started as a religious movement but developed into a political project aimed at shaping society through education, religious outreach and institutional influence. In Egypt, it has been severely restricted since the fall of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, but Shaif argues that its influence persists underground.

Yemen offers a different model. There, the Brotherhood-linked Al-Islah party did not simply copy the Egyptian organization. Instead, it embedded itself in tribal politics, patronage networks and state institutions. Shaif describes Al-Islah as a “hybrid political actor,” shaped by ideology but also by pragmatism and survival.

Sudan as a warning

Himedan gives the starkest account of the Brotherhood’s impact, focusing on Sudan. He argues that the movement, through the National Congress Party and related Islamist networks, helped shape decades of war, repression and institutional decay. He says Sudan shows what happens when the Brotherhood penetrates the state, education system, military and civil society.

Himedan describes recruitment through universities, where students could face pressure to join affiliated groups in order to advance academically. He also points to forced military recruitment, ideological indoctrination and the use of religion or ethnicity to divide communities. Brotherhood-linked elements within the Sudanese Armed Forces have been accused of extreme brutality in the current conflict, including the use of chemical weapons against civilians, which has contributed to sanctions and terrorist designations by multiple states. For him, the Brotherhood is no longer compatible with the modern world, because it cannot reform or adapt morally, even if it adapts tactically.

He believes the movement survives by creating enemies, sustaining conflict and blocking peaceful transitions that might end its political usefulness.

Yemen’s Al-Islah and political survival

Shaif and Carvajal both emphasize that Yemen’s Al-Islah is more adaptable than Himedan’s account of Sudan might suggest. Shaif says Al-Islah has survived because it understands Yemen’s fractured landscape. It has worked with tribal leaders, aligned with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, opposed southern independence and later positioned itself as a useful partner for Saudi Arabia against the Houthis.

Carvajal adds historic depth. He notes that Brotherhood influence in Yemen dates back to the 1940s, when Yemeni students in Cairo encountered Brotherhood networks. Over time, this influence moved through schools, mosques and state institutions. After unification in 1990, Al-Islah became a major pillar of political life.

Carvajal believes Al-Islah is not a normal party. Rather, it is an umbrella organization combining Brotherhood activists, Salafis, tribal leaders and business interests. Its strength lies in its capacity to provide religious legitimacy to political projects, much as it did for Saleh’s secular military regime.

Regional rivalries and shared enemies

The panel also explores how the Brotherhood fits into regional rivalries. Carvajal explains that Gulf monarchies view the movement as a threat because it seeks to shape Arab societies through religious politics. The Arab Spring intensified these fears, especially when the Brotherhood briefly led Egypt after 2011.

Yet the movement’s alliances are not simple. Despite the Sunni–Shia divide, Carvajal and Himedan both point to cooperation between Brotherhood-linked actors and Iran. Sudan, they note, has served as a route for Iranian weapons to Hamas, while Islamist forces in Sudan have received Iranian support. In Yemen, the Houthis, Al-Islah, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates form a shifting field of rivalry and convenience.

Carvajal summarizes the logic clearly: “Both entities, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Republic, need an enemy.” For him, permanent conflict gives ideological movements a reason to endure.

Decline or transformation?

The speakers disagree on the Brotherhood’s future. Himedan believes its era is ending because social media, public awareness and modern political expectations make old forms of manipulation harder to sustain. Shaif is more cautious. He sees Al-Islah as a survivor, especially in Yemeni cities like Taiz and Marib, where it retains social and charitable networks.

Carvajal warns that the Brotherhood remains dangerous precisely because it often lacks visible headquarters or formal structures. Its power lies in networks, education, secrecy and social influence rather than in a single command center.

The discussion ends with uncertainty rather than closure. The Brotherhood may be weakened in some countries, outlawed in others and divided by local conditions. Yet its history suggests that decline does not necessarily mean disappearance. Across Sudan, Yemen and the wider region, the movement’s future may depend less on its original ideology than on the crises, rivalries and political vacuums that continue to give it room to adapt.

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Airstrikes and contested truths

Khattar Singh opens by mentioning a recent and highly controversial Pakistani airstrike on the Omit camp in Kabul, a rehabilitation center that reportedly housed more than 1,000 drug addiction patients. According to initial reports, the strike killed nearly 400 people. Pakistan maintains that the site was a Taliban drone factory, while the Taliban insist it was a civilian medical facility.

Haidari firmly rejects Islamabad’s version, calling it “a flat lie” and arguing that the Taliban lack the technological capacity to operate such a facility. He reframes the broader pattern of strikes as part of a campaign that disproportionately harms civilians rather than Taliban leadership. In his account, Pakistan’s actions reflect a deeper strategic logic: weakening Afghanistan as a whole rather than targeting specific militant actors.

This divergence in narratives highlights a recurring feature of the conflict. Competing claims obscure accountability, while Afghan civilians bear the immediate cost. Images of grieving families and destroyed infrastructure have circulated, but they have not translated into sustained international scrutiny.

A battlefield for regional rivalry

The discussion then widens to the geopolitical dynamics shaping the conflict. Haidari describes Afghanistan as a space where regional powers pursue competing interests through indirect means. He characterizes the Taliban as a “strategic project up for rent,” suggesting that different factions within the movement are influenced by external actors.

Khattar Singh notes the historical irony: Pakistan originally cultivated the Taliban to secure strategic depth. Yet that relationship has become more complicated. Haidari explains that the group is no longer monolithic. Internal divisions, combined with shifting alliances, have opened the door for other players, particularly India, to establish influence.

Pakistan’s airstrikes can be seen as an attempt to reassert control. Haidari argues that India has found ways to pressure Pakistan indirectly, including through militant groups operating from Afghan territory. This triangular dynamic of Pakistan, India and the Taliban creates a volatile environment in which Afghanistan becomes a proxy arena.

The result, as Haidari puts it, is a “lose-lose for the Afghan people,” but a strategic gain for external powers. Each actor extracts some advantage, while the underlying instability persists.

Silence and selective outrage

Khattar Singh points out that the airstrikes occurred during Ramadan, yet drew limited condemnation from Muslim-majority countries. Haidari contrasts this silence with the frequent statements issued by organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on other conflicts.

He interprets this disparity as evidence of selective attention shaped by political priorities. Even when aid arrives, as in India’s delivery of medical supplies, Haidari views it through a geopolitical lens. Assistance may alleviate immediate suffering, but it does not address the structural drivers of the conflict.

For Afghans, this silence reinforces a sense of abandonment. The country’s crises compete with larger global events, including the Iran war, leaving Afghanistan largely absent from headlines and diplomatic agendas.

A deepening humanitarian crisis

Beyond the geopolitical maneuvering lies a deteriorating humanitarian situation. Haidari describes Taliban rule as enforcing a system of “gender apartheid,” restricting women and girls from education, employment and public life. These policies have far-reaching social and economic consequences.

Health indicators have also worsened. Mortality rates among infants and young children have risen, reversing gains made during the previous two decades. Haidari contends that more Afghans are now dying under current conditions than during the years of active conflict before 2021.

Simultaneously, the country faces economic isolation. Sanctions and lack of recognition limit formal trade and financial flows, while reports of external cash shipments create what Haidari calls an “artificial macroeconomic stability.” The result is a fragile system that masks deeper structural collapse.

Leadership vacuum and an uncertain future

The conversation concludes with a focus on governance and accountability. Haidari views the current situation as the outcome of both external decisions and internal failures. He describes the US withdrawal as enabling the Taliban’s return to power and leaving a political vacuum that has yet to be filled.

Inside Afghanistan, opposition forces remain fragmented and ineffective. Without a coherent alternative, the Taliban face limited pressure to change. Haidari argues that meaningful reform would require strong external incentives, both rewards and penalties, capable of altering the group’s calculations.

He also challenges attempts to frame the Taliban as representative of Afghanistan’s Pashtun population, emphasizing that many Pashtuns have been among the movement’s primary victims. This distinction underscores the complexity of Afghan society, which cannot be reduced to simple ethnic or political narratives.

Afghanistan remains a “managed island of instability,” in Haidari’s words, shaped by external competition and internal weakness. For now, the Afghan people continue to endure a conflict driven by forces largely beyond their control.

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A ceasefire under pressure

Olmert begins by stressing how precarious the situation remains. Just before the discussion, Israeli forces killed more than 20 Hezbollah members in an encounter several miles from the border. Hezbollah then announced that it no longer recognized the ceasefire, though it would decide its response according to circumstances.

For Olmert, this shows that the truce is not a stable political settlement. He argues that the ceasefire was forced on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by the United States as part of broader negotiations with Iran. In his view, Israel was close to weakening Hezbollah more decisively but stopped too soon. The result is a pause that may allow Hezbollah to recover rather than a turning point that changes Lebanon’s security landscape.

Hezbollah and ��������’s regional strategy

Singh asks Olmert to explain �������DZ�������’s history from an Israeli perspective. Olmert responds that while the name Hezbollah emerged after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the movement’s roots go back earlier, particularly to Shia factions influenced by ��������’s 1979 revolution. He accepts that Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon gave Hezbollah momentum, but insists that Iran would have backed a radical Shia movement regardless.

Singh offers a counternarrative often heard from critics of Israel: Hezbollah grew from the marginalization of Lebanon’s Shia community, the failures of the Lebanese state and the group’s provision of social services. Olmert does not deny �������DZ�������’s civic role, but says that these services are funded and shaped by Iran. For him, the organization’s defining function is not Lebanese representation but Iranian strategy. He calls Hezbollah “a division in the Iranian army which is based in Lebanon.”

That framing shapes his entire analysis. Olmert sees Hezbollah as part of ��������’s plan to pressure Israel through multiple fronts. Its role in the Syrian Civil War showed that the group was willing to sacrifice Lebanese lives for Tehran’s objectives. In this view, �������DZ�������’s conflict with Israel is not primarily about Lebanese sovereignty, but ��������’s regional confrontation with Israel.

The limits and purpose of force

Singh presses Olmert on what a “final blow” against Hezbollah would actually mean. Olmert clarifies that he does not believe Israel can eliminate an ideology. His goal is more limited: to weaken �������DZ�������’s armed wing so thoroughly that it can no longer dominate Lebanon or determine whether the Lebanese state goes to war.

Olmert rejects the idea that Israel can dismantle every Hezbollah structure or erase its political identity. But he believes Israel can reduce its military power to the point where it no longer controls Lebanon’s strategic choices. “You can’t kill an ideology,” he says, “but you can weaken the people who bear arms in support of that ideology.”

Singh also raises the humanitarian toll in Lebanon, noting that roughly 1.2 million people have been displaced and thousands have been killed or injured. He asks whether some critics are right to see Hezbollah as a pretext for broader Israeli ambitions, including control of southern Lebanon and the Litani River. Olmert dismisses that argument, saying Israel’s desalination capacity has solved its water needs. He argues instead that Hezbollah created the crisis by attacking Israel after October 7, 2023, and that democracies must be strong enough to defeat forces that threaten their existence.

Lebanon after Hezbollah

The discussion turns to what a durable settlement would require. Singh states that many Israelis privately believe the way forward must combine military neutralization of Hezbollah with reconstruction of the Lebanese state. Olmert agrees.

In his view, Israel should withdraw fully to the international border once Hezbollah is no longer able to dictate Lebanon’s security policy. He also calls for a stable buffer zone up to the Litani River, monitored by forces more effective than the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Beyond that, Lebanon would need international support and, potentially, Israeli cooperation to rebuild.

Yet Olmert sees a central obstacle: Lebanon remains difficult to govern because of corruption, sectarian patronage and �������DZ�������’s power. Singh emphasizes that elite politics and dysfunction also predate Hezbollah. Olmert accepts this but insists that no serious peace is possible while Hezbollah retains the ability to prevent Lebanon from making sovereign decisions.

The old US–Israel relationship is gone

The conversation ends by widening the frame to US–Israel relations. Singh notes growing Democratic opposition to Israeli military action and changing attitudes among younger Americans. Olmert agrees that the old bipartisan consensus has eroded. He points to demographic changes, social media, the rise of Muslim political influence and polarization inside both US parties.

Olmert is especially critical of Netanyahu’s relationship with US President Donald Trump. He argues that Netanyahu has become too personally dependent on Trump, weakening Israel’s strategic autonomy. Trump’s public demand that Israel stop bombing Lebanon, Olmert says, exposed a troubling imbalance between the two leaders.

Still, Olmert does not reduce the problem to Netanyahu alone. He argues that the broader US–Israel relationship must be rebuilt for a new political era. “The old relationships are dead,” he says. A different Israeli government, he suggests, would find it easier to negotiate that new formula, though he acknowledges that if Netanyahu wins again, that too is democracy at work.

For Singh and Olmert, the ceasefire is therefore only one piece of a larger puzzle. Hezbollah remains powerful, Lebanon remains fragile, Israel remains divided and Washington is no longer the partner it once was. The truce may hold, but the conflict’s deeper causes remain unresolved.

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Economic toll

Unlike Iran, the other Middle Eastern states, especially the six members of the GCC, have strengthened their economic ties with the West. One major example of such economic ties is the one between the EU and the GCC. The 1989 has resulted in over $170 billion in exports and imports between the two sides in 2023.��

Over the past five decades, these countries have also worked hard to attract foreign investors, entrepreneurs, and even wealthy individuals seeking to invest in luxury real estate and opulent lifestyles. To name a few examples of such steps, Dubai a five-year multiple-entry visa for business trips in 2021, and the UAE began five-year residency and renewable 10-year visas to those who own real estate in the UAE valued at $5 million and $10 million, respectively. To attract foreign capital, both and have introduced Golden Residency programs that grant wealthy foreigners, including their families, long-term residencies of ten years or longer.��

States such as the UAE and Qatar have become reliable hubs for travelers reaching their destinations globally. In 2023, an 18.25% share of the UAE’s GDP was through aviation. In practice, this means $92 billion in revenue and 992,000 jobs. It is a similar trajectory for Qatar. In 2025, only Qatar Airways Group reported a 28% over the previous year, surpassing $2 billion. Qatar’s tourism revenue surpassed , up 25% from 2023.��

Saudi Arabia is another Middle Eastern power with considerable financial clout. Its economic reform for the post-oil Kingdom, known as , aims to sector to become not only self-sufficient but also an exporter and global hub for biotechnology. Within this project, other strategies include the mining sector with a focus on minerals, and even the gaming and Esports to host international tournaments, as well as attracting foreign companies to Saudi Arabia. The program is reliant on the non-hydrocarbon sector, comprising foundational pillars namely construction, tourism and tech, which are integral to Saudi Arabia’s economic growth, as the World Bank states, “the non-oil economy’s share of GDP grew from 60 percent in 2015 to 68 percent by 2024”.��

With the risks of collapsed tourism, damaged energy infrastructure and logistics disruptions growing manifold, the Gulf countries face an imminent crisis. Amid the worsening security crisis in the region, all of these countries face a heavy blow, with the looming threat of economic devastation, as they remain heavily dependent on such critical sectors to attract foreign investment and capital while diversifying away from oil exports. Their economic leverage rests on regional stability, which has been put under immense strain due to the volatile situation. 

More alarming is the emerging scenario in which large companies tend to act quickly to secure their assets and withdraw from a conflict zone; however, their return is a slow, cautious process. Consequently, if the war results in the departure of some foreign companies from the region within a few weeks, their return may take months or years, which would be detrimental to the economies of the GCC in the long term.

Ironically, Iran will not face such a risk, as the Islamic Republic has not been a destination for international firms due to sanctions and an inadequate environment that has not been conducive to foreign investment. 

Damaged reputation

Over the past few decades, the Gulf countries have built a reputation as a safe destination. This feature has attracted not only investors and foreign companies but also pensioners and those fleeing high taxation in their home countries. As their reputation is now tarnished by the escalating conflict, it will take a long time to rebuild it and recover from the damage inflicted. During the early stages of the war, Iran hit back hard. Missiles and drones were fired at numerous targets, including , and industrial complexes.��

One small example is the UAE. It to around 240,000 British expats. The US–Israel–Iran war has distressed the majority of expats living across the region. It has gone as far as being by some Western news outlets, such as tabloid Daily Mail, as “‘Dubai Is Finished’: Expats say they will leave and never come back as tax-free dream is shattered by war and officials begin prosecuting people for posting videos of missiles.” 

Worthy US alliance? 

Except for Iran and Yemen, the US is in some sort of alliance with all states in the region. The closest allies are Israel, followed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan and others. Israel, for instance, has $330 billion in aid, both military and civil, from the US since its foundation.��

The alliance between the Gulf states and the US dates back to the 1940s, when, for instance, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Abdul Aziz Al Saud aboard USS Quincy in 1945. The result was access to Saudi oil for security assurance to the Kingdom. And other Gulf states suit and went into an alliance with the US.��

Fast forward to 2026, although the Gulf countries do not receive US military aid on the same scale as Israel and Egypt, their arms deals with the US are among the largest. Between 1950 and 2024, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE have $182 billion, $40 billion, $35 billion and $34 billion, respectively. These massive purchases have certainly helped these countries defend themselves against Iranian drones and missiles; however, the cost of munitions for them is considerably higher than for Iran, as a Shahed-136 drone costs under $50,000, compared with, say, Patriot interceptor missiles that cost per shot. The ineffectiveness of US military equipment to deter attacks, coupled with US’ waning commitment to uphold its allies’ defense under its security umbrella in the region, propels the Gulf countries to recalibrate their security ties with the US.��

After all, it was never their war to begin with, yet they face dire consequences simply for allying with the US (which now appears more to be a grave liability). Since the beginning of the war, Tehran has justified its attacks on ��������’s neighbors by claiming that any location in the region hosting a US military presence is a legitimate target. However, most of the missiles and drones thrown at the Gulf states were not precisely aimed at the American bases, either deliberately or due to a lack of precision, as it has been that the Circular Error Probable of Iranian missiles is between 20 and 500 meters. This makes it even harder for states such as the UAE to convince foreigners to stay or even consider returning, once the war is over. Expats, especially those who are attracted by luxury and 0% income tax rate, will hardly be willing to live in a place where even a one percent chance of missile penetration exists, should another round of conflict emerge.��

Post-war scenarios

While efforts were recently made to a peace deal between the US and Iran, with Pakistan acting as a primary mediator, the talks in Islamabad stalled; however, reports are now that the conflicting parties are expected to re-engage in negotiations soon.��

Regardless, for the Gulf countries, there are mainly two outcomes as of now. The first prediction is that the Iranian regime will be toppled and a new Iran will emerge. In this case, the Gulf states can simply claim that the old threat no longer exists. Hence, it will be relatively easier to convince expats and companies that departed in haste to return. And the Gulf states would emerge shaken but ultimately “victorious”, and their alliance with the US would be seen as worthwhile. Their domestic publics would also be less likely to question the rulers’ strategies and policies. However, this scenario appears very unlikely, given ��������’s position in surviving the war and transitioning to a ceasefire and negotiations, as well as the US stance shifting toward achieving a mere exit strategy.

A second scenario, which is the most likely one to consider, is that the  Iranian regime survives the war, in which case the main losers will be the Gulf countries. Iran, the US and Israel will all claim victory and, to an extent, those claims will be correct. The leaders of these three countries will be able to convince their publics that they have achieved their objectives, at least among those who support their governments’ policies. The new Supreme Leader, whether it is still Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei or a successor in case he is also killed, will claim that they have defeated the US plan to overthrow the regime, and the IRGC, Basij and regime supporters across all strata will buy it. President Trump will tell his MAGA supporters that he has “obliterated” the threat of a ballistic and nuclear Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu will tell Israelis, mainly his supporters, that ��������’s capability to attack Israel is diminished. 

However, for regional countries such as the UAE, there won’t be a victory narrative to pursue. They will not be able to convince their constituencies by claiming victory, as they have, at best, been defending themselves in a war that was not theirs. The public will be anxious about what the alliance with the US (and in the case of the UAE with Israel) will bring next. The Gulf states will face criticism from their people regarding the alliance with the US and any ties to the state of Israel. History bears witness to this, as public perception in Gulf states has often diverged from government narratives, and state decisions have not sat well with the public. 

The defiance was most noticeable in relation to the alliance between the US and Gulf state leaders, which does not always align with how the Arab public perceives the US and Israel. During the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, a reservations to customers who would like to enjoy their meals while watching Iranian missiles roaring towards Israel. A similar case happened during the Gulf War. On January 18, 1991, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq launched missile attacks on Israel. In his book, The Achilles Trap, Steve Coll writes that five Iraqi Scud missiles hit Tel Aviv and Haifa while Saudi officers and American counterparts were in the coordination center, C3IC, observing the attacks. The Americans were shocked when they saw the Saudi officers cheering the Iraqi strike with Allahu Akbar.��

Now, while the times may differ, similar sentiments persist. Gulf states have to tactfully handle public opinion while simultaneously preventing their economies from falling into the doldrums. Henceforth, the path for the Gulf states is certainly fraught with difficulties on multiple fronts. 

In the end, therefore, it is not the US that loses investors and entrepreneurs, nor is it Israel, which is a startup country with the most powerful military in the region. Iran will not suffer from the mistrust of foreign investors either, as the country has few or no foreign investors, especially Western ones, due to sanctions and an unfriendly environment for foreigners. Tehran has little involvement in the international trade community to worry about losing it. What Iran has never had will not be a loss to Tehran in the post-war period. The real costs will be borne by the Gulf states.

[ edited this piece.]

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The US has long-standing ties with the Kurds, which date back to the 1970s during the Kurdish rebellions against the Iraqi central government. Following the uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan in March 1991 and the creation of the over the Kurdistan region of Iraq, relations between the Kurds and the US have improved significantly. This relation with the regime change in Iraq in 2023 has further enhanced as the Kurdish fighters play a key role in helping the US open a new frontline in northern Iraq to topple the Saddam regime.�� 

Similarly, during the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, the US decisively supported the Kurdish figures in Iraq and Syria. The Kurds, with help from the US, played a key role in defeating ISIS in both countries. Hence, this historical partnership has laid the groundwork for Washington to publicly discuss the possibility of using Iranian Kurdish fighters as ground forces in a conflict against the current Iranian regime. 

Trump has sent mixed messages in this regard. On March 5, he argued that he would forces if they decided to launch a military offensive against Iran, describing the idea as positive. When asked whether the US would provide air support for the operation, he declined to give a clear answer, saying he could not discuss that.��

However, on March 7, Trump having Kurdish fighters join the war against Iran. In this regard, he said, “I don’t want the Kurds going in. I don’t want to see the Kurds get hurt, get killed. I told them I don’t want them. The war is complicated enough.” 

There is no clear answer whether the US will finally topple the regime or, at this specific stage, end this war. Hence, the key question is: Why has the Kurdish factor in Iran suddenly become an important topic in the US and Israel’s war against Iran?

In reality, there are many explanations for this. One possibility is that Israel and the US could move toward overthrowing the Iranian regime in Tehran. However, this has not yet been officially and clearly announced by the US. Moreover, Kurdish fighters could be viewed as an effective instrument in this context. In particular, the US and Israel seek to make western Kurdistan a platform for inciting and encouraging a general uprising in the rest of Iran.

Another possibility is that the US might have wanted to use Kurdish forces as a tool to pressure the current Iranian authorities and push them to make greater concessions to Trump’s demands. As he recently said, the aim of the war is “” of the Iranian authorities.��

Fear of abandonment: Kurdish demands for guarantees in any alliances against Iran

The Iranian Kurdish opposition parties are willing to seize the opportunity and ally with the US and Israel against Iran to achieve their historic ambition, manifested in establishing a federal or autonomous region in western Kurdistan. However, they have serious concerns about moving forward with such a policy without concrete guarantees of protection. In particular, the US doesn’t have a clear strategy, and it explicitly argues that the endgame is not regime change in Iran, but the destruction of Iranian military capacities. 

Furthermore, while the US has supported the Kurds at different times, it has also abandoned them on several occasions, leaving them to face existential threats. For example, following the Kurdistan in September 2017, the Trump administration allowed Iraqi federal troops and Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi militias — with direct support of Iran — to attack the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in Kirkuk and disputed areas. As a result, the Kurds lost roughly 40% of the territory that Peshmerga had held.��At that time, Trump said the US would not take a side.

In January 2026, even though the Kurds were key partners of the US in the war against ISIS in Syria, they were abandoned once again. The Trump administration allowed the former commander of Al Qaida al-Sharia, with his Damascus-led army, to attack the Kurdish forces and take the territory under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As a result, on January 20, , US Special Envoy for Syria, declared that the Kurdish-led SDF’s role as the primary anti-ISIS force had “.”

This background indicates that Kurdish concerns are genuine, as they fear the possibility that the US could once again abandon them. Therefore, before taking further steps, they seek guarantees and assurances from the US. The key demands of the Iranian Kurds are a guarantee that they will not be abandoned in the face of an Iranian threat, in both cases, whether the Iranian regime collapses or remains in place.

This is a very important point, in particular, if the regime survives, it may again crush the Kurds and could even against them as it has done after 1979. Hence, in this case, establishing a no-fly zone in Eastern Kurdistan is crucial to ensure that the Kurdish people are protected. Further, the Kurds seek to convert their military achievements into political gains. Therefore, the US should back the Kurds by guaranteeing support both if the current regime collapses and in advancing their demands for some sort of autonomy.�� 

Between Iranian threats and proxy attacks: Kurdistan faces rising security risks

In fact, any cooperation between the US and Iranian Kurdish groups against the regime in Iran would have serious implications for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). It is clear that the KRG has sought to reassure Tehran that it would not pose a threat. However, increasing conflict with the US is pushing the Iranian regime to pursue a more aggressive policy in the KRG. In particular, Iran and its proxy militias in Iraq have frequently threatened and targeted the Kurdistan region.

Since the 2020 of Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian military officer who served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran has essentially turned the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) into a battlefield, sending a message to the US, Israel and its allies. Following the of the young Kurdish-Iranian woman, Jina Mahsa Amini, and the outbreak of demonstrations across Iran in September 2023, the country has intensified its attacks against the KRI. As a result, the IRGC  the Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups.��

Iran blames the Iranian Kurds for instigating and sustaining the protests in Iran. Even the head of ��������’s elite Quds Force, , has  an unprecedented ground military operation against Iraqi Kurdistan if Baghdad does not disarm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups on Iraqi soil. Following the 12 days of with Israel in June 2025, Iranian proxies in Iraq hit oil fields and infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. These strikes targeted oil facilities, airports and some military locations.

With the start of the new military operation by the US and Israel against Iran beginning February 28, once again, the KRI turned into a battlefield, and Iran and its proxies are intensively targeting infrastructure in the Kurdistan region. These attacks intensified following reports that Trump spoke with Iraqi Kurdish leaders by phone, urging them to support the Iranian Kurdish opposition. 

In a statement, the KRG strongly reports suggesting the Kurdistan Region is taking part in a plan to arm and send Kurdish opposition parties into Iranian territory. Furthermore, the KRG emphasized that it would not be part of the current conflict, which could expand across the region.��It reiterated the Kurdistan Region’s stance of avoiding further conflict amid the current regional turmoil.

