One of the most consequential of these developments is the weakening of Iran’s regional leverage. Mounting economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and security challenges across several fronts have constrained Tehran’s ability to sustain influence through its proxy networks. This has direct implications for Yemen, where the have benefited significantly from Iranian political and military support.Ěý

A by a UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has highlighted how Iranian support has enhanced the Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities, enabling the group to conduct attacks not only within Yemen but also against regional infrastructure and maritime shipping routes. Should Iran’s ability to maintain support for the group decline, the Houthis’ operational reach and political leverage will diminish, thereby creating space for new political arrangements to stabilize the country.Ěý

Gulf strategic realignment and opportunities for cooperation

For Saudi Arabia, the evolving regional context presents an opportunity to reassess its Yemen policy. Over the past decade, Riyadh’s approach to Yemen has largely been driven by security concerns, particularly the necessity to counter Houthi expansion and limit Iranian influence along Saudi Arabia’s southern border. While these priorities remain relevant, changing regional dynamics may enable Saudi Arabia to adopt a broader strategy that emphasizes long-term stability over short-term security considerations. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) could play a role in this expansive strategy.ĚýĚý

Although between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have intensified in recent years due to their competing visions over Yemen’s political future, especially regarding the role of the Emirati-backed southern separatists, the wider regional security environment is shifting rapidly. Escalating tensions following the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, which prompted an Iranian retaliation on and in the Gulf, have underscored the interconnected nature of Gulf security.

In this context, current regional instability may paradoxically create an opportunity for cooperation, as heightened security threats often encourage greater coordination among partners who share common security vulnerabilities. The issue of Southern Yemen could therefore transform from a point of divergence into a platform for renewed strategic cooperation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. 

Stabilization prospects in Southern YemenĚý

Despite years of conflict, Yemen’s southern regions have retained relatively security structures and administrative institutions. These local capacities provide a solid foundation for broader stabilization efforts in the region focused on governance reform, economic recovery and institutional development. Through coordinated Gulf support, strengthening such capacities could help create conditions conducive to sustainable stability.Ěý

The past decade of conflict has demonstrated that a military approach alone cannot deliver lasting peace in Yemen. Durable stability in the country will depend on , effective governance and partnerships rooted in local legitimacy. This is particularly important given South Yemen’s strategic geographic location. The region borders the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most vital , through which an estimated 10–12% of global seaborne trade passes via the Red Sea corridor. Ensuring security along these waterways is therefore both a regional priority and a matter of global economic significance.Ěý

Current regional dynamics offer Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the opportunity to expand their role in Yemen beyond short-term security objectives. Moreover, geopolitical developments provide an opportunity for Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to reconcile, thereby contributing to a more stable future for southern Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula.

However, it is vital for southern political actors to strengthen governance performance and demonstrate commitment to inclusive and accountable administration. Yemen’s long-term stability will ultimately depend on political arrangements that reflect realities on the ground and address the aspirations of the country’s diverse regions. 

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Thirteen among the more than thirty countries that have formally expressed their interest in membership are now associated with BRICS+: four Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam), two Latin American countries (Cuba and Bolivia), three African countries (Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda), two Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and two European countries (Belarus and NATO member Turkey). They were given the status of “partner states” in Kazan.

To say that the Americans are not enthusiastic about the appeal of this new global club would be an understatement. Should the success of the summit in Kazan be interpreted as a sign of the failure of their strategy to isolate Russia? Worse still, are we witnessing the beginning of the end of the American century?

In addition to the nine member states and thirteen partners, the summit was also attended by some representatives of countries whose presence was rather unexpected, such as the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, the very Russophilic Alexander Vulin. However, it was the presence of UN Secretary-General Antonio Gutierres that caused outraged reactions, especially in Ukraine. “The UN Secretary-General declined Ukraine’s invitation to the first global peace summit in Switzerland. However, he has accepted the invitation of the war criminal Putin to Kazan,” hammered the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.

It is true that Gutierres boycotted the BĂĽrgenstock meeting this spring. It is also legitimate to wonder whether a UN Secretary-General should shake hands with a person accused of war crimes, even if he is the president of a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin on March 17, 2023.

This juicy skewer of participants is notable for its heterogeneity. There are dictatorships and democracies, Muslim, Christian and secular countries, economic superpowers and failed nations; some have been characterized as rogue states. Are what we are witnessing merely an updated reiteration of that elastic non-aligned movement launched in the 1960s by Yugoslavia’s Prime Minister Josip Tito and Indian Jawaharlal Nehru, which encompassed two-thirds of the world but never achieved any real global influence? No, something else is happening here. In the space of sixty years, the balance of global power has clearly changed.

A motley but (almost) global group with growing influence

Antonio Gutierres is a realist. He understands how historically significant the bubbling events within the BRICS states are. He was in Kazan because it is important. To underline that point, consider a few figures. The nine countries now called BRICS+ account for more than half of the world’s population. Their combined gross national product is already greater than that of their rivals in the G7, the Western directorate comprising the US, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the UK. The gap is likely to widen in the coming years, since the BRICS+ growth rate is around 5%, while Western economies are stagnating at 1–2% — and some, like Germany’s, are officially in a recession.

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Despite these new geo-economic realities, the international order established by the West after the World War II has been resistant to change. The UN Security Council will remain secure in the hands of its five permanent members — three Western states plus China and Russia — for a long time to come. However, the BRICS states are not seeking to change the United Nations Charter or create a parallel system to the United Nations. Rather, they are focusing on the economic and financial governance of the world.

Parallel to the founding of the United Nations, the victorious Western powers, at the Bretton Woods conference in 1945, created institutions designed to regulate world finance. The dollar became the world’s reserve currency, making every country vulnerable to US sanctions. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which provide financial assistance to countries in difficulty, are run like shareholder meetings, in which the US holds a decisive vote. Together with the other Western nations, they possess an absolute majority. It is these two pillars of Western power in the world that the BRICS states hope to compete with. But how?

It would be literally impossible to reform the international financial institutions in such a way as to reduce Western influence in them. However, they cannot prevent the creation of parallel systems of payment. The BRICS countries are thus working on three main tasks:

• A mechanism for processing international payments independent of SWIFT — from which Russia was excluded after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
• An intensification of trade that is invoiced in local currencies instead of dollars, in order to accelerate the “de-dollarization of the world.”
• A development bank that competes with the World Bank and finances infrastructure projects. There are currently 96 projects underway with a total volume of $32 billion.

Critics of the BRICS states doubt that they are able to really compete with the dollar. Despite a steady erosion, the greenback still accounts for 55% of the reserves of the national banks. And when it is replaced by other currencies, these tend to be Western currencies, with the notable exception of the Chinese renminbi. Nevertheless, the trend is clear and the potential of BRICS+ is there. The formation of alternative transportation corridors is part of the same strategy to break free from Western, i.e., American dependency.

Land routes vs. sea routes

In a globalized and interdependent world, the transport of goods represents a strategic dimension. From cars to cell phones, hardly any industrial activity exists that does not include and depend on an accumulation of natural resources and semi-finished products from all corners of the world. Over the last hundred years, goods have primarily been transported by sea. Today, sea freight accounts for 70% of world trade. You only have to look at a map of the US naval bases around the world to realize how important the sea lanes are to Washington’s power strategy. From the Sea of Japan to Malacca, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Panama, Rotterdam and New York, Washington’s ambition — sometimes supported by its British ally — to dominate the seas is obvious.

With its “Belt and Road” initiative, China has been trying for several years to develop land routes to, compete or at least complement the existing sea routes. It is therefore very revealing that one of the flagship projects highlighted in Kazan was the North–South Corridor, which will ultimately connect St. Petersburg with India, without passing through any Western-controlled areas. Is it worth remembering that India has become the largest importer of Russian oil products, despite the very audible gnashing of teeth in Washington?

What is Switzerland doing?

Between soft power and economic impact, the BRICS+ are redrawing the geopolitical map. Is Switzerland even aware of this probably irreversible development? Has it sought an invitation to Kazan?

The answer is yes, Swiss companies are well aware of the underlying forces shaping the world of tomorrow. This is why some, for example in the trade sector, are moving to Dubai. Yes, Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Economic Affairs is well aware of this. It wants to update our free trade with China. Switzerland is the only European country apart from Iceland to have concluded such an agreement. That is an advantage.

Unfortunately, the options chosen by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport have not been helpful. By running after the Americans, who have been losing all their wars for twenty years, weFO° Exclusive: Make Sense of BRICS Summit in Russia
have turned Russia against us and made China doubt our reliability. Moreover, for three quarters of the world Gaza has become a symbol of the moral bankruptcy of the West, including Switzerland. Is there still time to restore our credibility? Is this even possible with the current political cast running our affairs? These are the questions that every Swiss citizen must rightly ask themselves.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The trend of Arab–Israeli normalization pushed both Palestine and Iran to the sidelines. Hamas, backed by Iran, sought to change that. Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. The attack and the subsequent war not only brought the Palestinian issue to the front and center of discourse once again but also re-injected Iran into the fight for regional power.

The Israel–Hamas war created a crack in regional power dynamics

Iran now has an opening where it didn’t have one before. Of course, it is as they say in the business world: Never invest with your own money. Iran used Hamas to break into the fight for regional power, and it will continue with that tactic. Terrorist groups such as the Houthis and Hezbollah offer Iran the chance to upend the fragile regional dynamics. Not only this, but Iran can also threaten increasingly brittle global trade.

It is no secret that non-geographically centered power wins over geographically-centered states. Iran can strike from many places at once, stretching the US capacity to respond thin. As in the US–Vietnam War, asymmetric warfare has proven to be wildly successful in upsetting what seemed to be a one-sided power dynamic.  In backing and funding groups such as Hamas and the Houthis, Iran is now broading the focus of attention. No longer is the world only focused on the Israel–Hamas war; the focus is increasingly on Iran as a player with growing influence.

The big powers of the Middle East find themselves, much like Odysseus’ crew, caught between Scylla and Charybdis. Saudi Arabia in particular is feeling the strain. On one hand, war with Israel is the last thing Saudi Arabia wants. But on the other, its majority Sunni Muslim population views Saudi leaders as ignoring the sentiments of their citizens. The hearts of the Arab street, of course, are with their fellow Muslims in Palestine. Thus, regional leaders risk being viewed as either spineless or corrupt. Iran has thus thrown a wrench in the Arab monarchy’s plans. 

The ripples Iran is making spread far beyond the geographical confines of the Middle East, too. The Iran-sponsored Houthis are attacking shipping vessels in the Red Sea from their base in Yemen. Through them, Iran is doing damage to intercontinental trade and thus to the entire global economy.

The US is beginning to feel the strain. Iran and its allies are carrying out strikes in the Red Sea, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Russia and China may seize the opportunity to move into the area as the US has its back turned. Even India has sensed the rising tension. While it knows it must maintain connections with Iran, it must also uphold the principle of free trade on the high seas that Iran is attacking. So, India and other nations outside the region are beginning to stress.

From a unipolar world to multiple spheres of influence

The Israel–Hamas war may have lasting consequences globally. Ukraine, in particular, has lost much from the aftermath of October 7. As the US diverts its aid to Israel and the Red Sea, aid cannot make its way to Ukraine. The Biden administration is finding it harder and harder to divide its support between Israel and Ukraine. 

The unrest in the Middle East affects the US domestically too. The US public is divided between supporting Israel or Palestine. The Left criticizes the administration for refusing to call a ceasefire. The Right accuses the administration of being complicit with Hamas. Once again, the two-party divide seems to have weakened US coherence, actions and influence. 

Weakened influence isn’t the only danger that comes with a divided US public. The public struggles to understand why the US should be involved in any conflicts in the Middle East. This raises the temptation for US leaders to disengage from the region or even from the world at large. Disengagement will guarantee chaos. De facto spheres of influence will shape international transactions rather than a Western-backed, unipolar system.

In other words, what we know of the normative order is collapsing right in front of our eyes. 

This impending chaos will change everything from the price of pencils to how a war is waged. The Israel-Hamas war is a chip off the world order. We will no longer be facing a unipolar world order with the US on top. Rather, we face a multipolar one. 

Decentralization of power has already begun. US influence in the Middle East, which is the successor to European colonialism in the region, is losing its rationale in the eyes of American citizens and of the world. The Israel–Hamas war is the straw that broke the camel’s back. The domino effect has now cascaded from the region onto the global stage.

The normative system is now being replaced, and no one knows what the coming multipolar order will be like.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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This year’s BRICS summit took place in South Africa from August 22–24. The most important outcome of the summit was the decision to expand the group. will join on January 1, 2024: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Argentina, Iran and Ethiopia. The original membership has just been doubled and this is a transformative outcome.

Originally, the RIC group was a response to the emergence of a unipolar world following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Then, the BRIC nations, four economically rising powers from three continents, shared an agenda. All four wanted to make the global order more democratic and equitable. When BRICS emerged, these powers wanted a greater role of developing countries in the new world order. At least three of the powers—India, Brazil and South Africa—sought to reform the postwar UN system, including its political and financial institutions. These emerging powers wanted to make the UN the centerpiece of a reinvigorated multilateralism.

End of the unipolar moment

This multilateral approach is becoming all the more important as the world exits its unipolar moment. Although the US remains the world’s leading political, military and economic power, it is no longer able to unilaterally dictate the rules of the international system. It failed to change the Middle Eastern balance of power in its favor by military intervention in the Iraq War or by indirect means during the Arab Spring. The disastrous end of its War on Terror, exemplified by the retreat from Afghanistan, has reduced its international primacy.

The US now sees the need to strengthen its alliances in Europe and Asia to retain its global preeminence. This includes the reinvigoration of NATO in Europe, as well as the alliances with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines in Asia.

The US is pulling the team together as new tensions—with potentially dire consequences for global peace and security—have pitted it against both Russia and China. It has succeeded in getting its European partners to throw their into a common effort against Russia and that China is a systemic threat as well.

Furthermore, the US has used its to the hilt to isolate Russia and cause its economic collapse. Washington has also openly subscribed to the idea of regime change in Russia, a peer nuclear power. It is not only Russia but also China that lies in American crosshairs. The US now sees China as its principal longer-term adversary and is taking aggressive steps to thwart China’s technological rise.

Tensions between great powers are straining the international system. Western sanctions on Russia have been draconian. In particular, the US has weaponized the dollar-based global financial system. The war in Ukraine has also had deeply disruptive effects on the supply of , and to developing countries. The equity of a global order based on rules set by the powerful is now in serious question. This order does not emanate from the collective will of the international community but is defined and determined by the West.

RIC, BRIC and then BRICS were all about multipolarity. These non-Western powers wanted a seat at the top table. Yet the dominant Western powers who champion human rights and democracy are not ready to cede control. In fact, the West imposes its agenda on these powers through championing supposedly “universal values” and does not want to give up its traditional hegemony. Naturally, the BRICS nations oppose this hegemony and want a redistribution of global power.

The West has been locked in a confrontation with Russia and China. Both these powers are responding by expanding BRICS. Hence, they have added six new members to the group. Some of them, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Argentina have historic links with the US. Yet their joining BRICS demonstrates that they are willing to reduce their dependence on the West. These nations want a counterbalance to the US and seek a rebalancing of the global political and economic system, which does not have such punitive costs for transgression.

The inclusion of new members into the BRICS club is telling. Iran is already a of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and close not only to China but also Russia. Iran has long been at loggerheads with the US and is subject to strong . Ethiopia is wracked by and prolonged . Yet the country has made it to the club on the basis of its increasingly close relationship with China.

Clearly, the BRICS expansion sends a loud and clear signal. BRICS has welcomed powers that challenge the US and are close to China and Russia.

What were the criteria and what does BRICS expansion mean?

The entry of new members to the BRICS club raises a key question. What were the criteria?

Were they GDP size or growth prospects or population size or geographic location or regional influence or some combination of these factors? It turns out that, except for energy exporters Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the other new countries face serious economic problems. Egypt is the most populous Arab nation with the largest military in the region. Yet its economy is in an acute crisis. Argentina, the second-largest Latin American country, is in yet another . Their addition does not exactly strengthen the BRICS club economically.

Importantly, no East or South Asian country joined the BRICS club. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE lie in Asia but are part of the Middle East. Indonesia its candidacy at the last moment. It seems to be betting instead on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). BRICS is a geographically dispersed club while ASEAN is a cohesive organization with shared interests. External pressure by the US might also have played a role in Indonesia staying away from BRICS.

When it comes to African countries, Nigeria would have been a more credible addition than Ethiopia. However, the country did not apply for membership. Neither did Mexico. Algeria applied for membership but to have gotten in.

Clearly, the expansion of BRICS has been lopsided. Ethiopia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran are clustered together geographically. Only Argentina seems to stand out.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa : “We have tasked our Foreign Ministers to further develop the BRICS partner country model and a list of prospective partner countries and report by the next Summit.” Yet it is unclear what are the criteria for the expansion. It seems that new members have been admitted to the BRICS club on an ad hoc basis.

While expansion may boost multipolarity, it risks making the new BRICS+ club less cohesive. India and China have deep differences. Their militaries are in a at the border. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran are not exactly the best of friends. Brazil and Argentina are rivals.

Furthermore, the commitment of various countries to BRICS+ is far from solid. Under Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil had less commitment to BRICS than current president Lula da Silva. Tellingly, South Africa Russian President Vladimir Putin because of its obligations to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Ramaphosa might wax lyrical about BRICS+, but his government is still constrained by Western-made law of The Hague-based ICC.

It remains to be seen how BRICS+ shapes up but it is clear that the addition of new members and prospects of further expansion are an indication of a growing, if inchoate, trend towards multipolarity.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Expert opinion is that this could prove to be the calm before an imminent storm. As et al wrote for Bloomberg on 3 June:

Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have enough spare capacity to offset a significant portion of the supply gap created by sanctions on Russia. Much of that will remain untapped even after the July and August production increases, setting up a crucial OPEC+ meeting in two months that could determine whether the US and Europe persuade their Gulf allies to break further from Moscow.

However, the wider context, both economic and political, coupled with the challenges involved in the cartel’s internal dynamics, suggest that Riyadh may prefer to stick to the present course for some time yet.

For starters, and as this shows, the price of crude has been relatively stable for the past month, with the Brent range bound between US$110 and US$120 per barrel or thereabouts. July’s targeted output increase of 648,000 barrels per day (bpd) is unlikely to change this, not least since the June commitment to “redistribute equally” the 216,000 bpd increase above what was previously agreed across all cartel members means that it will probably amount to only 100,000 bpd or so. This likely suits cartel members just fine as the 2021 agreement continues to serve its intended purpose.

Three Economic Considerations

Furthermore, other economic considerations argue in favor of putting off trying to thrash out a new agreement. Consider three pertinent facts.

First, the on Russian oil imports and ban on insurance of tankers carrying Russian oil remains subject to tricky negotiations at the . So it is far from clear how quickly these will come into force and how far-reaching they will be in practice. The impact on EU economies, therefore, is not yet clear. The Economist on June 5 summed up the risks as follows: “Even if the euro area is spared a recession, then, the energy shock will be a drag on growth. The ECB faces an unenviable dilemma. With every increase in inflation on the back of food and energy prices, the European economy is getting weaker.”

Second, in the US, despite a healthy employment rate and high post-pandemic household savings, views — at least from — are even more pessimistic and the looks set to increase the interest rate by at least a further 50 basis points and possibly 75 this month.

Third, as for China, lockdowns are not the only cause of the sharp economic slowdown. Furthermore, the of COVID-related restrictions should not distract from the fact that at the end of June the authorities were still listing one high risk area (in Beijing) and 13 medium-risk ones countrywide. Despite the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to meet its economic growth targets — not least with an eye to the Party Congress in (probably) November —the involved in avoiding a possible recession are daunting.

At a time when inflation is soaring, these factors present all central bankers, not just the ECB and the Fed, with a to which there are no easy answers. Consequently, plausible scenarios could yet significantly depress demand for oil and, therefore, the price of crude before year-end as by Bank of America makes clear.

Added Realpolitik Considerations

Bridging economics and politics is the G7’s move to put a price cap on Russian oil which some experts believe could push the of crude up rather than down. While much has been made of the technical difficulties this entails, the of winning essential third country agreement are also far from straightforward.

