This widely accepted standard is the of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (UNCSR) and the international legal system human migration. The government so blatantly broke this agreement that the Court felt compelled to state so. The UK government has indicated that it will merely ¸é·É˛ą˛Ô»ĺ˛ąâ€™s as a safe third country. Additionally, it will withdraw from several international agreements that require it to uphold the principle. This will let it ignore the law and its bothersome requirements.

The UK’s externalization of asylum

British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak may have made these as a political ploy ahead of the country’s next election. After all, immigration control has been one of the most contentious political issues of our day, if not the most. As an electoral , it has successfully fanned xenophobic while offering no substantive answers to the migration problems in the UK’s asylum .

Some could argue that this kind of deliberate illegality is nothing new. Liberal-democratic constitutional governments have long been known for their flaws. These include extreme , breaking , weaponizing ideals and migrants’ standards — the same ones they are obligated to uphold. This may occur visibly or more covertly. It has mainly been the case when they deal with people who, in their view, belong beyond the purview of their legal frameworks.

When we take a broader view of the UK situation, we see that the asylum and immigration results from more extensive issues. These may also be seen in the EU’s with , and . Further, the issues appear in the EU’s attempts to distance itself from the of human rights, drownings and other that occur within its borders.

After the Supreme Court rejected the , Suella Braverman, the sacked home secretary, increased the pressure on Sunak to disregard human rights legislation. Recognizing that there is little hope of the boats within the current legal framework, Braverman has asked for revisions to her own Illegal Migration Act to resuscitate the Rwanda deportation system. Braverman’s are not limited to the UK; they are prevalent throughout Europe, Oceania and the Americas.

, a former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, highlighted the broader threat such politics pose to refugee protection. Refugee protection is a global concern and a common trust. It means that it is a shared , not an individual one. Unless it is shouldered widely, it may be borne by none as a normative .

Until recently, the of these liberal-democratic states was accompanied by a persistent (though flimsy) conviction that the law’s constraining force was still necessary. The law has always been put to the test, twisted and molded, and its principles have been stretched, distorted and abused. But there was still an underlying belief in the liberal legal that the law’s prohibitions and authorizations would matter. They would play a crucial role in how we treat others and ourselves. 

To guarantee states’ commitment to some hard-won European refugee protection , this role was used for executing governmental authority and as an instrument for setting its lawful boundaries. In my view, some of the democratically elected political leaders, as well as the UK’s public and their electors, have lost this dual of the law’s purpose. Rather than being seen as an essential component of effective governance, the law’s regulating and restraining role seems increasingly to be a barrier and to it. This is especially true in immigration control, where legislative on the government’s authority are being violated or legislated over.

Sunak is, in fact, in excellent company. The Italian government’s has likewise demonstrated a great deal of passion for the boundaries of the law, and it reacts angrily to courts’ to enforce them. To some extent, the EU has also started to play the same game. The regulatory power of the law is diminished each time enduring legal precepts are codified into new procedures and reception .

Good governance vs. immigration control

This rejection of the law as a tool of authority, limiting force and regulatory ideal seems to stem partly from the of good government being established within the of immigration control. A liberal constitutional prohibits good government from being defined by convenience or efficiency, nor can it include any governmental goal that most people find acceptable. In the age of globalization, liberal constitutional democracy has been under attack from the inside. The of illiberalism, populism and authoritarianism have attacked it further. We demand that normative standards of freedom, and human constrain the goals and actions of the government. That is the yardstick by which we judge, or ought to consider, the goodness of each government action and its underlying goal.

It is worth emphasizing that we did not choose these principles randomly. Despite potential hypocrisy in liberal legal and their problematic application, we deliberately incorporated these principles into our constitutions. We have seen firsthand the devastation that results from simultaneously deregulating political power and concentrating it in the hands of a minority.

For immigration control, however, good governance is defined in a way that denies the cultural, ethnic and religious and that characterize our political communities. Governments like the UK’s even view that as a threat. The pursuit of universal and human is no longer what good governance means in this regard. Instead, the purpose of government is to serve “us” at all costs. It makes no difference whether this cost comes in the form of invaluable human lives lost or a more intangible cost to the values by which we live — this is ultimately the price we must pay to protect what is right, and “right” is now what benefits us rather than the ethereal concepts of equal human .

This form of ethnonationalist has probably never wholly vanished from the political and judicial following World War II. Instead, it has consistently existed in the background, patiently awaiting an opportunity to resurface in the European shared political since the first European migration was heralded. 

The fallacy of Anglo-American human rights principles

Since then, ethnonationalism has undoubtedly grown in visibility, audacity and boldness in the demands it makes of the government. Along with it, we have witnessed the rise of a new kind of deliberate , a rejection of the law, which is viewed as both a regulatory ideal and a of political power. This logic leads to inhumanity and human , as seen in the recently revealed immigration by former US President Donald Trump. His commitment to resurrecting and extending programs like , , , and enormous mass is consistent with his criticism of the law as a restraint on governmental power.

Sadly, Germany has also shown itself to be to the perils of similar reasoning. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that the nation should finally stand firm in deportation — that Germany being tough does not make it heartless. Scholz would do well to embrace the law as a restricting factor and a tool for , even if it happens to forbid the exact toughness he aims to impose. This would prevent inhumanity from becoming the pattern for Germany’s immigration .

Will the Rwandan deal be stopped?

