On October 1, Iran carried out six missile strikes against Islamic State (IS) targets in Abu Kamal, situated in eastern Syria near the Iraqi border. Iran’s state-owned television showed one “Death to America,” “Death to Israel” and “Death to al Saud.” The bold move was officially a retaliation for the deadly attack in Ahvaz, in the Iranian Province of Khuzestan, nine days earlier, which the Iranian leadership blames on IS. In addition to killing “many terrorists” in Abu Kamal, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) , the missiles also stockpiles of the Islamic State’s ammunition and infrastructure. By firing missiles over Iraq into Syria, the Iranians delivered a powerful message to Washington at a time when the Trump administration ratchets up its aggression against the Islamic Republic.

Put simply, the message is that five months after the US withdrew from the Joint Plan of Comprehensive Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran will not change its regional conduct or cave in to pressure from the United States, Israel and certain Arab Gulf states. When it comes to Syria, Iran is set to remain in the country despite the White House’s stated to cause a retreat of Iranian forces and proxies. As Tehran begins conducting a more muscular and “” approach in the region following America’s JCPOA decision, hardline elements within the Iranian regime — chiefly within the IRGC, which carried out the October 1 missile strikes — are being empowered.

Also, the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) October 3 ordered Washington to ensure that its anti-Iran sanctions do not harm humanitarian assistance or civil aviation security. This left officials in Tehran more determined to stay their rigid course even if the ICJ lacks the teeth to enforce the ruling against the United States, which was rejected by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

Other recent instances of Tehran acting confidently against perceived security menaces and asserting a stronger regional clout came on September 8 when at least 11 people in long-range missile attacks on the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan’s headquarters in Koya, Iraq, which belongs to the Kurdistan Regional Government. During the previous month, Iranian officials stated that over the previous several months, had transferred several dozen short-range ballistic missiles to Tehran-sponsored Shia militias in Iraq to deter attacks against Iran’s homeland. Depending on from where in Iraq they are placed, these missiles (Zelzal, Fateh-110 and Zolfaqar) can reach both the Saudi and Israeli capitals.

Pressures Within Iran

Such acts, along with the Iranian intelligence ministry’s alleged role in the to attack a gathering by the militant Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen-e Khalq in France in June, illustrate how hardliners within the Islamic Republic are demonstrating more will to operate with greater autonomy from the central government, without obtaining permission before acting in the region. As the Iranian economy continues to suffer many ills, from rising unemployment and inflation to excess liquidity, as Washington’s sanctions continue to hurt the country, President Hassan Rouhani appears to find himself in a difficult political situation. That the parliament has summoned Rouhani to provide answers to questions about the country’s economic crises, and with a number of voices calling for his impeachment, the extent to which his centrist government has failed to meet the average Iranian citizen’s expectations about the economic rewards that JCPOA was to bring is clearly highlighted.

As such pressures within Iran intensify, moderate elements within the government struggle to maintain relevance in the country’s political arena. With nationalist sentiments on the rise, moderates have been prompted to align, at least to some degree, with hardliners in support of Tehran’s assertive conduct across the region. For the Iranian leadership, given the Trump administration’s rhetoric and conduct that leave many Iranians fearing a US-orchestrated regime change plot, engaging the White House at this point would be humiliating, particularly given how anti-Iranian Trump’s foreign policy has been since he entered the Oval Office.

Now with the Trump administration calling on Iran to leave Syria, and with a number of Sunni Arab states appearing set on welcoming the regime of Bashar al-Assad back from the cold, the White House, along with its Arab Gulf allies, seems optimistic about plans to accept Assad staying in power for the long term, but only with his regime putting space between itself and Iran. IRGC leaders, however, have declared that Iranian forces will remain in Syria as long as the Damascus regime demands their presence. Given how much Assad owes Iran for his survival, it is difficult to imagine the Syrian regime being in any position to push out the Iranians, who currently wield unprecedented influence over the Baathist order in Damascus.

Further Away from Diplomacy

That Iran’s missiles landed within three miles of US troops in Syria on October 1 shows how grave the risks are of intense friction originating in Washington and Tehran spiraling out of control in the Middle East. With US National Security Adviser on September 24 that the US military would remain in Syria “as long as Iranian troops are outside Iranian borders and that includes Iranian proxies and militias,” the 2,000 US troops currently in the country face a likelier possibility of a direct confrontation with Iran’s roughly .

Doubtless, Syria will remain a major point of contention between the US and Iran. Even when bilateral relations were at their warmest after the signing of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015 while Barack Obama was in the White House, Washington and Tehran had serious conflicts of interest in Syria notwithstanding their mutual interest in defeating IS. The JCPOA resolved neither both sides’ opposing stakes in the Syrian crisis, nor any other non-nuclear issue. Yet the nuclear deal afforded both the US and Iran the means to build on some degree of trust to work toward finding common ground on such regional issues such as Syria, along with Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan.

Without the JCPOA as a foundation, Washington and Tehran are set to address their conflicting interests in Syria on terms that move farther away from diplomatic strategies, raising serious risks of an American-Iranian war that could bring far more devastation and instability to the Middle East than the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On July 25, Yemen’s Houthi rebels attacked a Saudi Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) near the Bab-al-Mandab strait, causing Riyadh to unilaterally suspend oil shipments through the maritime artery. Saudi Arabia’s decision to suspend oil shipments through Bab-al-Mandab is not only about security, but is also a move aimed at changing Western discourse about the Yemen War and turning more attention to the Houthis’ threat to American and European economic interests rather than the Saudi-led coalition’s actions inside Yemen.

As Sadad al-Husseini, a former senior executive at Saudi Aramco, : “Rather than allowing these hostile maneuvers to go unnoticed in the eyes of the world, the Saudi (energy) minister has placed Iran’s subversions of the whole global economy under the spotlight for everyone to see.” Houthi-run Almasirah news channel was first to the July 25 attack. Conflicting sides have reported contradictory stories. Houthis claim that they have damaged the Saudi battleship Dammam, whereas the Saudi media claim that two of their VLCCs were targeted, but that the Houthis failed to inflict any serious physical damage or casualties. Saudi Arabia has yet to release the names or images of the vessels. It could have been Al-Mahfoza carrier, crude oil from Ras Tanura to Jazan.

According to Saudi and Yemeni officials, the Houthis launched the attack from the besieged port city of Hodeida, which is currently subject to an UN-regulated ceasefire process. Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led coalition forces launched an offensive to recapture the Red Sea port on June 13, but paused the offensive on July 1 to allow for the UN-mediated settlement.

Brent crude oil futures increased 0.6%, reaching $74.35 per barrel on the day of the Houthi attack and Saudi Arabia’s decision to suspend shipping through the maritime artery.��

Economic and Geopolitical Context

The Bab-al-Mandab strait is one of the most vital transit corridors in international maritime trade. Although the throughput capacity of the strait is almost three times less than the Strait of Hormuz, it plays an indispensable role in the supply of crude oil and petroleum products to European and Asian markets. Roughly 10% of the transits this maritime chokepoint.

Navigation through the strait is both northbound and southbound. The narrowest point of the transit corridor is between Perim Island and the Arabian Peninsula. Perim, a volcanic island, divides the strait into two passages. The western part is not suitable for navigation, the eastern passage is used for international shipping. UAE-trained pro-government forces have been controlling the island since it from Houthi rebels earlier this year.

Any disruption of the navigation through the strait can prevent northbound oil tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or the Suez-Mediterranean (Sumed) pipeline complex. The bulk of Europe’s oil and almost all of its jet fuel imports are transported through the strait. Crude vessels carry about 1.5 million bpd of crude oil produced from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman to European ports, while Iran and Iraq export around 1 million bpd through the strait to the European Union and Turkey.

Riyadh immediately took advantage of the recent escalation in tensions between Washington and Tehran to reify the rhetoric around destabilizing Iranian activity in the region. The attack came almost 20 days after Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz and more recently the exchange of threats between the US President Donald Trump and Rouhani. The Houthi attack has been immediately interpreted by the Saudis as an indication that Iran may make good on its promise to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

Immediately after the attack, Yemeni vice president, Lt. Gen. Ali Mohsen, was quick to for trying to disrupt international shipping and undermining the peace process. The Saudi-led coalition had repeatedly claimed that Houthis were not committed to the peaceful regulation of the conflict and this disruption and were using the peace process to deploy more forces. Hence, the attack on a crude carrier could be easily exploited to demonstrate that Houthis are not committed to the peace process in order to justify its military campaign against rebel-controlled Hodeida. It is too early to predict whether there will be further trade disruptions in the strait as Saudi Arabia is so far the only country to temporarily suspend its shipments.

To the Negotiating Table

The July 25 attack against Saudi vessels must be understood within the context of the Iran-backed rebel militia stepping up its aggression against the kingdom and the UAE, underscored by the recent Houthi-claimed drone strike targeting Abu Dhabi’s airport. The Houthi fighters are determined to bring their Arab Gulf enemies to the negotiating table by demonstrating that continued fighting will leave them only more vulnerable to growing threats to their vital economic and security interests.

The Houthis’ determination to speed up the process of bringing Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to the negotiating table with a genuine commitment to make painful concessions and compromises for the sake of conflict resolution builds up against the backdrop of an increasingly anti-Iranian foreign policy waged by the United States — underscored by Washington’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal — and Saudi Arabia, which has made clear the kingdom’s position in favor of regime change in Tehran.

The Houthis’ July 25 attack sends a message not only to Riyadh about the Houthis’ capacity to attack Saudi Arabia’s core interests as an oil exporter, but also signals Iran’s capacity to target America’s geo-economic interests in the Red Sea via Tehran’s proxies and partners. Unquestionably, the US is vulnerable to Iran’s capacity to attack Washington’s interests asymmetrically in the waters near the strategically-prized Bab-al-Mandab, which must be considered as the Trump administration steps up rhetoric against the regime in Tehran and implements increasingly aggressive policies aimed at pushing back Iranian influence in Yemen and other parts of the Arab and Islamic world.

Odds are good that as Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to make their case against Iran before the West and the international community at large, their leaders will strongly emphasize how the Iranian-backed militias in Yemen are threatening global trade near one of the busiest shipping routes in the world. Ultimately, while Saudi and Emirati officials have been keen to downplay Houthi missile and rocket attacks that have reached their soil, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will likely hype the Houthis’ strikes against targets in the Red Sea in pursuit of greater international support for their operations in Yemen.

*[Updated: August 2, 2018, at 15:45 GMT.]

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In October, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) unveiled , a futuristic desert city that he hailed as a “civilizational leap for humanity.” Situated next to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, the NEOM zone is close to major maritime trade corridors via the Suez Canal and has potential to further deepen economic links between multiple continents. NEOM will feature the future King Salman Bridge, connecting the city, which is expected to become , with Egypt and, by extension, all of Africa.

The will encompass roughly 10,000 square miles, stretching into Jordan and including the Red Sea islands Sanafir and Tiran, recently ceded to the kingdom by Egypt. Despite the challenges of making this project a success, the Saudi leadership envisions NEOM becoming a centerpiece of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (FIR) and innovation, ensuring that the kingdom completes a necessary social and political transition.

NEOM comes from the Latin word for “new” (neo). The final “m” stands for the Arabic word for “future” (mostaqbal). The project, which MBS stated will be built by “people who live in the desert” who possess “colossal will, determination and drive,” will be a part of a new Saudi framework. In addition to domestic and foreign investors, the Saudi government will back NEOM with more than $500 billion, and the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund — the Public Investment Fund (PIF) — will the futuristic project. MBS spoke of a , seemingly based on .

NEOM, which is to open by 2030, will rely heavily on the food, entertainment, energy, water, manufacturing and biotechnology sectors, but most importantly the city is promised to feature state-of-the-art Artificial Intelligence (AI), drones, nanobiology labs, solar panels, hyperloops, luxury retailers and first-rate restaurants. In line with MBS’ plans to address climate change, with clean energy powering the urban landscape.

to purchase a large stake in the Saudi Electricity Company that will provide the energy required by NEOM. Saudi Arabia’s government began investing in Softbank Vision Fund to the tune of $100 billion to pave the way for the information revolution’s next chapter.

Planning Ahead

NEOM fits into MBS’ plans for leading Saudi Arabia on its “return” to “moderate Islam,” with a less strict version of Sharia law and gender mixing encouraged under this new city-state model. The , situated south of NEOM on the kingdom’s Red Sea coast, will be made up of luxury resorts, covering as many as 50 islands and 13,127 square miles. This area between the cities of Umluj and al-Wajh is larger than Belgium and is set to become a tourist hotspot. RSCR and NEOM, which will be Saudi Arabia’s largest construction projects to be achieved in progressive steps set for 2022 and 2030, promise to make the Red Sea locale in Saudi Arabia a vibrant and busy regional trade hub that attracts tourists and businessmen from all corners of the world. To make the zone more attractive internationally, there will be looser social rules, with alcohol legalized in RSCR.

Both NEOM and RSCR have the potential to transform the Red Sea into a thriving regional hub that boosts the Hijaz’s regional and international standing as a travel destination for tourists and business entrepreneurs alike. Also, with Saudis making major investments outside the kingdom, NEOM represents an opportunity to counter the decline of the oil-rich country’s GDP, as oil prices remain controlled by the Saudi-Russian agreement, by encouraging domestic investment to minimize GDP flight that has resulted from minimal opportunities to invest in Saudi Arabia. Added to the equation is the Hajj and Ummrah industries, which will fuel further revenue and economic growth, helping to diversify the Saudi economy beyond its traditional hydrocarbon sector. By 2030, no matter what the path, the kingdom sees its geo-economic center in these three projects.

