Current gloomy economic projections indicate that the impact of the pandemic will neither spare the defense sector nor . Therefore, the EU, under certain conditions, should be open to cooperation with like-minded states, especially those with which member states already have a track record of cooperation. It is worth noting that discussions concerning third-country participation distinguish between various structures and pillars of European defense integration.

Is Europe Really Ready for Its Own Military Force?

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Specifically, the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) have different rules and are at varying stages of adopting them. While were established for the EDF and EDA in 2019, EU member states have only just agreed to a regime covering the politically more sensitive area of PESCO projects.

Why Cooperate With Non-EU Countries?

According to the of the European Council, third parties will be allowed to participate if their inclusion were deemed to add substantial added value to respective projects being carried out and when such participation will not lead to dependencies on third states. Any third country participant need also to share “the values on which the EU is founded” and “respect the principle of good neighbourly relations with Member States.”

The general conditions, consequently, of a fairly restrictive approach toward participation, undoubtedly satisfy only the closest partners of choice like the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom. In other words, the doors will remain closed to, for example, Turkey and China. Leaving open the possibility for Turkish participation was a sticking point, and some countries, including Greece and Cyprus, are wary. Some view a prior Finnish proposal as not sufficiently exclusionary on the matter. It is notable that neither PESCO nor the EDF alter the EU’s existing rules on defense procurement.

Third countries can contribute relevant capacities for military operations, technological know-how as well as research and development. Their participation also facilitates closer EU working relationships with neighbors and non-EU NATO allies, helping safeguard NATO unity. Take the example of Norway — an country with a third of its exports going to the bloc. As the only member of the European Free Trade Association that is both part of the European Economic Area and host to a notable defense industry, Norway would be a substantial contributor to PESCO projects, from research programs to the joint development and acquisition of defense capabilities initiatives.

Norway indeed maintains a diversified and high-tech defense industry, spanning communication technology to air defense, from undersea systems to state-of-the-art missiles like the renowned Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS). Moreover, Norway is home to numerous EU defense contractor subsidiaries and production plants like the multinational Airbus, Spain’s Indra, Sweden’s Saab and France’s Thales. At a time when the EDF and PESCO provide a vehicle for fostering EU partnerships and consortia in the defense sector, Norway would be a particularly pertinent addition. Norway could, for example, contribute to the Modular Unmanned Ground Systems (MUGS), a PESCO initiative by seven EU member states.

Cooperation in Times of COVID-19

But the benefits of joining PESCO initiatives are not limited to the positive economic impact that occurs from defense cooperation. Projects can also serve as platforms for nurturing resilience and improving preparedness for future pandemics. In this regard, , one of PESCO’s core projects, can aid, for example, in facilitating the movement of troops and military equipment, including sanitary and medical materials, across borders. Progress on the simplification and standardization of cross-border military transport, a , would further enable a speedy and swift of military personnel and equipment like food, doctors and field hospitals, for instance, from one country to the other, thereby strengthening EU solidarity.

While the impetus for European defense integration is undeniable, we should not take for granted that it will translate into enhanced capabilities for Europe to provide security for the continent. To move closer toward achieving this goal, the EU needs to intensify efforts to develop politically sound, organizationally efficient and industrially complementary relations with like-minded countries. 

*[This op-ed is part of the , Enhanced European Opportunity Partners in the EU’s Defence and Security Initiatives: Study Case of Norway. The support of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defense for the production of this publication does not constitute endorsement of its content, which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Norwegian Ministry of Defense cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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There can be no doubt that Jair Bolsonaro entered Brazil’s presidential campaign as a rank outsider. When it comes to populist anti-establishment politicians making their mark across Latin America, the far-right congressman and former army captain is certainly in good company. Take, for example, the rise of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico’s president-elect. Like Bolsonaro threatens to do in Brazil, López Obrador has broken the center-right’s traditional dominance of Mexican politics.

But there the similarities end. In stark contrast to López Obrador’s leftist message, Bolsonaro has consistently highlighted his and illiberal social views over the course of the election campaign. Brazil’s likely next president is a long-time defender of the country’s former military dictatorship and a supporter of the armed forces, a point underlined by the selection of retired general Hamilton Mourão as his running mate. Some of Bolsonaro’s more controversial statements include his preference for a dead rather than a gay son, and his declaration that it would not be worth raping Congresswoman Maria do Rosario��because she was “.”

Not that such choice words have affected his popularity among ordinary Brazilians. Indeed, support for Bolsonaro increased after he was in September. During the first round of presidential elections on October 7, Bolsonaro won a spectacular 46% of , with his closest rival, Workers’ Party (PT) candidate Fernando Haddad, polling at 29%. predicts that Bolsonaro will receive 52% on October 28 against his challenger’s 41%.