The politics are just as uncertain, with Saudi/US relations front and center. Intense US lobbying was undoubtedly a factor behind the June 2 decision. But even for this modest shift there is a political price for Washington to pay, i.e. US President Joe Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia this month going back on his pre-election to treat the Kingdom as a ‼ő˛ą°ůľ±˛ąłó”. To try to minimize back home, Mr Biden will look to dress this up as peace-making — admittedly with some justification if the recently extended ceasefire in holds. In reality, it has more to do with the oil price and the damage which US inflation is inflicting on the already struggling Democratic Party’s prospects in the midterms. Sadly for Mr Biden, former Clinton Administration Energy Secretary was almost certainly correct that “a president has to try. Unfortunately, there are only bad options. And any alternative options are probably worse than asking the Saudis to increase production.”

As energy expert Helima Croft was quoted as saying in the 3 June edition of the Financial Times, this is “a return to realpolitik” — possibly even to the point where we may yet see agreement on resetting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action () and limited US rapprochement with .

Riyadh too is indulging in realpolitik. Reports immediately before the June OPEC+ meeting of Russia’s possible expulsion from the group notwithstanding, it clearly makes sense from the Saudis’ perspective to keep OPEC+ together for now at least. Despite last month’s minor deviation, and especially bearing in mind the papering over of the between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the agreement struck last year is still the framework within which OPEC+ is working and which may prove to be the glue which is holding the cartel together.

The bottom line? We are very unlikely to have a clearer picture when OPEC+ meets August 3. Thus, both politically and economically, Riyadh certainly had nothing to lose and much to gain by stretching the July 2021 deal out as long as possible.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In recent years, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially the UAE, have recognized that trusting foreign governments, such as the United States, cannot offer them the best possible protection. The US has had a presence in the Persian Gulf since the 1990s and the Gulf Arab countries have relied on it to provide security. However, events in recent years have shown that the Gulf Arab states cannot rely solely on Washington.

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Such developments include the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan amid the US withdrawal; the US pivot to Asia; the US retraction of most advanced missile defense systems and Patriot batteries from Saudi Arabia; and the lack of a US military response to threats, missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil bases by the Houthis in Yemen.

This has encouraged the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf to pursue security autonomy. The UAE, in particular, has sought to transform its strategy from dependence on the US and Saudi Arabia to a combination of self-reliance and multilateral cooperation.

Self-Reliance Security Strategy

Although the UAE is an important ally of America in the Persian Gulf, over recent years, the US has sought to push the Emiratis toward security. Sociopolitical events in the Middle East over the last decade following the Arab Spring of 2010-11 have made it clear to the UAE that the primary goal of ensuring national security, in addition to benefiting from international cooperation, should be the use of national facilities and resources.

Hosni Mubarak’s ouster from Egypt during the Arab Spring protests and the reluctance of the US to defend him as an ally — which led to the rise of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood — further demonstrated to Abu Dhabi that it should not exclusively depend on the US for security assistance. Thus, the UAE began to develop a professional army.

The UAE‘s self-reliance strategy is divided into different branches, but most of all, its military security efforts have been given the highest priority. The UAE‘s determination to create an independent and professional military is evident from its years of investment in the defense industry.

Indeed, security is a top priority for the United Arab Emirates, and defense spending continues to make up a large portion of the national budget. The UAE’s defense typically accounts for 11.1% to 14% of the total budget. In 2019, the UAE’s defense spending was $16.4 billion. This was 18% more than the 2018 budget of $13.9 billion.

The UAE has invested heavily in the military sector and defense industry in recent years. In November 2019, the UAE formed the EDGE Group from a merger of 25 companies. The company has 12,000 employees and $5 billion in total revenue. It is also among the top 25 advocacy groups in the world, ahead of firms such as Booz Allen Hamilton in the US and Rolls-Royce in the UK.

EDGE is around five clusters: platforms and systems, missiles and weapons, cyber defense, electronic warfare and intelligence, and mission support. It comprises several major UAE companies in the defense industry, such as ADSB (shipbuilding), Al Jasoor, NIMR (vehicles), SIGN4L (electronic warfare services) and ADASI (autonomous systems). The main of EDGE is to develop weapons to fight “hybrid warfare” and to bolster the UAE’s defense against unconventional threats, focusing on electronic attacks and drones.

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The UAE has also come up with detailed plans to improve the quality of its military personnel, large sums of money each year on training its military recruits in American colleges and war academies. It also founded the National Defense College; most of its students are citizens of the UAE, because of its independence in military training. In addition, in 2014, the UAE introduced general conscription for men between the ages of 18 and 30 to increase numbers and strengthen national identity in its military. As a result, it gathered about 50,000 people in the first three years.

Contrary to traditional practice, the UAE’s growing military power has made it eager to use force and hard power to protect its interests. The UAE stands ready to use military force anywhere in the region to contain Iran’s growing influence and weaken Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Participating in the Yemeni War was a test of this strategy.

The UAE‘s military presence in Yemen began in March 2015. It a brigade of 3,000 troops to Yemen in August 2015, along with Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Arab countries. Over the past five years, the UAE has an ambitious strategic agenda in the Red Sea, building military installations and securing control of the southern coasts of Yemen along the Arabian Sea in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Socotra Island. Despite reducing its military footprints in Yemen in 2019, the UAE has consolidated itself in the southern regions. It has continued to finance and impart training to thousands of Yemeni fighters drafted from various groups like the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite Forces, Abu al-Abbas Brigade and the West Coast Forces.

The UAE‘s goal in adopting a self-reliance strategy is to increase strategic depth in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Thus, along with direct military presence or arms support for groups engaged in proxy wars, it affects the internal affairs of various countries in the region, such as Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and Libya. With its influence, the UAE can turn the tide in its favor in certain areas.

Multilateralism Security Strategy

The United Arab Emirates faces a variety of security in the Middle East, and addressing them requires cooperation with other countries. Currently, the most significant security threats in the UAE are: countering Iranian threats and power in the Middle East, especially in Arab countries under Iranian influence, such as Yemen, Syria and Lebanon; eliminating threats from terrorist groups and political Islam in the region, the most important of which — according to the UAE — is the Muslim Brotherhood; and economic threats and efforts to prepare for the post-oil world.

In its multilateral strategy, the UAE seeks to counter these threats with the help of other countries in the region or beyond. It has used soft power through investments or providing humanitarian aid, suggesting that economic cooperation is more important than political competition and intervention. In this regard, the UAE has cooperated with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Britain and France, as well as normalized relations with Israel.

On August 13, 2020, the UAE became the first Gulf state to normalize relations with Israel. The UAE‘s goal in normalizing relations with Israel is to counter threats from Iran and the region. The Abraham Accords have not only a security aspect, but also an economic one. Following the signing of the accords, on October 20, 2020, the US, Israel and the UAE the establishment of the Abraham Fund, a joint fund of $3 billion “in private sector-led investment and development initiatives,” aimed at “promoting economic cooperation and prosperity.” In addition, it outlined a banking and finance memorandum between the largest banks in Israel and Dubai, and a joint bid between Dubai’s DP World port operator and an Israeli shipping firm for the management of Israel’s Haifa port.

Through the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates seeks to invest and transfer Israeli technologies to the UAE through mutual agreements. The UAE has discovered that Israel is one of the bridges to the US economy and high technology. If the UAE intends to have an oil-free economy in the future, Israel may be the best option to achieve this by pursuing a strategy of multilateralization.

UAE relations with Turkey also have a multilateral dimension to reaching common security goals. The two countries had good relations until the Arab Spring protests ties between them. Abu Dhabi and Ankara began to defuse tensions after a phone call in August 2021 between UAE Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The nations mainly have differences around issues in Libya, Syria and Egypt. The UAE is trying to resolve its disputes with Turkey by investing in the country.

Turkey is the largest backer of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. The Turks claim the UAE participated in the failed coup of July 2016 against the Turkish government. Nonetheless, the UAE wants to end frictions with Turkey and has attracted Ankara by investing and increasing commercial ties. The Turkish lira has depreciated in recent years and Erdogan’s popularity has plummeted due to mismanagement in Turkey. Erdogan will not miss this economic opportunity with the UAE and welcomes Emirati investments. In this way, the UAE will likely easily resolve its differences with Turkey.

The current tendency to use force is contrary to traditional Abu Dhabi policy, yet increasing the strategic depth of the UAE is one of Abu Dhabi‘s most achievable goals in its strategy of self-reliance. This plan is the exact opposite of multilateralism. Unlike the use of force and hard power, Abu Dhabi seeks to achieve its objectives by using soft power, investment and humanitarian aid. In this situation, the tactical exploitation of economic cooperation takes precedence over political competition and military intervention in the region.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything?

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But times have changed. Three recent presidents — Barack Obama, Donald Trump and now Joe Biden — have made efforts to distance the US from its endless, exasperating entanglements in the Middle East. Those efforts had distracted the United States from its principal challenges in the world — China and Russia — and sapped it of its military, economic and political might and influence. America received very little in return on its investment. Furthermore, years of US involvement in the region had also fractured the American public’s support for the more critically important role it must play in anchoring the international order.

Enter the Others

Downgrading America’s involvement in the Middle East isn’t necessarily a bad thing. For decades, many in the Middle East and in the US had argued that the region’s problems must be tackled by the governments and people of the region. Outsiders can play a supporting role, but the tough decisions can only be made by the governments themselves. That may now be happening.

But handing off the task of addressing the region’s manifold challenges got off to a poor start. Neither the US, nor the international community, nor the states of the Middle East seemed able to solve the conundrum of the region’s three failed states.

Then, starting around 2015, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman started ordering others around — imposing a blockade on Qatar, detaining the Lebanese prime minister, jailing courageous dissidents and largely harmless millionaires, ordering a hit job on journalist Jamal Khashoggi and jumping into the Yemeni Civil War. And it all went bad, very bad in fact. Additionally, it provoked other would-be movers and shakers to get in the act, including the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, China, Russia and even Israel. And not always with good intent or positive results.

After years of misdirection, however, governments now seem to be taking a more sober and responsible approach that could prove genuinely beneficial for the region. For starters, they have embarked on a simple approach: dialog. They are talking about their problems, especially those between and among one another. Dialog leads to understanding, which can lead to shared interests. Ultimately, to be effective, dialog must lead to compromise. That involves the inevitable give-and-take that allows nations, especially those close to one another, to live and thrive in peace and prosperity.

It’s a Start

One of the most encouraging initiatives may be the most unexpected: dialog between the Middle East’s two major powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and hosted by perhaps the most unlikely state, Iraq, unquestionably the region’s most conflict-ridden for decades. The issues are many between these two historic rivals, separated by a narrow gulf on whose name neither seems able to agree. But the larger gulf lies in their differing views of the other, their competing religious sects — the Saudi uber-conservative Wahhabi Sunni Islam vs. Iran’s clerically-led, conservative Shia Islam — perceptions of the other’s role and intentions in the region, their wealth, and relations with and ties to the broader international community, almost non-existent in the case of Iran.

One especially neuralgic issue for both is their respective roles in the Yemen War. It is now abundantly clear that the Saudis’ overwhelming military power, bolstered by the US and some European nations, cannot defeat the Houthi rebels. Nor can it end either the war or even its costly intervention in it. The Saudis need help. Enter the Iranians, who have been supporting the Shia-affiliated Zaydi Houthis in this war since 2013. With ideology and much-needed weapons and funding, though much less than what Saudi Arabia has expended, the Iranians have empowered the rebels to the point where they are now an established power in a future Yemen, whether unified or bifurcated.

So, the two regional powers are talking it out. The Saudis want out of the war, but they also want reliable security along their southwestern border. The Iranians want a Shia power on the Arabian Peninsula, but preferably one at peace.

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Yemen may be the most immediate challenge for the two states. But there are others. More broadly, Saudi Arabia and Iran need to reach a modus vivendi in the region. On-again, off-again formal relations, menacing behavior toward each other’s oil and shipping interests, and verbal assaults do little more than increase the temperature in a region plagued by heat, literally and figuratively.

Brothers Reconcile?

Saudi Arabia has also launched a campaign to repair the frayed relations among its Arab neighbors. Last week, Mohammed bin Salman week began a PR  to demonstrate a new and improved political environment. In a swing through the neighboring Gulf states of Oman, the UAE, Bahrain and, most importantly, Qatar, he seems to be trying to rebuild what once had been the region’s preeminent multilateral organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Mohammed bin Salman single-handedly fractured the Gulf alliance when he imposed his 2017 blockade on Qatar, joined by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. It backfired. Qatar remained in the good graces of the US, drew the political and military support of peripheral power Turkey and earned the support of Iran. Consider it the young prince’s on-the-job training in global as well as regional politics. He is now devoting particular attention to Doha in the hope of what yet we aren’t quite certain. But this repair work and goodwill tour cannot help but create progress.

And not to be outdone, the Gulf’s other power, the UAE, has  on its own diplomatic repair mission. Like the Saudis, the Emiratis want to lower the temperature in the Gulf, and their position as the region’s prime economic entrepĂ´t gives them special heft. The UAE’s ties to the US, still the unquestioned but now quiescent power in the Gulf, also lend special weight.

Could It All Be for Naught?

Looming over all of these laudable efforts, however, is Iranian behavior in the region. All eyes are now on the recently restarted talks over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna, Austria. Following a near-six-month hiatus at Iran’s request, the P5+1 group and Iran renewed negotiations to reinstate the JCPOA — aka the Iran nuclear deal.

But it is the critical non-dialog between the US and Iran — the two countries are still not meeting face-to-face but rather communicating through the intermediation of the other P5+1 countries — that bears the most serious watching. Unless they can agree on a way forward that puts Iran’s nuclear weapons potential well into the very distant future while also lifting America’s onerous and inescapably crippling sanctions on the Islamic Republic, the heat in the Middle East will become white hot.

Judging from the US State Department’s uncharacteristically downcast semi-official  of the first round of the negotiation restart, there is cause for concern. Iran’s counterproductive, albeit predictable, maximalist opening gambit soured the P5+1, even China and Russia. Negotiators met again last week. Unless there is a greater attitude toward compromise, however, pessimism will win out. Positions will harden. And more extreme (and dangerous) measures will become viable.

President Biden has reiterated the US pledge that Iran will not get nuclear weapons. But neither he nor his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, will state what the consequences of failed talks might be.

Israel, however, is not so coy. Recent Israeli  confirm that the military option is very much in play. As if to put an even finer point on the matter, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin  Jerusalem late last week for meetings with his Israeli counterpart, Defense Minister Benny Gantz. Both men are retired top generals of their respective armed forces and will have discussed military and other options.

Military action would be an unspeakable disaster for the Middle East. But so would a nuclear-armed or even nuclear-capable Iran. Even an approach that stops short of armed conflict will impose extraordinary hardship on the region, certainly prompting other states to consider acquiring nuclear weapons and further isolate Iran.

It would be unfair to place the entirety of the burden for the success of these talks on Tehran. However, unless Iran understands the futility of its mindless pursuit of nuclear weapons, no effort at fostering understanding elsewhere can temper the region’s mercury-popping political heat.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Can the Taliban Govern Responsibly?

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In a fast-changing environment where international donors are less capable to meet funding requests from humanitarian organizations, the United Arab Emirates has taken a unique approach. The Gulf state’s method, which could be modeled on the logistics of major transnational corporations or a large military logistics operation, provides a glimpse into the future orientation of special humanitarian capabilities.

Establishing a Hub

The establishment of the first UAE hub in 2003 reflected a top-level and very strategic foreign policy judgment by the United Arab Emirates. It leverages the UAE’s highly developed status as a global node for airfreight and transit entrepot activity. It has gained an impressive list of committed partners — from UN agencies and major humanitarian organizations to charities and commercial suppliers of humanitarian-related services.

On this point alone, any regional replicant will find it difficult to duplicate the model exactly. The status of the international hub was reflected by being represented well after its launch and during its transition from a valuable strategic geographic location to an independent official humanitarian crisis response agency within the international community, according to a member of the royal family at the time of its founding. 

The EHC and its widening range of services, no longer only a regional storage hub for faster deployment of humanitarian supplies, but an expanding hub for humanitarian workers heading to the field, has also become more networked into international coordination mechanisms and processes. These national and often highly budget-driven and bureaucratic processes and their informal and formal international coordination are now well established in the EHC modus operandi, reinforcing it as a leading model for contemporary large and rapid humanitarian action.

An example of UAE pre-engagement with the club of donors was in the . The UAE, in 2015, through EHC predecessor institutions, flew selected humanitarian supplies toward the region following cyclone disasters over the past decade. The supplies proved less absorbable than expected. The transit stop was Brisbane, in Queensland, Australia, the location of the Australian government’s main South Pacific logistical base.

Following this natural disaster, the UAE recalibrated its approach. It recognized that even if it was able to act independently, beneficiaries’ interests and international coordination facilitate the path to effectiveness. Notably, aid to the region was used following the UAE’s diplomatic initiative in the South Pacific on climate change and its leveraging of gas and nuclear in the greenhouse debate.

By late February 2020, as the world began to address the spread of COVID-19, the UAE government set out to extend the role of the EHC. The aim of the directive by the Abu Dhabi government was to deploy the UAE’s “medical care capabilities at a time of crisis,” the Emirates News Agency . Its first task was to receive 215 citizens from neighboring countries evacuated from Hubei, China, as the began to interrupt international air travel. The EHC was to serve as a hub, receiving evacuees and providing necessary monitoring and preventive medical care, ensuring “privacy and dignity” throughout the process.

The EHC Today

Operations at the EHC now compliment an image of the UAE as a globalist and progressive international influencer through what some have called the world’s largest humanitarian hub. The additional success of the EHC in 2020 was a product of public and private sector cooperation that manifested the UAE’s foreign policy commitment to delivering and helping others deliver rapid crisis responses. The development of a hub for people affected by the COVID-19 pandemic continues to manifest itself in the role played by the UAE during the evacuation of Afghan refugees in August 2021.

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This support service, directly addressing people in danger, need and fleeing their country will require deep thinking and careful management. Like most sovereign states, the UAE itself, despite its fast-growing capability to balance its interests with the effects of its wealth and financial leverage, will face increasingly larger and more complex judgments about how to respond to incrementally higher demands for aid and human succor. These decisions will always come with distressing media coverage of human and environmental disaster events.

The success of the EHC is based on local capacity to deliver logistical infrastructure, a highly developed transport node and interest by an A-List of global humanitarians for a center close to several disaster-prone regions. These include the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean rim.

It will now need to deal with the deep and difficult policy problem, at least for humanitarians, of where to consolidate infrastructure and resources for rapidly accessible assistance to people suffering under complex situations. Here we will see realist foreign policy and the place and role of humanitarian assistance collide. Other wealthy states in the region will face the same problems under their current models of humanitarian support.

Humanitarian assistance, unless coupled with other incentives, rarely leads to a particular and favorable bilateral policy response. After all, the recipient state captures assistance from many quarters. Assistance by states such as the United Arab Emirates, if routine and on a policy basis more regular than opportunistic, will set a strong floor under the UAE’s global model. But it will be difficult to move from one crisis response to another without some clear “stop/go” decision points that do not appear mercenary.

Inter-Arab aid engagement has not been readily seen in humanitarian relief under the same Western and international media gaze as that of other UN member states. For the UAE, the dilemma stems from a priority to make its contributions visible and to showcase the model exemplified by the EHC. Clearly, realist soft power requires more from actions to provide international humanitarian relief. This is where real strategy concerning the concentration of aid and effective delivery will pave the way for success and emulation.

The Case of Afghanistan

The crisis continuing to expand in Afghanistan is a perfect example of emerging challenges and opportunities for new strategies. A growing need for assistance will not decline in the near future, nor will the need from time to time for states to explain their policy approaches and their prioritization of crisis responses. There is already a focus on the realpolitik of humanitarian support as a tool to advance interventionist global agendas. China’s COVID-19 vaccine aid is a clear example, especially as the breadth of Beijing’s response was undermined by the relatively poor efficacy of its vaccines.   

The model working out Abu Dhabi’s EHC allows states to advance more multilateral-driven crisis response strategies. In the case of the August reception of over 8,000 Afghan refugees, the UAE did not engage in unilateral interventionism. Instead, it responded to rapid coordination of responses to international needs for transport and hosting facilities, allowing an increasing number of Afghan nationals to be extricated during the chaos caused by the Taliban advance into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan.

The UAE offered facilities to house Afghan refugees en route to third countries, such as the United States. It also provided relief to overstretched militaries and civilian organizations in Europe and the US that were overwhelmed by the number of refugees. Facilities such as those found at Abu Dhabi’s EHC proved a more dignified alternative to military bases and public facilities such as town halls, schools, temporary shelters and, in some cases, church-based facilities in the West.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Is Football Still a Bastion of White Supremacy?

