51吃瓜

With recent giving former US President Donald Trump a reasonable chance of defeating US President Joe Biden in the November 5 election, commentators have begun predicting what his second presidency might mean for domestic politics. In a dismally detailed The Washington Post analysis, historian Robert Kagan that a second Trump term would feature his 鈥渄eep thirst for vengeance鈥� against what the ex-president has called the 鈥渞adical Left thugs that live like vermin within the confines of our Country,鈥� thereby launching what Kagan calls 鈥渁 regime of political persecution鈥� leading to 鈥渁n irreversible descent into dictatorship.鈥�

So far, however, Trump and the media that follow his every word have been largely silent about what his reelection would mean for US foreign policy. Citing his recent promise of 鈥渁 four-year plan to phase out all Chinese imports of essential goods,鈥� The New York Times did recently that a renewed trade war with China 鈥渨ould significantly disrupt the U.S. economy,鈥� leading to a loss of 744,000 jobs and $1.6 trillion in GDP. Economic relations with China are, however, but one piece of a far larger puzzle when it comes to future American global power, a subject on which media reporting and commentary have been surprisingly reticent.

So let me take the plunge by starting with a I made in a December 2010 TomDispatch piece that 鈥渢he demise of the United States as the global superpower could come far more quickly than anyone imagines.鈥� I added then that a 鈥渞ealistic assessment of domestic and global trends suggests that in 2025, just 15 years from now, it could be all over except for the shouting.鈥�

I also offered a scenario hinged on 鈥� yes! 鈥� next November鈥檚 elections. 鈥淩iding a political tide of disillusionment and despair,鈥� I wrote then, 鈥渁 far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.鈥�

Back then, of course, 2025 was so far off that any prediction should have been a safe bet. After all, 15 years ago, I was already in my mid-60s, which should have given me a 鈥済et-out-of-jail-free鈥� card 鈥� that is, a reasonable chance of dying before I could be held accountable. But with 2025 now less than a year away, I鈥檓 still here (unlike all too many of my old friends) and still responsible for that prediction.

So, let鈥檚 imagine that 鈥渁 far-right patriot,鈥� one Donald Trump, does indeed 鈥渃apture the presidency with thundering rhetoric鈥� next November. Let me then don the seven-league boots of the historical imagination and, drawing on Trump鈥檚 previous presidential record, offer some thoughts about how his second shot at an America-first foreign policy 鈥� one based on 鈥渄emanding respect for American authority鈥� 鈥� might affect this country鈥檚 global power, already distinctly on the decline.

As our Lonely Planet Guide to a country called the future, let鈥檚 take along a classi former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in retirement in 1997. Drawing on his view that Eurasia remained the 鈥渃entral basis for global primacy,鈥� he argued that Washington had to do just three things to maintain world leadership: first, preserve its position in Western Europe through the NATO alliance; second, maintain its military bases along the Pacific littoral to check China; and finally, prevent any 鈥渁ssertive single entity鈥� like China or Russia from controlling the critical 鈥渕iddle space鈥� of Central Asia and the Middle East. Given his past record and current statements, it seems all too likely that Trump will indeed badly damage, if not destroy, those very pillars of American global power.

Wrecking the NATO alliance

Trump鈥檚 hostility to alliances in general and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in particular is a matter of historical record. His hostility to NATO鈥檚 crucial mutual-defense clause () 鈥� requiring all signatories to respond if one were attacked 鈥� could prove fatal. Just days after his 2018 sycophantic summit with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Fox News host Tucker Carlson asked Trump, 鈥淲hy should my son go to Montenegro to defend it from attack?鈥�

Weighing his words with uncharacteristic care, Trump : 鈥淚 understand what you鈥檙e saying. I鈥檝e asked the same question.鈥� He then offered what could, in a second term, prove a virtual death sentence for NATO. 鈥淢ontenegro,鈥� he said, 鈥渋s a tiny country with very strong people 鈥� They鈥檙e very aggressive people. They may get aggressive, and congratulations, you鈥檙e in World War Three.鈥�

Since then, of course, Putin has invaded Ukraine and Biden鈥檚 White House has rallied NATO to defend that frontline European state. Although Congress a massive $111 billion in aid (including $67 billion in military aid) for Ukraine in the war鈥檚 first 18 months, the Republican-led House has recently stalled President Biden鈥檚 request for an additional $67 billion critical to Kyiv鈥檚 continued resistance. As the campaign for his party鈥檚 nomination gathers momentum, Trump鈥檚 pro-Putin sentiments have helped persuade Republican legislators to break with our NATO allies on this critical issue.

