For years, Washington relied on Qatar as the go-between ā€” the country that could talk to everyone: Hamas, the Taliban, even Iran when needed. Qatar was where messy conflicts met quiet diplomacy. By attacking in Doha, Israel not only violated the sovereignty of a key US ally but also torpedoed the very negotiations the US had been pushing to end the war in Gaza. The fallout was immediate. Qatar froze its mediation role. Arab leaders fumed. Even in Washington, President Donald Trump ā€” normally Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahuā€™s staunchest backer ā€” , complaining that he was ā€œnot thrilledā€ by Israelā€™s actions.

This wasnā€™t just another flare-up in a region used to them. It was a moment that revealed something deeper: the limits of American influence, the growing boldness of its allies and the real risk of the Middle East sliding into chaos without a plan to stop it. If Washington doesnā€™t change course fast, it risks losing control of the regionā€™s future.

Not just another bombing

To see why Doha matters, we need to rewind a bit. Since the October 2023 , Israel has been on a relentless military campaign. Gaza has been devastated. Civilian deaths, accusations of war crimes, even famine ā€” none of it has slowed Israelā€™s push. And increasingly, the war has spilled beyond Gazaā€™s borders: strikes in , , and now Qatar.

Doha is different, though. This isnā€™t some remote battlefield. Itā€™s a US ally hosting the biggest American air base in the Middle East. For years, Qatar played mediator ā€” sometimes the only one who could talk to groups Washington wouldnā€™t touch. By bombing Hamas leaders in Doha, Israel didnā€™t just cross a border. It shredded the basic trust holding together years of US-brokered diplomacy. Qatarā€™s leaders made it : their mediation role in the conflict is now ā€œnot valid.ā€ Without Qatar, the ceasefire talks are dead in the water.

framed the strike as a message to Israelā€™s enemies: no one is safe. But it also sent another message ā€” one Washington canā€™t ignore. Israel is willing to act alone, no matter the political cost to its closest ally.

How the US loses face

The US-Israel relationship has always been tight. Military aid, intelligence sharing, diplomatic cover at the UN ā€” Washington has given Israel unwavering support for decades. But Doha exposed the cracks.

First, the strike humiliated US officials. Israel gave Washington only a few minutesā€™ notice. Too little, too late. As one put it, ā€œThe US sought clarification, but by the time Israel provided it, missiles were already in the air.ā€ Second, it calls for a regional security alliance linking Israel and Gulf states against Iran into question. The idea had been simple: get Arab states on board with Israel, push back on Tehran and slowly move toward peace.

That vision just went up in smoke. Saudi Arabia, TĆ¼rkiye, Jordan and many other Gulf and arab countries the strike. Even countries with quiet ties to Israel are now . Finally, it raised awkward questions in Washington itself. US politicians ā€” ā€” were already uneasy about the Gaza warā€™s civilian toll. Now, some are asking whether unconditional support for Israel still serves American interests. The Doha strike gave that debate new fuel.

Across the Gulf, the reaction was swift. Qatarā€™s called the strike a ā€œblatant violationā€ of sovereignty and an emergency Arab League summit. Even the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which with Israel under the Abraham Accords, issued a sharp rebuke. This matters because it shatters Israelā€™s assumption that Arab states will eventually look the other way.Ģż

Instead, it risks driving them toward other partners ā€” Namely China and even Iran. has already offered to mediate between Israel and Hamas and continues for peace in the region. Iran, of course, is thrilled with the. For years, Tehran warned Gulf states that Israel was a destabilizing force. Now, it looks like just proved its point for them.

Worldwide condemnation

Outside the region, the pattern was familiar: outrage without consequences. called the strike ā€œin no oneā€™s interest.ā€ stated that it is a breach of a country’s sovereigntyĢżand is ā€œunacceptable.ā€ The held an emergency meeting. In a significant diplomatic move, the leaders of ā€” France, Andorra, Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta and Monaco ā€” announced their recognition of Palestinian statehood during a high-level summit in New York, held just before the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting.

and sudden decision to impose a total arms embargo on Israel is a striking exception. Apart from these rare examples, no one imposed sanctions, no one cut arms sales, and policy never really shifted. For decades, the lesson for Israel has been clear: international criticism comes and goes; real pressure almost never follows. Unless the United States itself draws boundaries, Israel has little reason to stop.

The pieces fall into their (new?) place

Of course, Israel sees things differently. Hamas killed over a thousand Israelis in the October attacks. Its leaders, Israel argues, were sitting safely in Doha, plotting the next one. From that perspective, the strike was a simple act of self-defense. Some analysts also say Gulf anger wonā€™t last. Arab states still fear Iran more than Israel. They rely on US .

Give it time, this argument goes and things will return to normal. Maybe. But even if Gulf states quietly resume ties, the damage . The perception of the US as unable ā€” or unwilling ā€” to rein in its closest ally is spreading. That makes room for China, Russia and Iran to play bigger roles. And it leaves the US looking like a bystander in a region where it once called the shots.

So what now? Words wonā€™t be enough. If the US wants to prevent more chaos ā€” and salvage its credibility ā€” it needs a real plan.

First, put conditions on military aid. No oneā€™s saying abandon Israel. But Washington should make clear: if you want US weapons, big cross-border strikes need coordination ā€” no more surprises like Doha. Second, rebuild the diplomacy Israel just blew up. That means convincing Qatar to return as mediator, bringing in Egypt and Jordan, maybe even exploring broader talks with European backing. Without diplomacy, the Gaza war will grind on indefinitely. Finally, draw some actual red lines. If Israel risks US alliances or bases with unilateral moves, there should be consequences ā€” arms delays, diplomatic pushback, something real. Right now, Israel acts like US support is automatic. That has to change.

The Doha strike was more than another chapter in the Gaza war. It was a warning. A warning that US diplomacy in the Middle East is fraying. That allies feel emboldened to act alone. That rivals like China and Russia are ready to step in. If Washington keeps giving Israel a blank check, it risks losing not just the peace process but its entire role as the regionā€™s power broker.

The US doesnā€™t have to choose between supporting Israel and maintaining regional stability. It can ā€” and must ā€” do both. But that means setting limits, demanding coordination and putting real weight behind diplomacy. Because if America canā€™t restrain its closest ally, the question almost writes itself: why should anyone else in the region take US promises seriously?

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The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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51³Ō¹Ļ Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch, a veteran of the Turkish capital of Ankara and the Middle East, explore Syriaā€™s dramatic upheaval and its regional consequences. The conversation highlights the fall of the Assad dynasty, the ascent of new Sunni leadership and the recalibration of regional power involving Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Strategic shifts in the region

Ruch opens by stressing that Syria is undergoing profound strategic changes. He recalls predicting a decade ago that the old Syrian order would collapse, though he did not foresee such rapid change. He lists key developments: the collapse of Iranā€™s land corridor to the Lebanese Shiite military group Hezbollah, Turkeyā€™s renewed influence, Russian and American hesitation and the re-emergence of energy projects such as a long-discussed Qatari pipeline through Turkey to Europe. These shifts, he argues, will shape not only the Middle East but also West Asia and Europe, especially regarding refugees.

The fall of the Assad regime

Singh summarizes the dramatic recent events: former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, ending 54 years of Baā€™athist rule. The Alawite minority, dominant since 1970, has lost power, while Sunnis, led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the head of the former Islamist military group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), seized Damascus in a lightning ten-day offensive. Turkeyā€™s intelligence chief prayed with Julani in the Umayyad Mosque, underscoring Ankaraā€™s backing. Celebrations erupted across Sunni communities, from Pakistan to Bangladesh, marking the symbolic return of the Umayyad Mosque from Shia to Sunni hands.

Historical burdens and Turkish ambitions

Singh asks about Syriaā€™s troubled past. Ruch traces its modern shape to the Sykesā€“Picot agreement and subsequent French mandate. He notes that outside powers have long dictated order in the region, from the Cold War to the Arab Spring. He emphasizes Turkeyā€™s central role today, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, intelligence head Ä°brahim Kalın and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan projecting power rooted in Ottoman legacy. Turkeyā€™s ambitions rest on military strength, economic reach and religious conviction. However, Ruch notes Arab mistrust persists, recalling how Egyptian women during the Arab Spring dismissed Turkish claims of returning.

New balances and fragile alliances

Ruch argues that Julaniā€™s victory is significant but unstable. The challenge lies in power-sharing among Sunnis, Arabs, Kurds, Druze and Alawites, with mediation from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar. He cites the risk of fragmentation: Lebanon may split, Druze may seek Israeli protection, Kurds resist HTS and Alawites retreat to Russian-backed enclaves. Regional powers must negotiate a new balance, while outside actors such as Russia seek to preserve bases in Tartus and Latakia. The 2012 Geneva CommuniquĆ©, Ruch believes, still offers a guiding roadmap.

Turkish grooming of HTS and Western involvement

Ruch attributes Julaniā€™s success to Turkish grooming over at least four years, with HTS supplied and trained through Turkey. He estimates HTS commands around 30,000 fighters and speculates that Gulf or even Western funding contributed to the groupā€™s rise. Turkey also relies on the Syrian National Army, effectively an extension of its military, to pressure Kurdish forces.

Ankaraā€™s strategic aim is to establish a 30-kilometer buffer zone free of Kurdish fighters, possibly with US President Donald Trumpā€™s backing. Singh adds reports that Assadā€™s army collapsed partly because soldiers were unpaid, while Julani benefited from foreign funding. Ruch notes Western efforts to rebrand Julani, once hunted with a $10 million US bounty, into a suit-wearing political leader named Ahmed al-Sharaa, raising doubts over whether this transformation is cosmetic or substantive.

The wider geopolitical picture

The conversation turns to broader dynamics. Ruch highlights Christian minoritiesā€™ anxiety, Alawite resentment and the risk of revenge killings. He stresses that justice mechanisms will be essential to avoid cycles of violence. Regionally, he underscores rivalry among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt for Sunni leadership. Iraq, he suggests, could mediate despite its limitations, recalling its role in the 2023 Iranā€“Saudi rapprochement. Israel, meanwhile, destroyed Syrian air defenses and sought to prevent a hostile Sunni coalition.

While normalization with Gulf states advanced under the Abraham Accords, Ruch doubts lasting peace without a Palestinian state. He warns that, absent such a resolution, hostility will fester and could erupt in future crises as severe as the infamous October 7 attack on Israelis in 2023.

The broken map

Singh and Ruch agree that Syria, as once defined, will not return. The Humpty Dumpty metaphor looms over their discussion: the old order is shattered and cannot be rebuilt. Whether Julani and his Turkish patrons can forge an inclusive and durable framework remains uncertain. Regional rivalries, sectarian divides and unresolved grievances threaten renewed instability. Yet the stakes are immense: the future of Syria will ripple across West Asia, Europe and the balance of global power.

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The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Josef Olmert: Hello. Hi to my watchers, to my readers, to my followers. This is the fourth and last in my short series on USā€“Israel relations. And the idea is really to lead us to the current situation with US President Donald J. Trump, his second administration, with a brief review of his first and the in-between period of the US presidency of Joseph Biden ā€” Joe Biden Jr. ā€” as president. And then weā€™ll come to the current situation, with the exception that I have to make already now: that we are in a situation that is unfolding. And there might be people who say, ā€œOh, itā€™s too early even to talk about USā€“Israel relations under Donald Trump.ā€ So what Iā€™m going to do is, therefore, to talk about what I consider to be situations that already are fully now results, and maybe inevitable results, of what we already discussed, and how they are happening right now ā€” not talked about, but happening.

Therefore, if we make any predictions for the future, they will be based on what I would consider to be a more solid ground. Thatā€™s about the methodics of all that. And I need to say, because I do get reactions, comments, responses from people who watch, read, and they are asking questions that lead me to say what Iā€™m saying to you now.

The American Jewish community and Israelā€™s image problem

Josef Olmert: So today, very briefly, just to remind you: In our previous episode, we discussed more in-depth processes, mostly in the American Jewish community, that led to changes in attitudes towards Israel. And we touched upon, therefore, what was happening in Israel at the same time that might have led to these changes in American attitude towards Israel, but also the rise of new movements in the US that were either more or less supportive of Israel. Of course, the evangelical Christians on the one end being more supportive; the left-wing, the progressive movement on the other side, in the Democratic Party mainly, that has been much more negative, still is, and becoming more and more negative.

And that brings us, really, to the situation that we are going to delve into in great detail today in our episode.

Trumpā€™s first term: populism, promises and policy shifts

Josef Olmert: And I would say to you that when President Trump was running for president in 2015, 2016, he was not taken seriously, not just by Jews, but also by ordinary America, of course, the commentators. And I cautioned people at the time ā€” itā€™s not like an ā€œI told you so, periodā€ ā€” but I cautioned people, because I talked to people about the significance of the politics of identities and populist politics altogether, in the unfolding political climate in the US, as well as in other Western democracies.

And by the way, I gave the comparison with Israel. I analyzed the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Bibi Netanyahu, at that time was already in his sixth year as prime minister in his second term, after the one that he was in from 1996 to 1999 ā€” this one was from 2009; we talk about 2015, 2016 ā€” that Netanyahu also succeeded in Israel with the politics of populism and identities. And this is a successful political card.

And Trump made promises about Israel, and everybody said, ā€œNo, I mean, »å“Ē²Ōā€™t take them seriously.ā€ And he fulfilled, to a large extent, a great deal of his promises. For example, the moving of the embassy to Jerusalem, which was, by the way, the policy of every American president before him, with the exception that they didnā€™t fulfill their decision because of whatever reason that they gave. That was basically based on the idea, ā€œYes, we say to the Israelis and to the Jews and to the pro-Israel community, we want to move the embassy ā€” but we canā€™t do it now.ā€

Trump did it. Trump also withdrew out of the Iran nuclear deal, as was expected by the Netanyahu government in Israel.

Let me say something here: Netanyahu was not wrong in his opposition to the nuclear deal as was devised by President Obamaā€™s administration. Where were the problems that he had, and they have to do with whatā€™s happening now, so therefore Iā€™m saying them now:

He didnā€™t know the limits of, or the ways in which to express, his opposition to the Obama administration policy, and therefore he made a terrible mistake of showing in Congress and giving his speech ā€” that was in March of 2015. In January of 2015, that is to say, two months before, the speech was announced by then-Speaker John Boehner. (By the way, I have a picture with John Boehner in my study, because I met him before ā€” I met many other people.) And I then cautioned from getting biting gifts ā€” I cautioned Netanyahu not to do the speech. That was a big mistake.

It comes back to what we discussed before in the previous episode about bipartisanship, or lack thereof, under Netanyahu. It was a big mistake.

The other mistake, which might have even been bigger, was that while he said no to the deal as was devised by Obama ā€” with the support of other powers, as part of Obamaā€™s internationalist policy ā€” he did not offer any alternative. He basically created the impression from day one that all he wanted was to see an American military operation against Iran ā€” or else to justify an Israeli one. But even then, he was not preparing one.

In 2011, the Israeli military establishment was waiting for a word from Netanyahu that he was giving the green light for an attack on Iran. He asked for three days to make a decision. He then said no. And there still are reports to that effect that even today, he basically did not approve all kinds of plans that were supposed to finance projects that were designed to improve technological abilities that were to be connected with an attack on Iran and so on and so forth.

So Netanyahu basically said to Trump, ā€œCancel the agreement, period,ā€ without offering an alternative.

Why is this important? Because itā€™s the same mistake he has done since the beginning of the war in Gaza, on the 7th of October 2023, to this very moment. While he said, ā€œno, no, no, no, no,ā€ to everything offered by other people, to other countries, including the best friends of Israel, he does not provide any alternative.

Then Trump, for example, said something which is again interesting: that when the US, with Israeli support, decided to eliminate the arch-terrorist Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, Netanyahu said yes. And then he said no, he would not be part of it. Which, by the way, caused ongoing damage in the relationship between him and Trump, because Trump ā€” and that we know already ā€” doesnā€™t like what seems to be weak people, leaders, losers. For Trump, the fact that Netanyahu did not show up in the end, as opposed to what Trump did, was an indication of lack of stamina, resolve, real determination.

But there were also examples of how Israel was so helpful to the American administration. For example, in the war against ISIS, I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t know how many of my watchers and listeners and readers remember that Trump, in public, said something that compromised the invaluable, great support that Israel gave to American intelligence to locate ISIS targets in Syria. Israelis were furious. But Trump said, ā€œHeā€™s a great friend.ā€

MAGA and the limits of right-wing support

Josef Olmert: Trump gave a lot of support also in the UN, the national organizations. But Trump also was the leader of MAGA, and thatā€™s the point that I want to emphasize here. And we saw it after the incident in Charlottesville ā€” if I even call it an incident, I believe what happened there in 2017, referring to ā€œgood people on both sides.ā€ I immediately wrote an in which I said, ā€œThere are no ā€˜both sidesā€™ where there are swastikas.ā€

When Trump referred to ā€œgood people on both sides,ā€ he also referred to those that were marching with people that waved the swastikas. That led me into discussion with myself about MAGA.

First of all, it was ā€œAmerica First,ā€ which was a bad memory to me. For those who remember history ā€” I mean, I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t remember it from that time, but I know it ā€” there was Charles Lindbergh with his America First Committee. That was basically a pro-Nazi domestic American organization that didnā€™t want America to join the Second World War. You can argue, ā€œOkay, he just used the words; he didnā€™t mean very much.ā€

The MAGA movement is a nativist movement. The MAGA movement is isolationist. When you look at the roots of the MAGA movement, when you look at the terminology used, the symbols used, the organizations that were at the forefront of the movement, you have to come to the conclusion that this movement cannot be the pro-Israel movement that existed in the past under the great US President Ronald Reagan ā€” when the world was divided according to the Cold War, and Israel was on that side, the good side. Or under US President George W. Bush, let alone previous presidents from before. Because their opinion about how the world is divided is totally different.

And nativist movements in America or in Europe, by definition, have more than a nucleus of antisemitism, because any movement which is also based on xenophobic feelings is bound to be antisemitic. And no antisemitic movement can be good to Jews, can be good to Israel. Itā€™s as simple as that.

And it was very convenient to many Israelis to accept the better sides of Trumpā€™s policies, but to ignore the roots of it that were based on assumptions and ideologies and terminologies which, as I said, by definition are not good to Jews and Israel.

And how many more times can I say it? How, with more decibels, stronger volume, to say it in order to make the point? Because it is a point that is still debated, even among Jews: What makes you really anti-Israel?

The MAGA movement was on the right side. The alternative to the MAGA movement as a mass mobilization political movement is the ā€œwokeā€ movement, which is, again, anti-Israel. The two most important political movements ā€” and I say movements, not parties ā€” in terms of mobilizing public opinion in the US from right and left, as developed in the last ten to 15 years, are not pro-Israel. And itā€™s just a question of time when these movements affect the political parties that they try to influence from the outside or by infiltrating from the inside. They already did it in the Democratic Party, and they are doing it now ā€” and have done it ā€” in the Republican Party.

And it will bring me to the current situation momentarily.

Bidenā€™s presidency and the fracturing of democratic support

Josef Olmert: Joseph Biden Jr. ā€” interesting fellow. I, by the way, met him personally: I had dinner with him in Tel Aviv in December of 2002, ahead of the invasion of Iraq. He came to visit the Middle East with a colleague from the Republican Party, Senator Chuck Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska who later became the moderate Republican defense secretary under US President Barack Obama; a much more moderate Republican than the Republican Party already at that time.

And Biden gave a brilliant prediction and analysis of what would happen in Iraq after the war. Because everybody knew there was going to be a war, the Bush administration would do it at that time. Much later on, I wrote an article in The Huffington Post, where I blogged for seven, eight years, praising Biden for the fact that he read and understood the situation in Iraq very properly. I also talked about the ethnic and sectarian divisions in all this.

The problem really is ā€” and this is not something that we need to develop in this particular episode, because itā€™s much beyond the topic that we are discussing ā€” Biden, who came to be president, was not the Biden of earlier years. And we understand it, Now we know more truth about it.

The Biden administration, from the beginning of its term, in all kinds of subtle ways that became much more obvious during the early stages of the war in Gaza ā€” and much later on, as the war dragged on ā€” developed the sense that we have problems with Israel. Exactly on the main core point of what the Israeli lobby and pro-Israeli lobbies all the time emphasized: that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a beacon of freedom, of human rights, of civility and all that comes with it.

The attack on Israel with regard to that was already at the time of Jimmy Carter. But who remembers Jimmy Carter? He was way back.

Now, Biden, whether wittingly or not ā€” I would say intentionally ā€” slowly, gradually, systematically, consistently built up the case in all kinds of ways, undermining this Israeli argument or claim to fame, if you will.

The forefront of it was whatā€™s called ā€œThe Squadā€ in the Democratic Party. And it was much beyond it. It infiltrated and crept into the trade union movement, the labor movement that in the past was one of the beacons of support for Israel; minority communities ā€” African Americans, but also Asian Americans, which is very interesting; Latinos ā€” tolerating the infiltration of Qatar and other states into universities in America, Saudi Arabia and others ā€” relying on people that were clearly not in the pro-Israel camp anymore, but were at various levels of being anti-Israel.

And the fact is that while still a majority of the Democratic caucus in the House voted with Israel, there was a growing number of the progressives that were already taking their distance. So you could see the cracks in the bipartisan coalition for Israel.

The Netanyahu speech was, in that case, a gift he gave to these people. A stupid gift. Terrible mistake, as I said.

Trumpā€™s second term: strategic ambiguity

Josef Olmert: The Trump administration these days ā€” letā€™s move on now. First of all, in the last campaign that brought Trump again to the presidency ā€” he didnā€™t even talk about Israel. He talked about Israel or the Middle East, made very, very superficial, almost insignificant comments or references. The promises were not there, you know.

Everybody took for granted that Trump is pro-Israel and will continue to be. The person that completely misread all this was Benjamin Netanyahu, again, in Jerusalem, believing that somehow Trump is going to be the same Trump of the first administration. He ignored the fact that in second administrations, presidents do tend to change.

I would remind people here that even Ronald Reagan ā€” a great friend and supporter of Israel ā€” he is the president that gave the first kosher certificate to the PLO before he left his second term. He was the one who authorized the beginning of official contact between the US and the PLO in 1989, as an example. But I can give you other examples.

Then came the inauguration, and I noticed something very interesting: While the inauguration was taking place, immediately afterward, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff ā€” I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t get into too many details about him and his connections with Qatar, all this I leave to investigative journalism ā€” but I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t need to get into investigative journalism to analyze what he said on Inauguration Day, about what would be the four main pillars of American policy in the Middle East, the name ā€œIsraelā€ was not mentioned. The name ā€œIranā€ was not mentioned. The name ā€œHamasā€ was not mentioned.

Remember, it is in January of 2025, and the war was already raging from October of 2023. That was the first red light.

But forget about this. Maybe it was a ceremonial occasion. You »å“Ē²Ōā€™t get into details, you just give main, big points and so on and so forth.

Gulf-centric policy and Israelā€™s marginalization

Then, of course, letā€™s see what has happened since then.

Some of his appointments have definitely been very pro-Israel. For example, Elise Stefanik, a congresswoman from New York, to be ambassador in the UN ā€” and she made the point already, before: Sheā€™s going to fight hard about anti-Israelism in the UN as the first, if not the most important, but one of the main missions. This appointment, by the way, was canceled for all the obscure reasons. Why did he cancel her appointment, arguing that, ā€œwe need her in Congress,ā€ when he did not cancel other appointments of people that had to resign from Congress and lead to early elections? I mean elections like in Florida. Well, Iā€™m just leaving you with the question.

Ambassador Mike Huckabee ā€” great, great supporter of Israel, thereā€™s no question about it. But was he appointed as a policymaker? Or as the person that is supposed to say the good stuff to the Israelis, as opposed to the leaks coming consistently from the White House that are the bad stuff? Good cop, bad cop? Yeah ā€” I leave my audience with this question.

All kinds of other appointments ā€” I was skeptical about Pete Hegseth as defense secretary, for all kinds of reasons. I was skeptical about National Security Advisor Mike Waltz for all kinds of reasons. I did welcome the appointment, of course, of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, for all kinds of reasons.

But ā€” you know ā€” instead of getting into every little detail, like this appointment, that appointment, letā€™s try to talk about three or four particular issues that are typical of what has happened, and still is happening, and would lead me, therefore, to a conclusion at the end of this discussion.

Take, for example, the question of fighting terrorism. Proud American President Donald Trump surrendered. Yes, he surrendered to the Houthis in Yemen. He gave up to terrorists because he allows them, maybe even encourages them indirectly, to keep attacking Israel, but not attacking America. Sure, itā€™s a pro-American move: ā€œWe »å“Ē²Ōā€™t attack America.ā€ But is it a pillar of your foreign policy to abandon a friend and ally like that?

Cautionizing, legitimizing attacks on Israel by saying, ā€œYou can do that. What can I do?ā€

Donald Trump started the negotiations with Iran with changing views about what the demands from Iran are. And we still »å“Ē²Ōā€™t know the final outcome of all that. But if the final outcome would be that Iran is still allowed to maintain a nuclear program ā€” even for civilian purposes ā€” it means that he doesnā€™t do anything different than what the Obama administration did.

Donald Trump put pressure on Israel to stop the war in Lebanon, exactly at the time when Hezbollah was ready to get the final blow from Israel. Yes, in the Lebanese situation, after 11 months of relative inaction by Israel, finally, Netanyahu, under pressure, decided to take the initiative. And it paid off so well to Israel, because this was the area in which you can talk specifically about the total defeat, almost, of the terrorists. Why ā€œalmost?ā€ Because something else was needed to finalize the job. And then the American administration put a stop to it.

Donald Trump promised hell to Hamas in Gaza if they »å“Ē²Ōā€™t release all the hostages within a short period of time. Nothing of this happened, of course. Edan Alexander was released ā€” it is great news, fantastic news ā€” but he is one hostage and an American citizen, which is also raising questions about the division between Americans and Israelis. You fight terrorism, you fight terrorism ā€” it is one problem.

And I can go on with some more examples like this.

Where does it come from? Where was the Israeli reaction? And therefore, how do we put it all in perspective? Where it comes from is Trumpā€™s version of isolationism. And many people will say itā€™s great, itā€™s a good American interest. So if thatā€™s an American interest, not to get into war almost at all cost, I will be the last one to criticize it. But I need to mention it in the context of the Middle East. Because what does it mean? It means that we tolerate the terrorists, that we coexist with them. And for the sake of clarity, I will refer not just to people like the Houthis or Hezbollah or Hamas, but Iran.

Donald Trump doesnā€™t really care, apparently, about the fact that these systems will continue to exist. If he believes that by coming to some accommodation with them, he will be able to tame them, thatā€™s a terrible, terrible mistake. Taming the shrew ā€” ah! Impossible.

But if it falls into the basic tenets of how he views American isolationism and his supporters, then I can understand that there are implications.

Donald Trump wants political solutions that will be short-sighted ā€” short of one situation that he raised and then did nothing about, which I immediately criticized, arguing itā€™s not going to happen because itā€™s just not even a half-baked cake. This is the talk about removing all the people of Gaza. Itā€™s ā€” let me use a non-diplomatic word ā€” nonsensical.

But what helps him in that is that, yes, he has done already now some things that are very pro-Israel. He unfroze the embargo on arms to Israel that was basically imposed by Biden. He ordered his people in the UN organizations to continue to support Israel, even though it hasnā€™t yet come to any big test, like, say, a resolution in the Security Council about possible sanctions against Israel. That remains to be seen.

And at the same time, he makes it very clear that the focal countries of his new policy in the Middle East are the Gulf states: Saudi Arabia and Qatar, mainly, and the UAE, because they have something that Israel doesnā€™t have. They have the resources, the money.

And to give a kosher certificate, for example, to Qatar is the total opposite of anything which is like fighting terrorism. It is the greatest possible encouragement of terrorism because of what Qatar is and who the Qataris are. Itā€™s as simple as this.

Israelā€™s paralysis and the waning American umbrella

Josef Olmert: What helps him with all that is ā€” and that brings me back to what we already discussed ā€” the total paralysis of the government of Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu has no alternatives to anything, has no proposals to anything, has no initiatives ā€” because he cannot do anything if he wants to maintain his current coalition, which is based on some lunatic ā€” I would say lunatic ā€” extreme right-wing parties, led by Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Israeli Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich. And for Netanyahu, this is the number one interest.

So even if Netanyahu were to change a little bit on all kinds of issues, or even to a large extent, it may not have changed completely the overall perspective that Trump has about how he should do his own policies and conduct them. But when Netanyahu does nothing and offers nothing, it makes it so much easier.

And that is the same mistake that Netanyahu has done throughout his political career ā€” and definitely when it came also to the Obama administration: to say no with great, polished English is all very nice and easy. But to say yes requires courage, resolve, determination, leadership, which he lacks.

And what happens now is that because of the distance that is being created between Trump and Israel ā€” heā€™s in the Middle East, but not in Israel. Heā€™s praising Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, heā€™s meeting the terrorists like Mohammad al-Julani in Syria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the model countries for relations with the US. More and more countries are encouraged now to take more and more anti-Israel positions because they believe that the balance is changing. The umbrella of defense provided to Israel by the US is weakening, if not in the process of disappearing ā€” which is, again, something very bad to Israel.

A troubling future for USā€“Israel relations

Josef Olmert: I can go on and on. I think Iā€™ve said enough to lead me to interim conclusions.

Beware, Israel. The second administration of Donald J. Trump is going to be the greatest challenge to Israeli foreign policy in our memory, definitely in my memory. And Iā€™m not a young person.

Israel will have to understand that America is changing. And with it are changes in American foreign policy, also in the Middle East.

And I will sharpen the point here by saying: The changes about Israel between this administration of Trump and the first one ā€” in terms of the action but also the image, the perceptions ā€” are just so important. These changes will not be the ones that will lead to a rebellion against Trump in the Republican Party, even by the greatest supporters of Israel, short of maybe a few. If there will be a rebellion against him, but it will be over other issues: the effect of the tariffs, the economic situation, the index of living, inflation, success or failure on the southern border and so on and so forth.

And thatā€™s where we are standing, from the perspective of being in Israel now with less and less bipartisan support. If the Republican administration is the one that is changing the way I described, Israel cannot expect the Democrats to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Israel. That could not happen.

So I have to leave my audience with this perspective: that for those who care about Israel and for Israel ā€” and Iā€™m one of them, of course ā€” this is a very troubling, pessimistic, but I believe realistic assessment of the situation.

Thank you all.

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March 18ā€™s United Nations Security Council spotlighted that divide. US Interim Ambassador Dorothy Shea was the only representative to accuse Hamas rather than Israel of breaking the ceasefire, reigniting hostilities and worsening an already catastrophic humanitarian disaster in Gaza. Similarly, Israel and the US stand alone at first glance in supporting US President Donald Trumpā€™s vision of Gaza as a high-end beachfront real estate void of much of its indigenous population.

The rest of the international community supports the Arab worldā€™s alternative plan that calls for an end to the war, an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the creation of a Palestinian interim administration of the Gaza Strip and the temporary resettlement of Gazans in safe zones in Gaza. Meanwhile, the war-ravaged territory is reconstructed to the tune of $53 billion.

