FO° Talks: The Culture of Culture, Part 2 — Memory, Melody and a Forgotten Opera
51Թ Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and opera and theater director Emily Hehl explore Augusta Holmès’s forgotten opera, La Montagne Noire, and examine its themes of history, myth and audience perception. Hehl shares her journey of rediscovery, emphasizing the opera’s overlooked feminist legacy. They highlight the living power of storytelling in music.
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[This is the second part of an ongoing series. To read more, see Part 1.
Peter Isackson: Welcome to FO° Talks. I’m Peter Isackson, 51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer. It’s my great pleasure to welcome back the talented opera and theater director Emily Hehl for our second edition of a series of conversations we’re calling The Culture of Culture. Our focus is on music, theater and all forms of storytelling. A key aim of what we’re doing is to look more deeply into the role of the audience — not just the artist, but the audience. Now, in the previous chat, Emily, we talked about the history of the classical concert and the role of the audience in its construction and impact. Today, I think you suggested that we delve into the relationship between music and storytelling. Could you just say a few words about what you’re working on now in Vienna?
Emily Hehl: Yes, I’m currently working on two productions, one of them being a new production of Norma by Vincenzo Bellini, and the other production is something that will be coming later this year, which is a new opera about Lee Miller, the war photographer who took a picture of herself in Hitler’s bathtub. And this new opera is questioning how a person could possibly have the idea to take a picture of herself in Hitler’s bathtub, and therefore it becomes a very intense portrait of Lee Miller and things she lived through. And yeah, so that’s the things I’m currently working on. And then, yeah, I have the pleasure of having these serious conversations with you every few weeks, which is a big pleasure. Thanks for having me.
Peter Isackson: Oh, it’s a wonderful pleasure for me to have these conversations. I never know where they’re going to go.
Emily Hehl: Neither do I! (Laughs)
Historical context and rediscovery of La Montagna Noire
Peter Isackson: So it’s not like we’re talking about the events in the political world — and there are plenty of those today — but it’s great to get away from them. So let’s go look at La Montagne Noire, which I don’t think many people know. It had some impact at the time. I think it was noticed by the musical world in Paris, where it was produced. When was it? Just before the end of the 20th century?
Emily Hehl: Yes. So the world premiere was 1895, and it was written by Augusta Holmès — a woman. She was French-Irish, and it was only the second opera that was ever premiered by a female composer in the Palais Garnier, or the big opera house in Paris. And the one before had been Louise Bertin in the 1830s. So after 60 years of no female composers presenting their own works in Paris, this was only the second time in history. So for that reason, this was quite remarkable, but it was forgotten since then and never performed again since 1895. And so we re-premiered the work last year at the opera in Dortmund in Germany.
Peter Isackson: So, has it been forgotten or neglected because it was written by a woman? She was the composer and the lyricist at the same time?
Emily Hehl: Absolutely.
Peter Isackson: And I think the critics said that the music was really good and interesting, but the plot and the writing wasn’t up to the same standard. Was that your impression?
Emily Hehl: To me, it would be the other way around, because I think the libretto is remarkable. But you’re right — she wrote the libretto herself. She wrote poems, she was composing, she was singing as well. And at her time, she was one of the most famous women in France, and she was living a radical life. She had kids with a man she was not together — who was actually married with someone else. So she had really the most liberal life you could imagine at that time. And being a composer as a woman in France, who actually had an Irish nationality, was very, very difficult for several reasons. And why was this work forgotten? I think, yes, her being a woman might have been one of the reasons, because the critiques were worse than they might have been if it was a work by a man at that time. But also, I think we’re quite deep in the kind of content we want to talk about, which is, for example, the repertoire — and how do things become part of history, and how do things just disappear in history? And I think it’s the responsibility of the people who live after the composers to keep these pieces alive. Because, I mean, many composers like Bach and Mozart, they were not composing music for them to become eternal. Music was composed for one event, usually. The idea of repertoire is an invention. It was not usual. But there was this time where an audience and performers started going back into history. And then, of course, we started appreciating a certain quality of pieces and then seeing pieces which are not in this kind of canon or repertoire. Sometimes they might have less quality, but also they might remind us of the quality that the pieces have that we keep playing again and again. So I think there’s a whole question connected to why do we not play certain pieces.
Emily’s directorial approach
Peter Isackson: So was this your choice, La Montagne Noire? And how did you — or whoever made the decision to produce it — how did you come to know it, because it’s such an obscure part of the repertoire?
Emily Hehl: It is. No, the artistic director of Opera Dortmund asked me if I would like to do this piece. The piano reduction was available on the Internet, and it is a collaboration with the Bru Zane, which is an edition that takes care of rediscovering composers or preparing the material in order for these works to be played again. And so they invited me, and all I got was the score. There was no translation, there was no research on this piece very much. And that’s a very different approach to directing, because usually, if you direct, I don’t know, an opera by Puccini or Verdi, you have to, on the one hand, deal with the piece, but you mainly have to deal with the history of the performance, because what has been done? What have been the interpretations? How have people looked at the piece? Whereas in this case, it was really just about trying to get any information about where is the libretto coming from? Because she wrote it, but you felt that there were sources. What is all of this music? Who is Augusta Holmès? So it was really more of a scientific work for a long, long time. It took me almost three years to prepare it. And I translated the libretto myself, all these kinds of things. It was really research. But it was beautiful. I play the piano, so that was very helpful, because whenever you turn a page, I started playing, and it was like reading a very interesting novel, because you had no idea where it would go.
Themes and storytelling in La Montagna Noire
Emily Hehl: And so, yeah, I did a lot of research on the libretto. It’s set in La Montagne Noire — it’s an old French word for Montenegro. So it’s set in this Slavic country during the time of the Ottoman occupation. And you feel in the libretto that there’s a lot of very specific terms and words that I didn’t know, but it didn’t feel as if it was a pure fictional text. And so I started doing a lot of research, and I was diving into the folk songs of the Slavic time around the time where the story is set, because often diving into folk poetry and folk songs can give you a lot of ideas of where things might be coming from. And as I was reading these folk songs of the Slavic people of this time, I recognized a lot of parallels to this libretto. And it turned out that she must have known these folk songs, because around the time where she was writing, just a few years before, there was a French translation of the most famous Slavic folk songs published in France. And she most likely came across them, because her father had one of the biggest libraries of France at the time. And it turns out that she must have done some kind of a mosaic — taking characters from the Slavic folk songs, turning them into a different kind of story, but also uncovering the backside of all the heroes and myths, and basically showing how history and myths are being constructed. And that maybe the truth is not the most strong word for where these stories are coming from.
Peter Isackson: So that’s why you maintain that the libretto is more interesting than the music itself?
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. Also because she talks about constructing, the construction of history, not knowing that she would be the one being forgotten. I mean, she had no idea that this could happen. But looking at it from today, her caring so much about her heritage and talking about how people are being remembered and then being forgotten herself is quite a remarkable combination of things. So we made this whole reflection part of the production. So, yeah.
Peter Isackson: I take it that when you were asked to do this — I don’t know if you committed immediately — but you didn’t know what you were getting into?
Emily Hehl: I had no idea. I was young. I just took it. (Laughs) Honestly, it was the first — I’m quite young, and I’m very lucky that at an early age I had people who trusted me to direct these kinds of massive operas. The whole thing is over three and a half hours. There’s a massive chorus. There’s like a hundred people on stage. The orchestra is almost bigger than Wagner’s orchestras are. It was a massive undertaking. So when they offered it to me, of course I was very much afraid. But yeah, I had no idea what would come.
Peter Isackson: How do you work with the performers? Are you concentrating on the musical side or the textual side — the storytelling side — or both?
Emily Hehl: Both. For me, I always start from music, because I’m a musician at first, and that’s ultimately what singers are as well. You can never go against the music. You always have to deal with the fact that it’s singing people on a stage. And there was a time of directing where directors tried to hide that people were singing — they should act as if they were just in a movie. But it doesn’t work, because singing needs your whole body in order to do it. So that’s where I will always start from, is this whole physicality of singing. But then, of course, in a case like this, to really have everyone included in the whole development of the piece and where things are coming from is important. So what I did with this production was that the first day — which is with the whole cast sat on a table — I tried to tell them everything I had researched in the last two and a half years. And it’s important for people to know where characters are coming from, because especially in this case, most of the characters have an equivalence in the Slavic folk culture. And so we were preparing, kind of — they were reading into the songs and into the characters where their characters were based on — because it’s important for a singer, an artist, a performer, to know where their characters are coming from. But in this case, we also invited a Montenegrin-Serbian artist whose profession is to sing these folk songs. So there’s this very specific instrument called the gusle, which is a one-stringed instrument, and it’s played like this. And this is how the bards at that time were traveling through the countries singing these folk songs. And because this is where this story is originating from, we invited a female artist from Montenegro-Serbia — she’s half-half — and she was part of this production. And we basically looked at the piece of Holmès through her eyes — or actually through her blind eyes, because we had her as a blind character. And so the audience was diving into the imagination of this blind bard. And that’s how the opera came into existence for the audience.
Audience reaction and impact of political events
Emily Hehl: Because it’s also a difficult piece — 1895 — I mean, political correctness is not the term that is the right one for this piece. So there’s a lot of religious conflict. So you have to be quite clever and careful when putting something like this on the stage, to not reproduce any kind of conflicts or assumptions or these kinds of things. So that’s why we chose this blind, imaginational approach to look at the story.
Peter Isackson: So when you started working on it — you say it took three years.
Emily Hehl: It took three and a half years, yeah.
Peter Isackson: So that was before the political events that Eastern Europe has been living through. Now, did that have an effect on the audience and on the production itself? Because, I mean, this is about the Balkans. The Balkans is the frontier between Eastern and Western Europe. In some ways, it epitomizes what’s happened in Ukraine, right? I just throw that out. I don’t want to get involved in political discussion, but your experience as a director and part of a production that wasn’t designed initially to take into account the politics that was going on around you. Of course, you did it in Dortmund — you didn’t do it in Montenegro. But just tell me if that had any influence at all, negative, positive or interesting, let’s say.
Emily Hehl: I mean, of course, it always has an influence, because you read the news in the morning before you go to rehearsal. So you’re full of these conflicts and these themes. But then also, you have to take artistic, visual decisions two years in advance, so you never have an idea what will be happening when you actually are directing the opera. Which is one of the reasons why I try to very much avoid any kind of contemporary reflections on a stage visually. Because you will always be behind, you have no chance. And therefore I’m trying to, of course, create a universe on a stage that allows these kinds of reflections, but they are never explicit. But of course, you know that the audience will be loaded with this information, and they will look at certain conflicts in the opera differently than you would have probably imagined they would a year before. But I think, therefore, it’s a task of an artistic team and the director to keep this openness without being too explicit, and to avoid making something too small. Because you have to be very concrete when you do something on a stage, otherwise no one can act if you don’t have a very concrete situation. But you can also not make the situation too concrete and too small, in order to keep the openness and the reflection of the audience into this situation.
Peter Isackson: So in terms of your aesthetic choices, as you were saying earlier, some people try to contemporize — if we can say that — to bring up to date traditional operas where the plots took place in defined historical circumstances, and then bring them up to date by referring to either modern customs or modern events and modern costumes as well. I think you chose a more classical idea of using the costumes and the styles of the end of the 19th century. Is that right? Or was it set in an earlier time?
Emily Hehl: No. So what we did actually is — because it’s so difficult, especially with these kinds of politics and these kinds of conflicts — to actually reproduce something on the stage. And therefore the approach we chose was through this blind poet. And maybe I’ll just quickly dive into why we chose this: Because I told you that this libretto comes from these folk songs, and that’s the reason why I suggested this theme for our conversation today — because there’s so much more connected to it than just this opera. Because there were these bards traveling through the Slavic countries, and they were writing their songs, and they were listening to people — their stories, their opinions on historical events — and they turned this mixture of historical events and fiction into the songs. But the interesting thing is that many, many of these bards were blind. So they had no possibility to verify things with their eyes. But they were really just depending on what people would tell them. But then these songs were the kind of historiography of this country at that time, and the people were singing these songs as kind of marching into the vision which they had created in the songs — they wanted to be freed from the Ottoman Empire. And they wrote songs about this liberation. But so historical events were turned into songs, and these songs then were turned into historical events, because eventually they were freed from the Ottomans. And so this kind of circle — how stories and fiction influence historical events, and how historical events are always stories in the end, because it’s what we tell each other — that was very crucial for us. And this idea of blindness, in a very beautiful, poetic sense, was the starting point for our production. And therefore, what you see on the stage is neither historical nor purely fictional, but we actually took fragments from all kinds of times and we turned them into a fictional world. Because Augusta Holmès, she had never — at least it’s not recorded — been to Montenegro or Serbia. She had no idea what it looked like. So she described certain things, but it’s a very French look of the 19th century on these kinds of things. And so we didn’t try to make a documentary, but we were really trying to go into this individual imagination of a person imagining these stories and these conflicts.
Peter Isackson: Were you thinking of a parallel with Homer? Because isn’t that the story of how the first truly important literature of Europe is accounted for? Whether it’s true or not, whether Homer was actually a blind poet. I mean, I think historians believe that there were a whole series of poets who were Homer, but maybe all of them were blind or some of them were blind in the same way you say that that seemed to be part of a tradition in the Balkans.
Emily Hehl: Yes, absolutely. It’s very, very fascinating. And this idea of this blind historiography that we’re now talking about — Augusta Holmès — and that’s why I think the libretto is better than the music, up to a certain point, because we have these myths in the Slavic culture. One of them is about Marko Kraljević, who is now — and I was in Montenegro in summer to really see the kind of settings and to talk to people — the hero of the Serbians, I mean, what we call Serbia now, because he’s the most celebrated hero who freed the country from the Ottomans. But if you dive deeper into the research of the historical Marko Kraljević, he in the end actually switched sides to the Ottomans. He didn’t die in the battle, but he had a quite good life until the very end. And so the main character in the opera is not called Marko but Mirko, but his fiancée has the same name. So it’s very obvious that she refers to this very character. But what Augusta Holmès does in the opera is that she uncovers the point where he actually switches his sides. So in the beginning, we have the folk and the people who are telling these songs about the hero, but then the audience — and that’s the interesting point — witnesses the actual other side of the coin of this myth. But in the end, the people keep singing the same song as they did in the beginning, but the audience knows more than they did in the first act. And in the very end, it’s very much about who survives and who is dying — because the people who survive, they will be the ones telling the stories. And that’s where we are questioning: Why do we perform certain pieces and why do we forget others? It’s always our responsibility — the living — to transfer stories in written or oral ways and to keep performing pieces. Yeah, it’s our responsibility.
Peter Isackson: So you added — I mean, as a jazz musician, I would call that your act of improvisation. You added the blind poet. That’s quite a feat, because you’ve got an opera which is totally composed. Did the blind poet actually have a musical role in your production?
Emily Hehl: Yes, but it was not part of the score that she wrote — something we added. But it was, for me, very, very important to actually add it. Because if you look at music in the 19th century, you have a lot of this local color — it’s composers who tried to make music sound like something they imagined Egyptian music would sound like, or Serbian music would sound like. And in order to overcome this, and to just say, okay, you see, this is an actual heritage of this country, and this is what Holmès made of it — but this is not trying to be this. This is really — it’s the creation of poetry, it’s fiction. It’s not reality. And also, for me, talking about this whole culture, which is a very complex culture — when I was in Montenegro this summer talking about these stories — it’s so deeply rooted, these conflicts, until this very day. And so for me, it was very, very important to have someone from this culture with us in the production to verify things and to feel more comfortable with this theme and to tell this story — which is definitely not my story — but to actually have someone on the stage who cared about it very, very much, because her grandfather had already been one of these blind poets as well. It felt more acceptable for me to perform this piece or to direct this piece, because I felt there was some kind of justification for it on a stage. And yeah, people said that she really opened their eyes for a different form of singing also. Yeah.
Peter Isackson: I’m very interested — you’re in the audience reaction. I mean, how much feedback do you get from your audience, and how long did the production run?
Emily Hehl: We had, I think, six performances, but spread over several months. And so, I mean, you get as much feedback as you would like to take in, because everyone will put their opinion on you if you want or not, but it’s up to you to listen to it or to actively seek for it. But the interesting thing was that there were some people at the premiere, and they kept coming back for every single performance because they loved the music, they loved the piece, and they loved the production. So if a theater programs a piece like this, they know that it won’t be sold out, because it’s not Don Giovanni and it’s not Wagner. But of course, then therefore they do musical theater before to be able to finance this kind of responsibilities, experiments, whatever you want to call it, rediscoveries. But the people who were there — and I was in three out of the six performances, for other reasons I was in town — but so I witnessed three of the six performances, and the audience was cheering and really, really enjoying the performance, apparently. Of course, you always have people who don’t like anything, but in general, the reviews were good and the audience seemed to really enjoy it as well.
Comparison with other productions and personal reflections
Peter Isackson: Because the storytelling was such a big part of it for you, do you feel that the audience could appreciate that and had learned something, if you like, had challenged their understanding of the opera itself? I don’t think that’s really a question, because nobody knew the opera — it’s not like Don Giovanni or Norma. But do you feel that you got the point across, the original points you were trying to make about the history, about the story itself, the impact? Also, it’s a tragedy, right?
Emily Hehl: Yes, it is.