Naysayers are recalling Saudi Arabia’s past attempts at grand projects. In the mid-2000s, King Abdullah recognized that to succeed in the future, Saudi Arabia must adopt visionary policies, break with the country’s ultra-conservative tradition and dispense with the shackles of oil dependency. The construction of six “” under his leadership was designed to enhance economic competitiveness, create new jobs and diversify Saudi Arabia’s economy. However, even before the plummeting of oil prices in 2014, these cities’ progress came slow, primarily due to the kingdom’s lack of an efficient economic model capable of reversing Saudi Arabia’s ministerial inertia enough to make grand objectives set forth by King Salman’s predecessor a reality. The announcement of NEOM raises serious questions about how realistic such dramatic change can be in the kingdom while also drawing attention to the plethora of issues that continue to plague it.

Yet, in the NEOM case, MBS and his team are setting out a vision for the fourth Saudi state. The aptly named NEOM stands for a new operating model, a fundamental adaptation to new realities. The kingdom’s new operating model is Vision 2030, which foresees Saudi Arabia both as the epicenter of the Middle East’s economic future and also as a global leader in embracing the FIR’s fusion of technologies that blurs the lines between the physical, digital and biological spheres. For having the tenacity to embrace NEOM as the centerpiece of the kingdom’s future, MBS deserves credit, for he sees NEOM not only as a near-term objective, but also as a springboard that he hopes will secure a strong position for Saudi Arabia in the global economy for the long term.

Challenges and Realizations

Due to the Saudi youth bulge, NEOM raises major social questions regarding the social ramifications of high unemployment rates amid an era of accelerated automation jobs. Naturally, the issue of labor under the kingdom’s National Transformation Plan is to be dealt with as , with greater centralized authority placed in the hands of individual leaders and more capital being directed at public programs with the aim of improving the overall economy and standard of living for the kingdom’s citizenry. The , according to Saudi officials.

The FIR is already disrupting national economies worldwide, but not every country has the financial resources to take advantage of advancements in technology that are drastically changing the international economic system. Despite being the world’s oil-richest country, NEOM’s price tag will be steep even for Saudi Arabia. Given the project’s grand objectives, the $500 billion MBS has already committed to making NEOM a reality is a conservative estimate. Indeed, financing NEOM may prove immensely difficult as the kingdom, which depends on the hydrocarbon sector bringing in 90% of national revenue, is already burdened by a persistently low��price of oil, substantial entitlement obligations to its citizens and financial commitments to existing projects.

Although in the future, funding for NEOM could come from sources of wealth outside the hydrocarbon sector, for at least the near term the futuristic city will be financed by petrodollars. Thus, the price of oil in upcoming months and years will determine how easily the Saudis will finance the first stages of this grand project. Other factors that will undermine Riyadh’s ability to finance NEOM and other pillars of Vision 2030 include the Saudi Aramco IPO’s recent setbacks and the costly quagmire in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia is promoting international investment to fund NEOM, and a number of investors have already expressed interest. On the heels of King Salman’s visit to Moscow in October, Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, the , said it will commit billions of dollars toward bringing Russian companies that specialize in AI, port infrastructure, high-speed transportation, health and education to NEOM.

Yet where this money may come from remains to be seen. British business magnate , and Japan’s SoftBank Vision Fund is already active in the kingdom. Yet to secure sufficient amounts of foreign investment and successfully position NEOM as a global hub, the Saudis must make their country an attractive destination for international businessmen and investors. Security risks stemming from the Yemen crisis’ spillover into the kingdom’s territory and problems with Saudi Arabia’s brand in Western countries will challenge the Saudi leadership to do so in an effort to achieve NEOM’s full potential.

NEOM is a dream that adds excitement and impetus to Vision 2030. Of course, there is risk involved throughout numerous areas, from finance and insurance to construction, in addition to the multifaceted impacts that this project will have on Saudi society. Even if rocky, the path will be necessary as Saudi Arabia embarks on a revolutionary transformation.

*[Gulf State Analytics is a of 51�Թ�. The article was updated on November 1, 2017.]

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Since Saudi Arabia’s King Salman ascended to the throne in January 2015, there has been much discussion about an “unlikely partnership” or “tacit alliance” between Israel and the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Earlier this month, the Arab Gulf states in an unreleased discussion paper an offer to establish better relations with Tel Aviv if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu commits to reinvigorating the Palestinian peace process.

Under the terms, if Israel would halt the construction of settlements in the West Bank and permit freer trade into the Gaza Strip, the GCC states would establish direct telecommunication links with Israel, allow overflight rights to Israeli aircrafts and lift certain trade restrictions. Although Netanyahu’s office declined to comment on the paper, the initiative underscores the vastly improved ties between Israel and the Arab Gulf states, which have no official diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.

Tacit Alliance

In light of US President Donald Trump’s decision to make Saudi Arabia and Israel the first two countries of his first official international trip this month, and his administration’s stepped up anti-Iranian posturing and rhetoric, the idea of a more official GCC-Israel alliance would receive extensive support from the White House, as well as from American lawmakers on both sides of the aisle.

To be sure, there is an undeniable partnership between the Israelis and Arab Gulf states based on a common threat perception of Iran. Since 2016, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has participated in that included Israel. The most recent one, held in March, was aimed at “strengthening ties among the participating countries, maintain[ing] joint readiness and interoperability.” In 2009, Tel Aviv lent its support to Abu Dhabi’s bid to headquarter the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), now an Abu Dhabi-based international agency that assists countries with renewable-energy usage. In November 2015, Israel opened its in the UAE to represent itself as IRENA.

The story of , an Israeli entrepreneur whose high-tech security companies built monitoring systems at New York’s airports and undertook a major project in the UAE, is telling. Kochavi was a part-time resident of the US, with companies based in several countries. He offered one of his firm’s services to the UAE’s leaders. He was transparent about his company’s technology and its employees being mainly Israeli. The Emirati officials maintained that, as long as none of the contractors were permanently based in Israel, there was no problem.

Kochavi’s company, AGT International, based in Zurich, installed surveillance gear (cameras, sensors, license-plate readers, etc.) throughout the UAE’s capital and along the country’s border with Saudi Arabia. AGT International’s operation in the UAE, which lasted from 2007 to 2015, was “the most comprehensive integrated security system in the world at the time,” according to . Kochavi managed it out of the US and Switzerland, but Logic Industries, another Kochavi company based in Israel, provided the brainpower for the project.

In addition to the UAE, Israel has cooperated with other Arab Gulf states. For decades, Israel and Saudi Arabia have maintained backchannel communications. Recently, since the Syrian crisis erupted, Saudi and Israeli officials have held meetings in Jordan to discuss Riyadh and Tel Aviv’s common concerns over the ongoing conflict. Israeli defense officials have engaged in covert dialogue with their Saudi counterparts on the Iran file too. Between the end of 2013 and June 2015, secretly held five bilateral meetings in India, Italy and the Czech Republic to discuss what both governments perceive as a grave threat posed by Iran to the Middle East.

, a former head of policy planning at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that by 2009 there was security cooperation between Israel and the GCC members. This limited cooperation, nevertheless, set a precedent for enhanced collaboration in the months between the announcement of the Geneva interim agreement or Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) in November 2013 and the actual agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), later in July 2015. During this period, Etzion claimed that Israeli and GCC officials were collaborating in their lobbying in the Beltway against Iran.

Doha Debates

There is also a history of significant interaction between Israel and Qatar. After the Israelis and Palestinians signed interim peace accords in 1993, Doha and other Arab governments lifted an economic ban on Israel. In 1996, Israel opened a during a trip that then- took to Doha. Over a decade later, Peres returned for the “Doha Debates” and answered 300 Arab students’ questions. Qatari-Israeli relations took a downturn in 2009, however, when Qatar the commercial office in response to Operation Cast Lead.

Twice in 2010, Doha offered to in exchange for Israel’s permission to provide Gaza with building materials and financial aid. Citing “security reasons,” Israeli officials rejected both offers. However, since the devastation resulting from Operation Protective Edge, Israeli officials have cooperated with Qatar’s rebuilding of 1,000 homes in Gaza with the importation of materials into the strip all under Israel’s eyes. In 2013, an visited Doha to discuss Qatari investment in Israel’s hi-tech sector. A year ago, at returning to better relations between Israel and Qatar, when he expressed his hopes to receive an invitation to the Arab Gulf emirate during an online conversation with an Al Jazeera anchor.

Part of Israel’s interest in pursuing better ties with the GCC relates to Hamas and the Palestinian group’s relationship with Iran. The Israelis would prefer to see Hamas shift toward the GCC states’ sphere of influence while away from Iran’s. The logic is straightforward: Hamas receives arms from Iran while Qatar provides the group with humanitarian assistance, and given that Doha, unlike Tehran, is a close ally of Washington, the Qataris are not expected to provide resistance factions in Gaza with weapons. Thus, with Hamas within the orbit of the US’ “moderate” Sunni Arab Gulf instead of Iran’s, the Israelis believe the group will pose less of a threat. Given that Hamas’ ties with Tehran caused substantial friction between the under King Abdullah’s rule (2005-2015), Riyadh and other GCC capitals would also prefer to see Hamas completely sever ties with Iran.

Perception of Threat

The key question is the following: Can the threat perception of the Islamic Republic lead to more formalized relations between Israel and the GCC? This seems quite unrealistic given the positions embraced by Israel’s current government on the Palestinian question. Odds are good that the GCC states will not follow Egypt and Jordan in establishing formal diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, unless Israel agrees to the Arab-Peace Initiative or some agreed-upon peaceful resolution to the Palestine-Israel conflict that gives Palestinians a sovereign and independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The GCC states are under pressure to keep a low profile when it comes to any cooperation with the Israelis. Although the Arab Gulf governments are keen to work pragmatically with those actors that share their interests, in the GCC countries public opinion is firmly on the side of the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel, even if the plight of Palestinians is not as much a central issue across the greater Arab world as it once was decades ago. Arab Gulf rulers have to take stock of this reality. Their own countries’ public opinion has pressured them to interact with Israel either discreetly or through a third party, such as Washington. Similarly, as underscored by both Qatar and Oman’s closing of Israeli trade missions in their countries following violence against Palestinians in and , respectively, the GCC governments cannot afford to be seen as too close to Tel Aviv when Palestinians are suffering under Israel’s occupation and apartheid system.

Discussions about an Israel-GCC alliance will likely continue to intrigue many. Undoubtedly, Israel sees Iran’s regime, much more so than any Sunni Arab one, as a threatening force. The Arab Gulf states, in turn, do not perceive Israel as a direct threat to their security, yet Saudi Arabia and some other council members view the Islamic Republic as an existential threat. Given that Israel and the GCC maintain close alliances with the US, there is certainly much more potential for deeper cooperation in the pursuit of countering Iran. Yet in all probability, Tel Aviv’s relationship with the Arabian Peninsula’s six monarchies will remain unofficial and controversial.

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Earlier this month, King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud became the first Saudi monarch to visit the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam, spending one day in this Southeast Asian Muslim-majority country 20 years after his first visit as the then-governor of Riyadh. As part of his three-week Asia tour, King Salman went to Brunei as well as China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia and the Maldives, with the expressed intention to boost the kingdom’s investment, commercial, security and cultural relations with Asian states, including four Muslim-majority nations. Although his visit to the monarchy in Borneo was brief, it was significant for several reasons.

The Saudi king met with Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah, the sultan of Brunei, who also serves as prime minister, finance minister, defense minister and supreme commander of the armed forces. Both heads of state agreed to deepen Riyadh and Bandar Seri Begawan’s cooperation on a host of global and regional issues, .

The sultan of Brunei his “important and historic visit” and hailed the “continuous, fraternal, friendly and bilateral relations binding” the kingdom and the sultanate. Before the Saudi king departed for his vacation in Bali, the two monarchs agreed to deepen cooperation in the spheres of trade, investment, education, culture, youth and sports. The Saudi and Bruneian leaders highlighted the importance of strengthening bilateral cooperation in political, military, security and Islamic affairs.

Shortly before King Salman visited the sultanate, Brunei’s ambassador to Riyadh, Hisham bin Abdul Aziz, that the Saudi monarch was visiting the Southeast Asian country due to its important location in the Asia Pacific and its membership in both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Jeddah-headquartered Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The ambassador asserted that the two countries share views on international issues, have common visions and are united in their rejection of extremism.

This rhetoric may seem to be standard diplomatic prose. Yet Saudi Arabia and Brunei are indeed aligned, and a growing relationship is bringing the kingdom and the sultanate closer to the point that Saudi Arabia can influence Brunei media. Five months ago, this was clear when Saudi Arabia’s unhappiness with the Bruneian press’ reporting on Hajj politics resulted in the sultan shutting down The Brunei Times, which claimed that because of the kingdom’s economic problems.

Saudi Arabia-Brunei Relations

The history of the kingdom and the sultanate’s relationship took off gradually and modestly. Saudi Arabia opened its at the level of chargé d’Affairs in 1995. Two years later, King Salman, as the then-governor of Riyadh, became the . In 2001, the two governments upgraded relations and signed an agreement of cooperation in tourism and joint investments in gas, oil, petrochemicals, health, agriculture and livestock. Six years later the agreement finalized, leading to the development of an increasingly positive bilateral relationship.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations 22 years ago, Sultan Bolkiah has visited the Saudi Arabia on , meeting King Fahd in 1998 and King Abdullah in 2011. These two trips to the kingdom came at pivotal times in Brunei’s development. The sultan’s meetings with both Saudi monarchs focused on Islamic and global issues. During the 2011 meeting, Riyadh sought Bruneian investment in one of the “Six Saudi Economic Cities” plan as part of economic .

Saudi Vision 2030 versus Vision Brunei 2035

Saudi Arabia and Brunei’s plans for transforming their economies away from energy dependence are similar. Like Saudi Arabia, Brunei’s long-term on the gas and oil sectors, which are responsible for 98% and 93% of national exports and government revenues, respectively. In total, 70% of the country’s exports are to India, Japan, South Korea and Thailand. Natural gas-thirsty Japan tops the list, receiving 36% of Brunei’s .