The UK Supreme Court has its own government’s “cash for humans” agreement with Rwanda to be highly unethical and illegal. The continuous attempts to externalize asylum and indefinitely detain asylum seekers are violations of non-refoulement and the UNCSR. Thousands of torture survivors are stuck in the massive asylum backlog, unable to reconstruct their lives or recuperate. The UK government should concentrate on eliminating this backlog before enacting cruel policies that violate their moral and legal obligations. 

The agreement was fierce and misguided, especially because Rwanda has a history of grave human rights abuses. These include torture, arbitrary incarceration and the suppression of free speech. The arrangement with Rwanda and the Illegal Migration Act ought to be scrapped by the new home secretary, James Cleverly. Only then will decency prevail.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The UK’s Ruthless Immigration Compromise Means Refoulement in Rwanda appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

According to the latest  published in October 2016 by the World Economic Forum, Rwanda has the highest percentage of women in parliament worldwide—64% of seats in the Rwandan parliament are occupied by women. Rwanda and Bolivia are the only countries with a female majority in parliament.

From the third ranked country—Cuba—onward, a male majority is once again the norm. The 10 highest-ranking countries in terms of female participation in parliament include three other African countries, Senegal, South Africa and Namibia, and just two European countries, Sweden and Finland.

However, Africa does not only have positive examples to offer. The sub-Saharan countries feature the full range—from very high to very low participation of women in parliament. And, of course, gender equality cannot be measured simply in terms of the proportion of female members of parliament (MP). Equally important is the number of women in leadership positions and ministerial offices, while other factors include primary school enrollment or years served by female heads of state.

Societal Transformations

In the broader context of societal transformations, opportunities are often limited based on individual criteria beyond gender, such as sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, race or political preference.  measures equality of opportunity for women and minorities in 129 developing and transition countries.

Ěý˛ą˛Ô»ĺĚý both score highly in the BTI equal opportunity indicator (7 out of 10 points). Comparing female participation in parliament, Botswana performs poorly with just 10%. The discrepancy is also hinted at by other indicators. In Rwanda, 35% of ministerial positions are held by women, compared to just 13% in Botswana. Yet, political and ethnic minorities fare much better in Botswana than in Rwanda.

In Africa, Ghana is the country with the most women in these leadership positions, at 50% , whereas only 11% of MPs are women—exactly the same proportion as Liberia, which in turn is one of the countries with the most years served by a female head of state: 11. As a result of these figures, the countries listed achieve higher positions in the rankings than many other countries, including those in the developed world.

Meanwhile, other African states are at the opposite end of the spectrum. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Eritrea all receive a score of three or below (out of 10) in the BTI equal opportunity indicator. In DRC, only 8.3% of MPs are female. In Eritrea and Somalia, gender equality is virtually non-existent. It would appear that these often-called failed states also fail with regard to gender equality.

More Democracy?

Can we assume that countries with a higher degree of gender equality will be more democratic? Or, to ask the question from a different perspective, does democracy automatically lead to gender equality?

Looking at the cases of Botswana and Rwanda, we see two very different scenarios. Even though gender equality appears to be highly developed in both countries, one is ranked by the BTI as a hard-line autocracy and the other as a consolidating democracy.  seems to be a typical example of the correlation between democratic development and equal opportunity according to which the more advanced a country’s democratic development, the greater the value placed on equality of opportunity.

This correlation holds true for almost all African countries. For example, Ghana and Liberia, as defective democracies, achieve only moderate scores in the equal opportunity indicator. It is not surprising that in failed states such as the DRC or Somalia women are the most vulnerable group and gender equality is completely out of reach.

, however, is an exception in this analysis. Although it is considered a hard-line autocracy according to the BTI, it nevertheless ranks very highly in all gender equality indicators. The Rwandan government, which believes in strong centralized leadership and puts every political and economic matter under government control, has also regulated the development of greater gender equality to demonstrate its progressive values.

Accordingly, the case of Rwanda is a kind of constrained process that might possibly see a backlash in later developments toward democracy. Since gender equality is forced upon society, it might not hold when at a later time the political process opens up to more participation by different social groups. When, contrary to the current situation, Rwandan society as a whole is involved in the political processes, it might well be that the role of women in politics will decline.

To assume that gender equality implies a general openness might thus be misleading. The Rwandan example shows that a very high performance in gender equality indicators does not allow any conclusions to be drawn regarding the status of a democracy or the recognition of human rights. It is interesting to note that some of the world’s most autocratic regimes such as Rwanda, Cuba or Angola, which are all ruled by men, adorn their rubber stamp parliaments with a strikingly large number of women.

The very low percentage of women in Botswana’s parliament might also point to the problem that democracy alone is no guarantee for the development of gender equality. A  in 15 African countries found that even in countries that are on a good track to more gender equality in the law and pursue progressive policies, public opinion still puts men first. In South Africa, for instance, 73% of men and 65% of women agree that a woman should obey her husband. In Botswana, 50% of men and women agree that women cannot refuse to have sex with her husband.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: 

The post Does Democracy Automatically Lead to Gender Equality? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

It only takes one hour to reach the island of Idjwi by speedboat that sails between two of the main cities in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) South Kivu region, Goma and Bukavu. The lush green landscapes and relaxed, smiling faces you see when entering Idjwi could not represent a bigger contrast to Goma, where people are hardened by the everyday prospect of insecurity from crime, volcanic eruptions and violent conflict.

Idjwi is home to around 260,000 people and is located on the Congolese side of Lake Kivu. The population mainly speaks their own language, Kihavu, and apart from a few diesel generators and solar panels on the island, there is no electricity. Life in the small villages and communities evolves around the fertile green fields that make up the island and from fishing in the lake that surrounds it. Poverty is a reality, but so is the laid-back, relaxed atmosphere.

