In the emerging global order, control over critical minerals increasingly defines technological leadership, industrial competitiveness and military power. Rare earth elements feed precision-guided munitions and advanced electronics. Copper underpins electrification, defense manufacturing and grid modernization. Lithium anchors the battery economy. According to data from the US Geological Survey, the is effectively 100% import-dependent for separated rare earth elements, while roughly 85ā€“90% of global rare earth processing capacity ā€” even when the ore itself is mined elsewhere.

Demand pressures are accelerating rapidly. Under global energy transition scenarios, demand for minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and copper is projected to increase several-fold over the coming decades as electric vehicles, renewable energy infrastructure and battery storage systems expand worldwide.

At the same time, widening instability across the Middle East and South Asia, including between Iran, Israel and the US, and growing Pakistan-Afghanistan military , are reshaping the strategic environment in which mineral supply chains must operate.

These overlapping conflicts are turning the region into a strategic intersection of resource security, maritime access and geopolitical competition. This structural asymmetry has reframed access to minerals as a national security imperative. Diversification is no longer optional; it is strategic insurance. Diversification, however, does not remove risk; it merely shifts it. In this shifting landscape, Pakistan has once again become a critical factor.

Pakistanā€™s mineral reserves in the USā€“China supply chain competition

Pakistan possesses significant untapped mineral reserves, particularly in Balochistan. The Reko Diq project alone is widely regarded as one of the worldā€™s undeveloped copper-gold deposits. Public feasibility estimates suggest potential annual output in the range of 200,000-250,000 tons of copper at peak production, a meaningful contribution at a time when global copper is projected to rise more than 40% by 2040 under energy transition scenarios.

Moreover, Pakistan has extensive mineral resources that extend beyond its currently discovered deposits. Pakistan possesses substantial coal reserves, located in Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan, 186 billion metric tonnes and copper reserves, with estimates placing the overall value of its mineral wealth at approximately . The US needs this resource potential as it seeks to diversify supply networks amid the growing demand for electrification and advances in military technology.

Washington has noticed. The Export-Import Bank of the US has support for mineral-sector financing in Pakistan, reportedly backing projects valued at around $1.25 billion. Pakistan, for its part, is actively seeking foreign direct investment to stabilize its economy and unlock its extractive potential.Ģż

Compared to heavily regulated Western jurisdictions, where mine permitting and environmental review can beyond seven to ten years and sometimes longer, Pakistan offers the possibility of faster development timelines and lower extraction costs, provided security and governance conditions stabilize. Geographically, access to the Arabian Sea enhances the appeal. Proximity to major maritime lanes the Middle East, Africa and Asia creates export optionality. Pakistan is not yet central to US mineral strategy. But it is no longer peripheral.

Chinaā€™s economic presence in Pakistan is institutionalized through the , including development at , often described as a strategic maritime node connecting western China to the Arabian Sea. Yet Beijingā€™s mineral security rests less on Pakistan specifically than on its dominance over global midstream and downstream processing. Chinaā€™s leverage derives from refining capacity and industrial integration, not reliance on any single upstream supplier.

Therefore, Pakistanā€™s mineral reserves hold comparatively greater diversification value for Washington than for Beijing. For the US, new upstream access reduces concentration risk. For China, it supplements an already integrated ecosystem. Yet the promise of mineral wealth cannot be assessed without confronting the security conditions that define Balochistanā€™s operating environment.

Security constraints and investment risk

Balochistan has long experienced insurgent violence. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), by the US State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, has targeted infrastructure and foreign personnel. High-profile attacks on Chinese projects illustrate the vulnerability of large-scale investment in the province. Beyond localized insurgency, Pakistanā€™s western frontier remains unsettled. Islamabad that elements of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are operating from Afghan territory, straining bilateral relations. Persistent cross-border militancy increases insurance costs, complicates logistics and erodes investor confidence.

Islamabad has responded by a dedicated Frontier Corps formation tasked with protecting mineral installations and strengthening border security along the Iran and Afghanistan frontiers. The initiative reflects recognition in Pakistanā€™s security establishment that economic corridors and extractive projects require hardened protection to remain commercially viable.

For American firms, the issue is practical. Mining requires secure transport corridors, predictable regulatory enforcement and reliable export routes. If disruption becomes chronic, even if episodic in intensity, capital will gravitate toward jurisdictions with lower political risk ā€” regardless of higher operational cost. Diversification carries its own exposure profile.

A further complication lies in the evolving regional security matrix. Pakistanā€™s leadership increasingly frames instability in Balochistan and along the western frontier as being exacerbated by an emerging , suggesting that regional rivalries intersect with militant safe havens in ways that sustain pressure on Pakistanā€™s southwestern corridor. India such allegations. Afghanistanā€™s internal political fragmentation adds ambiguity. Yet perception itself influences strategic behavior.

Strategic tradeoffs in diversification and regional connectivity

From Washingtonā€™s perspective, attribution may be contested, but impact is measurable. If persistent proxy dynamics, whether state-sponsored or opportunistic, sustain insecurity in mineral-rich corridors, US diversification efforts could face structural constraints. Political risk perception alone can redirect capital flows. In geopolitics, instability need not be formally coordinated to be strategically consequential.

Beyond extraction lies connectivity. Central Asian states seeking to reduce transit dependence on Russia view southern corridors through Afghanistan toward Pakistani ports as potential alternatives. But connectivity presupposes security. If Afghanistan remains permissive terrain for transnational militancy, confidence in infrastructure erodes. Cross-border instability undermines corridor reliability, complicates energy diversification and constrains regional integration.

Preventing Afghanistan from functioning as a hub of destabilization is therefore not solely a counterterrorism objective ā€” it is an economic prerequisite for broader Eurasian diversification strategies. The policy question becomes unavoidable: Will the US allow sustained regional instability to obstruct or stigmatize potential access to Pakistanā€™s critical minerals?

Washington is expanding domestic production, strengthening allied supply chains, investing in recycling technologies and pursuing substitution strategies. Yet full self-sufficiency remains distant. Import dependence in key categories persists. Pakistan sits within this diversification portfolio as a prospective contributor, not yet indispensable. But diversification away from China cannot be entirely risk-free. Engaging fragile environments is sometimes the price of reducing structural dependency elsewhere. If Washington avoids exposure in volatile regions entirely, concentration risk persists. If it engages more deeply, it must accept calibrated political and security exposure. That is the strategic tradeoff.

Pakistanā€™s mineral frontier remains a strategic possibility rather than a strategic necessity. Its evolution will depend on whether security stabilizes long enough for sustained investment to take root. Geology does not dictate strategic value. Governance and stability do. In an era defined by supply-chain leverage, todayā€™s marginal option can become tomorrowā€™s hinge point. Whether Pakistan becomes that hinge will depend less on rhetoric and more on whether instability from insurgency, cross-border militancy, or proxy competition can be contained. Diversification is not about perfect partners. It is about managing imperfect realities. The question for Washington is no longer whether risk exists. It is how much risk it is prepared to absorb to reduce dependence elsewhere and whether strategic hesitation will entrench the very concentration it seeks to escape.

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One of the most consequential provisions involved the release of approximately prisoners. While the agreement conditioned their release on their refraining from combat, within weeks, these fighters ranks, reinforcing insurgent capabilities across Afghanistan. Prior intelligence assessments had warned of this outcome, highlighting structural weaknesses in the agreementā€™s enforcement mechanisms.

Counterterrorism commitments and regional security risks

The Doha Accord obligated the Taliban to prevent Afghan territory from being used to threaten the security of the US and its allies. In practice, however, this provision has proven largely ineffective. The Talibanā€™s tolerance and facilitation of transnational militant groups, including al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), constitutes a clear violation.

, the leader of al-Qaeda, reportedly lived openly in Kabul before being killed in a US drone strike in 2022, nearly a year after the Taliban assumed power. His presence in the Afghan capital raised questions about the effectiveness of counterterrorism assurances. Additionally, reports that members of Osama bin Ladenā€™s family continue to reside in Afghanistan fueled debate over whether the Taliban have fully met their commitments.

These developments extend beyond Afghanistan. They complicate border insurgencies and compel regional powers to rethink their security arrangements.

Khalilzadā€™s advocacy and selective framing

Former US envoy Zalmay Khalilzadā€™s portraying the Taliban as ready to engage constructively with regional actors, including Pakistan, echoes a familiar pattern of misrepresentation. Khalilzad presents the group as cooperative and compliant, claiming any agreement would prevent extremist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and TTP from using Afghan territory to threaten others, with third-party monitoring. In reality, the Talibanā€™s record under the 2020 Doha Accord tells a starkly different story: promises of intra-Afghan dialogue were ignored, and the group marched unopposed on Kabul, exposing the failures of Khalilzadā€™s diplomacy.

Khalilzadā€™s repeated framing of the Taliban as reasonable actors overlooks the broader regional consequences and security risks, while his renewed advocacy for agreements modeled on Doha risks repeating past strategic mistakes where enforcement mechanisms were lacking and accountability is absent. Despite no longer holding a US government position, Khalilzad continues to in Afghan affairs, raising serious questions about his motives, judgment and credibility. The pattern is clear: overstatement, miscalculation and self-serving maneuvering consistently undermine meaningful conflict resolution, leaving the region to grapple with the consequences.

Multiple Pakistanā€“Taliban agreements

Over the past three years, Pakistan and the Taliban have engaged in several rounds of security dialogue. These efforts included a bilateral agreement guaranteed by the United Arab Emirates, promises made in backed by Turkey and Qatar, as well as follow-up discussions in Istanbul.

Despite repeated diplomatic engagement, none of the agreements yielded the expected results, thereby indicating the Talibanā€™s continued inability or unwillingness to fulfill their commitments.

Recent Saudi-mediated in Riyadh reportedly stalled when the Taliban rejected the proposed verification mechanisms, reinforcing a consistent practice of demanding recognition and legitimacy without taking responsibility. Pakistan has emphasized the need for enforceable monitoring frameworks, drawing lessons from earlier agreements: trust cannot be extended based on words alone; it must be secured through actual performance.

Regional fallout and security implications

The Talibanā€™s noncompliance has broader for South and Central Asia. Neighboring countries ā€” including Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian states ā€” face heightened risks of cross-border attacks because of the unregulated movement of militants. Activities linked to the anti-state Pakistan-based militant group were facilitated by the areas under Taliban control, while the presence of al-Qaeda in Kabul complicates regional counterterrorism coordination, exposing significant fault lines in regional cooperation.

Instability also affects economic cooperation. Trade corridors, humanitarian assistance channels and regional integration initiatives depend on predictable security conditions. As a result, the shortcomings of the Doha Accord have become a matter of transnational concern.

The Doha legacy

The Talibanā€™s consolidation of power also carried significant humanitarian consequences. Communities protesting coercion, resource seizures and governance abuses have faced violent repression. These actions highlight a governance model prioritizing power consolidation over human life, exacerbating instability within Afghanistan.

The Doha Accord failed because it lacked compliance and transparency, illustrating the importance of enforceability in diplomatic agreements. Verification is not a procedural luxury; it is essential for credible security cooperation and sustainable regional stability. Agreements that rely primarily on trust risk creating gaps between formal commitments and actual behavior, allowing the Taliban to consolidate power while projecting an image of compliance and perpetuating insecurity both inside and outside Afghanistan.

The Doha legacy is defined by strategic failure and its cascading effects on regional security. Taliban violations, internal repression and facilitation of militant networks have undermined intra-Afghan peace prospects and South Asian stability. Future diplomatic efforts depend on prioritizing enforceability, transparency and accountability frameworks with measurable performance to prevent further erosion of trust and mitigate the political, security and human costs that have defined the past three years.

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While such arguments may appear persuasive to those unfamiliar with the regionā€™s history and economic realities, they collapse under scrutiny. The idea that Pakistan benefits financially from war ignores the devastating cost borne by the country, economically, socially and politically, and grossly misrepresents the motivations behind its security policy.

A popular narrative without economic grounding

The origin of the ā€œwar economyā€ myth is not academic. It is rooted in the rhetoric of anti-institutional and anarchist movements that seek to portray the Pakistani state, particularly its military, as profiteers of perpetual conflict. These claims often appear in activist discourse and certain international commentary, asserting that Pakistanā€™s engagement in post 9/11 operations was driven by financial incentives rather than national security imperatives.

Central to this argument is the notion that Pakistan received billions in aid, particularly through the US Coalition Support Fund (CSF), and used this as a revenue stream. The implication is that peace was undesirable for institutions that allegedly benefited from instability. However, the economic data and ground realities paint a far different picture.

Counting the cost, not the gains

According to Pakistanā€™s Ministry of Finance, the country suffered over in economic losses between 2001 and 2020 as a direct result of terrorism and conflict-related disruption, losses that dwarf the total foreign assistance received during the same period.

In contrast, the US disbursed approximately to Pakistan in Pentagon military payments, primarily through the CSF between 2002 and 2017. Crucially, this payment was not an open-ended financial reward. It was a reimbursement mechanism for logistical and security support rendered in connection with NATO operations in Afghanistan.

Independent research institutions echo these findings. A published in Small Wars & Insurgencies estimates that Pakistan has endured over due to terrorism, hardly the profile of a nation exploiting war for its benefit.

Strategic necessity, not opportunism

Accusations that Pakistan chose war for dollars neglect the regional security environment that followed after the US invasion of Afghanistan. With terrorist networks, including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Al-Qaeda, establishing footholds along porous borders and violence spilling into Pakistani territory, neutrality was not an option. The state faced real and urgent threats to national cohesion and public safety.

To suggest that these decisions were made for mere economic gain is not only analytically unsound, but it also implies that Pakistan willingly invited terrorism onto its soil, destabilized its economy and lost thousands of lives for international financial aid, which it could neither fully control nor freely spend. While all institutions, including the military, must be subject to transparency and accountability, the idea that a nation enters war for reimbursement, much of which was withheld or conditional, is a distortion, not a diagnosis.

The power of the narrative and who it serves

So why does the myth persist? Because it serves a purpose. By casting national security decisions as economically motivated, anti-state narratives shift the focus from the complexity of militancy, cross-border terrorism and regional geopolitics to a simplified story of greed. It reframes a fight against extremism as a tool of oppression and reduces sacrifice to opportunism.

Such distorted framing appeals to international audiences unfamiliar with the regionā€™s internal dynamics and is often repeated by anarchist factions seeking to erode public trust in state institutions.Ironically, this narrative not only misrepresents Pakistan but also undermines the very the country has made in reversing the tide of terrorism over the last decade.

No profit in pain

The war economy myth is a powerful speculation, but it is not an economic fact. Pakistanā€™s security decisions have often come at an extraordinary cost rather than as a benefit. The state has faced intense , and immense resource strain in its pursuit of stability, not profit.

As the world revisits the consequences of two decades of war in the region, it is critical to separate facts from speculative narratives. Reducing Pakistanā€™s complex national security challenges to a monetary transaction does a disservice not just to truth, but to the countless civilians, soldiers and institutions that continue to strive for peace in one of the worldā€™s most difficult neighborhoods.

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However, in the broader context of national cohesion, its rise also highlights the intricate interaction between Pakistanā€™s official institutions and its peripheries. While it is true that the PTM expresses valid sociopolitical and humanitarian concerns, a sustainable response to its growth would require a nuanced, reform-oriented and inclusive state strategy. A strategy that would strengthen the integrity of Pakistan’s federation and address the structural inequities that started the movement. 

Colonial legacies to contemporary marginalization of PTM

The Pashtunsā€™ discontent dates back to the colonial administrative system of the British Raj, which ruled the tribal belt under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (),Ā  an extremely repressive legal system that denied the Pashtuns due process and political rights. Pakistan inherited this system after British rule ended. Following this, the tribal areas remained semi-autonomous, which were ruled by proxy. The political and economic marginalization of the region that makes up the current Newly Merged Districts (NMDs) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) was solidified by this legacy.

During the (1979-1989), the western borders of Pakistan became strategic rear bases for the anti-Soviet jihad funded by the USA and Saudi Arabia. The resulting militarization and refugee flow were inflicted particularly on the Pashtun population. After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistanā€™s role in the USā€™s war on terror turned the NMDs into war zones once again.

Military campaigns like , , and were undertaken to combat the terrorists. Though the operations were successful on a larger scale, they also resulted in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), to civilians and destruction of the socioeconomic infrastructure. As localities sought accountability and rehabilitation, this collectiveĀ trauma ultimately resulted inĀ the birth of PTM.

Pakistanā€™s response to PTMā€™s security imperatives and democratic accommodation

Pakistanā€™s engagement with the PTM has oscillated between safeguarding national security along the northwestern borders and maintaining space for democratic expression and dissent, as many of the PTMā€™s demands undermine Pakistanā€™s national security apparatus. Bearing in mind Pakistanā€™s history of political turmoil and regional turbulence, it is challenging to discern the stateā€™s cautious stance towards the PTM from substantive national security apprehensions.

Initially, the military high command accepted the complaints of the movementā€™s members, taking them as ā€œour own children,ā€ and described their plight as a consequence of decades of militancy and in the old tribal regions. This accommodating stance underscored Pakistan’s readiness to address the populace’s problems by carrying out a procedure of progressive sociopolitical consolidation.Ģż

After the , Pakistan embarked on a far-reaching process of integrating Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in KP and granted complete constitutional, political and legal rights to the tribal citizens. The repeal of the FCR, judicial review and inclusion into the KP Assembly were historical achievements of empowerment.

As part of the 10-year Development Plan, the infrastructure, education and healthcare sectors were made a priority, alongside for young people through Ehsaas, Ba-Ikhtiyar Naujawan and Kamyab Jawan, which opened up employment opportunities in the merging districts. Together, these activities are evidence of a wider vision of Pakistan, to substitute decades of marginalization of the tribal population with inclusion, justice and sustainable development.Ģż

Security, sovereignty and the shifting narrative of PTM

As the movement grew from the peripheries of KP, a northwestern province of Pakistan, and spread to urban centers like Karachi, Lahore and Quetta. Its rhetoric developed into not just confrontational but also into a propagation of an anti-state stance, as heard by their infamous slogan: ā€œLar ao bar yao Afghanā€ (ā€œHere and there Afghan are oneā€). Certain PTM leaders started making sweeping indictments of state institutions, especially the armed forces, and in so doing, destroyed the space for dialogue and fueled perceptions of foreign manipulation.

The incident of 2019, which led to clashes between the supporters of the PTM and security personnel, known as Khar Qamar, was a tragic expression of mistrust and polarization. The of PTM members of parliament Ali Wazir and Mohsin Dawar in 2024, on anti-terrorism grounds, exacerbated the rift between the state and the movement.

After recurrent intelligence warning signs that hostile actors were attempting to penetrate and utilize the expanding network of PTM, the federal government prohibited the movement pursuant to Section 11B of the in 1997. Although human rights organizations, such as and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (), had condemned the move as heavy-handed, the reasoning behind the decision by the state was based on a larger security risk assessment.Ģż

The evolving situation of Balochistan, a southwestern province in Pakistan, shows that legitimate socioeconomic unrest had been exploited by separatist and foreign sponsor networks, which became an important pre-set for the Pakistani state. Similarly, the rhetoric of PTM and its exaggeration by foreign media and antagonistic rhetoric ā€” by undermining the importance of the Durand line and waving Afghan flags in their events ā€” have caused concern that it might be employed as a soft front to damage the functioning of the national institutions, delegitimize anti-terrorism efforts and generate ethnic polarization. This poses a challenge toĀ  Islamabad in distinguishing between an acceptable civil disobedience and organized subversion, which is especially crucial in a region with external influence and asymmetric warfare.

Reconciling national cohesion and regional inclusion

The PTM phenomenon has been a timely wake-up call about the importance of inclusive governance and equitable development in Pakistanā€™s peripheries. The 25th Constitutional Amendment, which consolidated the former FATA with KP, was one of the milestones in the of Pakistan. This union officially terminated the century-long rule of colonial-era law and granted millions of Pashtuns full constitutional rights.Ģż

The key challenge after the merger is the effective implementation of the 25th Amendment, ensuring that the constitutional promises are translated into visible improvements in the tribal areas. However, this process has been made tricky due to multiple acts of terrorism, which cut across Afghanistanā€™s borders into the tribal region of Pakistan and the ethnic politics of PTM. This has been taken advantage of with developmental delays to propagate ethnic division, such as with chants and doubts about the goodwill of the state to work towards inclusive governance and stability in the country.

Rebuilding trust through reform and reconciliation

The stateā€™s strategic mandate is to unify these reforms by making specific investments in government capacity, education, medical services and livelihood recovery within the NMDs. Through long-term structural imbalances, the federation and Pakistanā€™s border regions can reinforce the social contract. This developmental solution aligns with the overall goals of national security, as inclusive governance is an inherent to radicalization and alienation.

At the same time, reform of the security sector is also a necessity to promote public trust. The normalization of state-citizen relations can be achieved through the gradual demilitarization of the civilian areas and empowerment of the local police and courts. Moreover, the establishment of a ā€œTruth and Reconciliation Commission,ā€ as sometimes suggested by the PTM and backed by certain quarters of civil society, would be a plausible model for settling grievances without necessarily compromising the institutionā€™s integrity.

This type of commission, based on transparency and inclusiveness, would not only promote reconciliation but also demonstrate Pakistanā€™s commitment to democratic resilience in post-conflict environments.

Pakistanā€™s response to the PTM will help shape the future course of its federal democracy, counter-extremism policy and civil-military balance. The way forward, as seen by Pakistan, is an open dialogue and not a confrontation. The PTM has, by all means, brought to the fore some problems that must be addressed, including displacement and post-conflict rehabilitation. The long-term credibility and moral capital of the movement, however, rely on the observance of nonviolence, constitutionalism and national unity. 

To become a positive force, the PTM needs to direct its activism through democratic institutions of Pakistan and mobilize parliamentarians, as well as cooperate with provincial governments in policy formulation. The continued rhetoric augmentation of the military and other state institutions, creating division and hatred against other ethnicities or a repetition of messages that appeal to the enemies of Pakistan, is perilous in diminishing the legitimacy of the very people it supposedly represents.

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On October 12, 2025, a for the Afghan government stated that Afghan forces had conducted retaliatory strikes against Pakistani military targets. Pakistan, in turn, that it had undertaken cross-border counterstrikes within Afghan territory, targeting both Afghan military installations and militant bases allegedly used to launch attacks on Pakistan. Subsequently, on October 15 and 17, Pakistan conducted additional airstrikes in Kandahar, Kabul and Paktika provinces, which struck civilian homes and marketplaces, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians.

Initially, Pakistanā€™s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) remained silent after the October 9 airstrikes, but ā€” following the Afghan retaliatory operations ā€” that Pakistan had exercised its right of self-defense against both the Afghan government and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).Ģż

In December 2024, following a separate set of airstrikes in Afghanistan, Pakistanā€™s MoFA had that its operations targeted the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, a nonstate actor, which, along with the TTP, was accused of carrying out multiple terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.Ģż

Pakistan that the Afghan authorities are either unwilling or unable to effectively address the threat posed by these groups, thereby necessitating Pakistan to take measures to protect its national security interests. Nonetheless, these actions have raised serious concerns about their potential illegality and their ability to undermine broader regional stability.

Use of force and the right to self-defense under international law

Under international law, states are generally prohibited from using or threatening to use force in their international relations. This rule is found in of the UN Charter and is considered a (jus cogens), meaning no state is allowed to violate it. However, there are three exceptions to this rule: (1) when a state exercises the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, (2) when a State uses force at the invitation or with the consent of another state and (3) the UN Security Council authorizes the use of force under of the UN Charter. Any use of force outside these exceptions constitutes a clear violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

The justification for Pakistanā€™s airstrikes in Afghanistan relies on the right of self-defense, as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, this right applies only when a state has been subjected to an ā€œarmed attackā€, and international law sets clear conditions for invoking it: (1) self-defense, whether individual or collective, must be in response to an ā€œarmed attackā€ under international law. 

The Charter does not define ā€œarmed attack.ā€ Nonetheless, it is generally believed that an armed attack occurs when the regular forces of one state attack anotherā€™s territory, whether by land, sea, or air. (2) The attack must be carried out by a state that is a member of the UN, and (3) the state using the right of self-defense must report its actions to the UN Security Council.

The question arises as to whether the right to self-defense extends to ā€œarmed attacksā€ by nonstate actors operating from the territory of another state. The wording of Article 51 does not explicitly say so, but the International Court of Justiceā€™s (ICJ) rulings ā€” including the opinion and the case ā€” indicate that Article 51 applies only to armed attacks by states, unless the nonstate actorsā€™ conduct can be legally attributed to a state.

Nevertheless, some scholars that the right to self-defense includes armed attacks by nonstate actors. These scholars rely on two UN Security Council resolutions adopted after 9/11 to support this view. However, Resolutions and recognize that the right of individual and collective self-defense must be exercised only in accordance with the UN charter, clearly implying that the use of force in self-defense must still adhere to the conditions established under Article 51.Ģż

Particularly, the need to establish a clear link (attribution) between the host state and the nonstate actor responsible for the attack. Because attacks by the TTP cannot be attributed to Afghanistan, Pakistanā€™s unilateral military operations inside Afghan territory do not meet the requirements of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Therefore, they constitute a violation of the international legal prohibition on the use of force.

ā€œUnable and unwillingā€ standard

The ā€œā€ standard suggests that if a state harbors nonstate actors who launch attacks against another state, and if that state either fails to act against them or lacks the capacity to do so, the victim state can claim its right to self-defense. For instance, Pakistan maintains that TTP operates from Afghan territory and has repeatedly urged Afghanistan to address the issue.Ģż

If Afghanistan is either unwilling or unable to confront TTP, Pakistan claims it may resort to self-defense measures against the group. The United States and its allies have previously this standard to justify unilateral military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria, arguing that Syria was unable or unwilling to suppress ISIS activities threatening Iraq. They also argued that their actions were taken at Iraqā€™s request, which faced an imminent threat from ISIS.

However, this doctrine formal legal status under the UN Charter or customary international law. Instead, it is a unilateral reinterpretation of Article 51, primarily advanced by the United States and some of its allies to legitimize unilateral use of force that would otherwise constitute clear violations of the Charter.

In practice, the ā€œunable or unwillingā€ standard has been invoked only by a few states so far, typically to justify their unilateral military actions without the consent of the territoryā€™s state or any authorization from the UN Security Council. Similarly, Pakistanā€™s use of this legally unfounded standard to justify airstrikes inside Afghanistan reflects the same domineering unilateralism that the US and its allies have used against weaker states, bypassing the UN Charterā€™s explicit prohibition on the use of force.

The recent Pakistani airstrikes

In recent months, Pakistan has conducted a series of airstrikes within Afghan territory, marking a significant escalation in regional tensions and raising serious questions about respect for international law by even postcolonial states. Pakistan previously its December 2024 air operations as lawful measures directed against the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, a nonstate actor along with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ā€” alleged to have orchestrated multiple terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.Ģż

However, following the airstrikes of October 9, 2025, Pakistan refrained from issuing an official explanation. It was only after Afghanistan reportedly launched retaliatory strikes on the night of October 11-12, 2025, that Islamabad released two official statements ā€” one from its and another from .

The military statement warned that if the ā€œTaliban governmentā€ failed to take effective action against terrorist groups operating from Afghan soil, Pakistan would continue to exercise its right to defend its people by the persistent neutralization of terror targets. This statement effectively left open the possibility of further cross-border unilateral military operations inside Afghanistan under the pretext of self-defense. 

The MoFA statement also noted that Pakistan has exercised its right of self-defense against the ā€œunwarranted aggressionā€ from the Afghan side. It warned that ā€œany further provocations would be met with an unwavering and befitting response.ā€ Both statements thus explicitly framed Pakistanā€™s use of force within the broader legal discourse of self-defense, but with little visible effort to articulate a clear legal basis for its actions within the established framework of self-defense under international law.

Pakistanā€™s justification rests on the argument that Afghanistan has failed to address the threat posed by the TTP, and that such failure demonstrates either unwillingness or inability on the part of the Afghan authorities to prevent their territory from being used as a base for attacks against Pakistan. 

By invoking this rationale, Pakistan clearly seeks to rely on the legally unfounded ā€œunwilling or unableā€ standard. Politically, these actions also expose Pakistan to charges of hypocrisy. Islamabad has repeatedly similar unilateral military strikes conducted by neighboring states ā€” particularly India ā€” labeling them as and violations of its sovereignty.Ģż

Pakistanā€™s recent actions mirror the very justifications it has historically rejected, thereby weakening its credibility and normative commitment to international law. Finally, by normalizing the cross-border unilateral use of force against non-state actors inside the territory of another sovereign state under the guise of self-defense, Pakistan risks legitimizing similar actions by other states inside its own territory.

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For instance, residents of deserts rely heavily on potable water from other regions, need fewer resources to cope with cold weather and have minimal rainwater drainage requirements. People living along seashores or in tropical regions experience a climate of moderate to hot weather. Their energy needs to manage climate severity in order to remain relatively stable and their diets depend largely on seafood.

In contrast, inhabitants of cold, mountainous regions face milder summers but harsher winters. They require abundant fuel and food resources, often relying on what they produce in summer or importing supplies from other nations. This natural balance in ecosystems is vital for all living beings in their habitats.

When is disturbed due to climate change, the consequences are severe. A temperature rise of just 1ā€“2 degrees Celsius can trigger glacier melts and cloudbursts in mountainous areas, leading to flash floods and landslides. Such events directly destroy lives, homes, seasonal crops and livestock. This would also indirectly affect populations living downstream in plains, where flooding disrupts food security and infrastructure. Coastal populations face rising sea levels that submerge land, displace communities and threaten livelihoods. These are just some of the impacts; other contributing factors include deforestation, carbon emissions and rapid urbanization.

The impact of industrializationĀ 

The root causes of ecosystem imbalances are overwhelmingly human-driven. , which began in the late 17th to early 18th century, accelerated resource consumption. The British Industrial Revolution relied heavily on coal and iron, while the first American was drilled in 1859, leading to rapid industrial growth in the US by the 1870s.

After World War II, industrialization expanded further with mechanized agriculture, large-scale manufacturing and new modes of transportation, such as steamships, automobiles and airplanes. Cities became centers of industry and research, driving urban migration.

Industry and urbanization heavily rely on fossil fuels such as coal, oil, diesel and furnace oil. Burning these fuels releases large amounts of carbon, contributing to global warming. Urbanization also leads to deforestation, displacing habitats critical for ecosystem stability. Additionally, transportation relies on fossil fuels, further increasing carbon emissions. Together, these human activities are major drivers of climate change.

Developing countries, where industrialization is still evolving, contribute relatively little to global carbon emissions. On average, a person in a high-income country emits more carbon than someone in a low-income country. Pakistan, for example, produces less than of the worldā€™s carbon emissions. Yet it ranks among the most vulnerable countries to climate change, bearing the brunt of industrialized nationsā€™ carbon output.

Countries like Bangladesh face similar challenges ā€” minimal contributions to global emissions but high vulnerability to floods and cyclones. Wealthier nations, which are the primary producers of fossil fuels and have higher carbon footprints, should support these vulnerable countries.

Urgent action needed

Recent events highlight this vulnerability. In August 2025, torrential monsoon rains devastating floods in India and Pakistan, affecting thousands of lives, livestock and infrastructure. On top of that, Pakistanā€™s 7,000 glaciers are , increasing the risk of glacier lake outbursts and flash floods.

Vulnerable nations urgently require funding not only to mitigate and adapt to climate damage but also to ensure compliance with international treaties, such as the (which governs the use of the river Indus and its tributaries, allocating the eastern rivers to India and the western rivers to Pakistan). Any suspension or unilateral violation of such agreements could set a dangerous global precedent, making the exploitation of natural resources easier and accelerating climate deterioration.

Climate change is no longer a distant threat. For countries like Pakistan, its impacts are immediate and catastrophic, demanding global attention, accountability from high-emission nations and urgent action to protect human lives and natural ecosystems.

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On , 2025, two government officials, Safi Ullah and Shah Khalid, and two teachers, Rafi Ullah and Nisar Ali Shah, were abducted in Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These kidnappings, which TTP Commander Qari Niaz carried out, are indicative of the agenda the group has.

The reign of terror by the TTP is not a sequence of isolated cases; it is a bigger, systematic operation to take advantage of the local communities and destabilize them. The TTP, which is driven by a of Islam, wants to legitimize their acts as jihad.

In actuality, their reasons lie in personal interest, political influence and an ideology that aims at bringing a reign of terror, using religion as a tool to serve their interests. Their activities, such as kidnapping innocent citizens in exchange for ransom, stealing vital funds, thus instilling fear in the local people, are contrary to the same principles that they purport to preach.

Misinterpretation of Islam

In the cases, the TTP did not just kidnap teachers, whose services are needed for the future of the country, but also stole their rupees. The kidnapping of government officials and stealing their funds highlights how the TTP is determined to ruin the development of Pakistan and sabotage the social structure of the country.

These activities are an outright contravention of the Islamic doctrine, which the sanctity of life and justice, as well as protecting the weak. On the contrary, the TTP has misused these values to complete its agenda.

This brutality is not new. The history of the TTP as a violent organization dates back to their attacks on , , and , which is highly essential to the stability of the country and its citizens. Their terror campaign has grown over the years, perpetuating the cycle of violence, which has a direct negative impact on civilians through destabilizing communities.

The attacks by TTP on teachers, government officials and ordinary citizens show their disrespect towards the sanctity of life. They are motivated by pure greed, the desire for power and the fear of being dominated.

Pakistanā€™s attempt to fight backĀ 

Nevertheless, these barriers have not derailed the determination of Pakistan to fight terrorism. In Darah Hassanzai, , the local people waged war against TTP operatives who attempted to collect Ushr, an outlawed tax. The community, together with the police reinforcement, caught the TTP operatives, sending a clear message to the global communities: terrorism and exploitation will not be tolerated by the people of Pakistan. This act of solidarity and bravery is a sign of the strong spirit of the Pakistani citizens, who are bent on resisting the people who want to ruin their lifestyle.

The fight against the TTP is not only about military power, but about moral determination. The elders of Hathi Khel and Taos Khel in Domel, Bannu, issued an to the TTP. They must leave the area by October 10, 2025, or they will face a joint police operation. This community-based program is a strong appeal that the Pakistani people will not submit to terror and will keep struggling to achieve peace and stability.

The violence and exploitation committed by aim to undermine the development in Pakistan. Through civic targeting, extortion and destruction of critical infrastructure, the TTP has harmed local economies, disrupted development and deterred foreign investment. In their quest to illicit wealth and power, they cause instability in the security environment in the country, hence forming an atmosphere of fear that is detrimental to the efforts made by Pakistan to move forward.

Pakistanā€™s optimistic outlook

Nevertheless, these challenges notwithstanding, remains determined to protect its citizens, infrastructure and national stability. The is persistent in ensuring that its citizens are no longer exposed to the reign of terror by the TTP. Law enforcement efforts, military operations and community-based initiatives are being utilized to counter the influence of the TTP, building a fear and violence-free future.

Despite the TTPā€™s persistent Terrorism, the power and unity of Pakistan will win. The quick response from the government to these attacks is a sign that the TTPā€™s terrorism will not succeed in derailing Pakistanā€™s developmental progress.

The future of Pakistan is still very bright and hardy as the communities, law enforcers and leaders of the nation work in conjunction to fight against these terror-causing agents. The ideological perversion of violence and exploitation by the TTP will be destroyed sooner or later, and Pakistan will emerge stronger than ever despite the adversities.

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Rising domestic reserves: A glimpse of self-reliance

As of December 2024, Pakistanā€™s proven oil reserves stood at approximately 238 million barrels, representing a from around 193 million barrels in December 2023. This growth, though modest in global terms, underscores the countryā€™s latent potential and highlights the importance of sustained investment in domestic exploration. Despite this encouraging rise, domestic production still falls short of meeting national demand, keeping Pakistan reliant on imports to fuel its industries, transport and households.

The scale of this reliance is significant. In the fiscal year 2023ā€“2024, Pakistanā€™s petroleum import bill reached $15.1 billion, according to the State Bank of Pakistan, while some sources reported a slightly higher figure of .

This consistent outflow of foreign exchange underscores the importance of developing local reserves as a top priority. Every barrel produced domestically represents not just a saving in import costs, but also a step towards greater national resilience.

Shale energy: Pakistanā€™s untapped frontier

Beyond conventional oil and gas, Pakistan is among the worldā€™s most promising nations in terms of shale energy potential. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Pakistanā€™s oil reserves are estimated at barrels, with oil and condensate production at around 60,000 barrels per day. These resources, largely concentrated in the Sembar and Ranikot formations of the Lower Indus Basin, could transform Pakistanā€™s energy profile if developed successfully.

