In 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, and the world responded by inducing a period of brinksmanship that����to spiraling the unending Korean War out of control. US President Barack Obama must have imagined himself as JFK during the Cuban Missile Crisis, expecting to be historically embraced as one of America’s greatest for going nose-to-nose with communism, based on a nuclear gamble that could have led to global destruction.

The problem with Obama’s 2013 gamble was the lack of communication. And North Korea, unlike Cuba in 1962, poses the real concern of becoming a suicidal state. Should we push the country to the brink of suicide, there is a real danger that Pyongyang could start the first nuclear war by launching a����from a submarine patiently waiting at the bottom of the Yellow Sea or the Atlantic Ocean into the White or Blue House, respectively.

Mass Hysteria and Nuclear Brinksmanship

Following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the United States’ allies��have ��a harsh response. US Secretary of State join Washington’s “DIS Plan,” or Demonize, Isolate and Sanction. Kerry has long-held the position that China’s plan isn’t working, while insinuating that America’s has. UN Secretary General ��North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) test as “profoundly destabilizing to all of Asia,” and the United Nations (UN) is now a lead vocalist in the “DIS Plan Choir.”

At a����after the detonation, struck the heart of conundrum by calling out Washington for denying reality: “[You say] we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear armed state. And yet it is. You also say this about other things too. You say you’ll never accept Crimea as a part of Russia. Yet it is. Isn’t it time to recognize these things for what they are and not live in this illusion or fantasy where you pretend that things that are, are not?”

America is essentially saying that there would have been no Cold War if we never recognized the Soviet Union as a nuclear state. The US State Department����the following day in obvious frustration that Dennis Rodman is better at diplomacy than Washington.

The catch 22:��The US��will without the country agreeing to completely abandon its nuclear program first, ���Ի��� its nuclear program under any circumstances. The result is a North Korea that proliferates its program in isolation, while the outside world pushes it closer to using its WMDs for something other than defensive purposes.

The US, in the meantime, believes the “DIS Plan” will change North Korea’s behavior, despite a long history of the exact opposite outcome resulting from of our misguided policies. We must try something new, such as: end the war and normalize, engage and develop North Korea if we want to see different results.

This is the essence of the stalemate, but what is the cause, and what are the solutions?

North Korea’s rationale

Following North Korea’s test of a hydrogen bomb, the Korean Central News Agency : “Nothing is more foolish than dropping a hunting gun before herds of ferocious wolves.”

In other words, we cannot expect political change to precede foundational changes in society, relations and economics. It must be the other way around.

The causes��of Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions—the “DIS Plan,” omnipresent military provocation, and America’s history of being an unreliable negotiator—yielded the results we have now witnessed on this fourth nuclear test. The timing��was predictable, given that��Kim Jong-un’s birthday was two days after the test, that he is out of the mourning period, and that he is�����ٴ�����at the WPK Congress.

North Korea, or the DPRK, has also been taught by the US that we are not a trustworthy partner in nuclear negotiations. Pyongyang witnessed the NATO offensive against Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, not long after he gave up his WMD program in exchange for sanctions relief and security guarantees. Libya is now in a state of economic ruin and institutional chaos, and portions of the country are occupied by factions of extremist radicals.��When Saddam Hussein let nuclear inspectors into Iraq, they looked for and found no evidence of WMDs, but we invaded in 2003 as part of regime change, leaving the entire Middle East worse off than Libya.

In 2015, the Japanese military����full operational offensive capability; annual��; B-2s����Pyongyang’s paranoia; the����to put North Korea back on the State Sponsors of Terror List; the����Kim Jong-un to be dragged off to the International Criminal Court; and the����agreement created a stronger alliance surrounding the North Koreans on three sides. Furthermore, many international officials, including President Obama,����the collapse of the North Korean regime.

Breaking the cycle

The “DIS Plan” has dominated the perpetuation of the Korean War for at least the past two decades, and it has only resulted in North Korea refining its ability to survive via mafia tactics.

The solutions are many, but all run directly in the face of what is popular in America. The US and North Korea have a lot of trust issues because the war has continued for so long, and because there is little-to-no communication between Washington and Pyongyang.

© Michael Bassett

While the pros and cons of sanctions have been��, many US and UN officials support increasing them, even though North Korea continues to develop ���Ի�����defiantly. North Korea has been heavily sanctioned, yet in 2014����to $29.8 billion, or 1%. And while����about the weakness of sanctions, Keith Luse, the director of the National Committee on North Korea,����that at the minimum sanctions agitate the North Koreans, hurt the lower classes more than the elites, and actually cripple the reforms we desire to see them implement—especially on the humanitarian front.

North Koreans joke that America would sanction the air if it could. In reality,����and there will be no ramification to the test,��according to��, who states: “Ramifications? What ramifications? A bit of noise, and perhaps another UN Security Council resolution which will change little or nothing, but nothing of substance.”

If we used��, Obama would use his remaining time in office to try improve relations, says Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations. The US should��in exchange for a��, and then do everything in its power to����and facilitate the reconciliation of the Korean Peninsula.

��America should “Gorbify,” “Cubify” and “Wi-Fi” North Korea as an alternate roadmap, adding: “The only right choice is to follow the Reagan model, vigorously engage and press hard the enemy across all lines of contact because proactive multifaceted engagement offers the most potential for effecting a fundamental change in the North’s behavior, although it may be politically difficult to advocate in Washington.”

In fact, there are numerous experts pressuring the Obama administration to improve relations with Pyongyang—ranging from, but not limited to,��,�������Ի������ٴ���,�� ���Ի���. But have these voices of reason fallen on deaf ears?

In reality, Washington’s inability to end the Korean War will be a stain on its legacy and global reputation for centuries to come. So, how do we get the public to support engagement, especially after something as agitating as a hydrogen bomb test?

Creating spaces for normalized relations

Former US Defense Secretary William Perry����that achieving normalization of relations with North Korea will require the US to deal with Pyongyang as it is, not how Washington wants it to be.

© Michael Bassett

Tone-deaf to war drums, and far behind “enemy lines,” a group of public diplomacy “artists” are mulling over the conundrum, one engagement project at a time.

At the University of Cambridge, I recently attended a consortium of North Korea engagement practitioners who converged in one of the world’s tallest ivory towers of academia to discuss and share lessons learned from each other’s experiments in diplomacy with the DPRK. One lesson was crystal clear across the board: The only way to improve relations with North Korea is to carve out spaces where ideological differences can be put aside, and bridges built by engaging through a range of public diplomacy venues.

North Korea is often����“the world’s longest ongoing performance.” Practitioners at the����event agreed with Jean Lee, who claimed that����who it is as a state through sports, culture, the arts, performances and other forms of artistic expression. Together, we arrived at the consensus that the best way to communicate with and understand North Korea is to operate within these spaces and expand them.

It is incredibly convoluted for the US to expect any type of political reform without any bridges built, or any ideological differences being reduced. Washington should, therefore, take some lessons from Dennis Rodman and the various engagement practitioners at the Engage DPRK event. For the price of one nuclear weapon, the following forms of engagement can be deployed to effectively negate the need for military confrontation:

1) Tourism:��Regular US-North Korea tourism exchanges will build trust and reduce misperceptions between countries

2) The Arts:��Painting, dance, sculpting, music and other arts venues are conduits for knowing the heart and mind of the artist expressing their performance

3) Education:��The scientific method, for example, challenges its students to think more critically and independently, learn each other’s languages, and achieve enlightenment through academic rigor

4) Sports:��Focusing on peaceful competition, countries can battle out their differences within the safe confines of stadiums

These are just a few examples, but the sky is the limit. Any creative collaboration one could possibly imagine between the US and North Korea is not only theoretically possible, but an actual reality. The DPRK may seem hostile, but it is actually open for business on any of these fronts. It is time to deploy troupes of artists, rather than military troops, to end the Korean War.

To achieve these ends, the US State Department must act like the foundation of American diplomacy it was created to be and establish a “Department of Cultural Exchange.” It should start practicing true engagement based on lessons learned from the brave and underappreciated heroes of international affairs—the artists who are on the ground building bridges and making a positive difference, despite the bellicose rhetoric.

If the goal of “strategic patience” is not to achieve improved relations, then what is it about?

The obvious answer: regime change—something that will destabilize yet another corner of the world. America is probably about one regime change away from being on the receiving end of the “DIS Plan.” Hopefully our leaders are considering that reality in their policymaking process.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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When Kim Jong-il died,����that North Korea would either collapse or be taken over by hard-liners. Analysts watched doggedly as the young marshal, Kim Jong-un, emplaced a����in power—a gang whom his father had not recommended in the��. Kim Jong-un’s affinity for these technocrats was temporary: That nearly all have been banished, purged or killed begs inquiry of the “.”

As I will show, Kim Jong-un has defied all predictions and permanently changed the trajectory of North Korea.

During his three years of Confucian mourning, the young marshal acted like a force of nature, obsessively restructuring the basic tenants of reality in North Korea’s foundational doctrine. Jang Jin-sung correctly argues that Kim Jong-un�� for��trying to sell off state resources—in other words, North Korea’s sovereignty—but later misinterpreted the rationale of his measures. The rest of the world largely misread the reason for his uncle’s execution, and to make matters worse, Jang Jin-sung published a book propagating that Kim Jong-un was secretly governed by the Organization and Guidance Department.

This hypothesis fell short of explaining the radical changes he has imposed, and it lacks an explanation for the�� he has committed.��We must consider the possibility that Kim Jong-un has been purging anti-reform hard-liners.��To understand the “method to Kim’s madness,” we must look at what Kim Jong-un has actually done and reflect critically over .

To claim that a secret organization is implementing structural changes fails to account for the fact that the changes are stripping themselves of power and spreading it across the board in a more democratic manner. It is more likely that Kim Jong-un is not a false figurehead, but instead has total control and is a reformer. Just like he��removed his , he has now removed the ideological damage imposed by his father, Kim Jong-il.

Liberty in North Korea

I suspect—like does—that in the 2016 Party Congress, the young marshal will announce that North Korea is adopting true reforms. We must consider that he knows��unification could to the global economy, and that��90% of North Korea’s problems could be solved by unification.

Since Kim Jong-un came to power,��406 state-sanctioned�����Ի���more than 1,000 informal in North Korea. Instead of stopping them, he has����by��allowing markets to . These markets are not only “,” but they’re��selling an abundance of , accepting foreign currency ���Ի���electronic and even��offering ��as a payment option.