Outside of gas and oil, there is little to Brunei’s economy. Although most estimates suggest that Brunei’s gas and oil exports will hold steady until at least 2030-40, the country is committed to an economic diversification agenda as outlined in Vision Brunei 2035. This plan, unveiled in 2008, seeks to capitalize on the sultanate’s potential to become a major Islamic finance hub in the Asia Pacific, or an “Islamic Singapore,” which requires from Indonesia and Malaysia.

Tourism is another important pillar of Vision Brunei 2035. From 2002-13, Brunei’s tourism industry was the only one in Southeast Asia that did not grow. Unquestionably, the global media’s coverage of Islamic law implementation contributed to the ossified tourism industry’s inability to lure more tourists, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who have opted to spend their vacations in other parts of Southeast Asia such as Indonesia and Malaysia where the practice of Islam is more tolerant. In Brunei, there are severe restrictions on non-Muslims’ rights to practice their own religion and, under the blasphemy law, insulting the Quran or declaring one’s apostasy are crimes punishable by death. Nonetheless, the Bruneian leadership is determined to make their country a more popular tourist destination.

Nearly a decade after launching Vision Brunei 2035, the sultanate’s economic system is demonstrating signs of strain. Of the country’s 420,000 citizens, those who work are mainly in the public sector, which means that Brunei’s civil service will suffer the most as the sultanate’s economic restructuring occurs. This same phenomenon is also taking place in Saudi Arabia. Brunei’s youth unemployment rate has increased in recent years, largely due to many youth waiting for higher-ranking public jobs, which results in social restlessness among . Brunei’s domestic situation is similar to some of the discontent seen in .

New Geoeconomic Realities in Southeast Asia

By pulling the United States out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), one of President Donald Trump’s first moves in the Oval Office was to null what was to be the world’s largest free trade agreement. As a result, China’s economic poise in the region can only expand further. Brunei, having been a member of the TPP as well as Beijing’s alternative, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), is likely to shift toward China’s geoeconomic influence. Officials in Bandar Seri Begawan and other Southeast Asian states, no longer able to count on Washington to promote a regional trade bloc aimed at countering Beijing’s influence in the global economy, will as the “driver of trade liberalization” in the 21^st century.

For Saudi Arabia, which has an important role to play in China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR), Beijing’s growing power in the global economic order is a valuable opportunity. Having redirected its oil sales to Asia (chiefly China) and away from the West at the start of the century, the kingdom has already made its geoeconomic pivot to the East. Recognizing the significance of the TPP’s demise for Brunei and other Asian countries, King Salman’s visit to the region came at an opportune time in which ASEAN members are seeking new partners while cautiously eyeing the potential for RCEP to deepen their links with the rest of the world via OBOR and other emerging Chinese-run trade corridors.

Islam, Oil and Iran

King Salman’s trip to the sultanate came with much symbolism. As the first Saudi monarch to visit Brunei, he sent an important message that he sees the sultan of Brunei as a fellow royal and that he approves of his religious legitimacy as the leader of his country’s citizens. Brunei has a special geostrategic and religious position in Borneo and the greater Asia Pacific region. Brunei’s authorities impose a version of Islamic law that is far harsher than what their Malaysian and Indonesian counterparts enforce, and the country is much more in sync with Saudi Arabia in terms of legal and religious strictures and hierarchy.

The sultan of Brunei decided to implement Islamic law in October 2004 for several reasons. First, he wanted to bring a new stability to Brunei, which the sultan saw as a requirement for society from outside ills such as drugs and crime. Second, the sultan thought that by introducing Islamic law Brunei could attract more foreign from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). A third reason was the regional security environment with al-Qaeda running in Saudi Arabia as well as the Asia Pacific. At this point, Bandar Seri Begawan sought to seek a closer relationship with its Muslim neighbors and Saudi Arabia to prevent any jihadist attack on Bruneian soil.

Brunei’s Islamic law in three phases. The first phase focused on family and community. The second phase focused on property offenses. The third phase instituted punishments for adultery, abortion, homosexuality and blasphemy. It is important to note that roughly one-third of Brunei’s population is non-Muslim, made up of Hindu and Chinese communities. The country’s , including Buddhists and Christians who represent 15-20% of the sultanate’s population, are adjusting to the new legal regime in the sultanate which, for example, requires Christians to notify the authorities of their and confine such traditions to their communities.

Like Saudi Arabia, Brunei has received ample criticism from activists across Western societies. Also, in Southeast Asia many voices condemn the expansion of Saudi influence in the region, maintaining that Wahhabism does not sit well in countries like Malaysia and Indonesia. Yet for Saudi Arabia, a conservative Sunni Muslim country such as Brunei offers the kingdom an opportunity to further use its position in the Muslim world to deepen its political, cultural and religious links.

The kingdom is also seeking to strengthen its leverage within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and work to make the cartel as influential in global oil markets as possible. Of course, with increased competition from non-OPEC oil producers, both the cartel itself and Saudi Arabia have lost leverage in the international oil market. Enhancing ties with more members of the cartel in terms of market share is a priority for Riyadh as it seeks to make its members more disciplined at a time when some in OPEC are considering the benefits of breaking away. The prospects of OPEC falling are deeply unsettling to both Saudi Arabia and Brunei as such a development would lead to oil prices falling based on a supply/demand equilibrium. Although OPEC’s fall would unquestionably create some winners with petroleum becoming cheaper, the Saudis would not benefit from the cartel’s breakup. For Riyadh, securing closer ties in the energy sector with Brunei factors into Saudi Arabia’s agenda within OPEC.

The Saudi-Iranian rivalry, which visibly manifests itself in Middle Eastern countries where there are deep sectarian divisions, reverberates as far as the Asia Pacific. King Salman’s visit to Brunei and other Muslim nations in the region was in no small part aimed at deterring the growth of such countries’ relations with Tehran. In March 2016, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to discuss opening up Bruneian-Iranian trade following the lifting of sanctions.

For Brunei, Iran’s economy of $400 billion and large population of 80 million with a highly educated middle class offers ample . As Riyadh associates Iran’s reintegration with the global economy with Tehran’s increasingly emboldened foreign policy in the Arab world, which Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members view as the number regional threat, the kingdom will certainly use its influence in Southeast Asia to try and veer these countries away from Iran’s economic lure.

Security Relationship

In 2015, King Salman received Brunei’s Lieutenant General Dato Abdul-Aziz Mohammed Tameet to . In March 2016, Brunei’s Commander of Armed Forces Major General Baheen Muhammad Tawih attended the North Thunder . Brunei’s defense capabilities are dedicated to maritime security and it has maritime disputes with in the . As such, Saudi defense ties with Brunei is a recent development that is slated to grow, given the kingdom’s interest in becoming an increasingly influential actor in Indian Ocean defense issues as related to protecting trade routes from piracy and counterterrorism initiatives. Both Brunei and Saudi Arabia have seen added investment from the United Kingdom in terms of British defense assets and positions of support.

The next step in upgrading Riyadh and Bandar Seri Begawan’s security relationship would be to have Brunei join the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT). When Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman unveiled this now-41 nation alliance in December 2015, Brunei was not listed as a member. However, the following month, Prince Mohammed met with Brunei’s deputy defense minister to in IMAFT. Saudi armed forces are now visiting Brunei . The Saudi and Bruneian leaders agreed to enhance cooperation within the framework of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to advance their countries’ interests and those of the Muslim world, “the need to reject extremism and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, whatever its source.”

In light of recent developments in the Levant and North Africa, where the Islamic State (IS) is losing and/or has lost its strongholds in Mosul, Raqqa and Sirte, security officials across Southeast Asia are increasingly alarmed by the potential for more jihadists from the region to return to their home countries. According to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, the Islamic State is determined to establish a caliphate that encompasses land in his country, as well as . As battle hardened fighters and experienced with new skills, IS militants from Indonesia, Malaysia and other Asia Pacific states will seek to relocate to new corners of the world to advance their nihilistic global cause, following the caliphate’s military losses in the Levant and North Africa. So, Brunei will be keen to seek new partners in international counterterrorism efforts.

To protect its image and unite the Muslim world behind the kingdom’s IMAFT, Saudi Arabia is seeking to convince the Southeast Asians that Riyadh is truly committed to their security. In terms of Saudi Arabia’s own security interests, working with security apparatuses across the Asia Pacific region is valuable given the threat of Southeast Asian supporters of IS entering the kingdom as low-skilled foreign workers, from where they can launch attacks. Jihadist terrorists coming to the kingdom from the Asia Pacific region as hajjis (pilgrims) represents another threat. In September, 2016, on Saudi authorities arresting a Bruneian pilgrim on terrorism charges.

Outlook

King Salman’s three-week Asia tour takes place at a pivotal time in the kingdom’s history. Determined to continue his predecessor’s “Look East” approach to trade and investment, the king’s visit to six Asian countries heavily factors into Riyadh’s quest to secure more support for Vision 2030 from major economic powers in all corners of the world. Unquestionably, regarding Vision 2030, the most important legs of the Saudi monarch’s tour were China and Japan. Compared to these two Asian powerhouses, Brunei has relatively little to offer Saudi Arabia in terms of cooperation for Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation agenda.

Yet the symbolism and religious undertones of King Salman’s meeting with the sultan of Brunei weigh into the kingdom’s grander plans for protecting Saudi Arabia and its allies from trans-regional threats. The kingdom and the sultanate find themselves in the same boat in many ways. Both are deeply conservative Sunni Muslim countries often at odds with Western values that face similar economic dilemmas stemming from dependency on their hydrocarbon sectors and the rise of extremists such as IS and al-Qaeda.

As the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, the Saudi king’s visit to Brunei to meet with the sultanate’s ruler was about the ruler of the Saud’s kingdom conferring legitimacy upon Sultan Bolkiah. ASEAN members like Brunei usually only fit into an analysis on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry as an afterthought. Yet as the leadership in Tehran seeks to expand Iranian trade ties with Southeast Asian nations, particularly the Muslim-majority ones, Saudi Arabia is unsettled by several ASEAN members’ expressed willingness to do business with Iran. By visiting Brunei, the king is giving robust support to the sultan’s rule. King Salman’s trip was largely aimed at keeping the country within Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence and at a distance from Iran’s.

Building on his first trip to Brunei 20 years ago, King Salman’s visit to a Muslim-majority located in a strategically prized section of the South China Sea was an important gesture. With Brunei in a region where violent Islamist extremists are making their presence felt and as ASEAN member states are growing increasingly alarmed by the threat of more IS fighters relocating from the Levant to the Asia Pacific region, it would be logical to assume that counterterrorism cooperation will play a greater role in shaping the Riyadh-Bandar Seri Begawan relationship. King Salman’s return to the sultanate was politically important for Brunei’s government as it seeks to increase its religious legitimacy by engaging with the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

Looking ahead, it would only be logical to assume that the kingdom and the sultanate will bring their bilateral relationship to new heights as both nations face the challenge of transforming their economies away from oil and gas, and protecting their monarchies from IS and other trans-regional threats.

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In May, at the China-Arab Cooperation Forum in Doha, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi����that Qatar should take part in the realization of China’s Silk Road Initiatives. Considering Qatar as a key partner to promote the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project, which Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated in 2014, Yi said that the initiative shares common cooperative opportunities with the Qatar National Vision 2030, a future development roadmap launched by Doha in 2008.

To this end, China hopes to strengthen bilateral relations with Qatar in economic, political and cultural spheres. This, however, is not the first time China took a step in courting Doha to help in implementing its OBOR projects. Last year, China����to establish a Renminbi Clearing Centre in Doha, which was the first financial institution in the Middle East to offer access to Chinese currency and foreign exchange markets. This move is crucial as one of the most important steps taken by China to abet the Silk Road Initiatives is the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which among its goals is to expand the use of Chinese currency.

Thirsty for Energy

It should come as no surprise that China is making its way to Qatar, particularly with respect to the establishment of the Silk Road Initiatives. Despite China leading the initiatives, it is impossible for Beijing to do everything alone; international participation and contributions are needed. Therefore, it is logical for China to turn to Qatar for a significant role.

As China is thirsty for energy resources to fuel its projects, Beijing clearly sees the benefits of strengthening ties with the gas-rich Persian Gulf emirate. Indeed, in the past several years China has grown increasingly����on Qatar’s hydrocarbon resources. China is presently����and the Silk Road Initiatives will require even larger amounts of energy resources for implementation.

Qatar has potential to become a major beneficiary. In recent years, some European nations have begun to relocate their industries to China due to low labor cost. The Qataris could establish petroleum and petrochemical facilities in China, which will help Doha acquire a lion’s share of demand and competitiveness.

Moreover, China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are at the moment����negotiations for a free-trade agreement, which will likely have positive implications for both Beijing and Doha, the most important of which is that it will abolish customs duties imposed on the two sides’ imports and increase their trade partnership. Throughout recent years, China has become the Gulf’s��, and their partnership continues to thrive. With Silk Road Initiatives’ focus on improving transport and connectivity infrastructure, the Sino-GCC trade ties will see further growth in the future as there are prospects for expanding and speeding up the travels of commodities between China and the GCC, as well as easing energy imports.

With respect to China’s ambition to expand the use of its currency, Beijing hopes that through the RMB clearing center and currency swap agreements, a growing share of its trade partnership with Qatar will be cleared in RMB. Ultimately, it also hopes that oil and energy exports can be priced in its own currency, lessening trading time and transaction cost. This would also enable Beijing to conduct business with Qatar, and other regional countries, on its own rules.