Tapping into Popular Anger

So what explains the meteoric rise of someone like Bolsonaro in a country where memories of the last military dictatorship remain relatively fresh? Many Brazilians are weary of the interchange between PT and Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) governments. Despite the remarkable achievements of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s PT — rapid economic growth and an expanding — things were far from plain sailing for his predecessor Dilma Rousseff. Under her leadership, Brazil fell into a deep recession in 2014 due to economic mismanagement and a decline in global commodity prices. And while economic growth has since , conditions remain grim, with more than 12% of the population unemployed, and millions living back below the poverty line. Put simply, trust in the PT is at an all-time low, with many Brazilians holding the party responsible for economic hardship and much more.

Jair Bolsonaro has effectively tapped into this anger and desire to disrupt the status quo, particularly when it comes to and high levels of street violence. Brazil continues to struggle with the repercussions of 2014’s “” —“Car Wash” — the country’s biggest ever corruption scandal. The revelations contributed to the impeachment and eventual removal of Rousseff from office in August 2016, as well as the Lula’s imprisonment earlier this year.

As things stand, Brazil remains the home to 17 of the world’s most , with an annual homicide rate of . According to , support for the police has declined by almost 20% over the past few years, from 53% in 2010 to 34% in 2017. Neither do Brazilians have much faith in their democratic institutions. A suggests that only 13% of the population were satisfied with the state of democracy, way below the Latin American average of 30%. Further polling suggests that 97% of Brazilians think that the country is governed by an elite that only has its interests at heart. The polls also make for grim reading for Brazil’s incumbent president Michel Temer and his Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), with an of just 5%. His cause has hardly been helped by his arrest and charging with obstruction of justice (a charge which he categorically denies) and a narrow brush with impeachment.

The Man

Finally, there is Jair Bolsonaro the man, a passionate and charismatic individual who stands apart from the relatively dour Haddad and Temer. Many Brazilians have also warmed to his backstory — a devout Catholic from a small town and working-class background. Bolsonaro has proved particularly adept at using social media on the campaign trail, a significant development given his small budget and the absence of major party backers. His Facebook page currently has 7.8 million followers, five times as many as Fernando Haddad (1.5 million), and knocking President Temer’s paltry 628,000 into the long grass.

Bolsonaro’s popularity has also been boosted by his decision to choose the free-market economist Paulo Guedes as his potential finance minister. This is a remarkable development, given that he has advocated economic nationalism throughout his political career. Thanks to this change of heart, Bolsonaro received more votes from investors and wealthy Brazilians than he perhaps expected in the first round of the presidential election. Many believe that he will curtail social spending and implement much needed market-friendly reforms.

Jair Bolsonaro is adamant that he is the man to . The task at hand should not be underestimated. Far-reaching reforms are required to boost the country’s weak economic growth, including the consolidation of public finances and reform of the pension system. Brazil’s next president also needs to restructure a business environment that hampers foreign investment. Without such measures the country will continue to teeter on the brink of one fiscal crisis after another. Fighting corruption and improving public security will also be at the top of the to-do list.

In the absence of party support, Bolsonaro will have to quickly learn the art of coalition building and managing the different factions that make up Latin America’s most fragmented congress. This will be no mean feat, with the next parliament consisting of 30 parties in the lower house and 21 in the senate. Regardless of each candidate’s ambitions, plans and expectations it will undoubtedly be difficult for the incoming president to make Brazil great again.

While it’s true that Bolsonaro’s right-wing politics could pose a danger to Brazilian democracy, it does not necessarily mean a collapse or a slide into tyranny. First, it may be simply that Brazilians are hungry for a strong and charismatic leader — one that would resemble Lula. Second, Brazilian politics are about coalition building, so Bolsonaro won’t find it so easy to push his ideas through congress. Finally, Brazilians are known for impeaching their presidents when they cross a red line, so Bolsonaro will have to watch out as he navigates his political path.

*[GLOBSEC��is a partner institution of��.]

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Mexico goes to the polls on July 1 for what promises to be an unprecedented set of elections. Not only will Mexicans vote for the presidency, legislative posts, governors and mayors at the same time, but it’s also likely that they will opt for a president from outside the established party system. It is anticipated that a victory by��Andrés Manuel López Obrador��(known as AMLO) will add another nail to the coffin of the ruling bargain —��dedazo — that dominated the country between 1929 and 1990. His elevation to the top office will also demonstrate that, despite Mexico’s ongoing travails, its elections and relatively young democracy are free, fair and transparent.

Recent polling suggests that Obrador and the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) have built a significant lead over their rivals. According to Oraculus’ poll aggregator, Obrador is 13 points ahead of José Antonio Meade (25%), the candidate for the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), with Ricardo Anaya’s (23%) conservative National Action Party (PAN) in third place. This huge wave of support for AMLO was unthinkable a decade ago and reflects the emergence of two key trends in Mexican politics.

