What is the Backstory of Western Sahara?

Western Sahara is a stretch of desert territory along the Atlantic coast. It borders Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. From 1884 to 1976, Spain was the colonial ruler of Western Sahara, which was then known as Spanish Sahara. During the great wave of decolonization in the second half of the 20th century, the —a Sahrawi nationalist liberation movement—waged guerrilla war against Spain.

Following the campaign of pressure that the UN, Morocco, and the Polisario Front launched against Spain in the late 1960s Madrid to consider withdrawing from the region, given that it no longer anticipated a future in the area. Subsequently, in 1974, Spain signaled its withdrawal by plans for a referendum in which the Sahrawi people could determine the future of the territory, whether to be a part of Morocco or Mauritania or to obtain their independence. Morocco and Mauritania welcomed Spain’s decision. However, the UNSG Resolution 3292 suspending the referendum until a formal process for this could be determined. 

On October 16, 1975, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague that while there were legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and certain tribes in Western Sahara during the time of Spanish colonization, and there were rights connecting the Mauritanian entity to the territory of Western Sahara, there was no evidence of a territorial sovereignty link between the territory of Western Sahara and either the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. In response to the ruling, in 1975 King Hassan II of Morocco  for a peaceful mass demonstration in the form of a march into Western Sahara. The King sought to reaffirm Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the territory and called upon the Moroccan people to participate in the march. He emphasized that the march was the only way to regain control of Western Sahara.

Western Sahara is important for Morocco not only for sovereignty reasons but also for economic ones. It is rich in , a valuable fertilizer that secures the world’s food supply. This mineral is Morocco’s third largest export and brought the country $850 million in 2021. As a region along the Atlantic coast, Western Sahara is important for fishing, providing 75% of Morocco’s catches. Clearly, this region is of paramount to Rabat.

What Is Going on Now with Spain, Morocco and Algeria?

Therefore, Moroccan-Spanish ties turned when Spain admitted Polisario leader Brahim Ghali in April 2021 for medical treatment without officially telling Rabat. In 2022, Madrid agreed to support Rabat’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara, ending a year-long diplomatic crisis.

Spain’s change in policy has with Morocco after a year-long diplomatic spat. However, this move has infuriated Algeria, which an economic blockade on Spain in June 2022. This resulted in significant losses estimated at around $1 billion (€930 million) in the following seven months alone. Spanish Secretary of State for Trade Xiana Méndez Bértolo recently that, between June and November 2022, Spain’s exports were a mere $189.1 million (€176.2 million) to Algeria. In December 2022, Spanish exports to Algeria amounted to $11.81 million (€10.8 million), a fall of 84%. Spain’s position as an exporter to Algeria fell from second in 2021 to ninth in 2022.

This has hurt Spanish companies and businesses exporting to Algeria, especially in Valencia and Catalonia. These regions account for over 50% of to Algeria. In terms of sectors, enamelers and ceramic machinery manufacturers are facing significant negative impacts.The economic pain of this blockade has led the Spanish Ministry of Trade to the support of the European Commission. It has come up with a financial plan to support Spanish companies suffering from the blockade. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell to Algeria in March to resolve this crisis but the visit was .

Algeria Is Still Supplying Gas to Spain

Spain depends on Algeria for gas. Therefore, it is important for Madrid to maintain good relations with Algiers. Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune commented that “among all the Algerian statements, what matters to the Spanish state is the full guarantee of Spain’s supply of Algerian gas and the strict respect of the international contracts.” Algeria has assured Spain that it will continue to supply gas under any circumstances.

Spain gets much of its gas through the Medgaz pipeline from Algeria. According to Spanish reports, Madrid has recently turned to the US for gas. Many analysts speculate that Spain might be moving away from Algerian gas. Hence, Algeria decided not to escalate matters with Spain when it comes to supply of gas. Losing a lucrative export market would not be in Algerian economic interest.

Tensions between Spain and Algeria have occurred in the past but the two countries have always been able to achieve an accommodation. This time, things are different. Spain’s change of policy has touched a raw nerve and only a change in government might lead to the calming of the waters.

Algeria Strengthens Ties with Other Countries

As Spanish exports to Algeria have crashed, other countries such as Portugal and Italy have stepped in. In 2021, Portugal exports to Algeria totaled $241 million. The main products were uncoated paper, heating machinery, and acrylic hydrocarbons. Between February 2022 and February 2023, Portugal’s exports have increased by $384.6 million. The top exports to Algeria in February 2023 were vegetables, wood pulp, paper products, plastics and plastic goods, machinery, mechanical appliances and parts. 

