Breaking from negotiations, Trump’s tariff salvo was an attempt to address simmering tensions in the Indo-US relationship by leaning on Pakistan through an oil deal and tariff concessions. Was this sudden shift a product of Trump’s ambitious economic agenda, or a mask for strategic signaling and transactional politics in this trade affair?

The latter seems likely, given America’s history of using deliberately exhaustive trade talks as a strategic tool to exert pressure on other nations, extract concessions or advance broader strategic objectives.

The deal

India was negotiating a Bilateral Trade Agreement () with the US, which began in February. By April, an had been drawn, reflecting US priorities of reducing India’s trade barriers and addressing its $45.7 billion goods trade deficit. From February to July, negotiations grew tense as India refused to liberalize or open up its agricultural and dairy sectors to US markets. India also pressed for , including lower US duties on steel (50%) and aluminum (25%), and preferential access for labor-intensive exports such as textiles, gems, jewelry and IT services. In return, India signaled willingness to provide the US greater market access.

However, apart from these two sticking points, India also US demands for reduced tariffs on auto components and acceptance of US Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, prioritizing its domestic industry and the campaign. Similarly, regarding non-tariff barriers, the US India’s Quality Control Orders (QCOs) and import regulations, which it viewed as barriers to market access for US goods. However, India defended them on the grounds of consumer and domestic industry safety.����

Trump’s negotiation style

The negotiations thus offered potential gains for both sides, but the costs and contentions were high. It made them intense and rigorous, conditions ill-suited to Trump’s negotiating style. The US’s negotiating approach under Trump, specific to trade and tariff issues, has been unconventional and rushed. 

A recent deal with Vietnam was concluded hastily under pressure. The US exploited Vietnam’s trade surplus and export dependence, using tariff threats and prolonged talks to secure concessions. Despite months of negotiation and goodwill gestures, such as liquified natural gas (LNG) deals, Vietnam ended up facing a and transshipment penalties — far less favorable than its proposed 0% reciprocal tariff.��

Similar tactics were seen with countries like Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and many more. These examples illustrate Washington’s tactics of achieving win-win trade deals, even with allies and partners, demonstrating how transactional diplomacy now colors their trade relations. 

However, a closer look suggests that economic or trade calculations do not solely drive these deals. The US is using these trade deals as geopolitical tools — deliberately exhaustive negotiations to push countries toward aligning with its strategic objectives.

Economic attrition diplomacy

Economic attrition diplomacy involves leveraging prolonged trade negotiations to pressure a counterpart into aligning with geopolitical goals, often by creating economic uncertainty or exploiting asymmetric dependencies.

Vietnam’s case illustrates this. The US Hanoi to cut reliance on Chinese industrial goods and curb transshipments, directly serving its anti-China agenda. The negotiations were lengthy, with multiple rounds reflecting prolonged and exhaustive talks to force Vietnam to concur with the deal, leaving it little room to maneuver.

The cases of Indonesia and Japan are also noteworthy. The US pressured Indonesia to align its anti-China goals, primarily due to Indonesia’s attempt to diversify trade with members, and a investment deal with China made in November 2024.��

In the case of Japan, Trump their bilateral relations by escalating dramatically: threatening 25% tariffs, then actually imposing them on Japanese goods, including automobiles, effective August 1. This was an unprecedented move against a US ally. Japan, burdened by its trade surplus and alliance status, yielded partial concessions under tariff threats and geopolitical pressure.��

South Korea, too, faced a tariff of 25% in July, and ended up with a 15% “reciprocal” tariff, effective August 1. The US sought geopolitical advantages from Korea, pressuring it to increase dependency on US purchases, specifically F-35 fighter jets. Although no deal was finalized, South Korea greater market access for US goods, as well as defense commitments to avoid higher tariffs.��

These tactics reveal that US trade negotiations often serve a larger purpose: pushing countries to align with its under the guise of economic bargaining. These echo Washington’s action from five years ago, when it used diplomacy against China. The US attempted to curb China’s technological rise by targeting firms like Huawei, pressured China on issues like intellectual property theft and signaled strength to its own allies.��

During trade negotiations, the US repeatedly escalated tariffs and introduced complex demands, including structural changes to China’s economy, prolonging the uncertainty and pressuring China. Subsequently, China yielded partial concessions, providing the US with some limited success.

Aggressive attrition driven by frustration

Unlike other countries that faced standard coercion from the US with only tariff threats, India was hit with multiple salvos — tariffs, penalties and an embrace of Pakistan. The reasons were clear: the Russia factor, trade with Iran and India’s non-compromising posture during trade negotiations.

This aggressive attrition behavior is motivated by geopolitical frustration, something the US is familiar with acting on. In the 1930s and 1940s, US economic attrition against Japan, driven by frustration, culminated in the of 1941, contributing to the escalation of World War II. Negotiations were prolonged. The US demanded Japan withdraw from China and Indo-China, while Japan sought recognition of its territorial gains, creating a deadlock with no progress.��

A similar situation is unfolding between the US and India today, where the former harbours geopolitical suspicion over India’s relationships with Iran and Russia, alongside deadlocked trade demands. These factors have likely fueled frustration and driven the US to send a strong strategic message by escalating risks and attrition, perhaps setting an example on the global stage.

Unconventional transactionalism: India must reassess its strategy

India must read the negotiating table more carefully and patiently, adopting measured and mixed negotiating styles instead of a confrontational approach, which at times frustrates the US. 

As India looks toward the prospect of a mini-deal by September-October, it should aim for strategic prolongation — progress with limited concessions — rather than dragging talks with no real progress. This will create more room for negotiations and reduce US frustration to some extent. 

India must also leverage its geopolitical value and diversify its trade relationships with Europe and other countries. This will strengthen India’s bargaining position, soften US demands and deter extreme measures. 

A similar approach saved South Korea from higher tariffs despite having no deal with the US, as South Korea adopted strategic prolongation, used measured negotiation tactics offering room via concessions and resisted hasty or pressured deals. 

India must remember that Trump is a master at playing unconventional transactional cards, where deals are more important than relations. India should demonstrate that an agreement is in progress and that there is something on the table, rather than leaving it empty.

[ first published a version of this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

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Iran isn’t the only nation advancing its nuclear capabilities in recent years. In 2019, the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range land-based missiles, citing alleged Russian violations and China’s non-involvement. The US is also its nuclear arsenal, with to deploy nuclear weapons in more NATO states and proposals to extend its to Taiwan.

Russia, too, has intensified its nuclear posture, expanding nuclear and updating its on first use. In 2023, the nation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limited US and Russian-deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In 2024, it stationed in Belarus. Russia and China have also deepened their , setting China on a path to rapidly expand its arsenal, as nuclear security collaboration with the US has steadily over the past decade.

The breakdown of diplomacy and rising nuclear brinkmanship among major powers are heightening nuclear insecurity among themselves, but also risk spurring a new nuclear arms race. Alongside Iran, numerous countries maintain the technological infrastructure to quickly build nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation would require significant collaboration among major powers, a prospect currently out of reach.

The US detonated the first nuclear weapon in 1945, followed by the Soviet Union in , the United Kingdom in , France in and China in . It became evident that with access to uranium and enrichment technology, nations were increasingly capable of producing nuclear weapons. Though mass production and delivery capabilities were additional hurdles, it was widely expected in the early Cold War that many states would soon join the nuclear club. Israel developed nuclear capabilities in the , India detonated its first bomb in and South Africa built its first by . Other countries, including , , , , and , pursued their own programs.

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968 to curb nuclear spread, led many countries to abandon or dismantle their programs. After the end of the Cold War and under Western pressure, Iraq its nuclear program in 1991. In a historic move, South Africa voluntarily its arsenal in 1994. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1996, securing international security assurances in exchange.

Nuclear proliferation appeared to be a waning concern, but cracks soon appeared in the non-proliferation framework. Pakistan conducted its first in 1998, followed by North Korea in , bringing the count of nuclear-armed states to nine. Since then, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, initiated in the 1980s, has been a major target of Western non-proliferation efforts.

Nuclear ambitions in the Middle East, Asia and Europe

Iran has a strong reason to persist. Ukraine’s former nuclear arsenal might have deterred Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022. Elsewhere, revolutionary Muammar Gaddafi, who Libya’s nuclear program in 2003, was overthrown by a NATO-led coalition and local forces in 2011. If Iran achieves a functional nuclear weapon, it will lose the ability to leverage its nuclear program as a to extract concessions in negotiations. While a nuclear weapon will represent a new form of leverage, it would also intensify pressure from the US and Israel, both of whom have engaged in a cycle of escalating sometimes deadly confrontations with Iran and its proxies over the past few years.

An Iranian nuclear arsenal could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Its relations with Saudi Arabia remain delicate, despite the brokered by China. Saudi officials have they would obtain their own nuclear weapon if Iran acquired them. Saudi Arabia gave significant to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, or even the latter with one upon request.

Turkey, which hosts US nuclear weapons through NATO’s , signaled a policy shift in 2019 when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so.

Middle Eastern tensions are not the only force threatening non-proliferation. Japan’s renewed friction with China, North Korea and Russia over the past decade has intensified Tokyo’s focus on nuclear readiness. Although Japan a nuclear program in the 1940s, it was dismantled after World War II. Japan’s , however, remains measured in months. Despite this, for nuclear weapons remains low, given the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nuclear bombings in 1945 killed more than 200,000 people.

In contrast, around of South Koreans support developing nuclear weapons. South Korea’s nuclear program began in the 1970s but was under US pressure. However, North Korea’s successful test in 2006 and its severance of , and to the South in the past decade, coupled with the of peaceful reunification in early 2024, have again raised the issue in South Korea.

Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, which similarly under US pressure. Any sign of wavering US commitment to Taiwan, together with China’s growing nuclear capabilities, could prompt Taiwan to revive its efforts. Though less likely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea could also motivate countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to consider developing nuclear capabilities.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also had significant nuclear implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently to the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraine’s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered. Zelenskyy later his comments after they ignited a firestorm of controversy. Yet if Ukraine feels betrayed by its Western partners — particularly if it is forced to concede territory to Russia — it could spur some factions within Ukraine to attempt to secure nuclear capabilities.

The war has also spurred nuclear considerations across Europe. In December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer a European nuclear deterrent. Donald Trump’s re-election in the 2024 US presidential election could amplify European concerns over US commitments to NATO, with France having increasingly an independent European nuclear force in recent years.

Nuclear collaboration

Established nuclear powers are unlikely to welcome more countries into their ranks. But while China and Russia don’t necessarily desire this outcome, they recognize the West’s concerns are greater, with Russia doing in the 1990s to prevent its unemployed nuclear scientists from aiding North Korea’s program.

The US has also previously been blindsided by its allies’ nuclear aspirations. US policymakers underestimated Australia’s determination to pursue a nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, including covert attempts to obtain a weapon from the UK. Similarly, the US was initially of France’s extensive support for Israel’s nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

Smaller countries are also capable of aiding one another’s nuclear ambitions. Argentina offered considerable to Israel’s program, while Israel assisted . Saudi Arabia financed Pakistan’s nuclear development and Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist is of having aided Iran, Libya and North Korea with their programs in the 1980s.

The slippery slope to nuclear conflict

Conflicts involving nuclear weapons states are not without precedent. Egypt and Syria attacked nuclear-armed Israel in 1973 and Argentina faced a nuclear-armed UK in 1982. India and China have clashed over their border on several occasions. Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression. But conflicts featuring nuclear countries invite dangerous escalation, and the risk grows if a nation with limited conventional military power gains nuclear capabilities; lacking other means of defense or retaliation, it may be more tempted to resort to nuclear weapons as its only viable option.

The costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals are already steep. In 2023, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states spent an estimated managing their programs. But what incentive do smaller countries have to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely, especially when they observe the protection nuclear weapons offer and witness the major powers intensifying their nuclear strategies?

Obtaining the world’s most powerful weapons may be a natural ambition of military and intelligence sectors, but it hinges on the political forces in power as well. In Iran, moderates could counterbalance hardliners, while continued support for Ukraine might prevent more nationalist forces from coming to power there.

Yet an additional country obtaining a nuclear weapon could set off a cascade of others. While larger powers are currently leading the nuclear posturing, smaller countries may see an opportunity amid the disorder. The limited support for the , in effect since 2021, coupled with the collapse of other international treaties, reinforces the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states. With major powers in open contention, the barriers to nuclear ambitions are already weakening, making it ever harder to dissuade smaller nations from pursuing the ultimate deterrent.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

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The Quad is a grouping of four major Indo-Pacific democracies: the United States, India, Japan and Australia. It was relaunched in 2017 to counterbalance China’s growing influence by promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific through cooperation in security, infrastructure and trade.

Despite this ambition, the Quad faces significant limitations. Critics argue it remains a “talking shop,” where dialogue seldom leads to concrete action. Additionally, some members have limited bilateral experience working together, which hampers effective collaboration.

South Korea was notably absent when Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first conceived the Quad in 2007. Abe’s vision was geographically focused; he pictured a rhombus with its corners in Japan (north), Australia (south), the US (east) and India (west). The idea was to cover ground and secure critical shipping lanes. This left South Korea, located in the middle, outside the equation.

Yet, South Korea has considerable strengths. South Korea and Japan, are the only two economic powers in the region that can plausibly compete with China in building infrastructure rapidly and at scale. South Korea is also a strong defense partner of the US, with a technologically advanced military boasting half a million active personnel — ten times the size of Australia’s. Moreover, South Korea is a leader in global industries like shipbuilding, memory chips and electric vehicle batteries, making it not just a regional player but a global one. Most importantly and obviously, it is a vibrant democracy. For all these reasons, it merits membership in the Quad.

The broader context is the growing security threat posed by China, which seeks to control sea lanes in the East and South China Seas and use its economic power to influence its neighbors. While it makes sense for South Korea to join the Quad, it is unlikely to make provocative moves against China, its largest trading partner and greatest military threat, without a security guarantee from the US. Ultimately, the Quad (or Quint) seems destined to evolve into a military alliance.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

[Note: This FO Talks/FO Live is part of the Osaka School of International Public Policy’s “Peace and Human Security in Asia: Toward a Meaningful Japan-Korea Partnership” project supported by the Korea Foundation.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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There is no clear agreement on the Quad’s purpose. Is it a group of friends, or a security alliance? If it serves any purpose, it’s because these democracies, neighboring China, feel the need to unite. While wary of China, they claim not to be forming an alliance to contain it.

If that is the logic, excluding South Korea seems illogical. South Korea, sharing a border with North Korea and with China nearby, is more vulnerable than any Quad member.

Why is South Korea not in the Quad?

It’s important to note that the Quad is originally a Japanese concept. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe envisioned it as a platform for future economic cooperation. India, the US, and Australia were key trading partners for Japan, and protecting sea routes to them was essential. This required international cooperation.

From Japan’s perspective, this still makes sense. However, the broader purpose of the Quad has shifted. In 2017, the group “rebooted” and rebranded itself with the slogan “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” — opposing China’s attempts to claim the East and South China Seas as its territorial waters. But if that’s the goal, why exclude South Korea? Or, for that matter, countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, whose maritime sovereignty China threatens?

The AUKUS deal, which includes the US, UK, and Australia, further complicates things. It suggests the US and Australia are moving toward alliances based on cultural ties rather than democracy. Britain has little role in East Asia today, yet it was included while regional powers like France were not. However, Anglo unity doesn’t have to clash with democratic solidarity. The US and Australia could deepen ties with Asian democracies, and including South Korea in the Quad would be a vital step.

Why the Quad needs South Korea

South Korea is more than just one more adversary of China that could cooperate in military matters. Including South Korea is a matter of defining the Quad’s identity. If the grouping aims to be a significant regional actor, it needs to inspire a sense of purpose. Right now, it looks like a ragtag team with little justification beyond each actor’s personal interest. The Quad needs an identity. Democracy is the obvious defining characteristic of the grouping, but if that is the case, South Korea must be involved. If South Korea remain excluded, observers may wonder whether something other than democracy is the real criterion.

There some flies in the ointment, though. South Korea has strong security ties with the US but is economically dependent on China, its largest trading partner. Joining the Quad could strain this relationship, especially since China has a history of using economic pressure to influence political decisions. In 2017, China’s boycott over South Korea’s decision to host the US THAAD system heavily impacted South Korea’s economy.

Another issue is the historical animosity between South Korea and Japan, stemming from Japan’s 35-year occupation of Korea. Many Koreans still harbor resentment for Japan’s actions during World War II, though tensions have eased since Abe’s tenure.

South Korea is more physically threatened by China than any current Quad member. The threat of a Chinese or North Korean invasion overland is a real danger (and one that has already occured, during the Korean War). For Japan, an island nation, the possibility of a Chinese naval threat to the homeland remains somewhat more theoretical. So, South Korea may hesitate to take a strong stance on issues like maritime freedom. However, due to its ties with the US from the Korean War, South Korea is even more integrated into the US security network than Japan. Will it be willing to join an alliance likely seen by Beijing as anti-China?

For now, it’s unclear. But South Korea’s inclusion would make sense. Both South Korea and Japan have strong infrastructure development sectors and, together, could offer an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. What the Quad needs is a clear identity that other nations can buy into. Without this, it will inspire neither moral nor strategic trust.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

[Note: This FO Talks/FO Live is part of the Osaka School of International Public Policy’s “Peace and Human Security in Asia: Toward a Meaningful Japan-Korea Partnership” project supported by the Korea Foundation.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Kim Yo Jong hasn’t left much of a paper trail. Some splenetic statements about the United States and South Korea from the country’s Propaganda and Agitation Department, which she has run since 2014, have been attributed to her. In August 2022, North Korean television broadcast her first speech, in which she reported on her brother’s case of COVID and lashed out at her country’s enemies.

Other than that, she traveled to South Korea to attend the opening of the Winter Olympics in 2018 and met that year with South Korean President Moon Jae-in. She attended US-North Korean summits in Singapore and Hanoi in 2018 and 2019 and accompanied her brother on his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Russian Far East in September 2023.

There’s hardly enough material on Kim Yo Jong to fill an article. And yet Lee Sung-Yoon, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, has devoted an entire book to her.

The book is less fact, more fiction

To fill in the gaps, Lee has filled his new book with lots of contextual material about her family — grandfather (Kim Il Sung), father (Kim Jong Il), brother (Kim Jong Un), and various other relatives — about North-South relations, and about US diplomatic contacts with Pyongyang. He has tried to intuit her personality from minor gestures made during overseas visits. He has even gone so far as to imagine her thoughts (“Well done, brother, she seemed to be thinking,” he writes at one point after a North-South summit, “On to Washington.”)

On this slender evidence, Lee attempts to build a case that Kim Yo Jong is, as the subtitle of the book states, “the most dangerous woman in the world.” Elsewhere, he claims that “she is unparalleled in the contemporary world” and that she may well take over the helm of the country.

Such overstatements could be dismissed as merely part of an effort to get a publishing contract or, later, book reviews. Unfortunately, Lee’s efforts to play up the importance of his subject leads him into some subtle and not-so-subtle distortions.

Such distortions begin with the cover of the book, which shows the half-profile of an unsmiling Kim Yo Jong, the rest of her face concealed by a block of red on the right side of the cover that showcases the title. This layout suggests that the book, when opened, will provide access to “the rest” of the “most dangerous woman in the world.”

It’s a proper teaser, perhaps, but this representation conceals a more serious transformation. Against the white backdrop of the left side of the cover, the stray hairs that escape Kim’s face make her look disheveled at best and maniacal at worst. It’s a photo that befits the portrait of a woman as a Fury or avenging angel or, as Lee writes in the book, someone who has “mastered the dark arts of psychological manipulation, strategic deception, fake peace overtures, hostage-taking, torture, and ad hominem name-calling.”

But the original photo shows Kim Yo Jong against a black background, where the stray hairs are practically invisible and where she looks like any other unsmiling North Korean official: Stolid rather than psychotic.

Such a manipulation would be justified if the book went on to reveal just how demonically powerful Kim Jong Un’s sister truly is. As a close advisor to her brother, Kim Yo Jong does indeed possess power, at least within the North Korean system. So, too, is she on the record saying rather unpleasant things about the US and South Korea, though she is simply participating in a long tradition of harsh invective coming from Pyongyang.

But is she really “the most dangerous woman in the world”?

An active imagination backed by little corrobaration

Consider this representative passage from the book about the passage of a certain South Korean law restricting the actions of North Korea human rights activists.

The domineering princess had only to snap her fingers and the South’s rulers complied with a vigour and a sophistry, not to mention human rights violations the likes of which shall seldom, if ever, be observed in another advanced democracy.

Lee advances a rather unusual argument that Kim Yo Jong, as a woman, has alternately charmed and bullied South Korean politicians into obeying her will, as if she combines the talents of a dominatrix and a diplomat. “She is not only pretty but also polite!” as Lee sums up the general response of South Korean commentators.

Misogyny aside, let’s take a closer look at two claims in Lee’s sentence: That South Korean officials changed policy in response to Kim Yo Jong and that the policy change amounted to an exceptional human rights violation for an advanced democracy.

The policy in question was the decision in December 2020 by the South Korean parliament to ban the flying of propaganda balloons into North Korea. According to Lee, South Korean politicians were motivated to pass this law because Kim Yo Jong demanded six months earlier that South Korea criminalize the launching of balloons.

Lee neglects to discuss that arguments about these balloons, which often contain Bibles, anti-government flyers, dollars, and thumb drives with South Korean videos, had long been taking place in South Korea. In 2014, when these balloons provoked a huge debate in South Korean society, both the ruling party and the opposition largely agreed that the launches were provocative and to be avoided (how to avoid them remained a point of contention).

The launches were also without question dangerous for those who picked up the airborne packages. Imprisonment and execution are not uncommon for North Koreans caught with Bibles or materials from South Korea.

Moreover, Lee leaves out the fact that the leadership of North and South had agreed in 2018 to stop the psychological warfare the two sides had been waging. Although not state-sponsored, the balloon launches certainly seem to fall into the category of psychological warfare.

So, South Korea’s legislature had plenty of reasons to pass the bill that had nothing to do with Kim Yo Jong and her threats.

Second, was the bill a human rights violation? Pejoratively labeled the “Gag Law” by its opponents, the bill certainly criminalized certain activities. But the balloon activists were effectively engaged in regime-change efforts that endangered the recipients of their messages as well as the efforts at the governmental level to reduce inter-Korean tensions. One could have an interesting argument about whether such activities lie outside the protections of free speech. But to call it a human rights violation “the likes of which shall seldom, if ever, be observed in another advanced democracy” certainly falls into the category of overstatement.

Overstated claims distort reality and shed little light

Other claims in the book seem equally overstated. Lee argues that the fate of the hereditary dictatorship “may yet lie in her hands.” That’s theoretically possible, but Kim Jong Un is thought to have three children who would more likely be his successors. Also, the patriarchal nature of the North Korean system militates against a female ruler.

Elsewhere, Lee argues that “North Korea’s ruling family has never faced any serious existential challenge: not a popular uprising or even organized public protest worthy of the name.” Although it’s true that there hasn’t been any significant uprising in North Korea, the ruling family certainly faced a serious existential challenge when the country’s industry and agriculture collapsed in the early 1990s and a terrifying famine ensued.

Other recent challenges came from within, like a thwarted army uprising in 1995. After the death of Kim Jong Il, his brother-in-law Jang Song Thaek represented a potential China-aligned challenge to the Kim Jong Un leadership. Lee portrays the execution of Jang as the result of a family disagreement, but it was more likely a serious factional dispute within the North Korean system.

Kim Jong Un — and by extension his sister — is undeniably brutal. But Lee is too quick to accept stories of this or that official being executed at their command (some, like diplomat Kim Hyok Chol, were later reported to be alive).

Lee also dismisses the notion that fear of regime change dominates the thinking of North Korean officials. “The Kim rulers have never had any real concern about an imminent US attack, despite playing this up for both domestic and foreign consumption to justify oppression and nuclearization,” he writes. And yet North Korean leaders have often referenced the US bombing of Belgrade during the Kosovo war and the efforts to remove Muammar Qaddafi in Libya as cautionary examples. The Kims might be mistaken about US enthusiasm for regime change, but it’s unlikely that they “never had any real concern” about these threats.

Perhaps the most significant distortion of the book is its portrayal of South Korean and US diplomats as consistently duped by North Korea. It’s certainly true that North Koreans have proven to be cagey negotiators. The government, after all, managed to acquire nuclear weapons even as North Korean officials engaged in denuclearization negotiations. North Koreans have excelled at using the weapons of the weak to make the best of a bad situation.

But engagement between North and South is not only about official conflict de-escalation between the two countries, which has had a mixed record of success (as opposed to the unmitigated failure that Lee suggests). It’s also about helping ordinary North Koreans with humanitarian assistance and running programs — like the divided family reunions and the Kaesong Industrial Complex — that have promoted people-to-people contact.

Kim Yo Jong is a Party functionary with an exalted bloodline, something of importance for North Korea’s ruling elite. But her power is constrained by gender and by the limits of her country’s influence in the world. It would be a mistake to underestimate her. But it is also a mistake to portray her as some demonic puppet master who controls the fate of the Korean peninsula if not the world. Exaggeration and thin speculation, in the end, are no substitute for the details of Kim Yo Jong’s life and ideology, which remain only a little less of a mystery after reading Lee’s book

[ first published this piece, which republished.]

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Nowhere is this more visible than in the Indo-Pacific. Most prominent is the revived Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a strategic security forum between the United States, India, Japan and Australia. The 2021 foundation of the AUKUS (Australia, UK and US) technology-sharing alliance has also manifested the phenomenon of minilateralism. In both cases, increasing cooperation has been spurred on by an increasingly threatening China.

It remains to be seen whether these organizations will be able to contribute to stability in the region by improving cooperation and governance or destabilize relations by building up opposed blocs.

The need for nuanced international cooperation 

Minilaterals are emerging as a consequence of the shifts in underlying power in the region. China, certainly, has become more belligerent in the last 30 years, but other nations such as South Korea, India and Singapore have been growing and are also asserting their influence in a region no longer dominated by Western powers. For its own part, the West, especially the United States, France and the United Kingdom, has been making efforts to maintain its foothold in the region. These shifts in the underlying power structure have created the need for an intricate cooperation structure that can balance so many overlapping interests.

On the economic front, diplomatic prospects with the signing of the Indo- Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) by 13 countries with interests in Southeast Asia, including the QUAD allies headed by the US, last year. The signatories hope to advance sustainable economic development and strategic inclusiveness for the overall peace and stability of the region.

“The future of the 21st century is largely written in the Indo-Pacific,” US President Joe Biden. The IPEF reflects the spirit of the Trans-Pacific Partnership as a part

of the US’s so-called “Pivot to Asia.” policy as manifest in the revamped entity of the QUAD. The US has also been US-Japan-South Korea and US-Japan-Philippines trilateral dialogue. Meanwhile, Australia is strengthening with India and Indonesia.

Pou Sothirak, an expert on International affairs at the Asian Institute of Policy Studies, cites a in the ability of multilaterals to operate effectively and represent member nations’ interests as a major driver of the proliferation of minilaterals.

The inertia and stagnation of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations compromise the effectiveness of these more formal political structures. Meanwhile, the changing nature of contemporary threats, coupled with the rapid development of information technology, has undeniably paved the way for more informal means of dialogue and negotiation, something which the minilaterals promise to incorporate.

More concretely, the Indo-Pacific’s democratic nations find themselves facing a Chinese threat that . This requires them to seek outside help and adopt a more aggressive collective stance than was previously necessary.

Challenges and criticisms

However, the picture is not as rosy as it may seem. Despite the strategic viability of these minilaterals, critics allege that they have diminished the sanctity of multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, as well as their own credibility.

This aspect has three facets. Firstly, the increased preference for minilateralism has disrupted international interdependence and globalization, leading to the fragmentation of global governance mechanisms. The Quad’s relatively informal and ambiguous strategic interests in curtailing Chinese belligerence provide an example of this.

Secondly, disparity of threat perceptions between minilaterals has the potential to duplicate the competition and power-building inherent in unilateralism. The increased role of China in the SCO and BRICS, as opposed to regional forums of the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and the G20, illustrate how this can disrupt the process of consensus-building.

Lastly, incompatibility of interests, coupled with centralizing nature of such institutions, have fostered accountability and compliance issues, arising from non-binding targets and commitments in mutually institutionalized, exclusive power blocs, as opposed to legally sanctioned ones, accentuating the existing differences in the Ind0-Pacific.

It could be said that minilateralism as a process cannot remain isolated and has to complement the existing multilateral institutions. Moreover, successful outcomes can only be materialized should member nations endeavor to bring about the very atmosphere of discourse that exists within minilaterals into the larger regional and multilateral framework as well. A lot still needs to be worked upon, given the tremendous hegemonic shift in present-day international affairs.

[ edited this piece.]

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In the Middle East, however, the metaverse continues to be embraced by governments with enthusiasm. Israel has opened its first metaverse in South Korea. Saudi Arabia has been engaged with companies such as The Sandbox, for long-term collaboration. Saudi Arabia has even opened the region’s first metaverse to provide training in the new technology. Scholars that NEOM, the planned smart city in Tabuk Province,  is building “the first metaverse that actually is a metaverse.” 

In February 2023, global professional services firm KPMG announced that it would establish a Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Saudia Arabia with the aim of speeding up the application of the metaverse in the country as well as the wider Middle East and North Africa region. 

KPMG will be collaborating with a broad collection of including Microsoft, Ericsson and Metakey. Microsoft will be responsible for providing the gaming platform and infrastructure; Ericsson will utilize its 5G technology and network; Metakey will be in charge of creating 3D objects.

Virtual tourism, services and more

The metaverse technology is set to transform the global competitiveness of companies, and Saudi Arabia is embracing this vision. Spearheading the initiative is the Royal Commission for AlUla, which has a captivating metaverse experience. Users can now virtually explore and interact with the Tomb of Lihyan, Hegra’s largest tomb, providing a unique glimpse into the country’s rich history.