Keep in mind that, right after Russia invaded in February 2022, Trump Putin鈥檚 move 鈥済enius,鈥� adding, 鈥淚 mean, he鈥檚 taking over a country for $2 worth of sanctions. I鈥檇 say that鈥檚 pretty smart.鈥� Last September, after Putin thanked him for claiming that, were he still president, he could end the war in 24 hours, Trump Meet the Press: 鈥淚 would get him into a room. I鈥檇 get Zelensky into a room. Then I鈥檇 bring them together. And I鈥檇 have a deal worked out.鈥�

In reality, a reelected Trump would undoubtedly simply abandon Ukraine, at best forcing it into negotiations that would be tantamount to surrender. As formerly neutral nations Finland and Sweden have to NATO and alliance stalwarts like Britain and Germany make major to Ukraine, Europe has clearly labeled Russia鈥檚 invasion and war an existential threat. Under such circumstances, a future Trump tilt toward Putin could swing a wrecking ball through the NATO alliance, which, for the past 75 years, has served as a singular pillar in the architecture of US global power.

Alienating allies on the Pacific littoral

Just as NATO has long served as a strategic pillar at the western end of the vast Eurasian landmass, so four bilateral alliances along the Pacific littoral from Japan to the Philippines have proven a geopolitical fulcrum for dominance over the eastern end of Eurasia and the defense of North America. Here, the record of the first Trump administration was, at best, mixed. On the credit side of history鈥檚 ledger, he did 鈥渢he Quad,鈥� a loose alliance with Australia, India and Japan, which has gained greater coherence under President Biden.

But only time spared Trump鈥檚 overall Asian diplomacy from utter disaster. His obsessive personal of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, marked by two meaningless meetings and the exchange of 27 mash notes, failed to produce any sign of Pyongyang鈥檚 (nuclear) disarmament, while weakening America鈥檚 alliance with long-standing ally South Korea. Although Japan鈥檚 prime minister obsequiously paid court to Trump, he battered that classic bilateral alliance with constant about its cost, even slapping a punitive duty on Japanese steel imports.

Ignoring the pleas of close Asian allies, Trump also the Trans-Pacific Partnership, leaving the door open for China to conclude its own Regional Comprehensive Economic with 15 Asia-Pacific countries that now account for nearly a third of Beijing鈥檚 foreign trade. Another four years of Trump鈥檚 鈥淎merica first鈥� diplomacy in the Pacific could do irreparable damage to those key strategic alliances.

Further south, by Taiwan to both confront and court Chinese President Xi Jinping, while letting the Philippines drift toward Beijing鈥檚 orbit and launching a misbegotten with China, Trump鈥檚 version of Asian 鈥渄iplomacy鈥� allowed Beijing to make some real diplomatic, economic, and military gains, while distinctly the American position in the region. Biden, by contrast, has at least partially it, a strengthening reflected in a surprisingly amicable San Francisco last November with President Xi.

In South Asia, where the bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan dominates all diplomacy, Trump trashed a 70-year military alliance with Pakistan with a single New Year鈥檚 Day message. 鈥淭he United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years,鈥� Trump , 鈥渁nd they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools 鈥� No more!鈥� Since then, Pakistan has shifted decisively into Beijing鈥檚 orbit, while India now plays Moscow and Washington off against each other to its economic advantage.

Just as Trump鈥檚 posture toward Europe could swing a wrecking ball through the NATO alliance in a second term, so his mix of economic nationalism and strategic myopia could destabilize the array of alliances along the Pacific littoral, toppling that second of Brzezinski鈥檚 three pillars for American global power.

That 鈥渁ssertive single entity鈥� in Central Asia

And when it comes to that third pillar of US global power 鈥� preventing any 鈥渁ssertive single entity鈥� from controlling the 鈥渕iddle space鈥� of Eurasia 鈥� Trump failed woefully (as, in fact, had his predecessors). After announcing China鈥檚 trillion-dollar Belt & Road in 2013, President Xi has spent billions building a steel grid of roads, rails, and pipelines that crisscross the middle space of that vast Eurasian landmass, an enormous new infrastructure that has led to a chain of alliances stretching across central Asia.

The power of China鈥檚 position was manifested in 2021 when Beijing helped push the US military out of in a deft geopolitical squeeze-play. More recently, Beijing also brokered a breathtaking diplomatic entente between Shi鈥檃 Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, stunning Washington and many Western diplomats.