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In the Gulf, the lucrative rights to World Cup packages are now being awarded. In Kuwait, ITL World has been appointed the sales agent. The company’s CEO, Siddeek Ahmed, could hardly his delight at being able to offer “fans a unique opportunity to purchase ticket-inclusive hospitality packages” for the World Cup. In addition to game tickets, the packages include flights, accommodation, transport and “leisure” programs. According to Arabian Business, the deals for the main venue, the 80,000-seat Lusail Stadium, will run from $14,350 to $74,200. That buys you all 10 matches hosted there, including the quarter-final, semi-final and final. If you are not short on cash, you can pick up a 40-seat suite at the stadium for just .

In Dubai, Expat Sport Tourism DMCC  the rights, with its website urging football fans to be a part of history to see the first World Cup held in the Arab world. “From the pinnacle in high end corporate experiences to individual hospitality solutions for football fans, we can cater for all those wishing to be part of FIFA World Cup 2022” is how the firm put it.

Not Everyone Is Happy

With an estimated 1.5 million fans heading to Qatar next year, Dubai, with its well-established tourism and entertainment sectors, sees itself as ideally placed to cash in on the World Cup bonanza. Yet others in the United Arab Emirates are less welcoming.

Mohammed al-Hammadi is the president of the Emirates Journalists Association and editor-in-chief of the newspaper  based in Abu Dhabi. Among the core values listed on the paper’s website are “apply best practice in line with the journalism codes” and “be an objective and trustworthy information tool.”

Hammadi is a strong proponent of normalization. He spoke at a  in October 2020, after the UAE and Bahrain had announced their plan to normalize relations with Israel. The event was organized by a pro-Israeli think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP). Hammadi said he believed in both peace and advancing the rights of Palestinians, but people like him who “speak in favor of peace are stigmatized … and find themselves falling under attack.” He added that the word normalizing “has a very negative connotation in our region.”

In June, he drew the ire of African journalists with a ham-fisted attempt to have them join a coordinated media attack on the World Cup in Qatar. They adopted a  denouncing efforts to “use Africa and its institutions as political football in order to settle scores in a political dispute.” The statement said:

“While journalists in the East African region struggle to preserve their independence and freedom from rogue government and commercial interests that threaten the integrity of journalists, an outside actor is behind attempts to manipulate, divert and involve journalists in an issue completely outside the scope and powers of journalists and their unions.

In the same way that journalists and their unions in East Africa are calling, confronting and protesting against governments for their interference in the work of journalists and the curtailment of their freedoms, all foreign powers that have a negative and false agenda must be condemned and publicly challenged as a matter of principle and consistency.”

Twelve days later, the website Emirates Leaks, what it called “reliable sources,” alleged that Hammadi had attempted to pressure the heads of the journalism unions of Norway and Finland. According to the site, he wanted them to influence journalism unions in Asia and Africa to “coordinate attacks against Qatar and tarnish its image before hosting the World Cup.”

His efforts occasioned a  on June 23 in the European Parliament from Fulvio Martusciello. The Italian MEP accused the head of the Emirates Journalists Association of leading a smear campaign against Qatar: “Al Hammadi asked the Finnish and Norwegian Journalists Federations to exercise influence on journalists unions that he supports financially to engage in the Abu Dhabi campaign and offend Qatar. He also tried to offer them financial bribes and expensive gifts in return for achieving Abu Dhabi’s inflammatory goals.”

So, while Dubai can barely contain its World Cup excitement, Abu Dhabi appears set to continue its anti-Qatar campaign. Imagine for a moment that the UAE was a football side and its two big stars had separate agendas and were playing only for themselves. That is not a winning formula and it’s something a good manager, like England’s Gareth Southgate, would quickly sort out.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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No doubt, MBS will not have forgotten revelations about Emirati attitudes toward Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s strategic vision of the relationship between the two countries. This was spelled out in  by Yusuf al-Otaiba, the UAE ambassador in Washington and a close associate of MBZ, which were leaked in 2017. The emails made clear that UAE leaders believed they could use Saudi Arabia — the Gulf’s behemoth — and Mohammed bin Salman as a vehicle to promote Emirati interests.

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“Our relationship with them is based on strategic depth, shared interests, and most importantly the hope that we could influence them. Not the other way around,” Otaiba . In a separate email, the ambassador told a former US official that “I think in the long term we might be a good influence on KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia], at least with certain people there.”

A participant in a more recent meeting with Otaiba quoted the ambassador as referring to the Middle East as “the UAE region,” suggesting an enhanced Emirati regional influence. In a similar vein, former Dubai police chief Dhahi Khalfan, blowing his ultra-nationalist horn, in Arabic, “It’s not humanity’s survival of the strongest, it’s&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;the survival of the smartest.”

To be sure, Mohammed bin Zayed has been plotting the UAE’s positioning as a regional economic and geopolitical powerhouse for far longer than his Saudi counterpart. It is not for nothing that it earned the UAE the epitaph of “Little Sparta,” in the words of former US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis.

Windows of Opportunity

No doubt, smarts count for a lot. But, in the ultimate analysis, the two crown princes appear to be exploiting windows of opportunity that exist as long as their most powerful rivals, Turkey and Iran, fail to get their act together. The Saudis and Emiratis see the Turks and Iranians as threats to their regional power. Both Turkey and Iran have far larger, highly educated populations, huge domestic markets, battle-hardened militaries, significant natural resources and industrial bases.

In the meantime, separating the wheat from the chaff in the Gulf spat may be easier said than done. , a Gulf analyst, notes that differences among Arab states have emerged as a result of regime survival strategies that are driven by the need to gear up for a post-oil era. The emergence of a more competitive landscape need not be all negative. Saif warns, however, that “left unchecked … differences could snowball and negatively impact the neighborhood.

Several factors complicate the management of these differences. For one, the Vision 2030 plan for weening Saudi Arabia off its dependence on the export of fossil fuel differs little from the perspective put forward by the UAE and Qatar, two countries that have a substantial head start.

Saudi Arabia sought to declare an initial success in the expanded rivalry by revealing last week that the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the airline industry body, had opened its  headquarters in Riyadh. IATA denied that the Saudi office would have regional responsibility. The announcement came on the heels of the disclosure of Saudi to create a new airline to compete with Emirates and Qatar Airways.

Further complicating the management of differences is the fact that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are likely to compete for market share as they seek to maximize their oil export revenues in the short and medium term. This is particularly before oil demand plateaus and then declines in the 2030s.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, economic diversification and social liberalization are tied up with the competing geopolitical ambitions of the two princes in positioning their countries as the regional leader. Otaiba signaled MBZ’s ambition in 2017 in an email exchange with Elliot Abram, a neoconservative former US official. â€śJeez, the new hegemon! Emirati imperialism! Well, if the US won’t do it, someone has to hold things together for a while,” Abrams wrote to the ambassador, referring to the UAE’s growing regional role. “Yes, how dare we! In all honesty, there was not much of a choice. We stepped up only after your country chose to step down,” Otaiba replied.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas

Differences in the ideological and geopolitical thinking of the princes when it comes to political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood reemerged recently. Differing Saudi and Emirati approaches were initially evident in 2015 when King Salman and his son began their reign in Saudi Arabia. This was a period when Mohammed bin Zayed, who views political Islam and the Brotherhood as an existential threat, had yet to forge close ties to the new Saudi leadership. At the time, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, barely a month after King Salman’s ascendancy, an interviewer that â€śthere is no problem between the kingdom” and the Brotherhood.

Just a month later, the Muslim World League, a body established by Saudi Arabia in the 1960s to propagate religious ultra-conservatism and long dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, a conference in a building in Mecca that had not been used since the banning of the brothers. The Qataris, who have a history of close ties to the Brotherhood, were invited.

After King Salman and his son came to power, Saudi Arabia adopted a harder approach toward Brotherhood-related groups as Mohammed bin Zayed gained influence in Saudi affairs. The Muslim League has since become Mohammed bin Salman’s main vehicle for promoting his call for religious tolerance and inter-faith dialogue. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are portraying themselves as icons of a socially moderate form of Islam that, nonetheless, endorses autocratic rule.

Last week, the kingdom signaled a potential change in its attitude toward Brotherhood-related groups with the broadcast of an interview with Khaled Meshaal, the Qatar-based head of the political arm of Hamas. The interview was aired on Al Arabiya, the Saudi state-controlled news channel. Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist group that controls Gaza, maintains relations with Iran and is viewed as being part of a Brotherhood network. Meshaal called for a resumption of relations between Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian movement.

In 2014, Saudi Arabia designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. This was part of a dispute between Qatar, a supporter of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, which had all withdrawn their ambassadors from Doha. The Saudis were particularly upset by the close relations that Hamas had forged with Iran and Turkey, Riyadh’s main rivals for regional hegemony.

A litmus test of the degree of change in Saudi Arabia’s attitude will be whether it releases scores of Hamas members. These members were arrested in 2019 as part of Saudi efforts to garner Palestinian support for then-US President Donald Trump’s controversial peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Quoting the Arabic service of Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency, Al-Monitor reported that Al Arabiya had  from broadcasting a segment of the interview in which Meshaal called for the release of the detainees.

Despite Differences

The Saudi–UAE rivalry and the ambitions of their leaders make it unlikely that Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed will look at structural ways of managing differences. This includes areas like greater regional economic integration through arrangements for trade and investment and an expanded customs union. The latter would make the region more attractive to foreign investors and improve the Gulf states’ bargaining power.

In the absence of strengthening institutions, the bets are on the crown princes recognizing that, despite their , “it doesn’t make sense for either one of them to let go of the other.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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This is a story that has long been in the public domain: In 2020, the Financial Action Task Force published a  that stated: “The UAE’s understanding of the risks it faces from money laundering, terrorist financing and funding of weapons of mass destruction is still emerging … The risks are significant, and result from the UAE’s extensive financial, economic, corporate and trade activities, including as a global leader in oil, diamond and gold ±đłć±č´Ç°ůłŮ˛ő.”

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In 2018, a UN  stated, “In every state [in the Economic Community of West African States region], it was reported that most of the gold exported from the region is destined for Dubai. Most of this gold is thought to be exported by plane; gold is thought to be smuggled, for the most part, out of the region through airports.”

The UAE authorities have been facing increasingly strenuous calls to clean up their bullion trade. In 2019, an International Crisis Group report  on them to ensure income from the gold trade is not used to finance terrorism. In December 2020, the UK Home Office national risk  stated: “These deficiencies expose the UAE, and other countries, to abuse by international controller networks which continue to launder the proceeds of crime to and from countries including the UK. These criminal networks exploit features of the UAE’s laws and systems, in order to move cash and gold easily into and out of the country, as well as engage in money laundering through the UAE property market, international trade, and newer areas such as crypto assets.”

Last year, the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), the world’s most influential gold market authority,  to stop UAE bullion from entering the mainstream market if it failed to meet regulatory standards. Since gold was the UAE’s&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č; export after oil in 2019, a trend that in a post-oil age looks only set to grow, the authorities responded by quickly pledging  for an LBMA initiative in December 2020 to crack down on illegal gold trading and improve regulation around issues like money laundering and unethical sourcing.

Gold Discovered in India

But recent developments in a court case in India are once again calling into question the UAE’s commitment to clean up its bullion trade. In June 2020, Indian customs over 30 kilograms of gold worth — at the official market rate — more than $2.1 million. The gold was found in diplomatic baggage addressed to the UAE Consulate-General Office in Thiruvananthapuram, the capital of the southern Indian state of Kerala; it had been  as bathroom fittings, noodles, biscuits and dates. The subsequent investigation has opened a Pandora’s Box of organized crime that has already led to around 30 , including a host of alleged facilitators, financiers, gold traders, former employees of the UAE Consulate and a principal secretary to the Kerala chief minister.

The National Investigation Agency (NIA), which is India’s counterterrorism task force, and at least four other central government agencies are now conducting separate but related investigations into a US  smuggling operation from Thiruvananthapuram airport to Cairo via Muscat. The operation was allegedly run by the former UAE Consulate Finance Department head, Khaled Ali Shoukry, an Egyptian national. The other investigations involve corrupt schemes related to various local government projects in Kerala, including the Wadakanchery LIFE Mission housing project, which is funded by the UAE Red Crescent, and the Kerala Infrastructure Investment Fund Board.

This is the first time UAE diplomats have ever been publicly implicated in gold smuggling. Emirati authorities have promised to cooperate, claiming they were duped by their Indian and Egyptian staff. But the former UAE consul general, Jamal Hussain al-Zaab, and Admin Attaché Rashed Khamis Ali Musaiqri both fled home last year before they could be questioned and are now claiming diplomatic immunity.

However, a steady stream of information has been coming to light through disclosures in Kerala High Court. The NIA  150 kilograms of gold was smuggled through Thiruvananthapuram airport in the last six months in a similar fashion, and most of the money was used for funding terrorism. According to  quoted in Indian media, over 20 such consignments allegedly came to India from Dubai since September 2019, around 19 of which were addressed to the UAE consul general and one was in the name of the admin attachĂ©. At the same time, senior Indian politicians linked to the case were enjoying five-star  to the UAE.

The Claims

In March, the political temperature rose significantly when two of the key accused, Indian nationals employed in the consular office,  that the UAE consul general was personally involved in the criminal enterprise. Swapna Suresh, formerly the consul general’s Arabic-language translator, and another employee, Sarith P.S.,  in an affidavit that the consul general, as well as several senior Indian politicians, were  of the gold and dollar smuggling activities and were coordinating illegal financial dealings under the cover of various projects run by the state government.

“Swapna and Sarith [the accused] stated that it was a common practice among foreign nationals, including diplomats working at UAE Consulate, to carry currency notes above permitted limits. We suspect that they were engaged in hawala activities to fund smuggling of gold from Dubai to Kerala. Similarly, they also smuggled goods from abroad using diplomatic privileges and sold them in the Kerala market. Many Indian employees of the consulate were aware of such activities and they will be questioned soon” an Indian customs official reportedly .

The UAE consul general, Swapna , split a 3-million UAE dirham ($817,000) commission for the Wadakkanchery project three ways between himself, Shoukry and her. Another accused claimed the consul general and Shoukry were carrying out illegal gold smuggling activities while working in the UAE Mission in  before coming to Thiruvananthapuram.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs recently issued permission to arraign the former consul general and admin attachĂ© who served at the UAE Consulate in Thiruvananthapuram. “Both of them assisted Swapna Suresh and Sarith PS to clear the baggage containing gold that arrived from the UAE. They also were receiving remuneration as per the quantity of gold smuggling on 21 occasions. They are equally involved as other accused persons,” an Indian customs official reportedly .

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The kingdom kicked off its effort to cement its position as the Middle East’s behemoth earlier this year. In February, Saudi Arabia announced it would  doing business by 2024 with international companies whose regional headquarters were not based in the country. 

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The UAE 16^th on the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business Index as opposed to Saudi Arabia at number 62. As a result, freewheeling Dubai has long been the preferred regional headquarters of international firms. The Saudi move “clearly targets the” United Arab Emirates and “challenges the status of Dubai,” said a UAE-based banker.

Saudi Arabia is a latecomer to the port control game, which is dominated by Dubai’s DP World. That company operates 82 marine and inland terminals in more than 40 countries, including Djibouti, Somaliland, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Cyprus. The kingdom’s expansion into port and terminal management appears to be less driven by geostrategic considerations. Instead, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT), backed by the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Saudi sovereign wealth fund, said it was targeting ports that would service vital Saudi imports, such as those related to food security.

In January, PIF and China’s Cosco Shipping Ports  bought a 20% stake in RSGT. The Chinese investment fits into Beijing’s larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which involves the acquisition of stakes in ports and terminals in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Oman and Djibouti, where China has a military base.

Jens Floe, the chief executive officer of RSGT, said the company planned to invest in at least three international ports in the next five years. He said each investment would be up to $500 million. “We have a focus on ports in Sudan and Egypt. They weren’t picked for that reason, but they happen to be significant countries for Saudi Arabia’s food security strategy,” Floe said.

Saudi Sports

Saudi Arabia’s increased focus on sports, including a possible bid to the 2030 World Cup, serves multiple goals. First, it offers Saudi youth, who account for more than half of the kingdom’s population, a leisure and entertainment opportunity. Second, it boosts Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s burgeoning development of a leisure and entertainment industry. The Saudis believe this could allow the kingdom to polish its image tarnished by human rights abuse, including the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, and challenge Qatar’s position as the face of Middle Eastern sports.

A recent  by Grant Liberty, a London-based human rights group that focuses on Saudi Arabia and China, estimated that Riyadh has invested $1.5 billion in the hosting of multiple sporting events. These include the final games of Italy and Spain’s top football leagues, Formula 1 races, boxing, wrestling and snooker matches, and golf tournaments. So far, Qatar is the Middle East’s leader in the hosting of sporting events, followed by the UAE.

According to Grant Liberty, further bids for events worth $800 million have failed. This did not include an  $600-million offer to replace Qatar’s beIN Sports as the Middle Eastern broadcaster of the UEFA Champions League. Saudi Arabia reportedly continues to ban beIN from airing in the kingdom, despite the lifting of the Saudi-Emirati-led diplomatic and economic of Qatar in January.

Oil Exports

Mohammed bin Salman’s&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č; plan to diversify and streamline the Saudi economy and ween it off dependency on oil exports “has set the creation of professional sports and a sports industry as one of its goals,” said , spokesperson for the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington. “The kingdom is proud to host and support various athletic and sporting events which not only introduce Saudis to new sports and renowned international athletes but also showcase the kingdom’s landmarks and the welcoming nature of its people to the world.”

The increased focus on sports comes as Saudi Arabia appears to be backing away from its intention to reduce the centrality of energy exports for its economy. Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, the crown prince’s brother, recently an International Energy Agency (IEA) report, saying “there is no need for investment in new fossil fuel supply” as “the sequel of the La La Land movie.” He went on to ask, “Why should I take [the report] seriously?”

Putting its money where its mouth is, Saudi Arabia intends to increase its oil production capacity from 12 million to more than 13 million barrels a day. This is based on the assumption that global efforts to replace fossil fuel with cleaner energy sources will spark sharp reductions in American and Russian production. The Saudis believe that demand in Asia for fossil fuels will continue to rise even if it drops in the West. Other Gulf producers, including the UAE and Qatar, are following a similar strategy.

“Saudi Arabia is no longer an oil country, it’s an energy-producing country … a very competitive energy country. We are low cost in producing oil, low cost in producing gas, and low cost in producing renewables and will definitely be the least-cost producer of hydrogen,” Prince Abdulaziz said. He appeared to be suggesting that the kingdom’s doubling down on oil was part of a strategy that aims to ensure that Saudi Arabia is a player in all conventional and non-conventional aspects of energy. By implication, he was saying that diversification was likely to broaden Saudi Arabia’s energy offering, rather than significantly reduce its dependence on energy exports.

“Sports, entertainment, tourism and mining alongside other industries envisioned in Vision 2030 are valuable expansions of the Saudi economy that serve multiple economic and non-economic purposes,” said a Saudi analyst. “It’s becoming evident, however, that energy is likely to remain the real name of the game.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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After almost four years of severed ties, in January led to the subsequent lifting of the blockade against Qatar and the formal restoration of relations. The resolution of the dispute is a positive regional development. However, it remains fragile because the issues that sparked the rift in the first place were never resolved.

It is therefore unlikely that the Gulf reconciliation will usher in a new beginning or bring about a return to pre-crisis normalcy. Deep-rooted mistrust between the Gulf countries, ongoing rivalries between them, divergence in their policies and geostrategic competition in Africa could trigger the next diplomatic crisis among member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Sudan’s Attempt to Play All Sides

Most Arab and sub-Saharan African states tried to resist pressure to join the anti-Qatar coalition and delicately maneuver their way into neutrality. These states were uneasy about their move because they feared that the Arab quartet would use their economic might against them. As a result, some African states cut or ties with Qatar.

Financial in Africa has helped GCC states capitalize on their geostrategic location, increase their food security and advance their diplomatic and security goals. By offering substantial economic , they have been able to bolster peace agreements between warring factions. Some GCC states have achieved notable success, growing influence and African allies that support their policies. Sudan is a case in point. In 2019, Saudi in Sudan were estimated at $12 billion, the UAE at $7 billion and Qatar at $4 billion, as per the Sudanese Bureau of Statistics. 