The first is that the country’s electorate is tired of the current political climate and hungry for change. Disillusionment with the political establishment has accelerated since the turn of the century. Put simply, Mexicans want fresh faces and new ideas for familiar problems such as crime, corruption and . Despite groundbreaking structural reforms introduced by President Enrique Peña Nieto, economic growth has fallen well short of expectations. It was hoped that closing corporate tax loopholes, opening Mexico’s energy sector to private investment and other initiatives would help the country’s economy to grow by 6% a year. As Peña Nieto’s term of office comes to an end, annual economic growth stands at a more modest 2.5%.

The outgoing Mexican president has also failed to deliver on his promise to improve security. Approximately have been killed in cartel-related violence over the past six years. According to the recent estimations the number of murders will pass 30,000 in 2018, more than the number of casualties for the previous year —��over according to government estimates. These victims don’t include (mostly from PRI) killed in the build up to the elections. Arguably the most appalling act of violence to have occurred during Peña Nieto’s presidency came in 2014, when heading to protests in the state of Guerrero were pulled off buses to be killed and burned by the local drugs gang (United Warriors).

Alongside rising violence, Peña Nieto’s PRI has been plagued by countless corruption scandals, with the chair of his 2012 election campaign currently under investigation for receiving bribes from Odebrecht, the Brazilian construction firm. Seventeen former governors have either been convicted or remain suspected of fraud and other criminal activities. Mexico currently ranks at 135 out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s . The country’s status as one of the world’s most corrupt seems well deserved.

Finally, Peña Nieto hardly did his PRI successor any favors when he invited then-US presidential candidate Donald Trump to Mexico in 2016. The visit of a would-be policymaker with a harsh opinion of the country and its citizens was viewed negatively by many Mexicans. The consequences of the decision to welcome an American politician who wants to build a border wall — for which Mexico is expected to pay — will most likely be felt in the days and weeks after Sunday’s elections.

The second important factor behind López Obrador’s growing popularity has been his ability to reinvent himself. The former Mexico City mayor has learned from the mistakes of his two previous presidential bids and successfully positioned himself as the country’s sole candidate of hope. Obrador secured this status by targeting and appealing to the average voter. Instead of solely identifying with Mexico’s poorest voters, he has also campaigned as a middle-class candidate, a strategy that has placed him firmly in the center of Mexican politics.

López Obrador has also taken MORENA into coalition with the Labor (PT) and conservative Social Encounter (PES) parties. In doing so, Mexico’s would-be president has shaken off his left-leaning tendencies and now presents himself as the only politician capable of bringing diverse groups and individuals together. This is the same approach to politics that the PRI employed almost 90 years ago.

Finally, López Obrador has replaced his criticisms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with vocal support and declarations that Mexico welcomes foreign investment. And while Trump remains a figure of hate for many Mexicans, AMLO has been careful not to use anti-US rhetoric on the campaign trail. It’s a tactical move that makes a lot of sense. Beyond a shared border and strong cultural, familial and historical ties, Mexico is the United States’ after China and Canada. Despite tense relations, both countries must find a way to work together. A Trump-led retreat from NAFTA would have dire consequences for Mexico’s economy.

Observers are divided over what López Obrador’s popularity means for Mexico’s short-to-medium-term future. While some worry that his anti-institutional rhetoric could pose a threat to Mexico’s democracy and economy, others are confident that he can transform his pragmatic campaigning into the type of politics that the country so desperately requires. It will also depend whether his coalition can gain a majority in both houses of congress.

Irrespective of who wins on July 1, the main job of Mexico’s new president is to make the country safe and tackle corruption. Doing this will help to reinforce Mexico’s political institutions and lay the foundations for a sustainable economic growth that works for all its citizens. As the columnist and political analyst Denise Dresser recently noted, Mexico needs an “accountability shock” and a president that will strengthen the rule of law and civil rights. Let’s hope the successful candidate can deliver this for ordinary Mexicans.

*[GLOBSEC is a of 51�Թ�. Updated: June 29, 2018, at 19:00 GMT.]

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On April 19 Raúl Castro will step down as Cuba’s president, ending almost six decades of his family’s rule of the Caribbean island. Contrary to some expectations, however, Havana will not embark on an extensive process of political transition. Even though the country faces a significant generational shift in power — most of the regime’s 80 and 90-year-old historicos (Raúl is 85) are also set to retire — the chances of systemic transformation remain very low. Seasoned and Cuba watchers instead see a continuation of the status quo: a non-Castro in charge, but no transition to a more liberal regime.

There are several reasons why Cuba will remain in Castro’s grip for the foreseeable future. To begin, Raúl’s most likely successor, Miguel Díaz-Canel, is considered the Castro brothers’ star pupil. Widely regarded as a but experienced manager, the 58-year-old vice president has risen sharply through government departments and Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ranks. In 2003 he became a member of the PCC’s principal policymaking committee, the Politburo, followed by education minister in 2009 and vice president of the six-member Council of State in 2013.