Before the rupture in relations, Algeria preferred Spanish products. Sociedad Española Automóviles de Turismo (SEAT), a Spanish car manufacturer was active in Algeria. In 2018, SEAT strategic operations in Algeria. Now, Italian car company FIAT seems to be replacing SEAT. In March 2023, six carlines were launched in Algeria. In contrast, SEAT’s growth has suffered.

Italy and Algeria have good neighborly agreements. They are now deepening their strategic partnership. In January 2023, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni Algeria to launch her new Mediterranean policy in Algiers. It is well known that Italy wants to become an energy hub between Europe and the southern Mediterranean. The Russia-Ukraine War is causing an energy crisis in Europe, which is looking for alternative sources. This offers a great economic opportunity for both Italy and Algeria.

Both countries also signed  agreements relating to aerospace and pharmaceutical sectors. These agreements were not only about economics but also geopolitics. Italy sees Algeria as a vital actor in the Mediterranean region that can underpin regional stability. Algeria’s neighbors are facing turmoil. Libya is going through a civil war. Al Jazeera has Tunisia a “ticking time bomb.” The unsettled situation in North Africa makes Algeria critically important not only for Italy but also the European Union.

Is Morocco a Springboard for Spain Into Africa?

Spain has a growing interest in the Moroccan market. In 2022, Spanish exports to Morocco amounted to $12.9 billion (€11.748 billion) while Moroccan imports to Spain were $9.4 million (€8.6 million). Morocco lies just across the Strait of Gibraltar to the south of Spain. It is Spain’s closest neighbor in North Africa. Morocco is a natural trading partner where demand for Spanish goods and services is growing. Therefore, it makes sense for Spain to invest in closer relations with its southern neighbor.

Spanish President Pedro Sánchez Morocco in February. The two governments reached agreements on migration, tourism, trade and investment. Just as Italy is developing a strategic relationship with Algeria, Spain is betting on Morocco. Spanish companies are looking to expand in North Africa. Morocco could be a good base of operations for Spain. Given the fact that Spain’s relations with Algeria have taken a hit and other European rivals are stepping in, it makes sense for Madrid to cultivate Rabat. A closer relationship with Morocco makes both economic and geopolitical sense for Spain.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The US-brokered agreement goes beyond a simple quid pro quo for Trump’s Arab peace deals. It represents a US investment in a North African security partner that is key to Washington’s conception of great power competition. Trump’s decision pulls Morocco closer to the US and the European Union. It also brings Rabat closer to the United Arab Emirates’ spheres of geopolitical influence in Africa and the wider Arab world. At the same time, the decision gives the EU cover to further align with Morocco.

Yet Trump’s gift to Morocco could have unintended consequences. Algeria might deepen its relationship with Russia and China, increasing their presence in the Maghreb region. The Biden administration is scrutinizing past deals signed by the previous president, and the decision pertaining to Morocco might come up for reconsideration. 

Not All Quiet on the Western Sahara Front

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The Moroccan kingdom conceives of its neighborhood’s stability in terms of a strong grip on Western Sahara, the continued development of the southern territory’s resources, and limited terrorist threats in and around its porous Saharan borders. In late November 2020, the US committed to $3 billion in Morocco — through the Development Finance Corporation — and designated the country as a regional hub for its Prosper Africa trade and investment program. A month later, the US committed to four sky guardian drones to Morocco, which expands its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity. By acknowledging Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, allotting Morocco more development funding and providing increased ISR, the US bolsters neighborhood stability as seen by King Mohammed VI.

In turn, increased stability for Morocco may reverberate across its littoral Sahara — a vacuum for terrorists and a potential target of Russian . New US development initiatives could amplify previous Moroccan actions in the region, such as the delivery of COVID-19 aid packages to Mauritania and Burkina Faso in . New ISR capacity will also see the increased interdiction of traffickers and terrorists, whose roles progressively overlap. These actions will not decisively change the nature of conflict plaguing the Sahel region, located just south of the Sahara Desert. But even marginal gains for Moroccan stability would decrease power vacuums for Russia to exploit with the , a private military company Moscow uses to surreptitiously advance its foreign policy.