Hence, it can be argued that if the US pushes Iranian Kurdish opposition groups to participate in a war against Iran, the KRG could face serious and even existential risks, even if it rejects or refuses to support such a policy. 

The Iranian authorities are clearly sending a very serious warning and threatening the KRI in case Iranian Kurdish fighters are involved in the war. On March 6, ��������’s Defense Council released a statement that so far, Iran has only focused on US and Israeli bases in the region, as well as opposition political parties operating within the Kurdistan region.��

It added that:

“Should their continued presence and plotting be permitted, or should these groups or [Zionist] regime elements enter the borders of the Islamic Republic through the Region, all facilities of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq … will be targeted on a massive scale.”

Further, the Spokesperson of the Khatam Al-Anbiya, Lieutenant Colonel Ebrahim Zolfaghari, issued a to the Kurdistan region, stating that any attempt by the Kurdistan region to deploy hostile forces in the Iranian border strip will be met with severe action by the Iranian armed forces.��

Hence, in the case of involving the Iranian opposition Kurds in this war, the most dangerous scenario for the KRG would be if the political system in Iran remains in place and does not collapse, and if the US and Israel halt their attacks. There’s no doubt the KRG would face a serious threat, and Iran would do everything to undermine the KRG’s position. 

One of the key instruments that Iran could use, besides directly attacking the Kurdistan region, is using its militia proxies in Iraq and even the Iraqi government led by the Shia parties against the KRG. In particular, since the eruptions of the current war, the Shia militias have intensified their attacks against the Kurdistan region. According to Rudaw News, since the beginning of the war, more than 638 drones and missiles have the Kurdistan Region.��

Therefore, in any scenario where the US pushes Iranian Kurdish fighters to participate in a war against Iran, it should provide clear assurances and guarantees not only to the Iranian Kurdish groups but also to the Kurdistan Region, which could face serious security consequences from such involvement.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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A war built on flawed assumptions

Atul opens by asking Manu to frame the conflict. Manu describes it starkly as “a royal fight between… two thoroughly different military ideologies,” highlighting the clash between Western shock-and-awe doctrine and ��������’s long-prepared defensive model. The United States and Israel entered the war believing Iran was weakened by sanctions, internal unrest and economic decline. That assessment shaped a strategy centered on rapid decapitation strikes designed to collapse the regime within days.

Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or projecting power through regional proxies was a central objective. If left unchecked, Iran could potentially dominate Gulf energy flows, reshaping the balance of power in one of the world’s most critical regions.

Yet the early premise — that Iran would quickly crumble — has not held. Despite economic strain and political tensions, the regime has endured. Atul and Manu suggest that Israeli and American planners underestimated the depth of ��������’s institutional and ideological structures, as well as its ability to absorb and respond to sustained military pressure.

��������’s resilience and asymmetric strategy

��������’s response rests on preparation rather than improvisation. Instead of relying on centralized command structures vulnerable to decapitation, it has implemented what a decentralized “mosaic defense.” This system distributes authority across 31 independent military commands, making it difficult to disable the state through targeted strikes.

The same logic extends to governance. ��������’s layered redundancy ensures continuity even under extreme conditions. Leadership positions are backed by multiple successors, while the broader theocratic system provides an additional reservoir of authority. As Atul notes, this creates a depth that is not easily dismantled through conventional military means.

Manu explains that Iran has effectively built a different “operating system” for political survival. This system combines ideological commitment with military capability, allowing the state to withstand pressure that might destabilize more centralized regimes. The result is a conflict that has settled into a form of strategic stalemate, where none of the principal actors have achieved decisive political collapse.

Diverging political realities

While the battlefield remains contested, political responses differ sharply across countries. Atul says the war is highly popular in Israel, where even critics of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu broadly support the campaign. In contrast, public opinion in the US is far more divided, creating what Atul calls a “tale of two countries.”

Iran, meanwhile, has focused on building support beyond its borders. Its diplomatic outreach across Asia, particularly among Shia Muslim communities, has generated both political sympathy and material support. There are visible signs of this mobilization, including donations and grassroots support, suggesting that ��������’s messaging resonates in parts of the Global South. Women are even donating gold, considered family treasure in Asia, to the Iranian war effort.

These dynamics reinforce a key point: The war is not producing uniform political outcomes. Rather, it is deepening fragmentation, both within societies and across the international system.

Economic warfare and Gulf vulnerability

Unable to match Israeli or American firepower, Iran has resorted to economic warfare. Iranian forces have targeted the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and shaken their economic foundations. Iran has also blocked the Strait of Hormuz and reduced the ships going through this chokepoint to a trickle. This strategy exploits structural vulnerabilities in a region that, despite decades of diversification, remains heavily dependent on energy exports and food imports as well as consumer goods and machines for critical infrastructure such as desalination plants.

By threatening shipping routes and energy facilities, Iran is effectively weaponizing geography. By blocking the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is driving up oil and gas prices, while attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf states create long-term supply constraints. In our globalized world, Arab states generating wealth through energy exports are diversifying their economies by pumping money into frontier economic activities. Iran has interrupted this flow of capital, which will have cascading effects far beyond the region.

The Gulf’s role as a hub for trade, finance and transportation amplifies these risks. Cities like Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and Doha in Qatar, built as global hubs with international airports, high-end shopping and luxury tourism, now face the possibility that their greatest strengths — connectivity and openness — could become liabilities in a prolonged conflict.

Global spillovers and systemic risk

The economic consequences extend well beyond energy markets. Gulf capital has played a crucial role in funding innovation and investment across Western economies, from real estate to cutting-edge technologies. If the war constrains the flow of this capital, the effects will ripple through sectors such as venture capital, artificial intelligence and infrastructure development.

Simultaneously, physical disruptions to energy production threaten the supply of critical industrial inputs. Helium shortages could affect semiconductor manufacturing, sulfur constraints could disrupt metal refining and reduced fertilizer production could reduce global agricultural output. These are not isolated shocks but interconnected pressures that strain the foundations of the global economy.

Manu captures the scale of the challenge with a warning: “This is a world that nobody is prepared for.” The conflict is no longer simply about territory or regime change. It is about the stability of systems that underpin modern economic life.

As Atul concludes, the war has entered a new phase. Iran has survived the initial assault, the US and Israel remain engaged, but the Gulf economies — central to global energy and finance — are under growing strain. The longer the conflict continues, the more likely it is to trigger cascading crises that reach far beyond the Middle East.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Foucault believed Western society had grown stagnant due to bureaucracy. In Tehran in 1979, he saw what he called the birth of a “”, a rare moment of collective revolt in which a nation attempted to shed its old identity and reinvent its soul. While Foucault was mesmerized by the collective revolt, critics argue that he focused on the drama of rebellion. This article explores that fundamental tension: how a thinker dedicated to unmasking the mechanisms of oppression could so passionately embrace a movement that, shortly after his writings, established a rigid, absolutist theocratic system.

An unlikely convergence

Pairing Iranian Supreme Leader and Foucault seems unusual at face value. Yet they intersected at a decisive moment in 1979, a historical juncture where political Islam hijacked the Iranian revolution, transforming a national event into a global phenomenon.

Today, as the Iranian theocratic regime faces pressure, interest in this case has grown again. To understand this interest, we must briefly revisit the history that forged this connection. At the time, Foucault’s influence among the Liberal-Left intellectual circles of  Europe was at its zenith. As Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s fall approached, Foucault was contracted with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera to cover the Iranian revolution. 

The pillars of Foucault’s illusion

Foucault visited Iran twice, first in September 1978, after which he visited Khomeini in his exile near Paris. He returned to Iran in October. During his second visit, Foucault’s reports were met with a mixture of shock and loathing by the West, in stark contrast to his immense popularity among Khomeini’s supporters at Tehran University, who translated his articles and plastered them on campus walls.

Foucault centered his analysis on the concept of “political spirituality.” He sought a form of politics rooted in the organic beginning between man, religion, and politics — a connection he felt Modernity had severed. After the failed in France and disillusionment with the Soviet model, Foucault sought alternatives. He saw in the “anti-imperialist” discourse of the Iranian movement a way to overlook the specificities of Islamism in favor of a spiritual alternative.

Foucault drew parallels between the 16th-century Anabaptist movement in Europe and 1970s Iran, seeking an “inspiring alternative” for a Western audience. His reading of Khomeini proved deeply flawed. In  (1978), Foucault described Khomeini’s role in the Iranian revolution, “It is the same confrontation … between the master of the kingdom and the saintly man, the man of the armed power and the luckless exiled, the tyrant against the man who stands bare-handed and is cheered by a people.”

He portrayed Khomeini to Western readers as a legendary, unarmed figure representing a love for politics and spirit, divorced from the evils of “modernity.”

The historical blind spot

Foucault’s dismissal of Khomeini’s political history revealed a profound lack of contextual scrutiny. He turned a blind eye to the specific social and political alternatives that Khomeini had already outlined in his published books. Furthermore, he seemed unaware that Khomeini was imprisoned in his youth for opposing land reforms that reduced clerical power.

Foucault also overlooked the broader political context. Namely, the of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, who foreign powers such as the US and Britain sought to remove due to his nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. All of this historical data did not deter Foucault’s support. It appears he was either entirely ignorant of this history or chose to exist solely within the “illusion of the present moment.” In his reports, one finds a man “defending” a project he had long been searching for. : “But one can also dream of another movement … a movement that would allow the introduction of a spiritual dimension into political life … so that it does not become the obstacle to spirituality, but its container, its opportunity.”

Without hesitation, he produced texts in a romantic style reminiscent of Greek epics to describe a volatile political event. He treated the revolution as a kind of epic transformation while framing it as a search for spiritual renewal in political theory. 

Criticisms and excuses

Some scholars defend Foucault.�� (2009) argues that Foucault acted as a journalist, suggesting his errors stemmed from a lack of information. However, his writings suggest something deeper: the use of Iran as a validator for his own political theories. This obsession led him to ignore other actors in the revolution. He wrote:

When I walked through the streets of Qom and Tehran, I carried the question “What do you want?” in my head … I avoided asking this question of professional politicians … instead, I had long discussions with religious leaders, students, and intellectuals.

While Foucault focused on the “spiritual” actors, he ignored the fact that 70% of a strategic city like Isfahan was controlled by workers’ councils (shuras), and that in Kurdistan, peasants were reclaiming land. The political Islam movement hijacked the terminology of the Left (e.g., “Republic of the Poor”), a reality Foucault systematically ignored.

The dream of the Iranians or the dream of Foucault?

Foucault believed the world and revolutionary theory were at a “point zero.” He saw the Iranian revolution as a new path beyond modernity. He formulated this as a question: “What is the mystery of this search for something that we ourselves have forgotten since the Renaissance and the great crises of Christianity: a political spirituality?”

He relied on the assurances of clergy members who claimed that “water and land” would belong to no one and that minorities would be respected. Yet, within a month of the revolution’s success, the political spirituality manifested as the invasion of Kurdistan and the execution of “immoral” women, none of which appeared in Foucault’s reports. Foucault was not pursuing the Iranians’ dream; he was pursuing his own troubled dream. At the end of his , he wrote: “I can already hear the French laughing. But I know they are wrong.”

In the end, his involvement in the Iranian Revolution became a cautionary episode. It showed how theory can distort judgment, and history has treated this moment with both criticism and irony.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Before the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamic terrorism was not well organized. Mohammad Reza Shah, ��������’s last monarch, laid the groundwork for the rapid growth and spread of Islamic terrorism by severely suppressing progressive and liberal forces in the country.

With liberal and progressive forces weakened, Islamic terrorist forces led by the cleric Ruhollah Khomeini seized control of the Iranian government in 1979 in a massive coup against the inhumane Pahlavi Dynasty. With ��������’s resources at their disposal, Islamists were able to terrorist organizations in countries across the Middle East.

Iran Supports Islamic Terrorism

The attack on the American embassy and the suicide bombing on the headquarters of the barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983, was a major turning point in how Islamists carry out terrorist operations. 241 US soldiers, 58 French soldiers, and six civilians were killed in the attack on the barracks. The culprits were affiliated with Iran.

These attacks ushered in an age of unending Islamic terrorism. But who is responsible for this disaster?

Inaction from Western governments regarding terrorism, especially from the US, sent a direct message to Iran’s leaders: you are allowed to establish and arm terrorist organizations. Western leaders did not have the determination and courage to respond to the new terrorist threat because they did not recognize or understand the ideological nature of the other side.

After these attacks, a joint plan to attack the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and centers in Lebanon was planned and approved by the presidents of the US and France. However, the US Secretary of Defense lobbied and successfully stopped it, claiming there was no clear evidence of Iran’s role in the previous attacks.

The leaders of the free world, especially the US, continue to be double-minded and indecisive in dealing with Iran and its terrorist regime. This wrongheaded policy created a suitable environment for the growth of Islamic terrorism and turned our world into a less safe place.

The formation of and its September 11 attacks, the rise of and its assault on the — including the abduction and sale of thousands of Kurdish women as sex slaves — numerous terrorist attacks across the West, and the profound sense of insecurity in these nations, culminating in the terrorist attack against Israel and ��������’s subsequent missile attacks against Israel in April and October 2024, highlight the consequences of failing to address Tehran decisively.

The Appeasement Policy

After almost five decades of toward Iran, the October 7 invasion of Israel by ��������’s proxy, Hamas, pushed Israel to take a defensive posture and cut off the arms of the Islamic terrorist regime by attacking the source of the satanic ideology: the Islamic Republic of Iran itself.

Unfortunately, the international community and the free world still insist on this appeasement policy. For this reason, Israel is alone in the fight against terrorism, bearing the weight of the world in its struggle against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Poor policy choices concerning Iran’s support of terrorism do not end there. On September 28, the US announced an with Iraq to withdraw American troops from parts of the country. This is likely the beginning of another global disaster produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The withdrawal will mean the complete handover of Iraq to Iran, providing a safe space for Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist organizations affiliated with Iran to hide from Israel by moving to Iraq. If this agreement is implemented, Iraq — with all its riches — will become a hub for the growth and spread of Islamic terrorism supported by Iran.

This will nullify all Israeli efforts to combat terrorism supported by Iran, as well as all Western efforts to create a secure Middle East. If Western countries are not more decisive in dealing with Islamic terrorism, our future will be more uncertain.

History has shown that Iran is the head of a snake. To kill a snake, you have to cut off its head. This is not an endorsement of an all-out war with Iran. Instead, free countries, especially the United States, should support liberation movements in the region. This support should be extended to the Kurds, who may be powerful enough to destroy the Islamic Republic but presently lack international support.

The lack of support from Western countries for the Iranian popular in December 2017 and and the Kurdish Woman, Life, Freedom movement that started in 2022 sent a message to the Islamic Republic that it can carry out its crimes domestically and continue its terrorist activities internationally without fear of retribution.

The West must end the appeasement policy with Iran and crush the snake’s head in Tehran by supporting the progressive and liberal movements of the Iranian people, thereby ending five decades of terrorism fostered by Iran.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Islamic Republic of Iran Should Be Overthrown appeared first on 51�Թ�.

As of now, Egypt does not seem to have followed the IMF’s policy recommendations. In making the recommendations, the IMF demonstrated a systemic misunderstanding of the fundamental dynamics of Egypt’s political economy. This misunderstanding is bound to exacerbate Egypt’s economic problems and exacerbate the current crisis.

The Military Likes Moolah

For decades, the military has had first claim on Egypt’s resources. The IMF recommends that the military give up its privileged economic position. It also calls for leveling the playing field between the public and private sector. Yet signs abound already that the regime is circumventing these recommendations. In fact, it is deepening the economic footprint of the military.

In January, Sisi issued a presidential assigning prized land to the military. The military now has land two kilometers wide on both sides of 31 roads. The military uses this tactic to gain control over commercially viable pieces of land, which it then uses for profit-generating activities. 

Sisi’s government has also instituted an of the 1975 Law 30, which regulates the operation of the Suez Canal Authority. This came only a few days after the IMF deal. Prima facie, this amendment carries out the IMF’s recommendations. It creates the “Suez Canal Fund,” which will invest surplus revenue from the canal’s operations. This fund will also be able “to lease, sell, and purchase assets, establish companies, and invest in financial instruments.”

However, the devil lies in the details. A from the president reveals that the new fund will be under the control of a “sovereign entity,” a euphemism for the security services. Furthermore, the amendment provides for no parliamentary supervision for the fund. This means that the military will be able to siphon off hard currency from this fund, which could prove critical for meeting both Egypt’s debt obligations and the import needs of the population. 

Finally, the government has no real plan to sell off state-owned assets as part of the effort to meet its debt obligations. Of the 32 companies it is selling off, only two of them are military-owned. Watanya, the petrol station chain, seems to have been subjected to . Most of Watanya’s assets have been moved to ChillOut, another military-owned chain. Deals that have been done are also in trouble. In February, ADNOC half of Total’s fuel stations . There are reports that this Emirati state-owned company is backing out of the deal.

It is clear that, as many predicted, the IMF’s recommendations are meeting stiff resistance. Hence, their implementation is extremely unlikely.

Increasing Inflation and Rising Debt Spell Trouble Ahead

Inflation rose from 21.9% in December to 26.5% in January. Food prices are up. Bread, meat and poultry cost a lot more. The IMF recommended “a shift to a flexible exchange rate while taking measures to help shield the Egyptian population from a mounting cost-of-living crisis.” Inherent in this recommendation is an admission. This shift will exacerbate inflation and worsen the cost-of-living crisis.

In January, Al Jazeera that the Egyptian pound had lost half of its value since March. Bloomberg has observed that devaluation has already the Egyptian economy. As of February, the private sector had declined for 26 consecutive months. Scarcities and the private sector is struggling. Business sentiment has sagged to its third lowest level since April 2012. Remember, this was a time when the Muslim Brotherhood was in power. 

Finally, Egyptian debt is showing worrisome trends. Even though external debt has by 0.5% on a quarterly basis, short-term debt has increased from 11.48% in September 2021 to 27.4% in September 2022. This rapid increase is alarming. Sisi’s regime faces pressure to repay its debt even as investor confidence remains low. So, the regime is relying on short-term borrowing to solve the problem. This debt comes at a higher price. It is issued with higher interest rates, driving up Egypt’s cost of servicing this debt. Unsurprisingly, Moody has Egypt’s credit rating from B2 to B3, piling up even more pressure on the Sisi regime.

In essence, the prospects for IMF’s policy recommendations are poor. Indeed some of its recommendations will only deepen the crisis and increase poverty. The only possible and durable solution to the crisis is a radical transformation of Egypt’s model of crony capitalism. The IMF economic policy recommendations cannot succeed under the country’s current political system, which the institution implicitly supports.Without a comprehensive understanding of Egypt’s political economy, the IMF will continue to throw good money after bad and its loans will only enrich elites in Sisi’s military regime while inflicting pain on Egypt’s long-suffering people.

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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As the truce expired, Houthi military spokesman, General , and Houthi delegate,, published statements foreign oil companies and vessels operating in Yemen. The were in line with Houthi demands for a larger share of oil revenue as part of failed with UN Special Envoy to extend the six month long ceasefire. The incidents temporarily suspended production and exports. Only a week later, Cal Valley Petroleum declared and suspended all work starting November 1.

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After eight years of conflict between the IRG and Houthi rebels, the listing by the NDC came a week after urged the UN Security Council (UNSC) “to designate Houthis as terrorists.” Calls at the Security Council by Saudi Arabia aimed to expand on language used in UNSC Resolution 2624 (2022), where at the urging of the the Council referred to Houthis as a “.” These efforts by members of the Arab to restore legitimacy aim to pressure the and the EU to officially designate the Iran-backed militia a “terrorist organization.”

An Increasing Threat

The accuracy and velocity of the latest drone strikes by Houthis are an indication of increasing capabilities, including intelligence resources. This should not come as a surprise following months of recruitment and deployment of troops and weapons by Houthis, who organized a dozen throughout northern Yemen during the period of the UN-brokered truce.Their recent choice of targets also indicates a clear shift in strategy since the truce expired. Prior to the start of the truce in 2022, Houthis focused on cross-border strikes against targets in and the . The shift to oil facilities within Yemen fits the Houthi narrative, calling the IRG mercenaries and the coalition members “”, Yemen’s oil.

Demands by Houthis for a bigger share of oil revenue appears to extend from decreasing sources of income this year. The UN donors conference in 2022 only delivered $1.3 billion from the requested. This has affected humanitarian operations across Houthi-held territory. It was a major blow from the rebels who profit from the entire : from collecting taxes at the port, to the control of ground transport and warehousing, to the local civil society organizations in charge of distribution of aid, and now to the and foreign exchange shops. The decrease in the flow of aid has affected the entire cycle, which also maintains a complex patronage of networks, sustaining the elite down to tribal levies.

US Sanctions Miss the Mark in Yemen

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By targeting the at al-Nushayma, Shabwa, the rebels also sent a message to the Southern Transitional Council (STC), whose ally is now of Shabwa province. The aim is to prevent the STC from profiting off oil exports. In , near al-Rayyan airport, the drone strikes on the South Korean vessel were called a warning by Houthis to foreign companies, more specifically, those that are linked to members of the coalition. Al-Masirah media reported Houthis used for the strikes in al-Dhaba.

New Targets   

While Houthi drone strikes within Yemeni territory are not new, the locations and distance show a shift amid a new balance of power. Aden has been a target along with nearby military bases and high-ranking security officers, but the reach to facilities along the coastlines of Hadramawt and Shabwa with such accuracy represent new threats to rising powers like the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The stalemate in al-Dhale province between Houthis and pro-STC forces remains months after southern Giants Brigades expelled Houthis from Bayhan, Shabwa.��

In January 2022, the clashes along Shabwa’s western mountains delivered the first major over the Houthis, reversing territorial gains beyond the old north-south divide. A fractured national army and a al-Islah party had placed pro-STC forces at the forefront in the fight against Houthis. This new balance comes with a high price for southerners, and Houthi strikes on oil facilities in southern provinces aim at dragging STC forces into direct confrontations along new frontlines.

Houthis know southern forces are stretched along multiple fronts. Security Belt Forces continue to advance across against terrorist elements, while Amalaqa and Shabwa Defense Forces cleanse Shabwa of elements that oppose governor Awad al-Awlaqi. Attacks on vital energy infrastructure come at a minimal risk and cost for Houthis. They are gambling on either instigating a wider response by the National Army or the coalition, which leads to a return of cross-border strikes on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, or a mobilization by southern forces that are already stretched thin.

The government of Yemen echoed members of the and has called for the international community to strengthen its stance on Houthis to designate the militia a terror group. by western following the attack on al-Dhaba ports have also come under criticism for their weak stance since the truce expired. In absence of compromise on a new ceasefire threatens an escalation across battlefronts under new conditions with higher stakes for warring parties.�� 

[ edited this article]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post A Surge in Attacks: Houthi Rebels Exploit Oil Infrastructure appeared first on 51�Թ�.

When I shared with him the fact that I came in second place, he informed me, strangely enough, that in case of an injury to the first place winner, I might be called upon to represent Morocco. I immediately dismissed the idea as I had no wish that such a thing might befall on Fatima Zahra, our newly crowned Miss Morocco. She carried the title beautifully, and we were all so proud of her. I arrived home and spent that evening telling my aunt and mother about the emotionally-charged experience the pageant had been for me. I felt the presence of my grandmother hovering above me the entire time.

Call it a premonition or fate. The taxi driver’s words later became a reality, which meant I would be going to Israel to represent Morocco during the Miss Universe 2021 competition. Life’s events are not as arbitrary as they seem, after all. Although Fatima Zahra’s injury was unfortunate, I think it served to teach us different lessons. She kindly expressed her trust in my abilities, her benevolent candor reflecting  her inner radiance. Today, she continues to personally and professionally blossom, and it has been a true pleasure witnessing that evolution  from afar.

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Not everyone was supportive. The political climate around Israel and Palestine has always been delicate, and the topic is still as sensitive as ever. When the location of the Miss Universe event was initially announced, people immediately began to express their discontent on social media. At the same time, the political relationship between Algeria and Morocco had also become a sensitive topic. My grandmother’s Algerian roots created an additional issue for some people. As soon as I was announced as the newly crowned Miss Morocco, someone unearthed a video depicting me sharing my grandmother’s life story meant to demonstrate the power of choice. This provoked a public debate about my legitimacy as an ambassador of Morocco.

I instantly became a name  in the news, as some journalists evidently sought to exploit the story. Others working in the media described the phenomenon as a strategic maneuver designed to generate more “buzz”, in other words, a publicity stunt. In my own thoughts I continued to ponder the notion of identity.

Discovering familiarity in a foreign land

Jerusalem is described as the city of peace, yet it contains the pain and passions of diverse peoples. We walked along its storied streets marked with the remnants of a diverse religious patrimony, a pattern of temples, churches, mounts, and mosques spread across its surface, mapping out something like a constellation. This route of sacred sites held more than nominal significance for me. As my ears rang to the greetings of “shalom” and “salam,” I wished for just that: peace.

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With approximately 700,000 in Israel with Moroccan Jewish ancestry, I was frequently approached by individuals who proudly expressed their families’ Moroccan origins. They generously offered me tokens of appreciation, even  my evening gown. They shared various types of food with me as well as smiles, hugs, songs, dances, and cheers. It produced the effect of a deeply rooted sense of amity. With a declining Moroccan Jewish population, these stories felt like echoes from a distant past. I had educated myself on this aspect of my country’s history, but the experience of being exposed to the number of people who came to me and made clear how widespread remembrance of the Moroccan Jewish past remains. I found the fact that it is  still celebrated eye-opening and, quite simply, wonderful.

One evening, Miss Universe 2020, Miss USA, Miss Israel, and I had the pleasure of dining together at the home of Eli Lankri, mayor of Eilat. His wife, whose joie de vivre was contagious,  had prepared an array of familiar dishes—couscous and shebakiya among them. The melodies of an oud accompanied us as we spoke of the memories the hosts had formed during their childhood in Morocco.

Stories that came into being long before my existence were thus  transmitted created an intergenerational as well as intercultural link. What had previously felt to me like random echoes of the past instead took the form of artfully composed symphonies. During my stay in Israel, I became fascinated by the land, by its capacity to juxtapose faiths, and the fact that the Dead Sea happens to be the lowest point on Earth. I contemplated that maybe, just maybe, this mix of the high and low has created a unique midpoint, one that celebrates difference, coexistence, and understanding.

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Growing up, I attended an American school in the morning and returned home to speak Darija and French. I then extended my academic journey in France while pursuing an anglophone program. Exploration was my native language, and the cultural dichotomy I grew up in was where I felt most comfortable. The people I met during my stay, though they had not been to Morocco in years, considered themselves to be as Moroccan as any other Moroccan citizen. So, how does one measure Moroccanness?

I mean that, to me, being Moroccan means creating space for both yourself and the other. It means respecting your beliefs as much as any other individual’s beliefs, demonstrating tolerance and coexistence. It means equally valuing two seemingly opposing thoughts, making the desire to understand the underlying force behind our eclectic relationships.