Egypt has also embraced the metaverse revolution, its first city called , inspired by its ancient civilization that continues to attract numerous tourists each year. The virtual city combines elements of ancient Egyptian culture with a futuristic touch, commemorating the 100-year anniversary of the discovery of King Tutankhamun’s tomb.

Notably, the Metaverse Tunisian Summit took place in 2022, emphasizing the region’s growing interest in this technology.

Countries like the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar have shown serious interest, with Dubai and Abu Dhabi being selected as the first global cities to launch within by Metaverse Holdings.

Various sectors are jumping into the metaverse bandwagon. Qatar Airways introduced the platform, offering customers a virtual reality experience. Users can now explore the airline’s premium check-in area and even tour the interior of their aircraft cabins, enhancing the travel experience.

Virgin Mobile Kuwait emerged as the first telecommunications company to its position in The Sandbox, a virtual game environment. 

The UAE’s Thumbay Group aims to bring innovative healthcare solutions to the virtual realm, while the Ministry of Health and Prevention has established a customer happiness service center within the metaverse. Furthermore, the UAE’s Ministry of Economy has opened its third office in the metaverse, offering services such as consumer protection, trademark and patent services, and industrial designs.

In with Multiverse Labs and the Sharjah Commerce & Tourism Development Authority, the UAE has launched Sharjaverse, the world’s first government-backed metaverse city. This ambitious project features a “” for official document processing and aims to boost the country’s digital economy and local tourism. The minister even announced that the UAE’s economic progress will now be measured using the Gross Metaverse Product (GMP) metric, replacing the traditional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) metric.

Digital authoritarianism on the horizon

The rest of the Middle East has seen a surge in the adoption of digital technology despite disparities in access. While countries like Yemen struggle with slow internet and limited smartphone usage, wealthier Gulf Cooperation Council nations pioneer the adoption of advanced tech like 5G. Gulf states have rapidly acquired the status of premier digital superpowers in the region.  

However, during the World Economic Forum, the UAE’s Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence warned about the concept of “” in the metaverse. He called for international standards to prohibit such acts. However, human rights activists have criticized the proposal as a veiled attempt at censorship.

The emergence of digital totalitarianism appears increasingly likely as well. We may see countries such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and the UAE themselves strategically with other formidable digital authoritarian superpowers, including China and Russia.

The stage is set for a high-stakes power play in the digital realm, where the rules for global dynamics are being written in the Middle East. The debate surrounding international standards for the metaverse will likely intensify as more countries and organizations grapple with the ethical and social implications of this emerging digital frontier.

[Naveed Ahsan edited this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Ironically, this order does not have much order. A term in vogue at the Pentagon applies. This term refers to a volatile, complex, uncertain and ambiguous (VUCA) world. The rules-based order that the US created after World War II stands weakened. Most states are operating in a world of shifting allegiances, maximizing their national interest in a quid pro quo basis.

Two blocs have emerged, one led by the US and the other by China. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is an economic giant. Its per capita income may be much lower than the US but the size of its population gives it heft. In many areas of technology, China is now a world leader. Nations of the Global South such as Brazil, Kenya and Saudi Arabia are now making advantageous deals with both blocs.

Geopolitics Matters

Sir Halford John Mackinder, the father of geopolitics and geostrategy, offers a good model to look at the current situation. He posited that the Eurasian landmass from Brest to Vladivostok is one fundamental entity. This generally has a dominant power, which is the continental power. France, Germany and Russia have been this power. Today, this continental power is China, which calls itself the Middle Kingdom.

Historically, the littoral states such as the UK, the Baltics and even Italy allied against the continental hegemon. Now, littoral states such as Taiwan, South Korea and Japan are allying with the US, which is on a different landmass, to counter China. That is why Taiwanese and South Korean leaders have been visiting the US. It is precisely for this reason that The Philippines conducted its largest ever military exercises with the US.

However, Mackinder’s explanation is not complete. Economics is important too. France constructs nuclear power stations and top quality Airbus planes. French luxury goods such as Chanel and Christian Dior are still world leaders. The biggest demand for all things French lie in China. Therefore, French President Emmanuel Macron showed up to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping. 

Economics Matters Too

Macron and, before him, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz showed up to meet Xi for the same reason. Both of them want to maintain good relations with China. This relationship guarantees thousands of jobs. As leaders responsible for their economies, they have to make sure that a Xi-led China continues to be a reliable export market. Unlike the US, neither France nor Germany have large enough domestic markets. They need China today in a way the US does not. Therefore, they are not entirely aligned with the US on China.

The same is true for Brazil. In 2021, China accounted for 31.3% of Brazil’s exports. The US came a distant second and accounted for 11.2% of Brazilian exports. Brazilian soybeans, iron ore and oil now feed the Chinese industrial machine, which has an insatiable appetite for commodities. At a time of economic trouble, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has no option but to visit China and cultivate relations with Xi.

Even the US now depends on Chinese imports. A rupture in US-China trade relations would push the cost of far too many products up in Walmart and on Amazon. So, we now live in an inextricably intertwined world.

Yet it is important to remember that the world has always been interconnected. The reason the US exists is because the Turks disrupted Europe’s trade with the East. The quest for silk and spices led Europeans to the Americas. Once they discovered silver, this underpinned the global economy. Spain and Portugal became global powers. The UK and France followed.

Few know that a third of the silver from Latin America ended up in China. It fueled trade and then inflation. The 1580 , which instituted payment of all taxes and tributes in silver, led to the fall of the Ming Dynasty.

Yet China’s trade surplus continued until the UK started exporting opium to the Middle Kingdom. The British monetized its colony in India by growing opium there and exporting it to China, causing starvation for brown people and addiction for yellow people. Naturally, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Ireland only won its independence in the 20th century and Northern Ireland is still a part of the UK) made a handsome profit and improved its balance of payments as a result.

However, this phenomenon is a historical aberration. China has been the dominant global economy for centuries. The US is a relatively new phenomenon. The global domination of the US is even newer. As the world reverts to its historical mean, the great balancing game has kicked off in right earnest.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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A 21-year-old named US National Guard soldier Jack Texeira was responsible for the leak. The question arises: why was such a young soldier in possession of such sensitive information?

The US government suffers from elephantiasis. The security apparatus has become too big. Too many people know that they should not. Many of them are contractors. Some of them are people in junior positions without the maturity or judgment to handle sensitive information. The need to know principle has been thrown out of the window. There is now a systemic problem in the US intelligence establishment.

The Texeira case is a farce. Sadly, it is a serious farce. Texeira released the documents on a social media site called Discord to impress his computer gaming buddies. In intelligence circles, MICE is an acronym used to summarize motivations for people lured to commit treason. MICE stands for money, ideology, compromise and ego. In Texeira’s case, his juvenile ego seems to be at blame.

These leaks create a problem. Everyone spies on everyone else. It is useful for the US to know what the South Koreans are saying to the Japanese. It is useful for Russia to know that China is discussing with the US. However, when revelations of spying come out, protests inevitably follow and so does a cooling off period. Texeira’s leaks have put South Korea in an awkward position.

The leaks will lead to a brief chill in US relations with South Korea and other allies. After a while, things will go back to normal. Regular spying business will resume. The more important fallout of Texeira’s leaks is that foreign intelligence sources will figure out who is leaking information to the US. In some countries, US sources will die.

The US national security establishment now uses thousands of contractors. The Intelligence Community (IC) employs over 45,000 of them and the Department of Defense a number north of a whopping 561,000. The Top Secret security clearance is now handed out to too many people, a ridiculous 1.2 million non-career intelligence officers. This means that leaks are inevitable and US national security is under threat.

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Nevertheless, my brilliant students also informed me that cosmetic surgery in general and nose jobs in particular were the rage in Iran. Like and , Iran is one of the great centers of cosmetic surgery. Rhinoplasty, the technical term for nasal surgery or “nose job,” is extremely popular in Iran. In fact, so fixated are many Iranians with this surgery that the has entered the surgical lexicon.

A culture obsessed with beauty

Iran, also known as Persia in the past, is a culture that has long prized sophistication, courtesy and beauty. In fact, tells us that Iran literally means the “Land of the Aryans” and the country adopted this name in 1935. This ideal of Aryan beauty—large eyes, symmetrical faces and beautifully shaped noses—runs strong in the culture.

Even though Iran is ruled by puritanical mullahs who do not allow women to reveal even their hair, the Iranian veneration for beauty continues. Those of us who grow up in India are sometimes indoctrinated from an early age about the legendary beauty of Iranian women. Shah Jahan, the Mughal emperor who ruled India from 1628 to 1658, built the Taj Mahal for Mumtaz Mahal. 

Like many high fliers in the Mughal court, Mumtaz came from a family of Iranian/Persian origins. Note that Persian (Farsi) was the official language of North India from 1192 to 1858 when the British finally replaced it with English. In the heyday of Mughal rule, the icons of beauty were Persians like Nur Jahan and Mumtaz Mahal. Unsurprisingly, the Taj Mahal has been “a marble tribute to a Persian princess.” 

The Taj Mahal may be a thing of the past but Iranians still prize beauty. In 2013, on Iran’s beauty obsession that feeds its voracious cosmetic surgery industry. Apparently, “a desire to gain a husband, western looks, or even clients are a few reasons why Iran has the world’s highest nose surgery rate.” Even men are getting nose jobs and plastic surgery now.

In a nutshell, nose jobs and cosmetic surgery thrives in Iran because people want it. In Keynesian terms, there is demand for this sort of surgery.

A track record of surgical intervention

I grew up in India as the son of an eminent plastic and reconstructive surgeon. My father was in the Indian Army. His patients were often soldiers who had been shot or injured by shrapnel. He did the whole gamut of reconstructive work. He often told me that the sort of surgery he did was born on the battlefield.

Iran is no exception. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War kicked off the cosmetic surgery industry. Thousands of soldiers were wounded in those eight years of war. Iranian plastic and reconstructive surgeons stitched them up on a regular basis. With so much practice, many of them became stunningly good at their jobs.

When the war ended, many of these military surgeons transitioned to cosmetic work. Two pioneers are remembered to this day. Dr. Mohammad Esmail Akbari and Dr. Hamid Karimi blazed new paths that others follow to this day. Akbari developed new techniques in rhinoplasty (nose jobs) while Karimi focused on facial cosmetic surgery, including facelifts, eyelid surgery and brow lifts. Along with other military surgeons, they triggered the boom in cosmetic surgery that lasts to this day.

Since 1988, the Iranian cosmetic surgery industry has grown rapidly. In fact, Iran is one of the leading destinations for cosmetic surgery. Patients can get top-level surgical procedures at a fraction of the cost in richer economies like the US, the UK or Switzerland.

In a nutshell, Iran has the supply of skilled cosmetic surgeons to satisfy both internal and international demand. Say’s law—the law of the markets that holds that supply creates its own demand à la iPhone—applies as well.

Some key problems

Cosmetic surgery in Iran is not without its problems. There have been reports of botched surgeries. Some people have suffered from complications and even died. Some blame this on the lack of regulation. Iran’s mullahs are keen to regulate what their women wear but have largely turned a Nelson’s eye to their decisions to go under the scalpel.

When foreigners who get their treatment in Iran suffer complications, they find themselves up a shit creek without a paddle. A simple cosmetic procedure leads to a lifetime of trouble. They cannot exactly sue for damages or go back to their surgeons for redressal.

Apart from these tangible issues, there is the deeper question about a cultural fixation with beauty and the social standardization of beauty. Just as the mullahs have imposed religious conformity on the country, so have arbitrary standards of beauty. Why is one type of nose superior to all others? Why is it so important to look a certain way? Are there racial prejudices that underpin Iranian ideals of beauty? Are women and, now even men, objectified in modern society? Is cosmetic surgery yet another rebellion against repressive mullah rule?

Iran and other modern societies will have to wrestle with questions like these. In 1820, the young British poet John Keats penned, “Beauty is truth, truth (is) beauty. that is all ye know on earth and all ye need to know.” Perhaps the time has come to think again as to what exactly is beauty itself.

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Ironically, Moon appointed Yoon as prosecutor general of the country. As the top prosecutor, Yoon secured the conviction of two former conservative presidents for corruption. He also pressed charges against Samsung Chairman who was sentenced to prison in a bribery scandal. “Owing loyalty to nobody,” Yoon then went on to investigate members of the Moon administration, catapulting this star prosecutor into the national limelight and eventually making him the PPP candidate.

Yoon is an outsider.  He has no administrative experience and little access to Seoul’s political networks. He has not even served as a member of parliament. The fact that Yoon came out on top confirms that public popularity is now more important than party allegiance and political or administrative experience in the South Korean presidential system.

The election — although very close nationwide —  exposed South Korea’s regional division. In this country, political parties are not primarily divided by ideology or political platforms but rather by history and regional origins. In the southwestern Cholla provinces, more than 80% voted for Lee while the southeastern Kyongsang regions voted overwhelmingly for Yoon. 

A Terrible Housing Crisis and Gender Issues

The biggest surprise was that Yoon won the capital city of Seoul, a stronghold of the DP. This crucial victory helped him win the election. It hinged on the only political issue that mattered during the campaign: unaffordable housing prices. The Moon administration failed to address this burning issue, which hurt the DP. 

The overwhelming importance of this matter can only be understood in the context of the rental system in South Korea. Jeonse requires lump sum payments and directly links rents to real estate prices. In addition, rental contracts are limited to two years and there is almost no protection for tenants who are left to the whims, fancies and even tyranny of their landlords. The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 2021 observed that: “While regulations on homeowners and tenant protection have been slightly improved, they have failed to arrest the massive increases in housing costs in the urban centers.”

COVID-19 Policies Carry Implications for South Korea’s Presidential Election

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In these elections, a gender divide emerged among younger voters. Only 34% of women in their 20s voted for Yoon in contrast to 59% of men in the same age group. This was by far the largest gender divide among different age groups ever recorded. In the past, younger voters have tended to vote for the DP. Yoon appealed to young men by opposing “feminism” and even promising to abolish the ministry of gender equality. Note that South Korea’s average gender pay gap is one of the largest in the world. Furthermore, South Korea’s labor-force participation rate among women is the fifth-lowest among the 29 EU and OECD countries as per a on Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI).  The authors of the report see a “continued prevalence of traditional ideas about family and gender roles.“ On a related note, Shim Sang-jeung, the highest-ranked female presidential candidate of the progressive Justice Party received only 2.4% of the vote as compared to 6.2% in 2017, exposing the crisis in which the political left now finds itself in South Korea. 

A Tricky Political Situation

Over the years, election campaigns have become almost completely personalized and devoid of political agendas. Negative campaigning now delves into character flaws of the candidates and even of their wives. Particularly shocking is how vital issues, such as the extreme environmental degradation in South Korea or how the country plans to combat climate change fail to feature in presidential debates. South Korea has the lowest share of renewable energy among the 41 countries examined by the SGI report. A later report takes the view that South Korea “is more focused on [its] growth aspect than on environmental protection.”

It is difficult to predict the direction the Yoon administration will take during its five-year tenure which begins on May 10. As a political and administrative novice, Yoon will rely on his party and the bureaucracy. When it comes to economic and social policies, Yoon – the son of a market-liberal economics professor – promised to reduce government interventions. However, he is likely to make little headway because his party does not have a majority in the parliament. The DP commands a strong majority with 172 out of 300 seats. It can shoot down Yoon’s economic policies even though it may not have the two-thirds majority needed to override presidential vetoes, amend the constitution, or impeach the president. 

While the South Korean president has strong constitutional powers and can rule by decrees, his ability to impose radical changes without proper legislation is limited. If the president ends up in a standoff with parliament, the country could end up in political gridlock. This might cause instability or, on a more positive note, inaugurate a new era of cooperation and compromises between the two camps or even a complete reorganization of political parties. Yoon’s election has upped the political ante for the country. Now, all parties are focused on the next parliamentary election in 2024.

Foreign Policy Ambitions 

If things seem rocky on the domestic front, they are better when it comes to foreign policy. For a long time, relations with North Korea, China, Japan and the US have been one of few ideological divisions between the two large parties. Moon’s presidency adopted the classic DP agenda of engaging North Korea to achieve an as-yet unfulfilled goal of signing a peace treaty or at least an end-of-war declaration. The PPP fiercely opposed the DP on this issue. Conflict with North Korea has long been a means for the conservative PPP to rally its supporters. Members of the PPP also fear that a peace treaty would undermine South Korea’s alliance with the US, risking the withdrawal of American troops. 

Yoon is likely to use the PPP’s excellent ties with the US to strengthen the US-South Korea alliance. His government is likely to repair relations with Japan. Japan-South Korea relations have deteriorated due to friction over Japanese reparations for its colonial atrocities in Korea. Closer ties to the US and Japan will give Yoon less leeway in dealing with China and Russia. When it comes to the war in Ukraine, Yoon is likely to put South Korea more firmly on the US side and against Russia. Under the new president, South Korea, Japan and the US are likely to come closer together to strengthen the rules-based international order in Asia.

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Although South Korea has reduced its prior strict , the percentage of critically ill patients is less than the country’s last peak in December 2021. The key question now is what the South Korean public thinks about the government’s COVID-19 response.

Getting the Public Behind the Fight on Misinformation

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South Korea’s 2020 national assembly election was internationally praised for balancing ease of voting amid pandemic restrictions and provided a blueprint for other countries, with President Moon Jae-in’s administration largely praised for its efficient response to the pandemic. South Korea even allowed citizens who have tested positive to cast a ballot at the polls once they , even if voting had officially ended. 

However, with cases rising in late 2021, evaluations of the Moon administration’s handling have soured, although still hovering around 40% — the  in the country’s democratic history for an outgoing president and similar to his vote share in 2017. Yet Yoon and the Democratic Party’s Lee Jae-myung, both polling  in the run-up to the election,  to outline any pandemic response plan until November, when there was already a shortage of hospital beds — likely a result of the government’s “living with COVID” plan. 

Similarly, minor candidates have not presented clear COVID-19 policies. Even beyond the “living with COVID” strategies, candidates have not shared concrete plans to build back infrastructure after the public health crisis. 

To understand South Korean evolving perceptions of COVID-19 policies, we conducted a pre-election web survey of 945 South Koreans on February 18-22 via Macromill Embrain using quota sampling on gender, region and age. We asked respondents to evaluate on a five-point Likert scale the following statement: “I am satisfied with the South Korean government’s response to the coronavirus �dzܳٲ����𲹰�.”

We found, at best, mixed support for the government’s response, with overall disagreement outpacing agreement — 43.6% versus 35.8%. As before, perceptions deviate on party identification, with supporters of the ruling Democratic Party (DP) largely satisfied with the response (64.8%), while supporters of the main conservative party, the PPP, are largely dissatisfied (71.4%). 

Supporters of the two smaller parties, the progressive Justice Party and the center-right People’s Party, showed responses that were more mixed, perhaps because candidates had not emphasized COVID-19 policies in campaign rhetoric. Regression analysis finds that women and older respondents are more supportive of COVID-19 policies, while after controlling for age, gender, education, income and political ideology, supporters of the DP were still more likely to evaluate pandemic policies favorably while PPP supporters were less likely to do so. 

Noting this partisan divergence, we next wanted to identify whether views on COVID policy may have indirectly influenced support for one candidate over another. Regression analysis finds that even after controlling for demographic factors and party identification, satisfaction with COVID-19 policies negatively corresponds with voting for Yoon and positively for Lee. 

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However, we also found that views of COVID-19 policies largely correspond with evaluations of President Moon’s job performance, questioning whether these measures were driving evaluations of Moon or whether perceptions now may simply be picking up sentiments regarding Moon irrespective of the actual policies. Further analysis shows that including evaluations of Moon’s performance in our earlier statistical models results in the COVID-19 evaluation failing to reach statistical significance. 

Whereas COVID-19 policies  Moon Jae-in’s party in 2020 win a clear majority in the national assembly, our evidence suggests evaluations now may have contributed to an anti-incumbency vote even as both of the major candidates lack clear policy prescriptions related to the pandemic. Regardless, President-elect Yoon will need to address a changing COVID-19 environment amid a fatigued and divided Korean public.

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In South Korea, on the other hand, the Green New Deal is a policy reality. In 2020, the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) put its version of a Green New Deal at the center of its platform. When South Korea held its parliamentary election that April in the middle of a worldwide pandemic, that platform helped propel the liberal DPK bloc to a landslide victory and a legislative super-majority. Emboldened by this victory, the liberal Moon Jae-in administration officially made the Green New Deal a part of government policy several months later.

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It wasn’t the first time that a South Korean government tried to address these problems. “When we heard about the Green New Deal in 2020, I asked myself, ‘Haven’t we seen this policy before?’ We had a pretty similar policy in the Lee Myung-bak administration that was called Green Growth,” remembers Lee Taedong, a political scientist at Yonsei University. Beginning in 2008, the conservative Lee Myung-bak government had indeed promoted a green stimulus program that addressed the twin crises of climate change and economic stagnation.

For President Moon’s government, which took office in 2017, the Green New Deal was not just an electoral ploy. South Korea was facing a reputational crisis. Successive governments had stressed the importance of addressing climate change. But the country was, as of 2018, the seventh-largest  of carbon in the world.

“South Korea is the ninth-largest consumer of energy in the world, and 95% of that energy is imported from outside,” notes Hong Jong Ho, an economist at Seoul National University. “It has the highest nuclear power plant density in world and the lowest renewable proportion among the 38 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.”

Contributing to South Korea’s dirty profile was its export of coal-fired power plants. “Along with Japan and China, South Korea was a lead financer of coal projects, mainly in Southeast Asia,” explains Kim Joojin, the managing director of the Korean NGO Solutions for Our Climate. “Because of abundant financing, countries like the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam had a lot of new coal-fired power plants in their future that were really straining the global carbon budget.”

Korean climate activists have worked hard to narrow the gap between the government’s rhetoric and its actual behavior. A key part of Korea’s climate action community are young people. “It’s limited how much pressure we can exert, as youth, on the government,” points out Kwon Yoo-Jung, an activist with Green Environment Youth Korea (GEYK). “But we have to communicate that we are aware of the financing of coal-fired plants abroad and we’re not proud of it and it has to stop, even though the government is not doing this in front of us but in other countries.”

Thanks to a sustained campaign of civic activism, the South Korean government finally announced this year that it would no longer finance overseas coal-fired plants. The Moon government also pledged in the lead-up to the Glasgow climate summit that it would, by 2030,  greenhouse gas emissions to 40% below 2018 levels on the way to becoming carbon neutral in 2050. It has also  to increase wind and solar energy production by more than double by 2025.

One of the chief sticking points in the country’s overall energy transition, however, has been South Korea’s singular focus on rapid economic growth. In the early 1960s, South Korea’s per capita GDP was  to that of Ghana or Haiti and  of the population lived in absolute poverty. But in the space of little more than a single generation, South Korea became a wealthy country and, by 1996, had joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Fossil fuel, almost all of it imported, was an essential ingredient of that economic success.

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Today, the country struggles to define a different kind of economic success and a different approach to energy policy. South Korea’s Green New Deal is the latest attempt to square the often-conflicting demands for growth and environmental action. It has proved to be simultaneously an inspiration for other countries and a lightning rod for criticism of Korea and the Moon administration.

Origins of the Green New Deal

In 1998, the Kim Dae-Jung administration began to organize South Korea’s first serious  to climate change with a top-level committee on the topic and a comprehensive national plan. Not much came of it. It wasn’t until a decade later that Korea became more proactive.

Lee Myung-bak had built a reputation as the head of Hyundai’s engineering and construction division. As mayor of Seoul, he developed a new profile as something of an environmentalist when, among other things, he removed an old elevated highway in the capital to restore an old waterway. Nicknamed the “bulldozer,” Lee entered the presidential office with the  to combine both economic growth and sustainability.

Shortly after becoming president in 2008, Lee unveiled his “Green Growth” program. “Lee Myung-bak’s policy vision was one of Green competitiveness,” explains Lee Taedong. “He wanted to make South Korea the seventh-largest economy by 2020 and the fifth-largest by 2050.” The new president also pledged considerable government funds — 56.9 trillion won or about $60 billion — for the mitigation of climate change and the securing of energy independence. Another $30 billion was allocated to creating new engines of economic growth, while $30 billion more went into improving quality of life and enhancing the country’s international standing.

The Green Growth program aimed to decouple growth and carbon emissions by reducing fossil fuel use, expanding green infrastructure and growing the economy, albeit sustainably. Expanding nuclear power was a key part of the Green Growth plan, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and lessen the country’s reliance on imports. Nuclear energy currently provides  one-quarter and one-third of the country’s electricity.

Lee also imagined that South Korea could become a green growth leader in the international community. He attracted the Global Green Growth Initiative, an intergovernmental development organization, to establish its headquarters in Seoul in 2010. That same year, the UN organization devoted to assisting the Global South in addressing climate change, the Green Climate Fund, also set up shop in Seoul.

Central to the Green Growth program was separating growth from its usual connection to increased carbon emissions. “Some European countries achieved decoupling of economic growth and greenhouse gas emission,” Lee Taedong explains. “Those that engaged in an emission trading system are more likely to achieve decoupling.”

South Korea under Lee Myung-bak did not, however, achieve decoupling. The country’s economy grew modestly during his five-year term, but its greenhouse gas  also continued to rise. Nor did the Green Growth plan achieve much in the way of economic equity. “One big part of Green Growth was the aim to create jobs,” Lee Taedong continues. “However, there is no measure or report of how many jobs were created.”

Another criticism of the Green Growth initiative was all the money that went into construction projects. “We spent a lot of money,” Lee points out, “but we didn’t get a lot of environmental goods from it. For the future, we need to consider how we steer these stimulus funds to make sure that we build up real green infrastructure.”

Elements of the Green New Deal

South Korea’s most recent parliamentary elections took place in April 2020. The ruling DPK, along with its partner Platform Party, won 180 out of the 300 seats. With the Green New Deal as a centerpiece of its platform, the DPK increased its parliamentary delegation by 57 seats and gained a legislative supermajority.

The ruling party’s Green New Deal manifesto contributed to its electoral success. “The key concepts of the Green New Deal manifesto were to achieve carbon neutrality and achieve a carbon-zero society vision by 2050,” explains Kim Joojin. “It promoted market mechanisms including RE100 [a global initiative bringing together the world’s most influential businesses committed to 100% renewable electricity] and allowed more renewable energy producers to supply renewable energy to more consumers. It prohibited coal financing by public institutions. It talked about reforming the power sector and how that sector has not been helpful in terms of renewable energy deployment, which is still an ongoing problem.”

In July, after considerable discussion of the need for a pandemic-related economic stimulus, the government announced the Green New Deal as official policy in July 2020. But, as Kim points out, the new initiative was not focused on climate issues. It devoted only $65 billion to the reduction of carbon emissions by about 12 million tons by 2025. “That’s about $5,000 per ton,” he says. “The current price of carbon is $33 ton, so reducing carbon emissions was not really part of the discussion.”

Instead, the focus was on infrastructure — such as zero-energy buildings, restoring ecosystems and creating safe water management systems — as well as Green innovation with renewables, electric vehicles and other Green technologies. “My intuitive sense is that it’s really a repackaging of already existing policies,” Kim continues. “So, there was a lot of criticism coming from the public, especially young people, who were asking, ‘Is it a Green New Deal or a Grey New Deal?’”

The price tag for the program is 73.4 trillion won or about $62 billion. The funding is thus less than what the earlier administration devoted to the Green Growth initiative.

Another key element of the program is the creation of 659,000 jobs by 2025. Lee Taedong warns that the Green Growth initiative didn’t follow through on its job promises. “We don’t want to see the same outcome from the Green New Deal. If we don’t see clear evidence, this policy won’t be worth very much,” he suggests.

The Green New Deal is part of a larger government stimulus package that includes a “Digital New Deal” and a stronger social safety net. It is intriguing that the Korean government separated out the environmental component of its stimulus package from the equity elements and the high-tech digital projects. It is also interesting that, although the investments into digital infrastructure are less than half of those going into the Green New Deal, they were projected to create many more jobs (903,000) by 2025.

Many environmental activists in Korea view the Green New Deal as necessary but insufficient. Six youth organizations held a press conference two months before the government released the program demanding that the government detail how South Korea would reach net carbon zero in 2050, that it protect and retrain workers in carbon-intensive industries, and that it create a mandatory educational curriculum for climate change and the environment. In addition, the groups demanded that the government phase out coal by 2030 and increase the share of renewable energy.

When it was launched, the Green New Deal reflected only a small portion of these demands. Still, one of those youth groups, the Green Environment Youth Korea (GEYK), participated in a video commending the Korean Green New Deal. “We considered the Green New Deal a milestone,” explains GEYK activist Kwon Yoo-Jung. “We wanted our youth to understand why it was so important, to make sure that they understand that it’s a Green New Deal not a Grey New Deal.”

Korea’s Overall Energy Picture

Lee Myung-bak had hoped that his Green Growth program would catapult South Korea to the very top ranks of the global economy. By 2020, South Korea had risen from  to the , just ahead of Russia. The country hadn’t become the seventh-largest economy in the world as Lee had hoped, but it was still an impressive achievement.

That growth was accompanied by increased carbon emissions, which peaked finally in 2018. Traditionally, Korean economic growth has been associated with heavy industry: car manufacturing, shipbuilding, steel production. And that industry has drawn heavily on the energy derived from fossil fuel.

Currently, Korea is home to three of the largest oil refineries in the world, all located near the zones of heavy industry in the southeast: the SK energy complex in Ulsan, the GS-Caltex refinery in Yeosu and the joint project of Aramco and Hanjin also in Ulsan. South Korea also has three of the top seven coal-fired power plants in the world at Taean, Dangjin and Yeongheung. These and other facilities have helped make South Korea a leader in the production of fine particulate matter (PM) — a key element of air pollution — with the  PM2.5 concentration in the OECD.

