In the two weeks since anti-corruption protests broke out across Russia, the Kremlin has made clear that it intends to fight back. Youth, the vanguard of the March 26 demonstrations, and social media, on which demonstrators organized themselves despite a media blackout, have come under severe government pressure, which is likely to intensify as the state enacts new counterterrorism measures following the . Indeed, the government’s response to the attack in Saint Petersburg offers some insight into its plan for suppressing Russia’s reinvigorated opposition as the 2018 presidential election nears, a plan that is far from perfect.

The Kremlin has reason to be concerned. Since March 26, the electability of anti-corruption crusader Alexei Navalny has risen, with every 10th Russian voter at least willing, if not determined, to vote for him in next year’s presidential election. By contrast, a mere 5% of the electorate had considered electable Navalny, whose investigation into Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s secret assets led to the March 26 protests, a month before. Medvedev, on the other hand, saw his approval rating by 10% in that same month.

Navalny has also become far more visible: Up to 55% of Russians now know of him, a considerable achievement given that the mainstream media in Russia tends to ignores his activities altogether. Moreover, that the government’s attempt to discredit the protests by its organizers of paying youth to attend has only convinced 24% of Russians, with 38% of Russians holding a favorable view of the demonstrations.

Russian youth, the face of the anti-corruption protests, have borne the brunt of the government’s counteroffensive. In the classroom, students and schoolchildren across the country have been accosted in what to prevent “extremism”: a Tomsk teacher called children in his class “”; a Samara teacher verbally and physically a pupil who interrupted a presentation about “extremism”; and a Moscow student was and threatened with legal action should she continue taking part in protests.

More worryingly, the security services have stepped in to make clear the costs of dissent. The families of youth who demonstrated have been by Federal Security Service (FSB) and Investigative Committee (SKR) agents, who have demanded that some relatives come in for questioning and told others that anti-government activities may endanger their children’s chances of going to university. In Nizhny Novgorod, five parents of schoolchildren detained at protests were with neglecting their child-rearing duties.

Other actions have underlined the state’s appreciation of the role of social media in mobilizing Russian youth. Russia’s federal parliament may soon be presented with legislation banning “children under the age of 14 from creating accounts on social media and [requiring] adults to use their real names, verified with passport information, when registering with any social media platform,” as by Global Voices. An important forum for political debate on the Russian internet that recently relocated its servers to Russia, LiveJournal on April 4 that users would no longer be able to post “political solicitation materials” without permission from the website.

In combination with the material from search results generated by news aggregator websites, effectively required under a recent law, the de-politicization of LiveJournal suggests the Kremlin is seeking to reduce the number of online spaces—where “the revolution is happening,” as Levada Center’s Denis Volkov said at a recent Sakharov Center panel discussion—where the Russian opposition can mobilize supporters. In addition, it has resolved to make television, its medium of choice for disseminating propaganda and one that Russians are trust in, a more effective means of shaping public opinion as the 2018 presidential election nears.

SAINT PETERSBURG ATTACK

This week’s terrorist attack, carried out in the Saint Petersburg metro on April 3, has further complicated the challenge of securing national support for another term for President Vladimir Putin. On the one hand, the government has found a cause around which to rally the people: vanquishing terrorism, something that only Putin can do, his supporters may assert. On the other hand, deploying such a narrative may prove to be counterproductive.

A “rally around the flag” effect seems to have been the intended outcome of the rallies held on April 6. Indeed, unity—political, religious and otherwise—was greatly emphasized. In Saint Petersburg, leaders representing various faiths stood “together against terror” (the rallies’ slogan) and, in Moscow, a vast swath of Russia’s parties and political movements was represented: from the ultra-nationalist movements NOD and SERB to the parliamentary parties United Russia, LDPR and Just Russia.

That an image of unity was created with some success is noteworthy in light of the absence of opposition parties at the anti-corruption protests—the result of the demonstrations’ close association with Navalny, who has come to blows with opposition leaders and . The office of Sergey Sobyanin, Moscow’s mayor, the capital’s rally a “non-political” event when explaining its exemption from rules concerning the organization of political rallies.