Kim Jong-un / Flickr

As a result of these combined liberties, ��are spreading like wildfire. And despite some satellite imagery depicting a labyrinth of sanction-induced blackness, the��.

Some may still argue that Kim Jong-un is an evil dictator and that North Koreans are reforming the country from the bottom-up, but that does not explain the��proliferation of a .

Critics must concede that the monopoly of first level of consciousness thought control can only be relinquished from the top-down. A knowledge-based economy means the state is encouraging its people to adopt new ways of thinking that are not part of traditional ideological tenants. This liberation of thought is evidenced by the�������Ի���, which encourage and incentivize average North Koreans to adopt critical thinking skills if they wish to succeed.

If some are still not yet convinced that Kim Jong-un is not only a reformer, but a liberator, then consider the following:��On two occasions, ��back into society ���Ի���are permitted upward social mobility in the ��by working in privately-owned markets. North Koreans are no longer confined within towns and provinces.��Many have been engaged in that a market for navigation and lodging��has sprouted as a result. In fact, the biggest revelations are that��the state allowed to travel abroad��in 2014, and it has��opened an �����Ի���welcomed the to report from within��North Korea, alongside Associated Press.

Becoming a “Normal State” Requires Normalization of Relations

The doors are wide open for science,��, economic,�� and even (state-sanctioned)��.

But the United States is the greatest barrier to unleashing the progress that North Korea is clearly on the brink of. Washington refuses to empower and enable these reforms without preconditions of Pyongyang abandoning its nuclear weapons program.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s offer of�� a year to denuclearize��the country matters little without a peace treaty and, therefore, brokering one is the best way for the US to stop being a barrier to North Korea’s liberation.

and unification on the Korean Peninsula, and instead worry about Chinese containment geo-strategy through a separate and less fatalistic lens. After all, China is a proven partner in global trade, and that aspect of the relationship should be continued and enhanced.

The US must seize the opportunity to play a productive role during the unification process and normalize relations with North Korea to allow for clearer communication and regional stability. To take any other measures would simply place America on the wrong side of history in one of the world’s longest-running conflicts. Being the main lien-holder on the armistice, the US is the only country that has the power to support a peaceful end to the war and broker unification in Korea. And as shown, an economic increase of $8.7 trillion should be enough incentive for those who have long been vested in maintaining the status quo—to change their course on parity with how Marshal Kim Jong-un has changed his leadership of North Korea.

If influencing these changes in North Korea—and waiting for them to occur—is not what “strategic patience” has always been about, then what is?

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Ask the average American their thoughts on North Korea and, without hesitation, most will recite the litany of evils that the country is caricatured as, but very few know much beyond a seemingly programmed list of horrors. Searching “North Korea” on the Internet reveals millions of hits echoing a consensus that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is an ongoing “meth-addicted,” “nuclear threat to humanity,” “a holocaust,” a “hell-on-earth,” and a place where “unimaginable cruelties” such as “castrating the disabled” and “mass murder by machine-gun fire” regularly occur.

Even if true, in-depth inquiry reveals little actual proof of these claims. Regardless, most surmise that (for the good of its people) the country����and “liberated” as quickly as possible.

It seems that��“” about the country is predominately informed by North Korean defectors and their sponsor nongovernmental organizations (NGO), which are considered by mainstream media as primary sources. One struggles to find Western pundits, much less “experts,” whose worldviews are not in some way informed by the sensational, un-provable narratives of these groups.

Through the immense influence of North Korean human rights narratives, policy approaches to the country are borne. Robert McChesney describes a contemporary media crisis in his book, , as a result of an “anti-democratic communications policy crisis.”

This author—a former DMZ reconnaissance soldier and information warfare officer—presents recent examples and draws out the implications of the hypothesis��on��“��of military/national security strategy”; and the fact that human rights awareness campaigns are military initiatives in the Information Era, which are used to program global thinking that perpetuates the ongoing North Korean��“problem” and results in hallucinatory responses to the DPRK��fiction. The analysis seeks not to challenge the tenants of that “hallucinatory thinking,” but to deconstruct what leads to it and interrogate the impact on global security such hysteria has.

The Ongoing War(s)

Let us start from the very beginning. The 1953 Armistice Agreement, signed between the United Nations and the United States and DPRK governments, called for “a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.” At the time of its signing, all actors clearly understood the����that hostilities brought to the peninsula. Unfortunately, the Korean War has been long forgotten, and the US government outsources its agitation operations to NGOs; the words of the armistice left completely deprived of their meaning.

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US involvement in����of Chinese containment. Sixty-two years later, the United States is still using the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a frontline military base camp for its China containment strategy. US Assistant Secretary of State����that South Korea “plays a major role in the international order,” and that the ROK’s compliance with US strategy is necessary for making Asia the “kind of region that you and I [meaning the imperial West] want to live in.” But the American dream of spreading democratic values has (at the institutional level) been ethnocentrically informed and driven by a ��seeking to exert hegemonic power.

Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon best articulate the irony of��jingoistic��human rights NGO foreign policy influence in their book, ,��where they state: “[V]iolence protects human rights from violence that violates human rights.” They claim “human rights discourse has become a desired resource for those seeking political influence and power,” and this discourse is the new “lingua franca of global moral speak”—pointing out that human rights politics has become “a new morality in international relations, a way of conducting international politics according to moral norms and rules … human rights are now canonical text for the moral disposition of world affairs.”

Andrew Burt, the author of , explains that American identity “is a way of defining��who we are by who we are against.” In periods of increased threat to American identity, such as during the Red Scare or post-9/11, the US has gone to war to defend its beliefs. For decades, the American government has shaped and harnessed mass hysteria, according to Burt, to achieve American political ends abroad. The UN North Korea human rights Commission of Inquiry (COI) conveniently established itself within four months of Kim Jong-il’s death. As PhD candidate��: “Since 2006, every Commission of Inquiry has preceded military action that worsened human conditions.”

The National Endowment for Democracy����those NGOs that develop such hysteria. It is interesting that in order to obtain a NED grant, one must meet two qualifiers in their proposal: to promote religious freedom and human rights. Burt’s arguments pass the Litmus Test for��government intentionality to manufacture and harness human rights hysteria, otherwise NED would give grants for cultural and educational exchanges without the two requirements—knowing that those forms of engagement spread democracy more effectively than forcing one’s own ethnocentric worldviews on “the cognitive other.” The fact that human rights awareness campaigns have exponentially increased since the COI is concerning for several reasons, and it is worthy of explaining how the human rights network is constructed and aligned.

While NED is the go-to organization for financial support among North Korea Human Rights (NKHR) NGOs, the Department of Defense finances a vast human rights industry. Human rights influence is rooted directly to the military, according to Perugini and Gordon, and has thereby resulted in “the proliferation of human rights appropriations.” They state: “[I]t is not surprising that state security institutions that hold the monopoly over legitimate violence also began invoking international humanitarian and human rights law in their work.” They point out that according to Amnesty International, “the US government trains approximately 100,000 foreign police and soldiers from more than 150 countries in approximately 275 military schools and installations while offering 4,100 human rights courses.”

Following international media big and small, especially from the US, one acutely gets the feeling that��: they target, explode and seek to destroy all that is in sight. They are about precisions, but like bombs their explosions can be exactly the opposite: imprecise, unpredictable and indiscriminate in their maiming. Although their campaigns impact thinking here, their devastation is always across the border: foreign land, foreign lives and foreign necessary cost of winning. Human rights awareness campaigns have transformed NKHR NGOs into US government-funded information warfare contractors.

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This author interrogates this approach for several reasons. First, it is known that a lying Iraqi����the decision-making process that led the US into Operation Iraqi Freedom—a war that destabilized the Middle East, leaving it in ruins. Second, North Korean defectors have been known to organize����to sway public opinion in their interests, threatening rule of law and national security in South Korea. Third, the soundness of US government financial support for a network of NKHRs that actively conspire to carry out operations that agitate—rather than peacefully resolve—the world’s oldest and most volatile conflict must be questioned.

Information Warfare Contractors in Action��

Collapsing a country is no easy task. The strategy, or so it appears, consists of several campaigns occurring simultaneously. It is unknown to the author who—if any single person—is orchestrating the overall “North Korea Operation,” but it is apparent that there is a concerted effort to forcibly collapse the regime.

Allen Weinstein, who helped draft the legislation establishing NED, was����when he said in 1991: “A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.” Not surprisingly, a good portion of NED funds��, which has����toward “accelerating change” in the country, but also in the international community to harness public hysteria in support of the operation.

NKHR NGOs actively conspired on their future plans at the��, which contrary to claims of “a diverse nature of conference attendants,” only����points recommended people-to-people exchanges. The other 13 ranged from taking Kim Jong-un to the International Criminal Court, to a ten-way rephrasing of “conduct information operations.”

The primary “information warfare contractors” carrying-out the “North Korea Operation” are: Human Rights Foundation (HRF); the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK); the European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea (EAHRNK); Fighters for a Free North Korea (FFNK); Radio Free Asia (RFA); Free North Korea Radio (FNKR); Open Radio North Korea (ORNK); North Korea Freedom Coalition (NKFC); and last but not least, an incalculable number of��.

The Rendon Group, a premier US military and government strategic communications contracting firm, published this author’s����how HRF’s “Hack them Back” campaign became a threat to ROK national security that pushed them to the��,��during a time when high level inter-Korean talks were taking place. The government, Christian groups and various foundations sponsor HRF’s work, even though����actively working to collapse governments that threaten the American identity—such as North Korea.

Besides sabotaging high-level inter-Korean talks, HRF also brought its media and balloons out in the height of recent cross-DMZ fire volleys.����over the “land mine/loudspeaker incident,” FFNK (HRF’s balloon-launching point of contact NKHR defector group)��—an act that could have resulted in the conflict spiraling out of control.

Celebrity defectors are a rapidly-emerging��and ��at the forefront of a militarized disinformation campaign against the West. Few understand the Korean War or Korean Peninsula in a complete, holistic and academic way. Celebrity defectors serve to monopolize an��empirical knowledge deficit of North Korea in the same way Iraqi defector “Curveball” informed our views of Iraq in 2003.