So far, it all seems straightforward. But dig a little deeper, and the fault lines begin to blur.

UAEā€“Israeli alignment

A series of persistent but unconfirmed reports suggest that the United Arab Emirates may be privately more in sync with Israel than with its Arab brethren regarding Hamas and Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not the only Middle Eastern leader infuriated by a last month between a senior US negotiator and Hamas. It was the first ever face-to-face US engagement with the group, which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and a terrorist organization by US designation. So was UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed, a staunch opponent of Islamist groups.

UAE ambassador to the US, Yousef al-Otaiba, a close associate of Bin Zayed, US President Donald Trumpā€™s administration to reject the Arab plan for Gaza drafted by Egypt and adopted unanimously at a March 4 Arab summit in Cairo. Privately, UAE officials have complained that the plan failed to call for the disarming of Hamas and its removal from Gaza. Bin Zayed did not attend the conference, sending his deputy prime minister instead.

In February, al-Otaiba described Trumpā€™s call for the resettlement of Gazaā€™s 2.3 million Palestinians as ā€œdifficultā€ and ā€œchallenging.ā€ But when asked whether the UAE was working on a plan for Gaza, al-Otaiba responded, despite Egyptā€™s draft of the Arab plan already having been circulated, ā€œNot yet. I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t see an alternative to whatā€™s being proposed. I really .ā€

Meanwhile, Emirates Leaks, a mysterious website critical of the Emirati government, asserted that the UAE had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade South Africa to withdraw or at least weaken the genocide case against Israel it filed in the International Court of Justice. The report could not be independently confirmed.

Lines blur further

In an even greater blurring of the fault lines, the UAE, alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is the largest shareholder in an investment firm headed by Jared Kushner, Trumpā€™s son-in-law, with stakes in Israeli financial services group Phoenix Holding. The Holding is in businesses listed by the United Nations Human Rights Council as operating in West Bank settlements deemed illegal under international law.

In a seemingly bizarre muddying of the lines, Netanyahu has kicked up a political storm with his firing of Ronen Bar, the head of Israelā€™s domestic Shin Bet security service. He did this in part for Barā€™s members of the prime ministerā€™s staff for their dealings with Qatar.

Netanyahuā€™s former spokesperson, Eli Feldstein, allegedly worked for a Doha-based firm that recruited Israeli journalists to write pro-Qatar stories. Two other Netanyahu staffers, Jonatan Urich and Yisrael Einhorn, allegedly helped Qatar bolster its image ahead of the Gulf stateā€™s hosting of the 2022 World Cup.

In late March, Israeli police two suspects in the case accused of bribery, fraud, breach of trust, money laundering and illegal contact with a foreign agent. The suspects were not identified under a gag order placed on investigation details.

The staffersā€™ activities countered Netanyahuā€™s long-standing efforts to tarnish Qatarā€™s reputation and undermine its mediation role. The staffers Qatar to fund the Hamas government in Gaza to weaken the Palestinian polity by perpetuating the rift between the group and the West Bank-based, internationally recognized Palestine Authority.

The blurred lines contribute to Israelā€™s ability to do what it wants with the Trump administrationā€™s backing, even if its actions violate agreements. One such agreement is the Gaza ceasefire, negotiated with the help of the US, Qatar and Egypt, and accepted by Israel. The blur also enhances Israel and the USā€™s ability to blame Hamas for the ceasefireā€™s collapse.

Extending the ceasefire

In the latest iteration of efforts to get the ceasefire back on track, Hamas agreed to an Egyptian to reinstate the Gaza ceasefire. Per the proposal, Hamas must swap up to six Israeli hostages and the remains of an unspecified number killed during the war. In exchange, Israeli officials will release Palestinians incarcerated in Israel, initiate negotiations on ending the war and lift the Israeli blockade. This blockade has prevented humanitarian aid from entering Gaza and cut off the supply of electricity in recent weeks.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Hamas Political Bureau member Bassem Naim said the groupā€™s acceptance of a 50-day extension of the ceasefireā€™s first phase was dependent on the mediators, the US, Qatar and Egypt, guaranteeing that all parties would engage in serious second-phase negotiations that would bring an end to the war and Israelā€™s withdrawal from the Strip.

The problem is that whatever guarantee the mediators may give is unlikely to be worth the paper it would be written on. The US is the only country capable of pressuring Israel to comply.

ā€œThere is no force on the planet prepared to give Hamas assurances that if they give up their only card ā€” the dead and living hostages ā€” Israel would agree to all of its obligations. Hamas understands what Trump and Netanyahu are doing with the phases. Theyā€™re Hamas of the cards it has left,ā€ said veteran Middle East peace negotiator Aaron David Miller, who worked for both Democratic and Republican administrations.

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Three combined levels of innovation

Modern, interconnected lifestyles prevalent by 2050 will demand that mobility performs as a seamlessly integrated service. It will be expected to work behind the scenes to the movement of people, goods and services from source to destination. Imagine a future where a low-speed, golf cart-styled neighborhood buggy shows up precisely when you are leaving for work. The buggy drops you off at the bus stop, where an automated people mover is already waiting to drop off passengers at the nearest metro station, where a train already awaits at the platform. This chain of convenient transit continues until you reach your destination.

Orchestrating such a service for millions of users all throughout the day has been impossible so far. But with advances in quantum computing, the explosion in computing capacity and real time, all-pervasive connectivity, it could happen. Mass personalization and optimization will become a reality through combined innovations at three levels.

The first level will be intelligent, aware, electric and autonomous vehicles. Solid-state batteries will become mainstream, causing battery weight and charging times to improve. As a result, all vehicles will become . Solar panels made perovskite and similar materials will lead to smaller panels and higher power generation; solar-powered vehicles will reduce the demand for grid charging.

Connectivity will have improved in speed, bandwidth and latency. With high-speed broadband cellular networks available, intelligent edge computing will work seamlessly with cloud quantum computing to make safe, real-time operations possible. Capitalizing on this, new types of vehicles will be created, suited for various usage environments. These will range from housing complexes and neighborhoods at the local levels, to newer modes like electric Vertical, Take-Off and Landing aircraft (eVTOLs) for intracity and intercity travel.

The second level will be smart, interactive and adaptive infrastructure. Vehicle-to-infrastructure communication will become widespread across all levels in intelligent cities ā€” from housing complexes to neighborhoods to local roads, highways and expressways. Real-time awareness of congestion, weather and road conditions, as well as communication to vehicles, will improve user safety, responsiveness and convenience.

The third level will be integrated digital mobility fabric and e-mobility backbone. Advanced countries will create an integrated digital mobility fabric that will be supported by a digital e-mobility backbone, enabling users and mobility service providers to engage with each other. Such a cloud-based backbone service will become a utility for autonomous e-mobility and will require governments and the industry to create standards for mobility services. These standards must encapsulate existing and newly developed ones to fill in any gaps. They will enable customers and service providers to seamlessly plug in and discover each other through an optimized service.

Mobility needed for an aging world

The foundational tasks for orchestrating mobility vehicles on the intelligent infrastructure will become as reliable as any other utility. When that happens, it will unlock productivity, personalization and convenience at unprecedented levels. This will reduce the demand for parking spaces by 90% or more, reduce collisions and deaths by 90% and increase productivity by recapturing the commute time. Additionally, new business models like mobile clinics, mobile offices, mobile kitchens and many other personalized services will become feasible.

These innovations are not only wishful, but a requirement given the worldā€™s aging population. By 2050, the population of people aged 65 or older is projected to nearly double from 771 million in 2022 to 1.5 billion. The number of people above age 80 is expected to from 137 million in 2017 to 425 million. In the United States alone, there will 386,000 people over age 100 ā€” that is over a quarter of Hawaiiā€™s . The ratio of women to men in the older age population will to 54-59%. With the decline in the working age population across most of the world, the availability of autonomous e-mobility services will help determine the quality of life for much of society.

Qatar has already made impressive foundational investments. The country has leaned on its Qatar National 2030 and created a comprehensive Transportation Master Qatar (TMPQ) to support it. By bringing the TMPQ to life through the creation of a digital mobility fabric and digital e-mobility backbone, Qatar will likely cement its leadership in this space. It may even set standards for the world to follow.

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A large business partner for Germany

Over the years, Qatar and Germany have considerable bilateral ties. Germany ships billions of eurosā€™ worth of civilian and military equipment to Qatar, and Qatar sends Germany a huge amount of gas in return. In addition, Qatari funds flood the German economy.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU a huge list of sanctions against Russia. About 27% of Germany’s energy from natural gas, of which 55% came from Russia before the invasion. It is clear why Germany began to scramble to find a new supply of gas.

New energy supply mean Qatar will up to 2 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas per year to Germany for 15 years starting in 2026. Because of this, the Qatariā€“German relationship has jumped from considerable to strategic. It has also enabled Germany to break free of Russian gas supplies. The completion of the Qatari deal led German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to : ā€œThese are long-term contracts. This is also a good statement for the security of Germany’s energy supply.ā€ They slash German dependency on Russian energy by a factor of four.

Speaking to Qatar News Agency, Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry Chairman Khalifa bin Jassim Al Thani that Germany is one of Qatarā€™s largest trading partners, as the volume of trade exchange between the two countries increased last year to 6.8 billion Qatari riyals ($1.87 billion), compared to 6.4 billion riyals ($1.76 billion) in 2020. Khalifa bin Jassim also mentioned the increasing mutual investments between the two countries. The immense income generated by the trade enables this small, autocratic Middle Eastern country to finance itself comfortably. The new energy supply agreement is bound to this trade exchange considerably.

With the Qatar energy deals and financial investments, Germany has taken another step towards securing its economy, but at the cost of placing itself under Qatari influence. This risks Germany being associated with ongoing investigations and tarnishing its image.

Not as peace-oriented and compliant as it may claim

Since the emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, came to power in 2013, he has put major efforts into brushing up the image of Qatar. He aims to present the picture of a modern, moderate and reputable international partner. Ranging from infrastructure to sports, Qatar has spared no effort in connecting with Western powers. Al Jazeera Media Network, which receives funding from the Qatari government, is also a massive influence asset, with its global presence.

This quest for respectability, of course, included changing domestic policies. Following the UN Human Rights committee in 2014, Qatar two major international treaties guaranteeing basic rights for workers, namely foreign ones, after years of blatant abuse. Western partners and the UN unanimously these progressive developments, but they are showing their limits today.

These reforms also afforded Qatar a level of influence that is disconnected from its actual demographic, economic and military power. (An exception is in the case of gas exports to Germany, where Qatar actually does yield considerable power.) Qatar’s public relations efforts were overall successful. Politico editor Jamie Dettmer : ā€œFor a small Gulf emirate located on a spit of desert jutting into the Persian Gulf, Qatar has long punched way above its weight in the corridors of Western power.ā€

These efforts have successfully gone beyond classic public relations campaigns. In 2022, the EU underwent a . It became apparent that Qatari corruption efforts had penetrated all the way to the heart of democratic institutions. Timo Lange, an expert with LobbyControl, : ā€œSeveral MPs and a former EU commissioner were supposed to exert influence on behalf of the governments of Qatar and Morocco and receive large sums of money in return.ā€ As more and more news outlets began to investigate the matter, Qatarā€™s practices came to light.

Der Spiegel an investigation in June 2023 about suspicions of corruption surrounding German electronics and defense subcontractor Hensoldt. It described how several German companies, with Hensoldt as the subcontractor to Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), discreetly worked with several intermediaries for Qatar. The main one that KMW and Hensoldt worked with was Multi Services Company (MSC) ā€” a Qatari company providing various services to aid businesses in expanding their operations.

MSC is 70% owned by a relative of a military general who is part of the Al Thani family and 30% owned by an investment fund for Qatar’s armed forces. This goes against Hensoldt’s own policy of not working with companies who are ā€œdirectly or indirectly owned or otherwise controlled or managed by Public Officials or politically exposed persons.ā€ There were also questions of whether bribes were made to military personnel involved in the transactions between the businesses, but Hensoldt vehemently denies this.

Finally, Qatarā€™s support to Islamic fundamentalist movements is to all. They have provided financial support to extremist and terrorist groups, harbored their exiled leaders and supported them diplomatically. They have done this with Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Bahraini Shia opposition groups. Qatar also still funds a large number of media outlets that support the Brotherhood’s ideologies.

On October 7, 2023, the military arm of Hamas launched an attack on Israel, killing almost people and taking roughly 250 people as hostages. Israel responded with an invasion, intent on rescuing the hostages and destroying the Hamas military. Qatar seized the diplomatic opportunity to act as a ā€œā€ in the region, given its numerous pre-existing ties with Hamas.

Scholz accepted this position of respectability, but it does not well with many other German officials. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, a representative of the Free Democratic Party, which is often in coalition with the CDU, the relationship with Qatar acceptable only to increase the chance of hostage release, and demands it be readjusted in the long run: ā€œNevertheless, this conversation with the Chancellor is unfortunately necessary in order to hopefully free as many hostages as possible from the clutches of the terrorist group.ā€

These oppositions could snowball and reignite critical voices, which were heard during the and following the gas supply . ā€œFollowing the preventable human rights catastrophes of the Sochi Olympics, Russiaā€™s World Cup, the Beijing Winter Olympics and the Qatar World Cup, Germany should step up and tie funding to transparency and adopting and implementing human rights policies,ā€ Wenzel Michalski, Germany director at Human Rights Watch. Large international events, such as the Olympics, have systematically highlighted that human rights were not universally upheld and stressed how democratic nations such as Germany should use their economic and diplomatic power to protect minorities and the rule of law.

Will Qatar go down the same road as Saudi Arabia and Turkey?

Saudi Arabia, Qatarā€™s neighbor, has already been down this road. For decades, the West created and maintained close ties with that Arabian kingdom, which it saw as a key partner in the region. There were many collaborations ranging from strategic to infrastructural and military. In 2019, Germany, along with many other nations, an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia following the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

As time went by, Germany revealed itself as even more strict and demanding with Saudi Arabia than other European nations. Others, such as the , did not impose full embargos. Germany based its position, among other reasons, on alleged human rights violations in the Yemen war. The German Bundestag made the decision to military supplies to Saudi Arabia. Although this has in recent times, no doubt it could do the same with Qatar.

At a more moderate but comparable level, Germany has been Turkey to act more in accordance with international standards and has embargos to enforce its policy in the past.

In 2013, Qatar 62 Leopard 2 tanks, one of the worldā€™s most advanced models produced by German firm KMW. As the operator, Qatar is highly dependent upon maintenance and supplies from Germany, in order to keep its military potential intact. Any further violations of international law, corruption practices and complacent attitudes towards minority discriminations from Qatar could lead Germany to limit interactions.

This could go as far as severing contractual ties, thus reducing Qatar’s military power for the duration of a military program. A military program, which spans from the political initiation to acquire or develop a new weapons system to the retirement of said equipment, can last over 40 years, making military potential highly vulnerable to momentum breakdown.

As a major defense equipment exporter, Germany has the ability to influence partners towards respecting human rights. In cases of violence and injustice, silence amounts to complicity, something the German foreign policy has pledged not to do. This is in no small part due to Germanyā€™s painful past and responsibility for the Holocaust, a mass psychological feature named Kollektivschuld (collective guilt).

Qatar is putting less effort into its disguise as it gains power and self-confidence. That said, its true nature never changed. The small Gulf state is still a monarchical dictatorship, with no intention to align itself with international standards and respect basic human rights, save a few cosmetic reforms, designed to play along with Western diplomacy. Europe of this ā€” Germany most of all ā€” when confronted with the dubious respect for minority rights Qatar displayed during the FIFA World Cup. The above-mentioned EU corruption scandal, dubbed Qatargate or the Qatarstrophe, also considerably damaged the Gulf nationā€™s image and put the German government under pressure.

In 2023, Der Spiegel economy minister Robert Habeck in a way that reflected the German publicā€™s incomprehension of the gap between their nationā€™s stance and practices: ā€œMr. Habeck, in 2022, you had to beg the emir of Qatar to sell Germany natural gas, coal-fired power plants had to be brought back online and you were forced to extend the lifespans of nuclear power plants in the country. As a member of the Green Party and as German economics and climate minister, it must have been an awful year for you.ā€

Germany is attached to its influential image and will need to protect it, even as it seeks to replace formerly necessary Russian relations. The new strategy places Germany at the center of international attention, making it crucial for Berlin to align its values and its factual choices.

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Widely seen as giving China a grip on Qatari gas, the deal is as much a commercial agreement as it is a security arrangement. It acknowledges China as the Gulf stateā€™s foremost export market and gives China a stake in protecting Qatar.

Qatar is not alone in giving China preferential access to its energy reserves. So do other major Gulf exporters, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for whom China has become their foremost market.

Qatar has close ties with the US

The difference is that Qatarā€™s energy dealings with China are embedded in a policy that broadly aligns the Gulf state with the United States, emphasizes the Gulf stateā€™s utility as a go-between, and avoids ruffling feathers.

In contrast, Saudi Arabia and the UAE stress their independence, on occasion counter or distance themselves from the policies of the United States, the region’s security guarantor, and sometimes poke the US in the eye.

Last month, the contrast was on full display. While UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed raised eyebrows as the only to attend the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani flew under the radar a week later when he Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

Bin Zayed ā€œhas made a sport out of the Biden administrationā€™s efforts to repair the relationshipā€ between the United States and the UAE. ā€œOf course, from his own perspective, Bin Zayed has proved himself a loyal partner to the United States time and again, but of late has had little to show for it,ā€ said scholars Jonathan Lord and Airona Baigal.

In a further illustration of the contrast, Qatar arranged a between a senior Venezuelan and US official last month to improve strained relations resulting from the United Statesā€™ recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuelaā€™s legitimate president and US sanctions against the South American state.

Officials said the talks could lead to a prisoner swap.

ā€œGetting involved in Venezuela is a high-reward/low-risk . By offering its services, Doha is consolidating its emerging reputation as a global diplomatic go-between, helping Washington in several particularly politically sensitive areas,” said Eldar Mamedov, a Brussels-based foreign policy expert.

A seemingly unlikely candidate to mediate in a region with which it has no ethnic or religious affinity, Qatar was well-positioned because it had neither joined a large number of governments recognizing Guaido nor adhered to the sanctions. Qatarā€™s refusal failed to upset Washington.

Similarly, Qatar hosts a Taliban office at the United Statesā€™ request. Hosting facilitated the 2021 negotiated US withdrawal from Afghanistan and since then. With the withdrawal underway, Qatar, like the UAE, provided significant logistical assistance.

Furthermore, Qatar, at times, between the United States and Iran and serves as a postman relaying messages between the two countries.

At the same time, Qatar, unlike the UAE, has not emerged as a for Russians seeking to circumvent US and European sanctions, including Russiaā€™s Wagner Group, or suspected criminals and corrupt officials.

As a result, the US has sanctioned Emirati rather than Qatari companies for violating US sanctions on and Iran. Moreover, Emirati freewheeling has landed the UAE on the of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering watchdog.

Furthermore, Qatar has ensured that it is less dependent on Chinese telecommunications technology that the United States fears could give China access to US technology embedded in American weapons systems and other security projects.

Last year, the US rewarded Qatar, home to the largest US military base in the Middle East, by awarding major non-NATO ally .

UAE and Saudi Arabia do not love the US the same way

To be sure, the and have been helpful, most recently negotiating prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine. In the past, the UAE contributed troops to support the United States in Afghanistan.

The different Gulf state approaches are rooted in Qatar’s response to the failed 3.5-year-long UAE-Saudi-led economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state. The embargo was lifted in early 2021 without the Gulf state caving in to demands that would have put Qatar under Emirati and Saudi tutelage.

During the boycott, Qatar significantly tightened its security relationship and cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism finance.

As a result, Qatari perceptions of relations with the United States differ from the Saudi and Emirati experience.

Ali Shihabi, a Saudi commentator with close ties to the Saudi ruling elite, noted that the kingdom ā€œhas over the years, from its infancy before the Second World War to a more self-confident G-20 country secure in its place in the world today.ā€

Saudi attitudes have been compounded by perceptions that “the US security umbrella has been weakened as far as Saudi Arabia is concernedā€¦ (That) convinced Saudi leaders that they had to look elsewhere to guarantee their security,” Shihabi said. He was referring to a US refusal to come to the kingdom’s aid when Iran in 2019 attacked Saudi oil facilities. He was also referring to a US cutoff of arms and ammunition sales because of the Saudi intervention in Yemen.

Emirati officials similar complaints about US reluctance to respond to Iranian-inspired attacks.

In the same vein, Karen Elliot House, an expert on the kingdom, quoted a Saudi minister as saying in March in a closed-door conference: “You tell us not to talk to Russia, your opponent, but you are talking to Iran, our opponent. You say don’t buy Chinese weapons. ‘Do you have an alternative,’ we ask? ‘Yes,’ you say, ‘but we can’t sell it to you.'”

Another minister told the gathering, “You said you were behind us in our war in Yemen, but you proved a no-show.”

House, referring to Bin Salman by his initials, added, “The Crown Prince is making a virtue of relying less on a reluctant US to protect his nationā€¦ MBS is skillfully playing a t of great power poker to benefit Saudi Arabia.ā€

Even so, North America remains a primary investment target of Emirati and Saudi sovereign wealth funds. Last year, the US$829 billion Abu Dhabi Investment Authority between 45 and 60% of its investments to North America.

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ā€œUndeniably, yes,ā€ its defenders would answer, gesturing to the way in which the sport unifies people of diverse backgrounds and with totally different characteristics. They might also note how football has brought prosperity to areas of the world that might otherwise remain deprived. And brought not just entertainment but an unusual type of gratification to populations that lack other forms of reward. I made this point recently on BBC Radio4ā€™s Moral Maze (you can listen).

Football has other virtues: it encourages camaraderie, teamwork and mutual respect. In recent decades, the sport has encouraged and promoted the participation of groups that have traditionally been marginalized or excluded from mainstream sports and, indeed, society. As well as women, football integrates disabled people and, unlike many other sports, has no restrictions on transgender players.

The Magic and the Dangers of Football

The anguish of being a football fan is this: everything else in life is unexciting and sublunary by comparison. Football fans are used to this. Going to a game means to be transported beyond the range of normal experience and, for two or more hours, feeling exalted and newly alive. Other sports offer similarly thrilling sensations but without the added exhilaration, the fieriness or the occasional delirium. Paradoxically, many of the features of footballā€™s unique formula are unwelcome outside the stadium and, often, inside too. Footballā€™s is an edgy, hostile environment, where fury, antagonism and belligerence are natural elements: they combine agreeably but dangerously. We wouldnā€™t want them all of the time. Life would be too treacherous. For a couple of hours, though, danger is fine.

Street Grit and Messi Magic Lead Argentina to Glory

The passion football fans feel is unparalleled. A heavyweight title fight, the Super Bowl, an Olympic track final, and a few other sports events provoke an intense arousal among fans, but footballā€™s pleasures are unique. Thatā€™s because of its history. Football was never supposed to be a sport: its origins lie in annual struggles between pre-industrial English villages or neighborhoods. The skirmishes were arranged confrontations involving physical conflict, weapons and injuries. Over time, rough-hewn rules gave the battles order, and eventually they were refined into football. There were a great many variants, but, by the end of the nineteenth century, just two remained: association football and rugby (which itself was divided into two codes).

The distinction between players and spectators didnā€™t exist in more primitive forms of what became association football and, even after the formation of the Football Association in 1863, observers were probably invested, as weā€™d say today. In their heads, the club they were rooting for was their club: owners were merely custodians. As the sport spread to continental Europe and Central and South America, the proprietorial sensibility spread, as did the feverish atmosphere. And ugliness too.

The violence associated with football was an outgrowth of the attachment fans felt for their clubs. Fighting was simply part of the continuum of normal behavior. It disappeared briefly and understandably after the Second World War, but recrudesced in the 1970s. While there are still violent undercurrents at football games anywhere in the world, they remain thatā€”below the surface. The reason for this is the gentrification of the sport that started in the early 1990s. Before then, few games were televised live, playersā€™ earnings were relatively modest and fans were raucous. Then, TV networks created subscription channels and clubs became content providers rather than bastions of local pride and gateways to community tradition.

Football appeared to become a different creature. Fansā€™ inclinations changed, though without being sanitized. Racism is one of the sobering reminders that, for all its modernizations, footballā€™s regressive features will not die easily. Their persistent presence continues to haunt the game and issues reminders that traditions, even the lamentable ones, are like clumsy thievesā€” they leave fingerprints.

Why Football Has a Racism Problem and How to Solve It

Codes of Silence

Football is not alone in harboring sex offenders, though the number of horrifying cases of in recent years invites speculation on how long this kind of exploitation has been going on and whether the sport has employed a code of silence. It is not alone in this respect and many other sports, including gymnastics, swimming, athletics, basketball, and hockey, have been embarrassed by their failures to protect children and adolescents.

Another code of silence is thought to suppress gay male players, who typically wait until their competitive careers are over before declaring their sexual inclinations. In so doing, they perpetuate the myth that football culture is homophobic and intolerant of LGBTQ+ concerns. The womenā€™s game is exactly the opposite. Indeed, womenā€™s football has developed into a for gay rights. Reality differs from myth: 95% of fans are decidedly not homophobic and most would prefer gay male players to come out. My own research in and confirms fans reject the popular characterization of football culture but suspect there are obstacles. They conjecture coaches, managers, agents, and football club owners prohibit gay players from being honest. Their reasons for doing so remain opaque, but probably derive from concerns (however unfounded) about the market viability of openly gay male players.

It could be argued that a different sort of code of silence operates in the administrative offices of football too. Certainly, the staggering amount of corruption revealed in recent years indicates that many senior officers of FIFA, the sportsā€™ governing organization, were loyal to an oath of “Ē³¾±š°ł³ŁĆ  for decades, aware of countless bribes and kickbacks but unwilling to blow the whistle. As the sport commercialized, the rights to host and broadcast major tournaments became valuable and were pursued with the kind of zeal associated with the most tenacious players. But while playersā€™ fouls were visible to all, administratorsā€™ dishonesty was barely perceptible, at least to those who were not involved.

A sprawling dating from 2015 and still ongoing resulted in scores of convictions, imprisonments and resignations. The awkward question of whether the corporatization of football had brought with it dishonesty was answered. It was like lifting a rock to discover the insect life beneath it. The creepy-crawlies were footballā€™s officials and politicians. And just think: players who were prone to fouling were often called ā€œdirty.ā€

Iā€™m not naĆÆve enough to think other sports are any different: All major sports respond to the clink of coin. This is why the most benevolent paymasters have been able to draw not only football, but golf, Formula 1, boxing and other major sports to the Gulf States. Many complain that football is selling its soul to billionaire sheikhs, but that presumes there was ever a soul to sell: Association football has been a professional sport since 1885 (baseball in the US was already professional by then), so the sport has always been more about lucre than love (the word ā€œamateurā€ is from the Latin ā€œamatorā€, meaning ā€œloverā€).

Like practically everything else that brings pleasure, including gambling, junk food, social media and TV-binging, football secretes harm. When reminded of this, everyone looks away. At least fans do. For them, football is like nothing else on earth: the joys it brings overpower everything. To others, itā€™s one of many pointless distractions that take peopleā€™s minds off of the things that really affect their material lives. And for still others, it is a once-great sport, now made presentable and incorporated into the entertainment industry.

Theyā€™re all right. If football had been a uniformly good force, it wouldnā€™t have had its thumping impact on cultural history. Itā€™s the doubtfulness that keeps people ruminating. While people are thinking, talking and philosophizing, the sport stays at the fore. The instant they stop, football becomes just another sport.

[Ellis Cashmore is co-editor of.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Is Football a Force for Good or Evil? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Potential for Mediation in Afghanistan 

Afghanistan was once the venue for the . The British Empire and the Soviet Union jostled for influence here. Today, external articles are involved too. Pakistan, the US, India, Iran, Russia, Turkey, China and the EU are involved in one way or another in Afghanistan. There are many organizations, regions and ethnic groups jostling for power as well.

With so many actors in the conflict, Afghanistan needs a neutral mediator. In the past, the likes of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran have tried to mediate but failed because they were unable to remain neutral. Qatar, however, is a neutral player in Afghanistan and its efforts deserve a closer look. 

Complicated Past but Profitable Future

Earlier mediation efforts by Qatar did not prevent the Talibanā€™s dramatic takeover in Afghanistan but Qatarā€™s leverage is considerable. Economic factors, neutrality, security, branding, and friendly connections with conservative Islamists make Qatar uniquely positioned to be a successful mediator. 

In the last two decades, Qatar sought to make an impact on the international stage by playing mediation roles since it lacks political clout and military power. Accordingly, Qatar authorities have demonstrated an ability to perform third-party dispute settlements and have also proved themselves to be successful local and worldwide investors. Qatarā€™s economic success has made them a major player on the global energy scene, heightening their importance in the eyes of public and private sectors  around the world.

Qatarā€™s foreign policy aim is to position itself as the champion of Arab diplomacy in the Arab and Islamic world, particularly the Middle East. Doha, Qatarā€™s Capital, sees itself as a beneficent mediator in all disputes. In addition, Qatar is not a member of any group in the Afghanistan conflict. This implies that Doha has no commercial ties to the Afghanistan war, which has earned Qatar the trust of other prominent actors in the conflict. 

Qatar has been heavily engaged in Afghanistan in recent years, using its advantage of historical experience to position itself as a key participant in several mediation procedures. They also established a modality for dispute resolution, which is called the Qatari Model of Conflict Resolution (QMCR). It is through this model that Doha has engaged in different conflict resolution processes in Middle Eastern and North African nationsā€”as well as in the failed Afghanistan peace process.

Even though Qatar’s goal of ending the Afghanistan conflict has not yet been achieved, there is still potential that Doha can be successful in mediation efforts to resolve the newest phase of the crisis in Afghanistan.

A Breakthrough Plan for Qatar

The following seven steps can help Doha achieve success in ending the half-century conflict in Afghanistan. 

Step 1: The most important reason for Doha’s advantage in the Afghanistan peace process is Qatar hosting the Taliban. Many of the groupā€™s leaders have lived in Qatar over the last 20 years and the groupā€™s political office has long operated out of the country.

However, this could raise concerns about partiality and Qatar’s role in the conflict since the Taliban is an extremist and terrorist group. Therefore, Qatar should work to assure the people of Afghanistan and anti-Taliban groups of its intention to support a secure Afghanistan and to adopt an inclusive citizen-oriented democratic set-up. Qatar should open offices of the Talibanā€™s oppositions abroad, particularly an office for the National Resistance Front in Doha. This would lay the groundwork for building trust and direct talks between the conflicting factions.

Step 2: The nature of hostilities varies by location. Afghanistanā€™s history, culture, identity, and narratives are distinctly different from those of the Arab world, like Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Sudan. The lack of a clear definition of the relationships among ethnic groups and an effective government structure has caused the crisis to be extended. Therefore, mediation to define a social contract and build trust among the leaders, elites and intellectuals of Afghanistan will help solve the ongoing crisis. 