These fossil fuel interests form a powerful lobbying force in Korean society that has made a transformation of the energy infrastructure very difficult. “The industry-related stakeholders, including academics in government, are very powerful, their lobbying power is very strong,” notes Hong Jong Ho.

This is not just a domestic problem. South Korea has also been a key player in promoting fossil fuels around the world. Until recently, it was financing coal-fired power plants, particularly in Southeast Asia. Its shipping yards also produce many of the vessels that transport fossil fuels. For instance, South Korean companies have a virtual  on the production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers, manufacturing 98% of them in 2018 and securing 94% of orders so far this year.

“The Korean Export-Import bank provides a lot of money for oil and gas financing,” explains Kim Joojin. “In fact, it’s 13 times higher than coal financing.” South Korea is no longer financing overseas coal projects, but it didn’t join the 20 countries that agreed in Glasgow to end public financing of all overseas fossil fuel projects by the end of 2022. Earlier, the Asian Development Bank made a similar pledge, so Korea is increasingly out of step with the region as well. “There’s a discussion in Korea as well as in Europe about whether gas can be considered Green, and behind that is a strong gas lobby,” Kim continues. “COP26 struck a critical blow against coal. The next climate discussion will be gas.”

Given the power of fossil fuel interests, it’s not surprising that South Korea has such a dismal record of incorporating renewable energy into its overall electricity generation. “In 2020, renewables in South Korea were only 7.2% of its energy,” explains Hong Jong Ho. “The OECD average is over 30%. Germany and the UK are close to 50%, while Denmark and Austria are around 80%. Even Japan and China are close to 20%.”

Most of South Korea’s electricity production is derived from coal, liquefied natural gas and nuclear energy. “South Korea has the highest nuclear power plant density in world,” Hong continues. “Korea is the only OECD country with over 90% of its electricity coming from the traditional three sources (nuclear, coal, natural gas).”

Moon Jae-in ran on an anti-nuclear energy platform but has since embraced nuclear power as a way to reduce carbon emissions and maintain economic growth. But nuclear energy is not carbon-neutral. When factoring in the entire life cycle of a nuclear power plant — construction, operation, transport of spent fuel, decommissioning — such facilities produce three to four as much carbon emissions as solar panels across their life span.

Another important aspect of Korea’s energy market is the pricing. “The energy market is so distorted,” Hong Jong Ho points out. “No country in the OECD has this type of energy price system. The government totally controls the price of energy.” Electricity is generated by the Korean Electricity Power Company (KEPCO), whose six subsidiaries effectively form a monopoly and which favors through its pricing the coal, gas, and nuclear facilities. The market power of KEPCO keeps the prices of renewable energy inflated and  the entrance of private actors into the renewable sector.

The overemphasis of coal, gas, and nuclear also has employment implications. “If you can expand the renewable energy sector alone, we can create a lot of jobs in the coming years,” Hong continues. “Compared to nuclear or coal, the renewable sector can create many more jobs.” According to his calculations, a moderate transition scenario would create 24,000 jobs by 2050, an advanced scenario would generate 270,000 jobs, and a 100% renewable future would create 500,000 jobs. In comparison, about 490,000 Koreans are currently employed directly and indirectly in the auto sector.

The resistance to renewables doesn’t come only from the coal, gas and nuclear lobbies. Farmers are often uncomfortable with on-shore wind power while fisherfolk are often opposed to off-shore wind. It’s not just a question of livelihoods. It’s often a question of values.

“The older generation, including my parents, endured prolonged poverty in the 1960s,” Hong recalls. “Their goal was the modernization of Korea. They all know that fossil fuel and nuclear have been the driving source of energy to have the rapid economic growth in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. They are so accustomed to this idea of supply-oriented, centralized generation. On the other hand, renewable wind and solar are very different, with distributed generation and an emphasis on demand management, energy efficiency and reducing energy consumption. This is an idea very different from what the older generation has become accustomed to.”

Hong laughs when he thinks about how his parents view his work. “Whenever I talk to my parents, my father scolds me. ‘Your idea is wrong,’ he says. ‘How can wind and solar generate enough electricity to continue to power our economic growth in Korea. That’s absurd!’”

The focus on overcoming poverty, dealing with political disruptions and ensuring that Korea becomes an advanced industrialized country has meant that “Koreans generally focus on the present,” Hong adds. “The future is not something they have the presence of mind to consider. But the climate crisis is a long-term problem that requires a consistent policy to be successful.” Still, the situation is changing. “The Korean people are slowly trying to understand the circular relationship between economy, climate and jobs,” he continues, “and familiarize themselves with the virtuous cycle between climate, economy and more employment.”

One hopeful sign is a statement on June 5, 2020, from 226 local government heads — mayors and provincial governors — that declared a climate emergency and called for a transition to a sustainable society. Since there are only 229 local autonomies in Korea, this list represents virtually all the heads of local governments.

“Irrespective of political party or whether they’re liberal, conservative, or progressive, they all joined together to say that the climate emergency is a critical issue,” Hong points out.

Overseas Coal Financing

Over the years, South Korea has financed coal-powered plants in India, Morocco and Chile. But it has focused on Southeast Asia where it financed three projects in Indonesia and seven in Vietnam. This kind of financing was long considered a natural extension of South Korea’s own coal-powered industry.

But that picture began to change about four years ago. Civic pressure on industry and government was enormous. “There were ads in publications with global circulation, like one that said, ‘President Moon, is this really Korea’s idea of a Green New Deal?” Kim Joojin recalls. “And there was one in the Financial Times that read, ‘Samsung, make the right call on coal.’ There were demonstrations in front of big institutions.”

Young people were a major part of that civic pressure. Established in 2014, the Green Environment Youth Korea (GEYK) is an organization of around 60 youth activists who are working to ensure that youth are at the forefront globally to press for climate justice. In a busy district of Seoul, they participated in a campaign of chalk painting on the sidewalk devoted to phasing out coal as well as a social media campaign that bombarded key players — Hanabank, KEPCO, the Blue House — to communicate that citizens were not happy with their policies. Back in 2017, they were involved in a coal-ending bicycle trip from the city of Cheonan to Dangjin, where the largest coal plant in the world at the time was located.

“This plant was not something to be proud of,” says GEYK activist Kwon Yoo-Jung. “It was something to be ashamed of given the impact of the coal-fired plants on community health.”

In 2017, debate over coal financing began in the Korean parliament. “In 2018, two Korean pension funds announced that it would make no new coal commitments,” Kim Joojin continues. “In 2020, KEPCO, the national utility finally decided to no longer sponsor coal projects. Samsung said it would not do any more coal financing in the future. Also that year, there was a national debate around the Korean-financed projects in Indonesia and Vietnam. Those projects eventually went forward, but close to 100 financial institutions committed to not financing coal projects. Coal became a no-go zone in our financial sector.”

As part of their activism, GEYK members went to the areas overseas where the coal plants were planned under the banner, “People Live Here.” South Korean activists  up with residents in Indonesia who were protesting the plants. “Due to the impact of the coal plant emitting so much air pollution, they can’t continue their way of living,” Kwon Yoo-Jung notes. “This is a moral question as well. Local residents had no say in the decision-making process, even though they suffer all the impact from the project. The community faces severe health issues. People are moving out of village.”

Furthermore, she explains, the coal-fired plant in Indonesia will soon become a  because electricity from solar energy will be cheaper to produce than electricity from coal three years after the plant comes on line.

The pressure campaign culminated in April 2021 at a summit convened by US President Joe Biden when Moon Jae-in announced no more coal-financing projects in 2021. It was part of a trend. “Japan made a similar announcement at the G20 in the United Kingdom the following June,” Kim Joojin notes. “At the UN General Assembly in September, Xi Jinping said that China would no longer finance coal. There’s some discussion about how specific these commitments are and what they will cover, but the heads of the state of these economies were saying that coal financing was wrong.”

As a result of these announcements, “Indonesia and Vietnam had to dramatically cut their coal portfolios, especially new coal projects,” he adds.

Phasing out coal is an integral part of reforming Korea’s energy sector. The official date for a phase-out is 2050, though the National Council on Climate and Air Quality, chaired by former UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon, has  an earlier date of 2040 or 2045. “Five years ago, there was not much discussion of whether coal is the right thing to do,” Kim continues. “There were 11 coal-fired plants commissioned in 2016-17, and seven began construction. But then came efforts from provincial governments, and the social license of coal power dramatically changed.”

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“The reality is that our government can provide a more ambitious coal phase out, for instance, in the 2030s,” he points out. “But what’s bogging down our government is how to compensate the already made investments. The same discussion is taking place in Germany around coal phase-out, but here in Korea, at least there is practically no coal mining.”

Korea has made a commitment to net zero carbon in 2050. But with such a large coal portfolio, meeting the goals in the near term will be difficult. Cutting carbon emissions by 40% by 2040 “relies on overseas offsets and carbon sinks that are not considered policies with the most environmental integrity,” Kim notes.

With its Green New Deal, South Korea is addressing both climate change and economic equity. But the effort is not yet commensurate with the challenge. Quoting Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner, a poet from the Marshall Islands who  the UN Climate Summit in 2014, Kwon Yoo-Jung concludes: “We deserve to do more than just survive. We deserve to thrive.”

*[This article was originally published by .]

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The expanded multidimensional collaboration marked meaningful progress in the transition of the US–South Korea relationship from that of a traditional military alliance to a more versatile, modernized partnership. But perhaps even more noteworthy was the joint commitment to strengthening regional governance and championing human rights, especially women’s rights. 

Making a Statement

To begin with, the Biden and Moon administrations reinforced their common vision of promoting regional governance centered on liberal values in the Indo-Pacific. Broad-brush commitments from the 2019 joint by the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) — such as encouraging regional digital transparency and advancing openness, sovereignty and the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific — solidified into more explicit terms during the meeting in Washington.

For instance, both sides agreed to oppose all activities that undermine, destabilize and threaten the rules-based order; uphold freedom of navigation and stability in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait; support open and inclusive regional multilateralism, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad); and build clean 5G and 6G telecommunications networks. The allies also the KORUS Global Vaccine Partnership, a tangible step toward strengthening regional leadership and governance through public health and vaccine distribution.

For Washington, getting South Korea to acknowledge and emphasize the importance of liberal norms in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, as well as demonstrate for the Quad, was a welcome change. Out of fear of damaging strategic ties with China, its largest trading and an important of regional diplomacy with North Korea, leaders in Seoul have largely avoided publicly siding with the US on China-related issues.

South Korea’s traditional wariness is based on experience. In 2016, after Seoul deployed the missile defense system, which China perceives as a vehicle for US strategic surveillance of Chinese interests, Beijing informal economic boycotts against South Korea and bilateral defense talks. Against this backdrop, the Biden-Moon statement from the summit, which contains language that can be viewed as contrary to Chinese interests (such as supporting the Quad and upholding liberal norms around disputed East Asian seas), signaled that Seoul is growing more confident in standing up for its own values and supporting a free and open Indo-Pacific, regardless of Beijing’s and despite the possibility of retaliation. 

Human Rights

In addition to regional governance, human rights marked another issue where Washington and Seoul renewed commitment at the summit. The joint statement comprised several pledges that soundly reflected the alliance’s devotion to human rights. This included expanded financial aid for countries, commitment to aiding North Korean citizens, support for the ongoing democratic movement in Myanmar, and standing for justice against racism and hate crimes Asian Americans. But particularly eye-catching was the alliance’s unusually strong emphasis on empowering women and enhancing gender equality.  

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The Biden-Moon statement acknowledged “women’s full participation” as the key to resilient democracy and presented several important commitments for women’s empowerment. The two presidents mentioned exchanging best practices to reduce the gender wage gap, empowering women in the fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), and combating abuses against women, including domestic violence and cyber-exploitation.

When it comes to workplace equality, both allies stand well below the average for member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on issues like gender wage disparity and female leadership (or the glass ceiling ), with South Korea ranking last. Tied to this is gender disparity in STEM, which limits greater labor diversification and which has also been a concern for both the and . Violence against women is a challenge both societies face.

These are all vital areas of improvement for both countries to elevate their state of gender equality and overall . The specific mention of these issues in the joint statement is encouraging for women’s rights advocates. 

Falling Short

Despite this promising turn, shared awareness of gender equality issues does not mean much if not put into action. Inconsistent progress on this front has been a problem for both allies. Women’s empowerment was a at the summit in 2015 between Barack Obama and Park Geun-hye. But while the US remained to these shared objectives, South Korea . While things have in South Korea, with its gender equality ranking rising from to under Moon, the US saw a backslide under former President Donald Trump, going from ^th to place globally, according to the World Economic Forum.

However, under the Biden administration, which prioritizes gender , the US will likely make significant progress in the future. Promoting gender equality is an indispensable element of the universal human rights agenda. As two sophisticated democracies championing human rights, both the US and South Korea are responsible for making enduring efforts to empower women. Under any administration ruled by whichever political coalitions, the value of women’s rights should not be . 

On top of striving to tackle gender inequality at home, the US and South Korea should lay out more concrete bilateral initiatives and build a high-level channel to discuss progress regularly and hold each other accountable for tangible progress toward their commitments. Gender inequality remains a longstanding to regional growth in Asia. At the regional level, the US–ROK alliance could revisit and expand on its pledges from the regarding women’s economic empowerment and in security and peacekeeping issues.

After all, the Biden and Moon administrations’ renewed cooperation on regional governance in the Indo-Pacific and gender equality established a good framework for the US–ROK alliance to expand its influence and spread democratic values throughout Asia. Both sides should make sure to diligently implement the commitments going forward.

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First, it became known that the US has been reaching out to North Korea through several channels, starting in mid-February, but it has not heard back. North Korea then published two statements within as many days by two high-ranking officials. On March 16, Kim Yo-Jong — the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un — the joint US-South Korea military exercise, warning that if Seoul dares “more provocative acts,” North Korea may abrogate the Inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement of 2018. She also cautioned the US that if it “wants to sleep in peace for [the] coming four years, it had better refrain from causing a stink at its first step.” Two days later, First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-Hui was saying that North Korea sees no reason to return to nuclear talks with Washington, calling its outreach a “cheap trick.”

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These statements coincided with a warning by the head of the US military’s Northern Command that North Korea might begin flight testing an improved design of its intercontinental ballistic missiles “in the near future.” On March 23, Pyongyang tested two cruise missiles before qualitatively upping the ante with a short-range ballistic missile test on March 25, constituting a breach of UN Security Council resolutions.

Although these developments may suggest that a further escalation on the Korean Peninsula is inevitable, North Korea has thus far been following its traditional playbook by signaling a message that leaves all options on the table, ensures maximum room for maneuver and, at least from Pyongyang’s view, places the ball in Washington’s court. North Korea is raising the stakes ahead of the conclusions of the policy review process in the US, while simultaneously conveying the message that the door is open for reengagement at some point. “In order for a dialogue to be made,” Choe said, “an atmosphere for both parties to exchange words on an equal basis must be created.”

Biden’s North Korea Policy Review

Further developments in US-North Korea relations will, to a significant extent, depend on the outcomes of the policy review process. Although this process is not yet complete, it is apparent that the policies of the Biden administration will differ significantly from those of the previous administration under Donald Trump.

First, we should not expect Trump’s personalized diplomacy to continue under President Joe Biden. Rather, the US is trying to restore a consultative process by involving the regional actors in Northeast Asia more directly in the North Korea question — and possibly trying to (once again) multilateralize the nuclear issue in the longer run.

During the visits of Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Japan and South Korea earlier this month, Blinken stated that the Biden administration was consulting closely with the governments of South Korea, Japan and other allied nations. He also that Beijing “has a critical role to play” in any diplomatic effort with Pyongyang. Whether more consultation leads to actual consensus remains to be seen.

Second, the US will most likely propose a processual solution to the nuclear issue. In an for The New York Times in 2018, Blinken himself argued that the best deal the US could reach with North Korea “more than likely will look like what Barack Obama achieved with Iran.” He wrote that an interim agreement “would buy time to negotiate a more comprehensive deal, including a minutely sequenced road map that will require sustained diplomacy.”

Third, the new administration seems to place a greater focus on the human rights issue in its policies on North Korea. During his visit to Seoul, Blinken made clear that the US would not only address security concerns, but also the North Korean government’s “widespread, systematic abuses” of its people.

Three Lessons From the Past

Act, not react: As past experiences with North Korea have shown, it is now critical for the United States to act quickly and clearly communicate its new North Korea strategy to both its allies and Pyongyang. If official communication channels are blocked, the facilitation activities of individual European Union member states and/or Track 1.5 intermediaries could be helpful. Until then, it is crucial not to get sucked into rhetorical tugs-of-war with North Korea.

If the international community fails to act quickly on North Korea, Pyongyang will likely once again resort to a crisis-inducing policy, thus forcing the international community to react to its expected provocations, rather than preventing further escalation in the first place.

Separate the issues: The North Korean nuclear issue is complex. Solving the military and security components of this issue will inevitably require addressing a range of related political, diplomatic, economic and even historical issues. As the case of the Six-Party Talks has shown, however, one individual negotiation process can quickly become overwhelmed by the multitude of challenges and issues associated with the nuclear issue. As such, it is essential to establish adequate formats with the right participants to address the respective issues and challenges.

There is a role for Europe: Although there is no doubt that the EU is only a peripheral player in Korean Peninsula security issues, the current debate on a new Indo-Pacific strategy provides an important opportunity for Brussels to critically reflect on its own approach to North Korea, as it has failed to achieve its stated goals — i.e., denuclearizing the peninsula, strengthening the nonproliferation regime and improving the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Although the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will not be front and center of this new strategy, the EU needs to show greater political will to contribute toward solving the pending security issues in the region if it wants to strengthen its profile as a security actor in the region.

*[This  was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

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Today, America faces unprecedented challenges from foreign powers, especially China and North Korea. To meet the challenges, we must build a coherent foreign policy that the world — especially our allies — can understand and support. We are witnessing China increasingly flexing its muscles on the Indian border, in Hong Kong, in the South China Sea and with Taiwan. America puts itself at risk to not realize that China is investing much of its resources into a growing, multifaceted military.

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The US needs to build alliances throughout Asia to ensure our stability for the next century. We need to be doubling down on our relationships with India, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan and especially South Korea. South Korea is the world’s 12th-largest economic power and one of America’s strongest allies for the last 60 years. It has been a bastion of democracy housing one of the largest US military bases in Asia. It also houses an essential element of the West’s global supply chain for technology, transportation and telecommunications. This supply chain is more important than ever if relations with China continue to deteriorate.

While the importance of a strong South Korea policy is at an all-time high, US President Donald Trump managed to stick his finger in the eye of our Korean allies. In 2019, Trump demanded “out of thin air” that the Koreans pay $4.7 billion per year to station US military forces on the Korean Peninsula, according to .

There is no question that our allies have to pay their fair share for defense. However, cost-sharing negotiations must be based on rationale and data. At precisely the time we need strong allies in Asia, President Trump is burning bridges. This is a major political gaffe that America needs to correct before our relationship suffers long-term damage. If the South Koreans cannot count on reasonable and predictable US foreign policy, they will have little choice but to abandon Washington and to seek out other alliances.

The South Koreans weren’t the only ones taken by surprise. Even Republican Senators Cory Gardner and Marco Rubio were unprepared to discuss the president’s comments. Senator Ed Markey, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, , “If South Korea decides that it is better off without the United States, President Trump will have undermined an over 60-year shared commitment to peace, stability, and rule of law.”

The United States can do better. We need to deepen our relationship with South Korea as an essential partner for dealing with North Korea and China. We should be doing the same with other Asian countries and continue to promote the policies that Democratic and Republican secretaries of state have built over decades. A president needs to communicate a consistent game plan that the American people — and our allies — can understand and count on.

Presidential leadership needs to be even-handed and sensitive to the concerns of our allies. Demands should be replaced by reasonable requests and ample explanations. Insisting that allies vastly increase payments to the United States might make good domestic election-year politics at the cost of American safety in the world.

If we do not rethink the importance of our allies soon, we may be left to fight the next war alone.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Containment advocates argue that North Korea has never truly been squeezed hard enough to force capitulation. Engagement advocates counter that serious tit-for-tat negotiations have never tested North Korea’s willingness to freeze or shut down its nuclear program in exchange for good-faith incentives. Both camps maintain that some additional variable — failure of leadership, bureaucratic inertia, the perfidy of North Korea, the resistance of the US Congress, the ambivalence of China — has undermined the integrity of the containment or the engagement approach. Politics and/or geopolitics, in other words, continually interfere with the workings of a perfectly good plan.

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There is a third category of options: try something new and different. Into this category falls a regional proposal like a nuclear-weapon-free zone for Northeast Asia. Unfortunately, it remains as marginal to the debate today as it was when it was first proposed. Even though the rationale for such a zone has arguably grown stronger, the political will in the principal capitals — Washington, Pyongyang, Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul — is lacking. Not surprisingly, the greatest interest in this proposal has come from Mongolia, a country that has not been central to the nuclear politics of the region.

But significant changes are on the horizon. The coronavirus pandemic poses a new, collective threat to the region. China is emerging from this crisis in a stronger, and more aggressively nationalist, position. The United States may well have new leadership in 2021, and its strategic thinking about the region is evolving regardless of who occupies the White House. The surprising resignation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in September has shaken up Japanese politics, while the engagement-friendly Moon Jae-in administration has a more powerful parliamentary majority in South Korea after the 2020 elections.

Ordinarily, such changes would merely shift the needle slightly toward one of the status quo positions, probably a renewal of tit-for-tat negotiations — between the US and North Korea on the one hand and North Korea and South Korea on the other — within a narrow spectrum of options. However, frustration over several decades of failed engagement and containment strategies could push pundits and policymakers to explore the third category of options, including a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The State of Play in Washington

The election of US President Donald Trump in 2016 introduced a new dynamic into nuclear politics in Northeast Asia in three ways. Trump was interested in demonstrating his reputed negotiating skills in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, a stand-off that frustrated his predecessor, Barack Obama. The new president showed little interest in shoring up traditional alliances, such as the military pacts with Japan and South Korea. And he demonstrated a marked indifference to non-proliferation norms, suggesting at one point that the US should remove the nuclear umbrella from Japan and South Korea and allow the two countries to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

Despite three direct encounters between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as well as repeated US attempts to extract more money in host-nation support from Tokyo and Seoul, the US president has not substantially changed the status quo in the region. North Korea has  to its nuclear deterrent. Japan and South Korea have bristled at Trump’s extreme burden-sharing demands. Relations between the United States and China have significantly worsened. But the US nuclear umbrella remains in place, as does the US alliance system. As a recent Stimson Center  notes, the stalemate on the Korean Peninsula persists and will likely to continue despite the coronavirus.

Over the last six to nine months, US pundits have churned out variations of their past positions, updated to reflect Trump’s erratic policies, Kim’s hardening stance and the outbreak of the coronavirus. Trump’s own vacillations between a “fire-and-fury” threat of military response and his seeming willingness to negotiate a comprehensive deal personally with Kim have provided hope and concern to both sides of the debate.

Containment advocates have argued, for instance, that the US and its allies haven’t really tried to squeeze North Korea. Some presidents have crafted what they have called campaigns of maximum pressure. But Bradley Bowman and David Maxell of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies have argued that what is needed is “” in which all tools of national power, including diplomacy, military, cyber, sanctions and information and influence activities, are brought to bear on Pyongyang.

Other conservative think tanks have offered variants of this. “There is no diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis—or to be a little more precise, no solution acceptable to Pyongyang that also involves security for the United States and her allies,”  Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute. “Thus the only viable Western option for dealing with the North Korean nuclear menace is ‘threat reduction’—a concerted and unremitting project to diminish the regime’s killing force materially by unilateral outside action, without Kim Jong Un’s assent.” Focusing on the more immediate, COVID-19 era,  of the Heritage Foundation has put it simply: no relaxation of sanctions in exchange for a “partial, flawed agreement.”

Engagement advocates, meanwhile, argue that the US and its allies haven’t really tried to negotiate properly. While those favoring containment propose different combinations of sticks, those favoring engagement offer different combinations of carrots. Most recommendations boil down to stepping away from an all-or-nothing approach and offering some partial sanctions relief for a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, as both the Carnegie Endowment’s  and  of the Brookings Institution argues.

Often, as with  of the Center for American Progress, there’s a plea to repairing U.S. alliances or, as with  of the Center for a New American Security, an additional realpolitik rationale, in their case a bid to deny China influence over North Korea. Sanctions relief for a freeze is possibly feasible, Sue Mi Terry of the Center for Strategic and International Studies , but Trump took this option off the table through his ham-fisted negotiating style.

Few in the Washington advocacy community think it is useful to step away from this tug-of-war to propose something new.  of the Quincy Institute hews to the engagement line but puts a few more carrots into the mix, not only partial sanctions relief but also declaring an end to the Korean War and establishing a liaison office in Pyongyang in return for North Korea dismantling some of its nuclear facilities over the course of one year.

Perhaps the most radical suggestion comes from the Cato Institute, where Doug Bandow  that normalizing relations with Pyongyang should precede further negotiations and thus transform the entire diplomatic framework. I have made a , referencing the US-China deal of the Richard Nixon era.

What has been noticeably absent from discussions has been a regional approach that involves all parties. For a while in the mid-2000s, the “six-party talks” arrangement gained traction, even in the US where the Bush administration was eager to avoid one-on-one negotiations with North Korea. A nuclear-weapon-free zone could have flowed out of such a process. But it has largely faded from the diplomatic agenda.

What would it take to get such an idea back on the agenda?

Zoning Out

A nuclear-weapon-free zone for Northeast Asia has been on the drawing board since 1972, at least in US arms control circles. Hiro Umebayashi, the Japanese arms control expert, has delineated perhaps the most detailed  of the proposal.

In his  to inject a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) proposal into the moribund six-party talks, Morton Halperin argued that the prospect of either or both Japan and South Korea going nuclear in response to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions made it imperative to conclude a comprehensive approach to regional security. Such a zone was only one of six elements of this comprehensive arrangement, which also included ending the state of war, turning the six-party talks into a permanent regional security council, a mutual declaration of no hostile intent, provision of nuclear and other energy sources to North Korea and the removal of sanctions.

The zone, according to most versions, would cover North Korea, South Korea and Japan. The United States, China and Russia would pledge not to store nuclear weapons in the zone. The US would maintain its nuclear umbrella over both its military allies but with some modification.

In 2016, South Korean security expert Moon Chung-in  in light of North Korea’s expansion of its nuclear program. He recommended that a “first step toward establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone would be for the six parties to request that the UN secretary-general and the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs convene an expert meeting to examine the concept behind the zone. Parallel efforts could be conducted by civil society organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.”

Most recently, Mongolia has taken the lead in pushing the idea at the United Nations as well as the civil society level. Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan of the NGO Blue Banner acknowledges the difficulties of pushing forward a nuclear-weapon-free zone at a time when North Korea is unlikely to negotiate away its nuclear program simply as part of a region-wide non-proliferation strategy. Rather, he  as a first step a declaration of “non-nuclear deterrence” from all the parties which “would contribute to greater predictability and stability and hence would avert a possible uncontrollable chain reaction leading to the regional nuclear arms race. This would also lead to ‘denuclearizing’ regional war planning and military exercises.”

Toby Dalton of the Carnegie Endowment’s Nuclear Policy Program, one of the few policy analysts in Washington to incorporate a nuclear-weapon-free zone into his analysis, suggests that the NWFZ can serve a useful function in negotiations as a commonly agreed-upon endpoint. To reach this endpoint using Halperin’s model, Dalton , requires the substitute of “cooperative security” for the current nuclear deterrence model.

Such a transformation would, in some sense, provide a new language for the negotiations so that the two sides would have a better chance of not talking past one another. A nuclear-weapon-free zone then becomes like a more advanced text that can only be read and understood by the participants once they’ve gone through the earlier language training in “cooperative security.” Importantly, Dalton sees this process as Korean-led rather than primarily a negotiated calibration of US-North Korean relations, which is also a departure from most Washington analyses.

Assessing the Likelihood

The six-party framework no longer exists. Mongolia has been a valuable diplomatic partner in many regional initiatives in Northeast Asia, but it doesn’t have the kind of convening power necessary to overcome the deep ideological divides and profound imbalances of power in the region. “Cooperative security” is indeed a powerful language to substitute for deterrence, and a Korea-led process is indispensable. But deterrence remains a deeply rooted status quo, and the two Koreas are too far apart to lead on anything at the moment.

On top of all this, the US Senate has never been very enthusiastic about nuclear-weapon-free zones. It ratified the Latin American zone during the Ronald Reagan years but didn’t  on the protocols connected to the African, Central Asian and South Pacific zones that the Obama administration submitted. The United States has not signed the protocol recognizing the Southeast Asian zone.

It would seem, on the face of it, that there is no foundation upon which to place a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapons-free zone. Still, here are some hopeful signs.

First, on the US side, the election in November could put Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden in the White House, where he would likely advance the (albeit conflicted) disarmament agenda of Barack Obama. Moreover, a shift of the Senate to a Democratic majority could provide a historic opportunity to move forward on a number of stalled arms control and disarmament initiatives.

An intensifying conflict with China, which has  among US policymakers and pundits, mitigates any optimism about the United States participating in regional threat reduction. On the other hand, an evolution in US strategic posture in the region away from what the Pentagon describes as a “targetable footprint” — most recently evidenced by the removal of  from Guam — anticipates the kind of US pullback that could support a future nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Second, neither Japan nor South Korea has pushed ahead with a program to acquire nuclear weapons, despite North Korea’s advanced nuclear status. The current leadership in Japan precludes any serious commitment to regional threat reduction much less a shift to cooperative security. However, the current government of Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga enjoyed an initial post-inauguration surge of support, but an election between now and October 2021 could nudge the country in a very different direction.