It is important to note, however, that these remain geological assessments rather than proven reserves. Unlocking them would require extensive drilling, advanced technologies and a carefully phased development strategy. Industry estimates suggest that an initial investment of $5 billion or more, along with several years of effort, would be necessary before commercial-scale extraction becomes feasible.

Yet, this challenge also represents an opportunity. Pakistan has the chance to build partnerships with technologically advanced nations and multinational energy firms that can bring the expertise, capital and innovation needed to realize these resources. By positioning itself as an attractive investment destination, Pakistan could set the stage for a major transformation in its energy sector.

The Pakistan-US investment relationship holds untapped strategic value, particularly in critical sectors like minerals, energy, information technology (IT) and agriculture. Pakistanā€™s mineral reserves, valued between , including copper, lithium and rare earths, offer a strategic edge. These resources are crucial for the US clean energy transition and technological security.

The Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) has been a pivotal enabler in streamlining procedures and boosting investment, especially in sectors like renewables and mining. US foreign direct investment (FDI) in Pakistan remains underutilized, with further engagement in energy development and mineral extraction critical for both countriesā€™ long-term economic interests.

Offshore exploration: the next energy frontier

Momentum is also being built offshore. In early 2024, a multi-year seismic survey was conducted in the offshore Indus Basin, which detected promising subsurface structures containing hydrocarbons.

While still at an early stage, these findings suggest that Pakistanā€™s coastal regions may hold the key to future discoveries. Successful offshore exploration would not only diversify the energy mix but also elevate Pakistanā€™s status as a serious player in the global energy market.

These initiatives underline the fact that Pakistan is far from resource-poor; rather, it is a nation on the cusp of converting geological promise into economic strength. With the right strategies and partnerships, it could unlock reserves that support industrial growth, create jobs and stabilize its balance of payments.

Energy development cannot be viewed in isolation; it is deeply tied to Pakistanā€™s international partnerships. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistanā€™s with the United States has been shaped by both geopolitical shifts and enduring economic cooperation. Despite ups and downs, the trade and investment relationship has proven resilient, with the US consistently ranking among Pakistanā€™s largest trading partners.

Today, the United States is not only Pakistanā€™s export market, accounting for about 17% of total exports, but also a leading source of foreign direct investment. US companies have been active in consumer goods, information and communications technology (ICT), renewable energy and financial services, bringing global expertise and creating local opportunities. Pakistan, in turn, has exported textiles, apparel and a growing range of goods to the US, cementing the bilateral trade corridor as one of the most important in South Asia.

The momentum has accelerated further in recent months. In Julyā€“August 2025, high-level talks culminated in a new trade agreement aimed at developing Pakistanā€™s oil reserves and reducing bilateral tariffs. The accord promises not only to deepen cooperation in hydrocarbons but also to expand market access for Pakistani exports.

US President Donald Trump that future exploration could position Pakistan as an energy exporter to regional markets such as India ā€” an ambitious but symbolic indicator of Pakistanā€™s potential.

Toward an energy-independent future

Pakistanā€™s energy challenge is undeniable, but so too is its potential. Rising proven reserves, significant shale prospects and encouraging offshore surveys highlight a future that could be shaped by reform, innovation and foreign investment.

For partners like the United States, deeper engagement in Pakistanā€™s energy sector is not only an economic opportunity but also a strategic investment in regional stability. If managed wisely, Pakistan could move from chronic dependency toward becoming a more resilient, self-sufficient player in the global energy landscape.

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Thanks to the government’s failures, Pakistan has sharply climbed up the ladder vis-Ć -vis weather extremes. It #5 among countries most affected by extreme climatic events in GermanWatchā€™s Climate Risk Index 2020. The country now tops the list, mainly due to its monsoon-driven, relative economic losses between June and September 2022.

The increased chances of natural catastrophes have proven lethal. Climate-related calamities have 802 fatalities this year, including 203 children, in the ongoing rainy season. Much of the damage and deaths took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and the bad weather wreaked havoc on infrastructure, crops and livestock.

One of the main reasons for the increase in climate-related catastrophes is due to a phenomenon called glacial melt. Over a period of many years, glacial melt led to the of thousands of glacial lakes in northern areas. The process, kindled by excessive heat, sharply elevated the specter of glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs). These sudden events ā€” which are able to cause significant downstream damage by releasing millions of cubic meters of water and debris in a few hours ā€” are a persistent threat to life, infrastructure and livelihoods of 7 million people in KP and Gilgit-Baltistan.

Governance weaknesses

Pakistanā€™s government often singles out climate and ā€œlopsided allocationā€ ā€” receiving $2.8 billion from international creditors against pledges of $10 billion ā€” of green funding for its failure on climate action. Yet it remains unwilling to address its own governance weaknesses and step up climate adaptation efforts.

For instance, the UN-backed GLOF-II project faced criticism for failing to contribute to disaster preparedness and early warnings, partially because the funds were misused. Other projects were also accused of being by institutional incompetence and corruption, or of eroding in value due to unimpeded .

Similarly, poor access to climate-smart for farmers and major policy , such as in wheat procurement and inequitable subsidies, continue to block Pakistan’s agricultural transformation and harm rural communities.

Climate finance gaps

At the international climate conference known as COP27, the loss and damage was hailed as a quantum leap in climate finance, but as of this past June, 27 countries had pledged just ā€” a minuscule fraction of the of billions required annually.

Developed nations, largely responsible for global emissions, have shaped the climate fate of vulnerable countries like Pakistan. Their industrialization has created an existential crisis for nations that have made minimal contributions to the problem. Pakistanā€™s government must act decisively and not succumb to inaction to prevent an irreversible climate catastrophe.

The situation demands an immediate response. Pakistan faces severe climate impacts, including heatwaves, droughts, floods and glacial melt that have disproportionately affected marginalized communities and jeopardized development.

To avert disaster, the government must address deep-seated governance issues like uncoordinated policy, insufficient resources, corruption and poor implementation of climate strategies. This includes strengthening institutions, ensuring transparency and fostering participatory decision-making with local communities, civil society and experts. Without strong governance, climate efforts will fail. The time for action is now.

Mobilizing domestic resources

For Pakistan to imprint a sustainable impact on climate change, it shouldnā€™t rely squarely on international climate financing and must mobilize domestic resources. Rather than merely shifting blame to the wealthy nations, it should expand the network of technology providers (largely in Punjab) across Pakistan and encourage private investment in renewable energy and climate-resilient infrastructure to boost productivity and lower emissions.

Establishing effective risk-sharing mechanisms, such as crop insurance, promoting initiatives like the of green bonds and experimenting with alternative climate finance models, for example, , should be expedited to protect farmers and generate climate finance.

The countryā€™s energy mix is highly by oil, gas and coal. Albeit , in the energy sector is both a threat to climate adaptation and economic stability, butting heads with terrorism and insurgency for the countryā€™s biggest challenge.

Considering Pakistanā€™s economic fragility and limited foreign exchange reserves, its heavy reliance on fossil fuels could be acceptable only as a short-term necessity to facilitate a transition toward long-term climate resilience.

Still, the government canā€™t lurk behind climate injustice to evade climate action. This will be akin to courting disaster. Fixing systemic inefficiencies such as a low tax-to-GDP ratio, strengthening accountability mechanisms and controlling transmission and distribution and unproductive could create a fiscal space to shore up Pakistanā€™s climate resilience.

The need for a non-partisan response

In the coming decades, Pakistan is projected to remain among the most vulnerable countries to climate change and extreme weather. The countryā€™s high exposure to torrential downpour, floods, cloudbursts and GLOFs urges a collective, nonpartisan national response.

By lacing up climate action with climate injustice or resorting to cosmetic measures ā€” by experts as taxation levies framed as climate mitigation efforts, while climate adaptation funding has declined from 40% to 10% in a decade ā€” the government shouldnā€™t pretend to act.

The monsoon that once whispered of bliss and euphoria now brings pain and affliction. What was rejoiced as a boon is being mourned as a doom. Climate change isnā€™t alone responsible for this tragic reversal. Chronic Governance failures have also magnified this crisis. Addressing systemic weaknesses is crucial to boost climate adaptation and build a climate-resilient Pakistan.

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Organizations like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan () in the tribal belt of Pakistan serve as an easy example of such a group of people who violate the religious principles they claim to support. The TTP is one of the longest-lasting instances of terrorism in Pakistan that misinterprets Islam to serve a political purpose.

The TTP ā€” a group that emerged from the tribal belt following the US takeover of Afghanistan ā€” aimed to impose its own twisted interpretation of Sharia, which not only targeted state institutions but also innocent citizens, schools, polio workers and religious minorities ā€” actions that directly conflict with Islamic teachings. 

The TTP does not have political grievances or seek regional independence like many other militant groups; instead, it explicitly uses violence as a religious obligation. This makes its misuse of Islamic principles particularly significant and relevant to consider within the context of faith-based radicalization. The TTPā€™s extremist rhetoric employs religious language to justify violence, and it remains crucial to return to the true meaning of Islam to counter these distorted terrorist ideologies.

Religion was never the reason

The reason behind such extremist groups is rooted in political and psychological systems and stems greatly from being uninformed and depressed. Research into poverty, conflict and development in Pakistan has shown that poverty can lead to of beliefs. Such research demonstrates that financial and social problems, rather than religious beliefs, create a prime environment for joining an extremist group.Ģż

When young people are deprived of hope, education and opportunities, they become impressionable and vulnerable. This creates space for terrorists to exploit. Instead of being guided by genuine religious teachings, these youths are fed anger and resentment, dressed up as devotion to God. Through such manipulation, acts of violence are sanctified in their eyes, legitimizing revenge and sacrifice as something sacred.

An Iranian on the resurgence of the TTP shows that this group, which continues to inspire radical extremists today, did so by abandoning all principles of kindness, fairness and moderation established in Islam. They became notorious for their rigidity, rejecting any differences and excluding Muslims from their community for the slightest reasons. The current TTP has persisted in these wrongdoings and only intensified them. Their cruelty is driven by fanaticism, which disregards the mercy at the core of Islam.

Authentic Islamic teachings never condone such actions

Religion, according to the Holy Qurā€™an (the central religious text of Islam) and the teachings of the founder of Islam, Prophet Muhammad, has nothing to do with violence; it is never linked to fire and bullets. In fact, in Islam, spreading fitnah ā€” discord and strife ā€” is considered among the gravest of evils.

In the Qurā€™anā€™s Surah Al-Maā€™idah, , it is said clearly: ā€œWhoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land, it is as if he had slain mankind entirely.ā€ If a life is taken, it is as if a whole universe is lost. Islam holds the sanctity of life in the highest regard. But these extremist groups change the meaning of holy words, isolate parts of scripture and mislead people to support their bloodthirsty actions.

While pretending to believe, terrorists work to control the community by threatening them. 

Terrorism only reveals the low moral values of those who commit it. They claim to seek justice, yet in reality, they just cause more destruction and ruin. In Islam, justice is not pursued through violence and guns; instead, its advocates seek justice by using respectful procedures, kindness and honesty. 

Several Islamic sources (like the Sirah and Hadith collections) recount that when the Prophet Muhammad faced deep persecution in Mecca, through mockery, boycott and attempts on his life, he showed restraint and entrusted justice to God. After the Muslim victory in 630 CE, known as the , he marked his triumph not with revenge but with a general amnesty, forgiving long-standing enemies. He spoke the famous words, ā€œGo, for you are free.ā€

If violence is justified in the name of religion, it becomes even more dangerous because the perpetrators believe their actions carry divine approval. 

The Qurā€™an, however, repeatedly stresses that peace should be the foremost goal for Muslims. If there is conflict between groups of believers, Surah Al-Hujurat, , advises them to find a solution. ā€œIf two groups among the believers should fight, then make a settlement between them. But if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the command of Allah.ā€ This verse does not promote rebellion or terrorism. It commands one to pursue peace and justice in accordance with moral and rightful conduct.

Terrorism rejects human dignity

No matter the claims made, is an inhumane act that betrays the religion it purports to uphold.Ģż

Supposed martyrdom achieved through killing, taking pleasure in spilling blood or committing suicide attacks are not acts of true faith; they demonstrate a lack of courage. Revenge against innocent individuals holds no honor, and hatred brings only further suffering. True strength lies in self-control, in the capacity to forgive those who deserve retribution and in helping others rather than spreading terror.

The actions of groups like the TTP contradict Islamic principles rather than represent them. Every bomb detonated and bullet fired distances people from the message of peace that Islam carries.

Jihad, in its true Islamic context, symbolizes ā€œstruggleā€ in the path of Allah, embodying the efforts to lead a virtuous life and to do better, making jihad a holy act. But instead of using the actual spiritual context, TTP has radicalized jihad by sowing chaos, confusion and suffering.

Efforts should extend beyond security measures to reclaim the true perception of Islam. Communities, and especially the young, must be guided toward the religionā€™s authentic teachings, which emphasize life over death and faith over fear. They should learn that prayer, compassion, and peace are stronger than violence, even in the face of oppression.

Organizations like TTP are fueled by secrecy, lack of knowledge, fear and division. The antidote is light. Light in our minds, light in how we treat others, and the knowledge that Islam is indeed a religion of peace. Choosing mercy over revenge requires real strength; resisting hatred is far more powerful than fire. Fire doesnā€™t match the strength of faith.

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In Pakistan, Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan () and Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan () terrorist organizations are the embodiment of such development. They are no longer limited by terrain and religious traditions in terms of how they wage warfare. They are more mobile and capable of delivering their blows both physically and psychologically.

Technology in terrorism

IMP and TTP use various social media platforms, including X, Instagram, WhatsApp and TikTok with the most focus on because of its anonymity, strong encryption and low moderation. The terrorist utilized these platforms for recruitment, proliferation and fear inducement by using coded language to escape identification.

Terrorism in Pakistan had a horrifying pattern two decades ago. They disseminated information with messages via recordings and through . Their tactics relied on the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), use of ambushes and attacks. These were methods that were devastating but were geographically and technologically limited.

From 2022 to 2025 the TTP and IMP started using not only for reconnaissance but also for warefar. TTP and IMP drone helicopters can reach military and civilian targets in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa near the Pakistani capital. These attacks highlight a worrying trend in the militant arsenal: affordable, massively destructive remote terrorist attacks. Using drones is a addition to the operation of these terrorist groups. It intensifies their ability to attack and remain safe. Now the main concern is not in the sky but online.

These terror groups frequently use secure . They share ideological material, logistical instructions, planning of targets and recruitment. Terrorists have shifted into decentralized locations where it is hard to bring them under conventional surveillance. The end-to-end encryption of many apps makes it difficult for many governments to monitor without expensive high-end surveillance hardware.Ģż

Meanwhile, mainstream are sources of extremist messages. Militants are using the platform algorithms by spelling deliberate variations, emojis, and symbols to bypass moderation. These use social media to broadcast propaganda and also recruit followers. They post videos of violence, fake information, and distorted stories that aim to manipulate the perception of the masses and form fear. They use encrypted messaging apps and social media to communicate with a greater number of people to advance their agenda. They write the narrative on the Internet to make their actions appear heroic and craft divisions that distrust builds in communities. Such online methods are equally harmful as their acts on the ground, and they are challenging for counter-terrorism activities.

Strategy, not chance

TTP or IMP know where to target: the issue of and misquotations, discontent with socio-political life, and generational identity crisis. They misquote religious rhetoric, but also populist laments in the crafting of their anti-state narratives. Their contents imitate the tone, aesthetic, and language of reputable media houses and create confusion in distinguishing between information and brainwashing. Even more dangerous is the structural failure of response.

Although it is possible to address the Western-centric extremism through global platforms, the latter are still not well-adjusted to finding and disrupting the local terrorism narratives. The tends to be blind to shades in Urdu, Pashto, or coded regional languages, dominating in the English language. There is minimal inter-platform cooperation, which enables the reappearance of content that has been banned on digital ecosystems. This gives us a whack-a-mole situation where the extremists feel one step ahead. There is a pressing need to take a different approach.

To begin with, tech companies need to partner with local professionals and governments to develop culturally and linguistically sensitive systems of moderation. The AI tools should be capable of detecting how extremist content is layered in the culturally coded language and imagery that is covert. This needs to be revised, and AI moderation regarding social media regulation must be updated to trace the terrorists’ handles and avoid the proliferation of their content in various languages.

The existing system must be updated to identify the terrorist contents and their bypassing tactic. The current AI moderation for social media needs to be upgraded to tackle the terrorists’ content and strictly avoid its entry to online platforms before it appearance. The AI code language needs to be revised to stop the proliferation of terrorist content.

The of digital literacy should be done in schools, media, and religious environments. Educating users about how to recognize manipulation, challenge narratives, and not be ideologically exploited should also be one of the main building blocks of national resilience.

The trend of terrorism is anymore. It travels on drones and bits and bytes. Be it cassette tapes or quadcopters, bomb vests or burner phones, terrorist organizations such as TTP and IMP have proven all too ready to modify themselves to use the instruments of modernity to their advantage.

Terrorist groups’ new strategies need a proper and holistic approach worldwide. The world and social media platforms must pay attention to it. The platforms need to revisit their algorithms to avoid the proliferation of terrorist propaganda.

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CPEC initially focused on infrastructure and connectivity, including roads, power projects and ports. Itā€™s now creating more room for cooperation in other areas, such as technological partnerships, agricultural development and human capital building. Hence, the China-Pakistan partnership is now pivoting from an infrastructure-only initiative to something broader and more long-term with reforms, institutional development and knowledge-based growth. This is expected to further strengthen China and Pakistanā€™s strategic economic alliance.

CPEC and Chinaā€™s reform blueprint for Pakistan

CPEC is a vital project under the flag of Chinaā€™s Belt and Road Initiative . This initiative was introduced to provide connectivity to the African, European and Asian regions with the help of infrastructure projects. To enhance the regional connection between the in Pakistan and the area of China, a network of pipelines, roads, railroads and industrial zones was initiated.Ģż

It has now developed into a comprehensive platform that fosters business, commerce and interpersonal relationships. Hence, Pakistan-Chinaā€™s cooperation is evolving into a multifaceted relationship that combines social development and economic collaboration. Iqbal highlighted CPECā€™s role in transforming bilateral ties into a broader social and economic partnership, enabling the relationship to grow beyond just diplomacy and into a deeper economic and social connection.

Chinaā€™s rapid transition from an agricultural economy to the worldā€™s industrial powerhouse is a success story that Pakistan is looking to emulate. Pakistan is now seeking to accelerate its own growth trajectory by applying Chinaā€™s model of scientific economic planning and reform trajectory. Pakistan has been attempting to China’s policy framework since the 1970s to enhance its effectiveness and update its economic institutions.

Boosting the export-based economy of Pakistan

Gaining access to Chinaā€™s import market is one of Pakistanā€™s current top priorities. At the same time, are underway to further integrate Pakistan into global value chains. As Pakistan seeks to deepen integration into global value chains through Chinese cooperation, Minister Lu Hao expresses confidence in Pakistanā€™s export-led growth strategy. This strategy aims to create jobs, increase foreign exchange reserves and lessen reliance on imports.

The new deal between China and Pakistan provides a foundation for both economic improvement and institutional revolution. aims to transform the country into a $1 trillion economy by 2035. A significant part of the plan involves deepening ties with China, particularly in areas such as trade, infrastructure, technology and investment. The idea is to establish a stronger foundation for long-term growth, boosting Pakistanā€™s role and influence in the region.Ģż

This goal is centered on technology transfer, export-led growth and knowledge-based businesses. The new agreement aligns national development goals with sustainable and equitable growth by laying down the foundation for institutional reform and economic vision.

Building institutions for sustainable growth

Beyond infrastructure and commerce, both parties agreed that institutional skill development is a crucial component for their economic cooperation. Joint research and training programs are required to boost Pakistanā€™s institutional capacity. It is anticipated that expert exchange between Pakistan and China will strengthen economic governance, thereby providing Pakistani institutions with cutting-edge planning, management and implementation capabilities.

One of Pakistanā€™s most well-known reform initiatives with a long-term sustainability goal is ā€œā€. This program spearheads economic reforms for long-term sustainability. Since the launch of Uraan Pakistan, the nation has witnessed a notable macroeconomic rebound, along with a bullish capital market and a steep decline in interest rates from 23% to , marking a major economic turnaround. Pakistan Stock Exchange reached a record high of , indicating resilience and investor optimism.

Addressing the structural issues

Despite development, the existing inefficient bureaucracy, extensive corruption, political instability, foreign policy challenges and weak governance mean Pakistan is persistently facing heavy . This has discouraged foreign investment and sustainability growth. Hence, political stability and consistent policies in Pakistan are vital to help keep its economic growth on track.Ģż

Both countries recognize that Pakistanā€™s political instability and inconsistent policies are hindering sustained growth. By collaborating on stability, China is pushing for stronger institutions and long-term investments. The idea is to keep the economy moving forward instead of letting uncertainty and constant shifts in leadership derail it. To promote sustainability, Pakistan further needs a stable climate for drawing foreign direct investment and promoting changes.

The latest dialogue between China and Pakistan marks a significant change in the evolution of their strategic partnership. CPEC has evolved from a collection of physical infrastructure projects to a platform for export-oriented growth, knowledge transfer and institutional transformation. 

The partnership has the potential to make economic dreams a reality with Pakistanā€™s tenacity as support and Chinaā€™s reform experience as a guide. The objective of Pakistan to establish a trillion-dollar GDP by 2035 could be achieved if both countries continue to have the same political commitment and strategic vision.

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Malikā€™s death also points to the shrinking operational space for terrorist groups within Pakistan. While the killing happened in the backdrop of infighting between militants, it also communicates a larger reality. ISKP is increasingly being put on the back foot. The killing of Malik highlights the growing on ISKPā€™s governance. The group has undergone losses at the leadership level, coupled with sustained counterterrorism pressure, all of which indicate dilution in its operational capabilities, specifically when it comes to carrying out mass influence and operations.

A decreasing safe haven for terrorists

Over the last two decades, Pakistan has waged several counterterrorism operations aimed at gradually disintegrating organized militant networks so that extremist groups are denied safe havens. This first began with (2007ā€“2009), mainly in the Swat region and in the tribal belt, followed by (2009), which pushed back Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) strongholds in South Waziristan.

April 2014 created a turning point for Pakistan with the onset of the phase of , which systematically targeted militant infrastructure, command and cross-border networks in North Waziristan. Capacity-building efforts were further reinforced through (2017), focusing on intelligence-based operations, urban counter-terrorism and the removal of residual extremists. These protracted campaigns attempted to disrupt terrorist sanctuaries and fracture the cohesion of pseudo-legitimate groups like the ISKP.

However, it is that militant infighting in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has weakened ISKPā€™s command structure and limited its maneuverability more than the operations led by the Pakistani government. Far from projecting strength, the groupā€™s internal conflicts highlight its desperation and decline in Pakistanā€™s increasingly inhospitable security environment.

The role of other countriesĀ 

Pakistan has India of aiding militant groups such as ISKP and TTP with funds and strategic guidance. Thus, allowing them to function as proxies made to destabilize Pakistanā€™s security environment. In December , Pakistan presented a detailed dossier containing evidence of Indian financing of the groups, their training and their safe havens linked to Indian Intelligence.

These concerns were in the reports of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the United Nations Security Council in , which charted ISKP-TTP linkages and mentioned external facilitation.

Despite this apparent foreign patronage, every important terrorist that has been killed represents a major blow to the terrorist movement, and the death of Malik falls in line with this trend. His killing highlights the fact that ISKP leadership cannot withstand Pakistan’s counterterrorism onslaught that continues to shrink the operational capacity of terrorist groups. 

From the United Nationsā€™ of Pakistanā€™s frontline sacrifices to senior US generals Islamabad as a ā€œphenomenal partner in counterterrorism,ā€ global voices have kept affirming the role of Pakistan in dismantling ISKP and other similar networks. The trajectory is increasingly evident: the ISKP is on the run. A series of Pakistani operations has reduced the footprint of this group to scattered remnants, disrupted its organizational capacity, and laid bare the external support systems that have tried to sustain it.Ģż

Uprooting terrorism in the regionĀ 

In spite of scattered operatives, ISKPā€™s true sanctuary has never been in Pakistan. The UN Sanctions and Monitoring Committee Report issued in confirms that the groupā€™s organizational hubs and training grounds are located in Afghanistan, where they receive protection and logistical support.Ģż

Pakistan has time and time again warned against the permissive environment Afghanistan maintains and that such an environment emboldens ISKP, TTP and allied groups. From Kunar to Nangarhar, the states for terrorists become a launching pad for cross-border attacks against Pakistan. Thus, the issue of terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan continues to be a central point of tension between the two countries.

In a nutshell, Pakistan cannot eliminate the roots of terrorism on its own; it requires a collective effort by Afghanistan and other neighboring states. After facing more than four decades of war, the responsibility now lies with the Afghan authorities to dismantle terrorist sanctuaries and cut off support networks operating from their soil.

Peace and stability in Pakistan are directly tied to Afghanistanā€™s security, and by extension, the stability of the wider region and the international community also hinges on Afghanistanā€™s ability to address this challenge. A unified regional approach, led by Afghanistan and supported by neighbors, is critical to finally uprooting terrorism in South Asia.

[ edited this piece.]Ā 

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Terrorist groups are these platforms to spread violence, radicalize individuals and coordinate attacks. This abuse of online platforms is not a theoretical concern anymore, but a reality. This growing problem needs to be addressed by governments, tech companies and the global community at large with swift and cooperative measures.

Social media has turned into a double-edged sword. Although it enables users to share ideas, build connections and exchange knowledge, it has become a non-regulated place where extremist ideologies can thrive. Organizations such as , and the (TTP) have discovered in them an effective tool to promote their violent agenda.Ģż

The platforms are enticing due to their anonymity, swiftness and magnitude of features, which enable terrorist groups to ignore conventional media regulations and propagate their message. These terrorist groups exploit the decentralized nature of social media sites, where content is posted in real time and crosses borders. Although platforms like X and Telegram offer freedom of speech, they have also become for hate speech and incitement to violence.Ģż

Terrorists use evasion tactics such as spelling variations, symbols and emojis to bypass the existing systems on social media platforms. Their messages are less likely to be flagged or removed quickly as they discover the tricks to dodge the existing algorithm-driven system. Such tactics make the existing moderation very challenging and increase the risk of extremism.

A quickly evolving threat

The global community has taken a long time to act against this growing menace. In one of the latest press conferences, Talal Chaudhry, the Pakistani Minister of State for Interior, an alarm regarding the misuse of social media by groups of terrorists. Chaudhry noted that it is not a problem of a single country, but a worldwide issue that requires a global solution. The Pakistani government has requested the international community to help ensure that the platforms do not become safe havens for either group that has been declared a terrorist by the UN.

An illustration of such risks about digital terrorism is the case of the TTP when it used social media to its Khandaq spring offensives live against the Pakistani military. The usefulness of these live broadcasts is twofold, as they amplify the psychological effects of violence and increase the recruitment of individuals who may be drawn to the groupā€™s cause. This change to digital warfare illustrates the evolving landscape of terrorism in the 21st century.

Social media is struggling to keep up with the complexity of digital attacks due to its current algorithms. Extremist organizations are coded language and on messaging applications, attempting to conceal their activities. In most instances, the material that is reported to be harmful lingers on the internet for hours or days before it is removed.

A global call to action

To stop this increasing menace, therefore, social media entities must prioritize security over user engagement. The topic should revolve around maximizing user contact while also maximizing the security of users and shielding against the dissemination of negative content. such as AI need to be recalibrated so they can be utilized properly to counter and identify the terrorists bypassing the existing AI patterns and tactics.

Governments also have to contribute more to the struggle against digital terrorism. The technological tools may be available in the private sector, but it is upon the governments to put in place appropriate laws that can regulate individuals and platforms sharing extremist content. These would consist of developing more transparent criteria for modifying content, as well as holding tech providers liable in the event of a lack of prevention against the abuse of their platforms. Governments should also invest more in cyber intelligence that monitors the activities of terrorist groups online and collaborates with tech companies.

The has urged international social media companies to collaborate on a global level to fight the abuse of social media by terrorists. This is not a problem specific to any one country or region, but rather a worldwide issue that must be addressed through the concerted efforts of various societal sectors.Ģż

On top of government intervention, the religious and civil society leaders play a significant role. Such leaders are in a position to counter the vilified accounts of the terrorists on which they base their violence. Religious leaders should condemn the misuse of religious documents by terrorist groups and offer alternative explanations that lead to the creation of peace and tolerance. Another contribution that civil society organizations can make is to foster digital literacy and critical thinking, and assist people, particularly the youth, in orienting themselves in the world of digital reality.

The idea of terrorism in the context of social media is not fictional and immediate. The multi-faceted approach that incorporates the bleeding-edge moderation of tech companies, increased international cooperation between governments and the active participation of religious and civil society leaders is required in tackling this growing menace. The international population should understand that it is a worldwide problem that should be dealt with decisively.

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Breaking from negotiations, Trumpā€™s tariff salvo was an attempt to address simmering tensions in the Indo-US relationship by leaning on Pakistan through an oil deal and tariff concessions. Was this sudden shift a product of Trumpā€™s ambitious economic agenda, or a mask for strategic signaling and transactional politics in this trade affair?

The latter seems likely, given Americaā€™s history of using deliberately exhaustive trade talks as a strategic tool to exert pressure on other nations, extract concessions or advance broader strategic objectives.

The deal

India was negotiating a Bilateral Trade Agreement () with the US, which began in February. By April, an had been drawn, reflecting US priorities of reducing ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s trade barriers and addressing its $45.7 billion goods trade deficit. From February to July, negotiations grew tense as India refused to liberalize or open up its agricultural and dairy sectors to US markets. India also pressed for , including lower US duties on steel (50%) and aluminum (25%), and preferential access for labor-intensive exports such as textiles, gems, jewelry and IT services. In return, India signaled willingness to provide the US greater market access.

However, apart from these two sticking points, India also US demands for reduced tariffs on auto components and acceptance of US Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, prioritizing its domestic industry and the campaign. Similarly, regarding non-tariff barriers, the US ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s Quality Control Orders (QCOs) and import regulations, which it viewed as barriers to market access for US goods. However, India defended them on the grounds of consumer and domestic industry safety.ĢżĢż

Trumpā€™s negotiation style

The negotiations thus offered potential gains for both sides, but the costs and contentions were high. It made them intense and rigorous, conditions ill-suited to Trumpā€™s negotiating style. The USā€™s negotiating approach under Trump, specific to trade and tariff issues, has been unconventional and rushed. 

A recent deal with Vietnam was concluded hastily under pressure. The US exploited Vietnamā€™s trade surplus and export dependence, using tariff threats and prolonged talks to secure concessions. Despite months of negotiation and goodwill gestures, such as liquified natural gas (LNG) deals, Vietnam ended up facing a and transshipment penalties ā€” far less favorable than its proposed 0% reciprocal tariff.Ģż

Similar tactics were seen with countries like Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and many more. These examples illustrate Washingtonā€™s tactics of achieving win-win trade deals, even with allies and partners, demonstrating how transactional diplomacy now colors their trade relations. 

However, a closer look suggests that economic or trade calculations do not solely drive these deals. The US is using these trade deals as geopolitical tools ā€” deliberately exhaustive negotiations to push countries toward aligning with its strategic objectives.

Economic attrition diplomacy

Economic attrition diplomacy involves leveraging prolonged trade negotiations to pressure a counterpart into aligning with geopolitical goals, often by creating economic uncertainty or exploiting asymmetric dependencies.

Vietnamā€™s case illustrates this. The US Hanoi to cut reliance on Chinese industrial goods and curb transshipments, directly serving its anti-China agenda. The negotiations were lengthy, with multiple rounds reflecting prolonged and exhaustive talks to force Vietnam to concur with the deal, leaving it little room to maneuver.

The cases of Indonesia and Japan are also noteworthy. The US pressured Indonesia to align its anti-China goals, primarily due to Indonesiaā€™s attempt to diversify trade with members, and a investment deal with China made in November 2024.Ģż

In the case of Japan, Trump their bilateral relations by escalating dramatically: threatening 25% tariffs, then actually imposing them on Japanese goods, including automobiles, effective August 1. This was an unprecedented move against a US ally. Japan, burdened by its trade surplus and alliance status, yielded partial concessions under tariff threats and geopolitical pressure.Ģż

South Korea, too, faced a tariff of 25% in July, and ended up with a 15% ā€œreciprocalā€ tariff, effective August 1. The US sought geopolitical advantages from Korea, pressuring it to increase dependency on US purchases, specifically F-35 fighter jets. Although no deal was finalized, South Korea greater market access for US goods, as well as defense commitments to avoid higher tariffs.Ģż

These tactics reveal that US trade negotiations often serve a larger purpose: pushing countries to align with its under the guise of economic bargaining. These echo Washingtonā€™s action from five years ago, when it used diplomacy against China. The US attempted to curb Chinaā€™s technological rise by targeting firms like Huawei, pressured China on issues like intellectual property theft and signaled strength to its own allies.Ģż

During trade negotiations, the US repeatedly escalated tariffs and introduced complex demands, including structural changes to Chinaā€™s economy, prolonging the uncertainty and pressuring China. Subsequently, China yielded partial concessions, providing the US with some limited success.

Aggressive attrition driven by frustration

Unlike other countries that faced standard coercion from the US with only tariff threats, India was hit with multiple salvos ā€” tariffs, penalties and an embrace of Pakistan. The reasons were clear: the Russia factor, trade with Iran and ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s non-compromising posture during trade negotiations.

This aggressive attrition behavior is motivated by geopolitical frustration, something the US is familiar with acting on. In the 1930s and 1940s, US economic attrition against Japan, driven by frustration, culminated in the of 1941, contributing to the escalation of World War II. Negotiations were prolonged. The US demanded Japan withdraw from China and Indo-China, while Japan sought recognition of its territorial gains, creating a deadlock with no progress.Ģż

A similar situation is unfolding between the US and India today, where the former harbours geopolitical suspicion over ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s relationships with Iran and Russia, alongside deadlocked trade demands. These factors have likely fueled frustration and driven the US to send a strong strategic message by escalating risks and attrition, perhaps setting an example on the global stage.

Unconventional transactionalism: India must reassess its strategy

India must read the negotiating table more carefully and patiently, adopting measured and mixed negotiating styles instead of a confrontational approach, which at times frustrates the US. 

As India looks toward the prospect of a mini-deal by September-October, it should aim for strategic prolongation ā€” progress with limited concessions ā€” rather than dragging talks with no real progress. This will create more room for negotiations and reduce US frustration to some extent. 

India must also leverage its geopolitical value and diversify its trade relationships with Europe and other countries. This will strengthen ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s bargaining position, soften US demands and deter extreme measures. 

A similar approach saved South Korea from higher tariffs despite having no deal with the US, as South Korea adopted strategic prolongation, used measured negotiation tactics offering room via concessions and resisted hasty or pressured deals. 

India must remember that Trump is a master at playing unconventional transactional cards, where deals are more important than relations. India should demonstrate that an agreement is in progress and that there is something on the table, rather than leaving it empty.

[ first published a version of this piece.]

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Following this, the Monitoring Team of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Sanctions Committee explicitly TRF in its reports for the first time ā€” a move that India has been advocating for since the 2019 Pulwama Attacks. A member state in regards to the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack that it ā€œCould not have happened without Lashkar-e-Taiba support, and thereā€™s a relationship between LeT and TRF.ā€ A second member state noted that ā€œthe attack was carried out by TRF, which was synonymous with LeT.”

While these are major diplomatic wins for India and help corner Pakistan when it comes to denying its terror-sponsoring activities, it will essentially be business as usual for the latter. 

For India, a real win lies in on-ground efforts. As the pattern indicates, a terror designation does little to deter Pakistan-funded terror in Jammu and Kashmir (a northern state in India that shares a contested border with Pakistan). But intelligence-based counterterror operations have proven successful in eliminating groups like the Indian Mujahideen (IM) in the past.

Terror designations offer little immediate securityĀ 

US designations of Pakistan-backed terrorist outfits have long been viewed as a diplomatic tool India can leverage in international forums, particularly in influencing outcomes such as listings on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is a global money laundering and terror financing watchdog. 

However, as takes center stage in the global order, these diplomatic maneuvers now hold little deterrent value. The case of the IM ā€” a group formed through the reorganization of the declining Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) cadre ā€” illustrates this trend.