Due to Saudi Arabia’s large investments, Sudan the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen in 2015 by Rapid Support Forces and severing diplomatic with Iran. However, Bashir’s relationship with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi began stalling in the last few years of his rule. As part of the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s regional efforts to counter what they considered political Islam, Bashir was expected to root out Islamists in Sudan. However, since Islamists were deeply in Sudan’s government, he could not risk alienating them and did not oblige.

The Gulf dispute put Bashir in another uncomfortable position. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar were all key investors in Sudan and he could not afford to alienate any of them. Therefore, Bashir took the safest route of remaining while offering to between the opposing sides.

The Sudanese leader’s reaction to the Gulf rift was not surprising. Historically, he cooperated with all regional powers, never fully aligning with any of them. His hands-off approach and ability to easily switch from the role of an army leader to an advocate of political Islam, enabled Sudan to simultaneously ally with rival GCC camps. It seems that Bashir’s key goal was to benefit economically from all Gulf states.

Sudan Under the New Transitional Government

Unfortunately for Bashir, Sudan’s economy collapsed, nationwide erupted in December 2018 and none of his Gulf allies came to his rescue. The GCC states were probably influenced by growing uncertainty regarding Bashir’s future. Their goal was to protect their investments, not Bashir. Without GCC financial support, the Sudanese president found his days in power numbered.

In April 2019, Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed a that ended three decades of Bashir’s rule and led to the creation of a Transitional Military Council (TMC). The GCC duo promptly promised a staggering in aid to support the TMC. However, growing international pressure pushed the TMC to sign a power-sharing agreement with Sudan’s&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;pro-democracy movement. The TMC transferred to a sovereignty council for a transitional period. Elections to usher in a civilian-led government are in late 2023 or early 2024.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have vested interests in backing the Sudanese military and ensuring it maintains control of the political transition. Consequently, they continue to offer economic and humanitarian to Sudan. In return, the TMC has supported their war efforts in Yemen and, more recently, in Libya.

After the 2019 revolution, Sudan temporarily with Qatar, accusing it of supporting Islamists. Qatar had a close relationship with Bashir’s former ruling National Congress Party that drew the ire of the TMC. However, Qatar has since rebuilt its influence by supporting Sudan’s  from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST). In October 2020, Doha that a peace agreement had been brokered between the transitional government and rebel forces. Qatar has also provided much-needed relief.

Sudan remains a country of great economic and security importance to the world. It has an abundance of natural resources. The African Development Bank Group estimates that approximately 63% of Sudan’s land is but only 15-20% is under cultivation. This offers vast investment opportunities in agriculture. Sudan is also strategically located on the Red Sea just south of the Suez Canal, a key shipping passage for world trade.

Major Challenges and Future Scenarios

Sudan’s transitional government recently set its for 2021, which include a focus on the economy, peace, security, foreign relations and the ongoing democratic transition. However, the challenges facing the transitional government are dire. Foreign debt has risen to over and inflation has crossed . The country faces massive and chronic of bread, fuel and foreign currency. Sudan is in the throes of a complex power struggle between civilians and the military. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)  Sudan’s water security. Sudanese and Ethiopian troops have clashed at the border. If this was not daunting already, Sudan has registered nearly confirmed cases of COVID-19, as of April 9.

In response to some of these challenges, the transitional government has instituted seismic constitutional . After nearly three decades, the US Sudan from the SST list in January, eliminating a major hurdle to debt relief and bringing an end to the country’s isolation from global financial systems. However, the transitional government remains under pressure to deliver quick economic wins. If it fails, power may shift back toward the military. In these tough circumstances, the transitional government’s success and Sudan’s democratic future depend on outside financial support.

For Sudan, the Gulf crisis served as a minor inconvenience. The revolution and Sudan’s removal from the SST list are more significant developments. GCC states are now encountering a growing number of new regional and international players who are looking at Sudan with increased interest. This could very well cause a shift in Gulf–Sudan relations.

Although GCC states have a shared strategic interest in Sudan’s stability, this takes a back seat to alliances that promote the individual interests of these Gulf countries. They are all trying to increase their regional influence and are turning post-revolution Sudan into another theater of GCC rivalry. Given Sudan’s fragile economic and political situation, it needs financial support. Economic forces played a major role in the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime and will determine the survival of the transitional government.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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That formulation of the dynamics of a complex multilateral relationship reveals what may appear to be a less than diplomatic bias. Accusing one party of holding a hostage sounds like taking sides rather than playing the honest broker. Moreover, Grappo’s judgment may be premature when he evokes “Arab states” using the plural. The United Arab Emirates is only one state. The most influential nation in the region, Saudi Arabia, has remained prudently silent on the UAE’s initiative.

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Echoing the US claims that the deal to normalize relations between Israel and the UAE was a major step toward peace, Grappo asserts: “The UAE extracted one apparent concession from Jerusalem: [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu will suspend annexation plans for the West Bank.”

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Concession:

In diplomatic language, anything that can be presented as an impressive, painful sacrifice from one side that will be made highlighted even more emphatically if it entails no actual sacrifice

Example: “We tend to equate progress with concessions. We can no longer make that mistake.”

— , Oakland, 1968

Contextual Note

In an for Haaretz, Anshel Pfeffer underscores the one major problem with calling this a concession. “Netanyahu never had a real plan for annexing parts of the West Bank,” he writes. “There was no timetable, no map, no draft resolution to be brought to the government or the Knesset.”

Grappo does call the concession “apparent” while admiring Netanyahu’s “remarkable ability to advance Israel’s interests.” This translates as his ability to marginalize Palestinian interests. Grappo understands that the postponement of the annexation of Palestinian territory in the West Bank “is a mere short-term sop” and that “annexation will be a fact of life.”

In other words, the deal was shamefully one-sided and, as a negotiation, thoroughly meaningless. To consider it a negotiation would require believing that the UAE was bargaining in favor of the Palestinians’ interests. But its rulers care no more about the Palestinians than they do about the Yemenis, whose civilian populations they have been bombing for the past five years in partnership with Saudi Arabia.

Grappo gives an indication of his personal attitude to this complex question in a paragraph that contains a series of what might be called “attitude tropes.” He tells us Ramallah should “get on with it … while there’s still some chance for an independent Palestinian state.” Americans are prone to judge even moral issues in terms of the cost of wasted time. The rhetoric continues with the complaint that “previous Arab conditions to the normalization of ties with Israel have exceeded their shelf life.” What could be more insulting to Palestinians than comparing what is for them an existential question to the presentation of perishable consumer products?

Grappo then offers this unfounded assertion: “Arab states are moving on.” This is only marginally different and slightly more diplomatic than Elon Musk’s recent tweet defending US foreign policy: “We will coup whoever we want. Deal with it.” Grappo continues by offering this avuncular advice to the Palestinians: “[President Mahmoud] Abbas and the Palestinians need to do the same.” He menacingly warns that even a Joe Biden victory in the US presidential election “won’t change this.”

Marwan Bishara, Al Jazeera’s senior political analyst, sees things differently. He the UAE’s initiative in these terms: “The agreement rewards US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for their protracted assault on the Palestinians over the past four years.” Trita Parsi, a Middle East specialist at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a knowledgeable Arab official: “This was something that the UAE did in order to be able to help Trump with re-election.”

Bishara makes an important point that Grappo prefers to ignore or dismiss. “Once signed, and implemented, [the deal] is likely to embolden Netanyahu‘s coalition, deepen Israel‘s occupation [of Palestinian territory] and strengthen Israel‘s alliance with Arab autocrats,” Bishara writes. If true, that can hardly be a recipe for future peace.

Parsi and others have noted of the deal that “the Arab street sees it as a betrayal of the Palestinians.” This may be the best explanation for Saudi Arabia’s silence. Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia and its de facto ruler, can’t afford to provoke his own people any more than his outrageously autocratic behavior has already done. As with any population — Belarus, for example — there is a point at which even an authoritarian rule begins to crack.

Moreover, as The Indian Express out, though Mohammed bin Salman is almost certainly on board with the US-Israel–UAE alliance, “as the leader of the Arab world, and the custodian of Islam’s holiest shrines, [Saudi Arabia] might have preferred someone else to take the revolutionary first step on this.” And most commentators seem not to have noticed another factor. This new alliance reinforces the already growing role of Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, as the top strategic leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It propels the UAE into a stronger geopolitical position within the Arabian Peninsula that could eclipse troubled Saudi Arabia.

This is occurring at the same time as when Mohammed bin Salman’s image has taken a new hit. The crown prince is being in the US by former Saudi intelligence officer Saad al-Jabri for an attempt on his life, similar to the assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in 2018.

Historical Note

Marwan Bishara reminds his readers of the UAE’s recent role in Middle Eastern history. He calls the UAE “the most pro-war in the region, rivalled only by Israel.” Created in 1971, this young nation’s political actions over the past decade have been marked by its government’s increasingly aggressive bellicosity. “The UAE and Saudi Arabia’s opposition to the Arab Spring [in 2011] and to any form of democracy in the region, and their deep hostility towards all popular, progressive, liberal or Islamist movements, put them at the helm of counter revolutionary forces throughout the Middle East and North Africa,” Bishara reminds us.

So, if the UAE’s interest isn’t the furthering of the prospects of peace in the eastern Mediterranean, what is its goal? Bishara describes it as an act of “â€�bandwagoning’ with Israel and the United States, in the hope of establishing a trilateral US-Israeli–Arab strategic alliance to contain Turkey’s influence and tame or destroy the Iranian regime.”

Trita Parsi adds that the GCC is counting on the continued presence of the US military in the region, which Saudi Arabia’s best friend, Donald Trump, has in the past promised to reduce. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and their allies see it as their security umbrella. They know that an increasingly disunited and despotically-managed GCC cannot handle it on its own. Israel is part of that umbrella. The region is thus divided between countries and peoples that either actively seek the maintenance of a US military presence or that, on the contrary, wish to see it removed from their lands after decades of strife. On this issue, the governments and their own populations are often at odds.

Bishara offers a challenge to those who, like Gary Grappo, celebrate the touted “breakthrough” announced by Trump. “Those celebrating the â€�historical peace agreement’ may soon discover it is nothing more than a drive towards another regional conflict or worse, war,” Bishara writes. This difference of appreciation merits a debate, and it’s a debate that goes beyond the relationship between two Middle Eastern nations, with wide-ranging geopolitical significance. 51łÔąĎ is an open platform to continue the debate.

For decades, US diplomacy has adopted a model that seeks primarily to get the economic and political elites of a range of willing nations to agree strategically on their common interests and form the kind of loose alliance that promises to maintain some kind of general order in the world. Grappo’s analysis conforms perfectly to that model. The model works on one of two conditions: that the government and its people agree on the direction of that policy, or that the government wields the authoritarian power that can stifle opposition by the people.

The first case is rare and, when it exists, requires careful management. The second represents the norm, particularly in the Middle East. The careful management it requires focuses on the needs of the elite and, in most cases, leaves in the background the expectations of the people. That is how the new Israeli-UAE alliance came into being and why it merits the positive appreciations of Western media outlets that are willing to see it as an overture to peace.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The recent strengthening of Indonesia–UAE ties was demonstrated when President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo  Abu Dhabi in mid-January and signed 16 agreements with the UAE’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed. The deals, which are deemed as the biggest in Indonesian history, consist of five government-to-government agreements in the fields of religion, education, agriculture, health and counterterrorism. They also involve 11 business-to-business deals in various sectors, including oil and gas, petrochemicals, ports, telecommunications and research. The estimated total value of this investment stands at $22.9 billion, or about 314.9 trillion rupiahs.

Changing Relations

Although Indonesia was not one of the UAE’s major consumers for energy previously, this may soon change. This fact was showcased by a $270-million  on liquefied petroleum gas between Indonesia’s state-owned energy corporation PT Pertamina and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The two companies, along with the UAE’s investment vehicle, Mubadala, also  a memorandum of understanding (MoU) titled, â€śEvaluat[ing] a Potential Crude to Petrochemical Complex Project at Balongan” in West Java worth $12.6 billion.

Those agreements were also  by another $3-billion long-term deal on naphtha supply between ADNOC and PT Chandra Asri Petrochemical Tbk. These developments were perhaps caused by the  in energy demands among the UAE’s usual consumers, such as China and the US, due to the coronavirus lockdowns around the world.

Another important sector that Indonesia and the UAE agreed to boost their cooperation is defense, which has been the major highlight in the two countries’ ties in recent years. In February, when the deadly coronavirus was spreading fast around the world, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto  to Abu Dhabi to meet with the UAE’s Minister of State for Defense Mohammed Ahmed al-Bowardi to strengthen defense diplomacy between the two countries.

Besides defense diplomacy, Subianto also explored potential cooperation on the manufacturing of drones, weaponries, munitions and aerospace. The visit between the two top defense officials also focused on cross-training in counterterrorism operations and their application in hot spots throughout the Middle East and Africa. 

It is important to note that the UAE opened up a defense attachĂ© office in Jakarta in December 2019. At that time, Malian Prime Minister Boubou Cisse and Malian Ambassador to the UAE Boukary Sidibe  with Bowardi to discuss Emirati and Indonesian assistance to Mali and the rest of the G5 Sahel nations. This expansion of military-to-military relations across the Sahel by the UAE is illustrative of Abu Dhabi’s scope of transregional operations, which will grow further in the wake of the UAE’s pandemic assistance.

Beyond energy and defense sectors, Jakarta and Abu Dhabi  their aim to partner in promoting a moderate understanding of Islam which, according to the two sides, “is very important for efforts to prevent extremism and terrorism.” This collaboration was marked by the signing of an MoU by Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs and the UAE’s General Authority for Islamic Affairs and Endowment.

The UAE’s Soft Power

The partnership will  exchanging experiences developing the capacity of imams and preachers in boosting the UAE’s&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č; â€śtolerance and moderation” concept, as well as sharing experiences and expertise in the field of Quran memorization, translation and publication. Both countries also agreed to exchange delegates in Islamic forums and to cooperate in the construction of mosques. Indonesia has closed all mosques in the country as part of its measures to curb the spread of the coronavirus, and it has  services and educational lessons via the internet. In one sense, this falls within the idea of Islamic boarding schools, except it is online and to a wide audience.

Accordingly, the UAE has  to build the Mohammed bin Zayed Grand Mosque in Solo, Central Java, that will enable scholars, politicians and academics from both nations to discuss ways to reinforce religious moderation. Indonesia and the UAE also  to cooperate in implementing digital education programs for madrasa students and to strengthen their partnership in the halal food sector.

The overall purpose of this Emirati soft power effort is building up the  of the Abrahamic house, where Christianity, Islam and Judaism exist together under one roof and to use that principle to guide religious discussion between the two countries in terms of “tolerance and moderation.”

Recently, as part of the agreement’s implementation, Indonesia’s National Standardization Agency (BSN)  a deal with the Emirates Authority for Standardization and Metrology to recognize each other’s&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;halal certificates. Such a partnership is aimed at enabling Indonesian products to reach the UAE’s market, and vice-versa.

Certainly, the UAE’s latest COVID-19 assistance to Indonesia was just the latest development in the growing Jakarta–Abu Dhabi relations in recent years. Since 1976, the two governments have witnessed remarkable, yet silent, growth in their two-way relationship. In 2020, these moves by the UAE are part of expanding the country’s soft power policy.

One important development that is often missed is that Jokowi has  to appoint Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed as a member of a steering board for his new capital plan, alongside Softbank CEO Masayoshi Son and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

Looking for Other Partners

Against the backdrop of any potential economic downturn in China as well as the US and Europe caused by Beijing’s&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;trade war with Washington and now the coronavirus pandemic, many countries — including the UAE and Indonesia — have tried to find alternative partners. Indonesia’s geographical position as Southeast Asia’s biggest economy and a G20 member makes it an alluring target for investment. With a population of more than 267 million, Indonesia is an enticing consumer market for Emirati exports. This factor is why the UAE’s investment in the Indonesia archipelago is the most dominant among Gulf Arab countries, according to Indonesia’s&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), which has  a representative office in Abu Dhabi. 

At the same time, Indonesia’s&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;strategic location offers the Emirates an opening to boost its ties with other countries that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc. In particular, the UAE’s relationship with neighboring Malaysia is problematic, given previous issues between Abu Dhabi and Kuala Lumpur on issues ranging from Islamic affairs to financial issues involving the 1MBD investigation. By tightening their relationship, both Abu Dhabi and Jakarta can put pressure on Kuala Lumpur’s Islamic â€śâ€ť regarding political issues such as Kashmir and Islamophobia. However, all three nations complement each other in terms of mil-to-mil relations.

For Indonesia, long-standing , which has grown amid the COVID-19 pandemic, has presented difficulty for China, which is one of Indonesia’s largest investors. Consequently, bolstering relations with fellow Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East is seen as a safer option by Jakarta. The China-US trade war has driven some firms to choose Southeast Asian nations over China as a base for their operations, but few have opted for Indonesia, causing Jakarta to look to the Gulf.

To be clear, COVID-19 has provided Indonesia and the UAE with a chance to enhance their bilateral relations at a critical time in transregional relationships. The UAE will remain important to Indonesia as a country in the Gulf that can serve as a gateway to new markets as well as a major hub for the largest Muslim-majority country’s expansion throughout the greater Middle East. Assistance from Abu Dhabi could steer its ties with Indonesia in a more strategic direction.

*[ is a partner institution of 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Pragmatic countries eying long-term economic sustainability know they must invest in technology amid an expected explosion of artificial intelligence (AI). According to a by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), AI adoption will account for 45% of the world economy’s total gains by 2030. The “greatest economic gains” from AI will be in China, estimated at a 26% boost to GDP, and North America with about 14.5%. PwC says this is the “equivalent to a total of $10.7 trillion and accounting for almost 70% of the global economic impact.”

There is a sense of competition between cities around the world. At Collision, one of North America’s biggest startup conferences on tech that took place in May, venture capitalists (VC) discussed where is the best place to invest. The event took place in Toronto for the first time, yet another sign of how the Canadian city is becoming a key player in this highly competitive sector.

At one session I attended, bosses from top tech cities such as San Francisco, New York, London, Amsterdam or even countries like Israel pitched their localities as the places to be. The main criteria revolved around concentration of talents, the proper ecosystems backed by education institutes or simply quality of life.

As a journalist who has lived in both the United Arab Emirates and Canada, I believe it’s worth taking a look at both countries to compare the industry.

AI IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Apart from Israel, there is not much mention of any other Middle Eastern country as a key place to invest in. This is due to the low level of patents in a region that excels in pushing its talent abroad due to conflicts, political suppression and among other factors needed for economic development.

What’s interesting is that, in March, Emirati media outlets reported that Dubai is ranked first globally in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) for AI and robots, citing figures from the Dubai Technology Entrepreneurship Campus (Dtec), a tech hub by the Dubai Silicon Oasis Authority (DSOA). It was also prepared in collaboration with ArabNet and startAD. The former is a Beirut-based organization focused on tech business and innovation in the Middle East and North Africa, and the latter is the innovation and entrepreneurship platform anchored at NYU Abu Dhabi.

As reported by the , Dubai attracted $21.6-billion worth of FDI in high-end technology transfers — AI and robotics — between 2015 and 2018. Most of this came from the member states of the European Union and the United States, $5.7 billion and $3.9 billion respectively. The authors of the article mention that — with AI expected to account for 45% of the global economy’s gains by 2030 — the projected annual growth of AI to the UAE is 33.5%. This is followed by Saudi Arabia at 31.3%, the rest of the Arabian Peninsula at 28.8% and Egypt at 25.5%.

THE CANADIAN TECH INDUSTRY

When compared to Ontario, the Canadian province has raised nearly $1 billion by AI companies from 2015 to 2018, according to figures supplied by the Canadian Ministry of Economic Development, Job Creation and Trade. These investments refer to all types of private and public capital, including VC funds, grants, mergers and acquisitions, and other types of private investments.

Yet Toronto absolutely wins over Dubai in terms of its diverse talent, solid tech ecosystem, innovation and, most importantly, its political stability backed by its Canadian culture and values. These are not only attractive for skilled migrants, but even for Americans who are escaping the populist President Donald Trump — the latter point was evidently made at the Collision conference.

Since 2016, Google, Uber, Adobe, Autodesk, Samsung, LG, Fujitsu, Huawei, Accenture and Etsy have all opened an AI research and development lab in Toronto. Suburbs in the Greater Toronto Area, especially Markham, have also managed to attract big names such as IBM. In 2018, opened a technical center in the same . York Region, which Markham belongs to, already has the “” of tech companies in Canada.