Díaz-Canel has also held top positions in the provinces of Villa Clara and Holguín. Both are centers of Cuba’s booming tourism industry and burgeoning private sector, regularly highlighted as success stories underpinning Raúl’s ambitious . The vice president’s “good relations’’ with the Cuban military are also significant. Despite stepping down from the presidency, Raúl will remain both first secretary of the PCC until 2021 and the unofficial chief of the armed forces.

There is no other person on the island who knows the military better than the outgoing president. Before replacing Fidel as head of state in 2008, Raúl served as defence minister from the beginning of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Indeed, the Cuban army has played an increasingly important role in government over the past decade, with several military officers and Raúl’s confidants serving as ministers. This has undoubtedly helped the army to consolidate its grip on Cuba’s economy. Through its conglomerate Gaesa, it owns the vast swathes of Cuba’s hotels, foreign exchange houses and ports. According to some , the army accounts for approximately 40-60% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings.

Consequently, it remains highly unlikely that the Cuban army will put political reform ahead of profits. Put simply, it has done very well out of economic reforms, which over the past decade have facilitated self-employment activities, tax cuts for companies and increased foreign investment. The army’s position is likely to be emboldened by the fact that despite improved diplomatic ties with the United States since 2014 and signing of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 2017, neither resulted in a loosening of Raúl’s grip on the country’s political system.

According to the Freedom House Index 2017, Cuba was the country in Latin America and the wider Caribbean region. Internet censorship and severe restrictions on the press, freedom of expression and assembly remain part and parcel of everyday life on the island. In addition, the , an independent nongovernmental organization, found that in 2016 Cuban authorities detained a record number of 9,940 individuals.

Thanks to Fidel and Raúl Castro, Cuba has been relatively successful in isolating itself from an increasingly interconnected world. However, given Venezuela’s parlous economic conditions, which for years oil supplies in return for doctors, teachers, sports trainers and military advisors, it will be hard for Havana to stay isolated for too long. Cuba is also facing major economic challenges that will be hard to solve within the existing model. These include weak GDP growth despite surging tourism (0.9% in 2016, as compared to the average of 2.8% between 2013-2015), damage caused by the destructive Hurricane Irma, and a dual-currency system that masks state inefficiencies.

Raúl’s successor must also consider the needs of an aging population (25% of Cubans are over 55 years old) and a Cuban youth that equates political change with greater opportunity. For its part, the government has responded by beginning to , despite fears that it will negatively impact the economy. It’s also likely that the appointment of a “young” non-Castro as Cuba’s new leader will be portrayed as a breath of political fresh air. But these changes are hardly Havana taking its first steps toward a bright democratic future.

By appointing an heir instead of a reformist, Cuba is signaling to the world that it only wants to open and modernize on its own terms. Yet, there is another way. Former authoritarians remaining prominent actors in the new political set up of a country is nothing new: Myanmar, Mexico, Poland, Spain or Tunisia are just a few examples. Indeed, history shows that authoritarian successor parties are quite often freely and fairly reelected to office. But this will not be the case of Cuba in 2018. Instead, an island located a mere 165 kilometers from the world’s leading democracy will remain a one-party authoritarian state, with or without a Castro at the helm.

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After finally seeing the end of the longest internal armed conflict in the Western hemisphere, Colombia is set to elect a new congress on March 11 and a new president on May 27. The 2018 elections cycle will be a response to the with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), signed in 2016, and its aftermath. Pro-peace politicians and skeptics are currently neck and neck in the opinion polls. Important criteria for voters include��individual candidates address current public concerns such as corruption, unemployment and security, as well as a strategy for negotiations with Colombia’s second largest insurgent group — the National Liberation Army (ELN).

The upcoming elections will mark the first time in Colombian history that former FARC combatants will hold seats in both chambers of congress and participate in presidential elections. Even though the peace accord automatically grants them five seats in both houses for two terms (until 2026), it remains to be seen whether they succeed or succumb to the same fate as Pablo Escobar’s foray into politics.

Peace Skeptics

Although most outsiders applauded President Juan Manuel Santos for signing the peace deal with the FARC (which won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016), his legacy in Colombia remains controversial. The main criticism has been leveled against a decision to grant immunity to the former guerrillas and allowing them to participate in political life — moves that were rejected by ordinary Colombians in a nationwide referendum. Wary of further objections, the Santos administration sought congressional approval rather than turning to the public to vote on amendments to the deal. It is hardly surprising that a by the pollster Invamer found that almost 70% of Colombians think that the peace agreement has been poorly implemented.

It would also be unwise to criticize Colombians for having such a dim view of the peace process. According to , about 7.7 million Colombians have been internally displaced by conflict-related violence since 1985. Additionally, the FARC performed more than 23,000 selective assassinations between 1981 and 2012 and 27,000 kidnappings between 1970 and 2010. According to the 2013 report, the group is also responsible for an additional 11,000 deaths or injuries resulting in amputations.