The South Kivu region is in many ways defined by wars and violence over access to power and minerals—the broken-down communities, decimated families, traumatized individuals. Prince Lubambo, one of the six local chiefs on Idjwi, is obviously proud when he explains how his community is nothing like that: “Idjwi does not know war. It’s a peaceful place. That is why when there is war and conflict in other areas, people like to come here.”

When things explode on the mainland, refugees find their way to the isolated and forgotten island, looking for a secure place to stay until peace prevails or to start a new life in safe surroundings.

Peace and Poverty

“We don’t have money to buy land, send our kids to school, and we can’t plan for the future,” says Bernadette who came to Idjwi from Rwanda for the first time in 1994. After losing her former husband in one of the refugee camps that was set up on the island during the genocide against the Tutsis, she continued to the neighboring Kalehe region in 1996. She returned to Idjwi looking for peace in 2009 after her current husband lost eight close family members to the fighting among local militias in Masisi, Kalehe. Despite the tough living conditions, Bernadette sees the family’s future on Idjwi, where they feel welcomed by the community and occasionally find work in the fields.

Florence © Anders Jacobsen

According to local journalist Yves Minani, 1994 to 1996 was an unusual period when the island received thousands of Rwandan refugees. The refugee camps on the island were infiltrated by Hutu soldiers who were still fighting the war in Rwanda. It was probably the first time the islanders heard gunshots. In spite of this, the local communities welcomed Rwandan refugees who were not involved in fighting and looting.

Butanda, another Rwandan refugee, quickly discovered that it was safer for him to move from the refugee camp to the local village. The chief made sure that he did not have to pay any rent to the family he stayed with. He decided to start a new life on Idjwi and has since made a living for himself and his family—a wife and nine children—from cultivating other people’s land and brewing the local banana wine, kasiksi. For Butanda it was an easy decision to stay in Idjwi: “I do not own any land back in Rwanda, so there was not a lot to return to. As I felt the love and hospitality of the local community here I decided that this was my new home.”

Despite having lived on the island for more than 20 years, Butanda still lives in poverty. He cannot afford to send his kids to school and sometimes receives help from neighbors to make sure his family has something to eat.

These days there are no refugee camps on Idjwi, and the island receives little support from the DRC government. This leaves a lot of responsibility to the chiefs in the local community who are required to report about refugees on the island to the authorities on the mainland, and organize that they are properly welcomed and introduced to the rules of the society. “The refugees have the same rights as everyone else on Idjwi. No discrimination,” says Prince Lubambo. “They are under the Congolese law. If someone behaves badly, they are punished.”

But the refugees don’t commit crimes. They live quiet lives and try to find work, so they can pay rent and provide food for their families. Often, they do not dare to dream of a bright future for themselves or their children. Peace is all that matters for now.

Escaping the Past

“The eruption of the volcano in 2002. The constant fighting among militias in Kalehe. When .” These are the first events that come to Prince Lubambo’s mind when asked about some examples that has led to a large influx of refugees coming to Idjwi. Many refugees’ stay is only temporary, as they want to return to their homes and lives on the mainland. Other refugees have fled from a past they cannot return to and do not have much choice other than to remain at Idjwi.

51łÔąĎ provides you deep and diverse insights for free. Remember that we still have to pay for servers, website maintenance and much more. So, to keep us free, fair and independent.

Florence had never heard of Idjwi when she was sent there in around 2009. She is a small, soft-spoken woman wearing a long brown skirt, matching shirt and a colorful kitenge scarf on her head. Her troubles started when the feared Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) militia attacked her village close to Walungu in South Kivu. After hiding in the bush, the men in the village decided to take up the fight, and four people, including Florence’s husband, died in the battle.

Immediately after, Florence’s father-in-law wanted her to marry her husband’s younger brother, which she refused. The father-in-law then demanded that she should leave the house and took over all of their land. Florence did not have any land to cultivate and live from. She was alone and pregnant, with six children to care for. A local priest, and a man Florence had never met before, offered to send her and her children to Idjwi and to pay the rent for one year.

Florence felt abandoned and the initial arrangement did not work out well. Eventually she was taken in and given a job by nuns on the island, who are also helping two of her daughters to get an education. She still dreams of returning to her old community, but she has been advised against it by the local priest who believes her husband’s family would see Florence and her children’s return as a threat to their family land. So she stays in Idjwi despite being confused, lonely and constantly worried about her future: “Idjwi is a safe place, but it is not easy to live here. I don’t have my own place and will I ever be able to get any land? I worry what will happen when the nuns leave the island. Will the new nuns accept and support me?”

A shelter from the storm

Both in the DRC and Rwanda, Idjwi is surrounded by mystery. There are rumors that rituals from are part of everyday life on the island. People visit from Bukavu and Goma to seek advice and instructions from spiritually gifted men and women in order to find solutions to their personal problems. According to Yves Minani, witchcraft is not the reason that the population on Idjwi continues to live in relative harmony and have avoided to be part of any conflicts. It is the lake that protects the island. “People don’t want to fight on Idjwi. They fear the lake, just as there is no base to fight from or any places to hide,” he says.

Kizenyi with her partner and neighborhood children. © Anders Jacobsen

According to a study published in 2012, the population on Idjwi rose from 112,000 in 1993 to an estimated 220,000 in 2010, due to one of the world’s highest fertility rates and the large influx of Rwandan and Congolese refugees settling on the island. With the large majority of people living off subsistence farming, it would be natural if the population worried about whether there will be enough space and resources to welcome more people. Minani is confident that this is not the case. “We know about the difficulties that refugees have, so there is solidarity in the society. Perhaps it will be people from Idjwi who need help another day. A lot of people are Christians out here, or follow other religions of love, and we want to do good.”