Granted, mourning the victims of a terrorist attack, especially one perpetrated in Russia’s cultural capital, is not an inherently political act. But many details suggest that the rallies were, in fact, politically motivated. In Moscow, the decision to use Manezhnaya Square, sandwiched between Red Square and the parliament building, as the rally’s location hints at an attempt to conflate solidarity against terrorism with solidarity with the Russian government. Other reasons for doubting the rallies’ alleged spontaneity include the fact that some people , a charge leveled at the organizers of the March 26 protests; that other outpourings of grief were by pro-Kremlin activists; and that forms for some rallies, including one in Tula, were after March 26 and before April 3.

To be sure, that is not to imply the government organized, or allowed to occur, the April 3 attack. Rather, it gives reason to believe that counter-rallies were organized by the government after March 26, and that the tragic events of April 3 provided it with a more resonant cause in the name of which to mobilize Russians.

Commentators as a sign of the government’s mandate to curtail freedoms in the name of counterterrorism. Introducing measures like last year’s Yarovaya law would serve not just national security needs, but also regime security needs, with the latter back at the top of the Kremlin’s agenda. One of the founders of the Anti-Maidan movement, which has committed itself to preventing a Maidan-like revolution from below in Russia, was with shaping United Russia’s ideological message on April 5; Putin recently to the unrest seen during the Arab Spring and Maidan; and Vyacheslav Volodin, speaker of Russia’s parliament, has said that Navalny “.”

However, as analysts note, each successive terrorist attack perpetrated inside Russia undermines the appeal of this social contract, whereby freedoms are given up in return for security. As by Carnegie’s Andrey Pertsev, future failures to prevent acts of terrorism may lead people to ask: “What did seventeen years of security concerns get us?” Similarly, as Carnegie’s Alexander Baunov has , each attack contradicts the claim, popular among propagandists, that the lack of restraints placed on Russia’s national security apparatus keeps Russia from becoming as vulnerable to terrorism as European states are.

“WASTE TERRORISTS”

In fact, an emphasis on security from terrorism in the upcoming presidential election may simply remind Russians that Putin has failed to carry out his , made as prime minister, to conclusively “waste [terrorists] in the outhouse,” as one analyst Kommersant. Since April 3, terrorism has loomed large in the minds of Russians. In that time, an attack on National Guard units in Astrakhan has been by the Islamic State; an explosion in Rostov-on-Don was as an act of terrorism despite being the of a jealous man; an additional bomb has been in Saint Petersburg; and the collapse of part of a Saint Petersburg building’s façade the city’s residents, who feared another attack was taking place.

That the government is allowing a terrorism scare to take hold is uncharacteristic. In the past, Russia’s mainstream media have said little about violent incidents believed to be linked to the Islamic State—from the of an infant by her nanny in Moscow to an on traffic police just outside of the capital.

Allowing Russians to become as paranoid about terrorism as some Western societies are is political dynamite, not just because of Putin’s 17-year-old promise to end the threat of terrorism, but also because of his role in Russia’s borders open to Central Asian migrants. The more terrorists hail from that region, as the Saint Petersburg bomber did, the more Russians will come to ask why the country’s immigration policy remains at odds with its national security needs. Ironically, it may simply benefit Navalny, who has long making Central Asian migrants apply for visas in order to enter Russia.

Such questions are anathema to the president, who appears set on running again in 2018. Although rallying Russians around the flag using the specter of terrorism sounds like a sure-fire way to suppress Russia’s opposition movement, it may yet come to benefit the opposition, with the curtailing of freedoms viewed as helping regime, but not national, security, and the maintenance of an open border with Central Asian republics a policy easily exploitable by terrorists. Judging by the anti-corruption protests’ impact on Navalny’s popularity and visibility, limiting the opposition’s activities to an increasingly regulated internet seems like the Kremlin’s best bet. Time will tell which path it pursues.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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On March 26, protesters hit the streets across Russia over corruption allegations against Prime Minister and former President Dmitri Medvedev. As Russian courts prepare to prosecute those detained during Sunday’s unsanctioned protests, as well as the employees of , it is important to identify what sets Russia’s latest series of protests apart from those of the recent past and how it may affect the country’s political landscape as the 2018 presidential election nears.