Peter Isackson: So it’s got that emotional dimension which fits into a historical context. So you could look at it like any Shakespearean tragedy and say it’s as much the emotion as the poetry and the music. But I’m curious: With only six performances, what kind of feedback do you get? I suppose there were critics about it.
Emily Hehl: Yes, and we also got nominated. There is the International Opera Awards, which is one of the biggest awards for opera. And our production got nominated for the Best Rediscovered Work. So it was really appreciated in the critics and the reviews. Also, what I was happy about most was that people were interested in Augusta Holmès and not only in this Slavic culture, because they were really intrigued by Bojana Peković. That was the artist that joined us. And she was also giving workshops around and concerts and stuff. So I really think that the people who saw it were really, really touched by her singing as well, because it’s a very different way of singing. It’s very direct. If you know this kind of wide voice that just goes right through your body — you immediately get goosebumps. It’s the opposite of operatic singing. Also to have this as a contrast, I think for audiences this was a great experience. But we had a lot of after-talks and these kinds of things. And people were just curious about Augusta Holmès. Because when you read a little bit about her, you wonder why you had never heard about her. Because she was so big at her time. Like, she was a friend of Wagner, and she had relations with Liszt and a lot of really important composers. She was very deeply in the scene of the poets in France at that time. Everybody knew her, but no one knows her today. And so I think that’s what people really started to wonder about — how is this possible? And I think this is where the reflection probably sets in even more than in just the story of the opera. Because her life’s story and the dilemma and drama of her life’s story corresponds so much with what she actually talks about in the opera, without knowing that this would become her story. The question that you are not responsible for what people will tell about you once you’re not on this planet anymore. So I think this was a coincidence of these two things that, yeah, I’m sure people realized it, and I hope that it inspired them to think further into it.
Peter Isackson: So how would you compare the kind of experience it was for you — in terms of the research you did on storytelling itself, and the relationship between music and narrative, and propaganda even, I think, is part of it because there’s this political dimension — how would you compare that with what you’re doing with Norma?
Emily Hehl: It’s a completely different world. It’s literally a different universe. And I must say, I prefer the universe of the rediscovered works, because you feel you’re actually contributing to something. And you’re giving these pieces a chance to be seen again, and also people to experience these things. I had a very interesting conversation with John Andrews not so long ago — who is a British conductor who is a master in performing rediscovered works or works that hadn’t been performed in a long time, or even just in the last 20 years. And as I said in the beginning, for me, it’s really the main difference that, in the case of Holmès, you take care of and really investigate the piece, just the piece and how it came into existence. Whereas in the other case of Norma, you’re mainly busy with what have other people done with the piece. And for me, that’s different.
Peter Isackson: With Norma, do you feel — I mean, not you personally — but is this the normal thing, to feel that you’re in competition with all the directors who have done this before you?
Emily Hehl: Absolutely. Because even now, it’s really culminating, because Vienna has two big opera houses: Staatsoper and Theater an der Wien. And within a few days of difference, they’re performing Norma in two different productions. So this is really the culmination of the problem I’m talking about. Because it’s not about Norma, it’s about the competition of these two productions. And that’s what I really, really admired about being able to direct La Montagne Noire, was to dive into this universe. And yeah, I mean, it’s a beautiful coincidence that this became this kind of meta-reflection on storytelling and historiography and all these kinds of things. And also this historiography that reflects on the repertoire we talk about. And I think that’s a whole other series of serious conversations, is the repertoire and who came up with the idea of having a repertoire, and how it didn’t exist for a very, very long time.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, so just to go back to the question of competition, you are now competing with another production?
Emily Hehl: Yes, Staatsoper is competing with another production! (Laughs)
Peter Isackson: Do you communicate? Do you know the people there?
Emily Hehl: Yes! Well, so the Norma, it’s not my personal direction. I’m part of the team, but it’s not my responsibility what the artistic output will be. There’s communication, there’s non-communication, I would say. Yeah.
Peter Isackson: I mean, when I say that, do you try to do things differently because you know the others are doing it in a certain way and you have to contrast? And is there a spirit of competition, or is it a kind of creative collaboration — “We can both turn Norma into something contemporary with impact on the audience?”
Emily Hehl: Ideally, it will be the second. And ideally, people who see the show in one place are so curious that they want to see the piece in the other one. And also it’s beautiful, because you’re confronted with the core conflict of performing arts, which is: You can never see a piece as it just hangs in a museum. Because you always need the people to do it. So I think this is really a beautiful problem we have, and something we’re presented with or we are confronted with now here in Vienna, on this example of Norma. But then also, something I said before is that you have to take the major decisions many years in advance. And with this size of house, even more than two or three years. And I’m not even sure if back then, things were clear that things would happen at the same time, so I’m quite sure that these productions came into existence without knowing of each other. And so, yeah. But I hope—
Peter Isackson: We’ll kind of wrap this up, because we’ve used the allotted time. But I’d like to come back, in perhaps a more general way, to the question of competition or collaboration in musical productions. I have my own ideas about it, but in a different context. We have the example given to us by Hollywood of Amadeus, where we are told, through that storytelling, that Mozart and Salieri were competing in ways that probably aren’t very true, but maybe they are as well. But that’s a topic — if you’re interested — I’d like to come back to that in one of our conversations.
Emily Hehl: Yes, I’d appreciate that.
Future plans and legacy of La Montagna Noire
Peter Isackson: Okay, great. Well, thank you again. And is there any place that people can profit from your production of La Montagne Noire? Has it been filmed?
Emily Hehl: It has been filmed. It hasn’t been published. But if anyone who is watching this is actually really curious, just reach out to us and I’m sure we can find a way of sharing this recording. But it’s not available in public. So we hope that someone will program this piece again. I mean, that’s why these kinds of awards — one might think about opera awards, whatever you like — but it’s good for these kinds of reasons, that things stay in the memory of people for a bit longer. And so maybe there will be an artistic director who will program it again. There are even conversations of actually bringing the piece to Montenegro, because Montenegro doesn’t really have an opera story. That was the reason why I was there in summer, because we’re trying to find a way to bring the piece there. But then also we would need to majorly rewrite it, because, of course, then there is already a political interest in performing art. And then that’s where it gets difficult for me as a director, because Augusta Holmès — she had never in mind to write it for this kind of event.
Peter Isackson: Yeah, if you were to do it again more than a year later than the initial production, would you have the same singers? Would they be available?
Emily Hehl: It really depends on when and how and what. But it’s also for singers to learn a piece that no one has ever performed before, and that will most likely not be performed again, and then you confront this really difficult music of like three and a half hours. It’s quite an investment of a singer to say, “Yes, I really want to do it.” And usually you don’t have an idea what the piece will be like when you sign the contract. So, yeah. It would be wonderful to keep—
Peter Isackson: At least they can see the film.
Emily Hehl: Exactly. (Laughs)
Peter Isackson: Okay. Well, thank you very much, Emily, and I’m looking forward to our next session. We’ll be announcing it very shortly.
Emily Hehl: Yes, wonderful. Thanks for this invitation to chat.
Peter Isackson: Bye.
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Stephen Zunes"
post_date="April 24, 2026 06:42"
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<p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Stephen Zunes, professor of politics and director of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco, about a war that was meant to be short but is becoming something far more complex and open-ended. What began as the United States and Israel’s targeted campaign against Iran’s leadership is now revealing deeper strategic limits, unintended consequences and a growing absence of clear objectives. As the conflict expands, the central question becomes whether military force is achieving anything at all — or simply prolonging the crisis.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A war built on flawed assumptions</h2>
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<p>Khattar Singh opens by challenging the premise of the campaign. It was framed as a swift operation aimed at regime change and nuclear rollback has instead turned into a prolonged and uncertain conflict. Zunes responds bluntly, arguing that the outcome was foreseeable from the start. As he puts it, “I really don’t know any serious strategic analyst… who thought that air power alone could end up with a regime change.”</p>
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<p>Despite the killing of senior clerical and military figures, Iran’s political system has not collapsed. In some respects, it has adapted and even strengthened. Repression has increased, opposition has been contained and the state has shifted into survival mode. Rather than triggering internal revolt, the campaign appears to have reduced the space for dissent.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>This exposes a recurring pattern in modern warfare: the assumption that precision strikes can produce political transformation. In this case, that assumption is proving deeply flawed.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Adaptation and the logic of resistance</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Zunes explains that Iran anticipated such an attack and prepared accordingly. Its leadership structure has been decentralized both politically and militarily, making it harder to dismantle through targeted strikes. While this has created coordination challenges, it has also ensured continuity.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The result is a shift toward asymmetrical warfare. Iran continues to deploy drones and missiles across the region, maintaining pressure despite sustaining heavy losses. The conflict, in his view, has become an “existential struggle,” one in which the regime is willing to endure significant costs.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Khattar Singh highlights how this dynamic complicates traditional measures of success. Damage inflicted does not necessarily translate into victory. As Zunes notes, overwhelming firepower can coexist with strategic failure if the adversary remains capable and willing to fight.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">From military targets to civilian infrastructure</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>A key turning point in the discussion is the expansion of targets. The targets, initially just military assets, have broadened to include infrastructure such as bridges, schools and industrial facilities. Zunes calls this shift “a war on the population.”</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Rather than weakening the regime, these attacks appear to be producing the opposite effect. Khattar Singh points to interviews with Iranian civilians who, despite opposing the government, express willingness to defend their country against foreign bombing. We now see national identity and historic pride becoming unifying forces.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Zunes reinforces this point by emphasizing the symbolic dimension of the strikes. Damage to culturally significant sites and urban infrastructure is not just material but psychological. It deepens resentment and reduces the likelihood of compromise, making the conflict more intractable.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A widening conflict with global consequences</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The war’s impact extends far beyond Iran. Khattar Singh highlights the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global trade in oil, gas, fertilizers and even helium. The blockage threatens supply chains, energy markets and food security.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Zunes notes that while Iran’s actions may violate international norms, they are also part of a broader strategy to impose costs on the global system. Simultaneously, other powers show reluctance to intervene militarily, both because of the risks involved and a perception that the crisis was avoidable.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>This widening scope underscores the absence of a coherent endgame. Even if the US or Israel declare victory, there is no guarantee that Iran will deescalate. The conflict risks becoming self-sustaining, with each side reacting to the other in an ongoing cycle.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">No clear path to resolution</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The conversation closes with a sobering assessment of the war’s trajectory. Khattar Singh raises the possibility of further escalation, including a ground invasion, but Zunes outlines the practical constraints: Iran’s size, mountainous terrain and limited US troop presence make such an option highly unlikely and costly.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>He also dismisses more speculative scenarios, such as seizing nuclear facilities, as unrealistic. Meanwhile, the risk of catastrophic consequences, such as radiation leaks from damaged reactors, adds another layer of danger. Sites like Natanz, Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility, are deeply buried and difficult to strike, while Bushehr, its only nuclear power plant, poses the risk of a wider environmental disaster if hit.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Ultimately, the core problem remains the lack of clear objectives. As Zunes observes, the goals of the war are “all over the map,” contributing to confusion both domestically and internationally. Without defined aims or a political settlement, military action alone cannot produce a stable outcome.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The result is a conflict drifting without direction — one that risks entrenching the very forces it set out to weaken.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Stephen Zunes, professor of politics and director of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco, about a war that was meant to be short but is becoming something far more complex and open-ended. What began as the..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Stephen Zunes examine how the US–Israel campaign against Iran has drifted from a limited military operation into an open-ended conflict. Iran has adapted, strengthened internal cohesion and shifted to asymmetrical warfare. With expanding targets, global economic risks and no clear objectives, the war lacks a clear path to resolution."
post-date="Apr 24, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: The Iran War Has No Clear Endgame" slug-data="fo-talks-the-iran-war-has-no-clear-endgame">
Jean-Daniel Ruch"
post_date="April 23, 2026 05:28"
pUrl="/video/fo-live-wars-in-ukraine-iran-does-europe-look-weak-in-2026/" pid="162083"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson speaks with former Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch and former NATO policy officer Peter Hoskins about Europe’s place in a world growing more dangerous by the month. They ask a sharp question: Is Europe preparing for a harsher strategic environment, or is it spending more on defense without deciding what that defense is for? Europe faces not only external threats from war and instability but also an internal problem of political confusion, institutional fragmentation and diplomatic drift.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Two wars, two public reactions</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Ruch begins by drawing a distinction between how Europeans see the war in Ukraine and the conflict involving Israel, Iran and the United States. Many Europeans still regard Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a direct threat to the continent, even if support varies by geography and weakens farther from Russia’s borders. That perception helps explain why many governments have justified higher military spending despite the economic burden of inflation and energy costs.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The Middle East conflict produces a different response. Ruch argues that much of the European public does not see that war through the same moral or strategic lens. Polling shows broad opposition and suggests that many citizens regard it less as a necessary response to aggression than as a discretionary intervention. Europe is not responding to a single, coherent public mood; its leaders are navigating two overlapping crises with two different levels of public legitimacy.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">More military spending with no clear strategy</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Hoskins approaches the issue from the military side. He argues that European states, especially leading powers such as Britain and France, spent too many years preparing for counterinsurgency and overseas operations while neglecting the capabilities needed for a major conventional war in Europe. The result is a continent that talks more seriously about defense than it did a decade ago but is still not fully prepared for the kind of conflict it now fears.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Ruch takes the point further. For him, the real weakness is not just underprepared armed forces but the absence of a guiding political framework. Europe may be spending more, but it still lacks a clear security strategy linking military means to foreign-policy ends. He says Europe continues to run on “old software,” meaning the post-1945 habit of assuming that the US will provide both strategic direction and military backing. That dependency, he suggests, has outlived the world that produced it.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Hoskins broadly agrees. He sees Europe as too reliant on American protection and believes it must start preparing for a future in which Washington is less willing, or less able, to carry the burden.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The loss of diplomacy</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Isackson returns to a deeper problem: the decline of diplomacy itself. Ruch and Hoskins agree that military planning cannot substitute for political engagement. Ruch argues that despite its dangers, the Cold War was in some ways safer because it had guardrails. Arms-control treaties, confidence-building measures and structured dialogue created habits of communication that reduced the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. With the expiration of the last major bilateral agreements and the weakening of diplomatic channels, that safety net has largely disappeared.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Ruch also argues that policymaking has shifted away from diplomatic institutions toward intelligence and military bureaucracies. That change matters because diplomats are trained to search for workable settlements, while security institutions are trained to identify and counter threats. The result, he says, is a world more inclined to manage crises through force than through negotiation.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Hoskins is more cautious but sympathetic to the point. He recalls periods when military officers from rival states could still work together and build trust. In his view, those opportunities mattered because professional contact often reduced suspicion. He laments that many of those openings were allowed to fade.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Russia, NATO and Europe’s political confusion</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The conversation then turns to Russia and the larger structure of European security. Hoskins maintains that, whatever opportunities may have been missed in the past, Russia remains Europe’s primary strategic threat. Ruch is less convinced by the more alarmist versions of that argument. He points to a long history of what he sees as exaggerated or sometimes irrational fear of Russia and argues that Europe never developed a serious long-term vision for how to live with Russia as a permanent neighbor.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>That debate leads into NATO and the European Union. Hoskins argues that NATO remains the most credible framework for defense, even if Europe must start thinking about how it would function with a diminished American role. Ruch responds that Europe still needs its own strategic culture and institutions if it wants genuine autonomy. Both men agree that Europe cannot drift indefinitely between dependence on Washington and vague talk of independence.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>US President Donald Trump’s return to power sharpens that dilemma. Ruch thinks the “divorce” between Europe and the US may now be too obvious to ignore, while Hoskins argues that Europe should assume life “without the United States” is becoming a real strategic possibility.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A dangerous year without a settled order</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>By the end of the discussion, neither Ruch nor Hoskins offers much comfort. Ruch calls 2026 “the most dangerous year” he has ever lived through, citing the erosion of diplomatic norms, the risk of wider war and even the possibility that nuclear escalation can no longer be dismissed as fantasy. Hoskins echoes the warning. He sees a clear gap between publics and leaders, but he also insists that leadership still matters. Europe’s problem is that its leaders are weak, divided and often unable to sustain a common line.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Europe knows the world is changing. But can it define its own interests before major world events do?</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson speaks with former Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch and former NATO policy officer Peter Hoskins about Europe’s place in a world growing more dangerous by the month. They ask a sharp question: Is Europe preparing for a harsher strategic..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Peter Isackson, Jean-Daniel Ruch and Peter Hoskins discuss Europe’s uncertain strategic position as the wars in Ukraine and Iran expose its weaknesses. Although European states are increasing defense spending, they remain too dependent on the US for security. Europe now enters a dangerous world without the diplomatic guardrails or leadership needed to navigate it."
post-date="Apr 23, 2026"
post-title="FO Live: Wars in Ukraine & Iran — Does Europe Look Weak in 2026?" slug-data="fo-live-wars-in-ukraine-iran-does-europe-look-weak-in-2026">
FO Live: Wars in Ukraine & Iran — Does Europe Look Weak in 2026?