There are a lot of untold tragic stories on Idjwi, but the refugees do not meet to share their grief and receive support from each other. Some mention the expenses from cooking and providing drinks to guests as a reason why refugee gatherings are not organized, while others seem more comfortable with mourning their loss by themselves.

As the proud woman Kizenyi, who decided to stay on Idjwi after having lost her husband and three out of her four children in the refugee camps, explains it: “No one can know what another person is thinking.”

Kizenyi is now married and lives with a man from the local community who took her in when she had nowhere else to go. The house is modest, but the two of them look happy and relaxed as she tells her story. It’s a painful one, but it could have been much worse if the population of Idjwi had not provided her and other refugees a shelter from the storm.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: 

The post Looking for Peace on a Forgotten Island in DRC appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Background

Despite the fact that the International Criminal Court (ICC) may appear to be a recent phenomenon, in reality, the long story of its establishment stretches back to the late 19^th century.

In 1872, Gustav Moynier, one of the founders of the International Committee of the Red Cross, proposed the creation of a permanent international court to seek justice for crimes committed during the Franco-Prussian War.

The next resurgence of interest in the establishment of an international tribunal occurred in 1919 during the Paris Peace Conference, when the drafters of the Treaty of Versailles proposed the establishment of a court to try Kaiser Wilhelm II and German forces. The idea was abandoned until it was resurrected following World War II, when the Allies started the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials to seek justice for victims of atrocities and to punish the perpetrators.  

Following these trials, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the . The document called for criminals to be tried "by such international penal tribunals" that have jurisdiction, while it also asked the International Law Commission (ILC) "to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trials of persons charged with genocide." Although the International Law Commission drafted these documents, the plan for an international tribunal was abandoned due to the tense political climate of the Cold War.

In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago, partially motivated by a desire to combat drug trafficking, moved to resurrect the pre-existing proposals for the establishment of an international tribunal. Consequently, the ILC resumed drafting a statute.

In the early 1990s, as the United Nations (UN) established ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and Bosnia to seek justice for genocide and other crimes against humanity, the need for a permanent international criminal court became increasingly clear.

After years of negotiations, the UN General Assembly convened a conference in Rome in June 1998 to finalize a treaty. On July 17, 1988, the was adopted — 120 nations voted in favor of the adoption of the Rome Statute; seven nations, including the United States, Israel, China, Iraq and Qatar, voted against the treaty; and 21 nations abstained. In 2002, the court became fully operational.

According to its mandate, the ICC is intended to complement existing national judicial systems. The court only exercises its jurisdiction in cases where national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute crimes. The Office of the Prosecutor is responsible for conducting investigations and prosecutions. The prosecutor opens investigations after referrals from state parties or the UN Security Council. However, the prosecutor may also open an investigation, if they receive information meriting a judicial response from individuals or NGOs.

The first prosecutor of the ICC was Luis Moreno Ocampo, while the current prosecutor is Fatou Bensouda. The court’s headquarters are in The Hague, Netherlands.

Why is the ICC Relevant?

In recent years, the ICC has been accused of bias and neo-colonialism as all eight cases that the court has investigated have been African ones. Despite having a global mandate, African leaders have complained that the ICC places too much of an emphasis on Africa while ignoring other nations.

Due to the prosecution of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto for , the ICC has been subject to severe criticism over the last few years. Kenyan Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed has accused the ICC of treating “,” while the Kenyan parliament passed a motion calling for the withdrawal of support for the ICC.

The Kenyan campaign against the ICC has received support from other African nations. In October 2013, the African Union (AU) convened a summit that . Following the summit, the AU called upon the ICC and the UN Security Council to delay the Kenyatta/Ruto case.

Now, a debate rages on over the court’s perceived bias and who should direct the fight for justice in Kenya.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright ©  All Rights Reserved

The post Justice for Kenya appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Under the pretext of sparing the world another genocide, France deployed 1,600 troops to the Central African Republic (CAR) late last year. Since Operation Sangaris was launched, however, the French military has proven powerless to stop the sectarian violence, which took more than a thousand lives in Bangui last month.

Since it has become clear that the humanitarian crisis is beyond French control, President Francois Hollande faces the question of whether Paris should have intervened in the CAR, where a significant percentage of the country’s citizens view France’s intervention as a form of 21st century neo-colonialism. France was clearly naĂŻve to believe that deploying fewer than 2,000 troops to a destabilized nation bordering on anarchy and awash with arms would restore stability.

While the first French brigades to enter the CAR last month were greeted as liberators, not all of its citizens welcomed the former colonial ruler’s military presence — thousands of SĂ©lĂ©ka supporters protested the intervention. Surely French military commanders did not imagine that they would simply waltz in and be greeted with a shower of rose petals. But by the same token, it seems clear that the French failed to anticipate such vigorous opposition and were unprepared for what awaited them.

French military spokesman Colonel Gilles Jaron stated that France was acting with total “impartiality” in the CAR, yet this perception was not shared by the Muslim-dominated former rebel coalition — SĂ©lĂ©ka — which overthrew the BozizĂ© government last year. Given France’s identity and historical role in the region, many within the CAR’s Muslim community view France as an ally of the country’s Christian militias, rather than a neutral arbiter. The resulting tension has been underscored by SĂ©lĂ©ka-waged attacks against French troops over the past two months. In turn, certain Christian militias have targeted African Union troops (mainly from Chad), viewing these forces as defenders of the CAR’s Muslim militants.