Courting Qatar

Courting Qatar would also enable China to pressure these countries to solve the security issues in the region. Undeniably, en route to Europe, the Silk Road Initiatives encompass some of the most unstable countries and regions in the world, including the Middle East—areas that Qatar has increasingly engaged in. As the projects unravel, China is apparently facing different security issues, urging Beijing to pressure relevant stakeholders to resolve their conflicts to protect its interests.

Qatar, an enigma on the international stage, has a unique hand of cards as the world’s top liquefied natural gas (LNG) producer and exporter. Situated between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, the uber-rich emirate sits between some of the world’s most complicated geopolitical fault lines and the Middle East’s brightest sectarian flashpoints. To maintain its prosperity and stability, Qatar has traditionally relied on a foreign policy strategy of pitting competing agendas of international and regional powers against each other to further Doha’s own strategic interests.

As host of USCENTCOM, Doha is a close and important ally of Washington. Yet like the other GCC states which have conducted foreign policies closely aligned to the United States, Qatar has embraced a Look East approach, taking stock of the global shift in economic prosperity from North America and Europe to the Far East. As Qatar’s second top LNG export partner, China has and will continue to offer Doha an opportunity to counter-balance the geopolitical interests of its Western allies, giving more important players in the international arena higher stakes in Qatar’s future.

*[This article was originally published by .]

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In September 2014, the White House emphasized the importance of obtaining support from Sunni Arab states prior to launching an air campaign against Daesh () targets in Iraq and Syria. For the Obama administration,��successfully soliciting��the —Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—in addition to Egypt and Jordan, represented a major foreign policy achievement. The last time Washington assembled such an international coalition to wage a military campaign on Arab soil was Operation Desert Storm in 1991, although on a much grander scale.

Since fall 2015, American politicians on both sides of the aisle have grown disappointed with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members’ contribution to the US-led efforts to fight Daesh. A growing number of voices in the US government have����these monarchies of shifting their focus away from the campaign against Daesh in Iraq and Syria to the conflict in Yemen. Indeed, in recent months, the percentage of the Washington-led coalition bombs dropped on Daesh targets by GCC fighter jets has been��,��with the US and France doing virtually all of the heavy lifting.

However, recent declarations from officials in raise questions about Riyadh’s priorities with respect to the regional threat posed by Daesh. On February 4, ��told��Al Jazeera��that “the Saudi kingdom announced its readiness to participate with ground troops … against” Daesh because “air strikes cannot be enough.” A few days later, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia in saying a real campaign against the group has “.” US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter����the news, but a healthy degree of skepticism about his enthusiasm appears warranted.

It makes sense for Saudi Arabia to deploy ground forces to fight Daesh in Syria, particularly given that the terrorist organization has its sights set on the kingdom, and that the Saudis have one of the world’s��. Having waged scores of attacks in the kingdom through its web of “homegrown” cells, Daesh poses a significant threat to Saudi security and national cohesion. Incorporating Mecca and Medina into its so-called “caliphate” is unquestionably an objective of the group, which views the Saud family as corrupt, immoral puppets of Western powers who live an opulent and offensive lifestyle.

Daesh has supporters in many parts of the kingdom, particularly near the Iraqi-Saudi border, where tribal connections shaping bonds between some of the kingdom’s subjects and Daesh are important, and often overlooked.

Yet winning ground wars requires a high level of experience and motivation. If history is any guide, the Saudis are unlikely to sacrifice much of their own blood to fight for their nation. In , for example, although the Saudi armed forces are clearly engaged in the battle, Riyadh has of Colombian ��to fight the Houthi rebels, and the Saudi-led coalition has relied on African states such as����to do much fighting on the ground in exchange for Saudi petro-dollars.

In addition, with Riyadh and Tehran backing opposing sides in Syria, this conflict has been an important battleground in the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical rivalry, which manifests itself in many forms across the greater Middle East and Asia. For Riyadh to deploy its forces into Syria to fight Daesh would imply that the Saudis are willing to fight the group alongside the kingdom’s Iranian, Russian, Lebanese and Syrian foes. The likelihood of such a development appears very low, particularly given Riyadh’s steadfast commitment to backing rebels fighting the Assad regime, not to mention the degree to which its military forces are so focused on the Yemen conflict, and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

Proxy War Between Two Nuclear Powers

Although the Syrian crisis is fluid and increasingly complicated, there is reason for the Assad regime to feel emboldened. The Syrian army—fighting alongside Russian soldiers in ground operations—has made notable gains so far this year, recently����from rebel forces.

The Russian intervention in this conflict, in defense of the Assad regime, has severely undermined the agendas of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other actors seeking to topple President Bashar al-Assad, particularly with the Syrian army��now ��Ankara’s lines to rebel forces in Aleppo—Syria’s commercial capital.

Unquestionably, if Assad’s forces were to take back Aleppo, there would likely be a significant turning of the tide in Syria’s civil war. Despite Saudi claims that their interests in possibly deploying ground forces to Syria center around defeating Daesh, their����and other Islamist extremist groups that are ideologically similar to Daesh suggest that Riyadh’s talk of sending troops is a response to the successful collaboration between Moscow and Damascus in squeezing out Saudi-backed rebel groups in Aleppo.

The Syrian foreign minister’s�� on the part of states entering the fray without the consent of Damascus underscores how this grander geopolitical struggle goes far beyond defeating Daesh. Indeed, the entry of Saudi forces into Syria, which experts agree would need US air cover, entails the risk of a confrontation between the kingdom and its NATO allies on one side, and the forces fighting for Assad—most importantly Russia—on the other. What all sides would presumably wish to avoid is a scenario in which a proxy war escalates between the world’s top two nuclear powers.

Despite the potentially explosive risks and uncertainties, some officials in the US are likely to continue to welcome more Sunni Arab states in the fight against Daesh, particularly given neoconservatives’ view that Russia and Iran’s recent successes in Syria are unacceptable.

This��week, the Saudi declaration is certain to be a topic of conversation when American officials meet in Brussels with defense ministers from various members in the US-led coalition. A deployment of Saudi ground forces into Syria, if it were to occur, would mark a significant shift in that country’s nearly five-year long conflict. Yet whether Riyadh actually sends troops to Syria remains to be seen. If the Saudis do so, it would represent the first time in history that the kingdom would commit ground forces to two battles in the Middle East simultaneously. Seeing is believing.

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On December 15, ’s young and inexperienced defense minister made up of nearly three dozen mainly Sunni Muslim states, stretching from Morocco to Bangladesh. The Saudi-led alliance’s stated purpose is to defeat global terrorism in five nations: Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Syria.

Mohammad bin Salman’s announcement followed months of increased pressure from US officials on Arab Gulf nations to fight Daesh (“”) more forcefully. However, given the conflicting interests and lack of military experience on the part of the coalition’s members, there is ample reason to conclude that this alliance lacks substance.

A “Coalition” of the Weak, Divided and Unwilling

The Saudi-led coalition includes Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

A number of these nations are failed states or just above that classification, beset by their own civil wars, Islamist insurgencies and endemic corruption. Several are among the world’s poorest countries.

For a variety of reasons, the announcement of this so-called coalition was bizarre and surprising. The leaders of Pakistan—one of Saudi Arabia’s most important allies—never officially agreed to join, and only learned of their purported membership from news organizations.��Malaysian officials also expressed reservations and ruled out the possibility of Kuala Lumpur making any military contribution to the alliance.

Saudi Arabia and several other Gulf Arab states took part in the US-led campaign against Daesh in September 2014. However, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members’ contributions to the campaign were insignificant and came to an end after the Washington-led coalition’s initial missions were completed.

Like Saudi Arabia, the smaller GCC members, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have showed a deeper commitment to fighting the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen—viewed in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as an extension of Iranian influence—than to combating Daesh in Iraq and Syria. It is unlikely that the GCC members’ priorities will change in light of Saudi Arabia’s announcement.

Split Interests

Among the Saudi allies with relatively powerful militaries—including Turkey, Egypt and the UAE—it is doubtful they will cease to pursue their own respective interests, which certainly conflict.

Ankara’s top priorities in Syria entail toppling the Assad regime and preventing the Syrian Kurds from establishing a proto-state governed by a Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) affiliate group along Turkey’s southern border. Overwhelming evidence demonstrates that NATO member Turkey has actively supported �ٲ������’s sale of oil to the global markets in order to advance these two objectives.

As Russia has stepped up its direct military involvement in Syria to fight certain militias, which Saudi Arabia sponsors yet the Kremlin considers “terrorist” organizations, it is difficult to imagine how the Riyadh-led coalition would interact with Moscow given the conflicting interests among the member nations. Saudi allies in Abu Dhabi, Amman, Cairo and Manama welcome Russia’s intervention in Syria, sharing Moscow’s interest in preserving the Syrian nation-state and defeating Daesh. On the other hand, Ankara and Doha staunchly oppose Russia’s direct military intervention in Syria, as underscored by the Turkish military having in November. Such geopolitical divisions undermine the potential for Riyadh to unite the Sunni Muslim world against “terrorism.”

Moreover, the stated objectives and strategies of this coalition are vague. Aside from Daesh, which other “terrorist” groups in the five target countries will this pan-Sunni alliance combat? Where will the intelligence to combat them be derived? Which countries in this coalition will deploy most of the troops? How many soldiers will be required to be effective?

Although many of the coalition members have combated extremist groups unilaterally, the task of defining terrorism will be problematic if they are to effectively fight such organizations within the framework of a NATO-like alliance. Among the 34 states, there is ample disagreement as to which non-state actors are “terrorist” organizations.

Turkey, Sudan and Qatar support the Muslim Brotherhood across the Middle East and North Africa region. Yet Egypt and the UAE consider the Islamist movement to be a “terrorist” organization. Saudi Arabia and other members of this coalition consider Hezbollah and other Iranian-sponsored Shia militias in Syria and Iraq to be “terrorist” organizations. Given that these groups—along with the Syrian and Iranian militaries and Kurdish fighters—serve as the most effective forces against Daesh, will the Saudi-led military coalition combat both Hezbollah in addition to the Daesh fighters?

Counter Iran

Certainly, the objectives of the coalition are unclear and most likely highly unrealistic. All of these questions leave one wondering why Riyadh bothered to make the surprising announcement. The answer has to do with , not Daesh.

Given that Saudi Arabia’s coalition deliberately omitted the “axis of resistance” (Iran, Iraq, Syria and ��������ԴDz�’s Hezbollah), Riyadh is determined to create a pan-Sunni alliance committed to countering Iranian influence in the Arab world. The declaration of this alliance underscores new geopolitical realities in the Middle East, in which Washington left the Saudi leadership with the impression that the US had abandoned much of its commitment to the kingdom’s security in favor of a rapprochement with Iran—Riyadh’s archrival. Saudi Arabia undoubtedly came to believe that it had little option to but to rely on itself and its perceived allies to establish a Sunni Muslim equivalent of NATO to provide a counterweight to Tehran.

The absence of a serious commitment on the GCC’s part to fight Daesh has been a source of frustration for many in Washington and other Western capitals. The Obama administration and members of the US Congress may issue statements expressing support for this anti-terrorism alliance led by Saudi Arabia. Yet both President Barack Obama and his successor will find Riyadh to be an awkward and highly problematic ally in the battle against groups such as Daesh. Given the history of the kingdom’s religious establishment promoting anti-Shia Islam and other forms of religion-inspired bigotry, there is little reason to wonder why Saudi Arabia has more of its own citizens fighting on behalf of Daesh than any other nation in the world aside from Tunisia.

Now that Daesh has set its sights on the kingdom and has expressed its commitment not only to��ridding the Arabian Peninsula of Shia Muslims, but also to��toppling the House of Saud, Riyadh faces an enemy largely of its own making. Despite Saudi Arabia’s proclaimed coalition against Daesh and other terrorist groups, the reality is that this disparate collection of nations is unlikely to weaken the “caliphate,” as its members are neither capable nor interested in doing so.

Indeed, if the Saudis were genuinely committed to weakening Daesh, officials in Riyadh would cease to finance religious schools worldwide that spread Wahhabism, �ٲ������’s ideological foundation. Without making such efforts aimed at addressing the root cause of jihadist terrorism in the broken Middle East, there is little reason to expect this coalition to effectively weaken the “Islamic State.”

*[Note: This article was updated on December 24, 2015.]

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For decades, consecutive US administrations pursued a foreign policy in the Middle East designed to “contain” the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by the P5+1 and Iran in June has opened the door for the West and the Iranians to address regional security issues within the framework of the US-Iran ��é�ٱ�Գٱ�.

Despite October’s conference in Vienna having failed to achieve a breakthrough political settlement to the Syrian crisis, the engagement of American and Iranian diplomats at the talks on Syria was indicative of shifting fault lines in the Middle East’s grander geopolitical order.

Common Ground

The rise of the “Islamic State” (IS) in Iraq and Syria has encouraged both Washington and Tehran to find greater common ground, and it has fostered a growing interest on the part of Western and Iranian officials in exploring a more open relationship to address shared security concerns.

At an early stage, the Syrian crisis became another battleground in the rivalry between the Iranian-led so-called “axis of resistance” (Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon) on one side, and the US-backed “axis of moderation” (the Gulf Cooperation Council and other pro-Western Sunni Arab nations) on the other. The Syrian Baathist regime, Tehran’s vital strategic ally, has long served a pivotal role in enhancing Iran’s strategic clout in the Middle East. Iran’s adversaries have viewed the Syrian conflict as an opportunity to strike a blow against Tehran and the influence it has exerted via its proxies in Lebanon and Palestine such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other non-state actors. For its part, Iran has seen the Syrian crisis as a critical battleground for retaining its influence in a strategically significant part of the Middle East.