Aron Rimanyi"
post_date="April 22, 2026 05:59"
pUrl="/world-news/fo-talks-viktor-orban-faces-his-toughest-challenge-in-hungarys-defining-vote/" pid="162070"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[Editor’s note: This video was recorded prior to Péter Magyar’s victory in the April 12 Hungarian parliamentary election.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Aron Rimanyi, an associate at Training The Street, about the political, economic and geopolitical dynamics that shaped the contest between incumbent Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and challenger Péter Magyar. Uncertainty dominated the leadup to Hungary’s parliamentary election, with polls and betting markets suggesting the strongest opposition challenge in 16 years. </p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A system under pressure</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Khattar Singh opens by providing historic context for this election. Since 2010, Orbán and his right-wing Fidesz party have maintained consistent two-thirds parliamentary control. Rimanyi emphasizes the significance of this moment, noting that “this will be the first time in 16 years… that an opposition will actually take the lead and gain a parliamentary majority.” That possibility alone marks a break from Hungary’s recent past.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The structure of Hungary’s parliament adds another layer of importance. With 199 seats determining executive power, even small shifts in vote distribution can have outsized consequences. Thus, this election is not just a routine democratic exercise, but a test of whether a long-dominant political system can be meaningfully challenged.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Magyar’s rise</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>At the center of this challenge is Magyar and his center-right Tisza party, or the <em>Tisztelet és Szabadság Párt</em>. A former Fidesz insider, Magyar entered the political arena only recently, breaking with the ruling party in early 2024 amid a broader scandal. His rapid ascent reflects both organizational momentum and public appetite for change.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Rimanyi describes Tisza as a significant disruption to Hungary’s political landscape, pointing to its strong performance in the 2024 European parliamentary elections, where it secured roughly 30% of the vote. He characterizes the movement as “a new opposition party… that was actually a kind of major upstart,” highlighting its unexpected strength.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Ideologically, Tisza positions itself as conservative and patriotic. This allows it to compete directly with Fidesz on national identity while shifting the focus toward governance and accountability. Its messaging blends familiar themes with a critique of the status quo, appealing to voters dissatisfied with both economic outcomes and political continuity.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Economic discontent and political messaging</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Economic conditions play a central role in the election. Hungary has faced high inflation in recent years, particularly in 2022 and 2023, alongside stagnating wages and slowing growth. The freezing or withdrawal of approximately €18 billion in EU funds has further constrained the economy, exposing structural weaknesses.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Rimanyi explains how these pressures have reshaped political perceptions. While earlier years of Orbán’s rule coincided with rising living standards and steady growth, the post-2019 period has been marked by disruption — from the Covid-19 pandemic to declining external support. Growth has slowed to below 1%, and affordability, particularly in housing, has deteriorated.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Tisza translates these macroeconomic trends into political messaging. Rather than relying on technical economic arguments, the party emphasizes perceived corruption and inequality. Rimanyi notes that their approach draws a clear contrast: “While your wages are stagnating… look at all these people who are quite close to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán who have gotten extremely rich.”</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Foreign policy and campaign narratives</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Hungary’s position on Russia and Ukraine adds another dimension to the campaign. Orbán is often portrayed as pro-Russian, but Rimanyi points out that, in practice, Hungary has largely aligned with EU policy since the 2022 invasion. “If you actually look at the voting record… Mr. Orbán and his government is much more towing the European line than actually the rhetoric would suggest,” he explains.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Despite this, campaign rhetoric tells a different story. Fidesz has framed Ukraine as a direct security threat, emphasizing risks to Hungary’s energy supplies and sovereignty. This narrative resonates with a significant portion of the electorate and places Tisza in a delicate position.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Magyar’s response reflects a balancing act. He avoids endorsing strong pro-Ukraine positions while also distancing himself from overtly pro-Russian narratives. Rimanyi suggests that even in the event of a Tisza victory, policy continuity is likely, though tone may change. A shift in rhetoric — particularly greater criticism of Russia — could emerge without fundamentally altering Hungary’s strategic posture.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The electoral system and uncertain outcomes</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The complexity of Hungary’s electoral system makes the outcome difficult to predict. Voters cast two ballots — one for a local representative and one for a party list — and the system redistributes surplus and losing votes into national totals. This “winner” and “loser” compensation mechanism complicates straightforward projections.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>“This makes it extremely difficult to actually forecast the seat allocations in the Hungarian Parliament,” Rimanyi points out. Even if polling suggests a lead for one party, translating that into parliamentary seats involves multiple layers of calculation.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>For Tisza, the stakes are particularly high. The party aims not just for victory but for a two-thirds constitutional majority, which would allow it to reshape institutions built during Orbán’s tenure. However, Rimanyi views such an outcome as unlikely given the electoral mechanics.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>As Khattar Singh and Rimanyi conclude, the election’s significance lies as much in its uncertainty as in its potential consequences. At the time of the discussion, Hungary stands at a political inflection point — one where economic strain, shifting alliances and institutional complexity converge to shape a deeply consequential vote.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Ultimately, Magyar would go on to win Hungary’s parliamentary election, and his Tisza party would secure 141 seats in the 199-seat parliament with 55.3% of the vote, while Orbán’s Fidesz party would take just 52 seats with 36.7%.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Aron Rimanyi, an associate at Training The Street, about the political, economic and geopolitical..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Aron Rimanyi examine Hungary’s April 2026 election after 16 years under Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. They discuss the rise of challenger Péter Magyar and his Tisza party, economic discontent and Hungary’s stance on Russia and Ukraine. The result ultimately signals a major political shift with implications for Europe."
post-date="Apr 22, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: Viktor Orbán Faces His Toughest Challenge in Hungary’s Defining Vote" slug-data="fo-talks-viktor-orban-faces-his-toughest-challenge-in-hungarys-defining-vote">
FO Talks: Viktor Orbán Faces His Toughest Challenge in Hungary’s Defining Vote
Matthew Cavedon"
post_date="April 20, 2026 07:08"
pUrl="/politics/fo-talks-the-american-jury-system-explained-democracy-or-illusion/" pid="162021"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and speaks with legal scholar Matthew Cavedon of the Cato Institute about the evolution and erosion of the American jury system. What began as a cornerstone of democratic participation has, they argue, become a marginal feature of a highly bureaucratized legal process. They trace how juries once embodied community judgment and ask whether that role can still be reclaimed in a system dominated by prosecutors, plea deals and legal complexity.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">From citizen judgment to constitutional right</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Cavedon traces the jury’s origins to ancient Athens, where ordinary citizens collectively judged disputes as part of direct democracy. That tradition carried into medieval England, culminating in Magna Carta’s guarantee that no free person could lose liberty or property except “by a jury of their peers.” Over time, this principle hardened into a defining feature of common law.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>By the 18th century, legal scholar William Blackstone had formalized the idea that a criminal conviction required the agreement of 12 peers. This tradition crossed the Atlantic, where American colonists embraced jury trials not only as a legal safeguard but as a political right. The Constitution enshrined this protection twice, in Article III and the Sixth Amendment, reflecting its centrality to the new republic.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Cavedon emphasizes that juries were never meant to be passive fact-checkers. Historically, they evaluated both facts and the justice of the law itself, exercising what some have termed “jury nullification.”</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Revolution, resistance and jury autonomy</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The American Revolution reinforced the importance of juries. Singh and Cavedon note that British attempts to bypass colonial juries — by shifting trials to admiralty courts or even to London — provoked widespread alarm. Cavedon describes this as an “absolute panic,” as colonists feared the loss of local accountability and community judgment.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Two landmark cases illustrate the power juries once wielded. In 1670, a jury acquitted Quaker leader William Penn despite judicial pressure; their case established that jurors could not be punished for their verdicts. In 1735, a New York jury acquitted publisher John Peter Zenger of seditious libel, even though the law offered no defense for truthful criticism of the government. In both cases, juries asserted their authority to interpret justice beyond strict legal instructions.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh contrasts this tradition with civil law systems, where judges and legal professionals dominate decision-making. In the Anglo-American system, by contrast, juries historically acted as a democratic check on state power.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The rise of the modern “assembly line”</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Cavedon states that over the past century, the criminal justice system has transformed into what he calls a “utilitarian… assembly line to produce convictions.” He traces this shift to Prohibition in the 1920s and 1930s, which expanded federal enforcement mechanisms that persisted long after alcohol bans ended.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Today, the overwhelming majority of cases never reach a jury. Roughly 97% of federal convictions and 94–95% of state convictions result from plea deals. Prosecutors wield significant leverage through what is often called the “trial penalty” — the threat of much harsher sentences if defendants refuse a plea and lose at trial.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Cavedon also points to structural incentives that reinforce this system. Many judges are former prosecutors, and law enforcement funding can be tied to arrest and conviction rates. Grand juries, once intended as a safeguard, have largely become procedural formalities. As Cavedon notes, they are often seen as “rubber stamps” for prosecutorial decisions.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The cumulative effect, he says, is a system that sidelines ordinary citizens and concentrates power in legal institutions.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Blinding juries to context</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Even when jury trials occur, Singh and Cavedon argue that jurors are often constrained in ways that limit meaningful judgment. Courts typically instruct juries to focus narrowly on factual questions while ignoring broader context, legal interpretation and consequences.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Cavedon highlights cases where this restriction leads to troubling outcomes. In one federal trial in California, jurors convicted a man for growing marijuana without being told he was part of a city-authorized medical program. In another case, a juror later learned that a defendant he helped convict received a 40-year mandatory sentence, prompting deep regret.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>For Cavedon, such examples illustrate a broader problem: Jurors are excluded from considering the full moral and social implications of their decisions. He believes that this undermines both fairness and the democratic purpose of the jury system. “If people do not have confidence that ultimately it will be their neighbors and their peers who will make judgments,” he says, “then I think we have lost a significant amount of personal liberty.”</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Can the jury system be reclaimed?</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh and Cavedon conclude with a question: Can the jury’s original role be restored? Cavedon believes it can, but only through a cultural and educational shift. He describes the forthcoming Cato Institute initiative, “Your Verdict Counts,” as an effort to reframe jury duty as an active form of citizenship rather than a burdensome obligation.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>He feels that jurors should see themselves as participants in a democratic process, bringing “their conscience and their values” into deliberations. This could revive the jury’s function as a check on state power and a protector of individual liberty.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh closes by considering the stakes. If juries no longer serve as a meaningful counterbalance within the justice system, then a key pillar of democratic accountability may already be eroding. The question is not just how the system functions today, but whether citizens are willing to reclaim the role it once gave them.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and speaks with legal scholar Matthew Cavedon of the Cato Institute about the evolution and erosion of the American jury system. What began as a cornerstone of democratic participation has, they argue, become a marginal feature of a highly bureaucratized legal process...."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Matthew Cavedon argue the American jury system has shifted from a core democratic safeguard to a sidelined institution dominated by plea deals. They trace its historic role as a check on authority and warn that modern practices limit citizen participation in justice. Reclaiming jury duty is essential to democratic accountability."
post-date="Apr 20, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: The American Jury System Explained: Democracy or Illusion?" slug-data="fo-talks-the-american-jury-system-explained-democracy-or-illusion">
FO Talks: The American Jury System Explained: Democracy or Illusion?
Manu Sharma"
post_date="April 19, 2026 06:14"
pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-talks-war-in-iran-does-the-future-of-the-middle-east-look-bleak/" pid="161977"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with <a href="https://fointell.com/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">FOI</a> Partner and geopolitical analyst Manu Sharma about how the Iran war is evolving beyond a military confrontation into a systemic economic crisis. What began as a conflict shaped by assumptions about regime weakness and rapid victory now reveals a far more complex situation. As the war drags on, its most consequential effects are spreading through global energy markets, financial systems and industrial supply chains.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A war built on flawed assumptions</h2>
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<p>Atul opens by asking Manu to frame the conflict. Manu describes it starkly as “a royal fight between… two thoroughly different military ideologies,” highlighting the clash between Western shock-and-awe doctrine and Iran’s long-prepared defensive model. The United States and Israel entered the war believing Iran was weakened by sanctions, internal unrest and economic decline. That assessment shaped a strategy centered on rapid decapitation strikes designed to collapse the regime within days.</p>
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<p>Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or projecting power through regional proxies was a central objective. If left unchecked, Iran could potentially dominate Gulf energy flows, reshaping the balance of power in one of the world’s most critical regions.</p>
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<p>Yet the early premise — that Iran would quickly crumble — has not held. Despite economic strain and political tensions, the regime has endured. Atul and Manu suggest that Israeli and American planners underestimated the depth of Iran’s institutional and ideological structures, as well as its ability to absorb and respond to sustained military pressure.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Iran’s resilience and asymmetric strategy</h2>
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<p>Iran’s response rests on preparation rather than improvisation. Instead of relying on centralized command structures vulnerable to decapitation, it has implemented what a decentralized “mosaic defense.” This system distributes authority across 31 independent military commands, making it difficult to disable the state through targeted strikes.</p>
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<p>The same logic extends to governance. Iran’s layered redundancy ensures continuity even under extreme conditions. Leadership positions are backed by multiple successors, while the broader theocratic system provides an additional reservoir of authority. As Atul notes, this creates a depth that is not easily dismantled through conventional military means.</p>
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<p>Manu explains that Iran has effectively built a different “operating system” for political survival. This system combines ideological commitment with military capability, allowing the state to withstand pressure that might destabilize more centralized regimes. The result is a conflict that has settled into a form of strategic stalemate, where none of the principal actors have achieved decisive political collapse.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Diverging political realities</h2>
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<p>While the battlefield remains contested, political responses differ sharply across countries. Atul says the war is highly popular in Israel, where even critics of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu broadly support the campaign. In contrast, public opinion in the US is far more divided, creating what Atul calls a “tale of two countries.”</p>
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<p>Iran, meanwhile, has focused on building support beyond its borders. Its diplomatic outreach across Asia, particularly among Shia Muslim communities, has generated both political sympathy and material support. There are visible signs of this mobilization, including donations and grassroots support, suggesting that Iran’s messaging resonates in parts of the Global South. Women are even donating gold, considered family treasure in Asia, to the Iranian war effort.</p>
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<p>These dynamics reinforce a key point: The war is not producing uniform political outcomes. Rather, it is deepening fragmentation, both within societies and across the international system.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Economic warfare and Gulf vulnerability</h2>
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<p>Unable to match Israeli or American firepower, Iran has resorted to economic warfare. Iranian forces have targeted the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and shaken their economic foundations. Iran has also blocked the Strait of Hormuz and reduced the ships going through this chokepoint to a trickle. This strategy exploits structural vulnerabilities in a region that, despite decades of diversification, remains heavily dependent on energy exports and food imports as well as consumer goods and machines for critical infrastructure such as desalination plants.</p>
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<p>By threatening shipping routes and energy facilities, Iran is effectively weaponizing geography. By blocking the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is driving up oil and gas prices, while attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf states create long-term supply constraints. In our globalized world, Arab states generating wealth through energy exports are diversifying their economies by pumping money into frontier economic activities. Iran has interrupted this flow of capital, which will have cascading effects far beyond the region.</p>
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<p>The Gulf’s role as a hub for trade, finance and transportation amplifies these risks. Cities like Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and Doha in Qatar, built as global hubs with international airports, high-end shopping and luxury tourism, now face the possibility that their greatest strengths — connectivity and openness — could become liabilities in a prolonged conflict.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Global spillovers and systemic risk</h2>
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<p>The economic consequences extend well beyond energy markets. Gulf capital has played a crucial role in funding innovation and investment across Western economies, from real estate to cutting-edge technologies. If the war constrains the flow of this capital, the effects will ripple through sectors such as venture capital, artificial intelligence and infrastructure development.</p>
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<p>Simultaneously, physical disruptions to energy production threaten the supply of critical industrial inputs. Helium shortages could affect semiconductor manufacturing, sulfur constraints could disrupt metal refining and reduced fertilizer production could reduce global agricultural output. These are not isolated shocks but interconnected pressures that strain the foundations of the global economy.</p>
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<p>Manu captures the scale of the challenge with a warning: “This is a world that nobody is prepared for.” The conflict is no longer simply about territory or regime change. It is about the stability of systems that underpin modern economic life.</p>
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<p>As Atul concludes, the war has entered a new phase. Iran has survived the initial assault, the US and Israel remain engaged, but the Gulf economies — central to global energy and finance — are under growing strain. The longer the conflict continues, the more likely it is to trigger cascading crises that reach far beyond the Middle East.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with FOI Partner and geopolitical analyst Manu Sharma about how the Iran war is evolving beyond a military confrontation into a systemic economic crisis. What began as a conflict shaped by assumptions about regime weakness and rapid victory now reveals a far more..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Manu Sharma examine how the Iran war poses huge risks to the global economy. Iran has withstood US and Israeli efforts to engineer regime change, and resorted to asymmetric warfare, which includes hitting targets in the Persian Gulf as well blockading the Strait of Hormuz. The ensuing disruptions to energy, shipping, finance and industrial inputs will trigger consequences far beyond the Middle East."
post-date="Apr 19, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: War in Iran: Does the Future of the Middle East Look Bleak?" slug-data="fo-talks-war-in-iran-does-the-future-of-the-middle-east-look-bleak">
FO Talks: War in Iran: Does the Future of the Middle East Look Bleak?