FLYING TAXIS IN DUBAI

But one thing Dubai is probably doing that’s garnering the attention of foreign investment is the ease of experimentation, less regulation and the government’s willingness to amend regulations once it sees opportunity. For example, in 2017, Dubai an unmanned two-seater drone designed to transport people autonomously. The Autonomous Air Taxi (AAT), which the UAE claimed would be the world’s first “self-flying taxi service,” is by a specialist German manufacturer called that has Daimler and Intel as investors.At the time, the Roads and Transport Authority of Dubai expected the trial run — in tandem with issuing legislation required to operate the unmanned flying vehicles — to take place in about five years. But with Volocopter hungry to unleash its first air taxi by the end of 2019, it announced on May 23 that it had entered a partnership with the UK-based vertiport owner and operator Skyports, with plans to the first-ever Volo-Port in Singapore by the end of this year.

While Singapore, the first state in Asia to release a framework on ethical use of AI, seems to be stealing Dubai’s thunder in having the world’s flying taxi make its actual debut, the UAE continues to be relentless. In April, the UAE cabinet launched a national strategy for artificial intelligence. As usual, the overly ambitious UAE is planning to position itself as a global leader in AI by 2031, according to the government.

Also, as diplomatic tensions continue between the West and China over Huawei, a leading Chinese tech company that has faced accusations of being a , the UAE is inching closer to take the lead for the (OBOR) initiative. The OBOR is a trade strategy by Beijing to revive the countries that line the ancient Silk Road. To take advantage of what China’s plan has to offer, the UAE has axed visa requirements for Chinese nationals and wants its share from a $15-billion Chinese tech fund announced last year.

In Canada, where startups are in need of venture capital, there are some impressive companies, including the Canadian-Israeli firm SkyX that uses long-range drones backed with AI sensors to check oil pipelines. Based in Markham, SkyX founder Didi Horn is a former Israeli fighter pilot, and Canada has managed to snap him.

Most importantly, the country’s first publicly-owned (DDC) in the field has tested its equipment in remote areas. Ron Struthers, a specialist on drone stocks, has DDC’s drone as “leaping ahead of any competition [such as Google and Amazon, who are both developing their own drones] with a new long range and heavy pay load drone.” But after new Canadian regulations on drones in January,ĚýDDC asked for more regulatory “flexibility,” giving a glimpse of how Canada has succeeded in attracting the likes of Horn but not Volocopter.

UAE WILL ATTRACT BIG AI FIRMS

Although Dubai was unable to keep hold of Volocopter for it to make the global debut in the United Arab Emirates, its vision and flexibility will at least enable it to arrive in the Middle East. Indeed, it is without a doubt that the UAE will continue to make international headlines.

In fact, the Dubai-based ride-hailing firm Careem, which uses AI technology, is in the process of being acquired by industry giant Uber for $3.1 billion, with $1.7 billion being in convertible notes and $1.4 billion in cash. The UAE, the first in the world to create a ministry for AI, is also pushing forward with gusto to create a solid AI ecosystem at home, which will bring in the big names over the long-run. In March, the country put forward $408 million to build “new generation” Emirati schools. These schools will include design and robotics labs as well as AI facilities. This could be part of the national investment in AI, which has reached $2.5 billion in the past decade, according to a recent by Microsoft and Ernst and Young.

As the United Arab Emirates takes the lead in the Middle East and bolsters its base, its chances in bringing the world’s leading AI firms will surely increase.

*[ is a partner institution of 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In June 2017, a group of countries led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates formed a diplomatic and economic blockade against the state of Qatar. Yet rather than bringing Qatar to its knees, the crisis has benefited the tiny Gulf nation in numerous ways. The siege has forced Doha to diversify its relations regionally and globally to gain independence from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s spheres of influence.

Qatar, a gas-rich Arab emirate, has reassured the world that regardless of the embargo, its economy has not been affected and it is ripe for investment. In fact, Qatari citizens have not particularly felt the impact of the blockade. Rather, it is — making up % of the country’s population — who have been hit the most for a number of reasons.

First, at the outset of the crisis in 2017, Qatari employers living in Arab countries enforcing the embargo were deported and forced to put business operations on hold. This meant South Asian construction workers were stranded in the Gulf. Second, foreign workers — especially from South Asia — primarily comprise the blue-collar working class in Qatar, so they were disproportionately harmed when the blockade caused material shortages and closed construction sites. Third, because migrant workers are often paid low salaries, even the slightest increase in food prices can immensely impair their standard of living.

Meanwhile, the state itself has triumphed over the blockade’s economic impact. By November 2018, Qatar was no longer spending any of its financial reserves to offset the embargo’s deleterious effects and, as a result, its economic prospects seem promising.

The Economy and Al-Udeid

Ironically, Qatar owes its current success to the Saudi-led coalition’s economic and diplomatic severance. Had it not been for the blockade, Qatar would not have been so incentivized to fortify its global reputation. While and grants won over many policy officials and academics, Qatar most efficaciously solidified a positive relationship with the US by intensifying America’s military dependence on the country.

In Qatar’s al-Udeid airbase, the US has a forward listening post on Iran, US Central Command operating headquarters and a Gulf-based launching pad to wage its military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The Qataris used the airbase to counter US President Donald Trump’s pro-Saudi foreign policy. Doha to expand al-Udeid’s resources and upgrade Hamad Port for use by the US Navy, all in exchange for a closer relationship with Washington.

Additionally, it was the very embargo intended to incapacitate Qatar’s economy that led to its prosperity and diversification. To compensate for severed economic ties with other Gulf states — including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain — Doha sought innovative ways to attract international business and foreign direct investment (FDI). Now, companies are to operate in Qatar because it has “a legal environment based on English common law, the right to trade in any currency, 100 percent foreign ownership, 100 percent repatriation of profits and a 10 percent corporate tax on locally sourced profits.”

Even pre-existing firms that wanted to maintain their Qatari clientele contributed to Doha’s financial success. These companies had to relocate their businesses to the country, thereby increasing FDI and local jobs in Qatar. Despite the embargo, FDI to Qatar by 4% in 2017, and the number of new companies licensed to operate in in the country by 66% in the same year.

The Saudi-led blockade has also contributed to Qatar’s self-sufficiency. Along with foreign direct investment, the domestic production of medicine and agricultural products has grown significantly.

For example, Qatar decided toĚýĚýsecurity throughĚý, a company that has become the country’s largest locally-owned fresh dairy and beverage supplier. Driven by the impossibility of importing foods from nearby countries, the Qatari government implemented Baladna and other infrastructure projects to cope with the desert landscape. These initiatives use innovative solutions to transform the arid landscape into fruitful agricultural land, which is much more than what other Gulf states can boast about.

Due to its newfound economic vigor and weighty relationships in the global community, Doha is rising to regional prominence, even threatening Saudi and Emirati hegemony in the Gulf. Equipped with financial stability and independence from its neighbors’ agendas, Doha provided $500 million to , $150 million to civil servants in and additional aid to at the beginning of 2019. Unlike other Gulf states, Qatar does not have to abide by the economic rules of the Saudi and Emirati-led (GCC). Instead, it can undermine this hierarchy by distributing regional aid to places like Lebanon, where Saudi Arabia has been working to counter , an Iran-backed political, military and social organization.

Jamal Khashoggi and Human Rights

Qatar’s uprooting of the status quo is well-timed, thereby increasing the odds of its successful ascension to regional prominence. Surviving its own defamation at the hands of the Saudi-led coalition, Qatar can now bask in the condemnation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has been criticized for the war in Yemen, the incarceration of women’s rights activists and the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Similarly, the UAE clings onto its credibility after a British graduate student, Matthew Hedges, for spying despite the lack of clear evidence. So long as these besmirched Saudi and Emirati reputations persist, Qatar will have the opportunity — not just the financial means — to secure its status as a key regional player.

Of course, no country has a perfect human rights record and Qatar is no exception. In March 2016, a by Amnesty International found that migrant workers building the Khalifa International Stadium in Doha for the 2022 FIFA World Cup had “suffered systematic abuses, in some cases forced labour.” While the country officially amended its sponsorship system for foreign workers , it has still faced from human rights organizations.

Mediating between the US and Iran

Even more surprisingly, the coalition inadvertently pushed Qatar and Iran closer. Fearful of Doha’s openness to Iran, the Saudi-led coalition enforced a trade and travel embargo on the Qataris back in 2017. This led to a loss of imports and the in countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia to all Qatari-registered aircraft. However, the blockade cemented relations between Iran and Qatar as the Iranians made up for lost trade and helped Doha devise new .

Although, amid current tensions between the US and Iran over the failure of the nuclear deal that was agreed in 2015, the embargo has also brought Qatar closer to Washington. Due to lobbying efforts, financial grants and the developments at al-Udeid airbase, the relationship between Qatar and the US has never been better. Uniquely situated in the good graces of both Iran and the US, Qatar could serve as an indispensable mediator between the two. Just recently, Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani placated Iranian concerns about new US military deployments to the Middle East. As by Mark Perry in The American Conservative: “It’s likely, as this writer has been told by senior Pentagon officers, that al-Thani brought just the opposite message: that the new deployments are not a preparation for war, but an attempt to prevent it.”

At the end of May, Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz hosted a triple summit in Mecca for Arab and Muslim leaders. Despite the ongoing embargo, he invited Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani to attend, which was aimed at establishing a diplomatic consensus on regional issues, including Iran. Although the emir did not travel to Mecca, opting to send the Qatari prime minister instead, his unexpected invitation lends credence to the idea that Qatar is an invaluable asset in diffusing tensions between Iran and its adversaries.

Despite lacking the coercive force of a large state, Qatar boasts a trifecta of close relations with Washington and Tehran, influence in US circles and recent negotiating success. In February and March, Doha the longest round of peace talks between the US and the Taliban to date. Although no agreements were finalized, Qatar facilitated unprecedented strides toward peace in Afghanistan, giving Doha the image of a potential peacemaker between the US and Iran.

Two years after the Gulf crisis began, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have nothing to show for their coalition’s efforts to pressure Qatar into surrendering. Rather than folding to its GCC neighbors, Doha has challenged the Saudis and Emiratis. Qatari economic successes, coupled with Saudi and Emirati reputational shortcomings, provide further opportunity for Doha to continue rising to regional prominence.

*[ is a partner institution of 51łÔąĎ. A previous version of this article incorrectly stated that Baladna raises livestock. Updated: June 12, 2019.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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As a business leader and property developer in the United Arab Emirates, I have seen our geographically tiny nation develop a wide global influence. To manage this power responsibly and conscientiously takes both an understanding of the country’s needs, along with those of the world at large.

Few know this fact more intimately than the nation’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, known as Sheikh Mohammed. For over a decade, his leadership has been marked by a strong consciousness about the UAE’s unique place in the world, and its responsibility to set an example through a strong economy, partnerships, anti-terrorism and philanthropy.

As chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council, the crown prince oversees all that happens within the borders of his continually growing nation.

Leadership in Prosperity

The UAE, blessed with substantial fossil fuel reserves, is forever seeking to grow beyond this ephemeral source of capital and enhance its position in the international order. To that end, bold plans have been enacted, such as .

Launched in 2010, the aim of Vision 2021 is to cement the UAE as a leader in the Middle East and worldwide by developing a formidable knowledge economy, one not beholden to oil reserves but centering true, permanent leadership in education and finance. In Sheikh Mohammed’s , the people of his country “are the real wealth, not the 3 million barrels of oil.”

New York University Abu Dhabi, opened in 2010, represents perhaps the Emirates’ most noteworthy step toward international educational preeminence. The keynote speech from Bill Clinton to the inaugural graduating class set the tone for this new generation of leaders, uniquely prepared to help bring the vision of a better world into reality.

Leadership in International Relations

One of the ways to ensure the economic viability of the United Arab Emirates is to forge and sustain strong relations with partner countries. The UAE’s international stance is important not just in the Middle East, but in terms of the world at large. For the nation to reach the goals of Vision 2021 and beyond, its place in the international order must be unyieldingly firm.

The principles of diplomacy put in place by Sheikh Mohammed’s predecessor, Sheikh Zayed, have held strong and been the foundation for the future. The UAE is to be a partner and friend to fellow global leaders, and the cooperation-based partnerships built and grown on his watch are the pathway to a more peaceful world, equipped to handle any problem laid before it.

Partnerships with nations like the US, the UK, France, China, South Korea and many more — not to mention its fellow Arab states — make the UAE ever-ready to engage in constructive international endeavors.

Leadership in Safety

As a leading figure in the Middle East, Sheikh Mohammed has taken a powerful and principled stance against forces seeking to do harm. While the UAE itself has extremely low , the international order depends on leading figures to keep a watchful eye on malevolent forces that pass within their purview.

An unmistakable part of 20th-century leadership is ensuring the safety of citizens from the nefarious forces behind international terrorism, drug trafficking and other destructive actions. In this regard, the crown prince has proudly taken a leading stance, overseeing one of the Middle East’s most formidable anti-terror frameworks. Recognized by the UN as aĚý, the UAE stands firm against those who wish to do harm to the peaceful citizens of the world.

Prevention being a vital form of anti-terror action, the 2012 establishment of theĚýĚýin Abu Dhabi stands as a monument to the UAE’s commitment to ending large-scale violence by fostering a peaceful international order.

Leadership in Philanthropy

Charitable endeavors, especially for a nation as prosperous as the UAE, must always be a leading concern. To achieve the goal of uplifting those in need, Sheikh Mohammed has been a continual example of generosity and support. Whether fighting disease or threats to nature, his work has always been toward preserving and protecting the good in the world.

In partnership with the Gates Foundation, the crown prince has to the delivery of lifesaving vaccines to impoverished children in the Middle East. His commitment to curing destructive disease goes even further, with aĚýĚýto the fight against debilitating polio infections. Every child deserves a life unencumbered by disease, and these efforts are helping the international community reach that goal.

Extending his mission to protect the vulnerable, Sheikh Mohammed established hisĚýĚýto sustain animal populations worldwide. The fund provides necessary support for conservation initiatives around the world, with an additional goal of increasing awareness of these crucial causes. A generosity of spirit distinguishes these goals, which fit well into the overall drive of the UAE: to leverage the good fortune into being a leading force in a more free and sustainable world.

A geographically small nation with grand importance on the world stage, the United Arab Emirates combines international prominence with a conscious focus on what’s simultaneously best for its people and the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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As the world’s media has once again picked up on theĚýĚýof Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s involvement in the brutal murder of journalistĚý, another story is receiving scant attention.

Alya Abdulnoor is a young Emirati woman who was arrested in July 2015 and eventually charged with financing international terrorist groups, though the only evidence presented was a record of websites she had visited. Abdulnoor was not politically active; she was concerned about the impact of the civil war in Syria on women and children and had been collecting donations on their behalf.

When she was arrested, Abdulnoor was already suffering from cancer. She was detained in an unknown place for four months, according to the Geneva-based International Centre for Justice and Human Rights (ICJHR). She was subjected to torture and forced to sign a false confession that was used to convict her. This is standard practice in the United Arab Emirates; it was used against the acclaimed human rights activistĚýĚýand the noted academic Nasser bin Ghaith, as well as dozens of other political prisoners.

In May 2018, a voice recording was smuggled out of Al Wathba prison, in the Emirati capital Abu Dhabi, and given to the ICJHR. In it, Abdulnoor detailed how she was exposed to torture, continuously intimidated and deprived of adequate medical care. Even though she was diagnosed with a recurrence of cancer shortly after her arrest, for several years the authorities did nothing to alleviate or treat the disease. She was eventually moved to a specialist hospital, but only after the cancer had spread throughout her body and she was unable to stand or walk without assistance.

On January 10, the ICJHR , Abdulnoor was moved against medical advice to a non-specialist hospital. When her family was able to visit her on January 21, she was under heavy guard in a windowless room without ventilation. She was chained to her bed.

The family has repeatedly requested that she be allowed home to die, citing federal legislation that allows such a practice, but the authorities have rejected all their requests. The family believes the move to the second hospital and the appalling treatment she is being subjected to is a punishment for their efforts.

The ICJHR notes: “Alya Abdulnoor is still denied basic hygiene care and adequate medical attention despite her critical condition now that cancer has reached her brain, her liver, lungs and her bones, making her pain unbearable. Despite the repeated requests of the family, the [Emirati] authorities are still refusing to deliver a medical report on Alya’s current state of health.”

Let Her Go Home

Stop for a moment and think about what the authorities in a country that Britain is happy to call a good friend and ally are doing to a dying woman and her family. It is extraordinarily cruel and happens only because the crown prince and effective ruler of the UAE — Mohammed bin Zayed — believes that, like his Saudi counterpart, he can behave with impunity, emboldened by the certainty that we will raise no objections. He is able to conduct his inhumane business in the shadows.

The Abu Dhabi crown prince has also largely escaped global criticism for the conduct of the UAE in Yemen, unlike Mohammed bin Salman, who is rightly held responsible for an aerial war that has killed of civilians. However, the Emiratis, too, have much to answer for. Among other charges, they stand accused of carrying out mass torture, including rape inĚýĚýset up by them in the south of Yemen. Yet that has had far too little international exposure and condemnation.

Alistair Burt, the UK’s minister of state for the Middle East, has aĚýwarm relationshipĚýwith the UAE’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash. Writing in an Emirati newspaper in 2017, Burt had about their relationship: “It would be wrong to suggest that we see eye-to-eye on everything, but the depth of the relationship means that serious questions can be raised without fear, and positions better understood to mutual benefit.”

Minister, I ask you now and as a matter of extreme urgency to raise the case of Alya Abdulnoor with your Emirati counterpart. Tell Dr. Gargash to allow her to go home to die.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Much has been written and speculated about life in the Middle East and North Africa. Some have experienced the love of being in a culture steeped in history and ancient folklore, romantic tales and strong cultural traditions. Others either love or loathe the contrast of modern cities like Dubai or Doha. These people simply prefer to submerge themselves in the hustle and bustle of everyday life, and join in the globalized “rat race” just like you would in any other major world city.

So, what makes the Middle East so enigmatic? What makes some people come for a holiday of a lifetime to satisfy their geographical curiosity and then never want to leave?

In a word: change. Over the past two decades, the Middle East has witnessed unprecedented levels of change. Not a single person—young or old, male or female—can escape the reality of being confronted with this on a daily basis. From the construction of iconic infrastructure in the region’s cities to the multicultural mesh of societal idiosyncrasies, constant change is an augmented feature of everyday life.

Arguably, the most perplexing example of change has been in the workplace. Many Middle Eastern societies—particularly in the Gulf Cooperation Council—have, in a relatively short space of time, been showcased on the world stage. This has been very positive for the economy, leading to a plethora of opportunities. Undoubtedly, this has projected an intense and unaccustomed spotlight on many areas of our societies, including education, culture, religion and economics.

Many people outside the Middle East have become increasingly curious and intrigued by such achievements, which for them appear as if they had emerged almost in a blink of an eye. Those achievements are now being benchmarked against the more familiar ones of developed nations.

With an expanding economy in a postcolonial world, we are reminded that for a long time the West has been thriving on what were, initially, resources borrowed from our immense academic and scientific contributions to the world. After all, Iraq was the cradle of world civilization, and now it is time to remind ourselves of our great history once again. It is time to tap into hidden reserves each and every one of us possesses in our own field and social function to once again be great.

The Contribution of Women in the Middle East and North Africa

One particular source of intellectual capability has been the contribution of women and the active role they play in society and in the workforce.

Women have been active in one of the most profound contexts of change. I say that with the greatest sense of pride, having been part of and witness to some of the most challenging initiatives seen in recent history. Organizations on all levels are restructuring, redefining, rebranding, growing and constantly innovating.

It is perplexing trying to think how the diversification of the economy away from a reliance on oil has challenged society to the extent that not only have companies and individuals embraced change, but in so doing they have smashed the glass ceiling, helping to pave the way for innovation and transformation of self and the community at large. And it’s not just in the Gulf. Across the Middle East and North Africa, similar challenges have been witnessed, maybe less publicized.

Despite the varying degrees of adversities women face, there is a common thread that aligns their professional and social goals—that is vision and a perpetuating self-belief of their own capabilities. This has, however, come at a cost for many where the risks in navigating opportunities are not apparent, and the bureaucratic policies that fail to mitigate those factors, in fact, compound matters beyond one’s individual control.