Step 3:  Doha has often used a checkbook approach, or financial leverage, during mediations. However, this is a potential challenge in the Afghanistan context. Dohaā€™s financial assistance to the Taliban and the republic government often resulted in a short-term or shaky peace, like the temporary in 2020. However, Qatarā€™s leadership can use its clout to join the US and NATO as a hard leveraging factor through likely military means, alongside checkbooks. To mediate, a combination of financial and military leverage is required in Afghanistan given the Talibanā€™s ideological and rejectionist nature. 

Step 4: Since , US representatives have visited the Taliban in their Qatar headquarters, but the Qatari government has attempted to keep these visits private to the public. Doha thought it could break the ice between the Taliban and the USA by not publicly revealing the agenda or the significance of the meetings. However, Qatarā€™s covert approach to talking to the Taliban resulted in a lack of trust in Doha in parts of Afghanistan and anti-Taliban organizations. Therefore, Qatar should begin open negotiations instead.

Step 5: Since Dohaā€™s aim is to bring all stakeholders to the table, the Qatari government should also use the QMCR approach both in and outside Afghanistan. For example, Doha even attempted to bring Iran and US officials to the table to talk about Iranā€™s nuclear .

Step 6: The QMCR model also faces challenges because of criticisms of Qatarā€™s approach to Afghanistan society. Many feel that Qatar has closer ties to Pashtunwali and the Taliban than the Persianized Tajiks because of Qatarā€™s allegiance to Salafi and Deobandi Orthodoxy. Some in Afghanistan also believe that Dohaā€™s foreign policy strengthened the Taliban. To distinguish Qatar as a neutral player, it must gain the trust of its critics.  To do this, Qatar must be sensitive to the complexities of the socio-political fabric of Afghanistan. This is vital for ending the Afghanistan conflict.

Step 7: Qatar can also forestall future conflict in the new Taliban-led Afghanistan. This entails building trust between conflicted parties, which Doha must understand cannot be done overnight. QMCRā€™s major priority should be to reduce conflict between the National Resistance Forces, other anti-Taliban fighters, and the Taliban in various districts of Afghanistan.

The Best Way Forward 

Considering the half-century conflict in Afghanistan has domestic and international dimensions, Qatar has the opportunity to play an effective role as a powerful mediator. This can bring major achievements for Afghanistan, but also for Qatarā€™s foreign policy interests.

Qatar has projected its mediation capacities as part of its foreign policy brand, but its mediation efforts in international diplomacy have largely been unsuccessful. Establishing lasting peace is not only  important to end this  long-term crisis in Afghanistan, but Qatar can regain its reputation as a successful mediator.

Ultimately, the Qatar conflict resolution model must make adjustments while retaining its core principles. If the government of Qatar adopts this new approach to this complex crisis, it stands a strong chance of success.

[edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Between Success and Failure in Afghanistan: Advice for Qatar appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Fans were even more enraged in 2005 when the American Glazer family bought the club. Some even started a rival club and transferred their support. Theyā€™ve never been satisfied the Glazers are suitable custodians of a club fans believe is rightfully theirs. Now, theyā€™re concerned the Glazers will sup with the devil and sell to the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, who already owns the club Paris Saint-Germain via a company called Qatar Sports Investments.

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Mighty Presence

The objections are now familiar to anyone vaguely familiar with sports. Gulf States, enriched by their reserves of oil and gas, have, over the past decade established a Middle Eastern control over many sports. The sovereign wealth fund of Saudi Arabia underwrites the LIV golf tour. Bahrain hosts a Formula1 grand prix. The International Cricket Council has moved its headquarters to Dubai, the most populous city in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). And, as if anyone hadnā€™t noticed, Qatar has recently staged footballā€™s most prestigious event, the FIFA World Cupā€”and done so successfully. will host footballā€™s Club World Cup later this year.

In Englandā€™s Premier League, both of Manchester Unitedā€™s local rivalsā€” andā€”have been bought. The former is owned by City Football Group whose majority shares are owned by Mansour bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the deputy prime minister of the United Arab Emirates and a member of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi.  Newcastle United was recently purchased by the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia. The Newcastle buy-out was challenged by many fans, though the opposition appears to have softened now that the clubā€™s on-field fortunes are improving.

The objection to the encroachment of Middle East interests on sports that have traditionally been dominated by the West is not based on xenophobia. Well, not totally. Territories in that part of the world are not so vigilant in observing what many other parts of the world regard as fundamental human rights, particularly when it comes to groups. Homosexuality is outlawed and, in some parts, an imprisonable offense. There are places where it is punishable by death. Womenā€™s status differs from country-to-country, but nowhere is there equality of access or opportunity comparable with the Westā€™s.

Sports Fans Say Qatar Has Now Politicized the World Cup

Whereā€™s The Harm?  

Now, a cynic might ask: since when did football fans become so self-righteous? Or did they always secretly harbor a strong sense of right-and-wrong, and were just not enraged enough to express their sense of morality? Until those Gulf States, with their ā€œmedievalā€ cultures started muscling in on that pure, unsullied and wholesome pursuit once the preserve of English gentlemen and, more recently, the proud property of the masses. Sports is too virtuous, too honorable, too undefiled by the sins of the world to be corrupted by those primitive Arab states where being able to quote the Quran counts as enlightenment.

But wait: let me offer a counterweight. Think about the meaning of sports: a pernicious biosphere where human effort is squandered in the futile pursuit of artificial objectives that have no benefit, material or otherwise, in the real world. Sports competitions are as trivial as they are purposeless. Sportsā€™ only point is to satisfy individualsā€™ self-serving desire to surpass others. The more successful sportsmen and sportswomen are egotistical plutocrats whose money derives from the financial reserves of media behemoths. OK, sports events might once have been innocent tests of physical proficiency in a number of set challenges, but now they have morphed into an industry analogous to, if not contiguous with, showbusiness.

Fine, you might reply: So, whereā€™s the harm? Again, I have an answer. Obviously, the physical injuries are commonplace and an expected byproduct of intense training and competition. And the long-term damage to the health of athletes and fans alike is an unfortunate, if inevitable, consequence of rivalries that might once have been friendly but are now warlike. Concussion and other forms of brain injury, sometimes permanent, are now seen as collateral damage in many sports. 

The End of the Extraordinary Abramovich Era

Activities that were designed to test the limits of human capability have become the means by which to extend those limits. Cyclists, swimmers, and track and field athletes habitually ingest substances in their efforts to enhance their competitive performance and break boundaries. Athletes from practically every other known sport, to some degree, use licit or illicit pharmaceuticals in their efforts to maximize their physical potential.  Sportā€™s injunction to give oneā€™s best appears quaint and unworldly: win-at-any-costs is more congruent with todayā€™s ethos.

Hypocrisy

Sportā€™s harmful effects extend beyond the physical: at a cultural level, its fierce and destructive onslaught on traditional citadels has been unsparing. Here the less visible, yet arguably more profound consequences of sport have turned every one of us into sports fans of some hue. Racism surfaced in sports in the late 1970s and, while it has diminished in the West, it flourishes in the sports of countries like Hungary, and other Eastern European democracies. Women have been pushed out of sports for most of its history and have only in recent years managed to compete in most major sports.

Unbelievable as it sounds, child abuse is an ungovernable wrongdoing in a variety of sports. Making the practice more pernicious is the fact that perpetrators are always the people charged with the responsibility for the welfare of young athletes.

What of the beautiful game itself? For decades, mired in corruption, bribery and miscellaneous other forms of venality, the worldā€™s governing organization has operated like a private feudal fiefdom dispensing preferential treatment to anyone with sufficient funds and insufficient scruples to grease the right palms.

Qatar Will Change the World Cup Forever

And remind yourself: this is the same sport, indeed the same institution, that voices objections on grounds of morality whenever Middle Eastern interest in a club or a tournament surfaces. Thereā€™s a word that describes the practice of upholding high moral standards but having standards of oneā€™s own that fall some way below: hypocrisy. It is endemic in western sports.

Sports were once thought to serve as a source of moral inspiration and maybe they were. But only a fool would ignore the deeply malevolent effects of their presence today. Over the next week or so, weā€™ll witness dutiful devotees of football protesting the growing influence of the Gulf States in their sport. They will almost certainly be genuine in their disapproval. But even a momentā€™s self-reflection will remind them that the sport they hold in such reverence is not only futile, arbitrary and wasteful, but a vile, unprincipled, rapacious, fraudulent and hopelessly corrupted environment in which decency is in short supply. How can Middle-Eastern owners possibly make it worse? Ellis Cashmoreā€™s latest book is ā€œ.ā€

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Why Don’t Football Fans and Arab Sheikhs Love Each Other? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Why are so many convinced the character of the World Cup and, by implication, the Olympics has changed, and why do so many believe this is bad? Basically, fans balance the benefits and intrinsic rewards offered by global tournaments against the hijacking of such events for partisan purposes. At Qatar, the hostā€™s abundant and its questionable labor practices were roundly criticized. There were clichĆ©d complaints of ā€œsportswashing,ā€ though, as one fan concluded: ā€œ is not really possible anymore. Attempts to pull the wool are cut off immediately by the billions of people on social media.ā€

Galvanizing Effect

Nowhere in the world is likely to be morally flawless in the mind of sports fans. They see sport as bringing climate change, human rights, bigotry and practically any other of the worldā€™s bedeviling social problems into focus. Sports is, as one participant put it, ā€œfair game,ā€ meaning, if there is a problem that needs fixing, the methods are of secondary importance: only the result matters and sports is becoming an effective instrument. Nearly 73% are convinced sport in the 21st century is politically weaponized and will be an effective force in changing society. Sports have a ā€œgalvanizing effect,ā€ according to one fan: ā€œMovements for change can use the associated momentum to kick off beneficial activity.ā€

Qatar Will Change the World Cup Forever

Qatar has ā€œlit a fireā€ under sport. ā€œAny future host nations will come under more scrutiny,ā€ suggested a fan, making a point shared by most. And another: ā€œIt is a myth that sports and politics are not intertwined. Sport can create positive change in society, and an open stance should be encouraged to drive this change.ā€  

ā€œAthletes like all of us have a right to free speech,ā€ declared one fan, confirming that the role of the World Cup, like it or not, will be to spotlight inequities, injustices and discrimination.

Politics and the World Cup in Future — What fans think

88.6% Think World Cups and Olympics of the future will be controversial political events

72.3% Think sport has the potential to produce social and political change

73.4% Think political World Cups are a negative development

62.1% Donā€™t think athletes should get involved in nonsporting affairs, like wearing emblems or       making gestures

51.8% Donā€™t think being involved in political activism is detrimental to competitive performance

34.1 %  Think future World Cups should follow Qatarā€™s example and ban alcohol.

Sample: 1,200. Conducted: Dec. 19, 2022-Jan 19 2023. Teesside University, UK                                                                                                               

Who Is In Charge of the Message?

But, while there is near-consensus on the moral destiny of the World Cup ā€” and, according to most fans, the Olympics too ā€” there is division over the desirability of sports becoming political in character. Nearly 74% »å“Ē²Ōā€™t feel that politicization shouldnā€™t be encouraged. It is, they say, not sportsā€™ responsibility to be a catalyst of change. Why then do so many think the politicization of sport is an unfavorable prospect?

The answers for this are not straightforward. Some fans believe the remonstrations witnessed over Qatar will soon be forgotten and will have achieved nothing. Sports only appear to be effective, but in the longer term are simply not. Some fans reflected on how sport was often lauded in the fight against apartheid in South Africa. There was a widespread boycott and SA was alienated from world sport for much of the 1970s and 1980s.Yet there is little evidence that the boycott actually served more than a symbolic role.

ā€œWho is in charge of the message?ā€ asked one fan, raising another objection. Is it legitimate for one culture to criticize another because its customs and practices differ? One of the present authors has argued that much of the attack on Qatar bordered on Islamophobia and several participants in the research were concerned that moral absolutism (the belief in absolute principles in ethical, political or theological matters) could prevail. As most fans recognize, there are few places in the world that are perfect enough to avoid some sort of reproval. (The next World Cup is to be held in Canada, USA and Mexico, which would seem to offer plenty of raw material for political protest.)

Football Is Ready for Openly Gay Players

One participant extended this argument: ā€œPeople like to pass judgment on other cultures without acknowledging the problems in their own country.ā€ He continued: ā€œDonā€™t forget homosexuality was illegal in the country that hosted the World Cup last time England won it.ā€ Itā€™s a slyly intelligent response: Britainā€™s Sexual Offences Act, which decriminalized private consensual homosexual acts between men aged over 21 was not passed until 1967, a year after Englandā€™s only World Cup win. There was no gay liberation movement; this started in 1969. While Betty Friedenā€™s The Feminine Mystique had been published in 1963, womenā€™s liberation didnā€™t pick up momentum till the late 1960s/early 1970s. There was no protest in 1966.

Sports Should Be Pure

Host nations have, in the past, largely escaped the kind of audit that would expose unwholesome legislation, customs and cultural practices. Footballā€™s World Cup has, over the decades, been held in countries mired in conflict, where dubious pursuits and, often abhorrent operations have been practiced. The 1934 tournament was played in Italy, then under the leadership of Benito Mussolini, the founder of the Italian fascist party, who annexed Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) in the same year and, in 1940, entered World War II on the same side as Germany. ā€œIl Duce,ā€ as he was known, used the World Cup to promote fascism.

In June 1978, General Jorge Rafael Videla, the military dictator of Argentina, presided over the World Cup opening ceremony, and presented the trophy after the final. Three years earlier, he had explained his philosophy of government: ā€œAs many people as necessary must die in Argentina so that the country will again be secure.ā€ About 30,000 political opponents of the Videla junta ā€œdisappeared,ā€ many feared killed, burned and their remains scattered on some of the pitches used during the tournament. The World Cup itself was a huge success, the Argentinian national team prevailing ā€” though only after suspicions of match fixing. Itā€™s sometimes been speculated that Argentinaā€™s invasion of the Falklands in 1982 was in large part an attempt to regenerate the feelings of nationalism and solidarity sparked off by the World Cup.

ā€œPolitics »å“Ē²Ōā€™t belong in sports,ā€ proclaimed one fan bluntly. The point is shared by nearly three-quarters of fans: They have largely accepted the prescription of Avery Brundage, who was president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) from 1952-72: He strongly condemned political interference in sport, which, he maintained, Only in recent years have sports fans departed from this and taken notice of athletes like, who explicitly used their sports as political platforms.

Social Mediaā€™s ExposĆ©

Sports fans have politicized over the past few years. Global movements, in particular Black Lives Matter and MeToo have demonstrated the electrifying power of social media in solidifying opinion and motivating people into action. Even if the majority »å“Ē²Ōā€™t encourage the politicization of sport, they have become perhaps unwitting participants in the process. Back in 2002, when Qatar was awarded the hosting rights by Fifa, footballā€™s world governing organization, fans were not concerned with the territoryā€™s culture and politics, nor its moral desirability as a site for one of the worldā€™s two most prestigious global tournaments.

By the time of the Qatar tournament last December, everyone was familiar with the customs and practices of the Sheikdom in the Persian Gulf. Some fans attribute this to a growing awareness, in itself hastened by changes in communications: ā€œSocial Media allows [a nationā€™s suitability as host] to be challenged far more than it ever was and exposes stories that the public would previously be unaware of,ā€ said one fan, underscoring the role of online exchanges. Another participant agreed: ā€œForthcoming events will be exposed in the same way.ā€

Tangential to the main inquiry, but an indicator of fansā€™ expectations of World Cups was the alcohol ban: Qatar, a Muslim territory of course, implemented a ban on the sale of alcohol in stadiums. This appeared to be an unpopular decision that fans would resent and oppose. In the event, they didnā€™t. Over a third (34%) of fans would now support a similar ban at future World Cup tournaments. A minority, but a significant minority nonetheless.

If their visions are to be accepted, future international sports tournaments will take on a very different and much more political complexion that weā€™re used to and, while most fans regret this development, the vast majority are expecting the kind of turbulence of the Qatar World Cup to be repeated time and again. As one fan summed up: ā€œWe live in a time where politics and sport are inextricably linked.ā€

[Cashmore, Cleland and Dixon are the authors of]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Sports Fans Say Qatar Has Now Politicized the World Cup appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The original intentions  of , the founder of the modern Olympics, were to promote internationalism and humanity. However, sports have continuously been used as a platform to promote nationalism. For instance, who can forget how the USSR and USA turned the 1980s Olympics into a Cold War battleground? If war is an extension of politics, then organized sports can be seen as a substitute for war and a bloodless theater for national competition.

This year, the FIFA World Cup has announced Qatarā€™s arrival on the international stage. It has become the first Arab and Muslim country to organize an event of such magnitude, This has added to its prestige and soft power globally and, especially, in the Islamic world.

Money Rules the World

The 2022 World Cup in Qatar comes after the 2018 World Cup held in Russia. Though both host nations are light years away from democracy, this did not matter for FIFA. Almost immediately after the nomination of the organizers, there were multiple allegations of corruption. There was suspicion that the Qatari government bribed FIFA so their country could be hosts.

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According to , 16 of the 22 voting members of the FIFA Executive Committee that chose Russia and Qatar are now under investigation for some form of corruption or wrongdoing. Allegations emerged that FIFA benefited from a $400 million TV rights deal with Al Jazeera, Qatar’s state broadcaster. Apparently, this deal came just 21 days before the decision to award the World Cup to Qatar. 

The French Connection

In recent years, particularly under French president Nicolas Sarkozyā€™s, ties between France and Qatar grew closer. In November 2010, Sarkozy, Michel Platini, the former head of the European football association (UEFA), and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, had a now infamous . This led to Platini changing his mind and voting in favor of Qatar hosting the World Cup. FIFA’s president at the time Sepp Blatter has since admitted this was a mistake. FIFA should not have awarded Qatar the World Cup.

The Qatari government would later buy Paris Saint-Germain, Franceā€™s most famous football team. Flush with money, the club has bought players like Kylian Mbappe, Neymar and Lionel Messi. The Qatari government has also increased its stake in a French media group, and bought the television rights for Ligue 1, Franceā€™s top league. France has also developed closer trade relations with Qatar. 

The Franco-Qatari collaboration continues. According to , the National Assembly ratified an agreement between Qatar and France. It turns out 220 French police officers will work with local officers in Qatar during the World Cup. The French Interior Ministry declared, “France’s ambition is not to deploy a large number of units, but to provide high-level expertise and specialized operational support.” It seems likely that France has profited from this arrangement.

Human Rights Abuses, Boycott and More

After Qatar won the 2022 FIFA World Cup bid, the government began constructing the necessary infrastructure to host the tournament. Workers from poorer Asian countries often worked in unimaginable conditions. As far back as 2013, several European newspapers, including The Guardian, Norwegian magazine Josimar and Danish daily Ekstra Bladet repeatedly reported on abuses against migrant workers. They even uncovered cases of . In February 2021, also reported that more than 6,500 workers from India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka had died in the last 11 years. Many of them had died on World Cup construction sites.

All these revelations have cast a dark shadow over this tournament and FIFA. Tragically, Footballā€™s apex body has embraced Qatar wholeheartedly and ignored all human rights violations.

In recent years global brands have focused their communications on socio-political causes. Advertisements are no longer just about the products, they are also about important brand values. When it came down to the World Cup, many companies faced a difficult choice: do they associate with Qatar?

According to , several companies have already announced they are boycotting the event. The ING Group, a major financial and banking services group that sponsors the teams of the Netherlands and Belgium, has decided it will neither accept any tickets nor be involved in any related promotion of the World Cup. Another company that is a baggage service provider, GLS, sponsors the Belgium team. It said, “we believe that a commercial use of the 2022 World Cup in the context of the human rights situation would be better not to take place.” The company is also not using ticket allocations for customer promotions and not engaging in any advertising campaigns in Qatar.

Brands like the national lottery Danske Spil and the bank Arbejdernes Landsbank, sponsors of the Danish Football Association, agreed to forgo their paid placement on the team’s training gear for human rights messages during the World Cup. 

The companies involved with the Qatar World Cup are facing a backlash. Football fans have kicked off a visual criticizing the brands participating in the event. Today, such action may seem relatively ineffective. In the long run, brands that have taken a strong stance against Qatar might have much to gain, especially if unpleasant events occur  during the tournament.

Nevertheless, at the end of this year, we will witness probably the most expensive sports event in history. Qatarā€™ would have spent about $220 billion on infrastructure and communication apart from bribes funded by its ample oil and gas reserves. The 6,500 who died will not be forgotten though and the FIFA Qatar World Cup will always remain tainted.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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For over 90 years, the World Cup has rivaled the summer Olympics for scope, grandeur and athletic excellence. It still does. But, from this point, it will also be an occasion for gathering forces of dissent. Many will despair at the wrangling thatā€™s changed the character of the 2022 tournament in Qatar, while others will be excited by the way sport can force into world focus problems, affairs or just situations that might otherwise be ignored or dismissed as unworthy of international attention.

Cultural Changes

Twelve years ago, when footballā€™s world governing organization FIFA agreed to let the sheikhdom on the coast of the Persian Gulf with a tiny population of 2,200,000 to host the tournament, the problems posed seemed logistical: weather, accommodation, timing and so on. No one could have known what was coming. The case came to the fore in 2017, and led to the subsequent surge of the MeToo movement. The comparably potent cultural movement of that grew after the killing of George Floyd by a police officer in 2020. Gender fluidity and the challenge to the traditional sexual binary., not only in sport but in every area of society. These were among the cultural shifts that changed ā€¦ well, practically everything in society, including perceptions and expectations of sport.

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The days when sports governors tried strenuously to prevent political or social issues fouling the onetime pursuit of amateur gentlemen are now gone. Sport is now fully weaponized and the majority of its fans not only accept but insist that it should be used as an instrument for exposing injustices and promoting causes (I have soon-to-be-published research that provides evidence of the rise of politicized fans).

Sports has a mixed record in promoting social change. While itā€™s hailed as partly responsible for bringing down South African apartheid, there is no persuasive evidence that boycotting South African sport was effective in any more than a symbolic way. The memorable at the Mexico Olympics of 1968 are now iconic reminders of the fight against racism in the USA, though many neglect how athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos, who gestured with their gloved fists, were actually punished and demonized at the time rather than vaunted. Muhammad Ali is often regarded as champion of civil rights as much as a boxer, though, in 1964, when he dropped his name Cassius Clay and converted to the Nation of Islam he was attacked for his

Criticism of Qatar or Islam?

Some believe revealing Qatarā€™s exploitative treatment of migrant workers and its admonition of homosexuality will hasten a change in both. In the first instance, this is possible. In the second, unimaginable. Islam decrees that homosexuality is sinful. No Islamic country on earth, nor any Muslim, whether in the middle east, Britain, USA or anywhere else will demur. Qatar is among at least eleven other countries that considerhomosexuality a , which may be punishable by death.

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At this point, I should perhaps declare an interest: I am a white, cisgender heterosexual male, born in the UK, part-educated in Canada, having lived in Asia and the USA. In common with other sociologists, I understand the deep cultural significance of religion, but believe in the primacy of humanity, making me atheist. I am also reflexive, meaning that I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t accept there is a neutral position from which to assess cultures: the very fact of my existence implicates me in culture and precludes objective analysis. I remain aware that I am steeped in the culture of my upbringing and mature development. So, while Iā€™ve supported gay rights and opposed racism for my adult life and argue against others who do not, I try to resist privileging my own culture over all others. I include this detail because my interpretation of much of the recent condemnation of Qatar is that it is a disguised attack on Islam.

Close to a quarter of the worldā€™s human population are Muslims. I find the Islamic code on homosexuality repugnant. I also acknowledge that its source is in faith and no amount of argument will change this. So, when Qatar is described by western journalists as ā€œmedieval,ā€ it discloses a sneering, ignorant disrespect. And, when I hear western Europeans, who are not Muslims, describing their commitment to ā€œcultural inclusivenessā€ or ā€œinclusivity,ā€ I suspect they mean excluding any party that disagrees with popular western principles, standards and values.

Intolerance is an old-fashioned word so maybe neo-intolerance is how we should describe the new form of western cultural pompousness. The affectedly — and usually self-congratulatory — manner with which west European liberals make pronouncements on practically anything that deviates from their own rules of thought and conduct is sure to be challenged. Possibly by the time of the next World Cup.

Politics and the 2026 World Cup

The 2026 World Cup will be shared by three hosts all from the same land mass and all predominantly Christian: Canada, USA and Mexico. Not all countries are equally worthy of opprobrium, of course. The USA will bear the heaviest burden, with laws on the possession of firearms framed in the nineteenth century (far from medieval) and laws on abortion that were reformed in 1973, but which may by the time of the World Cup, be retroceded to the 1820s. Mexico decriminalized abortion only last year. As for Canada, that perennially inoffensive territory in the north, consider: last year, Pope Francispublicly for the 150,000 indigenous children who were separated from their families and taken to residential Catholic schools where they were beaten, starved and sexually abused, between 1881-1996. This will be one of a number of concerns regarding indigenous people that will surface when the World Cup arrives. 

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Once more, there will be sanctimonious critics offering their insight, resonance and misplaced sense of superiority. There will also be earnest interrogation that will lead to useful and possibly productive developments. Qatar is not going to abandon Islam, but its citizens live on planet earth, eat, work, catch buses and do many of the same things as the rest of the world. That includes examining their lives from time to time — as we all do. They have been made forcibly and, I am guessing, uncomfortably aware of what many others regard as their shortcomings and may choose to revise them accordingly in future. 

What is football for?

Football is ridiculous, isnā€™t it? Eleven grown men kicking a ball in one direction while another eleven grown men try to stop them and move the ball the other way. Can you think of anything more trivial and purposeless? The attention granted the World Cup might lead a friendly alien to assume the tournament takes us closer to world peace, or finding a cure for cancer, or maybe saving the planet from self-destruction. It does none of these things. But this sporting wasteland may yet produce some good: if, as I expect, World Cups from this point become cultural tinderboxes, then they might cease to be trivial and conjure larger, more meaningful campaigns that will bring genuine benefits.

Those who wish football and other sports to ablute themselves of politics will rue the day FIFA awarded the 2022 World Cup to what was once a British protectorate where they speak Arabic and which got rich through its oil. But the sustained fury the decision has engendered may yet be the greatest blessing, not to football, but to the world.

Ellis Cashmoreā€™s latest book is ā€œ.ā€

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The designation conformed to a statement that Biden made to His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the emir of Qatar, during his visit to Washington in late January 2022.  During the visit, Biden had sent a to the US Congress indicating his intention to give Qatar the designation of  a major non-NATO ally. In the letter, the president acknowledged ā€œQatarā€™s many years of contributions to US-led efforts in the US Central Command area of responsibilityā€ and recognized that the US had a ā€œnational interest in deepening bilateral defense and security cooperation with the State of Qatar.ā€ 

BIdenā€™s designation for Qatar has a historical basis. For years, Qatar has supported US foreign policy objectives. The country has hosted and provided substantial financial support for the Al Udeid Air Base and engaged with the US on issues of strategic importance, including its recent assistance in relocating thousands of Afghans and its ability to serve as an effective mediator in critical situations. The designation 

What Does This Designation Really Mean?  

What are the legal foundations for the designation and its implications for Qatar? Under a federal statute, the US president has the unilateral power to designate a country a major non-NATO ally with the requirement that Congress receive notice in writing at least 30 days before this designation. As aptly noted, the designation alone does not make Qatar a NATO member and thus the collective security obligations and mutual defense benefits under NATO are not applicable to this GCC country.  

Yet, in addition to recognizing the close military ties between Qatar and the US, the designation as a major non-NATO ally ensures defense trade and security cooperation benefits. Qatar is now eligible for loans, research, training, and development, as well as gaining priority access to US military equipment and the ability to bid on certain US Department of Defense contracts. 

In the past, other regional players have benefitted from the designation. Their experience highlights the importance of a military and defense relationship for any GCC state with the US, especially given recent events. For example, Kuwait has benefitted from arms sales through the Foreign Military Sales Program. This the capabilities of the Kuwaiti military and enhanced the countryā€™s security. 

The Biden administration has given $1 billion to the US Army Corps of Engineers and other US companies to build Kuwaitā€™s new defense ministry headquarters. A training initiative, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, enables Kuwaiti students to be trained at US military institutions at a discounted rate.

Capacity building is one of the main incentives for US-Qatar cooperation, which is of great importance to this GCC state. Its defense regime is relatively young and capable of playing an influential role due to the countryā€™s proximity to both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Qatar can also play a key role as a mediator in the region. In the light of the above, the designation as a major non-NATO ally has critical long-term benefits to the country.

The new development also certainly signals closer cooperation between the US and Qatar. Historically, these designations tend to be mutually beneficial. In the case of Qatar, increased engagement with the US promises to strengthen its status as a security leader in the Middle East and benefit both the region as well as its superpower friend.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that trap heat in the atmosphere, making them major contributors to climate change. On the other hand, high industrial activities, alongside rapidly increasing populations, put growing pressure on energy demand.

The Example of Qatar

Qatar has made remarkable economic achievements over the past few decades. Yet Qatar is facing a trade-off between boosting its economic growth and lowering its carbon dioxide emissions. Its strategic mandate to boost economic development, along with other areas related to sustainability, makes Qatar an interesting country to analyze.

The World Bank defines Qatar as one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita. Its economy is highly dependent on oil and gas production, which for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of export earnings and 70% of government revenues. The country is also a major player in liquefied natural gas. Nonetheless, Qatarā€™s high dependence on fossil fuels has resulted in an in the CO2 emissions level when compared to global averages.

To combat the rising carbon emission percentages and lower environmental pressures, Qatar is introducing strict policy measures to achieve sustainable development through four central pillars: economic, social, human and environmental development. While many disruptions have occurred over the past few years, including fluctuations in oil and gas prices, economic downturns and a deadly pandemic, nobody expected an economic blockade.

The Diplomatic Rift

In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cut diplomatic relations with Qatar. They prohibited Qatar-registered planes and ships from utilizing their airspace and sea routes, and the Saudis also blocked Qatar’s only land border.

This point is of particular importance as the deterioration in relations among the Gulf neighbors urged Qatar to rethink its sustainable development goals while meeting local demand. At the beginning of the blockade, the country relied heavily on importing several commodities, especially food items. Later, it accelerated initiatives and programs to diversify the economy and reduce reliance on imports.

Achieving carbon neutrality is also factored into all Qatarā€™s initiatives. For example, by the end of 2022, Qatar aims to deliver the first carbon-neutral FIFA World Cup in the history of the event. All stadiums and infrastructure are subjected to rigorous sustainability standards. Several air quality monitoring stations and extensive recycling programs are being introduced, along with the construction of the eight stadiums that will be used during the football tournament.

Qatar has since become much more independent across several sectors, including food production and transport, making it a case study on how to transform challenges into opportunities for growth.