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In 2014, celebrity defector Yeon Mi Park’s meteoric rise,�� ���Ի�����caused many analysts () to raise their brows. Yeon Mi Park became a “Media Fellow” for OFF (an offshoot of HRF) in spring 2014 and went on a world tour that has not ended. Most notably, she spoke at the��, and in 2015 she has been a��headlining speaker at “Freedom Fest,” an organized collective of philanthropists, right-wing pundits and deep-pocketed political strategists.����over $12,500 per speech, until her book is released. Her fees could then increase to over $40,000 per speech.

Following now-disgraced defector��,��the core ��is that North Korea is a hell on earth and is currently experiencing a Holocaust. Despite the fact that Park , traveling and living lavishly��(by regime standards), the majority of people believe her story wholeheartedly.

It is����that they often tell the world what they think people want to hear. In a soon-to-be-released film, , Park furthers her core message in the movie’s theme, which is that the North Korean leadership is Nazi Gestapo and its people like the Jews in prison camps. The movie is fictitious, but it will have a tremendous impact on Western perceptions and is likely to have a hypnotic ���Ի�����on the public, whereby millions of people call for the violent overthrow of the regime and persecution of anybody arguing for peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Focus on Unification as a Solution

Information operations can be used to cause change in the country by exposing average North Koreans to the outside world. But in their current militarized behavior, these initiatives are seemingly intended to harness support from the West for collapsing the country.

We must therefore ask three questions.��First,��how does demonizing North Korea improve human rights conditions without causing jingoistic mass hysteria in favor of war? Second, how do these agitation operations affect ROK national security? ��Third, is there not a more diplomatic path to achieving unification of Korea?

Michael Lammbrau, bureau chief of the Arirang Institute,����that unification is a mentality, quoting Georgetown Professor David Maxwell in saying:

“The problem is we think in linear terms when looking at the North Korean dilemma. We first look to resolve the nuclear problem, then the human rights problem, and then finally unification, but that assumes the current regime is willing to give up their nuclear weapons and willing to resolve its human rights issues. I am saying they are not going to do that, I am saying we have to focus on unification.”

“Momentum is now slowly shifting to a “unification first” mentality. Goldman Sachs agrees with President Park [Geun-hye],” Lammbrau points out. That said, it is time for human rights politics to not only be questioned in their impact on international politics, but also time for experts, pundits, scholars, journalists and policymakers to scrutinize with careful forethought the impact NKHRs have on human rights in North Korea.

In short, it is time to re-imagine North Korea in international politics with a focus on unification—instead of demonization—if we truly seek to liberate North Korean people from the isolation they have endured for the past 70 years of the unending Korean War.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your����is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a��.

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Imagine for a moment that Kim Jong-un isn’t really an evil communist , but a Confucian king a capitalist monarchy. Imagine that positive were taking place in a newly designed North Korea that doesn’t place the first anymore. Then imagine that the Korean Peninsula suddenly found itself in a rare , where both leaders called adamantly for high-level talks about ending the 65-year-long conflict and reunifying. Then try to fathom the consequences of the armistice-holding United States missing the to broker peace between the two — instead imposing more sanctions at this crucial moment — and Russia in to facilitate the unification process to its geostrategic advantage.

What side of history would the be on, and what future would America have in Asia if this happened?

These considerations aren’t fiction. They’re part of a legitimate, possible future. And the US is faced with the option of allowing this to happen, or taking an entirely new to and the Korean War. An approach toward brokering (admittedly idealistic) genuine peace and unification, not “peace through conflict” as it currently stands.

US policymakers have consistently faulty remedies in dealing with North Korea and the Korean War — from the collapse of the Agreed Framework and the Axis of Evil speech, to the failed Leap Day Deal and the Obama administration’s misguided “strategic patience” . While it is understandable that the US views the Korean conundrum as a “North Korea problem,” that perspective doesn’t contribute to resolving the roots of the ongoing conflict.

Washington remains “strategically patient” toward North Korea while the country continues to its nuclear weapons program and commit human rights , which are gradually . The strategic patience policy is a gross byproduct of sensationalism, human rights and counter-productive nuclear nonproliferation gridlock.

North Korean diplomats the UN rapporteur, Marzuki Darusman, that hardliners would come to power if the US-led global approach to the country continued in this current trajectory. Although this is probably an empty threat designed to leverage the international community, it represents a future that is further preoccupied with perpetual bellicosity.

An example of misguided policies backfiring on the US agenda is in its most serious qualm with North Korea: the nuclear weapons program. In 1957, the US section 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement, allowing nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Since then, the US has failed to put that genie back in its bottle, and instead spent decades bickering on the Hill about how to engage the regime whilst North Korea developed its own program. Seoul National University Professor Park Tae-gyun suggests the only way to end hostilities is to replace the armistice with a peace treaty.

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As the nuclear provides the North Koreans with security and bargaining chips, they will likely never get rid of it. North Korea has weapons of mass destruction whether the US accepts it or not, and the program will only continue growing. Rather than stand in denial with fists clenched over this fact, the US should rush to broker peace on the peninsula. During the reconciliation process, the US could leverage developmental programs in exchange for nuclear disarmament, thereby replacing the country’s nuclear blanket with an equally warm developmental one.

The US government cites North Korean behavior as for furthering its geostrategic in Asia. But to what effect, and is the current US approach optimal?

Stephanie Klien-Ahlbrandt before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission that Beijing and Pyongyang hold “perpetual American hostility” responsible for the perceived necessity of their security apparatus. In testimony, she quoted the old Chinese proverb: “The one who ties the knot is responsible for untying it.”

On the peninsula where the Korean War is still technically being fought, the leaders of its opposing forces are focused on entirely different dialogue than Washington. Calls for an inter-Korean summit from South Korean President Park Guen-hye and North Korean Marshall Kim Jong-un have aligned the Koreas in rare posture toward political rapprochement of relations. These talks have the potential of achieving mutual recognition, which would be the first step toward ending the Korean War and unifying the country. A Unification Charter has even been to support inter-Korean inertia toward peace.

The Long Shadow

In his recent State of the Union address, US President Barack Obama highlighted the counter-productive impact that sanctions have historically had on Iranian and Cuban reforms, noting that shifting policy could “end the legacy of mistrust” between the countries. In an for The Washington Post, former US President Jimmy Carter called this strategy “cruel to innocent people.” He argued that the () Sony hack, which the North Korea sanctions are based on, is no justification for these “counter-productive measures.”

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Eun-sung Soh it is “time to move away from simplistic thinking” on North Korea. Perhaps it is time to reimagine North Korea, as Shine Choi so saliently , and support the Ministry of Unification in its to “spread the seeds of peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

Some scholars aptly argue that the regime earns positive rewards. Others add that the armistice with a peace treaty is the best solution to ending the war. While the of engagement are quantifiable because they’ve been tested, peace has not. Peace has no record to argue for or against. Since replacing the armistice with a peace treaty may not be in the best political of both Koreas, the US should instead strive to facilitate peace between the countries.

As a third rail issue, the American public will have difficulty supporting a sudden toward engagement from a “ to virtuous cycle” with a nation that we’ve long demonized. It would require Americans to consider North Korea’s of reality — which would require recognizing the country as a rational and a product of its that did what it needed to survive independently after 35 years of occupation and another 65 at war.

Granted, putting ourselves in the shoes of such a demonized regime is unfathomable to some, but the prospect is there. North Korea’s “enemy,” , is leading the public effort by promoting peace on the peninsula.

Like the Vietnam War’s “,” the Korean War’s long shadow could impact US foreign policy for decades or even centuries to come. America’s fate in Asia may be determined by its ability or inability to serve as a facilitator in the inevitable end of the Korean War.

Washington’s obligation to the conflict goes beyond geostrategic interests or petty domestic politics. The US government has an obligation to communicate this responsibility to Americans — seeking their support for assuming the historical role required of it now that the Koreas have prepared to end the war and unify. It is not a question of imagining possible realities, but recognizing them before they into the hands of those seeking to America’s legacy by playing this historically crucial role for us.

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On January 2, 2013, the Rodong Shimun — North Korea’s state-run newspaper —   New Year's “guidance,” which laid out details of his vision for the country. He spoke of a progressive national ideological shift in thinking that must be pursued by every North Korean while on their way to work, at work, and after work. The speech called for mutual development of the economy and the military, with priority placed on economic innovation. The “guidance” spelled out the facets of capitalism: innovation, entrepreneurship, market development, and new product production. Kim Jung-Un encouraged his "comrades" to focus on changing their way of thinking about economic modernization methods, while placing emphasis on maintaining national sovereignty as a state. The Machiavellian state is not collapsing, but instead has begun to evolve.

The Reality of Evolution in North Korea

Despite sanctions, the quality-of-life index and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is increasing for North Korea — thanks to relaxed economic laws passed last year. Their GDP grew by 1.6 percent, while five percent of North Koreans  — as opposed to 17 percent in the rest of Asia. The North Korean legal system is also evolving. Together, economic development and decriminalization of capitalist activities is resulting in an improvement in human rights conditions, and economic development in the country. North Korea's human rights record has been atrocious in the past, and Kim Jung-Un — “The Marshall” — is aware of the implications of this.

According to in NK News, Kim Jung-Un has reduced punishments for a litany of offenses, including the fines of $100 for listening to foreign radio, which is about a years salary for the average North Korean. For $2,000, a North Korean can “buy freedom” and avoid maximum sentences and save their families from kin-crime persecution. 

Though these examples are unlikely to raise acclaim from the international community, especially with Kenneth Bae still incarcerated, they are small — but not insignificant — signs of improvement.

The prison population has been on the decline for 15 years, according to David Hawk’s recent “.” Contemporary estimates place the number of prisoners in North Korea at approximately 80,000-120,000, which roughly equates to about 0.08% of their population; an extremely low percentage in comparison to most other nations.

North Korea appears to have been on a “charm offensive” since tensions on the peninsula calmed down. Kim Jung-Un has been promoting the idea of peace through cultural diplomacy. The Marshall’s primary aim is to achieve “mutual recognition” and a peace treaty with South Korea. His secondary aim is to normalize relations with South Korea and the United States. The Marshall’s recent meeting with “The Worm,” Dennis Rodman, makes one wonder if allowing Rodman to hold his daughter, Joo-Ae, is more than just a charm offensive. Never before has an American held a North Korean leader’s sole heir in their arms before.

