51吃瓜

Mediation between great powers is not something a country stumbles into. It requires a specific combination of access, credibility and restraint that is delicate and takes years to build. Pakistan built that combination without anyone in the international community noticing until the moment it mattered.

The US鈥揑ran war disrupted roughly a fifth of the world鈥檚 oil supplies and killed more than 2,000 people in Iran within five weeks. When the war began on February 28, 2026, Pakistan was not on anyone鈥檚 shortlist of likely peacemakers. Amid rising oil prices, it was facing a near-bankrupt economy and imposed sweeping austerity measures such as school closures and a four-day workweek to energy.

Its economic and political landscape was fragile, yet when Washington and Tehran needed a channel they could both trust, Pakistan was the one that answered. Understanding why Pakistan emerged as the key mediator in the US鈥揑ran war requires looking at what Pakistan actually is, not what the foreign policy commentary has typically assumed it to be.

A structural position nobody else held

Located near significant global powers like India, China, the Gulf States and Iran, Pakistan鈥檚 geography is a strategic advantage. Despite being an American partner in the region, it hosts no US military bases and avoided being by Iran during the conflict. That fact was diplomatically decisive as Iran needed a venue and an interlocutor that did not carry the stain of American military infrastructure on its soil. The absence of US bases in Pakistan provided Islamabad 鈥� the capital city of Pakistan 鈥� with in Iranian eyes, while its designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United States since 2004 kept it trusted in Washington.

Additionally, Pakistan鈥檚 relationship with the largest religious sects in Islam is structurally important. Despite Pakistan鈥檚 population being majority Sunni, they have the second-largest Shia Muslim population in the world after Iran. This provided Pakistan with a sectarian adjacency to Tehran that most Muslim states cannot emulate.

This proximity was shown in the nationwide protests at the start of the war following the assassination of Iran鈥檚 Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The civilian-led protests resulted in 22 in Pakistan, including 10 outside the US Consulate in Karachi, as security forces fired at the crowd. Pakistan has powerful domestic reasons to want the war to end, and that motivation made it a more credible mediator.

A prolonged US鈥揑ran war is likely to further destabilize Pakistan鈥檚 economy and domestic security environment; Pakistan had to utilize its geographic and theological proximity to broker peace for its own relief. Iran and the US accepted Pakistan in this role because the traditional alternatives were unsuitable. Iran would not accept India as it is diplomatically proximate to Israel. T眉rkiye and Egypt lacked the strategic religious alignment Pakistan enjoyed. China was not an ideal due to its competitive involvement with the US. Lastly, Gulf countries, especially Qatar, had their regional alignment held against them.

Building the relationship with Washington

The personal rapport between Pakistan and US President Donald Trump did not materialize out of nowhere. Pakistan formally nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize following the May 2025 India鈥揚akistan ceasefire. Trump publicly claimed credit for brokering the deal, and Pakistan acknowledged that claim while India rejected it. That sequence of events gave Pakistan legitimacy in the eyes of the US, accrediting its role as a rising geopolitical power.

In June 2025, Trump himself Pakistan鈥檚 ties with Iran, stating that Pakistanis 鈥渒now Iran very well,鈥� after hosting Pakistan鈥檚 military chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, for an unprecedented lunch. Trump made the operational assessment that Pakistan鈥檚 knowledge of Iran was the asset Washington needed.

In early April 2026, Trump posted on social media that 鈥渁 whole civilization will die tonight.鈥� This ultimatum sparked panic as the US President wagered the lives of many for the Iranian government to submit to his terms and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. His post came after rejecting a ceasefire proposal from Pakistan鈥檚 diplomats, and the threat of collective punishment concerned the official mediators.

A day before Trump鈥檚 ultimatum deadline to Iran expired, Munir personally made 鈥渁 flurry of calls鈥� to US leaders. On the night of April 7, Trump announced on Truth Social that he had agreed to a two-week ceasefire based on those conversations. Pakistan鈥檚 Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Munir had requested that the US 鈥渉old off the destructive force鈥� that he warned of in his post. At that time, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed the ceasefire, thanking both men for their 鈥渢ireless efforts.鈥�

What mediation actually looked like

The Islamabad Talks of April 11鈥�12, 2026, marked the highest level of direct engagement between Washington and Tehran since 1979. They ended without a final agreement. What followed was weeks of sustained, unglamorous shuttle diplomacy that received little coverage. Immediately after the first round of talks, Sharif flew to the capital cities of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and T眉rkiye while Munir three days in Tehran mediating with Iranian leadership.

That division of labor is worth noting, and mediation between the US and Iran was not a single man鈥檚 achievement. Analysts cautioned against overstating the personal dimension, noting the talks were the result of 鈥渋nstitutional alignment鈥� between the country鈥檚 civil and military leadership. They also note the sustained engagement with Washington over the past year has significantly contributed to institutionalizing power in Pakistan.

The process eventually produced an agreement in June 2026. Sharif told the National Assembly that Munir 鈥渨as awake all day and night鈥� throughout the negotiations, and that without his persistence, 鈥渢he dream of peace鈥� would not have survived.

An honest assessment

Islamabad was meant to mediate and facilitate between world powers. Severe distrust remains between the parties, and negotiations are contingent upon sensitive regional flashpoints like Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz. 

Domestic costs to Pakistan during this war are rarely featured in media coverage as well. The country relies on Gulf states for more than 85% of its oil and liquefied natural gas supplies. Playing mediator between Iran and those same Gulf states was not a cost-free exercise. Pakistan absorbed domestic protest, sectarian tension, economic strain and diplomatic risk simultaneously.

What the record shows is a country that converted a specific, narrow structural position into a sustained diplomatic effort under genuine pressure. Pakistan鈥檚 is thought to become a lasting component of the emerging regional order. Whether that proves true depends on what Pakistan does next, but Islamabad earned the biggest achievement of June 2026 鈥� securing a signed agreement between Washington and Tehran after more than 100 days of war.

[Aliyah A. Omar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.