Thanks to the Moon Jae-in government in Seoul, South Korea is already the most amenable to regional threat reduction, but it has been cursed by a lack of partners. That may change with elections in Washington and Tokyo, which could represent the “disruption and realignment” that Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations  is necessary for any change of status on the Korean peninsula.

In the 2000s, China supported turning the six-party talks into an institutional framework for addressing regional security. Since then, President Xi Jinping has presided over a more assertive and strident expansion of Chinese influence in practically all directions. Closer to home, Beijing has mended fences with Seoul, its relationship with North Korea remains vexed and it continues to eye Japan with suspicion.

As Cho Kyung-Hwan , however, a multilateral framework in Northeast Asia still makes sense for Beijing, for it “believes that the framework could reduce regional suspicion of China’s hegemony, deter Japan’s military buildup, and lessen US military deployment and the chances of US intervention in the region.”

North Korea remains the real question mark. Now that he has a credible nuclear deterrent, Kim Jong Un has focused on improving the country’s economic performance. A reduction of sanctions and a diminution of military threat are certainly on the North Korean leader’s agenda and, as in the past, could motivate a series of protracted, step-by-step negotiations on sanctions relief for steps toward nuclear disarmament. But Pyongyang will not likely waste time on regional negotiations — predicated on cooperative security and with a nuclear-weapon-free zone as an agreed-upon endpoint — without some concrete, immediate benefits.

Given North Korea’s pragmatism in this regard, a reframing is necessary, and COVID-19 points in the right direction. The current pandemic is a potent reminder that trans-border problems require collective, cooperative action. Regional environmental problems, and the effects of climate change more generally, represent an even larger challenge.

In the spirit of Dalton’s reframing, it is critical to view challenges such as the pandemic and climate change not simply as narrow environmental or health challenges but as security problems under the heading of “human security.” Establishing a Northeast Asia multilateral framework for addressing these issues under such a rubric would bring countries to the table to discuss actionable problems in a technical fashion. It would also, necessarily, involve non-political experts and NGO advocacy groups. And it could provide the immediate benefits — such as scientific cooperation and resource-sharing — that North Korea looks for in international initiatives. Reducing the risk of pandemic infections in North Korea and maintaining the country’s low rate of carbon emissions would also represent significant benefits for the region as a whole.

Once mechanisms and institutions of concrete cooperation have been established and once a measure of trust has been created, such a “human security” reframing could ultimately incorporate parallel discussions of more traditional security questions, including nuclear weapons, at which point Dalton’s recommendations would kick in. In this way, the mutually-agreed-upon endpoint of a nuclear-weapon-free zone can be approached not directly but in a sideways manner.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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COVID-19: What Indonesia Can Learn From South Korea and Taiwan

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How did South Korea succeed, and what are the challenges ahead for the government seemingly strengthened by its electoral victory? In part, South Korea was lucky but, most importantly, it was well prepared institutionally and mentally due to its experience with previous crises.

South Korea has close economic relations with China, and large numbers of Chinese tourists frequently visit the country. Therefore, South Korea was one of the first countries affected when the new coronavirus, which causes the COVID-19 disease, emerged in China in late 2019. At the same time, South Korea has some important advantages. People entering and leaving its territory are easily controlled in the nation, which is practically an island and has a closed border with North Korea.

Meanwhile, South Korea’s health system is well developed, as described in the for 2020: “The universal health-insurance program is the most advanced element within the welfare state.” This meant that those feeling sick did not hesitate to seek treatment, which limited the spread of the virus and reduced undiscovered infections.

Strengthened by MERS Experience

The outbreak of the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) in 2015 led South Korea to overhaul its emergency response system. Since then, people traveling to the country have been informed about infectious diseases and cameras at airports routinely check temperatures of arriving passengers, a measure that was in place even before the current crisis.

In addition, the MERS panic was still fresh in the minds of South Koreans, and most people started wearing masks immediately when the threat of COVID-19 emerged. Unlike the prevailing perception in the West, mask-wearing was never ordered by the government but was triggered by the public sensibility to the pandemic and the government’s ability for national mobilization. It helped that South Korea produces masks domestically, making more than 10 million a day, mostly because of the heavy air pollution during winter and spring.

When the COVID-19 crisis hit, the government was fast to react and built up its testing capacity, which included drive-through tests, and it was successful in tracking who infected patients had come into contact with. South Korea was lucky that initial infections were concentrated in a few easily identifiable hotspots that could be isolated. Travel restrictions for China’s Hubei province — which is where the new coronavirus first emerged — were also put in place early, while most other travelers had to observe 14 days of quarantine and download a self-monitoring app on their mobile phones. The tracing of movements of those testing positive for COVID-19 subsequently played an important role.

In South Korea, there have been few concerns about the privacy of tracing the movements of individuals, and everyone can check the movements of all known COVID-19 patients via online services and mobile apps. Names are excluded but almost all other information is posted. Warnings through apps and text messages are sent to people who could have come in contact with those infected.

In many ways, movement and contact tracing is far less intrusive than the nationwide lockdowns implemented in the West. On the other hand, lockdowns eventually end but data collection will most likely continue.

Protecting Privacy

So far, discussions about how to ensure the privacy of personal information and prevent the misuse of data are conspicuously absent. This is worrisome because institutions to protect individual rights against the state are still underdeveloped.

Officially, the South is still at war with the North, and national security laws limit freedom of expression and association. In this inherently repressive environment, there is always the danger that limitations on individual freedoms will be abused by an all-too-powerful executive. South Korea was institutionally and mentally prepared for the current crisis, but it might be less prepared for a post-coronavirus world.

Due to its dependence on exports, South Korea will be one of the most severely hit countries by the pandemic. Ironically, South Korea’s success in keeping its infection rate low might mean that the economic effects will last even longer. South Korea has fewer than 11,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in a country with a population of over 51 million, which means it will take longer for a broader number of people to develop immunity to the disease. The large share of precarious workers and the underdeveloped welfare state mean that the inevitable economic crisis will soon have massive social effects.

Toward an “Imperial Presidency”?

The election victory of President Moon’s party in April allows him to go back to his original promise of a more social, democratic and environmentally friendly South Korea. In particular, his plans to strengthen domestic demand by implementing welfare policies, increasing wages and strengthening labor rights seem appropriate at a time when exports will most likely collapse. The BTI 2020 report also warns of the dangers of an “imperial presidency” as presidential powers in South Korea are far-reaching.

Unlike the “war against the virus,” a post-COVID-19 South Korea cannot simply be built through technocratic interventions and national mobilization campaigns. The economic changes needed to weather the storm will have a redistributive effect and will thus trigger opposition.

Clearly, times of crisis are always the times of the executive. However, shaping a post-coronavirus South Korea will require a broad public discussion with individuals who have a plurality of opinions about different policy options. Ultimately, what shapes society is not the wars it wins, but the way it makes decisions about a better future.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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There are few reports with encouraging overtones emerging from North Korea. The country is mostly known for its contentious nuclear program and pervasive state violations of human rights. Yet despite suffering from international sanctions for so long, North Korean leaders describe it as a self-reliant socialist state.

The cult of personality existing around the ruling Kim family can be found in various manifestations of North Korean popular culture. Kim Jong-un’s often carry epic themes eulogizing the majestic nation and its steadfastness in the face of economic sanctions and external pressure.

Human Rights Watch North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong-un as one of the most repressive countries in the world. International news organizations refer to Kim as a dictator without hesitation. It is believed that there are some in North Korea. Contact with the outside world is highly restricted and the regime cracks down on all forms of political activism and social freedoms. The state’s monopoly over the media means the public has limited choices when it comes to finding reliable sources of information about what’s goes on beyond national boundaries.

In June 2018, US President Donald Trump held a widely-publicized in Singapore with Kim Jong-un�� to open a new chapter in the history of US-North Korea relations. While critics say the meeting failed to produce sufficient progress, Trump was satisfied with the outcome. The litmus test will be the fulfillment of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula. Both leaders are now scheduled to meet in Vietnam in late February for further talks.

In this edition of , 51�Թ� talks to Andrew Yeo, associate professor of politics and director of Asian studies at The Catholic University of America, about the situation of human rights and social reforms in North Korea.

The transcript has been edited for clarity. The interview took place at the end of 2018.

Kourosh Ziabari: North Korea is one of the world’s most repressive states. With restrictions on political activism and the punishments that await citizens who make contact with the outside world, North Korean society is more closed and isolated than one can imagine. Will the situation ever change for the better?

Andrew Yeo: The hope is for change in North Korea, which is why countless activists, including North Korean defector-activists, continue to pursue human rights advocacy. Activism is of course virtually nonexistent in North Korea, but information from the outside world does penetrate into North Korea.

One of the goals of activists is to flood North Korea with information about the outside world through shortwave radio broadcasts, through South Korean dramas, movies and music downloaded on USB drives, and through balloon launches with the hope that North Koreans themselves might push for change. North Korean society is also slightly changing with the rise of market activity.

Ziabari: Human Rights Watch recently published a perturbing account of the situation of human rights in North Korea in 2018. It notes that the government refuses to cooperate with international bodies, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN special rapporteur. Do you think there’s any mechanism by which North Korea will be compelled to work with international observers and human rights organizations?

Yeo: Yes and no. North Koreans often seem to be immune to international criticism and economic punishment. However, they have responded at times to international pressure, most notably when the release of the UNCOI [UN Commission of Inquiry] report in 2014 made reference to Kim Jong-un’s referral to the ICC. The North Koreans actually offered to invite the UN special rapporteur to visit North Korea if the ICC referral was removed.

The North Koreans also stated they would look into at more than half of the over 100 findings and recommendations addressed by the UN Human Rights Council on North Korea. Also, on human rights issues deemed less politically sensitive, such as the treatment of people with disabilities, North Korea has worked with international observers. In short, coercion and persuasion do work, but that’s more the exception than the rule.

Ziabari: Why does the government bar North Koreans from traveling abroad and penalize those who make contact with the outside world? Why is the regime so afraid of its people interacting with others?

Yeo: The legitimacy of the Kim family relies on controlling information internally and externally. If the North Korean people knew the extent to which the regime perpetuated lies, there might be greater instability. Kim’s grip on power relies on perpetuating myths and lies about his power, authority and claims of benevolence.

Ziabari: Do you think the 2018 summit in Singapore was a productive meeting and as successful as President Donald Trump claimed? Will the North Korean leader agree to abandon his nuclear arsenal and cooperate with the US?

Yeo: It was useful in that it helped dial back both sides from the brink of war. However, the summit was less than productive and a bit underwhelming in providing concrete steps that might lead to improved relations, including steps toward denuclearization. No one truly knows if North Korea will denuclearize, including Kim himself. Kim may very well move toward the path of denuclearization, but it will be a lengthy process, and there’s no guarantee that he wouldn’t reverse course if he feels threatened again, both from within and from outside.

Ziabari: North Korea is believed to have over 120,000 political prisoners. There are reports that torture, abuse and sexual violence are rife in detention facilities. Is there any indication that the government is willing to change its policy and practices under international pressure and sanctions?

Yeo: The regime might take steps to change human rights practices if it doesn’t significantly destabilize the regime. But, at the moment, fear and repression are still important tools for authoritarian control.

Ziabari: Do you think regime change is a possibility in North Korea? While the government continues to violate the rights of its citizens and crack down on any sort of dissent, do you think the society is prone to radical change, manifested in the overthrow of the Kim regime?

Yeo: In the short term, a revolution from below is unlikely unless there are also simultaneous cracks within the leadership or division among elites. I haven’t seen any recent evidence that would indicate real dissent or a challenge against Kim’s rule. I think Kim Jong-un’s rule is relatively stable at the moment, but stability does not necessarily mean the absence of change. In the mid to longer term, the rise of markets might alter relationships between state and society, which in turn raise the prospects for regime change.

Ziabari: You have written a book about the situation of human rights in North Korea. How difficult is it to write about North Korea while the government doesn’t cooperate with international organizations in providing them with data, information and evidence on its human rights policy?

Yeo: To be accurate, my book with Danielle Chubb is about North Korean human rights activism and not North Korean human rights per se. It is difficult to obtain information from inside North Korea. Thus, the vast majority of reports published by NGOs, which are then cited by government reports and vice-versa, are based on data and information shared by defectors. There is, of course, the potential for systematic bias if relying on defector testimony. However, there are over 30,000 defectors to date, and many of their testimonies do corroborate. Moreover, technology such as satellite imagery which reveal the location of prison camps also help verify evidence of ongoing human rights violations.

Ziabari: North Korea is a secular state and freedom of religious belief is protected under the constitution. However, reports from international organizations show that North Korea is a leader among countries that persecute Christians. Why is that so?

Yeo: On paper — that is legally — the North Korean state does permit religious worship, including Christian worship. In practice, however, true worship and religious freedom cannot exist because it poses a threat to the cult personality of the Kim family. In a country that deifies its leader, true Christian — or name any other religion — worship would weaken loyalty to the regime.

Ziabari: How do you see the future of relations between the two Koreas? Do the preliminary steps taken under South Korean President Moon Jae-in toward reconciliation herald the settlement of conflicts and reconstruction of bonds between the two neighbors?

Yeo: Inter-Korea relations have significantly improved the past year and certainly President Moon is moving forward with the belief that his actions will ultimately lead to true reconciliation. However, this is still only the beginning. The Korean Peninsula is heavily militarized, and we have yet to see further steps on denuclearization from North Korea, or a commitment from the US to move away from its maximum pressure strategy. The settlement of conflicts and reconstruction of bonds between the two Koreas won’t happen until we see greater progress toward denuclearization, and a true peace regime will be hard to achieve without seeing an improvement in human rights.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The world can be forgiven for having been whipsawed by on March 8 that President Donald Trump will meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The revelation came after briefings at the White House for the US administration by South Korean officials following South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s of a delegation to Pyongyang for talks with their North Korean counterparts. Those meetings resulted in the invitation from Chairman Kim for the meeting between President Trump and him.

No sitting US president has ever met with a North Korean leader. (Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton did but only after leaving office.) The jolting realization that this may now take place — tentatively scheduled for May — with a sitting US president who has variously threatened, taunted and excoriated Kim has the foreign policy intelligentsia and US public both flummoxed and leery, and probably just a bit anxious.

Is Donald Trump — both famous and infamous for his much touted deal-making skills, but also notorious for ignorance of complex foreign policy issues and lack of interest in educating himself — really up to this? Let’s remember, we are talking about two leaders who have both bragged about their nuclear weapons and .

Credit goes to South Korea’s President Moon for recognizing and capitalizing on the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic games to encourage North-South dialog. Especially noteworthy is his recognition that any such proposed talks between Trump and Kim would be dead on arrival in Washington without the North’s agreement to discuss the “d” word: denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Hoping the Past Isn’t Prelude

Let’s return to reality. In the past, negotiations have been a tried and true tactic of the North Koreans to extract what they need from the US and the West, only to restart nuclear and missile testing when they got what they wanted. Invariably, their nuclear strategy proceeded almost unabated.

The US and its various negotiating partners, including South Korea, China and Japan, have all had the carpet pulled out from under them every time they’ve attempted to negotiate with Pyongyang, including the and short lived in early 2012. North Korea had pledged not to launch satellites in exchange for US and other Western aid. The agreement was abrogated when the North launched a satellite a few short months later to celebrate the centennial birthdate of the country’s founder, Kim Il-Sung. And so it has gone, dating back at least to 1993. Ditto on agreements with South Korea, the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Can we expect this time to be any different?

The North is negotiating from a much different vantage point this time. It has nuclear weapons. It also possesses the means to deliver them, most certainly to South Korea and Japan and possibly even the US West Coast. The dynamics are changed, and not to the advantage of the US or its South Korean ally. Moreover, the North’s young and ruthless leader — he ordered the of his half-brother and of family members perceived as disloyal or threatening — has threatened to use them, including against the US. Possessing these weapons with the means to deliver them empowers Kim as never before, giving him leverage his grandfather and father could only have dreamed of. What does he want?

What Kim Jong-un Wants

The consensus appears to be that Kim wants the US out of the Korean Peninsula — i.e., to sever what has been one of Washington’s most important alliances with South Korea. Undoubtedly, there are other interests — official recognition, economic ties with the US and other major economic powers — besides China, which have taken a hit as of late due to , and the opportunity to appear one-on-one on the world stage with the leader of the world’s superpower. There he’ll be able to say to the American president, “I’ve got what you’ve got, now let’s talk!”

This is not a position that a US president has faced since the arms negotiations of the 1970s with the Soviet Union, which roughly qualified as an “equal.” Nuclear weapons have handed the leader of an impoverished, isolated police state the dream of every dictator: gravitas, respectability and the attention of the U.S. and its president.

Heretofore, Kim has made clear he will not give up his … ever. This may be mere posturing, but one must still ask: Is he really willing to rid his nation of its nuclear weapons, missiles and supporting infrastructure? And the answer is, only if he gets what he wants… maybe.

Meeting of Unknown Minds

Further obfuscating an accurate reading of this announced gathering is the personalities of the two principals. In past summits between an American president and his counterpart from any nation, senior State Department and National Security Council officials and experts conducted extensive pre-meeting negotiations so that the main event would be almost a mere formality — i.e., the handshakes, signings, banquets, toasts and photo ops. Pre-meetings are intended to sort out major issues, identify obstacles, reach preliminary understandings and ensure the ultimate encounter between principals is a satisfactory one. But that hasn’t happened this time, presumably at all.

Instead, these talks will be in the hands of two erratic and unpredictable leaders who are not likely to fully and accurately understand the other or the issues and implications. Nor will the issues have been tackled in advance by senior experts. That’s a risk.

For his part, Donald Trump places far too much stock in his innate abilities, soi-disant high-functioning gut instincts and business acumen, qualities that have earned him the Oval Office and the unflagging support of a core following within the Republican Party. He places little trust in the expertise and counsel of experts around him. That’s a further complicating risk. Luckily for Americans and South Koreans, the more sober-minded South Korean President Moon won’t be far away, one presumes, and should help keep the American tethered. Or at least, Americans and South Koreans can hope.

Kim, on the other hand, will face an American president he knows only from media reports and biased and censored information from his eager-to-please intelligence service, loath to tell him anything he may not wish to hear, less they suffer the fate of other disloyal minions. It’s impossible to know his mindset in the run-up to this meeting.

All this suggests that despite whatever happy talk emerges from this summit of shock, concrete results may be lacking and, in any event, suspect. It will depend on one ineluctable fact: What is on the mind of Kim Jong-un? For that, the world must place its trust and hopes in an untested, inexperienced president, whose own mind remains a mystery.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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South Korea has a problem with education. It also has a problem with the English language. The Korean government has just taken the step of of English for first- and second-grade students in elementary schools.

Al Jazeera reports the explanation given by Kwon Ji-young, director of early childhood education and care policy division at the Ministry of Education. “According to many English education experts and neuroscientists, the right age for learning English as a second language is the third grade.”

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Neuroscientist:

A category of scientist whose authority can never be questioned because they are believed to know everything about the brain (including how learning takes place), much like a car mechanic knows everything about the workings of an internal combustion engine

Contextual note

Note that Kwon cites “many English education experts and neuroscientists.” There are three key words here: many, experts and neuroscientists. “Many,” of course, can simply mean more than two or three, even if the selection pool is in the thousands. He fails to mention that there are many, many more holding the opposite view, for which much hard evidence exists.

The selected “experts” and “neurologists” alluded to apparently ignore a Harvard University that made the following observation: “Conversations in any language besides English [the children’s native language] are also helpful … bilingual children of many ages have better executive function skills than monolingual children, so experience using an additional language is an important skill.”

In other words, precocious ability in a second language will have a positive effect on other skills and on learning ability in general. Excluding English — or any second language — from the Korean curriculum cannot, therefore, be seen as helping young learners. As the study also affirms, “Based on the information we gain in our first few years, everything we have learned grows later in life … 50% of our ability to learn is developed by age 4 and another 30% by age 8. This is why three-year-olds are encouraged to learn a second language.”

In an of the Korea Herald, the author points out that “Ministry officials base their decision on the argument that the English classes have little effect in enhancing students’ English skills.” The ministry may be right to point out that foreign language as it is taught in schools may not be effective — at any age — since language is a multidimensional social skill, not a body of knowledge to be memorized. As Oscar Wilde , “nothing that is worth knowing can be taught.”

Deeper analysis of the ministry’s position may reveal what no one wants to talk about: that the real motive reflects a serious cultural and political trend. Pushing young children to learn English perpetuates South Korea’s economic and cultural dependence on the US at a time when the American empire is in decline. Korea may, in this superficially trivial way, simply be declaring its cultural independence from the United States.

Historical note

For many years, South Korea has been classed at the top of the education league tables by and the (OECD). The system is highly successful according to standardized criteria. But is it really ? South Korea’s educational culture “is often described as very stressful, authoritarian, brutally competitive and meritocratic. It emphasises high pressure and high performance.”

By focusing on the results from standardized tests, it has encouraged the phenomenon called “”: parents who micromanage their children’s education. The overly competitive educational culture leaves the lives of even many of the successful students socially, emotionally and intellectually impoverished, if not broken. “In 2015 Korea ranked in the bottom fifth of OECD countries in three categories — social connections, work-life balance and health status.” We also learn that “A Korean Ministry of Education survey of 6.5 million students showed that 16.3% needed psychiatric counselling, with 4.5% needing intensive treatment and 1.5% classified as in ‘imminent danger, such as committing suicide.’”

Statistically, the achievements of Korean education are real. But is it really learning, or is it simply a form of conditioning that produces significant collateral damage for learners and eventually the society as a whole?

When asked how he had learned rocket science Elon Musk , very simply, “I read books and talked to people. That’s kind of how one learns anything.”

This may be what Oscar Wilde meant. Teaching has its limits. Learning comes from knowing how to exploit the best available resources. On the other hand, banning the learning of a subject, even a foreign language, can hardly be the best way to produce long-term results, whether the desired outcome is communicating in a complex world, being a healthy and productive member of society,��or building a new generation of interstellar rockets.

And, of course, appealing to unnamed “experts” and “neuroscientists” will not convince many truly educated people of the wisdom of such a decision.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book,��, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

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A fervent disciple of the capitalist system, where social admiration revolves around material gain, modern South Korea has become a victim of its own success. In a country where it has become commonplace for every child to aspire to work for prestigious conglomerates like Samsung or Hyundai, the rat race for jobs is what really concerns Korean citizens. Despite all the media attention, historical atrocities and “landmark” arrangements—such as the comfort woman deal with Japan of��—remain secondary concerns.

With poor economic returns expected, both Presidents Park Guen-hye and Lee Myung-bak (Park’s predecessor) have responded to South Korea’s meager performance by��calling for the country’s employment culture to undergo “”—in essence��trying to reign in of .

Statistics, though rarely reliable just by themselves, are noticeable in this regard, as the financial toll for South Koreans who have chosen to pursue higher education has proved to produce more detriments than benefits. Tuition fees and other related costs have accounted for over a 10^th of national household debt in South Korea. Figures from South Korea’s own Student Aid Foundation have also����in the first half of 2015, linking it with other concerns afflicting the country’s demographics, such as the rising age of marriage and decreasing birth rates.

Strangely, despite South Korea’s overwhelming preoccupation with employment, the picture shown by certain commentaries these days would have us believe that a historical sentimental boogieman is just waiting to pounce.����have argued that the “domestic backlash” from such an abrupt deal with Japan could backfire, as oppositional forces get ready for the coming elections.

While such insights certainly deserve their place in the sun, increased bandwidth to such narratives may wind up creating blind spots for the rest of the world, whereby the real concerns of South Korean locals are glossed over. The deal may give the impression of a “,” but resentments such as these would seem to be only peripheral when compared to the sheer frustration pent up by South Korea’s unemployed.

With an����having difficulty finding jobs, the economy, not social justice, is what truly reoccupies South Korean politics.

In the end, in spite of South Korea and Japan’s “milestone achievement” from 2015, observers might do well to take a step back to see if anything of consequence has actually occurred.

Of course, advocates and detractors alike would be quick to point out that such a deal was more about foreign policy progress than domestic political achievement. Alarmists stating that the loss of momentum for this issue, which has been watered down as a “concession” on Park’s part, would appear to refute the notion that historical pressure points actually made a huge dent in foreign affairs. Though undoubtedly a sensitive nerve in the immediate term, South Korean policies in relation to its security (vis-à-vis the United States) and overall economy (vis-à-vis China), not to mention its frail ties with Japan, all remain nevertheless.

The South Korea-US alliance continues to be the bedrock for security on the Korean Peninsula, while Chinese economic interests—now being South Korea’s top trading partner—continuously force the country to play a careful diplomatic balancing act. Perhaps it would have been more appropriate then had such alarmists described “tensions” with Japan as inertia rather than a backward slippage into the abyss.

Adding to all this is the fact that the North Korean problem remains intact and a possible strike is still a prospect for which no one can rule out. Granted that no headway has been made, or will likely be made with South Korea’s new rapprochement, East Asia’s Kim dilemma will linger on for years, if not generations to come.

The options that remain are a toss between this trio: military action, which will always be a last resort; some form of diplomatic compromise; or strategic patience. The last option pertains to South Korea waiting to see if North Korea will eventually take after China to subscribe to a socialist model with Chinese characteristics and eventually open up its markets.

Of Old Wounds, and Bread and Butter Anxieties

In the end, in spite of South Korea and Japan’s “milestone achievement” from 2015, observers might do well to take a step back to see if anything of consequence has actually occurred. While genuine transformation may certainly be in the works for Japan-South Korea relations, one must consider if such transformation occurs due to the emotional healing of old wounds, or everyday bread and butter anxieties.

To be clear, the argument here is not that the comfort women deal does not matter, nor is it that a domestic price will not be paid for President Park’s actions. The point is rather that the burying of historical hatchets does not inevitably take center-stage when one examines it more deeply. At best, historical scars left by Japan created sparks to set things in motion and, at its worst, are distractions that keep us from noticing what everyday South Koreans truly worry about: domestic economic woes and high youth unemployment rates.

One must recall that despite all the yearnings for a fair deal, it was not until the 1990s that the unforgivable crimes against these women started to gain media traction—leaving one to wonder what exactly caused most South Koreans after independence in 1945 to remain silent till then. Was it a social taboo of some form that kept people away from assisting these women, or could it be just that South Koreans, like most people tragically, tend to be moved by their wallets and pragmatic calculations more so than their hearts?

After all, even after the horrors of Japanese occupation, South Korean officials themselves have been��, save for this time, to satisfy the needs of US soldiers stationed to protect South Korea.

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As the world focuses on the war in Syria, the and the in the United States, the two Koreas are heading toward a catastrophe in the Far East.

Although relations on the Korean Peninsula have been deteriorating for the better part of eight years, the last six months have been particularly tense. recently conducted its fourth nuclear test and followed up with a satellite launch using a long-range rocket. The international community reacted in its customary fashion, with condemnations and the imposition of more sanctions. South Korea joined in the chorus of disapproval.

But this time, South Korea went a step further. It severed its last important economic link with North Korea.

The Kaesong Industrial Complex was the only legacy remaining of the “sunshine policy,” the Nobel Prize-winning project of former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung. Established in 2004, the economic zone brought together South Korean businesses and North Korean labor in a business park located just north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ0 in the ancient Korean capital of Kaesong.

Last week, South Korean President Park Geun-Hye pulled the plug on Kaesong. North Korea expelled the South Korean employees and froze the assets. The north also cut the communications hotlines that had connected the two countries. In this way, the two sides cooperated one last time to extinguish the final fading rays of sunshine.

The South Korean Ministry of Unification initially claimed that the proceeds from Kaesong helped North Korea fund its nuclear and missile programs. The minister subsequently walked back that claim, admitting that the government��. That didn’t prevent President Park from repeating the same claim the next day.

The nosedive in relations on the Korean Peninsula is already having a regional impact. North Korea has announced, in response to a new round of sanctions from Tokyo, that����its investigations into the people it abducted from Japan in the 1970s and 1980s. Both China and Russia are concerned that South Korea will adopt a new missile defense system in the wake of North Korea’s actions. And the US has sent four F-22 stealth fighters to fly over South Korea in addition to an aircraft carrier already on its way for upcoming exercises.

But it’s the suspension of Kaesong that remains most troubling. The project represented the only real example of Korean reunification��avant la lettre: a model for how the two very different countries could gradually work together toward common goals. Kaesong had survived for more than a decade despite North Korea’s nuclear tests and South Korea’s shift to the right. It symbolized the triumph of pragmatism over propaganda.

© Shutterstock

Park Geun-Hye has abandoned all her earlier talk of a “trustpolitik” policy of engaging the north. “We now need to find a fundamental solution to effectively change North Korea, and it is our time to be brave,”��. Those sound a lot like fighting words.

Optimists always say that it’s darkest before the dawn. But we’re well past dawn on the Korean Peninsula. We’re heading toward a showdown at high noon. And yet the sky seems to be getting darker and darker. Can all the parties concerned somehow avert a total eclipse of the sun?

The Importance of Kaesong

At its height in 2015, the Kaesong Industrial Complex employed over 50,000 North Korean workers and over 800 South Korean managers at 124 firms. As a result, 2015 was a very good year for the economic zone. For the first time since it started over a decade ago, the complex generated����in economic output. That’s a lot of shoes, overcoats and electrical products, many of which are sold in South Korea.

North Korean workers, mostly women, earned $150-160 a month. The North Korean government took approximately 70-80% of that total, which led many outsiders to conclude that the place was a “,” even a place of “.”

But $30-48 a month, given North Korea’s depressed economy, is a lot of money for a North Korean—not to mention the other benefits such as lunches and snacks that came with the job. The average worker at a state enterprise��. The working conditions at Kaesong, meanwhile, were����than anything you’d find in other North Korean factories. Although North and South Korean workers ate separately and kept their interactions to a minimum, the complex nevertheless provided an unprecedented opportunity for each side to humanize the other.