Atul Singh"
post_date="April 18, 2026 05:04"
pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-live-how-the-us-israel-war-in-iran-could-redraw-middle-east-borders/" pid="161959"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh leads an FO Live editorial workshop on the escalating US–Israel war on Iran. The war is not an isolated crisis, but a conflict preceded by a long history. Joined by Katilyn Diana, Cheyenne Torres, Casey Herrman, Zania Morgan and Lucy Golish, Atul argues that the confrontation cannot be understood without revisiting the 1948 creation of Israel, the 1953 CIA-backed coup in Iran and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Atul moves between history, military strategy and economics, asking not only how the war began but also what kind of regional and global disorder it may yet unleash.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The three dates that shape the conflict</h2>
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<p>Atul begins by identifying three decisive turning points: 1948, 1953 and 1979. In 1948, the UN established the state of Israel. It immediately had to fight the invading Arab states. For Israelis, that moment remains inseparable from the trauma of the Holocaust and the fear that the state could be destroyed at birth. Palestinians remember this moment as the Nakba, the mass displacement that accompanied Israel’s creation. Atul suggests these two memories still shape how the region understands security and injustice.</p>
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<p>He then turns to 1953, when Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh faced an overthrow after nationalizing oil. Atul presents the coup as a foundational rupture in modern Iranian political memory. Britain and the US, he argues, removed a nationalist leader and restored a monarchy that ruled through repression. He says that the intervention weakened secular opposition and unintentionally strengthened the clerical networks that later filled the vacuum. By 1979, those clerical forces were organized enough to take power during the Iranian Revolution and build a theocratic state deeply suspicious of both Washington and domestic dissent.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Revolution, paranoia and the proxy strategy</h2>
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<p>The discussion portrays the Islamic Republic as a regime shaped by insecurity from the start. Atul explains that after the revolution, the new leadership distrusted the regular military and built Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a parallel force. The Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 then hardened the regime further, reinforcing a political culture built around sacrifice, siege and martyrdom.</p>
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<p>From that position, Iran gradually extended influence through allied armed groups across the region. Hezbollah, Hamas and later the Houthis became central as instruments of an Iranian strategy designed to offset conventional weakness. Atul argues that the regime sought legitimacy by presenting itself as the one power willing to resist both Israel and the US, while many Arab governments moved toward accommodation.</p>
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<p>Simultaneously, he makes clear that opposition to Western power did not make the Iranian system admirable. He repeatedly stresses its repression of women, students and dissidents, as well as its economic failures and political brutality.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A decisive moment for Israel and the US</h2>
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<p>Atul argues that Israel and the US believe Iran is now weaker than it has been in years. From the Israeli perspective, the danger is existential. A small state with limited strategic depth cannot easily tolerate the possibility of a hostile regional power gaining stronger missile and nuclear capabilities. As Atul puts it, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has built his career around the doctrine that “peace through strength is the way forward.” In that framework, confrontation appears necessary.</p>
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<p>Atul also highlights Israel’s confidence in its intelligence reach and military effectiveness. Atul describes a country that believes it has penetrated Iran deeply and can strike key personnel and infrastructure with precision. Yet he does not present victory as automatic.</p>
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<p>Casey raises the possibility of Iran’s “Balkanization.” Atul explores the idea, noting that some American and Israeli thinkers see advantage in a looser, weaker or fragmented Iran. But he also warns that this could produce unintended consequences, including nationalist backlash, prolonged instability and deeper hostility toward outside powers.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Uncertainty inside Iran</h2>
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<p>Iranian society is fractured and complex. Atul notes widespread discontent with the regime, especially among younger and educated Iranians. Protest movements, secular aspirations and anger at repression all suggest that the Islamic Republic has lost legitimacy among many citizens. Yet he cautions against assuming that foreign bombing will automatically translate into regime collapse.</p>
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<p>External attack can strengthen nationalism even where a government is unpopular. Atul remarks that “nationalism is the last refuge of a scoundrel,” but he also considers it a real political force. The killing of senior leaders, especially the Ayatollah, may not weaken the regime in the way outsiders expect. Martyrdom carries powerful weight in Shia political culture, and the failing oppressive late ruler has now become a symbol of resistance after being killed by a foreign enemy.</p>
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<p>Kaitlyn and others push the conversation toward possible futures, including a democratic Iran. Atul sees some hope there, especially in a decentralized federal model that protects minorities and devolves power. But he also emphasizes that opposition groups remain divided among monarchists, republicans, federalists and competing ethnic movements. That makes any clean transition unlikely.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The war’s economic danger</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>When Zania asks about stagflation, Atul shifts from battlefield dynamics to global markets. He warns that a prolonged conflict could disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, drive up energy prices and trigger a supply shock across the world economy. Oil above $90 per barrel is not just a regional problem; it hits transport, industry, fertilizers, food production and financial confidence all at once.</p>
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<p>The risk is not merely higher inflation but the toxic combination of inflation and stagnation that defined the 1970s oil shocks. The Gulf’s importance extends beyond crude exports. Capital from Arab states is deeply embedded in global finance, technology, property and sport. If war erodes confidence, both trade and investment could suffer.</p>
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<p>This discussion ends with a broader warning: This is not only a Middle Eastern war. It may become a global economic and geopolitical turning point whose consequences reach far beyond the region.</p>
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<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh leads an FO Live editorial workshop on the escalating US–Israel war on Iran. The war is not an isolated crisis, but a conflict preceded by a long history. Joined by Katilyn Diana, Cheyenne Torres, Casey Herrman, Zania Morgan and Lucy Golish, Atul argues that the..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Atul Singh and several 51Թ editors trace the US–Israel war on Iran back to 1948, 1953 and 1979. The conflict reflects historic grievances and present-day fears about Iranian power, Israeli security and American strategy. Even if Iran appears weakened, a prolonged war could be destabilizing and economically disastrous, posing risks for global energy."
post-date="Apr 18, 2026"
post-title="FO Live: How the US–Israel War in Iran Could Redraw Middle East Borders" slug-data="fo-live-how-the-us-israel-war-in-iran-could-redraw-middle-east-borders">
FO Live: How the US–Israel War in Iran Could Redraw Middle East Borders
Paul Chambers"
post_date="April 17, 2026 07:06"
pUrl="/politics/fo-talks-how-nationalism-the-monarchy-and-cambodia-shaped-thailands-2026-election/" pid="161941"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Professor Paul Chambers about Thailand’s general election, held February 8, 2026. It delivered a decisive victory for conservative forces led by Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and his Bhumjaithai Party. The result now reshapes the country’s political landscape, as nationalism, rural mobilization and institutional power outweigh strong urban support for the progressive People’s Party. Thailand now stands at a crossroads, where demands for democratic reform collide with entrenched elite authority.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Nationalism, strategy and electoral muscle</h2>
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<p>Chambers describes the vote as “a landslide victory for the forces of the right,” marking a sharp setback for progressive reformists. Early polling had favored the social democratic People’s Party, successor to the dissolved Move Forward and Future Forward parties. Yet a convergence of political forces shifts the outcome.</p>
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<p>A border clash between Thailand and Cambodia in July 2025, which resulted in Thai casualties, fuels nationalist sentiment. A leaked phone call between then-Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and former Cambodian strongman Hun Sen, in which she spoke negatively about the Thai army, further intensifies public anger. Chambers argues that Anutin capitalized on the moment and used “nationalism to glide towards a victory.”</p>
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<p>But nationalism alone does not explain the result. Chambers points to allegations of vote buying in several provinces, coordination among conservative parties to avoid splitting the vote and the strategic use of local power brokers. Bhumjaithai also benefits from access to bureaucratic networks while in office, helping channel resources through provincial structures. Legal and questionable tactics combine to produce a commanding win.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Urban–rural divide, not an ideological earthquake</h2>
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<p>The election reveals a stark geographic split. The People’s Party wins every district in Thailand’s capital of Bangkok and nearly all seats in the northern city of Chiang Mai. Rural provinces, particularly those near the Cambodian border, tilt heavily toward Anutin.</p>
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<p>This pattern seems to reflect structural differences rather than a sweeping ideological realignment. Urban voters gravitate toward progressive platforms, while rural constituencies respond more strongly to nationalism and patronage networks. Chambers does not see the result as evidence of a permanent conservative turn, however. Instead, he calls it the “temper of the times,” shaped by border tensions and political mood.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>He also criticizes the People’s Party’s internal weaknesses. Compared to its predecessors, it fails to organize effectively at the grassroots level and struggles to resonate beyond urban centers. The loss, then, stems not only from repression or manipulation but from strategic shortcomings within the reform movement itself.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Monarchy, military and managed democracy</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The structure of Thai power serves as a major talking point. Chambers explains that King Rama X, the king of Thailand, stands above politics and democracy. He says Thailand operates through a partnership between the monarchy and the military, with the armed forces acting as guardian and junior partner.</p>
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<p>The Senate, appointed rather than elected under the 2017 constitution, plays a decisive role in selecting the prime minister alongside the lower house. Parliament functions, but within strict boundaries. The lower chamber can debate budgets and investigate issues, yet it operates under the shadow of potential military intervention. Any serious challenge to royal prerogatives risks triggering a coup.</p>
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<p>This framework shapes electoral politics. Even when progressive parties perform well, institutional levers remain firmly in conservative hands. Courts, oversight bodies and security forces collectively reinforce elite dominance.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Section 112 and the cost of dissent</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The discussion turns personal when Chambers recounts his own prosecution under Section 112 of Thailand’s criminal code, the lèse-majesté law. The statute prohibits insulting the monarchy and carries severe penalties. He describes it as “a very ambiguous law,” one that allows broad interpretation and political weaponization.</p>
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<p>In April 2025, Chambers was sentenced to 15 years in prison over a conference flyer stating that the king holds more power than the prime minister. Although he did not write or post the material, his name appears in connection with the event. He spent two nights in a rural prison before being released on bail. Charges were eventually dropped by the attorney general, but immigration authorities retained his passport until he boarded a flight out of Bangkok. “Yes, I had to flee,” he tells Khattar Singh.</p>
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<p>His case is not isolated. More than 280 individuals face Section 112-related cases. Anti-monarchy protests between 2020 and 2023 drew thousands of young demonstrators. The state responds not only with arrests but with subtler tactics: visits to families, legal pressure and selective prosecutions. Prominent activist Arnon Nampa remains imprisoned. Such measures weaken the reform movement incrementally rather than through dramatic mass repression.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Constitutional reform at a crossroads</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Alongside the election, voters support a referendum to begin drafting a new constitution to replace the military-backed 2017 charter. Reformers hope to curtail the appointed Senate’s power and restore a more democratic framework akin to the 1997 constitution.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Yet the path forward is steep. Three separate referendums are required to amend the charter. Chambers doubts the new government will push aggressively for further votes. With a fresh electoral mandate, Anutin can argue that voters have rejected sweeping change.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Meanwhile, judicial pressure intensifies. The National Anti-Corruption Commission forwards a case against 44 People’s Party members to the Supreme Court. If upheld, the ruling could strip them of political rights and potentially dissolve the party altogether. Chambers sees this as part of a broader strategy to erode progressive reformism bit by bit.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Thailand’s election thus reflects more than a partisan shift. It exposes the tension between popular demands for democratic change and a resilient alliance of monarchy, military and judiciary. Whether reformers can overcome institutional barriers or whether conservative dominance hardens further will shape the country’s political future and reverberate across Southeast Asia.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Professor Paul Chambers about Thailand’s general election, held February 8, 2026. It delivered a decisive victory for conservative forces led by Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and his Bhumjaithai Party. The result now..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Paul Chambers discuss Thailand’s 2026 general election, which reelected conservative Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul amid rising nationalism. Despite urban support for the People’s Party, rural mobilization and institutional advantages favor the right. They also explore the monarchy–military alliance, Section 112 prosecutions and the uncertain path of constitutional reform."
post-date="Apr 17, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: How Nationalism, the Monarchy and Cambodia Shaped Thailand’s 2026 Election" slug-data="fo-talks-how-nationalism-the-monarchy-and-cambodia-shaped-thailands-2026-election">
FO Talks: How Nationalism, the Monarchy and Cambodia Shaped Thailand’s 2026 Election
Hugh Dugan"
post_date="April 17, 2026 06:22"
pUrl="/world-news/fo-live-wars-rage-in-iran-and-ukraine-where-is-the-united-nations/" pid="161937"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Hugh Dugan, a former UN insider and president of Multilateral Accountability Associates, and Daniel Wagner, the organization’s managing director and a political risk expert, about whether multilateralism can still function in a world shaped by war, rivalry and institutional fatigue. Global problems are increasingly interconnected, yet the institutions meant to manage them appear weaker, slower and less credible. Rather than declaring the system dead, Dugan and Wagner argue that multilateralism is changing form. The challenge now is to make it more accountable, more flexible and more relevant.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A fractured order without a clear replacement</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Khattar Singh begins by asking whether today’s world is the most fractured it has ever been. Dugan resists that conclusion. He says the current moment feels unusually heavy because crises move faster, news travels instantly and everyone can now consume and comment on world events in real time. Even so, he cautions against assuming that the present is uniquely catastrophic.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Dugan points to one paradox in the current order. While internal conflicts remain widespread, wars between states are relatively rare by historical standards. He also argues that countries are now more likely than before to see distant crises as shared concerns rather than someone else’s problem.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Wagner takes a more skeptical stance. The real difficulty lies in the absence of an agreed successor to the liberal order that followed the Cold War. In his view, power has become too diffuse for any stable framework to hold. He describes this condition as “diffuse multipolarity,” which he says is “collapsing our normative architecture.” For him, the problem is not simply that the world is changing, but that no accepted structure has emerged to manage that change.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">From old multilateralism to a more crowded system</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The discussion then turns to what Wagner and Dugan call the “new multilateralism.” Dugan defines the old model as a system dominated by governments and intergovernmental bodies, where civil society, academics and ordinary citizens remain outside the room. That structure, he suggests, no longer reflects how influence actually works.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>In its place, Dugan sees a more crowded environment. Social media, digital communication, corporations and wealthy private actors now shape global affairs alongside states. Issue-based networks can form quickly, operate across borders and exert real pressure on governments and institutions. He believes multilateralism is no longer just about formal diplomacy among states — it is also about how these newer actors enter spaces once reserved for governments alone.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>This is one reason he believes institutions like the United Nations have struggled to keep pace. They still operate through older structures even as the world around them has changed. Dugan says that many of these bodies have become too bureaucratic and too inward-looking. In his telling, they have focused more on preserving themselves than on adapting to new realities.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Accountability, outcomes and the limits of reform</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>A central theme of the conversation is accountability. Dugan argues that international institutions have long measured the wrong things. Too often, they highlight outputs such as meetings, reports or programs rather than outcomes that show whether real progress has been made. For him, that distinction is critical. The question is not how active an institution appears, but whether it actually solves problems.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Wagner agrees and states that many countries have already responded to institutional weakness by shifting toward bilateral arrangements. They still need trade, security and cooperation, but they no longer trust the multilateral system to deliver. His preferred answer is not to abolish existing institutions, but to supplement them with more flexible coalitions built around specific issues.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>He also sees a role for new tools. Wagner believes that digital governance, including blockchain and AI, could improve transparency and strengthen accountability across institutions that now rely too heavily on slow and opaque processes. Simultaneously, he doubts that major international bodies will change on their own. These organizations, he suggests, are too entrenched for wholesale reform unless governments and outside actors apply sustained pressure.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The UN Security Council and the problem of power</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Wagner and Dugan disagree strongly about the UN Security Council. Wagner feels the current structure no longer reflects our modern world. He points to the five permanent members as a relic of World War II and says countries such as India remain unjustifiably excluded from the top table. He considers the arrangement outdated and increasingly hard to defend.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Dugan takes a different stance: that the Security Council still performs its core function because it forces the most dangerous powers to remain engaged with one another. “It works and it works well,” he says, not because it is democratic, but because it keeps major powers in the same room. Dugan finds the veto frustrating but useful. It gives powerful states an incentive to stay inside the system rather than act wholly outside it.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>He is also doubtful that formal reform will happen soon. Instead of expanding the permanent membership, he proposes a more modest change: elected members should act as true representatives of their regions rather than merely advancing their own national interests. That would not solve the legitimacy problem, but it could make the Council more representative in practice.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Norms, middle powers and the future of the UN</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Khattar Singh presses both guests on whether international rules now apply mainly to weaker states while great powers ignore them when convenient. Wagner largely agrees, though he feels that reputational costs still matter at the margins. Dugan answers with more optimism. He says the UN’s greatest achievement may not be enforcement, but the accumulation of norms that define acceptable conduct. From human rights to humanitarian principles, these standards still shape expectations even when they are violated.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The discussion ends by considering middle powers and the United States. Wagner sees countries such as India, Canada and Australia as increasingly important bridge-builders in a world where many states do not want to align fully with either Washington or Beijing. Dugan makes a similar point in more institutional terms: smaller and mid-sized states often value multilateral platforms more than great powers do because they need them more.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>On the US, both reject the idea that Washington is simply abandoning multilateralism. Wagner sees recent funding cuts as a way of pressuring institutions to change. Dugan frames the Trump approach in more transactional terms, arguing that the UN is being treated like an underperforming property that powerful actors still believe could yield value if restructured.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The crisis of multilateralism is real, but it does not mean global cooperation is over. It means the old system no longer fits the world it claims to govern.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Hugh Dugan, a former UN insider and president of Multilateral Accountability Associates, and Daniel Wagner, the organization’s managing director and a political risk expert, about whether multilateralism can still function in a..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Rohan Khattar Singh, Hugh Dugan and Daniel Wagner examine whether multilateralism is failing or evolving in a fragmented global order. While institutions like the United Nations struggle with relevance, accountability and outdated structures, new actors are reshaping global governance. The future of multilateralism depends on adapting institutions to deliver outcomes, not just process."
post-date="Apr 17, 2026"
post-title="FO Live: Wars Rage in Iran and Ukraine, Where is the United Nations?" slug-data="fo-live-wars-rage-in-iran-and-ukraine-where-is-the-united-nations">
FO Live: Wars Rage in Iran and Ukraine, Where is the United Nations?