Trump鈥檚 Middle East policy during his first term in office was focused solely on backing right-wing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 鈥� Jerusalem as Israel鈥檚 capital, a nuclear agreement with Iran, his marginalization of the Palestinians, and Arab recognition of Israel. Since the Hamas terrorist attack of October 7 and Netanyahu鈥檚 devastating assault on Gaza鈥檚 civilian population, President Biden鈥檚 was skewed in an almost Trumpian fashion toward Israel, with a consequent loss of influence in the wider region. And count on one thing: An incoming Trump administration would only compound the damage.

In short, Beijing is already toppling the third pillar of American global power in that critical 鈥渕iddle space鈥� of Eurasia. In a second Trump term, an unchecked Chinese diplomatic and economic juggernaut could arguably grind that pillar into rubble.

Africa in the 鈥淲orld Island鈥�

In fact, however, no matter what Brzezinski might have thought, there are other pillars of world power beyond Eurasia 鈥� above all, Africa. Indeed, British geostrategist Halford Mackinder, the author of the global geopolitical analysis that deeply influenced the former national security adviser, over a century ago that the locus of global power lay in a tri-continental combination of Europe, Asia, and Africa that he dubbed 鈥渢he world island.鈥�

In the age of high imperialism, Europe found Africa a fertile field for colonial exploitation and, during the Cold War, Washington added to that continent鈥檚 suffering by making it a superpower surrogate battleground. But Beijing grasped the human potential of Africa and, in the 1970s, began building lasting economic alliances with its emerging nations. By 2015, its trade with Africa had climbed to , three times the United States鈥�. Its investments there were then projected to reach a trillion dollars by 2025.

Recognizing the strategic threat, President Barack Obama a 2014 summit with 51 African leaders at the White House. Trump, however, dismissed the entire continent, during a 2018 Oval Office meeting, as so many 鈥�.鈥� The Trump administration tried to repair the damage by First Lady Melania off on a solo trip to Africa, but her bizarre colonial outfits and ill-timed administration cuts in foreign aid to the continent only added to the damage.

In addition to a storehouse of natural resources, Africa鈥檚 chief asset is its growing pool of human talent. Africa鈥檚 median age is (compared to 38 for both China and the US), meaning that, by 2050, that continent will be home to a full one-third of the world鈥檚 young. Given his fraught record with the region, Trump鈥檚 second term would likely do little more than hand the whole continent to China on a gold-plated platter.

South of the border

Even in Latin America, the situation has been changing in a complex fashion. As a region informally incorporated into the American imperium for more than a century and suffering all the slights of an asymmetric alliance, its increasingly nationalist leaders welcomed China鈥檚 interest in this century. By 2017, in fact, Chinese trade with Latin America had hit a substantial , making it 鈥� yes! 鈥� the region鈥檚 largest trading partner. Simultaneously, Beijing鈥檚 loans to Caribbean countries had reached a hefty by the end of the Trump administration.

Except for drug interdiction and economic against leftist regimes in Cuba and Venezuela, the Trump White House generally ignored Latin America, doing nothing to slow China鈥檚 commercial juggernaut. Although the Biden administration made some diplomatic gestures toward the region, rose relentlessly to $450 billion by 2022.

Reflecting a bipartisan indifference in this century, a reelected Trump would likely do little to check China鈥檚 growing commercial hegemony over Latin America. And the region would undoubtedly welcome such indifference, since the alternative 鈥� along with draconian at the US鈥揗exican border 鈥� might involve to fire missiles at or send troops to knock out drug labs in Mexico. The backlash to such unilateral intervention amid panic over immigration could cripple US relations with the region for decades to come.

In the world that a second Trump term might face in 2025, American global power will probably be far less imposing than it was when he came into office in 2016. The problem won鈥檛 be that this time around he鈥檚 already appointing advisers determined to let Trump be Trump or, as the The New York Times recently, who are 鈥渇orging plans for an even more extreme agenda than his first term.鈥� By every significant metric 鈥� economic, diplomatic, and even military 鈥� US power has been on a downward slide for at least a decade. In the more unipolar world of 2016, Trump鈥檚 impulsive, individualized version of diplomacy was often deeply damaging, but on at least a small number of occasions modestly successful. In the more multipolar world he would have to manage nearly a decade later, his version of a unilateral approach could prove deeply disastrous.

After taking his second oath of office in January of 2025, Trump鈥檚 鈥渢hundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal,鈥� might indeed fulfill the I made some 15 years ago: 鈥淭he world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.鈥�

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.