Europe and the Gulf

Trump’s decision also provides political cover for the EU to overcome obstacles in its relationship with Morocco, which retains advanced status under the union’s . The Brussels-Rabat relationship is fraught with disputes over whether goods from Western Sahara should come under the jurisdiction of the EU-Morocco free trade agreement. Rulings in  by the European Court of Justice decreed that EU-Morocco trade and fishing agreements would only remain valid if they excluded goods originating from Western Sahara, contradicting the Moroccan autonomy plan for the territory.

Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty gives political cover to European states, including France, that lean toward the autonomy plan. European judicial decisions do not derive from US decrees, but if key EU member states were to change their stance on Western Sahara, the legal basis of the earlier court rulings could also differ. If so, like the US, the European Union would find itself pulled closer to Morocco, portending new initiatives that align with the European interest of Morocco as a stability exporter.

In the Gulf, Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty pushes Rabat and Abu Dhabi closer into alignment. This would continue their rapprochement after previous tensions, which stemmed from Morocco’s refusal to back the Saudi-Emirati-led blockade of Qatar between 2017 and 2021. To punish Morocco for its neutrality, in 2018, the UAE and Saudi Arabia voted against Morocco’s bid to host the 2026 FIFA World Cup. The states also recalled each other’s .

In October 2020, however, the UAE opened a consulate in Western Sahara’s , which at that time was not recognized as Moroccan territory by the US. This was an important symbolic gesture, given that the UAE was the first Arab state to do so. UAE actions that favor Morocco come amidst deteriorating Emirati-Algerian relations, as Abu Dhabi is unhappy with Algeria’s alleged support of Turkey or, to the UAE, “anti-Emirati lobbies in the region.” That the UAE is strengthening ties with Morocco while Saudi Arabia makes no such overtures could foreshadow Emirati attempts at constructing a new, intra-Sunni coalition.

Russia and China

US rivals have adopted less amenable stances. Russia has already Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The US decision, consequently, gives Russia and China an excuse to increase security and economic cooperation with the Algerians. As the most strident supporter of the Polisario Front — an armed group demanding independence for Western Sahara — Algeria is upset about the diplomatic win Morocco secured in the US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty.

To balance Rabat’s victory, Algiers could invite in Russian troops under the guise of counterterrorism operations to the Sahel. Algeria is one of Russia’s largest and China has already committed billions to in the east of the country. In light of the US move, both of these relationships could further develop.

Increased Russian and Chinese activity in Algeria would also diminish advances made in terms of Moroccan stability in the Sahel. Russia expanding its North African power projection and China increasing its investments in natural resources would balance Moroccan actions that close power vacuums to the Wagner Group. Unforeseen by Trump, Russia can also cite the US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara as justification for its annexation in 2014 of Crimea, which is officially part of Ukraine. The US may have improved ties with Morocco but, in doing so, pushed Algeria, another North African behemoth, firmly into a sphere of Russian and Chinese influence and provided Russia justification for its illegal invasions.

The New US Administration

The Biden administration has already stated its support of the Abraham Accords, a term used for the peace deals Israel signed with the UAE and Bahrain in 2020. In response to a question concerning US recognition of Western Sahara, however, Secretary of State Antony Blinken , “We’re also trying to make sure that we have a full understanding of any commitments that may have been made in securing those agreements.”

On January 27, 2021, US President Joe Biden the Trump-era F-35 sale to the UAE, pending review. Many considered the F-35 sale as a carrot Trump offered to the UAE. The freeze does not necessitate the reversal of the sale, but it indicates Biden’s resolve to scrutinize the quid pro quos that accompany the Abraham Accords. Once the US reaches “a full understanding of any commitments,” it will either continue or withdraw recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

If the Biden administration continues recognition of Western Sahara, Blinken would most likely work through an international framework at the United Nations to achieve increased support for Washington’s unilateral decision, as the US is the only state to recognize full Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. If EU states lean toward the Moroccan autonomy plan, the Biden administration will find some find needed political cover.

At the same time, Russia and China would continue their support for Algeria, and Morocco would export its version of stability across North Africa. Rabat would also continue its recognition of Israel. Malignant non-state actors, however, could use the endurance of the US decision to galvanize violent actions from some Polisario fighters, creating another opening for terrorist groups. Maintenance of the decision also comes at the expense of true self-determination for the Saharawi people in Western Sahara.