Finally, it’s by no means lost on the Colombian public that while the FARC has transitioned from guerrilla army to political party, it still uses the same acronym. The cosmetic name change from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia to People’s Alternative Revolutionary Force is supposed to reflect the group’s determination to actively participate in political life. “We have entered legal politics because we want to govern,”��said Iván Márquez, a member of FARC’s secretariat. Since then, the group has launched its political campaign and endorsed Rodrigo Londoño’s (or Timochenko, as the group’s former leader is known) presidential bid.

Both moves can be compared to Pablo Escobar’s aspirations for political power. Despite earning billions of dollars from exporting cocaine — a trade that ensured his place on Forbes’ richest list for seven consecutive years — the former head of the notorious Medellin Cartel dreamt of becoming Colombia’s president. With his increasing wealth, Escobar successfully ran for public office and even became a member of the lower house of congress. However, his political career was a short-lived strategic error. Being in the public spotlight meant Escobar had no choice but to confront his violent background, which eventually led to the revoking of his congressional seat. Thanks to their amnesty, FARC’s leaders have no such worries regarding their political careers.

Blank Ballots

Despite the fact that the peace agreement cannot be reversed until at least 2030 (in October 2017, Colombia’s constitutional court determined that the next three governments the accord commitments), the election campaign will be almost all about it. A recent indicates that the Partido Liberal (18%), which supports the peace deal, is garnering the same level of support as the Centro Democrático (CD, 16%), which rejects the accord. Additionally, similar to other parts of the world, independent candidates in Colombia with no apparent affiliations to traditional political parties are proving very popular (21%). Their popularity is strengthened by the findings of the latest , which suggests that only 10% of Colombians trust established political movements. What is more, 20% of Colombians said they will cast a in the presidential elections.

While the above opinion polls suggest that it is hard to predict who will win the next parliamentary elections, it nevertheless seems that CD, represented mainly through the ex-president Alvaro Uribe, is the most organized. The No campaign, which opposes the peace deal, is also particularly adept at mobilizing crowds and convincing people to turn out in high numbers on election day. It’s an altogether different story than President Santos’ Partido Social de Unidad Nacional (U Party), which is currently languishing at 8% in the polls.

The leftist Polo Democrático Alternativo is tipped to benefit the most from the U Party’s declining popularity, especially if it can convince undecided voters to support them. Polo Democrático Alternativo’s hand is further strengthened by the support it receives from indigenous tribes, Afro-Colombians, farmers and other social groups that have largely been ignored by the current government. The last big player is former President’s Vargas Lleras’ center-right, pro-peace Cambio Radical party, which has steadily gained popularity since its establishment in 2006. predicts that the FARC party will receive only 0.5% of the popular vote.

The race for the presidency is more open. Thanks to a constitution that forbids a��third consecutive term, we already know that neither incumbent President Santos nor Uribe can run. In keeping with the parliamentary elections, many candidates have started to explore ways to broaden their appeal through political coalitions and running as independents. Recent also suggest that focusing solely on the peace accord will not be popular. The successful candidate must address other concerns such as corruption (20%), the economy and unemployment (20%), combating terrorism (10%) and improving security (10%). Additionally, he or she must provide a concrete proposal for how the government should handle the implementation of the peace accord and possible negotiations with the ELN.

President Santos’ center-right coalition won the last two elections with promises of more equitable growth and the end of internal conflict. However, his critics say that instead of focusing on governance, he spent too much time, energy and political capital on accommodating a criminal group. As a consequence, his fell to 24%, a significant decline compared to 75% in 2011. It’s highly unlikely that his U Party will not endorse any candidate for the upcoming race.

Gustavo Petro, the leftist former mayor of Bogota and former member of the now-defunct M-19 rebel movement, currently with 22% support. He portrays himself as an anti-establishment��candidate and successfully attracts young people and those who do not trust traditional parties. Other candidates include Sergio Fajardo, the liberal former mayor of Medellin. His center-left electoral Coalición Colombia (which includes Partido Verde and Polo) supports the peace process and has built its campaign around anti-corruption and clientelism that plagues the Colombian public sector. Finally, there’s Centro Democrático’s Ivan Duque, a critic of the peace deal who is targeting the same groups that helped win the No vote in the referendum.

Flirting with Politics

The FARC’s flirtation with politics may become a curse rather than a blessing. Pablo Escobar’s example shows that being in the spotlight does not necessarily wipe the slate clean. However, his case also demonstrates that hunger for political power can be unstoppable. There is no doubt that the FARC has already achieved much more than Escobar. It can legally participate in political life and has been granted amnesty and seats in both chambers of parliament for two terms. However, Escobar’s dramatic fall from political grace should serve as a warning.

Last month’s further demonstrate the FARC’s lack of . This is particularly the case for its leader, Rodrigo Londoño, who recently polled the among the presidential candidates (1.6%). It’s safe to say that Timochenko will not be the next president of Colombia. After two terms in Congress, the FARC should also assess its achievements in politics. It might be more practical to move into business rather than meddle in the political sphere.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Put simply, last September’s general election was a disaster for Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD). With Martin Schultz at the helm, the party saw . Indeed, the results were so bad that the SPD leader ruled out the formation of another grand coalition (GroKo) with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Yet, four months on from the SPD’s poor showing, Schultz finds himself in a familiar scenario.