The rise of IS, combined with Russia’s entry into the fray, has prompted Washington to question the wisdom of pursuing regime change in Syria. Although the Obama administration publicly maintains its stance that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad must relinquish power, the fact that all direct US military intervention in Syria has targeted forces fighting the Baathist order indicates that President Barack Obama’s priorities have shifted. In Washington, there appears a begrudging and unstated acknowledgement that Assad may indeed be the lesser of evils—and certainly less of a threat to US national security.

Even prior to the Islamic State’s meteoric rise to power, the emergence of other Islamist extremist factions within the Syrian opposition contributed to Washington’s reluctance to take more forceful military action against the�� regime in Damascus.

At this juncture, given that the Islamic State is the most powerful force in Syria seeking to topple Assad, there is growing concern in the West that the regime’s demise would result in the black and white flag of IS flying over Damascus. Indeed, not only would the group’s capture of the Syrian capital’s resources and infrastructure exacerbate the refugee crisis to a new level, but the struggle to contain IS more generally would suffer a catastrophic setback.

Bashar al-Assad / Flickr

The Obama administration, therefore, seems to have reluctantly accepted that the Baathist regime is the most realistic bulwark against takfiri fighters who are unquestionably determined to conquer Damascus.

Political questions—most importantly about Assad’s future—have divided global and regional powers, preventing influential members of the international community from bridging the gulf between their differing positions on preconditions for resolving the Syrian crisis.

However, there is common cause among all the states that sent their diplomats to Austria in October. The globally-recognized urgency of defeating IS has highlighted Washington and Tehran’s common stakes in the conflict, which have led the US to reverse its previous position of not talking to Iranian officials about the Syrian crisis. Indeed, it was Moscow and Washington that invited Tehran to the Austrian capital.

The West and Iran’s overlapping interests in the Middle East’s security landscape have certainly contributed to a political environment in which officials in the US and the European Union (EU) recognized the need to resolve the nuclear issue, and pursue efforts to work with the Iranians to resolve the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

Saudi Concerns

Since the P5+1 and Iran signed the interim nuclear deal in late 2013, Saudi Arabia, and to various degrees some other Gulf Arab monarchies, expressed much unease with respect to a comprehensive nuclear agreement that would remove sanctions imposed on the Iranians. The possibility of Tehran one day developing a nuclear weapon was not the core of Saudi Arabia’s concerns. Rather, the underlying issue stemmed from the geopolitical implications of improved relations between Washington and Tehran.

In viewing the US, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s triangular relationship as a zero-sum game, officials in Riyadh perceive any improvement in ties between Washington and Tehran as necessarily the kingdom’s geopolitical loss. The Saudis fear that their strategic value to the US—still Saudi Arabia’s most important ally—would decline if Iran were to regain its pre-1979 role as Washington’s “cop on the beat” in the Persian Gulf.

Despite the Obama administration’s success in terms of securing Saudi Arabia’s lukewarm endorsement of the Iranian nuclear deal, the truth is that Riyadh is on a different page than Washington on a whole host of issues, including how it views Tehran’s role in the Syrian crisis.

As the Middle East’s fluid geopolitical order continues to shift, the US and Iran’s shared interests in defeating IS have prompted Washington to build on the nuclear agreement as a means of rekindling a relationship with Tehran. The Obama administration has determined that there is more to be gained than lost by opening dialogue with the Iranians who, whether the US likes or not, hold a variety of important cards in the region. Neither of the conflicts in Syria, Iraq or Yemen may be resolved without the inclusion of Iran at the table.

Since becoming president in 2013, Hassan Rouhani has sought to convince a number of the Islamic Republic’s traditional adversaries that Iran is a force for stability in the Middle East. It appears that a growing number of Western statesmen now agree with Rouhani on this point. For example, EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini stated that the Iranian nuclear agreement could “open unprecedented possibilities of peace for the region, starting from Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.”

The resolution of Washington and Tehran’s standoff over Iran’s nuclear program has opened a critical door that is needed to reach a resolution on a range of issues in the Middle East. Iran’s inclusion in the Vienna talks was the first major indicator of how the nuclear agreement’s geopolitical reverberations may play out.

Although Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and other public figures in Tehran maintained virulent anti-US rhetoric following the nuclear agreement, the Iranian government also knows that a resolution of the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen cannot be achieved without engaging the West. Iranian diplomats would have not traveled to Vienna if that were not so.

Clearly, the US and Iran believe that their common interests in Syria are worth discussing with each other and with other international powers. The challenge will be to maintain momentum during Obama’s remaining term in office, and following the 2016 presidential election in the US.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Despite Washington’s efforts to persuade its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies that a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran would serve their long-term interests, most Gulf Arab monarchs remain far from sold. In addition to economic concerns about the potential reintegration of Iranian gas and oil into global markets, the GCC fears that a thaw in US-Iran relations will diminish the council’s strategic value to America.

Under the leadership of King Salman, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has assumed an increasingly hawkish posture aimed at countering Iran’s regional influence. As Riyadh doubles down its support for militant Sunni Islamist extremists, including the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, fighting the Tehran-backed regime in Damascus, Washington’s incoherent Syria policy seems to prioritize countering the Islamic State (IS). Despite the US government’s rhetoric and its sponsorship of so-called “moderate” anti-Assad militants on Syria’s battlefields, recent jihadist gains in Syria are prompting the Obama administration to further question the wisdom of pushing for regime change in Damascus.

Washington and Riyadh’s differing perspectives on Iran’s nuclear program and Syria’s civil war have heightened tensions in an already turbulent relationship dating back to September 11, 2001. At the center of the tension are Saudi concerns about Iran’s alleged hegemonic aims in the Middle East and resentment of the Obama administration’s efforts to shift Washington’s Iran policy away from “containment” toward “limited engagement.”

Despite Saudi Arabia’s anger, Riyadh appears relatively powerless to dissuade Washington from making diplomatic overtures to the Islamic Republic. While the kingdom has significantly deepened its economic ties with China as a means of limiting dependence on the United States, neither China, nor any other world power can be expected to replace America as Saudi Arabia’s main military partner. Regardless of whether the P5+1 and Iran reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement, the GCC will remain within Washington’s geopolitical orbit. A case in point is Saudi Arabia’s ongoing war in Yemen, which has been sustainable solely due to US support in the form of in aerial refueling, intelligence sharing and logistics.

Saudi Arabia’s Shifting Foreign Policy

Following the 2011 Arab Uprisings, King Salman’s predecessor, King Abdullah, actively countered democratic opposition factions associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in several countries. From Saudi’s perspective, the Muslim Brotherhood—a grassroots movement that embraces political activism, social justice, democratic institutions and champions a competing version of Islamic rule—represented an existential threat to the ruling family’s legitimacy, its self-anointed divine right to rule and its role as custodian of Islam’s two holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

In contrast to other Arab states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia—with legislative bodies, in which Islamist parties hold seats, democratic institutions do not exist in Saudi Arabia. The rulers in Riyadh viewed forward-thinking, democratic-oriented Islamists as a threat to Saudi Arabia’s authoritarian political model, which is intolerant of dissent and demands full obedience from its subjects.

Back in the 1960s and 1970s, the kingdom provided support and sanctuary to the Muslim Brotherhood members who fled the deadly anti-Islamist crackdowns waged by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and Hafez al-Assad in Syria. During this period of the Cold War, Saudi Arabia viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as an ally against communism, socialism and Arab nationalism in the Muslim world. The kingdom hosted religious charities, including the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, of which the Muslim Brotherhood played crucial roles. During the 1980s, the Saudis utilized international networks that the Muslim Brotherhood established to fuel the flow of young Muslim fighters and weapons into Afghanistan throughout the Soviet invasion and occupation.

However, relations between Riyadh and the movement soured following the Gulf War of 1990-91, during which the Brotherhood supported Saddam Hussein and condemned the ruling al-Saud family for backing a US-led military campaign against a Muslim country.

The kingdom’s crackdown on the group intensified following the Arab revolts of 2011 due to grave concerns that the Brotherhood’s growing influence in Egypt and elsewhere could mobilize the kingdom’s subjects to challenge the monarchy’s political establishment. In 2014, Saudi Arabia joined the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt in labeling the Muslim Brotherhood a “terrorist” organization.

Despite this crackdown, the Muslim Brotherhood’s message—anti-corruption, rejection of US foreign policy and promotion of social justice—has significant support within the Saudi population, according to a poll commissioned by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The kingdom’s fears of the Muslim Brotherhood were perhaps most underscored by the tension that mounted between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which provided extensive moral, financial and diplomatic support to the movement’s regional branches. In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Doha as punishment for Qatar’s backing of the Brotherhood in Egypt and other countries.

Saudi Arabia even threatened to impose a land and sea blockade on Qatar before returning its ambassador to Doha last November. Less than one week after the July 2013 coup d’état, Riyadh offered $5 billion to the Egyptian military, further underscoring Saudi Arabia’s commitment to counter the Islamist party that had gained power in Egypt’s first democratic election.

Early in his reign, however, King Salman began easing Saudi’s tensions with the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the first signs of this evolving position came in February 2015, when Ahmed al-Tuwaijri, a former member of Saudi Arabia’s Consultative Assembly, declared that it was “completely unreasonable” to designate the Brotherhood a terrorist group. Tuwaijri was asked about an interview given by then-Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, who explained that Riyadh had “no problem” with the Muslim Brotherhood, despite having followed Cairo’s lead the previous year in designating the movement as a terrorist organization. In response, Tuwairjri went so far as to call the Brotherhood Saudi Arabia’s “natural ally” and sought to justify the labeling of the group as a terrorist organization on the grounds that there was a complicated “linguistic context” behind last year’s designation.

Since January, the kingdom has also improved relations with Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, and al-Islah, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood branch, both of which have historically troubled relations with Saudi Arabia. Analysts contend that Riyadh’s embrace of Muslim Brotherhood offshoots must be understood within the context of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to establish a pan-Sunni order to counter Iranian-influenced actors in Yemen and other Middle Eastern hot spots. Indeed, having received support for “Operation Decisive Storm” from Hamas and al-Islah, King Salman’s overtures to the Muslim Brotherhood appear to have paid off politically.

In a further move, Riyadh has also officially embraced more extreme Sunni Islamists in the region. In May, a source in Saudi Arabia’s ruling family admitted that Riyadh was working with Turkey and Qatar to back Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest) in Syria, marking a significant shift in foreign policy strategy. Jaish al-Fatah is an Idlib-based jihadist coalition dominated by Jabhat al-Nusra and other Sunni Islamist militias, including Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-Aqsa, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya (HASI), Faylaq al-Sham and Ajnad al-Sham.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s commitment to defeating the Islamic State (IS)has become increasingly questionable as Riyadh’s voiced concerns about Iraq are more focused on the central government’s relationship with Tehran. Most experts agree that King Salman has prioritized Saudi Arabia’s military campaign in Yemen above efforts to help NATO powers and other Arab states defeat IS. Despite the clear and eminent threat that IS poses to the kingdom, a number of Saudi Arabians consider the group an effective bulwark against Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria, which Riyadh perceives as a graver threat.

Riyadh’s turnabout regarding Jabhat al-Nusra is likely driven by an understanding that the organization is better poised to gain influence in Syria than other factions fighting the regime in Damascus. This reality was underscored in March, when Idlib fell from the regime’s control to Jaish al-Fatah, marking the second provincial capital to fall from Damascus’ control, the first being Raqqa in March 2014. After Jaish al-Fatah seized control of the entire province the following month, the group’s fighters carried out a massacre in the village of Qalb Lawzah, which targeted the Druze, a religious minority with ancient roots in Syria.

In sum, to achieve its geopolitical objectives of overthrowing Iran’s ally in Syria and crushing the Houthi Zaidi Shiites in Yemen—regardless of whether either of those goals are realistic—Riyadh has concluded that joining Ankara and Doha in supporting Jaish al-Fatah, while improving relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, best advances Saudi Arabia’s strategic objective of countering Iranian influence in the Arab world.

Implications for US-Saudi Relations

US officials are alarmed by Saudi Arabia’s support for Jaish al-Fatah. Whereas Washington’s limited support for militants in Syria is geared toward “moderate” rebels fighting the Islamic State, Riyadh remains focused on efforts to topple the Damascus regime, which Saudi Arabia blames for the Islamic State’s rise in Syria. America’s commitment to overthrowing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has become increasingly questionable now that IS—the Obama administration’s main concern in Syria—has seized large swathes of territory.

By sponsoring Jabhat al-Nusra, Saudi Arabia is supporting a group in Syria that the US-led military coalition continues to target. In September 2014, US President Barack Obama ordered air strikes against Jabhat al-Nusra, deemed a direct threat to US national security, along with IS targets. Washington has learned that support for such factions is risky, given that such extremist groups’ loyalties to state sponsors, arms providers and financial backers usually prove maddeningly temporary in the fluid and chaotic morass of the Middle East.

By canceling his visit to May’s Camp David Summit, King Salman sent a clear message of disapproval regarding Washington’s diplomatic overtures to Tehran. Bahrain’s King Hamad, who spent those days at a horse show with Queen Elizabeth in England, delivered a similar message. Ultimately, the summit proved a futile attempt by the Obama administration to convince most GCC leaders that a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran would serve the interests of all states in the region. Like the Israeli leadership, King Salman is not buying the argument and instead perceives a zero-sum game, in which any geopolitical win for Tehran constitutes a loss for Riyadh.

Unquestionably, the Saudi Arabian leadership is resentful of Obama’s efforts to move past the 1979 hostage crisis and to initiate a new chapter in US-Iran relations. Simultaneously, US officials see Saudi Arabia’s backing of hard-line jihadist militias as a dangerous policy that threatens to contribute to further terrorist gains in Syria. While cognizant of the widening gaps between American and Saudi Arabian foreign policy strategies, the Obama administration is determined not to rock the boat with Riyadh. During the visit of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the White House in May, President Obama hailed the kingdom’s “extraordinary friendship” with the US dating back to the 1940s. Officials in the Obama administration even dismissed claims that King Salman’s absence at the Camp Davis Summit constituted any sort of snub against Washington.