The US can also withdraw recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This action would see the White House realign with the UN-sponsored peace process and international law. Potentially, a US return to non-recognition would invigorate efforts toward a true autonomy plan. In this case, Morocco would withdraw its recognition of Israel and US relations with Morocco would cool. Although the US and Morocco would remain important partners, the Moroccans would feel betrayed by this decision and potentially align closer with Russia and China to castigate the Americans. The Polisario, moreover, would also find a renewed chance at some form of self-determination.

Regardless of the Biden administration’s actions, Trump blatantly circumvented a UN-sponsored peace process and gave Morocco a carte blanche to implement its autonomy plan. New US-Moroccan collaboration could see Morocco push Sahelian stability that benefits the US position in great power competition by closing power vacuums to Russian interests. Trump’s thirst for diplomatic wins, however, caused his administration to view Western Sahara through a transactional lens, obfuscating a legitimate international solution and potentially inviting new Russian and Chinese activity in North Africa.

*[51łÔąĎ is a media partner of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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When this author spoke to Ambassador David Welch, who served as the Assistant US Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2005-2008, about the situation between and the Polisario, the ambassador said: “…we [the US] didn’t think the most constructive way to address the status of the Western was by the piecemeal use of resolutions of one sort or another, to accomplish the goal of a movement [the Polisario] that we – laugh – we didn’t agree with, and with whose policies we had some difficulties.”

After further probing about what the disagreement with the Polisario – the Sahrawi leadership – involved, the ambassador stated that “we think the future of the Western Sahara lies within Morocco.” While the US still endorses the self-determination of the Sahrawis, that endorsement really includes anything short of independence. However, this has not always been the case. As Congressman Edward R. Royce in a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2007: “Once, the UN and US position was, frankly, to back a free and fair referendum on independence. Our position is now to back an autonomy plan.” This shift in the US position appears to coincide with a major effort by Morocco. The most significant impact can be seen in the push by some members of the US Congress to not only undermine the procedural component of self-determination – a referendum resulting in independence, autonomy or integration – but also to take the step of  further alienating the Polisario.

Former Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart, for example, before retiring from Congress in 2011, the Polisario’s ambition as one aimed at setting up a “fake, illusory microstate that is financed by and propped up by Castro.” After retiring from Congress, Balart maintained his relationship with Moroccan lobbyists and has set up his own lobbying firm called Western Hemisphere Strategies. The firm was hired by a Moroccan NGO called the Moroccan American Cultural Center, which has circulated aimed at connecting the Polisario with Cuba and – a claim Balart has endorsed.

By successfully spreading the image of ties between the Polisario, Cuba and al-Qaeda, Morocco is able to leverage those alleged ties to its advantage. It can portray itself as fighting terrorists, and this has resulted in the wavering regarding the expansion of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara () mandate to include the observance of the human rights situation. The mandate of the mission, which was established in 1991, was extended in April 2014 for another year, but despite the Polisario’s efforts a human rights monitoring mechanism was not included in the mission’s mandate. MINURSO remains one of only two UN peacekeeping operations in the world without a human rights monitoring mechanism.

At present, there is no United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution calling the Moroccan presence in the Western Sahara illegal and demanding a withdrawal. The closest to such a measure, UNSC resolution , was passed on November 6, 1975, the day the Green March into the Western Sahara occurred – the resolution called on the Moroccan king to withdraw all participants from the march, which saw approximately 350,000 Moroccans and 20,000 troops advance into the Western Sahara. On the Moroccan side, the aim of the march was to the territory colonized by . Subsequent resolutions and agreements have emphasized the rights of the Sahrawis to self-determination and the need for holding a referendum, with the substantive issues not explicitly addressed.

Third Party Investments In The Status Quo

One of the means at the disposal of the occupier to continue the occupation is by having other states invest in the status quo. When this author asked about the implications of having US hydro carbon exploration companies operate off the shore of the Western Sahara, Ambassador Welch stated: “I think that Rabat would consider that Moroccan territory […and] those companies that are operating there, I presume have accommodated themselves to that.” The ambassador further explained that foreign investments in the Sahara could benefit the Sahrawis. From the outset, some third party states were willing to invest in the Sahara’s resources while under Moroccan control.

When Spain decided to cede the Sahara to Morocco, for example, it did so in exchange for fishery rights and shares in the phosphate mining industry in the Western Sahara. These shares were by the Spanish state. The phosphate mine Spain owned shares in is Bou-Craa, the largest in the Western Sahara.  owned 35% of the industry’s shares. This situation is comparable to the Australian position regarding their exploitation of oil resources in the East Timor gap, which was mentioned above.