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This was also evident with total carbon emissions. According to my own analysis, carbon emission per capita fell by 13% as of 2018 from a historical record in 2000. Since then, total carbon emissions have increased as the economy has grown but at a slower rate, meaning that Qatar is undergoing expanding relative decoupling. In the 2008 to 2018 period, a 1% change in GDP resulted in a fall of CO2 emissions, from 0.65% to 0.44%. This drop is very relevant to Qatar as several measures have been applied, particularly over the last 10 years, to reduce emissions.

A Reduction in Emissions

While Qatarā€™s total emissions have declined over recent years, policies to increase energy efficiency, diversify the energy mix by introducing more renewables, support technological development to improve energy efficiency in a desert climate, and implement energy demand management programs to maintain the same trend of decline and achieve climate change objectives have been increasingly crucial.  

The heightened pressure caused by the blockade on Qatar is now over, but what is needed are more synergies and collective efforts across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to stimulate economic diversification and minimize carbon emissions. Member states of the GCC are sharing multiple environmental, social and economic factors that should incentivize them to cooperate to meet their climate change objectives and economic development goals.

*[Saad Shannak is a scientist at Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute, part of Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) in Qatar. The views expressed are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect the universityā€™s official stance.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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A case in point: For the first time in history, the 2019 IAAF World Athletics Championships held in Qatar was scheduled for late September to avoid the hot summer climate. Another major departure was to hold tournaments mainly in the late afternoon and evening, rather than following the traditional morning schedule of previous championships.

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Similarly, the next FIFA World Cup is scheduled to commence in Qatar in November 2022 to avoid extreme heat during the traditional summer schedule of the tournament. Even at the Tokyo Games, the Olympic women’s football gold-medal match between Canada and Sweden was switched from a morning start time to the evening to avoid the heat and its associated health impacts. Unsurprisingly, the International Olympic Committee has its plans to take into account “flexibility and adaptation to the consequences of climate change” in planning future events.

No Longer an Option

Addressing the impacts of climate change on the scheduling and planning of major sporting events is no longer an option but a necessity. Apart from climate-induced fatal heatwaves that may force changes to the schedule and timing of events, climate change could have wide-ranging effects on sporting infrastructure.

This includes the potential failure of facilities due to extreme weather, reduced lifespan of buildings, increased operational and maintenance expenditure of playing surfaces and tracks due to extreme temperatures, and the cancelation or abandonment of sporting games due to off-season rainfall, storms or heatwaves. Additionally, climate change could exacerbate injuries to players and athletes due to heat exhaustion.

From a risk mitigation perspective, addressing the impacts of climate change on major sporting events will have to go beyond moving the schedule to cooler months or hours. For example, while having events at midnight may be a good way of avoiding the extreme heat, such timing could negatively affect the level of fan attendance and active participation, which may detract from the overall recreational, educational, social and economic benefits of sporting events. Similarly, delaying tournaments until cooler or warmer months may not always be a solution, especially for sporting events such as skiing, beach soccer or volleyball.

Making Changes

So, how can countries and key stakeholders in sports cope with the cascading challenges of climate change for the sporting calendar?

Holistic risk mitigation strategies are required to effectively balance the social, environmental and economic aspects of planning major sporting events in a climate-constrained world. Addressing the health impacts alone, without addressing the social and economic impacts, could lower the overall sustainable development contributions of major sporting events, especially with respect to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 on zero poverty, SDG 3 on good health and well-being, and SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth, among others. Further, holistic and high-leverage interventions can accentuate the role of sports as an enabler of sustainable development.

Enhancing the adaptive capacity of existing and emerging sporting infrastructure to the risks posed by climate change will require a strategic commitment by sporting stakeholders to integrate climate objectives in the design, approval, finance and implementation of sport infrastructure projects.

For example, Article 7 (5) of the 2015 Paris Agreement specifically encourages countries to integrate climate adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, which include redesigning infrastructure and buildings to enhance their resilience and adaptive capacity. The United Nations Sports for Climate Action Initiative also the need for sporting stakeholders to systematically integrate climate mitigation and adaptation strategies into planning processes. 

A climate-smart approach to the planning and organization of major sporting events will place climate resilience objectives squarely at the heart of sporting decisions, including venue selection, infrastructure planning, kit design, marketing, branding and awareness creation among others.

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A starting point is for international sporting bodies to overhaul bidding requirements for major sporting events to include significant consideration of the level of available climate-smart infrastructure in host countries. Adopting holistic screening processes that integrate climate considerations, as part of sporting risk management frameworks, can help sporting bodies, host countries, suppliers and other relevant stakeholders to upgrade infrastructure design, operation and maintenance practices to prioritize climate resilience.

For example, the question will not only be whether a country has sporting venues, but how many of such venues are climate-smart in terms of the ability to withstand extreme weather events and advance global net-zero targets. At the same time, the extent to which associated infrastructure such as aviation and transportation, as well as digital infrastructure are climate-smart will be a key consideration.

By paying greater attention to climate due diligence, sporting events can serve as enablers of climate change mitigation and adaptation in host countries, which would in the long-term reduce the frequency of future disruptions to the traditional calendars and schedules of major sporting events.

Educational Institutions

Higher education institutions have crucial roles to play in developing innovative programs to train and equip sporting stakeholders with advanced skills needed to integrate climate resilience into their entire operations and value chain.

In Qatar, the College of Law at Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) is already spearheading innovation in this area. Its Juris Doctor (JD) program, LLM in International Economic and Business Law, LLM in International Law and Foreign Affairs, Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD), as well as the online course ā€œNavigating Legal and Commercial Aspects of Sports,ā€ offered by HBKU through edX, provides students with exceptional opportunities to acquire comparative skills and knowledge on the key legal, commercial and sustainability aspects of major sporting events.

*[This article is submitted on behalf of the author by the Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) Communications Directorate. The views expressed are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect the universityā€™s official stance.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The War on Terror Was Never Turkeyā€™s Fight

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The largely mono-dimensional US-Turkey relationship revolves around geopolitics and security, which is also where the main crises are located. In Syria, for instance, each views the otherā€™s local partners through the lens of terrorism. When Turkey acquired the Russian-made S-400 air defense system, Washington imposed CAATSA sanctions (under the Countering Americaā€™s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act). Such developments have generated debate ā€” both in the West and in Turkey ā€” over Turkeyā€™s place and future in Western institutions and specifically NATO.

After taking office in January, US President Joe Biden and his team initially gave Turkey the cold shoulder. Turkey responded with a charm offensive, sending a stream of positive messages. For instance, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered an impassioned defense of the NATO alliance at its summit in June.

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Just as geopolitical decoupling drove them apart, Ankara appears to believe that a convergence and cooperation responding to a major geopolitical crisis can bring Turkey and the United States closer together again, at least to some extent. In other words, an instrumental geopolitical crisis has the potential to improve the atmosphere between the Turkish and the Americans.

Point of Interest: Kabul Airport

This explains why Turkey was so eager to stay in Afghanistan when all its NATO allies were preparing to leave. Ankara is seeking closer relations with the Taliban and still aspires to a role in running Kabul airport, which is critical for the Western diplomatic presence and Afghanistanā€™s connectivity with the rest of the world. Turkey, Qatar and the Taliban are in talks over this matter.

Ankara hopes that the Taliban will permit Turkey to operate the airport, very likely in  with Qatar. Ankara would like its role to include a security dimension too, but the Taliban are very wary and would want to minimize the security aspect ā€” assuming it agrees at all.

Ankara is currently exhibiting flexibility in its endeavors to secure a role in Afghanistan. President Erdogan has that Turkey might find a bilateral deal with Afghanistan similar to those it signed in 2019 with the Libyan government of national accord on security cooperation and maritime boundaries.

Dual Identity and the Price of Recognition

The most obvious challenge is that the Taliban will tie any Turkish role at the airport to recognition of its government, while Ankara would not want to be among the first to do so. Instead, Turkey will prefer to cooperate without official recognition, operating in a gray zone. It will want to avoid antagonizing Washington and will be paying close attention to the stances adopted by the Americans and other international players. In Afghanistan, Turkey will continue to capitalize on its dual Muslim/NATO identity: the Muslim identity geared toward Afghanistan, the NATO identity Western-facing.

Erdoganā€™s gambit appears to be paying off. The tone of exchanges between Ankara and Washington is warming and the frequency of discussions is increasing. During his Senate Foreign Relations Committee  hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken  Turkey as a ā€œso-called strategic partner.ā€ Now, he and other US officials call Turkey ā€œā€ and ā€œā€. Whether this change in tone represents a real thaw in relations remains to be seen. Afghanistan certainly has the potential to break the ice, even it is unlikely to usher in any deep transformation.

Domestic Pushback

President Erdoganā€™s push for the vital role of airport security provider faces domestic political hostility. As growing numbers of Afghan refugees enter Turkey through Iran, virulent anti-refugee sentiment places increasing pressures on the government and erodes public support for Ankaraā€™s plans in Afghanistan. The opposition also flags the risks to Turkish military personnel.

Ankara might instrumentalize solidarity with the Turkic people of Afghanistan and Central Asia ā€” Uzbeks, Turkmens and other Turkic populations ā€” to cultivate domestic political support and situate Afghanistan within the wider geopolitics of Central Asia and the Turkic world. Such nationalist language may backfire.

As a predominantly Pashtun organization, the Taliban will dislike that narrative ā€” as will China and Russia. In fact, until very recently Turkey was supporting the Northern Alliance and figures like Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum in Afghanistan. Such a policy of ethnic solidarity would be hard to reconcile with overtures to the Taliban.

*[This  was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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In the Gulf, the lucrative rights to World Cup packages are now being awarded. In Kuwait, ITL World has been appointed the sales agent. The companyā€™s CEO, Siddeek Ahmed, could hardly his delight at being able to offer ā€œfans a unique opportunity to purchase ticket-inclusive hospitality packagesā€ for the World Cup. In addition to game tickets, the packages include flights, accommodation, transport and ā€œleisureā€ programs. According to Arabian Business, the deals for the main venue, the 80,000-seat Lusail Stadium, will run from $14,350 to $74,200. That buys you all 10 matches hosted there, including the quarter-final, semi-final and final. If you are not short on cash, you can pick up a 40-seat suite at the stadium for just .

In Dubai, Expat Sport Tourism DMCC  the rights, with its website urging football fans to be a part of history to see the first World Cup held in the Arab world. ā€œFrom the pinnacle in high end corporate experiences to individual hospitality solutions for football fans, we can cater for all those wishing to be part of FIFA World Cup 2022ā€ is how the firm put it.

Not Everyone Is Happy

With an estimated 1.5 million fans heading to Qatar next year, Dubai, with its well-established tourism and entertainment sectors, sees itself as ideally placed to cash in on the World Cup bonanza. Yet others in the United Arab Emirates are less welcoming.

Mohammed al-Hammadi is the president of the Emirates Journalists Association and editor-in-chief of the newspaper  based in Abu Dhabi. Among the core values listed on the paperā€™s website are ā€œapply best practice in line with the journalism codesā€ and ā€œbe an objective and trustworthy information tool.ā€

Hammadi is a strong proponent of normalization. He spoke at a  in October 2020, after the UAE and Bahrain had announced their plan to normalize relations with Israel. The event was organized by a pro-Israeli think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP). Hammadi said he believed in both peace and advancing the rights of Palestinians, but people like him who ā€œspeak in favor of peace are stigmatized ā€¦ and find themselves falling under attack.ā€ He added that the word normalizing ā€œhas a very negative connotation in our region.ā€

In June, he drew the ire of African journalists with a ham-fisted attempt to have them join a coordinated media attack on the World Cup in Qatar. They adopted a  denouncing efforts to ā€œuse Africa and its institutions as political football in order to settle scores in a political dispute.ā€ The statement said:

ā€œWhile journalists in the East African region struggle to preserve their independence and freedom from rogue government and commercial interests that threaten the integrity of journalists, an outside actor is behind attempts to manipulate, divert and involve journalists in an issue completely outside the scope and powers of journalists and their unions.

In the same way that journalists and their unions in East Africa are calling, confronting and protesting against governments for their interference in the work of journalists and the curtailment of their freedoms, all foreign powers that have a negative and false agenda must be condemned and publicly challenged as a matter of principle and consistency.ā€

Twelve days later, the website Emirates Leaks, what it called ā€œreliable sources,ā€ alleged that Hammadi had attempted to pressure the heads of the journalism unions of Norway and Finland. According to the site, he wanted them to influence journalism unions in Asia and Africa to ā€œcoordinate attacks against Qatar and tarnish its image before hosting the World Cup.ā€

His efforts occasioned a  on June 23 in the European Parliament from Fulvio Martusciello. The Italian MEP accused the head of the Emirates Journalists Association of leading a smear campaign against Qatar: ā€œAl Hammadi asked the Finnish and Norwegian Journalists Federations to exercise influence on journalists unions that he supports financially to engage in the Abu Dhabi campaign and offend Qatar. He also tried to offer them financial bribes and expensive gifts in return for achieving Abu Dhabiā€™s inflammatory goals.ā€

So, while Dubai can barely contain its World Cup excitement, Abu Dhabi appears set to continue its anti-Qatar campaign. Imagine for a moment that the UAE was a football side and its two big stars had separate agendas and were playing only for themselves. That is not a winning formula and itā€™s something a good manager, like Englandā€™s Gareth Southgate, would quickly sort out.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51³Ō¹Ļ.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The kingdom kicked off its effort to cement its position as the Middle Eastā€™s behemoth earlier this year. In February, Saudi Arabia announced it would  doing business by 2024 with international companies whose regional headquarters were not based in the country. 

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The UAE 16^th on the World Bankā€™s 2020 Ease of Doing Business Index as opposed to Saudi Arabia at number 62. As a result, freewheeling Dubai has long been the preferred regional headquarters of international firms. The Saudi move ā€œclearly targets theā€ United Arab Emirates and ā€œchallenges the status of Dubai,ā€ said a UAE-based banker.

Saudi Arabia is a latecomer to the port control game, which is dominated by Dubaiā€™s DP World. That company operates 82 marine and inland terminals in more than 40 countries, including Djibouti, Somaliland, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Cyprus. The kingdomā€™s expansion into port and terminal management appears to be less driven by geostrategic considerations. Instead, Saudi Arabiaā€™s Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT), backed by the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Saudi sovereign wealth fund, said it was targeting ports that would service vital Saudi imports, such as those related to food security.

In January, PIF and Chinaā€™s Cosco Shipping Ports  bought a 20% stake in RSGT. The Chinese investment fits into Beijingā€™s larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which involves the acquisition of stakes in ports and terminals in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Oman and Djibouti, where China has a military base.

Jens Floe, the chief executive officer of RSGT, said the company planned to invest in at least three international ports in the next five years. He said each investment would be up to $500 million. ā€œWe have a focus on ports in Sudan and Egypt. They werenā€™t picked for that reason, but they happen to be significant countries for Saudi Arabiaā€™s food security strategy,ā€ Floe said.

Saudi Sports

Saudi Arabiaā€™s increased focus on sports, including a possible bid to the 2030 World Cup, serves multiple goals. First, it offers Saudi youth, who account for more than half of the kingdomā€™s population, a leisure and entertainment opportunity. Second, it boosts Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salmanā€™s burgeoning development of a leisure and entertainment industry. The Saudis believe this could allow the kingdom to polish its image tarnished by human rights abuse, including the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, and challenge Qatarā€™s position as the face of Middle Eastern sports.

A recent  by Grant Liberty, a London-based human rights group that focuses on Saudi Arabia and China, estimated that Riyadh has invested $1.5 billion in the hosting of multiple sporting events. These include the final games of Italy and Spainā€™s top football leagues, Formula 1 races, boxing, wrestling and snooker matches, and golf tournaments. So far, Qatar is the Middle Eastā€™s leader in the hosting of sporting events, followed by the UAE.

According to Grant Liberty, further bids for events worth $800 million have failed. This did not include an  $600-million offer to replace Qatarā€™s beIN Sports as the Middle Eastern broadcaster of the UEFA Champions League. Saudi Arabia reportedly continues to ban beIN from airing in the kingdom, despite the lifting of the Saudi-Emirati-led diplomatic and economic of Qatar in January.

Oil Exports

Mohammed bin Salmanā€™s  plan to diversify and streamline the Saudi economy and ween it off dependency on oil exports ā€œhas set the creation of professional sports and a sports industry as one of its goals,ā€ said , spokesperson for the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington. ā€œThe kingdom is proud to host and support various athletic and sporting events which not only introduce Saudis to new sports and renowned international athletes but also showcase the kingdomā€™s landmarks and the welcoming nature of its people to the world.ā€

The increased focus on sports comes as Saudi Arabia appears to be backing away from its intention to reduce the centrality of energy exports for its economy. Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, the crown princeā€™s brother, recently an International Energy Agency (IEA) report, saying ā€œthere is no need for investment in new fossil fuel supplyā€ as ā€œthe sequel of the La La Land movie.ā€ He went on to ask, ā€œWhy should I take [the report] seriously?ā€

Putting its money where its mouth is, Saudi Arabia intends to increase its oil production capacity from 12 million to more than 13 million barrels a day. This is based on the assumption that global efforts to replace fossil fuel with cleaner energy sources will spark sharp reductions in American and Russian production. The Saudis believe that demand in Asia for fossil fuels will continue to rise even if it drops in the West. Other Gulf producers, including the UAE and Qatar, are following a similar strategy.

ā€œSaudi Arabia is no longer an oil country, itā€™s an energy-producing country ā€¦ a very competitive energy country. We are low cost in producing oil, low cost in producing gas, and low cost in producing renewables and will definitely be the least-cost producer of hydrogen,ā€ Prince Abdulaziz said. He appeared to be suggesting that the kingdomā€™s doubling down on oil was part of a strategy that aims to ensure that Saudi Arabia is a player in all conventional and non-conventional aspects of energy. By implication, he was saying that diversification was likely to broaden Saudi Arabiaā€™s energy offering, rather than significantly reduce its dependence on energy exports.

ā€œSports, entertainment, tourism and mining alongside other industries envisioned in Vision 2030 are valuable expansions of the Saudi economy that serve multiple economic and non-economic purposes,ā€ said a Saudi analyst. ā€œItā€™s becoming evident, however, that energy is likely to remain the real name of the game.ā€

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Saudi Arabiaā€™s System of Injustice

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Bidali, who blogs under the name Noah, has been a  of the treatment of migrant workers in Qatar, a small Gulf state that is hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup. ā€œA week before his arrest, Bidali gave a presentation to a large group of civil society organizations and trade unions about his experience of working in Qatar,ā€ Amnesty noted.

Migrant Workers in Qatar

For Qatar, his story draws unwelcome attention to the treatment of migrant workers in the run-up to the World Cup. The Qataris had won praise for scrapping the notorious kafala sponsor system, which ties workers to their employers with terms similar to those of indentured laborers or, as some critics say, to .

In August 2020, the government announced that included a minimum wage. The changes to labor law were hailed as a landmark in a region with an appalling record of mistreatment of migrant workers. Had the amendments been fully implemented, the conditions for migrant workers would have improved significantly. But more than a year and a half after the reforms were introduced, it is clear that little has changed for many migrants in Qatar.

An Al Jazeera in March 2021 revealed that ā€œthe majority of those interviewed experienced delays in the process as well as threats, harassment and exploitation by the sponsor, with some of the workers ending up in prison and eventually deported.ā€ The report cited the case of a migrant from the Philippines who worked at a food stall. When she told her boss she wanted to leave and get a new job, she faced threats and harassment. Her ID was canceled and she had a court case brought against her, none of which should have happened with the new laws in place. ā€œI thought the new laws were there to help us. All I did was try and seek a better job. I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t think Iā€™ve committed a crime to be facing these problems,ā€ she said.

Writing About Rights

Bidaliā€™s problems arose as a result of his blogs, which challenge the rosy narrative projected by the government. In a post , ā€œMinimum Wage, Maximum Adjustment,ā€ he writes:

ā€œā€˜Peanuts.ā€™ That’s the first thing that comes to Simon’s mind when I ask him about the changes to the minimum wage. A security guard from Kenya, toiling in Msheireb Downtown Doha, a slave to the elements for the better part of 12 hours a day. He earns [in a month] QR1250 (USD340). Paid a recruitment agent QR4400 (USD1200) to get the job, and spent a further QR1100 on related expenses. ā€˜There’s no difference for us (security guards). What they should have done is stipulate the specifics, like working hours, working conditions… things like that. When you take away the food and housing allowance, compensation for the work we do isn’t considered at all. We work so hard. Long commutes, long hours on-site, sweating like crazy with this heat, stress, fatigue… we don’t even eat properly.ā€™ā€

Bidali writes the following in a , ā€œThe Privilege of a Normal Lifeā€:

ā€œQatar, like all [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries, makes it virtually impossible for the spouses and partners of low-income migrant workers to accompany them for the duration of their contract. Over an extended period of time devoid of affection and intimacy, desire manifests, ever so intense. The situation isn’t made any easier when you look around and all you see are other couples of privileged nationalities, strolling side by side, holding hands, or having a meal together, enjoying each other’s company. After a magical day or night out, they retreat to their homes, where they enjoy the luxury of privacy.ā€

In other blogs, he writes of the crowded and unsanitary dormitories that workers, despite some improvements, are still forced to endure.

Amnesty told that since his arrest, the migrant rights activist has been allowed one short phone call to his mother. He said to her he is being held in solitary confinement, which Amnesty described as ā€œincredibly worrying.ā€ He is being held in an unknown place, and there are fears that he may be subjected to torture.

Claims by Qatari Authorities

The treatment of Bidali by Qatari authorities stands in stark contrast to their claims of change in the Gulf state. In 2020, Yousuf Mohamed Al Othman Fakhroo, the labor minister, said Qatar is ā€œcommitted to creating a modern and dynamic labour market.ā€ He added that the reforms ā€œmark a major milestone in this journey and will benefit workers, employers and the nation alike.ā€ That thought was echoed at the time by the general secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Sharan Burrow, who  the changes as ā€œa new dawn for migrant workers.ā€ Both the ITUC and FIFA, world footballā€™s governing body, had pushed hard for the reforms, using the World Cup as leverage.

Last week, Amnesty provided Arab Digest with the following statement:

ā€œThree weeks after his arrest, we still have very little information on Malcolm Bidaliā€™s fate. Despite our appeals and those of Malcolmā€™s mother, the government has continued to refuse to disclose his whereabouts or to explain the real reason for the ongoing detention of this courageous activist who risked his own safety to try to improve life for all migrant workers in the country. ā€¦ If he is detained solely on the basis of his legitimate human rights work he must be released immediately and unconditionally, and at an absolute minimum he should be granted access to a lawyer. Such practice by the Qatar authorities sends a clear signal that it will not tolerate migrant workers speaking out and claiming their rights, and can spread fear amongst activists and other workers.ā€

The ITUC and FIFA have not commented publicly on the detention and disappearance of Malcolm Bidali. For weeks, the government had only his arrest and that he was being investigated for ā€œviolating Qatarā€™s security laws and regulations.ā€ He has since been ā€œcharged with receiving payment to spread disinformation in the country,ā€ Al Jazeera .

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51³Ō¹Ļ.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Sovereignty: International Courts and Tribunals

Sovereignty is a legal concept that expresses the power of a country participating in the international system to exercise great and perpetual authority over its territory. To uphold this, the post-war international legal order created a variety of institutions for the resolution of disputes among nations. These range from ā€œtraditionalā€ practices to a multiplicity of international courts and tribunals, each operating within their own specialized regime. In response to the economic and diplomatic, Qatar has used both to exercise effective control over its territory.

From an international law perspective, Qatarā€™s sovereignty has been expressed through the initiation of legal action against the blockading countries: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. In doing so, Qatar has chosen a strategy of filing multiple claims before various international courts and tribunals. These include the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other fora.

Based in The Hague, the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and, as such, at the epicenter of the international legal order. Still, the court does not have mandatory jurisdiction over all disputes arising between two or more states. Rather, according to the ICJ Statute, states must have a concrete legal basis to introduce a case.

In June 2018, Qatar instituted proceedings against the United Arab Emirates in the ICJ under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). In doing so, Qatar requested the court to order provisional measures to protect Qatari citizens expelled from the UAE after the commencement of the blockade in June 2017.

On July 23, 2018, the ICJ issued its order on provisional measures requiring the UAE to: (1) allow families with mixed nationalities to be reunited; (2) give Qatari students in the UAE affected by the measures the opportunity to complete their education or obtain their educational records if they wish to continue studies elsewhere; and (3) grant Qataris access to tribunals and other judicial institutions. After this ruling, the UAE filed its own request for provisional measures relating to actions that Qatar had filed before the United Nationsā€™ CERD committee and elsewhere. On June 14, 2019, the ICJ denied the UAEā€™s request for provisional measures. A date for a hearing on the merits of the Qatar v. UAE case has not yet been set. 

In addition, the blockading countries have brought forward a separate action in the ICJ under Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation regarding a decision of the council of the ICAO, challenging their closure of airspace to Qatari traffic. In June 2018, the council issued a ruling that was largely in favor of Qatarā€™s complaint. The public hearings in the blockading statesā€™ appeal of the ICAO decision were held before the ICJ in December 2019 and a final decision is pending.

Sovereignty: Other Means to Peaceful Resolution

Apart from courts and tribunals, international law provides for a category of dispute settlement methods that include mediation, together with negotiation, conciliation and inquiry. These means of peaceful settlement of international disputes are mentioned under Article 33 of the UN Charter.

Mediation involves the participation of a third party with the aim of helping parties to the dispute come to a commonly agreed solution. Given the nature and rather informal character of the mediation process, it is exclusively up to the disputing parties to resolve the dispute. To assist, Kuwait has played a visible role in trying to mediate a solution to the blockade and recently reiterated its commitment to do so.

Qatar has also taken multiple steps to protect the rights of its citizens at the political, diplomatic and legal levels. At the level of politics and diplomacy, there are two possible approaches: bilateral and multilateral. Bilateral action involves engaging in direct dialogue with the governments of the blockading countries. The state of Qatar can also raise issues before the relevant multilateral international political fora, such as the institutions of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the UN General Assembly. In this respect, Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani raised the issue of the blockade before the General Assembly, most recently at its opening session on September 24, 2019. 

Initially a political crisis, the blockade against Qatar has been increasingly played out over multiple legal disputes. The hope is that the law will also provide a bridge for the resolution of the political issues. 

*[Dr. George Dimitropoulos is an associate professor at the College of Law at Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar. The views expressed are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect the universityā€™s official stance.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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In June 2017, a group of countries led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates formed a diplomatic and economic blockade against the state of Qatar. Yet rather than bringing Qatar to its knees, the crisis has benefited the tiny Gulf nation in numerous ways. The siege has forced Doha to diversify its relations regionally and globally to gain independence from Riyadh and Abu Dhabiā€™s spheres of influence.

Qatar, a gas-rich Arab emirate, has reassured the world that regardless of the embargo, its economy has not been affected and it is ripe for investment. In fact, Qatari citizens have not particularly felt the impact of the blockade. Rather, it is ā€” making up % of the countryā€™s population ā€” who have been hit the most for a number of reasons.

First, at the outset of the crisis in 2017, Qatari employers living in Arab countries enforcing the embargo were deported and forced to put business operations on hold. This meant South Asian construction workers were stranded in the Gulf. Second, foreign workers ā€” especially from South Asia ā€” primarily comprise the blue-collar working class in Qatar, so they were disproportionately harmed when the blockade caused material shortages and closed construction sites. Third, because migrant workers are often paid low salaries, even the slightest increase in food prices can immensely impair their standard of living.

Meanwhile, the state itself has triumphed over the blockadeā€™s economic impact. By November 2018, Qatar was no longer spending any of its financial reserves to offset the embargoā€™s deleterious effects and, as a result, its economic prospects seem promising.

The Economy and Al-Udeid

Ironically, Qatar owes its current success to the Saudi-led coalitionā€™s economic and diplomatic severance. Had it not been for the blockade, Qatar would not have been so incentivized to fortify its global reputation. While and grants won over many policy officials and academics, Qatar most efficaciously solidified a positive relationship with the US by intensifying Americaā€™s military dependence on the country.

In Qatarā€™s al-Udeid airbase, the US has a forward listening post on Iran, US Central Command operating headquarters and a Gulf-based launching pad to wage its military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The Qataris used the airbase to counter US President Donald Trumpā€™s pro-Saudi foreign policy. Doha to expand al-Udeidā€™s resources and upgrade Hamad Port for use by the US Navy, all in exchange for a closer relationship with Washington.

Additionally, it was the very embargo intended to incapacitate Qatarā€™s economy that led to its prosperity and diversification. To compensate for severed economic ties with other Gulf states ā€” including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain ā€” Doha sought innovative ways to attract international business and foreign direct investment (FDI). Now, companies are to operate in Qatar because it has ā€œa legal environment based on English common law, the right to trade in any currency, 100 percent foreign ownership, 100 percent repatriation of profits and a 10 percent corporate tax on locally sourced profits.ā€

Even pre-existing firms that wanted to maintain their Qatari clientele contributed to Dohaā€™s financial success. These companies had to relocate their businesses to the country, thereby increasing FDI and local jobs in Qatar. Despite the embargo, FDI to Qatar by 4% in 2017, and the number of new companies licensed to operate in in the country by 66% in the same year.

The Saudi-led blockade has also contributed to Qatarā€™s self-sufficiency. Along with foreign direct investment, the domestic production of medicine and agricultural products has grown significantly.

For example, Qatar decided toĢżĢżsecurity throughĢż, a company that has become the country’s largest locally-owned fresh dairy and beverage supplier. Driven by the impossibility of importing foods from nearby countries, the Qatari government implemented Baladna and other infrastructure projects to cope with the desert landscape. These initiatives use innovative solutions to transform the arid landscape into fruitful agricultural land, which is much more than what other Gulf states can boast about.

Due to its newfound economic vigor and weighty relationships in the global community, Doha is rising to regional prominence, even threatening Saudi and Emirati hegemony in the Gulf. Equipped with financial stability and independence from its neighborsā€™ agendas, Doha provided $500 million to , $150 million to civil servants in and additional aid to at the beginning of 2019. Unlike other Gulf states, Qatar does not have to abide by the economic rules of the Saudi and Emirati-led (GCC). Instead, it can undermine this hierarchy by distributing regional aid to places like Lebanon, where Saudi Arabia has been working to counter , an Iran-backed political, military and social organization.

Jamal Khashoggi and Human Rights

Qatarā€™s uprooting of the status quo is well-timed, thereby increasing the odds of its successful ascension to regional prominence. Surviving its own defamation at the hands of the Saudi-led coalition, Qatar can now bask in the condemnation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has been criticized for the war in Yemen, the incarceration of women’s rights activists and the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Similarly, the UAE clings onto its credibility after a British graduate student, Matthew Hedges, for spying despite the lack of clear evidence. So long as these besmirched Saudi and Emirati reputations persist, Qatar will have the opportunity ā€” not just the financial means ā€” to secure its status as a key regional player.

Of course, no country has a perfect human rights record and Qatar is no exception. In March 2016, a by Amnesty International found that migrant workers building the Khalifa International Stadium in Doha for the 2022 FIFA World Cup had ā€œsuffered systematic abuses, in some cases forced labour.ā€ While the country officially amended its sponsorship system for foreign workers , it has still faced from human rights organizations.