Additionally, Kim Jung-Un has allowed numerous cultural events to take place in North Korea this year. He hosted the Harlem Globetrotters once and Rodman twice. There have been movies produced, film festivals, and countless sports and music projects ranging from parkour to Christian music groups. There has even been an increase in student educational exchanges, as well as business exchanges, with scholars and non-governmental workers from all over the world. The South Korean flag was paraded in Pyongyang during a weightlifting event, while a North Korean movie, “The Flower Girl,” was preparing to hit the big screen in South Korea. Family reunions have also resumed. Unprecedented concessions are being made every day. Recently, a group of five motorcyclists from New Zealand were permitted to ride from Mount Peaktu, North Korea, down to Mt. Hala (Jeju Island) in South Korea — another historic first. Kaesong Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is back in full operation, with new terms of conditions dedicated to longevity, sustainability, and mutual respect. A “Peace Park” is being constructed, with the hopes that North and South Koreans will be able to meet, talk and eventually embark on inter-state travel through there.

Conflicting Rhetoric

For “Pyongyangologists,” these events are indisputable indications of changing trends and patterns that have been taking place in North Korea under Kim Jung-Un’s leadership. Although he is unlikely to totally open the floodgates to the point where his family’s dynastic rule collapses, he is nonetheless opening them slowly.

Internet will not be adopted any time soon, but other forms of science education and technological development are occurring. North Korea appears to be taking lessons from other socialist countries that have normalized relations with the United States, and placed its priorities in economic progression focused on contemporary models. Seeing India, South Korea, and the US move toward a technology-based economy, Kim Jung-Un is working diligently to develop his scientists to a level at which North Korea can catch up with the rest of the world — the North Koreans have a space program, sustainable energy projects, and infrastructure upgrades in the works.

North Korea makes a case for their desire of de facto nuclear recognition, which North Koreans believe they are justified in having. “If people who threaten us can have them, then we must have them too — to protect our people because we can’t depend on anyone but our own government,” as one North Korean official said to me.

I later asked the same official how he felt about the US dropping atomic bombs on Japan, their historical enemy. "[The] root cause of all [their] problems," I was told, and that "it wasn’t good because innocent people got killed." North Korean officials claim that the country doesn’t want to hurt innocent people, but so long as other countries have nuclear weapons, there can be no proliferation. They say it’s up to the individual state to make the decision, and that “individual states don’t need permission from their enemies to protect themselves from them.” They claim to maintain truer defensive force posturing than Japan. Indeed, North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons.

The ball is still in Washington's court. It will not bounce under Strategic Patience Policy, no matter what improvements North Korea makes, unless they abandon their nuclear program. North Koreans will not do this as long as they feel outside threats to be inevitable, and while they view the US as an untrustworthy policy maker. They have watched the US betray their allies and renege on deal after deal in the past 60 years. There are those who purposely or inadvertently prevent engagement from happening — but for now, they are in the United States, not North Korea. We must learn to understand North Korea’s behavior under the young Marshall. Brinksmanship and charm offensives used to go hand in hand, but North Korea has evolved and if we choose to try to understand them, and recognize them and their sovereign rights, then maybe tensions will not escalate so high year after year.

Many experts will assert that others are running the show behind the scenes, but it's more likely that these changes are coming quite directly from Kim Jung-Un. Kim Jung-Un noted in his guidance that initial changes could be a little painful in the beginning, but would become easier over time. His comrades comply because they know that any sign of internal struggle — to the outside world — could lead to an attack against the regime if it’s seen as vulnerable.

Old party hardliners in North Korea are franticly watching as “The Marshall” takes “survival diplomacy” to the next level: state evolution. Western actors, who purposely or inadvertently contribute to maintaining the status quo of the proxy conflict, do so based on the same moral arguments that drag us into other unnecessary wars, or irrational policies that result in human oppression.

Though the “status quo prolongers” may not mean to, they contribute to North Korean state stagnation, isolation, and the deprivation of millions of people by refusing to be part of the solution. They focus on hawkish, biased, and subjective policy because they have similar perceptions of North Korean behavior. Politics alone have never resolved conflicts; it has always been economic and cultural exchanges.

Will the world accept the undeniable signs that Kim Jung-Un is developing the economy and encouraging a change in ideological thinking? Will they notice the scientific innovation and the improvement in human rights conditions?

Not likely. This is not the first time North Korea has made attempts to engage the world. In the past, their attempts have been drowned out by opportunistic rhetoric. Human rights NGOs take their cases to the United Nations and universities around the world during calm periods. The silence in the air is filled with new vigor, reigniting the anti-North Korea hate machine. Before North Korea’s efforts can be taken seriously, “the prolongers” will have undermined North Korea’s attempts to seriously engage the world.

Invalidated assertions are even made up out of thin air just to keep “Asia’s boogeyman” looking scary. Human rights NGOs contribute to most of the public’s perception of North Korea. Almost anything the public knows about North Korea comes from human rights groups, the media, and their combined propaganda. NGOs must be opportunists to survive.

One such group, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, regularly propagates misperceptions based on circumstantial cause and effect information. Their perpetual claim is that North Korean’s are malnourished — but again only five percent are malnourished compared to 17 percent in the rest of Asia, according to British academic Hazel Smith.

Prolonging the Conflict

The Honorable Michael Kirby AC CMG, a former Australian judge, at the UN by presenting well-researched information about human rights atrocities in North Korean “gulags.” One has to wonder if Kirby was aware of the changes that have taken place since Kim Jung-Un took power, as he certainly didn’t acknowledge them. The timing is peculiar for his speech, being as it occurred during a “charm offensive.”

This is a pattern that seems to repeat itself every year. In recent years, some unsettling nuances have become apparent to me in the North Korean human rights discourse. Through the years that I have followed these patterns, I have noticed a few things lacking in the human rights abuse arguments. Namely, they often downplay the significance of “what year” their defectors served in prison, what crime they were accused of committing, what the North Korean law says, and how the “spy game” influences their testimonies.

The year is important because if they served in prison in the 1990s, it cannot possibly reflect the regime's current policy. The North Korean law is important because all countries' citizens have laws they must follow, whether they agree with them or not. A convict is a convict, whether the law is fair or not. Lastly, the “spy factor” is important because North Korean defectors feel immense pressure to demonize their homeland when they go through indoctrination training and start working with NGOs as a means of survival. Anything they say that contradicts the mainstream rhetoric can make their intentions seem questionable.

Other examples of human rights discourse being used to thwart North Korean attempts at engagement occur in this annual pattern. For example, years ago, an American student was hiking through China and went missing, and the blamed North Korea for “probably kidnapping him.” The (HRNK) then said Pyongyang was responsible for thousands of kidnappings of foreigners over time. However, the North Korean government has learned from their kidnapping mistakes in the past. They have not done it for decades; both points are made by Andrei Lankov, in . HRNK suggested that 20,000 prisoners have gone missing; implying that they could have been killed.

Indeed, those who listen to these stories understandably assume the worst, and thus believe that North Korea is completely “irrational and crazy” and should be toppled to “liberate masses of oppressed North Koreans.” The truth is that most North Koreans, and even many defectors, love their country. Recently, many defectors have re-defected back to North Korea and have reportedly not been punished for doing so. In a final strange example, Kim Jung-Un tried to signal regime change to the world last year by showing how they enjoyed American Disney performances; but this event was manipulated by the international media and their intentions were ignored. Consequently, North Korea was accused of violating Disney’s property rights.

Human rights groups claim that they exist to improve the situation of the average North Korean, but their actions often suggest that they only help those who defect from North Korea, denouncing the regime. By taking this approach, the regime becomes demonized and their intentions are undermined.

This is a flawed approach to dealing with a population of over 24 million inhabitants, most of whom just want to see their country develop and socioeconomic standards to improve. Many other invalidated rumors have surfaced over the past few months, such as “Kim Jung-Un’s ex-girlfriend [being] machine-gunned to death for making porn,” a very unlikely event which has not been proven and has been denied by North Korea. The source of this misinformation is unknown, but it serves as another example of opportunist propaganda by the prolongers. There is also no evidence to support these claims.

The intent behind misinformation is to distract the international public from noticing the more positive changes that are actually taking place. Every year, these misinformation campaigns occur during opportunities for positive engagement. In 2012, the big distraction was that a general was executed by mortar round; an unlikely means of execution even if he really was executed, which he was not. This and several other bogus claims last year prevented the world from even considering that Kim Jung-Un had succeeded in dynastic change.

The misinformation campaign benefited the prolongers as they tried to convince the world that the time to deal a deathblow to North Korea was in the midst of “unexpected” leadership change. They claimed Kim Jung-Un had only a few years of preparation and North Korea was in a weak state. Actually, Kim Jung-Un had been preparing for the position since he was a child, according to his former chef,  and North Korea was not in a state of confusion; they were in the midst of a regime-changing shake up, designed to make this entire new direction possible.

New Perceptions and Approaches

Will the world miss out on a golden opportunity to take Kim Jung-Un and a changing North Korea seriously? Or will we allow him to year after year be able to make the argument that during times when he held out the olive branch, he was largely ignored?

Making up stories, sensationalizing abuses, and painting an incomplete picture by not reporting positive change, does not help matters — it makes them worse. Improving human rights conditions in North Korea doesn’t just require an ideological shift solely on their part, but it takes one on ours as well. We should educate ourselves about the reasons for the North Korean government’s behavior, and on development in general. We need to try to understand that the overall solution does not lie in playing hard-line politics, but in undermining the politics altogether by focusing on engagement through cultural diplomacy and development.

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Many observers are wondering which direction events on the Korean Peninsula will go. The emerging mantra in South Korea calls for peace and understanding with its northern neighbor. The South Korean president, Park Geun-hye, recently stated that Japan needs to acknowledge its past role in Asian conflicts. This is a statement that indicates a lot more than the standard calls for acknowledgement of Japan's crimes against Korean “comfort” women. Park’s call for action from Japan alludes to much larger issues, such as a buried history of a forgotten war with Japan which has largely remained unacknowledged, and how the conflict on the Korean Peninsula perpetually continues.     