Tough Decisions

Throughout 2014, France will have difficult decisions to make regarding its military campaign. There is no indication that sectarian violence in the CAR is decreasing, despite hopes that the transitional parliament’s election of Catherine Samba-Panza as interim-president will stem the carnage. In fact, daily acts of revenge killings that involve lynch mobs have become the new normal. Samba-Panza has a nearly impossible task on her hands.

The severity of the violence, including the beheading of children, is troubling. Experts warn, and last month we addressed, what may become genocide in the CAR. John Ging, director of operations for the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), stated that CAR “has all the elements that we have seen elsewhere, in places like Rwanda and Bosnia” and “the elements are there, the seeds are there, for a genocide.”

In addition to the CAR, France’s recent military involvement in other African states (including Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali and Niger) highlights Paris’ more assertive and activist role in some of its former African colonies. As Europe has many interests in Africa, France’s African foreign policy underscores how it remains the leading EU power on the continent. Given French demand for African oil and minerals, the presence of hundreds of thousands of French nationals across the continent, and entrenched French business interests throughout these countries, the stakes are indeed high for France in Africa.

However, the extent to which France will sacrifice its own blood in the CAR to defend such interests remains to be seen. It would not be hard to imagine President Hollande declaring victory and withdrawing French troops if the situation deteriorates much more. The French government’s admission that Paris “underestimated” the level of hatred between the CAR’s Christians and Muslims, and its assessment of the crisis as “nearly impossible” to handle, indicate that Hollande may not have fully contemplated his government’s options.

The CAR crisis poses a major challenge for the Hollande administration. If more French troops die in what appears to be a looming genocide, and the French military remains powerless to stem the growing violence, it would certainly be a major blow to the French government. It does not appear that under such circumstances the French government will have any good options on the table.

After deploying troops to the CAR for the stated purpose of sparing Africa from genocide, Paris will look weak on the international stage for failing to meet its objective. If so, it will not have been the first country to have experienced such an outcome. Neither Africa, nor the West, wants another Rwanda. Ultimately, the CAR crisis and Operation Sangaris’ failure may compel the French to pursue more realistic aims in Africa and abandon romantic dreams of exporting civility to Africa at the barrel of a gun.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post France’s 19th Century Foreign Policy Fails in 2014 appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Each year, on June 20, the United Nations marks World Refugee Day; a time to recognize the contributions of refugees to their communities around the world. 

Refugees are people who are forced to flee their home countries due to political persecution, war, famine, and other causes of forced migration. The moment they cross the borders of foreign lands, migrants are known as "refugees" — a brand that doesn't only degrade their status, but also subjects them to indifference to their basic human needs.

Kakuma Refugee Camp

The Kakuma refugee camp was established in 1991 and is located 95km from Lokichoggio, a town at the Kenya-Sudan border. It is administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and falls under the jurisdiction of the Kenyan government. Kakuma, meaning "nowhere" in Swahili, has been controlled through the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) since the adoption of the Kenya Refugee Act of 2006. The refugee camp is connected with only a highway on the Kenyan northern corridor.

Kakuma is remote; it is a cosmopolitan camp. Over many years, it has developed into a town within another town, since the actual city of Kakuma is also home to non-refugees. The camp's area is defined by a harsh environment in a remote location, coupled with poor infrastructure and low access to essential services, in addition to other underlying causes of poverty.

In the Kakuma refugee camp, tens of thousands of multinational refugees have been warehoused for decades. Refugees are trapped there with one big difference between the camp's residents and those who live in the town of Kakuma: The camp's residents cannot leave without permission from the camp's governing authority.

The refugee camp itself has three major settlement sections. During the early stages of its inception, the Kakuma refugee camp was designed to accommodate South Sudanese refugees fleeing conflict and violence. Over the years, the camp has accommodated refugees from: South Sudan; Sudan; Somali; DRC Congo; Burundi; Ethiopia; Rwanda; Eritrea; Uganda; Tanzania; and Congo-Brazzaville. The camp has also accommodated three Ivoirians, an Iranian, a Zimbabwean, and a Cameroonian.

By mid-May, the total population in Kakuma stood at 150,891, of which 49,767 were refugees of Somali origin. Another 44,395 were refugees from South Sudan. However, by the end of May, the camp's population had already increased to 155,269 persons, according to a UNHCR official report.

Refugees' Voices

In the Kakuma refugee camp, World Refugee Day was commemorated on Thursday, June 20 at the Napata grounds in the camp. At 9am, flags were lifted and dancing and speeches soon followed.

Some views expressed by camp residents are full of bitterness and worries: "I'm in a voluntary prison, I was young when I arrived here 14 years ago," said Elias Wondimu, an Ethiopian refugee in Kakuma. "That has changed now, I don't see any reason as to why we celebrate refugee day. I hate life."  

Refugees in the camp are trapped and their rights to freedom of movement and to obtain employment and citizenship are denied. The UNHCR is supposed to advocate refugee rights, but camp residents strongly feel that the UN Refugee Agency has done little in finding durable solutions.

Sara Hassan, a Somali refugee, said: "I wish I could turn back time. I have lived here since 1994 [and] I was promised resettlement but that turned out to be a dream; many years of waiting. Was my case closed? I don't see real life anymore."

There are no well established structures, and human rights conditions are fragile. Therefore, the exact figures concerning victims of rape and sexual assaults are not registered, despite its rampant occurrences.