Mediating between the US and Iran

Even more surprisingly, the coalition inadvertently pushed Qatar and Iran closer. Fearful of Dohaā€™s openness to Iran, the Saudi-led coalition enforced a trade and travel embargo on the Qataris back in 2017. This led to a loss of imports and the in countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia to all Qatari-registered aircraft. However, the blockade cemented relations between Iran and Qatar as the Iranians made up for lost trade and helped Doha devise new .

Although, amid current tensions between the US and Iran over the failure of the nuclear deal that was agreed in 2015, the embargo has also brought Qatar closer to Washington. Due to lobbying efforts, financial grants and the developments at al-Udeid airbase, the relationship between Qatar and the US has never been better. Uniquely situated in the good graces of both Iran and the US, Qatar could serve as an indispensable mediator between the two. Just recently, Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani placated Iranian concerns about new US military deployments to the Middle East. As by Mark Perry in The American Conservative: ā€œItā€™s likely, as this writer has been told by senior Pentagon officers, that al-Thani brought just the opposite message: that the new deployments are not a preparation for war, but an attempt to prevent it.ā€

At the end of May, Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz hosted a triple summit in Mecca for Arab and Muslim leaders. Despite the ongoing embargo, he invited Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani to attend, which was aimed at establishing a diplomatic consensus on regional issues, including Iran. Although the emir did not travel to Mecca, opting to send the Qatari prime minister instead, his unexpected invitation lends credence to the idea that Qatar is an invaluable asset in diffusing tensions between Iran and its adversaries.

Despite lacking the coercive force of a large state, Qatar boasts a trifecta of close relations with Washington and Tehran, influence in US circles and recent negotiating success. In February and March, Doha the longest round of peace talks between the US and the Taliban to date. Although no agreements were finalized, Qatar facilitated unprecedented strides toward peace in Afghanistan, giving Doha the image of a potential peacemaker between the US and Iran.

Two years after the Gulf crisis began, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have nothing to show for their coalitionā€™s efforts to pressure Qatar into surrendering. Rather than folding to its GCC neighbors, Doha has challenged the Saudis and Emiratis. Qatari economic successes, coupled with Saudi and Emirati reputational shortcomings, provide further opportunity for Doha to continue rising to regional prominence.

*[ is a partner institution of 51³Ō¹Ļ. A previous version of this article incorrectly stated that Baladna raises livestock. Updated: June 12, 2019.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Needless to say, it is Iran that is uppermost on Saudi minds, given recent barbs exchanged between the US and Iran and incidents in the Gulf.

Trouble Brewingā€¦ Again

To be sure, these exchanges are more than mere customary trifles seen over the past 40 years of frosty relations between the two countries. On the one hand, US President Donald Trump has vacillated between threatening ā€œā€ to asserting he . On the other, his national security adviser, John Bolton, seemingly drawing guidance from his own well-worn hawkish talking points, is pointing an accusatory finger at Iran for recent attacks on oil tankers and Saudi targets.

For its part, Iran has responded in kind, on Washington for the heightened tensions. Incidents in the Middle East have lent a sharp edge to the uncertainty: explosions on on May 12 in the Gulf of Oman and against Saudi oil targets on May 14 by Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Earlier in May, the US dispatched the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier group and four B-52 bombers to the troubled region in light of unspecified threats, presumably from Iran.

So, the tension is indeed palpable, only made more so by the Trump administrationā€™s ā€œmaximum pressureā€ sanctions regime imposed on Iran since the president withdrew the US from the nuclear accord, aka the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018. The virulently anti-Iranian leaderships of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ā€” not to mention Israel ā€” have succeeded in riveting American attention on Iran. They would be justified in asking themselves, however, whether war with the Islamic Republic is necessarily in their best interests.

Thus the speculation holds that the Mecca confab is meant to (a) ratchet down tensions by invoking summit diplomacy ā€” though the Iranians are not in attendance ā€” and (b) get all Muslims/Arabs on board with a Saudi approach. Sparking all this hopeful hearsay is King Salmanā€™s invitation to Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani to attend the meetings. The kingdom effectively ostracized Qatar from the GCC bloc and severed all ties in 2017 on account of Qatarā€™s relationship with Iran as well as its friendly ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups.

Could the king be reaching out to repair that relationship and possibly seek Qatarā€™s intervention in dialing back Gulf war talk? The emir did not travel to Mecca but sent his prime minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser al-Thani, in his place. Qatar did not bend in the face of pressure from Saudi Arabia, joined by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, and continues to maintain close ties with Tehran. Theoretically at least then, the idea of inviting Qatar back into the fold and employing Qatari diplomacy between the Gulf states and Iran would seem plausible and even sensible.

Balloon Punctured

Reports of the first dayā€™s proceedings in Mecca, however, would seem to dispel the notion. King Salman used the hostā€™s podium to summon all nations to and blamed Tehran for the recent attacks on tankers and oil facilities. While he seemed to welcome the Qatari prime minister to the meeting ā€” not an extraordinary gesture by the Custodian of the Two Holy Places to a fellow Muslim visiting Mecca ā€” his son, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, the most ardent critic of Iran, gave the prime minister little more than a curt, perfunctory welcome. This is hardly the stuff of rapprochement with Qatar, much less Iran.

Of course, the king and prime minister might easily have had a ³ŁĆŖ³Ł±š-Ć -³ŁĆŖ³Ł±š on the margins of Mecca to discuss diplomacy. One can only hope. But if that is his MO, he might also reach out to Washington. For all its chest-thumping on the effects of its Iran sanctions, the US has seen no success in actually moving the needle when it comes to Iranian behavior in the region or willingness to negotiate with the Trump administration.

The sanctions, which indeed have exacted a high , are less about hurting Tehran than getting it to address genuine issues, like its nuclear program ā€” effectively mothballed for the time being under the JCPOA ā€” and interference in regional affairs. For the sanctions to really work, there must by a diplomatic track, a political off-ramp that allows the Iranians to address Washingtonā€™s and their own concerns short of conflict. At present, that doesnā€™t exist.

Two to Tangoā€¦ and Conduct Diplomacy

Trump has said heā€™s willing to to Tehran. Iran has so far maintained that itā€™s not interested in a JCPOA do-over. Employing Qatar ā€” another possibility would be Oman, which helped kick off the first nuclear accord talks in 2012 ā€” which maintains good relations not only with Tehran but also Washington, might be a useful gambit, if that is what King Salman genuinely wants. But, like the tango, diplomacy requires two to work, in this case, Iran and the US. Is the king making an effort to get Washington to engage? Thereā€™s nothing to suggest thatā€™s the case for now.

The region is in desperate need of genuine diplomacy, and not just on the Iran question. The Trump administration seems little interested in such an approach, unless it involves the president himself. But cautious, deliberate, quiet and purposeful diplomacy is a sure-fire way to begin to resolve differences. At least, it would be a welcome respite from the ugly, unseemly rhetoric between Washington and Tehran and tonic to the regionā€™s frayed nerves.

But the world will have to await concrete outcomes from Mecca before it can begin to breathe more easily. Early indications »å“Ē²Ōā€™t bode well.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The bitter rift between Qatar and its Saudi and Emirati-led detractors could spill onto the pitches of English football. A flurry of reports suggest that the Gulf rivals are seeking to buy big-name English clubs.

Abu Dhabi billionaire Sheikh Khaled bin Zayed al-Nahyan, a member of the ruling family, said this week he hadĢż terms with Newcastle United owner Mike Ashley to buy the English Premier League club. Meanwhile, Qatar was in talks to purchase a stake in Leeds United ā€” which plays in the second-tier Championship league ā€”Ģżwhile Saudi Arabia had been earlier this year to beĢżcircling Manchester United.

Stepped-up interest from the Gulf could take the regionā€™s rivalry from the European level, where the United Arab Emirates’ acquisition of Manchester City and Qatarā€™s buying of Paris Saint-Germain set examples, into a national competition. While both takeovers have contributed to the UAE and Qatarā€™s soft power despite hiccups, Manchester Cityā€™s owner, , has created a template for commercial exploitation. It has built what are of the Gulfā€™s most brandsĢżby acquiringĢżstakes in clubs in the United States, Australia, Japan, Spain, Uruguay and China.

The Gulf Crisis

The rush to buy English clubs is, at least in part, the latest round in the Gulf crisis, which erupted in June 2017 with an alliance led by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, declaring an economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar.

Doha has, so far, emerged on top with Qatarā€™s unexpected winning of the Asian Cup earlier this year ā€” in, of all places, Abu Dhabi ā€” and its successful thwarting this month of UAE-Saudi-backed efforts by FIFA to force it to expand the 2022 World Cup from 32 to 48 teams and share the tournament with neighboring Gulf states. Qatarā€™s victories came on the back of a series of failed, or at best partially successful,ĢżSaudi and UAE efforts to their influence in global football governance,Ģżwhich would have enabled them to pressure the Gulf state.

The rush also suggests that the soft power gains of Arab states seeking to project themselves in ways that contrast starkly with their image as autocratic and often brutal violators of human rights, including widely-criticized migrant labor systems, outweigh the associated reputational risks. That assessment is borne out by Manchester City fansā€™ enthusiastic embrace of the clubā€™s Emirati owners and willingness to ignore the countryā€™s human rights record. Singing to the tune of the 1920s classic Kum Ba Yah, fans ,Ģżā€œSheikh Mansour mā€™lord, Sheikh Mansour, oh lord, Sheikh Mansour,ā€Ģża reference to Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed, Manchester Cityā€™s owner, who is also the UAE minister of presidential affairs and half-brother of UAE President Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan.

Like Sheikh Mansour, Newcastleā€™s buyer , whoseĢżbusiness ties appear to be more with Dubai than Abu Dhabi, is likely to project his acquisition as personal even if the UAEā€™s de factor ruler, Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, keeps a tight lid on government as well as family affairs.

The Gulf states, responding differently to criticism, have nevertheless not had an easy ride in seeking to garner soft power and polish tarnished images. In contrast to the UAE and Saudi Arabia who seldom respond to their critics, Qatar has reacted to an avalanche of criticism since its winning of the 2022 World Cup hosting rights by engaging with its detractors. Although too little too late for its more strident critics,ĢżQatar has made to its kafala or sponsorship system that puts employees at the mercy of their employers. To be fair,Ģżso , even if it did so less because of pressure by human rights and labor groups and more as part of an effort to project itself as a model, cutting-edge, 21st-century state.

Business Practices

Nonetheless, both the UAE and Qatar could see their reputational gains undermined if legal proceedings involving their football business practices go against them. Manchester City has reacted angrily to an investigation by UEFA intoĢż of financial fair play irregularities, which could lead to a Champions League ban. Yves Leterme, chairman and chief investigator of UEFAā€™s club financial control body investigatory chamber, has referred the allegations to the groupā€™s adjudicatory chamber to issue a ruling. Similarly, Paris Saint-Germainā€™s president, Nasser al-Khelaifi, was last weekĢż in France with corruption in connection with the bidding process for this year’s world athletics championships in Qatar. Khelaifi is also a UEFA executive committee member and chairman of Qatarā€™s television network, beIN Sports.

In an argument that could spread to Britain, Javier Tebas, the president of La Liga, Spainā€™s top football league, Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain as ā€œstate-run clubs, one off petrol money, one off gasā€ that should be expelled from European competitions as threats to the sport. Echoing Manchester City fansā€™ rejection of criticism of the UAE as ā€œracist,ā€ the clubā€™s chairman, Khaldoon al-Mubarak, dismissed Tebasā€™ assertions as ethnic slurs.

Thatā€™s a tactic that will likely work as long as fans such as concede that they may be ā€œhypocrites” whoĢżā€œdon’t care about human rights in the Middle East.ā€ A Manchester City podcaster, Hockin adds: “Abu Dhabi is an up-and-coming country [sic], and it wanted to boost its profile. It’s a PR thing, and we’re fine with that ā€¦ I should care but I don’t. I should care about where my shoes come from ā€” if they’ve been made by slave labour ā€” but I don’t. I don’t look to football for my moral code. I don’t think I’ve sold my soul to support Man City.”

The question is whether Hockin would stick to his position if the business practices of his clubā€™s owner or the politics of the UAE become a liability rather than an asset. With Khelaifiā€™s legal issues, the same question could confront Paris Saint-Germain fans.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Gulf Wants to Buy the English Premier League appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The covert Qatari-Emirati cyberwar that helped spark the Qatar crisis may have just gotten murkier with theĢżĢżby US Special Counsel Robert Mueller.

The indictment provided details on the website DCLeaks, which was allegedly registered by Russian intelligence officers. The website initially distributed illicitly-obtained documents associated with people connected to the Republican Party and later leaked hacked emails from individuals affiliated with the election campaign of Hillary Clinton, the 2016 Democratic presidential candidate. ā€œStarting in or around June 2016 and continuing through the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Conspirators used DCLeaks to release emails stolen from individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign,ā€ the indictment .

The indictment focuses exclusively on hacking related to the US election that brought Donald Trump to office. It makes no mention of hacking related to the Gulf crisis that pits an Emirati-Saudi-led alliance against Qatar. Yet the indictmentā€™s repeated references to DCLeaks raises the question of whether there may also be a Russian link to the email hacking in 2017 of Yousef al-Otaiba, the United Arab Emiratesā€™ ambassador to the United States.

Global Leaks

Otaibaā€™s revealing and potentially damaging emails, which seemed to help Qatar in its public diplomacy campaign, were distributed to major media outlets and analysts, including this author, by an entity known as Global Leaks. Questions about a potential link between Global Leaks, DCLeaks and Russia stem not only from Global Leaksā€™ use of a Russian provider that offers free email service, but also by the groupā€™s own reference to DCLeaks. The groupā€™s initial email had ā€œDCLeaksā€ in its subject line.

It remains unclear whether the use of a Russian provider was coincidental and whether the reference to DCLeaks was meant to mislead or create a false impression.

Global Leaks initially identified itself in an email as ā€œa new group which is bringing to limelight human right violations, terror funding, illegal lobbying in US/UK to limelight of people to help make USA and UK great again and bring justice to rich sponsors of crime and terror.ā€ When pressed about its identity, the group said:

ā€œ[We] believe that [the] Gulf in general has been crippling the American policy by involving us in their regional objectives. Lately itā€™s been [the] UAE who has bought America and traditionally it was their bigger neighbor [Saudi Arabia]. If we had to hurt UAE, we have so much of documents given by source that it will not only hurt their image and economy but also legally and will for sure result in UN sanctions at the least. But that is not our goal.

Our goal is plain and simple, back off in playing with American interests and law, don’t manipulate our system, don’t use money as a tool to hurt our foreign policyā€¦. It may be a coincidence that most things [we are leaking] do relate to UAE but in times to come if they continue and not stop these acts, we will release all the documents which may hurt all the countries including Bahrain and Qatar.”

Global Leaksā€™ allegation that the UAE was seeking to suck the US into Gulf affairs preceded reports that Mueller was, aside from Russia, alsoĢż into whether George Nader had funneled funds to the Trump campaign. Nader is a highly-paid Lebanese-American advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed.

Mueller is further investigating aĢż in the Seychelles between Blackwater founder Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, the countryā€™s sovereign wealth fund, that was brokered by the UAE. Prince and Dmitriev have denied that the meeting had anything to do with President Trump.

The US president has not publicly addressed reports that his election campaign may have received Gulf funding. But at a news conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 16, Trump failed to endorse his government’s assessment that the Kremlin interfered in the 2016 presidential election, Ģżhe doesn’t “see any reason why Russia would be responsible.ā€ He has since he had misspoken.

Foreign Lobbying

A British public relations watchdog,Ģż, said, in a report detailing UAE lobby efforts, that the Emirates had tasked public relations companies in the US and Britain with linking members of Qatarā€™s ruling family to terrorism. The lobbying also aimed to get the Qatar-backed Muslim Brotherhood banned; involved UAE threats to withhold lucrative trade deals from Britain if allegedly pro-Brotherhood reporting by the BBC was not curtailed; and it targeted journalists and academics critical of the Gulf country, according to the report.

US intelligence officials said the UAE had last year Ģżthe hacking of Qatari government news and social media sitesĢżin order to post incendiary false quotes attributed to Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. The hacking provided the pretext for the Emirati-Saudi led economic and diplomatic boycott of Doha. The UAE has denied the assertion.

US and Qatari officials said earlier thatĢż for hire had executed the attackĢżon the Qatari websites. Cybersecurity experts said at the time that the hackers worked for various Gulf states. They said the methods used in the hacking of the Qatari website and Ambassador Otaibaā€™s email were similar. ā€œThey seem to be hackers-for-hire, freelancing for all sorts of different clients, and adapting their skills as needed,ā€ said security expert Collin Anderson.

Two cybersecurity firms, ThreatConnect and Fidelis Cybersecurity, said in 2016 that they had indications that the hackers who hit the Democratic National Committee were preparingĢża fake version of the UAE Ministry of Foreign AffairsĢż that could be used in phishing attacks.

The Emirati-Qatari cyberwar was indeed likely enabled by Russian hackers working for their own account, rather than in coordination with the Russian government. It is, however, equally possible that the same hackers also put their services at the disposal of Russia.

None of what is known about the murky world of Russian hackers is conclusive, let alone produces a smoking gun. The various strands of Muellerā€™s investigation, however, suggest grounds to query not only Russian cyber efforts to influence the US election, but also the involvement of Russian nationals in the cyberwar in the Gulf and potential links between the two operations.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The contrast in soccer soft power between Qatar and Iceland speaks volumes. A comparison of the strategies of both countries demonstrates that it takes more than money to leverage soccer to create political, geopolitical and economic opportunity.

Comparing Qatar and Iceland

Money and the desire of FIFA, the global soccer body, to take one of the worldā€™s foremost sporting events beyond Europe and the Americas helped Qatar win the right to host the 2022 World Cup. Six years after the awarding, Qatar is a nation under fire by human rights and labor activists for its controversial labor regime, and it has yet to convincingly counter widespread suspicions of wrongdoing in its campaign to win its hosting rights. It is also suspected by pro-Israeli circles, Christian conservatives and Arab detractors of supporting militant Islamist groups.

Iceland is a nation that is emerging from virtual bankruptcy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. It lacked the funds to mount the kind of high-profile, flashy sports diplomacy that is central to Qatarā€™s soft power strategy. Rather than focusing on attention-grabbing moves, Iceland built its strategy around performance on the pitch that took many by surprise and embedded it favorably in the consciousness of soccer fans around the world.

Oil and gas money has bought Qatar entry into the boardrooms of major corporations; catapulted it into being a major player in financial markets; and allowed it to employ sports, arts, air transport, high-profile real estate acquisitions, state-owned broadcaster Al Jazeera, and a high-powered, fast-moving, mediation-driven foreign policy as building blocks of its soft power. The strategy has enabled the tiny Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state to punch above its weight. It has also allowed Qatar to host multiple international sporting events and conferences that have helped put it on the map and develop niche tourism.

What all of this did not buy Qatar, however, is popularity and respect beyond the corridors of power. showed that 77% of Brits and 90% of British soccer fans believed that the awarding of the World Cup to Qatar was the result of bribery and corruption, and 78% being moved to another country. A similar survey concluded that Qatar Airways had succeeded where the hosting of the World Cup had failed: 96% of those polled rated the airline from positive to very positive.

Nonetheless, Qatar Airwaysā€™ sponsorship of FC Barcelona, which figures prominently in the airlinesā€™ advertising, was despite an that called on the club to ditch the Qataris as its shirt sponsor unless it ā€œtreats its workers fairly.ā€ Beyond being a sponsorā€™s worst nightmare, the petition constituted the first indication of a potential groundswell of fan opposition to Qatarā€™s hosting of the 2022 World Cup. There is little evidence that Qatari reforms of its kafala (labor sponsorship) system have substantially improved the Gulf stateā€™s image.

Qatarā€™s reputational issues were when the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV) gave FIFA three weeks to avoid legal action in a Swiss court on behalf of Nadim Sharaful Alam, a Bangladeshi migrant worker. The FNV, the biggest union in the Netherlands with 1.1 million members, is demanding in the first such legal challenge targeting FIFA that the soccer body admit that it should have demanded abolishment of the kafala system as part of the awarding process, or concede that the World Cup should not have been awarded to Qatar.

Iceland and Euro 2016

In contrast to Qatar, Icelandā€™s stunning performance in the 2016 European Championship and its steady progress in the 2018 World Cup qualifiers have positioned it as the underdog that everyone loves. Not only has it made Iceland a darling of a global soccer-crazy public, but it has boosted the countryā€™s bottom line. Icelanders from the countryā€™s president to its foremost writers and businessmen celebrate the impact soccer has had on their ability to do business.

ā€œI was in Brazil for the Paralympics [in September] and every Brazilian I met said: ā€˜Iceland did well in the football.ā€™ Iceland now exists in Brazil, as it were. It will be the same in other countries. Iceland has really made itself known through football and that will help the country in many ways,ā€ the countryā€™s president, Gudni Thorlacius Johannesson, toldĢż.

ā€œI was in America to promote my books in September and everyone you meet has been to Iceland, wants to go to Iceland or their friends have just been there. Itā€™s worldwide. The football team has really put Iceland into focus again,ā€ added Icelandic crime writer Ragnar Jonasson, whose books have been translated into 15 languages and have skyrocketed in France in recent months.

Ua Matthiasdottir, the rights director at Forlagio, Icelandā€™s largest publishing house, echoed Jonassonā€™s experience, saying soccer had made it easier for him to forge links to publishers in other countries. ā€œIt makes it easier when people know your country actually does exist, and the football certainly helped,ā€ the British paper quoted him as saying.

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Exports of Icelandic products ranging from literature to yoghurt and frozen food have boomed in the wake of Icelandā€™s soccer success, as have tourism and finance. Dairy producer MS Dairies has enlisted the countryā€™s foremost player, Eidur Gudjohnsen, as its ambassador. Increased passenger traffic has prompted privately-held Icelandic airline Wow Air to order three new aircraft.

Qatarā€™s soccer team, too, has been performing exceptionally well, raising hopes that it could qualify for the World Cup finals for the first time. The countryā€™s state-owned airline, Qatar Airways, has been continuously expanding its already significant fleet and destination network. None of this, however, has impacted the countryā€™s continued reputational issues.

Soft Power Strategy

The bottom line is that soccerā€™s potential as a tool of public diplomacy is considerable. It takes, however, more than success on the pitch and money to harness its power. It takes a mix of policies that address both domestic and foreign concerns, an efficient public relations and communications policy, and a measure of transparency and accountability.

To be fair, the issues for Iceland are easier. Unlike Qatar, it is not struggling with a demography in which the citizenry accounts for a small minority of the overall population, which forces the government to walk a delicate tightrope between domestic and foreign concerns. And Iceland does not have the kind of rights issues Qatar is dealing with.

Nonetheless, the comparison between two nations in which soccer has become a key element of their public diplomacy suggests that Qatar could benefit from taking a close look at Icelandā€™s successful exploitation of the sport. Invariably, Qatarā€™s issues are complex and cannot be resolved with a stroke of a pen. There are, however, policies and communication strategies it could adopt to significantly increase its return on investment in the worldā€™s most popular game.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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In May, at the China-Arab Cooperation Forum in Doha, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang YiĢżĢżthat Qatar should take part in the realization of Chinaā€™s Silk Road Initiatives. Considering Qatar as a key partner to promote the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project, which Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated in 2014, Yi said that the initiative shares common cooperative opportunities with the Qatar National Vision 2030, a future development roadmap launched by Doha in 2008.

To this end, China hopes to strengthen bilateral relations with Qatar in economic, political and cultural spheres. This, however, is not the first time China took a step in courting Doha to help in implementing its OBOR projects. Last year, ChinaĢżĢżto establish a Renminbi Clearing Centre in Doha, which was the first financial institution in the Middle East to offer access to Chinese currency and foreign exchange markets. This move is crucial as one of the most important steps taken by China to abet the Silk Road Initiatives is the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which among its goals is to expand the use of Chinese currency.

Thirsty for Energy

It should come as no surprise that China is making its way to Qatar, particularly with respect to the establishment of the Silk Road Initiatives. Despite China leading the initiatives, it is impossible for Beijing to do everything alone; international participation and contributions are needed. Therefore, it is logical for China to turn to Qatar for a significant role.

As China is thirsty for energy resources to fuel its projects, Beijing clearly sees the benefits of strengthening ties with the gas-rich Persian Gulf emirate. Indeed, in the past several years China has grown increasinglyĢżĢżon Qatarā€™s hydrocarbon resources. China is presentlyĢżĢżand the Silk Road Initiatives will require even larger amounts of energy resources for implementation.

Qatar has potential to become a major beneficiary. In recent years, some European nations have begun to relocate their industries to China due to low labor cost. The Qataris could establish petroleum and petrochemical facilities in China, which will help Doha acquire a lionā€™s share of demand and competitiveness.

Moreover, China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are at the momentĢżĢżnegotiations for a free-trade agreement, which will likely have positive implications for both Beijing and Doha, the most important of which is that it will abolish customs duties imposed on the two sidesā€™ imports and increase their trade partnership. Throughout recent years, China has become the Gulfā€™sĢż, and their partnership continues to thrive. With Silk Road Initiativesā€™ focus on improving transport and connectivity infrastructure, the Sino-GCC trade ties will see further growth in the future as there are prospects for expanding and speeding up the travels of commodities between China and the GCC, as well as easing energy imports.

With respect to Chinaā€™s ambition to expand the use of its currency, Beijing hopes that through the RMB clearing center and currency swap agreements, a growing share of its trade partnership with Qatar will be cleared in RMB. Ultimately, it also hopes that oil and energy exports can be priced in its own currency, lessening trading time and transaction cost. This would also enable Beijing to conduct business with Qatar, and other regional countries, on its own rules.

Courting Qatar

Courting Qatar would also enable China to pressure these countries to solve the security issues in the region. Undeniably, en route to Europe, the Silk Road Initiatives encompass some of the most unstable countries and regions in the world, including the Middle Eastā€”areas that Qatar has increasingly engaged in. As the projects unravel, China is apparently facing different security issues, urging Beijing to pressure relevant stakeholders to resolve their conflicts to protect its interests.

Qatar, an enigma on the international stage, has a unique hand of cards as the worldā€™s top liquefied natural gas (LNG) producer and exporter. Situated between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, the uber-rich emirate sits between some of the worldā€™s most complicated geopolitical fault lines and the Middle Eastā€™s brightest sectarian flashpoints. To maintain its prosperity and stability, Qatar has traditionally relied on a foreign policy strategy of pitting competing agendas of international and regional powers against each other to further Dohaā€™s own strategic interests.

As host of USCENTCOM, Doha is a close and important ally of Washington. Yet like the other GCC states which have conducted foreign policies closely aligned to the United States, Qatar has embraced a Look East approach, taking stock of the global shift in economic prosperity from North America and Europe to the Far East. As Qatarā€™s second top LNG export partner, China has and will continue to offer Doha an opportunity to counter-balance the geopolitical interests of its Western allies, giving more important players in the international arena higher stakes in Qatarā€™s future.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Never missing an opportunity to shoot itself in the foot, Qatar has adopted a new law that is likely to convince critics that it aims to put a friendly face on its kafala (sponsorship) system, rather than radically reform a legal framework that has been dubbed modern slavery.

Qatar has been under pressure since winning the hosting rights for the 2022 FIFA World Cup to reform, if not abolish the kafala system, which puts workers at the mercy of their employer. Requirements that employees obtain permission from their employer to switch jobs or travel abroad were among the main provisions of the sponsorship system targeted by activists.

The new law streamlines procedures, but does not fundamentally change them. Under the new law, employees can seek new employment once their labor contract has expired rather than at any given point. (Although the law has been signed by Qatarā€™s ruler, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, it will only take effect after a year.)

The law abolishes the requirement that employees leave the country for two years before seeking new employment in Qatar if an employer refuses to grant a no objection certificate. Employees who want to switch jobs before the termination of their labor contract would still need to obtain permission from their sponsors, as well as the Ministries of Interior and Labor. Employees with open-ended contracts would only be allowed to switch jobs after having served five years.

The law states that in order to obtain an exit visa, employees must inform the Ministry of Interior three days before their planned departure. The ministry rather than the employee would then obtain the employerā€™s consent. The law also grants employees the right to appeal if the employer refuses permission.

Qatar earlier adopted a law that comes into effect next week, which obliges employers to pay salaries and wages by bank transfer to ensure on-time payment of workers.

Qatarā€™s labor system is a focal point of widespread criticism due to the awarding of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Despite Qatarā€™s slow and disappointing moves to reform its labor system, the awarding of hosting rights has already sparked change that has, so far, failed to convince critics of the stateā€™s sincerity in the absence of measures that amount to more than a streamlining of the existing framework.

In response to criticism, Qatar has, in contrast with other Gulf countries that bar entry to foreign activists and imprison local critics, engaged with international trade unions and human rights groups. Several Qatari institutions, including the 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, the Qatar Foundation and Qatar Rail, developed in consultation with international organizations standards that significantly improve the working and living conditions of migrant workers, who constitute a majority of Qatarā€™s population. Activists had expected those standards to be enshrined in law.

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Domestic and International Pressure on Qatar

Perceptions that Qatar is not serious about fundamental reform of its labor system are reinforced by opposition to change by many Qataris, who fear that they as a minority in their own country will see their culture diluted and lose control of their society.

Opposition has expressed itself in, for example, demands for greater segregation of migrant workers, who largely leave their families behind to seek employment in Qatar. Dohaā€™s Central Municipal Council (CMC) recently called on the government to enforce more strictly a five-year-old ban on blue-collar workers living in neighborhoods populated primarily by families.

CMC member Fatima Ahmed al-Jaham al-Kuwari told Doha News that male workers had stood outside of her house in transparent undergarments, and that some women had complained that they were being watched from building windows while they held private parties in their backyards. Kuwari asserted that migrant workers harmed the infrastructure and increased pressure on local electricity grids.

She also demanded that measures be taken to ensure landlords and their tenants respect the ā€œcustoms and traditions of the Qatari society.ā€

Writing in The Peninsula, an English-language Qatari daily, journalist Rashed al-Audah al-Fadeh charged that ā€œthese bachelor workers are threatening the privacy and comfort of families, spreading like a deadly epidemic that eats through our social fabric.ā€

Kuwari and Fadeh were not only highlighting widespread concern among Qataris, but also the fact that the government is caught between a rock and a hard place. International pressure, coupled with the fallout of the FIFA corruption scandal, demands that Qatar respond quickly and forcefully to labor criticism. Domestic opposition forces the government to move gingerly.

The government has, so far, maneuvered that field of tension poorly. Critics charge that it could have taken clear steps rather than gradually increase the number of labor inspectors to enforce existing rules and regulations, which would have conveyed sincerity while at the same time reassuring Qataris.