Being Moroccan means having freedom inculcated into our biological blueprint. Adorned with colorful intricacies, our tables, tapestries, ceilings, floors, and living rooms continue to celebrate our innate vibrance. The Moroccan man walks to the end of his sentences with hope and gratitude. The Moroccan woman wears courage on her sleeve as she gracefully embodies liberty. Morocco is where despair surrenders to faith and where cynicism is replaced by a wise smile or a warm piece of homemade bread. It is a place where empathy is the  local currency, giving value to everything.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Among the cascading effects of inflation on the global economy is the negative impact it has on the market dynamics that drive illicit trade. Specifically, high levels of inflation can have a disastrous impact onconsumer purchasing . In turn, reduced purchasing power coupled with increased poverty reduces consumer “product affordability,” which is widely regarded as the primary driver for illicit trade. When prices rise faster than incomes, people can afford to buy fewer goods and services and cheaper goods includingillicit and black-market products become more .

Inflation leads to illicit trade

This phenomenon is playing out in real time in Turkiye, where inflation is at a of 86%, causing a notable erosion of consumer purchasing power that further incentivizes consumers to consider illicit products. Recent interviews with Turkish of both legal and illegal products showed that the most important determinant for choosing illicit goods over legal equivalents was the lower price of the illegal goods.

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Turkiye already faced challenges from illicit trade on multiple fronts. For example, it is an important source country for illicit plant protection products, goods are widespread, and it grapples with the harmful effects of illicit tobacco, alcohol and petroleum products. Moreover, the government’s goal of making Turkiye a top pharma hub by 2023 is threatened by a growing market for illegal pharmaceuticals.

The consequences of this illicit activity can be dire. In December 2021 a mass poisoning caused by illicit alcohol claimed the lives ofat least . In November 2020, the World Health Organization  (WHO) issued a medical alert cautioning that batches offalsified , an antiviral medicine used to treat chronic Hepatitis C, were discovered in Turkiye.

The challenge for Turkiye lies not just with mitigating illicit trade at home, but due to its geographical location as a gateway to Europe, it must also address illicit trade across its borders. It is known as a critical transshipment point for counterfeit and pirated finished goods and components across a variety of industry sectors. It is, for example, the leading source of fake clothing and accessories at EU borders in addition to being an established transshipment route of illicit alcohol and related packaging from Russia and neighboring countries (who are manufacturing at scale) to the Middle East.

The situation is exacerbated by the sizable of the Turkish lira, which drives international demand for exported Turkish fakes, as such items became cheaper to traders buying in US Dollars and Euros. Meanwhile, recent price hikes and tax increases on alcohol, tobacco and petroleum products have put upward pressures on retail prices for these products, making them more expensive to consumers and incentivizing demand for cheaper, unregulated illicit alternatives.

The Turkish government must step up

Given these dynamics, the problem of illicit trade in Turkiye can only be expected to intensify. Consequently, the Turkish government will necessarily need to be more vigilant in its efforts to root out this illegal activity.

A new , Inflation, product affordability, and illicit trade: Spotlight on Turkiye, by TRACIT, aims to increase awareness on these issues and proposes several policy recommendations that target some of the main illicit trade issues facing the country.

For the government to succeed, controls to fight illicit trade will require concerted, sustained and joined up efforts between all responsible government bodies and law enforcement agencies. These efforts must be supplemented with adequate budget allocations and clear objectives to ensure long term successful implementation of anti-illicit trade efforts.

The notoriously slow adjudication process must be streamlined and criminal penalties strengthened to deter repeat offenders. The government must also commit to tackling pervasive corrupt practices that continue to facilitate illicit trade, especially at the level of customs, local officials, law enforcement authorities and the judiciary. As long as persists within government agencies, any attempt to improve and strengthen enforcement actions will have limited effect.

Finally, partnerships with the private sector should be encouraged, as these can play an important role in improving enforcement actions. With real-time access to commercial data and private sector intelligence, enforcement agencies can improve the effectiveness of their operations and risk assessment techniques. Rights holders can also be more effective partners in investigations when they are informed by authorities of potential illicit trade affecting their brands, resulting in more deterrent criminal proceedings.

It is our hope that the report and its recommendations will provide the Turkish government and other impacted stakeholders with practical examples of reforms and controls they can implement to more effectively mitigate illicit trade in Turkiye.

[Read the report and full set of recommendations at.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Soaring Inflation in Turkiye Is Now Boosting Illicit Trade appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Currently, Iran is ruled by mullahs. ��������’s theocratic regime is disliked, if not despised, by the US and its allies. Many, including prominent Iranians, blame the mullahs for all of ��������’s ills. However, few are aware of an inconvenient truth. It was the British who paved the path to power for the mullahs with the Americans constructing the mile.

Over the years, the mullahs have faced many protests. In the current wave, protesters have government officials such as the police, ambulance attendants  and bank officials. They have also targeted mosques, clerics and religious people. Many protesters chant “marq bar dictaator,” a phrase that literally translates as “death to the dictator.” Some of them have a soft spot for Mohammad Reza Shah whom we will subsequently refer to as the Shah.

Sadly, the Shah so beloved by some Iranians was an oppressive dictator. His secret police SAVAK kept an eye on the people. Hence, a famous proverb was born: divar mush dare, musham gush dare — the wall has a mouse, the mouse has ears. Under the Shah, Iran was a surveillance state much like the Soviet Union and East Germany. If you said the wrong thing to the wrong people, SAVAK would throw you into prisons like Evin and Qasr. You also faced the risk of torture and murder. After all, the US had taught SAVAK the tricks of the trade.

Young women who wish for a return to the halcyon days of absolute monarchical rule do not know that the Shah was deeply sexist. He believed that were less intelligent than men. In his interview with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, the remarked, “You may be equal in the eyes of the law, but not, I beg your pardon for saying so, in ability.” Hence, it is unsurprising that the Shah objectified women and saw them purely through the lens of sexual pleasure.

A Classic Comprador

When the Portuguese pioneered European colonization of the colored peoples, a term came into being. A comprador or compradore came to signify a “person who acts as an agent for foreign organizations engaged in investment, trade, or economic or political exploitation.” The Shah was a comprador who ruled Iran first as a British vassal and then as an American one.

The circumstances of the Shah’s accession to the throne are most instructive. The British deposed Reza Shah for cozying up with the Germans in 1941. After sending the father packing, they placed the weak, callow 22-year-old son on the throne. They chose the young Shah precisely because they were convinced that he would do their bidding.

The Shah proved to be a good pick. The British and the Soviets occupied Iran. The British ��������’s north-south railroad to supply the Soviets against Germany. In 1942, both promised that they would withdraw their forces within six months of the end of the war. This promise was intended to appease Iranian nationalists. In 1943, American troops arrived in Iran too. When the war ended, the Soviets troops failed to leave the country as per their promise. Only American pressure made them leave by May 1946. Iranians were appreciative of American commitment to the integrity of Iran and its right to self-determination.

Foreign occupation fuelled national pride and democratic discourse in Iran. Once foreign troops left, this continued. While foreign troops left, foreign influence did not stop. The British continued to extract and export oil from Iran for a pittance. They treated Iran as a de facto colony and the Shah acted as their comprador.

Naturally, dissent emerged. Mohammad Mosaddegh emerged as the key leader. Reza Shah had put him under house arrest. Once the bloodthirsty ruler was deposed in 1941, Mosaddegh returned to public life and was elected to parliament. Protests in 1949 against fake elections led to the founding of Jebhe Melli, which literally translates as . As its leader, Mosaddegh promised to end the British control of ��������’s oil industry. He demanded that the British share profits equally with Iran. At the time, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was paying more money to Britain as taxes than to Iran as a share of the proceeds.

The British opposed Mosaddegh tooth and nail. They refused to share profits equally with the Iranians, claiming it would be a breach of contract. The very British idea of duress invalidating a contract did not apply to Iran. The Iranians had signed a deal that gave them 17.5% of AIOC’s profits when the British held a gun to their head. The AIOC cooked its books and Iran never really got the promised 17.5% either.

The Dirty Secrets About How Reza Shah Destroyed Iran

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In late December 1950, the American-owned Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) agreed to share profits with Saudi Arabia on a 50-50 basis. The British rejected the idea of any similar agreement for AIOC with Iran. This left the Iranian parliament with no choice but to pass a bill nationalizing the oil industry in March 1951. The Shah did not sign the bill. Mosaddegh was elected prime minister in April and the Shah was now forced to sign the nationalization bill.

The British responded by manipulating the Americans to conduct a military coup in 1953. The Cold War was on and the Americans were turning paranoid about communism. Nationalization allowed the British to paint Mosaddegh as a potential Soviet ally. Like a wily old uncle manipulating a sinewy nephew, the British got the Americans to do their dirty work for them. Mosaddegh was packed off to prison and the Shah emerged as an absolute ruler just like his father.

Until the 1953 coup, the Shah had one master: the British. From now on, he had two masters: the British and the US. As the American star rose, they came to dominate Iran. The British debacle in the 1956 Suez Crisis strengthened the American hand. As part of the Cold War, the US began beefing up the Shah’s regime. Washington provided the regime with military advisers, intelligence agents, and arms and ammunition worth millions of dollars. The Iranian taxpayer paid for such help most generously. American oil companies got a share of the Iranian oil pie.

The Shah’s Oppressive Police State

After 1953, life in Iran deteriorated. For Washington, the Shah was a key Cold War ally. Iran was a frontline state against the Soviet Union. So, in 1957, CIA and FBI helped the Shah’s regime to set up the dreaded Sazman-e Etelaat Va Amniat Keshvar (), a secret police to cow his people into submission. The US and, later, Israel coached Iranian military, police and intelligence officials in the arts of surveillance, coercion and torture.

By 1960, the Shah had a vise-like grip on the country. He had eliminated, imprisoned, and silenced the opposition. Nobody dared to protest. SAVAK routinely scrutinized students, civil service employees and industrial workers. It censored and controlled all forms of media and professional associations. SAVAK also monitored Iranian communities abroad. It had over 5,000 full-time employees and many part-time agents around the world.  SAVAK used all forms of torture necessary to extract information and punish dissenters. Nobody felt safe in Iran.

Such was the brutality of SAVAK that American public opinion began to turn. The US put pressure on the Shah to reform. In 1963, the Shah announced a plebiscite for an ambitious program of social, political and economic reform that has come to be known as the . The most important element of this revolution was . He broke down large land holdings to give away land to poor cultivators. In theory, this sounds like a good egalitarian measure. In reality, it led to disaster.

Poor cultivators did not have money to run their small farms. The government gave them land but did not give them farming implements, seeds, fertilizers, irrigation and funds. Unsurprisingly, they abandoned their farms to become landless laborers in cities, particularly Tehran. The urban population and, in due course, so did discontent.

It was in 1963 that the then relatively obscure Ruhollah Musavi spoke out against the White Revolution. Khomeini was teaching at the prestigious Fayẕiyyeh Madrasah in Qom. He was already a prominent ayatollah. The Shah arrested Khomeini and killed many students at Fayẕiyyeh. Luckily for Khomeini, the Shah did not kill him or confine him to an Iranian prison. In 1964, Khomeini publicly criticized the Shah for awarding the US capitulation and called him a lackey of US and Israel. The Shah first arrested Khomeini but, after 19 days in Qasr and a another few days in a military base, packed off the ayatollah into who ended up living in Turkey, Iraq, and, eventually, France.

Extravagant Opulence by Foreign Lackey

When the Shah was not oppressing his people, torturing dissidents or locking up his opponents, he was lavishly blowing up Iranian tax money on obscenely extravagant events. In 1967, the Shah himself in an occasion that still lives on in Iranian memory. This American lackey assumed the resonant but meaningless title, “His Imperial Majesty The Shāhanshāh of Iran,” and wore a crown that was studded with a mere 3,380 diamonds. He gave his wife Farah the title, “the Empress of Iran,” an unprecedented act in Iranian 2,500-year history. 

In most monarchies, coronation is held soon after the king or queen ascends to the throne, as the coronation of Charles II in the UK demonstrates. In the case of Iran, the coronation ceremony was a reflection of the Shah’s perverted narcissism. He wanted the world to see him as a secular reformer, a great modernizer, a savior of an ancient civilization, the resuscitator of ancient Persia and a historic emperor beloved by his people. Four years later, he threw what has come to be known as “the world’s greatest party” to celebrate 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy.

In 1971, the Shah held this party in the ancient ruins of Persepolis, which now lies in the middle of a desert. An airport, a highway and an entire tent city were built for the occasion. This “billion-dollar party” has come to be known as “the Devil’s Feast.” As his people toiled in poverty, the Shah and his foreign guests were quaffing the fanciest of champagnes and gorging on caviar. 

Many kings and queens, presidents and prime ministers were impressed by this ostentatious desert party. However, canny observers were not entirely convinced. The most memorable of these was US diplomat who attended this party and saw the spectacle of the crowning of the “Sun of the Aryans.” His words sum up this 1971 incongruous big bash: 

“What an absurd, bathetic spectacle! The son of a colonel in a Persian Cossack regiment play-acting as the emperor of a country with an average per capita income of $250 per year, proclaiming his achievements in modernizing his nation while accoutred in the raiment and symbols of ancient despotism.”

While the Shah was good at throwing lavish parties, he was not as savvy at retaining Iranian territory. Bahrain had been overwhelmingly Shia and was under Iranian suzerainty before the British took over. The British were supposed to return this island to Iran. Instead, the British pressured the Shah to let become an independent state in 1970. They had installed a comprador Wahhabi Sunni dynasty just as they had installed the Pahlavis in Iran. This Wahhabi dynasty still rules over Bahraini Shias with an iron hand.

While the Shah projected himself as a mighty emperor, in reality, he was the of the Persian Gulf for Uncle Sam. The US relied on Iran as its leading security partner in the Gulf. Iranian oil revenues were spent to protect American interests in the region. The Shah also the US in the Vietnam War.

A Sordid and Dissolute Despot

Today, many Iranians see the Shah as a liberator of women. During his time, glamorous women in elegant dresses sashayed down his red carpets. This is in stark contrast to the current regime of mullahs that imposes draconian dress codes on women. The nostalgia for the more permissive pre-1979 era obscures the fact that the Shah did not really see women as equals. He made his wife regent but did not think she would be able to rule as well as him.

The Shah led a famously dissolute life, visiting nightclubs across Europe and chasing beautiful actresses. One of them was who became the Princess Grace of Monaco in 1956. The Shah spent millions on Kelly. He gifted her “three pieces of Van Cleef & Arpels jewelry: a gold birdcage housing a diamond and sapphire bird, all fashioned into a perfect pin; a gold vanity case with a clasp set with thirty-two diamonds; and a gold bracelet with an intricate pearl and diamond face.” He gifted others ancient jewelry from the treasury. Tragically, the poor, toiling Iranian taxpayers funded this libertine lifestyle. They also paid for the Shah’s gambling . This magnificent emperor often lost about 50 million tomans ($42 million) in a single night as peasants went hungry in his homeland.

More importantly, the Shah was the Harvey Weinstein of his day. In fact, he was much worse than Weinstein. Not only pimps but also government officials were supposed to procure beautiful women for the Shah. Some of these women were underaged. The Shah was a serial sexual offender who preyed on vulnerable women and got away with it.

Given the Shah’s lack of loyalty to his nation, his excessive ostentation, brutal oppression and moral turpitude, a revolution was inevitable. Monarchs cannot eat cakes forever when their people struggle for bread. Even though SAVAK had imprisoned, tortured or killed opposition leaders like Mosaddegh, the Iranian people were seething in rage against their “.” Iranians revolted in 1979, exactly 190 years after the 1789 French Revolution. Once the dust settled, the mullahs led by Khomeini took charge.

Today, the Shah’s eldest son Reza lives in the US and continues the family tradition. Reza dreams of the restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty and a return to good times for his family. He has been financed not only by the but also the . Like his grandfather and father, Reza is also a lackey. The apple has not fallen far from the tree.

Today, people are out on the streets protesting against the mullahs who run a theological state. Most of them are very young with some barely 15. Some of them are vulnerable to myths about a glorious past and look favorably upon the Shah. Even in 2022, there are Iranians who glorify and glamorize the Shah. They must remember that he was a corrupt tyrant who stole from his people, gave territories away, helped foreigners destroy Iranian democracy, killed innocents and sexually abused innumerable women. The Shah belongs to the dustbin of history. ��������’s future has to be about liberty, equality, human rights, freedom and democracy.

[The authors corrected and updated this article on November 9, 2022.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Revolution Erupted in Iran Because of Mohammad Reza Shah appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In the recent protests, unknown assailants have banks, police, ambulances, other government officials, mosques, clerics and religious people. During their attacks, protesters often yell, “Reza Shah ruhat shad,” a phrase that literally translates to “Reza Shah, may your soul be happy.” These protesters are totally ignorant about the fact that, if Reza Shah was in power, he would have all of them killed. History tells us that Reza Shah dealt brutally with his opponents and crushed any sign of dissent.

British Domination and Exploitation

The British began interfering in Iran as early as the late 18th century. At that time, Persia, as Iran was then called, was under pressure from the Ottomans and the Russians. To Persians, the British seemed a countervailing power. To Britain, Persia was like Egypt, a buffer state to protect the jewel in the crown: India. The British did not rule Iran directly but dominated the country through bribery and intimidation. A cadre of collaborators helped the British Empire to run Persia as an informal colony. The British drained the to support their Indian ventures. Unlike Egypt though, Persia never became a protectorate thanks to the resistance of Shia religious leaders.

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Persia became increasingly important to British interests in the early 20th century. While Egypt had the Suez Canal, Persia had oil. In 1914, before World War I broke out, the House of Commons backed Winston Churchill’s proposal for the British government to 51% of the shares of Anglo-Persian. Churchill was determined to keep Anglo-Persian an absolutely “all British Company” and spent a then princely sum of £2.2 million to do so. The goal was to ensure energy security for Great Britain where the Royal Navy switched from coal to oil to compete against the fast-rising German navy.

After World War I broke out, Persia remained neutral but supplied oil to Britain. In fact, Persian oil arguably led to Allied victory. The “ of the British fleet to oil… [gave them] advantages over the German fleet powered by coal–greater range and speed and faster refueling.” In keeping with their imperial tradition, Britain paid a pittance to Persia for oil.

Britain not only exploited Persia for oil but also grain. This led to the 1917-18 . About nine million Persians died, an estimated 40% of the population. Scholars have called this a and, arguably, it was the biggest tragedy of World War I, exceeding the loss of life in Somme and Verdun. The British skilfully blamed the Russians and the Turks, and the genocide remained unknown for nearly a century.

The British Enthrone Ruthless Reza Mirpanj

After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Persia became a frontline state for the British Empire to counter the Bolshevik menace. As in other countries, the Soviets tried to foment trouble in Persia. Britain countered by propping up Reza Mirpanj, an officer in the Persian Cossack Brigade. He went on to depose the Qajar dynasty in 1925 and declare himself shah. The rubber stamp parliament approved Reza Mirpanj’s power grab. 

Once he became shah, this opportunistic officer changed his name to . Importantly, the Persian language was called Pahlavi during the . The Sasanian dynasty centralized Persia and made it a great power. Choosing Pahlavi was a very clever public relations stunt. Not everyone bought into Reza Shah’s sham. Four courageous legislators opposed the new shah. One of them was Mohammad Mosaddegh who would go on to become prime minister years later. The British managed Reza Shah’s using the coronation of George V as their guide. 

Reza Shah presided over the greatest loot of Iranian historical and cultural relics. In 1931, he allowed foreign to explore Iran and excavate Persepolis, the capital of the ancient Persian Achaemenid empire founded by Darius the Great in the 6th century BCE. His regime looked the other way as they loaded invaluable ancient artifacts onto big trucks. Then these trucks made their way from Persepolis to the Persian Gulf. Eventually, these artifacts ended up in the US and other prosperous countries of the West. Many ended up at the where they are housed in the appositely colonial sounding Oriental Institute.

The new shah turned out to be a classic British lackey. He stamped out Soviet influence and built the Trans-Iranian Railway connecting the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. Built at ruinous cost to the Iranian taxpayer, this allowed British troops to deploy faster to counter the Soviets. Most importantly, the shah increased oil concessions to the British. The British increased their oil in Persia from around 5 million tons (37 million barrels, equivalent) in 1932 to 10 million tons (over 74  million barrels, equivalent) in 1938. Note that very little of this old money trickled down to the Persian treasury and oil revenue comprised merely 10% of the budget.

In 1936, protests against Reza Shah’s policies erupted in Mashhad. The security forces cracked down the protesters. The protesters sought sanctuary in the holiest place in Iran: ’s mausoleum. On the shah’s order, security forces entered the mausoleum and viciously massacred people. After that slaughter, Reza Shah became damned to eternity to most Iranians. After that incident, many people feared to even say his name, but referred to him as sag, which means dog—considered the most derogative of abuses in the Farsi language.

For increasing military might and expensive projects, Reza Shah had to increase the tax burden on the people. He also pursued a policy of centralization and Persianization. This meant ethnic minorities had no place in Persia, which he named Iran — the name used by natives of the land. Reza Shah’s detribalization and Persianization led to and genocide. , a noted American judge, had the following to note about one community that fell foul of Reza Shah:

“Lur after Lur was beheaded. Again and again, the plate was heated red hot and slapped on the stub of a neck….The colonel started betting on how far these headless men could run…. Every man, woman, and child had been killed. Not a living soul was left.”

Overall, Reza Shah was a disaster for Iran. He banned all newspapers, organizations, and any opposition. Intellectual and political expression was censored. This undid the remnant of reformist efforts kicked off by , the remarkable modernizer of the mid-19th century. who preceded him about 80 years earlier. This reformer had started Vaqaye Etefaqieh, ��������’s first newspaper whose name literally translates as “The Happened Events.”

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İnspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Turkey, Reza Shah banned Iranian traditional dress. Both men and women now had to wear Western clothing. If they did not do so, they were beaten and even taken into custody. This policy caused a massive rupture with tradition. In small towns and villages, people ignored the shah’s edict. In cities, people suffered, especially the women. Many women stopped going to public places to avoid harassment and became involuntary prisoners within their own homes. Like many other policies, the shah’s policy on clothing was an unmitigated disaster. It led to resentment across the country and had unintended consequences. Today, the mullahs enforce rigid rules of dress on women in much the same way as the shah. Then too, women protested as they are protesting today.

Bloodthirsty at Home, Weak Abroad

Reza Shah might have been ruthless to ethnic minorities and desenters but he was always subservient to the great powers. He gave away many parts of Iran to buy peace. Scared of the Soviets, he gifted them the region, which lies today in Turkmenistan and is home to its capital Ashgabat, in 1933. Later, Reza Shah succumbed to British pressure and parted with more land. In 1937, the wily Brits convened a meeting to unite Muslims against the Bolsheviks. The was signed. As per this treaty, Reza Shah gave  the Helmand wetland to Afghanistan, full rights of Shatt al-Arab to Iraq and the strategic to Turkey. This Iranian that Reza Shah gave to Turkey allows Turkish troops access to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, which is an enclave of Azerbaijan within Armenia. Consequently, Turkey has replaced Iran as the natural ally of Azerbaijan even though the country is 85% Shia and Azeri culture has been deeply influenced by its Iranian counterpart. 

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In World War II, Reza Shah overplayed his hand. The rise of Nazi Germany swayed his head. By engaging with the Nazis, he began playing a dangerous game. Once the Germans invaded Russia in 1941, the British and the Soviets Iran to secure oil supplies and continued access to warm waters. Reza Shah’s troops capitulated. The reason was simple. Reza Shah had started as a cavalry gendarme. These gendarmes were backed by landlords and their main job was to keep the peasants in check. They were bullies who lived off the fat of the land and not patriots who were serving to fight for their country. When the British and the Soviets invaded, most of Reza Shah’s top officers simply fled. Reza Shah himself proved to be a coward who did not resist the invading powers in the slightest. The military historian Robert Lyman observed that the was, “one of the fastest capitulations in history.”

Part of the reason Reza Shah lost was because he was a corrupt, cruel and incompetent autocrat. He was a lowly cavalry officer who was part of a coup and then conducted a coronation. Once on the throne, this autocrat engaged in a massive land grab across the country. By the time the British packed him off to exile in 1941, Reza Shah had become ��������’s. He also deposited a fair bit of at British Barclays Bank. The money that should have been used to build roads, schools and hospitals became the private property of a bloodthirsty upstart.

Fundamentally, Reza Shah was a narcissist, not a patriot. When the British took over Iran, he was more worried about preserving his private wealth instead of fighting for his country. By this time, this king had lost the trust of his people. The canny British had been keeping an eye on him. About 15 years ago, the imperial diplomat observed, “He [Reza] is secretive, suspicious, and ignorant; he appears wholly unable to grasp the realities of the situation or to realize the force of the hostility he has aroused.” Nicholson proved prophetic.

The Modern Reza Shah Myth is a Lie

When Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah ruled, writers and teachers lied to survive. Flattery was the order of the day. Reza Shah was glorified as a “social, economic, and political” reformer who laid the foundation for modern Iran. He was even given credit for reforms instituted by . The regime kept Iranians in the dark about Reza Shah’s paranoid, violent and oppressive rule. Iranians did not realize how this corrupt king betrayed Iran to the British and stole from the exchequer. 

Apologists for the Pahlavis claim that Reza Shah brought modern medicine to Iran. The truth is that the had begun in 1919, many years before he seized power. It was the first public health institution in the Middle East, producing vaccines for the region. Hospitals existed even in ancient Iran. Reza Shah was not the first to build hospitals in the country. To be fair, he did build a few but so did almost every colony from Nigeria to Vietnam.

The most incongruous myth pervasive in the Iranian diaspora is that Reza Shah ended and expelled foreign forces from Iran. History tells us that Iranians had always opposed foreign troops. Amir Kabir had called for their expulsion 80 years ago. The British saw the writing on the wall, withdrew their troops but exercised power behind the scenes. British troops did not march down streets in Tehran in contrast to New Delhi. Instead the British used Reza Shah to do their dirty work in Iran.

Some give credit for railways, roads, industries and instituting a in Iran. The railways were for British strategic interest and cost the Iranian taxpayer a fortune. The roads were few and terrible. Industries came because Iranians have traded for centuries. Entrepreneurs learnt from Europeans and set up factories. Besides, Iranians had been producing and , two industries showcased by his supporters, for centuries. The registry was demanded by the parliament five years before Reza became shah.

Reza Shah’s regime failed to serve Iran. At the moment of reckoning, he and his troops just ran away. He was a thug in uniform who looted the country and killed innocents. He served imperial powers, not his people. Ayatollah Khomeini was not wrong when he said, “The monarchy was against the law from the day it was established. They formed a fake Constituent Assembly and forcefully made him [Reza Khan] the ruler over Iran. ”Today, protesters in Iran chanting “Reza Shah ruhat shad” need to study their history. Iran needs freedom, democracy and equality, not the glamorization of a paranoiac, cowardly, murderous, and traitorous shah.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Dirty Secrets About How Reza Shah Destroyed Iran appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The BBC tells us that women around the world are now their hair to show their solidarity with their Iranian counterparts. Abir Al-Sahlani, a Swedish Member of the European Parliament, cut her hair in the midst of her speech, giving a rallying cry: “women, life, freedom.”