As North Korean defector Je Son Lee��, “When I was still living in North Korea, people used to say, ‘If you have one person in the family who works for Kaesong Industrial Complex, it can feed the mouths of everyone in their family.’”

Unfortunately, the international community largely treated Kaesong as the bastard child of inter-Korean relations. God forbid that any Kaesong products might have sneaked into other countries covered by free-trade agreements with South Korea. As I��: “Despite trade union concerns, the FTA — which went into effect in 2012 — has not extended any benefits to Kaesong. The United States — along with the EU and Turkey — relies on a panel to determine if any products from Kaesong are eligible under the FTA. So far, the panel��has nixed every product.”

Nor was North Korea able to attract significant foreign investment into the zone beyond that from the South Koreans.

The cynical will say that the international community has tried both isolation and engagement, and neither has worked. But that’s not really true.

And yet ironically, here was something that American and South Korean conservatives should have been rushing to support. It was a clear capitalist encroachment into what many consider one of the last bastions of communism in the world (though I prefer to think of North Korea as an example of corporatist nationalism). It was a non-union zone, and conservatives love to talk about how much they hate unions (except, of course, in countries where they want workers to organize and effect regime change).

And the zone was smack dab in the middle of one of North Korea’s invasion routes into the south. As of last week, the North Korean military has taken control of the area. In what possible way could the closure of Kaesong represent a win for Seoul and Washington?

The North Korean Threat

When pressed by Chuck Todd of MSNBC at one of the Democratic debates to pick the biggest threat to the US—Russia, North Korea or Iran—Bernie Sanders chose North Korea.

That in itself wasn’t such a strange answer. After all, the US continues to cooperate with Russia on a number of issues and has recently concluded a nuclear agreement with Iran. No one in Pyongyang or Washington was going to get angry at Bernie for that.

In fact, Sanders’����revealed not so much his ignorance of foreign policy—a favorite evaluation of media savants—but how thoroughly mainstream his approach is:

“Clearly North Korea is a very strange situation because it is such an isolated country run by a handful of dictators, or maybe just one, who seems to be somewhat paranoid. And, who had nuclear weapons.

“And, our goal there, in my view, is to work and lean strongly on China to put as much pressure [as possible]. China is one of the few major countries in the world that has significant support for North Korea, and I think we got to do everything we can to put pressure on China. I worry very much about an isolated, paranoid country with atomic bombs.”

Sanders supports increasing sanctions against North Korea and wants to pressure China into doing likewise. Again, this puts the Democratic presidential candidate in good company. The Senate passed the most recent sanctions legislations 96 to 0, and the House did the same by a margin of 408 to 2.

© Shutterstock

But here’s the problem with this position. First, if isolation is what makes North Korea so dangerous, why would more international sanctions make the country any less of a danger? Second, if China has resisted pressure for more than two decades to turn the screws on its neighbor, why would it change its position now?

I’m not happy that North Korea has a nuclear weapons program. And believe me, China isn’t happy either. But registering our opposition to the program will not magically eliminate the North’s nukes. Nor will additional sanctions convince the leadership in Pyongyang to change their minds any more than the economic embargo against Cuba transformed the system there. North Korea is convinced that the outside world wants to destroy it—which is not mere paranoia—and a nuclear weapon is its only security blanket.

The cynical will say that the international community has tried both isolation and engagement, and neither has worked. But that’s not really true. The international community has put its body and soul behind isolation and has been, at best, half-hearted about engagement. If only to make the obligatory nod toward non-proliferation, politicians condemned North Korea for its nuclear tests and missile launches.

But at some point, again in the interests of non-proliferation, the key players have to get back to the table with North Korea and negotiate a freeze of its nuclear capabilities at their current rudimentary level. More importantly, we have to multiply the points of engagement, not shut them down.

The North Korean regime is noxious in many ways. But one thing is for sure: Even though it’s outgunned, it won’t stand down in a showdown at high noon. And unless we start using our words, East Asia will be plunged into a darkness far more profound than the one that so famously exists north of the DMZ at night.

*[This article was originally published by .]

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The news cycle around ’s actions has become all too predictable. Its rocket launches and bomb tests tend to lead to a round of condemnation but little action from the usual voices. As of last week, the cycle repeated itself once more.

On January 6, the it had detonated a hydrogen bomb, the fourth test since 2006. Although experts are skeptical that it was in fact a hydrogen bomb, a chorus of criticism from the United States, Japan, South Korea and China sounded out. The key players in the region each have reason for choosing words over action.

US President Barack Obama cannot divert from his policy of “strategic patience” without a real act of provocation. If the Kim dynasty was to be removed by force, it would not go down without South Korea suffering devastating retaliation. Seoul, the South Korean capital, is just 50 kilometers from the demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas. While Obama is in charge, the US will continue to play the waiting game.

South Korea, for its part, has resumed propaganda in the shape of through loudspeakers that can be heard 20 kilometers into North Korea. Yet while South Korea is committed in principle to reunification, many within the country fear the outcome of such a victory, other than the potential damage expressed above. Even if the Kim dynasty were to collapse from within, a huge refugee crisis and a bill for reunification that could cost over $500 billion would result.

, the most crucial player, has stressed its commitment to a de-nuclearized Korean Peninsula. Most of North Korea’s food and money comes from China, and its ability to trade nuclear weaponry and secrets over the border could not be possible without a green light from the Chinese. While China is believed to have the most power over the rogue state, Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons demonstrates how little influence Beijing really has.

Yet this is not to say that there will no implications for the region. While the tests are damaging for stability and peace in East Asia, they are also bringing enemies together in response.

Keep Your Friends Close, But Your Enemies Closer

South Korea and Japan will “.” Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told reporters: “We agreed that the provocative act by North Korea is unacceptable … We will deal with this situation in a firm manner through the cooperation with the United Nations Security Council.”

This is a remarkable statement given that South Korea and Japan have been reluctant allies since the end of World War II. It marked a further warming of relations between the East Asian nations, coming just over a week since the over the “comfort women” issue that had previously caused a huge strain in relations between the two countries.

Pyongyang can no longer rely on resentment between the key players in the region. The tests, whether real or not, show a North Korea running out of friends and options.

Although it might not mean much for Sino-Japanese relations, the nuclear crisis at least draws attention away from tensions over disputed islands in the South China Sea, which China calls the Diaoyu and Japan the Senaku. While Tokyo fears a rising Beijing, a nuclear-armed North Korea poses a more immediate threat. As a consequence of the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan is the oldest enemy of the nationalist Kim dynasty.

There have even been calls for the US to cooperate closer with China over the North Korea issue. While it remains to be seen how China will respond, US Secretary of State John Kerry called for China to “” with the rogue state.

Further afield, while Iran and North Korea are still partners, the nuclear deal struck between the P5+1 and Tehran in 2015 no doubt left North Korea feeling further isolated. Iranian officials were present during North Korea’s three previous nuclear tests—, but not 2016. Furthermore, while Pyongyang’s desire for nuclear weapons is for survival, it also holds tests to , as it has done for years. Now that Iran has given up its nuclear ambitions, North Korea has lost a loyal customer.

Indeed, perhaps it is this isolation from its partners in Iran and China that has led to North Korea continuing its quest to become a nuclear power as a means for survival as a state.

It would be near impossible for America to repeat the success of the Iran nuclear framework. Neither North Korea nor the US can be easily brought to the negotiating table. While Iran had sometimes been diplomatic in the past—for example, offering to help the US fight terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11—North Korea’s diplomacy has never been as sophisticated.

Pyongyang can no longer rely on resentment between the key players in the region. The tests, whether real or not, show a North Korea running out of friends and options.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Nanjing Massacre. “Comfort women.” Did the Chinese communist forces beat imperial Japan or the nationalists? And who really owns the islands known in Japan as Senkaku and in China as Diaoyu?

Yet if there is one thing that , and can agree on, it’s that history is a powerful tool that can be used to manipulate their own respective populations.

History is a sensitive subject in East Asia. It is little wonder, then, that Seoul erupted into protest on November 14 over the decision by the government of President Park Guen-hye to make drastic revisions to how history is taught in South Korea’s schools. Tens of thousands of demonstrators marched through the streets of downtown Seoul after the announcement that South Korea’s history textbooks would be replaced with a that all high schools will use��from 2017.

It is not the first time South Korea has imposed a single state-approved textbook in schools. President Park’s father, Park Chung-hee, issued history manuals in 1974, and these remained in place until 30 years later, when private publishers were finally allowed to print their own history books, ending the state’s monopoly on the teaching of history. Currently, schools can choose from eight different state-approved textbooks.

Of these eight textbooks, conservatives in the government only endorse one as appropriate for teaching purposes. Yet it was criticized for overlooking many episodes of state-sponsored violence in South Korea’s recent history, and for championing the controversial 1961 coup that brought President Park Chung-hee to power. Published in 2013, this book was rejected by schools. Unsatisfied by this shunning, conservatives have decided to ditch the eight-book system and impose a single state-sanctioned textbook.

The aim of this new policy is to correct a “pro-North Korea bias,” with proponents such as Education Minister Hwang Woo-Yea claiming,��“.”��Critics of the decision are calling it a��, as it will continue to overlook the atrocities of authoritarian governments of pre-democratic South Korea. In the 2013 book, there is no mention of, for example, the Geochang Massacre of 1951 in which 719 unarmed civilians perished. Photos of the first North-South Korea summit have also been removed, which speaks volumes about the current government’s attitude toward reconciliation with North Korea.

The Park government is also attempting to stifle debate on the legacy of the president’s father, who while modernizing South Korea also presided over serious human rights abuses. Awkwardly, while Korean nationalism is based on opposition to Japan, the elder Park was a Korean collaborator with imperial Japan, serving as an officer in the Japanese colonial government of Manchukuo (now present-day Northeast China).

Japanese soldiers in Nanking, China, 1937

By reverting back to issuing a single textbook, it makes South Korea the latest East Asian country to meddle with its own history for political purposes.

The History That Bends…

Japan has long been guilty of ensuring a national amnesia of its history. It is a common complaint outside Japan that the Japanese education system simply does not cover enough of World War II and Japan’s attempts at establishing its dominance in Asia during that time. Mariko Oi, a BBC journalist,��recalls how the —an atrocity in which between 40,000 to 300,000 Chinese civilians and soldiers were systematically raped, tortured and murdered—was reduced to a footnote in her school history book.

Outside the classroom, an atmosphere of intimidation in Japan is mostly to blame for the muting of open discussion over the country’s dark past. To criticize the Sino-Japanese War could prove to be career-threatening and even life-threatening in Japan. In 1990, a gunman almost fatally shot Motoshima Hitoshi, mayor of Nagasaki, for saying that Emperor Hirohito bore some responsibility for World War II.

Perhaps most damaging is the manipulation of history at the top of Japanese society. In August, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s����was more sympathetic to the soldiers of imperial Japan, casting them as only following orders from their emperor. “Comfort women” were not mentioned in name, but only referenced in a single sentence as “women … whose honor and dignity were severely injured.” There was no mention of the Nanjing Massacre. Little wonder, then, that both China and South Korea regarded this apology as��“” and “not living up to expectations.”

At its worse, in his statement, Abe appeared to attempt mitigating or even seeking legitimacy for Japan’s past acts of aggression and war crimes. Claiming that “the peace we enjoy today exists only upon such precious sacrifices,” he suggested that the atrocities imposed on East and Southeast Asia by imperial Japan somehow led to peace in the region. It fits in with the Japanese far-right’s version of history in flowery rhetoric: Japan as the liberator rather than colonizer, as the victim and not the aggressor.

The issue of Japan’s past has always been fresh in the minds of Chinese and Korean leaders since Abe’s visit to the controversial Yusukuni Shrine in 2013. Abe visited the site to pay respects despite a chorus of Korean, Chinese and Taiwanese protests that the shrine honors Japanese war criminals as well as Chinese and Korean nationals who were conscripted into the imperial Japanese army against their will.

For Japan and South Korea, preferring to overlook or downplay difficult episodes of their respective histories is a result of their vibrant democracies. South Korean and Japanese leaders often have to pander to far-right views to stay in government and bolster their own authority. In contrast, authoritarian China is effective in stifling debate over its history.

History with Chinese Characteristics

Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also exploits history for its own legitimacy. Like Korea, the Chinese brand of nationalism is based on opposition to Japanese intentions. While there is no right-wing party in Chinese politics, the CCP uses the struggle against Japan to bolster its own party’s legitimacy and exploit the nationalism of the Chinese population. “In school, we were taught that the nationalists did not prioritize defending our country,” says Fang Jinqing a student of China’s prestigious Fudan University.

The outcome of the bending of history is increasingly strained relations between the three biggest powers in East Asia. Today, the biggest point of tension has been over island disputes, despite shabby historical claims.

This historical revisionism was on show during the Victory Day parade held in Beijing last September. China is wholly justified in reminding the world of the forgotten sacrifices it made during World War II. However, the Victory Day celebrations exaggerated the role of the CCP in the war against Japanese aggression and ignored the role of the nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek.��As Rana Mitter of Oxford University points out, it was the of the Japanese invasion. Historian Jung Chang goes further, saying that during the war, the Communist Party did not completely cease hostilities toward the nationalists and often sabotaged Chiang’s efforts against the invading Japanese armies.

Beijing loves to cast Japan as an aggressive villain of East Asia. China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Liu Xiaoming, recently��.��While it is true that Japan has not apologized for its war crimes as fully as Germany has done, Japan today is not the aggressive power that is painted in the CCP’s narrative. Unlike China, Japan has not fired a shot, let alone engaged in any conflict since 1945. By being dishonest about Japan, China uses this narrative to claim more clout in the region today. Comments over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands) are often laced with references to Japan’s imperial past.

The CCP’s worst offence is the forced national amnesia of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, in which hundreds or thousands died (the death toll is unknown). Meanwhile, just across the border in Hong Kong, an enormous candlelight vigil is held every year—the subject remains completely taboo in public, in the media and online 26 years on. On each anniversary,�� and remove any online posts that reference the massacre. The result is that those born after 1989 or who were too young at the time to remember have no reference to the protests. “Many young people have no idea about the June 6^th incident,” says Zhang Bowei, a father of two who works in Beijing.

This is not to say that all history is often used to ill use. China rightly teaches in great detail about the Nanjing Massacre and other Japanese war crimes, which are often forgotten in the West. On any given day of the year, dozens of different schools across China visit the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall. Before Iris Chang’s��The Rape of Nanking��was published in 1997, very little was known about the massacre outside of China. Neither Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China, nor Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China sought wartime reparations from Japan after the war as both leaders were competing for Japanese trade and political recognition. Against the threat of communism, the United States, too, sought close relations with Japan and did not press the issue.

Great Leaders Make History, Bad Leaders Write It

The outcome of the bending of history is increasingly strained relations between the three biggest powers in East Asia. Today, the biggest point of tension has been over island disputes, despite shabby historical claims. Both China and Japan lay claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Yet China never����China’s claim to Taiwan is also difficult to defend, given that the island was never part of the People’s Republic of China. Indeed, the mainland has not administered Taiwan since 1895. Meanwhile, relations are strained between South Korea and Japan over the Liancourt Rocks, though no conclusive evidence has surfaced as yet on ownership.

The war in East Asia has long been over. But dishonesty over it is threatening peace in the region.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.��

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When Kim Jong-il died,����that North Korea would either collapse or be taken over by hard-liners. Analysts watched doggedly as the young marshal, Kim Jong-un, emplaced a����in power—a gang whom his father had not recommended in the��. Kim Jong-un’s affinity for these technocrats was temporary: That nearly all have been banished, purged or killed begs inquiry of the “.”

As I will show, Kim Jong-un has defied all predictions and permanently changed the trajectory of North Korea.

During his three years of Confucian mourning, the young marshal acted like a force of nature, obsessively restructuring the basic tenants of reality in North Korea’s foundational doctrine. Jang Jin-sung correctly argues that Kim Jong-un�� for��trying to sell off state resources—in other words, North Korea’s sovereignty—but later misinterpreted the rationale of his measures. The rest of the world largely misread the reason for his uncle’s execution, and to make matters worse, Jang Jin-sung published a book propagating that Kim Jong-un was secretly governed by the Organization and Guidance Department.

This hypothesis fell short of explaining the radical changes he has imposed, and it lacks an explanation for the�� he has committed.��We must consider the possibility that Kim Jong-un has been purging anti-reform hard-liners.��To understand the “method to Kim’s madness,” we must look at what Kim Jong-un has actually done and reflect critically over .

To claim that a secret organization is implementing structural changes fails to account for the fact that the changes are stripping themselves of power and spreading it across the board in a more democratic manner. It is more likely that Kim Jong-un is not a false figurehead, but instead has total control and is a reformer. Just like he��removed his , he has now removed the ideological damage imposed by his father, Kim Jong-il.

Liberty in North Korea

I suspect—like does—that in the 2016 Party Congress, the young marshal will announce that North Korea is adopting true reforms. We must consider that he knows��unification could to the global economy, and that��90% of North Korea’s problems could be solved by unification.

Since Kim Jong-un came to power,��406 state-sanctioned��and��more than 1,000 informal in North Korea. Instead of stopping them, he has����by��allowing markets to . These markets are not only “,” but they’re��selling an abundance of , accepting foreign currency and��electronic and even��offering ��as a payment option.

Kim Jong-un / Flickr

As a result of these combined liberties, ��are spreading like wildfire. And despite some satellite imagery depicting a labyrinth of sanction-induced blackness, the��.

Some may still argue that Kim Jong-un is an evil dictator and that North Koreans are reforming the country from the bottom-up, but that does not explain the��proliferation of a .

Critics must concede that the monopoly of first level of consciousness thought control can only be relinquished from the top-down. A knowledge-based economy means the state is encouraging its people to adopt new ways of thinking that are not part of traditional ideological tenants. This liberation of thought is evidenced by the����and��, which encourage and incentivize average North Koreans to adopt critical thinking skills if they wish to succeed.

If some are still not yet convinced that Kim Jong-un is not only a reformer, but a liberator, then consider the following:��On two occasions, ��back into society and��are permitted upward social mobility in the ��by working in privately-owned markets. North Koreans are no longer confined within towns and provinces.��Many have been engaged in that a market for navigation and lodging��has sprouted as a result. In fact, the biggest revelations are that��the state allowed to travel abroad��in 2014, and it has��opened an ��and��welcomed the to report from within��North Korea, alongside Associated Press.

Becoming a “Normal State” Requires Normalization of Relations

The doors are wide open for science,��, economic,�� and even (state-sanctioned)��.

But the United States is the greatest barrier to unleashing the progress that North Korea is clearly on the brink of. Washington refuses to empower and enable these reforms without preconditions of Pyongyang abandoning its nuclear weapons program.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s offer of�� a year to denuclearize��the country matters little without a peace treaty and, therefore, brokering one is the best way for the US to stop being a barrier to North Korea’s liberation.

and unification on the Korean Peninsula, and instead worry about Chinese containment geo-strategy through a separate and less fatalistic lens. After all, China is a proven partner in global trade, and that aspect of the relationship should be continued and enhanced.

The US must seize the opportunity to play a productive role during the unification process and normalize relations with North Korea to allow for clearer communication and regional stability. To take any other measures would simply place America on the wrong side of history in one of the world’s longest-running conflicts. Being the main lien-holder on the armistice, the US is the only country that has the power to support a peaceful end to the war and broker unification in Korea. And as shown, an economic increase of $8.7 trillion should be enough incentive for those who have long been vested in maintaining the status quo—to change their course on parity with how Marshal Kim Jong-un has changed his leadership of North Korea.

If influencing these changes in North Korea—and waiting for them to occur—is not what “strategic patience” has always been about, then what is?

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On September 3, China’s Victory Day celebrations unveiled a turning point in northeast Asian relations: South Korean President Park Geun-hye was present, while her North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-un was not. Kim’s absence signaled a dramatic shift in the triangular relationship between China and both Koreas, which has been based on Beijing’s desire to preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Though the two Korean states have been seeking reunification on their own terms over��the last decade, the relationship had taken a step back following beginning with a landmine maiming two South Korean soldiers in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), leading to artillery rounds fired from both sides. While high-level talks were held to ease tensions, North Korea’s destabilizing behavior became an opportunity for Beijing and Seoul to reassess their relationship.

Park’s attendance shortly after a summer of tension shows how Beijing has hoped to use its friendly relations with Seoul as leverage against Pyongyang. China, after all, has been providing the financial and political support that has kept the Kim regime in power since the end of the Korean War in 1953.

Wary of Beijing’s support of its neighbor, South Korea has simultaneously engaged with and balanced against a rising China in recent years. Seoul has cooperated��with China in the form of trade over North Korea, but has balanced against China by emphasizing the importance of the strategic alliance with the United States. Stronger cooperation between the two Confucian nations would be mutually advantageous, as the triangular relationship has not fostered lasting stability on the Korean Peninsula. President Park should use political leverage to persuade China to gradually end relations with North Korea and side with South Korea.

Of course, a closer relationship with China would come at the expense of relations with the US. Yet Park’s attendance at the Victory Day celebrations, , shows that such a relationship is already taking shape.

President Park should persuade China to turn a blind eye to —where North Korean traders have been bringing smartphones and radios into the Hermit Kingdom, which in turn educates North Koreans about the world around them. More importantly, President Park could strike a deal with Beijing to allow North Korean defects to escape safely into South Korea. If China is tired of Western governments criticizing its human rights record, Park could reason with the government, which��would at least help North Korean refugees.

China’s Traditionalists and Progressives

Two main factors have led to Beijing reassessing its relationship with the two Koreas.

First, China’s current policy is contradictory and is clearly not working. It finances the Kim dynasty by paying for its fuel, food and guns, while simultaneously encouraging the north to follow the same economic trajectory that transformed China—.

Second, Sino-North Korean relations have been at their coolest for years. Since President Xi Jinping took the helm in China in 2012, official has shrunk to a “trickle,”��and factions have emerged within the Chinese government over North Korea; between traditionalists those who still see the DPRK as a strategic asset and progressives who view it as a liability.

The traditionalists assert the need to maintain the status quo. They insist that Beijing must continue to back Pyongyang as a buffer against the US and its allies, especially South Korea. Though they concede that the north is an unreliable ally, it is still an ally among hostile neighbors in the region (China has territorial disputes with ��save for Pakistan). Even worse, the conventional wisdom is that if North Korea collapses, a joint South Korean and American-sponsored government would take its place, setting US��soldiers at China’s borders.

These arguments have been outdated since the end of the Cold War, retort the progressives. This faction emphasizes the importance of maintaining a solid relationship with the US and understanding the limitations of the Pyongyang regime. Indeed, while traditionalists have emphasized preserving stability on the Korean Peninsula, the progressives point out that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is destabilizing and harms China’s national interests.

Until the progressives can sway Beijing’s policy over the Koreas, the peninsula will be unstable. Worse, if Pyongyang is to acquire nuclear weapons, China will be forced to act with unpredictable consequences.

The Victory Day celebrations were an exercise in muscle flexing, but its official aim was to “convey to the world that it is devoted to safeguarding international order, rather than challenging it,” as a .

If China wants to show it is a responsible world power, it should pull the plug on funding a��rogue state. The stability of the region may depend on it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Ask the average American their thoughts on North Korea and, without hesitation, most will recite the litany of evils that the country is caricatured as, but very few know much beyond a seemingly programmed list of horrors. Searching “North Korea” on the Internet reveals millions of hits echoing a consensus that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is an ongoing “meth-addicted,” “nuclear threat to humanity,” “a holocaust,” a “hell-on-earth,” and a place where “unimaginable cruelties” such as “castrating the disabled” and “mass murder by machine-gun fire” regularly occur.

Even if true, in-depth inquiry reveals little actual proof of these claims. Regardless, most surmise that (for the good of its people) the country����and “liberated” as quickly as possible.

It seems that��“” about the country is predominately informed by North Korean defectors and their sponsor nongovernmental organizations (NGO), which are considered by mainstream media as primary sources. One struggles to find Western pundits, much less “experts,” whose worldviews are not in some way informed by the sensational, un-provable narratives of these groups.

Through the immense influence of North Korean human rights narratives, policy approaches to the country are borne. Robert McChesney describes a contemporary media crisis in his book, , as a result of an “anti-democratic communications policy crisis.”

This author—a former DMZ reconnaissance soldier and information warfare officer—presents recent examples and draws out the implications of the hypothesis��on��“��of military/national security strategy”; and the fact that human rights awareness campaigns are military initiatives in the Information Era, which are used to program global thinking that perpetuates the ongoing North Korean��“problem” and results in hallucinatory responses to the DPRK��fiction. The analysis seeks not to challenge the tenants of that “hallucinatory thinking,” but to deconstruct what leads to it and interrogate the impact on global security such hysteria has.

The Ongoing War(s)

Let us start from the very beginning. The 1953 Armistice Agreement, signed between the United Nations and the United States and DPRK governments, called for “a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.” At the time of its signing, all actors clearly understood the����that hostilities brought to the peninsula. Unfortunately, the Korean War has been long forgotten, and the US government outsources its agitation operations to NGOs; the words of the armistice left completely deprived of their meaning.

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US involvement in����of Chinese containment. Sixty-two years later, the United States is still using the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a frontline military base camp for its China containment strategy. US Assistant Secretary of State����that South Korea “plays a major role in the international order,” and that the ROK’s compliance with US strategy is necessary for making Asia the “kind of region that you and I [meaning the imperial West] want to live in.” But the American dream of spreading democratic values has (at the institutional level) been ethnocentrically informed and driven by a ��seeking to exert hegemonic power.

Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon best articulate the irony of��jingoistic��human rights NGO foreign policy influence in their book, ,��where they state: “[V]iolence protects human rights from violence that violates human rights.” They claim “human rights discourse has become a desired resource for those seeking political influence and power,” and this discourse is the new “lingua franca of global moral speak”—pointing out that human rights politics has become “a new morality in international relations, a way of conducting international politics according to moral norms and rules … human rights are now canonical text for the moral disposition of world affairs.”

Andrew Burt, the author of , explains that American identity “is a way of defining��who we are by who we are against.” In periods of increased threat to American identity, such as during the Red Scare or post-9/11, the US has gone to war to defend its beliefs. For decades, the American government has shaped and harnessed mass hysteria, according to Burt, to achieve American political ends abroad. The UN North Korea human rights Commission of Inquiry (COI) conveniently established itself within four months of Kim Jong-il’s death. As PhD candidate��: “Since 2006, every Commission of Inquiry has preceded military action that worsened human conditions.”

The National Endowment for Democracy����those NGOs that develop such hysteria. It is interesting that in order to obtain a NED grant, one must meet two qualifiers in their proposal: to promote religious freedom and human rights. Burt’s arguments pass the Litmus Test for��government intentionality to manufacture and harness human rights hysteria, otherwise NED would give grants for cultural and educational exchanges without the two requirements—knowing that those forms of engagement spread democracy more effectively than forcing one’s own ethnocentric worldviews on “the cognitive other.” The fact that human rights awareness campaigns have exponentially increased since the COI is concerning for several reasons, and it is worthy of explaining how the human rights network is constructed and aligned.

While NED is the go-to organization for financial support among North Korea Human Rights (NKHR) NGOs, the Department of Defense finances a vast human rights industry. Human rights influence is rooted directly to the military, according to Perugini and Gordon, and has thereby resulted in “the proliferation of human rights appropriations.” They state: “[I]t is not surprising that state security institutions that hold the monopoly over legitimate violence also began invoking international humanitarian and human rights law in their work.” They point out that according to Amnesty International, “the US government trains approximately 100,000 foreign police and soldiers from more than 150 countries in approximately 275 military schools and installations while offering 4,100 human rights courses.”

Following international media big and small, especially from the US, one acutely gets the feeling that��: they target, explode and seek to destroy all that is in sight. They are about precisions, but like bombs their explosions can be exactly the opposite: imprecise, unpredictable and indiscriminate in their maiming. Although their campaigns impact thinking here, their devastation is always across the border: foreign land, foreign lives and foreign necessary cost of winning. Human rights awareness campaigns have transformed NKHR NGOs into US government-funded information warfare contractors.

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This author interrogates this approach for several reasons. First, it is known that a lying Iraqi����the decision-making process that led the US into Operation Iraqi Freedom—a war that destabilized the Middle East, leaving it in ruins. Second, North Korean defectors have been known to organize����to sway public opinion in their interests, threatening rule of law and national security in South Korea. Third, the soundness of US government financial support for a network of NKHRs that actively conspire to carry out operations that agitate—rather than peacefully resolve—the world’s oldest and most volatile conflict must be questioned.

Information Warfare Contractors in Action��

Collapsing a country is no easy task. The strategy, or so it appears, consists of several campaigns occurring simultaneously. It is unknown to the author who—if any single person—is orchestrating the overall “North Korea Operation,” but it is apparent that there is a concerted effort to forcibly collapse the regime.

Allen Weinstein, who helped draft the legislation establishing NED, was����when he said in 1991: “A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.” Not surprisingly, a good portion of NED funds��, which has����toward “accelerating change” in the country, but also in the international community to harness public hysteria in support of the operation.

NKHR NGOs actively conspired on their future plans at the��, which contrary to claims of “a diverse nature of conference attendants,” only����points recommended people-to-people exchanges. The other 13 ranged from taking Kim Jong-un to the International Criminal Court, to a ten-way rephrasing of “conduct information operations.”

The primary “information warfare contractors” carrying-out the “North Korea Operation” are: Human Rights Foundation (HRF); the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK); the European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea (EAHRNK); Fighters for a Free North Korea (FFNK); Radio Free Asia (RFA); Free North Korea Radio (FNKR); Open Radio North Korea (ORNK); North Korea Freedom Coalition (NKFC); and last but not least, an incalculable number of��.