While US-Saudi Arabia relations have been strained in the past—particularly due to the Palestinian question, human rights and oil prices—Washington and Riyadh have maintained a strong alliance, driven largely by economics. Yet the US will have to answer tough questions regarding its alliance with Saudi Arabia as Middle Eastern rulers contemplate the geopolitical implications of a potential comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran and as Saudi-sponsored jihadist militias in Syria continue to alarm the West.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Nearly four years after NATO-backed rebels toppled , the former Libyan ruler, has plunged into chaotic unrest.

The failure of last year’s election to achieve political unity in Libya was most evident when Fajr Libya, or “Libya Dawn” — a diverse coalition of armed groups that includes an array of Islamist militias — rejected the election’s outcome and����control of Tripoli. The internationally recognized government����to Tobruk, situated in eastern Libya along the Mediterranean coast near the Egyptian border, while Libya Dawn set up a rival government, known as the new General National Congress, in the capital.

As forces aligned with the Tobruk government have fought Libya Dawn, the conflict has gradually become internationalized.��Egypt and the United Arab Emirates��have airstrikes targeting Libya Dawn, while��Turkey, Qatar and Sudan��are to have provided the Islamist-dominated coalition with varying degrees of support.

The emergence of Daesh, or the so-called “,” in strategically vital areas of Libya has further complicated the conflict in Africa’s most oil-rich country, and it has raised security concerns in nearby states.

Libya’s Most Polarizing General

, the mercurial general, has emerged as an influential, yet highly divisive, leader in this bloody conflict. In early March, the anti-Islamist general was����commander of the armed forces loyal to the Tobruk government. Haftar’s role in the former Gaddafi regime, his cozy relationship with Washington and suspicions about his long-term ambitions have given him a controversial reputation among many Libyans. Nonetheless, he is also gaining respect from those who share his vitriol for Islamists.

Haftar was an early Gaddafi loyalist, and he played an��important ��as one of the “Free Officers” in the 1969 revolution that toppled the monarchy led by King Idris al-Sanusi. Gaddafi later����that Haftar “was my son … and I was like his spiritual father.” It was the start of a military career in which Haftar fought on many different sides.

During the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Haftar����a Libyan battalion. Later, as a commander of Libyan forces in the country’s 1980-87 war with Chad, he was allegedly����for war crimes when his forces were accused of using napalm and poison gas. In 1987, the Chadian military����a major victory in the battle of Wadi al-Doum. In addition to killing more than����Libyan forces, Chad took over����Libyans, including Haftar, as prisoners.

Around that time, Haftar’s loyalties shifted. While held in Chad, he worked with other Libyan officers to coordinate a coup against Gaddafi, before the United States����his release — by����him and 300 of his men to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and from there to Virginia.

As a newly minted US citizen, Haftar lived in northern Virginia from 1990-2011, spending part of this time����with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) before returning to Libya in March 2011 to fight once again against the Gaddafi regime. Several sources insist that Haftar was out of the CIA’s hands by 2011, but others maintain that the US government orchestrated his return to Libya that year.

Libya’s Civil War

In 2014, Haftar����for the unilateral dissolution of Libya’s parliament and the establishment of a “presidential committee” to rule the country until new elections were held. He cited Libya’s “upheaval” as justification for the armed forces to take over.

Many saw his act as an attempted military coup aimed at crushing the Muslim Brotherhood, which had�� second place��in Libya’s 2012 elections. Prime Minister Ali Zeidan����his announcement as “ridiculous.”

Although many in Libya’s government viewed him as a rogue general hungry for power, Haftar’s ongoing campaign against Islamist forces has gradually won him supporters. In May 2014, he waged a campaign called “Operation Dignity” to “eliminate extremist terrorist groups” in the country. Since then, the Tobruk-based government has by and large come to support the general, viewing him as the government’s best bet in the struggle against its Islamist enemies.

Haftar’s anti-Islamist crusade parallels that of Egyptian President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, who is presiding over a crackdown on Egypt’s Islamists. In making no distinction between so-called moderate Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and hard-line factions such as Daesh and Ansar al-Sharia, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate, Haftar and Sisi are both selling a narrative to the West that their anti-Islamist positions are in sync with the “Global War on Terror.”

So far, Haftar has been unwilling to negotiate with Libya Dawn, which����the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing and the “Loyalty to Martyrs” bloc within its coalition. In turn, Libya Dawn refuses to negotiate with Haftar.

The United Nations (UN) has begun hosting talks in Morocco between Libya’s various political factions, in an effort to unite them against the growing threat of Daesh. Unfortunately, the UN’s efforts to push Libya’s two governments toward dialogue is undermined by the low levels of trust between them, and their mutual belief that only through continued armed struggle can they secure more territory and resources. Indeed, with strong backing from Cairo and Abu Dhabi, Haftar is likely convinced that he can make greater gains through warfare than diplomacy.

The toxic legacy of Gaddafi’s divisive and authoritarian regime, which pitted Libya’s diverse factions against one another, has plagued the prospects for any central authority gaining widespread legitimacy in the war-torn country. Indeed, since he was overthrown in 2011, Libya has turned into a cauldron of anarchy, with little meaningful security existing outside of Tripoli and Benghazi.

Gaddafi’s regime harshly oppressed the Islamist groups that went on to form Libya Dawn, which views its rise to power in Tripoli as hard fought and a long time in coming. They view Haftar as a war criminal from the��ancien��regime��committed to their elimination, which will certainly undermine the potential for Libya’s two governments to reach a meaningful power-sharing agreement. With no peace in sight, a continuation of the bloody stalemate between the Tobruk- and Tripoli-based governments seems most likely.

International Implications of Libya’s Turmoil

The fall of Gaddafi launched a�� tsunami��across Africa and into the Middle East. Libya is now home to the world’s largest loose arms cache, and its porous borders are routinely transited by a host of heavily armed non-state actors — including the Tuareg separatists and jihadists who forced Mali’s national military from Timbuktu and Gao in March 2012 with��newly acquired from Libya. The UN has also the flow of arms from Libya into��Egypt,��Gaza,��Niger,�� and��Syria.

Last October,����fighters loyal to Daesh seized control of Derna near the Egyptian border, some 200 miles from the European Union. Since then, �ٲ������’s Libyan branch has taken ��of Sirte and�� a degree of influence��in Benghazi, the nation’s second largest city and heart of the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi.

The group’s use of Libyan territory to terrorize and threaten other states has raised the international stakes. In February, Daesh��beheaded��21 migrant workers from Egypt because they were Coptic Christians, and then it��released��a propaganda video containing footage of the heinous act. That lured Egypt into��waging��direct airstrikes against the group’s targets in Derna.

Last November, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis — the dominant jihadist group in the Egyptian Sinai —����allegiance to Daesh, as did Nigeria’s��Boko Haram��more recently. Daesh has also made��direct threats��against Italy,����officials in Rome to warn that Italy’s military may intervene in Libya to counter Daesh fighters.

One-quarter��of �ٲ������’s fighters in Derna from other Arab countries and Afghanistan. A major����of Jabhat al-Nusra fighters from Syria have also entered the fray in Libya, underscoring how Islamist extremists from lands far away have exploited Libya’s status as a failed state. This development was most recently underscored when a Sudanese member of �ٲ������’s Libya division�� out��a suicide attack on April 5, which targeted a security checkpoint near Misrata. The bloody incident resulted in four deaths and over 20 injuries.

The number of weak or failing states across Africa suggests that such international networks will continue to take advantage of frail central authorities and lawlessness throughout the extremely underdeveloped Sahel and other areas of the continent to spread their influence. In the absence of any political resolution to its civil war, Libya in particular — as a failed state with mountainous oil reserves — will remain vulnerable to extremist forces hoping to seize power amidst the ongoing morass.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Last October, ’s Special Criminal Court����Sheikh , a popular cleric and outspoken political dissident, to death. This was not an ordinary criminal trial, even considering Saudi Arabia’s liberal use of capital punishment. Among other charges, the prosecutor����to convict al-Nimr of “waging war on God” and “aiding terrorists,” even calling for the cleric to be publicly executed by “crucifixion.” In Saudi Arabia, this rare method of execution����beheading the individual before publicly displaying his decapitated body.

The widely revered Shiite cleric was ultimately convicted of “” the king; waging violence against the state;����“foreign meddling” in the kingdom;����vandalism and sectarian violence; and����the Prophet Muhammad’s relatives. However, al-Nimr’s family and supporters����that the ruling was politically driven and insist that the cleric led a non-violent movement��committed to ��Shiite rights, and democratic reform in Saudi Arabia.

Since the October 15 ruling, high-ranking political and religious authorities in and international human rights organizations have sought to pressure the Saudi Arabian leadership into sparing al-Nimr’s life. Demonstrations demanding that the death sentence be revoked have been held in��,��,�� and the��, underscoring the international sensitivity surrounding al-Nimr’s imprisonment and death sentence.

While many experts doubt that the authorities will actually carry out the execution, it is important to take stock of the political context in which the Special Criminal Court issued the death sentence.

Saudi Arabia’s Restive Shiite Minority

Saudi Arabian Shiites have long complained of state-sponsored discrimination and human rights abuses by conservative Sunni authorities.����to Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabian Shiites “face systematic discrimination in , , justice, and .”

© Shutterstock

In early 2011, anti-government protests erupted in the district of Saudi Arabia’s , which is home to nearly all of Saudi Arabia’s 3 million Shiite citizens and nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply. Throughout 2011-12, al-Nimr was a leader in these protests, in which activists demanded the release of the “” — a reference to nine political prisoners who had been detained then for some 16 years.

After��,�� and����forces entered to help quell a non-violent Shiite uprising in the tiny island kingdom, Saudi Shiites expressed solidarity with their Bahraini counterparts. This prompted officials in Riyadh to fear that growing Shiite dissent could trigger a crisis in the strategically vital Eastern Province, which borders several other countries with sizeable Shiite populations. So between March 2011 and August 2012, the Saudi government waged a harsh crackdown on Shiite protestors, killing over��20, injuring��several and detaining over��1,000��others, including��24��children.

Following the shooting of four Shiites in the Eastern Province in November 2011, al-Nimr spoke at one of their funerals. “We are determined to demand our legitimate rights by peaceful means,” he��. Al-Nimr, who had already been detained several times by that point, had called for peaceful resistance to the ruling monarchy on numerous other occasions, despite Riyadh’s allegations that the cleric incited violence.

On July 8, 2012, Saudi security forces��,�� and����al-Nimr after�� with his bodyguards. Amnesty International����the arrest and described the cleric as “an outspoken critic of the policies and practices of the Saudi Arabian authorities affecting the [Shiite] community, including detentions without charge or trial, and excessive use of force against protestors.”

Al-Nimr’s trial began in March 2013.����to the Saudi Press Agency, the judges claimed that the cleric was “insistent” and “stubborn” during the trial. Al-Nimr did not deny the charges levied against him, yet he maintained that he never incited violence.

Daesh and Saudi Arabia’s Domestic Environment

Anti-Shiism has��as a pillar of the Wahhabi brand of Islam ever since founded the movement in the 18^th��century. By inciting violence against Shiites in the and beyond, Saudi Arabia’s political leadership has maintained the alliance with the kingdom’s hard-line Wahhabi religious establishment (which views all Shiites as “heretics” and holds notoriously intolerant views of Christians and Jews) that led to the formation of the modern-day state of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

However, the rise of (or the “”) in Iraq and Syria — combined with the threat of violence from Daesh sympathizers inside Saudi Arabia — has put the government in an interesting position of having to defend its Shiite citizens from the rigidly anti-Shiite group.

�ٲ������’s capacity to increase Saudi Arabia’s sectarian temperature was����last November, when three Saudis and one Qatari linked to Daesh used machines guns and pistols to kill five Saudi Arabian Shiite worshippers in the Ahsa district of Dalwah. In contrast to the government’s traditional role of promoting anti-Shiite bigotry, Saudi authorities����the following day by shutting down Wesal TV, which had broadcast programs that labeled Shiites as “rejectionists.” Later than month, Saudi Arabian security forces����three of the four men responsible for the attack and����a Daesh-linked cell consisting of 77 members (three came from , and , while the rest were Saudi Arabian nationals) that stored the weapons used in the Dalwah attack.

The threat from Daesh and its sympathizers in Saudi Arabia poses a new security and ideological challenge for Riyadh, which previously faced an al-Qaeda ��from 2003-06 that killed hundreds of Saudi Arabians. Yet the authorities’ response to this new menace has not been well received among certain conservative circles within the kingdom.

The official position of Saudi Arabia — a key Arab member of the -led military campaign in Iraq and Syria — is that Daesh and the Damascus regime must be simultaneously defeated.

Bashar al-Assad © Shutterstock

However, some Saudis are not sold. By taking military action against Daesh while not striking against ’s forces, they say, Saudi Arabia is aligning itself with Iran, Syria and ��������ԴDz�’s Hezbollah. Some hard-line Saudis believe that Daesh deserves Riyadh’s support for serving as a Sunni bulwark against Iranian-backed governments in Baghdad and Damascus. Even some Saudi Sunnis who are opposed to �ٲ������’s ideology and fearful of the group’s agenda object to the bombing of Sunni Arabs combating the Alawite-led regime in Syria.

Within this context, the Saudi Arabian government’s treatment of al-Nimr serves to communicate that while Riyadh channels greater resources toward the threat of Sunni extremism, the monarchy has not abandoned efforts to crush all forms of Shiite dissent in the restive Eastern Province. It is part of an effort by the government to prevent Daesh from exploiting a perception within hard-line Wahhabi circles that Riyadh is becoming “soft” on Shiite activism at home and abroad.