Why are women protesting?

Since 1979, Shia clerics have ruled Iran. They have imposed strict moral codes and restrictive rules on society. Women are supposed to dress modestly and cover their hair in accordance with clerics’ strict interpretations of Islam. As education levels increase, Iranian women are increasingly unwilling to play by such rules.

Irshad can stop and intimidate any woman for the most arbitrary of reasons. Over the years, Iranian women have become highly educated. The percentage of females in higher education from 3% in 1978 to 59% in 2018. Women have entered almost all professions now. Their expectations have risen similarly. Even when there have been no protests, there is a simmering discontent among women about the restrictions they face on a daily basis. Many women hate the morality police. 

So unpopular is irshad that conservative president Mahmoud proposed to parliament to get rid of this morality police but he was shot down by those far more conservative than him, led by Parliament’s members Mutahari and Pizishkiyan. He explained that the police are also young people and they cannot make a correct diagnosis. Overall, Ahmadinejad forcing people to observe the hijab rule. He held that people had rights to choose and they must be given choices so he was accused by ultra-conservatives of supporting indecency. 

While women may have done well in gaining an education, jobs have been hard to find. Glass ceilings remain thick and strong. Few women make it to top positions. They also find it difficult to get married because educated men with good jobs are in short supply. Furthermore, strict rules make it difficult for women and men to socialize. Like women elsewhere, Iranian women want some choice when it comes to their life partners.

Last year, Ebrahim Raisi was elected president. He is a conservative cleric who has to reinvigorate the old cultural revolution. Irshad have stepped up patrols and taken women away for “re-education” because of their supposedly improper dress. A hijab-and-chastity decree bans women without headscarves from posting pictures of themselves on social media. Naturally, women are dissatisfied with the tightening of restrictions and Amini’s death has set off a powder keg.

Why are men protesting?

Not only women but also men have taken to the streets. If Iranian women are dissatisfied, so are the men. They are really frustrated with the lack of opportunities. Many have lost hope in the future. In particular, educated men are most discontented. They are unable to get decent well-paying jobs. This restricts their marriage opportunities.

Young people are increasingly influenced by western media. They think of the US as a land of milk and honey. Alumni of the elite Sharif University of Technology leave the country in the search of a better life. Those who remain behind are frustrated by the lack of jobs in Iran. They access western media and want similar lifestyles to what they see on screen. This exacerbates their discontent.

American sanctions have taken their toll on the Iranian economy. Since 2012, per capita income has stagnated. After the Russia-Ukraine War, inflation has further soared. To make matters worse, Iran is facing an environmental crisis. Rivers have run dry, groundwater is falling, lakes are drying up and farmland is parched. A growing population has led to wanton felling of forests. In turn, deforestation has exacerbated desertification. As in India and China, pollution is choking cities. Young men find it very difficult to be hopeful about the future.

Over 60% of ��������’s 84 million population is under 30. Historically, young single men have been a source of instability in any society. Iran has millions of discontented young men. During the recent protests, unknown assailants have banks, police, ambulances, other government officials, mosques, clerics and religious people. The 1979 revolution may not yet be at risk but Iranian society is volatile and could erupt in a volcanic eruption given the slightest provocation.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Even as the UAE has a historic relationship with the US, it has been deepening its relationship with Russia. Both countries target periphery nations for discreet joint involvement. Shared interest across Africa has seen the UAE-Russia partnerships from Senegal to Sudan.

A power struggle in Sudan

The UAE has significantly increased its involvement and direction of affairs within Sudan since the of the civilian prime minister Abdalla Hamdok in January. He had already been ousted in a coup led by the generals in October last year and his brief return was due only to international pressure, primarily from Washington.

Since Hamdok’s departure, a power struggle between the chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his deputy, General Mohamed agalo, “Hemeti”, has developed. As competition between Burhan and Hemeti quietly intensifies, Sudanese actors are courting the UAE. Abu Dhabi is receptive to such overtures and Tahnoon bin Zayed, UAE’s national security advisor and Mohammed bin Zayed’s brother, has decided to back Hemeti. So has Russia.

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Burhan has attempted to consolidate his position by centralizing power within institutions, such as the ministry of defense, and by maintaining formal relationships with regional allies. This has seen the ministry increase its stake in the control of Port Sudan as well as other industrial ventures in the eastern region. By doing so, Burhan seeks to reduce the potential for and his principal backer, the UAE, to secure access for themselves and Russia to the area.��

Moscow has long been trying to secure naval access to Port Sudan, a deal that continues to be delayed as Khartoum tries to secure greater financial and political support. It is important to note that Burhan is not overtly opposed to the UAE and Russia but is driven by the principal requirement to secure his own grip over Sudan. Burhan has tried to balance internal power dynamics while managing the tainted legacy of former president Omar al-Bashir with the whims and expectations of the international arena.

Burhan has recently visited Egypt, Libya, and Chad in an attempt to reinforce his own centrality in the future of Sudan. This has been conducted through high level relations with regional actors. Additionally, Burhan deployed Gibril Ibrahim, the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), to to secure short-term funding for Sudan.

Even as Burhan is making his moves, Hemeti is countering them. The chief of staff to Chad’s president is his first cousin and a prominent negotiator with leading figures in the Darfur region. There are even reports that the governor of Darfur, is preparing to leave Burhan’s coalition and side with Hemeti. However, this dynamic is extremely delicate as Hemeti was the leader of the who perpetrated mass violence in the Darfur region. The implications of these power struggles for Sudan’s domestic scene are extremely perilous. After several coups, there is a real risk of another civil war.

The UAE and Russia join hands for a common cause

Sudan is still suffering from continuing US-led sanctions imposed after the coup that removed Hamdok. In such a situation, the UAE has assumed the role of facilitator and provider of urgently needed funds. In doing so, the UAE is bolstering the military-led administration in Sudan, developing its network in Khartoum and averting any potential shift of power to civilian government. 

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While  supporting the role of the military within Sudan’s  political structure, Abu Dhabi has sought to develop ties with key civilian actors. The UAE is cultivating Osama Daoud, a billionaire businessman with close ties to the military. He is the chairman of the , which has an office in the UAE.�� It has been reported that Daoud maintains a very close relationship with Tahnoon bin Zayed, and it is through this dynamic that a investment project came through.��

The Abu Dhabi Ports Group will construct a new port, just north of Port Sudan, with an accompanying free zone. In addition, the Sudanese Central Bank will have $300 million deposited which should help to smooth over the condemnation the country faces over the lack of progress towards a civilian government. The UAE has also signed an agreement to develop a large agricultural project in Eastern Sudan that will export its produce through the new port. While the West has been trying to force the military to cede power, the UAE has been concluding deals with key military and military-backed players that will only further their influence in Sudan.

The timing and decision to increase financial assistance to Sudan is crucial. It is now clear that the Hemeti. In the past, he has proven his loyalty to Abu Dhabi by supplying a large contingent of soldiers to South Yemen where Hemeti’s soldiers helped secure key areas from Houthi forces. Now, Russia may be joining hands with the UAE to back Hemeti. The , ��ܲ�������’s shadowy mercenaries, could intervene should civil war in Sudan break out. Hemeti has on several occasions, securing military assistance and intelligence support from Russia’s .��

To counter Hemeti, Burhan has tried to win the UAE’s support. In March 2022, Burhan visited the UAE but did not gain Abu Dhabi’s backing. Therefore, he recently ordered the release of some Islamist prisoners, a move that has irked the UAE and made it move closer to Hemeti.

The US is watching the UAE’s involvement in Sudan with concern, especially as Abu Dhabi and Moscow are working together to back the same horse. In essence, Washington’s long-term project to install a civilian government in and bring peace to Sudan is being undone by Abu Dhabi. The UAE is not only eradicating the last vestiges of Sudanese democracy but it is also enabling Moscow to extend its reach far beyond the Eurasian sphere. Washington would not be pleased if Moscow gains naval access in Sudan. Yet it can do little as Abu Dhabi and Moscow cooperate to achieve a common goal. Dynamics in Sudan reveal clearly the UAE’s centrality in a shifting power dynamics in the Middle East, both in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

Sudan has been on the periphery of international attention. The new democratic government was poorly supported by the international community. This made the country vulnerable to external designs. The transition to civilian rule failed when the UAE and Russia backed military elites to achieve their strategic interests. Should Sudan succumb yet again to civil war, Russia is likely to provide security assistance to Hemeti while the UAE will provide the money. In the process, Abu Dhabi will acquire economic assets whose value would have depreciated due to conflict. Any internal conflict and civil war will enable Russia and the UAE to secure their long-term interests in the Horn of Africa and beyond.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Now, Israel’s most recent soft power tool is audiovisual culture, especially TV shows. The main goal may not be peace or just profits to the country’s production companies. Over the long term, those productions are made to seduce the hearts and minds of the worldwide population that watches these shows in streaming services, creating a positive perception of  Israeli narratives concerning several issues shown in the series.

The most important ingredients to make a nation’s audiovisual products a tool of a soft power exist in abundance in Israel today. There’s enough money and international co-production agreements to make good-quality TV shows, full of special effects, different locations and talented screenwriters, directors and stars. There are enough interesting real stories happening every day in the region, inspiring writers to deliver products about religion, politics, sex, culture, corruption, violence, prejudice, social injustices and more. And the most important ingredient: Israel is a democracy with freedom of speech, an essential tool for touching sore spots concerning their own failures and regrets and favoring the production of compelling audiovisual art and entertainment.

The story of Israeli TV success

The kickoff of the Israeli audiovisual boom was the HBO psychotherapy drama BeTipul (2005-2008), that generated the HBO adaptation ‘In Treatment’ (2008), winner of two Primetime Emmys. Gideon Raff’s Prisoners of War (2009-2012) was adapted in Hollywood as ‘Homeland’ (2011-2020), winning eight Primetime Emmys. But Hollywood’s adapting and winning more awards than the original stories is just the tip of the iceberg. The new trend of Israeli audiovisual culture’s soft power are TV shows spoken in Hebrew and Arabic, shot in the Middle East and distributed all over the world by streaming giants like Nefflix, HBO Max and AppleTV+. Success of the original productions internationally and in festivals facilitates shaping the world’s preferences toward narratives in which Israel controls the content, the moral of the stories and, of course, the profits.

The first non-English TV show on AppleTV+ — the International Award Emmy winner Tehran’(2021)  — is spoken in Hebrew and Arabic. It is considered the new Homeland among TV shows, with the special participation of Hollywood star Glenn Close. After an explosive Season 2 finale late last June, fans are demanding its renewal for Season 3. The story follows a Mossad agent in her first mission as a hacker in Tehran.

With lots of political critique among the amazing scenes of car chases, explosions and betrayals, the show also emphasizes a “fictional” underground life in Iran, where women drink, have uninhibited sex and young people, including the son of the most powerful general of Iran, party with drugs and alcohol.

Ori Elon’s show ‘Shtisel’ (2013-2021) became an international hit on Netflix using a different strategy designed to strengthen Israel’s cultural soft power. Its brilliant screenplaytries to demystify religious orthodoxy by following the lives of Shulem Shtisel (Doval’e Glickman), a teacher, and his son Akiva (Michael Aloni), who discuss moral issues such as arranged marriage, pride, feminism and religion. With its style that combines the influence of This is Us and Downton Abbey’, ‘Shtisel’ generated so many debates over the internet about fundamentalism – not only Jewish, but also Christian and Islamic – that Marta Kauffman, co-creator of Friends and Grace and Frankie, is now developing the American version for Amazon Prime.

Just like Hollywood, Israel’s new boom of TV shows don’t target only on Israeli cultural specificities. They seek to conquer the world thanks to stories with universal themes. One such is the psychological thriller Losing Alice (2021), premiered by Israeli channel Hot 3 in June 2020 and internationally on Apple TV+ in January 2021. The series follows a frustrated film director, Alice, mother of three daughters, and tracks her obsession with Sophie, a young screenwriter. Alice is played by Israeli star Ayelet Zurer, known for Angels & Demons and Munich.

The Israeli TV drama The Lesson competed in the 2022 edition of the prestigious TV Series Festival in Berlin and won two awards in the Canneseries Longform Competition. Co-starring Doron Ben David (Fauda), it tells the story of a high school teacher and the conflict with his students over racism following a social media post. 

Soft power collateral damages

Controlling the narrative means owning the morals of the stories. But even if talented screenwriters try to make it as realistic as possible, collateral damage is almost certain. TV shows that are mega-hits like Netflix’s The Spy (2019), Fauda (2015) and Hit & Run (2021) show ordinary Israelis recruited by Mossad or the Israeli Air Force, who become effective agents in infiltrating and capturing even the most difficult enemies, a clear message celebrating Israel’s invincible secret service and its technologies. HBO’s Valley of Tears (2020) goes further by turning the arrogance of the Israeli army in the initial moments of the Yom Kippur War into an overall lesson in overcoming adversity.

Another type of collateral damage to soft power occurs when its own citizens reject the show’s perspectives. The HBO-Keshet co-production Our Boys (2019) was called “anti-Semitic” by Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who urged a boycott of the production. The show emphasized the death of a Palestinian boy rather than the Israeli victims whose death led to the Gaza conflict in 2014. The producers tried to show the violence caused by three ultra-orthodox Jews from the perspective of the Palestinian boy’s family, but part of the Jewish audience in Israel and around the globe complainedthat the series left the deaths caused by Hamas in background.

Last but not the least, the collateral damage to soft power is competition. Everyone wants to claim a slice of the result of cultural increased soft power influence over the global population. Producing a full season of a TV show is usually more expensive than producing a film., Palestine is thus getting help from streaming services like Netflix to tell their stories told in movies. Palestinian Stories, released last October by the streaming giant, is a collection of 32 award-wining films either directed by Palestinian filmmakers or recounting Palestinian stories. Most of them are about the life of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, both occupied by Israel since 1967. But there’s also one TV show that aims at competing with Israeli narratives. After watching Fauda, Palestinian director Mohammed Soraya is making his own version of the conflicts in a Gaza TV studio. 
Qabdat Al-Ahrar (Fist of the Free) will revisit the 2018 Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip that resulted in the deaths of seven Hamas fighters and an Israeli officer. It is a modest,low-budget production with poor salaries for artists and crew. That helps to account for even the biggest problem of the Hamas TV series: Its lack of realism.: Local actors play Israelis and say they are exposed to real-world hostility. Israeli characters speak only in Arabic and, at the request of the Hamas mufti, women wear headscarves even if they are portraying Jewish characters. The perfect ingredients to turn Qabdat Al-Ahrar into a propaganda preaching to their own choir and not a soft power instrument to the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Israeli Bet on Audiovisual Culture as Soft Power appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The ICG report details the apparent ease with which small units of ISIS fighters, in groups of four or five, conduct raids on Syrian troops and SDF forces, conduct assassinations and mete out other forms of punishment on those deemed to have “collaborated” with any enemy. The report also details how ISIS runs lucrative smuggling and extortion rackets. These provide the funds to recruit and pay fighters and to equip them with weapons.

Of Prisons and Prisoners

The report points out the vulnerability of the 27 prisons holding ISIS fighters scattered throughout the northeast of the country as well as the holding camps for women and children, the most notorious of which is al-Hol. There, militant hardline women much of the camp. The SDF, already stretched, is charged with policing and holding the prisons, the holding camps as well as IDP camps. “Our ticking time bomb” is how a senior SDF commander, citing a lack of personnel and resources, describes al-Hol where 15 murders were committed in the first three months of this year.

The SDF’s vulnerability was on full display in January when ISIS launched a full-scale attack on Ghowayran Prison in Hasakah:

“The attack showcased the shortcomings of existing security mechanisms. A prison holding thousands of ISIS fighters was guarded by members of unarmed self-defence units who had received minimal training before being deployed.  The inmates quickly overran this under-trained and under-equipped force.”

It took nearly two weeks to bring the attack to an end and it was only achieved with the aid of US and British airstrikes and special forces on the ground. The ICG estimates that 200 SDF soldiers died in the fighting along with hundreds of ISIS fighters and inmates. Hundreds more .

Guerrilla Tactics

That sort of full frontal assault as on Ghowayran Prison has been something of an anomaly. ISIS tactics in Syria by and large are classic guerrilla engagements of the hit and run variety: attacks on checkpoints and convoys by small mobile cells operating independently of a central command.

ISIS conducted an ambush on a bus of Syrian army soldiers in Jabal Bishri, Raqqa, on June 20, killing at least 13 soldiers. The insurgency flourishes in a climate of suspicion, resentment and fear that the Arab population holds for the Kurdish-dominated SDF. Add to that the extreme climate conditions that have significantly damaged harvests as drought conditions and high temperatures prevail and the elements for constant insurgency are all in place.

Details of the severity of the agricultural crisis are available in a from the Turkish-based Operations & Policy Center which notes:

“Since the latter months of 2020, Syria has yet again fallen into a severe drought. This new drought is occurring in a country whose agricultural capacity has already been decimated by decades of  agricultural and water misgovernance, as well as an 11-year war, making it less capable of coping with a drought than at any point in its modern history.”

In such dire conditions, ISIS recruits new fighters easily, especially as its well-organized smuggling infrastructure provides the cash to lure desperate young men to become ISIS foot soldiers.

The ICG sheds light on a sophisticated and well-oiled machine that includes the bribing of elements both in the regime and the SDF:

“The north east has become a pillar of ISIS finances. The SDF-held territory is rich in natural resources, including oil and gas, and has longstanding economic links to other parts of Syria, as well as Iraq. ISIS relies on three primary funding sources: racketeering, taxation and smuggling. With this money ISIS buys weapons and supplies, offers stipends to its members’ families, bribes SDF guards to secure detainees’ release, recruits new fighters and pays the occasional hit man.”

The report continues:

“In many ways, ISIS operates like a mafia, preying on governing institutions and businesses through extortion and blackmail. In some cases, it has recruited local council employees to collect protection money from their colleagues. It also shakes down traders, artisanal oil refinery owners, bakers and smugglers. It is unclear how ISIS determines the amount of money to demand from each target, but SDF officials claim that oil investors and refinery owners pay thousands of dollars per month to avoid ISIS attacks on their businesses.”

The ICF report, though it paints a bleak picture, does not foresee the restoration of a caliphate. Rather it sees an ongoing insurgency, one that harasses and destabilizes, all the while building on the economic miseries that the still-unresolved Syrian civil war  and the drought have unleashed. Integral to any strategy to finally see off ISIS is cooperation between the many factions, both internal and external, that bedevil the conflict. With such cooperation seeming more a pipedream than reality, the ISIS insurgency will remain a constant threat within Syria, neighbouring Iraq and well beyond as it inspires the next generation of jihadist terrorists.

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The designation conformed to a statement that Biden made to His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the emir of Qatar, during his visit to Washington in late January 2022.  During the visit, Biden had sent a to the US Congress indicating his intention to give Qatar the designation of  a major non-NATO ally. In the letter, the president acknowledged “Qatar’s many years of contributions to US-led efforts in the US Central Command area of responsibility” and recognized that the US had a “national interest in deepening bilateral defense and security cooperation with the State of Qatar.” 

BIden’s designation for Qatar has a historical basis. For years, Qatar has supported US foreign policy objectives. The country has hosted and provided substantial financial support for the Al Udeid Air Base and engaged with the US on issues of strategic importance, including its recent assistance in relocating thousands of Afghans and its ability to serve as an effective mediator in critical situations. The designation 

What Does This Designation Really Mean?  

What are the legal foundations for the designation and its implications for Qatar? Under a federal statute, the US president has the unilateral power to designate a country a major non-NATO ally with the requirement that Congress receive notice in writing at least 30 days before this designation. As aptly noted, the designation alone does not make Qatar a NATO member and thus the collective security obligations and mutual defense benefits under NATO are not applicable to this GCC country.  

Yet, in addition to recognizing the close military ties between Qatar and the US, the designation as a major non-NATO ally ensures defense trade and security cooperation benefits. Qatar is now eligible for loans, research, training, and development, as well as gaining priority access to US military equipment and the ability to bid on certain US Department of Defense contracts. 

In the past, other regional players have benefitted from the designation. Their experience highlights the importance of a military and defense relationship for any GCC state with the US, especially given recent events. For example, Kuwait has benefitted from arms sales through the Foreign Military Sales Program. This the capabilities of the Kuwaiti military and enhanced the country’s security. 

The Biden administration has given $1 billion to the US Army Corps of Engineers and other US companies to build Kuwait’s new defense ministry headquarters. A training initiative, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, enables Kuwaiti students to be trained at US military institutions at a discounted rate.

Capacity building is one of the main incentives for US-Qatar cooperation, which is of great importance to this GCC state. Its defense regime is relatively young and capable of playing an influential role due to the country’s proximity to both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Qatar can also play a key role as a mediator in the region. In the light of the above, the designation as a major non-NATO ally has critical long-term benefits to the country.

The new development also certainly signals closer cooperation between the US and Qatar. Historically, these designations tend to be mutually beneficial. In the case of Qatar, increased engagement with the US promises to strengthen its status as a security leader in the Middle East and benefit both the region as well as its superpower friend.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Biden called Saudi Arabia a during his presidential election campaign. He has since effectively boycotted MBS because of the crown prince’s alleged involvement in the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. MBS has denied any involvement in the killing but accepted responsibility for it as Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler.

A Symbolic Visit to the UAE

MBS waited for his 86-year-old father to from the hospital before traveling to Abu Dhabi to offer his condolences for the death of United Arab Emirates (UAE) President Khaled bin Zayed and congratulations to his successor, Mohamed bin Zayed, the crown prince’s one-time mentor. MBS used the composition of his to underline his grip on Saudi Arabia’s ruling family In doing so, MBS was messaging the international community at large, and particularly Biden, that he is in full control of the kingdom no matter what happens.

The delegation was made up of representatives of different branches of the ruling Al Saud family, including Prince Abdulaziz bin Ahmed, the eldest son of Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, the detained brother of King Salman. Even though he holds no official post, Abdulaziz’s name topped the Saudi state media’s list of delegates accompanying MBS. His father Ahmed was one of three members of the Allegiance Council not to support MBS’s as crown prince in 2017. The 34-member council, populated by the many parts of the Al-Saud family, was established by King Abdullah in 2009 to determine succession to the throne.

MBS has detained Ahmed as well as Prince Mohamed bin Nayef, the two men he considers his foremost rivals, partly because they are popular among US officials. Ahmed was detained in 2020 but never charged, while bin Nayef stands accused of corruption. Ahmed returned to the kingdom in 2018 from London where he told protesters against the war in Yemen to address those : the king and the crown prince.

Abdulaziz’s inclusion in the Abu Dhabi delegation fits a pattern: MBS appoints to high office the younger relatives of people detained since his rise in 2015. Many older powerful royals were arrested in a mass anti-corruption campaign that often seemed to camouflage a power grab. A consultative government among members of the ruling family has now been replaced with one-man rule. MBS probably takes pleasure in driving the point home as Biden mulls a pilgrimage to Riyadh to persuade the crown prince to end his opposition to increasing the kingdom’s oil production and convince him that the United States remains committed to regional security.

The MBS and Joe Biden Dance

So far, the crown prince not only rejected US requests to help lower oil prices and assist Europe in reducing its dependency on Russian oil as part of the campaign to force Moscow to end its invasion of Ukraine but also refused to take a from Biden. Asked a month later whether Biden may have misunderstood him, MBS an interviewer. “Simply, I do not care.”

Striking a less belligerent tone, Mohammed Khalid Alyahya, a Hudson Institute visiting fellow and former editor-in-chief of Saudi-owned Al Arabiya English, noted this month that “Saudi Arabia laments what it sees as America’s wilful of an international order that it established and led for the better part of a century.” Alyahya quoted a senior Saudi official as saying: “A strong, dependable America is the greatest friend Saudi Arabia can have. It stands to reason, then, that US weakness and confusion is a grave threat not just to America, but to us as well.”

The United States has signaled that it is shifting its focus away from the Middle East to Asia even though it has not rolled back its significant military presence. Nonetheless, Middle Eastern states read a reduced US commitment to their security because Washington has failed to robustly to attacks by Iran and Iranian-backed Arab militias against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is not to mention the Biden administration’s efforts to revive a moribund 2015 international with Iran.

Several senior US officials, including National Security Advisor and CIA Director Bill Burns, met with the crown prince during trips to the kingdom last year. Separately, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin the crown prince. In one instance, MBS reportedly at Sullivan after the US official raised Khashoggi’s killing. The crown prince reportedly told Sullivan that he never wanted to discuss the matter again and that the US could forget about its request to boost Saudi oil production.

Even so, leverage in the US-Saudi relationship goes both ways. Biden may need Saudi Arabia’s oil to break Russia’s economic back. By the same token, Riyadh, despite massive weapon acquisitions from the US and Europe as well as arms from China that the US is reluctant to sell, needs Washington as its security guarantor. MBS knows that he has nowhere else to go. Russia has written itself out of the equation, and China is neither capable nor willing to step into the shoes of the US any time soon.

Critics of Biden’s apparent willingness to bury the hatchet with MBS argue that in the battle with Russia and China over a new 21^st-century world order, the US not only needs to talk the principled talk but also walk the principled walk. In an editorial, The Washington Post, for whom Khashoggi was a columnist, that “the contrast between professed US principles and US policy would be stark and undeniable” if Biden re-engages with Saudi Arabia. Yet, with oil prices soaring and inflation rising, interests might trump values and a Biden-led US might kiss and make up with an MBS-led Saudi Arabia to attain its realpolitik ends.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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No Story Is Worth Dying For

In most Kenyan media schools, the phrase “No Story Is Worth Dying For” is quite a common saying. However, what happens when you fall in love with your work?

Describing herself as a “product of Jerusalem,” with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shaping much of her life, Shireen Abu Akleh has shown the world what it means to be a journalist and what it means  to tell stories that  affect you as a journalist and your community. In her own words, her only mission was to be close to her people, and within her people she was killed.

“I chose to become a journalist to be close to people. It may not be easy to change reality, but I was at least able to bring their voice to the world,” Abu Akleh said in a taped for the Qatari channel’s 25th anniversary.��

Journalism in Africa Has Become a Travesty

When I was growing up, I listened to Kenya Broadcasting Corporation’s Radio Taifa and watched KBC Channel 1 —  that’s what we had at that time and I must say that the type of journalism exhibited was mind-blowing. A type of journalism that can only be compared to Abu Akleh’s.

Today, African journalists have turned their craft into a very ordinary career reserved for cool kids, who spent most of their time in big cities or overseas. After spending time overseas, these cool kids return to their homeland and land jobs in major newsrooms, thanks to their polished English. Sadly, most of them have zero journalism skills or storytelling abilities.

While journalists like Ahmed Hussein-Suale,a renowned investigative journalist from Ghana, was in 2019 for his role in exposing the corruption in his country,and Jamal Farah Adan of Somalia, Betty Mtekhele Barasa of Kenya, and dozens were killed in Ethiopia covering the Tigray conflict, it is very unfortunate that some journalists still find it right to use journalism for fame, power, and build future political careers.