That’s because the rank and file of the SPD will decide on January 21 whether to commence formal negotiations for another CDU/CSU-SPD coalition. If both sides agree on a final deal, the SPD must then seek a further endorsement from ordinary party members. The stakes are undoubtedly high, both for ordinary Germans frustrated by months of political deadlock and EU member states yearning for Berlin to play a leading role in the tumultuous years ahead. Yet, there are several alternatives to a new GroKo. All of them present challenges, and none is ideal.

Nightmare Scenarios

Let’s get the most unfeasible option out of the way first — a minority government. This appeals neither to nor . Moreover, a recent Infratest dimap opinion poll suggests that only . It’s a finding that adds credence to the argument that stable governments with an average program are better than weak and volatile regimes that could fall at any point.

Taken at face value, it’s also an assumption that could potentially strengthen the case for the formation of an even “grander” coalition of political parties. Since becoming chancellor, Merkel has gained a reputation for bringing different political factions together — no mean feat given the domestic and international challenges she has faced over the past 12 years. It’s a quality that has also helped her to deflect criticism that the CDU has become very good at swallowing the ideas of its coalition partners because it doesn’t have enough of its own.

That said, a major factor behind Merkel’s efforts to initiate talks with her former SPD partners was last November’s breakdown of negotiations with the Free Democrats (FDP) and the Greens. The failure to reach an agreement was caused in part by the chancellor’s lack of flexibility and fears that her dominance could eat into the junior coalition partners’ votes at later elections. This is precisely why some SPD members are concerned about going into a new grand coalition. It’s also helps to explain why party officials across the political spectrum view the third option with a sense of trepidation.

Same as It Ever Was

Additional polls by Infratest dimap suggest that . Conversely, the same data also reveals that polling would most likely bring as last September, with Germany ending up exactly where it started. The case against prolonging the country’s political deadlock is further strengthened by the popularity that Merkel still commands among the wider electorate. Other opinion polls suggest that 90% of the population regards the chancellor as a source of political stability, with . Moreover, Merkel’s popularity only fell by a mere 6% in the aftermath of the failed “Jamaica” dialogue.

Despite the growing number of critics inside the CDU, there is neither the support nor enthusiasm for replacing her as party leader. The same is also true of Martin Schultz. Despite vocal opposition from the far left and the Young Socialists, the SPD leader seems poised to rise above last year’s electoral drubbing and take his party into another GroKo. If this happens, Schultz will begin dialogue with the tacit support of SPD moderates that are prepared to risk the loss of more votes at the 2021 general election to influence Germany’s current political landscape. To this end, Schultz might also end up as a minister of foreign affairs.

Weakened but Not Weak

The case for another four years of CDU/CSU-SPD government is further strengthened by Germany’s current economic fortunes. According to , real gross domestic product rose by 2.3% in 2017. Moreover, Germany currently enjoys a vast budget surplus and the (5.7%). Put another way, the German economy has remained resilient in the face of uncertain political conditions, and economic growth has been helped rather than hindered by the previous grand coalition.

That’s also good news for the EU’s remaining member states that can now expect a stable German government that’s keen to play a leading role in relaunching the European project. Indeed, some of the talking points from preliminary CDU/CSU-SPD meetings suggest an even more pro-European GroKo is on the cards. It’s been suggested that the SPD’s call for a “European awakening” has dominated initial conversations and has shaped the opening pages of the potential coalition’s new agenda.

Yet, there should be no room for complacency. Party politics across Europe is changing, with traditional parties losing ground to new movements. As the overall results of last September’s elections demonstrate, Germany is no exception, particularly when it comes to the left. Unless Germany’s political establishment can stem the tide caused by the likes of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), this might be the last time that Angela Merkel forms a GroKo involving the Social Democrats.

*[GLOBSEC is��a of 51�Թ�.]

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Most people start the new year with a renewed sense of hope and optimism for the future. It’s unlikely, however, that many Spaniards will be as enthusiastic about 2018 as other parts of the world. The stalemate in Catalonia will not be easily overcome and tensions with Madrid could flare up at any time.

Despite winning last month’s snap regional elections, it remains far from certain that the pro-independence coalition will be able to form a stable government. Catalonia’s next prime minister and the fate of the 18 politicians in jail, self-imposed exile or under investigation are among the issues that could undermine the coalition’s ability to break the deadlock with Madrid. What’s more certain is that the Catalan political landscape remains dominated by forces more interested in separating from Spain than governing this fragile region.

Just the Start

Catalonia’s December 21 election was significant for two reasons. First, the reflects the determination of many Catalans to resolve the secession issue one way or another. Second, the vote demonstrated that Madrid’s strategy of “winning hearts and minds” to restore “rule of law” was ineffective. Indeed, the outcome may have left Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy with less freedom to maneuver given that his . The biggest single vote-winner was actually the center-left Ciudadanos (Citizens), on whose support depends. It might well be the case that this unionist party will be the PP’s biggest competitor in the general election scheduled for 2020.