The limits of self-determination within the colonial context depend on the success of the occupying power in legitimating the occupation, getting other states to invest in the status quo and quelling the people’s effective control over the territory through the use of force.

With the absence of a UN Security Council resolution calling for divestment from the Sahara, private companies have teetered. , a US based energy company, has engaged in offshore oil exploration since 2001, but decided in 2005 to not renew its contract for drilling and exploring rights due to the piling on the corporation. In the meantime, Kosmos Energy, another American oil and gas exploration , has picked up where Kerr-McGee left off.

Use Of Force

Another means at the disposal of the occupier to maintain the status quo is the use of force. In addition to making it difficult for the Polisario fighters to cross the , Omeima Abdeslam, the Polisario representative to the UN and Switzerland, kept mentioning the overwhelming and disproportionate use of measures by the Moroccans to maintain control of the territory. She expressed her frustration with the Moroccan success in presenting itself as a fighter against terrorism, and explained that in reality Morocco is more of a police state. In her words: “they created this image of themselves as this perfect democracy in North Africa which is not true. I invite you Abdulaziz, you can go to Morocco and you can see for yourself how the Moroccans are suffering from their own policies, from their own “mekhzan” – “mekhzan” is some kind of very archaic way of security who has in its lines more than two million people who are paid just to supervise and to see and to maintain the situation which is not good for neither the Moroccans or the Sahrawis.”

This secret police , sometimes in plain clothes, tried to break up peaceful protests by the Sahrawis in the past. As for Morocco’s own campaign to gain the favor of the Sahrawis in order to have their pursuit of independence wane, Abdeslam explained that the Moroccan state has “… tried to buy Sahrawi loyalty from all over the world. They have tried – that’s why there are some divisions within the Polisario Front, [some Sahrawis] have gone back to Morocco [for] the money. Morocco has resources and they use it to buy whatever they find in their way.”

Still, she maintained that the referendum should be pursued, and that those who have defected and acquiesced to Moroccan incentives would join in the move for independence.

The limits of self-determination within the colonial context depend on the success of the occupying power in legitimating the occupation, getting other states to invest in the status quo and quelling the people’s effective control over the territory through the use of force. Morocco’s occupation of the territory appears to have succeeded, and the prospects for Sahrawis to include independence as an option on the referendum look dim. What this leaves the Polisario with is either latching on to the formalism of self-determination, and insisting “independence” be included as an option on the referendum; or they could leverage the Morocco Initiative and gain autonomy in the Western Sahara.

Autonomy means more self-government for the Sahrawis short of having the economic, political and legal decision-making authority a fully independent state would have. Given Morocco’s success in maintaining the occupation, with no visible signs of any change in the future, this author believes the Polisario should work with Morocco and pursue the autonomy of the Sahara.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.
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In November 2013, President Barack Obama met with Morocco’s King Mohammed VI in Washington for their first face-to-face meeting. The result was a bitter disappointment for supporters of human rights and international law.

Two days before the summit, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued  calling on the US president to tell the king that "US support for the reform process in Morocco depends on moving beyond rhetoric and making tangible change." Specifically, the human rights group called for "stronger legal protections for rights and an end to impunity for police who use violence and commit other abuses."

Instead, according to , Obama applauded the Moroccan monarch for "deepening democracy" and "promoting economic progress and human development."

Western Sahara: Denied Self-Determination

The most critical issue facing northwestern Africa involves Western Sahara, a sparsely populated country on the Atlantic coast that has been under Moroccan occupation since the kingdom invaded the former Spanish colony in 1975, just prior to its scheduled independence.

Defying a series of , , and international mediation efforts, the Moroccans have continued to deny the people of the territory their right of self-determination through a UN-sponsored referendum. No country recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over the territory, and more than 80 nations, as well as the African Union, have formally recognized Western Sahara as an independent state.

When the nationalist Polisario Front, which had been fighting for the occupied nation’s independence, agreed to end its armed struggle in 1991 in return for a referendum, the UN brought in a peacekeeping force known as MINURSO to enforce the ceasefire and oversee the scheduled plebiscite, which never came.

The United States and France, both of which hold veto power in the UN Security Council, blocked the United Nations from enforcing a series of resolutions demanding that Morocco provide the Western Saharan people an opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination.