One reason Qatar has been reluctant to abolish the exit visa is the fact that the Gulf state has few extradition treaties with other countries. As a result, businessmen who hire foreigners to operate their businesses and give senior managers access to company bank accounts fear a manager could empty an account and skip the country.

Critics suggest the government could have addressed that concern by offering businesses a system modeled on the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) in the United States, which guarantees bank deposits up to a certain amount.

In response to the new labor law, Sharan Burrow, the general secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation, charged that it added a new layer of repression for migrant workers: ā€œPromises of reform have been used as a smokescreen to draw in companies and governments to do business in Qatar as the government rolls out massive infrastructure developments to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup.ā€

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The 2022 FIFA World Cup may be sparking social change in the Gulf, but not (yet) in Qatar. Qatarā€™s winning of the hosting rights for the World Cup gave human rights and trade union activists the leverage they needed to more effectively pressure the Gulf state for reform of its controversial kafala (labor sponsorship) system, whichĢżputs employees at the mercy of their employers.

While focused on Qatar, the campaign also targeted other Gulf states and prompted activists to focus on high-profile construction projects like sites for Western museums and universities in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It also motivated countries across the region to tinker with their labor systems. While Qatar made lofty promises of reform and engaged with its critics, the UAE and other Gulf states rejected criticism and barred activists from entry to their countries.

Gulf Cooperation Council

Now, however, as Qatar continues to dither, the UAE has decreed the very reforms DohaĢżhas yet to implement nationwide, and a prominent Saudi intellectual has called for abolition of kafala in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait recently became the first Gulf state to pass legislation granting domestic workers greater rights. By contrast, in September, students denounced conditions for workers at Weill Cornell Medical College in Doha.

The UAE move and public debate in other Gulf states deprives Qatarā€”a supporter of change across the Middle East and North Africa with the exception of the Gulfā€”of its claim to be on the cutting edge of transition in the region. It also casts further doubt on the sincerity of Qatarā€™s promises.

Qatar has promised to pass legislation by the end of 2015 that would ease procedures for exit visas and improve recruitment, housing and working conditions for migrant workers, who constitute a majority of the Gulf stateā€™s population.

Several major Qatari institutions, including the 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy and the Qatar Foundation, have adopted standards that go a far way to meet activistsā€™ demands, but these have yet to be enshrined in national law. Qatar has suggested that its emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, would approve legislation by the end of this year.

Sharon Burrow, the secretary general of International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), noted after a visit to Oman in September that the Gulf state had just about as many migrant workers as Qatar does, but that its laws did not discriminate between Omani and foreign workers even though Omanis, migrant workers and Western expatriates have different contract terms. Burrow further noted that in contrast to Qatar, workers were allowed to unionize and elect their leaders and were accorded ā€œhumane accommodation.ā€

ā€œIn Oman, you feel optimism and the hope of a shared future. In Qatar, you feel discrimination, denial and a master-servant relationship. Common region, shared cultures, neighborsā€”why the difference?ā€ Burrow asked.

Leaving Qatar looking like a straggler, the UAE has decreed labor reforms that aim to tighten oversight of employment agreements for migrant workers, with the exception of domestic labor. The decrees focus on improving transparency of job terms and employment contracts, spell out how contracts can be broken and could make it easier for workers to switch employers.

Under the new policies, prospective workers would be asked to sign a standard employment offer in their home country, which would in turn be filed with the Labor Ministry before a work permit is issued. That agreement would then be registered as a legal contract once the worker arrives in the country, and no changes would be allowed unless they extend additional benefits that the worker agrees to. Contracts can be broken by either side under certain circumstances, and workers would be free to switch to a new employer after obtaining authorization from the Labor Ministry.

In Saudi Arabia, Khaled Almaeena, a prominent Saudi journalist, called recently for the abolition of the kafala system in the kingdom. Noting that his repeated efforts to get ministers to focus on labor reform had gone unheeded, Almaeena recently wrote: ā€œA media campaign should be conducted and people, both the workers and the employees, should be made aware of their rights and obligations. Contracts should be lodged with the Ministry of Labor rather than with employers. And the kafala system must go.ā€

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Oil Dependence

The push for reform in the Gulf is about more than ensuring adherence to international labor standards. In the smaller Gulf states, it raises the specter of giving rights to a majority of the population against the backdrop of a minority citizenry that fears losing control of its culture and way of life.

Concern is heightened by the fact that the social contract in Gulf states that involves surrender of political rights in exchange for a cradle-to-grave welfare system is fraying at the edges. Faced with population growth and reduced oil revenues, Gulf states have begun to roll back subsidies, sparking sharp rises of food prices in Bahrain and bringing fuel prices in the UAE to world market levels. Oman is mulling over the raising of fuel prices, while Kuwait is looking at the introduction of a value added tax and road tolls.

To many in the Gulf, labor reform is a Pandoraā€™s Boxā€”not only in terms of potentially laying the groundwork for foreigners demanding ever more rights, but also with regard to badly needed economic reforms in preparation of a post-oil age. Newborns in all Gulf statesā€”with the exception of Qatar and Kuwaitā€”are expected to witness their countries running out of fossil energy resources within their lifetimes.

Reforms would have to rebalance the relationship between the state and a private sector that remains dependent on governments. They would also have to restructure labor markets in which citizensā€”who largely enjoy comfortable government jobsā€”would have to compete with expatriates who are likely to sell their services at a lower price. As a result, Kuwait has moved to subsidize salaries of Kuwaitis employed in the private sector.

Inevitably, the reforms will be building blocks for a move from a rentier to a productive economy, in which citizens become productive rather than entitled members of society. That could spark greater interest in political change.

That change is inevitable and is likely with or without the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The tournament, however, is proving to be a catalyst.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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is discovering the reputational risk involved in hosting mega sporting events. Qatar Airwaysā€™ sponsorship of FC Barcelona is producing exactly the kind of publicity that is a corporate sponsorā€™s worst nightmare, while a Swiss investigation of the Qatari World Cup 2022 bid threatens to expose questionable financial dealings that will fuel demands for withdrawing the tournament from the Gulf state.

An online petition, calling on FC Barcelona to ditch Qatar Airways as its shirt sponsor unless it ā€œtreats its workers fairly,ā€ has collected more than 50,000 signatures in only a few days.

The petition was launched in the wake of an International Labour Organization (ILO) report based on a year-long inquiry, which accused the airline of gender discriminationā€”with the backing of the governmentā€”by retaining the contractual right to fire cabin crew who become pregnant and by forbidding female employees to be dropped off at or picked up from company premises by a man other than their father, brother or husband.

To be fair, Qatar Airways has addressed some but not all of the ILOā€™s concerns in changes to its employment contracts. The vast majority of the airlinesā€™ cabin crews are women, while migrant workers account for 90% of its staff.

ā€œThe women who work for Qatar Airways face an extremely grim reality: cabin crew are being exploited, imprisoned without charge, forcibly confined on company premises and automatically sacked if they become pregnant. These abuses are an everyday event not only in Qatar Airlines but in the Qatari national employment system,ā€ the petition says. ā€œBarcelonaā€™s millions of fans see the team as ā€˜more than a club,ā€™ revered not only for the quality of its playersā€”like Neymar, AndrĆ©s Iniesta and of course, Lionel Messiā€”but for its allegiance to ethics, fairness and social justice. Thatā€™s why weā€™re asking the worldā€™s most respected football club to cut ties with the airline until workers conditions improve.ā€

Barcelona signed a ā‚¬150 million deal with Qatar Foundation for the 2011-12 season, which has since been replaced by Qatar Airways as the clubā€™s shirt sponsor.

Beyond being a sponsorā€™s worst nightmare, the petition constitutes the first indication of a groundswell of fan opposition to Qatarā€™s hosting of the World Cup in 2022. Intermittent smaller protests in Britain focused on the overall plight of migrant workers, who constitute a majority of the Gulf stateā€™s population, and allegations that Qatar had bought the votes it needed to win its hosting rights.

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Allegations of wrongdoing in its bid have been fueled as a result of the worst corruption scandal in the history of world soccer body FIFA, which has sparked separate investigations in Switzerland and the United States where 14 people, including senior FIFA executives, have been indicted. Qatar has repeatedly denied wrongdoing.

Switzerlandā€™s attorney general, Michael Lauber, disclosed that his investigation had flagged a total of 81 instances of possible money-laundering linked to the Qatari bid and that of Russia for the 2018 World Cup. Lauber said he was ā€œvery pleased with analysis work done by the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland as it is of great support to the (Swiss) criminal proceedings.ā€

The groundswell of fan hostility toward Qatar, coupled with the investigations, undermines the very purpose of the Gulf stateā€™s massive investment in the World Cup, which was designed to brand it as a cutting-edge 21^st century state and embed it in the international community in ways that other countries would come to its aid in an emergency.

Qatarā€™s model is the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991 by a US-led international coalition. Fan hostility toward Qatar suggests that public opinion would be less sympathetic to the country, a tiny state incapable of mustering the hard power to defend itself on its own, than it was toward Kuwait.

Not to mention that sponsorship of FC Barcelona was intended to enhance Qatar Airwaysā€™ image as a five-star airline that connects continents via its hub in Doha. Beyond making good business sense, the airline is like sportsā€”a key pillar of Qatarā€™s soft power strategy that increasingly is struggling to achieve its goals.

Airlines in the Gulf

Criticism of Qatar, including Qatar Airways, is fueled as much by facts that the Gulf state has promised to addressā€”even if it largely has yet to match words with deedsā€”as it is by prejudice, arrogance and ulterior motives.

The Barcelona petition comes as the Qatari airlineā€”alongside two other Gulf airlines, Emirates and Etihad, which are both based in the United Arab Emiratesā€”is locked into battles with American carriers, who allege that they have distorted competition by benefiting from tens of billions of dollars in government subsidies. The Gulf airlines have denied the allegation.

The complaint of the US airlines, who are unable to match the level of service of their Gulf competitors, in part because they face no competition in their lucrative domestic market, ignores the fact that they have repeatedly been bailed out of bankruptcy by US government support. The Financial Times recently calculated that over the years, US airlines had benefitted from almost four times the $42 billion that they allege Gulf governments have invested in their airlines.

Nonetheless, recent responses to criticism from Qatar, angry at what it sees as a biased anti-Arab and Muslim campaign against it, have done little to further the stateā€™s soft power goals.

ā€œI don’t give a damn about the ILOā€”I am there to run a successful airline. This is evidence of a vendetta they have against Qatar Airways and my country,ā€ Qatar Airways CEO Akbar al-Baker said in June.

A different response, together with engagement with Barcelona fans, may not have prevented the launching of the petition, but it could have cast the debate in a different lightā€”a move that would have made both political and commercial sense.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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After four years of engagement with its critics in a bid to turn its hosting of the FIFA into a successful soft power tool, appears to have decided that the Middle Eastā€™s tendency to intimidate those who »å“Ē²Ōā€™t fall into line may be a more effective strategy. In doing so, Qatar appears to be backtracking on its record of being the one Gulf state that, instead of barring critics from entry or incarcerating them, worked with human rights and trade union activists to address concerns about the working and living conditions of migrant workers.

The cooperation resulted in key Qatari institutions adopting forward-looking standards that would improve conditions and modernize, but not abolish, Qatarā€™s controversial kafala (sponsorship) system, which puts workers at the mercy of their employers.

Qatarā€™s engagement sparked understanding among major segments of the international human rights community, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, of the existential issues involved in labor reform in a country where citizens only account for 12% of the population. Many Qataris fear that tinkering with the labor system would open a Pandoraā€™s Box that could lead to them losing control of their society and culture.

Labor has emerged as the major distraction from Qatarā€™s success in winning the right to host the 2022 World Cup, against the backdrop of a relatively high migrant workersā€™ death rate and criticism of their living and working conditions. Qatar has conceded that it needs to reform its labor system in a bid to fend off calls that it be deprived of its World Cup hosting rights, but it has been slow in implementing reform.

Theo Zwanziger, the outgoing member of the executive committee of FIFA, who is also in charge of monitoring Qatari progress on labor reform, has warned that the Gulf stateā€™s snail pace approach could result in a resolution being tabled at the groupā€™s congress in late May, demanding that the World Cup be moved away from Qatar.

Zwanzigerā€™s warning rings hollow against the backdrop of guarantees given to FIFA by , the host of the 2018 World Cup, that it would suspend labor laws with regard to World Cup-related projects. FIFA has said the German television report had taken the agreement with Russia out of context.

Qatarā€™s backtracking with the detention of foreign journalists who investigate workersā€™ living and working conditions ā€” and warnings to those in Qatar who have worked with Qatari institutions, human rights groups and trade unions ā€” comes as Gulf states adopt more assertive regional and foreign policies. In doing so, Qatar joins the conservative Gulf mainstream.

Ā© Shutterstock

The GCC

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has in recent weeks barred entry to a New York University professor, who was scheduled to attend a conference at the universityā€™s Abu Dhabi campus, and two prominent artists because of their criticism of the countryā€™s labor regime.

Gulf states distrust US policy in the Middle East, particularly the Obama administrationā€™s handling of nuclear negotiations with Iran, which could return the Islamic Republic to the international fold. They also feel that Iran is projecting its power in the region through proxies that are encircling the Gulf. In response, Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, have become militarily and politically more assertive as in Yemen, where they have waged a destructive bombing campaign, and in Syria, with stepped-up support for rebels fighting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Gulf assertiveness began with Saudi troops helping in brutally suppressing a popular revolt in Bahrain in 2011, and the kingdom, together with the UAE and Kuwait, backed a military coup in Egypt in 2013. Qatar, with its close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, appeared at the time of the coup to be the one Gulf state charting an independent course.

With Qatar falling more in line with the more hard-line mainstream Gulf approach, Oman is replacing Doha as the odd man out in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the regional group that brings together Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, the UAE and Kuwait. Oman has refused to join the bombing campaign in Yemen; it has mediated US contacts with Iran; and it has rejected militarization of the GCC.

In the latest evidence of a reversal in Qatarā€™s approach, security forces detained a BBC television team that had been invited by the government to report on the labor issue. ā€œWe were invited to Qatar by the prime ministerā€™s office to see new flagship accommodation for low-paid migrant workers ā€” but while gathering additional material for our report, we ended up being thrown into prison for doing our jobs,ā€ wrote Mark Lobel on the BBCā€™s website.

The 13-hour detention of the BBC journalists followed the arrest earlier this year of a German television crew. Both teams had their equipment confiscated, which in the case of the Germans was returned only after all data had been deleted. In a meek defense, the Qatar Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, which is responsible for the 2022 World Cup, said the German crew had failed to obtain permission to film. It is an argument that doesnā€™t hold up in the case of the BBC.

FIFAā€™s rejection of the German documentaryā€™s findings, and particularly the fact that it expressed surprise that one of its media partners would report independently and critically about the group, raises questions about the sincerity of its pledge to investigate the detention of the BBC journalists. ā€œAny instance relating to an apparent restriction of press freedom is of concern to FIFA and will be looked into with the seriousness it deserves,ā€ the group said in reference to the BBC case. It did not issue a similar statement when the German team was detained.

It is unclear as to whether the hardening attitude of Qatar, which is also reflected by sources in Qatar being hesitant to speak out, is simply security forces taking a tougher position as they forge closer security and intelligence ties to other GCC states, or whether it reflects an overall change in the countryā€™s approach.

Qatarā€™s changed stance could signal a partial shift away from seeing soft power as the main pillar of its security and defense architecture, in the absence of the manpower or strategic depth to project hard power in adherence to a Saudi-led projection of military force. In 2014, Qatar stepped up its arms purchases with an $11 billion deal to acquire US Patriot missiles.

Yet given that it is sandwiched between Iran across the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, Qatar sees Riyadh as both an ally and a threat. Qatar is likely to walk a fine line, even if it adopts some of its big brotherā€™s more repressive tactics.

In the end, it doesnā€™t really matter in an autocratic state in which decision-making is highly centralized. But at risk is Qatarā€™s potential of becoming a rare example of a mega-sporting event that leaves a legacy of social if not political change, rather than white elephants and financial loss. The World Cup offers Qatar an opportunity to put its best foot forward and emerge as a forward-looking 21^st century regional model. The question is whether Qatari backtracking will squander the Gulf stateā€™s unique opportunity.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:ĢżĢż/Ģż

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The month of Ramadan is in full swing. Muslims around the world, male and female, will abstain from eating, drinking and having sexual intercourse between dawn and sunset until the end of July. Based on one of the five pillars of Islam,ĢżsiyamĢż(fasting) in Ramadan is compulsory for those who are physically able to do it.

Beyond such basic knowledge of the month lies the ā€œpoliticsā€ of Ramadan. No, we are not talking about sectarian conflict among Sunnis and Shiā€™ites in the Middle East. Rather, the politics of Ramadan sees Muslims themselves separating the month from its original meanings.

Spiritually, Ramadan is a time of meditation, inner peace and sadaqahĢż(charity). It is a month for personal reflection and a chance to become closer to God, and it is a moment for family and community. This may involve simply sitting in a mosque alone, reading the Qurā€™an or volunteering at charities. The month of Ramadan is a point where one should not only abstain from food, water and sex, but rather from doing anything that is deemed sinful such as lying, cheating or backbiting.

Instead of seeing fasting as a chore, followers of Islam are taught to remember those in the world ā€” Muslim and non-Muslim ā€” who essentially fast every day not as an obligation, but rather because they live in war, hunger and poverty. As Ayesha Almazroui succinctlyĢżĢżit: ā€œThe true meaning of fasting is to experience hunger; to feel humility and compassion towards the poor.ā€

Overeating and Obesity

However, when we see practices ofĢżsomeĢżMuslims during Ramadan, the festival threatens to move away from its spirituality and instead into a month of excessive consumption. While the common belief among many is that a huge feast is served atĢżiftarĢż(breaking of the fast), Islam actually teaches that we should not overeat, for the meaning of the month is to show patience, restraint and humbleness. Instead, eating should always be done in moderate proportions, for even the Prophet Muhammad is noted as saying: ā€œNothing is worse than a person who fills his stomach. It should be enough for the son of Adam to have a few bites to satisfy his hunger. If he wishes more, it should be: one-third for his food, one-third for his liquids, and one-third for his breath.ā€

Today, for example, Ramadan often sees binge eating and wastage by Muslims throughout the worldĢżā€” with consumption said toĢżĢżby 30%. InĢż, it has become an annual occurrence for people to be hospitalized from eating too much atĢżiftarĢżand suhoorĢż(pre-dawn meal). As for wastage,ĢżĢżsees an extra 20% of food in its landfill sites during Ramadan alone, while year round the United Arab EmiratesĢżĢża high proportion of food. Authorities in Abu Dhabi have evenĢżĢżfor citizens to reduce the amount of food they waste.

Moreover,Ģż to a study by the United Nations, Gulf States are among the most obese in the world, with Kuwait followed by Saudi Arabia being the highest in the region. Obesity in the Gulf is not only caused by high summer temperatures that mean people often stay indoors to enjoy leisure activities. Rather, a lavish lifestyle with widely available junk food and a lack of physical activity is a leading cause.

This culture of binge eating among Arabs and Muslims living in the East and West has led to what some have dubbed the commercialization of Ramadan. The holy month sees increased advertising, hiked prices and huge buffets at hotels in the Middle East. Amid Arabic soap operas that have viewers glued to the TV set due to reduced working hours in Ramadan, mass advertising campaigns are a key feature. In 2009, EgyptĢżĢż$146 million on adverts during Ramadan ā€” a 62% rise on previous months. With people sitting indoors, it is little wonder that television bosses rub their hands together and watch the dollars and dinars roll in.

Even in Mecca, Islamā€™s holiest city, historical sites have beenĢżĢżto pave the way for skyscrapers. The increasing number of luxury hotels charge extortionate amounts during Ramadan due to pilgrims flocking to the city. Of course, companies should always analyze market trends and capitalize on demand. This is key to any economy that seeks to boost its growth and always move toward further development. However, as Jaweed KaleemĢż, such policies by Saudi authorities have led to ā€œdiscussions of excess in a faith that emphasizes simplicity and accessibility.ā€

With petrodollars in the Gulf, splashing cash at luxury hotels is not an issue for those who can afford it, but the true meaning of Ramadan is being lost in the process. For those concerned about consumption and commercialization in Ramadan, the month of fasting threatens to be turned into the month of overeating and excessive prices.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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A disclosure byĢżĢżof millions of documents allegedly revealing Qatari vote-buying for World Cup hosting rights could shake the Gulf. The revelations might affect the peninsulaā€™s fragile balance of power, reverse hopes that Qatar would initiate significant social change in the region, and return the worst corruption crisis in global soccer governance to the top of the agenda.

The documents appear to show how disgraced former FIFA Vice President and Asian Football Confederation (AFC) President Mohammed bin Hammam, a Qatari national, used a secret $5 million slush fund to make dozens of payments, primarily to African soccer executives, to create the basis for a vote in favor of Qatar in FIFAā€™s executive committee. The committee awarded the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar in a controversial vote in December 2010.

The disclosure comes as Michael Garcia, FIFAā€™s independent investigator into the corruption allegations, was scheduled to meet members of Qatarā€™s bid committee. FIFA officials suggested prior to the disclosure that Garciaā€™s two-year long investigation was unlikely to produce a smoking gun.

The Fallout

Qatar has long denied any wrongdoing and sought to distance itself from bin Hammam, who was at the center of the previous corruption scandal. In 2012, bin Hammam was banned by FIFA for life from involvement in professional soccer on charges of ā€œconflict of interest,ā€ which was related to an internal audit about his financial and commercial management of the Asian soccer body. Like Qatar, bin Hammam has consistently denied the allegations.

Qatari defense and security policy sees sports and soccer, alongside hyper-diplomacy with a focus on mediation in multiple conflicts and projection of the state through Qatar Airways, Al Jazeera, high-profile investments and art acquisitions, as ways of compensating for its military weakness.Ģż

The documents counter Qatari assertions that they opposed bin Hammamā€™s 2011 bid for the FIFA presidency that sparked his downfall, because a Qatari win of the World Cup and simultaneous control of the world soccer body would have been too much at the same time. They also counter Qatari suggestions that Qatar and bin Hammam had parted ways to the degree that the former FIFA executive had supported Australiaā€™s bid against the Gulf state.

The potential fallout ofĢżThe SundayĢżTimes revelations could be immense:

1) There could be a retraction of Qatarā€™s right to host the 2022 World Cup. Such a move would likely be embraced by the Gulf stateā€™s detractors led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ā€” states that oppose Dohaā€™s idiosyncratic foreign policy, including Qatarā€™s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, a retraction could fuel perceptions in significant parts of the Muslim world in terms of discrimination on the grounds of religion and ethnicity.

2) The situation could see increased pressure being mounted on global soccer governance to radically reform. This would include the AFC having to act on recommendations of an internal 2012 audit that accused bin Hammam of using an AFC sundry account as his personal one. The audit also suggested that his management of AFC affairs may have involved cases of money laundering, tax evasion, bribery and breaching of US sanctions against Iran and North Korea. Bin Hammamā€™s successor as AFC president, Sheikh Salman bin Ebrahim al-Khalifa, has so far been able to bury the report that recommended possible legal action, as well as a review of a $1 billion master rights agreement negotiated by the Qatari national on behalf of the AFC with a Singapore-based company.

3) The disclosure could thwart Qatari hopes to use the World Cup as one of its tools to build soft and subtle power. The stateā€™s soft power is seen as attempting to compensate for its inability to build the hard power military strength that is necessary to defend itself. Qatari defense and security policy sees sports, in general, and soccer, in particular, alongside hyper-diplomacy with a focus on mediation in multiple conflicts and projection of the state through Qatar Airways, Al Jazeera, high-profile investments and art acquisitions, as ways of compensating for its military weakness. That soft power strategy depends on garnering global public empathy.

4) Qatari attempts to improve living and working conditions as well as to enhance the rights of foreign workers, who constitute a large percentage of the population in Qatar and other Gulf states, could see a setback. The bid could amount to significant social change in the region. The moves, which were having a ripple effect throughout the Gulf, were being driven by the World Cup that empowered human rights and labor activists.

5) The affair could substantially weaken Qatarā€™s ability to stand up to Saudi Arabia. ĢżAlongside the UAE and Bahrain, Riyadh recently withdrew its ambassador to Doha in a bid to force Qatar to end its strategic relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, expel resident Islamist leaders, including prominent Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, temper Al Jazeera reporting, and close down critical Doha-based think tanks.

Qatar has yet to respond toĢżThe Sunday TimesĢżreport, but has systematically refused to give a full account of its bid to win World Cup hosting rights, including the budget of the bid and how it was spent as well as its relationship with bin Hammam. A simple denial of the newspaperĢżreport is unlikely to put to bed the allegations that have persisted for more than three years.

*[James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also co-director of the University of WĆ¼rzburgā€™s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author ofĢżĢżblog and a forthcoming book with the same title.]ĢżĢż

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Mass protests against Brazil’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup, Turkey’s loss of opportunities to hold sports events, and controversy over Qatar’s labor system are impacting the global sports world’s thinking about the requirements future hosts will have to meet. The impact is likely to go far beyond sporting and infrastructure concerns and raise the stakes for future hosts.

Qatar is under increasing pressure to overhaul its kafala, or labor sponsorship, system, denounced by the United Nations and labor and human rights activists as violations of international human rights standards. The Gulf state potentially risks losing its hosting rights, if it fails to demonstrate rigorous enforcement of existing rules and regulations and enact radical reforms.

The Qatar controversy illustrates the risk that sporting authorities, such as world soccer governing body FIFA and the International Olympic Committee, shoulder with the awarding of tournaments to nondemocratic or authoritarian-run nations. FIFA has been heavily criticized for its awarding of the 2022 World Cup to Qatar.

We know perfectly well that big French companies and big German companies have interests in Qatar. But they are not only involved in the World Cup.

ā€” FIFA President Sepp Blatter

FIFA President Sepp Blatter recently described the awarding to Qatar as a ā€œmistake.ā€ FIFA later tried to soften the impact of Blatterā€™s statement, saying he was referring to the fact that the awarding disregarded a negative FIFA technical assessment that warned about the countryā€™s bruising summer temperatures.

ā€œOf course it was a mistake. You know, one makes a lot of mistakes in life. The technical report indicated clearly that it was too hot in summer, but despite that the executive committee decided, with quite a big majority, that the tournament would be in Qatar,ā€ Blatter said, sparking a soccer diplomacy spat, charging that pressure by the governments of France and Germany as a result of commercial interests had contributed to the success of the Qatari bid.

In doing so, Blatter perhaps unwittingly raised the question over what the drivers for the awarding of mega sporting events should be. ā€œWe know perfectly well that big French companies and big German companies have interests in Qatar. But they are not only involved in the World Cup,ā€ Blatter said. France and Germany have denied his allegation.

Qatar, meanwhile, is caught in a Catch-22: its international image and the achievement of its soft power policy goals demand swift and decisive action; its domestic politics necessitate a more gradual approach.

Sports Events as a Tool to Build Soft Power

For Qatar and other Middle Eastern and North African nations, the risks in hosting mega events are particularly high, given that their significant investment is designed to achieve more than country-branding and international projection; rather the creation of commercial and other opportunities.

Mega events serve them as a tool to build soft power, either as part of a defense and security strategy designed to compensate for the inability to acquire the hard power that is necessary to defend themselves, or as a way of increasing international willingness to provide economic and political support in difficult geopolitical circumstances.

Mass protests in Brazil against the World Cup have further pinpointed the need to obtain public buy-in as part of the awarding process, in a bid to prevent mega events from being mired in controversy and social protest. Brazil hosts this yearā€™s World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.

Finally, brutal police responses to protests and a series of authoritarian measures to control the media, Internet and judiciary have cost Turkey the chance to host the 2020 Olympics as well as Euro 2020, reinforcing the fact that mega sports events cannot be viewed independently of a countryā€™s domestic policies.

Construction in Qatar, Doha. Copyright Ā© Shutterstock; All Rights Reserved

Case Study Qatar

Qatar, however, provides the foremost case study to date of what potential future hosts of mega events may expect. Qatar has garnered significant credibility by becoming, since the awarding of the World Cup, the first Gulf state to engage with its critics and work with them to address issues.

Yet at the same time its credibility is being called into question by a history of promises on which it has yet to make good. Qatari institutions have in the past three years adopted lofty principles in response to criticism of its labor system; they pledged to incorporate these into World Cup-related contracts; and they stepped up enforcement of existing rules and regulations. Those promises and principles have yet to be implemented into law.

At the same time, promises pre-dating the awarding of the World Cup, such as a pledge in 2008 to introduce a law governing the rights of domestic workers, have yet to be fulfilled. Human rights and trade unionists have charged that the recent promise to overhaul the kafala system, while easing some restrictions on workersā€™ rights, appear to be more of a relabeling exercise rather than a radical reform, much like Formula 1 host Bahrain did several years ago.

Qatarā€™s lesson for future hosts is that putting a countryā€™s warts on public display is risky, if it is unwilling or unable to proactively tackle sensitive domestic issues.

Jordanā€™s Efforts: A Progressive Player

The Jordanian hosts of the recent Asian Forum of Soccerex, a major sports business conference that expanded into Asia for the first time, appear to have realized which way the wind is blowing. Recognizing that global soccer governance and business is focused on the top-end of professional soccer, they introduced debates on issues such as grassroots and womenā€™s soccer. The Jordanians are also looking at including preparations for future World Cups in forthcoming Soccerex gatherings.

Hosting the conference is part of a Jordanian effort to project itself as a significant and progressive player in international sports. Jordan is scheduled to host the 2016 Under-17 Womenā€™s World Cup. Jordanian Prince Ali al-Hussein, the Soccerex conferenceā€™s host and a vice president of FIFA, said: ā€œFootball is not just a sport but a tool to improve society.ā€

*[Note: James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also co-director of the University of WĆ¼rzburgā€™s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author ofĢżĢżblog and a forthcoming book with the same title.]ĢżĢż

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

Images: Copyright Ā©Ģż: .ĢżAll Rights Reserved

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While there has been much debate within the international community over what should be done in Syria, France has adopted a more assertive, if not , position. From the very beginning of the Syrian conflict, the French government was the the Syrian National Coalition in November 2012. It was also the first government to promise arms to the rebels.

Later, French President FranƧois Hollande to “punish” the Assad regime, while most of his European counterparts remained very skeptical of such an intervention. Nonetheless, the French government finally decided not to deliver arms to the insurgents. Following the on Syria’s chemical weapons in September 2013, the idea of a military intervention was abandoned.

Meanwhile, in Africa, France launched a military intervention in Mali in January 2013 and has been involved in the Central African Republic since December 2013.

To many, French foreign policy seems to be quite messy and inconsistent. However, there are very rational explanations behind it that can justify these mixed foreign policy decisions. France’s strategy in Syria ā€” and elsewhere ā€” has been shaped by long-standing and well-identified interests.

Nonetheless, by promoting France’s interests, President Hollande has probably done more harm than good to his own country as well as to Europe and, above all, the Syrian people.