A Shiite Backlash on Saudi Arabia’s Borders

But that strategy comes at a cost. Al-Nimr’s prosecution and death sentence have triggered an outcry among Shiites across the Middle East, leaving little doubt that al-Nimr’s execution would worsen the violent state of sectarian unrest in the region.

Iran’s religious establishment, in particular, has harshly condemned al-Nimr’s sentence. Conservative ayatollahs — including Jafar Sobhani, Hossein Nuri-Hamadani and Naser Makarem Shirazi — have����Riyadh that al-Nimr’s execution would produce “unpredictable results” and that “such cruel actions will have consequences.” Iran’s��FarsNews Agency quoted Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi, who����Saudi Arabia’s leadership, as saying: “[T]he execution of this scholar of religion will result in tough and serious repercussions, and it will cost you dearly.”

Bahraini Shiites have����protests in solidarity with al-Nimr that resulted in clashes with local police. Militant Shiite factions in the island kingdom have also mobilized in response. Last August, Saraya al-Mukhtar — an organization that has pledged solidarity with its Shiite counterparts in Saudi Arabia —����an assault near a Bahraini military base, citing al-Nimr’s imprisonment as the motivation.

The group also issued threats on Facebook against US troops stationed in Bahrain, proclaiming that Washington’s support for the ruling Saudi Arabian and Bahraini monarchies makes the U.S. a legitimate target if al-Nimr is executed. On August 10, the group����Saudi nationals in Bahrain with a poster warning that “harming [al-Nimr] means every single Saudi national will enter our country in a coffin.”

The following October, the group claimed responsibility for attacks in Sanabis and Aker. “The occupying mafia of Al Saud and Al Khalifa,” it����in a statement referring to the Saudi and Bahraini monarchies, will “face consequences for the death sentence.” Three days later, the Shiite faction����to the attacks as “revenge of the Faqih [a scholar in Islamic jurisprudence] Nimr” and����that the violence targeted the “ranks of the enemy occupier,” referring to Saudi Arabia.

Bahraini officials have����over pictures of al-Nimr that Shiites had plastered on walls to demonstrate solidarity with the cleric. Unquestionably, officials in Manama must be concerned about security risks in Bahrain as well if al-Nimr is executed.

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��������ԴDz�’s has not been silent about al-Nimr either. The day after al-Nimr was sentenced to execution, the Lebanese resistance movement����the ruling as “unfair and politically charged.” In an earlier release, the group����a statement, saying: “The continued detention of this great scholar and prosecuting him for natural political activities comes while such rights exist for every individual and every scholar and expression of ideas and views is a natural right of all individuals, underlined by all international regulation and divine faiths.”

Protests against al-Nimr’s death sentence were also����outside of Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. Ibrahim Bader al-Deen al-Houthi — the brother of Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the����of ’s Shiite rebels —����in an online commentary: “We warn Saudi Arabia against … harming Sheikh al-Nimr in any way.” He also�� that: “[I]f the Saudi authorities execute al-Nimr, it will be a criminal act that will not go unanswered.”

Shiite militias — including Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (“The Battalion of the Sayyid’s Martyrs,” or KSS), Kata’ib Hezbollah (“Battalions of the Party of God”) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (“League of the Righteous”) — have����as well. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s political wing, in particular,����that Saudi Arabia would face “consequences” for the verdict. Previously, KSS praised Bahraini Shiite militant groups’ attacks in the island kingdom, and Kata’ib Hezbollah (not the Lebanese group)����assaults against US armed forces in Iraq, citing Washington’s support for the Bahraini government during the Shiite uprising of 2011 as justification.

Saudi Arabia and Iran’s Rivalry

The flames of sectarian violence have wreaked havoc across the and Arabian Peninsula. Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen continue to serve as sensitive proxy battlegrounds in Saudi Arabia and Iran’s geopolitical rivalry.

Riyadh has backed Sunni forces in these countries with the intention of countering Tehran’s influence in the Arab world, which grew substantially after ’s regime fell in 2003. The country played a pivotal role in sending its youth into Syria to wage a “holy war” against the secular Alawite regime in Damascus and its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah.

�ٲ������’s rise to power in 2014, however, demonstrated that Riyadh’s sectarian foreign policy has backfired against the kingdom’s interests. Interestingly, while Saudi Arabia and Iran maintain opposing interests in Syria and Iraq’s political futures, the two states share a common interest in defeating Daesh, which controls swathes of Iraqi territory near both countries’ borders. Recent diplomatic overtures between Riyadh and Tehran, following the 2013 election of the moderate Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, have prompted speculation that the mutual threat of Daesh will pave the way for a thaw in Saudi Arabian-Iranian relations.

Yet if a rapprochement between the two rivals is in the works, al-Nimr’s execution would surely derail it. If Saudi Arabia executes al-Nimr, which would make him the����Muslim cleric to receive the death penalty in the kingdom, Iranian officials would have to respond in some form, as the Islamic Republic fashions itself as the heart of modern day Shiism. Additionally, new threats to Saudi Arabia will arise from other countries on its borders, as various groups who revere al-Nimr would feel obligated to strike against the state or its interests abroad.

Within the oil-rich Eastern Province, there is a possibility that Saudi Hezbollah (which is also distinct from the Lebanese group) could reemerge as a force capable of wreaking havoc, posing graver security challenges for the ruling monarchy. Indeed, in the late 1980s, Saudi Hezbollah bombed energy infrastructure in the kingdom and waged an�� campaign that targeted Saudi Arabian diplomats in Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey, in response to the����of hundreds of Iranian pilgrims who traveled to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj in 1987 and the beheading of four Saudi Hezbollah members.

As officials in Riyadh decide what steps to take toward al-Nimr, they must be cautious about the possibility of Shiite militias carrying out future attacks against the ruling monarchy. Indeed, reports have surfaced of Shiite militants striking first against Saudi security forces in the Eastern Province. If true, al-Nimr’s execution would only serve to exacerbate the dangerous state of relations between the Sunni monarchy and the kingdom’s 3 million Shiites at a time when Saudi Arabia faces a growing security threat from Daesh in Iraq and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen.

Ideally, Saudi Arabia’s authorities will conclude that they must spare al-Nimr’s life to prevent sectarian unrest from further escalating in eastern Saudi Arabia and the greater Middle East. Until that decision is made, al-Nimr’s fate will hang like a sword of Damocles over the region’s already volatile geopolitical environment.

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The����of senior Hezbollah commander Hassan al-Laqis in early December, coming on the heels of the recent����on the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, marked the latest in a series of Salafist-orchestrated attacks against Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s escalating involvement in Syria’s civil war, crystallized during the pivotal battle for the Syrian border city of Qusayr, has helped to fuel a wave of jihadist militancy in Lebanon from Sunni forces opposed to the Assad regime. As al-Qaeda-affiliated militias like the Abdullah Azzam Brigades launch brazen attacks deep inside Hezbollah strongholds, such Sunni forces are exposing the Shi’ite group’s fatigue, confusion, and vulnerability.

Throughout the first two years of the conflict, Hezbollah’s military role in Syria was minimal. Last May, however, as the fighting increasingly pressed up against ��������ԴDz�’s borders, thousands of Hezbollah fighters were ordered to invade western Syria and fight alongside the Syrian Army in the strategic border town of Qusayr. Bashar al-Assad’s forces����Qusayr on June 5, and Hezbollah received much����for the victory.

Since then, Hezbollah militants have remained in Syria and have joined the Syrian Army in��. In November, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah��: “As long as the reasons [to fight in Syria] remain, our presence there will remain.”

Still, Hezbollah’s resolve to carry on in Syria comes at a price. With Nasrallah’s forces and their Salafist rivals dragging Lebanon ever more deeply into Syria’s civil war, reprisal attacks like the hit on al-Laqis erode any notion, prevalent only several years ago, that Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanon is beyond question. Despite this challenge, however, grander geopolitical developments appear to be moving in Hezbollah’s favor.

Syria: Hezbollah’s Vietnam?

Hezbollah has justified its role in Syria within a narrative of defending all Lebanese citizens from “” elements — that is, hardline Sunnis who accuse other Muslims of apostasy — within the Syrian opposition. However, Hezbollah will be challenged to devise an exit strategy from Syria if a prolonged and bloody stalemate ensues.

As the fighting raged in Qusayr, Nasrallah����that Hezbollah would fight to deliver a “victory” for Assad, but the pragmatic Hezbollah leader must know that victory’s definition can be vague. How many young Lebanese citizens will die fighting in defense of Assad before more voices within Hezbollah start to raise questions?

Since the battle of Qusayr, Sunni forces inside Lebanon have escalated their attacks against Hezbollah. The two groups that claimed responsibility for al-Laqis’ assassination — the Free Sunnis of Baalbek and Ansar al-Sunnah —����his role in the “massacre” of Qusayr for the killing.

And following the Abdullah Azzam Brigades’ attack on the Iranian Embassy in Beirut on November 19, the al-Qaeda-linked faction����that more attacks would follow unless Hezbollah fighters retreat from Syria.

For now, however, a Hezbollah withdrawal from Syria does not appear to be on the cards. In November, Nasrallah stated that he would not compromise Hezbollah’s presence in Syria over political concerns in Lebanon, where opposing stakes over the conflict have led to political paralysis between Hezbollah and its allies on the one hand and the Future Movement led by Saad Hariri on the other.

“Anyone who speaks of Hezbollah’s withdrawal from Syria as a condition to form a new government,”��, “is imposing a crippling condition.” He����that Hezbollah would not undermine the Levant’s future “for a few useless cabinet portfolios.”

With neither side backing down, Salafist attacks against Hezbollah and Iranian interests in Lebanon can be expected as jihadists attempt to distract the Shi’ite group from Syria, pressuring Hezbollah to return to Lebanon to defend its position. In turn, this threatens to drag Lebanon into a renewed civil war along sectarian lines, which Hezbollah seeks to avoid.

Hezbollah’s Position in the New Middle East

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Hezbollah’s primary strategic concern has been the break-up of the tripartite “axis of resistance” (Iran, Syria, and Lebanon) that could follow Assad’s ouster, which would leave Hezbollah without a direct land route to its sponsors in Iran. However, recent geopolitical developments underscore the alliance’s resilience and indicate that the so-called “Shi’ite Crescent” is not likely to fall in the near term.

Given the����achieved by Washington and Tehran in Geneva, a US-led military strike on Iran during the remainder of President Barack Obama’s final term can be virtually ruled out. On the battlefield in Syria, meanwhile, Assad’s forces are riding a wave of momentum as the tide shifts in their favor, as evidenced by numerous regime victories achieved in 2013.

Furthermore, Washington’s decision to opt for a diplomatic approach, rather than military action, following Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons should dim expectations that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will intervene militarily in Syria and tip the balance in the rebels’ favor, as occurred in Libya in 2011.

The probability of the Syrian regime falling is further decreased by Western governments’ refusal to provide advanced weaponry to the rebel forces, a consequence of the al-Qaeda-affiliated militias’ growing influence within the opposition.

Thus, even if the Syrian regime fails to regain control over its northern territories, an arms corridor linking southern Lebanon to Iran could be maintained, staving off Hezbollah’s isolation from its sponsors in Tehran.

Hezbollah’s Diplomatic Hand

While Hezbollah remains committed to the battle in Syria, it is also seeking to exert diplomatic leverage in any potential political settlement. Although the US embassy in Beirut has denied it, the Lebanese newspaper��Al-Jumhouria����on December 13 that Hezbollah and the US government are engaged in a secret dialogue regarding developments inside Lebanon. If accurate, this development underscores Hezbollah’s interest in riding the coattails of any potential US-Iran rapprochement.

On December 3, Nasrallah����that he had met with a Qatari envoy and told the Doha official that any military solution in Syria is “pointless.” While Hezbollah and Qatar had enjoyed cordial relations prior to the Arab Spring, the Syrian crisis led to a deterioration of ties.

Understanding that Qatar is Saudi Arabia’s����within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and given that Hezbollah����for the growing wave of Salafist attacks against Shi’ites in Lebanon, Nasrallah’s talks with Qatar likely factor into a strategy to weaken Saudi Arabia’s regional clout.

Given that Iraq, Turkey, and nearly all Gulf states except Saudi Arabia have praised the interim agreement that Iran reached with international negotiators in November, Hezbollah must be delighted to watch as developments unfold that leave��.

Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, visited����and����in December to relay a message to Gulf leaders from Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stressing Tehran’s interest in improving Iran-GCC relations, which would set back Riyadh’s agenda of isolating Iran.

At earlier stages of the Syrian crisis, the prospects for Assad’s ouster alarmed Hezbollah officials, who feared the group’s regional isolation as a consequence. Yet given the resilience of the tripartite “axis of resistance,” events are unlikely to leave Hezbollah high and dry anytime soon.

The graver threat to Hezbollah is the escalating series of attacks on Shi’ite strongholds in Lebanon. Most recently, on December 17, 2013, a car bomb����next to a Hezbollah base in the Baalbek region of eastern Lebanon, resulting in several casualties. Later that day, three rockets were����into the Hermel region, a Hezbollah stronghold in northeastern Lebanon.

Hezbollah, which remains the most powerful Lebanese faction, will be pressured to deliver a harsh response. However, the Shi’ite group will be hard-pressed to assert its authority without playing into the jihadists’ game of dragging Lebanon into a second civil war.

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Iran’s alleged role in the 1994 attack on the Jewish-Argentina Mutual Association (AMIA) community center in Buenos Aires was followed by eighteen years of tense relations between Argentina and Iran. Earlier this year, however, Argentine and Iranian officials agreed to establish a “truth commission” pertaining to the terrorist attack that killed 85 people, which indicates that Argentine-Iranian relations have entered a new chapter. The agreement has been hailed by officials in both capitals as a “historic” opportunity to seek the truth about the AMIA bombing. Nevertheless, a grander strategic scheme, unrelated to the 1994 attack, drives the rapprochement.