The group was a nightmare for the Indian security landscape as IMā€™s operational behaviour was of maximum terror with minimum identification. The IMā€™s designation as an FTO by the US came in September 2011, two months after the July 13 Mumbai serial . Yet this did little to deter IM from striking Indian cities: three cases of limited intensity bombing were conducted by IM in eight months in 2013, from the Hyderabad to the Patna , resulting in and around 190 injuries.

The LeT was designated as an FTO in December 2001, but carried out the Akshardham Temple within nine months, followed by the 2003 Mumbai ā€” demonstrating continued operational capacity.Ģż

The US itself has faced serious threats and attacks after terror designations. Take the case of Al-Qaeda, which was designated an FTO by the US in October 1999, but less than two years later carried out one of the deadliest terror attacks of the decade: the September 11 (9/11). It was followed by continued strikes, including the USS Cole in 2000 and the Riyadh compound in 2003. Similarly, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the precursor to the Islamic State (ISIS), executed a series of hotel targeting Westerners in 2005, shortly after its own FTO designation in 2004.

In the long term, it can be seen that IM faced a strong impact from sanctions. However, despite being a weaker group, they still managed to survive (though in degraded strength) till 2017. With this in mind, it is easy to see how the impact of FTO designations on stronger and well-resourced terror groups like the LeT or Jaish-e-Mohammed remains limited.

Designations disrupt but donā€™t dismantle

These examples point to a fundamental limitation: the FTO mechanism aims primarily at disruption, not dismantlement. It is most effective against groups with limited resilience and financial dependency on formal networks, and can thus collapse due to disruption. Robust terror organizations tend to endure due to three key structural advantages:

1. Safe Havens and Porous Borders: Territories with weak governance, such as parts of Africa or , provide physical bases for training, recruitment, and planning. Designation efforts have little effect without the of local and national host governments. After 9/11, Al-Qaeda shifted its base to Pakistanā€™s tribal areas to remain off the radar of US military operations. LeT similarly went underground with the of Pakistanā€™s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) after the November 26, 2008, (26/11) in India.
2. Decentralized Operations: Decentralized and tight, cell-based networks help terror groups build multiple offshoots and use them as front organizations. This allows these groups to operate even if their leadership gets targeted by arrests or FTO sanctions. The LeT used IM and TRF, while Al-Qaeda used its regional branches such as AQI and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to bypass sanctions.Ģż
3. Alternative Funding Sources: Some non-traditional funding sources are immune to the USā€™s banking sanctions, allowing terror organizations to procure arms and explosives and send them to safe havens for training through various cross-border networks. The , charitable fronts, and non-traditional funding from sympathetic donors allow groups to circumvent asset freezes and FTO-sanctioned disruptions. After their designations, Al-Qaeda used hawala networks and Gulf-based donors to finance 9/11, while LeT sustained itself through the ā€œcharitable activitiesā€ of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), a front with ISI backing, leading to 26/11.

The benefits of network-centric counterterror strategiesĀ 

Where designations fell short, coordinated multi-dimensional and intelligence-led strategies focused on dismantlement have yielded better results. This involves a : combining targeted strikes with intelligence-led efforts to degrade networks.

Targeted strikes help in eliminating leadership, and strong intelligence works to identify financial pathways, front organizations, and decentralized cells. This has driven major successes in ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s counterterror landscape, starting with the collapse of the IM. 

Beginning in 2012, Indian intelligence worked in close with the US and other countries like Nepal, highlighting a multi-specter counter strategy. They conducted sustained operations that dismantled IMā€™s operational and financial networks.Ģż

in the Gulf were identified and sanctioned under the FTO, leading to a collapse of its funding streams. Some serious intelligence work led to the of key operatives, including IMā€™s leader Yasin Bhatkal, as well as Abdul Wahid Siddibapa, who was associated with their financial funding. With the of other key operatives in 2014, IMā€™s Azamgarh and Pune modules were also brought down. By 2017, the Indian Mujahideen had been effectively dismantled.

TRF and IM: Learning the right lessons

The key operational similarity between LeTā€™s IM and LeTā€™s TRF is the use of maximum terror with minimal identification, with a slight difference in operational advancement and method of engagement, which is direct but sophisticated in °Õøé¹óā€™s case. The IM overtly and aggressively executes attacks through bombings, but TRF relies more on covert work and sets a limited target with high symbolic value and psychological impact. 

The approach is also quite the same ā€” they young muslims by exploiting local grievances, communal coloring and political approaches. TRF has intensified this through via limited tech capabilities, focusing on Kashmiri youth.Ģż

Despite being a smaller organization, TRF’s efforts to develop and modernize its operational behavior make it harder to influence through designations and sanctions. Moreover, an additional difficulty with TRF lies in developing a strong and grounded counterterror strategy ā€” not at the operational level, but at the tactical level. Several key factors explain the limited progress so far:

First, network-centric operations have not been able to penetrate °Õøé¹óā€™s tight, decentralized cells, likely due to in human intelligence and limited visibility into ground-level dynamics in Jammu and Kashmir.

Second, the groupā€™s operational pattern relies heavily on and recently radicalized individuals who are not on law enforcement watchlists. This makes early detection and preemption difficult.

Third, TRF has demonstrated quick tactical adaptability. The satellite data, secure encrypted communication, coordinated hit-and-run strikes to exhaust and distract government forces, as well as the use of body-cameras and high-end weaponry, show that the outfit focuses not only on sustenance but on advancement ā€” and is actively evolving its methods.

These challenges, while significant, are not insurmountable. Addressing them requires a shift toward more advanced network-centric operations ā€” anchored in the integration of intelligence across domains. This means building intelligence fusion models that combine human intelligence (HUMINT) and open-source intelligence (OSINT) with technical assets such as drone surveillance, cyber forensics, and satellite imaging. Such capabilities must be embedded within a broader multi-spectrum counterterrorism strategy: one that combines targeted operations, search-and-destroy missions, and financial disruption. 

°Õøé¹óā€™s ā€” particularly its financing through hawala networks and front organizations ā€” can still be targeted in the same manner as the IM was in the early 2010s, ideally in coordination with international partners such as the US.

The dismantling of TRF will depend not on designations or sanctions, but on sustained operational and intelligence recalibration. That will require clear strategic direction ā€” and political will ā€” from the highest echelon in New Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir.

Perhaps the recent , which resulted in the elimination of the Pahalgam terror mastermind, is one indication of a gradual movement towards a multi-specter counterterror strategy.

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In Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan, the war disrupted cross-border trade, triggered fuel shortages and intensified humanitarian and security concerns. These cascading effects prompted Pakistanā€™s National Security Committee (NSC) to convene on to assess not only the strategic and defense implications but also the broader humanitarian fallout threatening socio-economic stability and communal harmony in its most vulnerable western frontier.

Balochistan, Pakistanā€™s largest and geostrategically most sensitive province, shares a long and porous (562 miles) with Iran, making it acutely susceptible to the ripple effects of regional conflicts. The recent Israel-Iran war not only destabilized the Middle East but also cast a long shadow over Balochistan, intensifying existing sectarian sensitivities within Pakistanā€™s diverse social fabric.Ģż

As a predominantly Sunni nation with a significant Shiite minority (approximately of the population), Pakistan found itself grappling with the dangerous spillover of sectarian propaganda, targeted violence and renewed proxy activity. The deep-rooted religious and cultural bonds between Shiite communities on both sides of the border amplified these tensions, particularly as someone deliberately wove religious symbolism and sectarian rhetoric into the war narrative.Ģż

Security analysts warned that such polarization could provide fertile ground for militant outfits like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), potentially reviving separatist propaganda under the banner of a ā€œGreater Balochistan.ā€ In this highly combustible environment, the intersection of external conflict and internal fault lines poses a serious threat to Pakistanā€™s national cohesion and border stability.

Baloch activism in response to provocation

Throughout the military confrontation between Iran and Israel, reports have emerged of various activities conducted by Baloch militants in Iranā€™s Sistan-Balochistan province. During a at the University of Sistan and Baluchestan, students responded with backlash after Daneil Asadullah, a member of the universityā€™s Islamic Association and an agent of the security forces, made insulting statements against the Baloch people.Ģż

Maulvi Tayyeb Ismail Zahi, son of Maulvi Abdul Hamid, in response to the messages and requests of the people following the conflict between Israel and the Islamic Republic, a story on his Instagram page, emphasizing the dignity, unity and readiness of the Baloch people and called for strategic patience and prayers for the good and glory of the homeland. The anti-regime Baloch activist is campaigning to bring joy to the Baloch people of Giyeh (Nikshahr) and to convey their message to the rest of the world.

Following concerns about the expansion of Baloch activities, the checkpoint, deployment of Special Forces and increased have been implemented at the entrance to Zahedan. This city has been subject to increased security control due to the sensitive location of the main centres of the IRGC, intelligence and command of the forces. In continuation of the revolutionary movements, the Sarbaz-Mehristan axis was closed by Baloch militants.Ģż

The Baloch people are blocking the route of military forces and taking control of traffic in various areas. The Baloch Revolutionary Youth closed the Pahra Niskhahr, Chabahar road to control the entry and exit of military forces. According to reports, , Khameneiā€™s representative in Fahraj, was eliminated by the Baloch people while fleeing. Reports indicate that Baloch Insurgent groups are efforts to eliminate government officials in Balochistan. This was the fourth regional attack by the Baloch on government forces after the start of the Israel-Iran war.

Implications for Pakistanā€™s border security

The recent conflict between Israel and Iran in the Middle East has had profound implications for Pakistanā€™s border security, particularly in the restive province of Balochistan. Although a ceasefire has temporarily halted hostilities following US-led mediation, the escalation of tensions has renewed concerns over the security of the , a critical maritime chokepoint connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Had Iran proceeded with its threat to close the Strait, it would have severely disrupted global trade and oil supplies to the Western world, while also impacting Pakistan. Such a closure would have driven up global oil prices and exacerbated Pakistanā€™s inflation, currency depreciation and energy shortages.Ģż

The conflict particularly intensified in Balochistan, where a significant portion of the population relies on the informal trade of oil and other commodities. This situation highlights the regionā€™s vulnerability to regional instability.

The recent ceasefire between Israel and Iran offers a critical opportunity to halt the immediate conflict and prevent further destabilization across West Asia, South Asia and beyond. While this pause in hostilities provides much-needed relief, the underlying tensions and risks of escalation remain significant. It is imperative that global powers, including the US, Russia, China, Pakistan, the OIC and the EU, build on this moment of calm to pursue sustained diplomatic engagement and collective action. 

Establishing a neutral UN-led peace forum to facilitate dialogue, addressing root causes such as economic sanctions, religious extremism, proxy warfare and curbing sectarian rhetoric are essential to fostering lasting stability. Maintaining the ceasefire and providing humanitarian support will be crucial to preventing a return to conflict and safeguarding regional and global security. Failure to capitalize on this fragile peace could lead to renewed violence with far-reaching consequences for global stability.

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Missed opportunities on the global stage

Modi has failed to establish meaningful and assertive interactions with external powers such as the US, UK, France, Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Turkey. He also struggles to address issues with troublesome neighbors like Pakistan and China, who have deliberately intruded into ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s territory. Although he traveled around the globe to promote ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s foreign policy and diplomacy, he to convince foreign powers, including America, that India has been a victim of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism for decades and not the other way around.Ģż

Perhaps due to this, Pakistan ā€” despite being an epicentre of Global Terrorism, including cross-border terror against India for the past many decades ā€” has been adorned as Vice Chair of the Anti-terrorism Committee by the UN Security Council (UNSC), which is an unparalleled paradox.

Additionally, he has not secured a for India in the UN Security Council or membership in other prominent forums like (a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (), the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty () and (an intergovernmental political forum consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US).Ģż

The recent security crisis and the Indiaā€“Pakistan war have exposed flaws in ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s national security and foreign policy. The terror attack in on April 22, 2025, killed 26 innocent tourists in Baisaran valley of India-administered Jammu and Kashmir, revealing serious lapses in security management and civilian safety. In retaliation, India launched on May 7, 2025, which demonstrated the capabilities of its forces across all three wings. However, the announced on May 10 showed that Modi succumbed to US President Donald Trumpā€™s pressure. The ceasefire benefited Pakistan because India had gained the upper hand in the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict. This event significantly India’s diplomatic landscape.Ģż

In 2014, Modi his tenure with enthusiasm to transform India into a haven for foreign investments by streamlining rules and regulations to make investment easier. However, bureaucratic disputes and a rising middleman culture discouraged his well-planned efforts. An excessive concentration of power within the Prime Ministerā€™s office and among a small group of Indian Administrative Service () officers led to the formation of a confidant coterie. His reliance on this small circle marginalized democratic governance, frustrating senior ministers, party leaders and top officers.ĢżĢż

Governance crisis and administrative decay

The Bharatiya Janata Party () government at the center, along with its own party governments in many states, has failed to control rising prices, poverty, unemployment, law and order, ever-mounting , undue interference by party workers and officials in daily administration and declining morals and increasing promiscuity among party cadres. This indicates a weakening of the top leaders’ control over party members and office bearers.Ģż

The high-profile of a sitting BJP Member of Parliament (MP), Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh, accused of molestation and sexual offenses under the POCSO Act by women wrestlers Vinesh Phogat, Sakshi Singh and other minor girls, has garnered attention. Unfortunately, the First Information Reports (FIRs) lodged against this MP have been . Similar cases against BJP leader (who has now obtained bail) and , ā€œBum-Bum,ā€ a BJP district president, are particularly concerning.Ģż

Crimes committed by party workers have severely tarnished the party’s reputation, which claims to establish a new culture in the country. Modi has also for the BJP through Electoral Bonds and granted extraordinary favors to billionaires such as Gautam Adani, Mukesh Ambani and others.Ģż

The central government has waived large loans for wealthy businessman, Gautam Adani, while thousands of have gone bankrupt and suffered due to natural calamities. ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s wealthiest industrialist, Mukesh Ambani, enjoys Z+ security by the Indian state along with other VIPs and politicians. Taxes paid by ordinary citizens fund the cost of this security. Ironically, while elites enjoy top security, common citizens often fall victim to crime due to a shortage of police personnel and ineffective law enforcement.

Furthermore, the BJP is the powers of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Election Commission, Enforcement Directorate and Income Tax Department to intimidate politicians with non-BJP affiliations who are facing various criminal charges. This can be seen in like Ajit Pawar, Chhagan Bhujbal, Ashok Chauhan, Hemanta Biswas Sharma, Subhendu Adhikari, Prafulla Patel and many others. These politicians are pressured to join the BJP and support its interests, leveraging these agencies. An ironic aspect is that once these tarnished politicians join the BJP, the cases against them are often withdrawn.

Another serious concern is the declining health of Indian democracy. In a parliamentary system, opposition parties and their leaders play a crucial role. However, the of opposition members from the House to prevent meaningful debates and discussions on national issues, merely to serve the ruling partyā€™s interests, represents a negation or violation of democracy.

Another troubling development that has caused an internal crisis is the ethnic riots in that started last year. Yet, the Prime Minister has not visited the region to ease the suffering of the affected community or to restore the declining confidence in the police and security forces.Ģż

The Indian Army’s (a recruitment model that allows youth to serve in the armed forces for four years) has sparked controversy. Politicians, who do not retire from active politics even in their seventies, face ridicule as young men in their twenties prepare to leave the army after just four years of service. People express about the scheme’s long-term implications, especially given the rising cross-border terrorism from Pakistan and China’s consistent intrusions into Indian territory. Former Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat reportedly the scheme’s merits, and his mysterious death in a helicopter crash highlights his cautious judgment today.

The overemphasis on the Hindu-Muslim also threatens national unity and social cohesion. The use of slogans like ā€œJai Shri Ramā€ (ā€œHail Lord Ramaā€) to advance the BJPā€™s political goals has caused alienation among Muslims and other minorities, actions that conflict with the ideals of Lord Ram and ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s diverse culture. The government must stop communal segregation and actively include Muslim and other minority communities in ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s growth and progress.

±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s economy remains , despite grand claims to become the worldā€™s fourth-largest economy and its ambition to reach third place. In 2025, the national debt has sharply increased to approximately $248 billion due to ill-planned spending, misappropriation of funds and large-scale embezzlement. These issues have fostered a parallel black economy that threatens the countryā€™s economic stability.

media agencies are another worrisome aspect of Mr. Modiā€™s politics. They undermine the principle of democracy by violating the idea that the media serves as the fourth pillar of democracy. News channels based in Noida are mostly labeled as ā€œā€, and many consider them biased and sold. The print media in the country does not dare to challenge or hold the government accountable, drawing parallels to the of 1975.ĢżĢżĀ 

A call for renewal and accountability

The popularity and support for the BJP have declined, with only minor exceptions in some states. As its foremost leader, Modi cannot escape the responsibility that comes with his prominent role in the party and the country. His advancing age, declining mental focus, the rise of vested interests and the absence of a strong opposition have created obstacles in governance. Additionally, giving undue favors to elites and corrupt elements within the BJP has prevented the leadership from ensuring independent, fair and effective decision-making. These issues have shattered the hopes, aspirations and expectations of the people not only within India but also across the international community. The grand vision of making India the (ā€œworld guruā€ or ā€œteacher of the worldā€) of ancient times again has proven ineffective, as seen after Operation Sindoor, when none of its allies supported it.

As Modi approaches the end of his likely last term, he must carefully assess his personal shortcomings and reemphasize the BJPā€™s original promises to build a new culture of honest, fair, corruption-free, responsive and responsible democratic governance ā€” completely different from the previous Congress governments in India. 

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Current Politics of Narendra Modi Exposes the Limits of His Leadership appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The speakers introduce the three primary actors: the US, Israel and Iran, framing the discussion around the American attack that occurred in the weeks preceding the conversation.

Israelā€™s perspective and objectives

The dominant political faction in Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is the right-wing, on whom Netanyahuā€™s political survival depends. Netanyahu is running a coalition government that includes hardline far-right figures like Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir. Netanyahu is keen to prolong his rule because he fears trial in court on corruption charges. Smotrich and Ben-Gvir have extreme objectives, including seizure and colonization of the West Bank and Gaza. This implies the expulsion of Palestinians and the destruction of the Iranian regime.

Israel assesses that Iran poses an existential threat because Tehran is developing a nuclear weapon. Israeli leaders deem this as ā€œabsolutely unacceptable,ā€ because this would put ā€œIsraelā€™s and all Jewsā€™ survival ā€¦ on the brink of extermination.ā€ Therefore, Israelis consider regime change in Iran to be fundamental and necessary to alter the current strategic equation. This task is believed to be beyond Israelā€™s sole capabilities ā€” it requires US involvement.

Atul and Glenn highlight recent Israeli actions, including the decapitation of top Iranian leadership. This was a ā€œspectacular special ops Mossadā€ operation and ā€œone of the great intelligence operations in history.ā€ Israelis also hit a number of Iranian nuclear and missile sites and claimed control of Iranian airspace. Despite Iranian counterclaims, the Israelis experienced far fewer casualties (an order of magnitude less) than they had anticipated, which led to a less pessimistic reality than their initial fears. This suggested Iranian counter strike capabilities were less powerful than feared. However, the economic dislocation for Israel has been immense.

There is a strong belief among Israelis that the Iranian regime is a ā€œpaper tiger,ā€ which is utterly corrupt and infiltrated at all levels. Atul and Glenn cite the killing of the Palestinian leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in a VIP guest house ā€” equivalent to killing someone in Blair House that is next to the American White House ā€” as evidence of the deep Israeli infiltration into the Iranian regime. This suggests that this regime, despite its outward appearance, is not as cohesive, effective or united as it was after the 1979 revolution.

For Netanyahu, the timing of the attack on Iran was crucial: ā€œIf not now, when? If not us, who?ā€ He views himself as the ā€œsavior of Israelā€ and the ā€œguarantor of Israeli security.ā€ With Hamas weakened, Hezbollahā€™s top leadership dead and the Assad regime in Syria gone, Israelis perceive a significant opportunity to strike Iran. Netanyahu believes the Iranian proxies present minimal danger, giving Israel a historic opportunity to attack Iran.

The ultimate goal for Israelis is regime change in Iran. A new liberal, tolerant and friendly regime could potentially restore the pre-1979 amicable relationship between the two nations. Atul and Glenn believe that the 1979 revolution, which brought in a ā€œcrazy Islamic regimeā€ based on Shia ideology, fanaticism and opposition to the US, was an unnecessary development. The US was manipulated by the UK in 1953 to conduct a coup against a democratically elected Mohammad Mossadegh. In 2025, some even believe the best course of action would be to eliminate Ayatollah Khamenei. Israelis think they can exert pressure and squeeze Iran due to its declining birth rate and persecution of Sunni minorities.

Atul and Glenn also explain the Begin Doctrine, which underpins Israeli national security. Per this doctrine, ā€œnone of Israelā€™s enemies or potential enemies should have or be able to have nuclear weapons.ā€ Israel followed this doctrine to destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007. Note that Netanyahu attempted to apply this doctrine against Iran twice between 2009 and 2013. 

Netanyahu champions a hardline national security strategy but not all of Israel supports it. Many Israeli politicians, as well as intelligence and special forces personnel, oppose Netanyahu and his right-wing allies. The former head of Shin Bet left after much controversy. Historically, a strong majority of the Israeli population has favored a two-state solution and a negotiated solution with Iran, but this group is not currently in power. Many Israeli politicians and security professionals view the far-rightā€™s desire for regime change as ā€œa bridge too far.ā€

The US perspective

The US intelligence communityā€™s assessment, as presented by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, differs from Israelā€™s dominant view: Iran is not manufacturing or possessing a nuclear weapon, and Ayatollah Khamenei has not reauthorized its manufacture. However, Iran has been ā€œsecretly developing weapons-grade fissile material,ā€ which has only one use: a nuclear weapon. Iran is estimated to be anywhere from ā€œdays,ā€ as Israelis assert, to ā€œa good number of monthsā€ away from manufacturing one.

US President Donald Trump faced a dilemma: He had vowed not to engage in ā€œforever warsā€ (precluding an invasion) but also stated he would not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. He ultimately aligned with the right-wing Israeli assessment that Iranā€™s capability to manufacture a weapon constituted an existential threat, irrespective of whether they currently possessed one. Faced with an ā€œimpossible dilemma,ā€ Trump chose a minimalist attack on Iranā€™s nuclear capabilities and declared victory. He came to realize that regime change in Iran was not feasible and attempting it would make the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq ā€œlook like a birthday party.ā€

Iranā€™s perspective and resilience

The Iranian regimeā€™s top priority is survival. Many analysts view them as ā€œnot crazies at allā€ but ā€œvery subtle and astute,ā€ repeatedly signaling a desire for a resolution short of open war. In response to the US attack, Iran informed the Qatari government (and thus the US) in advance of their planned response, which involved a one-off missile attack on Americaā€™s largest base in the Middle East ā€” symbolizing a strike at the heart of the US presence ā€” before stopping.

Despite Israeli beliefs, Iran is more cohesive than its enemies imagine. It has demonstrated an ability to survive chaos, notably during the eight-year war with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. Note that Western powers and the CIA backed Saddam. After the attacks, Iran could experience zeereh parcham ā€” ā€œrally to the flagā€ ā€” and nationalism could make regime change far more difficult.

Atul and Glenn emphasize that Iran retains the potential to manufacture a nuclear weapon because ā€œknowledgeā€ cannot be killed, even if all involved scientists were assassinated. Iran is a ā€œsophisticated society with millions of brilliant people who can study science.ā€ They also note that Iranā€™s nuclear program was initiated by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, not the mullahs. The Iranian moral police have reportedly ā€œdialed downā€ because of protests. There is little likelihood of an imminent revolution. Significantly, 20% of Iranā€™s population still lives in villages and largely supports the current regime. The Iranians want ā€œnuclear insurance.ā€ They note that poorer neighboring Pakistan has managed to avoid foreign interference for all its faults because it has the nuclear weapon.

Note that the Iranian counter strike was not ā€œpainless for Israel.ā€ It hit business districts and apartment buildings, causing immense economic strain.

Broader implications and strategic changes

Atul and Glenn highlight profound strategic and structural changes to the power dynamics in the Middle East since October 7, 2023. Israelā€™s ā€œbrilliant decimationā€ (more than decimation because that means a tenth) of Hezbollah and Hamas has forced them into a defensive posture. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen as well. Israel has achieved lasting structural change.

However, the deeper issue of Iranā€™s nuclear potential remains unaddressed. While the Iranian regime may be weakened and subject to collapse in the long run (ā€œstable until the day itā€™s not,ā€ ā€œthings last until they donā€™tā€), it has survived to fight another day. If the mullahs fall, they are unlikely to be replaced by women protestors in the streets. Rather, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) might replace the mullahs unless the women can convince a section of the military to side with them.

The British, drawing on a longer historical memory, express skepticism about swift regime change. They recognize Iranā€™s ā€œimperial memoryā€ and argue the nation is more cohesive than its enemies imagine. The Brits also point out that killing top military officers, while providing short-term tactical advantage, might lead to their replacement by younger, more competent and potentially more aggressive higher-testosterone individuals (ā€œproper nuttersā€ who are happy to have bullets with their names on them).

The most recent conflict has broader implications:

• The US is now back in the Middle East, leading to lower attention and lesser support for Ukraine.
• China will have a freer hand in the Far East. It can now increase pressure on Taiwanā€™s sovereignty through more incursions into international and Taiwanese waters. The Chinese will shift the status quo of what is acceptable before military intervention.
• Pakistan will feel less constrained and controlled by the US, potentially leading to increased assertiveness against India and ā€œfireworks by September.ā€

The current situation is a ā€œfragile truce,ā€ with both Israelis and Iranians believing there is ā€œunfinished business.ā€ While there may be no immediate large-scale flare-up, Iran will ā€œlick its woundsā€ and strive to obtain nuclear weapons for ā€œinsuranceā€ against foreign intervention and regime change.

The ā€œmost likely happy solutionā€ from a Western perspective is proposed as an ā€œMohammed bin Salman (MBS) evolution,ā€ where the Iranian regime evolves without collapsing. The current doctrinaire mullahs who are in their 70s and 80s are replaced by more educated and internationalist successors.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FOĀ° Exclusive: What Will the Middle East Look Like if Iranā€™s Islamic Regime Falls? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

In 2022, it carried out a around Karachi University, killing three Chinese teachers. That marked a shift toward more targeted and sustained operations. The group has since launched increasingly complex attacks against Pakistanā€™s security establishment.Ģż

On March 11, 2025, BLA militants the Jaffar Express, a passenger train travelling from Quetta to Peshawar with nearly 400 passengers. They sabotaged the tracks and detonated explosives as the train passed through a tunnel in a mountainous region. After stopping the train, they opened fire, boarded the train, and took hostages. They executed several Pakistani security personnel present on the train.ĢżĢż

Operation Green Bolan: a tactical success but strategic failure

In response, Pakistan launched Operation . A unit of the Special Services Group (SSG), led by a major from the Zarrar Company, used drone surveillance to conduct a 36-hour rescue operation.Ģż

that the military killed 33 BLA militants and that 26 hostages died. Among the dead were 18 security personnel, three railway staff, and five civilians. , however, reported that nearly 100 coffins were seen at the Peshawar station, raising doubts about the official death toll.

Pakistanā€™s government Green Bolan as a success. However, it failed to eliminate the BLA. The hijacking demonstrated the BLAā€™s continued operational strength and exposed the limits of Pakistanā€™s counterinsurgency strategy.Ģż

Pakistanā€™s ongoing counter-terror and insurgency operation, (ā€˜Resolve for Stabilityā€™), has failed to produce results.Ģż

Previous operations such as Operation Sher Dil (ā€˜Lion Heartā€™) and Zalzala (ā€˜E²¹°ł³Ł³ó±ē³Ü²¹°ģ±šā€™) in South Waziristan have similarly failed to dismantle terrorist networks. After Operation Sher Dil ended in February 2009, major attacks followed, including the March 2009 and the May 2009 .ĢżĢż

Groups like the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State ā€“ Khorasan Province (ISIS-KP or IS-K) could take cues from the BLAā€™s partially successful hijacking to stage their own high-profile operations. Pakistanā€™s security agencies could also face multi-prong or coordinated attacks from multiple terror groups ā€” much like the we are currently witnessing in Syria.

The March 2025 hijacking also echoed the US failure at the . From November 30 to December 17, 2001, the US military bombed Taliban positions in Afghanistanā€™s cave-terrained Tora Bora region to capture al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Although the operation destroyed Taliban strongholds, bin Laden escaped. That escape fueled the Taliban insurgency and prolonged the war in Afghanistan.

Likewise, Pakistan celebrated short-term results without recognizing its strategic failure to defeat the BLA. The group continues to execute strikes with increasing coordination and precision.

The BLAā€™s rising strike rate

In August 2024, the BLA launched Operation Ā  (ā€˜Dark Stormā€™), a series of coordinated attacks in which it claimed to have killed 130 military personnel.Ģż

BLA attacks in 2024 reached the fatality count in Balochistan since 2015. An of the attacks between January 29 and August 14 demonstrates a growing planning capability and in-depth and precise striking capabilities.

Overall, the BLA has significantly gained operational momentum, with dynamic ramifications for Pakistanā€™s security matrix in the coming months and years. 

The Baloch revivalĀ 

Pakistanā€™s internal security remains unstable.

The BLAā€™s cooperation with Islamist groups allows it to shift toward organized, large-scale attacks, and fuel the most critical part: Baloch nationalism. 

The BLA has learnt after brutal responses from the Pakistan government previously left them staggered. Unlike before, the groupā€™s leadership no longer depends on the landed tribal elite ā€” or as they are called. Instead, the BLA has gained support from women and the working-class Baloch. This strengthens their nationalism and enlarges the capacity of their struggle.Ģż

Baloch nationalism has also grown stronger through political mobilization.

Human rights activist Dr Mahrang Baloch leads the (BYC) ā€” a non-violent organization formed in response to alleged state violence in the region. After a recent rousing and rally in Gwadar, many local Balochi people have been mobilised. According to , if security forces had not forced many to turn away, the she would have drawn a crowd of 200,000. It is first time unity and mobilisation has been seen at such a scale among the Balochis.

Speaking to The Guardian, Mahrang Baloch said, ā€œWe started mass mobilisation in schools as well as going door-to-door to provide the youth ā€¦ with political education. From an organised armed struggle to an organised political upsurge, the revival of Baloch nationalism shows promising signs of strong struggle.ā€

There has always been a static argument in the spectrum by Pakistanā€™s security establishment; that is, Pakistan has a strong capability of suppression, and like years back, they can still crush the BLA force. 

However, this resolve seems hollow in the face of the upward momentum of Baloch nationalism. 

The implications of the resurgence

Meanwhile, Pakistan faces other attacks, including at the Darul Uloom Haqqania seminary in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.Ģż

The implications of this insurgency are severe.

First, it harms Pakistanā€™s global diplomatic standing and counter-terror credentials. Second, it threatens the Chinaā€“Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and strains relations with China. Third, it could lead to a broader crackdown on political dissent, especially after Pakistanā€™s Army Chief, Asim Munir, mentioned the threat of . Fourth, it increases the risk of prolonged conflict with armed terror groups. Fifth, the US may renew counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan. In 2024, the for Pakistan, citing cooperation in the tracking and handover of ISIS terrorists.Ģż

Notably, the US State Department also condemned BLA attacks, showing their solidarity and commitment to Pakistan’s counter-terror efforts. On this, Vikram Sood, former chief of the Indian intelligence agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), noted that the US had never made such statements on ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s behalf. On his X account, Sood , ā€œThe U.S. never made such statements for India when Pak-based Pak-inspired terrorists were at work in Kashmir.ā€Ā 

However, in previous cooperations with the US, Pakistan has displayed a half-hearted and selective approach. Parvez Musharraf, former General and President of Pakistan, strategically manoeuvred his ties with the Taliban whilst cooperating with the US on the surface. He covertly facilitated the of key personnel and Taliban operatives into the country’s tribal areas, and cleverly avoided US retaliation.Ģż

As the risk of heightened insurgency and the near collapse of counter-terror plans strains Pakistan, it must seriously re-examine its strategy and recognize the political and social dimensions of the Baloch uprising.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorialĀ policy.

The post Pakistanā€™s Counter-Terror Ambitions Fail as Baloch Militants Hijack Train appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The Great GameĀ 

In the past few years, especially after the Bangladesh crisis, ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s traditional sphere of influence was under tension as ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s eastern and western frontiers became unstable in the westā€” the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and east-Bangladesh witnessed a dramatic . The eastern frontier after the Dhaka episode became more tense as India was already negotiating a tense situation in Myanmar after a coup in 2021, keeping its northeast borders secure from and arms cartels, which had surged ever since the Manipur crises began in 2023. Measured diplomatic and watching from the fence approaches were a kind of mood-observing behaviours, which were no more effective given dynamically evolving strategic security where, at one end, Pakistan is pressing hard to develop strategic depth, especially after the Afghanistan debacle and Bangladesh crises. On the other hand, China used show-off tactics, and the clandestine drug-arm cartel was attempting to weaken the northeastern region, especially the Indo-Myanmar border. If we pay closer attention to recent regional developments in and around South Asia, undercurrents challenging Delhiā€™s Sphere of Influence are quietly building up.Ģż

Asim Malik, Pakistanā€™s Intelligence Chief, visited after decades, indicating that Pakistan is opening a sense of strategic depth against India after its Afghanistan strategy has backfired. If nurtured well, Pakistan can develop an interesting opportunity. First, sustainable strategic strategies against India by staging terror proxy groups this is a strategy that has been in an eroding position for a few years. Second, it sets the stage for Pakistan-China-Bangladesh strategic and economic cooperation, which can help Pakistan with its short-term financial problems. Third, suppose the above two things get into the flow. In that case, Pakistan can carve out tactical sustainability and pursue an anti-Taliban campaign in full throttle, which is currently limited due to multiple crises at home.

Easier said than done: Pakistanā€“China axisĀ 

Pakistanā€™s diplomacy in Bangladesh, China and Turkey may be an effort to create a strategic competition that includes Bangladesh within the Pakistan-China axis against India. As noted earlier, this diplomatic maneuvering by Pakistan is significant, at least in the long term. However, it remains challenging for Pakistan to find a silver lining in this escalating diplomatic game in South Asia.

First, there is the absence of full backhand support in Bangladesh. Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunusā€™s regime received clandestine support from the US, but as the US underwent a regime change, it adjusted to the evolving Asian geopolitical realities. Bangladesh would have limited options to bank entirely on China as Dhaka must also keep the US in its court. The void in full backhand support will create problems for Yunus, who will face mounting pressure to call early elections in Bangladesh.

Second, the Taliban threat in Pakistan has recently increased. Tajik militant organizations supported by the Taliban have established their presence in Afghanistan with the backing of Al Qaeda. The threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan is growing, especially after the ISIS-Khorasan resurgence, which is attempting to establish itself in Afghanistan. If it goes out of the grip, then this security nightmare is enough for Pakistan not to make much noise in the neighborhood.

Third, China and Turkey are close strategic partners to Pakistan and may carefully deal with it. Turkey has already observed a moderate response to the backdrop of Pakistanā€™s President’s visit. Turkish President Recep Tayyip recently made a statement that India and Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir issue through dialogue, unlike years ago when Turkey used to back Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. The backdrop of the visit shows some such signs. China plans to shift its focus toward the US, similar to its approach during the Trump administration. At the same time, the US intends to confront China directly, particularly in the South Asia theater. Such diverted attention and efforts of Pakistanā€™s all-weather partners will make initiating a strategic competition or great game-like situation targeting India challenging. This highlights Pakistan’s intricate challenges in the geopolitical game in South Asia.

India’s deft diplomacy and growing depth with the USĀ 

±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s effective negotiations and organized tactics drive adjustments to adapt to the changing political scene in South Asia. On the one hand, this deft diplomacy will help moderate and negotiate with emerging threats and attempt to increase and secure ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s traditional sphere of influence.