MINURSO is the only UN peacekeeping operation in the world without a mandate to monitor the human rights situation in its areas of operation. And when Washington sponsored the UN Security Council resolution renewing MINURSO operations earlier this year, the  in the original draft that would have added such a mandate.

Repression in Western Sahara

While the human rights situation within Morocco itself has improved somewhat since King Mohammed came to power in 1999, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other reputable human rights groups have highlighted ongoing severe repression in the occupied Western Sahara.

Even the  acknowledges "limitations on the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association" and "the use of arbitrary and prolonged detention to quell dissent." Observing that support for self-determination is ruthlessly suppressed, the report goes on to note that security forces have "engaged in torture, beatings, and other mistreatment of detainees" with impunity.

Despite this, a  following the conclusion of the summit pledged that the United States and Morocco would "work together to continue to protect and promote human rights in the territory."

As an alternative to allowing the Western Saharan people to go forward with a referendum on the fate of their country, the Moroccans have proposed what they refer to as  that would cede limited local control of the region to the Western Saharans.

Unfortunately, not only are important matters such as control of Western Sahara’s natural resources and security rather ambiguous under the Moroccan proposal, all powers not specifically vested in the proposed autonomous region would remain with the king.

Furthermore, based on Morocco’s broken promises on the UN-mandated referendum and its related obligations from the ceasefire agreement 22 years ago, there is little to inspire confidence that Morocco would live up to its promises to provide genuine autonomy for Western Sahara.

More problematically, the proposal is based on the presumption that Western Sahara is part of Morocco, a contention that has long been rejected by the United Nations, the World Court, the African Union, and a broad consensus of international legal opinion.

Endorsing the Expansion of Territory by Military Force

To accept Morocco’s autonomy plan would mean that, for the first time since the founding of the United Nations and the ratification of the UN Charter more than 68 years ago, the international community would be endorsing the expansion of a country’s territory by military force, thereby establishing a very dangerous and destabilizing precedent.

If the Western Saharans accepted an autonomy agreement over independence as a result of a free and fair referendum, it would constitute a legitimate act of self-determination. However, Morocco has explicitly stated that its autonomy proposal "rules out, by definition, the possibility for the independence option to be submitted" to the people of Western Sahara, the vast majority of whom — according to knowledgeable international observers — favor outright independence.

Despite this,  announced that President Obama believes "Morocco’s autonomy plan is serious, realistic, and credible. It represents a potential approach that can satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity."

It appears, then, that the Obama’s administration’s policy on Western Sahara constitutes nothing less than a rejection of fundamental principles of international law that prohibit territorial expansion by force, thereby constituting a de facto acceptance of the right of conquest.

In the comparable case of East Timor, it was only after human rights organizations, church groups, and activists in the United States and abroad successfully pressured their governments to end their support for Indonesia’s occupation that the Indonesian regime was finally willing to offer a referendum to give the East Timorese their right to self-determination.

It may take a similar grassroots campaign to ensure that United States lives up to its international legal obligations and pressures Morocco to allow the people of Western Sahara their right to determine their own destiny.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy. 

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I recently returned from Dakhla, in the south of Morocco, where the sounds of the Atlantic Ocean reminded me that there is an undeniable link that is becoming increasingly stronger between Africa and the Americas. 

Earlier, in October, that was the theme of the , a joint project of the and the  that explores the growing vitality of commerce, diplomacy, and common interests in the environment, human development, and economic growth on both sides of the ocean.

Throughout my stay in Morocco, including most recently in Dakhla, the theme of the country's future in Africa was a recurring issue. South-south ties are highlighted, along with outreach to the US, as an alternative to Morocco’s traditional trading partners in Europe, which have experienced a decline in their interactions with Morocco. Dakhla, we were told, is Morocco’s “Door to Africa” — much as Tangier is Morocco’s “Door to Europe.”

Morocco’s Role in Regional Security

At a recent roundtable organized by the focusing on Morocco’s security relations in Africa and their intersection with US interests in the region, Dr. J. stated his belief that Morocco is sometimes taken for granted by US policy makers, despite, or perhaps because of, our long and valued ties.

He believes that in a region where the US does not have many reliable allies, it should do more to build a strong security relationship with Morocco. While the country has a very robust counterterrorism strategy, Pham noted that greater international cooperation will certainly expand the effectiveness of the region’s efforts to maintain security and promote stability.

