51吃瓜

The Korean War is the root cause of all human suffering on the peninsula. The cycle must be broken, says Michael Bassett.聽

In 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, and the world responded by inducing a period of brinksmanship that聽聽to spiraling the unending Korean War out of control. US President Barack Obama must have imagined himself as JFK during the Cuban Missile Crisis, expecting to be historically embraced as one of America鈥檚 greatest for going nose-to-nose with communism, based on a nuclear gamble that could have led to global destruction.

The problem with Obama鈥檚 2013 gamble was the lack of communication. And North Korea, unlike Cuba in 1962, poses the real concern of becoming a suicidal state. Should we push the country to the brink of suicide, there is a real danger that Pyongyang could start the first nuclear war by launching a聽聽from a submarine patiently waiting at the bottom of the Yellow Sea or the Atlantic Ocean into the White or Blue House, respectively.

Mass Hysteria and Nuclear Brinksmanship

Following North Korea鈥檚 fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the United States鈥� allies聽have 聽a harsh response. US Secretary of State join Washington鈥檚 鈥淒IS Plan,鈥� or Demonize, Isolate and Sanction. Kerry has long-held the position that China鈥檚 plan isn’t working, while insinuating that America鈥檚 has. UN Secretary General 聽North Korea鈥檚 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) test as 鈥減rofoundly destabilizing to all of Asia,鈥� and the United Nations (UN) is now a lead vocalist in the 鈥淒IS Plan Choir.鈥�

At a聽聽after the detonation, struck the heart of conundrum by calling out Washington for denying reality: 鈥淸You say] we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear armed state. And yet it is. You also say this about other things too. You say you鈥檒l never accept Crimea as a part of Russia. Yet it is. Isn鈥檛 it time to recognize these things for what they are and not live in this illusion or fantasy where you pretend that things that are, are not?鈥�

America is essentially saying that there would have been no Cold War if we never recognized the Soviet Union as a nuclear state. The US State Department聽聽the following day in obvious frustration that Dennis Rodman is better at diplomacy than Washington.

The catch 22:聽The US聽will without the country agreeing to completely abandon its nuclear program first, 补苍诲听 its nuclear program under any circumstances. The result is a North Korea that proliferates its program in isolation, while the outside world pushes it closer to using its WMDs for something other than defensive purposes.

The US, in the meantime, believes the 鈥淒IS Plan鈥� will change North Korea鈥檚 behavior, despite a long history of the exact opposite outcome resulting from of our misguided policies. We must try something new, such as: end the war and normalize, engage and develop North Korea if we want to see different results.

This is the essence of the stalemate, but what is the cause, and what are the solutions?

North Korea鈥檚 rationale

Following North Korea鈥檚 test of a hydrogen bomb, the Korean Central News Agency : 鈥淣othing is more foolish than dropping a hunting gun before herds of ferocious wolves.鈥�

In other words, we cannot expect political change to precede foundational changes in society, relations and economics. It must be the other way around.

The causes聽of Pyongyang鈥檚 nuclear ambitions鈥攖he 鈥淒IS Plan,鈥� omnipresent military provocation, and America鈥檚 history of being an unreliable negotiator鈥攜ielded the results we have now witnessed on this fourth nuclear test. The timing聽was predictable, given that聽Kim Jong-un鈥檚 birthday was two days after the test, that he is out of the mourning period, and that he is聽听迟辞听聽at the WPK Congress.

North Korea, or the DPRK, has also been taught by the US that we are not a trustworthy partner in nuclear negotiations. Pyongyang witnessed the NATO offensive against Libya鈥檚 Muammar Qaddafi, not long after he gave up his WMD program in exchange for sanctions relief and security guarantees. Libya is now in a state of economic ruin and institutional chaos, and portions of the country are occupied by factions of extremist radicals.聽When Saddam Hussein let nuclear inspectors into Iraq, they looked for and found no evidence of WMDs, but we invaded in 2003 as part of regime change, leaving the entire Middle East worse off than Libya.

In 2015, the Japanese military聽聽full operational offensive capability; annual聽; B-2s聽聽Pyongyang鈥檚 paranoia; the聽聽to put North Korea back on the State Sponsors of Terror List; the聽聽Kim Jong-un to be dragged off to the International Criminal Court; and the聽聽agreement created a stronger alliance surrounding the North Koreans on three sides. Furthermore, many international officials, including President Obama,听聽the collapse of the North Korean regime.

Breaking the cycle

The 鈥淒IS Plan鈥� has dominated the perpetuation of the Korean War for at least the past two decades, and it has only resulted in North Korea refining its ability to survive via mafia tactics.

The solutions are many, but all run directly in the face of what is popular in America. The US and North Korea have a lot of trust issues because the war has continued for so long, and because there is little-to-no communication between Washington and Pyongyang.