Argentina’s new tone toward Iran is best understood within the context of President Kirchner’s confrontational actions on the international stage. By nationalizing the energy company YPF – a subsidiary of Spain’s Repsol – resurrecting the longstanding dispute over the Falkland Islands, while going toe-to-toe with the IMF over the sovereign debt dispute, Kirchner has in fact conducted an antagonistic foreign policy toward Western powers. The decision to establish the “truth commission” with Iranian officials added the US and Israel to the list of governments increasingly irritated with an Argentina that seeks to redefine North-South relations in the 21^st century, while challenging conventional taboos.

Without question, while irking Western powers and international financial institutions, Argentina is pursuing deeper regional integration and greater autonomy from the US.

The establishment of BancoSur – a monetary and lending institution established in 2009 for the purpose of providing South American countries an alternative to the World Bank and IMF – increased trade within the South American continent and voting patterns, particularly with respect to Cuba, at the Organization of American States underscore such efforts.

As an ally of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Kirchner’s position ������-à-������ Iran must be analyzed in the framework of a new regional order that has veered increasingly under Caracas’ influence. As Venezuela established deeper ties with Iran, Chavez’s regional allies followed suit to various extents. Clearly, as leaders in Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Nicaragua have reached out to the Islamic Republic, they have defied the West’s wishes. The authors concur with analysts, such as Sergio Berenzstein, who that Argentina’s warmth toward Iran factors into Kirchner’s agenda of supporting this Venezuelan-led bloc that seeks to create a more multipolar world.

Beyond a regional realignment in Latin America, Kirchner views Iran as an opportunity to advance specific Argentine national interests. During recent years, Argentina has become increasingly reliant on energy imports. Therefore, greater ties with the world’s fifth largest producer of crude oil and sixth largest producer of natural gas could yield enormous benefits. Meanwhile, Iran is desperate to find more export partners as the noose tightens around its central bank. More likely than not, Tehran would reward Buenos Aires with generous energy deals if Argentina continues to resist Western pressure to honor the sanctions.

Since Kirchner became president in 2007, Argentine exports to Iran (primarily agricultural commodities) have 338%, reaching $1.08 billion in 2012.Overall bilateral trade has increased 200% within the last five years. As the international economic sanctions have led many Iranians to live with a shortage of goods, Argentine officials understand that Iran’s demand for Argentina’s soya beans, corn and wheat should remain steady for the near- to medium-term.

Nonetheless, this development in Argentine-Iranian relations has met its share of criticism and controversy – most notably from Washington, Tel Aviv and certain segments of Argentine society.

In response to a question about the “truth commission,” US State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland : “Iran’s record of cooperation with international authorities is profoundly deficient, which underlines the concern that its engagement on this matter be focused on achieving justice promptly.” Israel’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement “astonishment and disappointment” with Argentina and condemning Buenos Aires for holding an “unacceptable attitude” toward Israel. Sergio Widder, director for the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Latin America , “How will it be possible to close the case by collaborating with those who have denied any part in the bombing […] Furthermore, how can Argentina trust a totalitarian regime with absolutely no respect for human rights?” These voices, according to Kirchner and her allies, have no interest in obtaining any truth about the event of 1994. Kirchner’s supporters dismiss these critics as agents of foreign interests that seek to utilize the 1994 attack as a geopolitical football to further isolate Iran.

Of course, predicting the longer-term consequences of Kirchner’s policies ������-à-������ Iran is difficult. Moreover, as demonstrated by the 8N movement, Kirchner already faces a plethora of domestic concerns. This movement was formed last year by upper-middle class and wealthy Argentines who grew angry with Kirchner, accusing her administration of only catering to the needs of her political support base. The rise of inflation, skyrocketing crime rates, a damaged foreign investment climate and greater government control over the media are contentious issues that have created much political turmoil in Argentina and added momentum to the 8N movement. Thus, the thawing of Argentine-Iranian relations may not capture the average Argentine’s attention. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the “truth commission” will yield results and if it fails to achieve its objective, there is reason to question how close Argentina and Iran can grow.

Nonetheless, by merely collaborating with Iranian authorities, Buenos Aires is making a bold statement. In 2009, former US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton that if Latin American states “want to flirt with Iran, they should take a look at what the consequences might well be for them.” Clearly, Washington will apply pressure on any state in the western hemisphere that refuses to tow the West’s line ������-à-������ Iran. Argentina knows this. But does it care? Considering that China has surpassed the US as an export partner for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, the decline of US economic influence is unquestionably giving Latin American leaders, such as Kirchner, more freedom to thumb their nose at Washington when it suits their interest to do so. Clearly, Kirchner is convinced that forming a partnership with Iran will advance Argentina’s interests and she appears unafraid of the associated risks.

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“I salute all people of the Arab Spring, or Islamic winter, and I salute the Syrian people who seek freedom, democracy and reform.” Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, this declaration before a crowd at the Al Azhar Mosque in Cairo on February 24, 2012.

In 2011, Hamas its political headquarters from Syria and Bashar Al-Assad’s request to stage rallies in support of the Syrian regime at Palestinian refugee camps in Syria. Haniya’s statement simply confirmed that Hamas had officially broken ties with its longtime state sponsor in Damascus. The Arab Uprisings ended the alliance that Hamas had formed with the Assad regime in the aftermath of the Palestinian group’s expulsion from Jordan in 1999.

The Syrian uprising placed Hamas in between a rock and a hard place. Even as Hamas sought to remain loyal to a regime that had provided economic aid and weapons during times of isolation, the group could not maintain an alliance with a regime that was brutally oppressing a Sunni-led opposition movement. Hamas’ final calculation that severing ties with Assad would best further its long-term objectives was driven by an assessment of the Syrian crisis, particularly with respect to Palestinian refugees in Syria and . However, the democratic victories of Muslim Brotherhood branches throughout the region were perhaps Hamas’ greatest incentive to break ties with Syria and pursue alliances with Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar.

Hamas is betting that new geopolitical realities in the region may offer it an opportunity to escape isolation, gain recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians in Gaza, spread its ideology, and cultivate ties with neighbors. Nonetheless, by breaking ties with Assad and cultivating ties with Tehran’s strategic competitors, Hamas is jeopardizing its relations with Iran as well.

Evolving Approach to Syria

From March until December 2011, Hamas attempted to maintain a relatively neutral stance on the Syrian crisis. The organization even attempted to mediate negotiations between the regime and the opposition. However, such efforts proved futile. The opposition leaders Hamas intended to meet were , and Damascus rejected the initiative several days after it was proposed. to the Washington Post, “Hamas officials still seemed eager to depict themselves as straddling two sides, insisting that their policy was neutral and in favor of the Syrian people, not against Assad.” Hamas’ website explicitly : “we hope the current circumstances are overcome in a way that fulfils the hopes and aspirations of the Syrian people and preserves Syria’s stability and internal cohesion.”

A painful lesson from the first Gulf War influenced Hamas’ initial reaction to the situation in Syria. When PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat supported Saddam Hussein during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Palestinian refugees in Kuwait from their leader’s alliance with Baghdad. Two decades later, Hamas did not want the half-million Palestinian refugees in Syria to face the wrath of a regime that could target them for being associated with a disloyal benefactor.

However, as the Syrian death toll mounted, Assad became a liability for Hamas. As polls among Palestinians—and in the Arab world at large—indicated that support for Assad was , Hamas determined that it could not afford to be on the wrong side of history.

By December 2011, after months of divesting its assets from Syria, Hamas removed its staff from Damascus. This decision was driven, in no insignificant manner, by pressure from Ankara and Doha. One Hamas official who departed Damascus , “Qatar and Turkey urged us to leave Syria immediately. … They said ‘Have you no shame? It’s enough. You have to get out.'” The mixed emotions surrounding this departure were by another Hamas official: “We have to go. But you have to understand that we have a sense of gratitude to this regime. They did a lot for us. And there are a lot of intimate relations, on a personal level. Politically, however, there is no reason to stay.”

Realignment

Unlike Hezbollah, which fears the rise of Syrian Sunni Islamists, the prospects of Syria becoming an Islamist state with a conservative Sunni identity does not alarm Hamas. And the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the most powerful faction within the Syrian National Council, has traditionally supported Hamas. If the Ba’athist order collapses and the Syrian Brotherhood takes power in Damascus, Hamas (itself an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood) has reason to expect a flourishing relationship with post-Assad Syria.

Hamas is building relationships with other Sunni Islamist actors throughout the Middle East, the most prominent being Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-led civilian government. Although Cairo’s relationship with Hamas will be compromised by certain Egyptian national interests—including maintaining security in the Sinai, preserving relations with the United States and EU, and avoiding a military confrontation with Israel—Egyptian-Hamas ties have unquestionably turned a new page since the fall of Hosni Mubarak. With the Egyptian government agreeing to host Hamas’ political headquarters and taking steps to travel restrictions between Sinai and Gaza, Haniya’s optimism about the future of Egyptian-Hamas relations is well grounded. Moreover, Cairo’s in the Hamas-Israel prisoner exchange deal of October 2011 indicates that Egypt’s leverage can potentially reduce Hamas’ international isolation.

Hamas leader Khaled Meshal joined Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi at the ruling Turkish party’s congress in Ankara on September 30, 2012. to Turkish media, Meshal was the “most applauded foreign guest” in a conventional hall where the audience “Damn Israel.” When Haniya visited Turkey in January 2012, he gratitude to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan “for Turkey’s continuing support for the lifting of the Israeli embargo on Gaza.” During that same trip, an AKP official, Omer Celik, that “[i]f Israel is sincere about the peace process, it should quit declaring organizations like Hamas that support the peace process illegal, and stop building settlements.” Beyond warm rhetoric, Turkey $40 million in a hospital at Hamas’ Islamic University in Gaza, where Turkish is now part of the curriculum.

Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, Gaza on October 23, 2012—marking the first visit of an Arab head of state since the imposition of Israel’s blockade on Gaza—to inaugurate Qatar’s $400-million investment in infrastructure in Gaza. Tony Karon, a senior editor for TIME, the Emir’s visit as interconnected with Qatari interests in Syria, where his regime has played an aggressive role in militarizing the opposition. “Qatar’s mission, in part, has been to woo Hamas back into the Arab fold and wean it off support from Tehran—the Emir’s Gaza visit was widely interpreted as in part a reward for Hamas breaking ties with the Assad regime,” Karon wrote. Regardless of Qatar’s motives in Gaza, its support for Muslim Brotherhood factions from Syria to Tunisia is consistent with its support for the form of democratic Sunni Islamism that Hamas embodies. Furthermore, Qatar’s efforts to mediate past Fatah-Hamas disputes indicate Doha’s recognition of Hamas as a legitimate political entity.

The Gamble over Iran

Hamas and Iran’s opposing stakes in Syria have created tension between the two. In August 2011, Iran aid to Hamas by (USD) $300 million when it refused to defend Assad. Additionally, Hamas that it would not provide military support for the Islamic Republic in any Israeli-Iranian war. Whether this tension is temporary or will precipitate a divorce remains an open question.

Although both Hamas and Iran have deep interests in the Syrian crisis, the two have much to walk away from. For many years, Hamas has received more funding, weapons, and training from Tehran than any other capital. to Ezzat al-Rashq, a Hamas political bureau member, Hamas would not be capable of paying its 45,000 staff members without Tehran’s financial support. Likewise, Hamas has provided the Islamic Republic a degree of leverage over Israel and prestige on the Arab Street as a defender of the Palestinian cause when most Arab governments have become non-confrontational actors in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Nevertheless, Hamas is gambling. Iran’s capacity to play spoiler could undermine Hamas’ power in Gaza. Tehran could deepen its ties with Hamas’ rivals (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Resistance Committees, etc.), who have posed challenges for Hamas when it has sought to enforce ceasefires brokered with Israel. If at Iran’s urging, such groups in Gaza fire missiles at Israel, Hamas’ capacity to rule Gaza would certainly be undermined. Furthermore, if such attacks elicit an Israeli response, Hamas’ role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could grow complicated as it attempts to serve as a resistance organization while gaining international legitimacy by enforcing ceasefires.

International Implications for Hamas

Syria has become the center of a Middle Eastern Cold War between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Hamas’ leaders eventually accepted the reality that they could not please all the regional actors—nor embrace a position of neutrality—as the Iranian-backed regime in Damascus fights for its survival against armed rebels funded by the Gulf sheikdoms and Turkey. Hamas’ decision to sever ties with Damascus and support the Syrian opposition was a major strategic setback for Iran and a major victory for Assad’s regional enemies.

Despite the national interests advanced by various states ������-à-������ Hamas, the Palestinian organization is unquestionably pursuing its own agenda as the Arab Uprisings unfold. Hamas’ leaders have no doubt taken note of the success of moderate and democratic Islamist parties throughout the region. As the democratically elected political party that survived a failed US-sponsored attempt in 2007, the Israeli-Egyptian blockade, and the Israeli war against Gaza in 2008-2009, it appears that various Arab states have begun to accept that Hamas is not on the verge of disappearance, despite the dreams of Washington and Tel Aviv.

Nonetheless, as the tension in Gaza each day after the Israeli Air Force assassinated Ahmed al-Jabari—Hamas’ military commander who negotiated the cease-fire that for the majority of the last year—the prospects for a greater Middle East war are growing. Unfortunately, it appears probable that Israel’s ongoing military strikes against Gaza are only shoring up Netanyahu’s right-wing base before the election next January.

However, the interests of Netanyahu’s political future and the long-term security of Israel do not always coincide. It would be in Israel’s interest to elect a leader who can accept the reality of Hamas’ growing international support and reject military force as a means of addressing it.

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