Today, some Kenyan journalists engage in uncalled-for social media wars with critics who point out their lack of skills and unreasonable theatrics for clout chasing.

We have lost the basics of journalism such as good storytelling. Instead, journalists are thirsty for social media numbers, likes, and retweets. We don’t verify anymore. As long as it helps increase the number of followers, it goes for publishing. Right now, distinguishing a professionally trained journalist from a socialite is becoming an uphill task.

African Governments Must Learn from Palestine

Shireen Abu Akleh was shot dead by Israeli forces just eight days after the world marked the World Press Freedom Day on May 3. With such events, African governments need to step up and steer clear of Israeli-like behaviors of gagging the media, and instead, just like Palestine gave Abu Akleh the freedom to tell her people’s story, they should also give the same freedom to their journalists.

In March, Ugandan authorities the offices of Digitalk, an online tv station known for airing critical views of President Yoweri Museveni and his family. Other than confiscating the TV’s production and broadcasting equipment, they also arrested and charged its reporters with cyberstalking and offensive communication. The charges could see them facing up to seven years in prison.��

The killing of this brave journalist who dared to tell the stories of the oppressive Israeli should not kill the spirits of journalists worldwide. Instead, this should be an inspiration to every reporter to work even harder,  to help give voice to the voiceless, uphold justice and make the world a better place for every person whether in Gaza, Tigray, Libya, Syria or Afghanistan among other countries and regions experiencing instability.

(Senior Editor Francesca Julia Zucchelli edited this article.)

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Over the years, the Lebanese have lost faith in the state. A recent from Zogby Research Services showed that the people had much higher confidence in civil society (85%) and the October 17 Revolution (65%) than in parliament (29%) or traditional political parties (19%). For these reasons, US policy has rightfully focused on combating corruption and providing aid directly to the Lebanese people.

Lebanese Americans Urge Crisis Resolution

Fortunately, over the past few weeks, three encouraging developments in Lebanon have dominated the news. The first was an announcement that the country had reached a staff-level with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The second was that groups have assembled their candidate lists for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The third highlighted that Lebanon took a courageous step in ��ܲ�������’s invasion of Ukraine.

The US has made resolving the crisis in Lebanon a . The Lebanese American community has stood firmly behind these efforts to aid the Lebanese people and enact necessary reforms. On the eve of the most recent IMF negotiations in March, a delegation of Lebanese American business and civic leaders undertook a to Lebanon, where they met people in the government and the political opposition, as well as religious leaders from all major sects, and those who ran NGOs. The delegation carried a message for key leaders: Lebanon is on the verge of collapse. They urged authorities to conduct upcoming parliamentary elections in a timely, fair and transparent manner. They also found that the prime minister and his economic team were eager to conclude an agreement with the IMF speedily. 

The delegation also met the minister of interior who indicated he was prepared to hold elections on time. He also said that the parliament had allocated the resources necessary to hold fair and free elections. Separately, the UN has pledged aid to support the internal security forces across more than 6,000 polling stations across the country. 

The IMF Staff-Level Agreement Is Promising

It is encouraging now to see that the IMF staff-level agreement concluded quickly. In religiously diverse Lebanon, agreement can be hard to reach. This time, the Maronite Catholic president, the Sunni Muslim prime minister and the Shi’a Muslim speaker of parliament speedily agreed. Hopefully, this might start the process of implementing badly-needed reforms to support the economic and social needs of the people. 

The staff-level agreement is a good start, but the next hurdle for the Lebanese government will be to follow through with legislative actions to implement this deal. Therefore, the coming elections that choose a new parliament on May 15 are critical. The new parliament will have to rebuild the economy, restore financial sustainability, strengthen governance and take anti-corruption measures, remove impediments to job-creating growth, and increase social and reconstruction spending, initially in the electricity sector. Without such actions by the new parliament, no IMF relief will be forthcoming.

May 15 Parliamentary Elections Are Tricky

The upcoming elections offer Lebanese citizens the chance to vote for reformist candidates who advocate change and good governance. As a first order of business, a new parliament will be faced with enacting reform legislation in order to meet the requirements of the IMF and bring badly needed economic relief. But how “new” the new parliament will be after the elections is in question. Will it be dominated by Hezbollah and its allies who will resist change and reform or by new leaders who will move a reform agenda forward? 

The Lebanese American leadership delegation met with a diverse group of reformist candidates. While it is clear that the Lebanese people have more political options, the visiting delegation found an opposition movement that is divided about how to best engage politically. The proof of this division came out recently when political party were finalized on April 5. Instead of joining together, most opposition groups announced lists competing with one another.  

The lack of coordination among the opposition diminishes the chances of the reformists. The good news is that if the opposition can take away 10 of the 128 seats up for election from the current Hezbollah-Christian coalition, the balance of power in parliament will decisively away from the old guard. This is not a big figure but even this may prove hard to achieve.

A New Opening in the US-Lebanon Relationship  

Both elections and the deal with the IMF have come at a time when the US has turned its attention to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The war has caused shortages of and fuel. Inflation has spiked. Yet Lebanon has taken the courageous decision to Russian atrocities and voted with the US at the UN. No other country in the Middle East has been so clear and forceful in its condemnation of Russia. 

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The IMF staff-level agreement and Lebanon’s condemnation of Russia are creating a new opening in the US-Lebanon relationship at a time when both countries can be helpful to one another. Thanks to the US, Lebanon could possibly come to a historic agreement on its maritime border with Israel. It could import electricity and natural gas from Jordan and Egypt to overcome its electricity and energy shortages. However, all of this is contingent on voters electing a reformist parliament. 

The agreement with the IMF could mark a turning point in Lebanon’s history, or it could turn out to be yet another disappointing tactical maneuver by Lebanon’s ruling elite. The future is now squarely in the hands of the Lebanese voters to elect a government that is willing to take the risks necessary to save the country. It is certain that Lebanon’s actions so far have caught the attention of the Biden Administration and the Congress. They would be more than willing to help a government and people courageously standing up to Russia and embracing reforms.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Is Bosnia-Herzegovina Next on ��ܲ�������’s Radar?

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“All experts,” the avowed Erdogan supporter continued, agreed that Washington was escalating the crisis to solidify its dominance in Western Europe. With that, Barlas also echoed the general mood in Turkey. It is fortunate, he said, that ��ܲ�������’s president is much more reasonable and wiser than his American counterpart, Joe Biden.

The Bond Between Erdogan and Putin

This positive image of Putin and Erdogan’s familiarity with the Kremlin leader is no accident. Particularly since the failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, Erdogan has, with Putin’s help, been able to position himself independently of — and sometimes even against — the United States and Europe on key foreign policy issues.

In Syria and Azerbaijan, Ankara and Moscow succeeded in marginalizing Western actors. In Libya and the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey acts as a competitor or even adversary to member states of the European Union.

Turkey’s flirtation with Moscow led to concerns that Ankara might turn away from Europe altogether. That contributed to the EU’s kid-glove approach to Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus. It also resulted in Washington’s belated reaction to Turkey’s acquisition of ��ܲ�������’s S-400 missile defense system with sanctions. It is true that Turkey has experience with Putin as a cool strategist and ruthless power politician in conflicts such as the one in Syria. But Erdogan has always seemed to succeed in avoiding escalation.

Despite all of Ankara’s tension with Moscow, Erdogan’s rapprochement with Russia has brought him much closer to his goal of strategic autonomy for his country from the West. Turkey skillfully maneuvered between the fronts of global rivalry and was able to considerably expand its scope and influence in just a few years.

In this seesaw policy, however, Turkey is behaving much more confrontationally toward Western states than toward Russia. For years, the government press has painted a positive picture of Russia and a negative one of the United States and Europe. This is not without effect on Turkish public opinion. Around a month before Russia attacked Ukraine, in a poll carried out by a renowned opinion research institute, a narrow relative majority of 39% of respondents favored foreign policy cooperation with Russia and China instead of Europe and the United States.

In the first days after ��ܲ�������’s invasion, Ankara’s policy followed exactly the aforementioned pattern. Turkey condemned the attack, but it is not participating in sanctions against Russia. In the vote on suspending ��ܲ�������’s representation rights in the Council of Europe, Turkey was the only NATO state to abstain and, as such, is keeping its airspace open to Russian aircraft.

The West is paying particular attention to whether and how Turkey implements the Treaty of Montreux. The 1936 treaty regulates the passage of warships through Turkey’s Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits into the Black Sea. It limits the number, tonnage and duration of stay of ships from non-littoral states in the Black Sea. In the event of war, the convention stipulates that the waterways must be closed to ships of the parties to the conflict, and it entrusts Ankara with the application of the treaty’s regulations

Ankara Swings Around

It took Turkey four days to classify the Russian invasion as “war.” However, Ankara is still reluctant to officially close the waterways — as the treaty stipulates — to ships of parties to the conflict, Russia and Ukraine. Instead, Ankara is “all countries, Black Sea riparian or not,” against sending warships through the straits.

In the literal sense, this step is not directed unilaterally against Moscow, but it also makes it more difficult for NATO ships to sail into the Black Sea. According to the treaty, however, the waterways may only be closed to warships of all countries if Ankara considers itself directly threatened by war. Consciously creating ambiguity, Turkey has triangulated between the West and Russia.

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Almost imperceptibly at first, however, a reversal has now set in. There are four reasons for this. First, the West is showing unity and resolve unseen since the Cold War, and its sanctions are undermining ��ܲ�������’s standing in the world. Second, Putin is losing his charisma as a successful statesman and reliable partner. Third, Ankara realizes that Putin’s vision of a great Russian empire could provoke more wars. Fourth, the ranks of the adversaries are closing and it is becoming more difficult for Turkey to continue its seesaw policy.

Thus, strongly pro-Western tones have emerged from Ankara in recent weeks. Turkey will continue to support Ukraine in consultation with the West, according to the president’s spokesman. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu now claims to have contradicted ��ܲ�������’s wishes for the passage of warships through the Bosporus “in all friendship.” President Erdogan is also in of admitting Ukraine to the European Union and Kosovo to NATO.

Moreover, Ankara is not contradicting reports by Ukrainian diplomats that Turkey is supplying more armed drones and training pilots to fly drones. On March 2, Turkey joined the vast majority of states in the UN General Assembly’s condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine that Russia to “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces.” Two days later, during the extraordinary meeting of NATO’s foreign ministers, Turkey supported the deployment of NATO’s Response Force to NATO countries neighboring Ukraine.

It looks like Putin is not only bringing long-lost unity to the EU, but he is also reminding Turkey of the benefits of its Western ties. Western states should realize that only more unity among themselves and more determination will make Turkey reengage with the West.

*[This was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post On Ukraine, Turkey Is Moving Cautiously Toward the West appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Is Ukraine Likely to Join the EU Any Time Soon?

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The inclination will be to put China in the same basket as Russia, even if China is still being cautious about its next steps. Many other countries will be pushed to choose. One country, Turkey, will soon face difficult choices, since balancing acts may not be enough this time around.

A Tough Balance Between the West and Russia

Turkey has been trying to  and balance its alliances between the West and others for a long time now. Turkey is a NATO member that possesses Russian anti-aircraft missile systems, namely the S-400. This purchase not only led to CAATSA sanctions by the United States — which was a first against a NATO ally — but also the removal of the country from the F-35 program.

These measures did not hinder Turkey’s special relationship with Russia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan always maintained personal relations with his counterpart in Moscow, Vladimir Putin. Even when they were at opposite ends of the theater of power — in Syria or Nagorno-Karabakh, for example — they kept talking. This did not change even after Turkey shot down a Russian plane in November 2015. Turkey’s dependence on Russian gas and tourism has also been a reason for their continued dialogue. Turkey also awarded the construction of its nuclear power plant — the  — to Russia.

Today, Turkey is staying out of the sanctions schemes of the European Union and NATO. It has also tried juggling the Ukrainian demand to close the Turkish Straits to Russian warships — even if the Montreux Convention upholds the demand. Turkey that the Russian attack “is a grave violation of international law and poses a serious threat to the security of our region and the world.” It has hesitated, however, to move beyond that declaration. When the pressure mounted — masterfully and publicly by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — and other actors continued to announce historic decisions one after the other, Turkey had to make a  on the Straits.

It is important to remember that Turkey has also sold drones to Ukraine in the recent past and signed a free trade agreement, meaning that it was in a strong position to claim that it has supported Ukraine. Turkey even offered to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, but the offer has not been accepted as of yet.

The longer Russian aggression continues, the more Turkey will be pushed to move more decisively. Even Switzerland declared that it will apply the EU’s sanctions on Russia. Candidate countries are also encouraged to follow the course. Soon, there will be no more room for strategic ambiguity.

And When the Dust Settles?

However, there is even a broader question that requires strategic thinking. When the dust settles, where would Turkey like to stand when the European security architecture of the 21^st century is being discussed? Where it was in the 20^th century — a member of NATO, the Council of Europe, an integral element of the so-called Western order — or with the “others”? Turkey has spent recent years trying not to choose and playing all sides against each other when necessary.

The year 2022 was going to be decisive with regard to the European security architecture, even without a war on the continent. Europeans are already working on the publication of the “strategic compass” in addition to NATO’s strategic concept, which will be discussed in Madrid in June. These thought-provoking exercises have become even more significant in light of recent developments.

The historic steps that both the EU and some of its member states are taking will set the tone when it comes to the European security architecture. In addition to the sanctions package, the EU is  lethal weapons to a third country under the European Peace Facility. Germany is increasing its defense spending to more than 2% of its GDP while facilitating a one-off of €100 billion ($109 billion) for the Bundeswehr.

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One should also underline the exemplary coordination between the EU and NATO. Nothing strengthens the transatlantic bond more than a Russian threat to the continent. Geopolitical challenges that were not expected in the 21^st century are going hand in hand with the necessity for drastic moves. Concepts such as sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, which are protected under international law, have become even more visible. One thing to expect now is that different camps across the world will close ranks.

Will Turkey’s importance increase for the West, as it had during the Cold War? Maybe. It will surely play an important role in the Black Sea, especially when it comes to the Straits. However, once the cleavages between democracies and autocracies deepen, the state of affairs in Turkey will be even more important.

Right now, these changes have caught Turkey off guard. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is tired after 20 years in power. The government it leads is mostly seen as authoritarian by many in Europe. The Turkish economy is in never-ending decline. It is hard to look for long-lasting consensus in a society once it has become extremely polarized. This is not necessarily the best time to set directions for the decades to come. But the country may have no choice.

Last but not least, the Ukraine crisis has demonstrated the importance of well-functioning relations with neighbors for European sovereignty. It is important to underline once again that European security is not only about the EU, but also its neighborhood. As an integral piece of European security architecture in the 20^th century, Turkey will need to define where it stands very clearly. It is not only about who wins and who loses, but also about who will adapt to the changes that Europe is going through. It is time for reaffirmations for everyone. It would be beneficial for the European continent as a whole if Turkey also closed ranks with its traditional allies.

*[This was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Is There Any Place Strategic Ambiguity in Europe? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Unthinkable: War Returns to Europe

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The immediate answer is there are very few today outside of Russia itself, hence the large rise in gas prices witnessed lately. Over the medium term, however, Libya and Algeria have ample opportunity to increase their supplies to the EU.

Supplies From Libya and Algeria

Libya boasts proven gas reserves of 1,500 billion cubic meters (bcm). Its production is a modest 16 bcm. Algeria has 4,500 bcm of proven reserves and 20-25 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of unconventional gas reserves, the third-largest in the world after the United States and China (and Argentina whose proven reserves tie with Algeria). How much gas that could produce is anyone’s guess, but we are speaking of a figure in the tens of bcm.

Algeria today produces 90 bcm, of which 50 bcm were exported. Another feature of Algeria is the huge storage capacity — 60 bcm — of the Hassi R’Mel gas field, its oldest and largest compared with the EU’s storage capacity of 115 bcm.

Pierre Terzian, the founder of the French energy think-tank Petrostrategies, out that four underwater gas pipelines link these two producers directly to the European mainland: the first links Libyan gas fields with Italy; the second Algerian gas fields to Italy via Tunisia; the third Algerian gas fields to southern Spain; and the fourth the same gas fields to southern Spain via Morocco.

The latter has been closed since November 1, 2021, due to deteriorating relations between Algeria and Morocco, but this has not affected the supply of gas to the Iberian Peninsula. Algeria also has two major liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals, which adds flexibility to its export policy. Its exports to France and the United Kingdom are in LNG ships.

The leading cause of the current crisis is structural as, according to Terzian, EU domestic gas production has declined by 23% over the last 10 years and now covers only 42% of consumption, as compared with 53% in 2010. That decline is the result, in particular, of the closing of the giant Groningen gas field, which is well underway and will be completed by 2030.

Europe has done a lot to expand the gas transmission grid among EU countries, but some major gas peninsulas remain. In 2018, it was suggested that connections between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe needed developing. Spain boasts one-third of Europe’s LNG import capacity, much of it unused, and is connected to Algeria by two major pipelines that could be extended.

As Alan Riley and I four years ago, the “main barrier to opening up the Iberian energy market’s supply routes to the rest of the EU is the restricted route over the Franco-Spanish border. Only one 7-bcm gas line is available to carry gas northwards … The main blocking factor has been the political power of Electricité de France, which is seeking to protect the interests of the French nuclear industry.” An Iberian solution, we added, would not only “benefit France and Spain, but also Algeria, creating additional incentives to explore for new gas fields and maybe kick start a domestic renewables revolution,” which would encourage a switch in consumption from gas to solar in Algeria.

Germany, the Netherlands and Italy

Germany, for its part, has never put its money where its mouth is with regard to Algeria. In 1978, Ruhrgas (now absorbed in E.ON) signed a major contract to supply LNG to Germany. Germany never built the LNG terminal needed to get that contract off the ground. So far, it is the only major European country to have no LNG import terminals, although it can rely on existing facilities in the Netherlands and Belgium.

In 1978, the Netherlands also contracted to buy Algerian gas. Algeria dropped the contract in the early 1980s because of Germany’s refusal to go ahead. Later in the 1980s, Ruhrgas again expressed its interest in buying Algerian gas, but the price offered was too low and because Ruhrgas wanted to root the gas through France, which insisted on very high transit fees. By discarding Algerian gas, Germany has tied itself to Russian goodwill.

Italy, like Germany, a big importer of Russian gas, has positioned itself much more adroitly. In December 2021, Sonatrach, Algeria’s state oil and gas monopoly, increased the amount of gas pumped through the TransMed pipeline, which links Algeria to Italy via Tunisia and the Strait of Sicily at the request of its Italian customers. This followed a very successful state  by Italian President Sergio Mattarella to Algeria in early November. On February 27, Sonatrach  it could pump additional gas to Europe, but contingent on meeting current contractual commitments.

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Relations between the Italian energy company ENI and Sonatrach are historically close because of the important role played by the Italian company’s founder, Enrico Mattei, in advising the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria in its negotiations with France, which resulted in the independence of Algeria in July 1962.

The pursuit of very liberal energy policies since the turn of the century by the European Commission overturned the policies of long-term gas and LNG purchase contracts, which were the norm in internationally traded gas until then. Yet security of supply does not rest on such misguided liberalism. New gas reserves cannot be found, let alone gas fields brought into production if producers and European customers are, as Terzian points out, “at the mercy of prices determined by exchange platforms which have dubious liquidity (and can be influenced by major players).” This is an attitude, he adds, “that borders on the irresponsible.”

German energy policy has mightily contributed to the present crisis. It has blithely continued to shut down the country’s nuclear plants, increased its reliance on coal in the electricity sector and with that a consequent increase in carbon emissions.

Serious Dialogue

When considering Caspian gas as an alternative to Russian gas, I would add another country, Turkey, which has a very aggressive and independent policy as a key transit for gas. However, few observers would argue that such a solution would increase Europe’s security.

Engaging in serious long-term strategic dialogue with Algeria would provide Spain and the EU with leverage. This could help to build better relations between Algeria, Morocco and also the troubled area of the Sahel. When trying to understand the politics of different nations, following the money often offers a good guide. One might also follow the gas.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Why Now?

The raid comes after IS conducted an attack on al-Sinaa prison in the northeastern city of Hasakah in January in an attempt to break free its fighters. In the assault, several Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters were . According to SDF officials, IS was  for six months. Nevertheless, the US-backed SDF recaptured the prison about a week later. 

Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona suspects that the attack on the prison “was the catalyst that led to the decision to act on what was obviously already known location intelligence on … al-Qurayshi.” Francona, who served as the US military attaché in Syria from 1992 to 1995, notes that “Over the past few months, there has been an increase in ISIS activity — more widespread and bolder in nature. This also comes at a time when Iranian-backed militias have also stepped up attacks on US forces in Syria and Iraq.”

Both Qurayshi and his predecessor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, were eliminated in Idlib province, in areas under the control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Previously, HTS was known as Jabhat al-Nusra, affiliated with al-Qaeda and initially  with IS. In 2013, however, it  from IS and has been with the group since 2014. In 2016, it also  relations with al-Qaeda and  itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS). The following year, JFS assumed its current iteration as it  with other groups. 

During much of the past decade, Idlib served as a  for extremists. In 2017, then-US envoy to the coalition fighting the Islamic State, Brett McGurk,  that “Idlib Province is the largest Al Qaeda safe haven since 9/11.” Following Baghdadi’s elimination in 2019, former US President Donald Trump suggested Baghdadi was in Idlib as part of a plan to rebuild IS. Indeed, it was  to see Qurayshi hiding in Idlib as well. 

According to David Lesch, professor of Middle East History at Trinity University in Texas and author of “Syria: A Modern History,” “it seems strange that al-Baghdadi and al-Qurayshi were killed in [a] province largely controlled by its rival HTS and overseen by Turkey, but on the other hand it is the only area not under the control of the Syrian government and its allies or the US-supported SDF, all of whom are opposed to ISIS.”

“Idlib is now home to thousands of IDPs, therefore it was easier for the two to blend in, live secretively, and not be identified as outsiders since most everyone in certain areas of the province are outsiders,” Lesch explains. “Yet they were still found because despite all this they lived in an area still teaming with enemies who were obviously directly or indirectly assets to US intelligence.”

The recent US operation in Idlib, which was  planned over several months, has been the largest of its kind in the country since the 2019 raid that eliminated Baghdadi. Although Qurayshi was  than Baghdadi, the fact that he was targeted in the US raid confirms his .

It is worth noting that Qurayshi was named as the leader of IS in 2019, following the death of Baghdadi. While IS called on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to Qurayshi as the new “caliph,” it did not provide much information about his . The use of the name “Qurayshi” seemed to be an attempt to  to the Prophet Muhammad. This is a tactic that was  vis-à-vis Baghdadi with the aim of  his leadership role. Qurayshi’s real name is Amir Muhammad Said Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla but he is also known as Hajji Abdullah and Abdullah Qaradash.  

As the US continues to create an impression that it is minimizing its presence in the region, especially following its withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, the raid seems to have been used to demonstrate  to reassure Washington’s partners. It also  as a needed win for Biden at a time when the Ukraine crisis remains unsolved. 

However, while Qurayshi’s elimination is a positive development, it may simply be a “,” as Sean Carberry suggests in The Hill. While the operation against Qurayshi may create internal chaos within IS, ultimately, the terror group is likely to name a new leader and move on, which is what took place following Baghdadi’s assassination. Although IS was militarily defeated, the group has not been eliminated and remains a threat. In fact, there have been increased indications, such as the attack on al-Sinaa prison, suggesting that the group is in a state of resurgence. The militants might also seek to use the recent US raid to encourage revenge attacks. 

US Policy in Syria

The Biden administration’s policy vis-à-vis Syria seems to indicate that the official approach will be “,” as Abdulrahman al-Masri and Reem Salahi suggest. It should not be surprising to learn that Syria does not constitute a top diplomatic priority for President Biden. Yet while the US does not want to remain engaged in endless regional wars, it seems to  that a political settlement in war-torn Syria would only empower President Bashar al-Assad, whom Washington would never back. 

Moreover, the US and the Kurds are partners, and Washington would not want to portray an image that it has abandoned those who have shouldered the fight against the Islamic State. This was the overall perception when Trump announced the withdrawal of US forces from Syria in 2019, and Biden seems keen to remedy that controversial decision. 

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It is worth noting that during President Barack Obama’s tenure, Vice President Biden was one of the  when it came to what the US could achieve in Syria. Nevertheless, it  be taken as a given that as president, Biden may be in favor of removing all US forces from the country. For instance, he criticized Trump’s decision to withdraw forces from Syria,  it granted IS “a new lease on life.” In the same year, Biden also  he supports keeping some forces in eastern Syria for the foreseeable future. 

Middle East expert and former US State Department analyst, Gregory Aftandilian doesn’t see the US leaving Syria anytime soon. Aftandilian, who is also a non-resident fellow at Arab Center Washington DC, thinks “It is doubtful [Biden] will do more than the anti-ISIS campaign and humanitarian aid. In light of the attempted prison break in northeastern Syria he may put pressure on some countries to take back ISIS ��������DzԱ����.”

For the US to play a role in stabilizing Syria, there needs to be a clear strategy. Unfortunately, at the moment, that strategy is largely . While the elimination of Qurayshi is a positive step, much more work needs to be done to stabilize the country.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Water World: Is Climate Change Driving Our Future Out to Sea?

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Burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that trap heat in the atmosphere, making them major contributors to climate change. On the other hand, high industrial activities, alongside rapidly increasing populations, put growing pressure on energy demand.

The Example of Qatar

Qatar has made remarkable economic achievements over the past few decades. Yet Qatar is facing a trade-off between boosting its economic growth and lowering its carbon dioxide emissions. Its strategic mandate to boost economic development, along with other areas related to sustainability, makes Qatar an interesting country to analyze.

The World Bank defines Qatar as one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita. Its economy is highly dependent on oil and gas production, which for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of export earnings and 70% of government revenues. The country is also a major player in liquefied natural gas. Nonetheless, Qatar’s high dependence on fossil fuels has resulted in an in the CO2 emissions level when compared to global averages.

To combat the rising carbon emission percentages and lower environmental pressures, Qatar is introducing strict policy measures to achieve sustainable development through four central pillars: economic, social, human and environmental development. While many disruptions have occurred over the past few years, including fluctuations in oil and gas prices, economic downturns and a deadly pandemic, nobody expected an economic blockade.

The Diplomatic Rift

In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cut diplomatic relations with Qatar. They prohibited Qatar-registered planes and ships from utilizing their airspace and sea routes, and the Saudis also blocked Qatar’s only land border.

This point is of particular importance as the deterioration in relations among the Gulf neighbors urged Qatar to rethink its sustainable development goals while meeting local demand. At the beginning of the blockade, the country relied heavily on importing several commodities, especially food items. Later, it accelerated initiatives and programs to diversify the economy and reduce reliance on imports.