And while two — Carles Puigdemont’s JuntsxCat (Together for Catalonia) and Oriol Junqueras’ Esquerra (Republican Left) — won most seats, it’s the small anti-capitalist Popular Unity (CUP) that remains the most likely kingmaker. Despite holding only four seats in the new Catalan parliament, the CUP has a reputation for being a tough negotiator, as found out when he tried to form a government back in 2016. Indeed, the former Catalan leader’s inability to build rapport with the CUP resulted in his downfall and the selection of for the subsequent round of elections. To this end, the JuntsxCat leader’s “exile” in Brussels, coupled with the threat of arrest upon his return, might also prove to be an obstacle to forming a new administration.

Conversely, successful talks resulting in a JuntsxCat-Esquerra-CUP agreement would most likely be followed by efforts to reinstate Puigdemont as Catalonia’s prime minister and the formation of an administration hell-bent on unilateral independence. In response, , meaning that Spain’s Deputy Prime Minister Soraya Saenz de Santamaria will remain at the helm of the Generalitat of Catalonia.

The secessionist parties’ problems don’t end there. Despite winning 70 of the Catalan parliament’s 135 seats, 8 of their MPs are either in Brussels or in jail. Their failure to turn up for the opening parliamentary session on January 17 would reduce the bloc to 62 seats, six short of the amount required to form a majority government and select a new leader. There’s also the prospect of the secessionists losing another 10 MPs currently under investigation for illegal activities. Governing under these conditions would be virtually impossible.

Consequently, the pro-independence parties have a very tight deadline for forming a new government. Following two rounds of leadership elections in late January and early February, the secessionists have until April to form a new government or parliament will be dissolved. Under this scenario, JuntsxCat and Esquerra might try to work with Comú-Podem’s 8 MPs. However, a partnership with the former Podemos affiliate would not only preclude the CUP from government but also require the secessionists to significantly soften their stance on unilateral independence. While some Esquerra leaders have said they would set aside calls for independence in order to govern, JuntsxCat is unlikely to follow suit.

Unionist Disunity

Ultimately, the outcome of last December’s election cast further light on the divisions that exist within Catalan society. Despite turning out in record numbers, the result mirrored 2015, when roughly 47-48% of the electorate voted for either side of the independence debate. Indeed, while the pro-unity vote increased by 4.5% this time around, the pre-electoral hopes of a silent majority turning out to maintain the status quo did not materialize. This meant that the pro-union Ciudadanos also had no chance of forming a government with PP or Socialist Party (PSC) counterparts, despite achieving 25.4% of the popular vote.

Some misjudged decisions taken by Madrid, the post-referendum violence on the streets of Barcelona and short deadline for new regional elections are among the factors that also help to explain the unionist parties’ underwhelming performance. In addition, their cause was hardly helped by those Spanish legal experts who defended the prosecution of separatists for civil disobedience but disagreed over whether charges should include rebellion, which carries a maximum prison sentence of 30 years. As a result, Rajoy saw Catalan support for his party plunge from 8.5% to 4.2%. This turn of events also strengthened Ciudadanos’ claim that it is now best placed to take charge of the crisis and uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Spain. Additionally, if the general elections were to take place today, it would be (23%), that would be the most popular party.

Yet, it’s not all doom and gloom for the incumbent Spanish prime minister. The removal and imprisoning of former members of the Catalan government and other separatists sent a strong signal that Madrid will not tolerate any breach of the rule of law and Spanish constitutional order. It’s a decision that’s seemingly proved popular with the wider electorate after a recent opinion poll suggested that . From there, Rajoy must also seek to capitalize on the fact many Catalans remain reluctant to pursue the dream of full independence. A renewed approach to the Catalan question should be supported by fresh thinking on how to rebuild relations between Barcelona and Madrid.

As recent history has amply demonstrated, the very fact that a political scenario seems absurd and irrational to some commentators and observers doesn’t mean that it won’t happen. That’s another reason why Madrid should rethink what it can offer Catalans, up to and including a legal referendum on independence. Otherwise, Catalonia and the rest of Spain will remain in a harmful state of limbo that’s unwanted by separatists and unionists alike.

*[ in Foreign Policy is a of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Politicians in Madrid and citizens all over Spain accept the fact that Catalonia’s dream is to become an independent republic. However, nobody thought that the pro-independence coalition would go so far as to make its recent (and reckless) attempt to declare unilateral separation. Catalonia’s regional president, Carles Puigdemont, completely ignored both the signals of cooperation coming from Moncloa (Spain’s central government) and the rulings of the Spanish Constitutional Court. As a result, Catalonia has seen its autonomy suspended and most of its leadership imprisoned.