Her statements also bring to question the strength of the “Asian Alliance.” President Park is breaking from standard US-South Korea relations. The new Korean “Iron Lady” seems to be taking ownership of her country. The brevity of her statement indicates a division in the interior regarding whose policies to follow: Korean or American. It seems the country that most strongly supports the Washington's Asia Pivot Policy is Japan, a nation which is currently in violation of its constitution for producing warships. Even more than the current Asia Pivot Policy, the United States’ “Strategic Patience Policy” towards North Korea leaves much desired to secure our national security interests.   

A Strategic Failure

A recent experience of mine proves this point. When I returned from North Korea after three months of practicing "crisis public diplomacy," I met with some folks at the Center for Security Studies in Georgetown University. My goal was to explain to them why the Strategic Patience Policy is a failure. It is a failure because it undermines the national security of the United States and is also counter to our interests and values. My logic follows that the Strategic Patience Policy is a Cold War-style containment policy, which is ineffective in promoting positive outcomes with the North Koreans. Following a policy of Strategic Patience assures that the US will continue to sanction every one of North Korea’s citizens, regardless of their culpability in their government’s policies.

Lessons from the past would indicate that this approach will result in North Korea continuing to develop its nuclear program, as the North Korean people “demand their government to provide them security from the most powerful nation on earth [and its] aggression,” as one North Korean put it to me.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is exacerbated by the failure of American policy-makers to understand the new regime in the north. The new North Korean regime is focused on peace and unification, and Kim Jung Un has shifted to engagement policies by invoking his grandfather’s "Ten Point Plan for Unification."   

The United States currently has no diplomatic relations with North Korea; so all policies created by American policymakers are based on information provided by anti-North Korean lobbyists, who profit from the status quo. Even in the past, all engagement with North Korea was designed to be corrosive, and that strategic paradigm is still strong in the minds of many DC policy advisors, as the Center for Security Studies event demonstrated to me.

While at the event, it was my goal to encourage engagement policy with North Korea by providing hard evidence as to why it would work. Instead of presenting my supporting data, I was forced to sit through a painfully misguided lecture where I was told that “strategic patience works because it shows the allegiance of nations stand[ing] strong together,” and how “the next provocation will result in a war, and President Park is going to launch a serious military blow to the north if one more incident occurs.”  

It was the view of many of my fellow participants at the Center for Security Studies that South Korea, China, Japan, and the United States are all on the same page in this conflict; that’s not any truer than their assumption about the “new regime” and its intentions in North Korea.

We are missing a golden opportunity to bring real peace to Asia, because people inside the beltway are so entrenched in realpolitik that the idea of "trust-politic" creates cognitive dissonance in their thinking.

False Assertions

What security studies folks also fail to take into account is the fact that South Korea is not suicidal either. Actually, the south isn’t even willing to take risks. South Koreans love their way of life too much to suffer another conflict. They enjoy one of the highest quality of life indicators on the planet, and South Korea is a bastion of prosperity, with its citizens storing over $22 trillion of personal wealth in overseas accounts alone. Indicitive of priorities in the south is the new phenomenon where some South Korean teachers make as much as $4 million a year. The last thing South Korea wants is a conflict on its peninsula.

Also explained to me at the event was the American intelligence communities’ consensus that “North Korea is already collapsing because they are using foreign money in their country now.”

In response to this assertion, I am sure that North Korea isn’t the first communist country to use more than one type of currency. After all, it — like many countries — promotes tourism, which introduces foreign currencies. The Chinese renmibi (RMB) isn’t more valuable than the Chosun Won, it’s just easier to exchange for most foreigners. I observed scores of people purchasing various items with Chosun Won.

The emerging entrepreneurial class in North Korea, which is ready, willing, and able to deal in multiple currencies and sell pretty much any goods via semi-legal and black markets, is also a facet of modern North Korean life that is not paid particular attention to in Washington DC.

Contrary to the expectations of many of my fellow event participants, President Park already had a plan to defy the US by taking ownership of her peninsula. Despite her meetings with Secretary of State John Kerry in Seoul and New York, Park’s approach to dealing with North Korea is more focused on achieving peace through trust-politic and understanding her relatives to the north.

The new parameters of the recently re-opened Kaesong Industrial Zone are sustainable and focused on mutuality, benefiting the two estranged states. This mutuality entails understanding, cooperation, and longevity, and could very well lead to formal recognition between North and South Korea.

The timing of this movement towards reciprocation couldn’t be better. North Koreans have been given more freedom of travel, allowed market-like sectors in the country, and reduced punishments along with alternatives such as paying fines. Kim Jung Un has even accepted ex-defectors back into the country, and publicly stated that they won’t be punished. He has also protected the entrepreneurial class from the old party hardliners.

In his new books, the North Korean leader encourages “unity under the banner of peace, unification and developing the country to a new (economic) revolution,” and his new economic regulations support market-style development. President Park seems savvy about North Korea’s signals to the world and has negotiated a sustainable deal in Kaesong. As a result, family reunions between the two Koreas have been resumed.

An Opportunity for Washington?

What side of history will America be on in this conflict? That will depend on how much we care to understand the situation objectively in its entirety, with consideration of the worldviews and historical development on both sides of the DMZ.

In the context of this engagement between North and South Korea, the United States should strive to remain true to its values, and act in good faith towards promoting regional stability in Asia by encouraging these diplomatic initiatives between President Park and Kim Jung Un. Although so often elusive, peace on the Korean Peninsula will provide the necessary engagement to lead to an opening and greater freedom in North Korean society. The United States has a golden opportunity to help the birth of this freedom.

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Real political change on the Korean Peninsula will occur only when mutual recognition is achieved between the north and the south. This “Achilles Heel” of the Korean quagmire is the reason why joint talks between the north and the south are so delicate, rare, and controversial. If joint talks ever went well enough to achieve mutual recognition, the quagmire would be over, and the US, Japan, China, Russia, and the UN and NATO would have no legal basis to oppose it or intervene in the situation anymore. It is, after all, their Korean peninsula, and if they achieved mutual recognition, international actors would have to respect it. This year’s annual period of brinksmanship and engagement on the Korean peninsula quickly came and went like a spectator sport for most people. In reality, however, the Korean Peninsula remains in a state of perpetual conflict with no end in sight.

North Korea seemingly had a total change of heart this month, going from the warpath to peace talks in the blink of an eye; leading most pundits to believe that sanctions and pressure worked, and that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) needed to soften its stance in order to survive. This is not the case, this time.

My Trips to North Korea

Having been in and out of the entire DPRK numerous times over the past three months, I have noticed changes in its social discourse; but no noticeable negative changes in terms of any decline in the country’s living conditions. Many North Koreans have been without hot water or electricity since 2006 and they have adapted to it. Domestic regulations are being relaxed about personal production, going to and selling goods at markets, and there is a rising entrepreneurial class in the DPRK. People throughout the country have seemingly been living their lives a bit more fully than ever, and are even enjoying their lives more than I have ever witnessed there.

Throughout the country I have seen people smiling and having fun during and after work. Despite the geo-political tensions, people still nonchalantly went about their normal routines because they are used to this annual phenomenon. The North Korean people comfortably trust in their government’s ability to ensure their survival because their government constantly displays its capability to protect and provide for them, even when the outside world is posturing to destroy the DPRK. The North Korean people have full faith that their military can “hold the lines” against the outside world because they have witnessed the Kim regime successfully demonstrate its ability throughout the years during annual periods of brinksmanship. The DPRK’s government benefits from international war posturing because it proves the necessity of the regime’s way of functioning to its people, and in turn its people become more loyal to it. If the international community forgot about North Korea, the Kim regime would be more likely to collapse.   

Despite what most pundits believe, the DPRK will not bow to whatever China, South Korea, or the United States demands of it. The DPRK’s objective for participation in such meetings does not go far beyond gathering information on how to adapt its “self-sufficiency strategy” for survival. It has learned from its painful past to never trust in, rely on, or concede to outside actors. Pundits who believe China has influence over the DPRK’s behavior have obviously not paid attention to the historical development of Chinese-North Korean relations. China has no more political power in the DPRK than it does in the US. Recent actions by the US and UN have only resulted in a confirmation of the mainstream domestic rhetoric in North Korea, which is that the DPRK government is really the only actor that cares about its people, and for that, the people remain loyal to the regime. The reinforcement of the DPRK regime is the only influence on North Korean behavior that will result from joint meetings held by international “key state actors.”  

The change in North Korean posturing seems to have come from a new type of North Korean nationalism, as much as it reflects the end of the war games along the country’s perimeter. It is now seen as quite patriotic to honor the dying wish of the eternal leader Kim Il Sung, which is his “Ten Point Plan for Unification.” For example, in several places throughout the DPRK, I have observed people watching the 2010 Philharmonic DVD, on a constant loop entwined with Moronbong Band performances. Inquiring about this “foreign performance,” I was told that Kim Jung Un desires to realize his grandfather’s wish of achieving peace and unification by placing some emphasis on “cultural diplomacy” efforts. In the final years of his life, his father Kim Jung Il also tried to honor Kim Il Sung’s wish in a similar way when he allowed the Philharmonic to perform in Pyongyang in 2010.        

Sweet and Spicy Public Rhetoric

Public rhetoric on the Korean Peninsula works both ways, and is always targeted at appeasing some sect of the masses. Often times, the public rhetoric exchanged between North and South Korea is both sweet and spicy, which is exactly the combo that is so inherent in Korean society. They like spicy meals to be chased with some shik-hae (sweet rice drink), ddok (sweetened rice cake), or ice cream. They build jung (bonding) through the combination of genuine sincerity and displays of intestinal fortitude (hence the slogan “fighting!”). Appeasing the masses on both sides of the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) through sweet and spicy public rhetoric, is a strategy for maintaining domestic stability, and should not be mistaken for actual policy. 

There are people in the leadership ranks on both sides of the DMZ, who are interested in maintaining the perpetual status quo. Whether on purpose or an accident, a certain level of immaturity and irrationality seems to enter inter-Korean relations, so that neither side face losses in the eyes of its public. This type of posturing achieves no end results beyond satisfying pride, and thus the stalemate continues. North Koreans are very politically savvy people, and the DPRK government will not cede its “go-it-alone” style of survival while it simultaneously crafts a careful strategy to improve the quality of life in the country. Until the end of the 1990s, diplomatic engagement between North and South Korea was always designed to be corrosive. Now, it seems the DPRK regime wants more than some simple concessions.        