Achieving carbon neutrality is also factored into all Qatar’s initiatives. For example, by the end of 2022, Qatar aims to deliver the first carbon-neutral FIFA World Cup in the history of the event. All stadiums and infrastructure are subjected to rigorous sustainability standards. Several air quality monitoring stations and extensive recycling programs are being introduced, along with the construction of the eight stadiums that will be used during the football tournament.

Qatar has since become much more independent across several sectors, including food production and transport, making it a case study on how to transform challenges into opportunities for growth.

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This was also evident with total carbon emissions. According to my own analysis, carbon emission per capita fell by 13% as of 2018 from a historical record in 2000. Since then, total carbon emissions have increased as the economy has grown but at a slower rate, meaning that Qatar is undergoing expanding relative decoupling. In the 2008 to 2018 period, a 1% change in GDP resulted in a fall of CO2 emissions, from 0.65% to 0.44%. This drop is very relevant to Qatar as several measures have been applied, particularly over the last 10 years, to reduce emissions.

A Reduction in Emissions

While Qatar’s total emissions have declined over recent years, policies to increase energy efficiency, diversify the energy mix by introducing more renewables, support technological development to improve energy efficiency in a desert climate, and implement energy demand management programs to maintain the same trend of decline and achieve climate change objectives have been increasingly crucial.  

The heightened pressure caused by the blockade on Qatar is now over, but what is needed are more synergies and collective efforts across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to stimulate economic diversification and minimize carbon emissions. Member states of the GCC are sharing multiple environmental, social and economic factors that should incentivize them to cooperate to meet their climate change objectives and economic development goals.

*[Saad Shannak is a scientist at Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute, part of Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) in Qatar. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the university’s official stance.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Taliban Use Violence Against Women as a Bargaining Chip

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The theme for the 2022 International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation, which took place on February 6, was accelerating investment to end FGM. With the COVID-19 pandemic seriously impacting efforts to eliminate this harmful practice, it is crucial for governments, international actors and donors to scale up investments in global efforts. 

What Is FGM?

FGM involves the partial or complete removal of external female genitalia for non-medical reasons. It is not recommended in any religious texts, has no health benefits and can cause serious lifelong physical and psychological harm. 

With an increase in investment to end this harmful practice, it is important to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to the Middle East and Asia, which have not been traditionally prioritized, partly due to the absence of official data on the practice. The impact of low investment is felt by women’s rights activists, whose work in both regions is woefully underfunded and lacks sufficient international support.

Globally, an 200 million women and girls have experienced some form of FGM, which is a human rights violation and form of violence against women and girls. However, this data is based only on 31 countries from which national prevalence data is available and does not reflect the true scale of the problem. This has been documented in various reports, including by the US End FGM/C Network, the End FGM European Network and Equality Now. This report found that FGM occurs in more countries around the world than widely acknowledged and that the number of women and girls who are affected is being woefully underestimated.

FGM in Iran

In Iran, the lack of sufficient resources and international assistance has impacted the work of organizations such as . This organization, in particular, does not have big statistical studies to provide reliable data on the scale and nature of FGM in Iran. It also faces challenges due to little support and limited media coverage.

FGM has been documented in Iran for almost a century. In 1928, a travel by pediatrician Dr. Rastegar, writing about Lorestan, a province in Western Iran, was published in the magazine Nahid:

“Another important point that is common among women living in tents is the circumcision of girls, which must be done from the age of five to nine; for until a girl is circumcised, she is not a Muslim and no one will take bread from her. As it was heard from the Lors, the method of circumcising girls is that they put the girl to sleep and cut the outer part of the clitoris, which is out of the small lips, with a sharp razor. Due to the weather and other environmental qualities, the genitals of the nomadic girls are different from urban girls. As is understood, this practice is also common among the Arabs and the tribes of Khuzestan also believe in this practice. To stop the bleeding, the girl has to sit in the river up to her waist, and if she bleeds again, she has to move in the water for a while.”

Despite such early reports, the Iranian press has been reluctant to report on FGM. Homa Sarshar, a pre-revolutionary journalist, said in an that she noticed the spread of FGM 50 years ago during a trip to southern Iran. In a report, she tried to make the news public. However, she says, the media outlet’s editor did not publish her piece as he had been instructed by authorities that the government was aware of the situation and was deciding what to do about it.

Although FGM continues to be practiced in western and southern Iran, the lack of news coverage has been a challenge. For over a decade, activists were unable to convince Iranian news outlets to report on FGM, but some journalists have now begun to cover the issue. Reporting on the issue is key as gender-sensitive media coverage has an important role to play in increasing public understanding about human rights violations, holding duty bearers to account and instigating positive change.

Small-scale in Iran have found FGM prevalence ranging from 16% to as high as 83% in some communities, and there are still many unknown places in the country where FGM may be happening.

Stopping FGM

At one point, the government, at the suggestion of Stop FGM Iran, attempted to conduct a pilot project. The project was launched and provided unprecedented insight, but government cooperation was abruptly paused and, despite a follow-up, never resumed.

Efforts to draft a specific law against FGM in Iran continue. Although some legal provisions refer to the issue of amputation of genitals and allocation of blood money, they are incomplete and should be reconsidered to effectively address the issue. A law explicitly banning FGM in Iran would make it clear to the public that FGM is a human rights violation and provide a deterrent effect to would-be offenders. It would also grant specific legal recourse to survivors within the criminal justice system.

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Many gynecological centers in Iran advertise under the pretext of genital cosmetic surgery, sometimes even under the name of female circumcision, and exploit the lack of public awareness. No government authority is responsible for raising public awareness against this human rights violation, and with very low costs, women are encouraged to have cosmetic surgery on their genitals.

A recent on attitudes toward FGM in southern Iran found the continued prevalence of misconceptions about FGM amongst women in the region, including that FGM prevents infertility, reduces the chances of divorce, protects girls from rape and ensures that women deliver more sons.

How can we stand against female genital mutilation without government intervention, changing the law and raising awareness? Today, in addition to the above, activists need to receive financial and other assistance from government and international actors so they can work toward reducing FGM prevalence and, ultimately, eliminate it.

*[Rayehe Mozafarian is the founder of Stop FGM Iran. Divya Srinivasan is a legal adviser at Equality Now.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Evolution of National Security in the UAE

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The killings, ordered by then US President Donald Trump, have served to exacerbate the severe security challenges the government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi already faces. The PMF, without al-Muhandis’ leadership, is becoming increasingly splintered, threatening even more insecurity for ordinary Iraqis who are trying to recover from nearly two decades of war and terrorism.

Growing Security Challenges

Security is a prerequisite for the prosperity, welfare and economic development of any society. However, as long as Iran continues its extensive influence over Iraq and uses Iraqi territory as a venue to play out its conflict with the United States, security cannot be achieved.

After the assassinations of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, the PMF appeared to be even more aggressively pursuing Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s strategic goal, namely the  of all US troops from Iraq. The US Embassy, the Baghdad Green Zone and US military bases have been repeatedly targeted by PMF militias. The US responded in kind and  PMF positions in various parts of the country, further an already fragile security situation.

Meanwhile, al-Kadhimi, viewed by his critics as catering to Washington,  the US for violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching unilateral operations inside the country. At the same time, he faced strenuous demands from the Americans for his government to do more to stop PMF attacks on US targets.

The withdrawal of foreign military forces had been  by the Iraqi parliament just two days after the high-profile assassinations. Following the US–Iraqi strategic dialogue that launched in June 2020, the US evacuated some of its bases that have been in place since 2003, handing them over to the Iraqi army. But a final withdrawal agreed to be completed by the end of last year has , and the remaining 2,500 US troops have stayed on, no longer in a combat role but rather to “advise, assist and enable” the Iraqi military.

This quasi-exit was met with a stern reaction from the PMF, who threatened to treat the US forces as aggressors if they did not withdraw completely from Iraq. “Targeting the US occupation in Iraq is a great honor, and we support the factions that target it,” was how a for one of the PMF militias put it. Such threats underline the risk of further confrontations between the militias and the US and the potential for more insecurity for ordinary Iraqis.

The targeting of Baghdad’s airport on January 28, with at least six rockets landing on the runway and areas close to the non-military side, causing damage to parked passenger planes, underlines just how fragile the security situation remains.

The PM and the PMF

The conflicts over differences between the PMF and the government are another reason for growing insecurity in the post-assassination period. The PMF has a competitive relationship with the prime minister’s government, and this competition has only intensified over the past two years. PMF groups consider al-Kadhimi to be pro-US, seeking to reduce the influence of Shia militant groups in Iraq.

Initially, in March 2020, major Shia factions  his nomination, accusing him of being inordinately close to the US. The Fatah Coalition, composed of significant Shia groups close to Iran, later accepted his candidacy. Still, tensions remain as al-Kadhimi strives to strike a balance between Iran on the one hand and the US and its allies on the other.

The prime minister believes that the PMF should  the political stage. He also believes that the PMF should be freed from party affiliation and be fully controlled by the government. This would mean that their budget would come from the federal government and not from private sources or other states. In this regard, al-Kadhimi is seeking to strengthen government control over  to fight corruption and smuggling.

The crossings are used by militias, including those reportedly active at Diyala’s border crossing into Iran. If the government effectively controls these vital channels, financial inflows from smuggling, which strengthens the militias, will decrease in the long term while federal coffers will directly benefit.

The dispute between the PMF and the prime minister escalated in May of last year when police  Qasem Mosleh, the PMF commander in Anbar province, over the assassination of a prominent Iraqi activist. In response, the PMF stormed and took control of the Green Zone. Al-Kadhimi, not wanting to escalate the conflict, found no evidence against Mosleh and released him after 14 days.

In November 2021, al-Kadhimi himself was targeted in an  attempt following clashes between various Iraqi parties during protests against the results of the parliamentary elections. Despite its failure, an armed drone attack on the prime minister’s Baghdad residence presented a disturbing development for contemporary Iraq and was attributed to a PMF militia loyal to Iran.

Internal Struggles

The assassination of al-Muhandis had a huge impact on the PMF. He was a charismatic figure able to mediate more effectively than anyone else between various Iraqi groups, from Shia clerics in Najaf to Iraqi government politicians and Iranian officials. After his death, the militia groups in the PMF face internal division.

The PMF’s political leadership, including its chairman, Falih Al-Fayyadh, has  to present itself as committed to the law and accepting the authority of the prime minister. In contrast, two powerful PMF factions, Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, have taken a hardline stance, emphasizing armed resistance against US forces. Tehran’s efforts to mediate between the leaders of the two factions and the Iraqi government have yielded few results.

Meanwhile, internal disagreements over the degree of Iranian control caused four PMF brigades to split off and form a new structure called , or Shrine Units. Their avowed intention is to repudiate Iranian influence while supporting the Iraqi state and the rule of law.

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Another divide in the PMF has  between groups such as Kataib Hezbollah on the one hand, and Badr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Saraya al-Salam on the other, due to poor relationship management by Kataib Hezbollah in the PMF Commission after Muhandis’ death. While it is unsurprising that a number of critical PMF functions like internal affairs and intelligence are controlled by Kataib Hezbollah given that Muhandis founded the group before assuming the PMF’s leadership, he managed to exercise control in a manner that kept other factions onboard.

But Kataib �������DZ�������’s imposition, in February 2020, of another one of its commanders, Abu Fadak al Mohammadawi, to succeed al-Muhandis on the PMF Commission alienated key groups such as Badr and Asaib. Clearly, a severely factionalized and heavily armed PMF continues to pose a significant security threat in the country.

the assassinations on January 3, 2020, Donald Trump said of Soleimani that “we take comfort knowing his reign of terror is over.” Two years on from the killing of the IRGC general and the PMF boss, ordinary Iraqis beset by violence and insecurity take no such comfort.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner of 51�Թ�.]

The post Iraq Still Feels the Consequences of US Assassinations appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In recent years, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially the UAE, have recognized that trusting foreign governments, such as the United States, cannot offer them the best possible protection. The US has had a presence in the Persian Gulf since the 1990s and the Gulf Arab countries have relied on it to provide security. However, events in recent years have shown that the Gulf Arab states cannot rely solely on Washington.

Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East?

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Such developments include the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan amid the US withdrawal; the US pivot to Asia; the US retraction of most advanced missile defense systems and Patriot batteries from Saudi Arabia; and the lack of a US military response to threats, missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil bases by the Houthis in Yemen.

This has encouraged the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf to pursue security autonomy. The UAE, in particular, has sought to transform its strategy from dependence on the US and Saudi Arabia to a combination of self-reliance and multilateral cooperation.

Self-Reliance Security Strategy

Although the UAE is an important ally of America in the Persian Gulf, over recent years, the US has sought to push the Emiratis toward security. Sociopolitical events in the Middle East over the last decade following the Arab Spring of 2010-11 have made it clear to the UAE that the primary goal of ensuring national security, in addition to benefiting from international cooperation, should be the use of national facilities and resources.

Hosni Mubarak’s ouster from Egypt during the Arab Spring protests and the reluctance of the US to defend him as an ally — which led to the rise of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood — further demonstrated to Abu Dhabi that it should not exclusively depend on the US for security assistance. Thus, the UAE began to develop a professional army.

The UAE‘s self-reliance strategy is divided into different branches, but most of all, its military security efforts have been given the highest priority. The UAE‘s determination to create an independent and professional military is evident from its years of investment in the defense industry.

Indeed, security is a top priority for the United Arab Emirates, and defense spending continues to make up a large portion of the national budget. The UAE’s defense typically accounts for 11.1% to 14% of the total budget. In 2019, the UAE’s defense spending was $16.4 billion. This was 18% more than the 2018 budget of $13.9 billion.

The UAE has invested heavily in the military sector and defense industry in recent years. In November 2019, the UAE formed the EDGE Group from a merger of 25 companies. The company has 12,000 employees and $5 billion in total revenue. It is also among the top 25 advocacy groups in the world, ahead of firms such as Booz Allen Hamilton in the US and Rolls-Royce in the UK.

EDGE is around five clusters: platforms and systems, missiles and weapons, cyber defense, electronic warfare and intelligence, and mission support. It comprises several major UAE companies in the defense industry, such as ADSB (shipbuilding), Al Jasoor, NIMR (vehicles), SIGN4L (electronic warfare services) and ADASI (autonomous systems). The main of EDGE is to develop weapons to fight “hybrid warfare” and to bolster the UAE’s defense against unconventional threats, focusing on electronic attacks and drones.

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The UAE has also come up with detailed plans to improve the quality of its military personnel, large sums of money each year on training its military recruits in American colleges and war academies. It also founded the National Defense College; most of its students are citizens of the UAE, because of its independence in military training. In addition, in 2014, the UAE introduced general conscription for men between the ages of 18 and 30 to increase numbers and strengthen national identity in its military. As a result, it gathered about 50,000 people in the first three years.

Contrary to traditional practice, the UAE’s growing military power has made it eager to use force and hard power to protect its interests. The UAE stands ready to use military force anywhere in the region to contain Iran’s growing influence and weaken Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Participating in the Yemeni War was a test of this strategy.

The UAE‘s military presence in Yemen began in March 2015. It a brigade of 3,000 troops to Yemen in August 2015, along with Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Arab countries. Over the past five years, the UAE has an ambitious strategic agenda in the Red Sea, building military installations and securing control of the southern coasts of Yemen along the Arabian Sea in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Socotra Island. Despite reducing its military footprints in Yemen in 2019, the UAE has consolidated itself in the southern regions. It has continued to finance and impart training to thousands of Yemeni fighters drafted from various groups like the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite Forces, Abu al-Abbas Brigade and the West Coast Forces.

The UAE‘s goal in adopting a self-reliance strategy is to increase strategic depth in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Thus, along with direct military presence or arms support for groups engaged in proxy wars, it affects the internal affairs of various countries in the region, such as Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and Libya. With its influence, the UAE can turn the tide in its favor in certain areas.

Multilateralism Security Strategy

The United Arab Emirates faces a variety of security in the Middle East, and addressing them requires cooperation with other countries. Currently, the most significant security threats in the UAE are: countering Iranian threats and power in the Middle East, especially in Arab countries under Iranian influence, such as Yemen, Syria and Lebanon; eliminating threats from terrorist groups and political Islam in the region, the most important of which — according to the UAE — is the Muslim Brotherhood; and economic threats and efforts to prepare for the post-oil world.

In its multilateral strategy, the UAE seeks to counter these threats with the help of other countries in the region or beyond. It has used soft power through investments or providing humanitarian aid, suggesting that economic cooperation is more important than political competition and intervention. In this regard, the UAE has cooperated with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Britain and France, as well as normalized relations with Israel.

On August 13, 2020, the UAE became the first Gulf state to normalize relations with Israel. The UAE‘s goal in normalizing relations with Israel is to counter threats from Iran and the region. The Abraham Accords have not only a security aspect, but also an economic one. Following the signing of the accords, on October 20, 2020, the US, Israel and the UAE the establishment of the Abraham Fund, a joint fund of $3 billion “in private sector-led investment and development initiatives,” aimed at “promoting economic cooperation and prosperity.” In addition, it outlined a banking and finance memorandum between the largest banks in Israel and Dubai, and a joint bid between Dubai’s DP World port operator and an Israeli shipping firm for the management of Israel’s Haifa port.

Through the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates seeks to invest and transfer Israeli technologies to the UAE through mutual agreements. The UAE has discovered that Israel is one of the bridges to the US economy and high technology. If the UAE intends to have an oil-free economy in the future, Israel may be the best option to achieve this by pursuing a strategy of multilateralization.

UAE relations with Turkey also have a multilateral dimension to reaching common security goals. The two countries had good relations until the Arab Spring protests ties between them. Abu Dhabi and Ankara began to defuse tensions after a phone call in August 2021 between UAE Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The nations mainly have differences around issues in Libya, Syria and Egypt. The UAE is trying to resolve its disputes with Turkey by investing in the country.

Turkey is the largest backer of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. The Turks claim the UAE participated in the failed coup of July 2016 against the Turkish government. Nonetheless, the UAE wants to end frictions with Turkey and has attracted Ankara by investing and increasing commercial ties. The Turkish lira has depreciated in recent years and Erdogan’s popularity has plummeted due to mismanagement in Turkey. Erdogan will not miss this economic opportunity with the UAE and welcomes Emirati investments. In this way, the UAE will likely easily resolve its differences with Turkey.

The current tendency to use force is contrary to traditional Abu Dhabi policy, yet increasing the strategic depth of the UAE is one of Abu Dhabi‘s most achievable goals in its strategy of self-reliance. This plan is the exact opposite of multilateralism. Unlike the use of force and hard power, Abu Dhabi seeks to achieve its objectives by using soft power, investment and humanitarian aid. In this situation, the tactical exploitation of economic cooperation takes precedence over political competition and military intervention in the region.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Since 2005, as part of a power-sharing agreement, the Iraqi presidency has been set aside for a Kurd. Within the Kurdish community itself, the post has been informally reserved for a candidate of the PUK. Meanwhile, the speaker of parliament is held by a Sunni and the job of prime minister by a Shia.

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The two main Kurdish parties have also agreed that in return for the Iraqi presidency being earmarked for the PUK, the KDP takes nearly all significant positions within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This includes the positions of president, premiership and the deputy of parliament as well as several ministries within the Iraqi federal government.

Losing Support

Recently, the KDP has made political gains and the PUK has lost significant support since the 2018 elections. Currently, the KDP has 31 members in the Iraqi national council, while the PUK has only 16. This has led the KDP to eye the position of the Iraqi presidency. If the party insists that President Salih should not be elected again, it could lead to a significant change of the political map of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Both the PUK and KDP have lost the trust and confidence of the public. This was particularly reflected three years ago in the last parliamentary election when only around 40% of registered voters participated. The PUK and KDP have lost over 700,000 voters in the Kurdish region itself. Their legitimacy is declining day after day and smaller parties are emerging. This is because citizens do not believe the people and parties in power are competent enough to represent them and or deliver the basic services they need.

The KDP is strongly against the reelection of Salih because, in 2018, he ran for the presidency without the blessing of Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP; he went on to beat Barzani’s candidate, Fuad Hussein. Today, if the PUK and Barham Salih the presidency again, it would have significant implications on intra-party, Kurdish, federal and regional politics.

The KDP has nominated Hoshyar Zebari as their candidate to challenge the PUK’s Salih, according to . Zebari served as the Iraqi finance minister from 2014 to 2016 before he was  from his position following a secret parliamentary vote of no-confidence over alleged corruption and misuse of public funds. At the time, Zebari denied the allegations against him and said they politically led, and he was later cleared of charges.

The KDP wants the PUK to nominate a new candidate. Currently, it appears that the PUK is leaning toward Latif Rasheed, a former Kurdish minister in Baghdad and a close relative of the Talabani family as an alternative person for the presidency should Salih not win the support he needs when parliament votes on February 5.

The KDP claims that Salih has not succeeded in resolving the political differences and disagreement between the KRG and the federal government of Iraq. The budget for the Kurdistan Regional Government has also not been settled. It is hoped that Salih can find a solution to the economic and monetary between Erbil and Baghdad.

Salih Is the Only Real Candidate

There are currently five people who have nominated themselves for the job. Yet it is clear that the only powerful candidate is Barham Salih and the others are only competing against him to enrich their resumes and or undermine the position of the presidency.

Across Iraq, Salih is known for his international and diplomatic experience and for being a politician with a vision. It was during his premiership that the KRG had boomed with a strong economy that saw the development of real estate. Hundreds of thousands of people rebuilt their homes, students went abroad to continue their studies and many others started small entrepreneurial projects thanks to his good governance and meritocracy.

During his time as prime minister of the Kurdistan region between 2009 and 2012, Salih laid the foundations for several strategic projects, namely the American University of Iraq in Sulaimani, the airport, the new University of Sulaimani campus and the Hawari Shar, one of the greatest national parks in Iraq. Salih has also built many strategic projects like the underground water and sewage system of Sulaimani, along with dozens of other useful initiatives. Salih is widely known among the Kurdish people for his dedication to working in the public interest.

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At a regional , many anticipate that Salih’s presidency will play an important role in maintaining Baghdad’s balance between the United States and Iran. On the one hand, Salih has a good working relationship with the Iranians and speaks Farsi. On the other, he has maintained a decade-long relationship with influential figures in Washington. The hope is that Salih will strive to minimize the damage done to Iraq as a result of the rivalry between the US and Iran. The election of Salih, in terms of person and approach, is a crucial step toward stability in the new government. The hope is that he will play a more positive and engaged role and fulfill the expectations the Iraqi people have of him.

Barham Salih has also strongly advocated for the rights of the ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq and is a great defender of the , which has given the Kurds certain rights. Salih has a good reputation and has political experience. He is also well known for his integrity, righteousness, fairness and loyalty to the homeland.

The president’s role is to serve as a symbol for the country. Their job is to represent Iraq’s sovereignty, safeguard the constitution and preserve its independence, unity and security. Many believe that Salih’s reputation, political demeanor and balanced stance enable him to implement these tasks of the presidency.

Salih is a politician and can lead Iraq as a mediator, rather than a nationalist, sectarian and or populist. If he is given a second chance as president, Salih could deescalate the existing tension and dispute between Erbil and Baghdad, and among Shia factions as well. After all, he was once the protégé of the late Jalal Talabani, the president who united Iraq and prevented further conflict. Hence, Salih meets the qualifications that the people and also his regional allies would prefer in an Iraqi to become a president. As it stands, Salih has the best chance of retaining his position, but not without encountering many challenges.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Throughout the war, international policymakers have overemphasized the role of the private sector in addressing Yemen’s severe food crisis, insofar as they have tirelessly insisted since the late 1960s that opening the local market to unrestricted food imports would feed a growing population and drive economic growth. Commercial staple food imports — as well as food assistance — are vital during the war.

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However, be that as it may, the role of commercial food importers in postwar, post-neoliberalism Yemen must not be blown out of proportion. Reducing Yemen’s deep agrarian and rural social crisis to wartime and postwar commercial food import issues shows that the root causes of the country’s severe food crisis continue to be gravely misunderstood or deliberately overlooked.

To begin with, Yemen’s absurd, inordinate dependence on staple food imports is but a consequence of . Regrettably, it was a policy that failed to preserve the rural sector’s productivity, let alone stimulating it and accumulating wealth. Rehashing past failed agricultural development policies is evidence of two distributing realities.

The first is Yemeni elites’ lack of capacity to imagine alternative paths of development in Yemen. The second is international policymakers’ position that developed countries  can adopt national agricultural policy frameworks that avowedly control food supply through production and import controls and pricing mechanisms, whereas developing countries cannot do the same to support their agriculture sector.

Inspiration and Lessons

To end this long deadlock between Yemen’s autonomy and global capitalism, perhaps one ought to draw attention to India’s  for inspiration and lessons.

It is not in Yemen’s national interest to continue ignoring its small and marginalized farmers. In a rural society like Yemen, they are the engine of a healthy economy. The vast majority of the population continues to live in rural Yemen. Current official  put Yemen’s rural population at about 70%. This reality limits the role of the private sector in sustaining rural livelihoods. While some might argue that Yemen’s private sector should not be viewed as a monolith, consisting only of large conglomerates, to lump smallholding agriculture and agricultural commercialization together under the umbrella of the private sector is fundamentally flawed.

Small farmers in Yemen are subsistence households, each representing a domestic unit of agricultural production that is economically self-sufficient and combines production and consumption functions. This rural social organization is not the same as one where farmers are reduced to landless, wage earners. Thus, small and marginalized farmers cannot be pigeonholed as private sector actors. Worse is to drop them from the economic equation altogether, especially in so-called developing countries.

Without making this fundamental distinction between smallholding agriculture in Yemen and private sector activity, and without understanding why domestic food production is a matter of national priority to Yemeni citizens, Yemeni elites and international policymakers alike will continue to bungle the task of putting the country on the right path to development.

Food Sovereignty and Security

Many seem to think of Yemen as a big chicken farm that only needs to be fed somehow. They do not understand, or do not want to understand, that at issue is food sovereignty as well as food security. Yemen is a sovereign nation. Yemenis are a people who have the right, needless to say, to choose what to farm, how to farm and how to define the relationship between their local market and the international market. Choosing whether to eat homegrown sorghum or imported wheat is a fundamental national question of utmost importance, not a trade finance problem.

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Private sector activity is not an economic activity that occurs in an empty space; it occurs within social spheres. It impacts domestic production, changes the modes of production within a society and, consequently, remolds all social formations and economic relations. Agrarian changes are . One cannot discuss private sector activity and commercial food imports in isolation from their long-term social impacts. This is lesson number one from five decades of steady economic decline and social regress. It is Yemen’s rural population that has marched down the road to impoverishment and starvation, and they know exactly how — but not why — they got there in the first place. In rural Yemen, lives and land are at stake.

Millions of people in Yemen are famished neither because of the war nor because the private sector is unable to import enough staple foods, in spite of significant and critical wartime challenges. Yemenis are starving because the country has systematically lost its long-standing ability to produce food, particularly staple grains. The magnitude of production losses in Yemen’s agriculture sector has fundamentally limited the economy’s resilience to shocks. Economic  is the ability of the country’s main productive forces to cope, recover and reconstruct. How can you cripple a country’s most tangible, corporeal and immediate branch of production and, at the same time, foster resilience? Speaking of resilience of an incapacitated agriculture sector is a logical fallacy and is, therefore, meaningless and a distraction from the real problem.