Some refugees have the opportunity to go back to their homeland, while others will never have the chance to set foot on their country of origin again. In Kakuma, refugees have strongly encountered the negative impact of warehousing and many lives are being lost in exile. Some refugees will be lucky enough to secure resettlement abroad, while many others who desire the same thing will never get the opportunity. Some even feel discriminated against.

"Are all refugees equal? Some are more equal than others [and] some deserve resettlement, but it's a taboo to Rwandese in Kakuma," said Leah Bugingo, a Rwandan refugee. "I hope there will be change for [future] generations."

In the Kakuma camp, refugees are entirely dependent on humanitarian food aid. Their life consists of constant waiting and dreams of new hope. Under these circumstances, children grow to adulthood and adults grow to old age in this warehousing situation.

As a refugee community leader in Kakuma said: "We're vulnerable, we're voiceless, [and] we're neglected by the UN, the media, [and] the international community, as well by our host government." 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Life in the Kakuma Refugee Camp appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The question of how to treat people who have fled their homes has been around for quite some time. However, a fairly recent development requires new answers to this question.

Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS), defined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as a situation where refugees “…continue to be in exile for 5 years or more after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for (the) implementation of durable solutions,” have developed into a pressing issue. Such situations can be found all across the globe, for example in North and sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America — where returning home is not a safe option for refugees.

According to the United Nations (UN), around two thirds of all refugees today have to face PRS. Not only has the percentage of refugees affected by PRS increased, the average time they spend in exile has too. Refugees who experience this ongoing displacement are in a constant state of limbo. On the one hand, the situation in their home-countries is not safe enough to return, and on the other, their host countries are often incapable or unwilling to deal with them in a way that respects their most basic human rights, as laid out in the UN’s 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

Whether it is a lack of capacities or political will, individual governments and the international community should be aware that cases of PRS are not only problematic from a human rights perspective, but also with regards to security matters.

Problematic Circumstances for PRS Refugees

Most existing cases of PRS — over 30 situations — take place in developing and under-developed nations since most refugees, in an attempt to escape violence and persecution, flee to neighboring states.

Kenya, for example, is currently home to over 604,000 refugees — not counting the nearly 44,900 asylum seekers. This sums up to nearly 1.5% of its population. Similar circumstances can be observed in the Republic of Congo, where 92,000 refugees — mainly from the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo — currently account for over 2% of its population. This is already a major improvement when comparing these numbers to the situation before repatriating refugees began there in 2012.

Indeed, a few percent may not seem to be a lot. But when comparing these numbers to wealthier nations, it becomes apparent how big the impact actually is. Roughly 0.3% of the United Kingdom’s population is made up of refugees, and this includes asylum seekers and stateless persons. Figures do not significantly differ in most developed countries either. Even in Germany, which hosts more refugees than any other developed nation, refugees account for only 0.7% of the population.

Humanitarian Issues and Warehousing

Since many cases of PRS take place in nations that have a hard time catering for their own population, let alone offering support to refugees over an extended period of time, living conditions in host-countries are often harsh. International aid does help, but is still far from eliminating all the troubles.

This is also connected to another problematic aspect of PRS: a strategy of dealing with refugees often referred to as, “warehousing.” The term describes a practice which confines refugees in camps, where they are often denied basic human rights such as freedom of movement or seeking paid work. These camps are, in many cases, set up due to a lack of other feasible options for host countries’ governments. However, this practice does not hold any long-term solutions.

As the term warehousing already suggests, it is mainly concerned with “storing” refugees somewhere, often in remote border areas. Some of these camps have existed for decades. Dadaab in Kenya, for example, was set up as a temporary measure to deal with the refugee inflow from civil war torn Somalia, 22 years ago. Originally designed for only 90,000 refugees, it has expanded to a population of around 474,000 people. With nowhere else to go, and with governments often restricting their movement, a lot of refugees have to stay within those camps for many, many years. For inhabitants of warehousing camps, becoming self-sufficient and independent from aid is nearly impossible.

Such human rights restrictions do not only negatively impact the lives ofrefugees, in many cases, it is also the host country that misses out on the potential contributions of these people to its society and economy. Apart from the UNHCR’s conclusion that refugees can be beneficial for local economies if they are allowed to actively participate in it, refugee experts Gil Loescher and James Milner also point out: “Refugees frequently have skills that are critical to future peacebuilding and development efforts, either where they are or in their countries of origin following their return home. Containing refugees in camps prevents them from contributing to regional development and state-building.”

Locking the problem away might seem like an easy short term solution. However, if safe repatriation or resettlement is not an option, approaches are needed that respect refugees’ human rights and also make full use of their human potential.

Security at Stake

Apart from humanitarian concerns, cases of PRS can also create precarious security situations. An example from Africa illustrates this point.

When Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda, many displaced since the 1960s, organized themselves and finally started a military initiative in Rwanda, a civil war broke out that lasted from 1990 to 1993. Despite a peace agreement that ended the atrocities, the war had added yet another layer to longstanding and deep rooted ethnic tension between Hutus and Tutsis. This tension erupted into the infamous Rwandan genocide, after the president’s plane was shot down in 1994. The incident served as the final catalyst for violence in which over 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed.

The refugee outflow that followed, further destabilized the area known as the Great Lakes Region and also contributed to the horrendous war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A large refugee community which feels dissatisfied and neglected, is a force that security analysts have to take into account. Moreover, tension with the local population often leads to xenophobia and can erupt into serious conflicts, especially if resources in the host country are already scarce. These conflicts further put individuals at risk. As refugees spend increasing amounts of time in their host countries, refugee policies also need to be concerned with how to properly integrate them, in order to avoid a toxic climate of dissatisfaction.