This comes hand in hand with the need to be resilient. Having learnt this from my own personal journey, the need to be resilient is one of the hardest competencies to master in light of constant change. The exposure on the world platform has undoubtedly created unprecedented opportunities. On the other hand, it has also highlighted many critical areas for development. Yet most observers agree that women’s role in the workplace and in society is notably helping to build bridges between the labor market requirements and education, paving new roads to success.

In this interdisciplinary, inter-gender context, the role of women in the workplace has its own history. The cases range from women being largely disenfranchised to achieving financial and social liberation and almost everything in between. Women are somehow viewed as been being subjugated to the arbitrary power of men. But whilst certain cultural practices maintain their inertia, the reality is very different.

Stereotypes and Cultural Expectation

It’s fascinating to see how curious people are to discover the unexpected within our culture and society. So many innuendos and nuances exist concerning so-called “cultural restrictions,” particularly with regard to women and how “oppressed” we are supposed to be. And yet, as I write this article, I am reminded that it’s not the supposed oppression that the West associates with the issue of women’s role in society, but more the barriers to change that are generally felt by society as a whole.

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The only difference for women, regardless of geographical position or culture, is that “it’s a man’s world.” But even James Brown, while affirming that sentiment in his song, insisted: “It’s a man’s world, but it wouldn’t be nothing without a woman or a girl.”

It is through women in the workplace and their role in education and the mentorship that the understanding of cultural sensitivities and emotional differences comes to the force, that cultural stereotypes are challenged and, in some cases, completely overhauled. It’s not that men can’t do it. It’s that women are doing it and making contributions in their own unique way.

From the visionary and supportive leadership in some of our Middle Eastern nations, such as the United Arab Emirates, we see many beacons of hope for change in motion. As HH Sheikha Fatima Bint Mubarak said:

“In a world dominated by turmoil and conflicts, I believe that women are capable of disseminating Islamic culture and instilling its spirit in the new generation. This capability is closely linked with women education and the guarantee of living in a community, which provides equal rights and obligations. Based on this belief, I am committed to continue to work relentlessly to ensure that women remain fundamental partners in the growth and development process. I will continue to support women wherever they are, empowering them to manifest their status as the key to peace in our present world.”

The Paradigm of Respect in the Middle East

Middle Eastern men as a whole are very supportive of women, and the dynamics between the sexes stems from a bond and respect of the different roles and responsibilities each holds. With the advent of globalization, these roles and responsibilities are, to some extent, being obscured. Game theory teaches us, through the famous prisoner’s dilemma, that in times of uncertainty, cooperation pays.

In the same spirit, by working toward an integrated society, we can contribute to global empowerment while producing an economically sustainable impact without necessarily destabilizing or radically challenging the status quo. This paradigm is rooted in the strong traditions of cultural and gender identity particular to our culture and yet allows for flexible adaptation and the embrace of modern life.

What the Middle East needs are visionary role models of leadership that can inspire individuals and nations, in particular those that hold steadfast to their collective values while avoiding the perpetuation of unhealthy competition as opposed to cooperation, support and mentorship.

In order to achieve this and deliver real value, socioeconomic frameworks need to be robust and address global needs. They must not depend merely on “goodwill” or the individual’s assertion of ethics, but rather prove strategic enough to take into consideration long-term sustainability, focused on the collective benefit of all—both men and women.

Education is the key that brings about change in a profound way. This is because education, training and personal development converge with economic gains at the point of creativity and innovation, thus rendering effective outcomes.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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How can health education develop a public health infrastructure based on prevention? In 2011, Forbes ranked the United Arab Emirates (UAE) number 18 on a list of countries with the highest obesity rates, estimating that .

Obesity is a including Type 2 diabetes, chronic kidney disease, osteoarthritis, cardiovascular disease and cancer. Public health initiatives and disease prevention are only effective through means of education, which the UAE is determined to improve.

Obesity is not a problem for the UAE alone as it has across all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Due to similar cultural and social norms, this issue has become a major public health challenge for the region.

The UAE’s obesity rates have not slowed in recent years. As a result, there is a of Type 2 diabetes in children, which is alarming. What factors have contributed to this problem? How can health education be used as an effective tool to develop a more health conscious society?

Factors

Generous hospitality is imbedded in Arab customs and culture. Food is central in gatherings and social events, especially the offering of sweets—juices, dates, chocolates. Traditional Arab foods tend to be , with an increased intake of saturated fats and sugars and decreased intake of cereals, legumes, vegetables and fruits.

According to , “half of all women and a third of all men in the region do not exercise enough. Studies by the World Health Organization (WHO) found that the Eastern Mediterranean Region, of which the UAE is a part of, was second only to the Americas in terms of low activity rates.” There have been efforts made by the UAE to create parks and open spaces to encourage physical activity. However, in general, a sedentary lifestyle still prevails.

Furthermore, the population is at risk for developing a myriad of mental health problems such as depression, low self-esteem or issues related to body image due to obesity and a lack of activity. Preventative measures can be taken to reverse these dangerous trends. However, the culture of the GCC states does not have a preventative health care mindset.

This fatalistic behavior is rooted in the Arab and Muslim culture’s surrender to “God’s will.” This attitude offsets the recognition of necessary preventative measures. Many patients, especially those of Bedouin origins, who and are not educated on health awareness, do not believe in modern medicine. The combined intersections of culture, religion, eating habits and lifestyle choices make health education a growing challenge to integrate into not only schools, but throughout society as a whole.

Economic development in the UAE has experienced progress on a variety of fronts: better access to education, improved living standards and the rise and use of information and communication technologies.

Fast Food and Health Education

However, not all advancements have been associated with positive outcomes. Given the impact of globalization, an influx of Western fast food restaurants has dominated the food industry in the UAE: McDonald’s, IHOP, Pizza Hut, KFC and Shake Shack just to name a few. The “Mcdonaldization” of the food industry has enabled individuals to enjoy a more efficient, predictable and timely food experience. According to , “They offer a limited, simple menu, that can be cooked and served in an assembly line-fashion.” Adding to this, have delivery options.

Combining these factors—along with a sedentary lifestyle, hot climate and limited outdoor activity—creates a recipe for disaster, especially for the most vulnerable population: children. The over the past two decades, from 25.6% in 1980 to 31.2%—a third of the nation’s youth—in 2013. Childhood obesity in the UAE is ranked 16^th in the world.ĚýWhat is being done?

In 2015, would be incorporated into Abu Dhabi’s school curricula by the 2016-17 academic year. According to Amer Al Kindi, a health manager for Abu Dhabi Education Council, “it will be a separate curriculum that will be integrated into the system at all grades.”

In a recent study analyzing obesity rates in students attending government schools in the Emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah, it was found that obesity starts in toddlers and is most prevalent among boys. Early intervention strategies, such as improved school health policy and practice through initiatives involving better nutrition choices and exercise classes are of health education. Initiatives need to be created to raise public health awareness of issues affecting both children and adults.

Health EducationĚýInitiatives

The Health Authority of Abu Dhabi, along with the Abu Dhabi Education Council, launched the Iftah Ya Simsim initiative for health education this year across schools to promote and raise awareness of health issues for children. Iftah Ya Simsim is comparable to the American children’s TV show Sesame Street. The initiative contains a series of educational materials, including activities for students, parents and teachers. across Abu Dhabi are offered training workshops and necessary resources and tools to promote and encourage a healthy lifestyle inside the classroom.

What must remain clear is the role, importance and need for health education, which comes in many forms. It is not solely the responsibility of the education sector, but both public and private sectors, the media and the medical community.Ěý

The program focuses on nutrition, physical activity, oral health, hygiene and vaccination. In addition, the overall campaign also incorporates the of healthy habits through educational video games. It is a fun and interactive way to not only raise public health awareness, but to engage students, parents and teachers in the process. Children need to learn at an early age the impact of their eating habits and lifestyle choices.

As per the UAE’s 2021 Vision, the Ministry of Health and Prevention aims to between the ages of 5-17 to a target goal of 12%.

To reach this target goal, a variety of initiatives have been created to tackle childhood obesity. For example, over 1,200 students from public and private schools participated in the “let’s walk” activity in April 2015. The walkathon is part of the “Healthy Children 2021” national campaign to promote the and a healthy lifestyle.

Collective Responsibility

Health education should not only come in the form of initiatives, school curricula or awareness campaigns. Rather, physicians also play a vital role in a patient’s overall welfare; they act as educators, role models and advisors. An educated patient, who understands his or her illness or risk for illness, is more likely to be accountable and invested in health care. However, there are many instances where physicians fail to inform and educate their patients.

Generally speaking, doctors in the Arab world do not take the time to educate their patients, while at the same time most Arab patients do not feel the need to understand the science behind their ailment. There are many examples of cases where diseases such as diabetes can be prevented, but due to a lack of intervention measures by the doctor, patients will likely develop the disease.

The UAE is aware of these tremendous health challenges and has been proactive in creating initiatives, partnerships and importing Western health institutions.

In the United States, the UAE has a long-standing relationship with the Children’s National Medical Center in Washington, DC. Through generous donations from Abu Dhabi, the Sheikh Zayed Institute for Pediatric Surgical Innovation at Children’s National Medical Center was established in 2009. In 2015, other reputable Western institutions such as . The UAE continues to establish partnerships with US health institutions for the purpose of gaining Western health values, disseminating cutting edge research and creating preventative public health programs, as well as enhancing medical education and care.

The UAE has taken progressive steps to tackle some of theĚýmost challenging health issues facing its citizens today. What must remain clear is the role, importance and need for health education, which comes in many forms. It is not solely the responsibility of the education sector, but both public and private sectors, the media and the medical community. In order for the UAE to witness meaningful and lasting change, society as a whole would need to make conscious health choices and lead by example for future generations to come.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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This year, Dubai played host to the 2016 World Government Summit, which was attended by more than 4,500 participants from 130 countries. The summit showcased “the tremendous growth of the UAE, the geopolitical, economic and social challenges it currently faces,” as well as its plans “to recapture its legacy of innovation in the sciences that goes back to the Islamic Golden Age,” according to the co-authors of this opinion piece. They include Daphne Chen, Crystal Nwokorie, Valentina Ryabova, Dongye Zhang and Ahmed Fikri—all students from the Wharton MBA Class of 2016 who attended this year’s summit.

Background

The Dubai Museum is housed in the oldest building in the Emirate. It was built in 1787 as the Al Fahidi Fort and converted to a museum in 1971. It contains artifacts several millennia old. It is, in a sense, symbolic of the 2016 World Government Summit (WGS) held at various modern locations in the city recently. The theme of the WGS was “Advancing the Future While Preserving the Past.”

US President Barack Obama presented the keynote address by video link on the opening day of the summit. “When a government listens to its people, that is how we move forward,” he said. “Embracing reform will continue to have a partner and friend in the US.”

Reform has been a way of life in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has undergone an incredible identity transformation since the birth of the confederation in 1971. (Dubai is the largest city in the UAE.) What was once a network of loosely organized, semi-nomadic communities is now one of the wealthiest, most-educated and perhaps even happiest countries. It is now the most diversified economy in the Gulf and the second-largest economy in the Arab world.

It is, therefore, appropriate that the UAE play host to the WGS, which it has done since the summits started in 2013. The 2017 summit will expand the canvas further. According to Ohood Khalfan Al Roumi, the UAE’s minister of state for happiness who is also vice-chairman of the organizing committee of the WGS, among other things the summit will be opened to participation from companies and organizations.

This year’s summit, attended by more than 4,500 participants from 130 countries, was a testament to the tremendous growth of the UAE, the geopolitical, economic and social challenges it currently faces, and the lessons that other nations might glean from its 40-year history in nation-building. It was a forum that brought together thought leaders and innovators from all around the world, from fields as diverse as international development, energy, biomedicine and space travel.

Dubai, United Arab Emirates © Shutterstock

The summit provided an overview of how the UAE plans to recapture its legacy of innovation in the sciences that goes back to the Islamic Golden Age, a period between 800 AD and 1200 AD marked by momentous intellectual and cultural achievements. This was a time when the Muslim world, not the West, was the center of science and innovation. People from around the world descended on the Middle East to learn under the tutelage of great intellectuals like Ibn Al-Haytham, the father of modern physics, and Muhammad Ibn Zakariya Al-Razi, an influential philosopher and ophthalmologist of the time. In their lectures on Islamic Science and the Islamic Golden Age, Jim Al-Khalili, professor of theoretical physics at the University of Surrey, and Neil deGrasse Tyson, astrophysicist, reminded the summit participants that the key to this period’s success was a culture of inquiry, dominated by people who were not afraid to challenge and be challenged.

The obstacle the UAE now faces as it attempts to breathe life into this legacy is not only to remind its constituents that innovation is a birthright, but also to put in place programs and education that further its plan to demonstrate science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) leadership in a world where innovation is currently largely a Western export. If the Middle East was once the bedrock of global innovation, what is stopping the region from resurrecting this legacy and what role will the UAE play in leading the charge?

The Fourth Industrial Revolution

One of the voices leading the campaign for nations to become better stewards of innovation was Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum (WEF), who took the stage to describe his theory of the fourth industrial revolution, based on the premise that technology, digitization and the Internet of Things is transforming the way we interact on social, physical and even biological levels. He warned governments that the technological and innovation revolution is coming like a tsunami, so they had better be prepared for it. For the UAE and many Middle Eastern nations, adapting to the new systems that spring from this revolution requires more than just investment in science and technology. It requires a culture of innovation and discovery, once abundant in the region and which is now experiencing revitalization.

One initiative that was discussed during the summit was the UAE’s first mission to Mars. Concern has been increasing about the mismatch between demand and supply of qualified STEM professionals in the UAE. Increasingly, nations are attempting to close that gap. As Ibrahim Al Qasim, director of education and media outreach for the Emirates Mars Mission, and Tyson both noted, the space race of the 1960s was responsible for a generation of young minds getting interested in the sciences. Making big bets to stimulate and glamorize such endeavors is, at the very least, a bold move to enliven interest in STEM.

A central question of the summit was: What is the role of government? After three days of seminars, speeches and discussions, the answer seemed to converge around the idea that governments should become a platform for the delivery of public services. With people becoming ever more fluent with technology and interfacing with digital objects, if governments are to survive, they must adapt to such trends. Computing power doubles every 18 months. People are moving faster and expecting more than ever before.

Reform has been a way of life in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has undergone an incredible identity transformation since the birth of the confederation in 1971.

One example of experimentation with the government-as-a-platform idea was the launch of healthcare.gov in the United States. Despite the desire to meet users online, where they are comfortable ordering other services, the healthcare.gov launch was a disaster and its enrollment rates low—a question mark on whether or not the government is even capable of running such platforms. Beyond the US, even in high-income OECD countries, it still takes more than eight working days and about five different procedures to open a new business.

Some promising early signs are now visible, such as the United Kingdom’s government-as-a-platform initiative and the UAE’s government portal government.ae, indicating that the effort toward the plug-and-play mode of government services is still being tinkered with and improved. However, some wonder whether or not the private sector is better equipped to deal with such services.

The Integration Doctrine

Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE’s deputy prime minister and minister of the interior, shared with the audience the UAE’s integration doctrine. In this approach, the leadership, government and community work hand in hand to continuously learn from the past to better prepare for the future. Governments have to be proactive in foreseeing disruptions and planning for them to eliminate the risk of failure caused by surprised reactive responses. This is only achievable when governments are aligned on the vision and are collaborating rather than competing on the implementation. The integration doctrine sees past failures as valuable opportunities to learn and improve rather than a chance to blame someone else.

With the celebration of the UAE’s advancement comes the realization of how fragile this prosperity might be due to the political and economic turmoil in the region. Given the deep interdependencies among Arab countries, the UAE’s prosperity is highly dependent on the prosperity of its neighbors. In the past, it was this very interconnectedness that allowed the region to flourish. Therefore, significant attention at the summit was given to not only how to advance future development but also how to preserve those precious results that were so hard to achieve. Arab countries have a lot of potential for economic growth that is determined by the availability of natural resources, human capital and young working populations. However, political and social unrest in the region might prevent countries from realizing these resources to their fullest potential.

Five Challenges for the Arab Region

Speaking at the summit, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary General Abdullatif Al Zayani shared five challenges that should be collaboratively addressed by Arab countries in order to preserve and enhance the prosperity of the region and of each individual state:

United Arab Emirates © Shutterstock

1) Collaboration and a shared vision are key to stabilizing the situation in the region. The scale and magnitude of the current political and economic turmoil in the region are such that no one individual state has the capabilities to resolve the situation on its own. At the same time, no individual state can afford to not take action under the current circumstances, as inaction deters investments, partners and business from the region.

2) Restoring safety and security. Arab nations must provide a safe and secure environment to all its citizens. It is crucial to create a secure environment to facilitate economic growth and to attract foreign capital, especially given that some Arab states are in the process of diversifying their economies away from dependence on fossil fuels. For example, the UAE’s ambition is to become a global hub for associations, tourism and commerce. This aspiration will be challenging to achieve unless tourists and investors believe in the UAE’s commitment to safety with respect to not only the UAE but also its neighbors. Gaps in security have already more than halved the tourism industries in Egypt and Tunisia.

3) The eradication of terrorism. Terrorism in the region remains a wide-ranging threat to political, economic and social stability. Terrorism should be eliminated by averting terrorist funding and preventing atrocities through cooperation between international police and national governments.

4) Mobilizing efforts and resources by Arab countries to provide assistance to millions of displaced refugees from Palestine, Syria and Libya. Arab countries cannot accept watching Syrian children die of hunger or drown in the Mediterranean. Unified efforts should be employed to provide human relief to all such refugees. This plea arrives in the midst of the migrant crisis in Europe. Hosting Arab nations should provide those people who seek asylum from repressive regimes with all necessary support to establish themselves in a new place, such as access to health care, education and employment.

5) Initiating of the process of national reconciliation among Arab countries. Many Arab countries will need to be reconstructed both physically and institutionally. Arab people in those countries should be guaranteed human rights and the hope for a better future. Those Arab countries devastated by wars and social unrest lack sufficient resources to reconstruct their cities and societies. Surrounding Arab nations should collaboratively assist in the restoration of peace in their less fortunate neighbors.

All this is easier said than done. But the summit lit up the road ahead. The WGS bills itself as “a knowledge exchange platform at the intersection between government, futurism, technology and innovation. It functions as a thought leadership platform and networking hub for policymakers, experts and pioneers in human development. The summit is a gateway to the future.”

Dubai 2016 showed some glimpses through that gateway.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner institution of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Saudi Arabia recentlyĚýannounced that the kingdom was prepared to to fight the Islamic State (IS). Days after the Saudi announcement, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) followed suit,Ěýrevealing it was also ready to to “help support and train an international military coalition” against IS, “provided such efforts were led by the United States.”

The announcements raise many questions but few answers.

First, why not start with more airstrikes? The US formed its coalition, of which both nations are members, to carry out an air campaign against IS almost 18 months ago. Both countries’ air forces have carried out air sorties against the terrorist organization, but relatively few have been conducted by non-US coalition members.

According to the Ěý(DOD),Ěý3,375 strikes against IS were carried out in Syria through February 10 of this year. Only 209 of those were flown by the nine non-US coalition partners whose aircraft fly in Syria, about 6% of the total. The DODĚýdoes not report the number of strikes carried out by individual coalition members other than the US. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not released numbers of their respective airstrikes. So, while the exact numbers of Saudi and Emirati airstrikes are unknown, it is safe to assume they were a fraction of the 6% reported by the DOD.

The reason the Saudis and Emiratis have not conducted more airstrikes against IS in Syria is that their aircraft are far more fixedly engaged in the war in Yemen, which is doing nothing to counter IS anywhere. Anecdotal reports indicate that Saudi and Emirati aircraft have become a non-factor in the coalition air war against IS in Syria. But now they are apparently prepared to enter a non-existent coalition ground war against IS.

Second, in what capacity would these Arab forces be used? US Defense Secretary Ěýfor greater coalition engagement in the war against the Islamic State for weeks. So, it is heartening to see Saudi Arabia and the UAE step up. The Saudi offer was non-specific, while the UAE proposal specified for “support and training of an international military coalition.” So, there is no apparent offer of combat forces from the UAE. This author’s own presumption is that the Saudi troops would limit themselves to the same mission—i.e., no combat.