Drivers of French Foreign Policy

France’s strategy in Syria has been defined according to a set of three key drivers. The first is related to French interests in the Middle East. Following its colonial legacy and historical tradition, France has always conducted, especially since Charles de Gaulle’s time in office, a pro-active policy toward Arab states. The French “Arab policy” has taken the form of economic, military and diplomatic relations with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and, more recently, Qatar.

Thus, what has sometimes been called France’s “aggressive” policy on Syria is nothing but a reflection of its well-established interests in the region. France has certain ; before the war, it also expected to use the country as a “hub” for oil and gas transit.

In addition to that, France has deep in neighboring Lebanon. Since the end of the mandate period in the 1930s, Paris has constantly sought to maintain and develop strong diplomatic and cultural ties with Lebanon in order to establish its influence in the region.

Lastly, Syria takes on a prominent geostrategic dimension, especially in respect to its role within the Russian-Iranian axis. Indeed, the three countries share a common interest in counterbalancing Western powers on the world stage. They have been developing a strong relationship for the last decade. France’s influence and interests in the Middle East are threatened by this new geopolitical axis.

This explains why the French government was initially willing to deliver arms to rebels in Syria. It eventually backed down for three reasons. First, French experts feared the delivery of arms would trigger a flare-up in the entire region. The had already proven that it was really hard to control arms flows after their delivery. Second, following the stagnation of the conflict, it became unclear whether arms would benefit the “right” opposition groups or the jihadists, against which France has been fighting for the last decade. Third, France was forced to abandon its project due to the reticence of the international community.

A second driver of France’s foreign policy is its desire to be recognized as a global power. While such a claim was relevant under de Gaulle and even before his time, the role of France on the international stage has become unclear since then.

A subsequent priority for French leaders was and still is to guarantee France’s independence in decision-making. This explains why France had been so assertive in promoting a military strike against the Syrian government. It wanted to show that it could take the initiative on matters as important as the Syrian crisis. Paris had to step back eventually.

Once again, domestic tensions arose as the possibility of another military intervention was mentioned. Further, the compromise found by Russia and the US regarding a deal on Syria’s chemical weapons made a military intervention obsolete.

External factors are not the only elements that have shaped Hollande’s strategy in Syria. Logically, the foreign policy of any given country, and France makes no exception, is intrinsically connected to, if not determined by, the situation at the domestic level.

Ever since Hollande became president in 2012, he has faced growing challenges at home, especially regarding the economic situation. Despite the measures he took, unemployment remains high and economic growth has barely recovered. He has not been able to satisfy neither the left-wing, which sees him as having reneged on his electoral promises, nor the right-wing, which blames him for not going far enough. Overall, Hollande is often depicted as ineffective, not to say feeble.

This explains France’s current policy in Syria in three ways. First, by focusing on serious issues abroad, Hollande attempts to distract from the problems at home. Second, the idea that France has a significant role to play in international affairs enjoys a . Third, for Hollande, being a on the international stage clears himself of being too soft on the domestic scene and gives him a bit more legitimacy and credibility.

Thus, France’s policy toward Syria is not irrational. It is the result of political and geopolitical calculations coupled with domestic considerations. Yet whether this strategy has been successful is much more debatable. In fact, the main issue is that President Hollande has been far too gung-ho to deal with the Syrian crisis. This has not been without consequences.

Hollande’s Gung-Ho Strategy

France’s strategy in Syria has had several boomerang effects. To begin with, recent events have shown that France does not have the political means, nor the material capacity to play by its own rules. While Hollande was ready to launch a military strike in August 2013, US President Barack Obama stepped back and waited for the approval of Congress.

Hollande found himself in a very embarrassing situation. This event exemplified France’s dependency on the US. In other words, it seems that without the support of Washington, or at least of some of its allies, France is .

Moreover, the question was finally solved by the US-Russian deal on Syria’s chemical weapons. For most of the international community, the deal represented a good compromise between a potentially damaging military intervention and the human costs of a “doing-nothing” policy.

However, for the French government, the situation was particularly humiliating since it . Thus, this event not only revealed France’s lack of influence on the international stage, but also showed that the international community could merely do without it.

Overall, the way the French government dealt with the entire crisis contributed to its de-legitimization. The fact that the French president was ready to launch a military strike without seeking parliamentary consent was seen as highly undemocratic. Besides, President Hollande did not appear to give much credit to international law when he declared that it “” rather than being a constraint to a military intervention.

By bypassing both principles of democracy and legality, France deeply damaged its credibility. In sum, the way the French government has managed the Syrian crisis has only succeeded in deepening its .

France’s strategy toward Syria has also negatively impacted Europe. Hollande’s assertive policy has . On the question of arming the rebels, Germany, Sweden and Austria had always been very cautious and disapproved of French ā€” and British ā€” rushed statements about the need to help the insurgency fight back against the Assad regime. Likewise, the Germans and Italians were very critical of France’s military activism. The the French warmongers would threaten the security of European troops in Lebanon.

While France has justified its policy regarding the need to protect the Syrian population, one must not forget that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Ultimately, the Syrian people have been the very first victim of France’s ineffective strategy in their country.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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About a year ago, in Los Angeles, I asked Jaco, a Tunisian-Jewish friend, for his thoughts on the post-Ben Ali Tunisian political situation. He thought about it for a second and summed up the Tunisian reality in two sentences. “Things will get worse… and then they’ll get better.” The first part has certainly come true. But right now it’s harder to see the bright future at the end of the tunnel.

Three years ago, on December 17, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi immolated himself in Sidi Bouzid, an impoverished town in the Tunisian interior. The ensuing social explosion would force dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi, from power before expanding to the entire Middle East.

Three years later, the prospects for “a new Tunisia” are somber enough. Talk of Tunisia as “the only successful democratic transition” in the Arab world is, unfortunately, more wishful thinking than fact.

The country is in full crisis. As in the region’s other revolutions, the Tunisian revolt was triggered by economic stagnation, massive corruption, and a repressive dictatorship. The demands of the revolution, which remain largely unaddressed, were essentially secular: far-reaching socioeconomic change and greater democracy. It was not about what variety of Islam the country might embrace.

True enough, Tunisia has not deteriorated to the levels of the civil war in Syria or the large-scale violence in Egypt. But three years after Bouazizi set the country aflame, the path Tunisians have traveled has been a rocky one, involving a fair amount of suffering, much of it self-inflicted. Three years on, Tunisia slides from one crisis to another.

Despite formal progress — credible elections, some regime facelifts — Tunisia is caught in a downward spiral that could easily get much worse. As the economy continues to tank and jobs become even scarcer for youth, more young people are amenable to the Salafist call of Islamic radicalism.

After considerable outside pressure, Tunisia is ushering in a new set of political leaders. But do they also represent a new politics or just more of the same?

The Errors of Ennahda

Outside factors, such as the corroding influence of Qatari and Saudi money, have played a role in Tunisia’s drift toward theocracy. And without foreign economic and political aid from the United States and Europe, the current government would not have a leg to stand on, and Tunisia’s fragile political stability would collapse.

But much of the responsibility for Tunisia’s current plight must be placed at the feet of the three-party ruling coalition, and particularly the Ennahda Party, which is essentially the Tunisian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Ennahda and its leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, bear a great deal of responsibility for the growing polarization in the country. Like its sister organization in Egypt, Ennahda ruled with a mixture of ineptitude, factionalism, and growing repressiveness. Ennahda gave a free-hand to more radical Islamist elements, permitting Salafists to gain control over the country’s mosques, bully and threaten more secular figures, intimidate women in an effort to undermine women’s rights, and Islamize the country’s educational system. In this process, the moderates of the past have been unceremoniously pushed aside.

The Ennahda-led government has lacked an economic program or vision to address the country’s economic and social ills. It has limped along on IMF handouts, with the usual harsh structural adjustments these entail. Its program was essentially cultural — to advance its own particular version of Islam within Tunisia’s long secular-oriented post-colonial government. A new intolerant religious sectarianism, fueled and funded with Saudi and Qatari money, has produced an even more toxic cocktail.

Shuffling the Deck

Now for the fourth time since the overthrow of the Ben Ali-Trabelsi dictatorship, the Tunisian ruling elite has had to shuffle the deck in response to widespread public outrage. Unending mass protests, combined with pressure from both the Obama administration and the European Union, have forced a leadership change. Past changes have been little more than political musical chairs, with the ruling Troika — in which Ennahda holds most of the power — simply exchanging one Ennahda leader for another.

This time, fearing that it might suffer the same fate as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahda reluctantly began a more serious process. The fundamental question is whether the new leadership actually offers the country a way out of the crisis, or whether it is once again an exercise of all the change necessary to maintain the status quo.

A “national dialogue” — somewhat limited in scope — has resulted in the announcement of a new government in which Ennahda has agreed to share power with Beji Caid Essebsi’s , a party made up largely of prominent business and government elements from the Ben Ali period, including Essebsi himself. Nida Tounes is the old guard’s bid to return to power through the back door. 

After several months of political wrangling, Ennahda agreed to a new transitional government of technocrats to replace the current government led by . Under pressure from Paris, Mehdi Jomâa, a Tunisian with ties to the French energy multinational , was chosen to replace him.

Business as Usual

Although Ennahda and Nida Tounes disagree sharply on cultural policies — for instance, on the Islamization of Tunisian society — both parties are firmly committed to the same neo-liberal economic policies that Tunisia has embraced for the past 30 years and that are responsible for the ongoing social crisis facing the country. The new Ennahda-Nida Tounes power-sharing agreement slightly enlarges the social base of those in power while splitting and weakening the broader Tunisian opposition, just as it was meant to do.

Jomâa, a hardly known political figure, is already viewed with mistrust beyond the country’s business community. The Popular Front, the leftist opposition party whose size and influence continues to grow, has opposed the selection of a Jomâa-led government, noting that his support has a narrow base. Two of the leaders of this party, Chokri Belaid and Mohammed Brahmi, have been assassinated within the past year. These assassinations were key elements in  and the narrowing of its base of support.

Both Washington and Paris, wary of a perceived challenge from China in Africa, immediately acknowledged and strongly supported Tunisia’s new political constellation. Curiously, among those expressing most hope for the new Tunisian political pact is US neoconservative  — of Iran-Contra fame — who penned an entry on his Council of Foreign Relations blog deeming Tunisia the “” and expressing support for the Jomâa-led government. He quoted a similar statement issued by the  spin-off, the .

Violence Escalates

After trying to reign in Salafist excesses for three years, the Tunisian government has found that these elements are now out of control. The government is in pitched battles with armed Islamist radicals in the country’s mountainous western region near the Algerian border and elsewhere. As retired Tunisian General Rachid Ammar, “hero” of the events of January 2011, warned: 

Three years later, self-immolation has been replaced by suicide bombing, unknown in Tunisia until recently. In October 2013, one youth managed to blow himself up in Sousse, a lovely seaside fishing town that independence turned into a European tourist Mecca. The second attempt, by Aymen Saadi, a 17-year-old youth, was diffused before its payload could be detonated.

Saadi’s story is worth telling. A promising student, he left high school a year ago along with hundreds of other young Tunisian volunteers and traveled incognito to Libya, where he received military training in Salafist camps in and around Benghazi. From Libya he was flown to Turkey, . Saadi and fellow travelers returned to Tunisia as trained and hardened Islamic guerillas.

Tunisian youths, recruited and radicalized by Salafist elements, are reportedly working with terrorist groups in Mali, Algeria, Iraq, and Libya. They return home to Tunisia and continue their “jihad.” Although there is no exact figure for the number of Salafist-trained youth re-entering the country, the figure thrown around is in the hundreds.

Ennahda has repeatedly denied that it actively recruits Tunisian youth to fight with Islamist rebels in Syria and Mali. But such denials ring false. In line with Muslim Brotherhood policy, the Tunisian government supports the Islamist-dominated Syrian rebels politically and militarily. Ennahda has done little to interfere with Salafist military recruiting taking place in Tunisia’s mosques and religious schools. Now it faces the inevitable blowback.

Complex as the Tunisian situation is, the country remains an island of hope in a sea of increasing cynicism. Preserving what is left of Tunisian democracy is very much in the US interest.

Three years ago, many US policymakers, including Hillary Clinton, urged President Barack Obama to take a more conservative course and continue to support Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Against that advice, the president tilted toward supporting the democratic movements and the changes they demanded. It was one of Obama’s finest moments.

No doubt, US pressure was one element in convincing Ennahda to extend its base and embrace some of the country’s democratic elements. This was done not only to strengthen the government’s position in its struggle against a growing armed radical Islamic insurgency, but also to help save Tunisian democracy from disintegrating into Egyptian- or Syrian-like chaos.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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Gulf states are lining up as targets for criticism by international trade unions and human rights groups for their treatment of foreign workers. Qatar, long in the firing line after its winning bid to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022, was recently joined by Abu Dhabi as a result of projects to build world-class museums, luxury hotels and a campus for New York University.

Dubai is likely to be next in line after its winning bid to host the 2020 World Expo, which is expected to generate $7 billion in construction projects.

A comparison of the media fallout as well as campaigning by trade unions and human rights groups of Qatar and Abu Dhabi highlights the power of the World Cup and soccer. This puts the onus of responsibility on sports associations, including FIFA, for ensuring that hosts meet international standards of human rights.

As a matter of principle, there is little news in the abominable conditions of foreign workers in the Gulf where they often constitute a majority of the population. This writer wrote his first report on the plight of foreign workers in the region in 1976. Vast realms have been written since.

The Independent focused several years ago on the UAE. Yet it took Qatar’s winning of the World Cup to put the issue on the agenda, with any number of groups and government organizations since seeking to get on the bandwagon.

Britain’s The Guardian ensured that it moved even further up the agenda with a series of recent reports on workers in Qatar involved in World Cup-related projects. In contrast to those reports, revelations in The Guardian’s sister publication, The Observer, about workers’ conditions on Abu Dhabi’s Saadiyat (Happiness) Island have had a more muted fallout than those about Qatar.

Workers’ Rights in the Gulf

Yet Abu Dhabi is not just about the arts and education, of which there are far more restrictions on academic freedom than in Qatar; although this is not to suggest that the Gulf state is a beacon of freedom of expression, research and the press.

Abu Dhabi, too, is about sports. FIFA has organized in recent years several tournaments in Abu Dhabi, while the International Cricket Council (ICC) moved its headquarters in 2005 from London to Dubai. The UAE would like to see others follow suit.

While Gulf states compete for topping the list of where workers’ conditions are worst, Abu Dhabi and the UAE compare unfavorably to Qatar not only when it comes to academic freedoms.

Besides cracking down on research institutions and activists and barring critical researchers from entering the country, the UAE also has the dubious distinction of being the world’s only government to hire an army of at least 800 Africans and Latin Americans, who are parked outside the capital for the eventuality of major labor unrest or a popular revolt – an indication of how far it is willing to go to keep the ruling family in power.

In a bid to avoid joining Qatar and Abu Dhabi in the firing line, Bahrain — already on the defensive for its brutal suppression of a 2011 popular uprising and its ongoing crackdown on majority-Shiite Muslim activists that has led to the continued incarceration of scores of athletes — recently announced that it would adopt Gulf labor standards. These include banning the confiscation of workers’ passports and ensuring timely payment of wages.

Abu Dhabi: A Worker's Paradise?

While Qatar has acknowledged the need for change and problems with implementation and enforcement of existing workers’ rights, Abu Dhabi has sought to project itself as a workers’ paradise.

"The UAE has built the world's greatest labor camp, complete with manicured cricket grounds, a chess center, a multilingual library with works by Ayn Rand and Barack Obama, the UAE's first multi-denominational prayer hall, film screening rooms, tug-of-war competitions, a coffee shop and landscaped grounds. Regular government press releases show groups of smiling dignitaries who have come to admire the Saadiyat Construction Village, while promotional videos show smiling workers playing cricket in spotless whites," The Guardian reported, noting that a majority of workers on Saadiyat lived in what can only be described as appalling conditions.

The message is clear: Gulf states have long gotten away with sub-standard living and working conditions as a result of the international community, including sports associations. They have, at best, paid lip service to globally accepted standards and their own professed values. While Gulf states promise change and reform of their labor laws and regulations, they fail to put their money where their mouth is.

To Qatar’s credit, the Gulf state — unlike the UAE — has engaged with trade unions and human rights groups. That engagement has given it some degree of the benefit of the doubt. The proof, however, will be in the pudding.

Because of the FIFA World Cup, Qatar has taken the heat of the focus on workers’ conditions in the Gulf. That hardly makes the circumstances of foreign workers in the UAE less onerous or lessens the onus on international sports associations to uphold universal values. For the Gulf states, the litmus test will be implementation and enforcement rather than adoption of lofty principles and showcases to keep critics happy.

*[Note: James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture at the University of Würzburg, and the author of  blog.]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy. 

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Political analysts are looking at the seismic transfer of power from Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani to his 33-year-old son, Sheikh Tamim, in order to examine a number of issues. Sheikh Hamad's abdication occurred just days before the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi, the former Egyptian president, was ousted from power.

One pivotal point of concern is Qatar’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. Previously, Qatar’s leadership had been doing more than simply flirting with Islamists in the region. While comparing Sheikh Tamim to the former Emir, analysts argue that he is a staunch "" but displays a  to Islamists. However, does this mean the love affair with the Muslim Brotherhood is over?  

Qatar’s Support for Islamists

Having held close ties with the Brotherhood for some time, Qatar's relationship with the movement has only grown stronger in recent years. Notably, while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) cracks down on its own Islamists, Qatar has played host to numerous Islamists seeking refuge from its neighbor and the region.

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who fled Egypt in 1961, is pivotally linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and their activities emanating from Qatar. The tiny Gulf state has also been a staunch supporter of the Free Syrian Army along with other Syrian rebels. Importantly, Doha brokered a deal for the umbrella organization, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, in November 2012. Qatar's support for the Syrian opposition is said to involve as much as .

Qatar has also long-supported Libyan opposition Islamists, mainly from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, hosting among others Ali al-Salibi in 1999. The Gulf state, at the advent of the Arab Spring, also supported Libyan rebels with arms, training and financial support. Khaled Mesha'al, the Hamas leader, frequently holds strategic meetings in Doha while the Taliban now have an office in Doha, too. The support for Islamists in the region is extensive politically and financially; another key example being Qatar’s financial support for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood as well as Morsi during his short term in office.

A Dramatic Shift Under the New Emir?

Yet analysts seem to think that the change of power in Qatar has already resulted in cooler relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists; or it may perhaps lead to a dramatic shift in the near future. Sheikh Tamim’s  to Saudi Arabia is interpreted as being indicative of a future alliance against Islamists, whereby Qatar might adopt the same stance towards the Brotherhood as the Saudis – perhaps even suppressing the group.  further point out that in recent months, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken the driver’s seat in supporting the rebels in Syria, leaving Qatar in a distant shadow.

As a Syrian opposition member relayed to the author, the coalition is not succeeding but is in a mess whereby members are splitting into factions and major arms support from the West has dwindled to the delivery of small ineffective weapons. The Qatari state does not have a clear strategy on how to move forward due to Syria’s worsening crisis. Indeed, some Islamists in Qatar are anxious about what the state's transfer of power could mean, as one Muslim Brotherhood member revealed to the author that he and his fellow Brothers are now "shaking." But this fear still remains unsubstantiated.

Could this be a utopian dream of an Islamist-free Middle East with Qatar no longer meddling in regional politics through support for Islamists? Might some observers be wanting to and expecting to see Islamists disappear so badly that such expectation is placed on the young, Sandhurst-educated Gulf leader?

An assumption that Qatar’s love affair with the Muslim Brotherhood has ended is naively construed. To start, there are no tangible indicators that the relationship has been strained. Qatar’s leadership might be surprised by how events have turned out in Egypt where much has been invested in the Brotherhood. There is much talk about Qatar turning more to domestic concerns, but relations with Islamists are virtually unaffected.

The tiny state continues to host Islamists and, in fact, has accepted some Muslim Brothers, including Ashraf Eddin, Hamza Zawba and Amir Darag. Even Salafists have fled Egypt and sought refuge in Qatar as thousands of Islamists have been imprisoned by the new Egyptian government.

Some hotels are so full with Islamists that they are now known as the go-to-place for journalists and other Islamists as well as their supporters. Several more Islamists have come to Qatar on work visas over recent months.

Islamists' activities have most definitely not decreased. They are doing business as usual, holding their regular religious study circles and developing strategic plans for all areas of their work. This includes collaborating with a wider circle of local and international networks and leaders with concrete steps, and orchestrating and carrying out wide-reaching charitable projects — usually with some consideration for Qatar’s political interests.

In fact, the desert has simultaneously become the place-to-go for meetings and religious learning, at times with even close to 300 Brotherhood members (with families) gathering. This vertical and horizontal growth of activities and the sheer number of participants is an indicator for a blossoming relationship.

How the Love Affair Works

However, an assumption about a cooling off in relations is naively construed in large part by a misunderstanding of the way love affairs work. Qatar’s foreign and domestic policy has always been opportunistic and ostentatious. The state's leadership is concerned with its regional influence, as well as its stability and legitimacy. Such affairs thrive on the fulfillment of needs and infatuation. Given their extensive networks and connections, societal support, anti-Shi’a, anti-Wahhabi and even anti-Western rhetoric, the young Emir needs the Muslim Brotherhood.

With the rising tide of Islamism in the region, Qatar saw great opportunity in this relationship. The Qatari leadership may view an ousted Morsi as a setback for the state's goals and may feel that the umpteen "mistakes" made by Islamists in Egypt and even Tunisia are irritating. But Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood still has strong roots throughout civil society, legislative bodies, and political parties as well links to various other Salafists and Islamists in the region and beyond.

Parting ways with the Brotherhood is simply not an option as Sheikh Tamim must strive for legitimacy, stability, and influence in a region with real threats and, in particular, where Shi’a and Sunni differences are political. He is, in fact, burdened with the responsibility and challenge to keep Qatar at the forefront as the new mediator in regional crises. The Muslim Brotherhood serves this most basic need.

The Importance of the Muslim Brotherhood

As regional crises are kept in purview, the Emir of Qatar will need to turn his attention to long neglected domestic issues. While some Qataris claim that the country now has a growing indigenous religious scholarship — there are a greater number of scholars produced through Qatar University’s Sharia College — most of the internationally-known scholars were actually nationalized. Others do not have Qatari citizenship.

Yet most of these scholars collaborate with Muslim Brotherhood activists locally and internationally or hold an actual affiliation with the group. However, these same scholars will ensure Qatar plays a future leading role in religious teaching internationally. They will supposedly lead a moderating discourse to counter extremist thought and terrorism.

This collaboration offers religious grounding of the state and abating of criticism for Qatar's role in cultural Westernization and hosting of the US Central Command. Moreover, these Islamists are anti-Wahhabi, an ideology produced just across the border in Saudi Arabia with a stronghold in Qatar itself.

Ideology becomes important, too, when many core activists know how to move financial support out of Doha to war and impoverished zones where the crisis is ideologically implicated and politically strategic — namely Syria. They know how because as Muslim Brothers they are part of established networks of trust. These scholars play a formidable role.

Above all, the Muslim Brotherhood offers the new Emir of Qatar a longer reign. The state officially dismantled its Brotherhood branch, so it is not viewed at this time as a major contender for power. One of Qatar's most critical fears beyond Iranian expansionist policy in the region, though, is the rise of Shi’a groups to positions of power and influence domestically.

Among numerous endeavors to avoid this prospect, in the last few years, two Shi’a scholars were expelled and a good handful of Shi’a activists have been sent to Iran; all of them were apparently born in Qatar. Beginning in 2002, the majority of Shi'a places of worship have been either shut down, removed, or are supposedly temporarily disabled from operating for a variety of stated reasons.

Some Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated scholars have been highly vocal about the threat of an Iranian expansionist strategy in the region and Shi’a beliefs — al-Qaradawi being a case in point. They have often been quoted as saying that Shi’a are not legitimate citizens and are a threat. These voices are frequently given a platform to speak through the state-owned Al Jazeera network.

While Sheikh Tamim might well be cozying up — at least a bit — to Saudi Arabia, that has nothing to do with the Muslim Brotherhood. Such an alliance becomes important when Iran and its support for Shi'a communities in the region are framed as a major threat. But in this one example lies a clue for what the more distant future will be like for Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood relations.

Love affairs are based on opportunism and the fulfillment of some kind of need in the moment without foresight for future consequences of action. They have no substance of loyalty and Qatar is most certainly not monogamous. Qatar’s rendezvousing all at once with the Brotherhood among other Islamist groups, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Western powers, Iran and whoever should ascend to power regionally, is highly risky behavior.

The Muslim Brotherhood itself is far removed from its original formation in goals and will not lose sight of its most earnest desire for expansionism, power and influence. Given this cocktail mix of relations and conflicting interests, the potential long-term consequences are unfathomable. But for now, and for some time to come, we have a flourishing Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood love affair.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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In a bid to reassure Gulf states worried about a US-Iranian rapprochement and critical of American Middle East policy, the Obama administration has opted to back Saudi efforts for regional hegemony through greater integration of Gulf military capabilities in the framework of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).    

The United States-backed Saudi blueprint would effectively establish the kingdom as the region’s military superpower and first line of defense, while allowing the US to balance its commitment to the region with its goal of pivoting towards Asia. But it risks splitting the GCC, which was established to enhance Gulf security.

Giving Saudis What They Want

Speaking at a think-tank dialogue just a stone’s throw away from Bahrain’s restive Shiite neighborhoods, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel made this move on his first visit to the Gulf since last month’s agreement between the United Nations Security Council's permanent members – the US, China, Russia, Britain and France – plus Germany and Iran, aimed at resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. 

Hagel handed Riyadh what it wanted: a first step towards a union of the GCC member states – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman – with the kingdom as the dominant power.

In doing so, Hagel went beyond seeking to reassure Saudi Arabia and its closest allies within the GCC that Washington's rapprochement with Iran would not be at the expense of the energy-rich, fragile Gulf autocracies. The US also wanted to show that it would remain committed to its defense umbrella for the region, despite focusing increasingly on Asia.

Confidence between the US and Saudi Arabia, home to a fiercely anti-Shiite puritan interpretation of Islam, has eroded as a result of Saudi opposition to the Iranian agreement because of the prospect of Shiite Iran reintegrating into the international community and emerging as a power house, capable of rivaling the kingdom.

Saudi confidence has been further undermined by American support for the popular uprisings in the Arab world; failure to provide Syrian rebels with the arms needed to defeat the regime of embattled President Bashar al-Assad; inability to force a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and an increased US focus on Asia rather than the Middle East and North Africa.

Saudi concerns have sparked a series of critical statements of US policy, and persuaded the kingdom to demonstratively refuse to join the UN Security Council when it was elected to a seat.

Fear of Being Swallowed    

By laying out a series of steps to put the GCC, in which Saudi Arabia is by far the most powerful member, rather than individual Gulf states at the centre of US defense policy, Hagel effectively endorsed Saudi calls for a union of Gulf states. This is a move that, so far, has been thwarted by fears among some of its smaller members that they would be swallowed by their big brother.

Indeed, the Saudis failed in their initiative in the last year to forge a union with Bahrain, where Saudi and UAE troops have been based since the brutal squashing of a 2011 popular uprising to bolster the regime.

In a rare public statement against Gulf union, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi al-Ibrahim, a one-time representative of a separatist movement, confronted his Saudi counterpart, Nizar bin Obaid Madani, in no uncertain terms.

"We absolutely don’t support [the] Gulf union. There is no agreement in the region on this… If this union materializes, we will deal with it but we will not be a member. Oman’s position is very clear. If there are new arrangements for the Gulf to confront existing or future conflicts, Oman will not be part of it," he said.

Al-Ibrahim suggested that the Gulf’s major problems were internal rather than external and should be the region’s focus. Last year, Ahmed al-Saadoun, at the time speaker of the Kuwaiti parliament, rejected a Gulf union, saying that as a democracy Kuwait could not unite with autocratic states.

Barely a hundred meters from where he spoke, police vehicles and machine-gun mounted armored vehicles patrol the perimeter of the Shiite neighborhood of Karbad. Graffiti on its walls reflects the area’s mood. Slogans include: "Down with King Hamad"; "Martyrdom is our habit"; "Our goal is toppling the regime"; and "We bow only in front of God." A local resident said: "This will never end. It’s gone too far. Reform is the only way out."

Saudis Pleased, But Not Smaller Gulf States

Hagel couched the new US approach in terms of "strategic agility" and "wise deployment of our influence." The US would help the GCC integrate its missile defense capabilities, he added, by emphasizing the GCC as a “multilateral framework that is the best way to develop an inter-operable and integrated regional missile defense.”

This would include missile defense in annual meetings of US and Gulf air force commanders and officials; making missile defense, marine security and counterterrorism-related sales to the GCC as a group rather than to individual member states; and instituting an annual US-GCC defense ministers conference. Hagel said the first such conference should be held in the next six months.

Saudi officials, endorsing Hagel’s proposals, said the defense secretary had understood the kingdom’s needs and, in doing so, had supported their effort to achieve a Saudi-led Gulf union. "This fits our agenda perfectly," one official said.

Integrating regional defense as a step towards a union is likely to prove easier said than done, due to more than just political resistance by smaller Gulf states. The GCC for one has no mechanism to make military purchases, despite its members having signed a joint security agreement a year ago. Even if it did, Gulf states would likely squabble over every detail of the acquisition.

In addition, smaller Gulf states are hesitant to rely on Saudi Arabia for their defense not only for political reasons, but also because of the kingdom’s checkered military record. Saudi Arabia was unable to defend Kuwait against Iraq’s 1990 invasion of the Gulf state. More recently, Saudi troops had a hard time confronting Houthi rebels on the other side of their border in the north of Yemen.

"The Omani foreign minister’s remarks were unprecedented. Other Gulf states may not say publicly no, but they certainly won’t buy into it," said an analyst from one of the smaller Gulf states.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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Saudi Arabia has become the latest Gulf country to discover that investment in European soccer to achieve national and corporate branding, risks reputational damage when potentially discriminatory government and company policies are exposed.

With Qatar taking a public relations beating for the working and living conditions of foreign laborers involved in construction of infrastructure related to its hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, second tier German soccer club FSV Frankfurt terminated a sponsorship agreement with the state-owned Saudi Arabian airline, Saudia.

Club spokeswoman Ann-Katrin Hautk said the agreement had been terminated because the airline refuses to transport passengers who carry Israeli passports. US critics have called for the barring of Saudia from US airports.

It was not immediately clear how much the sponsorship deal, which involved placing a Saudi airlines model aircraft in Frankfurt’s Volksbank Stadium, was worth. FSV cancelled the agreement after German media accused the airline of anti-Semitism and Frankfurt municipal officials and prominent German Jews denounced it.

“FSV is selling principles for cheap sponsorship money… Saudi Arabia is a dictatorship, Israel is a democracy in the Western sense,” Frankfurt daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung quoted Michel Friedman, former deputy chairman of the Central Committee of Jews in Germany, as saying.

Local bank and major FSV sponsor Frankfurter Volksbank and FSV, after which the club’s stadium is named, said it was “irritated” by the agreement with an airline that has discriminatory policies. The bank said it finds any discriminatory policy unacceptable. Local politicians warned that money was not a license to engage without consideration with any potential sponsor.

