51吃瓜

Last week, the US and Iran signed the Memorandum of Understanding () to formally end (at least for the present) this phase of the four-plus months of war between the two countries. Israel, which was a partner with the US from day one of the war, did not participate in the negotiations of the deal and is not a signatory.聽

An unnecessary and disastrous war聽

Before directly addressing the deal, however, it is important to state that the war clearly did not go the way that either the Americans or Israelis had expected. The Iranians, despite losing many of their most senior political and military leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali , did not cave. Another capable and seemingly even more hardline group of leaders, including Mujtaba Khamenei, son of the assassinated former Supreme Leader, quickly stepped up to lead the Islamic Republic alongside a much-empowered Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).聽

American and Israeli tactical military advantages were clear from the beginning as both reported ever-growing numbers of destroyed Iranian military and other targets. Nonetheless, the Iranians responded with devastating missile and drone attacks against US military installations and assets in the region, on Israel itself and on all of America鈥檚 Gulf allies, many of whom heavy damage.聽聽

Iran鈥檚 closure of the Strait of Hormuz upset the chessboard and had a major impact on the war鈥檚 outcome. Iran, it seems, really did not need nuclear weapons to force the world to listen and bend. Without the twenty-some percent of oil that passes through the Strait, the world 鈥� and specifically US President Donald Trump 鈥� had no choice. They were going to have to deal with Iran on its terms. 

For two reasons, the decision to go to war was a colossal mistake by Trump and his Israeli partner, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. First, every war game exercise the US Defense and State Departments and CIA had run for at least the last 20 years had shown that Iran would close the Strait within days of the start of war with the US. Donald Trump chose to ignore that fact, which any senior US military or intelligence officer or American diplomat would have known. Second, Trump and Netanyahu attacked Iran鈥檚 military apparatus and infrastructure, which, though weaker than both of its adversaries, wasn鈥檛 the true vulnerability of the Iranian leadership. That was (and remains) the decrepit, inefficient, corruption-ridden, inflation-plagued and sanctioned-constrained economy. Almost every anti-regime demonstration over the past 10 to 15 years has attacked Iran鈥檚 declining economic state, the burdens that it imposes on the Iranian people and the government鈥檚 abject inability to fix the economy.  

A wiser course of action would have concentrated on targeting Iran鈥檚 biggest vulnerability, doubling down on punishing the economy, especially those elements associated with the all-powerful, controlling IRGC. That would have meant not only stepped-up US sanctions but working with US allies and partners in the region and around the world to also expand their sanctions and enforcement. No amount of illicit sanctions-busting oil exports or meager support from Russia or China can resuscitate Iran鈥檚 dying economic corpse. Attacking the enemy鈥檚 weakest point has almost always been a standard strategy in warfare. Why didn鈥檛 the US? 

The war was a disaster for America and so many others. The dreadful Memorandum of Understanding that it eventually signed only proves it.  

A very bad deal, except for Iran聽

Commentary on the deal, especially in the US, has been universally bad. 鈥淧resident Trump lost the war,鈥� from the editorial board of . 鈥淕ood reasons to be skeptical that a comprehensive peace, even if reached, will hold,鈥� from the US Council on Foreign Relations (). 鈥淭his outcome, after months of destruction and global economic disruption, is the greatest foreign policy failure of both of Trump鈥檚 terms,鈥� from . From the , 鈥渁 strategic retreat short of achieving (Trump鈥檚) war aims.鈥� From , 鈥淧resident Donald Trump retreated on unfavorable terms.鈥� And from , 鈥淚ran has lost its fear of war.鈥� There are many others, most even more severely critical.聽

None of the objectives Trump sought at the war鈥檚 outset 鈥� admittedly a moving target 鈥� were achieved. No agreement on Iran鈥檚 nuclear weapons program. No limits on Iranian missiles, still capable of wreaking havoc on Israel, the Gulf States and even NATO countries like Turkey and Greece and possibly parts of Italy. And no constraints on Iran鈥檚 support for regional proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, several Shia militias in Iraq and others. Oil sanctions are dropped, an enormous American concession, and a development fund of $300 billion will be established to help the country rebuild. Iran鈥檚 single to open the Persian Gulf 鈥� 鈥淚ran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf 鈥�,鈥� per the MOU language 鈥� is so wobbly one wonders how the American negotiators could have accepted it, given it was the one thing they had to get. Most experienced diplomats/negotiators will see all sorts of opportunities for mischief in such loose language.聽

To be honest, the MOU offers many opportunities for both sides to skirt most of the obligations, commitments or 鈥渂est efforts鈥� therein. Perhaps as an initial statement of intention, it may pass muster. But even that is a stretch. The Iranians are rightly claiming victory with the MOU, ending the war and surviving the American and Israeli onslaught with no genuine concessions. In the war of wills that this had become, Donald Trump not only blinked but also effectively surrendered the battlefield. 