New Delhiā€™s efforts to engage with the Taliban and even allow them to send a representative to Afghanistanā€™s embassy, which has seen almost no diplomatic presence since the Taliban’s takeover, were notable. The most notable deft diplomacy was with and Myanmar. New Delhi engaged with top BNP leaders and attempted to influence and moderate relations with Bangladesh, which underwent significant change after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster. Last year, New Delhi Myanmar’s rebel group to negotiate a deteriorating security situation at its northeastern border, which impacted Manipur.Ģż

The increasing clout of ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s deft diplomacy puts New Delhi in a good spot not only to progress but also to contest the changing power dynamics of South Asia. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modiā€™s recent visit to the US has led to tectonic movements in the power balance of South Asia. The US and India are deepening their strategic ties with initiatives like (ā€œCatalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technologyā€) and TRUST (ā€œTransforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technologyā€) to explore multi-dimensional areas of cooperation, especially in technology and defence, which can build a strong US axis in developing multilateral forums such as Indo-Pacific, enlarging strategic and political salience at the regional level.Ģż

However, what is intriguing is Trumpā€™s of F-35 jets to India. This offer, which New Delhi should seriously consider, has the potential to influence the power balance in South Asia. India does not possess standalone air striking capability and does not have fifth-generation fighter jets. Suppose India agrees to this deal after considering its acquisition needs and calculations. In that case, it will be a game-changer, putting India in direct competition with China regarding air superiority. Air denial operations and air striking capabilities against Pakistan would significantly increase, giving India an option for carrying out more precise and in-depth strikes inside Pakistan without much noise, as the F-35 comes with a high degree of stealth. ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s increase in offensive and deterrence capabilities will surely stir the Chinaā€“Pakistan axis, but thatā€™s what the US wants. They want to push China to such a limit where the US can significantly influence Asian power dynamics against China to contain its overreaching sphere of influence in and around the South and Southeast region. At the same time, the US continues to develop its political and strategic clout in the region through the West- South Asia Connect and Indo-Pacific theatres.

With changes happening in West Asia and Europe, there is ample space for ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s deft diplomacy and the Indo-US relationship to explore geopolitical and geostrategic aspects. This exploration will open South Asia to significant multilateral connections, ultimately contributing to ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s strategic rise in the world order. However, a caveat in this bright possibility is the dangers of misadventure and miscalculations by those who will come under intense pressure to respond to ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s strategic rise and Asiaā€™s changing power balance.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorialĀ policy.

The post The Rivalries of South Asia: A New Era of Diplomacy? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The Biden years To Trump 2.0: resetting the White HouseĀ 

A mix of socio-economic failures and the decline in the USā€™s geopolitical influence created the conditions for a reset in the White House.

Following Trumpā€™s dramatic exit from power in 2021, the Joe Biden administration embraced a ā€œmeasuredā€ and retrained strategic response toward global politics. This put pressure onĀ the USā€™s position of global influence because of the emerging high-power rivalries the US has with China and Russia. Bidenā€™s foreign policy may have contributed toĀ the emergence of a strong alliance against theĀ US between (PRICK).

One of Bidenā€™s greatest international was the Build Back Better World (B3W) plan. The 2021 plan was an international economic development initiative by the G7 countries to counter Chinaā€™s Belt and Road initiative and stabilize regional economies after COVID-19. However, the plan failed to gain traction and was as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment with much less ambitious goals.

On the domestic front, the Biden White House made other miscalculations. One of these missteps was the economic failure of Bidenā€™s big policies, such as the American Rescue Plan, which led toĀ . Bidenā€™s energy policies were another blunder, experiencing since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. theĀ Keystone XL pipeline put additional pressure on the US energy sector.

Another domestic failure was an increase in theĀ crime rate. According to , ā€œViolent crimes have dramatically increased during the Biden-Harris administration, according to a recent Department of Justice study that appears to refute consistent claims by the Harris campaign.ā€ Other , such as immigration and rejecting identity politics also influenced voters.

The USā€™s realpolitik

The USā€™s realpolitik has two key features: influence and competition with emerging powers. During the Cold War, the US deep state used every available strategy to counter the Soviet Unionā€™s increasing influence. However, one major player in the US realpolitik significantly influenced the USā€™s approach to global events, sometimes even challenging branches of the deep state.

Two significant presidents during the Cold War were John F. Kennedy and Gerald Ford. To some extent, bothĀ had a ā€œmeasured, strategic responseā€ rather than an assertive, strategic response, which in the 1980s with President Ronald Reagan. Kennedyā€™s hesitation in using the CIA as a significant tool for US foreign policy goals, instead slashing its , created difficulties in steeringĀ US foreign policy during the initial phases of the Cold War.

Similarly, the Sovietā€“US dĆ©tente supported by President Ford was by analysts and Fordā€™s Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger. The DĆ©tente was a strategic failure, with the Soviet Union Afghanistan in 1979. A major setback came when Ford ordered the immediate evacuation of US personnel from South Vietnam in 1975, causing a similar to the disastrous US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. The CIA faced during Fordā€™s presidency when an investigative journalist exposed the CIAā€™s Operation CHAOS, which engaged in domestic surveillance of US citizens, in of the National Security Act of 1947.

Following the Cold War, President Bill Clinton attempted to adjust the USā€™s foreign policy strategy back to a ā€œmeasured response.ā€ Clinton’s main focus was on policy and . His foreign policy has been described by analysts as the , which favored the promotion of free markets and democratic principles in other countries. To some extent, thisĀ policy was responsible for the failure to restore democracy in Somalia, which resulted in the resignation of Clintonā€™s Secretary of Defence after the failed Operation Gothic Serpent. The Clinton administration also failed in 1993 when it was unable to oust Haiti’s military dictator, Raoul Cedres, and in 1994 when it did not intervene inĀ Rwanda to prevent genocide.

These failures share many similarities with those of theĀ Biden presidency. Biden the nuclear deal with Iran, from Afghanistan and made other miscalculations in Europe and the Middle East. Similar to Bidenā€™s predecessors, who embraced a similar foreign policy, these errors caused significant setbacks to the US’s geopolitical position.

Now that Trump will be back in the White House, the USā€™s foreign policy will be better suited to navigate the ever more complex world order. Trump’s second term promises an assertive response to global and regional crises, making it worth observing how wars in the Middle East and Europe unfold after he assumes office.

Trumpā€™s second term may ease on the trans-Atlantic security architecture and provide more freedom for European countries to make their own security and defense decisions. This new policy contrasts the Biden years, when the US was too involved in European security decisions, leading to friction with European countries, especially .

Some have that US realpolitik is hampered by Ukraine. However, if the US engages in an ā€œassertive, strategic responseā€ to re-building confidence among European nations and shore up European security architecture, the US may be able to check Russian influence.

During Trump’s , his “assertive, strategic response” effectively addressed evolving geopolitical dynamics, keeping China under the radar and Russia in check without straining relations with the US. Similar adjustments are expected in Trumpā€™s second administration, but with a key difference in the Middle East. The space for Iran, which expanded under the Biden administration, is likely to shrink rapidly under Trump. This shift will allow the US to adopt a more assertive stance toward Iran while rebuilding strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

It is unlikely that Donald Trump will eliminate the so-called , which consists of officials embedded within the executive branch of the US government who espouse an ideology that may be contrary to the administrationā€™s. Instead of being completely eliminated, the deep state could be reduced in size, as it plays a significant role in the US’s realpolitik, particularly for any incoming Trump administration. During Trumpā€™s first term, the deep state functioned in a limited yet operational manner. For instance, Trump appointed Gina Haspel, the first woman to serve as deputy director of the CIA and later as CIA director in 2018, despite strong reservations from some senators. These examples suggest that the deep state under a Trump administration could continue to function effectively with minor adjustments.

Indiaā€“US relations: and upward trajectoryĀ 

The Indiaā€“US is currently on an ā€œupward trajectory,ā€ with the Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership between the two countries recently . The partnership will receive more traction in theĀ Trump Administration. During Trumpā€™s first term, the USĀ understood ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s interests much better than theĀ Biden administration, with few exceptions. The Trump administrationā€™s superior understanding of India will help build much-needed trust between the two nations, whose relations have been by US criticism of ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s internal affairs. However, trade between India and the US will not change much during Trumpā€™s second term, given the implications of his America first policy for trade and high tariffs.

When Trump enters office, he has to re-adjust the USā€™s realpolitik to revive the USā€™s declining influence on the global stage. The move from a measured to an assertive approach will only come after the realization that restrained and measured approaches lead to significant policy and strategic failures for the US. Bidenā€™s foreign policy failures are the most recent example of this.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Resetting US Realpolitik In Trump’s Second Term appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The West has tried to Russia internationally, defeat it militarily and, through an array of draconian sanctions, cause its economic collapse. It has met none of these objectives.

Russiaā€™s connections with China have deepened strategically. India has preserved its strategic ties with Moscow despite Western pressure. Russian with several African countries also have a new momentum. Moscow is strongly present in the West Asia region and has a close relationship with key Arab countries. Its partnership with some Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries is gaining steam, too.

BRICSā€™s expansion

The of BRICS in 2023 with Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia had already signaled that major countries in the Global South had a very different perspective on Russia than the West did. It sees Russia as a friendly country, not an adversary. That almost 40 countries have shown interest in joining BRICS, a forum in which Moscow plays a key role, signifies that Russia is an attractive partner to them.

The Global South seeks a reformed international system that would reflect the shifts in power equations away from the West, both economic and political, that have occurred over the years. These countries want more attention to be paid to their concerns and priorities.

The Westā€™s double standards regarding its ā€œvalues-basedā€ policies, its military interventions, its use of various means to bring about regime changes, its use of sanctions as a policy tool, its weaponization of the United States dollar and the USā€™s global financial system have increasingly pushed non-Western countries to hedge themselves against Western pressures by joining forums such as BRICS. If Russia earlier looked westwards, the West has turned its back on Russia. Now Russia is much more focused on its Eurasian identity and is looking eastwards.

Non-Western countries cannot opt out of the existing international system or create one of their own. What they hope to do is to change the balance of power within the existing system and reform it to ensure more equality and equity in its functioning. The Global South countries, which also have close relations with the West, are being attracted to join BRICS or associate with it in order to increase their political, economic and security options.

The fact that 24 world leaders attended the Kazan summit, including those of five founding members and the four new permanent members, show that the Westā€™s already failing efforts to isolate Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, have been strongly rebuffed.

More members may bring complications

With so much interest in BRICS in the Global South, the question of expanding its membership and the criteria to do that pose difficulties. BRICS is a consensus-based forum. With the expansion, building a consensus on issues would become more difficult. That would affect the operation and credibility of the forum.

The of the BRICS Foreign Ministers in June 2024 at Nizhny Novgorod in Russia, also attended by the four new members, could not issue a joint communiquƩ because of differences on certain points.

Putin has himself publicly recognized the downside to any further expansion. He noted that the existing members have worked together for years and know how the forum functions. The process of absorbing the new members into the methods and spirit of the forum will be the immediate focus, not its expansion.

The decision, therefore, has been not to broaden the BRICS membership for the moment but to enlarge its base by accepting new countries as partners. Developing a consensus within BRICS on which countries should be admitted as partners was presumably not an easy exercise; all the BRICS members, old and new, had effective veto rights. It had to be ensured that no member country was particularly advantaged by the choice of partners and that the final list reflected a balance between the preferences of the forumā€™s members.

A wide spread

The Kazan summit saw the of 13 new BRICS partners: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. It is significant that four members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also among these.

Algeria, much to its disappointment, become a member when BRICS expanded last year. It has now obtained partner status. Two key Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) have become partners, too. Other Central Asian countries could obviously not be included as that would have weighed too much in favor of Russiaā€™s interests. Already, the inclusion of Belarus is a clear Russian preference. The geographical spread of the new partner countries is noteworthy.

Russiaā€™s obvious preference for Turkey was also accommodated given the latterā€™s for Russia, even though giving partner status to a NATO country might not fit into any normal criteria for deciding BRICS partnerships. Should NATO get a foothold in BRICS? From the Russian point of view, this would be a welcome political development in NATOā€™s eastern flank. The US, which sees BRICS as an organization created to rival the West in the global system, would be obviously perturbed by Turkeyā€™s decision.

Why Pakistan was kept away

It would seem that China has not exercised its own special geopolitical preferences too visibly. If it were interested in Pakistanā€™s inclusion, as it could well have been ā€” it had linked ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) membership with that of Pakistan ā€” it would have run into ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s strong opposition. In September 2024, while visiting Pakistan, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk its inclusion in BRICS but stated that such a decision would have to be based on a consensus. India clearly scotched any move to reach out to Pakistan, to the point that Pakistan seemingly was not invited to the summit.

India had reservations about Turkey becoming a partner because of its on Kashmir in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Ultimately, India did not stand in the way of Turkey becoming a BRICS partner.

The last BRICS summit approved the membership of Saudi Arabia, but it has not its acceptance. It was represented at the Kazan summit by its foreign minister. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Riyadh while the summit was being held in Kazan, which tells its own story.

Do not overestimate BRICSā€™s pace

The importance of BRICSā€™s expanded partnerships across Asia, Africa and Latin America should not be underestimated. It shows dissatisfaction with the current international system. Non-western countries want an end to the Westā€™s hegemony. They suffer from the Westā€™s self-centered, arbitrary policies. They see strengthened multilateralism reflected in multipolarity as the key to change.

At the same time, the pace at which BRICS can bring about this change should not be exaggerated. The goals of BRICS in forging alternatives to the dollar-dominated financial system are not easy to achieve. Within the BRICS countries, there are rivalries and divisions. Their political systems differ. Some are deeply anti-West. Others have friendly ties with the West even when they seek more space for themselves in a West-dominated global system. There are large economic disparities within the group. The policies of some both help and hurt the interests of the Global South.

When all is said and done, BRICSā€™s expansion, with all its challenges, is a vehicle for a much-needed re-balancing within the global system ā€” something India also seeks.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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This confrontation transcends conventional political rivalry; it is a over the nationā€™s direction and identity, with implications for stability, governance and democracy. Pakistanā€™s choices today will echo for decades to come.

The military and the populist

Pakistanā€™s military is not merely an institution, but a foundational pillar of the state. Since its birth in 1947, the military has been a guarantor of national security and unity, navigating the country through wars, internal conflicts, and natural calamities. However, this role has often extended into , with the military exerting substantial influence over the state.

Of course, military intervention receives a great deal of criticism. Its defenders argue that the military has stepped in to stabilize a nation plagued by political infighting, corruption and weak governance.

This dual role ā€” protector and power broker ā€” has created a complex dynamic, one that often overshadows Pakistanā€™s democratic aspirations. This dynamic continued until the Khanā€™s emergence in 2018 marked a seismic shift.

A cricketing legend turned political reformer, Khan rode a wave of popular discontent to in 2018. His Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party promised a break from the past: economic reform, and an end to elite-driven politics.

However, Khanā€™s tenure as prime minister was polarizing. While his supporters lauded his vision for a Naya Pakistan (ā€œNew Pakistanā€), critics pointed to economic mismanagement and policy inconsistencies. By 2022, Khanā€™s relationship with the military ā€” once seen as a source of strength ā€” had deteriorated, culminating in his through a parliamentary no-confidence vote alleged by the PTI to have been engineered by the Pakistan military.

Instead of retreating, Khan reinvented himself as an opposition leader, channeling public frustration into a potent political force. His narrative of resistance against entrenched elites resonated deeply, particularly among younger voters and the middle class.

Since August 2023, Khan has been incarcerated under a cloud of his party deems politically motivated. He faces over 150 legal cases.

Khanā€™s imprisonment has become a flashpoint for political unrest. For his supporters, these charges symbolize a broader attempt to stifle dissent and eliminate a genuine challenger to the status quo.

Despite his incarceration, Khanā€™s influence endures. His calls for judicial reform and fresh elections have kept his movement alive, with rallies, protests and sit-ins challenging the governmentā€™s authority. His wife, Bushra Bibi, has stepped into an uncharacteristic public leadership role, rallying PTI supporters and intensifying the push for his release.

Khanā€™s supporters hit the streets in huge numbers

The latest escalation came on November 24 when, upon Khanā€™s ā€œ,ā€ hundreds of thousands of PTI supporters government-imposed lockdowns to march toward Islamabad from the four corners of Pakistan, Khanā€™s release from prison, among other demands.

On Sunday, thousands of supporters from Peshawar, led by Bushra Bibi, Khanā€™s wife, and Ali Amin Gandapur, a prominent ally and chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Demonstrators removed barricades and shipping containers set up by authorities. The government has justified its actions as necessary to maintain order, accusing the PTI of inciting chaos. The Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi has to fire upon pro-Khan protestors if the capital lockdown is breached.Ģż

The clashes have turned violent, resulting in casualties on both sides. Authorities have responded with , internet shutdowns, barricades and to prevent protesters from reaching D-Chowk, a symbolic venue for political demonstrations.Ģż

The PTI, in turn, argues that these measures reflect a broader erosion of democratic freedoms. The result is a nation on edge, with Islamabad resembling a city under siege. Undeterred by governmental threats, Khanā€™s supporters have vowed to stage a sit-in in the capital to press for his release. 

At the time of writing, no side seems to be budging from its maximalist position. The PTI has that negotiations with the government are conditional on the prisoner’s release.Ģż

The stakes in this political deadlock are extraordinarily high. Political instability could trigger an economic collapse and precipitate a full-blown currency crisis, leading to severe social and economic disruptions. The potential for civil unrest is real, with regions such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and ā€” long plagued by their own issues ā€” standing on the edge of serious disturbances. The specter of violence and instability looms large, casting a shadow over the nationā€™s future.

Adding to the urgency is the international communityā€™s lack of appetite for intervention. With global attention consumed by a myriad of conflicts and geopolitical risks, Pakistanā€™s plight risks being relegated to the periphery. The international communityā€™s reluctance to bail out a nation embroiled in chronic issues ā€” a proverbial ā€œproblem childā€ ā€” only exacerbates Pakistanā€™s vulnerability. But the world cannot ignore Pakistanā€™s woes, albeit those are never-ending and perpetual.

As Pakistan faces these unprecedented challenges, the next few days will be crucial. The choices made by the key actors ā€” the military establishment, the current government and Khan ā€” will determine the nationā€™s trajectory. A failure to address the root causes of the crisis could lead to a situation far worse than that faced by Sri Lanka or , where political and economic turmoil would engulf the country, leading to widespread suffering and instability. The ongoing protests could be the tipping point.

Above all, the militaryā€™s entrenched power and the governmentā€™s resistance to political reform create a standoff that leaves little room for compromise. Yet, this deadlock cannot continue indefinitely. The political rupture facing Pakistan today demands a collective reckoning ā€” a recognition that the current path is untenable and that a new, inclusive approach to governance is urgently needed.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Pakistan on the Brink as Protestors Descend on Islamabad appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Singhā€™s rise to military success

Singh was born in Kusumdesar Village in the Churu region of the Bikaner Kingdom on July 14, 1919, to Brijlal Singh Rathore, a soldier, and his wife Jadao Kanwar. In 1938, after his intermediate exam, Singh was enrolled as a Naik, or corporal, in the Bikaner State Forces. When World War II broke out, he received a commission as a Second Lieutenant from the King. In 1949, he was absorbed into the Indian Army with the Third Gorkha Rifles .Ģż

In 1961, Singh was promoted to the rank of brigadier and was given the command of±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s paratroopers, the . ā€œOperation Vijay,ā€ the plan for the liberation of Goa from the Portuguese, commenced on December 17, 1961. Although the 50th Parachute Brigade was given a secondary role in the original operational plan, their rapid advance and initiative under Singhā€™s dynamic leadership made them the first to reach Panjim, the capital of Goa. On the morning of December 19,Panjim to the brigade. Portuguese Governor General and Commander-in-Chief Major General Vassalo Deā€™ Silva fled to Marmagao but later surrendered. At 11 AM, Singhā€™s forces hoisted the Indian tricolor on the Secretariat Building at Panjim.

Refusal to retreat led to one of ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s greatest victories

Singhā€™s success did not stop there. In 1965,China issued an to India to vacate the border outposts of Nathu La and Jelep La in Sikkim. Above him in the military hierarchy was Lieutenant General Sam Manekshaw, the Eastern Army Commander, and Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, commander of the XXXIII corps, who were responsible for Sikkim. Singh, now a major general, was the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 17th Mountain Division, which controlled Nathu La. Orders given to the 17th and 27th Divisions required that they vacate the outposts and fall back to the main defenses in the case of hostilities.

The GOC of the 27th (deployed to the east of the 17th) from Jelep La. Thus, Jelep La fell to the Chinese. To this day, the vital pass leading to the is still with China. Singh, however, refused to pull back. From August to September 1967, the Chinese tried their best to make Indians withdraw from Nathu La, but Singh made his forces hold on even though he could have vacated this outpost. During this engagement, both sides suffered casualties, but Nathu La gave a bloody nose to the Chinese under Singhā€™s audacious leadership. The victory helped the nation and the army overcome some regrets of the military defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Perhaps Singhā€™s insistence on defending Nathu La led to him being given a non-operational command, the 101st Communications Zone in Shillong. However, this general with ā€œa talent for warā€ had the uncanny quality of winding up in military operations. By this time, the Mizo separatist , orchestrated by the Mizo National Front, had begun. Since the area was under his responsibility, Singh set counter-insurgency operations into motion in Mizoram. His quick thinking quelled the rebellion for some time. Mizoram became an Indian state much later, in 1986. Mizoram is the rare example of a successful counter-insurgency operation, allthanks to the initial sagacious set by Singh.

The liberation of Bangladesh is Singhā€™s crowning glory

In December 1970, Singh was promoted to lieutenant general and assigned the command of the IV Corps. The hierarchy above Sagat was the same as it was in Nathu La in 1967: Aurora was now the Eastern Army commander and Manekshaw the army chief. 

Initially, the plans for the liberation of Bangladesh did not involve the capture of Dacca (now Dhaka), the capital of Bangladesh. The plan was to liberate areas up to the major rivers surrounding Dacca and thereafter to declare Bangladesh liberated. The army headquartersā€™ directive to Eastern Command did not envision Dacca as the final objective of the campaign in the east.

Singh was ordered to advance up to River Meghna from Tripura in the East and up to the river line. He was ordered not to cross the Meghna. However, military genius that he was, Singh clearly identified the two centers of gravity of the campaign: the fall of Dacca and the capitulation of all Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Undaunted by the massive Meghna, Singh launched the first-ever Indian heliborne operation across the river. His IV Corps raced to Dacca in a blitzkrieg. This led to the fall of the city and the capture of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers. It would perhaps have been appropriate for Singh, seeing as it was he who captured Dacca, rather than Aurora to have accepted the of Pakistani forces from Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi.

Singhā€™s legacy lives on

The Param Vishisht Seva Medal and the Padma Bhushan, awarded to Singh for his services in war, fall short of the magnitude of his contribution to the Indian nation. According to an unverifiable rumor, his victory ride through Dacca and his ā€œson-of-the-soilā€ image may have ruffled his superiorsā€™ feathers, causing them to deny him the awards he deserved. Whatever the case, it would now be appropriate to award him the , even posthumously.

Singh eventually settled down in Jaipur after retiring from the army in 1979. His house in Jaipur is called ā€œMeghna,ā€ as is his younger granddaughter. He breathed his last on September 26, 2001, at the age of 82.

On July 14, 2019, and the week after that, I had the unique privilege of organizing celebrations for the of the birth of this illustrious general. A prominent road in Jaipur has been adorned with a bust of Singh and named after him. The Jaipur Literary Festival in January 2019 witnessed readings from his biography. A seminar was organized in Jaipur, where generals who fought the war with him, as well as his son Lieutenant Colonel Ran Vijay Singh and his relatives, paid tribute in a very publicized event.

Truly, Singh was a general who never lost a battle.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Iran isnā€™t the only nation advancing its nuclear capabilities in recent years. In 2019, the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range land-based missiles, citing alleged Russian violations and Chinaā€™s non-involvement. The US is also its nuclear arsenal, with to deploy nuclear weapons in more NATO states and proposals to extend its to Taiwan.

Russia, too, has intensified its nuclear posture, expanding nuclear and updating its on first use. In 2023, the nation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limited US and Russian-deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In 2024, it stationed in Belarus. Russia and China have also deepened their , setting China on a path to rapidly expand its arsenal, as nuclear security collaboration with the US has steadily over the past decade.

The breakdown of diplomacy and rising nuclear brinkmanship among major powers are heightening nuclear insecurity among themselves, but also risk spurring a new nuclear arms race. Alongside Iran, numerous countries maintain the technological infrastructure to quickly build nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation would require significant collaboration among major powers, a prospect currently out of reach.

The US detonated the first nuclear weapon in 1945, followed by the Soviet Union in , the United Kingdom in , France in and China in . It became evident that with access to uranium and enrichment technology, nations were increasingly capable of producing nuclear weapons. Though mass production and delivery capabilities were additional hurdles, it was widely expected in the early Cold War that many states would soon join the nuclear club. Israel developed nuclear capabilities in the , India detonated its first bomb in and South Africa built its first by . Other countries, including , , , , and , pursued their own programs.

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968 to curb nuclear spread, led many countries to abandon or dismantle their programs. After the end of the Cold War and under Western pressure, Iraq its nuclear program in 1991. In a historic move, South Africa voluntarily its arsenal in 1994. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1996, securing international security assurances in exchange.

Nuclear proliferation appeared to be a waning concern, but cracks soon appeared in the non-proliferation framework. Pakistan conducted its first in 1998, followed by North Korea in , bringing the count of nuclear-armed states to nine. Since then, Iranā€™s nuclear weapons program, initiated in the 1980s, has been a major target of Western non-proliferation efforts.

Nuclear ambitions in the Middle East, Asia and Europe

Iran has a strong reason to persist. Ukraineā€™s former nuclear arsenal might have deterred Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022. Elsewhere, revolutionary Muammar Gaddafi, who Libyaā€™s nuclear program in 2003, was overthrown by a NATO-led coalition and local forces in 2011. If Iran achieves a functional nuclear weapon, it will lose the ability to leverage its nuclear program as a to extract concessions in negotiations. While a nuclear weapon will represent a new form of leverage, it would also intensify pressure from the US and Israel, both of whom have engaged in a cycle of escalating sometimes deadly confrontations with Iran and its proxies over the past few years.

An Iranian nuclear arsenal could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Its relations with Saudi Arabia remain delicate, despite the brokered by China. Saudi officials have they would obtain their own nuclear weapon if Iran acquired them. Saudi Arabia gave significant to Pakistanā€™s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, or even the latter with one upon request.

Turkey, which hosts US nuclear weapons through NATOā€™s , signaled a policy shift in 2019 when Turkish President Recep Tayyip ·”°ł»å“Ēğ²¹²Ō foreign powers for dictating Turkeyā€™s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkeyā€™s growing partnership with Russia in could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so.

Middle Eastern tensions are not the only force threatening non-proliferation. Japanā€™s renewed friction with China, North Korea and Russia over the past decade has intensified Tokyoā€™s focus on nuclear readiness. Although Japan a nuclear program in the 1940s, it was dismantled after World War II. Japanā€™s , however, remains measured in months. Despite this, for nuclear weapons remains low, given the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nuclear bombings in 1945 killed more than 200,000 people.

In contrast, around of South Koreans support developing nuclear weapons. South Koreaā€™s nuclear program began in the 1970s but was under US pressure. However, North Koreaā€™s successful test in 2006 and its severance of , and to the South in the past decade, coupled with the of peaceful reunification in early 2024, have again raised the issue in South Korea.

Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, which similarly under US pressure. Any sign of wavering US commitment to Taiwan, together with Chinaā€™s growing nuclear capabilities, could prompt Taiwan to revive its efforts. Though less likely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea could also motivate countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to consider developing nuclear capabilities.

Russiaā€™s war in Ukraine has also had significant nuclear implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently to the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraineā€™s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered. Zelenskyy later his comments after they ignited a firestorm of controversy. Yet if Ukraine feels betrayed by its Western partners ā€” particularly if it is forced to concede territory to Russia ā€” it could spur some factions within Ukraine to attempt to secure nuclear capabilities.

The war has also spurred nuclear considerations across Europe. In December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer a European nuclear deterrent. Donald Trumpā€™s re-election in the 2024 US presidential election could amplify European concerns over US commitments to NATO, with France having increasingly an independent European nuclear force in recent years.

Nuclear collaboration

Established nuclear powers are unlikely to welcome more countries into their ranks. But while China and Russia donā€™t necessarily desire this outcome, they recognize the Westā€™s concerns are greater, with Russia doing in the 1990s to prevent its unemployed nuclear scientists from aiding North Koreaā€™s program.

The US has also previously been blindsided by its alliesā€™ nuclear aspirations. US policymakers underestimated Australiaā€™s determination to pursue a nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, including covert attempts to obtain a weapon from the UK. Similarly, the US was initially of Franceā€™s extensive support for Israelā€™s nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

Smaller countries are also capable of aiding one anotherā€™s nuclear ambitions. Argentina offered considerable to Israelā€™s program, while Israel assisted . Saudi Arabia financed Pakistanā€™s nuclear development and Pakistanā€™s top nuclear scientist is of having aided Iran, Libya and North Korea with their programs in the 1980s.

The slippery slope to nuclear conflict

Conflicts involving nuclear weapons states are not without precedent. Egypt and Syria attacked nuclear-armed Israel in 1973 and Argentina faced a nuclear-armed UK in 1982. India and China have clashed over their border on several occasions. Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression. But conflicts featuring nuclear countries invite dangerous escalation, and the risk grows if a nation with limited conventional military power gains nuclear capabilities; lacking other means of defense or retaliation, it may be more tempted to resort to nuclear weapons as its only viable option.

The costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals are already steep. In 2023, the worldā€™s nine nuclear-armed states spent an estimated managing their programs. But what incentive do smaller countries have to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely, especially when they observe the protection nuclear weapons offer and witness the major powers intensifying their nuclear strategies?

Obtaining the worldā€™s most powerful weapons may be a natural ambition of military and intelligence sectors, but it hinges on the political forces in power as well. In Iran, moderates could counterbalance hardliners, while continued support for Ukraine might prevent more nationalist forces from coming to power there.

Yet an additional country obtaining a nuclear weapon could set off a cascade of others. While larger powers are currently leading the nuclear posturing, smaller countries may see an opportunity amid the disorder. The limited support for the , in effect since 2021, coupled with the collapse of other international treaties, reinforces the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states. With major powers in open contention, the barriers to nuclear ambitions are already weakening, making it ever harder to dissuade smaller nations from pursuing the ultimate deterrent.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Politics of terror

For decades, Pakistan has used state-sponsored terror as an instrument to buy geopolitical rent from the United States via Afghanistan. In the past, Pakistan gave operational control to terror proxies to cultivate ground for against India.

However, the strategy of using terror did not last long. On May 2, 2011, the US al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. This incident sowed seeds of distrust between the two nations.

Similarly, Iran Pakistan in the 1971 war against India. However, ideological confrontations have led to distrust and hostility between the parties. Iran also believes that Pakistan is Baloch jihadists to please the West and Saudi Arabia.

Evidently, politics of terror have cost Pakistan heavily, without much reward. The state is clearly weakening, as several signs indicate. The Afghan Talibanā€™s is being more assertive than it otherwise would be. Pakistan is targeting Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamist nationalist network opposing the Pakistani military. Pakistanā€™s approach against Afghanistanā€™s Supreme Council is also telling.

Middle Eastern terror conflicts have increased following Israelā€™s 2023 invasion of Gaza. Pakistan seems to be negotiating with a few proxies, and allegedly with . These actions may be in order to de-escalate terror attacks in Pakistan and deter the TTP.

The nation may also be seeking openings for security and strategic cooperation with the West. In December 2023, Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir and former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Nadeem Anjum, Washington, DC. The US didnā€™t show any interest in engaging with Pakistan; it is already locked in multiple fronts from Ukraine to Israel. The nation also believes that TTP is already weakening the ISIS threat.

However, the ISIS in Iran in January paint a worrisome picture of regional security.ĢżThe on Moscowā€™s Crocus City Hall in March stoked fear of revival of ISIS regional branches, especially in Central Asia.

Islamization and flashpoints

Pakistanā€™s politics of terror typically end poorly, which complicates its negotiation of geopolitical rent. It suffers from the usual dilemma that comes with terror politics; proxies can be useful for some time, but eventually, their radicalism becomes too extreme.

One can argue that the US, too, had relations with terror proxies. In December 1979, the CIAā€™s provided arms and logistics to jihadist groups in Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet Union. Unlike Pakistanā€™s relationship with proxies, however, this was a limited relationship.

Pakistanā€™s continued engagement with proxies may come from former president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haqā€™s regime in the 1970s and 1980s. He Sharia Benches in the High Court to align the nationā€™s legal statutes with Islamic doctrine. His policies brought in officers who wanted to pursue an active Islamic agenda in military matters. A new breed of military thinkers and strategists also emerged. They pushed for a merger of social jihadism with military plans.

Islamization had far-reaching consequences. It led non-state actors, directed by Pakistanā€™s ISI, to quell opposition to Ziaā€™s pro-Sunni Islamization measures. This in turn the extremist Jaish-e-Mohammad and Soviet jihad groups.

Ziaā€™s radical Islamization continues to permeate the Pakistani Army, which has prevented action against Islamic terror groups such as TTP. The virus of Islamization has removed Pakistanā€™s ability to think like a rational nation, putting it in a state of poly-crises.

In January, Pakistan witnessed new flashpoints, including Iranian against the Baluch terror group Jaish al-Adl. This attack on the Pakistani province of Balochistan further deteriorated Iranā€“Pakistan relations.

Pakistanā€™s response was limited to diplomatic protests and the of Iranā€™s ambassador. However, Pakistan likewise carried out retaliatory precision strikes against Baluch camps on Iranian territory. This indicates a strategy of deterrence similar to the it used against India in 2019.Ģż

Pakistan does have the option to use force against Iran; it did so in a limited manner on January 17, when it launched a series of air and artillery inside Iranā€™s Sistan and Balochistan province. The limited strike demonstrated Pakistanā€™s deterrence capabilities, but terror groups inside Pakistan continue to complicate its situation.

Attacks on Chinese workers

On October 7, Baloch terrorists in the Pakistani city of Karachi conducted a that killed two Chinese nationals. Before that, on March 26, Baloch insurgents conducted a that killed five Chinese workers in Pakistanā€™s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. These are merely the most recent instances of deadly attacks on Chinese nationals. In 2022, a in Karachi killed three Chinese instructors. In 2021, yet another killed two Chinese nationals in the Gwadar region.

These incidents have raised serious questions over Pakistanā€™s credentials of being a safe investment for China. In defense, China shut its firms and launched a sound into these incidents.

Pakistan is attempting to revive its economic situation and its relations with China, but such incidents might jeopardize long-term Pakistanā€“China economic relations. The issue of terror attacks paints Pakistan as an unsafe investment, to China and the rest of the world. Regardless, for the time being, China intends to with Pakistan to protect its personnel.

For Pakistan, going full throttle against insurgents raises the concern of a mass insurgency. However, Pakistan has gradually begun cross-border operations in relation to Afghanistan. The consequences may put Pakistan into a severe security headache as the capital of Islamabad is now caught in a twin terror trap with the TTP and Baloch militants. If flared, this situation could heavily impede Pakistanā€™s strategic and economic interests.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Pakistanā€™s Terror Could Ruin Its Last Chance With China appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Donald Trump and Imran Khanā€™s unexpected friendship

The year 2018 began with a jarring discord when Trump, then in office, launched a stinging accusing Pakistan of deceit and duplicity for accepting billions of dollars in foreign aid while purportedly sheltering terrorists. The tweet ignited a diplomatic conflagration. Pakistani Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif retorted sharply, summoning the US ambassador in Islamabad to the Foreign Office to lodge a formal protest. This sharp exchange underscored the fragility of the USā€“Pakistan relationship and set the tone for the turbulent interactions to follow.

The discord reached in November 2019 when Trump once again targeted Pakistan via Twitter, accusing it of continuing to harbor terrorists. By this juncture, the Pakistani political landscape had undergone a significant shift. Imran Khan, leader of the Pakistan Movement for Justice party, now served as prime minister. Khanā€™s response was a of Pakistanā€™s honor, which he framed against the broader backdrop of its sacrifices in the War on Terror. Khanā€™s retort not only challenged Trumpā€™s assertions but also underscored the broader implications of these accusations ā€” the US was holding Pakistan to an unfair standard, blaming it for its own failures in Afghanistan while exonerating itself.

Amid these diplomatic storms, a surprising development emerged in July 2019 when Khan visited Washington. His arrival was marked by an unexpected from the US president. This high-profile greeting was emblematic of a shared populist ethos between the two leaders. Both Trump and Khan, having risen to prominence with considerable celebrity status, shared a mutual disdain for the conventional political establishment. A certain camaraderie characterized their interaction and suggested a potential thaw in their relationship.

Could a change in administration alter Washingtonā€“Islamabad relations?

Both Khan and his party have been the target of numerous legal maneuvers and political machinations. In April 2022, an unprecedented no-confidence motion in parliament removed Khan from office. Since then, Khan has been repeatedly accused of various crimes, convicted, and then acquitted on appeal; he remains, however, in government custody. Given the apparent warmth between Trump and Khan, Trumpā€™s candidacy in 2024 has spurred speculation within Pakistan about a possible revival of Khanā€™s political fortunes.