The Rendon Group, a premier US military and government strategic communications contracting firm, published this author’s����how HRF’s “Hack them Back” campaign became a threat to ROK national security that pushed them to the��,��during a time when high level inter-Korean talks were taking place. The government, Christian groups and various foundations sponsor HRF’s work, even though����actively working to collapse governments that threaten the American identity—such as North Korea.

Besides sabotaging high-level inter-Korean talks, HRF also brought its media and balloons out in the height of recent cross-DMZ fire volleys.����over the “land mine/loudspeaker incident,” FFNK (HRF’s balloon-launching point of contact NKHR defector group)��—an act that could have resulted in the conflict spiraling out of control.

Celebrity defectors are a rapidly-emerging��and ��at the forefront of a militarized disinformation campaign against the West. Few understand the Korean War or Korean Peninsula in a complete, holistic and academic way. Celebrity defectors serve to monopolize an��empirical knowledge deficit of North Korea in the same way Iraqi defector “Curveball” informed our views of Iraq in 2003.

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In 2014, celebrity defector Yeon Mi Park’s meteoric rise,�� and����caused many analysts () to raise their brows. Yeon Mi Park became a “Media Fellow” for OFF (an offshoot of HRF) in spring 2014 and went on a world tour that has not ended. Most notably, she spoke at the��, and in 2015 she has been a��headlining speaker at “Freedom Fest,” an organized collective of philanthropists, right-wing pundits and deep-pocketed political strategists.����over $12,500 per speech, until her book is released. Her fees could then increase to over $40,000 per speech.

Following now-disgraced defector��,��the core ��is that North Korea is a hell on earth and is currently experiencing a Holocaust. Despite the fact that Park , traveling and living lavishly��(by regime standards), the majority of people believe her story wholeheartedly.

It is����that they often tell the world what they think people want to hear. In a soon-to-be-released film, , Park furthers her core message in the movie’s theme, which is that the North Korean leadership is Nazi Gestapo and its people like the Jews in prison camps. The movie is fictitious, but it will have a tremendous impact on Western perceptions and is likely to have a hypnotic and����on the public, whereby millions of people call for the violent overthrow of the regime and persecution of anybody arguing for peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Focus on Unification as a Solution

Information operations can be used to cause change in the country by exposing average North Koreans to the outside world. But in their current militarized behavior, these initiatives are seemingly intended to harness support from the West for collapsing the country.

We must therefore ask three questions.��First,��how does demonizing North Korea improve human rights conditions without causing jingoistic mass hysteria in favor of war? Second, how do these agitation operations affect ROK national security? ��Third, is there not a more diplomatic path to achieving unification of Korea?

Michael Lammbrau, bureau chief of the Arirang Institute,����that unification is a mentality, quoting Georgetown Professor David Maxwell in saying:

“The problem is we think in linear terms when looking at the North Korean dilemma. We first look to resolve the nuclear problem, then the human rights problem, and then finally unification, but that assumes the current regime is willing to give up their nuclear weapons and willing to resolve its human rights issues. I am saying they are not going to do that, I am saying we have to focus on unification.”

“Momentum is now slowly shifting to a “unification first” mentality. Goldman Sachs agrees with President Park [Geun-hye],” Lammbrau points out. That said, it is time for human rights politics to not only be questioned in their impact on international politics, but also time for experts, pundits, scholars, journalists and policymakers to scrutinize with careful forethought the impact NKHRs have on human rights in North Korea.

In short, it is time to re-imagine North Korea in international politics with a focus on unification—instead of demonization—if we truly seek to liberate North Korean people from the isolation they have endured for the past 70 years of the unending Korean War.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your����is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a��.

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Imagine for a moment that Kim Jong-un isn’t really an evil communist , but a Confucian king a capitalist monarchy. Imagine that positive were taking place in a newly designed North Korea that doesn’t place the first anymore. Then imagine that the Korean Peninsula suddenly found itself in a rare , where both leaders called adamantly for high-level talks about ending the 65-year-long conflict and reunifying. Then try to fathom the consequences of the armistice-holding United States missing the to broker peace between the two — instead imposing more sanctions at this crucial moment — and Russia in to facilitate the unification process to its geostrategic advantage.

What side of history would the be on, and what future would America have in Asia if this happened?

These considerations aren’t fiction. They’re part of a legitimate, possible future. And the US is faced with the option of allowing this to happen, or taking an entirely new to and the Korean War. An approach toward brokering (admittedly idealistic) genuine peace and unification, not “peace through conflict” as it currently stands.

US policymakers have consistently faulty remedies in dealing with North Korea and the Korean War — from the collapse of the Agreed Framework and the Axis of Evil speech, to the failed Leap Day Deal and the Obama administration’s misguided “strategic patience” . While it is understandable that the US views the Korean conundrum as a “North Korea problem,” that perspective doesn’t contribute to resolving the roots of the ongoing conflict.

Washington remains “strategically patient” toward North Korea while the country continues to its nuclear weapons program and commit human rights , which are gradually . The strategic patience policy is a gross byproduct of sensationalism, human rights and counter-productive nuclear nonproliferation gridlock.

North Korean diplomats the UN rapporteur, Marzuki Darusman, that hardliners would come to power if the US-led global approach to the country continued in this current trajectory. Although this is probably an empty threat designed to leverage the international community, it represents a future that is further preoccupied with perpetual bellicosity.

An example of misguided policies backfiring on the US agenda is in its most serious qualm with North Korea: the nuclear weapons program. In 1957, the US section 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement, allowing nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Since then, the US has failed to put that genie back in its bottle, and instead spent decades bickering on the Hill about how to engage the regime whilst North Korea developed its own program. Seoul National University Professor Park Tae-gyun suggests the only way to end hostilities is to replace the armistice with a peace treaty.

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As the nuclear provides the North Koreans with security and bargaining chips, they will likely never get rid of it. North Korea has weapons of mass destruction whether the US accepts it or not, and the program will only continue growing. Rather than stand in denial with fists clenched over this fact, the US should rush to broker peace on the peninsula. During the reconciliation process, the US could leverage developmental programs in exchange for nuclear disarmament, thereby replacing the country’s nuclear blanket with an equally warm developmental one.

The US government cites North Korean behavior as for furthering its geostrategic in Asia. But to what effect, and is the current US approach optimal?

Stephanie Klien-Ahlbrandt before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission that Beijing and Pyongyang hold “perpetual American hostility” responsible for the perceived necessity of their security apparatus. In testimony, she quoted the old Chinese proverb: “The one who ties the knot is responsible for untying it.”

On the peninsula where the Korean War is still technically being fought, the leaders of its opposing forces are focused on entirely different dialogue than Washington. Calls for an inter-Korean summit from South Korean President Park Guen-hye and North Korean Marshall Kim Jong-un have aligned the Koreas in rare posture toward political rapprochement of relations. These talks have the potential of achieving mutual recognition, which would be the first step toward ending the Korean War and unifying the country. A Unification Charter has even been to support inter-Korean inertia toward peace.

The Long Shadow

In his recent State of the Union address, US President Barack Obama highlighted the counter-productive impact that sanctions have historically had on Iranian and Cuban reforms, noting that shifting policy could “end the legacy of mistrust” between the countries. In an for The Washington Post, former US President Jimmy Carter called this strategy “cruel to innocent people.” He argued that the () Sony hack, which the North Korea sanctions are based on, is no justification for these “counter-productive measures.”

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Eun-sung Soh it is “time to move away from simplistic thinking” on North Korea. Perhaps it is time to reimagine North Korea, as Shine Choi so saliently , and support the Ministry of Unification in its to “spread the seeds of peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

Some scholars aptly argue that the regime earns positive rewards. Others add that the armistice with a peace treaty is the best solution to ending the war. While the of engagement are quantifiable because they’ve been tested, peace has not. Peace has no record to argue for or against. Since replacing the armistice with a peace treaty may not be in the best political of both Koreas, the US should instead strive to facilitate peace between the countries.

As a third rail issue, the American public will have difficulty supporting a sudden toward engagement from a “ to virtuous cycle” with a nation that we’ve long demonized. It would require Americans to consider North Korea’s of reality — which would require recognizing the country as a rational and a product of its that did what it needed to survive independently after 35 years of occupation and another 65 at war.

Granted, putting ourselves in the shoes of such a demonized regime is unfathomable to some, but the prospect is there. North Korea’s “enemy,” , is leading the public effort by promoting peace on the peninsula.

Like the Vietnam War’s “,” the Korean War’s long shadow could impact US foreign policy for decades or even centuries to come. America’s fate in Asia may be determined by its ability or inability to serve as a facilitator in the inevitable end of the Korean War.

Washington’s obligation to the conflict goes beyond geostrategic interests or petty domestic politics. The US government has an obligation to communicate this responsibility to Americans — seeking their support for assuming the historical role required of it now that the Koreas have prepared to end the war and unify. It is not a question of imagining possible realities, but recognizing them before they into the hands of those seeking to America’s legacy by playing this historically crucial role for us.

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Iraq, a founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), has large oil reserves which are unevenly spread across the country. As of January 2013, it also held the 12^th largest natural gas reserves in the world, with over 60% being located in southern Iraq. 

Situated along some of the region's key fault lines, Iraq's future is likely to determine some of the wider issues and conflicts in the Middle East.

51�Թ�'s Middle East Editor, Manuel Langendorf, speaks to , a senior analyst specializing in Middle East affairs for the risk management group Helios Global. Langendorf and Zambelis talk about the causes of violence in Iraq, the players involved, and the country's potential in the world energy market.

Manuel Langendorf: I would like to talk about energy. Iraq is estimated to have the fifth largest proven crude oil reserves in the world, with many analysts pointing to a lot of exploration potential not being realized yet. How do you assess Iraq's position on the world energy market and its potential?

Chris Zambelis: Without a doubt, Iraq is a vital player in international oil markets. Its position as a major oil producer is especially important, given that a wide consensus of projections for global oil demand sees it as remaining steady in the foreseeable future and likely to rise over the long-term on the back of strengthening demand from Asia. We also have to remember that Iraq's potential as an energy producer has been stymied over the years due to conflict, economic sanctions, underdevelopment, mismanagement and politics.

In this context, Iraq has tremendous potential. This is the case despite the ongoing global economic downturn. Other factors, including neighboring Iran's anticipated return to international energy markets — Iran is another major oil player that has failed to realize its full potential as a producer and exporter due to economic sanctions and politics, among other things — have not diminished Iraq's significance as an oil producer. 

The growing availability of tight (shale) oil; natural gas and related natural gas liquids (NGL); oil sands; coal-to-liquid (CTL) derived fuels; biofuels; widespread interest in new and alternative energy resources; and the rapid pace of technological innovation that is yielding more efficient energy consumption patterns have not erased the importance of crude oil. 

There are other factors to consider when assessing the importance of Iraq in international oil markets. Let us not forget that Libya, a major oil producer in its own right, has failed to realize its potential as an oil producer due to ongoing violence and political instability. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster also rattled international energy markets; Japan, a huge energy importer, was forced to increase its imports of oil (and other hydrocarbons) to compensate for the lack of nuclear energy that had to be taken offline. 

In short, crude oil remains vital to the functioning of the global economy today and will remain critical for some time to come. Consequently, the presence of additional supply of oil is welcomed by consumer nations around the globe. And when you have a country with the unrealized potential of Iraq, naturally, it is no surprise why so many are watching its steady return to energy markets with great interest.

Langendorf: How does the location of energy reserves within Iraq affect Iraqi politics?

Zambelis: The placement of Iraq's oil reserves is certainly an important factor in affecting Iraqi (and regional) politics. This is best illustrated in Iraq's northern Kurdish region, which is home to a significant percentage of Iraqi oil reserves. The ability of Iraqi Kurds to leverage the crude oil resources lying within their jurisdiction in northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan) has bolstered their efforts to secure autonomy and otherwise gain substantial geopolitical influence under the auspices of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). 

But there remains a great deal of controversy over the disposition of Iraqi oil originating in KRG-administered territory relating to extraction, export rights and revenue sharing. The central authorities in Baghdad want to limit the ability of the KRG to extract and export oil out of fears that it will lead to the region's eventual secession. 

The KRG has already secured numerous agreements with international oil majors and currently operates a pipeline that ships oil to Turkey. Baghdad considers the KRG's efforts to engage with foreign companies as a way of evading its authority. The central government has also punished foreign oil companies over their relationship with the KRG. For example, Baghdad barred US oil major Chevron Corporation from operating in central and southern Iraq as a result of its engagement with the KRG. 

The location of significant oil reserves in southern Iraq, such as in Basra Province, has also impacted Iraq's domestic political picture. Some of Iraq's most important oil fields are located in Basra Province. It is no surprise the region has enjoyed a contentious relationship with Baghdad over a range of issues. Basra Province continues to lobby for more political autonomy from Baghdad and to have greater input on energy-related investment issues. A number of local factions also continue to push for the region to be granted a formal autonomous status. 

Langendorf: What interests do other countries in the region have in Iraq, especially when it comes to its energy reserves? Which other countries are involved in Iraq's energy market? China, for example, is expanding its influence across the region.

Zambelis: On the demand side, owing to its position as a key source of crude oil reserves and potentially natural gas further down the line, key consumers in Asia led by China but also India and South Korea have a major stake in Iraqi oil. China, in particular, has been among the most active in terms of increasing its purchases of Iraqi oil and also engaging in upstream and downstream activities. For its part, Iraq has identified China as a strategic market for its exports of crude oil. 

In 2008, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) concluded an agreement with Iraq's North Oil Company (NOC) to develop the al-Ahdab oil field. The agreement, which was estimated at around $3.5 billion, represented the first between Iraq and China since 2003. China imported around 500,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) from Iraq in 2012. In 2013, China's imports of Iraqi oil increased by 50%. China has also expressed its intention to import even more oil from Iraq in 2014. The geopolitical implications of growing Chinese interest in Iraqi oil will be profound, especially in the context of China's relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran.

It is worth mentioning that China has also engaged with the KRG over energy projects, however, nowhere to the extent comparable to its dealings with Baghdad.

At this stage, the United States and Europe also represent an important destination for Iraqi oil exports. Iraqi oil, by way of Iraqi Kurdistan, is also flowing to Turkey by way of a newly minted pipeline that became operational in January. In terms of development of upstream and downstream projects, a host of international energy majors representing the United States, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia are, to different degrees, active in the Iraqi energy sector.

Langendorf: How do you see the situation in Iraq evolving? What regional role is Iraq likely to play in the future?  

Zambelis: I see the situation in Iraq remaining highly volatile in the near- to medium-terms. Iraq is likely to continue to experience escalating violence and terrorism. Much of these hostilities will be expressed through sectarian animosities but will ultimately remain a product of deeper social, political and economic grievances. These circumstances will be inflamed by the ongoing conflict in Syria. 

I also believe the role of regional players, particularly Saudi Arabia, is underreported when it comes to the trajectory of events in Iraq. A stable, strong and unified Iraq has tremendous potential to project power in the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East. By default, this scenario threatens Saudi Arabia. 

When considered in the context of the incremental rapprochement between the United States and Iran, Saudi Arabia's long-term prospects as a regional power start to look dim. As a result, it is likely that Saudi Arabia will up the ante in terms of attempting to shape events in Iraq. Saudi Arabia's aggressive stance toward Syria may provide a window into its possible approach toward Iraq down the line. I think this is something that warrants closer attention in the months to come.     

*[Note: The opinions expressed here are the interviewee's alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of Helios Global, Inc.] 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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By Kalyan M. Kemburi

Over the last two decades, cruise missiles were predominantly deployed by a select group of advanced industrial countries, in particular the United States. Subsequently, there had been a wider use of this weapon system by militaries, partly due to globalization which accelerated technology diffusion, but also because of affordability and operational requirements (in particular the search for asymmetric capabilities). 

Asian militaries top this list. The main advantage of cruise missiles involves the ability to strike targets accurately almost under any weather condition from a long-range by evading most air defenses, and with minimal risk to friendly forces. 

Asian Militaries and Cruise Missiles

Although most countries in Asia have acquired anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), China, India, Pakistan, South Korea and Taiwan are developing or have deployed land-attack cruise missiles (LACM). Some Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam have also expressed interest. Japan has indicated interest in a system that could endow it with preemptive strike capabilities — for which cruise missiles could fit the bill.  

For countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the high-cost of deploying missile defenses and the treaty restrictions in developing ballistic missiles have made cruise missiles an attractive system to strike against potential adversaries' ballistic missiles and artillery systems. 

As with any military technology, there is always a dynamic between defense and offence. Deployment of cruise missiles have also resulted in consequent developments in defense: active countermeasures include advances in early warning systems and the deployment of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, as well as the strengthening of passive defenses such as installations holding critical assets like aircraft or command and control equipment. Moreover, new operational requirements have intensified efforts to acquire high-speed cruise missiles. 

R&D in Supersonic and Hypersonic Systems 

Five countries in Asia — China, Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan — have either civilian and/or military programs aimed at developing supersonic and hypersonic systems. It is generally agreed that supersonic systems (powered by ramjet engine) operate in the range of Mach 2-4 and hypersonic (scramjet engine) over Mach 5; most of the deployed LACMs fly at subsonic speeds of around 800km/hr. 

China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center and the National University of Defense Technology are currently working toward scramjet propulsion, pulse-detonation engines and turbine-based combined cycle (TBCC) engines, with an aim to eventually develop hypersonic missiles and aircraft. Further, the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics has reportedly developed an experimental scramjet. 

The Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) is involved in developing high-speed air-breathing propulsion for a hypersonic aircraft. JAXA is also collaborating with institutions based in Australia, Germany, Italy and the US in developing scramjet-based systems for space access. In 2012, Japan reportedly tested a rocket-based combined-cycle engine model under Mach 8. 

India currently deploys the ramjet-powered supersonic LACM Brahmos flying at 2.5-2.8 Mach, and has plans to collaborate with Russia to develop a kerosene-based hypersonic Brahmos 2. Concurrently, the Defense Research and Development Organization is working on a hypersonic system that could fly at Mach 6-7 speed propelled by scramjet. Similarly, for space access, India's civilian space agency has been working on a hydrogen-fueled scramjet engine. 

Taiwan's Hsiung Feng III (HF-3) LACM is propelled by a ramjet engine flying at a maximum speed of Mach 2 with an estimated range of 150-200 km. Initially developed as an ASCM by Chung Shan International Institute of Science and Technology, it was later reported that the missile also has land attack capabilities and entered into service in 2008. 

A new entrant of the cruise missile club, South Korea, has also been developing a supersonic Haeseong-2 LACM from the existing ASCM Haeseong-1 (Sea Star, or SSM-700K). In September 2011, Korea Times reported that the missile was slated for deployment by the end of 2013 and has a range in excess of 500 kms.

Additionally, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) has on the drawing board a two-stage Mach 4 scramjet propelled surface to air interceptor. Reportedly, KARI has ground-tested various scramjet components required for this concept. 

Evolution or Revolution in Fire Power 

Supersonic cruise missiles would increasingly become an attractive option due to the following factors.

Firstly, they reduce sensor-to-shooter to-target times. A supersonic LACM flying toward a target at a distance of 1,000 kms has clear time advantage of over 60 minutes over its subsonic counterpart.

Secondly, the kinetic energy of a supersonic missile not only increases the explosive power of a warhead, but also facilitates reduction of the warhead payload, which helps in expanding the range of the missile. Moreover, they are also very useful for targeting hardened targets; this is important given the hardening of installations as part of key passive defensive measures undertaken by many countries.

Thirdly, supersonic LACM used in conjunction with subsonic and theatre ballistic missiles create processing difficulties for any advanced early warning and air defense system. 

On the other hand, hypersonic air-breathing missile is a key emerging technology. For an effective and efficient use of this technology, changes are necessary in organizational structures, decision-making processes, operational concepts, and C4ISR systems. For most Asian militaries, accustomed to organizational and procedural inertia, bringing these changes in itself is revolutionary.

Moreover, enormous technical and financial resources are necessary to deploy a hypersonic cruise missile; therefore, over the next 10-15 years, supersonic cruise missiles offer a more viable complement to the existing cruise and ballistic missiles. 

Asian militaries are still in the process of inducting subsonic LACMs — supersonics in some cases — in significant numbers, and currently are working on innovative concepts and organizational changes that aim to take advantage of these systems in affecting the outcomes on the battlefield. Therefore, induction of high-speed missiles is evolutionary. 

Nevertheless, in a decade, military commanders in Asia would be able to have a cruise missile delivered to their target 1,500 kms away in less than 30 minutes. 

*[Note: Kalyan M. Kemburi is an Associate Research Fellow with the Military Transformations Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Most of the world’s poorest countries are located in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the region escaped from the shackles of colonialism, numerous development and reform programs have been implemented.

However, all but few have failed to deliver the expected results. Paradoxically, while Africa harbors "immense natural and human resources" — despite its rich cultural, economic and ecological status — it remains largely underdeveloped.

Eradication of poverty requires a global solution. To achieve this, the  (EU) claims it is necessary that the world "addresses the inequality within and among nations." 

 contained a similar justification regarding the need to tackle extreme poverty. In agreeing to the content of this "holy book," ministers of both developed and developing countries, as well as heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions, acknowledged their collective responsibility in promoting development and in taking "actions to reform the ways [they] deliver and manage aid." This was to be done through measurable mechanisms that would ensure aid effectiveness through "efforts to strengthen governance and improve development performance."

Behind the Rhetoric

In their attempts to tackle avoidable abject misery and dire poverty, national and international institutions have set a brilliant agenda. It is clear that poverty has taken the larger part of the world’s population hostage in the midst of increasing global affluence. Although there is not a shadow of doubt that the initiatives are laudable and timely, the promising and hopeful statements mentioned above are not new.

In the eyes of the world's poor, it must feel weary, sickening and, at best, annoying to realize the incongruence between the international community's never-ending rhetoric and the paltry progress we have made by turning words into action.

The inaction of the international community is perhaps most clear in unfair trade practices like tax evasion and tax havens, especially by multinational corporations which relish the opportunity to avoid payments to African governments. The ongoing diplomatic saga over combating illicit financial flows contradicts the wonderful pledges made at the Paris Declaration, while it perpetuates abject poverty, mortality and disease.

Between tax evasion and the World Trade Organization's failure to stop affluent states from heavily subsidizing their local producers, and their pursuit of protectionist policies, one must wonder if the world really wants to fight poverty.

What's Needed for Real Change?

In academic circles, the capabilities and failures of African states are often discussed. Talk of rampant corruption and weak institutions harming growth is often on the cards, while one is encouraged to question global order. In fact, the numerous reforms that different economies and government institutions have undergone over the last century — all in the name of enhancing good governance and alleviating poverty — are frequently mentioned.

However, until today, the same old story is being told and written about everywhere. The famous and ill-informed structural adjustment initiatives are one such example of how global policies deceived Africa — the impact of which has done nothing but damage African economies.

The need for cooperation between developed and developing countries was reechoed by speakers and participants of the European Development Days last November in Brussels. The slogan, "A Decent Life for All by 2030: Building a Consensus for a New Development," was used. 

But is history not just repeating itself? Judging from historical antecedents, attitudes and realities in Europe and the world at large, how can this vision be considered anything but an unrealistic dream?

Europe is still a continent in which posters of miserable black Africans begging for aid are paraded on advertisement boards. Surely, this should be called "rich eating the flesh of the poor," as the better part of this money solicited on behalf of the African poor ends up in the pockets of fundraisers and in African bureaucrats’ briefcases.

Does the increasing apathy and rhetoric in the fight against poverty stem from the fact that many powerful actors, institutions, and businesses are sustained by ongoing poverty of most of the world's population? Or is it because donor countries are discouraged by the misappropriation of their tax payers' hard-earned money by corrupt and greedy African leaders?

During the European Development Days, the president of the European Commission acknowledged that the EU is the leading trade partner and the biggest donor for Africa.

While this may be true, it is also neglects another aspect of European-African relations: the damaging effects of trade barriers to Africa. Are we ignoring the fact that Africa needs fair terms of trade and a fair global market place rather than handouts? Since numerous reforms prescribed for African governments have failed to achieve the desired results, is it not wise to look elsewhere for the causes and solutions of poverty?

Or rather, while they reform and fight corruption, embezzlement and mismanagement, can the world not look inward and assess the global order as an avenue for reform? Or is the international community immune to reform?

It is high time for the world to realize that more than half of its people are living miserable lives, due to the infrastructure of global trade and policy. Unless we are willing to make meaningful and necessary changes to the rules of the game and the way powerful institutions do business, poverty is here to stay.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The narrative of hostility, suspicion and aggression towards immigrants and asylum seekers is not new, nor is it unique. Reports of governmental and societal mistreatment of asylum seekers ebb in and out of the news continuously, to the extent that many stories of this nature disappear into the slipstream.��So it has been with Israel’s African asylum seekers, until the recent wave of strikes and protests that caused the global media to snap to attention.

By now, the practical dynamics of the situation have been well-recounted: the numbers of asylum seekers in Israel, their countries of origin, the facts of their arrival and the Israeli government’s increasingly draconian measures to first stem, and then reverse the influx of those seeking refuge.��Yet it is a less reported element of the experience of Africans in Israel that sets it apart from other apparently similar situations; namely, the violence that has been done to them by their host country in both word and deed.

The Journey to Israel

With the possible exception of the Roma, it is difficult to think of a parallel case in the Western world — and given that Israel chooses to identify itself as part of the West, that is the area with which the contrast must be made. However, this is an asymmetric comparison, as in spite of their almost uniformly-reprehensible treatment at the hands of governments across Europe, Roma communities have not fled dictatorial regimes and mass crimes against humanity, as have Israel’s African migrants.

Eritreans, the largest group of asylum seekers in Israel, have escaped an autocratic government which routinely kidnaps, tortures and executes its citizens; in prison, detainees have , beatings with metal bars, and the use of shipping containers for housing prisoners. Sudanese migrants, the second-largest asylum seeker group in Israel, have left behind a government that is widely considered to have committed genocide through both its own soldiers and the Janjaweed, a government-sponsored militia. War crimes in the country include infanticide, gang rape, and mutilation.

Furthermore, while crossing the Sinai on the way to Israel, many asylum seekers — particularly Eritreans — are for ransom money by Rashaida Bedouin.

What also makes Israel a case apart is its population’s own recent history. As reductive as arguments based on exceptionalism can be — and indeed, morally-speaking, this is an unacceptable approach — racially-driven violence in Israeli society cannot be examined in isolation from the dominant events of the 20th century.

So what do we find when we start to probe the contours of the cruelty visited on asylum seekers in Israel? A bloated and seething public discourse, fed by politicians, the media, and other members of society alike. We encounter quotations from public officials, which in most Western democracies would lead to dismissal and potentially a police investigation for incitement to racial violence. We learn of the brutal attacks that stem from such provocation. And we discern, gradually, a consistent strain of amnesia working its way through Israeli society.

Sent to Gas Chambers?

The media in Israel is fond of using the term “red line” to denote commonly-perceived boundaries of decency and morality. For African asylum seekers in Israel, this “red line” was undoubtedly crossed on the night of May 23, 2012, when a rally in south Tel Aviv calling for the removal of African asylum seekers from Israel mutated into a riot.

Following Member of the Knesset (MK) Miri Regev’s address to the crowd, during which she Sudanese people “a cancer in our body,” the rally’s attendees proceeded to shops, smash car windows and physically assault passing Africans. A was stopped and searched, fires were with cries of “the people want the Africans to be burned” and — in addition to the many racist slogans that were voiced that night — one protestor chose to ensure her message would not be lost in the ether by up in a vest on which she had written, “Death to Sudanese.” Journalists covering the events were also ��and aid organizations were threatened. On the morning of the riot, the received threats, one of which called for Sudanese to be sent to gas .

These events, although marking a severe intensification of attacks on asylum seekers, were not unprecedented. A rally had also taken place the previous night, during which MKs engaged in hate speech against Africans, and attendees called for Israeli women expressing sympathy for asylum seekers to be .

The months preceding that had seen a political conference on migration, at which plainly racist views were by Israeli politicians, along with a night of firebomb and arson attacks against the African community in south Tel Aviv. Throughout this period, the public dialogue surrounding asylum seekers in Israel was characterized by , and prejudice that has not yet relented. Sporadic rallies have also , featuring the now-customary racist demagoguery, calls for the rape of leftist Israeli women, and — when Africans pass by — monkey noises from protestors.

Although the far-right Otzma LeYisrael (Strong Israel) party has led the line on anti-African agitation — one of their primary platforms was the expulsion of all asylum seekers — racism has emerged from center-right and even “” political parties, including those currently in power.

None of this is empty rhetoric. State persecution has culminated in recent legislation mandating the indefinite detention of asylum seekers in the new “Holot” desert prison camp. In practice, this policy has been implemented via violent , unannounced , and cynical by Israel’s Ministry of Interior (MOI).

Indeed, state persecution of African asylum seekers has matched aggression in the street, and Israel’s treatment of them —����— has been publicly . (These condemnations have been .)

In a final insult, the MOI — in an apparent historical blackout — recently summoned over 150 asylum seekers to trial by presenting the court with a .

Meanwhile, calls for the extermination of Africans in Israel continue on social media, with . Of the many miracles that Israel claims to have worked in its young life, the transformation of amnesia into a weapon against the dispossessed must surely rank among the most audacious.

Human Rights Violations

As with any appalling abuses that defy description and deny logic, we are left with a question which is both the most compelling and the hardest to answer — for in attempting to answer it, we risk lapsing into justification, a transgression that must be rigorously guarded against. Yet it must be asked: How does violence so gratuitous and indecent come about?

“Violence… is man recreating himself,” wrote Jean-Paul Sartre in his introduction to Frantz Fanon’s classic postcolonial work, The Wretched of the Earth. While Sartre was referring specifically to the intensity of action needed in order to break from the stranglehold of colonialism into the throes of revolution, his words have a wider application.