The DPRK is sincere about achieving mutual recognition with its estranged kin in the south, which can be seen in the types of concessions it desires. Prior to Kim Jung Un’s succession, most periods of engagement between the two sides were designed to fail in order to maintain the status quo. Cooperation and joint humanitarian projects all had a shelf life, so as to not allow concrete and enduring relationships from forming between North and South Korea. Now, the DPRK’s government wants sustainable projects that last, and it wants an enduring relationship with the south. The DPRK kicked the workers out of Kaesong, for example, to show financial independence from the south, as well as to show its sincerity in meaningful relations during a period of brinksmanship. That move demonstrated sincerity because it showed that they, the North Koreans, were hurt by the south’s willingness to allow war-games during national holidays in the DPRK. If the north was actually desperate and seeking minor concessions, it would have allowed the workers to stay. What the DPRK’s government wants is a sign of respect and sincerity focused on improving relations with the south.   

The Red Phone

Pundits around the world have been criticizing North Korea for not picking up the phone when the south called them; a move that derailed joint talks as soon as hopes for them rose. This move has confused and irritated experts, and has only solidified the standard Western narrative that North Korea is totally irrational. In fact, there is an explanation for this, and it has to do with satisfying that sweet and spicy component of Korean culture. Ministers in South Korea have claimed that they’ve made “infinite concessions to the north,” and that the north needs to consider the south’s national pride. The north cannot understand this claim because the south hasn't made any concessions, not even a sign of respect, and it wonders why the south can't show it a basic sign of respect. Thus, the spiral of negative relations continues. 

The DPRK sent a representative of its choosing to have a talk on that famous red phone.  For whatever reason, Kim Jung Un chose Kim Yong-Gon as North Korea’s representative to communicate to Rhu Gil-Jae of South Korea. South Korean pride was hurt over this move, because Kim Yong-Gon was not viewed as “high-level” enough. Sending the “wrong person” to talk, in the south’s view, was a sign of disrespect and provocation. The talks fell apart as quickly as they started because of this conflict over pride, and a golden opportunity disappeared. 

This lost opportunity, however, does not change the fact that the socio-political system in North Korea is stable, and will remain stable, and no amount of sanctions or isolation can cause it to collapse. The north and the south will someday, over the course of Kim Jung Un’s lifetime, have to move past matters of pride. If Koreans are serious about stability and peace on their peninsula, they will have to swallow a little bit of pride and give each other some recognition and respect, no matter who is appointed to talk on that red phone.

*[Note: This article was originally published by , and the views expressed should not be construed as the official position of the organization.]

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The annual round of brinksmanship between the US and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is seemingly more intense than in years past. This is a tactic that makes perfect sense for the DPRK, as no country has any political power over it. It is a tactic that is usually initiated by North Korea for the purpose of forcing the external world to give it concessions, and hopefully, a little respect. The DPRK wants mutual recognition and normalization of relations, and it sees the strategy of brinksmanship as an effective tactic because, at the minimum, it forces the world to ask the question: “What do they [North Korea] want?”

The Myths

There are several myths regarding this tactic, which are false. First, China has no more political power in North Korea than the US or South Korea has. Second, the DPRK does not want temporary aid. It wants sustainable and responsible aid, which it can use self-sufficiently. Third, the North Korean government is not suicidal, so its threats are empty. Fourth, the core of North Korea’s foreign policy is centered on Kim II-sung’s dying wish, which was laid out in detail in his final book, “The Ten Point Plan for Unification.” Reminders of this filial piety are displayed in North Korea as one travels from the southwestern city of Kaesong towards the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ), when they must pass under the Unification Monument. When one arrives at the DMZ, there is one singular billboard. It states, “Let us inherit one unified country to our next generation.”  

During periods of annual brinksmanship there seems to be some finger pointing between Washington and Pyongyang about who started what first, and as the Washington Consensus rules, it always settles that debate rather quickly. However, this period of brinksmanship is highly peculiar because Pyongyang’s position is that they tried to engage the US on numerous occasions since Kim Jung-un took power, but Washington ignored those efforts. There is truth to this, which is evident in the Obama Administration’s “Strategic Patience Policy.” This policy is designed to be totally unresponsive to any positive developments in Pyongyang, unless it regards the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The administration has missed numerous opportunities to improve conditions and behavior within the DPRK due to this policy. These opportunities are evident of a regime ready for change, and are displayed by North Korea’s emerging entrepreneurial class, its Disney Performances, its Google Earth mapping, its Basketball Diplomacy, and direct communications requesting talks.  

This period of brinksmanship begs the question, “why is this happening?” more than “what do they want”. The answer is hidden behind this distracting wall of brinksmanship. While the majority of the pundits focus on inevitable war with a regime that has no real capability or desire for it, the Obama Administration smoothly lays a legal framework for its “Asia Pivot Policy,” which was enduring a setback when pundits discovered that the Sankaku/Diaoyu Conflict was grossly misrepresented, and even seemingly fabricated by the talking heads in the media. A Maritime Act had resolved that “conflict” back in November, which divided the islands into three economic zones, and China had again successfully achieved its main goal of regional stability.

Obama’s Narrative

This year’s period of brinksmanship was on all historical accounts propagated by the media, sensationalist authors, movie producers, and pundits with little detailed empirical knowledge regarding the DPRK. The US narrative created mass profits for all the aforementioned actors, and effectively threw North Koreans under the bus. This rhetoric was not toned down by the Obama Administration, despite clear evidence that there were no credible threats. This was because the Obama Administration has larger strategic goals in the region, and it too fell in line with throwing North Korea under the bus for that strategy. The “Asia Pivot Policy” is really nothing more than a new Cold War in Asia and is designed to contain China. China has no political power abroad, but it is an economic threat to the national security of any country, which is why the Obama Administration desires to contain it. The legal basis for this, as stated, is based on irrational fears, mistrust, and realpolitik.

This is not sufficient for deploying forces to contain a nation, and even containing a nation isn’t acceptable in contemporary international law. The war in Afghanistan and the Asia Pivot promises to effectively contain China. The legal basis for the Asia Pivot was destroyed by the Senkaku/Diaoyu resolution. But using the Korean quagmire as a legal basis for the pivot is highly reliable and easily manufactured into a proxy war. Sadly, the South Korean government stated that it desired direct talks with North Korea — which would be a first step towards mutual recognition — until John Kerry met with the Park Administration. Soon, Park Geun Hye will report to Washington to kowtow to the Washington Consensus, as the US has, and always will be seen by the South Korean masses as the proctor of their existence and their comfortable way of life — much like the US has been Israel’s proctor for so long.   

History repeats itself. The Korean Peninsula has been a “speed bump” in wars between the West and the East for centuries. The Park Administration may desire to tell Washington that, “this is our peninsula and we want stability and peace here.” It will be highly unlikely to stand up to Washington because it would be the political suicide for the woman who has the potential to be the next “Iron Lady.” South Korea’s younger generation has forgotten its shared history with the north, and is on the path to becoming as Westernized as Japan. This South Korean younger generation is not willing to gamble with their newfound economic prosperity and a pervasive culture of extreme neo-capitalistic superficiality, especially after the pain of South Korea’s post-Korean War development efforts.

The chances of war occurring are nearly 0 percent, just as the chances of unification will be nearly zero if the government of South Korea lacks the will to take ownership of the Korean Peninsula. The United States will contain China, the Korean Peninsula will remain estranged, and the North Koreans will remain poor and isolated. The peninsula is not just the speed bump of Asia; it is a speed trap. Everyone has a price to pay at the expense of realpolitik on the Korean Peninsula.  

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I thought it was going to be a great risk for me to visit North Korea as an ex-soldier in the United States Army who had been deployed on the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ). The riskiness of the trip seemed even more threatening because the rhetoric of tension between the DPRK and the US and its allies in the region had escalated to a boiling point during my visit. When I returned to the DMZ, this time on the North Korean side of the border, I was worried when I observed that there were no US soldiers within sight on the southern side. During my time deployed along the DMZ this would have been a sign that US military leaders in the region believed that war was imminent. As I would find out, however, rather than be a casualty of war, my time in North Korea was a fascinating journey of cultural diplomatic engagement.

North Koreans are equally frightened by war, and in their attempt to confront this fear, their rhetoric seems to the international community to be reactionary, visceral, and aggressive. The outside world is a scary place for many North Koreans; it is usually depicted to the average North Korean as full of enemies that seek the destruction of their country and families. North Koreans, in my experience, are not naturally inclined to war, and are instead almost “traumatized” by the threat of conflict destroying their way of life and independence. This fear fuels the DPRK government’s bellicosity.

The North Korean way of life, expressed in the juche ideology of self-reliant nationalism, is reinforced by Koreans’ historical memories of being brutally conquered, particularly by the Japanese during the early 20^th century. It is the collective memory of occupation by the Japanese, and the North Korean fear of a re-ignition of another Korean War with all the mass destruction that it would bring, which makes it unrealistic that the North Koreans would surrender their nuclear weapons program. Nuclear weapons are, in the popular imagination of the North Korean public, the best and only deterrent to an invasion of their country. These fears aside, North Koreans are not adverse to unification, and in fact, signs all over the country proclaim “Independence, Peace, and Unification.”

North Korea’s strident emphasis on self-reliance and the ability to resist potential foreign invaders is contrasted sharply with the fragile state of the country’s economy. In driving around the countryside of North Korea, and not staying exclusively in the capital of Pyongyang where a tenth of the country’s population lives, I got a vivid look into the daily struggle that impacts the average North Korean. Sadly, many North Koreans are chronically impoverished and are daily confronted with severe infrastructural deficits that inhibit the country’s economic growth.

Infrastructure in North Korea is built by the Korean People’s Army (KPA), which uses the best material for monuments. As a result, a significant part of the country’s infrastructure and housing is built with weaker material, presenting a great risk to public safety. Bridges and apartment buildings throughout the country often have cracks in them. Apartment buildings and infrastructure in Pyongyang, the showcase capital city, are better maintained and are constructed in a more modern, if socialist utilitarian, style. Outside of Pyongyang, interestingly, North Korean homes adhere to a more traditional, Buddhist-style of aesthetics.