New Challenges

Today, cases of PRS are one of the greatest challenges resulting from long-standing conflicts and a lack of capacities in many parts of the world. Of course, the aim should ideally be to stop PRS from developing. However, if conflicts in home countries persist, they might be inevitable.

Under these circumstances, present-day refugee policies need to address human rights issues, while at the same time keeping an eye on security matters. Less developed host-countries most affected by large refugee inflows, will need more support from foreign actors to achieve these goals. This is not only necessary from a normative point of view, but also lies in the own interest of the international community.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright © .  All Rights Reserved

The post Protracted Refugee Situations: Stuck in Limbo appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

A Refugee Life

Jean-Marc is Burundian by nationality, but has never lived in Burundi. In 1976, he was born into exile in Rwanda where he lived as a refugee until the 1994 genocide when his father was killed and the rest of the family had to flee to Tanzania. Over the course of the next two decades, his family were moved to three different camps within Tanzania, finally ending up in Mtabila camp. From 2009, in the aftermath of a peace deal and democratic elections in Burundi, they came under increasing pressure to return to Burundi as part of a "voluntary repatriation" exercise.

However, Jean-Marc did not want to return for two reasons. First, he had never lived in Burundi: his parents had died and he did not know whether or not he would be able to access the land on which his family had once lived. Second, he believed it was too dangerous: he knew that because of the circumstances surrounding his family’s flight and his reluctance to return, the government of Burundi would accuse him of supporting the former rebel group, the Forces National de Libération (FNL).

Despite his concerns, Jean-Marc was ultimately given no choice. After various warnings and threats, the government of Tanzania and the United Nations decided he no longer needed protection, revoked his refugee status, and told him and his family to go. At the end of November 2012, the Tanzanian army moved into the Mtabila camp and started forcing people onto trucks: “There was no time or opportunity to pick up our things. We left all our documents and belongings in the house.” On arrival in Burundi, he was unable to claim his land as someone else was living on it and, as Jean-Marc said: “In Burundi there is no place for those who have nowhere to go.”

Jean-Marc was threatened with death and intimidated by members of the imbonerakure, an unofficial government militia-cum-security and intelligence force that allegedly operates in Burundi. He was accused of being a supporter of the FNL, and was told by a member of the security forces: “This is not like Tanzania, we shall finish you!”

Fearing for his safety, he fled to Rwanda and then sent for his family to join him. They travelled together to the Nakivale settlement in the east of Uganda. He has now had his application for asylum turned down by the Ugandan government and does not know where else to go. He is living in a shed in a refugee camp, along with 225 other Burundians, receiving no assistance. He is 37-years-old and has been displaced all his life.

Looking for Somewhere to Belong

Jean-Marc has spent his whole life looking for somewhere to belong – somewhere that he can find safety, where his children can go to school, and where he can find work to support his family. Current regional and international refugee protection structures have failed him. And he is not alone: his predicament is echoed by thousands of individuals and families across the Great Lakes region. As a young Burundian woman with three children, also in Nakivale camp, said: “No-one wants us in their country."

So how has this happened? Although the answer to this question is multi-faceted, it is in part due to a broader trend in the Great Lakes region to push large-scale repatriation initiatives even when, for many individuals, returning home is impossible. After decades of conflict, the region is seen to be in a new era of stability, and governments, along with the international community, are keen to remove the refugee "burden" of the past decades. Countries that in the last decade have generated large flows of refugees, now appear to have reached greater stability and it is time to promote return.

Repatriation Disregards Individual Circumstances

This logic of repatriation makes sense: many refugees decide to return at the slightest sign of increased stability, and approximately half a million refugees have returned to Burundi since 2000. After all, no-one actually wants to be a refugee, and it is unlikely that anyone would choose to stay in a refugee camp unless there was good reason for doing so. The problem, however, is the assumption that if repatriation makes sense for some, then it makes sense for all, thereby disregarding individual circumstances that may make return inadvisable or even dangerous.

As a result, the fact that repatriation is being pushed without offering alternatives is leading to a growing crisis in the region. With no space within current national, regional and international protection structures for renewed flight from an apparently post-conflict country, a remnant of refugees and asylum seekers remain in a perpetual state of exile – unrecognised as refugees and unable to access protection as such. The fact that Jean-Marc has nowhere to go, demonstrates that an approach to ending exile — which essentially focusses on refugee status as a humanitarian category and on geographic movement (namely return across a border) as proof of success — remains blind to political realities.

Specifically, it ignores the fact that there is a deep-rooted failure in – polices that have reinforced exclusive approaches to belonging, and therefore have left hundreds of thousands of individuals living in a state of permanent exclusion. Jean-Marc’s story reveals a Tanzanian government fatigued with hosting refugees now that a peace agreement has been signed in Burundi; a Burundian government that has failed to implement equitable structures for land distribution and failed to create an inclusive polity in which opposition is tolerated; and a Ugandan government that is reluctant to add to its refugee "burden" and is refusing to grant refugee status to these asylum seekers.

New Approaches Needed

Such exclusive approaches to belonging have failed to reflect the fact that the boundaries of how and where individuals can seek to put down roots — whether at a local, national or regional level – do not necessarily conform to tidy national categories. While at a policy level some progress has been made – for example, under an evolving political union, citizens of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are now being invited to become "East African citizens" and to live and work across borders – in practice these "new" forms of belonging still remain elusive, as evidenced by Jean-Marc’s predicament.