Third, what are the conditions of deployment of their respective forces? The Emiratis seemed to make it fairly clear: to “support an international military coalition.” Moreover, spokespersons for both countries implied that they would expect coalition buy-in for any ground campaign. Media reports have also speculated that they would expect such a campaign to be led by the US. That may be the final rub.

US President Barack Obama has been emphatic that he is not prepared to deploy US ground forces to fight IS in Syria—or anywhere else in the Middle East, for that matter. That does not apply to the 50 or so US Special Operators already in Syria. Nevertheless, it is clear that to carry the fight to IS in Syria as well as Iraq, more coalition forces are necessary in varying capacities—e.g., special operations forces, strike and reconnaissance aircraft, weapons and munitions, training assistance and combat support.

Such external support is certainly needed, but there is a final and more important question: Who will do the actual fighting on the ground? (One might also ask, where was all that support when it was needed three or four years ago?)

Fall of Aleppo

Syrian moderate opposition forces in the north, specifically in the vital city of Aleppo, areĚýand on the verge of being surrounded, if not wiped out, by Syrian regime forces supported by Russian airstrikes and Iranian-led Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The moderate opposition forces operating in the south near the border with Jordan may be next. Any remaining forces in Aleppo are likely to either abandon the field and flee as millions of their countrymen have or, if truly committed, join Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic State.

If Aleppo is retaken by the regime and opposition forces are defeated, there may probably be very few actual moderate opposition fighting forces left to support in Syria. The only opposition forces left to confront IS may be those remaining in the south—whose principal objective to date has been battling Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces and not IS—the YPG (People’s Protection Units) Syrian Kurdish forces and a handful of eastern tribes allied with the Kurds. That is hardly a force cable of “degrading and destroying” the Islamic State, which is the US-led coalition’s ostensible mission as enunciated by President Obama.

The Syrian Kurdish forces have been the most effective moderate opposition group confronting IS. However, their . Picking up on the changing winds of fortunes, the Syrian Kurds’ principal political organization, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), is sidling up to Moscow now, where it has opened its first overseas office. The welcome mat is surely out for them, given increasing tensions between Russia and Turkey, and Ankara’s deep suspicion and distrust of the PYD and its military force, the YPG. YPG forces sympathetic to Russia would mark a major setback for opposition forces fighting IS, and for the US-led coalition against the group.

Furthermore, the bulk of Syria’s estimatedĚý have been directing their efforts against regime forces, and only secondarily against IS.

This further begs the question: With a significant number of those forces facing defeat, if not annihilation, or considering switching sides, who is going to fight IS? What fighting forces are Saudi Arabia and the UAE proposing to support? More pointedly, to which forces is Defense Secretary Carter asking that more international support be directed? The scattered remnants of the Aleppo disaster? The Syrian Kurds? The dispersed eastern Syria Arab tribes?

The Saudis and Emiratis seem to imply the answer: an international coalition, preferably US-led. And that seems hardly in the offing without a significant change in US policy.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The 2022 FIFA World Cup may be sparking social change in the Gulf, but not (yet) in Qatar. Qatar’s winning of the hosting rights for the World Cup gave human rights and trade union activists the leverage they needed to more effectively pressure the Gulf state for reform of its controversial kafala (labor sponsorship) system, whichĚýputs employees at the mercy of their employers.

While focused on Qatar, the campaign also targeted other Gulf states and prompted activists to focus on high-profile construction projects like sites for Western museums and universities in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It also motivated countries across the region to tinker with their labor systems. While Qatar made lofty promises of reform and engaged with its critics, the UAE and other Gulf states rejected criticism and barred activists from entry to their countries.

Gulf Cooperation Council

Now, however, as Qatar continues to dither, the UAE has decreed the very reforms DohaĚýhas yet to implement nationwide, and a prominent Saudi intellectual has called for abolition of kafala in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait recently became the first Gulf state to pass legislation granting domestic workers greater rights. By contrast, in September, students denounced conditions for workers at Weill Cornell Medical College in Doha.

The UAE move and public debate in other Gulf states deprives Qatar—a supporter of change across the Middle East and North Africa with the exception of the Gulf—of its claim to be on the cutting edge of transition in the region. It also casts further doubt on the sincerity of Qatar’s promises.

Qatar has promised to pass legislation by the end of 2015 that would ease procedures for exit visas and improve recruitment, housing and working conditions for migrant workers, who constitute a majority of the Gulf state’s population.

Several major Qatari institutions, including the 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy and the Qatar Foundation, have adopted standards that go a far way to meet activists’ demands, but these have yet to be enshrined in national law. Qatar has suggested that its emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, would approve legislation by the end of this year.

Sharon Burrow, the secretary general of International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), noted after a visit to Oman in September that the Gulf state had just about as many migrant workers as Qatar does, but that its laws did not discriminate between Omani and foreign workers even though Omanis, migrant workers and Western expatriates have different contract terms. Burrow further noted that in contrast to Qatar, workers were allowed to unionize and elect their leaders and were accorded “humane accommodation.”

“In Oman, you feel optimism and the hope of a shared future. In Qatar, you feel discrimination, denial and a master-servant relationship. Common region, shared cultures, neighbors—why the difference?” Burrow asked.

Leaving Qatar looking like a straggler, the UAE has decreed labor reforms that aim to tighten oversight of employment agreements for migrant workers, with the exception of domestic labor. The decrees focus on improving transparency of job terms and employment contracts, spell out how contracts can be broken and could make it easier for workers to switch employers.

Under the new policies, prospective workers would be asked to sign a standard employment offer in their home country, which would in turn be filed with the Labor Ministry before a work permit is issued. That agreement would then be registered as a legal contract once the worker arrives in the country, and no changes would be allowed unless they extend additional benefits that the worker agrees to. Contracts can be broken by either side under certain circumstances, and workers would be free to switch to a new employer after obtaining authorization from the Labor Ministry.

In Saudi Arabia, Khaled Almaeena, a prominent Saudi journalist, called recently for the abolition of the kafala system in the kingdom. Noting that his repeated efforts to get ministers to focus on labor reform had gone unheeded, Almaeena recently wrote: “A media campaign should be conducted and people, both the workers and the employees, should be made aware of their rights and obligations. Contracts should be lodged with the Ministry of Labor rather than with employers. And the kafala system must go.”

Flickr

Oil Dependence

The push for reform in the Gulf is about more than ensuring adherence to international labor standards. In the smaller Gulf states, it raises the specter of giving rights to a majority of the population against the backdrop of a minority citizenry that fears losing control of its culture and way of life.

Concern is heightened by the fact that the social contract in Gulf states that involves surrender of political rights in exchange for a cradle-to-grave welfare system is fraying at the edges. Faced with population growth and reduced oil revenues, Gulf states have begun to roll back subsidies, sparking sharp rises of food prices in Bahrain and bringing fuel prices in the UAE to world market levels. Oman is mulling over the raising of fuel prices, while Kuwait is looking at the introduction of a value added tax and road tolls.

To many in the Gulf, labor reform is a Pandora’s Box—not only in terms of potentially laying the groundwork for foreigners demanding ever more rights, but also with regard to badly needed economic reforms in preparation of a post-oil age. Newborns in all Gulf states—with the exception of Qatar and Kuwait—are expected to witness their countries running out of fossil energy resources within their lifetimes.

Reforms would have to rebalance the relationship between the state and a private sector that remains dependent on governments. They would also have to restructure labor markets in which citizens—who largely enjoy comfortable government jobs—would have to compete with expatriates who are likely to sell their services at a lower price. As a result, Kuwait has moved to subsidize salaries of Kuwaitis employed in the private sector.

Inevitably, the reforms will be building blocks for a move from a rentier to a productive economy, in which citizens become productive rather than entitled members of society. That could spark greater interest in political change.

That change is inevitable and is likely with or without the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The tournament, however, is proving to be a catalyst.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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As Nigerians prepare for a presidential election amid a insurgency, the question remains: What about the economy? With falling oil prices, a depreciating foreign reserve and a plunge in the value of the naira, is in economic uncertainty. Whoever emerges victorious from the polls on March 28 will have his work cut out for him.

The country’s next president could face a myriad of economic problems. While a gross domestic product (GDP) makes Nigeria look good on paper, the reality on ground proves otherwise.

With 174 million , Nigeria has one of the worst poverty levels in the world, third behind India and China. At least 61% of the population on less than a dollar a day, and this was during a period of economic boom when crude oil averaged about $120 a barrel, far beyond the country’s budget benchmark.

While the gains of the oil boom were reportedly stashed in Nigeria’s foreign reserve and Excess Crude Account, most of the funds have since been frittered away. Electricity is almost non-existent, with a measly 4,500 megawatts for the population; refined crude is still being imported in a nation that is a major exporter of crude oil. Unemployment is at an all-time high, and virtually nothing works. Like a Dutch-diseased economy, Nigeria is about to feel the full brunt of a recession.

Dubai’s Model for Nigeria?

Of course, economies go through booms and busts. And several nations have gone through situations similar to Nigeria’s and emerged for the better.

A case in point is the (UAE). As one of the seven emirates making up the UAE, has been through its own economic boom and bust. It is now a world destination for tourism, a center of commerce and a model for major oil exporters seeking to diversify their economy.

Like Nigeria, Dubai wasn’t always so savvy in economic principles. In the 1900s, the main stay of the Dubai economy was pearl trading and pearl diving. However, following the emergence of artificial pearls from Japan in the late 1920s and the Great Depression of 1929, Dubai’s economy took a downward spiral.

Dubai © Shutterstock

A parallel can be drawn here with the current situation in Nigeria. Not only has the country lost a major customer for its crude oil in the United States, but Nigeria also has to face stiff and price wars from the Arabian Peninsula in the battle for market share. While the robust economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council allow them to offer discounts to Asian buyers even in the face of dwindling oil prices, such tactics do not come easily for Nigeria. As it stands, Nigeria faces problems financing its 2015 budget, while the naira is losing value.

Just like pearl divers in Dubai learned to cast their nets for fish rather than jump in for pearls, Nigeria would be wise to seek other sources of revenue while the oil market gains some form of stability. Perhaps it is time for Nigerian leaders to seek lessons on how to jumpstart an economy — and Dubai is probably a good place to start.

What makes the emirate worthy of emulation is that despite being in a region bedeviled with crises and an arid landscape, Dubai has gone from being a desert to a world-class state, dazzling and ambitious in development. Dubai shows how sincerity of purpose, true leadership and strong institutions contribute to economic prosperity.

Nigeria’s biggest problem is corruption, which likely stems from insincere governance. Since the discovery of oil in the 1950s, Nigerians have remained poor while oil wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few. This is the result of one thing: a failure in leadership.

To prosper, nations need leaders who put in place strong institutions that guarantee security of lives and property; leaders who coordinate and promote economic growth; and leaders who provide critical public infrastructure, formulating laws that facilitate trade and private participation.

The absence of constant electricity has been a major impeding factor to an industrial revolution in Nigeria, and successive governments seem to have no idea how to change the trend. When oil was discovered in 1966, Dubai’s leaders chose to quickly use the receipts from oil rent to finance mass infrastructure, building large ports and 5-star hotels that would one day make the emirate a major trading hub and tourist destination.

While the judicious use of Dubai’s oil receipts were probably due to the fact that its oil reserves were not as vast as Abu Dhabi’s, the fact remains that having sincere and visionary leaders helped put Dubai on the path to prosperity. Indeed, Dubai’s leaders could have pocketed the cash from oil rent or shared the funds among a select few, as most corrupt leaders often do.

So, as harsh economic realities beckon, it is time for Nigeria to overhaul its corrupt institutions, revamp its educational system, invest in critical infrastructure and perhaps revisit the cocoa plantations and groundnut pyramids the country was once known for. And just as Dubai learned from its mistake of depending on a major source of revenue in the early 20^th century and instead diversifying its economy when oil was discovered, Nigeria must not be complacent at a time when respite does come.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The month of Ramadan is in full swing. Muslims around the world, male and female, will abstain from eating, drinking and having sexual intercourse between dawn and sunset until the end of July. Based on one of the five pillars of Islam,ĚýsiyamĚý(fasting) in Ramadan is compulsory for those who are physically able to do it.

Beyond such basic knowledge of the month lies the “politics” of Ramadan. No, we are not talking about sectarian conflict among Sunnis and Shi’ites in the Middle East. Rather, the politics of Ramadan sees Muslims themselves separating the month from its original meanings.

Spiritually, Ramadan is a time of meditation, inner peace and sadaqahĚý(charity). It is a month for personal reflection and a chance to become closer to God, and it is a moment for family and community. This may involve simply sitting in a mosque alone, reading the Qur’an or volunteering at charities. The month of Ramadan is a point where one should not only abstain from food, water and sex, but rather from doing anything that is deemed sinful such as lying, cheating or backbiting.

Instead of seeing fasting as a chore, followers of Islam are taught to remember those in the world — Muslim and non-Muslim — who essentially fast every day not as an obligation, but rather because they live in war, hunger and poverty. As Ayesha Almazroui succinctlyĚýĚýit: “The true meaning of fasting is to experience hunger; to feel humility and compassion towards the poor.”

Overeating and Obesity

However, when we see practices ofĚýsomeĚýMuslims during Ramadan, the festival threatens to move away from its spirituality and instead into a month of excessive consumption. While the common belief among many is that a huge feast is served atĚýiftarĚý(breaking of the fast), Islam actually teaches that we should not overeat, for the meaning of the month is to show patience, restraint and humbleness. Instead, eating should always be done in moderate proportions, for even the Prophet Muhammad is noted as saying: “Nothing is worse than a person who fills his stomach. It should be enough for the son of Adam to have a few bites to satisfy his hunger. If he wishes more, it should be: one-third for his food, one-third for his liquids, and one-third for his breath.”

Today, for example, Ramadan often sees binge eating and wastage by Muslims throughout the worldĚý— with consumption said toĚýĚýby 30%. InĚý, it has become an annual occurrence for people to be hospitalized from eating too much atĚýiftarĚýand suhoorĚý(pre-dawn meal). As for wastage,ĚýĚýsees an extra 20% of food in its landfill sites during Ramadan alone, while year round the United Arab EmiratesĚýĚýa high proportion of food. Authorities in Abu Dhabi have evenĚýĚýfor citizens to reduce the amount of food they waste.

Moreover,Ěý to a study by the United Nations, Gulf States are among the most obese in the world, with Kuwait followed by Saudi Arabia being the highest in the region. Obesity in the Gulf is not only caused by high summer temperatures that mean people often stay indoors to enjoy leisure activities. Rather, a lavish lifestyle with widely available junk food and a lack of physical activity is a leading cause.

This culture of binge eating among Arabs and Muslims living in the East and West has led to what some have dubbed the commercialization of Ramadan. The holy month sees increased advertising, hiked prices and huge buffets at hotels in the Middle East. Amid Arabic soap operas that have viewers glued to the TV set due to reduced working hours in Ramadan, mass advertising campaigns are a key feature. In 2009, EgyptĚýĚý$146 million on adverts during Ramadan — a 62% rise on previous months. With people sitting indoors, it is little wonder that television bosses rub their hands together and watch the dollars and dinars roll in.

Even in Mecca, Islam’s holiest city, historical sites have beenĚýĚýto pave the way for skyscrapers. The increasing number of luxury hotels charge extortionate amounts during Ramadan due to pilgrims flocking to the city. Of course, companies should always analyze market trends and capitalize on demand. This is key to any economy that seeks to boost its growth and always move toward further development. However, as Jaweed KaleemĚý, such policies by Saudi authorities have led to “discussions of excess in a faith that emphasizes simplicity and accessibility.”

With petrodollars in the Gulf, splashing cash at luxury hotels is not an issue for those who can afford it, but the true meaning of Ramadan is being lost in the process. For those concerned about consumption and commercialization in Ramadan, the month of fasting threatens to be turned into the month of overeating and excessive prices.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Lately, some African countries have signed anti-gay legislations. The consequence has been retribution from the West in the form of withdrawal of aid and vilification in international media.

Other countries outside Africa took similar courses of action but till today receive different responses from the West. There appears to be a double-standard in how the West engages with sub-Saharan Africa.

Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, a year prior to the that overthrew his government, :

“The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. The methods and form of this direction can take various shapes… More often, however, neo-colonialist control is exercised through economic or monetary means… Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress… Neo-colonialism, like colonialism, is an attempt to export the social conflicts of the capitalist countries.”

Looking at post-independence Africa, any unbiased student of history can attest to the fact that Nkrumah, whose golden statue graces the Chinese-donated African Union Conference Center in Addis Ababa, was amazingly accurate.

Up until today, African states — though in theory independent — have their economic and political policies directed from outside. If they refuse to toe the policy line drawn by the West, development assistance is used to force compliance, with absolute disregard for the democratic institutions of the land and its evolution of democracy.

The Case of Nigeria and Uganda

The Parliament of Nigeria passed the Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act in May 2013 and President Goodluck Jonathan signed it on January 7 this year. This was not an arbitrary decision taken by a dictator but instead by the people as reflected through their parliament and executive arms of government. Yet the response from the West was a smear campaign and a barrage of threats.

Needless to say, the West did not succeed in changing Nigeria’s policy. This is because Nigeria is a global powerhouse in its own right and any economic sanctions would result in reciprocation from the most populous nation in Africa.

Uganda and other less-economically robust African countries are not as fortunate, however. When President Yoweri Museveni enforced an anti-gay bill after the Ugandan Parliament had passed it, the West retaliated. The Netherlands , while Norway and Denmark chose to .

Unfortunately, this is the lot for smaller developing nations. In 2013, donors using aid as a punitive tool in economic growth. Young mothers and children potentially had to forego health care, food, shelter or security as a result of canceled government programs. How does the restriction of economic means justify these ends?

Equality of All Men?

Some of the greatest words ever penned include: “[All men are] endowed by their Creator with inherent and inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

This is part of the 1776 United States Declaration of Independence. The US wrested independence from Great Britain because on a very basic level, they believed that all humans were created equal and, therefore, have a right to be free — free to make their own policies and determine the course of their destiny within the ambits of certain limitations.

How does the West justify these ideals, later enshrined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, while in the same breadth applying discriminatory standards to less-developed nations?

This author once asked an ambassador of a Western nation why the scales were so uneven between the West and Africa. His response was a quote from George Orwell’s Animal Farm: “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”

Double-Standards

The Russian Parliament in 2013, much like Nigeria and Uganda, . Yet no Western power has been bold enough to attempt economic war against the Kremlin as they have against African states.

A similar situation exists in the relationship between the US and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The that in the UAE: “Both civil law and Sharia criminalize homosexual activity.” The report adds: “Under Sharia the death penalty is the punishment for individuals who engage in consensual homosexual activity.”

This report notwithstanding, no Western power has dared reacting toward the UAE like they have against sub-Saharan African states.

In Saudi Arabia, a young Saudi man was to 500 lashes and five years imprisonment by a court in Jeddah for the criminal offence of homosexuality. These actions are wrong and much worse than what transpired in Nigeria or Uganda. Yet no Western country has dared to threaten Riyadh or gone ahead to withdraw aid as has been the case with Uganda. The question is why?

At least in Saudi Arabia’s case, though it is one of the most repressive countries in the Middle East by Western definition, it is also one of Washington’s closest allies. As : “The US does more trade — overwhelmingly in oil and weapons — with Saudi Arabia than any other country in the Middle East, including Israel, and depends on close Saudi cooperation in its counterterrorism efforts in Yemen.”

In addition to gay rights, another source of . According to : “The Spanish government has approved tighter rules on abortion, making it legal only in the case of rape or when the mother faces a serious risk.” This is a reversal of Spain’s stance toward abortion.

In places like Malta and Andorra, abortion is illegal on all grounds. It is also very restricted in Poland. Yet neither the European Union (EU), nor the US is cracking down on any of these countries for stifling freedom by vilifying or threatening them with economic sanctions. If any sub-Saharan African state that once permitted abortion reverses its stance by restricting it — as with Spain — it would surely attract retribution.

The double-standards of the West are a bit embarrassing. The US, Belgium, France and others have a history of forcefully replacing legitimate African governments with despots, all the while preaching democracy. This was especially prevalent during the Cold War period.

In addition to of former Ghanaian President Nkrumah — one of the leaders behind the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) — the US- and Belgium-orchestrated of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Patrice Lumumba, remains one of their most despicable moves.

Lumumba was ultimately replaced with Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled and impoverished the DRC for over three decades. Ghana’s case was similar and likewise Liberia’s where Charles Taylor, , became president for six years — destabilizing his nation and the surrounding region.