To further complicate matters, thousands of companies have moved their headquarters from the region, Spaniards are boycotting Catalan products, and .

Spain has faced numerous crises over the past decade. The deep economic and financial crisis of 2008 was followed in quick succession by the anti-austerity Indignados movement in 2011, multiple corruption scandals at both central and regional levels, and a year-long process of forming a stable government in 2016. Conversely, a (CIS), a Madrid-based pollster, found that Catalan independence ranks second (29%) among Spain’s three top problems, behind unemployment (66.2%) and just ahead of corruption and fraud (28.3%).

Accordingly, the recent crisis over the Catalan question following its illegal referendum and non-binding declaration of independence is another symptom of the country’s wider problems. The crisis also underpins a complex clash of democratic legitimacies, where inter-periphery tensions constitute a permanent feature of Spain’s political landscape. This is amply demonstrated by the findings of . While the overwhelming majority of respondents want Catalonia to gain more autonomy from Madrid (64.6%), many are also in favor of remaining part of (49.3%), rather than separating from, Spain (40.2%). Not to mention the fact that many Spaniards from Valencia, Galicia or Andalucia would also like to have a greater say on the future of their country. Indeed, the 1978 Spanish Constitution states that sovereignty resides with its people, which, in turn, implies that all Spaniards would have to agree on letting Catalonia leave the union.

Operation Dialogue

That said, separatism in Catalonia is partly rooted in its culture and history. While the region has never been , it nevertheless retains a strong regional identity and its own language, and was not fully incorporated into Spain until the early 18th century. In more recent times, nationalist parties have contributed to Spanish governance (1977-2012) and signed up to the constitution. However, mutual mistrust between the regional and central government has intensified, especially since the last economic crisis hit Spain. Madrid’s response left the majority of Catalans unhappy and feeling that Spain simply takes too much of their money.

The mobilization of nationalist sentiment and civil society gathered further momentum in 2010, following the Constitutional Court’s decision to partially outlaw the , which was approved both by a local referendum and the central government. While reviewing the statute, which defines the scope of self-government within the Spanish state, the court decided that promoting Catalan as the region’s main official language and calling Catalonia a nation violates the Spanish Constitution. What followed was years of inactivity on both sides to ease tensions. It’s hardly surprising, therefore, that the “” launched by Mariano Rajoy’s government in 2016, which consisted of frequent visits by the deputy prime minister to Barcelona and a promise of €4.2 billion in infrastructural investment by 2020, was destined to fail.

It is unlikely that recent developments in Catalonia will have an impact on the territorial organization of Spain, as it will most probably remain part of the kingdom for several reasons. First, secessionist parties have failed so far to win a clear majority in the Catalan Parliament, and many Catalans remain wary of independence. This feeds into the second point that support for independence may be crumbling. Prior to recent events, the ousted regional government failed to deliver on a key promise made to the Catalan people: a binding and effective referendum with legal guarantees. Moreover, even though the Catalan government claimed to have the required legitimacy, . Additionally, some high-profile secessionists have recently downplayed their enthusiasm for independence; these include former regional President

It should also be pointed out that Catalonia’s political parties were very quick to accept the new reality of Article 155 that removed the incumbent Catalan government and called for regional elections. Finally, world leaders are hardly falling over themselves to welcome Catalonia into the international fold, with the exception of Venezuela. As the European Commission was quick to point out, even if a referendum were to be organized in line with Spain’s Constitution, it would mean that an independent Catalonia would fall into the so-called “” and find itself outside of the European Union.

Whichever Scenario

The upcoming regional elections to be held on December 21 will be key in determining the future political landscape of both Catalonia and Spain. Recent polls suggest that (52%) in Parliament with the pro-independence Esquerra Republicana being the largest party (27%). It’s a scenario that should inspire both sides of the independence debate to moderate their positions and become constructive coalition partners. Smooth cooperation at the regional level would also vastly improve relations with Moncloa. This “new beginning” would not lead to a review of the Spanish Constitution, which could address the steps of a potential secession by Catalonia, but it could result in Catalonia being granted even more autonomy.

At the end of September, Spain’s government said it was willing to discuss if the region backed down from its demands for independence.” Back then the offer was not accepted, but it means that there is a room for maneuver on both sides. On the other hand, if the pro-independence movement does the unlikely and wins big on December 21, it will have a strong enough mandate to negotiate with Madrid for a countrywide, binding and effective referendum with legal guarantees. What will then follow is discussions regarding constitutional amendments that pave the way for secession.

Whichever scenario becomes reality, Madrid and Barcelona must stop blaming each other and restart genuine cooperation. Christmas would be the ideal time for Moncloa to begin a meaningful dialogue on all levels of society, taking care to include Spain’s youth, representatives from the nonprofit sector, businesses, finance and academia. Only by erasing misunderstandings and ignorance on both sides will it be possible to turn the current negative dynamics into a positive and forward-looking development for all Spaniards, the region and the EU.

*[This article was updated on November 21, 2017.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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