Bryn Barnard"
post_date="April 14, 2026 05:48"
pUrl="/business/technology/fo-talks-from-minneapolis-to-kuwait-welfare-model-under-pressure-in-the-ai-era/" pid="161879"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and author Bryn Barnard discuss whether universal basic income can really solve the social dislocation promised by artificial intelligence. Their conversation moves far beyond abstract theory. Using Kuwait as a real-world example of a society sustained by oil wealth, Barnard argues that the country already offers something close to a universal basic income (UBI) system. In doing so, it reveals the political, economic and moral complications that come with paying citizens while relying on others to do much of the work.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">AI, redundancy and the UBI question</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The discussion begins with the larger technological fear driving renewed interest in UBI. Singh asks Barnard to assess predictions that AI could replace both cognitive and manual labor, leaving millions economically unnecessary. Barnard notes that some thinkers, including Yuval Noah Harari, imagine AI not merely as a tool but as an autonomous force that may eventually outperform humans across most forms of work.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Barnard highlights the critics. He points to figures such as cognitive scientist Gary Marcus and author Ed Zitron, who argue that current large language models remain deeply flawed, whether because of hallucinations, financial unsustainability or the poor quality of synthetic training data. Even so, the uncertainty does not remove the policy problem. If AI does eliminate vast numbers of jobs, governments will still have to decide how displaced populations are meant to live.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>That is where UBI reenters the debate. Rather than treating it as a futuristic abstraction, Barnard turns to a country that already approximates it in practice.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Kuwait as a living model</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Barnard presents Kuwait as an oil-funded welfare state where citizens receive extensive benefits that together amount to a substantial annual social transfer. As he explains, “It’s about [$33,000] to $60,000 a year, depending on how you do your counting.” Free healthcare, free education, subsidized housing, child-related benefits and guaranteed public-sector jobs combine to create a system in which many citizens enjoy economic security without participating fully in a competitive labor market.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>This model rests on a sharp hierarchy. Kuwait has roughly 1.5 million citizens, alongside a far larger population of migrant workers who carry out much of the country’s manual and professional labor. Barnard explains that this arrangement emerged when Kuwait lacked the domestic skills needed to build a modern state. Migrants became teachers, engineers, administrators and laborers, while the state used oil wealth to distribute benefits to citizens.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>For Barnard, Kuwait shows what can happen when income is detached from productive pressure over generations. A large share of citizens work in protected government positions, where advancement is often weakly tied to performance or innovation. This, he argues, creates long-term deskilling.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Migrant labor and the human cost</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The conversation then turns to the structure that makes this system function. Singh presses Barnard on the treatment of migrants across the Gulf. Barnard describes the Kafala system, under which workers’ legal status is tied to employers who may hold their passports and control their mobility. He agrees with Singh that this resembles bonded labor, even if the comparison is not exact.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Barnard also recounts the cruelty that can emerge when a society views migrant labor as disposable. During Covid-19, a Kuwaiti influencer suggested that migrants be sent into the desert to die so they would not spread disease. Unfortunately, a wider dehumanization is built into the system.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Kuwait’s dependence on migrants, then, is not just an economic fact. It is a moral contradiction within a welfare order that protects one population by exposing another to precarity and abuse.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Citizenship, denaturalization and shrinking the welfare pool</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Barnard argues that Kuwait’s real warning for UBI advocates lies not only in deskilling, but in what happens when the money tightens. As oil revenues fluctuate and long-term fiscal pressures mount, the state has looked for ways to reduce the number of people entitled to benefits. That has taken the form of citizenship revocation.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Barnard describes how thousands have been denaturalized, including dual nationals and others whose family claims have come under state scrutiny. “The campaign is not over,” he warns, underscoring that citizenship itself is becoming a fiscal instrument. In effect, reducing the citizen pool becomes a way of reducing obligations.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>This is where the conversation becomes especially relevant beyond Kuwait. Singh draws comparisons to debates in the United States over immigration, denaturalization and welfare burdens. Barnard suggests that once a state promises cradle-to-grave security, political pressure may grow to decide who fully belongs and who does not.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The deeper problem of meaning</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>By the end of the discussion, Barnard argues that Kuwait exposes more than a budgetary problem. It reveals a human one. “Kuwaitis have been deskilled,” he says. In Kuwaiti society, guaranteed support can weaken incentives to build capability, purpose and resilience.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>That insight gives the conversation its wider force. UBI may cushion economic disruption, but Kuwait suggests that it can also generate dependency, distort citizenship and leave unresolved the question Singh repeatedly returns to: If work disappears, what gives life structure and meaning? Barnard’s answer is not that welfare should be abolished, but that any society considering UBI must reckon with its unintended consequences before treating it as a simple solution to the age of AI.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and author Bryn Barnard discuss whether universal basic income can really solve the social dislocation promised by artificial intelligence. Their conversation moves far beyond abstract theory. Using Kuwait as a real-world example of a society sustained by oil wealth,..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Bryn Barnard consider Kuwait as a test case for universal basic income in an age of AI-driven job loss. Kuwait’s welfare state shows how generous benefits can create deskilling, dependence on migrant labor and rising pressure to narrow citizenship when fiscal strains grow. UBI can bring deep political and social consequences."
post-date="Apr 14, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: From Minneapolis to Kuwait — Welfare Model Under Pressure in the AI Era" slug-data="fo-talks-from-minneapolis-to-kuwait-welfare-model-under-pressure-in-the-ai-era">
FO Talks: From Minneapolis to Kuwait — Welfare Model Under Pressure in the AI Era
Vinay Singh"
post_date="April 13, 2026 05:47"
pUrl="/business/fo-talks-the-9-trillion-crisis-ai-burnout-and-the-collapse-of-white-collar-jobs/" pid="161853"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>51Թ</em>’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and Global Civilization Dynamics Founder Vinay Singh examine a silent breakdown in the modern white-collar economy. They begin with a striking anecdote: a software engineer claiming experience at Meta sends hundreds of applications and reaches out to more than a thousand recruiters without receiving a single offer. For Singh, the episode raises a disturbing possibility about today’s labor market. “When this top-tier engineer sends 1,000 signals into the market and gets back nothing but silence,” he says, “we have to ask: Is the hiring system broken or is it working exactly as designed?”</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Their discussion widens from this example to a broader diagnosis of technological change, economic transformation and mounting worker burnout. Both speakers argue that artificial intelligence, financialized markets and decades of economic restructuring may be redefining the value of human labor itself.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The “black hole” of hiring</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh frames the engineer’s experience as evidence of what he calls the “black hole of human meritocracy.” Highly qualified candidates increasingly encounter opaque hiring systems dominated by automated screening tools. Resumes disappear into applicant-tracking systems, while recruiters struggle to distinguish genuine candidates from automated applications generated by AI tools.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The phenomenon, Singh suggests, echoes earlier labor shocks. He points to similarities with the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, when job seekers reported submitting hundreds of applications with little response. The difference today is the scale and persistence of the problem, which now spans multiple economic cycles.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The result may be a profound misallocation of human effort. Millions of workers spend vast amounts of time tailoring resumes and applications that are processed almost entirely by algorithms. Singh characterizes this as a massive extraction of human productivity from the economy without producing meaningful output.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">From postwar inclusion to financialized capitalism</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Isackson situates the present moment within a longer historical arc. In the decades following World War II, Western economies cultivated a strong sense of social participation. Programs such as the US GI Bill and New Deal institutions created relatively stable employment and reinforced the idea that society needed the contributions of ordinary citizens.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>That sense of belonging, he argues, gradually eroded over the past half-century. Economic thinking increasingly prioritized shareholder returns and financial markets over employment and social stability. This has resulted in a system that measures value almost exclusively through financial outcomes.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>“We’ve seen a long trend going in the direction of devaluing human presence,” he says. Human worth, once embedded in institutions and communities, is now assessed primarily through economic productivity.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The rise of agentic AI</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>They then turn to the accelerating development of artificial intelligence. Singh distinguishes between the generative AI that became widely visible in recent years and a newer phase known as agentic AI — systems capable of performing complex tasks autonomously.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Recent partnerships between technology companies and research organizations illustrate the shift. AI systems are now being deployed to analyze biological data, design pharmaceutical compounds and carry out tasks that once required large teams of human specialists.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh describes a rapidly emerging “bot-versus-bot” economy in which automated systems apply for jobs while other algorithms evaluate applications. “Human beings’ souls are being lost,” he warns, arguing that the decoupling of labor from value creation threatens the foundations of the modern workforce.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Isackson agrees that the economic logic driving automation is powerful. Yet he stresses that production alone cannot define human activity within an economy. Businesses and institutions, he argues, are not merely technical systems but social environments shaped by human interpretation and meaning.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Burnout in the global workforce</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Evidence is mounting of global worker burnout. Singh cites workforce surveys reporting that more than 80% of employees experience some level of exhaustion or disengagement. Younger workers appear particularly affected, with high levels of reported stress and declining engagement.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The phenomenon extends beyond white-collar sectors. Labor unrest across Europe, including widespread strikes in Italy’s transportation sector, reflects similar frustrations among blue-collar workers facing stagnant wages and rising costs of living.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Isackson believes burnout reflects more than excessive workloads. Many workers are experiencing a deeper loss of purpose within economic systems that no longer recognize their broader human value. When individuals feel interchangeable or invisible within automated systems, they can experience severe psychological consequences.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A civilizational turning point</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh points to the growing recognition among global economic leaders that technological change may be reshaping capitalism itself. Some figures within finance and industry have warned that AI-driven productivity gains could deepen inequality and destabilize consumer economies.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Isackson sees these concerns as signs of a larger historical transition. The transformation now underway may force societies to rethink the relationship between technology, labor and human identity.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>“We’re in a great transformation,” he says. Whether political and business leaders can adapt to that transformation remains uncertain. Yet both speakers agree that the scale of the changes now unfolding suggests that the future of work, and perhaps the meaning of human contribution within modern economies, is entering a decisive new phase.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and Global Civilization Dynamics Founder Vinay Singh examine a silent breakdown in the modern white-collar economy. They begin with a striking anecdote: a software engineer claiming experience at Meta sends hundreds of applications and..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Peter Isackson and Vinay Singh examine a growing crisis in white-collar employment as automation, opaque hiring systems and financialized capitalism reshape the labor market. Agentic AI and algorithmic hiring may be decoupling human work from economic value. The discussion frames rising burnout and disengagement as signs of a deeper civilizational transition."
post-date="Apr 13, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: The $9 Trillion Crisis — AI, Burnout and the Collapse of White Collar Jobs" slug-data="fo-talks-the-9-trillion-crisis-ai-burnout-and-the-collapse-of-white-collar-jobs">
FO Talks: The $9 Trillion Crisis — AI, Burnout and the Collapse of White Collar Jobs
Kanwal Sibal"
post_date="April 12, 2026 05:56"
pUrl="/world-news/fo-live-kanwal-sibal-explains-why-india-is-europes-strategic-alternative-to-china/" pid="161831"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>51Թ</em>’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson, former Foreign Secretary of India Kanwal Sibal and Assistant Editor Luna Rovira discuss the landmark January 27 trade agreement between India and the European Union. Sibal frames it in striking terms, calling it the “mother of all deals” because of the scale involved: India’s 1.4 billion-strong market linking with the EU’s 27-nation bloc, whose economy rivals that of the United States.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>India is already the world’s fourth-largest economy and is projected to become the third within a few years. Europe, meanwhile, remains a high-consumption, technologically advanced export power but faces demographic decline and slow growth. Sibal sees the agreement as more than commercial; once economic linkages deepen, political cooperation on international issues becomes easier. Trade, investment and technology transfer create strategic ballast.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The deal also reflects Europe’s recalibration away from China. Sibal argues that Beijing’s “excessive manufacturing capacities” and dominance in rare earths, renewables and key industrial processes have generated structural imbalances. Europe seeks resilient supply chains and alternatives to overdependence. In this context, he describes India as “a very attractive partner,” citing democratic governance, market openness and greater predictability compared to China.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Trump, tariffs and strategic diversification</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>US President Donald Trump serves as the catalyst here. The US imposed 15% tariffs on Europe while extracting major energy purchase and investment commitments. This has shaken European confidence in the transatlantic relationship.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Sibal argues that Trump has “humiliated Europe,” not only through trade pressure but through the broader disruption of NATO structures and Ukraine diplomacy. Isackson probes whether Europe’s long-standing subordinate alignment with Washington has reached a breaking point. Sibal identifies that India and Europe now seek to “expand [their] options” and reduce exposure to American unpredictability.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>For India, the calculus is similar. It faces some of the highest US tariffs, and the future direction of American trade policy remains uncertain. The India–EU agreement thus reflects mutual hedging. It is an attempt to widen strategic autonomy in an era of volatile American leadership.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Europe, Ukraine and the question of sovereignty</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The discussion broadens to Europe’s geopolitical standing, especially in the Ukraine war. Sibal observes that both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin have sidelined Europe in negotiations. For him, this exclusion signals that Washington does not assign Europe decisive weight in matters of continental security.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>He also argues that Europe weakened its own credibility. Admissions by former French President François Hollande and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel that the Minsk agreements served as temporary arrangements undermined trust in Moscow. Meanwhile, Baltic states and Poland exert disproportionate influence within EU consensus politics, amplifying a moralized anti-Russian narrative.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Isackson raises the internal fragmentation of Europe itself: weak parliamentary authority at the EU level, rising populist parties such as Germany’s Alternative for Germany, and declining public trust in national governments. Sibal agrees that the Belgian capital of Brussels has accumulated authority in areas that blur the boundaries of member-state sovereignty, though he cautions against dismissing Europe as strategically irrelevant. If Washington and Brussels coordinate effectively, Europe could still shape outcomes. But at present, he sees a continent struggling to define a coherent geopolitical voice.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Regulation, reform and economic complementarity</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>On the mechanics of the deal, Sibal pushes back against concerns about India’s bureaucratic readiness. He believes Europe’s regulatory ecosystem poses a greater challenge. The EU’s strict health, digital and environmental standards — including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism — may limit practical market access even after tariff reductions.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Agriculture, notably contentious in the agreement between the EU and the Southern Common Market trade bloc, is excluded from the India deal, reducing the likelihood of domestic backlash. The deal also includes a mobility framework for skilled workers, which Sibal distinguishes from immigration.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>He stresses economic complementarity. Indian exports in textiles, leather, gems and jewelry could benefit significantly as duties fall to zero. Europe supplies advanced industrial goods and technology. India, meanwhile, is consciously reducing protectionism, having concluded or pursued agreements with Australia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and others. Integration into global supply chains is now a strategic priority, not an afterthought.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Russia, sanctions and India’s strategic balance</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The final segment addresses India’s continued purchase of Russian oil and its role within BRICS. Sibal insists India has violated no international law. Purchases were made at discounted price caps set by the US, and Indian refiners operated within sanction parameters. Recent US tariff penalties have already reduced Indian offtake.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>European leaders have voiced concern, and some Indian firms have faced EU sanctions. Still, Sibal rejects accusations of hypocrisy as “ridiculous,” especially given Europe’s own substantial energy purchases from Russia in the early years of the war.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>India, he emphasizes, will not sever ties with Moscow or its BRICS partners. Rather, it is a moderating force within BRICS — a country that prevents the grouping from hardening into a purely anti-Western bloc. In his formulation, India’s presence serves Western interests by keeping channels open between democratic and authoritarian systems. A multipolar world, in his view, should not be anti-Western but more balanced, giving emerging powers a greater voice in global governance.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson, former Foreign Secretary of India Kanwal Sibal and Assistant Editor Luna Rovira discuss the landmark January 27 trade agreement between India and the European Union. Sibal frames it in striking terms, calling it the “mother of all deals”..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Peter Isackson, Luna Rovira and Kanwal Sibal discuss the January 27 India–EU trade agreement. They argue that US unpredictability, alongside Europe’s frictions with China and its Ukraine-era strategic confusion, helped accelerate Europe’s turn toward India. The conversation examines regulatory hurdles, economic complementarity and India’s positioning as a balancing power in a multipolar order."