What is immediately striking is the cause of the protests: “,” an investigation into Medvedev’s wealth published on YouTube by anti-corruption activist and one-time Moscow mayoral candidate Navalny on March 2. The video, which has been viewed more than 14 million times, implicates Medvedev (Dimon is a nickname for Dmitry)—a close ally of President Vladimir Putin who briefly replaced him as president from 2008 to 2012 in what was widely considered an act of political theater—in owning secret assets, including mansions, yachts and a vineyard.

Viewed out of context, Navalny’s latest investigation is unremarkable. Medvedev is not the first Russian official to have ill-gotten gains exposed by Navalny, whose brother, Oleg, is currently serving a three-and-a-half-year sentence meant as an (apparently ineffective) leverage over Alexei. Navalny’s greatest hits include investigations targeting Yuri Chaika, Russia’s prosecutor general, and Igor Shuvalov, the first deputy prime minister.

Despite the egregiousness of their alleged corruption—Shuvalov was found to have used a private jet to regularly fly his family’s pet corgis around the world—both men remain in their posts.

Widespread Contempt

The outbreak of protests, which on March 15, owes to a specific condition that was absent in the cases of Chaika and Shuvalov: widespread contempt toward Navalny’s target. Medvedev increasingly appears to have given up on pretending he represents the interests of Russians. The country’s middle class made its disapproval of him known when it led the protests of 2011-13, aggrieved at the sight of a self-professed modernizer handing over the reins of power to Putin—a reactionary force that few middle-class Russians wished to see back in office having come to believe that Russia had abandoned its historical tradition of leaders never stepping down.

The working class has joined the chorus of Medvedev’s critics thanks to a string of gaffes highlighting the prime minister’s indifference to Russians’ economic difficulties. In August 2016, distraught over meager pay that their predicament was no one’s fault but their own: “You didn’t go into business, as I understand, so there you have it.”

Worse still, in May 2016, while visiting Crimea, the annexation of which has come at a hefty cost for Russia and its people, , an especially vulnerable segment of the population, “There’s just no money right now. … You hang in there. Best wishes! Cheers! Take care!”

Medvedev, once commonly cited as a potential successor to Putin, made these recommendations as he literally escaped the people in whose name Russia had invaded Ukraine. He neatly symbolizes in his clear indifference to the economic problems of ordinary Russians and to the optics of Navalny’s allegations, which he has responded to by and going .

Medvedev’s complacency may stem from the appearance that his place in power is guaranteed. However, recent weeks give reason for doubt about Medvedev’s job security. His behavior has combined with increasing negative attention over Navalny’s accusations to drive even the so-called “loyal” opposition in Russia’s parliament to demand an .

More embarrassingly, Putin appears to be subtly marginalizing the prime minister. At a meeting of Russian officials on March 14, Putin offered a mocking explanation for that almost certainly undercut the prime minister’s authority: “The [flu] epidemic here is waning. Nonetheless, the situation is still serious. See, we weren’t able to save Dmitri Anatolievich.” In a counterproductive move that made him look even more side-lined, Medvedev Putin’s comments on March 23, saying he had never fallen ill.

Russian analysts say from both elites and the public, and are increasingly considering the possibility that he will be .

Pursuit of Political Power

Like Medvedev, Navalny is at a critical juncture in his pursuit of political power. Having been rendered ineligible for the office of president by a recent , which has plagued him since 2010, Navalny needs all the public attention he can get in order to remain relevant in Russia’s brutally cynical political landscape. , begun in December, despite the legal obstacle disqualifying his inclusion on the ballot and a media blackout that has limited his efforts to social media, the grassroots and opposition-friendly news outlets.

Medvedev’s situation has given Navalny an opportunity to keep the spotlight on himself, even at the cost of prosecution, and to unite an otherwise divided opposition movement around the universally resonant cause of anti-corruption.

Sunday’s protests appear to have accomplished just that, with , his organization’s activities indefinitely and an estimated , according to reputable independent radio station Ekho Moskvy.

