51吃瓜

Weapons are pouring out of Africa鈥檚 most oil-rich country, while extremist fighters tumble in.

Nearly four years after NATO-backed rebels toppled Muammar Gaddafi, the former Libyan ruler, Libya has plunged into chaotic unrest.

The failure of last year鈥檚 election to achieve political unity in Libya was most evident when Fajr Libya, or 鈥淟ibya Dawn鈥� 鈥� a diverse coalition of armed groups that includes an array of Islamist militias 鈥� rejected the election鈥檚 outcome and听听control of Tripoli. The internationally recognized government听听to Tobruk, situated in eastern Libya along the Mediterranean coast near the Egyptian border, while Libya Dawn set up a rival government, known as the new General National Congress, in the capital.

As forces aligned with the Tobruk government have fought Libya Dawn, the conflict has gradually become internationalized.听Egypt and the United Arab Emirates听have airstrikes targeting Libya Dawn, while听Turkey, Qatar and Sudan听are to have provided the Islamist-dominated coalition with varying degrees of support.

The emergence of Daesh, or the so-called 鈥�Islamic State,鈥� in strategically vital areas of Libya has further complicated the conflict in Africa鈥檚 most oil-rich country, and it has raised security concerns in nearby states.

Libya鈥檚 Most Polarizing General

Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, the mercurial general, has emerged as an influential, yet highly divisive, leader in this bloody conflict. In early March, the anti-Islamist general was听听commander of the armed forces loyal to the Tobruk government. Haftar鈥檚 role in the former Gaddafi regime, his cozy relationship with Washington and suspicions about his long-term ambitions have given him a controversial reputation among many Libyans. Nonetheless, he is also gaining respect from those who share his vitriol for Islamists.

Haftar was an early Gaddafi loyalist, and he played an听important 听as one of the 鈥淔ree Officers鈥� in the 1969 revolution that toppled the monarchy led by King Idris al-Sanusi. Gaddafi later听听that Haftar 鈥渨as my son 鈥� and I was like his spiritual father.鈥� It was the start of a military career in which Haftar fought on many different sides.

During the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Haftar听听a Libyan battalion. Later, as a commander of Libyan forces in the country鈥檚 1980-87 war with Chad, he was allegedly听听for war crimes when his forces were accused of using napalm and poison gas. In 1987, the Chadian military听听a major victory in the battle of Wadi al-Doum. In addition to killing more than听听Libyan forces, Chad took over听听Libyans, including Haftar, as prisoners.

Around that time, Haftar鈥檚 loyalties shifted. While held in Chad, he worked with other Libyan officers to coordinate a coup against Gaddafi, before the United States听听his release 鈥� by听听him and 300 of his men to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and from there to Virginia.

As a newly minted US citizen, Haftar lived in northern Virginia from 1990-2011, spending part of this time听听with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) before returning to Libya in March 2011 to fight once again against the Gaddafi regime. Several sources insist that Haftar was out of the CIA鈥檚 hands by 2011, but others maintain that the US government orchestrated his return to Libya that year.

Libya鈥檚 Civil War

In 2014, Haftar听听for the unilateral dissolution of Libya鈥檚 parliament and the establishment of a 鈥減residential committee鈥� to rule the country until new elections were held. He cited Libya鈥檚 鈥渦pheaval鈥� as justification for the armed forces to take over.

Many saw his act as an attempted military coup aimed at crushing the Muslim Brotherhood, which had听 second place听in Libya鈥檚 2012 elections. Prime Minister Ali Zeidan听听his announcement as 鈥渞idiculous.鈥�

Although many in Libya鈥檚 government viewed him as a rogue general hungry for power, Haftar鈥檚 ongoing campaign against Islamist forces has gradually won him supporters. In May 2014, he waged a campaign called 鈥淥peration Dignity鈥� to 鈥渆liminate extremist terrorist groups鈥� in the country. Since then, the Tobruk-based government has by and large come to support the general, viewing him as the government鈥檚 best bet in the struggle against its Islamist enemies.