Despite by the Pakistani diaspora, including those with access to influential US senators and congressmen, current US President Joe Bidenā€™s administrationā€™s approach to Pakistan and Khan has remained largely unchanged: The White House has the brutalities faced by Khanā€™s party or the ongoing political turmoil. This apparent inertia has heightened the anticipation surrounding a potential Trump return.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that, historically, USā€“Pakistan relations have fared better under Republican administrations. The Cold War era and the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks illustrate how Republican presidents have often taken a realpolitik approach and sought to rekindle ties with Pakistan for strategic purposes. Still, Trumpā€™s leadership style is transactional and inherently nature. It could open the doors to potential negotiation, but it is impossible to make definitive forecasts.Ģż

Besides, USā€“Pakistan relations were never easy to put in a box, especially given the USā€™s with India ā€” a crucial ally in its efforts to counterbalance China. The India factor creates a formidable obstacle for any potential shift in US policy towards Pakistan. The Biden administrationā€™s alignment with India reflects a broader strategic calculus that might constrain the scope for any significant policy changes. Nevertheless, if the Pakistani diaspora succeeds in mobilizing influential Republican congressmen to advocate on his behalf, there could be a sliver of hope for more favorable outcomes for Khan, on the individual level. (Anecdotal evidence suggests such efforts are already underway.)Ā 

While Trumpā€™s return might offer a glimmer of hope for Khanā€™s political revival, the uncertainty surrounding Trumpā€™s presidency, and the broader geopolitical considerations render any forecasts speculative. Diplomatic maneuvering, strategic interests and personal relationships are all at play.

As the world watches the unfolding drama, the future of USā€“Pakistan relations and Khanā€™s political fortunes remain in flux. The next chapter in this saga promises to be as unpredictable and riveting as the twists and turns that have come before.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post What Could a Trump 2.0 Presidency Mean for Imran Khan and USā€“Pakistan Relations? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

After your speech observing ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s 78th Independence Day on August 15, you may wish to convene the best and the brightest minds around you to respond to the countryā€™s most pressing internal security challenge, one which no Indian political leader has had the courage to confront let alone take any steps to resolve: the sinister designs that Muslims on the Indian Subcontinent have for India.

Their plans are all the more dangerous given the overthrow of the Bangladeshi government, after which, quite expectedly, outfits like the came crawling out the woodwork. HuT is an Islamic terrorist organization that positions itself as a political party. On August 9, it organized a rally in Dhaka and demanded the establishment of the . Such Muslim fundamentalists see India as a colonizer state, in the same vein as the US and the UK. I am sure that your National Security Adviser Ajit Doval is telling you the same thing I want you to understand: ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s neighborhood has become exponentially more dangerous than before.

Some home truths for you to noteĀ 

Before I carry on, it is my duty as a well-wisher and as a concerned citizen to point out some important truths.

First, you insisted on making the 2024 elections a referendum on your name. Now, there are no prizes for guessing where the buck ought to come to a grinding stop for the underwhelming result.

Second, ten years have vanished since 2014, the year when you won a historic first mandate. In another blink of an eye, the next election will be upon us in 2029. Soon, it will be 2047, the target year you have set for Viksit Bharat (Developed India). Even you know that this is your last term and that you are running out of time.

Third, Hinduismā€™s holy texts repeatedly warn of the perils of (ego). Both and enemies have accused you of this failing. So, I advise you to get a grip on your ahankara. Shrink-wrap and freeze it. Instead, adopt , Mr. Prime Minister. This will do you good and, more importantly, it will bring the nation tremendous benefit.

Fourth, you tried to win the Muslim vote through massive welfare schemes. Yet, unlike Jawaharlal Nehru, you did not win their hearts and minds. You certainly did not win Muslim votes. Indian Muslims , tactically and effectively against you in 2024. Consider it carved in stone they will never vote for you and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Fifth, you underestimate your enemies. The opposition, thuggish, bereft of all scruples and decorum, will do anything ā€” anything ā€” to defeat you and obtain power. The English media in India follows the countryā€™s strange brand of secularism that has a romantic view of sharia. This scotch-drinking elite is happy for Muslims to marry four times and, together with their friends and family members in academia, wants the BJP out of power. The same holds true for Bollywood and left-leaning non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Sixth, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), more appositely known as the Indian Arrogant Service, is ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s deep state and is implacably opposed to you. IAS officers have come through an examination system designed by the Congress Partyā€™s left-leaning ideologues. For their entire careers, they have benefited from rent-seeking by embodying a still-colonial state. They do not want any change. You have succumbed to their flattery and are surrounded by an IAS mafia that does not allow anyone access to your presence. Hindu organizations and devout Hindus have little standing in your administration, but IAS officers who were communists during their St. Stephenā€™s College days can get things done in hours, if not minutes, by calling IAS officers who work in the Prime Ministerā€™s Office.

Seventh, the international ecosystem of the Left is your mortal enemy. For them, you are the butcher of Gujarat who slaughtered thousands in 2002. The American press calls a ā€œHindu supremacistā€ and ā€œHindu fascist.ā€ For them, you are an Indian version of Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Yet you crave approval from this ecosystem and ignore your supporters. 

Eighth, centuries of colonization have made Hindus indifferent to their long-term civilizational interests. Extracting all the salt from the earthā€™s oceans is an easier task than awakening the fractious, argumentative and chronically ineffective Hindus. Under your prime ministership, we had a shot, but you have blown that opportunity most spectacularly. If and when voters turn to the opposition, itā€™s highly unlikely your party will ever return to power. EVER. Then it’s over for India and her Hindus.

The pathetic state of Hindus

Allow me to dwell on the division and weakness of Hindus here for a moment. And no, this is not some fake, doomsday, clickbait claim, but rather extrapolated from the views of two of ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s greatest leaders: Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar. The first is credited (falsely) with winning our independence, and the second is credited (rightly) with being the chief architect of our constitution. Love them or loathe them, but dismiss their views at your peril, Mr. Narendra Modi.

Gandhi , ā€œHindus are cowards and Muslims bullies.ā€Ā The venerable leader offered no solution to this conundrum. Gandhi suggested that Hindus could sacrifice their lives for the Muslims if they wanted to establish their rule over India. Gandhi did not believe in fighting back even during the darkest days of pre-Partition violence.

Ambedkar, who was no friend of Gandhi but his political and ideological adversary, was a bare-knuckled on Islam and Muslims. His are as relevant today as then: ā€œTo the Muslims, a Hindu is a Kaffir. A Kaffir is not worthy of respect. He is low-born and without status. That is why a country which is ruled by a Kaffir is Dar-ul-Harb to a Musalman. Given this, no further evidence seems to be necessary to prove that the Muslims will not obey a Hindu government.ā€ He commented on the ā€œadoption by the Muslims of the gangsterā€™s method in politicsā€ and stated, ā€œThe fact remains that India, if not exclusively under Muslim rule, is a Dar-ul-Harb and the Musalmans according to the tenets of Islam are justified in proclaiming a jihad.ā€

That jihad is underway not only in Pakistan but also in India. The now-banned Popular Front of India (PFI) plans to make India Islamic by 2047. Authorities have seized PFI plans that ā€œcreating a civil war-like situationā€ in India. They also uncovered ā€œa short course on how to make improvised explosive devices (IEDs) using easily available materialsā€ and pen drives containing videos related to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

In India, few leaders have taken on the problem of Islam like their European counterparts. French President Emmanuel Macron has against ā€œIslamist separatismā€ and the dangers of Muslims forming a “counter-societyā€ in France. Retired French generals have of ā€œcivil warā€ in the country.

Note that Muslims have marched in Germany Sharia law. In the recent UK elections, Muslims organized themselves on exclusively Islamic issues through the ā€œThe Muslim Vote.ā€ The BBC on a Labour candidate who faced ā€œabuse and intimidationā€ from supporters of an independent Muslim candidate. Australia has also started ā€œIslamic sectarianism.ā€ Muslims self-separating in non-Muslim countries is inevitable given the Quranic not to befriend Christians and Jews. We Hindus are much worse because we are not People of the Book, but idol-worshippers.

When the Muslims of India plan to make India by 2047, they are not trifling. World history records Islamā€™s consistent pattern of lethality towards non-Muslims. Shia Iran has targeted the peace-loving and Sunni Saudi Arabia still has no space for non-Sunni communities. In India, Muslims conducted ethnic cleansing of Hindus in Kashmir in the early 1990s.

That ethnic cleansing is a precursor to what many Muslims plan for the entire subcontinent. The PFI of 2047, when political power is to return to the Muslim community from whom it was unjustly taken away by the British. Itā€™s entirely in character, given that Muslims also dream of getting back ā€” most of which they have not held since the Middle Ages. The saying that Muslims never forget and Hindus never remember has an element of truth.

Alarming trends call for immediate action, Mr. Prime Minister

Al Jazeera, the flagship media organization funded by gas-rich Qatar, has emerged as the voice of the Muslim world. It , ā€œBetween 1951 and 2011, the Muslim population [of India] rose from 35.4 million to 172 million. The Hindu population rose from 303 million to 966 million in the same period.ā€ That works out to a 391% increase in the Muslim population as compared to a 218% increase in the Hindu population. In short, the Muslim population increased at almost double the rate of Hindus for decades after independence.

Demography is destiny in a democracy. If Muslim populations increase, then politicians have to appeal to them. Obviously, some will promise sharia, as Muslims are calling for in Europe. We are facing a clash of civilizations as Samuel Huntington after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Given the times of strife and struggle that lie ahead, we need a good successor to you, Mr. Prime Minister. I take the view that your successor must be Yogi Adityanath, the popular chief minister of Uttar Pradesh. Yogi, as this charismatic leader is known, is young (yes, age matters and you are now old, Mr. Modi), dynamic and strong. Yogi is the only political leader in India who has had the courage to shine the light on and the atrocities against Hindus in Bangladesh. Just as you were the future once, Yogi is the future now, and you must give way.

As your parting gift to the nation, you must give Hindus administrative control over their temples. Most of my Western friends are shocked to learn that mosques and churches are autonomous and temples are . Muslims and Christians have the right to run their religious establishments. However, the government controls Hindu temples and even runs them. The IAS lord it over Hindu places of worship but do not dare to intervene even if there is murder or rape in Muslim or Christian institutions. Similarly, Christians and Muslims have the right to run educational institutions whilst Hindus have the same right. Mr. Narendra Modi, free the Hindus finally in their own land.

Mr. Prime Minister, you are a visionary and farsighted politician. So, get your act together and letā€™s see some bare-knuckled action. Borrow your friend Donald Trump’s phrase and say, “You’re fired,” to Home Minister Amit Shah and BJP party chief Jagat Prakash Nadda ā€” they are both utterly incompetent, and you know it. 

Instead, make alliances, soothe bruised egos and bring back sulking Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) leaders. Once, you were a committed RSS worker. Today, you have abandoned the RSS for the IAS. Go back to your roots, Mr. Narendra Modi.

My advice is straightforward: Reduce ahankara; embrace ³Ł²āÄå²µ²¹; announce Yogi as your successor; give Hindus long-awaited religious freedom; fire your two cronies; return to your roots. If you do this and nothing else, history will remember you as the prime minister who successfully prevented India from falling to Islam yet again.

Will you listen and act?

Yours respectfully,

Dr. Sushil Kaul 

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Simple Lessons on Islam and Hindu Politics for Narendra Modi appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Even as I write this, Bangladesh is in turmoil. Mobs stormed the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasinaā€™s palace, and she has fled to India after 15 years of increasingly autocratic rule. Pakistan is not doing much better. Economically, it is definitely doing worse. In 2023, Pakistanā€™s per capita income to $1,407, from $1,589.3 in 2022. Bangladeshā€™s per capita income too, but to $2,529.1 in 2023 from $2,687.9 in 2022. In 1971, Pakistanā€™s per capita income was $175.2 while Bangladeshā€™s was $128. Clearly, the darker cousin outstripped the fairer one over the decades.

Anwar Iqbal, writing in Pakistanā€™s flagship newspaper Dawn, tells the tale of Pakistan with a begging bowl to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) a staggering 23 times. Even as IMF bailouts continue, a kleptocratic elite lives opulent lives as latter-day Mughals. The Pakistani Army holds the country together with the barrel of a gun and by whipping up the fear of its larger neighbor, India.

Yet there are schisms even within the military. Two days ago, the military Lieutenant-General Faiz Hameed of the fabled Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in a historic first. The former ISI chief was close to cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, who became prime minister upending traditional parties but is now languishing in jail. Now, members of Pakistanā€™s traditional political families ā€” lucky sperm club ā€” hold elected offices after blatantly rigged polls. As Pakistani elites flee the country to safe havens like Dubai and London, this nuclear-armed country is becoming ever more Islamist.

India is doing much better but is in ferment

±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s per capita GDP has risen from $118.2 in 1971 to $2484.8 in 2023. India has avoided the instability of either of its Muslim-majority neighbors. Except for a brief two-year interlude in the 1970s, India has been a with regular elections and a peaceful transfer of power.

Today, Indians are better-fed, taller and live longer than ever before. In 1947, when India won independence, an average Indian lifespan was a little over 32 years. Today, it is over 70. To be fair, life expectancy has also gone up in Pakistan and Bangladesh. If I go by numbers, independence has been a jolly good thing for the Indian subcontinent.

Yet for all the progress, Indians feel a sense of underachievement at the global stage. At the recently concluded Paris Olympics, 1.4 billion-strong India finished 71st, behind tiny Lithuania with a population of 2.8 million. Before independence, India had Nobel laureates like Rabindranath Tagore and C.V. Raman. Today, the country has none. 

Education has become a game of competitive examinations with private coaching companies making fortunes to train teenagers to crack exams for prestigious public universities generously funded by the state. Government hospitals are overcrowded and the country is currently up in arms after the of a female doctor in Kolkata. Ironically, this state of West Bengal (population of over 100 million) is ruled by the Trinamool Congressā€™s Mamata Banerjee, one of the most prominent women leaders in the country. A day ago, a final-year engineering student was abducted, raped and dumped on the Agraā€“Delhi highway. This state is ruled by Yogi Adityanath, a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader who has made his reputation for being tough on crime.

Part of the reason for high crime is the lack of police reforms since 1947. Also, courts take an eternity to decide upon cases. The structure of the state is still colonial and corruption is a way of life. In many ways, Indian democracy is skin-deep. At the district level, unelected officers of the imperial-era Indian Administrative Service (IAS) rule like feudal lords from colonial bungalows. They are assisted by officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS). Both the IAS and the IPS answer directly to the chief minister of the state. Local mayors have no real power.

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Strong chief ministers from almost all parties rule their states with two to five IAS officers and one or two IPS officers imposing their will on the people. They are elected monarchs with vast powers of patronage. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken this IAS model of governance to the national level. His ministers are ciphers with no power or even status. Favored IAS officers are Modiā€™s feudal barons who ride roughshod even over BJP politicians. In other parties such as the historic Indian National Congress or the Samajwadi Party, dynasts rule the roost. Indian democracy is proving resilient but is not in rude health.

India is not alone in experiencing institutional and moral degradation. South Africa does not have a Nelson Mandela; France is not led by Charles de Gaulle, and the US is far cry from the days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt or Dwight David Eisenhower. Yet with 1.4 billion people, urban squalor, rising unemployment, unmet expectations and social divisions along caste, region and religion, the Indian republic faces immense challenges ahead.

My father was born in 1942, five years before ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s independence. In the 1971 Indiaā€“Pakistan War, he operated for 72 consecutive hours. In his old age, he views India’s post-independence story wistfully. India is doing much better than Pakistan or Bangladesh, but that is not enough for him. He takes the view that hospitals safe for women doctors and trains where toilets are clean are not that hard to achieve. That is the minimum I have to achieve as a people to make the sacrifices of those who spent years and even decades in British jails worthwhile.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post How to View Independence Amidst Ferment, Rape and Dirty Toilets appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

For most of its history since independence in 1947, India has been ruled by the Indian National Congress (INC) party. Leadership of the party passed from father to daughter to son to sonā€™s widow to grandson as the INC has dominated Indian politics for 40 years. During the rule of the Nehru dynasty, India maintained close relations with the Soviet Union and followed socialist policies, without the bloody purges of its big brother. 

The INC first lost power in 1977 and opposition parties came to power in coalitions but the grand old party of Indian politics could always stage a comeback. In 2014, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) triumphed and the INC-led coalition lost power. Since then, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has presided over a blossoming economy and is still exceedingly popular. The BJP is now the dominant party in the country like the INC.

Modi is widely expected to win the 2024 election. If he does, he will become only the second prime minister in Indian history to win three elections. Jawaharlal Nehru did so in 1951ā€“1952, 1957 and 1962. Given the BJPā€™s likely victory, what can we expect from a third Modi term?

What to expect from Modi III

The Modi government will probably take steps to address slow job generation, especially in the manufacturing sector. In the past, poor physical and power infrastructure limited ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s ability to boost this sector. Today, the roadblocks are high cost of capital, labor and land. Another challenge facing the Modi government is the poor civic management of ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s cities. Presently, Indian cities are difficult to live in due to congested roads, crazy high air pollution and a lack of clean drinking water.

The Modi government would also have to tread carefully in its relations with foreign partners. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau recently blamed India for the assassination of a Canadian citizen in British Columbia. Similarly, the US believes that India was involved in an attempt to murder an American citizen. In ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s eyes, the two assassinated gentlemen were Sikh terrorists advocating the dismemberment of the Indian state. Both immigrated from India, the Canadian on a false passport.

Despite the diplomatic tiff, Washington and Ottawa are keen to maintain close ties with Delhi. They want to bring together all democracies in the Asia-Pacific to create a united front against China. However, India is more diffident about the West. Modi may keep the US at armā€™s length, instead engaging closely with middle powers on bilateral terms. The government may also prefer a transactional foreign policy rather than a values-based one.

±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s troubled neighborhood

China is ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s northern neighbor and is indeed a threat.China disputes Indian territory in the Himalayas and has seized Aksai Chin, which India claims as part of Ladakh. India may no longer be able to rely on trade deals and economic relations to keep the peace with China.  India needs to reassess its defense architecture to deal with China.

Myanmar is currently in the midst of a civil war. In the past, militias based in Myanmar have caused trouble in the northeastern Indian states of Manipur and Nagaland. India may need to fortify its border to prevent the spillover of the Myanmarese civil war into India.

Nepal, which traditionally has close ties with India, is now trying to balance relationships with both India and China. ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s challenge is to keep Nepal firmly in its sphere of influence and prevent the expansion of Chinese influence in a country where the local communist party has become quite powerful.

Maldives recently asked India to remove its 89 soldiers and support staff. The country is growing increasingly Islamist and hostile to India. China will be all too happy to step into the vacuum but Maldives is in ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s sphere of influence. As in Nepal, India will compete with China for influence in Maldives.

Finally, relations between India and Pakistan have been deteriorating due to Islamabadā€™s sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. As Pakistanā€™s economy goes into free fall, Modi may have the opportunity to improve relations by securing a Pakistani pledge to discontinue these operations.

Modi certainly has his work cut out for him. Rising to these challenges will be crucial for the success of his third term.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FOĀ° Talks: Geopolitical Guru on the State of Indian Democracy, Part 2 appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

While they provide crucial income for families and boost the national balance of payments, remittances can be a double-edged sword. They can lead to currency overvaluation, making a country’s exports less competitive on the global market. They can reduce labor participation in the domestic sector, causing workers to opt for more lucrative jobs abroad.

Pakistan relies on remittances to manage external debt and finance deficits. This dependency makes the country vulnerable to external economic shocks. If the flow of remittances were to decrease due to a global economic downturn or changes in immigration policies in host countries, Pakistan could face severe financial challenges.

Remittances are also associated with higher consumption and imports. This trend could lead to a situation where the economy relies more heavily on remittances to maintain consumption levels, potentially limiting investment in productive sectors that drive long-term growth and job creation.

Learning from Israelā€™s example

Nasir Khilji, a retired senior US Treasury economist, emphasizes the importance of managing these inflows effectively. Nations that receive large amounts of remittances must avoid relying on cash inflows by undertaking structural reforms and investments to diversify the economy and increase labor productivity.

In recent decades, Israel has had similar experiences with remittances. The country directed remittance funds toward infrastructure and technology development. This skillful management helped Israel avoid the trap of dependence. It allowed the Israeli economy to grow, leading to positive economic outcomes.

Countries like Pakistan could follow suit by creating incentives for investment in productive sectors and developing financial products targeted at expatriates. Moreover, they need to implement structural reforms to ensure that the economy does not become overly dependent on remittances. This includes diversifying the economy, improving the business environment, and investing in human capital to increase labor productivity and participation.

As developing economies progress, effectively harnessing these financial resources can be a powerful tool to drive long-term growth and maximize the benefits of the incoming cash while mitigating its potential downsides.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Quick Take on How Remittances Affect Economies appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

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The authors then delved into Indian society, claiming that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu organization formed in 1925, engages in violence against ā€œunarmed, unsuspecting civilians ā€¦ using batons, machetes, strangulation, sulfuric acid to the face and rape, among other horrors.ā€ They drew an ill-considered comparison between Israelā€™s illegal settlements in the West Bank and the actions of cow vigilante groups affiliated with the RSS.

The authors also referenced the horrors of the 2002 Gujarat riots but presented a biased account of the train compartment burning, an event that incinerated 58 Hindu sadhus. They labeled the communal riots as ā€œstate-sponsored terrorism.ā€ The authors further alleged that the US has turned a blind eye to the ā€œantidemocratic and all-too-violent national visionsā€ of India and Israel.

As an Indian student, Iā€™ve identified numerous inconsistencies in the article. I find many of these allegations baseless and inconsiderate. Therefore, I am presenting a point-by-point rebuttal of the article.

Muslims receive special treatment despite Islamā€™s violent past

India’s geographical landscape has a complex history shaped by over a millennium of military campaigns. During these, the Islamic invaders progressed relatively slowly compared to the rest of the world. For instance, the Arabs Sindh multiple times starting in 636 AD, and finally seized the province in 711 AD. It took Islamic forces over 300 years to capture Kabul and nearly 500 years to conquer Delhi. Nonetheless, after a valiant resistance, the Brahman Shahi Sultanate of Kabul fell to the Ghaznavid Empire in 1026 AD.

After that, Islamic invasions in the Indian heartland became more brutal and frequent. After the of Tarain in 1192 AD, Islamic rule was established in Delhi. It lasted until 1858 when the Mughal Empire was replaced by the British Empire. During these 650 years, it was the minority Muslims ā€” mostly Turks, Central Asians and Persians ā€” who ruled over the majority of Hindus. During this period, the official of India was Persian and the religion was Sunni Islam. Muslim rulers desecrated and countless Hindu temples. Surprisingly, this historical context is completely overlooked in contemporary debates of Hindu-Muslim relations.

From 1858, the British exhibited a preference for Muslims, recruiting them into civil and military positions in disproportionate numbers. This is evident in the Census of India, 1911 : Muslims constituted only 21.24% of India’s total population but made up 41.94% of the ā€œservice of the state,ā€ and 50.33% of the police force. Even in higher salary ranges, Muslims were disproportionately represented, with 37.9% earning more than ā‚¹400 salaries compared to 41.3% for Hindus. According to Pakistani military historian Major Agha H Amin, this policy of preferential recruitment a fundamental reason for the Partition of India.

The extraordinarily tolerant Republic of India

Driven by the demands of the Muslim League, the Partition of India resulted in the bifurcation of the ancient geography along communal lines. Post-partition India embraced Hindu values of inclusivity, tolerance and peace. This is reflected in Part III of the Constitution, containing four articles under to protect the freedom of religion. These articles serve as the foundation for ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s engagement with all religions, granting every religious group the right to manage their religious affairs without state interference.

Furthermore, the constitution safeguards the rights of minorities under Articles and , with the latter specifically designed to protect the rights of religious and linguistic minorities. However, the worldā€™s longest constitution does not define the term ā€œminority.ā€ This empowers the Muslim community to establish and manage religious and educational institutions such as madrasas ā€” schools that specialize in Islamic teachings ā€” with little or no oversight. These schools also receive from the secular government of India, yet the state is not empowered to decide their and recruitment patterns.

Additionally, madrasas also receive largely foreign funding. India even allows establishments such as Darul Uloom Seminary, situated in Deoband, Uttar Pradesh. This madrasa is infamously known as the ideological of the Taliban. After independence, India disregarded any perceived animosity towards Muslims and granted them equal rights, if not more, in the newly established democratic republic.

Indian Muslims are governed under the Sharia

While independent India granted equal rights to all citizens, it faced challenges in reforming the Muslim society. The successive governments did not replace the British-era of 1937. Initially designed to create distinctions between Hindus and Muslims in the lead-up to the partition, this legislation granted numerous privileges to Muslims.

The act permits a Muslim man to have up to four wives, stipulates that Muslim men only need to pay alimony for three months, allows double inheritance for sons compared to daughters and includes several provisions that can never be permitted in other democracies. (, an Islamic form of divorce whereby a Muslim man can legally end a marriage by saying ā€œtalaqā€ ā€” ā€œdivorceā€ in Arabic ā€” three times, was allowed until the Indian Government repealed it in 2018.) The successive governments also viewed Muslim society as a vote bank. They continue viewing Muslims through the lens of maulvis, Muslim doctors of law. This meant abhorring any possibility of reforming the Muslim Personal Law. Hence, Muslims of the worldā€™s largest democracy are still governed under Sharia.

In 1973, the Muslim society formed the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB). This body acts as the highest religious and legal authority over Islamic laws in India. The AIMPLBā€™s stated is to ā€œeradicate all non-Islamic rituals and customs in [the] Muslim community.ā€

This body is predominantly filled with ulemas, groups of Muslim scholars with special knowledge of Islamic theology and law. Their qualifications are generally shady. The AIMPLB has a checkered history: The organization has opposed , the right to , an increase in womenā€™s age and marriages. They support return to Kabul and desire to open in a constitutional democracy, the latter of which would create a second judicial system that would diminish the value of the first. Most recently, the body called terror attacks a ā€œnatural reaction to Israeli atrocities.ā€

While AIMPLB lacks executive powers, their influence on Muslim voters makes them an extremely important part of Indian politics.

The Government of India also introduced a distinctive safeguard for Muslim religious bodies through the . First implemented in 1954, this globally unparalleled legislation grants governing rights over religious and charitable lands to Muslims. No other religious group in India has such a favorable regime for religious land management.

The necessity for this legislation arose in the aftermath of the Partition of India. Many Muslims migrated to Pakistan, leaving their properties in India behind. Consequently, the Indian Government decided that their properties should be allocated exclusively to Muslims. The Wakf Act, 1954 established , Muslim committees that dedicate property permanently to religious or charitable ends, to oversee this process.

This act was later replaced by the Waqf Act, 1995. It granted expanded powers to the waqf boards. Under this act, waqf boards practically have the authority to claim any in India as their own. Unsurprisingly, they rank as the third-largest landowners in India, following the army and railways. The shrewd nature of this act has drawn from legal luminaries and scholars, with concerns about its constitutionality. Regardless, it is still in effect in India.

As a result, the Muslim society enjoys not just constitutional equality but also preferential treatment in the form of Sharia-driven laws, AIMPLB and the Waqf Act, from the Indian state. Considering this, writers who make exaggerated allegations about discrimination against Indian Muslims demonstrate a poor understanding of history and contemporary events. When the Indian Government decides to reform Muslim personal laws, regulate the obscure functioning of madrasas and form AIMPLB to ensure proper representation of Muslim society, it is blatantly ignorant and hypocritical to claim oppression.

Too many communities engage in hate speech but the Indian state does not discriminate

In recent years, India has witnessed several incidents of against Muslims. The and have understandably noticed such events and have enacted stringent legislation to address this menace.

Regrettably, acts of hate speech have been a facet of ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s ugly political landscape, given its multi-ethnic composition. In South India, social activist EV Ramaswamy was known in his heyday for making vociferous hate speeches against the . A spokesperson from the , the ruling party of the state of Tamil Nadu, recently made a speech calling for Brahmin genocide.

Radical groups are equally involved in several incidents of hate speech. Just two years ago, Muslim groups rioted, committed arson and openly called for the of Nupur Sharma after she quoted įø¤adÄ«th verses ā€” statements of words and actions of the Prophet Muhammad ā€” from Sahih Bukhari, a key Islamic text. In of India, every few months, radicals call for ā€œsar tan se juda.ā€ This Islamic slogan means, ā€œseparate the head from the body,ā€ and is a for the decapitation of blasphemers.

Therefore, it is essential to understand that these incidents of hate speech do not necessarily reflect the larger policy of the state or a community. Many such incidents arise due to the politicization of local sentiments. Hence, these hate speeches should more appropriately be viewed as law and order issues rather than indicative of the national sentiment.

The status of Indian Muslims remains unchanged, resembling the situation before. Consequently, India is a unique place where all varieties of Muslims, including Shia, Sunni and coexist as equal citizens in the republic. They represent diverse ethnicities such as Pashtun, Punjabi, Bihari, Gujarati, Bengali, Kannada, Kashmiri, Tamil and more. They have equal opportunities for education, work, mobility and sustenance, like other religious groups. In fact, Indian Muslims have far greater rights than Ahmadis in Pakistan, Sunnis in Iran and Shias in Saudi Arabia. Critics of India in The Atlantic, The Washington Post, The New York Times, the BBC, Al Jazeera and 51³Ō¹Ļ might do well to note that everyone in India, including Muslims of all denominations, are equal in the eyes of the law.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Does India Oppress Muslims? Not Now, Not Ever. Here’s Why. appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The CAA has proved controversial. Both the foreign press and much of the English-speaking media have accused the act of being anti-Muslim. The US State Department has said that it is concerned about the implementation of the CAA. In response, ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s Ministry of External Affairs has the US statement as “misplaced, misinformed, and unwarranted.”

It is time to take a step back and examine this legislation coolly. In fact, we must ask the operative question about the CAA: Why did the government pass this legislation? 

The dark view of the CAA

Asaduddin Owaisi, the leader of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen party “CAA is meant to only target Muslims, it serves no other purpose.ā€ In his long post on social media site X, this Muslim leader asserts, ā€œOnce religion is accepted as the basis of Indian citizenship, the next step is to deny it on religious grounds.ā€ Note that Owaisiā€™s party wanted the then feudal Hyderabad state ruled by an autocratic Nizam to join Pakistan in 1947, The Nizamā€™s militia, the Razakars, conducted of the rulerā€™s own Hindu majority population before Indian troops liberated the long-suffering Telugu, Marathi and Kannada people in his realm.

Keralaā€™s ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist) has called for state-wide protests as has the All Assam Students’ Union. Opponents take the view that the BJP is weakening the secular character of India. The communists blame the ruling party for practicing the politics of what Indians call ā€œcommunalismā€ or what some in the West might call majoritarianism. Opponents of the BJP argue that the party has announced the CAA rules as an opportunistic move to mobilize the Hindu votes just before the election.

Most international outlets such as the Qatari-funded Al Jazeera and the British government-backed BBC have also termed the CAA anti-Muslim. In fact, the BBCā€™s headline it all, ā€œCAA: India to enforce migrant law that excludes Muslims.ā€

The context of the CAA

Given the sound and fury generated by the CAA, examining the context behind the parliamentary act becomes critical. The legislation aims at  expediting citizenship for refugees who have suffered as members of persecuted minorities in three neighboring Islamic countries, one of whom is ruled by the Taliban. 

The CAA does not pertain to Muslims who are Indian citizens. The legislation does not exclude a single Indian Muslim from citizenship, making the BBCā€™s headline far from true. 

All the CAA does is give Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians living in India after having fled from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh a fast track to citizenship. Members of these persecuted minority religions must have migrated to India before December 31, 2014. The BBC a big deal about the fact that ā€œthe new law does not cover those fleeing persecution in non-Muslim majority countries, including Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka.ā€ It also says that the CAA does not cover Rohingya Muslim refugees from neighboring Myanmar.

Such arguments are specious because existing provisions allow all refugees to claim citizenship,including Muslims. In 2016, India Pakistani singer Adnan Sami citizenship. The Indian government grants other Muslims like him Indian passports too.

Both the BBC and the State Department could do well to note that the CAA is only emulating the 1990 . The US Congress passed this legislation to facilitate the resettlement of Jews from the former Soviet Union. It was ā€œlater expanded to include persecuted religious minorities in other countries, such as Jews, Christians, Bahaā€™is, Sabaean-Mandaeans, and Zoroastrians from Iran.ā€

India is only offering an expedited path to citizenship to refugees from minority groups who have been subjected to ethnic cleansing, not just discrimination. Afghanistan, Pakistan and even Bangladesh have practiced a conscious policy of exterminating non-Muslim minorities for decades. 

The reality of Islamist South Asian nations

In 1992, Sikhs and Hindus numbered 200,000 in Afghanistan. Even before the Taliban took over a second time, this number had dropped to 500 by 2018. Today, there are practically no Sikhs or Hindus left in Afghanistan. The Taliban views both these communities as pagan kafirs who can be raped, tortured, enslaved and killed. 

The Sikhs and Hindus who lived in Afghanistan for decades have now fled to India as have the handful of Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians. The Taliban did not even spare statues and both the priceless ancient Bamiyan statues of the Buddha. India owes these persecuted people of minority religions in fundamentalist Afghanistan some responsibility. The CAA seeks only to fulfill ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s moral duty. It is hypocritical and self-serving of Islamists and leftists to criticize a profoundly humanitarian legislation.

Pakistan is hardly more tolerant than Afghanistan. When British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan in 1947, the countries signed the , promising minorities equal rights. India has abided by that agreement and given all minorities equal rights. In fact, India gives minorities multiple protections that the Hindu majority lacks. For instance, minority educational institutions are run entirely by their religious organizations and many of them do not admit students of any other religion. This privilege is not available to Hindu institutions that are overseen and even administered by the state. In contrast, Pakistan is an expressly Muslim state where minorities are often raped, killed or forced to convert to Islam.

Innumerable reports have Pakistanā€™s genocidal treatment of its minorities. During the original sin of the partition in 1947, Pakistan engaged in ethnic cleansing of Hindus and Sikhs, which the state still celebrates. While the Indian state became a secular and democratic entity, Pakistan has become a factory for jihad, exporting violent terrorists around the world. Note that the Taliban was backed by Pakistanā€™s Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistani society has become increasingly more radicalized over time.

Unsurprisingly, minorities in Pakistan fell from 23% in 1947 to 3.7% in 2014. The figure today is even lower. Note that the population of Muslims in India both in absolute numbers and in percentage has grown since 1947. In other words, both the BBC and the State Department appear to be either mistakenly or deliberately maligning India for being anti-Muslim when in reality its policy is guided by the principle of giving refuge to minorities fleeing death and destruction in fundamentalist Islamist nations.

In 1971, India liberated Bangladesh despite opposition from the US. Henry Kissinger famously ignored the ā€œā€ of his own diplomat who detailed mass rape, brutal torture and mass killings by Pakistani troops. The Indian army chief was a Parsi, a Zoroastrian community that fled from Iran when Islam took root inĀ  the country. The general commanding troops on the eastern front was Sikh and Indian troops came from a variety of religions, regions and races.

Despite the contribution of such diverse actors in liberating Bangladesh, today this country has become intolerant. Non-Muslim communities are often killed and forced to convert. Their women are frequently raped. In 2001, no less than 200 of them were in a single incident. The United Nations has alarm over the fast-dwindling population of non-Muslim minorities in Bangladesh as a result of de facto ethnic cleansing.Ģż

±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s only concern is to give those who fled before 2014 a long overdue safe haven. Thanks to its reputation as a democratic, tolerant and inclusive society, religious minorities have fled to India for centuries as the cases of the Gujarati Parsis, the Kerala Jews and Syrian Christians demonstrate. Non-Muslims in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh have no place to go other than India. Those who came here before 2014 need a sanctuary. India has done the just and right thing by implementing the CAA, which the BBC, Al Jazeera and the State Department could and should make the effort to understand.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Western Press Gets CAA Wrong: Here Is the Truth About the New Law appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

PTI-supported candidates netted a large number of seats. At time of recording, they had 102 seats in parliament (now 93). The number of seats required to form a majority is 169. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifā€™s Pakistan Muslim League (PML) had won 73 (now 75). Former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardariā€™s Pakistan Peopleā€™s Party (PPP) had won 54. The Jamaat-e-Islami ideological party, which has always pushed the Islamist agenda, lost all its seats.

Everything that occurs in Pakistanā€™s political scene does so under the watch of the corrupt GHQ. Was this election rigged? And can we expect from the new administration?