post-date="Apr 12, 2026"
post-title="FO Live: Kanwal Sibal Explains Why India Is Europe’s Strategic Alternative to China" slug-data="fo-live-kanwal-sibal-explains-why-india-is-europes-strategic-alternative-to-china">
FO Live: Kanwal Sibal Explains Why India Is Europe’s Strategic Alternative to China
Ben Freeman"
post_date="April 11, 2026 05:20"
pUrl="/world-news/fo-talks-is-america-building-a-1-5-trillion-war-machine-to-fight-china/" pid="161815"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Ben Freeman, co-author of <em>The Trillion Dollar </em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Trillion-Dollar-War-Machine-Bankrupts/dp/1645030636/ref=sr_1_1?adgrpid=185684971425&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.jafOgukmgeSmUSncETHF_Lo1cFnjBvM8ftOxD9bOVWdN3RzDl3iXXCJQLj9bgp4nRygUS7xzquT4hvjisJr8OvAKFLfLJQG_YN3QnxdAIdE.oF213-8XFTSe-M6PAyVXO0Sr34cYuPPlPiR8zraVPLc&dib_tag=se&hvadid=779674212947&hvdev=c&hvexpln=0&hvlocphy=1019250&hvnetw=g&hvocijid=5232793906792822668--&hvqmt=e&hvrand=5232793906792822668&hvtargid=kwd-2430239029883&hydadcr=22592_13821282_8484&keywords=the+trillion+dollar+war+machine&mcid=6f8dcee94c29396ebb3ceb5073b0af3b&qid=1771560465&sr=8-1" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow"><em>War Machine</em></a><em>: How Runaway Military Spending Drives America into Foreign Wars and Bankrupts Us at Home</em>, discuss US President Donald Trump’s proposed $1.5 trillion defense budget. Their conversation moves beyond headline numbers to examine threat inflation, the power of defense contractors and the mounting risks posed by America’s nearly $39 trillion national debt. At stake is military posture toward China and the long-term sustainability of the American state.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The 1.5 trillion-dollar question</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh opens by noting that Trump has called for a $1.5 trillion military budget for fiscal year 2027, a figure endorsed by <em>The Washington Post</em>’s editorial board. Supporters argue that as a percentage of GDP, defense spending is historically low, and that China’s rapid military buildup demands urgent investment.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>“I don’t think much of it,” Freeman says bluntly. He points out that the current US military budget is already roughly three times larger than China’s. The United States maintains more than 700 overseas bases, effectively surrounding China, while Beijing operates only a handful abroad. Ignoring that accumulated infrastructure distorts the debate.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>When Singh raises concerns about China’s 22 shipyards, drone production and expanding industrial capacity, Freeman stresses the difference between quantity and quality. “The Chinese Navy pales in comparison to the US Navy,” he states, insisting that technological sophistication and global reach matter more than raw output. For him, tripling China’s spending has already secured a qualitative advantage. Raising it to five times China’s level requires a clearer strategic rationale than simply invoking Beijing’s rise.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Threat inflation and the iron triangle</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The conversation then turns to “threat inflation,” a concept central to Freeman’s work. The military-industrial complex requires a persistent adversary to justify its scale. Without an external foe, Americans might begin asking why resources are not directed toward healthcare, education or infrastructure.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Freeman describes the “iron triangle” linking Congress, the Pentagon and defense contractors. Roughly 54% of the Department of Defense budget flows to private contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics. These firms then invest heavily in lobbying, campaign contributions and hiring former officials, reinforcing a cycle that sustains high spending.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The result, he says, is a self-perpetuating system that has expanded beyond what President Dwight Eisenhower warned about in 1961. Today, the ecosystem includes think tanks, universities, media organizations and even local institutions, all reinforcing the normalization of American militarism.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The defense tech disruption</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Yet the system is not static. Singh asks whether the “Big Five” will simply continue vacuuming up taxpayer money indefinitely. Freeman points to the rise of defense tech firms such as SpaceX, Anduril and Palantir as a disruptive force.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>These companies, often backed by Silicon Valley capital and closely connected to the Trump administration, are competing with legacy contractors for Pentagon contracts. Freeman characterizes the moment as a pivotal transition, with tech-driven firms potentially supplanting parts of the old guard.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>But he tempers expectations. “A rising tide is lifting all defense contractors right now,” he notes. Even if the composition of contractors changes, the overall budget trajectory shows little sign of decline.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Debt, deficits and the limits of expansion</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The most sobering portion of the discussion concerns the national debt. With US debt nearing $39 trillion and annual deficits exceeding $1 trillion, Freeman warns that any increase in defense spending will be entirely debt financed. According to projections, a $1.5 trillion annual budget could add nearly $6 trillion to the debt over a decade.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>For the first time, US debt servicing costs now exceed the Pentagon budget. Interest payments alone are approaching $1 trillion annually. Freeman cautions that borrowing to pay interest risks triggering a vicious debt spiral. The US has not run a budget surplus since 1999, making this a bipartisan problem decades in the making.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>If defense spending remains politically sacrosanct and debt servicing unavoidable, the remaining pressure points are the long-untouchable Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. Cutting them, Freeman observes, would be “political suicide.” That leaves Washington with few painless options.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A new cold war?</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>As the US–Russia New START treaty expires and nuclear arms control weakens, Singh raises the prospect of an accelerating arms race. Freeman questions the strategic logic of expanding nuclear arsenals beyond already overwhelming levels, arguing that such expansions chiefly benefit contractors.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Still, he concedes that a technological cold war with China is real. Competition in artificial intelligence, robotics, drones and hypersonics is intensifying. Here, Freeman does not oppose investment per se. Instead, he criticizes what he sees as misallocation. The problem, he suggests, is not insufficient funding but inefficient spending on legacy platforms at the expense of emerging technologies.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Ultimately, the debate is about how the US will prepare to face Chinese competition. Singh and Freeman leave viewers with a dilemma: expand the war machine and risk fiscal crisis, or reform it before the debt itself becomes the greatest national security threat of all.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Ben Freeman, co-author of The Trillion Dollar War Machine: How Runaway Military Spending Drives America into Foreign Wars and Bankrupts Us at Home, discuss US President Donald Trump’s proposed $1.5 trillion defense budget. Their conversation moves beyond headline..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Ben Freeman examine US President Donald Trump’s proposed $1.5 trillion defense budget, questioning whether China’s rise justifies such expansion. Freeman critiques threat inflation, the entrenched “iron triangle” and growing influence of defense contractors. He warns that rising debt and interest payments may pose a greater long-term threat than Beijing."
post-date="Apr 11, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: Is America Building a $1.5 Trillion War Machine to Fight China?" slug-data="fo-talks-is-america-building-a-1-5-trillion-war-machine-to-fight-china">
FO Talks: Is America Building a $1.5 Trillion War Machine to Fight China?
Kuber Chalise"
post_date="April 10, 2026 05:35"
pUrl="/politics/fo-talks-nepals-political-earthquake-as-gen-z-elevates-a-rapper-to-power/" pid="161799"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong><em>[Editor’s note: This interview was conducted on March 13, prior to Nepali Prime Minister Balen Shah’s inauguration on March 27, 2026.]</em></strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Rohan Khattar Singh, 51Թ’s Video Producer & Social Media Manager, speaks with Kuber Chalise, a journalist for <em>Nepal Khabar</em>, about the election that has upended Nepal’s political order. At the center of the discussion is the rise of Balen Shah, a 35-year-old engineer, former rapper and former mayor of Kathmandu, who has become prime minister after the Rashtriya Swatantra Party’s sweeping victory. Khattar Singh and Chalise explore why traditional parties collapsed so quickly, why young voters turned so sharply against the old guard and why Nepal’s new leaders now face a harder test in government than they did at the ballot box.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A revolt against the old parties</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Chalise presents the result as a long time coming. Nepal’s established parties, including the Nepali Congress and major communist factions, lost public trust over years of corruption, nepotism and poor governance. These parties had once expanded rights and shaped the post-monarchy political system, but they failed to adapt after the 2015 constitution.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>That failure created a widening gap between political elites and the public, especially younger voters. Chalise says the old parties behaved as though politics could continue as usual even after their original mission had ended. Public frustration deepened over stagnant leadership, weak performance and a closed political class dominated by insiders.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Khattar Singh places the election in the context of the September 2025 Generation Z protests, which erupted over these frustrations and forced the resignation of then-Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. Despite the unrest, the subsequent vote was peaceful. Chalise calls the election’s conduct “a miracle,” given the violence that preceded it.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The scale of the political shift</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The results show how decisively voters turned away from the traditional order. Chalise explains that the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) dominated the lower-house contest and is expected to hold 182 of 275 seats. By contrast, the Nepali Congress fell sharply. The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), led by Oli, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre), associated with former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (or Prachanda), were reduced to minor roles.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>For Chalise, the message is clear. The public has handed the RSP a workable majority and the chance to govern for five years, but not a mandate to rewrite the constitution. Because the party lacks upper-house representation, it cannot change the constitutional framework alone.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The result also breaks a longstanding assumption that no single party could secure a stable majority. Khattar Singh notes that Nepal has seen 32 governments in 35 years. Still, Chalise warns that a majority alone is not enough. The real question, he suggests, is majority versus maturity.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why Shah rose so fast</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The discussion then turns to Shah. His rise began with his victory as mayor of Kathmandu, which gave voters a chance to judge his performance. His reputation rests largely on contrast. In a system associated with financial scandals, Shah emerged without a personal corruption case.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>That clean image becomes his main political asset. Chalise describes it as Shah’s “USP,” the unique selling point that distinguished him from many local leaders facing corruption allegations. He also notes Shah’s unusual style. Unlike many senior leaders, Shah speaks sparingly. Chalise calls him “a very mysterious character,” and Khattar Singh notes that this unpredictability can appear both as strength and weakness.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The youth dimension is equally important. Chalise argues that for decades, Nepal’s young people drove political movements but were sidelined once power was distributed. This election reflects a democratic revolt against that pattern, with younger voters choosing to take power through the ballot.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A party with power but no identity</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Even after its landslide, the RSP remains politically unsettled. Chalise says the party lacks a clear ideological identity and has not yet held its first convention. Its elected members come from varied backgrounds, including democrats, leftists and some with monarchist leanings.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Its appeal rests on delivery rather than doctrine. Khattar Singh suggests that voters increasingly prioritize jobs, prosperity and competence over ideology. Chalise agrees, noting that the party’s commitment paper points toward liberal economic instincts and a role for the private sector, though he stops short of calling it ideologically defined.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>That ambiguity creates risk. If the new government performs, it may dominate Nepal for years. If it fails, support could collapse quickly. From a political science perspective, Chalise says, the RSP is “not yet a party.” It must evolve while governing.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The real test starts now</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The conversation concludes with the challenge ahead. Khattar Singh points to Nepal’s difficult geography, limited state capacity and dependence on India and China for trade and energy. Nepal cannot insulate itself from regional instability or global shocks.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Chalise agrees that foreign policy may prove decisive. Nepal’s next government must navigate shifting regional dynamics and domestic expectations simultaneously. Shah’s nationalist symbolism, including the “Greater Nepal” map seen in his office, adds uncertainty. Chalise returns to the same point: Shah is unpredictable, and whether that becomes an asset or liability depends on how he governs.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>For now, voters have rejected the old political class and chosen youth, anti-corruption politics and the promise of delivery. But protest energy and electoral success are only the beginning. The real test starts with governing.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="Rohan Khattar Singh, 51Թ’s Video Producer & Social Media Manager, speaks with Kuber Chalise, a journalist for Nepal Khabar, about the..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Kuber Chalise analyze Nepal’s 2026 election, where Gen Z protests and anti-corruption sentiment propelled Balen Shah and the Rashtriya Swatantra Party to victory. They highlight the collapse of traditional parties and the movement away from ideology toward delivery. Governance, stability and geopolitics will determine whether this political earthquake endures."
post-date="Apr 10, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: Nepal’s Political Earthquake as Gen Z Elevates a Rapper to Power" slug-data="fo-talks-nepals-political-earthquake-as-gen-z-elevates-a-rapper-to-power">
FO Talks: Nepal’s Political Earthquake as Gen Z Elevates a Rapper to Power
Evan Munsing"
post_date="April 09, 2026 06:02"
pUrl="/world-news/us-news/fo-talks-america-first-to-iran-war-making-sense-of-donald-trumps-foreign-policy/" pid="161785"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Evan Munsing, candidate for Colorado’s competitive 8th Congressional District, Marine Corps veteran and entrepreneur, examine the United States’s sudden entry into war with Iran under President Donald Trump. Contradictorily, a president who campaigned on avoiding foreign entanglements has launched a new conflict in the Middle East. As Singh and Munsing explore the implications, they situate the war within a broader pattern of strategic ambiguity, institutional decline and growing public distrust. The result is not just a geopolitical crisis, but a test of American democracy itself.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Shock, contradiction and shifting goals</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Munsing describes a political landscape caught off guard. Across party lines, Americans are struggling to reconcile Trump’s long-standing “America First” rhetoric with a decision to initiate war. Drawing on conversations from the campaign trail, he notes that voters are not only surprised but deeply confused about the rationale behind the conflict. “I think the first thing is just shock across the political spectrum,” he observes.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The absence of clear objectives compounds that confusion. Singh presses Munsing on what the administration is trying to achieve, and the answer remains elusive. From regime change to nuclear containment to vague notions of victory, the stated goals appear to shift constantly. Munsing points to statements from the White House suggesting that Trump alone will determine when Iran has “unconditionally surrendered,” dismissing the idea as “ridiculous.” Without a stable definition of success, the war risks replicating the strategic drift seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the endgame remained perpetually undefined.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Miscalculation and the risk of escalation</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The discussion then turns to how the conflict began. Munsing argues that Trump’s decision-making reflects a pattern of boundary-testing behavior. Early military successes, particularly a high-risk operation in Venezuela, may have created a false sense of confidence. According to this view, the administration expected a rapid, decisive outcome in Iran — perhaps even regime collapse — without fully accounting for the complexity of the region.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>This miscalculation now presents a dangerous dilemma. If the US withdraws quickly, it risks signaling failure. If it escalates, it may become trapped in a prolonged and costly conflict. Singh raises the possibility of deploying ground troops, a scenario that would dramatically raise the stakes. Munsing considers such a move unlikely but politically catastrophic, arguing that it would face overwhelming public opposition and significantly increase casualties and financial costs.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The broader concern is that the administration lacks a coherent strategy. Without clear objectives or limits, the conflict could expand in unpredictable ways, drawing the US deeper into a region already defined by volatility and competing interests.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Domestic repercussions and the terrorism calculus</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Beyond the battlefield, Singh and Munsing examine how the war could reshape domestic politics. Recent lone-wolf attacks in the US complicate public sentiment. While such incidents may initially push Americans toward disengagement, a confirmed state-sponsored attack linked to Iran could have the opposite effect.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Munsing explains that a direct threat to the homeland would likely trigger a “rally around the flag” response, increasing support for the war despite broader skepticism. This distinction underscores how fragile public opinion remains. Americans may oppose the conflict in principle, but their stance could shift rapidly under the pressure of perceived national danger.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Simultaneously, the lack of a clear initial justification for the war weakens the administration’s position. Without a compelling narrative, it becomes harder to sustain public support over time, especially if the conflict drags on or casualties mount.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Congress, executive power and institutional decline</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh highlights the constitutional role of Congress in declaring war. Munsing argues that lawmakers have increasingly ceded this power to the executive branch. “It certainly feels like we’re moving to a Cesarean presidency,” he says, pointing to a long-term trend that has accelerated in recent years.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>This shift reflects deeper institutional problems. Congress, once protective of its prerogatives, now appears reluctant to assert itself. Munsing criticizes a culture of performative politics in which legislators prioritize media presence over substantive lawmaking. With approval ratings hovering around 17%, public confidence in the institution has reached strikingly low levels.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The Iran war exposes these weaknesses. Despite the absence of formal authorization, Congress has struggled to respond decisively. For Munsing, this moment represents both a failure and an opportunity: a failure to uphold constitutional responsibilities, but also a chance to reassert them, if lawmakers choose to act.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Distrust, disillusionment and fragile hope</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh and Munsing close with a broader reflection on declining trust in American institutions. From prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to economic crises and elite scandals, many citizens now see a system that operates by different rules for the powerful and the public. Some have even labeled the conflict the “Epstein war,” viewing it as a distraction from unresolved controversies involving political and economic elites.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Munsing warns that this perception could lead to two dangerous outcomes: widespread disengagement from civic life or a turn toward more extreme political solutions. Both, he suggests, would undermine the foundations of American democracy.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Yet he also identifies tentative signs of renewal. Public frustration is driving greater political engagement, from town hall participation to grassroots campaigning. On the campaign trail, he finds that a majority of voters are willing to engage seriously, even across party lines. This rising involvement, combined with pressure on elected officials, could create an opening for institutional reform.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Whether those “green shoots” take root will depend on whether political leaders respond to public demand for accountability and clarity. As Singh and Munsing make clear, the stakes extend far beyond the Iran war itself, touching on the future of American governance in an increasingly unstable world.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Evan Munsing, candidate for Colorado’s competitive 8th Congressional District, Marine Corps veteran and entrepreneur, examine the United States’s sudden entry into war with Iran under President Donald Trump. Contradictorily, a president who campaigned on avoiding..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Evan Munsing discuss why US President Donald Trump waged war on Iran despite campaigning against foreign entanglements. The administration’s aims keep shifting, risking escalation and a repeat of the strategic failures seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. This conflict is part of a wider American crisis of collapsing public trust."