漏 Michael Bassett

While the pros and cons of sanctions have been聽, many US and UN officials support increasing them, even though North Korea continues to develop 补苍诲听reform its country聽defiantly. North Korea has been heavily sanctioned, yet in 2014聽聽to $29.8 billion, or 1%. And while聽聽about the weakness of sanctions, Keith Luse, the director of the National Committee on North Korea,听聽that at the minimum sanctions agitate the North Koreans, hurt the lower classes more than the elites, and actually cripple the reforms we desire to see them implement鈥攅specially on the humanitarian front.

North Koreans joke that America would sanction the air if it could. In reality,听聽and there will be no ramification to the test,听according to聽, who states: 鈥淩amifications? What ramifications? A bit of noise, and perhaps another UN Security Council resolution which will change little or nothing, but nothing of substance.鈥�

If we used聽, Obama would use his remaining time in office to try improve relations, says Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations. The US should聽broker a peace treaty聽in exchange for a聽, and then do everything in its power to聽聽and facilitate the reconciliation of the Korean Peninsula.

聽America should 鈥淕orbify,鈥� 鈥淐ubify鈥� and 鈥淲i-Fi鈥� North Korea as an alternate roadmap, adding: 鈥淭he only right choice is to follow the Reagan model, vigorously engage and press hard the enemy across all lines of contact because proactive multifaceted engagement offers the most potential for effecting a fundamental change in the North鈥檚 behavior, although it may be politically difficult to advocate in Washington.鈥�

In fact, there are numerous experts pressuring the Obama administration to improve relations with Pyongyang鈥攔anging from, but not limited to,听,听听补苍诲听听迟辞听,听 补苍诲听. But have these voices of reason fallen on deaf ears?

In reality, Washington鈥檚 inability to end the Korean War will be a stain on its legacy and global reputation for centuries to come. So, how do we get the public to support engagement, especially after something as agitating as a hydrogen bomb test?

Creating spaces for normalized relations

Former US Defense Secretary William Perry聽聽that achieving normalization of relations with North Korea will require the US to deal with Pyongyang as it is, not how Washington wants it to be.

漏 Michael Bassett

Tone-deaf to war drums, and far behind 鈥渆nemy lines,鈥� a group of public diplomacy 鈥渁rtists鈥� are mulling over the conundrum, one engagement project at a time.

At the University of Cambridge, I recently attended a consortium of North Korea engagement practitioners who converged in one of the world鈥檚 tallest ivory towers of academia to discuss and share lessons learned from each other鈥檚 experiments in diplomacy with the DPRK. One lesson was crystal clear across the board: The only way to improve relations with North Korea is to carve out spaces where ideological differences can be put aside, and bridges built by engaging through a range of public diplomacy venues.

North Korea is often聽聽鈥渢he world鈥檚 longest ongoing performance.鈥� Practitioners at the聽聽event agreed with Jean Lee, who claimed that聽聽who it is as a state through sports, culture, the arts, performances and other forms of artistic expression. Together, we arrived at the consensus that the best way to communicate with and understand North Korea is to operate within these spaces and expand them.

It is incredibly convoluted for the US to expect any type of political reform without any bridges built, or any ideological differences being reduced. Washington should, therefore, take some lessons from Dennis Rodman and the various engagement practitioners at the Engage DPRK event. For the price of one nuclear weapon, the following forms of engagement can be deployed to effectively negate the need for military confrontation:

1) Tourism:聽Regular US-North Korea tourism exchanges will build trust and reduce misperceptions between countries

2) The Arts:聽Painting, dance, sculpting, music and other arts venues are conduits for knowing the heart and mind of the artist expressing their performance

3) Education:聽The scientific method, for example, challenges its students to think more critically and independently, learn each other鈥檚 languages, and achieve enlightenment through academic rigor

4) Sports:聽Focusing on peaceful competition, countries can battle out their differences within the safe confines of stadiums

These are just a few examples, but the sky is the limit. Any creative collaboration one could possibly imagine between the US and North Korea is not only theoretically possible, but an actual reality. The DPRK may seem hostile, but it is actually open for business on any of these fronts. It is time to deploy troupes of artists, rather than military troops, to end the Korean War.

To achieve these ends, the US State Department must act like the foundation of American diplomacy it was created to be and establish a 鈥淒epartment of Cultural Exchange.鈥� It should start practicing true engagement based on lessons learned from the brave and underappreciated heroes of international affairs鈥攖he artists who are on the ground building bridges and making a positive difference, despite the bellicose rhetoric.

If the goal of 鈥渟trategic patience鈥� is not to achieve improved relations, then what is it about?

The obvious answer: regime change鈥攕omething that will destabilize yet another corner of the world. America is probably about one regime change away from being on the receiving end of the 鈥淒IS Plan.鈥� Hopefully our leaders are considering that reality in their policymaking process.

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Michael Bassett

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