Is conspiracy at play?

In a fair election, the PTI would be the clear winner. The people overwhelmingly support Khan, seeing him as a challenger of the corrupt establishment. The public has lost faith in their irresponsible government and rejected radical parties.

Many voters believe the election was rigged. If it was, then it was done skillfully. The GHQ did not let the PTI take the majority of seats, which likely would have happened in a fair election. They afforded them less than a majority.

In Pakistanā€™s electoral process, the initial vote is counted and signed on a paper called Form 45 and the final vote on Form 47. Voters allege the signed document here was quite different from the final result. Thus, many cases are going to the Court of Appeals to contest the result.

Some people believe this situation is a shadow game between the US and China; that Khan is backed by China and the GHQ is following the US. As the expression goes, ā€œAllah, Army and Americaā€ have guided Pakistan since independence.

This conspiracy theory may have some merit. While Khan was in power, he did not promote the Chinaā€“Pakistan Economic Corridor Sharif had negotiated. There is no evidence linking Khan to China, as he has never strongly favored them but he certainly favors Beijing over Washington, DC.

Pakistanā€™s dire situation

Rampant corruption is only one of Pakistanā€™s terrible problems. The country is politically dysfunctional and economically broken. Employment is scarce, demoralizing young Pakistanis and making them seek opportunities elsewhere. Pakistan has with neighboring India and Afghanistan, as they have had years of conflict and cross-border terrorism.

To escape their economic crisis, Pakistan has once again gone to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for support. Thanks to their history as a frontline state in the Cold War, they will not get much funding from the IMF or the US. Chinaā€™s debt relief may only be available in small doses, as their own economy is suffering under President Xi Jinping.

Because the government has failed to provide for its people, religiosity and radicalization are increasing across the nation. This opposition, surprisingly, is overwhelmingly coming from Punjabis. In many ways, Pakistan is basically Punjabian ā€” the army, bureaucracy and business class are filled with people from the Punjab region of eastern Pakistan and northwestern India.

Pakistani youths are tired of corruption and want the government to improve the country’s standing with India. In fact, a recent found that 69% of Pakistani youths aged 18-34 favor better relations with India.

Imran, Nawaz and Bilawal

The GHQ opposes Imran Khan. The Muslim playboy and retired cricket champion was once their golden boy. That changed when he gained power in 2018, as he began questioning their orders. In June 2019, then-Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Asim Munir, Khan with proof of his wifeā€™s corruption. Khan responded pettily by removing him from service and refusing to promote him. For this offense, the GHQ sought his removal.

In March 2022, Pakistani and US diplomats held a meeting. Khan took a secretive cipher document from this meeting and it in a public forum, claiming it was proof of a conspiracy against him. This illegal disclosure of state secrets was just one of his misdeeds; he had also abused his power to get private from public gifts and married Bushra Bibi against Islamic law. In October 2023, Khan was sentenced to 24 years in prison, and Bibi received 14.

Times and public opinion change. In 2018, then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was an unpopular politician who could not do anything right. Now he and Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, son of the late prime minister Benazir Bhutto, are back in the publicā€™s good graces.

Pakistanā€™s future

The next prime minister, whoever that may be, will determine Pakistanā€™s future. The nationā€™s new darling, Bhutto Zardari, was highly critical of India, calling their prime minister the ā€œButcher of Gujarat.ā€ Yet the GHQ brought back Sharif, who wants to improve relations with India. A cabinet with both politicians would be incongruous. Are the GHQ for or against India?

If Pakistan is to correct itself, it must construct a coalition and have a civilian government stabilize the country. If Nawaz becomes the prime minister, he and his family may be able to effectively fix the economy. He will likely try to initiate regular trade with India.

As people say, the GHQ’s motto is ā€œlose all wars but win all elections.ā€ Pakistanā€™s hatred of India will not improve their economy. Someone in charge needs the courage to decide the stateā€™s best interest ā€” Indian trade is the correct answer. If the new government can get past their hostility, Pakistan might get a sorely needed change. Ending violence against Afghanistan and building trust with them would be another move toward prosperity.

Pakistanā€™s hyper-Islamic ideology is not enough to support its peopleā€™s needs. Once the new prime minister is chosen, we will have to see if a popular resistance movement emerges or another crisis erupts.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FOĀ° Talks: Pakistan’s New Election Might Have Been Rigged appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Every now and then, I feel despair over the plight of Pakistan. We are hurtling toward catastrophe, but nobody wants to hear about it or do anything to avert it. For years, I have been ranting like Nietzscheā€™s fool with a lantern: It is coming. It is coming. I do not know where and how. We stand on a volcano. We feel it tremble, we hear it roar, how and when and where it will burst and who will be destroyed by its eruption, it is beyond the ken of mortals to discern.

Somehow, our history has gone astray. We were such good people when we set out on the road to Pakistan. What happened? An evil spirit now hangs over Pakistan. The people are too tired, too disappointed, too disillusioned, too often betrayed and too ill-informed to comprehend the issues churning beneath the placid surface of life. Depression, fear, frustration and anger no longer have an outlet in politics. The people have, therefore, turned inward, to religious orthodoxy, to intolerance, the small things in life, to local politics and impotent rage.

It is as if all the time one was boiling inside with some kind of helpless indignation, enraged to see such a good country going to hell, and going to hell with such cruelty and waste. People are watching with increasing apprehension the country going downhill, its strength gradually sapped by dissension and divisions. Trust in institutions is at historic lows. It is impossible to be calm and quiet in a country that is going downhill, going to hell. A country that tolerates a situation in which people begrimed with corruption rule, is a sick country.

Today Pakistan, a broken landscape of empty, sagging state institutions, superficially intact but visibly shredded, is at war with itself. The drums of secession are beating loud and clear in the smaller provinces. Today the threat to Pakistan is not external. It is internal. This brings to mind Toynbee’s comment that a civilization doesn’t die from being invaded from the outside but rather commits suicide.

Many early symptoms that heralded the decline of Rome may be seen in our own nation today: periodic military intervention in the affairs of state, prolonged military rule, concentration of power in one corrupt ruler without responsibility and accountability, contempt for the constitution and political institutions, absence of the rule of law, high-level corruption and greed. When the history of Pakistan comes to be written, the verdict of history will be, almost certainly, that corrupt civilian and military dictatorships, more than anything else, destroyed Pakistan.

Today the biggest single burning issue before the country is this: How do we put the country back on the rails? How do we get back on the right path to a democratic Pakistan? Above all, how do we reclaim the army from its abuse by a power-hungry junta that wants to use it as an instrument for grabbing and retaining political power?

It is now abundantly clear, except to those who are blind or on drugs, that if Pakistan is to survive, the army must be placed outside the turbulent arena of political conflict. As a direct consequence of military intervention in October 1958, we lost half the country in 1971. Our Bengali compatriots parted company with us when we drifted away from the democratic path. They saw no future for themselves in a military-dominated Pakistan and broke the country in two.

Complacency keeps Pakistan from creating the democracy it needs

ā€œMan learns nothing from history,ā€ Hegel once said, ā€œexcept that man learns nothing from history.ā€ The secession of East Pakistan made it abundantly clear that the federation cannot survive except as a democratic state based on the principle of sovereignty of the people and supremacy of civilian rule. Pakistan cannot survive under military rule ā€” direct or indirect, thinly disguised or not, with or without a civilian faƧade ā€” because military rule lacks legitimacy and is doomed to failure. Pakistan will never be what it can be, let alone what it will need to be, without a genuine democratic setup.

Today, all the historical symptoms which one meets prior to great changes exist in Pakistan. The country appears to be adrift. Nobody knows where it was headed without wise and mature leadership to guide or direct it. We are on the verge of a political and economic collapse. The social contract between the government and the people has collapsed. The dialogue between the rulers and the ruled has broken down.

All the philosophers tell the people they are the strongest, and that if they are sent to the slaughterhouse, it is because they have let themselves be led there. Autocracy is retreating everywhere except in Pakistan. Why? In other countries there are men and women who love liberty more than they fear persecution. Not in Pakistan. Here, the middle class, which owes everything to this poor country, does not think in terms of Pakistan and her honor but of their families, their jobs, their business interests, etc. Surrender rather than sacrifice is the theme of their thoughts and conversations.

To such as these, talk of resisting autocracy is as embarrassing as finding yourself in the wrong clothes at a party, as tactless as challenging a legless man to a race, as out of place as a bugle call in a mortuary. Every now and then, one hears some of them reciting the verses of Horace: ā€œOh how much wiser is he who rather than go to war [against despotism] stays at home, caressing the breast of his mistress.ā€ I am exasperated at those camping comfortably on the edge of a volcano, who do not see disaster looming ahead. What is tragic is the total failure of the politicians, the intelligentsia, in fact, the whole of civil society to comprehend the internal threat and to devise ways and means to thwart it.

What is more intriguing is that the rhythm of life remains, more or less, unchanged. ā€œEverything seems,ā€ as Goethe said, ā€œto be following its normal course, because even in terrible moments in which everything is at stake people go on living as if nothing were happening.ā€ In Pakistan, as in geology, things can look perfectly stable on the surface ā€” until the tectonic plate shifts underneath. The straws in the wind are there. Time will show whether there are enough of them to make a bale of hay.

If you want to see the chasm between the grotesquely rich and the abjectly poor, come to Pakistan. A privileged few own the country and all the resources of life; The rest just pray or die. Pakistan today is a land of opportunities for corrupt, unscrupulous, unprincipled politicians holding fake degrees, dishonest civil servants, smugglers and tax evaders who have fat bank accounts, luxurious villas, mansions and apartments in the West. A great divide, a yawning chasm ā€” some call it a new Iron Curtain ā€” separates them from their less fortunate countrymen whose life is ā€œnasty, brutish and shortā€. They have a stake in the status quo, or the system, as they call it. While life at the top gets cushier, millions of jobless people and those at the bottom of the social ladder are forced to resort to crime merely to survive. Many of them are fleeing the country and desperately trying to escape to the false paradises of the Middle East and the West. The rich are getting richer, while the poor are sinking deeper and deeper into a black hole.

The state of things has been so insufferable that one longs for it to be decided, as it must be now, one way or another. Unfortunately, the tyranny of the status quo is too strong and only a major crisis can produce a real change.

Pakistan will need a revolution

When we organize with one another, when we get involved, when we stand up and speak out together, we can create a power no government can suppress. We live in a beautiful country. But those who have nothing but contempt for the people and no respect for democracy, freedom or justice have taken it over. It is up to all of us to take it back. And as Margaret Mead said, ā€œnever doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.ā€ Those who support the corrupt order are standing against the irreversible march of history and are doomed to failure.

ā€œRevolution inevitably erupts when rising economic and social aspirations are not met by political institutions.ā€ So said Samuel Huntington. A fair, equitable and corruption-free tax system must be primary objective of a democratically elected government. It is now incontestable that the French, Russian and American revolutions had a common financial origin. All began as protest against unjust taxation. The years preceding the outbreak of revolution in France, Russia and America, to name only three, witnessed unusually serious economic and fiscal difficulties. Pakistan too is facing economic collapse. Rampant inflation has devastated the majority of Pakistanis. The poor are on the verge of starvation; indeed people are dying for a bag of flour.

Flashback to 1789. Like today’s Pakistan, France was a striking example of a rich society with an impoverished government. The end of the old regime in France in 1789 was brought about by an inequitable, unfair and unjust taxation system and a cash-flow crisis. Physical exhaustion precipitated the French Revolution.

Revolution comes of its own accord, un-engineered by anyone, and is born in the chaos of the collapse of the state. In the French revolution, the Bastille was assaulted by washerwomen who could not get soap.

One of the earliest and most spectacular acts of the great uprising in Paris in July 1789 was to pursue the economic vampires who were widely rumored to have secreted away their booty. ā€œTremble, you who suck the blood of poor unhappy wretchesā€, warned Marat. ā€œThese blood suckers either give an account of their larceny and restore to the nation what they have stolen or else, be delivered to the blade of law.ā€ Today, Pakistan is on the cusp of such a revolution. Never before have so few plundered so many.

The country appears to be adrift. Terror is the order of the day. Talibans are resurgent and anti-American anger is boiling over. Pakistan is sliding into anarchy. Pakistan is in ā€œgreat disorder,ā€ ā€œexcellent situation,ā€ to quote Mao Zedong.

One of the lessons of history is that, when hunger and anger come together, people sooner or later come on to the streets and demonstrate Lenin’s maxim that in such situations voting with oneā€™s feet is more effective than voting in elections. The bringing together of anger with hunger is like the meeting of two live wires. At their touch, a brilliant incandescence of light and heat occurs. Just what and who will be consumed in the heat is hard to tell.

The state of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan reminds me of the telegram from an Austrian general responding to his German counterpart toward the end of World War I. The German general described the situation in his sector of the eastern front as ā€œserious, but not catastrophic.ā€ In the Austrian sector, came the reply, ā€œthe situation is catastrophic but not serious.ā€ In Pakistan, the situation is serious verging on catastrophic.

Ordinary Pakistanis are sick and tired of the corrupt power game being played in Pakistan. While there is no sign yet of a spring tide, millions of tiny waves are lapping the shores of despair. Our only chance is to rise against these practitioners of grand larceny who are looting and plundering this poor country with impunity.

It is time to wake up. Let Pakistan be Pakistan again. Let it be the dream it used to be ā€” a dream that is almost dead today. All those who see the perils of the future must draw together and take resolute measures to put Pakistan back on course before the tsunami catches up and hits us all. The longer we allow the waters to rise, the greater the catastrophe that will follow the bursting of the dam. Our window of opportunity is getting narrower and narrower by the day. It will, no doubt, be an uphill struggle to redeem our democracy and fashion it once again into a vessel to be proud of.

At a time like this, people detest those who remain passive, who remain silent, and love only those who fight, who dare. In this transcendent struggle, neutrality is not an option. You’re either with the people or against them. It is as simple as that. One thing is clear. The day is not far off when status quo will shift, corrupt, inept rulers will get their just desserts, and people will once again believe in the ā€œpower of the powerless.ā€

Enough corruption!

No military dictator and no corrupt civilian ruler can afford an independent judiciary or an independent media. They cannot co-exist. Today, both are under attack in democratic Pakistan.

In Thomas Paineā€™s words, ā€œthese are times that try men’s souls. The best lack all conviction while the worst are full of passionate intensity. The summer soldier and sunshine patriot will in this crisis shrink from the services of his country, but he who serves it now deserves the love and thanks of man and woman.ā€ It is not enough to sit back and let history slowly evolve. To settle back into your cold-hearted acceptance of the status quo is not an option. The present leadership is taking Pakistan to a perilous place. The course they are on leads downhill. This is a delicate time, full of hope and trepidation in equal measure. Today, it is a political and moral imperative for all patriotic Pakistanis to fight for our core values, to destroy the roots of the evil that afflicts Pakistan.

Once the civil service, in the words of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was the backbone of the state. No longer. Successive governments have reduced public servants to the level of domestic servants. The service we inherited on independence, known for its integrity, objectivity and political neutrality, has over the years been thoroughly mutilated, demoralized, emasculated, politicized, corrupted and changed beyond recognition. It is now a ghost of its former self.

Not surprisingly, when tragedy struck in the greatest flood in our history, one-fifth of the country went underwater, and millions of people were rendered homeless, there was nobody to look after them. Elected representatives of the people just vanished and were not to be seen anywhere. Civil administration was paralyzed. The lesson of history is that when the dykes of administration crumble, revolutions begin.

In the farcical system we have today, things are not what they appear to be. Realism does not exist in Islamabad, because life in Islamabad is itself a fiction. The constitution says one thing. What happens on the ground is something quite different. Behind the constitution, there is an unwritten constitution which governs the state.

Here in Islamabad, there is nothing but the nauseating stench of resignation. With every passing day, the tide of hope recedes, revealing the unpleasant mud that the souls of slaves are made of. Is it our destiny that there must always be darkness at high noon, there must always be a line of shadow against the sun? We need people who will stand up and say: Enough! Enough

This is not acceptable in the 21st century. Why is the better sort of the nation so silent today? Why have the intellectuals adopted ā€œthe genre of silenceā€? Why is there no public outrage? Why is there no loud protest? ā€œWhere are the men to be found who will dare to speak up,ā€ as Voltaire said? The creative intellectuals have been driven to ramshackle ivory towers or bought off. Show me an educated man with a silver spoon in Pakistan today, and I will show you a man without a spine.

Pakistan is a case of failed leadership, not failed state. Until we get the right kind of leadership, Pakistan will continue to oscillate between long periods of authoritarianism and bouts of corrupt and sham democracy. I am a short-term pessimist but a long-term optimist. I have this palpable feeling that the Maoist prescription ā€” things have to get worse before they get better ā€” is being tested in Pakistan today.

These are dangerous times in our country. These are also anti-elitist times. Pakistan is seething in ferment and in disarray. Under an imbecile and feeble government, as we have today, there is but one step from discontent to revolution. A sad situation but true.

Farewell our dreams, our sublime illusions, our hopes, our independence and our sovereignty. Today the survival of the country, its hard-won democracy, its independent judiciary, its liberties all are on the line. No one is safe, and perhaps no place on earth more closely resembles Hobbesā€™ description of a stage of nature in which life is ā€œnasty, brutish and short.ā€

Pakistan is rudderless and sliding into darkness. It is like a nightmare in which you foresee all the horrible things which are going to happen and canā€™t stretch out your hand to prevent them. Such is the feeling conjured up by corrupt, inept rulers of Pakistan as it enters a period of great uncertainty and sinks deeper and deeper into the quagmire. I reproduce below some lines, relevant to our situation today, from an unknown writer about a railway accident:

Who is in charge of the clattering train?

The axles creak, and the couplings strain.

For the pace is hot, and the points are near,

And Sleep hath deadened the driverā€™s ear:

And signals flash through the night in vain.

Death is in charge of the clattering train!

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Pakistan Has Lost Its Way, but the People Are Powerful appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Religious extremism is a growing problem in Pakistan

The situation worsened as members of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, joined in. They used mosques and public spaces to make emotional announcements, encouraging people to gather at the site of the alleged incident.

A mob gathered around the Salvation Army church soon after, forcing vendors nearby to close shop immediately. The church was along with other smaller churches in the vicinity.

According to a pastor, Imran Bhatti, a total of five churches were targeted and subjected to vandalism and arson. Among the places of worship that fell victim to this heinous act were the United Presbyterian Church, Allied Foundation Church and Shehroonwala Church, all of which are located in the Isa Nagri vicinity. The assailants went so far as to desecrate a nearby Christian cemetery, leaving a trail of vandalised graves. A section of the compound wall was demolished as well.

The recent incident in Faisalabad’s Jaranwala highlights Pakistan’s ongoing struggle against extremism. Simply such incidents does not address the root causes. Pakistanā€™s ambiguous blasphemy policies have created this crisis of religious bigotry. 

The Pakistan Penal Code has against insulting the Prophet Muhammad. It reads, in part, ā€œderogatory remarks, etc, in respect of the Holy Prophet [Muhammad] either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.ā€ However, the constitution (Article ) also guarantees the right to a fair trial. Despite this, judges in blasphemy cases often feel pressured to convict, even when evidence is lacking, due to the fear of physical violence by vigilante groups.

While no judicial executions have yet occurred under these laws, there have been numerous cases of lynchings and street vigilantism against individuals accused of blasphemy, their legal representatives and those who oppose such laws.

How can we reform the law?

In today’s world, marked by social progress is a critical need to reaffirm our commitment to diversity and combat intolerance. These goals offer hope for a more inclusive and harmonious future, but it’s important to recognize that, while they point the way, humans must actively work towards these goals themselves.

Reforming blasphemy laws is crucial. Outdated laws that limit individual freedoms have no place in a diverse and expressive world. Revisiting and amending these laws can protect individuals from unjust persecution for their beliefs and expressions. The recent events in Jaranwala highlight the urgent need for concrete actions that go beyond words. Pakistan must work to eliminate extremism and preserve its minority populations.

In the intricacies that characterize interfaith relations, lack of education plays a significant role in escalating tensions. Ignorance and misinformation thrive when people lack proper knowledge and understanding. In a world where quality education is a privilege, not everyone has the opportunity to objectively assess religious matters. Many people have limited access to information, making them susceptible to manipulation and extremist influences. This vulnerability can lead to tragic incidents like the recent attack in Jaranwala. Education is essential in fostering tolerance and preventing such conflicts

Considering our changing educational landscape, comprehensive education reforms must be prioritised. As we mold the minds of future generations, our curriculum must incorporate values like religious tolerance, critical thinking and human rights. Religious tolerance, in particular, is a fundamental building block of a harmonious society.

In incidents like these, one key lesson is consistent: In a society guided by the rule of law, no one should act as judge, jury and executioner. The recent rise in incidents where individuals resort to violence against the accused without due process and evidence is not only deeply troubling but also undermines the foundations of justice on which the nation was built on. This perpetuates a dangerous cycle of vigilantism. While emotions can run high in the face of terrible crimes or perceived injustices, it’s vital to remember that the legal system is designed for fairness and impartiality.

When people take matters into their own hands, they risk compromising the integrity of the judicial process.The principle of ā€œinnocent until proven guiltyā€ is fundamental in any civilized society. It safeguards against wrongful convictions and protects the rights of the accused. By bypassing this principle and resorting to violence, individuals not only deny the accused a fair trial but also implicate themselves in the process.

Although, instances such as burning the Holy Quran in the name of freedom of expression or ridiculing religious leaders by non-believers may result in friction and provide obstacles, the accused must be punished only through the due process of law.

Pakistanis ought to appreciate that an individualā€™s religious views are delicate and emotive standpoint. The creation of Pakistan was driven by the desire of the Muslim population in the Indo-Pak peninsula to establish an autonomous nation that would safeguard their religious freedom and enable them to freely practice their faith. The colors of the national flag symbolise the equal rights and unrestricted autonomy to observe religious beliefs of all faiths in the nation. 

To tackle these issues effectively, we can take some more concrete steps. Firstly, both the state and civil society can carry out vital public awareness campaigns. They should focus on revealing the severe consequences of false accusations and offer guidance on how to handle such situations if they arise. Equally important is to speak out individually, in journalism, in social media and in personal conversations, to foster the value of tolerance and an attitude of understanding.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Pakistan Has to Do Something About Religious Extremism appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Bhuttoā€™s opportunistic rise to power

Bhutto entered politics under President Iskandar Ali Mirza as a cabinet member in 1955. In 1958, President Muhammad Ayub Khan, the first military dictator of Pakistan, appointed Bhutto commerce minister and he went on to hold other cabinet posts. In 1963, Bhutto was appointed foreign minister and became a proponent of Operation Gibraltar. This was Pakistanā€™s military strategy to incite insurgency among the Muslim-majority population in the Kashmir Valley. Bhutto advised Ayub Khan to infiltrate Kashmir, assuring him Pakistan would walk away victorious. However, as a result of poor planning and execution, the infiltrators’ presence was quickly discovered by the Indian military, resulting in their defeat. 

In early 1966, India and Pakistan signed the Tashkent Declaration to resolve the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. Bhutto negotiated this treaty but, soon afterwards, claimed that the peace treaty to which Bhutto himself was a party was signed unilaterally by Ayub Khan. To be precise, Bhutto backstabbed Ayub Khan. 

This populist politician dishonestly argued that Pakistan was denied a victory thanks to Ayub Khanā€™s deal with India and started a movement against his boss. Bhutto resigned as foreign minister and launched the PPP on an Islamic socialist platform. Bhutto caused the downfall of Ayub Khan and another military general named Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan took charge in 1969.

Yahya Khan announced an election in 1970. Bhuttoā€™s PPP won in West Pakistan, the modern-day Pakistan. The Bangladesh Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman triumphed in East Pakistan, modern-day Bangladesh. After 1947, Pakistan comprised both West and East Pakistan, both of them separated by around 2,000 kilometers with India in between. West Pakistan tended to dominate and imposed Urdu on its eastern cousins. In 1970, Mujibur Rahman won the overall majority but this caused unease among the West Pakistan elites.

Many in West Pakistan, including Yahya Khan and Bhutto saw Awami League’s Six Point Movement as an attempt to divide the country. Bhutto refused to accept an Awami League government and charmingly threatened to “break the legs” of any elected PPP member who dared to attend the inaugural session of the National Assembly, Pakistanā€™s parliament. Bhuttoā€™s intransigence created a political and constitutional crisis.

The military annulled the elections. Mujibur Rahman called Bengalis to join him in the struggle for Bangladesh. He was jailed but a full-blown struggle for independence erupted. The Pakistani Army committed awful human rights abuses, including indiscriminate killings, torture and mass rape. Refugees fled across the border and India intervened on behalf of Bangladesh. The Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 led to catastrophic defeat for the Pakistani Army and the liberation of Bangladesh. Yahya Khan stepped down and Bhutto took over.

Bhuttoā€™s achievements and failings as Pakistanā€™s leader

Bhutto rescued the 93,000 West Pakistani troops that became prisoners of war in India after signing the Shimla Agreement, a peace treaty signed between Pakistan and India in 1972. The agreement put an end to the India-Pakistan conflict and the diplomatic recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan. On the whole, this agreement turned out to be very favorable for Pakistan because Bhutto won great gains on empty promises to India. After the Shimla Agreement, Bhutto became a savior for retrieving thousands of Pakistani troops and wresting diplomatic victory from the jaws of military defeat. This was the high watermark of his leadership.

±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s League of Internationalists

While Bhutto deserves praise for his deft diplomacy during the Shimla Agreement, his economic policies are more controversial. Bhutto lurched to the left in his economic policies. After all, he had promised his people Islamic socialism and proceeded to implement a policy of widespread nationalization. The Pakistani government took over key industries, banks and private enterprises. 

Like other left-leaning policies, Bhuttoā€™s socialism intended to reduce economic disparities and promote public ownership. However, it led to inefficiency, reduced productivity and a decline in private sector investment. Bhuttoā€™s socialism gave too much power to the Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), leading to red tape, inefficiency, corruption, increasing transaction costs, and crushing businesses. 

Bhuttoā€™s critics not only blame him for the military defeats of 1965 and 1971 but also brutal repression in Balochistan. Bhutto sacked two provincial governments within six months, arrested the chief ministers, two governors and 44 legislators. In 1973, he launched a military crackdown on Balochistan that caused thousands of deaths and led to massive human rights abuses. It was under his leadership that Pakistanā€™s parliament passed a law declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims in 1974. 

Many blame Bhutto for this highly discriminatory sectarian law but others point out that it was the National Assembly that passed this legislation. Bhutto was just a politician who followed the mob instead of a leader who pointed to a promised land. Because of his reputation for loving wine, women and song, he banned alcohol for Muslims to appease the mullahs. They had been growing in power since independence in 1947 because Pakistan was a largely illiterate country. These mullahs were criticizing Bhutto and, once he gave in on alcohol, they pushed hard on the Ahmadi issue. Ironically, Ahmadis were some of the greatest votaries of Pakistan, great entrepreneurs and one of them was the father of the Pakistani atom bomb.

Even Bhuttoā€™s critics give him credit for his foreign policy though. He promoted secular internationalism as well as bolstering relations with the Islamic world. Relations with both communist China and Wahhabi Saudi Arabia improved during Bhuttoā€™s tenure. In 1973, his government drafted the current constitution of Pakistan, following which he appointed Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry as president and assumed the newly-empowered role of prime minister. Bhutto also initiated Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which ultimately led to his country developing an atom bomb. 

To this day, Bhuttoā€™s supporters defend him. Some even support his economic policies, claiming they increased social justice and reduced income inequality. Nasir Khilji points out that postcolonial states were going through a socialist zeitgeist. Bhuttoā€™s Indian counterpart Indira Gandhi turned even more socialist than him. The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) became even more powerful than the PAS. So, Bhutto deserves a benefit of doubt for adopting socialism. After all, he was a lawyer, not an economist.

To this day, Bhutto’s legacy is a matter of contention. Supporters laud his nationalism, secular internationalist agenda and diplomatic achievement, especially the Shimla Agreement. They give him credit for the atom bomb and the constitution, and consider him one of Pakistan’s greatest leaders. In contrast, his critics condemn him for Pakistanā€™s economic ruin, catastrophic military defeats and terrible human rights abuses. Khilji believes he was more of a villain than a hero. In a nutshell, his legacy is a deeply tortured one for his country and his region.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Truth About Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

In this episode of FOĀ° Podcasts, Bilal Rahmani explains exactly how the Taliban are transforming Afghanistan into an oppressive pariah state through rank incompetence and self-enriching policy decisions. Eventually, this downward spiral of corruption and violence could spell an end to the modern borders of Afghanistan. 

Economic stagnation and brutal oppression

Restoring some semblance of normalcy in the Talibanā€™s Afghanistan has been incredibly difficult. Policy around economic activity shifts on the whims of elder militant leaders. Some days, entire sectors, like womenā€™s beauty salons, are told to close. On other days, crops are simply not allowed to leave the country, killing exports. Operating on this shifting ground has created new risks in Afghanistanā€™s economy. Business planning has become impossible because the Taliban make economic policy on a whim. 

Land seizures by the Taliban are the most egregious example of a toxic economic environment. The Talibanā€™s Ministry of Justice is seizing agricultural or housing land en masse and redistributing it to Taliban leaders. These seizures force many Afghans off their land and deprive them of their livelihoods. Furthermore, these warlords are probably the least productive members of society. The land grab is making Taliban leaders rent-seeking parasitical landlords who live off the blood, sweat and toil of ordinary Afghans.

Just as the Taliban are deciding who are the winners in Afghanistanā€™s economy, they are also anointing the winners in society. The Taliban have deemed Pashtun men as the undisputed top dogs in Afghanistan. Fanatical Islamist policies that interpret the Koran literally deny women education, bar them from jobs, prevent them from traveling alone and reduce them to second-class members of society.

Even when women are given rights by the Taliban leadership ā€” often to appease international organizations or foreign governments ā€” ground-level Taliban members unleash violence and intimidation to ensure that women do not exercise their rights. Fearing for their safety, women are increasingly excluding themselves from normal social activities and living in hiding.

Ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks have also found themselves on the losing side of the new Taliban-led state that dispenses patronage overwhelmingly to Pashtuns. The Taliban are seizing ancestral Hazara and Tajik lands. There is a distinct punitive military character to the land seizures. Taliban leaders do not feel the need to negotiate with their historical ethnic rivals. Instead, they are following medieval tactics and using extreme military force and human rights abuses to take away land from those they consider their enemies.

The Taliban bait and switch and the future of Afghanistan

The Taliban have proved that they are neither competent nor cohesive. They are now targeting Pakistan to win domestic legitimacy. Simply put, the Taliban are using their insurgent tactics to take back their ancestral ethnic Pashtun lands in Pakistan and create Pashtunistan, a new state that reclaims the historic lands of the Pashtuns.

This shift in the Talibanā€™s paradigm has caught Pakistan napping. Ironically, Pakistanā€™s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) once backed the Taliban. This dreaded military intelligence wanted strategic depth against India and aimed to use Pashtun jihadis in Kashmir. Now that the Taliban are in charge, they do not feel beholden to the ISI. They have turned their guns on Pakistan itself. Alarmingly, Taliban forces have already clashed with Pakistani troops.

Some senior leaders in the Taliban do not want relations with Pakistan to deteriorate. They are resorting to both direct talks and shuttle diplomacy. Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, the ISI chief, Kabul recently to smooth ruffled feathers. In a very public appearance, he told journalists not to worry and that ā€œeverything would be okay.ā€ However, Hameed might be putting on a brave face because the more ethnonationalist members of the Taliban fanatically believe in the creation of Pashtunistan.

Just as the Taliban seek to redraw the borders of modern Afghanistan and Pakistan to benefit the Pashtun people, Afghanistanā€™s many ethnic groups have carved out their own centers of power for self-preservation. Militant rebellions have broken out. Mawlawi Mehdi Mujahid, a Hazara leader, and the National Resistance Front, composed chiefly of Tajiks, have rebelled. So far, the Taliban have been successful at quashing these rebellions. They deploy overwhelming force to quash the rebellion and maintain control over rebel territories. However, rebellions still keep erupting to challenge the Taliban.

Such rebellions will continue. During the Afghan Civil War, Abdul Rashid Dostum created a proto-state for ethnic Uzbek Afghans. With the Taliban repeatedly threatening the lives and livelihoods of ethnic minorities, they are bound to create Dostum-style enclaves for survival. At some point, multiple rebellions might erupt simultaneously and threaten Taliban rule.

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Make Sense of the Taliban-Ruled Afghanistan appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The grand dream of General Zia-ul-Haq, architect of Pakistanā€™s insurgent strategy, that Pakistan achieve geopolitical dominance in South Asia by facilitating domestic and international jihadist groups never seemed more in focus.

Now using its newfound allyā€™s resources, Pakistan could set its security problems to rest. The Taliban had adept combat capabilities and resilient from madrasas. They also carried the credibility based on their status as a Pashtun and Islamic group.

Pakistan placed its hopes in the ability of the Afghan Taliban to broker peace between Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban. The Taliban could further assist in fighting Islamic State ā€” Khorasan Province and militant groups in Balochistan and, ultimately, continue its ā€œGlobal Jihadā€ in Jammu and Kashmir.

Yet, the dream has been cut short by a rude awakening. The ISI has instead seen its assets tied up in a, major operations, continued and new with Afghanistan.

The Taliban havenā€™t been Pakistanā€™s geopolitical silver bullet; they may become one of its greatest existential challenges. Not only does Taliban-controlled Afghanistan pose new challenges to Pakistanā€™s security establishment, but it directly challenges Pakistanā€™s territorial integrity by igniting clashes at its border, inspiring insurgency in border provinces and sheltering new security vacuums Pakistan must fill or combat.

The Taliban had already planned their next steps for Global Jihad: pressure the Durand Line border from within Pakistan and from Afghanistan, establish shadow control over border areas and ultimately erase the Durand Line. Through this long-war strategy, the Taliban could expand Afghanistan and finally heal the scars of its colonial wars with the British Empire by regaining lands taken from the nation during the Angloā€“Afghan Wars, taking on the mantle of the heroes of the Pashtun people and the saviors of South Asia.

The saviors of South Asia?

In the midst of the Afghan Civil War, Mullah Mohammed Omar founded the Taliban to address issues in their immediate surroundings in Kandahar. It is unknown if Omar and his group of extremist Deobandi Islamic militant scholars saw the future of the Talibanā€™s exploits then, but their early success certainly prepared the way for a truly meteoric rise. From the Talibanā€™s very first successful against two pedophilic warlords in Kandahar, they won the hearts and minds of locals for their ability to bring stability and maintain credibility.

It was at this early stage in the groupā€™s operations that a sort of ā€œTaliban Promiseā€ was formed. The group could take control of territory with use of insurgent and guerilla ground tactics in storm-type attacks and defend the territory through its ability to rapidly recruit new units. Then once in control, the Taliban would govern through a mix of Deobandi Islamic principles ā€” adherence to extreme literalist fundamental Islam with specific belief in declaring apostasy ā€” and Pashtun ethnic principles ā€” honor, reciprocity and tribal courts.

Both aspects of the Talibanā€™s initial Afghan campaign fed into one another, and their identification as Muslim and Pashtun gave them legitimacy and access to fighters while continued territorial control and battlefield success gave their rule legitimacy. This Taliban Promise wasnā€™t glamorous, but it was something Afghans could predict, expect, understand to some extent and accept as the alternative was being at the whims of a vagrant warlord.

Thus, the Taliban set out from Kandahar, reversing the of Afghanistan, destroying fiefdoms and maintaining a common link to most Afghans through religious and ethnic values. The Talibanā€™s movement likewise stood in stark contrast to Pakistanā€™s then main ally, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (not a difficult feat, as he was best known for residential neighborhoods in Kabul, earning him the title ā€œGulbuddin Rocket-yarā€). With no real competitors and an incredibly successful domestic campaign, the group became the de facto future rulers of Afghanistan, gaining Pakistanā€™s full support by 1994 and even earning from the US in early 2001.

It was only when the Taliban was implicated in the events of 9/11 that the international communityā€™s hope for its success faded. With the faƧade revealed and the Talibanā€™s links to international terror organizations like al-Qaeda plain to see, almost all of the groupā€™s bridges with the international community were burned. Then, with the US invasion of Afghanistan and the end of the Taliban government, it seemed the Talibanā€™s fate was sealed. With no ability to fight against the US military in a head-to-head conflict, Taliban leadership quickly withdrew across the Durand Line to Pakistanā€™s Pashtun tribal lands.