post-date="Apr 09, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: America First to Iran War — Making Sense of Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy" slug-data="fo-talks-america-first-to-iran-war-making-sense-of-donald-trumps-foreign-policy">
FO Talks: America First to Iran War — Making Sense of Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy
Devina Mehra"
post_date="April 09, 2026 05:45"
pUrl="/economics/fo-talks-will-ai-gold-and-dedollarization-reshape-global-markets-in-2026/" pid="161782"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Devina Mehra, Founder and Chairperson of First Global, about the forces shaping global markets in 2026. After a volatile 2025 marked by wars, inflation and US President Donald Trump’s disruptive economic policies, how should investors make sense of an increasingly fragmented world? Mehra’s answer is strikingly unsentimental: geopolitics matters, but markets operate on their own logic.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Markets, Trump and the limits of geopolitics</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Mehra identifies Trump as the common thread running through much of the recent turbulence. In her words, he is “dismantling the old order without your knowing what comes next.” Yet she draws a clear distinction between macro-level disruption and market behavior.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Looking at 50 years of data, from the Gulf Wars to September 11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, she argues that stock markets tend to recover from geopolitical shocks within six to 12 months. Unless a country is directly involved in conflict, markets historically “shrug it off.” The notable exception is when major commodity producers are involved, as in the Russia–Ukraine war, where energy and commodity prices experience sustained impact.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>In 2025, another dynamic was at play: extreme market concentration. The so-called Magnificent Seven US tech stocks once again drove the bulk of S&P 500 gains. In 2025, roughly 43% of the index’s performance came from this narrow group, down from more than 60% in 2023 and 2024 — but still highly concentrated. Even within that group, only three or four stocks accounted for most of the gains. The average stock, Mehra cautions, has underperformed.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The AI boom and the profitability question</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Much of the recent market enthusiasm centers on artificial intelligence. Mehra remains cautious. History, she argues, shows that transformative technologies do not automatically translate into investor profits.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Automobiles and aviation reshaped the 20th century but were “a graveyard of companies” from an investor’s standpoint. The early Internet era followed a similar pattern. Infrastructure firms such as Global Crossing laid undersea cables that still carry global data traffic today — yet the company itself went bankrupt.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Mehra’s concern with AI is less about its transformative potential and more about capital intensity and monetization. Massive data centers, rapidly depreciating hardware and soaring talent costs create enormous upfront investment. Meanwhile, she points to data suggesting that usage of some AI platforms fell 60–70% during school holidays. This implies that student adoption, not high-margin enterprise demand, drives a significant portion of current traffic.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Even more worrying, she notes, is financial engineering. Some large technology firms avoid placing AI-related debt directly on their balance sheets by routing it through smaller entities that build and finance infrastructure separately. The result is systemic leverage that may be underappreciated.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">India’s growth versus market reality</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Turning to India, Khattar Singh challenges the dominant narrative that India is rising while the West stagnates. Mehra acknowledges that India’s headline GDP growth remains among the highest globally. Yet the composition of that growth raises questions.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Manufacturing as a share of GDP has fallen to roughly 12–13.5%, near its lowest level since the 1960s. Tourism has not yet surpassed pre-pandemic levels. Foreign direct investment and foreign institutional flows have slowed, and India recently recorded a capital account deficit for the first time in two decades.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Most importantly, Mehra stresses that macroeconomic growth does not guarantee market performance. China offers a stark example: Between 2007 and 2023, Chinese GDP expanded more than sixfold, yet its equity market only recently surpassed its 2007 peak. High growth does not automatically translate into shareholder returns or sufficient job creation.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Dedollarization, crypto and the myth of safe havens</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>On dedollarization, Mehra has revised her earlier skepticism. While reserve currencies rarely change quickly, she believes the pace of diversification has accelerated as confidence in US institutions comes “under question.” Even so, she doubts that China’s renminbi will replace the dollar outright. Instead, she anticipates gradual diversification toward a basket of currencies — euro, Swiss franc, Japanese yen — alongside gold.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Cryptocurrencies, in her view, are legitimate assets but not true currencies. Extreme volatility makes them impractical for pricing goods or serving as stable stores of value. With drawdowns of 70–85% occurring multiple times, she recommends limited exposure — 2% to 5% of a portfolio at most.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Gold fares no better under scrutiny. Over a 50-year period, gold has been more volatile than equities. After peaking in 1980, it took 27 years to reclaim that high. Its steady rise in Indian rupee terms, she explains, reflects currency depreciation rather than intrinsic stability.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Machines, bias and the discipline of data</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>At First Global, Mehra has adapted to what she sees as a structural shift in markets. In the 1990s, the edge lay in privileged information. Today, regulation ensures simultaneous disclosure. The advantage now lies in analysis.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Her firm uses machine learning systems to screen more than 20,000 securities globally, examining numerous factors without human emotional bias. Machines reduce randomness and cognitive error — insights drawn in part from behavioral economist Daniel Kahneman’s work on decision-making. Yet she insists on a “human overlay” to design models and interpret outputs. Technology is a tool, not an oracle.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Mehra will not speculate on what single trend could make or break markets in 2026. “Risk is always something you didn’t see coming,” she says, recalling how <em>The Economist</em> failed to flag Russia–Ukraine as a major geopolitical risk just weeks before war erupted in 2022. For her, disciplined data checks matter more than bold predictions. In an age of narrative excess, humility may be the most valuable asset of all.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Devina Mehra, Founder and Chairperson of First Global, about the forces shaping global markets in 2026. After a volatile 2025 marked by wars, inflation and US President Donald Trump’s disruptive economic policies, how should..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Devina Mehra discuss why markets often detach from geopolitics, even amid Trump-era disruption and global conflict. She questions the profitability of the AI boom, highlights extreme market concentration and warns against overinterpreting India’s growth narrative. Mehra urges diversification, limited crypto exposure and disciplined, data-driven investing over seductive market stories."
post-date="Apr 09, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: Will AI, Gold and Dedollarization Reshape Global Markets in 2026?" slug-data="fo-talks-will-ai-gold-and-dedollarization-reshape-global-markets-in-2026">
FO Talks: Will AI, Gold and Dedollarization Reshape Global Markets in 2026?
Fernando Carvajal"
post_date="April 08, 2026 06:58"
pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-live-when-will-the-houthis-join-the-war-to-support-iran/" pid="161762"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh moderates an FO Live discussion on the US–Israel war with Iran. He is joined by Fernando Carvajal, executive director of The American Center for South Yemen Studies; Eric Jeunot, a professor at Abu Dhabi University; and Heena Lotus, a geopolitical analyst. Khattar Singh pushes the panel to assess whether Yemen’s Houthis will enter the conflict, how Iran is calibrating its proxy network and why Gulf states are working to contain escalation. What emerges is a picture of a war no longer defined by direct strikes alone, but by chokepoints, indirect leverage and long-term strategic positioning.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Houthi dilemma</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Jeunot frames the discussion around a fundamental tension shaping Houthi decision-making. The movement is strengthening itself amid fragmentation in South Yemen, using the lull to consolidate territory, recruit fighters and rebuild capacity. Yet it faces a strategic choice between ideological alignment with Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and its own domestic priorities.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>That tension is not abstract. The Houthis must decide whether to demonstrate commitment to Iran by joining the war or instead focus on expanding control toward resource-rich areas such as Marib in Yemen. Jeunot states, “The Houthi are for the moment at a crossroads in terms of objectives.” Entering the war may reinforce their ideological legitimacy, but it could also undermine their long-term economic and political stability.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Fighting capacity and ideological momentum</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Lotus shifts the focus from strategy to motivation. While previous US and Israeli strikes degraded Houthi military infrastructure, she argues that capability alone does not determine action. The group’s ideological drive remains intact and may even outweigh material constraints.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>She emphasizes that the Houthis are deeply embedded in the broader narrative of resistance aligned with Iran and Palestine. As she puts it, “They’re very passionate about being part of the Axis of Resistance.” That passion, however, exists alongside practical constraints, particularly the risk of reigniting conflict with Saudi Arabia.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Jeunot reinforces this point by describing the Houthis as a system sustained by conflict. War is not simply an activity, but a mechanism of governance and legitimacy. A prolonged peace could weaken the movement internally, making the presence of an external enemy central to its survival.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Geography, Saudi Arabia and strategic restraint</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Carvajal grounds the discussion in geography and political reality. Yemen remains divided, with the Houthis controlling a smaller share of territory but the majority of the population. Meanwhile, South Yemen has shifted into Saudi-managed security control following the displacement of UAE-backed forces in late 2025.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>This balance helps explain the Houthis’ current restraint. Despite their alignment with Iran, they have not targeted Saudi positions or escalated attacks in the Red Sea. For Carvajal, the key lies in their relationship with Riyadh, the Saudi capital. The Houthis may see more value in securing a stable arrangement with Saudi Arabia than in immediate participation in a regional war.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>This creates a paradox. The group maintains ties with Iran while preserving flexibility to negotiate with Gulf powers. The result is a calibrated ambiguity that allows the Houthis to remain relevant without overcommitting.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Chokepoints and the global economy</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Khattar Singh introduces the broader strategic stakes by focusing on the Bab el-Mandeb strait. If the Houthis were to disrupt this maritime corridor, the consequences would extend far beyond the Middle East, affecting global trade, energy flows and major economies such as China and India.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>This raises the possibility that Iran itself may be exercising restraint. Rather than encouraging escalation, Tehran may prefer to keep the Bab el-Mandeb as a latent threat. A simultaneous disruption of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea would approach systemic economic shock.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The panel also considers whether Israel might attempt preemptive strikes on Houthi positions. Lotus warns that such a move could trigger a domino effect, pulling Yemen fully into the conflict. Jeunot, however, questions the strategic logic of opening another front, noting that escalation in the Red Sea would draw in a far wider set of international actors.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Yemen as a long-term battleground</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The discussion closes with a broader reflection on Yemen’s enduring strategic importance. Carvajal situates the country as a historic crossroads, long contested by regional and global powers. Its position along critical trade routes and its complex internal divisions make it both valuable and volatile.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Looking ahead, the panel diverges on whether the war could redraw borders. Lotus sees a shifting geopolitical landscape in which rapid changes in alliances could produce unexpected outcomes. Jeunot is more cautious, arguing that sovereignty remains deeply entrenched and that meaningful territorial change would require large-scale ground operations rather than air campaigns.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>What the panel agrees on is the scale of the conflict’s potential trajectory. Yemen is not yet the central battlefield, but it is no longer peripheral. If the Houthis enter the war, the consequences will not be contained locally. They will reverberate across trade routes, regional alliances and the global economy, transforming an already dangerous conflict into something far harder to control.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh moderates an FO Live discussion on the US–Israel war with Iran. He is joined by Fernando Carvajal, executive director of The American Center for South Yemen Studies; Eric Jeunot, a professor at Abu Dhabi University; and Heena Lotus, a..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Rohan Khattar Singh moderates a discussion on Yemen’s potential role in the US–Israel war on Iran, joined by Fernando Carvajal, Eric Jeunot and Heena Lotus. They examine the Houthis’ strategic dilemma and risks tied to Red Sea chokepoints. Yemen could shift from the periphery to a pivotal front with far-reaching economic consequences."
post-date="Apr 08, 2026"
post-title="FO Live: When Will the Houthis Join the War to Support Iran?" slug-data="fo-live-when-will-the-houthis-join-the-war-to-support-iran">
FO Live: When Will the Houthis Join the War to Support Iran?
Nabeel Khoury"
post_date="April 07, 2026 06:51"
pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-live-did-trump-and-netanyahu-miscalculate-irans-resolve/" pid="161746"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh moderates a fast-moving FO Live discussion on the widening war between the United States, Israel and Iran. He is joined by Dr. Nabeel Khoury, a former US diplomat; Fernando Carvajal, executive director of The American Center for South Yemen Studies; Mohammad Basha, founder of the Basha Report; and Heena Lotus, a geopolitical analyst. Khattar Singh asks whether Washington and Tel Aviv fundamentally misread Iran’s capacity to absorb a leadership decapitation strike and still fight back. Whatever military damage Iran has suffered, the war has already exposed the limits of coercion, deepened regional instability and raised the risk of a broader conflict that no side can fully control.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A war with shifting goals</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Khoury begins by questioning the coherence of the American and Israeli approach. He notes that the stated goals keep changing, especially on the US side. US President Donald Trump’s rhetoric moves from promises of a quick end to talk of an open-ended campaign, making it difficult to know what Washington is actually trying to achieve. For Khoury, that inconsistency matters because it suggests that the war is not being driven by a stable strategic framework.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>He argues that Israel’s goals are clearer and more expansive. The conflict is not really about an immediate Iranian nuclear threat, but about weakening any force capable of resisting Israeli regional dominance. He links the current war to the broader trajectory of Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, arguing that force is being used not simply to deter Iran but to reorder the region. From that perspective, he warns, military escalation may temporarily damage adversaries but will not remove the political anger that generates future resistance. Violence keeps reproducing new forms of militancy rather than ending them.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Iran’s response and the failure of expectations</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Khattar Singh presses the panel on the central question: Did Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expect a much faster collapse of Iranian resolve? The group suggests they did. Instead of mass unrest toppling the system after the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and senior figures in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Iranian state continues to retaliate with drones and missiles across multiple theaters.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Carvajal argues that this is now a regime-survival war for Tehran, Iran’s capital. Iran appears to have prepared for exactly this kind of confrontation and is responding in calibrated ways, including strikes on infrastructure and military targets across the Gulf. He also raises the possibility that some apparently irrational moves make more sense if Iran’s leadership believes its neighbors are also part of the threat environment. If Iran is being pushed backward, it may seek to ensure that the states around it do not emerge untouched or stronger.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Lotus goes further, arguing that Iran was underestimated during the months between the earlier 12-day war and the present crisis. She believes many regional actors assumed the US security umbrella would protect them, only to discover that alignment with Washington now carries serious liabilities. As civilian infrastructure, shipping and energy systems come under pressure, Gulf states must reckon with the costs of being drawn into a confrontation they did not choose.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why the Houthis are holding back</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>A major theme in the discussion is the relative silence of the Houthis. Khattar Singh asks why Yemen’s Houthis, who had previously attacked Israel and maritime targets, have not yet entered this round of fighting with the same intensity as Hezbollah.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Al-Basha offers the most detailed explanation. He argues that the movement’s restraint reflects a combination of political calculation, financial weakness and operational vulnerability. The Houthis, he says, are cash-strapped, under pressure and eager to preserve the fragile truce with Saudi Arabia. They also do not want to hand their enemies a pretext for a renewed US–Israeli strike package while anti-Houthi forces are more coordinated than before.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Just as important, Basha says, the group wants to preserve its own agency. “The Houthi don’t want to be seen as an Iranian proxy,” he explains. They want to appear capable of choosing their own timing rather than acting automatically on Tehran’s behalf. Even so, Basha and Khoury caution that this restraint may not last. If the war drags on and Iran faces a more existential threat, the Houthis may decide they can no longer remain on the sidelines.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Khoury adds another strategic point: The Houthis know that closing major waterways would damage their own access routes as well. For now, that creates an incentive to hold back. But if the conflict becomes all-or-nothing, those calculations could change quickly.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Gulf anxiety, Pakistan’s balancing act and the risk of widening war</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Lotus describes a Gulf region increasingly anxious about the consequences of a war fought in its airspace and across its infrastructure. Gulf monarchies historically aligned with the Western bloc for security, she says, but now find themselves paying the price for that alignment. If the US cannot shield them from economic and military blowback, the value of that partnership comes into question.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The discussion then turns to Pakistan. Lotus sees its capital of Islamabad as trying to maintain relations with everyone at once: Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the US. Carvajal agrees that Pakistan is walking a narrow line, constrained by its own regional rivalries and unwilling to overcommit to any one side. Both suggest that this balancing act may work only for so long if the war expands.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Carvajal also highlights a growing divergence between Trump and Netanyahu. Trump, he argues, is transactional, while Netanyahu’s confrontation with Iran is ideological and long-running. That difference could matter if Washington seeks an exit while Israel wants escalation. He also warns that even if the US steps back, the conflict may continue through proxy networks, sleeper cells and asymmetric retaliation far beyond the immediate battlefield.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Can diplomacy still work?</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Khattar Singh closes by asking the question only Khoury can answer as the diplomat on the panel: How does this end? Khoury insists that diplomacy remains possible because all wars eventually end in negotiation, however bitter the path there may be. Oman and Qatar, he says, are still the most plausible mediators when the fighting subsides.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>But he also argues that diplomacy cannot succeed if the underlying injustices driving regional anger remain untouched. He rejects the idea that every armed actor in the region simply takes orders from Tehran, stressing that local groups often act from their own grievances, especially over Palestine, Gaza and repeated occupation. “There is always room for diplomacy,” he concludes, but diplomacy without justice will only postpone the next war.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh moderates a fast-moving FO Live discussion on the widening war between the United States, Israel and Iran. He is joined by Dr. Nabeel Khoury, a former US diplomat; Fernando Carvajal, executive director of The American Center for South Yemen..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Rohan Khattar Singh moderates a discussion on the US–Israel war on Iran with Nabeel Khoury, Fernando Carvajal, Mohammad Basha and Heena Lotus. Washington and Tel Aviv may have misread Iran’s ability to absorb leadership losses, retaliate and deepen insecurity for Gulf allies. If the conflict continues, more regional actors may be drawn in."
post-date="Apr 07, 2026"
post-title="FO Live: Did Trump and Netanyahu Miscalculate Iran’s Resolve?" slug-data="fo-live-did-trump-and-netanyahu-miscalculate-irans-resolve">
FO Live: Did Trump and Netanyahu Miscalculate Iran’s Resolve?