Recognition of this failure to resolve crucial issues of citizenship in the region, however, also points to the possible resolution of exile: just as the absence of citizenship leaves refugees in a state of perpetual exile, the active political (re)engagement of refugees in negotiating effective access to citizenship not only resolves displacement, but can be essential in helping states transform – which, in turn, prevents renewed displacement. However idealistic this might seem, it is a reality that needs to be acknowledged and embraced – not resented and fought against.

Therefore, Jean-Marc’s story provides an opportunity to re-think some of the structures and assumptions that underpin the relentless drive for repatriation. His story points to the need for more creative and flexible approaches to belonging that would allow individuals and groups alternative means to securing safety for themselves and their families.

Ultimately, exile within the Great Lakes will only be resolved when spaces for belonging at a local and national level become less exclusive; when the deficit in justice in the region in the aftermath of multiple layers of conflict have been equitably confronted; and when the international community recognises that it is a political, rather than humanitarian solution that is needed. Resolving exile will not only benefit those who remain excluded from national belonging, but will lead to a far stronger polity that is less likely to be hit by renewed conflict from those forced onto the margins.

The post Refugees in Africa’s Great Lakes Region: A Perpetual State of Exile appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

High hopes were held across the African continent when Barack Obama, the first US president with Kenyan roots, came into office for the first time in 2009. However, four years in office have significantly lowered expectations to a more realistic level. This may explain why most Africans greeted the president's second electoral victory with far less fervour.

It is clear from the president's electoral campaign that this term, US domestic issues will trump foreign affairs, which includes US relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. This will come to no shock to most Africans following US politics, as Sub-Saharan Africa was of near nil significance in the 2012 presidential campaign. The presidential policy directive ‘US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa’ released in June 2012 has set the tone for US-African relations and will most likely continue do so during Obama's second term. Its' four key objectives are to strengthen democratic institutions, spur economic growth, trade, and investment, advance peace and security, and promote opportunity and development. Current challenges and priorities for the US, however, seem to lie predominantly in the areas of security and economic relations.

Countering Terrorism Franchise

Despite a lack of new policies toward the region, the US will have to keep an eye on Africa's security situation for the sake of its' own counter-terrorism focus. Ongoing turmoil in may lead to some form of US involvement. Ever since northern portions of Mali were taken over by rebels last year, and subsequently flooded with Al Qaida affiliated groups, the international community has been keeping a watchful eye on a region that may now be a perfect breeding ground for armed terrorist groups. Interventions have already been instigated in the form of French troops. The US with its’ clear anti-terror stand has every motivation to quell the situation in Mali, where weak borders are already a major security concern. Recently, a US government representative confirmed that the US is indeed considering supplying French troops with intelligence information. The use of drones to gather intelligence on Mali’s northern territories seems to be a plausable option. Ironically, it was the US’ interference in Libya that largely contributed to Mali’s current problems. The power vacuum left by Gaddafi’s demise spurred the flow of weapons and insurgents between Libya and Mali. Apart from the Sahel, similar US anti-terror concerns will further its’ relationship to the African continent, alongside close monitoring of terror threats in countries such as Somalia and Nigeria.

Battling Civil War

Furthermore, renewed or ongoing conflicts in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Sudan/South Sudan will also challenge the Obama administration’s declared will to advance peace and security. The latter conflict was already a primary concern during Obama’s first four years in office. The US strongly advocated the referendum that made South Sudan an independent nation in 2011. However, ongoing conflict between the two countries, mainly over oil revenues and disputed territories at border areas, still remain unresolved. Even though the US pushed for talks between the two country’s leaders, and Obama renewed 15 year old sanctions on Sudan in last November, the security situation is still fragile. Recent rebellions in Southern Kordofan have again been blamed on the turmoil in South Sudan. In order to create long-lasting peace and improve the dire humanitarian situation, more pressure must be exerted on Sudan’s al-Bashir. On the other hand, the White House stance toward the DRC has been highly criticized for being too soft and protective of Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame; long time ally of the US but also allegedly supportive of the rebel group M23 driving violence in the DRC.  With millions of people dead since the eruption of the conflict in the DRC and no end in sight to the atrocities, strong external interference is much needed.

Dealing with Changing Economic Realities

Asides pressing security issues, the Obama administration should be watching out for Africa’s rising economy. Given that 7 out of the 10 fastest growing economies are on the African continent, the US would be wise to increase its’ efforts in reversing the trend that allows China to surpass the US in terms of trade with Africa. Even though the US is still struggling to deal with its’ own domestic economic crisis, investment in the region is highly recommended by entities such as the IMF, having positioned Africa as the world’s fastest growing region within the next five years. A step has recently been taken to encourage investors, by launching the “Doing Business in Africa” campaign. Additionally the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which grants duty-free access for a variety of goods from eligible African countries into the US market, will have to be renewed by US congress in 2015. Given that, according to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, goods imports from Sub-Saharan Africa under the AGOA and the related GSP program totaled $70.6 billion in 2011, it is imperative that this US-African trade initiative continues.

Obama’s reservations when it comes to African affairs have often been attributed to the fact that he had to prove himself as a “true American” to the electorate during his first term. The question remains whether or not his second term in office, without the pressure of an upcoming re-election, will bring any change to US relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. New challenges will undoubtedly arise, but it seems unlikely that the next four years will engender any radically different positions from Obama’s first term. After all, the US president already stated in his 2009 visit to Ghana that "Africa's future is up to Africans".

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Obama’s Sub-Saharan Strategy: Business As Usual? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.