That Navalny managed to organize protests from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok is highly impressive. The FBK that 99 locations around the country hosted demonstrations, even , where 92% of voters supported Putin in the 2012 election.

By contrast, intermittent protests by truckers over a highway tax enriching the brothers Rotenberg—close friends of Putin at the receiving end of numerous government contracts—have remained largely contained within Russia’s western parts. Similarly, the 2011-13 protests took place mostly in Moscow.

New Wave

Commentators have heavily emphasized the role of youth in Sunday’s protests. Indeed, came out in great numbers across the country, giving rise to a consensus that “the ranks of protesters in Moscow [since the demonstrations of 2011-13] have grown younger,” as articulated by . “This group missed the Bolotnaya [Square protests] because of its age,” Novaya Gazeta observed.

This specific group’s media consumption habits make it immune to the state propaganda that dominates Russian television, the same medium that refused to cover Sunday’s protests as part of an unmistakable . (It was such a slow news day that a march in Italy commemorating the 60^th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome the cut.) These are Russians unable to recall a Russia not governed by the United Russia party or Putin, and unlikely to recall a time when Russia was not at odds with the international community.

Medvedev’s behavior has alienated not only the middle-class Russians who had abandoned him after he became prime minister in 2012, but also working-class Russians and even Russia’s political elites.

Putin’s promise of a russkiy mir—Russian world—encompassing the “near abroad,” which has become almost completely hostile to Russia, and images of Russian aircraft bombing Aleppo do not resonate with the youth involved in Sunday’s protests, who have been deprived of their ability to study abroad—or worse, in the case of working-class families who struggle to make a living.

The government appears to have realized this shortly before the demonstrations, with multiple educational institutions , and one Russian senator even to remove those minors found to have joined the demonstrations from their families. Already, reports of attempts to parents whose children attended protests have emerged, and there is talk of .

The government has explained away youth participation on Sunday using the classic narrative of —an ironic charge to level against the opposition given of children for campaigning purposes during the 2016 election season.

Alarmingly, the presence of , and at Sunday’s protests failed to deter the use of brute force by Russian police. Images of young people being hauled away by riot police, wearing astronaut-like helmets and the sort of padding one expects to see on soldiers, spread like wildfire on social media before the protests had even come to a close. Some that the national guard, an internal military unit established in spring 2016 and widely regarded as a safeguard against any Maidan-like movement in Russia, saw its first deployment on Sunday, just one day before the official celebrating its invaluable contribution to Russian society.

The timing is coincidental. But the police’s ruthless conduct on Sunday raises an important question: Was the decision to use brute force against Russia’s youth made in the Kremlin, or on the squares where protesters stared down police? of groups of riot police beating lone protesters can come to symbolize injustice for a broader part of society than that which attended Sunday’s protests.

Commentators had latched onto one such photo, that of Olga Lozina—a young woman in white carried off by five officers wearing black—well before it that Lozina had not even been a participant in the Moscow demonstration but had been arrested on her way from McDonald’s along with her mother and sister.

Brute force proved counterproductive in Ukraine, where it enraged revolutionaries into digging in instead of intimidating them into fleeing. Although Russia in 2017 is not Ukraine in 2014, the open and disproportionate use of violence risks provoking a wider conflagration as an example of the abuse of state powers, especially if it becomes a staple of protests in Russia.

Reports of detained are similarly dangerous. It certainly appears that the government is willing to escalate, with commenting that Russia’s police had acted “softly.”

Sunday’s protests have underlined a number of developments in Russian politics. Medvedev’s behavior has alienated not only the middle-class Russians who had abandoned him after he became prime minister in 2012, but also working-class Russians and even Russia’s political elites.

Navalny has gained from his predicament. However, his inclusion on the ballot in 2018 is far from certain, and Navalny must first cross the bridge that is his 15-day prison sentence before returning to an admittedly altered political landscape.

That landscape now recognizes Navalny as the opposition leader in Russia—not an opposition leader—and acknowledges that the opposition’s ranks have swelled thanks to the political awakening of Russia’s youth. How the government will respond to this new series of threats to United Russia’s continued dominance in Russian politics is not yet clear. But the signs thus far do not bode well.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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