Natalie Halla"
post_date="April 07, 2026 06:37"
pUrl="/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-live-afghanistans-last-woman-ambassador-defies-taliban-rule-from-exile/" pid="161743"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>51Թ Contributing Editor Laura Pavon Aramburú speaks with Afghanistan’s last serving woman ambassador, Manizha Bakhtari, and director and producer Natalie Halla about her 2025 <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt35598071/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">documentary</a>, <em>The Last Ambassador</em>. The film follows Bakhtari’s decision to keep Afghanistan’s embassy in Vienna, Austria, open after the Taliban return to power, even as the Afghan state’s institutions collapse and formal diplomatic support evaporates. Across the conversation, Aramburú, Bakhtari and Halla link diplomacy in exile to Afghan women’s lived reality under Taliban rule, and to the question many outsiders avoid: What does meaningful solidarity look like when girls are barred from school and women are pushed out of public life?</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">An embassy left in limbo</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Aramburú opens by asking how the Afghan embassy in Vienna reached a point of financial and logistical isolation. Bakhtari situates the break not as a single moment but as a process that accelerates into rupture in August 2021. After the withdrawal of US and NATO forces, the Afghan government collapsed quickly. Bakhtari describes “the complete institutional disappearance of a state overnight,” where ministries stopped functioning, parliament broke down and the banking system collapsed. For embassies abroad, the consequences were immediate. Vienna lost salaries, operational funding and the basic infrastructure that normally keeps a mission alive.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Bakhtari also draws a line the embassy refuses to cross. She does not recognize the Taliban, arguing it is impossible to work with a regime that excludes women from education and public life. Yet she also insists the embassy’s obligations to citizens do not vanish with the government. The Vienna mission became, in her telling, a moral outpost for human rights and a place to preserve a country’s dignity when its political voice was forcibly muted. She stays because she believes diplomacy must be accountable to people, not only to regimes. As she puts it, “diplomacy is not only about governments; it’s about people.”</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Making a film under threat</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Aramburú then turns to the documentary’s origins and the practical constraints of filming a story shaped by censorship, danger and funding shortages. Halla describes her first hurdle as persuading Bakhtari to participate. The ambassador was “exposed” and “fragile,” still holding office while being persecuted by the Taliban. Halla began with what she had, filming alone without financing, because she did not want to lose time. Only later did she bring on a Vienna production company, Golden Girls Filmproduktion & Filmservices, and expand the project’s capacity.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Halla spent four years completing the film, making it her longest project to date, with an especially complex edit. She constructed an 80-minute narrative from a “mosaic” of footage, including filmed material, family archives and documentation from Afghanistan gathered through other sources. She avoided traveling to Afghanistan during production, fearing that filming there would endanger local people and her team. Her core aim was to build a film that does more than inform. She wanted viewers to leave feeling personally implicated, saying audiences often walk out thinking, <em>“I cannot stay silent.”</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Gender apartheid and the collapse of justice</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>From filmmaking, Aramburú moves into the reality the film documents. Bakhtari describes women’s lives under Taliban rule as a coordinated system designed to erase them from society. Women and girls are banned from higher education, restricted from work, barred from public gatherings and denied basic freedoms of movement and participation. Compounding the crisis is the breakdown of constitutional order. Afghanistan is now the only country in the world ruled without a constitution or a functioning legal system. Democratic institutions are dismantled, and what remains serves the Taliban’s purposes rather than the public’s rights.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Aramburú asks about justice and the heightened risks women face, including sexual violence. Bakhtari answers that without functioning legal protections, women have no system to defend themselves. The violence is not incidental but structural, backed by those who hold coercive power. Bakhtari names that structure using the term “gender apartheid,” emphasizing that legal codification lags behind lived reality. Language is part of the struggle because naming the system clarifies accountability, and neutrality becomes complicity. “Silence is never neutral; silence always sides with power,” she says. As long as the world fails to act, the Taliban will continue to rule Afghanistan.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Resistance that stays local</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Aramburú asks what resistance looks like when public protest is met with imprisonment, torture and intimidation. Bakhtari stresses that Afghanistan’s situation is not easily comparable to other cases, including Iran, even when women’s aspirations converge. She argues that Afghan women do not need to be “rescued” through a Western lens. They need to be heard and supported in ways that respect local realities.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Bakhtari describes an early wave of street protests after the Taliban takeover that was violently suppressed. Over time, resistance shifted into quieter forms, which remain today. Women continue organizing through clandestine gatherings, social media and educational initiatives that operate outside formal public space. Internet access still exists for many, though not for all, given poverty and uneven infrastructure. Even so, networks form through pseudonymous online activity and decentralized support. As Bakhtari says, the fight is global, but resistance is local, shaped by what is possible under dictatorship.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Daughters Programme and what solidarity can become</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Aramburú closes by asking about “bright moments” and practical ways to help. Bakhtari describes the Daughters Programme, a small, decentralized, volunteer-led initiative. It supports school-age girls inside Afghanistan through a package that can include financial help, emotional support, mentorship and leadership guidance. The design is intentionally simple, minimizing administrative barriers so that individuals abroad can directly support one girl.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Both guests also reflect on the film’s reception. Halla says screenings across continents produce overwhelmingly positive responses, often well beyond the Afghan diaspora. Bakhtari notes some criticism of her chosen title, <em>The Last Ambassador</em>, but she insists it is symbolic. It marks a historical turn from a recent period with several women ambassadors to the present, where she is the only one still serving.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Looking ahead, Halla states that the film will continue to appear at festival screenings. She intends to travel to Berlin, Germany, for a Cinema for Peace nomination. It will be screened in London for diplomats linked to the “gender apartheid” campaign. She is also developing a new project on threats to the International Criminal Court.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>For Bakhtari, the central question remains urgent. Condemnation is easy; action is harder. <em>The Last Ambassador</em> and the Daughters Programme are her answer to what can be done now, even if the work is incremental. Planting seeds is a resistance effort.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
51Թ Contributing Editor Laura Pavon Aramburú speaks with Afghanistan’s last serving woman ambassador, Manizha Bakhtari, and director and producer Natalie Halla about her 2025 documentary, The Last Ambassador. The film follows Bakhtari’s decision to keep Afghanistan’s embassy in..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Live, Laura Pavón Aramburú, Natalie Halla and Manizha Bakhtari discuss The Last Ambassador, Halla’s 2025 documentary on keeping Afghanistan’s Vienna embassy open after the Taliban takeover. They describe the collapse of institutions, “gender apartheid” and injustice for Afghan women. The conversation highlights quiet resistance, diaspora solidarity and the Daughters Programme supporting Afghan girls’ education."
post-date="Apr 07, 2026"
post-title="FO Live: Afghanistan’s Last Woman Ambassador Defies Taliban Rule From Exile" slug-data="fo-live-afghanistans-last-woman-ambassador-defies-taliban-rule-from-exile">
FO Live: Afghanistan’s Last Woman Ambassador Defies Taliban Rule From Exile
Simon Cleobury"
post_date="April 06, 2026 06:30"
pUrl="/world-news/fo-talks-the-collapse-of-new-start-treaty-raises-global-nuclear-risks/" pid="161707"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Simon Cleobury, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, discuss the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and what its disappearance means for global nuclear stability. With the last major US–Russia arms control agreement gone, are the world’s nuclear guardrails disappearing? Singh and Cleobury examine how New START functioned, why it mattered and why rebuilding trust among nuclear powers will now be far more difficult. They also explore the roles of China, France and the United Kingdom in a shifting nuclear landscape shaped by geopolitical rivalry and declining cooperation.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What New START achieved</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Cleobury begins by explaining that New START placed limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads, missiles and launchers held by the United States and Russia. These “strategic” weapons are designed to target infrastructure and population centers, making them central to deterrence. By capping these arsenals, the treaty helped maintain balance and prevented either side from seeking overwhelming superiority.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Equally important were the treaty’s verification mechanisms. These included data exchanges, notifications, inspections and regular consultations. These measures are essential for reducing uncertainty. “It gave an element of predictability and certainty,” Cleobury explains; transparency lowered the risk of miscalculation. Without such mechanisms, each side must rely more heavily on assumptions about the other’s capabilities, increasing the chance of suspicion and escalation.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>The treaty’s structure also reflected practical constraints. Reducing nuclear arsenals takes time, technical effort and financial resources. The seven-year implementation period ensured neither side gained a temporary advantage while reductions were underway. This gradual process reinforced stability and maintained deterrence while cuts were completed.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A world without constraints</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>With New START’s expiration, those formal limits are gone. Cleobury cautions that this does not automatically trigger an arms race. Building new nuclear capabilities requires time and investment. Yet the psychological shift may be more consequential than immediate force expansion. “The guardrails are off,” he warns, noting that uncertainty can alter planning even before weapons numbers change.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Without inspections or data exchanges, military planners may assume the worst. If leaders believe the other side is secretly expanding its arsenal, they may respond by strengthening their own. This dynamic creates a classic security dilemma. Even absent hostile intent, fear and suspicion can drive competitive buildup.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh places this development in the context of today’s geopolitical tensions, highlighting the Russia–Ukraine war and conflict in the Middle East. Cleobury agrees that the current environment differs sharply from the one in which New START was negotiated. Trust between Washington and Moscow has deteriorated, making future agreements more difficult to achieve.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Trust collapse and negotiation barriers</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Both sides now question the reliability of the other. In Washington, Russia is widely viewed as an aggressive power that violated international norms in Ukraine. In Moscow, US military support for Kyiv fuels suspicion that Washington is engaged in a proxy conflict. This mutual distrust complicates arms control discussions that once proceeded despite broader disagreements.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Cleobury notes that US policymakers also seek a broader agreement covering tactical nuclear weapons and emerging technologies, such as hypersonic missiles. In addition, Washington wants China included in any future arrangement. These expanded goals increase complexity and reduce the likelihood of quick progress.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Despite these obstacles, leadership at the highest level could still make a difference. Cleobury argues that political will is essential, especially from US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. “If any progress is to be made here, then Putin and Trump are absolutely key,” he says, pointing to the importance of top-level engagement in nuclear decision-making.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">China, France and a changing nuclear landscape</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>China’s role further complicates the picture. Beijing maintains that its arsenal is far smaller than those of the US and Russia and therefore sees bilateral reductions between the two superpowers as the priority. China also lacks the long tradition of arms control negotiations that shaped Cold War diplomacy, making engagement more challenging.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Meanwhile, France’s recent signals about increasing its nuclear stockpile and reducing transparency add another layer of complexity. Such moves reinforce perceptions of competition among nuclear powers and strengthen calls for broader multilateral discussions. Yet expanding negotiations to include multiple states makes agreement harder to reach.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Cleobury suggests that a leaders summit of the five nuclear-armed permanent members of the UN Security Council could help restart dialogue. Even limited discussions on transparency or risk reduction might rebuild some confidence. He emphasizes that arms control can function not only as a reward for improved relations, but also as a tool to reduce tensions.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:heading -->
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">An uncertain future for arms control</h2>
<!-- /wp:heading --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Singh and Cleobury conclude that the world is entering a period with fewer formal constraints on nuclear competition. The absence of New START removes a key mechanism for managing rivalry between the largest nuclear powers. Replacing it will require political leadership, renewed trust and willingness to engage despite ongoing conflicts.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>Cleobury warns that without such efforts, the world may face a prolonged gap in arms control agreements. “Without that political direction … we’re in for quite a long period without any arms control agreements,” he says.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>While the risks are growing, dialogue remains possible if leaders choose to pursue it.</p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
<!-- /wp:paragraph -->"
post-content-short="
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Simon Cleobury, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, discuss the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and what its disappearance means for global nuclear stability. With the last major US–Russia..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Simon Cleobury examine what the expiration of the New START Treaty means for global nuclear stability. Its value lies in verification, transparency and predictability, which reduced US–Russian mistrust. Without them, arms control will be harder to rebuild, especially with ongoing wars and pressure to include China in any new framework."
post-date="Apr 06, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: The Collapse of New START Treaty Raises Global Nuclear Risks" slug-data="fo-talks-the-collapse-of-new-start-treaty-raises-global-nuclear-risks">
FO Talks: The Collapse of New START Treaty Raises Global Nuclear Risks
Peter Isackson"
post_date="April 05, 2026 06:54"
pUrl="/world-news/us-news/fo-talks-the-epstein-files-redactions-and-the-deep-state-question/" pid="161691"
post-content="<!-- wp:paragraph -->
<p>51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with 51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson about the political and structural implications of the newly released Jeffrey Epstein files. With millions of pages of documents now public and millions more still pending, the scandal has reignited scrutiny of figures across the political spectrum. Their conversation moves beyond individual allegations to examine elite networks, media hesitation and what the unfolding revelations could mean for US President Donald Trump and the approaching midterm elections.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A mountain of evidence, a moving target</h2>
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<p>Rohan opens with the scale of the release. Roughly 3.5 million pages have been made public, with an estimated three million more still to come. The files include emails sent to more than 1,000 individuals, images, video material and victim testimonies provided to the FBI. Independent media outlets are combing through the material daily.</p>
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<p>Peter cautions that the story is far from settled. “We know more and more every day,” he says, emphasizing that the volume of material makes reaching definitive conclusions difficult. The disclosures are less a single revelation than an evolving mosaic. As he describes it, observers are assembling a “jigsaw puzzle,” starting with the frame before gradually filling in the center. The real significance may lie in the structural patterns emerging from the whole.</p>
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<p>The files were released under the Epstein Files Transparency Act, which Trump signed after bipartisan pressure from US Representatives Thomas Massie and Ro Khanna. The law permits limited redactions, but only in narrowly defined circumstances. Yet many names and details remain obscured, fueling suspicion that something larger is being protected.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Trump, transparency and political blowback</h2>
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<p>Rohan presses Peter on Trump’s role. During his 2024 campaign, Trump promised transparency on unresolved national controversies, including the infamous assassination of US President John F. Kennedy and the Epstein trafficking case. Peter argues that this pledge helped consolidate Trump’s image as a leader willing to challenge entrenched power structures.</p>
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<p>But the release has placed Trump in a precarious position. In a now-notorious cabinet meeting exchange, Trump reportedly dismissed the files as “old business,” angering parts of his own electorate. The very transparency he championed has generated political turbulence.</p>
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<p>Peter suggests Trump miscalculated. By aligning himself with disclosure, he raised expectations he could not fully control. Now that millions of pages are public with more pending, the administration faces an unpredictable political environment in which allegations touch figures across party lines, including both Trump and former US President Bill Clinton.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A club of the compromised</h2>
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<p>Moving beyond partisan politics, Peter adopts what he calls a sociological lens. Drawing on analyst Simon Dixon’s framework, he proposes that the Epstein network reflects not a simple blackmail ring but a broader culture of elite mutual compromise.</p>
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<p>In his formulation, influence operates through belonging to an exclusive circle. “To get into the club, you have to be compromised,” Peter explains. Rather than classic blackmail, the logic is reciprocal vulnerability. The more compromised individuals are, the more securely they are bound into a system of shared silence and protection.</p>
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<p>He likens it to organized crime structures in which mutual exposure ensures loyalty. Within such a system, power is distributed across finance, politics, intelligence and business, with occasional sacrifices when exposure becomes too costly. Whether or not one accepts the full thesis, the files appear to expose dense interconnections among influential actors across sectors and continents.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Media silence and editorial risk</h2>
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<p>Rohan highlights a striking disparity in coverage. British outlets such as <em>The Guardian</em> and the BBC prominently feature the story, while major US newspapers appear comparatively restrained. In India and parts of East Asia, coverage is also limited.</p>
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<p>Peter attributes this to institutional caution. Large outlets operate within established editorial frameworks and may hesitate to amplify allegations that could disrupt long-standing narratives or implicate powerful interests. The sheer scale of the data also poses practical challenges: responsible verification takes time.</p>
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<p>He describes mainstream media as “diffident” and at times “cowardly,” suggesting that some organizations may hope public attention fades before deeper scrutiny becomes unavoidable. Independent platforms, less constrained by legacy structures, have moved more aggressively.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Atomized America and the midterm test</h2>
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<p>Why, Rohan asks, are Americans not protesting en masse if the files implicate their political class? Peter offers a bleak assessment of civic cohesion: “There is no ordinary American.” He describes a society fragmented into individualized identities. In his view, cultural and ideological shifts have weakened the capacity for unified moral movements.</p>
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<p>As for Trump’s future, Peter is cautious but skeptical. Impeachment appears unlikely, given bipartisan embarrassment and prior failed attempts. However, he predicts political damage. “Most people think he will be humiliated in the midterms,” he says, though what that humiliation would mean in practice remains uncertain.</p>
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<p>With both major parties potentially implicated and media institutions hesitant, the Epstein saga may continue to unfold primarily through independent journalism and social media. The files, Peter suggests, are a mirror held up to the structure of power — and the reflection is still coming into focus.</p>
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<p><em>[<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/leethompsonkolar/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener nofollow">Lee Thompson-Kolar</a> edited this piece.]</em></p>
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<p><strong>The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.</strong></p>
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post-content-short="
51Թ’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with 51Թ’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson about the political and structural implications of the newly released Jeffrey Epstein files. With millions of pages of documents now public and millions more still pending, the..."
post_summery="In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Peter Isackson examine the political and structural implications of the newly released Jeffrey Epstein files. They explored elite compromise, media hesitation and US President Donald Trump’s electoral vulnerability. As millions of documents surface, the scandal exposes deeper questions about how power, protection and public trust operate in the United States."
post-date="Apr 05, 2026"
post-title="FO Talks: The Epstein Files, Redactions and the Deep State Question" slug-data="fo-talks-the-epstein-files-redactions-and-the-deep-state-question">
FO Talks: The Epstein Files, Redactions and the Deep State Question
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