Throughout North Korea the socialist economy has deteriorated. North Koreans stated to me that the DPRK government supports the nutritional and educational needs of everyone until the age of 25, further creating dependency on the government for survival. Complementing the state’s active intervention in the North Korean people’s lives is the slowly growing presence of foreign firms and international organizations that, in cooperation with the DPRK government, employ North and South Koreans inside of North Korea. Wages earned by North Korean workers in these ventures are an important source of supplemental income that improves the relative position of some North Koreans while providing the DPRK government with a connection to the international community through trade. The most famous example of this type of partnership is the Kaesong economic zone, which was shut down on the first day of my visit to North Korea, stranding over 300,000 South Korean workers in the north. Ironically, South Korea’s major multi-national automobile corporation Hyundai operates several production facilities in Kaesong.

A majority of North Koreans know only their grueling day-to-day routine, which allows them to survive. Frequently, North Korean peasants are not generally aware of events that could affect their lives in the halls of power in Pyongyang, and the world outside of their country might as well be another planet. ��The country’s rural areas face the most difficult challenges. North Korea’s countryside is filled with cornfields and rice paddies, and in mountainous areas with mines and ginseng farms. A majority of the country’s harvest is used for North Korea’s military, poised to repel invasion from the south, or exported to boost the country’s GDP. What remains of the harvest is divided for North Korea’s population and is accessed by ration coupons which are divided in equal proportion.

As I traveled further away from Pyongyang, basic utilities such as electricity and running water became scarcer. Rolling power outages lasting for several hours occurred a few times a day, and hot water was not widely available. Often, hot water is present only if it is boiled. Farm animals are rare and public transportation is minimal; I would frequently see farm labor walking in large groups over significant distance to work at their community co-operative farms. ��Hospitals, present in every rural county of the country, lack modern equipment and suffer from the same lack of infrastructure as the people they were built to serve.

In spite of these challenges, North Koreans expressed genuine support for the Kim family and their government. The impression I received from my interaction with North Koreans is that regardless of state propaganda, which is pervasive, there was an underlying collective memory of being “stabbed in the back” by the outside world. North Korea’s history before Kim-il Sung, as expressed by North Koreans, was one of pain and trauma, and the only power able to restore their pride in being “Korean” was the government of the DPRK under the leadership of the Kim family. This visceral, public historical memory that strengthens the acceptance of North Korea’s government is difficult for the international community to understand and accept, but it is the most important facet of North Korean social life that must be respected in order for effective cultural diplomacy to occur between the DPRK and the outside world.

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Every year, there seems to be two periods of tension in the relationship between the United States and North Korea. These seasons of tension are nothing new. The historical pattern of bi-annual tensions are a result of confrontation spawning from joint military exercises by the US and its allies on the Korean Peninsula which coincide with two major North Korean public holidays, May Day and the Mass Games. May Day demonstrations celebrate the effort and sacrifices of the working class and are thus often proceeded by a major publicity stunt meant to honor that sacrifice, such as the launching of a satellite, last year, or Kim Jung Un's Basketball Diplomacy effort this year. The Mass Games are North Korea’s largest choreographed displays of culture meant for public pride, including a hundred thousand person strong feat of dance meant to stir the North Korean nationalist spirit and promote the juche ideology.

It is during this event that the majority of foreigners observe North Korea. US and allies training exercises coinciding with these public holidays are considered a disruptive affront to North Korea’s national celebrations and aggravate tension between the US and North Korea. Sensationalist propaganda on both sides is thus exacerbated by the increased tension that results from this annual series of events.

On both sides of the Pacific, rhetoric and media sensationalism creates false narratives of impending war. All too often, the media in both the US and North Korea portrays the other as an irrational actor hell-bent on destruction and mayhem. This year, the narrative of conflict has become so frozen in its terror that milestones inside of North Korea that would otherwise be considered signs of cooperation are ignored. The most important of these is the plenary session of the North Korean government towards thawing peace and unification efforts with South Korea.

Even at the movie theater, it is difficult to get away from US-North Korean tensions. The recently released movie Olympus Has Fallen is a sad summation of the anxieties bursting from the relationship between the two countries. The conflict of Olympus Has Fallen is straightforward and can be summed up thus: North Korea, using secret agents, successfully topples the US government. I recently watched the film in a packed movie theater in northern Virginia and was shocked by the level of anger that ordinary Americans have towards a nation they only know through often sensational media reports.

I was deployed three times as a tank commander in the US Army, served four years on the De-militarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea, and I was on the Korean Peninsula during two nuclear tests. In my experiences in conflict, I never witnessed the level of jingoism that I witnessed that night. The behavior of the audience was surrealistically Orwellian; it was a scene from 1984’s “two minutes of hate,” focused and energetic over two hours. All around the theater, whispers of rage were directed towards North Korea.   

Audience members whispered curses upon North Korea, exhorting the American protagonists of the film to “nuke” and “carpet bomb” North Korea, and to kill all North Koreans and “let God sort them out.” The crowd shouted a collective “yes!” when North Koreans were stabbed in the head or blown up. At the end of the film most everyone in the audience stood and cheered, ecstatic with the bloodletting of North Koreans that they had witnessed.  

Sadly, the United States and North Korea are now engaged in a propaganda war that is among the harshest in recent memory. Neither side in this conflict is prepared to view the other as rational, and instead insinuate that the other is poised to initiate war. All that is accomplished, however, by the fighting words and bellicosity is the loss of credibility for both sides.

The season of tension this year is especially harsh because of lingering US doubts over the intentions of Kim Jung Un. As a young ruler, Kim Jung Un has shown more willingness to engage in cultural diplomacy with the US that any of his predecessors, a sign that there is the opportunity to engage constructively with him towards peace and unification. Since Kim Jung Un achieved succession of dynastic power, he has made numerous attempts to engage the US. One of his first appearances in the international media was with his wife in the presence of Disney characters while listening to an 80’s cover band in Pyongyang. The US government condemned this cultural extension for not having proper rights to use Disney’s good name.

This year, Kim Jung Un formed a partnership with Google to work out details regarding Google Earth, a transparency effort that shocked analysts of North Korea. The partnership was an obvious response to the US’ disapproval of North Korea’s satellite launch and was designed to express remorse for endangering special orbit of other satellites due to the North Korean launch, and was a show of good intentions to the world. Kim Jung Un’s invitation for the Harlem Globetrotters to visit North Korea was also an attempt at opening to the US, as the North Korean leader hoped to strike a personal chord with President Obama whom he knew loved basketball.

These North Korean attempts at engagement are effectively ignored by the US media, who goes out of its way to demonize the weak North Korean nuclear program as its main focus on the country. The US media portrayal of an imminent North Korean nuclear strike is creating an atmosphere where otherwise rational Americans instinctively call for the “carpet bombing” of North Korea while watching a fictional movie. Further, U.S House of Representatives Resolution 298, which was passed by the Senate last month, would create the legal authority for US military forces to actually preemptively strike North Korea.  

Perception framing on North Korea in the US lacks important historical context, which would not be kind on the US’ ally on the Peninsula, South Korea. South Korea attempted to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1970s, and possessed a dictatorship government which was supported in the name of stability by the US. The US has allocated billions of dollars for missile bases in Alaska in the past month, a very serious move in the context of the sequestration that recently took place in the US defense budget. Further, an undetermined amount of funding is currently being allocated for the cost of a projected build-up of forces in the Yellow Sea of China and the Sea of Japan. This move risks angering China as it is effectively surrounding the country.

In order to avoid a fruitless and fatally flawed case for war with North Korea, which could have grave consequences for the international community, it is necessary for the media to avoid war rhetoric. The public narrative of bellicosity towards North Korea is misinformed by sensationalist media, and lacks historical context. The public narrative of bellicosity towards North Korea must be changed to create a dialogue of analysis that understands the historical context of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. A strategy of waging peace, instead of waging war, should be the narrative of US-North Korean relations. 

Sadly, citizens on both sides are culturally and ideologically indoctrinated to be experts at waging war with each other when relations become tense and tumultuous. War should never be the most popular discourse, especially when a situation is so misunderstood and skewed, as in the North Korea conundrum. 

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The Harlem Globetrotters basketball team’s recent trip to North Korea should have been hailed as an effective cultural diplomatic venture. This trip was made possible by the official invitation of the North Korean President Kim Jung-Un, and, headlined by the star power of Dennis Rodman, should have opened a serious discussion in US foreign policy circles over non-confrontational methods to engage with North Korea. Instead, the trip gathered a storm of disapproval from the US media, whipping up a media frenzy of sensational reporting and aggressive bombast towards North Korea’s government that was perhaps more provocative to the North Koreans than the passage of US Senate Resolution 298, which can be construed as authorizing preemptive war against North Korea.

Resolution 298 passed with the unanimous vote of the Senate in the same time period that North Koreans were being dazzled by the basketball exploits of the Globetrotters. Also important, Kim Jung-Un is reported to be a great lover of the National Basketball Association, and his invitation to the Globetrotters to come play in North Korea was one of the great “opening” moments of international engagement that the country has had. Looking at the pictures taken on the day that Kim Jung-Un and the leading members of the politically dominant Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) met the Harlem Globetrotters, the joy on their faces is clearly evident. The cultural exchange between the pinnacle of North Korea’s leadership and American basketball players that day will not long be forgotten in North Korea’s ruling circles; a pity then that it was barely mentioned in the US.

The news stories on North Korea were not focused on the first game in what might someday be looked back upon as the start of a basketball diplomacy between North Korea and the US. Media reporting on the Globetrotters’ cultural diplomatic trip was overwhelmingly negative and focused on the particular eccentricities of Dennis Rodman’s character (his basketball nickname the “Worm” was also repeatedly and smugly referenced), and the depravity of Kim Jung-Un. Rather than focus on the possibility that the invitation was extended to the Globetrotters’ out of an attempt to form a personal connection to President Barack Obama, who Kim Jung-Un knows is also a huge basketball fan, the US media decided to label the North Korean president as a “madman,” whose recent nuclear weapons testing would lead to a global war.

While it is understandable that the media and the international community would be upset by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the world has been living with a nuclear armed North Korea for several decades. In spite of the fear in the media over the most recent North Korean nuclear weapons tests, it is highly unlikely that North Korea will go use its nuclear weapons, even in spite of Kim Jung-Un’s recent fiery rhetoric of a North Korean preemptive nuclear strike upon its enemies. North Korea’s president had seemingly went in the matter of a short period of time from cherubic over the possibility of engaging basketball diplomacy with the outside world to being prepared to diabolically call down destruction upon it. There is no coincidence that this dramatic change in language was the result of frustration on the part of Kim Jung-Un at the vitriol spewed towards the Globetrotters’ trip.