Others Lose as Well聽

In the broader sense, however, Iran鈥檚 leaders and the Iranian people are worse off. Their economy and infrastructure 鈥� civilian and military 鈥� have suffered extensive damage and destruction that will take years and billions of dollars to repair. Unless Iran can find a way to integrate its economy with that of the rest of the world, it鈥檚 going nowhere, despite the development fund promised by the Americans. They would be well advised to recall the many promises the American president has made to his own constituents, never mind the banks and businesses with which he has dealt in his business career, and failed to deliver on. 

What about those not mentioned in the MOU? Israel may be the worst off, especially Bibi Netanyahu. Netanyahu chose to hitch his wagon to the Trump train, only to be left at the station and forced to explain to the Israeli people his rapidly disintegrating relationship with Donald Trump and the greater US. Throughout his business and political careers, Trump has proven to be a very temporary and disloyal partner and ally. How did Bibi and the vaunted Israeli intelligence not see that?  

Israelis are now left to wonder where they stand vis-脿-vis their future security and alliance with the US, having been left out of the MOU negotiating process. (To add insult to injury, Trump and Vice President Vance have all but blamed Netanyahu and Israel for the war.) Israelis face ongoing threats from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and a weak but nevertheless deadly Hamas in Gaza. The MOU calls for the cessation of all action against Lebanon, meaning Hezbollah. But if the latter fails to comply, will the US support Israel鈥檚 right to respond? 

Then, there are the Gulf States, all of which suffered extensive damage during the war. While much of that damage is repairable, it will take billions of dollars and time, especially in , whose principal LNG facility was knocked offline. And these countries have reportedly been included as potential contributors to the MOU鈥檚 proposed development fund for Iran. Were they consulted? All these states had tied their security to America. It鈥檚 fair to ask now: What did that get them?聽聽

The US has lost much more than the bases in the region that were damaged. Thirteen Americans died in the war. Its weapons stockpiles, already low at the start of the war, are now badly depleted and will take years to rebuild. Can Ukraine and Taiwan count on the US to step up to support them in the future? NATO and US allies in Asia are asking similar questions. 

And after 60 days?聽

The MOU鈥檚 60-day clock is counting down. The two sides must now find a way to resolve the main issues: for the US, neutralizing Iran鈥檚 nuclear weapons capability; and for Iran, easing sanctions and lifting the asset freeze on more than $25 billion held in foreign banks. There are dozens of other equally complicated issues, and very few are likely to be settled in just 60 days. It took the US and Iran (plus Britain, China, France, the EU, Germany and Russia) more than two years to negotiate and sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. (Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA in 2018.) This two-page MOU is nothing like the 159-page JCPOA. And it鈥檚 hard to believe that whatever results from these negotiations will be as comprehensive and detailed as was the JCPOA. 

America fell into the classic 鈥�,鈥� believing that a quick war employing overpowering advanced precision weapons could achieve its goals in Iran in a short war. Instead, it found itself in a war in which its enemy was prepared to risk all and suffer all in order to survive. Trump grossly underestimated the Islamic Republic鈥檚 ideological resolve; that is, save the Islamic revolution above all else. In many ways, it was a modern-day Vietnam. After all, how could a third-rate military match the nonpareil might of the US? Kissinger asked that very question about Vietnam in the lead-up to the start of negotiations with Hanoi.聽

Trump started a war he was unwilling to finish at the price and military resources it required and the time it would demand. Moreover, he faced political pressures that hardly exist for Iran鈥檚 leaders and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Tehran knew all that and had prepared for it; Trump either didn鈥檛 or ignored those who tried to advise him before the war was launched. 

The Middle East and the global economy are changed. Some semblance of balance and economic stability may return. Oil markets will (probably) adjust, albeit at higher prices for importers and consumers. But it won鈥檛 look like it did on February 27, 2026. Under Donald Trump, America is undermining the very world it had labored diligently to build for more than 80 decades. Its image and standing around the world have suffered badly. And all because of an unnecessary war. 

[Cheyenne Torres edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.