Pakistan could never let the Taliban fail. The nation had abandoned its previous allies for the Taliban and, therefore, this was Pakistanā€™s last real chance at creating an insurgent movement to dominate South Asia. Too much had been invested in the Taliban to let them be destroyed by the US military. So, while the US was establishing supply lines through Pakistan for its invasion of Afghanistan, the ISI began the Taliban arms, logistics, intelligence and shelter to ensure their survival.

Double games, double problems

The Pakistani intelligence and security community would not abandon its master plan to fulfill General Zia’s goal of creating and controlling the worldā€™s preeminent insurgent paramilitary group for the domination of South Asia. These were the cards Pakistan had played for over 20 years to this point, and changing strategies was not under discussion. The foundational moves for Pakistan were too consequential to even consider looking back. 

General Ziaā€™s 1979 decision to combat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by funneling international funds specifically into extremist Islam had opened Pandoraā€™s box. Partnering with extremist, the architect of the Global Jihad, created the current pipeline of militants, and dismantling it would be immensely difficult. This was the original ā€œdouble gameā€ Pakistan had created during the Sovietā€“Afghan War, supporting US interests by supporting counter-Soviet religious militants in Afghanistan but ultimately damaging US interests by instrumentalizing those militants.

Pakistanā€™s plan, however, does not seem to have been specifically directed at damaging US national security. The intention was, and always has been, to open the door to extremist militant Islam while directing its violence against Pakistanā€™s immediate national security concerns. Pakistan would become the champion of Islam in South Asia and lead the Global Jihad against the regionā€™s greatest threat: rival India ā€” Hindustan.

Islamabadā€™s double game therefore could not end with the US invasion of Afghanistan; it just became more dangerous. The ISI had to directly oppose the US by aiding the Taliban while also maintaining outward support for the US and facilitating its military operations. The stakes were never higher, but in 2021, with the Taliban yet again in control of Kabul and the US still not explicitly pursuing action against Pakistan for its role, it looked as if the double game had been won.

Pakistanā€™s double game, however, has only created double the problems. Today, the nation remains ensnared by daily insurgent violence and, all under the dark cloud of devastating. The Taliban have not proven to be the magnanimous allies Pakistan had hoped for, and Pakistanā€™s problems have only grown as a result of its costly partnership with them.

A stark reminder of the enmity now between the two allies is theTorkham Border Crossing seen in February. Pakistani Frontier Corps and Afghan Taliban troops opened fire, wounding one member of the corps and prompting a swift Pakistani diplomatic response to ease tensions.

The documented gunfights between the two militaries in broad daylight at their busiest crossing, however, do not encompass the entirety of their negative interactions. Clashes have died down since February, but smaller interactions like explosions at border points, and drug seizures and illegal crossings still show the Talibanā€™s continued destabilizing effect on Pakistan.

The Talibanā€™s active clashes with Pakistan are not even the largest destabilizing factor. The groupā€™s takeover of Afghanistan has proven far more problematic to security because it has given modern insurgency a proof of concept. Insurgents in South Asia and beyond may feel they donā€™t have to settle for a seat at the table, because if they wait long enough they may own the whole restaurant just as the Taliban seized Afghanistan.

The TTP is the greatest example of this new insurgent impetus. Emboldened by the Afghan Talibanā€™s victories, it has taken to a new campaign of violence against Pakistani forces and civilians. With no war in Afghanistan, Taliban fighters likewise gain a new purpose and can easily move through Pashtun tribal networks to join a new battlefield.

Pakistan attempted to execute its strategy of controlling the Taliban when it entered into Afghan Taliban-negotiated talks with the TTP, but this quickly failed. Negotiations between the two sides after only a few rounds of talks;Pakistan TTP core leadership, decisively ending the rapproachment, and violence has trended upward since. Now, one need look no further than the front page of Pakistanā€™s or the TTPā€™s propaganda websites to see that clashes between Pakistan and the TTP have become a daily occurrence.

Likewise, the drumbeat of attacks by Baloch militant groups like the , the and the has only increased. These groups have also become emboldened by the Talibanā€™s advances and now conduct gruesome attacks specifically targeting Chinese nationals, like in the, and broader regional critical infrastructure.

This turn of events has proven that although the Taliban are a byproduct of long-term Pakistani national security and intelligence decision-making, the Taliban do not feel they are beholden to Pakistan. Although the ISI sheltered the Taliban from the US, the Taliban are still a grassroots ethno-religious militant movement with its own goals that now challenge Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

With Afghanistan firmly in the Talibanā€™s grasp, a new double game is beginning in South Asia: a double game that seeks to rewrite the history of British colonial rule.

The New Fight for the Durand Line

Pakistanā€™s strategy to gain a stronger position in South Asia by supporting militant extremism has turned out to be quite flawed. While it was possible to steer the Mujahideenā€™s Global Jihad during the Sovietā€“Afghan War, it does not seem equally possible to direct the Taliban. The success of Pakistanā€™s strategy of directing militancy during the Sovietā€“Afghan War was largely due to the Mujahideen being a specifically Islamist militant movement; the interests of both Pakistan and the militants were mostly aligned. However, the Taliban is a hybrid organization that represents both extremist Islam and Pashtun nationalism; as a result, many of the Talibanā€™s interests run entirely contrary to Pakistanā€™s. Erasing the Durand Line and retaking the Pashtun land taken from Afghanistan by the British is the largest of these differing interests.

The Durand Line was drawn in 1893 by the British Empire to better administer Afghanistan after its Pyrrhic conquest during the Second Angloā€“Afghan War (1878ā€“1880). Learning from theBritish armyā€™s at the hands of Pashtun tribal alliances during the First Angloā€“Afghan War (1838ā€“1842), colonial Britain was unwilling to invest too heavily in Afghanistan and sought a strategy that would instead defang the nation.

Abdur Rahman Khan was installed as shah by the British in 1880, allowing him to lead a violent domestic campaign to gain undisputed control of Afghanistan from the powerful Pashtun tribal networks. Then, once the Pashtun tribes had been cowed, it was necessary to permanently debilitate them so their tribal alliances could never rise again to challenge Afghanistan or British India.

Pashtunistan was cut in two by the Durand Line, dividing the lands governed by the Pashtun tribes between Afghanistan and British India. Then, with tribal networks separated by administrative and political borders, there was no way for them to form a cohesive military organization to threaten British control of South Asia again as they once did in theFirst Angloā€“Afghan . Furthermore, subjugating and ruling over fractured tribal networks allowed both Abdur Rahman Khan and the British to maintain a high degree of regional autonomy without consulting domestic power brokers.

The British Empireā€™s scar on Afghanistan was challenged during the Third Angloā€“Afghan War (1919), but ultimately maintained when Afghanistan gained independence. When Pakistan was created in 1947, the border was retained and it has lasted ever since.

The Durand Line served a significant strategic purpose during the Sovietā€“Afghan War, the Afghan Civil War and USā€“Afghan War which followed. The political boundary allowed combatants in Afghanistan to easily retreat and regroup into Pakistan when in danger and launch sorties from a safer position than from within Afghanistan. Yet, with no current foreign invading force in Afghanistan, Afghan militants no longer have a need for the border.

Militant Deobandi Islam has proven to be the potion Pashtun nationalism needed to revive itself, and now the Taliban are emerging as the champions of Pashtunistan as an entity. Likewise, the Taliban have good reason to reunite Pashtunistan and erase the Durand Line, as doing so would provide them immense domestic and regional legitimacy, potentially cementing their rule.

Gheyrat and izat, the Afghan concept of honor, run deep through the nation’s history and future. Invasion after invasion has instilled within our storied nation a ceaseless, brave resilience to cruelty in the face of insurmountable odds.

Just as all nations who foray into the Graveyard of Empires do, Pakistan is learning this lesson from the inside out. This all converges on the faultline of their shared scar of British colonial rule ā€” the Durand Line ā€” with a promise to restore Afghanistanā€™s honor at the price of accepting an extreme Deobandi, kleptocratic military state.

Pakistanā€™s territorial integrity is facing its first true challenge: The Taliban are increasing their influence and violence at an alarming rate, and insurgents are inching ever closer to nuclear capabilities, all as we peer from over the horizon.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Pakistanā€™s Taliban Problem and the New Fight for the Durand Line appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Pakistanā€™s terrible economic crisis

Political instability, unfair capitalism, financial mismanagement and the impact of a 2022 natural disaster have contributed to Pakistan’s economic crisis. The devastating flooding last year resulted in in damage, putting immense strain on the country’s agriculture and health sectors. It exposed Pakistan’s susceptibility to climate disasters and revealed concerns about vulnerabilities in governance and economic stability.

Why Is the Pakistani Economy Imploding Now

The country’s economic model relies on foreign loans. The massive external debt obligations are putting the country at great risk of bankruptcy. Pakistan has various creditors, which fall into four categories: multilateral debt, Paris Club debt, private and commercial loans, and Chinese debt.

Of Pakistanā€™s $126 billion debt, a large portion totaling $45 billion is owed to multilateral institutions, according to the published by Nilanjan Ghosh of Observer Research Foundation. Some of the main lenders are the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Pakistan also owes smaller amounts to the Islamic Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Despite the massive size of Pakistan’s debt, it doesn’t pose major immediate risks for the country. Repayments are made in small installments over time, from 18 to 30 years. This gives Pakistan some time to make payments. In 2022-23, Pakistan paid back a total of $4.5 billion to multilateral creditors, which accounted for one-fifth of the total debt repayment for that year.

Additionally, Pakistan owes the Paris Club $8.5 billion. The Paris Club is a group of 22 creditor countries. Pakistanā€™s debt is planned to be repaid over a period of 40 years and carries a low interest rate of less than 1%. Most of this debt is owed to countries like Japan, Germany, France and the United States.

Pakistan also has a substantial amount of private debt, primarily in the form of private bonds like Eurobonds and global Sukuk bonds, totaling $7.8 billion. In the previous fiscal year, Pakistan secured $2 billion through the issuance of Eurobonds with different maturity periodsā€”5, 10, and 30 yearsā€”and interest rates ranging from 6% to 8.87%. The country currently holds foreign commercial loans amounting to nearly $7 billion. This is expected to increase to approximately $9 billion by the end of the current fiscal year. A great portion of Pakistan’s commercial loan portfolio is owed to Chinese financial institutions, as the country has paid off major non-Chinese commercial loans.

Pakistan’s Chinese debt amounts to about $27 billion, which comprises, among other things $10 billion of bilateral debt and $6.2 billion in Chinese government-provided debt to Pakistani public sector enterprises. China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) has deposited $4 billion with Pakistan’s central bank. The bilateral debt has favorable terms, with a repayment period of 20 years. Alongside the debt, Pakistan has a currency swap arrangement with China.

Khanā€™s spectacular downfall

In March 2022, Khan faced a submitted by the opposition. Khanā€™s Pakistan Movement for Justice (PTI) party had 155 members and needed at least 172 lawmakers on its side to remain in power. The motion initially failed, receiving favorable votes from 161 members, but gained the votes needed to pass in another vote on April 10.

The confidence vote resulted in key figures quitting. Punjab Chief Minister Sardar Usman Buzdar, a member of PTI, presented his to Khan, who rejected it. After Buzdarā€™s resignation, the Housing Minister and leader of the coalition partner Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), Tariq Bashir Cheema, the federal cabinet.

On May 9, 2023, Khan was for corruption charges. His arrest resulted in a widespread demonstration by his followers across the country. Supporters of the PTI engaged in violent behavior to protest against the arrest. The country has implemented a ban on various social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. 

National Accountability Bureau officials carried out Khan’s arrest in relation to the . The case involves an alleged payment of $17.5 million to Khan and his wife with the intention of legitimizing a laundered sum of money. Prosecutors alleged that real estate tycoon Malik Riaz provided land and money following the assistance of the Khan government in 2019. This pertained to a case involving repatriated funds from the UK investigation into Riaz.

Since being removed from office in April 2022, Khan has been confronted with a series of legal challenges. He is currently dealing with numerous legal cases, totaling . The legal cases are related to various serious offenses such as terrorism, blasphemy, murder, violence and incitement to violence.

Khan sets the country alight

Khan came into power in 2018 with the support of the Pakistani people and the military. After he was ousted in a no-confidence motion, things turned sour: Khan went from being the armyā€™s sweetheart to its nemesis. The military has been relentlessly targeting Imran Khan and his party. It appears that the military silently stopped supporting Khanā€™s coalition government. Furthermore, Khan strained Pakistan-US relations even more than they already were by alleging that Washington was behind the conspiracy to remove him from power. 

to Khan, the US wanted to replace him as prime minister and expressed its wish through the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Donald Lu. Khan claimed he received an intercepted message in which Lu warned the ambassador about potential consequences for Pakistan if he wasn’t removed from his position. Later on, he accused the former Army chief general of portraying him as anti-American and the general himself as pro-American. 

Khan was criticized for his to Russia on February 24, 2022. His meeting with President Vladimir Putin occurred on the very same day that Russian troops entered eastern Ukraine. This created the appearance that Pakistan endorsed Russia’s actions. The two leaders discussed mutual concerns in Afghanistan, regional security cooperation and plans for a natural gas pipeline.

The visit marked a shift in South Asian geopolitics as Russia is now aiming for a more balanced regional policy between Pakistan and India. Pakistan sees Russia as a means to reduce its reliance on the US. China’s involvement further strengthens the possibility of a counter to India’s regional ambitions.

The visit raises questions about India’s strategic partnership with the US and Russia’s increasing engagement with Pakistan. These geopolitical shifts pose challenges for both India and Pakistan in managing their relationships with major powers. 

Pakistan is now in big trouble

Separatist and extremist movements, most prominently the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), popularly known as the , have worsened the struggle for political stability in the country. The TTP was established in 2007 to unify Islamist militant organizations in the northwest border region known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The TTP’s main objectives include fighting Pakistan’s security forces, resisting Western forces in Afghanistan and implementing Sharia law in areas under its control.

The TTP is highly decentralized and its factions often disagree on policy, making leadership challenging. The government’s efforts to negotiate peace with the TTP failed in 2014. Consequently, the government launched the , which displaced over a million people and cost billions of dollars. Although the operation weakened the TTP, they and other militants continued to carry out major attacks.

In 2018, Khan and his election was marked by concerns over the participation of banned militant groups in the political process. The TTP campaign rallies and polling places during this time.

In the same year, leadership changes within the TTP, as well as shifts in Pakistan-US relations, influenced the group’s direction. The US security assistance to Pakistan due to concerns over its approach to militants. The international pressure increased as the country was placed on the Financial Action Task Force’s ā€œgrey listā€ for insufficient efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 

In the past, Pakistan has been reluctant to cooperate with the US in fighting terrorist groups. It has groups like the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, which are enemies of the US. Now that the Taliban has regained control of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s influence over these groups has diminished. Besides that, the TTP is gaining strength again. The TTP used to be targeted by US airstrikes, but now that they mainly operate from Afghanistan, it is harder to go after them. Even though the current TTP leadership claims not to have international ambitions, their past threats to attack the US and other countries raise concerns, especially if there is a change in leadership.

As the TTP’s strength grows and security in Pakistan worsens, this could empower other separatist movements and armed groups. These groups pose a serious challenge to Pakistan’s financially strained government. Destabilization increases the risk of militant groups spreading in the region and launching international terrorist attacks. Though complete collapse of the state is unlikely, concerns about the safety of Pakistanā€™s nuclear arsenal persist. Warheads could be targeted or stolen by non-state actors, a possibility that worries both US and Indian policymakers.

Pakistan has failed to attain its potential

Amidst the ongoing political turmoil, Khanā€™s willingness to pour fuel on fire has destabilized the country. An unstable Pakistan is now a concern to its neighbors.

For decades, Pakistan has been a garrison state. The army has ruled the roost. It is the dominant institution of the country. The army believes that it is the only Pakistani institution that can preserve national unity and help the country overcome its challenges. The army has legitimized its outsized influence by using Kashmir. Pakistan has claimed this part of India since 1947, fomented insurgency and fought wars to conquer Kashmir. 

This obsession with Kashmir has made Pakistan reliant on external support from the US and China. Both bankroll this failed state for their own geopolitical reasons. This combination of dominance by the army and support of two major global powers makes Pakistan uniquely complex and it can be compared to no other sovereign state.

A democratic Pakistan would have been beneficial for the region and especially for India. The country would not have promoted cross-border extremism or separatism in India. Instead, Pakistan could have become a state with respect for human rights, procedural justice and integrity. This would have addressed the crisis of legitimacy that bedevils the military establishment and political leadership.

Kashmiris, victims of Pakistanā€™s actions for decades, must recognize Pakistanā€™s underlying faultlines and not fall prey to its rhetoric of freedom for Kashmir. A garrison state meddling in the political affairs of a democratic neighbor and inciting violence cannot claim to be a beacon of freedom for anyone.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Pakistan Struggles With Economic Collapse And Extremism appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Although Khilji is American, he grew up in Pakistan. He has been a regular visitor to the country and has observed the Pakistani economy closely.

In a wide-ranging conversation with 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editor-in-chief Atul Singh, Khilji addresses Pakistanā€™s struggles with its political leadership, military involvement in politics, persistent instability, and rampant corruption. The two also discuss inflation, brain drain, and more.

[Matthew Knudson produced this podcast and wrote the podcast description above.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Why Is the Pakistani Economy Imploding Now appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Yet not all is well in this rather vigorous and virile land. Punjab has a troubled history. After a tragic partition in 1947, it emerged as a prosperous state in India that pioneered the green revolution. After Bangladesh declared independence in 1971 from Pakistan, Islamabad decided it was payback time.

A Troubled Legacy

Pakistan had always fostered trouble in Kashmir. In the 1980s, it also stirred up an insurgency in Punjab. Violent terrorists demanded Khalistan and unleashed a wave of violence against the Indian state. Initially, terrorists killed legislators, policemen and military personnel. Soon, violent attacks extended to innocent civilians. It took over a decade for the Indian government to bring the situation under control.

Much of the world assumed that this reign of terror was India-centric and not exactly a major problem. This assumption persisted despite Khalistani terrorists blowing up an Air India in 1985, killing all 329 people on board. This flight was en route from Toronto to London and blew up mid air over the sea. This was one of the biggest terrorist attacks before the 9/11 attacks.

Khalistani terrorism took thousands of innocent lives. Yet the West never quite took it seriously. Even Encyclopedia Britannica still erroneously the Khalistani movement erroneously as a ā€œviolent civil unrest between Sikh and Hindu factions.ā€ This erroneous mischaracterization of a dangerous terrorist movement as ethnic strife in a former colony led to serious misjudgments in Germany, the UK, Australia and Canada in particular.

A Change in Narrative

Recently, this narrative is being questioned for the first time in the West itself. has expressed concern about the ā€œextremist fringe ideology within the pro-Khalistan movement.ā€ As per this review, this ideology has a ā€œnegative effect on wider Sikh communitiesā€ and the time has come for the British government to counter it.

Khalistanis in the UK threaten and intimidate upstanding members of the Sikh community. They pursue an ethno-nationalist agenda and incite violence within India. The review notes that Khalistanis do not claim any territory in ā€œthe part of the Punjab located in Pakistan.ā€ This is noteworthy because the Sikh kingdom of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the lion of Punjab, was largely in modern day Punjab. The great Pakistani city of Lahore was the capital of this magnificent Sikh empire.

In 1947, the Muslim majority of modern day Pakistan followed a policy of ethnic cleansing of Sikhs and Hindus. As a result, there are hardly any Sikhs left in the country. Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh faith, was born in Nankana Sahib, which is 91 kilometers west of Lahore. The reason Khalistanis ignore ethnic cleansing and fail to claim the territory of their haloed guru is simple: Pakistan has backed them since day one. Khalistanis simply cannot bite the hand that feeds them.

Threat to the West

The Bloom Review is paying heed to an issue that poses serious threats in some countries of the West. Indian Punjab is facing an unemployment and identity crisis. The state voted in the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), an upstart that has ousted traditionally dominant national and regional players. The 2022 AAP victory is a political revolution and Punjabis around the world find themselves in social ferment.

Khalistanis have latched on to this ferment and are trying to trigger violence in Punjab. These efforts originate in countries like Canada, Australia, Germany and the UK. Naturally, the violence they seek to export often spills over in their safe havens in the West. In 1985, , the 33rd premier of British Columbia and a Canadian MP, was brutally attacked for refusing to kowtow to Khalistani terrorists. This violence is terrible for any society, especially a multiethnic, multicultural liberal democracy.

India and the West are increasingly interconnected. Indians are in top jobs and key positions in the West. Young people, especially in Punjab, aspire to become the next Sunak and Banga. Similarly, the diaspora strives to influence the land of their origin. An Indian problem is no longer exclusively an Indian one. Very quickly, it can become a headache for the West as The Bloom Review rightly notes. The time has come for the West to address its homegrown Khalistanic problem with focus, energy and wisdom.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Khalistani Terrorists Now Threaten Both India and the West appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

One of the most glaring stains on Kissinger’s record is his involvement in the Vietnam War. Serving first as the national security advisor and then as the secretary of state under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Kissinger played a pivotal role in prolonging an unwinnable conflict. His adherence to a policy of gradual escalation, coupled with secret bombings in Cambodia and Laos, only exacerbated the suffering and destruction in Southeast Asia. The infamous , “The illegal we do immediately; the unconstitutional takes a little longer,” perfectly captures his  callousness and ends-justify-the-means approach to diplomacy. 

Kissinger’s pursuit of realpolitik, while espousing lofty ideals of stability and balance of power, often came at the expense of human rights and democratic values. Nowhere is this more evident than in his support for authoritarian regimes. For example, his embrace of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet is a dark stain on American foreign policy. Kissinger’s complicity in the overthrow of the democratically elected Salvador Allende and subsequent support for Pinochet’s brutal regime exemplify a disregard for the principles the United States claims to champion.

Havoc in the Middle East and trouble with China

Another critical failure of Kissinger’s foreign policy was his approach to the Middle East, particularly during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While he brokered the historic Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, his focus on short-term gains and strategic interests contributed to the perpetuation of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Kissinger left a lasting legacy of conflict and mistrust in the region by placing geopolitical considerations above the principles of justice and self-determination.

Moreover, Kissinger’s infamous doctrine of “triangular diplomacy” with China and the Soviet Union, although hailed as a masterstroke of realpolitik, had its own detrimental consequences. 

At the time, the United States faced challenges on two major fronts: a Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union and a hot war with Vietnam, which strained its military and economic resources. Kissinger recognized an opportunity to shift the balance of power by engaging with both the Soviets and the Chinese. By playing them off against each other, he sought to create a more favorable environment for the United States.

Kissinger sought to stabilize relations between the US and China. Engaging with China was a pragmatic move to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. By then, both these communist countries had fallen out with each other. By establishing diplomatic ties with China and prioritizing relations with Beijing, the US effectively isolated the Soviet Union and weakened its influence in the international arena. However, this led to unintended consequences.

Firstly, Kissinger’s pursuit of dĆ©tente with China created a sense of uncertainty and threat perception in the Soviet Union. The growing closeness between the US and China forced the Soviet Union to divert significant resources towards its military buildup, thereby intensifying the arms race and heightening Cold War tensions.

Secondly, Kissinger’s engagement with China also provided the Soviet Union an opportunity to strengthen its own alliances and partnerships. In response to the US outreach to China, the Soviet Union deepened its ties with other socialist states and expanded its influence in regions such as Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East. 

Furthermore, Kissinger’s China policy also had economic implications. By opening up trade and investment opportunities with China, the US inadvertently contributed to China’s economic rise. This economic growth eventually transformed China into a major global power, challenging US dominance and creating new geopolitical complexities in the 21st century. 

Kissinger himself recently The Economist that the world is ā€œin a classic pre-World War I situation.ā€ The looming specter of artificial intelligence, and the development of weapons that seem inspired by science fiction make the situation more precarious still. ā€œWe are on a path to great-power confrontation,ā€ Kissinger argues because ā€œboth sides have convinced themselves that the other represents a strategic dangerā€. The Economist, however, chose not to ask him if the current impasse could be a result of his own policies.  

Kissinger’s controversial legacy cannot be solely attributed to his policy decisions. His style of diplomacy, shrouded in secrecy and backdoor negotiations, fostered an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion. By conducting diplomacy as a closed-door game of chess, he sidelined democratic institutions and undermined transparency. The infamous of his staff members and leaks to the press further eroded trust and tarnished the integrity of the American government. 

As we reflect on Henry Kissinger’s 100th birth anniversary, it is crucial to recognize the enduring impact of his with Indira Gandhi, which stands as a pivotal moment in history. The complex dynamics that unfolded during their interactions not only impacted the bilateral relations between the United States and India but also had far-reaching repercussions for the volatile region as a whole.  

Misunderstanding India and promoting Pakistan

During the early 1970s, India found itself facing a precarious situation. It was grappling with political unrest and had a strained relationship with neighboring Pakistan. Against this backdrop, Kissinger’s visit to India in 1971 aimed to address these pressing issues. 

At the heart of the Indo-US discord lay the India-Pakistan War of 1971, ultimately leading to Bangladesh’s creation. Kissinger’s diplomatic efforts were driven by a desire to maintain a balance of power and avert a larger conflict in the region. He favored his Cold War ally Pakistan. Gandhi opposed Kissinger. She wanted justice for the genocide, rape and terrible atrocities committed by Pakistani occupying forces in Bangladesh.

The encounter between Kissinger and Gandhi revealed a stark disparity in their approaches to international relations. While Kissinger favored realpolitik based on strategic interests, Gandhi championed self-determination and human rights. Their clash resulted in strained relations between the worldā€™s two biggest democracies that lasted for decades.

After this war, India moved closer to the Soviet Union. The Cold War came to the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan became even more of a US lackey while India came to rely primarily on the Soviet Union for its defense equipment. Only in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union did India-US relations normalize.

In Pakistan, Kissinger’s support during the 1971 war emboldened the military regime and perpetuated a culture of military dominance in the country’s politics. This had long-term implications for democracy and stability in Pakistan Subsequent military regimes suppressed dissent and undermined civilian governance, knowing fully well that the US would stand by them.

The encounter between Kissinger and Gandhi also exacerbated South Asian tensions. With the security of US backing, Pakistan sought revenge for defeat in 1971. It abetted and funded insurgency in India, first in Punjab and then in Kashmir. Dispute over the latter became far more toxic and Kashmir remains a flashpoint even today.

While Kissinger may be remembered as a master tactician by some, his legacy is one of disastrous consequences. This centurion is responsible for devastation in Vietnam, perpetuation of authoritarian regimes and unending chaos in South Asia. As we reflect on his life’s work, let us not forget Kissingerā€™s moral compromises that caused immense human costs and still haunt the world today. He was a narcissist who operated alone, disregarding the constraints of institutions of values.

His worldview and approach to international relations can be summed up in one single quote from an with the journalist Oriana Fallaci in November 1972: ā€œAmericans like the cowboy ā€¦ who rides all alone into the town, the village, with his horse and nothing else ā€¦ This amazing, romantic character suits me precisely because to be alone has always been part of my style or, if you like, my technique.ā€ 

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Even at 100, Henry Kissinger’s Legacy Is Frightening appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

In 1947, India and Pakistan gained independence. Until then, both of them were a part of British India. Since the partition, Pakistan has indulged in cross-border terrorism. In 1947 itself, Pakistan sent Pashtun tribesmen to fight jihad and conquer Kashmir.

As per the , these tribesmen ā€œshot everyone who couldn’t recite the kalima – the Arabic-language Muslim declaration of faith. Many non-Muslim women were enslaved, while many others jumped in the river to escape capture.ā€ Had these jihadis not stopped to nuns, women and girls in Baramulla, they would have captured the capital Srinagar and Kashmir would have been in Pakistani hands.

Taliban Takeover Will Further Radicalize Pakistan and Increase Nuclear Threat

Pakistan has used terror as an instrument of state policy ever since. In 1965, it sent Pashtun tribesmen, which led to a war. Then, Pakistan used terror against Bangladesh, perpetrating a that is remembered to this day. Bangladesh won its independence from Pakistan in 1971 thanks to Indian support. The loss of Bangladesh, which was known as East Pakistan, led the Pakistani military to double down on terror. As per Pakistani dictator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the goal was to bleed India ā€œthrough a .ā€

Unfortunately, as retired Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) chief Vikram Sood has pointed out, India ā€œā€ in the manner it should have. This reticence came from ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehruā€™s pacifist policies. He worried more about a military coup than a foreign invasion. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Nehruvian reticence is a thing of the past. India has adopted a more robust foreign policy, which includes cross-border military strikes at terror targets. For long-term peace, India must continue to follow its great classical philosopher Kautilya and be tough with Pakistan until it makes a bona fide gesture of peace.

Police Reforms and Cross-Border Strikes

Over the years, India has been caught with its pants down during terror attacks. Police forces have done too little too late. Such is the endemic corruption in the police force that low-level constables have acted as accomplices for terrorists. 

It is an open secret that cross-border smuggling occurs with the collusion of the police, especially at the lower levels. The 1993 Mumbai were facilitated by corrupt policemen who were sold out to Pakistanā€™s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for the proverbial thirty pieces of silver. Corrupt policemen are also said to have facilitated the attack. Police corruption is now a national security issue in India.

Above All, India Needs Rule of Law

There were technical deficiencies in responding to the 2008 attacks indicating institutional weaknesses. In 2008, terrorists were able to hold local policemen at bay for three days. Starting in Pakistan, they were able to enter Mumbai easily in local fishing boats. The 2008 ā€œattacks the utter inadequacy, inappropriateness and incompetence of Indian.ā€ It is an open secret that Pakistanā€™s ISI masterminded these so called 26/11 Mumbai attacks.

Suffice to say, Indian police organizations are in serious need of. Recruitment at the lower entry levels is corrupt. So, policemen have to recoup their investment. Pay is low, the hours are long, the weapons are outdated and the equipment is inadequate. As per one survey, 73% had signs of health and a third are on the verge of . The budgets are low and auditors have found that the funds allotted are often left unutilized. 

The litany of woes that affect Indian police do not need a full description here. Suffice to say, the police system does not work. Yet it is important to remember that the system is not as broken as in . Some Indian states do better than others. India has the of deaths from terrorist attacks despite being in the top ten countries affected by terrorism.

The police are the first line of defense for India. The policeman walking his beat or driving around neighborhoods gets the first whiff of trouble. Therefore, police reforms are a top priority. The government could begin with implementing the recommendations of the 2007 Second Administrative Reforms Commission. It recommended independence of the police and an end to ministers using police forces for personal and political reasons. The police need autonomy in law-and-order situations and when conducting investigations. The colonial 1861 Indian Police Act is outdated. India needs new legislation to underpin policing nationally. It also needs independent oversight authorities that are accessible to the public and address police misconduct. ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s Supreme Court and parliamentary bodies have also come up with specific suggestions for police reform.

±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s central police organizations also need reform. These are paramilitary organizations such as the Border Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and the Central Reserve Police Force. Officers in these organizations are facing major morale issues and the government must address them. 

National Security: The Sikh State of North America

Both Sun Tzu andKautilya ask the king not to use the army on a whim to achieve the stateā€™s goals. Open warfare could be very destructive, expensive and unpredictable. Kautilya favored that included intelligence, spies, deception and honey traps. Sun Tzu asks us to avoid strength, strike weakness. Pakistan uses non-state actors to unleash terror on India. They are a weak link. India must strike these actors decisively even if that means crossing the border.

The Modi government has done so. It has launched three on Pakistan terror camps. Yet the government can do better. It must learn from Israel, the US and the UK. They have long carried out military operations across borders. Recently, the US assassinated with Israeli support. Israelā€™s Mossad Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh after eight months of surveillance, using a one-ton gun smuggled in pieces. Both operations leveraged intelligence and technology to spectacular effect. Kautilya would have approved.

Since the horrific events of 9/11, a significant change has taken place in the law of self-defense. It is now accepted that countries can exercise the right against attacks or threats posed by non-state actors. Criminal defendants enjoy protections in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). And in constitutional guarantees. Non-state actors do not enjoy these as they are ā€˜unlawful combatantsā€™. For legal cover, we cannot direct attacks against civilians or against state actors. However, India has limited legal risk when taking actions against armed non-state actors. Hence, eroding the leadership capability of these actors based in Pakistan must be an integral part of ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s defense strategy. By eroding their leadership on a regular basis, India can pressure Pakistan to take a more mature and sensible approach at the negotiating table.

India has failed to build a top-class intelligence agency. Its ability to conduct cross-border operations or even set honey traps is limited. As the birthplace of Kautilya, India must improve its informational, influence and kinetic operations. The time has come for India to behave as a major power and hit its enemies at a time and place of its choosing.

Peace in Kashmir, Economic Cooperation and Tolerant Sufism

The Modi government abrogated of the constitution in 2019, ending Kashmirā€™s special status. This provision was unfair to the people of Jammu and Ladakh. India has also been subsidizing Kashmiris for decades. Since the 2019 decision, the in Kashmir has improved. Nevertheless the situation is not entirely normal and terrorists continue to target and migrant laborers.

India has to address the root of the problem. It cannot treat Kashmir as an issue forever. In an earlier article, this author recommends a range of measures for peace, including economic development and tourism.

The Solution to the Kashmir Conflict

India needs better engagement with its neighbors. For years, smaller countries have regarded India as a patronizing big brother and even old friends like have turned resentful. Since its inception, Pakistan has feared military conquest by India and has looked for what Pakistani scholar Ishtiaq Ahmed has called ā€œstrategic depth.ā€ Hardly anyone in India now seriously pursues the idea of (greater unified India). Yet it still scares Pakistanis.

India has to convince Pakistan that the future lies in coexistence. India can neither absorb Pakistan nor does it want to. Instead, India should propose economic cooperation. In turn, Pakistan should let bygones be bygones and forgive India for the defeat of 1971. In 2023, Pakistan is facing runaway inflation, a debt crisis and economic collapse. It is clear that trade, not conflict, is the way forward. The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) envisaged in 2006 is the way forward. Intraregional SAFTA trade represents just 5% of the total trade. By comparison, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations intraregional makes up 25% and the European Union figure is 75% of the total. For millennia, people in Pakistan and India have traded with each other. There is no reason the two countries could not return to the historical mean. Intraregional merchandise trade in South Asiaeasily from $23 to $67 billion.

I am in favor of an even bolder idea. India should work towards an economic and monetary union (EMU) in South Asia. If France and Germany can get together after fighting on opposing sides in two world wars, there is no reason why India and Pakistan cannot be part of the same EMU. At the moment, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are facing grave crises but, after requisite reforms, they could join a South Asian EMU. Nepal already has a fixed exchange rate with India. Others could follow. A South Asian EMU would boost trade, investment and employment. Like their European counterparts, South Asians could one day even have freedom of movement of people, not just of goods, services and capital.

Finally, Sufism in South Asia is key to a peaceful region. For decades Saudi Wahhabism has spread from Pakistan to Bangladesh, Kashmir to Kerala. This has been toxic for the region. Instead, India must back the beleaguered Sufis who personify the syncretic nature of South Asian Islam. 

Kautilyaā€™s guidance for a vijigishu (victorious king) is to use psychological influence or what Joseph Nye has termed soft power. India will need to win hearts and minds in Pakistan. Today, many Pakistani commentators that India is miles ahead of their country and seek to emulate their eastern neighbor. Others question the wisdom of falling into Chinaā€™s diplomacy.

India must convince ordinary Pakistanis about the advantages of trade and economic cooperation. It must be able to win them to the more tolerant and pluralistic form of Sufism that allows for music and artistic expression, which the Pakistanis enjoy. Over of Indian Muslims worship at Sufi shrines. The World Sufi Forum was held in and in. In, an international conference on Sufism took place in Srinagar. Sufism is a draw for Pakistanis too. If New Delhi can champion Sufism effectively, then India will win hearts and minds tired of the fanatical, puritanical and repressive version of Islam that is a foreign import into Pakistan. To be magnanimous, ecumenical and far-sighted for peace requires greater toughness than waging war. India needs this toughness to embrace big ideas and then sell them for a peaceful and prosperous South Asia.

[Here are Part 1 and Part 2 of this three-part series.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post India Now Needs Kautilyan Toughness With Pakistan appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi inherited a Nehruvian defense policy that was flaccid. India did not have a clear strategy against an aggressive China and a hostile Pakistan. Furthermore, there was corruption in defense imports. 

Modi has a chance to change that Nehruvian legacy. He must modernize ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s defense policy. COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine War have been to the Indian economy. So, India has to be efficient in its defense expenditure and use modern technology to counter its two nuclear-armed neighbors.