Kim Jung-Un’s recent threat of preemptive nuclear war echoes the threat inherent in Section 3, sub-clause 7 of US Senate Resolution 298 which can easily be construed to approve of preemptive war against North Korea either by unilateral US military action or through coordination with US allies in the Pacific-Asian region. Neither of these threats, hopefully, should be seen as more than bellicose words that are the product of stale policy thinking and the frustration of false cultural diplomatic starts. Cultural diplomacy, basketball diplomacy, should not be laughed at and scorned, but viewed as a great opportunity to change the failing communication between North Korea and the outside world.

Basketball diplomacy, like the Ping Pong diplomacy held between the US and China in the 1970s, offers a means for the US and its allies to constructively engage with North Korean society. What should have been ironic and thought-provoking for the US media was not that North Korea tested a nuclear weapon and invited an American basketball team to Pyongyang, but that it was Kim Jung-Un, and not Barack Obama, who passed the ball into the others’ court in the interest of cultural engagement. 

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The “North Korea Nonproliferation and Accountability Act of 2013,” Senate Resolution 298, which passed in the US Senate by a unanimous vote on February 25, is most likely to be another unproductive measure taken by the US government against North Korea. Worryingly, Section 3(7) of the resolution directs that the US government should “…explore all appropriate measures for enhanced military operations in the Asia-Pacific Region…” This language in the resolution goes further than two resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (1718 and 1695 respectively), and the US House of Representatives Resolution 65 on February 15, which simply condemned North Korea’s February 12 nuclear test. The Senate resolution is simply a continuation of a failed policy of “containment” of North Korea that has not reduced the country’s desire to obtain more nuclear weapons, nor has it reduced human rights abuses and the repression of the civil liberties of North Koreans by their government.

This Senate resolution’s inclusion of Section 3(7) is written in a manner that implies a legal foundation for Congress to approve a preemptive declaration of war against North Korea. The United States military is already heavily engaged with its regional allies in constructing a Pacific Asian security apparatus aimed at containing China and North Korea. Military intervention against North Korea as a result of this resolution would as a matter of course lead to a rapid escalation of conflict in the region that would be disastrous for the people of the Korean Peninsula, nations in Pacific Asian region, and the international community.

The cost of a preemptive invasion of North Korea would be enormous and very difficult to contain. Such a war would economically destabilize the Pacific Asian region. The cost of the war, the cost of reconstruction following the war, and the cost of the interference of trade and production, would deteriorate Asia’s ability to continue to be the wheel of global economic development. Further, bellicosity towards North Korea is only hardening the North Korean government’s resolve to develop its nuclear weapons arsenal and to maintain the country on a war footing.

Ironically, the NATO-led air campaign against Libya and its support for Libyan rebels to overthrow the government of Muammar Gaddafi, might have provided the North Korean government with an “Exhibit A” of why it should continue its nuclear weapons acquisition. Gaddafi agreed to dismantle his nuclear weapons programs as part of an agreement brokered with the international community led by the United States, and he was later deposed under the authority of the United Nations led by NATO. North Korea’s government has historically broken contact with states under international condemnation, when to continue contact would be a risk to its already-tarnished reputation. It followed this course of action with Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania and recently with Gaddafi in Libya.

North Korea’s government is not ideologically disposed to anything but its survival. Positive engagement with the government of North Korea, a change of former and ongoing policy, is an important means of achieving a “shift in worldview” over the North Korean government’s perspective concerning its place, and ability to survive, in the modern world. Engagement communicates to the government of North Korea that there is another alternative to war and a feeling of being under constant siege. At present, the process of communicating that the North Korean government has nothing to fear from the international community seems to be stalled. 

Communication between the governments of North Korea and the United States is neither sustainable nor is it targeted in the appropriate manner. Generally, the only communication between the states is through the high office of foreign policy statements and denouncements, and not through the genuine dialogue of shared global citizenship. The harsh rhetoric exchanged between the governments of the United States and North Korea does not move the Korean Peninsula closer to unification. As with any other state, the “opening up” of North Korea will have to be gradual and at the rate that North Korea’s leadership is able to manage according to their concept of sovereignty to rule North Korea.  

Often in foreign policy circles, talk of a “grand bargain” between belligerent actors is made. In the case of North Korea, there is a path towards peace, without war, even if few commentators acknowledge it. This path is through managed and sustained economic and cultural interactions between North Koreans and the outside world. South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” towards North Korea under the leadership of Kim Dae Jung, imperfect as it was, is starting the path of economic development in North Korea. North Korea’s government is also engaging positively, albeit in a managed manner, with the development of the North Korean tourist industry. Cultural engagement through tourism will do more to effect North Korean society than any number of aggressive legislation.

Further, private sector opportunities to work with the North Korean people and build human development in the country have barely started, and face extreme challenges. Severe international sanctions and global political saber-rattling frighten off international investment in North Korea and stall its socio-economic development. Private-public engagement between international investors and the North Korean government are essential to improve relations between North Korea and the outside world, and to improve living conditions within the pariah state. 

The path to unification on the Korean Peninsula would start with the encouragement of continued active engagement with North Koreans in cultural and economic exchanges. It would continue with formal recognition of the North Korean government as the sovereign authority over North Korea’s territory, and talks towards a comprehensive peace treaty on the Peninsula. The United States and its regional allies could then work with China to achieve the normalization of relations between North Korea’s government and the US government and its regional allies, and lift all sanctions and embargoes, except for those that are concerned with the most egregious human rights abuses and the transfer of nuclear weapons materials into and out of North Korea.

It is more cost-effective for the US government to build relations with the North Korean government and people through cultural connection and eventually, economic engagement. North Korea’s social and economic development will occur, even slowly, by easing sanctions and economic and social barriers to cultural diplomacy and economic partnership. The longer that a narrative of near-war with North Korea is promoted in American and international policy circles, the more likely war will occur and devastate the region and, more widely, the well-being of global society.

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Analyzing North Korea and its place in the international system strikes a personal chord. For me, it is frustrating that so many international actors, state and non-state, are seemingly in a state of perpetual war. The process of understanding North Korea’s society, and its conflict with the outside world, has been ongoing for a third of my life.

I joined the military in 1997 and spent all ten years of my military career overseas. The majority of my career in the military was spent on or near the de-militarized zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. During that time period I had the fortune to share many cultural experiences with Koreans, providing me with a wealth of empirical knowledge of the actual, daily lives of people on both sides of the DMZ. I’ve also been to North Korea once, at Kaesong, and I have worked extensively with South Korean NGOs which are helping North Korean defectors and have interviewed dozens of them.

As a result of my living experience and later academic training both on the Korean Peninsula and in the United States, my analysis of events on the Peninsula is always careful to be respectful of North and South Koreans as human beings. Specifically applied to North Koreans, my analytical argument stresses that the North Korean people need to be understood as best as possible from the perspective of “their” worldview. In my view, too much analysis focusing on North Korea simplifies the conflict over North Korea’s role in the international system as simply that of a disobedient “dog” refusing to lie down to the dictates of its “master”, meaning the entire global community.

North Korea and its opponents in the international community are locked in a vicious cycle of relations. Perceived as a disobedient dog, North Korea (and its people more than its government) is punished with sanctions and threats of military force by its master, the international community. North Korea’s government, angered by the response of the international community towards it, acts out even more aggressively towards its neighbors. The North Korean people, raised in the all-encompassing social environment of the juche ideology which stresses allegiance to the state and self-sufficiency, become even more defiant against the threat of international intervention.  Prospects for peace, reconciliation, and reunification of the Korean Peninsula, as a result, seem further and further away.

The international community on the whole generally perceives the North Korean state as an irrational, violent, and defiant entity that runs with a “bad pack,” nations such as Iran. In my analysis, the North Korean state would be willing to engage constructively with the international community, if it did not perceive itself as being in the midst of an existential battle. The international community’s perception of North Koreans, and not just the North Korean government, is also in my view dismissive, viewing North Koreans as helpless actors locked into system that robs them of their personal agency. It might be surprising to learn, but many North Koreans are fiercely proud of their country, and would bite back at the international community and die for the North Korean state if North Korea is threatened.  

Too much of the international community’s narrative on North Korea is combative. It is time that the international community, led by the United States, engaged with North Korea’s government to normalize bi-lateral relations.  A policy of engagement with North Korea will begin the long process of building trust between North Koreans and much of the rest of the world. Building trust with North Koreans will necessitate an honest understanding of their culture, society, and identity, a task that will not be east, but is extremely important ensure that sustained peace and social, political, and economic development occurs for all people on the Korean Peninsula.

It is time for the international community to move forward with the North Korean government, and to not dwell upon past tensions. In order to improve the lives of everyday North Koreans, the United States will need to set an example for the rest of international community and begin to engage bilaterally with North Korea. Most important, the international community has to begin to seek to understand North Koreans from their worldview. As a nation that has been hit, told to obey, and hit again, North Korea is naturally untrusting of foreign intentions and liable to bark, and possibly in a nightmare scenario, bite its neighbors. Avoiding war on the Korean Peninsula will depend upon expanding international and cultural and public diplomacy with North Koreans.

North Korea’s government is a rational actor that acts like a weak state struggling for its survival. Its actions are to be expected as it views itself as being surrounded by enemies with power to destroy it. I believe that the following actions need to be taken towards North Korea by the international community, led by the United States: recognizing North Korea as a rational actor with state sovereignty; acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear state; and normalizing relations with the North Korean government in the interest of beginning to interact with the North Korean people directly.

It is during the process of normalization of relations between North Korea and the international community that the greatest opportunity to positively impact North Korea’s society and the lives of its people will present itself. The international community could request to send in humanitarian support teams with aid packages, determine if the status of human rights in the country is improving, and ensure that North Korea’s nuclear program is operated safely within international standards.

Lastly, during the normalization process, I would strongly recommend dealing with each issue of concern for the international community separately. Issues such as nuclear weapons, human rights abuses, and other issues should be dealt with separately. No single issue should prevent progress towards a peace treaty between North and South Korea and the unification of the Korean Peninsula.   

The author would like to acknowledge and thank Nicholas A. Heras for his attention in commenting on and editing this article.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy. 

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