In remaking himself, in forging a new identity, man is embracing the possibility that he can decouple himself from his past. So it is that the State of Israel — which was conceived in response to violence, born amidst violence, grew up submerged by and continues to live in the same — can be unmistakably perceived as a nation recreating itself. Israeli society is possessed of a dread memory, while being simultaneously militarized and terrified even if the terror is not visible, for braggadocio in the face of existential anxiety is part of the national character.

Consequently, Israel is uniquely prone to excesses of force, for it has a recent past that foments panic as well as the resources with which to swing at it wildly. In short, Israeli society is brutalized, and is therefore liable to brutalize in return. Furthermore, it belongs to a culture that prizes insularity, and thus insulates itself by design. As a nation-state, Israel remains in development, trying to define itself while in the grip of a volatile combination of��fear and isolationism, and in a perpetual state of being at war or on the brink thereof.

Small wonder, then, that unknown quantities — no matter how little threat they pose — are susceptible to such disproportionate aggression when they debut into Israeli society; in this case, African migrants.

In praxis, Israel’s government is inflicting indefensible human rights violations on a vulnerable group within its borders, as well as directly and indirectly encouraging the atrocious abuse of that group by significant numbers of Israelis. Moral abasement aside, these circumstances also provoke wider questions about Israel’s sociopolitical stability.

As Hannah Arendt posited in her book,��On Violence: “[P]ower and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance.”

If we are to avoid cruelty’s eternal recurrence, we must recover our memory and abandon violence, blind or otherwise. It is the only permanent way out of this situation, for all concerned.

*[Note: All incidents discussed in this article have been documented by , an independent journalist and film-maker from Toronto, Canada, who now lives in Dimona, Israel. Further incidents and background information are also documented on his website.]

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On Sunday, we bid a final farewell to this generation’s most beloved leader. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, a man for the ages, will be laid to rest. Leaders and dignitaries from all over the world have flocked to little-known Qunu, in South Africa, to see Mandela return to his roots, to the home of his people and the place of his childhood. Last Tuesday, a sea of world leaders arrived in Soweto to pay their final respects to a leader whose appeal transcended race, borders and beliefs. People turned up in the thousands and even a heavy downpour did little to dampen their spirits.

The Boy From Qunu

Mandela was a worthy heir to Mahatma Gandhi. He lives on in the hearts of many. His story is woven in bright colors that will refuse to fade with time. So profound was his influence and the reach of his example, so consummate was his work in altering the arc of history that the whole world mourns his loss whilst celebrating his life.

Throughout generations, in Africa and around the globe, many have heeded the call to serve and fight for freedom. Yet some precious few stand apart. Mandela is unique even in this group. His courage of conviction was such that he was prepared to die. His loyalty to those around him was absolute. His integrity was legendary. Despite its best efforts, the apartheid regime could never co-opt him. He carried himself with much pride and grace. Yet he was modest, engaging and courteous. He was Africa’s most celebrated son, and one of the greatest leaders to have ever graced the earth.

In 1918, Africa’s most challenging century bore its greatest son in Transkei, South Africa. “Rolihlahla,” which means troublemaker, rose to face the harsh repression of apartheid facing his people. Burdened by the weight of destiny, he stood up to be counted and became a willing advocate against the senseless chains clamping down on the rights of his people. A man with a wealth of flaws, he chose to pick up the gauntlet of a people’s struggles and carry the burden of their hopes. By so doing, he acquired the status of a saint.

He lived up to the immortalized words that he uttered at his trial before conviction:

"During my lifetime, I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to see realized. But… if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die."

Chained But Free

Throughout his 27-year incarceration, Mandela remained unbowed by the backbreaking inclement habitat designed to shatter his resolve for the realization of an indivisible free nation. Through many a long day and night of confinement and the punishment of hard labor, he soldiered on and carried forth the indefatigable hope for a brighter tomorrow. In detention, he refused to settle for the allure of anything less than the Promised Land. Eventually, it was Mandela’s captors who recognized that they were in chains and set free a man whose spirit was always free.

Like the biblical David against Goliath, he unflinchingly took on the behemoth of intolerance and domination. He slayed the beast with the help of others — some well-known like Oliver Tambo, some who lived to see the day and fruits of freedom, and some who paid the ultimate price in terms of their lives for emancipation.

Father of the Nation

Upon his release, he opened the iron fist of oppression and by shaking hands with it, melted the grip of its ideology. By his indomitable courage, Mandela led his country to freedom. His empathy, compassion and magnanimity saved it from chaos, violence and civil war. A new and bright South Africa was thus born and Mandela came to be regarded as Tata, the father of this nation.

A nation is only as strong as its foundation. Mandela was the catalyst that brought divergent and apprehensive groups onto the negotiating table to hash out a new constitution. The negotiations demonstrated that unity was possible, true freedom for all was accessible, common ground was ample, and dialogue indispensable. Mandela inspired the promulgation of one of the most revolutionary constitutions in the world. Under South Africa’s constitution, the inherent right of equality of all people is sacrosanct — civil and political rights and socioeconomic rights are intrinsic.

During his "self-imposed" single-term presidency, Mandela focused on the task of uniting stubbornly disparate groups and peoples under the banner of a rainbow nation. Recognizing that healing and restoration was paramount, his government set up the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to enable the nation to examine and acknowledge its painful past. Citizens were encouraged to embrace each other in the light of forgiveness, and to create a harmonious and inclusive society.

Mandela demonstrated by word and deed that all races could coexist in a unified country, sharing the same fundamental values. The powerful symbolism of his incarcerators sitting in the front row at his inauguration, shall forever prove that the power of forgiveness enables people to bridge any gap and heal any scar.

By voluntarily serving for only a single-term — a rare act in history — Mandela set an example to leaders across the globe, that power was but a means to an end and that leaders were merely servants of their people. He showed that for democracy to flourish, power must be relinquished even before one’s allotted constitutional mandate. He demonstrated that stepping down from power is a moral imperative, even if the masses clamor for a leader to continue in office.

Across the globe, Mandela stood for the oppressed and downtrodden with disregard to political correctness. He made no alliances out of political expediency. Instead, he championed the cause of peace and security, freedom and self-determination, and the recognition of the inherent rights and dignity of all humanity.

Flaws

Admittedly, as with all great leaders, it is important to interrogate all aspects of Mandela’s legacy. Even though he was a model statesman and charmed the world and a nation, he was far from a model father to his children. He is known to have engaged in infidelity, and his three marriages bring to question his commitment to the institution.

He regretted not having done more to stem the tide of HIV infection in South Africa while he was in office. During the freedom struggle, he abandoned Gandhian non-violence, and was the co-founder of Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) — the armed-wing of the ANC — which engaged in acts of violence.

The man maketh the legend. Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between the man and the legend. As a man, Mandela is thus blameworthy. His blemishes must be spoken of for the wider society to cite, criticize and learn from, as well as for all to appreciate the fact that he too was immensely flawed.

Greatness

Mandela’s courage in fighting against injustice and his compassion — even for those who wanted him dead — makes him a great man. A tall and handsome man, he was that rare book that could be judged by both its cover and its contents. At once, warm, humble and delightful to all and sundry who were fortunate to meet him in person, Mandela was also unremitting, ferocious and singular in the quest of his life’s mission.

As the African story rattles on, with its record of less than stellar leaders, Mandela will forever be a source of pride to his continent and a symbol for all humankind. His story shall be told in schools, at the kitchen table, in the open fields, and by the fireplace. Songs and books will continue to be written about him. He leaves but lives, especially through the ideals of peace, love, liberty, equality and harmony for all.

Goodbye, Tata.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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By Emanuel Pastreich

There is a terrible danger lurking just over the DMZ that threatens the Republic of Korea and Northeast Asia. This threat demands an immediate response that is focused and forceful, as well as a long-term strategy that will bring together all members of the international community for a campaign dedicated to the permanent containment of this threat.

It is not North Korea’s Taepodong ICBM systems, nor its Musudan or Nodong missiles that I have in mind. Nor do I refer to the nuclear weapons that were recently tested as part of Pyongyang’s high-stakes diplomatic cat-and-mouse game with the international community. Although the danger of an arms race in Northeast Asia is serious, humanity faces another, potentially more devastating peril — one for which we have yet to begin to make required strategic preparations.

I refer to the spread of deserts and semi-desert regions in North Korea as a result of the reckless logging of forests, the misuse of soil, and irresponsible farming practices. These ecological dead zones, where few plants can survive, are spreading. As desertification worsens, this ecological nightmare will have serious, perhaps irreversible, repercussions in South Korea and throughout the region.

Professor Kim Seoung-il of Seoul National University estimates that over 1 million hectares of forests in North Korea have been lost over the last 20 years, leading to a nearly of soil and an endless series of floods and droughts.

Widespread Trends in Asia

This crisis in North Korea is only a more extreme manifestation of widespread trends in Asia, a region that is losing land to deserts more rapidly than Africa. At present, almost 500,000 hectares of land are lost to deserts annually in the region, and at least 2.62 million hectares, accounting for 27 percent of the total landmass of China, has been irretrievably lost to deserts. Already, yellow dust carried by the wind to Seoul, and even to regions of Japan, from the spreading deserts of Northeast China has emerged as a serious ecological and health threat.

The loss of soil in North Korea cannot be stopped by B-2 bombers or missile defense systems. In contrast to military threats, these new environmental dangers demand not the isolation of North Korea but direct, long-term international engagement, partnership, and cooperation. The international community must work closely with the citizens, organizations, and government of North Korea to address this threat and must readily lend expertise and support. The world cannot walk away and leave North Korea to continue its destructive practices.

Needless to say, the destabilization of ecosystems from desertification knows no national borders. International distaste for the government in Pyongyang should not blind us to our common interest in combating the spreading deserts in East Asia. Training North Koreans in how to respond to the threat of climate change through effective environmental policies should be our highest priority where North Korea is concerned.

North Korea, as well as much of China and Mongolia, currently lacks the technical expertise to address the problems of deforestation on the ground. In many cases, local farmers have been forced to cut down trees just to keep themselves warm or generate some much-needed income. The developed world must make a strong commitment to addressing these issues through the supply of expertise, resources and, most importantly, through a profound modification of its own consumption culture.

These habits of consumption, whether in Seoul or in New York, ultimately drive this global desertification wave. As more and more people in developing nations rush to enjoy the indulgent lifestyle dangled before their eyes in the media — and in this, North Korea is no exception — the resulting overgrazing, stripping of forests, and disregard for topsoil will increase.

A Promising Start?

Going forward, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification should play a central role in future Six Party Talks. And on the American side, the threat of desertification should be raised to the same level as nonproliferation for government officials in the United States. Washington needs to reconfigure entirely its response to the North Korean threat in light of the spread of deserts in North Korea, Mongolia, and China.

The time has come to look with clear eyes at the true threats in the region and understand at last that the Cold War has come to a close. The damage to Korea’s ecosystem done today will last far beyond any political reunification of the peninsula. President Barack Obama’s recent to address deforestation globally and to work together with China to address environmental is a promising start. Perhaps both initiatives can be tied to the North Korean problem.

*[Note: Emanuel Pastreich is the director of the Asia Institute in Seoul. This article was originally published by .]

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On January 2, 2013, the Rodong Shimun — North Korea’s state-run newspaper —   New Year's “guidance,” which laid out details of his vision for the country. He spoke of a progressive national ideological shift in thinking that must be pursued by every North Korean while on their way to work, at work, and after work. The speech called for mutual development of the economy and the military, with priority placed on economic innovation. The “guidance” spelled out the facets of capitalism: innovation, entrepreneurship, market development, and new product production. Kim Jung-Un encouraged his "comrades" to focus on changing their way of thinking about economic modernization methods, while placing emphasis on maintaining national sovereignty as a state. The Machiavellian state is not collapsing, but instead has begun to evolve.

The Reality of Evolution in North Korea

Despite sanctions, the quality-of-life index and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is increasing for North Korea — thanks to relaxed economic laws passed last year. Their GDP grew by 1.6 percent, while five percent of North Koreans  — as opposed to 17 percent in the rest of Asia. The North Korean legal system is also evolving. Together, economic development and decriminalization of capitalist activities is resulting in an improvement in human rights conditions, and economic development in the country. North Korea's human rights record has been atrocious in the past, and Kim Jung-Un — “The Marshall” — is aware of the implications of this.

According to in NK News, Kim Jung-Un has reduced punishments for a litany of offenses, including the fines of $100 for listening to foreign radio, which is about a years salary for the average North Korean. For $2,000, a North Korean can “buy freedom” and avoid maximum sentences and save their families from kin-crime persecution. 

Though these examples are unlikely to raise acclaim from the international community, especially with Kenneth Bae still incarcerated, they are small — but not insignificant — signs of improvement.

The prison population has been on the decline for 15 years, according to David Hawk’s recent “.” Contemporary estimates place the number of prisoners in North Korea at approximately 80,000-120,000, which roughly equates to about 0.08% of their population; an extremely low percentage in comparison to most other nations.

North Korea appears to have been on a “charm offensive” since tensions on the peninsula calmed down. Kim Jung-Un has been promoting the idea of peace through cultural diplomacy. The Marshall’s primary aim is to achieve “mutual recognition” and a peace treaty with South Korea. His secondary aim is to normalize relations with South Korea and the United States. The Marshall’s recent meeting with “The Worm,” Dennis Rodman, makes one wonder if allowing Rodman to hold his daughter, Joo-Ae, is more than just a charm offensive. Never before has an American held a North Korean leader’s sole heir in their arms before.

Additionally, Kim Jung-Un has allowed numerous cultural events to take place in North Korea this year. He hosted the Harlem Globetrotters once and Rodman twice. There have been movies produced, film festivals, and countless sports and music projects ranging from parkour to Christian music groups. There has even been an increase in student educational exchanges, as well as business exchanges, with scholars and non-governmental workers from all over the world. The South Korean flag was paraded in Pyongyang during a weightlifting event, while a North Korean movie, “The Flower Girl,” was preparing to hit the big screen in South Korea. Family reunions have also resumed. Unprecedented concessions are being made every day. Recently, a group of five motorcyclists from New Zealand were permitted to ride from Mount Peaktu, North Korea, down to Mt. Hala (Jeju Island) in South Korea — another historic first. Kaesong Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is back in full operation, with new terms of conditions dedicated to longevity, sustainability, and mutual respect. A “Peace Park” is being constructed, with the hopes that North and South Koreans will be able to meet, talk and eventually embark on inter-state travel through there.

Conflicting Rhetoric

For “Pyongyangologists,” these events are indisputable indications of changing trends and patterns that have been taking place in North Korea under Kim Jung-Un’s leadership. Although he is unlikely to totally open the floodgates to the point where his family’s dynastic rule collapses, he is nonetheless opening them slowly.

Internet will not be adopted any time soon, but other forms of science education and technological development are occurring. North Korea appears to be taking lessons from other socialist countries that have normalized relations with the United States, and placed its priorities in economic progression focused on contemporary models. Seeing India, South Korea, and the US move toward a technology-based economy, Kim Jung-Un is working diligently to develop his scientists to a level at which North Korea can catch up with the rest of the world — the North Koreans have a space program, sustainable energy projects, and infrastructure upgrades in the works.

North Korea makes a case for their desire of de facto nuclear recognition, which North Koreans believe they are justified in having. “If people who threaten us can have them, then we must have them too — to protect our people because we can’t depend on anyone but our own government,” as one North Korean official said to me.

I later asked the same official how he felt about the US dropping atomic bombs on Japan, their historical enemy. "[The] root cause of all [their] problems," I was told, and that "it wasn’t good because innocent people got killed." North Korean officials claim that the country doesn’t want to hurt innocent people, but so long as other countries have nuclear weapons, there can be no proliferation. They say it’s up to the individual state to make the decision, and that “individual states don’t need permission from their enemies to protect themselves from them.” They claim to maintain truer defensive force posturing than Japan. Indeed, North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons.

The ball is still in Washington's court. It will not bounce under Strategic Patience Policy, no matter what improvements North Korea makes, unless they abandon their nuclear program. North Koreans will not do this as long as they feel outside threats to be inevitable, and while they view the US as an untrustworthy policy maker. They have watched the US betray their allies and renege on deal after deal in the past 60 years. There are those who purposely or inadvertently prevent engagement from happening — but for now, they are in the United States, not North Korea. We must learn to understand North Korea’s behavior under the young Marshall. Brinksmanship and charm offensives used to go hand in hand, but North Korea has evolved and if we choose to try to understand them, and recognize them and their sovereign rights, then maybe tensions will not escalate so high year after year.

Many experts will assert that others are running the show behind the scenes, but it's more likely that these changes are coming quite directly from Kim Jung-Un. Kim Jung-Un noted in his guidance that initial changes could be a little painful in the beginning, but would become easier over time. His comrades comply because they know that any sign of internal struggle — to the outside world — could lead to an attack against the regime if it’s seen as vulnerable.

Old party hardliners in North Korea are franticly watching as “The Marshall” takes “survival diplomacy” to the next level: state evolution. Western actors, who purposely or inadvertently contribute to maintaining the status quo of the proxy conflict, do so based on the same moral arguments that drag us into other unnecessary wars, or irrational policies that result in human oppression.

Though the “status quo prolongers” may not mean to, they contribute to North Korean state stagnation, isolation, and the deprivation of millions of people by refusing to be part of the solution. They focus on hawkish, biased, and subjective policy because they have similar perceptions of North Korean behavior. Politics alone have never resolved conflicts; it has always been economic and cultural exchanges.

Will the world accept the undeniable signs that Kim Jung-Un is developing the economy and encouraging a change in ideological thinking? Will they notice the scientific innovation and the improvement in human rights conditions?

Not likely. This is not the first time North Korea has made attempts to engage the world. In the past, their attempts have been drowned out by opportunistic rhetoric. Human rights NGOs take their cases to the United Nations and universities around the world during calm periods. The silence in the air is filled with new vigor, reigniting the anti-North Korea hate machine. Before North Korea’s efforts can be taken seriously, “the prolongers” will have undermined North Korea’s attempts to seriously engage the world.

Invalidated assertions are even made up out of thin air just to keep “Asia’s boogeyman” looking scary. Human rights NGOs contribute to most of the public’s perception of North Korea. Almost anything the public knows about North Korea comes from human rights groups, the media, and their combined propaganda. NGOs must be opportunists to survive.

One such group, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, regularly propagates misperceptions based on circumstantial cause and effect information. Their perpetual claim is that North Korean’s are malnourished — but again only five percent are malnourished compared to 17 percent in the rest of Asia, according to British academic Hazel Smith.

Prolonging the Conflict

The Honorable Michael Kirby AC CMG, a former Australian judge, at the UN by presenting well-researched information about human rights atrocities in North Korean “gulags.” One has to wonder if Kirby was aware of the changes that have taken place since Kim Jung-Un took power, as he certainly didn’t acknowledge them. The timing is peculiar for his speech, being as it occurred during a “charm offensive.”

This is a pattern that seems to repeat itself every year. In recent years, some unsettling nuances have become apparent to me in the North Korean human rights discourse. Through the years that I have followed these patterns, I have noticed a few things lacking in the human rights abuse arguments. Namely, they often downplay the significance of “what year” their defectors served in prison, what crime they were accused of committing, what the North Korean law says, and how the “spy game” influences their testimonies.

The year is important because if they served in prison in the 1990s, it cannot possibly reflect the regime's current policy. The North Korean law is important because all countries' citizens have laws they must follow, whether they agree with them or not. A convict is a convict, whether the law is fair or not. Lastly, the “spy factor” is important because North Korean defectors feel immense pressure to demonize their homeland when they go through indoctrination training and start working with NGOs as a means of survival. Anything they say that contradicts the mainstream rhetoric can make their intentions seem questionable.

Other examples of human rights discourse being used to thwart North Korean attempts at engagement occur in this annual pattern. For example, years ago, an American student was hiking through China and went missing, and the blamed North Korea for “probably kidnapping him.” The (HRNK) then said Pyongyang was responsible for thousands of kidnappings of foreigners over time. However, the North Korean government has learned from their kidnapping mistakes in the past. They have not done it for decades; both points are made by Andrei Lankov, in . HRNK suggested that 20,000 prisoners have gone missing; implying that they could have been killed.

Indeed, those who listen to these stories understandably assume the worst, and thus believe that North Korea is completely “irrational and crazy” and should be toppled to “liberate masses of oppressed North Koreans.” The truth is that most North Koreans, and even many defectors, love their country. Recently, many defectors have re-defected back to North Korea and have reportedly not been punished for doing so. In a final strange example, Kim Jung-Un tried to signal regime change to the world last year by showing how they enjoyed American Disney performances; but this event was manipulated by the international media and their intentions were ignored. Consequently, North Korea was accused of violating Disney’s property rights.

Human rights groups claim that they exist to improve the situation of the average North Korean, but their actions often suggest that they only help those who defect from North Korea, denouncing the regime. By taking this approach, the regime becomes demonized and their intentions are undermined.

This is a flawed approach to dealing with a population of over 24 million inhabitants, most of whom just want to see their country develop and socioeconomic standards to improve. Many other invalidated rumors have surfaced over the past few months, such as “Kim Jung-Un’s ex-girlfriend [being] machine-gunned to death for making porn,” a very unlikely event which has not been proven and has been denied by North Korea. The source of this misinformation is unknown, but it serves as another example of opportunist propaganda by the prolongers. There is also no evidence to support these claims.

The intent behind misinformation is to distract the international public from noticing the more positive changes that are actually taking place. Every year, these misinformation campaigns occur during opportunities for positive engagement. In 2012, the big distraction was that a general was executed by mortar round; an unlikely means of execution even if he really was executed, which he was not. This and several other bogus claims last year prevented the world from even considering that Kim Jung-Un had succeeded in dynastic change.

The misinformation campaign benefited the prolongers as they tried to convince the world that the time to deal a deathblow to North Korea was in the midst of “unexpected” leadership change. They claimed Kim Jung-Un had only a few years of preparation and North Korea was in a weak state. Actually, Kim Jung-Un had been preparing for the position since he was a child, according to his former chef,  and North Korea was not in a state of confusion; they were in the midst of a regime-changing shake up, designed to make this entire new direction possible.

New Perceptions and Approaches

Will the world miss out on a golden opportunity to take Kim Jung-Un and a changing North Korea seriously? Or will we allow him to year after year be able to make the argument that during times when he held out the olive branch, he was largely ignored?

Making up stories, sensationalizing abuses, and painting an incomplete picture by not reporting positive change, does not help matters — it makes them worse. Improving human rights conditions in North Korea doesn’t just require an ideological shift solely on their part, but it takes one on ours as well. We should educate ourselves about the reasons for the North Korean government’s behavior, and on development in general. We need to try to understand that the overall solution does not lie in playing hard-line politics, but in undermining the politics altogether by focusing on engagement through cultural diplomacy and development.

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As more US military women break the silence about sexual violence committed by their comrades in arms, it is clear that sporadic “scandals” — at the Tailhook Naval Aviators’ Convention (1991), Aberdeen Proving Grounds Ordnance Center (1996), and the US Air Force Academy (2003) — are not isolated incidents, but spring from the mycelium of US military culture and ideology.

Victims’ testimonies, official complaints, lawsuits against the military, critical and the 2012 award-winning documentary, , have pushed this issue into the spotlight.

In May 2013, an impatient commander-in-chief, Barack Obama,  military leaders to the White House, instructing them to get to the root of this problem. Over the years, the military has set up hotlines to hear victims’ complaints; initiated internal investigations, task forces, and trainings; changed; and repeatedly declared a “” policy.

So why does military sexual violence persist? One explanation offered by The Invisible War is that the US military includes a higher percentage of “sexual predators” than civilian society. Also, some military commanders not only tolerate sexual assault, they are also complicit in covering up these incidents, punishing victims, and exonerating perpetrators or, at most, giving them a “boys-will-be-boys” slap on the wrist.

A weakness of the current debate is its narrow focus on US military women. Cynthia Enloe, a leading feminist scholar of international relations, recently the importance of looking to “those who are pushed to the margins” in order to learn about the big picture.

To locate the root of the problem means looking beyond the assaults on US military women — appalling as they are — to the routine incidents of military violence against civilians in combat situations and outside the fences surrounding US bases overseas. Given their mission, soldiers are trained to kill. This means seeing “others” as foreign or less-than-human. Gender and masculinity are at play; so too are racism and national chauvinism.

Military Violence in the Asia-Pacific Region

Okinawan women have documented the history of rape by US troops in Okinawa (1945 to present). shows how sexual violence is a factor in contemporary tensions surrounding US basing agreements in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines.

Militarized prostitution in the Asia-Pacific is alive and well. Bar areas near the bases are thriving, and US ships continue to make port calls in the Philippines and Thailand. In the past, Philippine women were called “little brown fucking machines powered by rice,” among other: “Yankee whore,” “bar girl,” or “hostess,” reflecting US soldiers’ expectations that women would provide sex.

In 2005, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith was of raping a Filipina identified as “Nicole,” near Subic Bay. The case was the first to test the extent of Philippine jurisdiction under the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States. The district court convicted Smith, but the US military had him transferred from the local jail to the US embassy. He was later acquitted after Nicole issued a revised statement that cast doubt on her earlier testimony. Many feminists, including Task Force Subic Rape and the nationwide organization Gabriela, this case as a testament to the lopsided relations between the United States and the Philippines.

, in South Korea, a US soldier, “R”, broke into a woman’s home and raped her, only a month after another rape by “I” of an 18 year-old South Korean woman. Members of Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence held a press conference to denounce the latest rape incident in . The group was founded in 1995 after a 12-year-old girl was gang raped by three US servicemen. This incident sparked new opposition to US bases in Okinawa, drawing protests involving 85,000 people.

Rape in War Zones: Iraq and Afghanistan

Reports of US military women raped or sexually assaulted by troops or contract personnel in Iraq have trickled into the American news over the years. Colonel Janis Karpinksi commented on the tragedy of several women who  when they stopped drinking liquids after 3 or 4pm, because “they were afraid of being assaulted or even raped by male soldiers if they had to use the women’s latrine after dark.”

Nadje Sadig al-Ali, a professor of Gender Studies at the University of London, has that there are “many documented accounts of physical assaults on women at checkpoints and during house searches.” In 2006, six soldiers were accused of rape and murder in connection with the killing of a young Iraqi woman and her family, though the accusations did not lead to convictions. And in 2012, the Center for Research on Globalization an incident in which US Special Forces in Afghanistan were accused of raping Afghan women during a raid.

Sexual abuse and torture against Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison introduced a on this issue, in which race and nation trumped gender as white US women were deployed strategically to shame and humiliate Iraqi men. In this case, the power they wielded derived from their national affiliation as members of the US military — and from their whiteness — rather than their gender. A small minority in Abu Ghraib included who were raped and subjected to systematic abuse.

The liberation of Iraqi and Afghan women was widely touted by both George W. Bush and Tony Blair to justify military intervention in those countries. In the post-9/11 era, the West has defined itself as the rescuer, while depicting the Muslim world as backwards, uncivilized, or barbaric. Post-colonial feminist scholars in the United States were quick to point out these “.”

Linking the Domestic and International

In response to the crisis of military violence among co-workers, the US House Armed Services committee has proposed a to be included in the 2014 Defense Policy bill: “Anyone found guilty of rape, sexual assault, forcible sodomy, or the attempts of the aforementioned will lead to a punishment that includes, at a minimum, a dismissal from military service or a dishonorable discharge.” Although this is a step in the right direction, it overlooks the fact that most military victims of sexual violence do not report it, and that most accused of such crimes are not found guilty.

To get closer to the root of the problem, Congress and Pentagon officials should hear testimony from victims of US military sexual assault and their advocates in other nations. Although not all men rape or commit acts of violence against women, a clear pattern exists that goes beyond assaults of US military personnel.

President Obama and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel have both called for a change in military culture. Is this possible, given the mission of the military and the role it plays in US society? The military is still a male-dominated institution even though women now provide 15 percent of its “manpower.”

Like women in the US military, activists in the Asia-Pacific region critique the military culture of violence. Beyond this, their goals are often very different. Many US military women want to see stronger policies and enforcement regarding crimes of sexual violence in the military. Feminists in the Asia-Pacific region, and their counterparts in Iraq and Afghanistan, call for an end to US militarization and occupation of their countries.

The Philippine organization, , notes that the US military always does “its best to protect its soldiers from the laws of host countries.” They argue that solidarity amongst women in countries where US troops are permanently stationed is necessary to respond to these unequal relations. South Korean organizations have a change in the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) governing the conduct of US troops overseas. They want to see greater powers for “host” nations regarding legal jurisdiction over US troops who commit crimes against civilians, as well as greater sovereignty for host governments and democratic rights for citizens. Okinawan women call for apologies to victims of sexual assault by US military authorities, punishment for perpetrators under Japanese laws, and the withdrawal of US troops from Okinawa.

Examining sexual violence in these different contexts — from the centers of the US military to the margins of occupied countries — makes it much more complex. The women who seek justice within the US military are part of a superpower with 1,000 bases overseas. A focus on domestic sexual violence makes invisible the fact that crimes within the military are tied to military practices in occupied countries (and vice versa). And as shown by women who of , bases and routine maneuvers also destroy land, contaminate the environment, and distort local economies, alongside crimes of violence committed by US troops.

*[Note:  received her PhD in Ethnic Studies with a designated emphasis in Women, Gender & Sexuality Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Currently, she is an adjunct lecturer in Peace & Conflict Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. is a scholar and activist focused on issues of gender, racial and environmental justice in the service of genuine security, peace-making, and creating a sustainable world. This article was originally published by ]

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The extra-territorial nature of US sanctions, as well as the fact that these measures were supported by a large number of countries (such as the UAE, Canada, Australia, EU members and others), also have a negative influence on Asian-Iranian economic relations. Even with support from their government, Asian exporters appear to be scared to deal with Iran in order to avoid punishment from US authorities.