±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s Defense Strategy Has Evolved Since 2020

Post-independence ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s defense policy. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister, , ā€œWe donā€™t need a defense policy. Our policy is ahimsa (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. As far as I am concerned, you can scrap the army ā€“ the police are good enough to meet our security needs.ā€ 

Nehru had a rude wake-up call in 1947-48 when Pakistan invaded Jammu and Kashmir. Yet he ignored this warning and continued to neglect the military. In fact, Nehru chronically feared a military coup. He kept the military out of the national foreign policy framework and decision-making loop. Nehruā€™s principle of non-alignment was to have no military alliances with superpowers. The 1962 India-China War destroyed Nehruā€™s childlike ideas about national security. It appears Nehru was unfamiliar with the great Indian political philosopher Kautilya.

Under Modi, India has changed and is finally letting the military take a central role in driving defense diplomacy. In January 2020, the Modi government created the office of the chief of defense staff (CDS). Its mandate is to unify the military services and improve their effectiveness. commands created over three to four years would partly help achieve this. Admiral Arun Prakash this move ā€œthe most significant development in the national security domain since Independence.ā€

The Modi government seeks to build up the domestic defense industry in its policy of import substitution. It also seeks to improve defense through joint ventures with US and Israeli defense companies. A key goal of these ventures is transfer of technology to India. In May 2020, ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s foreign direct investment (FDI) limit rose to 74% under the automatic route in the defense sector. Despite from labor unions, corporatization of has already begun and of niche technologies is also underway. The Make in India and (Self-Reliant India) policies are helping this effort. These include artificial intelligence, blockchain, quantum communications, unmanned systems, and other directed-energy weapons. 

±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has been building critical roads, bridges, and tunnels along the Chinese border. The country is also eliminating in its borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is adoptingall land, water and space technologies, i.e. radar, sonar, laser and drones, to secure the border. It is also emulating Israelā€™s smart fencing, quick response teams and CCTV control rooms on its borders. Israel now has an system to shoot down hostile drones, which India seeks to adopt. 

±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s with Myanmar is also being and sealed to manage northeast insurgents who engage in arms and drug trafficking from the that includes parts of Burma, China, Laos and Thailand. 

The Modi government is also the National Cyber Security Strategy of 2023.

The Times Have Changed and India Must Change Too

India’s supply chain dependency of 85% on a much-weakened Russia is no longer tenable. In the Ukraine war, Russian arms and platforms have been found wanting against NATOā€™s superior firepower. Russia is also strapped for resources and would be unable to supply spare parts to India, were a conflict to arise. It is true that Russian arms are effective and they are much cheaper than their Western counterparts. Moscow has also been flexible on and waivers. Yet India has no option but to diversify its supply chain. Indigenization and diversification of its military supply chain are the need of the hour. Future defense procurement is likely to come from the US, France, Israel, UK and Italy.

The Ukraine war has also shown how corruption is now a national security issue. Part of the reason the Russians did poorly early in the war was because of rampant corruption in procurement, maintenance and all aspects of their military. India has a history of corruption in too. from four or five important families dominate this space and the defense ministry is trying to sideline them. This is a matter of national importance.

The Ukraine war has also demonstrated the importance of new technologies such as drones, advanced hand-held missiles and cyber warfare. Closer to home, the highlighted the importance of technologies. Artificial intelligence, big data, and autonomous vehicles including aircrafts and ships will play an increasing role in war as will quantum computing.

As of now, India is using  drone jamming technology to counter drone-based and terrorism in Punjab and Jammu. India must disseminate this technology better to security forces around the country to improve national security. India needs to manage its border with Myanmar better as well. As stated above, insurgents can be a menace in that part of the world and the current porous border has to be monitored better.

It is also time for the Modi government to the scheme. Most of ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s defense budget goes into salaries, pensions and benefits. This four-year tour of duty scheme frees up resources for weapons, modernization and new technology.

India Needs Institutional Reforms

A may find India ā€œresource-constrained, overstretched, and vulnerable.ā€ Therefore, India must improve its operational readiness and reform its institutions. The prime minister recognizes the need for reforms. To his credit, Modi advocated for a CDS in and introduced the post in January 2020. The position of the CDS was first mooted after the 1971 India-Pakistan War. Inter-services rivalry and a fear of by the army delayed the introduction of the CDS. Even the 1991 Kargil War did not change things. 

Similarly, joint theater commands have been pending. They are a complicated process and can take a lot of time. The US military took almost to fine-tune these commands after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Yet India does not have the luxury of the US with two oceans providing security from foreign threats. Long borders with Pakistan and China make joint theater commands a priority.

It is high time for the government to reform the that acts as the militaryā€™s overlord. Unlike the Japanese, French, Israeli or American military bureaucracies, ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s defense ministry is run by generalists. They can be in the ministry of textiles one day and be in charge of ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s navy the next day. India needs domain specialists, not generalists from ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s so-called elite Indian Administrative Service (IAS) running its defense. Nehru established the IAS stranglehold on the military, which Modi must end soon.

India also needs a thorough overhaul of its professional . This will help to ā€œ [in] the new structures that are taking shape.ā€ India also has to improve its military expenditure, which lags behind that of China and the US. It also has to improve its research institutions, many of which are bureaucratic and sclerotic. Autonomy, accountability and professional management of these institutions would improve ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s national security tremendously.

Improve the Balance of Power and Make a Deal with China

Kautilya teaches us that the enemy of our enemy is a . The US fears Chinaā€™s ascendency. India also needs to enhance its balance of power equation with China. A deeper economic and security arrangement with the US is in ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s national interest. 

India must attract manufacturing away from China. It must compete to be the manufacturing hub of the world. Chinaā€™s increasing tensions with Taiwan give India a unique opportunity. It must emulate key elements of the Chinese manufacturing model. Improving infrastructure, power generation and labor laws would give Indian manufacturing a great boost. 

Kautilya regards wars as expensive. The key driver of war with China is a boundary dispute. India claims the British boundary as legitimate, while China upholds the Qing dynasty. After 18 rounds of negotiations, both countries have been unable to end the impasse. 

From New Delhiā€™s point of view, China occupies square kilometers of Indian territory in the Union territory of Ladakh. This includes the Shaksgam Valley (5,180 square kilometers) gifted by Pakistan in 1963 and Aksai Chin, which was a part of Jammu and Kashmir, that China occupied in the 1950s. Aksai Chin is a largely uninhabited cold high-altitude (4,200 meters above sea level) desert but it is of strategic value because this plateau links Tibet and Xinjiang. The Chinese have built an all-weather road in Aksai Chin. They have also built another road through Shaksgam Valley connecting China to Pakistan.

For China, militarizing both Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley is highly expensive. The same is true for India in the case of the Siachen Glacier. Both countries must accept facts on the ground and move on. In 1959, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai proposed maintaining ā€œthe long-existing status quo of the borderā€ and that is what India should propose. Once India and China can define the border, the risks of war will plummet, freeing up valuable resources for both nations.

A creative way forward for India might be to seek compensation for its territory that China occupies. India could ask for 100,000 rupees, i.e. $1,216 per acre. This would amount to $11.59 billion, less than 0.07% of the 2021 Chinese GDP. Of course, the amount of money India claims could be higher and China would bargain hard to lower the price. But India must think creatively and pragmatically to end its border dispute with China. This modern version of the deal would be a win-win for all parties involved.

India must pay attention to Sun Tzu as well. He states that the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. Besides new military alliances with the US and the West, India must recognize the power of its market. China is currently benefiting from trade with India with its trade surplus surpassing in 2021. China accounts for no less than 40% of India’s total. This also gives India negotiating power on border disputes. India must threaten to reduce its Chinese imports during negotiations. 

At the same time, India must reduce sensitive Chinese imports such as pharmaceuticals and mobile phones over the longer term. ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s high dependency on China is unacceptable from a security point of view. As a result of the Ladakh conflict, India some foreign investments in April 2020. It banned Chinese apps like TikTok. 

[Here are Part 1 and Part 3 of this three-part series.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Kautilyan Perspective on How India Should Sort Out China appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The American Anti-Caste Movement 

The groups pressuring universities and lawmakers to pass bills like Californiaā€™s SB403 ā€œbanningā€ caste discrimination are capitalizing off of a caste narrative that is being increasingly racialized. It is uniquely American to view conflict through a reductive racial lens. In this case, Hindu Americans arelabeled the ā€œā€ of the Asian diaspora while their alleged victims, the ā€œcaste oppressedā€,are likened to . This elicits a powerful, but misplaced, emotion in many well-meaning Americans and is fomented by influential personalities in universities like and . 

The forces pushing these angles depend on the deeply ingrained association between Hinduism and caste built into the American consciousness. In fact, anti-Hindu prejudices are often subconscious and have been reinforced through high school and missionary literature. Just Google the word ā€œcasteā€ and the link to Hinduism is ubiquitous. With these foundational biases in place, private groups like Equality Labs claim that these bills donā€™t target the Hindu community specifically, but rather, South Asians at large. 

At the heart of the push for ā€œcaste equityā€ is the posturing that Dalits, formerly referred to as ā€œuntouchables,ā€ are inherently oppressed by virtue of their birth, no matter where they are located or how wealthy they may be. There are ample testaments from American Hindus, including Dalits, that systemic discrimination simply isnā€™t present in the diaspora. The 2021 Carnegie Endowment’s on Indian Americans clearly chronicles this. American Dalits like Sudha Jaganathan and Aldrin Deepak, senior leaders in the Coalition of Hindus of North America, have regularly the claim that Equality Labs speaks for their communities. Their stories rarely get coverage.

The flaw in these caste bills is fundamental: they fail to delineate how to identify someoneā€™s . Such lack of clarity in legislation can be tremendously damaging. These bills assign American understandings of ā€œprivilegeā€ and ā€œoppressionā€ onto poorly understood religious and ethnic communities, making Hindu Americans victims of another wave of colonization.

Silence on the Fate of Pakistanā€™s Hindu Dalits

Rather than focusing on the betterment of the truly oppressed, the American anti-caste movement targets Hinduism and . This is evident in the coalitionā€™s indifference to Dalit persecution in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Inconveniently, these Dalits are overwhelmingly Hindu. 

My first exposure to advocacy for Bangladeshi and Pakistani Hindu Dalits was in 2011 when I participated in the Hindu American Foundationā€™s annual DC Advocacy Day. We visited with several congressmen to discuss the of minor Hindu girls to Islam. Our ā€œaskā€ was that the US place human rights contingencies on its seemingly endless cash flow to Islamabad. 

Pakistan, an Islamic republic, has the strictestblasphemy and apostasy in the world. Like other minorities, Dalit Hindus are actively persecuted by the . Rape is often used to pressure kidnapped minority women and boys to convert. Even as their families fight to retain custody of their children, the act of conversion is immutable, prohibiting the children from returning to their birth religion.

The cases of and Kareena Kumari (no relation) have made international headlines, even though both women were denied justice and are living with their abductor husbands. In 2022, 15-year-old was murdered by an older man; she rejected his advances to convert her to Islam so he could marry her, resulting in her execution on the front step of her home. This phenomenon continues today. In March 2023, 13-year-old was abducted while returning home from school and remains missing. 

Most of these girls happen to share a surname, Kumari, because they are Dalits from the Pakistani province of Sindh. Other common surnames for the missing Hindu children are ā€œKholiā€ and ā€œBheel,ā€ belonging to other Dalit communities.

Over 90% of Pakistani Hindus live in Sindh. In the1931 British India , Sindhā€™s Hindu population stood at 26%. Partition in 1947 saw an exodus of Hindus to India. Today, Hindus live in rural areas and are overwhelmingly Dalit. The government forces Hindus to choose between classification as ā€œHinduā€ or ā€œscheduled casteā€ (Dalit). The 2017 puts the number of Hindus at 6.9% and Dalits at 1.74%. Experts believe the number of Dalits to be much higher, as they consider those that opted for the label ā€œHinduā€ as opposed to ā€œDalitā€ on the census.

Many far-left groups clamoring for caste laws in the US cite violence against Dalits in India, particularly sexual violence, to allege that anti-Dalit discrimination is baked into the fiber of Hindu society. Their indifference to state-sponsored violence against Dalit Hindu children in Pakistan however lends itself to my concern as a Hindu American: their activism is rooted in Hinduphobia rather than justice for Dalit lives. 

The Ignored and Persecuted Hindus of Bangladesh 

This intentional indifference became even clearer last year when , recognizing the special targeting of Bangladeshi Hindus in 1971, failed to make it to vote in the US Congress. In 1971, Bangladesh was still East Pakistan and faced a terrible military backlash against calls for independence from Islamabad. While simultaneously targeting Bengali intellectuals and political leaders, the Pakistani army unleashed a wave of brutality against the sizable Hindu minority. This disproportionate violence can be understood against the backdrop of the Pakistani national identity being a rejection of ā€œIndiannessā€ and ā€œHinduness.ā€

Hindus accounted for nearly 80% of those in the 1971 genocide. 

House Resolution 1430 faced strong opposition from the same groups pushing todayā€™s anti-caste measures, like the misleadingly named Hindus for Human Rights (HfHR). While denying official recognition for the genocide of Bangladeshi Hindus in 1971, the focus of HfHRā€™s international campaign is to draw attention to an ā€ against Muslims in India, whose population has steadily risen since 1947. Between 1951 and 2011, this has gone up from 9.8% to 14.4%, and Indian Muslims currently number at around . 

HfHR acknowledged the Pakistani armyā€™s anti-Hindu atrocities. However, it claims that these occurred because of anti-Bengali sentiments. This narrative denies facts well recorded by many sources, including the US State Department. The Blood Telegram by Princeton professor Gary J. Bass has ā€œthe hardhearted policy and outright bigotryā€ of even the American decision to support Pakistan during that campaign.

Without an accurate historical record, the Hindu diaspora is handicapped from demonstrating the extent of systemic anti-Hindu bigotry. HfHR also vocally opposed an Indian law that would give minority refugees fleeing religious persecution in Pakistan and Bangladesh a path to , forcing them to remain stateless. 

Like Pakistan, a significant number of Hindus remaining in Bangladesh after the 1947 partition are Dalits. The Bangladeshi government does not conduct a caste census and many Hindus resist identifying with a caste for the same reasons as Pakistani Hindus: they do not seek to make themselves more vulnerable in a majority Muslim country with increasingly intolerant tendencies. This is incidentally the same source of unease many American Hindu Dalits express with the push to unmask and identify South Asian Americans by their castes today.

After the dust of partition settled, the first Pakistani national in 1951 placed the Hindu population at 22% of East Pakistan. Per the 2011 Bangladesh census there were 12 million Hindus in the country, 8.9% of the population. This dramatic fall in the Hindu population over 60 years reflects the genocide and ensuing exodus to India. The group Nagorik Udyog, a Dalit advocacy group in Dhaka, placed the 2011 Dalit population at around 5.5 million. This population is . I spoke to human rights advocates in Dhaka for this piece and they ballpark the Dalit composition of the Bangladeshi Hindu population at approximately 44%. 

Crimes against Bangladeshi Hindus get far less coverage than the scant attention Pakistani Hindus receive. Well-organized attacks by Islamists during the fall Hindu celebration of Navaratri over the last two years have cloaked the vulnerable community in fear. The 2021 organized violence was particularly jarring, with around 100 Hindu temples vandalized and up to 10 Hindus over the ten-day holiday.

By calling themselves activists fighting global Islamophobia (as HfHR and Equality Labs do), American anti-caste groups harness their media access and wealth to undermine minority Hindu suffering. In doing so, they create a climate in which calling out Islamist bigotry is viewed as Islamophobia. Thus, they simultaneously shield dangerous religious ideologies from criticism while making it socially acceptable to deny Hindu persecution. So much for Dalit upliftment.  

The push to legally recognize caste in the United States is steeped in Hinduphobia. When the California city of Fremont passed a symbolic anti-Hinduphobia bill in April, the executive director of Equality Labs broadcasted an , putting her prejudice on full display. But like of the South Asia Scholar Activist Collective, she refuses to use her privilege to protect the most vulnerable Dalits in the world. 

American anti-caste legislation was never about protecting Dalits. It was always about persecuting Hindus.

[51³Ō¹Ļ updated this article at 16.40 Eastern Time on Monday, 15 May.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Why American Anti-Caste Measures Arenā€™t Really About Uplifting Dalits appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The post FOĀ° Explainers: India Faces Five-Front War appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

China and India have many similarities. India has been shaped by Hinduism and China by Buddhism. Buddhism originated in India and has a similar to Hinduism. The roots of many systems considered Chinese are actually Indian, including, acupressure and acupuncture. China is also emerging as the new after the US. Logically, India and China should be friends, although Chinaā€™s ambitions do not allow this.

India is a nuclear state with two nuclear-armed adversaries in China and Pakistan on its borders. China seeks to deepen economic relations with Pakistan via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It has followed a ā€œstring of pearlsā€ strategy to encircle India and makes constant revisionist claims about the India-China border.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that China had not supported Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil conflict. However, Chinaā€™s assistance to Pakistanā€™s nuclear weapon and missile programmes, and its BRI investments in Pakistan threaten India. Therefore, India faces the risk of a two-front war.

A Power-Hungry China Seeks to Dominate India

China only respects hard power. Money and military might are the operative metrics. Beijing is seeking to wrest the mantle of global leadership from Washington. India has traditionally played a passive role with China. New Delhi has consistently demonstrated reluctance to confront Beijing or take the initiative of proposing new solutions to sort out its border disputes. Indian foreign policy, influenced by Hindu philosophy, including ahimsa, has traditionally seen leadership as an exercise of soft power, moral pressure, and diplomatic negotiations.

This soft ā€œhead-in-the-sandā€ foreign policy of unending talk and little action is further aggravated by ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s inability to reduce import dependence on Chinese electronics and pharmaceutical intermediates. Thus, Chinaā€™s authoritarian regime believes that it has a free pass to bully India. The Chinese test this periodically through border skirmishes and aggressive rhetoric in different forums. 

Rising powers attempt to dominate their ā€œā€ and this reflects clearly in Chinaā€™s , diplomacy and ā€”uniting with the small to counter the bigā€”strategies. Jawaharlal Nehru, ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s first prime minister, came up with five Panchsheel principles, which included the principle of non-aggression. Yet the 1962 India-China War broke out at the height of bhai-bhai.

China has no problem with deception. Through the millennia, the Chinese have been guided by The Art of War, the classic penned by Sun Tzu in the 5^th century BC. He argued that ā€œwarfare is a way ofā€ and the 1962 war serves as a good example of the application of this principle. China uses Sun Tzuā€™s psychological techniques to achieve its political goals. In the case of and Tibetans, China has practiced cultural genocide. China is aggressive, persistent, and unpredictable in its constant attempts to redraw the borders. of border negotiations with India have yielded no results.

Chinaā€™s BRI initiative through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to Gwadar port creates a super link through which military equipment can be moved. China is weaponizing BRI and this is detrimental to India. In a future scenario, Chinese military bases in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan, acquired through debt trap diplomacy, would jeopardize Indian national security. Beijing is also cosying up with both Nepal and Afghanistan. In Nepal, China has had much success and the country even elected a communist government. In Afghanistan, success has been harder to come by because the Taliban runs a hardline Islamist regime.

India has to respond to Chinese aggression. It will only achieve peace when the country achieves adequate military and economic power. India could also turn to its very own political philosopher known as Chanakya or Kautilya who wrote in 300 BC.

Nuclear Pakistanā€™s Economic Woes Can Unleash Jihadism

The 1971 India-Pakistan War still scars the Pakistani psyche. India liberated Bangladesh, which until then was East Pakistan. Since then, Pakistan has been obsessed with India. As revenge it sought to ā€œbleed India with a.ā€ It funded and supported insurgencies in India. In Punjab, it led to a campaign of terror for Khalistan. Pakistan has always dreamt of annexing Kashmir and has persistently fomented trouble there since 1947. India and Pakistan have fought three major wars, one minor one and engaged in countless border clashes. So, a Pakistan-China nexus worries India.

India and US in the New World

Pakistan describes its friendship with China as being ā€œhigher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey.ā€  Pakistan is the biggest recipient of BRI money. Chinese debt is $30 billionā€” of its external debtā€”and continues to grow. Because of this debt, Pakistan has lost its ability to be an independent voice for Muslims. Pakistanis speak about Kashmiris all the time but dare not mention fellow Muslim Uyghurs. So beholden is Islamabad to Beijing that Pakistan would have to follow Chinaā€™s lead and could lead to a war for India.

After years of military rule and a pseudo-democracy, Pakistanā€™s economy is in tatters. Both economic mismanagement and have brought the country to its knees. The has increased dramatically. Inflation has spiraled out of control. Thousands of madrassas have churned out tens of thousands of jihadis since the 1980s when Saudi money flooded into the country. Then, the goal was to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Now, jihadis could cause civil war and the implosion of Pakistan. Since Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state, an implosion poses tremendous security risks for India. Fostering a peaceful Jihadi-free Pakistan is in ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s direct security interests.

India Must Heed Kautilyaā€™s Wise Words

Kautilya recommends that states strive for a balance of power and prevent rivals from becoming too powerful. He asks the king to become the most powerful among his peers) to achieve peace and security. He includes conquest, psychological influence, physical domination, seduction and assassination as tools of state policy.

Kautilya also speaks of security alliances as a key tool of foreign policy. The combined of Pakistan and China was $263 billion in 2020. This was nearly 3.6 times ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s defense budget. China alone outspends India by $180 billion. China spends less than 33% on personnel costs, while India spends about 60%. Hence, China can spend much more on modernization with better combat potential. 

Needless to say, the Indian Army needs to focus on technology-driven modernization. Indian foreign policy wonks must deepen the countryā€™s security arrangement with the US and Japan, which has just doubled its military spending.

The Chinese army has an edge over the Indian Army, but India is better prepared in warfare and has more experienced troops. The Chinese air force is stronger than ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s in terms of fleet and strategic inventory, but India has more reliable. Chinaā€™s navy is the largest in the world. Its naval build-up outscores ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s by almost. The US still has the most advanced navy though. India needs closer naval ties with the US and greater expenditure on its navy.

India’s military spending of is ranked third highest in the world after the US and China. It is one of the largest importers of arms. Indian armed forces are projected to spend around in capital procurement from 2022 to 2027. Such large imports highlight repeated failures in indigenous defense production despite transfers of technology to the public sector companies. India must modernize and privatize this sector to lower its import bill and prepare better for war.

In Dec 2020, the government authorized the armed forces to raise their weapons and ammunition reserves so as to be able to  sustain of high-intensity conflict. Until then, Indian forces could have only sustained such a conflict for ten days. Once, ±õ²Ō»å¾±²¹ā€™s could sustain 40 days of war. This dropped to 20 days in 1999 and further dropped to 10 days. The current 15-day reserves must go back up to the 40-day mark.

In a nutshell, India has to build up its military strength again. It also has to embark on the Kautilyan exercise of developing alliances with countries wary of China. Not only the US and Japan but also Vietnam and Australia are potential partners. Peace will come only through strength, not supplication.

[Here are Part 2 and Part 3 of this three-part series.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Can Kautilya Help Look at India’s War Risk Differently? appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Sharifā€™s statements sparked a plethora of heated debates among the media and the Indian academic community regarding this alleged ā€œolive branchā€ from Pakistan. However, given Pakistanā€™s volatile history, India should remain wary of such grandiose statements. 

The Birth of Terrorism 

The radicalization of Islam in Pakistan due to the open preaching of extremist ideologies has made peace extremely difficult. The number of have grown consistently in Pakistan. Even the , formed in the aftermath of the brutal attack perpetrated by Al-Qaeda, recognizes madrassas as “a particular concern”. However, successive governments in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, have to curb this kind of dangerous religious indoctrination.  

Pakistan, just like India, has a with 64% of the population below 30 years of age. However, when the madrassas teachIslamic texts such as hadith, tafsir and fiqh with puritanical interpretation, they turn demographic dividend into a demographic disaster. The majority of the madrassas in Pakistan are Sunni , who trace their origins to the fall of  Mughal Empire, after the first of Indian independence in 1857. 

The seminary, founded in 1866, is the headquarters for Sunni Deobandi belief. It is situated in the western part of the densely populated Indian state of , in the town called Deoband. The Deobandi beliefs have been a source of controversy due to their alleged links to some notoriously extremist organizations. The , an extremist group founded by Mullah Mohammad Omar, also derives its ideological beliefs from the Sunni Deobandi school of thought. 

Although the international community has failed to agree on a singular definition for terrorism, several scholars have detected underlying themes. American Historian Walter Langueur in 2000, “Nationalism is the core essence of religious terrorism and that, as such, can be categorized as ā€˜Right-wing Terrorismā€™.” He connected the obfuscated and ambiguous boundaries separating nationalism and religious terrorism. Other scholars attribute the fear tactics surrounding the Islamic belief in the afterlife to the successful recruitment of more men to carry out terrorism. The term perpetuated by terrorist leaders to promote the war on non-Muslims is ā€˜ā€™ or ā€˜holy warā€™.

UN-designated terrorist has evoked the same , calling his followers to, ā€œMarry for jihad, give birth for jihad and earn money only for jihad till the cruelty of America and India endsā€. The Islamic State (IS) uses similar methods to recruit more people to wage the global jihad. These religious dictations have been omnipresent in all conflicts, and are consistently used to recruit fighters for terrorism. 

There exists a misplaced perception among historians that the  implementation of nationalism-based religious terrorism was first witnessed in Afghanistan following the Soviet Union’s of 1979. However, a close reading of contemporary conflicts proves otherwise. It was the then Indian state (now union territory) of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) which faced the initial brunt of religious terrorism.

Religiously-imbibed Insurgency

J&K first witnessed religious terrorism during the of 1947-48, also known as the . Pakistan mobilized from frontier areas to capture J&K, including its capital, Srinagar. Pakistanis built the narrative for invasion around the theory that a Muslim majority region can’t be governed under any other religious interpretation. This extremist Islam interpretation is referred to as Dar al-Harb, or  ā€œhouse of war.ā€

Dar al-Harb justifies and makes necessary the waging of Islamic holy wars, and the recapture of any territories which Islamic nations had historically controlled. This kind of extremism is the biggest roadblock preventing peace between Islamic and non-Islamic nations. Similarly, the later Indo-Pak war of 1965, code-named , was a military strategy contingent on the expectation that following the invasion of Kashmir,  local Kashmiris would join Pakistani troops and  incite a rebellion against the Indian military. This sagacious plan combined nationalism and religious terrorism, a brew which the Pakistani president, , hoped would fuel a powerful revolt. 

When Khanā€™s risky hypothesis failed to ignite a revolutionary spark, the Pakistani military changed its approach to the capture of J&K. This novel approach included supporting the of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1976, a nationalist insurgent group that fought for Kashmirā€™s independence from both India and Pakistan. 

By backing the JKLF, Pakistan hoped to instigate violence from within Kashmir by radicalizing the youth. However, the JKLF initially failed to attract enough attention. However, several factors helped the JKLF gradually amass power. These factors included the increase in cross border infiltration, the development of more extremist madrassas in the area, and the unrest following the of 1987.

The resulting insurgency destroyed the syncretic culture of the Kashmir Valley. In 1990, the peaceful minority group known as the , was forced from their homeland and became refugees overnight.. Since then, the environment in the Kashmir Valley has remained tense, as Kashmiri Pandits continue to face from radical forces. Most recently, in February 2023, a Kashmiri Pandit was by terrorists in Pulwama.

On most occasions, these attacks have been led and carried out by local Kashmiri citizens. This antipathy towards Kashmiri Pandits is a result of indoctrination by local clerics, as well as Pakistanā€™s manipulative meddling in an effort to alter the demographics of J&K to suit its irredentist territorial claims.

The situation across the Line of Control (LOC) is similar, as in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). As stated previously, many mainstream clerics are spreading ideas of religious terrorism and nationalism in J&K.These clerics, in most cases, enjoy the support of the Pakistani military in return for the clericsā€™ continued indoctrination of much-needed nationalist fighters to wage religious war in both Kashmir and Afghanistan. Both Shia and Sunni Muslim clerics have participated in this military indoctrination, particularly when it comes to radicalizing the youth.

Why Pakistan Needs Afghanistan

While the Pakistani government denies its support for the Taliban, many are convinced that the Taliban began as a special project for the Pakistani military to achieve strategic depth in Afghanistan. When the US finally from Afghanistan in August 2021, a large number of both Pakistanis and Afghans .The then Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief for Pakistan, Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, Kabul in September 2021 to set the tone for future Pakistan-Taliban engagement. 

Hameed played an active role in the reconciliation of the Haqqani and Baradar groups, the two leading factions of the Taliban’s internal power structure. His support was also instrumental in defeating the resistance groups operating out of . These groups, known as the National Resistance Front (NFR), operate under the command of , former intelligence chief and vice president of Afghanistan. Also commanding the NFR is Ahmad Massoud, son of , the former commander of the who the Taliban assassinated back in 2001. The younger Massoud continues to against Taliban takeover in his late fatherā€™s footsteps, alongside Saleh, who is the current ā€œacting presidentā€ of Afghanistan.   Both Saleh and Massoud have allegedly fled to Tajikistan.

Pakistan’s military considers geopolitics to be a , and believes that gaining so-called ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan is critical to its goal of confrontingIndia. This approach has led to a decline in Pakistan’s military reputation, as Pakistanis begin to point to the armed forces as a source of many economic and social issues. Excessive military funding has also contributed to the across Pakistan, particularly in the port city of Gwadar, where citizens have lost access to ā€œclean water and other basic facilitiesā€. Pakistan has also contemplated the impacts of the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan for a long time. To secure its interests in such a strategic space, it has formed a multi-pronged strategy. 

Pakistan’s multi-pronged strategy rests on two intertwined pillars. The first pillar encompasses    the advantages to obtaining control of Afghanistan. By dominating the Afghan geopolitical space, Pakistan intends to divert its resources from frontier areas to J&K. Using Afghan resources and manpower, Pakistan can bolster its campaign for control of the region. This strategic alignment would only heighten tensions betweenIndia and Pakistan, and put pressure on India to grant concessions on J&K. 

The second pillar of Pakistan’s ruthless desire to dominate Afghanistan arises from its economic compulsions. Aligning with Afghanistan would give Pakistan control of the key entry point into the and the economic opportunities of Eastern Europe.  For control of J&K and access to the Heartland, Pakistan would ā€œwage a war for 1,000 yearsā€ according to former Pakistani prime minister   in his speech to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) back in 1965.  After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, several oil companies explored the possibility of building an oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to India, via Afghanistan and Pakistan (TAPI). However, the instability in Afghanistan has brought this plan to a halt. If Pakistan gains viable control over Afghanistan, the TAPI pipeline could become a reality, bringing in billions of petrodollars to Pakistan’s depleted state .

Insurgency and Economic Woes

The Taliban has brought medievalism into Afghanistan, has been funded, supported, and sheltered by the Pakistani state for decades. Despite Pakistanā€™s aid,, the Taliban havealways maintained that they are fighting ‘to free their land from foreign occupationā€™, including potential occupation by Pakistan. The Taliban refuse to accept the as a border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Instead, it claims the western parts of Pakistan for Afghanistan, including the historic city of , for historical and demographic reasons. 

Now, the Taliban has completely turned against Pakistan, increasing support to an insurgent group known as the (TTP) which seeks to overthrow the ā€œunIslamicā€ Pakistani government.  Once the government has been dismantled, the TTP hopes to make Pakistan its headquarters for future jihadi operations, an objective first championed by the now Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri.

In this quest to ‘Islamize’ Pakistan, the TTP has vociferously attacked military infrastructure belonging to Pakistani police and military. The group has also taken the responsibility for the in the Shia Mosque of Peshawar, which killed more than 100 Pakistani citizens. Currently, TTP militants are infiltrating Pakistan in massive numbers, due to the nationā€™s porous borders and presence of Pashtuns, with whom many members of the TTP share an ethnic background. 

In addition to Pakistanā€™s fight against insurgency, the nation is also drowning in debt. Pakistan has already defaulted on several debt payment promises, but was temporarily using funds from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In a recent , the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) says that its total liquid , as of 24 February, stand at US $9.267 billion while the net forex reserves are only US $3.814 billion, barely sufficient to ensure three weeks of imports. 

This situation is turning worse with forex reserves tanking further with each passing day. The same report says that at the end of fiscal year 2021, the net reserves were US $17.298 billion. These statistics show that while the world is recovering from the economic perils of COVID-19, Pakistan is falling deeper into the abyss. Poor economic management has sent the national rupee into a freefall as inflation rates skyrocket. Even more condemning were the devastating which plagued nearly 15 million Pakistanis, many of whom still do not have access to clean water.Food and water insecurity combined with civil unrest results in the perfect breeding ground jihadi recruits, which will only bring more instability and bloodshed to Pakistan and the region as a whole. 

US Involvement

During the , Pakistan was a key state for the US, acting as a lackey to help contain the Soviet Union while receiving billions in from the western superpower. The Soviet of Afghanistan in 1979 made Pakistan even more critical to the US and its ā€œ.ā€ Even today, the US describes Pakistan as important for “.”  

In a recent statement by US State Department spokesperson, Ned Price, the US potential peace negotiations between India and Pakistan. However, if peace is desired by all then how come some of the most dreaded terror organizations are operating in the Subcontinent? Why hasn’t the US  sanctioned Pakistan, for its non functioning democracy and for funding and sustaining several terror organizations, while Myanmar, another dictatorship to India’s East, is sanctioned? The answer signifies that interests triumph over values. Myanmar does not sit on the connecting lines to the heartland while Pakistan does. The strategic location of Pakistan makes it much more ‘important’, as the war in Afghanistan demonstrated. 

On several occasions, former US president expressed for Americaā€™s relationship with Pakistan, before going back on his campaign promise to end the war in Afghanistan once and for all. However, since President Joe Biden took office in 2021, the US has revived its efforts to find with Pakistan and build a modern partnership. Biden even provided Pakistan with in aviation equipment to help fortify the Pakistani military in its fight against terrorism. However, Bidenā€™s goodwill towards Pakistan was not well received by those in India, who still consider Pakistan to be an imminent threat.

Even more alarming to India, in October 2022, Pakistani Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa . Secretary of defense Lloyd J. Austin III welcomed Bajwa to the Pentagon and ceremoniously escorted the general through an honor cordon, a bestowal conventionally reserved for the highest-ranking US officials. 

Many foreign leaders visit the US, but very few receive the hospitality provided to Bajwa. Despite Bajwaā€™s grand welcome, both nations remained tight-lipped over the agenda of discussion and divulged little to the public. The Department of Defense broadly summarized the encounter, stating that “discussions focused on opportunities to address key mutual defense interestsā€. 

American citizens, South Asians, and the world at large deserve to know what was actually discussed between the two military officers. Was India a topic of discussion? How do the US and Pakistan plan on containing  the Taliban? These unanswered questions are pertinent to both regional and international security.

Why India Should Not Trust Pakistan

There are three main reasons why India should be dubious of Pakistanā€™s call for peace.

First, providing aid to Pakistan in the past has made no impact on its geopolitical aim. Pakistan continues to harbor UN-designated terrorists like , and .  Militants of the , , and around 81 other proscribed still currently operate in Pakistan. The madrassas continue to radicalize the young, filling the vessels of their minds with hatred and bigotry. Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to have clandestine with China, allowing Chinese officials and military officers to operate in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and .

Second, the Pakistani government is in a precarious position as deep internal division and civil unrest continue to plague the nation. India cannot rely on the promises of the Pakistani government when so many different separatist groups are still actively trying to dismantle it.

While the Pakistani  military is doing everything it can to ensure the territorial integrity of Pakistan, overstretching, the ambiguity of Pakistan’s national interests and overall political instability are making it very difficult to manage.

Third, at a time when countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are modernizing and incorporating more tolerant values, Pakistan is falling back into medievalism. The of religious places belonging to Ahmadiyyas, a tolerant Muslim sect, are becoming commonplace  in ā€œmodernā€ Pakistan. 

Since the partition of India and its birth as an independent nation, Pakistan has used ā€˜jihadā€™ to achieve foreign policy objectives. Since the dictatorship of General , the Pakistani military has succumbed to religious indoctrination and supported religious wars in J&K and Afghanistan. Pakistani media, police and other governmental agencies have also become strongholds of the ‘mullah’ and militantism.

India would be taking a colossal risk if it engages in peace agreements with radioactive Pakistan. Instead, India should focus on its own economic growth and development, rather than investing time and resources in a nation that ultimately appears to be unwilling to reform.

If Pakistan truly desires peace with India, then it should begin by taking concrete actions against terrorism on the ground. A good place to start would be with the destruction of the terrorist that are spreading across the LOC. Before any real negotiations can begin, both India and Pakistan should take heed of this great proverb: Actions speak louder than words.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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