Haftar鈥檚 anti-Islamist crusade parallels that of Egyptian President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, who is presiding over a crackdown on Egypt鈥檚 Islamists. In making no distinction between so-called moderate Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and hard-line factions such as Daesh and Ansar al-Sharia, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate, Haftar and Sisi are both selling a narrative to the West that their anti-Islamist positions are in sync with the 鈥淕lobal War on Terror.鈥�

So far, Haftar has been unwilling to negotiate with Libya Dawn, which听听the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood鈥檚 political wing and the 鈥淟oyalty to Martyrs鈥� bloc within its coalition. In turn, Libya Dawn refuses to negotiate with Haftar.

The United Nations (UN) has begun hosting talks in Morocco between Libya鈥檚 various political factions, in an effort to unite them against the growing threat of Daesh. Unfortunately, the UN鈥檚 efforts to push Libya鈥檚 two governments toward dialogue is undermined by the low levels of trust between them, and their mutual belief that only through continued armed struggle can they secure more territory and resources. Indeed, with strong backing from Cairo and Abu Dhabi, Haftar is likely convinced that he can make greater gains through warfare than diplomacy.

The toxic legacy of Gaddafi鈥檚 divisive and authoritarian regime, which pitted Libya鈥檚 diverse factions against one another, has plagued the prospects for any central authority gaining widespread legitimacy in the war-torn country. Indeed, since he was overthrown in 2011, Libya has turned into a cauldron of anarchy, with little meaningful security existing outside of Tripoli and Benghazi.

Gaddafi鈥檚 regime harshly oppressed the Islamist groups that went on to form Libya Dawn, which views its rise to power in Tripoli as hard fought and a long time in coming. They view Haftar as a war criminal from the听ancien听regime听committed to their elimination, which will certainly undermine the potential for Libya鈥檚 two governments to reach a meaningful power-sharing agreement. With no peace in sight, a continuation of the bloody stalemate between the Tobruk- and Tripoli-based governments seems most likely.

International Implications of Libya鈥檚 Turmoil

The fall of Gaddafi launched a听geopolitical tsunami听across Africa and into the Middle East. Libya is now home to the world鈥檚 largest loose arms cache, and its porous borders are routinely transited by a host of heavily armed non-state actors 鈥� including the Tuareg separatists and jihadists who forced Mali鈥檚 national military from Timbuktu and Gao in March 2012 with听newly acquired from Libya. The UN has also the flow of arms from Libya into听Egypt,听Gaza,听Niger,听 and听Syria.

Last October,听听fighters loyal to Daesh seized control of Derna near the Egyptian border, some 200 miles from the European Union. Since then, 顿补别蝉丑鈥檚 Libyan branch has taken 听of Sirte and听 a degree of influence听in Benghazi, the nation鈥檚 second largest city and heart of the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi.

The group鈥檚 use of Libyan territory to terrorize and threaten other states has raised the international stakes. In February, Daesh听beheaded听21 migrant workers from Egypt because they were Coptic Christians, and then it听released听a propaganda video containing footage of the heinous act. That lured Egypt into听waging听direct airstrikes against the group鈥檚 targets in Derna.

Last November, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis 鈥� the dominant jihadist group in the Egyptian Sinai 鈥斕�听allegiance to Daesh, as did Nigeria鈥檚听Boko Haram听more recently. Daesh has also made听direct threats听against Italy,听听officials in Rome to warn that Italy鈥檚 military may intervene in Libya to counter Daesh fighters.

One-quarter听of 顿补别蝉丑鈥檚 fighters in Derna from other Arab countries and Afghanistan. A major听听of Jabhat al-Nusra fighters from Syria have also entered the fray in Libya, underscoring how Islamist extremists from lands far away have exploited Libya鈥檚 status as a failed state. This development was most recently underscored when a Sudanese member of 顿补别蝉丑鈥檚 Libya division听 out听a suicide attack on April 5, which targeted a security checkpoint near Misrata. The bloody incident resulted in four deaths and over 20 injuries.

The number of weak or failing states across Africa suggests that such international networks will continue to take advantage of frail central authorities and lawlessness throughout the extremely underdeveloped Sahel and other areas of the continent to spread their influence. In the absence of any political resolution to its civil war, Libya in particular 鈥� as a failed state with mountainous oil reserves 鈥� will remain vulnerable to extremist forces hoping to seize power amidst the ongoing morass.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

Photo Credit:听 /听

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your donation听is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a听sponsor.