Causing Alarm

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT), Yemen on its domestic soil on average 98% of its grains during 1961-65; namely, sorghum, millet, barley, maize and wheat, in this order. Sorghum production in Yemen peaked at 921,000 tons in 1975. In sharp contrast, the country domestically produced on average only 18% of its total supply of the same grains during 2011-15 and imported the rest. By 2015, the production of  had plummeted to 221,510 tons. To make an already alarming situation unmanageable, the ongoing war more than halved Yemen’s total domestic grain production. Most notably, sorghum production reached a record low of 162,277 tons in 2016, followed by another record low of 155,722 tons in 2018. Yet, some still argue that this decline is due to population growth, not policy.

In a country that primarily produces and consumes sorghum — the traditional staple of man and beast in Yemen — millet and barley, an over 80% dependency on imported wheat is evidently catastrophic during war and peace. This is a well-documented socioeconomic problem. In its 2004  of “The State of Food and Agriculture,” the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) noted that the long-term damaging impact of the loss of domestic food production and exposure to price volatility on individual countries outweigh the plausible short-lived collective benefits: “Lower international prices have moderated the food import bills of developing countries, which, as a group, are now net food importers. However, although lower basic food prices on international markets bring short-term benefits to net food-importing developing countries, lower international prices can also have negative impacts on domestic production in developing countries that might have lingering effects on their food security.”

The heart of the matter is that the agriculture sector is the country’s main productive force. Unchecked private internationally integrated capital has destroyed Yemen’s rural capital and silenced the interests of the country’s sizable rural population. Further, the malintegration of Yemen’s local food market with global markets has jeopardized the country’s economic independence and prevented any real development in Yemen.

The Issue

There is great, non-monetary economic and social value in reclaiming and revalorizing Yemen’s domestic food production and rebuilding its basic rural infrastructure. Domestic food production is too important to Yemenis to be addressed as an afterthought. At issue is not how to procure wheat from international markets, but how to stop the hemorrhage of surpluses out of the agriculture sector.

What serves Yemen’s national interest is to refrain from calling for increasing the country’s dependency on speculative, volatile international food markets; imposing in the guise of development and economic resilience policies that undermine the country’s ability to domestically produce adequate food for local consumption; overstating the benefits of export-oriented agriculture and cash cropping more broadly; and overlooking or downplaying the role of smallholders in generating abundant jobs and sustaining rural infrastructure. In a nutshell, any serious discussion of Yemen’s food security crisis must take into account ecological sustainability, rural livelihoods and both food security and sovereignty in the long term.

Yemeni farmers do not yet fully understand why policymakers and development practitioners insist on promoting imports and more broadly large commercial activity, at a time when the whole world is prioritizing the opposite of these dictates: strengthening self-reliance, planning and regulating limited resources, and minimizing local markets’ exposure. Yemeni struggle has not yet reached the level of political awareness seen in India during its 2020-21 farmers’ protests. To get there, we must understand one point: tying the rural sector’s destiny to large commercial organizations cannot lead to any real growth and prosperity of the entire population.

Indian farmers inspire us to rethink development paradigms in Yemen, for there is more to farming than exporting bananas and onions to Saudi Arabia, and there is more to the role of the private sector in national development than flooding local markets with wheat from Australia, Russia, the United States, France and other international source markets, or even import substitution.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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However, after signing the deal, the government in Madrid never formalized its political and diplomatic position regarding Moroccan over Spain‘s former colony in Western Sahara. A geopolitical matter of vital importance for Morocco, the question of Western Sahara remains an unhealed wound in the relationship between Madrid and Rabat.

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In 2021, this wound was reopened after Spain, in a somewhat secret and irregular move, welcomed Brahim Ghali, secretary-general of the Polisario Front, a nationalist movement seeking independence for Western Sahara vis-à-vis Morocco. On top of the fact that Ghali is wanted in Spain for crimes against humanity, rape and torture, among others, he is also a staunch enemy of the government in Rabat.

This politically embarrassing situation, a product of a diplomatic miscalculation by the Spanish government, created a feeling of betrayal in Rabat. Morocco quickly conveyed its discomfort, considering Spain’s harboring of Ghali a challenge to the kingdom’s sovereignty and interference in an internal state matter. Thus, Morocco issued a warning that continuing to host Ghali would have consequences.

Spain in North Africa

Despite these warnings, the government in Madrid decided not to make any political or diplomatic overtures to Morocco, declining to resolve the misunderstanding in a consensual manner. Therefore, in a way, the Spanish government forwent its diplomatic relationship with Morocco and disregarded the important role that Rabat has always played as a critical partner in the fight against illegal trafficking and terrorism stemming from the Maghreb and the Sahel.

Though the relationship between Morocco and Spain has lived through ups and downs, the tensions last year felt much different. Through relaxation of its military controls, Rabat‘s threat became a reality in May 2021 when Morocco effectively opened its border with Ceuta, a Spanish enclave and autonomous city located on the African continent, which made it easier for waves of irregular to reach Tarajal beach. Around 8,000 people, including more than 1,500 estimated minors, tried to cross the Spanish-Moroccan border on foot and by swimming to enter Spanish soil illegally.

As crude as it may seem, this political move by the government in Rabat, using Moroccans and Africans in general as a weapon against Spain, is not new. For years, Morocco has used this modus operandi as a diplomatic weapon to pressure and obtain concessions from its European neighbor. However, there has not been such a mass arrival of people, especially such a high percentage of minors, to the Spanish border in recent history.

The diplomatic crisis last May led to authentic moments of chaos and siege along Ceuta‘s border, making the passage of many of these immigrants to the European territory possible. Through its actions, Rabat sent a message without palliatives and the Spanish government to back down from political moves, such as open invitations to regional nationalist leaders.

The Existential Issue of Territorial Integrity

Morocco’s red lines related to Western Sahara have been drawn, and the kingdom has reiterated that interferences with its national sovereignty will not be tolerated. The crude political response at the Spanish border of Ceuta represents the harshness of Rabat‘s diplomatic relations, choosing, yet again, to weaponize its population.

Spain needs Morocco; indeed, Europe needs Morocco. Rabat is a crucial partner in Africa, especially given the many challenges in the region. However, Spain and the European Union should not allow the pressure and blackmail from their North African neighbor to stand because they embolden others. Spain and the EU should impose strict red lines on Morocco as well as clear and intelligent economic sanctions concerning development, education and health funds.

Political, and diplomatic issues can be resolved with class and delicacy without cheap blows and without trivializing despair and compassion. For this, Spain needs to reach a rapprochement with Morocco the status and future of Western Sahara.

Energy and Copycats

In tandem with Morocco’s migrant valve vis-à-vis Spain, Algeria started leveraging its gas valve to counter France’s escalation on matters like issuing visas to Algerian citizens. In this latter issue, Spain and Morocco, neither of whom are particularly close with Algeria, are collateral damage to the Paris-Algiers feud whether in the form of declining pipeline or a higher power bill.

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Since these episodes toward the middle of last year, the same playbook has been used by Moscow’s client in Minsk, who has fostered a migrant cul-de-sac along the EU’s Polish border. In doing so, Russia and Belarus are feeding the euroskeptic spirits the Visegrad countries and beyond, which are particularly sensitive to migration and border sovereignty issues. Moreover, Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin are playing good cop, bad cop on the issue of Europe’s gas supply by offering both threats and assurances that further highlight the EU’s vulnerable dependency on external providers when it comes to energy.

On the migration front, the European Union needs to reinforce its external borders and FRONTEX agency, particularly within the Schengen area, and formulate a common framework to tackle both migration quotas and allocation throughout Schengen member countries. Not only is the migrant in places like Spain, Greece, and Poland a human tragedy, but it is also increasingly a geopolitical lever weaponized by Morocco, Turkey, Belarus and other adversaries to destabilize the EU and bolster internal chaos to the benefit of figures such as Viktor Orban, Geert Wilders, Santiago Abascal, Marine Le Pen, and Eric Zemmour.

Whether nuclear, solar or wind, a common and comprehensive European defense framework urgently requires a holistic approach that tackles the issue of energy independence, in addition to that of border security, particularly in an increasingly hostile and multipolar neighborhood.

Building Solutions Where Possible

Along the Maghreb, one of the best solutions would be a new pragmatic and flexible bipartisan agreement between Spain and Morocco. An agreement that commemorates the golden jubilee of the Tripartite Agreement provides a firm solution to the Western Sahara dispute in a framework that benefits coexistence in the region and maintains collaboration in critical matters such as the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and human trafficking.

In the same way, Spain and the EU must encourage the good behavior of Morocco with humanitarian aid and fruitful commercial relations to definitively close the post-colonial wound that sometimes reopens between the two countries.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Was the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Mother of All War Crimes?

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So, when on November 30, 2021, a court in Frankfurt, Germany, handed down a life  to an Iraqi man who joined the Islamic State (IS) group for genocide against the Yazidi minority — the first time a former member of IS had been convicted of genocide and the first verdict for genocide against Yazidis — it was celebrated as a landmark case in the fight for justice and accountability. Taha al-Jumailly was found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity resulting in death, war crimes, aiding and abetting war crimes, and bodily harm resulting in death.

“T�ǻ岹��, ISIS member Taha AJ was convicted of genocide and sentenced to life in prison. This is the first genocide verdict against an ISIS member. This verdict is a win for survivors of genocide, survivors of sexual violence, & the Yazidi community,”  Nadia Murad, a 2018 Nobel Peace Prize winner and a Yazidi survivor of IS enslavement.

Universal Jurisdiction

The trial was also the first in Germany based on the principle of universal jurisdiction addressing crimes under international law committed abroad by a perpetrator who is not a German citizen and was only extradited on the basis of an international arrest warrant. Universal jurisdiction is the principle that some crimes are so serious that states should be allowed to claim jurisdiction over an accused person regardless of where they were committed or any other relation with the prosecuting entity. None of the crimes in the Jumailly case were committed in Germany, and neither the victims nor the suspect were German nationals.

Though universal jurisdiction has been practiced in just a few countries in recent years, it has become an increasingly important tool for achieving accountability and justice for the survivors and victims of international crimes. Hundreds of investigations are ongoing and dozens of convictions have been obtained.

The blossoming of universal jurisdiction is attributable to several factors, one of which is that the alternative route to prosecuting international crimes through the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court (ICC) has effectively been closed by geopolitics. The Syrian conflict, for example, has never been appraised by the ICC because Russia backs President Bashar al-Assad.

The Pursuit of Cases

In recent years, there has been a greater capacity and willingness on the part of some domestic authorities to pursue cases involving international crimes, at least in certain circumstances. More and more countries have also passed laws allowing them to conduct the kind of landmark prosecution that took place in Frankfurt. More countries are following the Dutch  in setting up specialized units within the police, prosecution and even immigration services dedicated to identifying perpetrators of international crimes and bringing them to trial.

Another important factor in the power of universal jurisdiction is that victims and their advocates can contribute to investigations and prosecutions, and sometimes even influence the direction they take. In some countries, such as France and Belgium, victims and NGOs can initiate criminal proceedings. Even where this is not possible, victims and their advocates can still drive cases forward in other ways, such as by tracking perpetrators’ movements, sharing information with the authorities and exerting pressure on them to act.

Dutch authorities have even issued  for Syrians in the Netherlands on how to file a criminal complaint against other Syrians relating to violations in Syria. In February, after Germany’s top court  that war crimes committed abroad can be tried in the country, a court in Koblenz became the first court outside of Syria to rule on state-sponsored torture by the Assad regime when it sentenced a former member of the secret police to four and a half years in prison for being an accomplice to crimes against humanity. Another former Syrian intelligence officer is currently on  in Germany for  58 counts of murder and at least 4,000 cases of torture, rape or sexual abuse.

Many Challenges

Despite this recent progress, enormous legal, evidentiary and logistical challenges remain before international criminal cases can be brought to trial. Investigating and prosecuting international crimes in domestic courts is not straightforward, especially in a complex conflict such as the Yemen war where crimes have been committed over many years by different actors.

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Foreign investigators cannot easily gather evidence on the ground, so they have to rely on the cooperation of different parties to the conflict to build cases. UN bodies like the group of eminent experts, international organizations, local NGOs, and organizations such as Airwars assist with investigations.

Even if evidence linking an individual perpetrator to war crimes can be established, the suspect still has to be apprehended. In some countries practicing universal jurisdiction, those accused of committing war crimes do not need to be within reach of authorities for an investigation to be opened, but they need to be physically brought to court before any trial can take place.

Though international cooperation can be used to apprehend and extradite international pariahs like IS militants, pirates and slave traders, war criminals who are still serving members of Arab regimes are not about to be handed over. Only when they set foot in a country practicing universal jurisdiction — whether for work, vacation, claiming asylum or for any other reason — can they be arrested immediately, providing they do not benefit from immunity.

Jumailly’s conviction “sends a clear message,” Natia Navrouzov, a lawyer and member of the NGO Yazda, which gathers evidence of crimes committed by IS against the Yazidis. “It doesn’t matter where the crimes were committed and it doesn’t matter where the perpetrators are, thanks to the universal jurisdiction, they can’t hide and will still be put on trial.”

*[This article was originally published by , a partner of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Biden’s New Culture of Brinkmanship

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Carter considers his time in office to be peaceful, but his says otherwise. Under his one term as president from 1977 to 1981, the US was still instigating conflicts across the world. The most notable was the Iran-Iraq War, which the US, the Soviet Union and their allies were heavily involved in by supporting the Iraqis.

Causing Trouble

The , a publication of the Peace Worldwide Organization, labels the US the world’s worst troublemaker. The evidence for this is clear.

First, the US at least 750 military bases in around 80 countries. It also has more than 170,000 troops stationed in 159 countries. Second, in 2016, The Washington Post that the US has tried 72 times to overthrow governments of sovereign nations between 1947 and 1989. These actions were in clear violation of the UN Charter. Third, the US continues using economic against numerous countries to force their leadership to bow to Washington’s demands.

The worst example is Iran, which the US has sought to use a policy of “maximum pressure” against. Sanctions are also in clear violation of the UN Charter and affect civilians more than the political leaders they seek to squeeze. These unwarranted interventions in Iran have brought pain and suffering to people in a country that is not known for its human rights.

The US, meanwhile, is known well as a country that pays lip service to human rights, democracy and peace. It talks about a lack of democracy in some nations but favors tyrannical rulers in others. This includes countries like Bahrain, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The US today is the world’s only superpower, and with such power comes great responsibility. If the US is truly interested in human rights, democracy and peace, then it too must change its actions. It must begin by complying with the UN Charter and respecting international law. Washington must right its many wrongs — particularly in the Middle East — not because it is forced to do so, but because it is the right thing for a world in which peace can prosper. For this to become a reality, there are a number of areas for the US to consider.

Never Forgotten

The first area is addressing the US relationship with Iran. In the 1980s, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the United States and its European provided assistance to Iraq when it leader, Saddam Hussein, ordered the of chemical weapons against Iranian troops. Most victims of that attack in 1988 died instantly, while many others are still from the consequences. Some survivors of the chemical warfare now struggle to find inhalers in Iran, which is scarred by sanctions. The US should acknowledge the role it played in the war and provide reparations for the injuries and damage it caused. 

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Today, the draconian sanctions the US has placed on Iran has deepened a rift with the European Union, Russia and China, all of which signed a nuclear agreement with Tehran in 2015. The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 under US President Donald Trump led to the reintroduction of crippling sanctions that have hurt the Iranian middle class and the poor, causing hardship and death.

Washington must lift its unlawful sanctions, which Trump introduced to bring Iran to its knees. The US thinks that Iran is meddling in the affairs of countries like Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and that a policy of “maximum pressure” will force it to rethink its foreign policy. The Trump administration used this as an excuse to pull out of the nuclear deal, despite the Iranians complying with all of its obligations under the JCPOA. The US under President Joe Biden should also comply with the JCPOA by rejoining the agreement and lifting sanctions.

In the long term, a détente between the US and Iran could pave the way for the Iranians to forgive the 1953 coup d’état against the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh. During the Cold War, a US-orchestrated led to the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh. He was replaced with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the brutal last shah of Iran, who himself was overthrown in the 1979 Revolution. In a country struggling under US sanctions, memories of the coup have never been forgotten.

Lies Over Iraq

Iraq is another country where US actions have not been forgotten. If you attack anyone without being provoked, any court with an ounce of justice would require you to repair the inflicted damage. Relations between nations work in the same way. If a nation harms another without provocation, the aggressor is expected to repair the damage caused.

In 2003, under the false pretext that the Iraqis had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ties with al-Qaeda, the US under President George W. Bush invaded Iraq. The result was the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his government, the destruction of infrastructure, the death of hundreds of thousands in the years to come and the displacement of 9.2 million Iraqis.

The US invasion inevitably led to the rise of radical groups like the Islamic State (IS), which in 2014 seized territory in Iraq and Syria. The that American taxpayers paid for the Iraq War could have been well spent in the US on addressing poverty, building high-speed rail networks or repairing infrastructure. Instead, the dollars were spent on bombs and bullets to counter insurgents like IS.

When Iraqis led by Iranian General Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Mahdi al-Muhandis formed a resistance against IS militants and expelled them from Iraq, many people were jubilant that their country was freed. Instead of congratulating Soleimani and Muhandis for the role they played, the US violated Iraq’s territorial integrity. In a US drone strike at Baghdad airport in January 2020, both men were assassinated in violation of international law. The US action was not only , but it also puts all foreign diplomats in danger by setting a precedent for other countries to assassinate enemies.

There are two ways the US can make up for its illegal actions of 2003. First, holding those responsible to account for the invasion and human rights violations would show the world that the US is serious about the rule of law. That includes the likes of Bush and his accomplices, who lied and betrayed the trust of the American people, as well as security and military personnel who went beyond the rules of war. Holding such persons to account would restore respect for the US across the world by demonstrating that no one, not even the president or American soldiers, is above the law. Second, providing reparations for the loss of Iraqi and American lives, the injuries caused, the people displaced and the property destroyed is essential.

Famine in Yemen

Yemen is another place where bombs have destroyed the country under the watchful eye of the Americans. In 2015, a Saudi-led coalition supported and armed by the United States, Britain and France began indiscriminatingly bombing Yemen in response to a takeover by Iran-backed Houthi rebels. The destruction of Yemen has led to accusations of war crimes by all parties involved. It has also resulted in 5 million people being on the brink of and millions more facing starvation.

The US must promptly stop all military and intelligence support to the coalition. As the one nation with such political power, the US must work on bringing the combatants together by implementing the that calls for respecting “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”

As citizens in a free world, we must assume responsibility for our political leaders’ actions. First, as a bare minimum, we should realize that the problems we cause for others, sooner or later, will come back to haunt us. The example of US support for the mujahideen during the 1980s in Afghanistan is well known. Second, electing the right political leaders who strive for freedom and peace will not only benefit people in faraway lands, but also in the US itself. Instead of taxpayer dollars being spent on weapons, cash can be reinvested into our society to educate children, improve access to health care and do much more.  

United, we can put “maximum pressure” on the US to become a leader in creating a world free from war, oppression and persecution.

*[The author is the founder and president of , a non-religious, non-partisan and charitable organization in the United States that promotes freedom and peace for all. It recently released its Civility Report 2021, which can be downloaded .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything?

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But times have changed. Three recent presidents — Barack Obama, Donald Trump and now Joe Biden — have made efforts to distance the US from its endless, exasperating entanglements in the Middle East. Those efforts had distracted the United States from its principal challenges in the world — China and Russia — and sapped it of its military, economic and political might and influence. America received very little in return on its investment. Furthermore, years of US involvement in the region had also fractured the American public’s support for the more critically important role it must play in anchoring the international order.

Enter the Others

Downgrading America’s involvement in the Middle East isn’t necessarily a bad thing. For decades, many in the Middle East and in the US had argued that the region’s problems must be tackled by the governments and people of the region. Outsiders can play a supporting role, but the tough decisions can only be made by the governments themselves. That may now be happening.

But handing off the task of addressing the region’s manifold challenges got off to a poor start. Neither the US, nor the international community, nor the states of the Middle East seemed able to solve the conundrum of the region’s three failed states.

Then, starting around 2015, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman started ordering others around — imposing a blockade on Qatar, detaining the Lebanese prime minister, jailing courageous dissidents and largely harmless millionaires, ordering a hit job on journalist Jamal Khashoggi and jumping into the Yemeni Civil War. And it all went bad, very bad in fact. Additionally, it provoked other would-be movers and shakers to get in the act, including the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, China, Russia and even Israel. And not always with good intent or positive results.

After years of misdirection, however, governments now seem to be taking a more sober and responsible approach that could prove genuinely beneficial for the region. For starters, they have embarked on a simple approach: dialog. They are talking about their problems, especially those between and among one another. Dialog leads to understanding, which can lead to shared interests. Ultimately, to be effective, dialog must lead to compromise. That involves the inevitable give-and-take that allows nations, especially those close to one another, to live and thrive in peace and prosperity.

It’s a Start

One of the most encouraging initiatives may be the most unexpected: dialog between the Middle East’s two major powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and hosted by perhaps the most unlikely state, Iraq, unquestionably the region’s most conflict-ridden for decades. The issues are many between these two historic rivals, separated by a narrow gulf on whose name neither seems able to agree. But the larger gulf lies in their differing views of the other, their competing religious sects — the Saudi uber-conservative Wahhabi Sunni Islam vs. ��������’s clerically-led, conservative Shia Islam — perceptions of the other’s role and intentions in the region, their wealth, and relations with and ties to the broader international community, almost non-existent in the case of Iran.

One especially neuralgic issue for both is their respective roles in the Yemen War. It is now abundantly clear that the Saudis’ overwhelming military power, bolstered by the US and some European nations, cannot defeat the Houthi rebels. Nor can it end either the war or even its costly intervention in it. The Saudis need help. Enter the Iranians, who have been supporting the Shia-affiliated Zaydi Houthis in this war since 2013. With ideology and much-needed weapons and funding, though much less than what Saudi Arabia has expended, the Iranians have empowered the rebels to the point where they are now an established power in a future Yemen, whether unified or bifurcated.

So, the two regional powers are talking it out. The Saudis want out of the war, but they also want reliable security along their southwestern border. The Iranians want a Shia power on the Arabian Peninsula, but preferably one at peace.

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Yemen may be the most immediate challenge for the two states. But there are others. More broadly, Saudi Arabia and Iran need to reach a modus vivendi in the region. On-again, off-again formal relations, menacing behavior toward each other’s oil and shipping interests, and verbal assaults do little more than increase the temperature in a region plagued by heat, literally and figuratively.

Brothers Reconcile?

Saudi Arabia has also launched a campaign to repair the frayed relations among its Arab neighbors. Last week, Mohammed bin Salman week began a PR  to demonstrate a new and improved political environment. In a swing through the neighboring Gulf states of Oman, the UAE, Bahrain and, most importantly, Qatar, he seems to be trying to rebuild what once had been the region’s preeminent multilateral organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Mohammed bin Salman single-handedly fractured the Gulf alliance when he imposed his 2017 blockade on Qatar, joined by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. It backfired. Qatar remained in the good graces of the US, drew the political and military support of peripheral power Turkey and earned the support of Iran. Consider it the young prince’s on-the-job training in global as well as regional politics. He is now devoting particular attention to Doha in the hope of what yet we aren’t quite certain. But this repair work and goodwill tour cannot help but create progress.

And not to be outdone, the Gulf’s other power, the UAE, has  on its own diplomatic repair mission. Like the Saudis, the Emiratis want to lower the temperature in the Gulf, and their position as the region’s prime economic entrepôt gives them special heft. The UAE’s ties to the US, still the unquestioned but now quiescent power in the Gulf, also lend special weight.

Could It All Be for Naught?

Looming over all of these laudable efforts, however, is Iranian behavior in the region. All eyes are now on the recently restarted talks over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna, Austria. Following a near-six-month hiatus at ��������’s request, the P5+1 group and Iran renewed negotiations to reinstate the JCPOA — aka the Iran nuclear deal.

But it is the critical non-dialog between the US and Iran — the two countries are still not meeting face-to-face but rather communicating through the intermediation of the other P5+1 countries — that bears the most serious watching. Unless they can agree on a way forward that puts ��������’s nuclear weapons potential well into the very distant future while also lifting America’s onerous and inescapably crippling sanctions on the Islamic Republic, the heat in the Middle East will become white hot.

Judging from the US State Department’s uncharacteristically downcast semi-official  of the first round of the negotiation restart, there is cause for concern. ��������’s counterproductive, albeit predictable, maximalist opening gambit soured the P5+1, even China and Russia. Negotiators met again last week. Unless there is a greater attitude toward compromise, however, pessimism will win out. Positions will harden. And more extreme (and dangerous) measures will become viable.

President Biden has reiterated the US pledge that Iran will not get nuclear weapons. But neither he nor his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, will state what the consequences of failed talks might be.

Israel, however, is not so coy. Recent Israeli  confirm that the military option is very much in play. As if to put an even finer point on the matter, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin  Jerusalem late last week for meetings with his Israeli counterpart, Defense Minister Benny Gantz. Both men are retired top generals of their respective armed forces and will have discussed military and other options.

Military action would be an unspeakable disaster for the Middle East. But so would a nuclear-armed or even nuclear-capable Iran. Even an approach that stops short of armed conflict will impose extraordinary hardship on the region, certainly prompting other states to consider acquiring nuclear weapons and further isolate Iran.

It would be unfair to place the entirety of the burden for the success of these talks on Tehran. However, unless Iran understands the futility of its mindless pursuit of nuclear weapons, no effort at fostering understanding elsewhere can temper the region’s mercury-popping political heat.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything?

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After years of conflict that have caused one of the biggest migration crises since World War II, it is clear that the Assad government, with the support of Russia and Iran, will maintain its grip on power. The question now is what a post-war Syria will look like with President Assad and his regime still in office.

In order to understand what may lie ahead, it is necessary to understand the origins of the Assad family, their Alawite background and their influence on Syrian identity over the past 50 years.

The Alawite Community

The two largest sects in Islam are Sunni and Shia. Both sects overlap in most fundamental beliefs and practices, but their main difference centers on the dispute over who should have succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as leader after his death in 632. Today, 85% to of Muslims are Sunni and around 10% are Shia. Sunnis live in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia and Pakistan. Shias are largely located in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan, with significant minorities in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

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Alawites, although not doctrinally Shia, especially venerate Ali ibn Abi Talib, one of the earliest Muslims and the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet. Shias consider Ali to be the first imam and rightful successor to Prophet Muhammad, while Sunnis see him as the fourth rightly-guided caliph who made up the Rashidun Caliphate. Before the French took control of Syria in 1920, members of the Alawite community themselves to be Nusayris. The French “imposed the name ‘Alawite,’ meaning the followers of Ali,” to emphasize the sect’s similarities with Shia Islam.

Syria is ruled by Alawites, but the community itself is a minority making up around 12% to 15% of the pre-war Syrian . Sunnis account for the majority of the country.

