51吃瓜

Damascus has crossed another significant milestone since the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. On March 30, Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani 鈥� born Ahmed al-Sharaa and formerly a senior commander of the jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra 鈥� the formation of a new cabinet as president of the Syrian Transitional Government (STG).

Initial reactions from analysts and regional observers suggest that al-Jawlani maintains a firm grip over the cabinet. His dominance reflects the continuation of the influence of Hay鈥檃t Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which evolved from al-Qaeda鈥檚 Syrian affiliate, within the emerging government in Damascus. These developments followed earlier in March in Syria鈥檚 predominantly Alawite coastal areas. The announcement of an inclusive cabinet may serve more as a public relations move than a substantive shift, especially if HTS forces continue to against civilians.

The new , set to govern for up to until elections take place, includes ministers. Al-Jawlani included one woman, one Alawite, two Druze and one Kurd. Some ministers, including al-Jawlani himself, studied in Europe. However, only a few lack previous connections to HTS. HTS loyalists occupy of the most influential posts. These appointments came amid heightened Western pressure on the STG to prove its legitimacy. That pressure increased after a hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron called for substantive reforms in Damascus.

Al-Jawlani the first cabinet meeting on April 7. Days earlier, he his brother, Maherr al-Sharaa, as head of the General Secretariat of the Presidency. Critics pointed to this decision as an example of nepotism within the HTS-led administration. Many interpreted this move as part of al-Jawlani鈥檚 broader effort to consolidate power and solidify his central role in post-Assad Syria.

Beyond the center

Governments in the West and the Middle East remain focused on two concerns. First, they question whether an extremist group like HTS can govern a diverse population. Second, they doubt HTS鈥檚 willingness or ability to prevent Syria from becoming a haven for global jihadist networks. Al-Jawlani鈥檚 outreach and the presentation of his cabinet may attempt to project competence and inclusivity. However, violence in areas beyond Damascus suggests that stability remains out of reach.

Even before the ink dried on a cooperation between Damascus and Kurdish forces, new clashes erupted in northwestern Syria. Fighting in Kurdish-held territories near the Turkish border. Violence in Alawite-dominated coastal towns has briefly . Ethnic tensions challenge the STG鈥檚 ability to maintain stability. The administration continues to struggle to secure control over oil resources, which remain vital to economic recovery.

In March, pro-HTS militias and Alawite factions loyal to Assad in Latakia, a coastal province and Assad stronghold. These events raised concerns about Damascus鈥檚 limited ability to manage loosely affiliated militant groups. European governments have taken note. Observers that the government鈥檚 failure to bring all militias under centralized control has widespread abuses. These groups have hindered the Ministry of Interior鈥檚 attempts to enforce public order.

Western officials have over Syria鈥檚 failure to rein in jihadist groups and the crimes committed by Islamist militias against Alawite civilians. Damascus claims that Minister of Defense Marhaf Abu Qasra continues efforts to merge armed factions into formal government forces. However, independent analysts it as 鈥渁lmost entirely a symbolic process.鈥� Most factions have refused to integrate or disband, despite HTS鈥檚 claims of reform. Only a small fraction of former Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Islamist militias submitted to HTS authority in 2018 and 2019, during conflict in Idlib.

Governing factions

Experts that prolonged negotiations with rebel factions and ethnic could lead to renewed violence. The STG faces a serious threat from jihadist groups still operating on the fringes of its territory. HTS leaders now face the challenge of asserting control while avoiding confrontation with rival militant groups. Their goal is to prevent widespread from derailing efforts to unify the country under a single authority.

In Aleppo, fighting between HTS forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed coalition led by Kurdish fighters. Elsewhere, HTS Islamic State (IS) elements, some of whom it has controversially into its own ranks. This arrangement raises concerns that confrontations serve retaliatory purposes rather than genuine security aims. HTS鈥檚 strategy to integrate jihadist factions into the Ministry of Interior units, including police and , complicates the situation. These units largely come from earlier HTS and Salvation Government formations, at least at the senior leadership level.

HTS鈥檚 past affiliation with al-Qaeda and ideological roots in Iraq鈥檚 insurgency place it under international scrutiny. US officials have expressed over foreign fighters still operating in Syria. They that if the STG fails to control them, other groups with no commitment to governance may fill the vacuum. A limited signed on April 1 in Aleppo between al-Jawlani and General Mazlum Abdi, commander of the SDF, the groundwork for Kurdish integration into the transitional structure and aimed to prevent interference by extremist groups.

Despite ongoing instability, a well-orchestrated continues. European and regional leaders continue to highlight al-Jawlani鈥檚 effort to present HTS as a viable governing authority. However, this narrative risks ignoring a critical reality: jihadist factions remain active in key transit zones linking Syria to Europe by land and sea.

The future of Syria depends on actions, not performances. The and Europe must maintain pressure on terrorist networks while al-Jawlani works to stabilize the country amid international offers to sanctions. The outcome remains uncertain.

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The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial聽policy.