Adding insult to injury, FSV announced on the same day of the cancellation a partnership with TuS Makkabi Frankfurt, a local Jewish club that is historically part of the centrist wing of the Zionist movement. Makkabi President Alon Meyer said he had come to know FSV as “very sympathetic and absolutely politically neutral.” He said that FSV stood for tolerance, openness to the world and rejection of violence” and that he could “document that with numerous steps” the club had taken. Before FSV’s cancellation of the agreement, Meyer warned: “I now see FSV with different eyes.”

The Saudi airline is likely to find support for its policy in much of the Muslim world but suffer reputational damage in other parts of the world. Saudia risked widespread opposition to its deal even without its refusal to transport Israeli passport holders, considering its reluctance to endorse women’s rights to engage in sports and its human rights record.

Ironically, FSV exposed the policy at a time when the kingdom has been more open than ever about the fact that it shares certain interests with Israel. Saudi Arabia and Israel have spoken with one voice about their opposition to last month’s first step by the US and the P5+1 towards resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. Unofficial spokesmen for the kingdom have gone as far as suggesting that Saudi Arabia would not refuse entry to the Israeli Air Force into its territory, if Israel decides to attack Iranian nuclear facilities.

Soft Power and Reputational Damage

The sponsorship agreement is the latest example in which Gulf states, who while turning to sports to enhance their soft power in a bid to compensate for a lack of or insufficient hard power to independently defend themselves, have discovered that they run reputational risks which could undermine the very purpose of the exercise.

Qatar, despite taking some significant steps to counter criticism of the working and living conditions of foreign laborers — having engaged constructively with major human rights and labor groups — has suffered significant damage to its reputation. Few would want to defend a country that rightfully or wrongfully stands accused of practicing modern-day slavery.

Bahrain, in the last two years, twice saw its efforts to employ its sponsorship of a Formula 1 race — to portray the country as having put its brutally crushed 2011 popular uprising behind it and returned to normalcy — thwarted. Coverage of the races were dominated by reporting on mass anti-government demonstrations.

Human rights groups this summer accused the United Arab Emirates of seeking to launder its reputation with its high profile acquisition of clubs like Manchester City, plans to establish a New York-based Major League team, and soccer sponsorships. The criticism came as scores of dissidents were sentenced to lengthy prison terms on charges of plotting to overthrow the government in proceedings that failed to meet standards of fairness and justice, along with UAE support for the military coup in Egypt that toppled Mohammed Morsi, the country’s first democratically elected president.

The former English Football Association chairman, Lord Triesman, has called for making a country’s human rights record one of the criteria for establishing whether a state entity or member of a ruling family passes the "fit and proper person test" for ownership of a Premier League club. Similarly, criticism of Qatar has prompted a push to include human, labor, gender and other rights in criteria that a potential host of a major sporting event should meet – standards none of the Gulf countries currently live up to.

*[Note: James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture at the University of Würzburg, and the author of blog.]

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Amid the hubbub of excited chatter surrounding the initial six-month deal signed between Iran and the P5+1 over Tehran's nuclear program, it is worth casting our minds back to an earlier age.

Indeed, May 17, 2010, seems like another world now, especially in a Middle East geopolitical landscape that has shifted with incredible speed. That was the date when Turkey and Brazil — two rising powers who had both stepped out from behind the US’ shadow — dared to sign a  with Iran on a deal to swap nuclear fuel as a possible solution to the intractable Iranian nuclear row.

Both Turkey and Brazil were  for their eager impertinence. Even though the deal was based on an October 2009 agreement struck in Vienna between Iran, the US, Russia, France, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it was still the work of smaller regional powers who were presuming to influence world events. The cold-shouldering let Turkey and Brazil know that big deals are for big boys, and that their job as regional players was to react, not to lead.

Chained Reactions

Fast forward to November 24, 2013, and Turkey finds itself in a reactive role once again. With news of the interim nuclear deal, Turkish stocks leapt to three-week highs and the  with the ensuing drop in oil prices and optimism for potentially greater regional stability.

While this may be good news, it also highlights how far Turkey has slipped from leading the curve in the Middle East. Throughout the 2000s, Turkey’s standing in the Middle East was catapulted by its newly assertive, soft power policies of "zero problems with neighbors" and "strategic depth" to that of a regional, cultural, political, and economic poster boy. It was the country every state in the Muslim world wanted to be like.

An annual  of Arab public opinion conducted by the University of Maryland with Zogby International, revealed the stunning ascent of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from a regionally unknown politician to the most inspiring world leader in the minds of the Arab public. This was an example of serious soft power — and it was democratic, yet Islamic.

Then came the uprisings. Revolutions spawned counter-revolutions in a messy brawl for control over an economically crippled, yet pivotal region of the world. Turkey — led by its charismatic leader, Erdoğan — was politically hardwired to ride with cavalier gusto into the heat of the battle.

Battle Lines

Uprisings calling for democracy in a region long regarded as the last bastion of the strongman dictator, were always going to cause trouble. Turkey’s elite, with the important assistance of close US military ties, had maintained an undemocratic police state for much of the 20th century.

Yet to its credit, Turkey steered a path out of military rule into a democratic landscape that had the inevitable result of empowering the voting public. The country's more conservative, more religiously observant masses re-elected the Justice and Development Party (AKP) three times.

Given the chance, the public did the same in Egypt and Tunisia, pointedly rejecting the representatives of the established elite. In Egypt, this resulted in the 2012 victory of Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood over Ahmed Shafiq, a senior Air Force commander who had previously served as prime minister under the deposed dictator, Hosni Mubarak. This not only shocked elites with a sense of entitlement, but was also a euphoric moment of power for a class used to repression and powerlessness. The initial results have been predictably rocky.

Presented with the prospect of the democratic removal of their inherited power, the old guard has naturally pushed back. Rather than wait for the Muslim Brotherhood to make their own mistakes in governing a state, the military elite swept them from power in Egypt, backed by the royalist forces of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

The Gulf states have also  heavily on Muslim Brotherhood activity and its calls for  in the Gulf. Meanwhile, what began as a pro-democracy movement in Syria was successfully transformed by the Assad regime into an armed and increasingly sectarian conflict. The Syrian Civil War has pulled in regional and international powers with their own agendas.

No More Center Ground

For Turkey, the result of all these developments is a bewildering loss of cohesion in its own foreign policy, and a resulting slump in its regional prestige.

More than any other regional state, the interaction of the various crises in the Middle East has resulted in a fragmentation of Turkey’s foreign policy. Firstly, the AKP rightly viewed the fall of dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as a historic opportunity for not only democracy, but also the mildly Islamist brand of democracy which they were elected upon in Turkey.

However, events did not turn out as Turkey might have wished. Perhaps most uncomfortably, Ankara did not influence its perceived friends as expected. Erdoğan’s triumphant visit to Cairo in September 2011 was meant to cement his role as a regional trendsetter. Instead, the trip revealed the divergence between his political vision and that of the .

Nevertheless, Turkish support for the Morsi government remained strong, and his removal by the Egyptian military was met with . The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood was deeply opposed by the Gulf monarchies and Israel, and distrusted by Iran. The push back by the establishment in Egypt — and to a lesser extent Tunisia — left Turkish support for the revolutions at odds with Saudi Arabia, the other key Sunni power in the region. And why is the Sunni nature of their power so important? Take a look at Syria.

In Syria, the Sunni-Shi’a conflict that had already erupted in Iraq, and which is fuelled by Iranian-Saudi geopolitical rivalry, has taken center stage. The entrance of the Hezbollah Shi’a militia means Turkish support for the armed opposition now appears to be a Sunni stance, rather than simply a Turkish one.

Though the pro-Sunni position of Saudi Arabia and Turkey might be thought to have created shared interests, their opposing visions for the wider region have undermined cooperation. Turkey’s regional stance was far closer aligned to that of Qatar, the Gulf state which did so much to support the revolutions and the Muslim Brotherhood until the of the assertive Sheikh Hamad al-Thani and Qatar’s subsequent diplomatic retreat.

Consequently, Turkey is at odds not only with Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s new regime, but also with Iran over Syria. To pop the cherry on the top, Turkish-Israeli relations had already soured in the late 2000s as Erdoğan became the most popular voice of the Muslim Middle East, while being a staunch of Israeli policy in Gaza. The result is Turkish non-alignment with any of the major powers in the region.

Jam for the Donut?

By a curious twist of circumstances, we find a region where — aside from the recent Egyptian vassalage to Saudi oil dollars — perhaps one of the most closely aligned foreign policy perspectives are those of Israel and Saudi Arabia, two very strange bedfellows indeed. Both are anti-Brotherhoodl; both are anti-Iranian; and both are increasingly anti-Turkish policy.

Where in this polarized mess can Turkey turn now? Is there any way of becoming the regional jam in an otherwise hollow geopolitical donut? With so much clear space in the center ground of Middle Eastern politics, small movements could have profound effects for Turkey.

The potential for a thaw with Iran is not only presented by the nuclear deal, and the ensuing upturn in bilateral trade, but also by working in tandem on Syria. Despite backing opposing sides in the civil war, Iranian and Turkish Foreign Ministers Mohammad Zarif and Ahmet Davutoğlu held a joint  in Tehran on November 27, at which they called for a ceasefire to precede planned Geneva peace talks in January. With the new government of President Hassan Rouhani, Iran is likely to be far more willing to join Turkey in treading a moderate diplomatic line.

Yet while there may be competition between Iran and Turkey for the moderate middle ground, other regional rivals may be checked for the time. Israeli and Saudi antipathy towards Iran has so far forced them onto the diplomatic fringes of the region’s most pressing crises. Egypt’s turmoil makes it hard to envisage a moderate regime emerging there anytime soon.

As the political and security situation in the Middle East has deteriorated, Turkey’s standing has appeared on the surface to collapse as well. Yet such a judgment is misleading. Many years of earnest soft power cultivation does not count for nothing. Though the Turkish government may have stumbled, Turkey itself still offers one of the region’s most successful models for the future.

In both cultural and economic terms, Turkey’s power and influence in the Middle East is still on the rise, and this compels its politicians to seek compromise for Turkey’s own benefit. Paradoxically, as the region appears to reach a nadir, Turkey may find that it is better placed than others to turn the charm offensive back on.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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The world watched with great interest as mass protests, starting in December 2010, swept the Arab world, most prominently leading to the ouster of Egyptā€™s and Tunisiaā€™s long-standing presidents.ĢżIn Libya, an armed opposition campaign, with NATO air support, brought a violent end to Muammar Qaddafiā€™s 42-year rule.ĢżThe initially peaceful protests in Syria against the Assad government turned into a bloody civil war, which has cost more than 100,000 lives, led to over 2.1 million refugees, and continues to rage on.

Almost forgotten were protests in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf ā€“ namely the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain , Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Apart from temporarily heightened coverage of the , events in the Gulf were mostly left in the background, as the turbulent events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria dominated the headlines.

The GCC countries are hereditary monarchical systems, with varying degrees of parliamentary influence. Kuwaitā€™s parliament, for example, first elected in 1963, has law-making and certain veto powers in the countryā€™s system of a constitutional monarchy in which the Emir has the final say on policies. In contrast to that, the Shura Council in Saudi Arabia, seen as an absolute monarchy, has very limited rights and draft laws are always to be approved by the king. In a recent move, however, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who appoints all members of the council, for the first time nominated to join the Shura Council.

Overall, parliaments in the Gulf are not the centers of power, as ultimate authority lies with the executive and its rulers.

The importance of this region derives from the fact that several key Gulf states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are crucial players in the global energy market with Riyadh holding ā€œā€ and being the largest producer and exporter of total petroleum liquids. Ģżis currently the worldā€™s largest supplier of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and holds the third largest natural gas reserves in the world. Both states rely heavily on rents from natural resources; despite diversification efforts, a common pattern in the Gulf. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates is the ā€œā€ in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Apart from economic ties, several Gulf states have close political and military relations with Western countries. Bahrain hosts the US Navyā€™s fifth fleet and signed a with the United Kingdom in 2012. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar serves as the forward headquarters of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Moreover, Kuwait is considered as a counterterrorism partner for the US and played an important role in the Iraq War as a key platform for US and coalition forcesā€™ operations. US-Saudi relations have been a cornerstone of US strategy for the Middle East.

However, many human rights organizations have criticized Gulf states for their poor human rights record, which includes the repression of and . Qatar recently came under fierce criticism, following reportsĢżthatĢżwere made public byĢżĢżof serious mistreatment of migrant workers. These migrantsĢżwere brought to the country to build the 2022 FIFA World Cup construction sites.

51³Ō¹Ļā€™s Middle East Editor, , speaks to , a renowned expert on Gulf politics from the University of Cambridge.

Matthiesen is the author of the recently published book,Ģż, which talks about political uprisings and political dissent in the Gulf states. He received his PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, examining: ā€œTheĢżShia in Saudi Arabia: Identity Politics, Sectarianism, and the Saudi State.ā€ He is currently a research fellow in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, and a research officer at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

Langendorf and Matthiesen talk about the stability of regimes in the Gulf, an upsurge in activism, Western interests at play, and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Manuel Langendorf: You recently published a book entitled: Ģż Ģż. What is your main message in the book and what propelled you to write it?

Toby Matthiesen: I had worked on the Gulf States and sectarianism for my PhD, and was in Bahrain on a research trip when the uprising started. So I saw the historic events unfolding before me, and started to understand the sectarian logic behind the crackdown.

The main message of the book is that the Gulf regimes were willing to go all the way to prevent any GCC state from becoming a constitutional monarchy or a democracy, and one of the main tools they employed was increasing sectarianism.

Langendorf: How were protests in the Gulf states covered by the media? Were there any common patterns and shortcomings?

Matthiesen: While Bahrain did receive some coverage in early 2011, the Gulf protests and crackdowns have generally received much less attention than comparable events across the region. This is partly because of access restrictions for Western media, but also partly a result of PR campaigns financed by the GCC states.

Particularly, Bahrain has spent millions through PR companies in the US and in Europe to try and change its tarnished reputation.

Langendorf: As we witness continuous unrest, especially in Bahrain, do you see the stability of the GCCā€™s rulers in danger? What are the prospects for real change?

Matthiesen: I think it is a long process. The GCC states have been quite effective at repressing the different movements for change. Kuwait and Bahrain are the countries that may have to change first; the others will try to hold out for longer.

We should not expect the ruling families to give in to reformist demands without pressure. I think that if these countries do not profoundly reform, there may come a time when these states fracture and descend into civil strife.

Langendorf: Many human rights organizations criticize the Gulf statesā€™ repression of political and religious activists? A recent case was the warnings by Saudi ministries against participation in the October 26 campaign to demonstrate the factual ban on women driving cars. Have the Arab Uprisings which started in Tunisia almost three years ago brought an upsurge in activism in the Gulf?ĢżĢż

Matthiesen: Yes, definitively. Whether the ruling families like it or not, we have seen a new repertoire of contention spreading across the Gulf, including to Saudi Arabia. These instances of protests, petitions, driving campaigns, student protests, online debates and so on, may not be threatening the core of the system, yet they are steps towards a further politicization of the population on a hitherto unseen scale.

Langendorf: Given the fact that the Gulf still holds massive natural resources and the US Navyā€™s 5^th fleet is stationed in Bahrain, what role have Western interests in the Gulf played during the uprisings?

Matthiesen: They have been crucial in shaping Western non-responses, particularly towards the Bahraini uprising. The US does not want to jeopardize the future of its naval base in Bahrain by taking a too-strong position towards democratization.

The West has essentially sacrificed any interest it once had for democratization in the Gulf for economic, strategic and security interests. This strategy may be self-defeating, however, since long-term unrest and civil strife in Bahrain will also endanger the future of the naval base and of the security of the Gulf states more generally.

Langendorf: Several Gulf states have lent diplomatic and financial support to the new military-backed government in Egypt after the ouster of Mohammed Morsi in July. Many have interpreted that as part of these governmentsā€™ strong anti-Brotherhood stance. Was or is the Muslim Brotherhood a real threat to the ruling families of the Gulf?

Matthiesen: Yes, definitively. The Muslim Brotherhood is the most organized quasi-opposition force in most GCC states. This is why Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, in particular, sought to weaken them in Egypt, so that they will not be empowered in the Gulf.

We see a regionalization of Gulf security dynamics, where key Gulf states seek to defend their national security interests far from their borders in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and elsewhere.

Langendorf: There has been much talk about a rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Both countries, for example, seem to back different Islamist forces in Syria and Egypt. As an observer of Gulf politics, what is your take on this rivalry?

All the smaller Gulf states, except Bahrain, are wary of Saudi Arabia’s influence in the GCC. Saudi Arabia’s size, wealth, and military power makes it the dominant force in the GCC. The rivalry with Qatar has to be seen in this context.

Also, Qatar wants to be the leader of a new kind of political Sunni Islam that is at odds with the ways in which the Saudis want to use Islam. This is why Qatar has supported the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi has cracked down on the Brotherhood. But Qatar punched above its weight, and while we still do not really know what the reasons for the abdication of former Emir Hamad were, the new Emir has certainly tried to ease tensions with the Saudis.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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By Jane Williams

ā€œIā€™m a serious private equity professional and not just a woman in finance.ā€ At 26, Haif Zamzam, is senior analyst for Masdar Capital, the private equity arm of the multi-billion dollar Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company, and one of a growing number of educated and ambitious young women who refuse to accept that any obstacle can stand between them and success.

She is also an Emirati from a traditional Muslim family with strong ties to her culture and faith. And she is a member of the first MBA module to be held on INSEADā€™s Abu Dhabi campus, in the winter of 2013.

ā€œWomen are empowered here, there are opportunities,ā€ Zamzam insists, referring to life in her native UAE. She describes a situation very different to the Western perception of the ā€œoppressed Muslim wife and daughter.ā€

“I Could Be That”

ā€œWhen you look around Abu Dhabi and in the broader UAE, you see that women are taking on really high positions here, theyā€™re represented at board level and theyā€™re at ministerial level and you really feel that ā€˜I could be that one day.ā€™ā€ Zamzam spoke with INSEAD Knowledge during her MBA class module on the Asia Campus in Singapore in February.

This quiet advancing of Arab women is not confined to the UAE; across the region they are becoming increasingly visible in the boardroom and taking on leadership roles in both the public and private sector.

Lara Boro, (MBA ā€˜96D) CEO International of British media company Top Right Group, like Zamzam had many female role models during her early childhood in Lebanon, all holding senior positions in government ministries, universities, media and the world of business and all convincing her she could be whatever she wanted. Since moving to Dubai four years ago, Boro has travelled extensively across the Gulf region meeting many ā€œimpressiveā€ female leaders in business, government and social services.

ā€œThere are more of them every day and the younger women I meet today are just as promising as the women I looked up to growing up,ā€ Boro notes.

Limited Participation

But opportunities and participation is not ubiquitous. Unemployment among women in the region is around 42 percent, according to a United Nations 2012 report which identifies cultural and social impediments, notably family pressure, religious interpretations and inability to travel, as the major impediments to women gaining meaningful employment.

In Saudi Arabia there are practical issues. Women are forbidden to drive a car or to start a business or travel abroad without a guardianā€™s consent. In contrast, the governments in the UAE and Qatar have identified women as vital to the countryā€™s economic development and are encouraging their participation, expanding childcare facilities and introducing family friendly business practices.

Programs like the Arab Women Leadership Forum, have been set up by women to network and develop professional skills and leadership capabilities. In December last year, the UAE made it compulsory for all corporations and government agencies to include women on their board of directors.

Prime Minister and Vice President Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum enforced this pro-women stance during a federal government summit in February, cautioning the countryā€™s male population they would have to pick up their act if they didnā€™t want to lose their position to their female colleagues.

ā€œIf you visit my office, 85 percent of [staff there] are women,ā€ he warned. Itā€™s support like this, says Zamzam, which has made the country a model for others in the region. ā€œI started at Masdar right after I graduated from the marketing course at the University of Sharjah and I worked my way up to senior analyst.”

ā€œ[Attaining] an MBA from a top school has always been a goal of mine,ā€ she notes. ā€œI come from a very education-driven family… my parents have always been 100 percent supportive of [my brotherā€™s and my] career and educational choices.ā€

Zamzam says she chose INSEAD because of the reaction she received whenever she asked anyone about the program. ā€œThey all kind of had the same response which was: ā€˜It was the best year of my life!ā€™ That response and the fact that it is a 10-month program means that I get to go back to the UAE and take part in its development.ā€

The first six months studying an MBA has given Zamzam a sense of where she wants her career to head. ā€œI have a really strong passion for womenā€™s empowerment, specifically through knowledge and building businesses. I have a passion for social entrepreneurship and for promoting new innovative sustainable business ideas. ā€œWith the knowledge Iā€™m getting here and the skills Iā€™m getting, the support from my friends and family and just with all the passion and drive that I have, I »å“Ē²Ōā€™t feel there are many obstacles that will hinder my progress.ā€

Like the Abaya, Women Are Developing

ā€œIā€˜m quite representative of the new generation of Emirati women,ā€ she adds. ā€œWeā€™re very focused on career and at the same time weā€™re very cultural in the sense that we still value all of the things that our mothers and grandmothers have instilled in us.ā€

And, while she still wears the abaya and shayla (robe and head scarf) when in the UAE, Zamzam says that even this has changed.

ā€œIn the last eight or nine years, itā€™s gone from being a traditional black abaya to something that looks like a beautiful gown, it keeps developing just as women are developing.ā€

*[This article was republished courtesy of . Copyright: INSEAD 2013]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Corruption is the misuse of a trusted position for illicit private ends. Corruption ranges across phenomena, including bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism, and outright theft. Corruption is difficult to measure, of course. In perceptions of people around the world, corruption is closely related to administrative efficiency, rule of law, and ethics in the private sector. We can spend days or even academic lifetimes debating definitions and the deeper causes of corruption and weak governance. Letā€™s instead focus on a separable, practical question: What can be done to reduce corruption? 

Here there is good news. Even in very corrupt settings, corruption can be reduced, leading to greater investment and public satisfaction. And the success stories exhibit some common principles, regardless of cultural setting. 

Success Strategies

ā€œSuccessā€ means significant improvement in governance measures, followed by increases in investment and improvements in public services. The success stories range from classic cases such as Singapore and Hong Kong to more recent ones such as the Republic of Georgia, Qatar, Colombia, and the Philippines. Some people would also include Indonesia, which has risen under President Susilo Yudhuyono from the very bottom in terms of quality of government, and Malaysia, whose government transformation program has already yielded promising results.

Their strategies recognize the following principles. Corruption is an economic crime, not a crime of passion. Givers and takers of bribes respond to economic incentives and punishments; corruption follows a formula:  C = M + D ā€“ A. Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. To reduce corruption, you have to try to reduce monopoly and enhance competition, limit official discretion, and clarify the rules of the game. Accountability about processes and especially about results can be enhanced in many ways, including citizen- and business-driven scorecards for government agencies and programs.

Lessons

Lessons can also be discerned about the politics of anti-corruption. Identify and mobilize allies. Fry big fish. Diagnose and subvert corrupt systems. Do a few things that can show results in six months, to build momentum. Donā€™t try to do everything at once. 

Lessons do not mean one-size-fits-all. They suggest principles, which must be tuned and applied by locals to their inevitably unique situations.

Here are two more lessons for reformers. Donā€™t think of corruption primarily as a legal or moral issue. In very corrupt countries, new laws, codes of conduct, and better training for public officials will, alas, make little difference.

Second, think of collaboration across the public-private-nonprofit divide. Business and civil society can play key roles. They are part of corrupt systems, stuck in a corrupt equilibrium. To get out, they have to be given ways to expose corruption without taking personal risks.

Ipaidabribe.com in India is a promising example. Successful partnerships, such as Ciudadanos al DĆ­a in Peru and the Bangalore Agenda Task Force in India, exploit credible information supplied by NGOs and the pressure, resources, and technical expertise of the business community.

Forces of Change

Some people, tired of corruption and endless chatter about it, may rightly wonder if change is even possible. Why would politicians ever want to reform corrupt institutions or systems?

Politicians are ready to move when several forces converge. Expanding opportunities for international trade, investment, financing, and emerging industries that depend on fast-moving knowledge and innovative styles breed young entrepreneurs with little tolerance for corrupt practices. Finally, a growing popular dismay for corruption: Anti-corruption is a major force behind demonstrations in many Arab countries, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Bulgaria. 

Around the world, elections are being fought with corruption as a key issue. In my experience, many new presidents, governors, ministers, and mayors are eager to reduce corruption. They know that corruption is constraining development. What politicians need is help which recognizes that corruption is a system that needs a hard-headed, politically tuned strategy ā€” and that fighting corruption can help them win elections and advance their countries.

And so, I am optimistic about progress here and elsewhere in making government more effective and efficient, with the help of business and civil society. Someone even more optimistic is John T. Noonan, author of Bribes, the best book ever written on corruption. 

In 1985, Noonan predicted that systemic corruption would eventually go the way of systemic slavery. Both, he noted, were once widespread, even ways of life, in most parts of the world. Nowadays, slavery seems almost incomprehensible. Noonan says that in the not too distant future, we will feel the same way about the corrupt systems that characterize some of the poorest places on the planet.

Moral outrage will be part of the solution, he says. So too will be learning from practical ways to reduce corruption, even in very corrupt settings. Progress will be made with an approach that combines economics and shrewd politics. And business and civil society, which are part of the problem, will be indispensable parts of the solution.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Tunisia is currently experiencing an intense hyperbolization of political sentiment. The glorification of the flag originates from multiple factors. Since the first demonstrations following the fall of the regime, the use of the flag has been a sign of a sort of national communion. Today, it has become an object of struggle.

Who bears true national legitimacy? Is it the party selected through elections? Is it the opposition party, which claims legitimacy of a different order? Which territories? Which generations? It is difficult to situate and include all its components. Such a comprehensive listing could stretch indefinitely.

One Mission: To Save the Arab Revolutions

Several corresponding factors could explain the current flame of patriotism — all of which could be summarized by a feeling of urgent necessity to “save the Tunisian revolution.” Often described as the “the last hope,” this feeling gives many Tunisians a mission they perceive as quasi-sacred. As François Hollande said during his speech to the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly in July 2013: “You carry a hope that extends beyond the Tunisian people, well beyond the Arab people.”

The responses to this alleged task, which has uncertain contours but is imagined by all as a “national duty,” are diverse. In one sense, it gives rise to a Tunisian particularism, most often expressed with formulas such as “Tunisia is not Egypt” (or not Syria, or not Qatar, or not Europe), or by the absolute: “Tunisia is unique.” 

Depending on its interlocutors, this discourse is constructed on the idea of the peaceful nature of Tunisians, on the legacy of Habib Bourguiba (and his influence on demography, for example), on the education, or even on the climate. Sometimes, it is simply the insignificance of the country that is claimed, ironically, as an opportunity: Tunisia, so little, could not be coveted. Thus, it must be possible to succeed in revolution.

Despite unfurling the flags and proclaiming an ostentatious national pride, the success or failure of this mission is often paradoxically perceived as independent of the will or the action of the Tunisian citizenry. For the enunciation of a national duty to hold firm, it often feeds on the impotence of international conspiracies, geopolitical theories, and suspicions that weigh on the political class in its entirety, among others.

This discourse sometimes even goes so far as to cast the Tunisian Revolution (the same one that it declares necessary to save) as an invention (be it occidental, American, Israeli, Qatari, Saudi) so as to reshuffle the deck of cards in the region. The elections in October 2011 fed this suspicion: they must have been manipulated to give power to the Islamists, who are allied with the United States (or others, depending on the rhetoric).

These arguments must not be taken lightly. They are signs of the installation of a long-lasting regime of uncertainty that has continued to intensify and thus engulf the country in a climate of fear, giving way to the feeling that “anything could happen at any time.”

A final sense in which this national duty is imagined­, invoked more by those in politics, is the “sacred union” that certain “events” may require. These events are disturbing notions that cannot be forcibly characterized as political or economic crises, but rather as a state of enduring global crisis. Nonetheless, the political consensus is proclaimed constantly, like an incantation, especially as tension and opposition is high between the different political paths. 

Additionally, it is based on a voluntary confusion between patriotism and national unity. The latter assumes a state of war and requires the silencing of opposition. The former, if it requires the respect of country and nation, does not necessarily imply the silencing of disagreement and opposition within them.

The Struggle of the Flag

This patriotic exaltation must be placed in its context of the diffusion of fear, which different channels of information and political discourse instill. This fear, which was believed to have fallen like a wall after the 2011 revolts, has taken another form: it is no longer the fear of the regime, of the state, that makes what Béatrice Hibou called “forced obedience.”

It is a more diffused fear, which combines the difficulty in obeying or respecting hierarchy (tainted civic capability, visible dysfunction of public services) with a disorderly panic in the face of real or imagined danger. Certain people invoke the “Egyptian scenario” as an eventuality like a scarecrow or a barely veiled threat — others cite the Salafist peril or a more general insecurity (pedophilia, crime, etc).

All of this has driven political actors to prioritize saving Tunisia and its revolution. However, this unanimous display of patriotism hides a ferocious struggle for national legitimacy. Each actor has his/her own idea of Tunisia. The central question becomes where is the national interest and who is best serving it today? Each then returns to a supposed treason in a new national and widely remarked bipolarity (Ennahda/anti-Ennahda).

One of these groups attests that the Islamists — including Ennahda — have never been in the service of the Tunisian nation. They are but marionettes whose strings are between the hands of some international actor, whether it is the Muslim Brotherhood or the jihadists. The information that is published on Tunisian news sites circulates rumors that suggest, for example, Rachid Ghannouchi’s visit to Istanbul in the middle of July could have been an occasion to participate in a secret meeting held by the Muslim Brotherhood.

The meeting was said to have been for the purpose of electing the president of the political bureau, the number two in power. Meant to offer proof that the meeting was held, videos from an Emirati channel show people moving about in what resembles the hall of a hotel.

Faced with these suspicions of infidelity to the nation, the Ennahda party members countered with a national display differentiating themselves from the Salafists associated with the black flag. The replacement of the national flag with a Salafist flag at Manouba University on March 7, 2012, and the indignation it provoked, marked the national spirit.

The young student, Khaoula Rchidi, who was used as an intermediary, was at the time solemnly thanked and decorated by the president of the republic. 

Since then, the mobilization of politicians in the current government insists on the legitimacy of the Islamist party in power and its national character. The reference to the Turkish example is used to show that the Tunisian Islamists, like their Turkish counterparts, do not seek to export their model, but only to instill it in a national context. 

The latest demonstrations that followed the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi, on July 25, 2013, are of a distinctly red color, while the pro-Ennahda demonstrations following the assassination of Chokri Belaid (February 9, 2013) were composed of the flags of the party: white with a blue logo. At these demonstrations, the Salafist flags were also present en masse. The partisan image of these gatherings was replaced by the centrality of national legitimacy and its color: red. 

*[Note: Read the on October 27. This article was originally published by .]

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