The Rise of the Alawites

After Syria attained independence in 1946, the Alawite community began to play an active role in two key areas: political parties and the armed forces. On the one hand, the Baath party, founded in 1947 by Arab politicians and intellectuals to integrate Arab nationalism, socialism, secularism and anti-imperialism, “more attractive to Alawites than the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni religious organization” founded in Egypt with a large base in Syria.

Furthermore, Alawites and other minorities continued to be in the military due to two main factors. First, middle-class Sunni families tended to despise the military as a profession. Alawites, on the other hand, saw the army as an opportunity for a better life. Second, many Alawites, due to their difficult economic situation, could not afford to pay the fee to exempt their children from military service.

The Alawite presence in the army culminated in a series of coups in the 1960s. Supporters of the rising Baath party were a minority in Syria at the time. As scholar Rahaf Aldoughli , the regime embarked on a course of “rigorous state-nationalist indoctrination to consolidate Baathist rule and establish” its popular legitimacy. Among other efforts, “the Baathists sought to manipulate tribal and sectarian identities, seeking patronage by” upgrading the status of previously marginalized groups. This included the Alawite community.

The last coup d’état in Syria was carried out by General Hafez al-Assad, who had been serving as defense minister and was an Alawite. His actions brought the minority to power in November 1970. Three months later, Assad became the first Alawite president of Syria.

Once in , “his project centered on homogenizing these diverse [marginalized] Syrians into a single imagined Ba’athist identity.” More broadly, Aldoughli adds, the overall aim of “nationalist construction was to subsume local identities into a broader concept of the ‘Syrian people,’ defined according to the state’s territorial” boundaries.

The Sectarianism of the Syrian Civil War

Shortly before the outset of the US-led war on terror, Hafez al-Assad died in 2000. His son, Bashar, took over the reins and continued in his father’s footsteps. This included policies of coopting the religious space and portraying a moderate Islam under the guise of a that sought to curb Islamism and blur religious differences. Despite these efforts, the confessional fragmentation of Syrian society provided a factor of tension and instability for a state that ultimately never succeeded in addressing these differences in the political arena.

The Arab Spring consequently arrived in Syria at a time marked by a crisis of of secular ruling parties such as the Baath. The crisis of governability meant the secular balance imposed by the regime in society began to crack, exposing anger around the Alawite minority’s overrepresentation in the state apparatus and the Sunni majority’s underrepresentation. The result was anti-government protests that began in March 2011.

Ultimately, the ensuing sectarianism of the Syrian conflict only makes sense if we also incorporate the affecting the region. On the one hand, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iran are the Assad government’s main supporters and are interested in propping it up. On the other hand, Sunni actors such as the Islamic State group, the al-Nusra Front and Saudi Arabia want the government to fall.

That has failed. After 10 years of war, military forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad have retaken the vast majority of Syrian territory with the support of Iran and Hezbollah. As a result, both repression of the Sunni-dominated opposition and the strengthening of the Alawite community in the state apparatus are likely to remain part of a post-war Syria. How the Sunni majority reacts to the fact that Assad and the Alawites remain at the center of Syrian politics is unknown.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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How Date Farming Helps Yemenis on Soqotra

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Until now, the negotiations have reportedly revolved around two main issues. The first is the restoration of diplomatic relations between both countries. Bilateral ties were cut off in 2016 when Saudi Arabia executed Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, a Saudi dissident who was a Shia cleric, and protesters in Tehran stormed the Saudi Embassy in retaliation. The second topic of discussion is the Yemen War, which entered a new phase with the 2015 Saudi-led intervention against Houthi rebels who had taken over the Yemeni capital, Sanaa.

For more than one year, the Saudis have been looking for a way out of Yemen. The enormous economic costs of the conflict became more when oil prices fell as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdowns.

Even after the recovery of the hydrocarbon market, the fact remains that six years of war have not brought Saudi Arabia any closer to its two major goals in Yemen: reestablishing Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and constraining the Houthis’ influence. Furthermore, US President Joe Biden, while not as tough on the kingdom as promised in his election campaign, has been less with Saudi Arabia than his predecessor, Donald Trump.

Who Are the Houthis?

The Saudis often present the Houthis as little more than Iranian puppets. ��������’s official is that the Houthi movement only receives ideological support from Tehran. Both narratives are inaccurate, to say the least.

The Houthis are a homegrown movement that successfully the Yemeni government’s military offensives from 2004 to 2010 without any external assistance. Hussein al-Houthi, the movement’s early leader and from whom its name is derived, was an of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and was influenced by its symbolism and ideology. His brother and current leader of the movement, Abdel-Malek al-Houthi, has also his admiration for the Islamic Republic.

The first credible of Iranian military support for the Houthis date back to 2013. Until 2016, weapons transfers were largely restricted to light arsenal. In the following years, Tehran started to supply the Houthis with increasingly sophisticated missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components. Furthermore, a contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards on the ground has been Houthi fighters. The Yemeni movement’s capacity to key strategical interests within Saudi Arabia, such as oil extraction facilities, pipelines and airports, cannot be understood without accounting for ��������’s role in the conflict.

At the same time, and contrary to Saudi claims, the Houthis are largely independent from Iran. Their territorial expansion in 2014 was politically built on its Faustian bargain with the former Yemeni president and arch-rival, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the unpopularity of the Hadi government, which was backed by Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, most of the Houthis’ current arsenal has not been sourced from Iran. It has rather been acquired in the local — which is well-connected to the Horn of Africa’s smuggling routes — in battle or as a result of the of governmental military units to the Houthis. Before the war began, Yemen was already a country with small weaponry, coming only to the US in terms of weapons per capita.

According to the official Saudi narrative, the Houthis necessitate Iranian help to maintain their military effort. While this is most likely the case when it comes to the group’s capability to strike targets within Saudi territory, an abrupt end of Iranian military assistance to the Houthis would make little difference in Yemen’s internal balance of power.

What Saudi Arabia and Iran Need to Do

Saudi Arabia needs to come to terms with the fact that its attempt to impose a military solution in Yemen has failed. It has done so because of counterproductive airstrikes, support for unpopular local actors and a misunderstanding of internal dynamics. If Yemen has become Saudi Arabia’s quagmire, this has little to do with ��������’s limited support for the Houthis.

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Iran, for its part, should understand that its claims of non-interference in the Yemen War have gained a farcical nature over the years, as growing evidence has piled up on Iranian–Houthi ties. Iranian leaders cannot impose on the Houthis an end to attacks against Saudi territory. However, they can decisively constrain them by stopping the flow of UAV and missile technology to the Houthis, as well as ending their military training on the ground. In conjunction with this, Iran can support the direct Houthi–Saudi talks that began in late 2019.

For Saudi–Iranian negotiations to bear fruits in relation to the Yemen conflict, both sides need to show a realistic appraisal of ��������’s role in the war. It comes down to acknowledging two key facts. On the one hand, Iran has leverage over the Houthis because of its military support for the group. On the other hand, this leverage is inherently limited and cannot be used to grant Saudi Arabia a military victory in Yemen.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The price tag of €17 billion ($19.1 billion) means that Dassault Aviation, which exists to supply France itself, has for the first time sold more equipment to six foreign countries than to the French armed forces. Macron may think of it as an act designed to spread the lethal wealth, making the world a more equitable place — at least as far as lethality is concerned.

The New York Times Manages the Unknown

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Some human rights organizations in France that have taken the time over the past six years to notice what Mohammed bin Salman was up to in his chosen approach to the use of lethal weapons (which include bone saws for use in Saudi consulates) dared to criticize the encounter. Unfazed by the reproach, Macron had the perfect , quoted by Le Monde: “What’s good for French women and men, I will ardently defend.”

Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

What’s good (for):

Anything that produces cash, whether in moral terms it serves the cause of good or evil or just the multiplication of consumer goods.

Contextual Note

Anything Macron ardently defends is by definition part of France’s defense policy. In the land of “liberté, égalité, fraternité,” the “liberty” of French women and men to earn their salaries by producing lethal weapons is fundamental. It sustains the liberty of their bosses and politicians — skilled at what could be called diplomatic marketing — to sell those weapons to despotic regimes across the globe. This, in turn, promotes the “equality” (of class) and the “fraternity” (of culture) shared by wealthy business leaders, successful French politicians, bankers and foreign despots. As Voltaire’s Pangloss would say, “all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.”

Unlike US President Joe Biden, who, bullied by moralists at home, refuses to talk to the Saudi crown prince, treating him as an international pariah, Macron has earned Mohammed bin Salman’s undying respect. And he has done so in the name of what’s good for the French people. He is of course riffing on the, “what’s good for General Motors is good for the United States,” but he has the good sense to associate it with democracy rather than the corporate oligarchy Americans have adopted as their form of democracy. The US is, after all, the land in which “.”

Le Monde appears to accept as a fatality Macron’s logic that focuses on “jobs created in France by this unprecedented purchase order.” By the same token, when Adolf Hitler took the unprecedented initiative of launching Auschwitz or George W. Bush building the Guantanamo prison, they were creating jobs.

Neither does the French journal critique Macron’s claim that it is all about their common commitment to fight terrorism, a pretext that over the past two decades has served to legitimatize ever brutally authoritarian policy of both liberal democracies and the world’s worst tyrants. The fact that Saudi Arabia has consistently encouraged terrorism and appears, at some level, to have facilitated the 9/11 attacks, doesn’t seem to bother Macron. After all, tyrants with stable governments have the same need as liberal democracies to ensure their security against malcontents tempted by terrorism.

Macron has another argument to explain his intent to develop good relations with Mohammed bin Salman, when he claims that “one might decide, following the Khashoggi affair, not to have any policy in the region … but I believe that France has a role to play. It doesn’t mean we’re complacent or that we are willing to forget. It means we must be a demanding partner, but we must keep the dialogue open and remain engaged.” What France is “demanding” can be measured in billions of euros.

Just to bring home the point that cynicism trumps moral scruples, Macron insists that the current standoff between Mohammed bin Salman and Joe Biden could be “good for” France (creating “favorable opportunities”). If the Biden administration finds itself obliged to demonstrate a new-found sense of moral sensibility after four years of Donald Trump’s brazenly naked cynicism, that provides a pragmatically cynical European country with a significant occasion to exploit.

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In the article, Philippe Ricard, Le Monde’s correspondent in Dubai, allows himself a touch of irony aimed at deflating Macron’s pretentions. He cites Macron’s own lame attempt at self-serving irony as he asserts, “Saudi Arabia organized the G20 over a year ago and I haven’t noticed that many powers have boycotted the G20.” Seizing the opportunity, Ricard comments, “Mr. Macron failed to specify that the meeting, in November 2020, was held by video conference, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.”

In fairness to Le Monde, by quoting Macron’s shoddy justifications for his good relations with totalitarian regimes without reframing them, Ricard knows that most of the paper’s relatively sophisticated French readers will understand the hypocrisy. The typical Le Monde reader gets the message. Unlike most Americans, the French have been trained not to take most political discourse at face value. Politics is never about sincere expression. This capacity to deconstruct political discourse may be the last remnant of the ancient European educational tradition, where the study of rhetoric was a major component of the liberal arts curriculum.

Historical Note

Emmanuel Macron typically used one other somewhat more substantial rhetorical tool to justify his rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. He insisted on pleading on behalf of Lebanon, a nation suffering from a deepening crisis, literally a failed state, thanks in part to the refusal of Mohammed bin Salman to assist a fellow Arab nation that has impertinently failed to follow his orders on multiple occasions and, more recently, openly criticized the Saudi-led war in Yemen. Macron is cleverly using the historical relationship between France and Lebanon, despite its admitted ambiguity, to affirm a moral position aimed at humanitarian assistance.

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, as the West set about divvying up the spoils, Lebanon became effectively a French protectorate. Now, following Joe Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and his conscious distancing himself from Mohammed bin Salman, Macron sees an opportunity for France and perhaps Europe to assume a more proactive role in a Middle East that is no longer as clearly attached to the American empire.

Mandated by the League of Nations following World War I, according to the terms of the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, France assumed control of what was then the region of Syria. France immediately sought to separate Lebanon from Syria to ensure the existence of a state with a Christian (Maronite) majority. This led to friction in the following decades but turned the newly created state of Lebanon into a zone known for its diversity and tolerance and its strong ties to France. All that changed, of course, after the creation of the state of Israel in Palestine (formerly controlled by the British), especially after the fiasco of the Suez crisis in 1956 that resulted in a major humiliation for France and the UK, while opening the door to mounting US influence in the region.

Al Jazeera Macron as asserting that France and Saudi Arabia together “want to commit ourselves to supporting the Lebanese people and therefore do everything possible to ensure that trade and economic reopening can take place.” The article concludes that “there’s no doubt that a new page has been opened in the relationship between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.”

Al Jazeera’s Zeina Khodr notes that Macron’s initiative “will help revive brotherly relations.” There may be neither liberty, nor equality in Saudi Arabia, but Macron apparently has done something to promote fraternity in Lebanon, a country that was once known for that virtue. This could prove to be a minor moment in what is turning out to be a series of acts that signal a major historical shift in the region. In the absence of the US as the indefectible ally of Saudi Arabia, Sunnis and Shias may begin seeking to rediscover their own sense of fraternity.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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��������’s ethnic minorities endure double discrimination — from the ruling regime and from the Iranian human rights community. While the regime and human rights organizations both at home and abroad disagree on many issues, they share a disdain for ��������’s ethnic minorities, unwilling to see them gain national rights. Thus, the government and its mainstream opposition share a common cause that strengthens the regime’s ability to stay in power and prevent democracy from taking root in Iran.

Repression Is No Longer Enough to Stem the Anger of ��������’s Minorities

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��������’s undergo extreme discrimination beyond the restrictions imposed on all Iranians. They are not allowed to operate schools in their native language, are forced to use Persian in all formal settings, and are regularly subjected to mockery and ridicule in the official media and school textbooks. Ahwazi Arabs face suppression of any expression of their ethnic identity and culture as well as open anti-Arab racism.

Ahwazi Arabs, who number around 8 million, suffer from , environmental degradation, in employment, and high rates of poverty despite being the majority population in the oil and gas-rich . The Persian ruling class reaps the profits from these abundant natural resources while the local Ahwazi people suffer the from their production.

Shared Prejudice

Despite being formally committed to advancing democracy, Iranian human rights organizations share the regime’s prejudices and racism. These organizations rarely report on the distinct discrimination against ��������’s ethnic minorities, the specific goals of Ahwazi Arab protests or the political prisoners who have campaigned for the rights of ethnic minorities.

For instance, when listing the names of activists who have been abducted from their Western exiles by Iranian operatives, they neglect to mention , an Ahwazi activist and Swedish citizen kidnapped by the regime in Istanbul. Chaab is being held in Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison and is in imminent danger of execution.

I personally have experienced this double discrimination. As an Ahwazi Arab human rights activist, I was almost to death for supporting the right of Ahwazi children in Iran to learn their native language, Arabic. I was lucky to escape and settle in the US in 2015. My fellow activists were not so lucky — they were executed in 2014. The physical scars from that torture, which run from my sternum to my groin, will never leave me. Even after multiple operations, I will be on medication for the rest of my life.

Yet despite all the available evidence, I was shocked to discover that the Persian-dominated human rights organizations in the US opposed recognizing the rights of the Ahwazis and other minorities, co-opted our struggles and blocked reporting on our plight.

Social Media Wars

With ��������’s regime imposing a total media blackout on the Ahwazi issue, social media remains the only option for activists to raise awareness. But even here activists face constant abuse and threats not only from the regime, which deploys trolls and bots to mass-report activists’ accounts in an effort to shut them down, but also from Farsi-speaking Iranian dissidents. At one point, I had three Twitter bans in under 20 days. 

Due to this media war, most people in the West are not aware of Iran’s ethnic diversity, where Turkish, Ahwazi Arabs, Balochi, Kurdish and Caspian account for nearly 40% of ��������’s population. Most Iranian human rights organizations in exile focus on abuses against Persian dissidents while barely giving any coverage to the systemic racism against the ethnic minorities.

When our young men die for their rights in the streets of Ahwaz, the Persian-dominated groups report on these protests as anti-regime activity, intentionally disregarding the ethnic factor. This was the case in the widespread November 2019 protests and the recent wave of demonstrations this July, which were led by Ahwazi youth. Such co-opting of our activism adds insult to the injury of the brave sacrifices made by our young people.

Refused Recognition

The country’s Persian opposition is reluctant to recognize that Iran is a fundamentally diverse country and that its people have both a national identity and local sovereign claims. These Persian opposition groups have succumbed to the idea that providing support to the Ahwazi cause and recognizing its ethnic demands is a prelude to secessionism. Instead, they continue to turn a blind eye to the demands of ethnic minorities in their own regions in order to promote one nation, one centralized rule, one culture and one language — all Persian.

With this denial by Persian oppositions groups both at home and in exile, and with the regime continuing its brutally repressive, restrictive and racist rule, the outcome of subjugating the country’s ethnic minorities and disregarding their rights is predictable. The civil war that ravaged former Yugoslavia serves as a terrible warning of how states can fracture along ethnic lines. 

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To avert such a catastrophe, Iran must abandon its antiquated supremacist mindset and acknowledge its non-Persian minorities as equal stakeholders and partners who form a power base in their own right. The creation of a federalized democratic system would defuse tensions and mean the possibility of a fair, genuinely progressive, modern state.

Even without its regressive theocratic foundation, the current supremacist system in Iran is an inadequate and outdated relic reflecting a mindset based on 19^th-century colonialism. In reality, the Iranian state is a patchwork of ethnicities, faiths and doctrines. As a result, Iran can choose between creating a fair, stable, democratic and progressive 21^st-century state — which reflects this vibrant and diverse melting pot where each group can elect its representatives to share in an equal, fair and federalized system — and collapsing into factionalism and civil war.

This double oppression to which Ahwazis and other ethnic minorities are subjected and the refusal of the Persian Iranian opposition in exile to even acknowledge both the regime’s or its own deep-seated antagonism toward Ahwazis and other ethnic minorities ultimately only benefits the regime, which can easily thwart a splintered opposition. In the end, we can only dismantle oppression in Iran — and globally — through unity and mutual respect.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Chaos Makes a Comeback in Southern Yemen

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As the economy continues to in war-torn Yemen, with widespread protests from to Shebwa and Hadhramawt, there has been little to no hope. of the Yemeni rial is a prominent issue driving protests across southern provinces, while the mass of civilians from northern provinces is driven by violence and unpaid salaries by authorities. The humanitarian crisis deepens as unemployment grows and donor funds are insufficient to meet demand by international nongovernmental organizations. Opportunities for job creation are minimal, but small initiatives led by local actors, with direct assistance from state donors, have made progress as economic activity contributes to local stability.

In a micro-environment like Soqotra, political stability over the past seven years of conflict has come at a high price. While fighting at a scale similar to the Yemeni mainland has not reached the Soqotra archipelago, the managed to disrupt life until a degree of order was over a year ago. Humanitarian assistance has flowed into Soqotra for years following devastating cyclones, but with recent political stability on the island, assistance has shifted to more permanent projects — from hospitals and a power station to the island’s first factory.

Small Steps Forward

While industries struggle through a moribund economy, the agriculture sector has received much-needed investment, mostly from aid agencies. Challenges remain, like annual storms, drought, pests and shortage of labor. From Hodeida to Hadhramawt, agriculture has . Date farming is a particular example. This sector has suffered across the mainland, but it is being resurrected on Soqotra.

In August 2020, a group of women led now by Wafa Mohammed was hired to operate the first factory on Soqotra island. Built in the outskirts of Hadibu, with funds provided by the UAE’s Khalifa Bin Zayed Foundation, the date factory became the first major project of its kind on the island. The factory can deliver nearly three tons of dates per day from a harvest of around half a million palm trees. According to Mohammed, this factory collects produce from around 500 farmers and has a direct impact on the economy of nearly 2,000 families on the island.

Prior to the construction of the factory, production was only for local consumption. Saeed Othman, a date farmer in Soqotra, said that in the past, “production was very weak because it was just for daily consumption.” The island also lacked other agricultural products and dates were often used as feed for livestock. Production at the factory has also created a competitive environment among local farmers as demand for higher quality increased for export, said Othman.

The factory project instantly provided unexpected opportunities to a group of college graduates, who simply had no hopes beyond the usual “routine at home, cooking, cleaning, doing the other home chores,” said Mohammed. Farmers across the island also highlight the opportunities created by the factory, primarily through an increase in income impacting their daily life. Farmers and factory workers alike enjoy the benefits from a stable environment that allows economic activity outside a war economy that prolongs the armed conflict on the mainland.

Conflict and Aid

As local, regional and international organizations jockey for their share of available funds since the on March 1, the debate continues over alternative approaches. UN organizations nearly $4 billion this year, only to receive pledges for $1.7 billion, of which an undisclosed amount has been so far.

, low-impact and reduced funding have all contributed to wide-ranging in recent months over alternatives to the current process. The multilateral approach has failed to deliver sufficient funds to meet demand, while warring parties continue to aid and obstruct delivery. In an environment like Soqotra, isolated from the armed conflict on the Yemeni mainland, direct delivery of aid by a state actor has proved efficient, delivering long-term impact on the ground.

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The date factory project came as the political in Soqotra settled. Under the current circumstances, the situation in Soqotra could offer an alternative. For example, in contrast to affected areas in Hadhramawt or Mahra, soon after Cyclone struck the Soqotra in 2015 and following Cyclone in 2018, the United Arab Emirates delivered life-saving assistance directly to the people on the island. During the length of the conflict, the UAE has delivered over $110 million in aid to the Soqotra archipelago. The aid has targeted areas in public and health services, transport and storage, fishing sector, construction, public education, energy and potable water.

Aid provided over the years also targeted farmers, who not only benefit from the funds provided for their crops, but also from projects like the date factory. The factory, for example, has provided an outlet for farmers to export goods rather than relying on local consumption alone. The aid provided has allowed the farmers to expand and stabilize harvests, improve the quality of products and increase revenue. In addition, the power plant in Hadibu, with a capacity of 2.2 megawatts, provides facilities like the date factory with a sustainable power supply that contributes to local economic security. The UAE also provided the Qalansiya area with 800 kilowatts. Other projects include a distribution network for more than 30 sites and solar-powered street lighting.

Development projects in Soqotra account for a fraction of funds requested by aid agencies every year, but the impact so far is wide and sustainable. Other environments could emulate the process in Soqotra, but deeply rooted political conflicts remain an obstacle. Aden, the interim capital, continues to suffer from a lack of sustainable power source, unemployment is high despite efforts by Aden authorities and the political conflict easily escalates to armed clashes. On the mainland, it is more difficult, but opportunities abound across southern provinces.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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How Will the UAE Cope With Growing Environmental Insecurity?

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Exposure to extreme heat can be fatal for those who have no access to air conditioning. Apart from being a direct threat to human life, the effects of climate change and high temperatures have the potential to spill over and impact all sectors of the economy.

It has been long understood that economic activity and climate conditions are related. This relationship between the climate and the economy has defined the magnitude and scope of markets in several countries, including in the Middle East. In 2020, the World Economic Forum concluded that climate change is ranked as the biggest risk to the global economy.

The Climate and the Economy

While greenhouse gases have no geographical boundaries, their impact differs significantly across the globe. A paper published in Nature that under current climate policies that are on course for an average temperature rise of 2.9˚C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century, the world’s most vulnerable countries would suffer an average GDP loss of around 20% by 2050 and in excess of 60% by 2100. In the Middle East, Sudan is expected to suffer the most: Its GDP is projected to drop by around 32% by 2050 and by more than 80% by 2100 as a result of climate change.

One sector in the economy that would struggle the most is agriculture. Exposure to high temperatures could cause losses to agricultural production as heat stress negatively affects plant growth and animal productivity. Over time, heat stress is likely to increase vulnerability to disease and reduce dairy output. According to a 2018 UNDP report, crop production in the Middle East region is expected to drop by 30% in case of 1.5˚C-2˚C warming by 2025. Additionally, extremely high temperatures might aggravate an already bad situation in this sector.

On the one hand, agriculture is the largest consumer of water in the Middle East, using between 78% to 87% of all resources. Higher temperatures will add more stress to irrigation schedules in terms of both frequency and amount. On the other hand, farming activity and businesses could be wiped out as they do not contribute significantly to the regional economies, whether in terms of GDP or exports, in proportion to the amount of resources it uses. This translates into a potential risk of economic instability and disruptions in the food supply chain.

Similarly, the tourism sector in the Middle East would lose a significant share of the market due to climate change. In 2018, contributed $270 billion to the region’s GDP, or around 9% of the economy. In the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as of 2020, the tourism sector had, on average, a 13% share of the GDP. Although the pandemic has slowed down travel, the sector is now attempting to recover.

The impact of climate change on the sector could be irreversible. In Jordan, the , which used to attract some 1.5 million visitors every year, now welcomes just a few thousand after it had shrunk by almost a third due to low rainfall and high temperatures. Alexandria, in Egypt, home of one of the Seven Wonders of the World as well as a , faces flooding, building collapse and loss of life as a result of sea-level rise.

Furthermore, some of the driest countries in the region suffered from flooding as a result of sudden heavy storms. For , Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia, was hit by abrupt storms that killed 30 in November 2018. Long periods of dry weather increased fire risks in Algeria, which suffered devastating that took 90 lives in August.

The Impact on Energy Systems

Energy systems are no different than the tourism and agriculture sectors in terms of susceptibility to climate change. For example, energy demand for space cooling will rise due to average temperature increase. In 2015, it was estimated that 80% of total in the Middle East is used for cooling systems. These countries face challenges meeting growing energy demands, particularly during the summer months, and they could experience frequent grid failures and subsequent power blackouts.

Power shortages and blackouts would in turn cause negative societal and economic impacts. Cooling systems are necessary to sustain life during extremely high temperatures, and blackouts could significantly affect the everyday activities of the local populace.

Given the negative impact of high temperatures, in order to combat growing greenhouse gas emissions, GCC policymakers should consider an integrated climate change policy that helps enable decision-makers to allocate natural resources in a sustainable and integrated manner as well as achieve net-zero carbon emissions. The Middle East and other countries around the world must factor climate change into their strategic planning in order to secure economic development alongside a climate-resilient economy. Unfortunately, the concept of integrated climate policy is relatively new to Middle Eastern countries in particular.  

Lastly, and most importantly, GCC members and other countries in the region have launched climate change initiatives to reduce emissions and adapt to high temperatures. For instance, at the end of October, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa of Qatar unveiled the national environment and in an effort to mitigate climate change impact. Under the plan, the country hopes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by 2030.

Other targets include reducing groundwater extraction by 60%, reducing daily household water consumption by a third and the doubling of desalination via reverse osmosis as well as prioritizing high yield and sustainable agriculture production by driving more than 50% improvement in farmland productivity.

The initiative emphasizes the importance of balancing the different goals and interests among resource consumers. This will improve security and accelerate the transition toward a climate-resilient economy as well as drive climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies for Qatar, the Middle East and the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy or HBKU’s official stance.

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