Morocco and the US have held joint military exercises since 1999, and building these into a program of regional joint operations would contribute to the interoperability of forces in West and North Africa and the Sahel, and improve the professional behavior of militaries in participating countries. Pham pointed out that Algeria’s reluctance to include Morocco in regional counterterrorism coordination makes it necessary to have overlapping regional security agreements, which does not serve US interests for a broader, more effective approach to regional security.

Pham also strongly supports a holistic approach to security, which means enhancing stability by including programs that promote economic development, respect for minorities, enhanced rule of law, and better governance. At the core of the recommendations in his paper, later expanded on by the experts, is the view that the US has much to gain by broadening and deepening its security programs with Morocco as a regional player.

While some may argue that Algeria is the dominant counterterrorism player in the region, there is much to be said for comparing the effectiveness of Morocco’s “soft” power results over time to the overpowering use of the “hard” power security force by Algeria, which has largely resulted in displacing extremists from Algeria to its neighbors. It is logical to argue that the best of both may be the best option, if it were available. The inability of the two neighbors to face a common enemy weakens the region’s capacity for integrated security arrangements and exacerbates the weaknesses in combating extremism.

Despite the obstacles inherent in dealing with Morocco-Algeria tensions over the Western Sahara, and the ensuing competition for regional leadership, it was clear, from the consensus at the roundtable, that American and regional interests are not well served by the lack of robust military and security ties between Morocco and Algeria.

Knocking on the “Door to Africa”

Analyzing Morocco’s position on the African continent, , deputy director of the , made a strong case for the country's strategic pivot to the south, arguing that the decline of trade, investment, tourism, and remittances from the EU makes that shift an imperative. Another important point that may seem counterintuitive is that Morocco’s business outreach to the US has been limited, due to the lack of competitiveness and “fit” of Moroccan products with the US market.

With the prospects for North African regional economic integration at a stalemate due to the conflict in relations with Algeria, the Moroccan strategy to expand and deepen its economic ties to sub-Saharan Africa is sensible and can be immensely profitable. Malka’s recommendation is that the US work to enhance Morocco’s strategy to more deeply engage economically throughout Africa, beyond its traditional ties to Francophone Africa.

His basic concern is the need for Morocco to become more competitive in terms of its domestic economy, so that it can enhance its capacity to export manufacturing products to Africa. While Morocco has a strong base in financial, transportation, and IT services, it needs to greatly improve its manufacturing base if it is to succeed in the Africa marketplace.

Among his other recommendations is for the US to work with Morocco by re-allocating US funding through triangular aid programs that utilize Morocco’s expertise in Africa in delivering social, health, and community development projects. He also makes a strong recommendation that Morocco decouple its economic strategy from its Western Sahara policy, as some of the biggest markets in Africa do not agree with Morocco’s position on that issue.

While it is hard to imagine how Morocco could adopt this approach of “agreeing to disagree” with its southern neighbors that support the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), it is not an option to be ignored. There are benefits to all of the parties, not just Morocco, to move the Western Sahara to the side when exploring greater economic and commercial ties critical to their growth targets. Africa would benefit from more efficient markets for commodities, manufactured products, specialty goods, and services; otherwise, external players such as China and India will continue to dominate local economies and deprive the continent of sustainable advancements.

Increasing the Competitive Edge

The experts noted that Morocco already has a strong footprint in Africa and must focus on increasing its competitive edge, in order to expand existing market opportunities and open new ones. This is where business interests can subsume political concerns, in that the private sector has more freedom to operate below the political radar, and therefore, more flexibility and opportunities to promote ties across Africa.

This outcome of enabling accelerated business ties to contribute to regional stability can be a core strategy for US regional interests in stability, employment, and economic growth. And Morocco can be a catalyst in this regard.  

Africa’s rapidly growing consumer markets, the need for more efficient use of agricultural land, power generation requirements, and banking and financial services, all provide immense opportunities for Morocco in Africa. The basic requirement, at this point, is for Morocco to undertake a comprehensive analysis of where it has competitive advantages in the emerging African economy, and build a strategy to target and support its exports to those markets.

While Morocco does not compare with China, India, and even South Africa in terms of size of impact on African markets, it has the agility and private sector capabilities to carve out a prosperous and effective presence in Africa, serving its regional and national economic growth goals, and US interests for greater stability and development on the continent.

*[This article was published in collaboration with .]

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