Only in 2012, Korean SK and Samsung, as well as Japanese Mitsubishi and Toyo, stopped dealing with Iran. In August 2012, Shipping Corporation of India (SCI) declared its decision to disinvest its assets from the joint Iran-o-Hind Company, raising its concerns that another shareholder of the firm – Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) – is sanctioned by US authorities. The SCI and Indian Great Eastern Shipping Company also refused to carry Iranian oil to the oil refinery in Mangalore. These fears are not baseless: During the last decade, Washington sanctioned dozens of Chinese companies which were involved in oil, gas and petrol trade transactions between the IRI and their country. One of the recent bold moves by the US in this direction was the sanctioning of Zhuhai Zhenrong Company in January 2012.

Those companies which continued their trade with Iran were compelled to do so indirectly through third countries or to use different grey measures to avoid sanctions. However, these measures inevitably increase the amount of subcontractors and intermediaries involved in trade operations. This, in turn, led to growing costs of trade transactions. In 2012, Asian companies substantially increased the price of their services for the IRI (up to 20-25%), if these services were in violation of US and EU sanctions.

Apart from that, almost all joint projects with the participation of Asian countries have been either frozen or their implementation fell behind schedule. Thus, by 2013, the leading Chinese companies have taken on the wait-and-see approach: Usually, they get involved in different projects but try not to be in a hurry to implement achieved agreements, as they do not know the possible reaction of the West. By doing so, they try to preserve their share in Iran’s energy sector but hope to use it only when the situation around sanctions is settled.

Additionally, certain problems are experienced by companies using US and EU spare parts and technologies whose sale to Iran is prohibited. This was one of the reasons for the withdrawal of Chinese and Indian companies from joint LNG projects with the IRI. The replacement of European spare parts and technologies by Chinese, Indian or South Korean equivalents is not always accepted by Iran due to their low quality.

US-Asian and EU-Asian Relations

The close ties of the Asian economic elite with US and European business circles, as well as the financial and technological dependence of its companies on the West, also do not allow the governments of Japan, South Korea, India or even China to use all opportunities provided by the sanctions adopted against Iran.

During the period of 2010-2012, a number of private and semi-governmental Asian companies with strong economic interests in the United States and the EU, decided either to leave Iran or to limit cooperation with the IRI. Even oil and gas companies enjoying the support of the Chinese government, such as CNOOC and CNPC, have been compelled to slow down the pace of their cooperation with Iran by trying not to go further than general and technical discussions of possible projects.

The behavior of Asian business elites is logical: Although the Iranian market is relatively appealing for them, it does not deserve a fierce fight for it. Gains never justify losses. As is demonstrated in Table 1, the US and EU are among the four biggest trade partners of China, South Korea, Japan and India. At the same time, Iran is usually ranked only as the 16^th��to 22^nd biggest trade partner with a share of 0.4-0.9% in the volume of trade of the above-mentioned countries.

Table 1. Rank and share of the US, EU and Iran in the volume of trade of China, South Korea, Japan and India

Source:��

The example of China is, probably, most notorious. It holds $1.16 trillion (26.1%) of US federal debt and is the US’ second largest trading partner. The trade relationship between the US and China continues to deepen. The emergence of China as a leading world power led to increasing economic interdependence. Consequently, Chinese energy companies like CNOOC, CNPC, Zhenhua Oil, ZPMC, Sinopec, and Kingdream PLC either invested in the American economy or established their subsidiaries in the United States which are much more profitable than any of Iran’s project.

Future of Iran’s Trade and Investment

It is almost impossible to analyze the current development of economic dialogue between Iran and leading Asian countries without taking into account the external factors. Subsequently, it is probably correct to assume that the future of their relations will be determined by the evolution of sanctions and the US stance. There are, at least, three probable scenarios of further development of the situation.

Scenario 1: The Continuation of the Confrontation Between Washington and Tehran

The continuing Iranian-American confrontation will lead to further economic engagement between Iran and China (as well as probably South Korea and India), and to the reorientation of the oil and gas industry of the IRI to the markets of Far East Asia and India. The absence of western companies in Iran will also create convenient conditions for the activities of Asian companies in the Iranian domestic markets where they will be unrivaled.

Yet a further increase in the political and economic pressure by the US on Asian countries should not be excluded from the analysis. There is a possibility that the gradual evolution of sanctions will make the conduct of business with Iran either extremely hard or impossible.

Scenario 2: US-Iranian Rapprochement

The restoration of relations between Tehran and Washington will probably have a diverse influence on the Iranian economic cooperation with the four leading Asian countries. On the one hand, this will eradicate a considerable part of obstacles for the development of dialogue and probably make countries like Japan more active in Iran. On the other hand, the economic cooperation with China, South Korea and India will lose its political importance for Tehran.

The US-Iranian rapprochement will also open Iran not only for American companies, but for European firms. This will inevitably make market conditions for the Asian companies extremely competitive: Although the Americans will have to start their cooperation with Iran from scratch, the period of the European absence was not that long and the EU will only need to resume their activities rather than to restore long lost positions.

Finally, the return of the US will strengthen the positions of pro-Western political groupings among the Iranian political elite seriously weakened during the period of 2009-2012. They will certainly try to change the vector of Iran’s energy diplomacy from the East to the West, by restoring old projects like the Iranian participation in the Nabucco pipeline and the so-called Persian gas pipeline.

Scenario 3: EU-Iranian Rapprochement

This scenario became possible after the victory of Hassan Rouhani in the recent presidential elections. As stated by some analysts, the restoration of political and economic relations with the West will probably be one of the main priorities of the new president. However, they believe that due to certain factors, he will initially try to launch rapprochement with the EU only and leave relations with the US as they are. If successful, this process will reopen Iran for the Europeans.

This third scenario is less harmful for Asian countries than American-Iranian rapprochement. In this case, it is highly possible that the situation will return to the pre-2009 state when the European countries were largely present in Iran, but the US pressure did not always allow them to act openly. Under these circumstances, they used Asian companies (mainly those from China) as front or umbrella companies to cover the scale of European presence in the Iranian energy sector, in order to avoid American sanctions.

A return to this situation would probably be for the Asians’ good: On the one hand, the easing of pressure of the European sanctions will have general positive effects on the activities of China, Japan, South Korea and India in Iran. On the other hand, the usage of EU companies as subcontractors will allow the Asians to compensate the lack of necessary funds and technologies.

All in all, the future of Iran’s economic cooperation with Asian countries is still undetermined. Since the early 2000s, Asian countries have been gradually acquiring a special importance for Tehran as prospective trade and investment partners. One can argue that, by 2012, the East and South Asian regions have become a strategically important vector of Iranian economic diplomacy. During the last decade, in spite of all domestic and external challenges, the aggregate volume of Iranian trade with China, South Korea, Japan and India enjoyed an upward trend. In 2011, this indicator hit the threshold of $90 billion.

Nevertheless, in 2012, economic relations between Iran and above-mentioned countries experienced a serious stress-test. That year, East Asian and Indian financial institutions and business companies preferred to limit their cooperation with the Islamic Republic. Although Tehran has not yet published its customs statistics for 2012, experts are convinced that this decision accompanied by a substantial dropdown in the volume of oil imported by China, South Korea, Japan and India from Iran will slow down the pace of economic cooperation between the IRI and the countries.

This, in turn, shows that the future of Iran’s relations with East and South Asia is not completely protected from volatility and pitfalls which make it less predictable than it may initially seem. The last role in this situation is played by external factors and, first of all, by American and European sanctions against Iran. The latter are capable both to boost and tangibly deter Iranian cooperation with China, South Korea, Japan and India. At the same time, as demonstrated in the above-mentioned scenarios, it is hardly possible to completely cut relations between the countries.

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Many observers are wondering which direction events on the Korean Peninsula will go. The emerging mantra in South Korea calls for peace and understanding with its northern neighbor. The South Korean president, Park Geun-hye, recently stated that Japan needs to acknowledge its past role in Asian conflicts. This is a statement that indicates a lot more than the standard calls for acknowledgement of Japan's crimes against Korean “comfort” women. Park’s call for action from Japan alludes to much larger issues, such as a buried history of a forgotten war with Japan which has largely remained unacknowledged, and how the conflict on the Korean Peninsula perpetually continues.     

Her statements also bring to question the strength of the “Asian Alliance.” President Park is breaking from standard US-South Korea relations. The new Korean “Iron Lady” seems to be taking ownership of her country. The brevity of her statement indicates a division in the interior regarding whose policies to follow: Korean or American. It seems the country that most strongly supports the Washington's Asia Pivot Policy is Japan, a nation which is currently in violation of its constitution for producing warships. Even more than the current Asia Pivot Policy, the United States’ “Strategic Patience Policy” towards North Korea leaves much desired to secure our national security interests.   

A Strategic Failure

A recent experience of mine proves this point. When I returned from North Korea after three months of practicing "crisis public diplomacy," I met with some folks at the Center for Security Studies in Georgetown University. My goal was to explain to them why the Strategic Patience Policy is a failure. It is a failure because it undermines the national security of the United States and is also counter to our interests and values. My logic follows that the Strategic Patience Policy is a Cold War-style containment policy, which is ineffective in promoting positive outcomes with the North Koreans. Following a policy of Strategic Patience assures that the US will continue to sanction every one of North Korea’s citizens, regardless of their culpability in their government’s policies.

Lessons from the past would indicate that this approach will result in North Korea continuing to develop its nuclear program, as the North Korean people “demand their government to provide them security from the most powerful nation on earth [and its] aggression,” as one North Korean put it to me.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is exacerbated by the failure of American policy-makers to understand the new regime in the north. The new North Korean regime is focused on peace and unification, and Kim Jung Un has shifted to engagement policies by invoking his grandfather’s "Ten Point Plan for Unification."   

The United States currently has no diplomatic relations with North Korea; so all policies created by American policymakers are based on information provided by anti-North Korean lobbyists, who profit from the status quo. Even in the past, all engagement with North Korea was designed to be corrosive, and that strategic paradigm is still strong in the minds of many DC policy advisors, as the Center for Security Studies event demonstrated to me.

While at the event, it was my goal to encourage engagement policy with North Korea by providing hard evidence as to why it would work. Instead of presenting my supporting data, I was forced to sit through a painfully misguided lecture where I was told that “strategic patience works because it shows the allegiance of nations stand[ing] strong together,” and how “the next provocation will result in a war, and President Park is going to launch a serious military blow to the north if one more incident occurs.”  

It was the view of many of my fellow participants at the Center for Security Studies that South Korea, China, Japan, and the United States are all on the same page in this conflict; that’s not any truer than their assumption about the “new regime” and its intentions in North Korea.

We are missing a golden opportunity to bring real peace to Asia, because people inside the beltway are so entrenched in realpolitik that the idea of "trust-politic" creates cognitive dissonance in their thinking.

False Assertions

What security studies folks also fail to take into account is the fact that South Korea is not suicidal either. Actually, the south isn’t even willing to take risks. South Koreans love their way of life too much to suffer another conflict. They enjoy one of the highest quality of life indicators on the planet, and South Korea is a bastion of prosperity, with its citizens storing over $22 trillion of personal wealth in overseas accounts alone. Indicitive of priorities in the south is the new phenomenon where some South Korean teachers make as much as $4 million a year. The last thing South Korea wants is a conflict on its peninsula.

Also explained to me at the event was the American intelligence communities’ consensus that “North Korea is already collapsing because they are using foreign money in their country now.”

In response to this assertion, I am sure that North Korea isn’t the first communist country to use more than one type of currency. After all, it — like many countries — promotes tourism, which introduces foreign currencies. The Chinese renmibi (RMB) isn’t more valuable than the Chosun Won, it’s just easier to exchange for most foreigners. I observed scores of people purchasing various items with Chosun Won.

The emerging entrepreneurial class in North Korea, which is ready, willing, and able to deal in multiple currencies and sell pretty much any goods via semi-legal and black markets, is also a facet of modern North Korean life that is not paid particular attention to in Washington DC.

Contrary to the expectations of many of my fellow event participants, President Park already had a plan to defy the US by taking ownership of her peninsula. Despite her meetings with Secretary of State John Kerry in Seoul and New York, Park’s approach to dealing with North Korea is more focused on achieving peace through trust-politic and understanding her relatives to the north.

The new parameters of the recently re-opened Kaesong Industrial Zone are sustainable and focused on mutuality, benefiting the two estranged states. This mutuality entails understanding, cooperation, and longevity, and could very well lead to formal recognition between North and South Korea.

The timing of this movement towards reciprocation couldn’t be better. North Koreans have been given more freedom of travel, allowed market-like sectors in the country, and reduced punishments along with alternatives such as paying fines. Kim Jung Un has even accepted ex-defectors back into the country, and publicly stated that they won’t be punished. He has also protected the entrepreneurial class from the old party hardliners.

In his new books, the North Korean leader encourages “unity under the banner of peace, unification and developing the country to a new (economic) revolution,” and his new economic regulations support market-style development. President Park seems savvy about North Korea’s signals to the world and has negotiated a sustainable deal in Kaesong. As a result, family reunions between the two Koreas have been resumed.

An Opportunity for Washington?

What side of history will America be on in this conflict? That will depend on how much we care to understand the situation objectively in its entirety, with consideration of the worldviews and historical development on both sides of the DMZ.

In the context of this engagement between North and South Korea, the United States should strive to remain true to its values, and act in good faith towards promoting regional stability in Asia by encouraging these diplomatic initiatives between President Park and Kim Jung Un. Although so often elusive, peace on the Korean Peninsula will provide the necessary engagement to lead to an opening and greater freedom in North Korean society. The United States has a golden opportunity to help the birth of this freedom.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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There are no doubts that international economic sanctions imposed on Iran remain one of the main factors shaping Tehran’s dialogue with the rest of the world. Nevertheless, their influence on Iranian economic cooperation with leading Asian countries such as China, Japan, South Korea and India cannot be considered as either negative or positive. It is more accurate to speak about diverse implications which the international punitive measures have on the development of the economic dialogue between Tehran and the Asians.

Economic Cooperation With Asian Countries��

The sanctions of 2006-2012, adopted by the US and EU, became a serious blow to the Iranian economy. As stated by :��“$50 to $60 billion in Iranian oil and gas development projects have been terminated or put on hold in recent years, primarily by European companies, as a result of the threat of sanctions.” The amount of losses could probably be considered irrecoverable, unless Asian countries — first of all, China and South Korea – stepped in.

Up until now, the People’s Republic of China has provided Iran with a number of opportunities, either to bypass the American and European sanctions of 2010-2012 or to mitigate their negative impact. First of all, by 2012, China was the main supplier of petrol to Iran. Moreover, by mid-2012, Chinese companies such as Zhuhai Zhenrong, Unipec, Chinaoil and Sinochem, not only supplied Tehran with fuel, but sold Iranian oil to third countries. After the US government adopted the 2010 sanctions, Asian companies continued their attempts to increase their presence in Iran’s energy sector. Thus, in July 2010, Sinopec with Malaysian SKS Ventures launched talks with their Iranian counterparts concerning their possible involvement in projects previously abandoned by other companies under the pressure of American sanctions.

The Chinese banking system is mostly open to Iranians. Theoretically, this allows them to make financial transactions not only with China, but also with other countries. Although Iranian businessmen dealing with China still faced obstacles, these problems are not crucial. As stated by some Iranian businessmen, in October 2010, the Bank of China stopped opening credit lines for Iranians. The bank authorities explained this decision as having been at the behest of the US-based investors. However, these services were also immediately provided by other Chinese banks. Although banking sanctions indeed created certain problems for international financial transfers with Iran, they were easily handled: A substantial part of Iranian trade operations with India, China, Japan and South Korea was either carried out as barter deals or with the usage of local currencies (i.e. rupees, yuans, yens and wons).

In certain cases, the support of Asian countries played an even more important role than a mere replacement of runaway companies in development projects. Existing difficulties with Iran’s access to the international financial system, tangibly limited the number of food exporters to the country. For instance, during January-February 2012, some companies suspended wheat, palm oil and rice shipments to Iran. All of these companies had one reason for this decision: They feared not to receive payments from the Islamic Republic.

As stated by experts at the FAO, by 2012, Iran was “.” In this situation, a decrease in imports of this produce was capable of destabilizing the Iranian domestic food market. However, Iranian authorities attempted to compensate the instability of external sources of food supply by signing barter contracts with remaining buyers of Iranian oil. These agreements implied that a country importing hydrocarbons from Tehran will pay back by food produce. In 2012, for example, such a contract was signed by the Iranians with the Indian government (oil was offered in exchange for wheat, tea, and rice).

New Opportunities

However, each cloud has its silver lining and Asian countries also use the withdrawal of EU companies from Tehran’s energy sector for their own benefit. The flight of Western companies from Iran created a vacuum in the country’s investment market, which was swiftly filled by the Asians who faced no rivals. Thus, while during the period of 2006-2012, European companies halted their participation in investment projects in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), and China signed contracts supporting the modernization of the “Arak” refinery and the development of such oil and gas fields as Northern Azadegan, Yadavaran, Garmsar, and phase 11 of the South Pars (previously assigned to the French company Total). In 2012, the Chinese government allegedly took a decision to launch large-scale investments in approximately 20 petrochemical projects in the IRI.

Cooperation With South Korea

South Korea also preferred not to cut economic relations with Tehran. It is significant that Seoul officially voiced its support of the UN sanctions imposed on Iran in 2010 and, on September 8, 2010, even adopted its own punitive measures against 102 Iranian entities and 24 individuals. However, the Korean authorities made an important reservation in their position on sanctions. As their officials stated, Seoul is ready to interact with the UN Security Council and the United States on the issue of Tehran’s nuclear program. Nevertheless, it is determined to minimize the negative effect of the sanctions in all spheres of economic cooperation with Tehran that are not related to nuclear research.

Given that during recent years, economic cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the IRI enjoyed gradual growth, and that Tehran supplied 15% of all oil imported by Seoul, the South Korean government preferred not to support the official American opinion that Iran’s economy works solely on the nuclear program. Thus, despite US pressure, on August 25, 2010, the Korean government declared that it would help all Korean companies dealing with the IRI which would suffer from the American sanctions. Furthermore, starting on October 1, 2010, Korea started using its own currency, the won, instead of dollars in financial transactions with the IRI in order to compensate for the negative impact of American sanctions on the financial interactions between the two countries. The right to perform these operations was granted to the Industrial Bank of Korea and Woori Bank.

On the Iranian side, the won accounts were supposed to be opened in Iran’s Central Bank. Additionally, the Korean government allowed Iranians to keep financial resources earned from the export of oil to the Republic of Korea in accounts in the above-mentioned banks. It was supposed that this money could later be used for buying Korean products and importing them to the IRI. These decisions by the Iranian and Korean authorities led to the establishment of direct links between the countries and excluded the unnecessary foreign exchange operations in dollars that could have been affected by the US sanctions of 2010-2012. Measures adopted by Seoul encouraged Korean companies that had been on the verge of leaving the Iranian market.

It is notable that, as in the case of China, the US government has limited its possible retaliatory measures. First of all, Seoul is its loyal ally on the issue of Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Moreover, nominally, South Korea has adopted its own set of sanctions against the IRI. In this situation, US authorities could do nothing but praise the Korean activities that, in fact, create loopholes in the sanctions against Iran. Thus, the above mentioned decision of the Korean government to allow Iranians to keep their oil money in the accounts of the Industrial Bank of Korea and Woori Bank, was considered by the Americans as a move to make financial transactions between Seoul and Tehran more transparent.

China and South Korea Set an Example

Meanwhile, the independent behaviour of China and South Korea set an example for Iran’s other trading partners. For instance, India started reviving its trade relations with the IRI in 2011, which had been harmed by the sanctions of 2010. Thus, from March 2011 on, the Central Bank of India began making overdue payments to the National Iranian Oil Company for shipments of crude oil. It was the first time since transactions were halted in December 2010 under the pressure of punitive American measures. Additionally, in March 2012, Iranian Parsian bank signed a cooperation agreement with Indian UCO bank in order to ease financial transactions between the countries. It is notable that, although the Indian government tried to follow sanctions requirements in certain fields, it immediately compensated this by increasing cooperation with the IRI in other areas. Thus, the decision of New Delhi to suspend its participation in the construction of the gas pipeline between Iran, Pakistan and India was partly balanced by signing the agreement on importing electricity from Iran on March 4, 2012.

By 2013, even the main US ally in East Asia – Japan — declared its decision to maintain a certain level of economic ties with Iran. In 2012, the Japanese authorities periodically repeated that they are not going to halt trade relations with Iran. Moreover, in summer 2012, Tokyo took a decision to allocate $7.6 billion to the needs of companies providing insurance coverage for tankers carrying Iranian oil to Japan. Subsequently, the Japanese authorities not only compensated the rejection of European firms to provide this service, but set an example immediately followed by India and China.

Growing Troubles

However, the international punitive measures created not only opportunities for the development of Asian-Iranian economic ties, but also obstacles. By 2012, the effectiveness of sanctions adopted by the US, EU and their allies against Iran had presumably reached its climax. The maintaining of the pre-2012 level of relations with Iran appeared to be hardly possible for Asian countries due to political (US pressure), economic (punishment measures implied by sanctions) or technical (the cut of Iran from the SWIFT system, refusals of European companies to ensure tankers carrying Iranian oil, and etc) issues. Under these circumstances, negative consequences for Iran’s economic dialogue with Asian countries were inevitable.

First of all, China, India, Japan and South Korea tangibly decreased the volumes of oil imports from the Islamic republic. Thus, in 2012 China reduced its hydrocarbon purchases from the IRI by 21% (to 440 thousand bpd), South Korea by 36% (to 153 thousand bpd) and India by 2.4% as compared to 2011. In certain months of spring-summer 2012, the dropdown in oil imports from Iran was more than 30-40%. Apart from that, the governments of above mentioned Asian states are compelled to comply with the requirements of UN resolutions and to limit some exports to Iran (first of all, those related to arms deals) or to conduct it illegally.

*[Note: Read theon August 29.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Old habits die hard. The United States still seems to think of Africa through the prism of aid instead of trade. US President Barack Obama has announced a new $7 billion "Power Africa" plan and visited sub-Saharan Africa to promote "world health initiatives." Whilst seemingly innocuous, it seems the US is still seeking to bring light to Africa while the Chinese just want to do business: they are building factories, buying land, and mining minerals with a ferocity that was once associated with the Europeans.

Have the Chinese overreached? Is the stage set for the US to regain influence in Africa? Or are we going to see a scramble for Africa reminiscent of former times? Or is Africa finally a power in its own right and will it play off these two giants to negotiate the best deals it can? Or is the very idea of Africa as a cohesive entity a false one, given the diversity, disparity and divergence in this continent of a billion people?

51�Թ� presents Conversations on Google+ Hangout, where we discuss Obama's recent visit to Africa and what it portends. It casts a bird's eye view over the legacy of the past, the developments over the last two decades, and the trends that we can extrapolate into the future.

Who is on the panel?

•  (), DAAD public policy and good governance fellow

•  (), British journalist and former BBC reporter and producer

• , senior finance professional in New York

The Google+ Hangout is moderated by  (), founder & editor-in-chief at 51�Թ�.

The discussion took place on July 26. 

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If North Korea is the hysterical child that Western news media — aided by the north’s own apocalyptic rhetoric — portrays it to be, then China is often cast as the doting grandparent, indulgent to a fault. In 2013, however, this indulgence appears to have come to an abrupt end. After North Korea proceeded with a nuclear test in February, despite China’s pleas for restraint, the Chinese approved the UN-imposed sanctions passed in March, even helping to draft the resolution.

Where this remarkable change in tack has been noted, it has been with optimism; though the basis for this optimism seems unclear. While China has moved, unusually, to align with the international community and isolate its ally, it remains unclear that this is a lasting change in attitude; and it remains unlikely that this change in attitude reflects a fundamental shift in China’s view of North Korea.

Plus ça Change?

In itself, there is very little that is novel about the most recent North Korean crisis; any difference has been in degree rather than form. Warnings have been issued, from subtle ones about the safety of foreign diplomatic stuff to all-out apocalyptic threats of nuclear war. To back up those threats, North Korea’s medium range missile arsenal is being wheeled out and prepared for launch, the Kaesong Industrial Park — token of an earlier, sunnier age in the Korean peninsula – has been closed, while the Yongbyon reactor, cornerstone of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, is back in operation. The subsequent course of this escalation, with a plateau and eventually some easing, is also predictable; as of writing, “progress” is being made on returning South Korean managers trapped in Kaesong, and the Korean crisis has fallen off the headlines again.

Even China’s willingness to apply pressure on Pyongyang is not very surprising. Where North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal is concerned, the Chinese line of disagreement has been relatively consistent. President Xi Jinping has said that no state should “throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains.” Moreover, the chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expressed a willingness to “work…with all sides to make the North Koreans suspend nuclear testing.”

These statements, and of course the pro-sanction turn in the UN Security Council, have been tempting augurs for those who see a coming split between North Korea and China, completing the rogue state’s international isolation. Kurt Campbell, former assistant secretary of state and an Asia expert, has identified a “recognition in China that their previous approach to North Korea is not bearing fruit,” and therefore that they need to be “clearer and more direct…that what Pyongyang is doing is undermining Chinese security.” It is as if China has finally seen the light, and that their fundamental interests in the Korean Peninsula have therefore shifted, albeit slightly.

Besides being rather patronizing, however, such statements overlook what underlies the Chinese-North Korean alliance. To say that what Pyongyang does now undermines Chinese security, ignores that North Korean escapees, a government-controlled drug trading network, and mistreatment of Chinese traders and workers in North Korea have long been a source of migraines for Chinese authorities. Besides, Chinese trade and aid to North Korea, which provides little economic gain in return for considerable tensions with far more useful economic partners like South Korea and Japan, hardly makes it worth the while. If China’s concern stood solely on the basis of North Korea’s crises and brinksmanship, they would have abandoned their ally years ago.

Therefore, perhaps uniquely, greed is not a driving force for China’s relationship with North Korea — instead, it’s fear. Here it is useful to compare the current crisis with previous incidents, the better to specify China’s fears. In 2010, a series of incidents — the sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean corvette, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island — actually led to 50 South Korean deaths and another ramping up of external pressure and tension. China’s response to this actually lethal crisis was muted, to put it kindly. Surely, inter-Korean rivalry or more shelling in the Yellow Sea (a crucially important transport lane for Northern China) undermined China’s security. The Chinese, however, saw fit to do nothing.

Two differences stand out between the crises of 2010 and 2013. Firstly, Kim Jong-Un has since replaced his long-ailing father as leader. Secondly, instead of conventional shells and torpedoes, North Korea has brandished its nuclear weapons. These two differences provide an explanation for why China has chosen to act in 2013. More importantly, they also serve to highlight the unique threat calculus which China applies to North Korea, and why this threat calculus does not warrant optimism.

A Sum of Different Fears

It is easy to see that North Korea is a threat to all its neighbors, but this threat is posed in very different ways. To South Korea and Japan, and via them the United States, the north’s threat lies in what it can do — not just with its nuclear weapons, but with its artillery, missiles and the fifth largest army in the world. A fifth of the south’s population lives in Seoul, which is within shelling range; even a victory over the north would be Pyrrhic at best. And as the 2010 crisis shows, the Pyongyang is not shy to use what means it has aggressively.

To China, however, the threat from North Korea is not what it can do but what could happen to it — the collapse of its government, further breakdown of its already parlous economy, and the consequences of these breakdowns. This is what makes the 2013 crisis different to the Chinese. Instead of a known quantity, they face in the younger Kim an untested leader, with a power base of uncertain resilience — and a nuclear arsenal. North Korea’s imposing of itself in the region parallels the younger Kim imposing himself on North Korea, using brinkmanship not just as an external strategy but also to assert his own control over the levers of power in his country — namely the Party and the Korean People’s Army.

This is to be expected of any new leader, but it is a risky strategy. Northern overreach could lead not only to external pressure, as is happening now, but also to internal discontent and conflict. This makes China’s nightmare scenario more likely — not just a humanitarian catastrophe in the short term, but also the possibility of an American-allied Korean state, with its historical suspicion of Chinese intentions and a land border with China’s northeastern industrial heartlands. The presence of nuclear weapons in the mix only deepens the nightmare; their use would be too awful to contemplate. But their falling into the hands of South Korea would be cold comfort indeed to the Chinese.

In this light, China’s decision to drive the sanctions process forward has a new logic. It is a potent means of signaling displeasure to Pyongyang, warning it against overreach. It is also a means to ease the pressure, not only on North Korea but also on its leader, by providing a ramp for de-escalation. It is one thing for Kim Jong-Un to buckle under enemy pressure, but it would be far more acceptable to be restrained by an ally. If these are taken to be the aims of Chinese policy, they do seem to be working; the threats have quieted, and North ��Korea is now clear to move on to its usual requests for negotiations, albeit on unacceptable terms. Meanwhile, Chinese-North Korean trade appears to be continuing apace despite the sanctions, which would make sense if China’s policy is to restrain, as opposed to undermine, its buffer state.

Is this situation sustainable? Perhaps not. What isn’t certain is that, even assuming everyone’s attendance at the negotiating table, there can be much common ground between China and the other stakeholders on what to do with North Korea. The threats posed by the north must be ‘stopped’; there must be ‘resolution’ — but how is this to be done, and what sort of resolution is the aim? If Iraq and Afghanistan have taught the Chinese anything about how the West ‘resolves’ its perceived threats, one can hardly fault them for being indulgent with its neighbor and ally, even a neighbor and ally as aggressive and unpredictable as the Kim dynasty. It seems a lot more likely that China’s change of heart is instrumental, not fundamental — certainly not as fundamental as its reasons for supporting North Korea.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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