With such a track record, is it any wonder why Africa sees China as a viable alternate development partner? At least with China, what you see is what you get; plus Beijing does not meddle in domestic policies in Africa.

The Bigger Issue

Some may want to reduce the issue under discussion to social conflicts like gay rights or abortion — social problems of which there is much contention in society. But the core issue here is much bigger. Nkrumah hit the nail on the head: it is neocolonialism. He cited the export of social conflicts by capitalist countries. Consider this, Nigeria and most sub-Saharan African countries have historically never had any intense social friction regarding gay rights or abortion. Even today, many nations in the region do not have such conflicts. These conflicts are not the basic issue for African states.

The basic issue rests with the right of nations to self governance and the freedom to evolve in that governance. It is about the West hiding under the cloak of promoting democratic ideals to selectively strip weak states of this right while conferring it upon strategic partners.

This from the West in Africa’s economics and politics is the bigger issue being discussed here. The West must allow fledging African democracies and their democratic institutions to evolve without petty interferences.

How would the US feel if, for instance, China or Japan, , started using finance to control American policies without regard for Congress, Senate or the White House — forcing compliance with policies more reflective of Chinese or Japanese norms, values and customs rather than North America’s? The American Revolution is proof the US sees such a state of affairs as tyranny.

Enough is Enough

In a global village, leader-nations have emerged primarily in the Western hemisphere and, as part of their leadership role, they are expected to secure the rights of all nations — more so the weakest and poorest from whom they in part derive their just powers via arrangements like the United Nations.

But when these governments choose to be tyrannical in controlling weaker states adversely, then it is the right of the states to alter or abolish the inordinate control, and to institute new leadership that permit liberty and true multilateral discourse predicated on respect and true equality.

African states are willing to be part of an international community that respects them as equals and allows them the right to govern themselves without control from outside. However, what they should no longer be willing to tolerate is being told how to run their countries.

Part of growing up is being allowed greater autonomy and responsibility. After around 50 years since independence, African states should be given space to take charge of their own destinies and make their own decisions. They should be allowed to decide for themselves which lessons they consider beneficial from the West and which ones they consider not so beneficial.

Changing Times

Our world is changing. Africa is no longer as dependent on Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as it was a few decades ago. According to , remittances in 2013 to the developing world were more than three times the size of official development assistance. The shows that private flows from Africans in the Diaspora back to the continent have overtaken Foreign Direct Investments and ODA.

Moreover, Africa has been undergoing a decade-long economic expansion. A number of the world’s fastest growing economies are now found in the continent. Africa need not be bullied by aid withdrawals any longer.

That notwithstanding, African nations are not islands. They need the rest of the global family as much as the global family needs them. Africa needs aid but the nature of development assistance needed is changing. Africa needs technical assistance to help add value to its raw materials instead of exporting them.

The rules of engagement between Africa and the West need serious revision. The times of having absolute disregard for what African nations want while manipulating their national policies from outside to the detriment of Africans, are fast coming to a close as seen with Nigeria and Uganda. It behooves the West to recognize this and to desist from neocolonial control methods.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Gulf states are lining up as targets for criticism by international trade unions and human rights groups for their treatment of foreign workers. Qatar, long in the firing line after its winning bid to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022, was recently joined by Abu Dhabi as a result of projects to build world-class museums, luxury hotels and a campus for New York University.

Dubai is likely to be next in line after its winning bid to host the 2020 World Expo, which is expected to generate $7 billion in construction projects.

A comparison of the media fallout as well as campaigning by trade unions and human rights groups of Qatar and Abu Dhabi highlights the power of the World Cup and soccer. This puts the onus of responsibility on sports associations, including FIFA, for ensuring that hosts meet international standards of human rights.

As a matter of principle, there is little news in the abominable conditions of foreign workers in the Gulf where they often constitute a majority of the population. This writer wrote his first report on the plight of foreign workers in the region in 1976. Vast realms have been written since.

The Independent focused several years ago on the UAE. Yet it took Qatar’s winning of the World Cup to put the issue on the agenda, with any number of groups and government organizations since seeking to get on the bandwagon.

Britain’s The Guardian ensured that it moved even further up the agenda with a series of recent reports on workers in Qatar involved in World Cup-related projects. In contrast to those reports, revelations in The Guardian’s sister publication, The Observer, about workers’ conditions on Abu Dhabi’s Saadiyat (Happiness) Island have had a more muted fallout than those about Qatar.

Workers’ Rights in the Gulf

Yet Abu Dhabi is not just about the arts and education, of which there are far more restrictions on academic freedom than in Qatar; although this is not to suggest that the Gulf state is a beacon of freedom of expression, research and the press.

Abu Dhabi, too, is about sports. FIFA has organized in recent years several tournaments in Abu Dhabi, while the International Cricket Council (ICC) moved its headquarters in 2005 from London to Dubai. The UAE would like to see others follow suit.

While Gulf states compete for topping the list of where workers’ conditions are worst, Abu Dhabi and the UAE compare unfavorably to Qatar not only when it comes to academic freedoms.

Besides cracking down on research institutions and activists and barring critical researchers from entering the country, the UAE also has the dubious distinction of being the world’s only government to hire an army of at least 800 Africans and Latin Americans, who are parked outside the capital for the eventuality of major labor unrest or a popular revolt – an indication of how far it is willing to go to keep the ruling family in power.

In a bid to avoid joining Qatar and Abu Dhabi in the firing line, Bahrain — already on the defensive for its brutal suppression of a 2011 popular uprising and its ongoing crackdown on majority-Shiite Muslim activists that has led to the continued incarceration of scores of athletes — recently announced that it would adopt Gulf labor standards. These include banning the confiscation of workers’ passports and ensuring timely payment of wages.

Abu Dhabi: A Worker's Paradise?

While Qatar has acknowledged the need for change and problems with implementation and enforcement of existing workers’ rights, Abu Dhabi has sought to project itself as a workers’ paradise.

"The UAE has built the world's greatest labor camp, complete with manicured cricket grounds, a chess center, a multilingual library with works by Ayn Rand and Barack Obama, the UAE's first multi-denominational prayer hall, film screening rooms, tug-of-war competitions, a coffee shop and landscaped grounds. Regular government press releases show groups of smiling dignitaries who have come to admire the Saadiyat Construction Village, while promotional videos show smiling workers playing cricket in spotless whites," The Guardian reported, noting that a majority of workers on Saadiyat lived in what can only be described as appalling conditions.

The message is clear: Gulf states have long gotten away with sub-standard living and working conditions as a result of the international community, including sports associations. They have, at best, paid lip service to globally accepted standards and their own professed values. While Gulf states promise change and reform of their labor laws and regulations, they fail to put their money where their mouth is.

To Qatar’s credit, the Gulf state — unlike the UAE — has engaged with trade unions and human rights groups. That engagement has given it some degree of the benefit of the doubt. The proof, however, will be in the pudding.

Because of the FIFA World Cup, Qatar has taken the heat of the focus on workers’ conditions in the Gulf. That hardly makes the circumstances of foreign workers in the UAE less onerous or lessens the onus on international sports associations to uphold universal values. For the Gulf states, the litmus test will be implementation and enforcement rather than adoption of lofty principles and showcases to keep critics happy.

*[Note: James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture at the University of Würzburg, and the author of  blog.]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy. 

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Political analysts are looking at the seismic transfer of power from Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani to his 33-year-old son, Sheikh Tamim, in order to examine a number of issues. Sheikh Hamad's abdication occurred just days before the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi, the former Egyptian president, was ousted from power.

One pivotal point of concern is Qatar’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. Previously, Qatar’s leadership had been doing more than simply flirting with Islamists in the region. While comparing Sheikh Tamim to the former Emir, analysts argue that he is a staunch "" but displays a  to Islamists. However, does this mean the love affair with the Muslim Brotherhood is over?  

Qatar’s Support for Islamists

Having held close ties with the Brotherhood for some time, Qatar's relationship with the movement has only grown stronger in recent years. Notably, while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) cracks down on its own Islamists, Qatar has played host to numerous Islamists seeking refuge from its neighbor and the region.

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who fled Egypt in 1961, is pivotally linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and their activities emanating from Qatar. The tiny Gulf state has also been a staunch supporter of the Free Syrian Army along with other Syrian rebels. Importantly, Doha brokered a deal for the umbrella organization, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, in November 2012. Qatar's support for the Syrian opposition is said to involve as much as .

Qatar has also long-supported Libyan opposition Islamists, mainly from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, hosting among others Ali al-Salibi in 1999. The Gulf state, at the advent of the Arab Spring, also supported Libyan rebels with arms, training and financial support. Khaled Mesha'al, the Hamas leader, frequently holds strategic meetings in Doha while the Taliban now have an office in Doha, too. The support for Islamists in the region is extensive politically and financially; another key example being Qatar’s financial support for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood as well as Morsi during his short term in office.

A Dramatic Shift Under the New Emir?

Yet analysts seem to think that the change of power in Qatar has already resulted in cooler relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists; or it may perhaps lead to a dramatic shift in the near future. Sheikh Tamim’s  to Saudi Arabia is interpreted as being indicative of a future alliance against Islamists, whereby Qatar might adopt the same stance towards the Brotherhood as the Saudis – perhaps even suppressing the group.  further point out that in recent months, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken the driver’s seat in supporting the rebels in Syria, leaving Qatar in a distant shadow.

As a Syrian opposition member relayed to the author, the coalition is not succeeding but is in a mess whereby members are splitting into factions and major arms support from the West has dwindled to the delivery of small ineffective weapons. The Qatari state does not have a clear strategy on how to move forward due to Syria’s worsening crisis. Indeed, some Islamists in Qatar are anxious about what the state's transfer of power could mean, as one Muslim Brotherhood member revealed to the author that he and his fellow Brothers are now "shaking." But this fear still remains unsubstantiated.

Could this be a utopian dream of an Islamist-free Middle East with Qatar no longer meddling in regional politics through support for Islamists? Might some observers be wanting to and expecting to see Islamists disappear so badly that such expectation is placed on the young, Sandhurst-educated Gulf leader?

An assumption that Qatar’s love affair with the Muslim Brotherhood has ended is naively construed. To start, there are no tangible indicators that the relationship has been strained. Qatar’s leadership might be surprised by how events have turned out in Egypt where much has been invested in the Brotherhood. There is much talk about Qatar turning more to domestic concerns, but relations with Islamists are virtually unaffected.

The tiny state continues to host Islamists and, in fact, has accepted some Muslim Brothers, including Ashraf Eddin, Hamza Zawba and Amir Darag. Even Salafists have fled Egypt and sought refuge in Qatar as thousands of Islamists have been imprisoned by the new Egyptian government.

Some hotels are so full with Islamists that they are now known as the go-to-place for journalists and other Islamists as well as their supporters. Several more Islamists have come to Qatar on work visas over recent months.

Islamists' activities have most definitely not decreased. They are doing business as usual, holding their regular religious study circles and developing strategic plans for all areas of their work. This includes collaborating with a wider circle of local and international networks and leaders with concrete steps, and orchestrating and carrying out wide-reaching charitable projects — usually with some consideration for Qatar’s political interests.

In fact, the desert has simultaneously become the place-to-go for meetings and religious learning, at times with even close to 300 Brotherhood members (with families) gathering. This vertical and horizontal growth of activities and the sheer number of participants is an indicator for a blossoming relationship.

How the Love Affair Works

However, an assumption about a cooling off in relations is naively construed in large part by a misunderstanding of the way love affairs work. Qatar’s foreign and domestic policy has always been opportunistic and ostentatious. The state's leadership is concerned with its regional influence, as well as its stability and legitimacy. Such affairs thrive on the fulfillment of needs and infatuation. Given their extensive networks and connections, societal support, anti-Shi’a, anti-Wahhabi and even anti-Western rhetoric, the young Emir needs the Muslim Brotherhood.

With the rising tide of Islamism in the region, Qatar saw great opportunity in this relationship. The Qatari leadership may view an ousted Morsi as a setback for the state's goals and may feel that the umpteen "mistakes" made by Islamists in Egypt and even Tunisia are irritating. But Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood still has strong roots throughout civil society, legislative bodies, and political parties as well links to various other Salafists and Islamists in the region and beyond.

Parting ways with the Brotherhood is simply not an option as Sheikh Tamim must strive for legitimacy, stability, and influence in a region with real threats and, in particular, where Shi’a and Sunni differences are political. He is, in fact, burdened with the responsibility and challenge to keep Qatar at the forefront as the new mediator in regional crises. The Muslim Brotherhood serves this most basic need.

The Importance of the Muslim Brotherhood

As regional crises are kept in purview, the Emir of Qatar will need to turn his attention to long neglected domestic issues. While some Qataris claim that the country now has a growing indigenous religious scholarship — there are a greater number of scholars produced through Qatar University’s Sharia College — most of the internationally-known scholars were actually nationalized. Others do not have Qatari citizenship.

Yet most of these scholars collaborate with Muslim Brotherhood activists locally and internationally or hold an actual affiliation with the group. However, these same scholars will ensure Qatar plays a future leading role in religious teaching internationally. They will supposedly lead a moderating discourse to counter extremist thought and terrorism.

This collaboration offers religious grounding of the state and abating of criticism for Qatar's role in cultural Westernization and hosting of the US Central Command. Moreover, these Islamists are anti-Wahhabi, an ideology produced just across the border in Saudi Arabia with a stronghold in Qatar itself.

Ideology becomes important, too, when many core activists know how to move financial support out of Doha to war and impoverished zones where the crisis is ideologically implicated and politically strategic — namely Syria. They know how because as Muslim Brothers they are part of established networks of trust. These scholars play a formidable role.

Above all, the Muslim Brotherhood offers the new Emir of Qatar a longer reign. The state officially dismantled its Brotherhood branch, so it is not viewed at this time as a major contender for power. One of Qatar's most critical fears beyond Iranian expansionist policy in the region, though, is the rise of Shi’a groups to positions of power and influence domestically.

Among numerous endeavors to avoid this prospect, in the last few years, two Shi’a scholars were expelled and a good handful of Shi’a activists have been sent to Iran; all of them were apparently born in Qatar. Beginning in 2002, the majority of Shi'a places of worship have been either shut down, removed, or are supposedly temporarily disabled from operating for a variety of stated reasons.

Some Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated scholars have been highly vocal about the threat of an Iranian expansionist strategy in the region and Shi’a beliefs — al-Qaradawi being a case in point. They have often been quoted as saying that Shi’a are not legitimate citizens and are a threat. These voices are frequently given a platform to speak through the state-owned Al Jazeera network.

While Sheikh Tamim might well be cozying up — at least a bit — to Saudi Arabia, that has nothing to do with the Muslim Brotherhood. Such an alliance becomes important when Iran and its support for Shi'a communities in the region are framed as a major threat. But in this one example lies a clue for what the more distant future will be like for Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood relations.

Love affairs are based on opportunism and the fulfillment of some kind of need in the moment without foresight for future consequences of action. They have no substance of loyalty and Qatar is most certainly not monogamous. Qatar’s rendezvousing all at once with the Brotherhood among other Islamist groups, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Western powers, Iran and whoever should ascend to power regionally, is highly risky behavior.

The Muslim Brotherhood itself is far removed from its original formation in goals and will not lose sight of its most earnest desire for expansionism, power and influence. Given this cocktail mix of relations and conflicting interests, the potential long-term consequences are unfathomable. But for now, and for some time to come, we have a flourishing Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood love affair.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In a bid to reassure Gulf states worried about a US-Iranian rapprochement and critical of American Middle East policy, the Obama administration has opted to back Saudi efforts for regional hegemony through greater integration of Gulf military capabilities in the framework of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).    

The United States-backed Saudi blueprint would effectively establish the kingdom as the region’s military superpower and first line of defense, while allowing the US to balance its commitment to the region with its goal of pivoting towards Asia. But it risks splitting the GCC, which was established to enhance Gulf security.

Giving Saudis What They Want

Speaking at a think-tank dialogue just a stone’s throw away from Bahrain’s restive Shiite neighborhoods, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel made this move on his first visit to the Gulf since last month’s agreement between the United Nations Security Council's permanent members – the US, China, Russia, Britain and France – plus Germany and Iran, aimed at resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. 

Hagel handed Riyadh what it wanted: a first step towards a union of the GCC member states – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman – with the kingdom as the dominant power.

In doing so, Hagel went beyond seeking to reassure Saudi Arabia and its closest allies within the GCC that Washington's rapprochement with Iran would not be at the expense of the energy-rich, fragile Gulf autocracies. The US also wanted to show that it would remain committed to its defense umbrella for the region, despite focusing increasingly on Asia.

Confidence between the US and Saudi Arabia, home to a fiercely anti-Shiite puritan interpretation of Islam, has eroded as a result of Saudi opposition to the Iranian agreement because of the prospect of Shiite Iran reintegrating into the international community and emerging as a power house, capable of rivaling the kingdom.

Saudi confidence has been further undermined by American support for the popular uprisings in the Arab world; failure to provide Syrian rebels with the arms needed to defeat the regime of embattled President Bashar al-Assad; inability to force a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and an increased US focus on Asia rather than the Middle East and North Africa.

Saudi concerns have sparked a series of critical statements of US policy, and persuaded the kingdom to demonstratively refuse to join the UN Security Council when it was elected to a seat.

Fear of Being Swallowed    

By laying out a series of steps to put the GCC, in which Saudi Arabia is by far the most powerful member, rather than individual Gulf states at the centre of US defense policy, Hagel effectively endorsed Saudi calls for a union of Gulf states. This is a move that, so far, has been thwarted by fears among some of its smaller members that they would be swallowed by their big brother.

Indeed, the Saudis failed in their initiative in the last year to forge a union with Bahrain, where Saudi and UAE troops have been based since the brutal squashing of a 2011 popular uprising to bolster the regime.

In a rare public statement against Gulf union, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi al-Ibrahim, a one-time representative of a separatist movement, confronted his Saudi counterpart, Nizar bin Obaid Madani, in no uncertain terms.

"We absolutely don’t support [the] Gulf union. There is no agreement in the region on this… If this union materializes, we will deal with it but we will not be a member. Oman’s position is very clear. If there are new arrangements for the Gulf to confront existing or future conflicts, Oman will not be part of it," he said.

Al-Ibrahim suggested that the Gulf’s major problems were internal rather than external and should be the region’s focus. Last year, Ahmed al-Saadoun, at the time speaker of the Kuwaiti parliament, rejected a Gulf union, saying that as a democracy Kuwait could not unite with autocratic states.

Barely a hundred meters from where he spoke, police vehicles and machine-gun mounted armored vehicles patrol the perimeter of the Shiite neighborhood of Karbad. Graffiti on its walls reflects the area’s mood. Slogans include: "Down with King Hamad"; "Martyrdom is our habit"; "Our goal is toppling the regime"; and "We bow only in front of God." A local resident said: "This will never end. It’s gone too far. Reform is the only way out."

Saudis Pleased, But Not Smaller Gulf States

Hagel couched the new US approach in terms of "strategic agility" and "wise deployment of our influence." The US would help the GCC integrate its missile defense capabilities, he added, by emphasizing the GCC as a “multilateral framework that is the best way to develop an inter-operable and integrated regional missile defense.”

This would include missile defense in annual meetings of US and Gulf air force commanders and officials; making missile defense, marine security and counterterrorism-related sales to the GCC as a group rather than to individual member states; and instituting an annual US-GCC defense ministers conference. Hagel said the first such conference should be held in the next six months.

Saudi officials, endorsing Hagel’s proposals, said the defense secretary had understood the kingdom’s needs and, in doing so, had supported their effort to achieve a Saudi-led Gulf union. "This fits our agenda perfectly," one official said.

Integrating regional defense as a step towards a union is likely to prove easier said than done, due to more than just political resistance by smaller Gulf states. The GCC for one has no mechanism to make military purchases, despite its members having signed a joint security agreement a year ago. Even if it did, Gulf states would likely squabble over every detail of the acquisition.

In addition, smaller Gulf states are hesitant to rely on Saudi Arabia for their defense not only for political reasons, but also because of the kingdom’s checkered military record. Saudi Arabia was unable to defend Kuwait against Iraq’s 1990 invasion of the Gulf state. More recently, Saudi troops had a hard time confronting Houthi rebels on the other side of their border in the north of Yemen.

"The Omani foreign minister’s remarks were unprecedented. Other Gulf states may not say publicly no, but they certainly won’t buy into it," said an analyst from one of the smaller Gulf states.

*[This article was originally published by .]

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