The tale of ’s ascent and Uber’s retreat across Southeast Asia is instructive because it exposes how a platform wins not only through technology but through cultural and institutional attunement. In Malaysia, Grab secured four in five ride-hailing trips, a market grip that looks less like an accident and more like : active regulatory engagement, accommodation of local payment habits, halal-sensitive services and driver-facing benefits all stitched together to make the service . The contrast with Uber’s exit a blunt lesson — technological superiority without socio-political fit is fragile.Ěý

This region is not an economic backwater waiting to be optimised. Southeast Asia’s platforms underpin a veritable economic pivot: digital services are projected to account for a rising share of GDP and investment flows, while household behaviours migrate online. 

An expanding digital economyĚý

The World Bank’s of the digital economy in the region underscores how homegrown platforms from ride-hailing to e-commerce have become core national assets, not optional conveniences. Such platforms bring scale quickly — but with scale comes concentrated market power and the social consequences that flow from it.Ěý

Regulation has not been the enemy. In Malaysia, localization rules, the Public Service Vehicle for e-hailing drivers and competition enforcement have all forced platforms to choose between becoming partners in governance or adversaries of the state.Ěý

Grab’s decision to subsidise driver compliance with PSV rules and to incorporate local payment systems and halal options converted regulatory friction into a source of legitimacy — and a barrier for rivals. That approach mirrors from regional policy studies: platforms that co-design with authorities secure not just market share, but a form of political shelter that is hard for latecomers to breach.

But legitimacy bought at scale raises uncomfortable questions about bargaining power and social risk. Algorithmic management turns gig workers into nodes in a precision-optimised system; earnings and work conditions become a function of opaque code and shifting incentives.

The rise of platform labor

Research on the lived realities of platform labor in Southeast Asia paints a : algorithmic control, weak social protection and the erosion of collective bargaining amplify precarity even as incomes rise for some. Policy responses that prize innovation should not be blind to the social costs of the innovation itself.Ěý

A different path is possible. Several rigorous think-tank and industry — many recently collated by regional research partners and platform-backed institutes — argue that the smartest form of industrial policy for a digital era is hybrid: infrastructural investment and interoperability (ability to work with other systems) standards alongside enforceable worker protections and transparent competition rules.Ěý

˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s internet penetration and an expanding gig workforce that the prize is large: inclusive growth can be engineered if governance catches up. The Tech for Good Institute and Bain’s of the platform economy outlines this architecture: a stronger social compact, clearer data governance and smoother payment integration unlock deeper economic inclusion without sacrificing contestability.Ěý

The necessity of regulatory laws

The political choice at hand is not binary. Platforms can be tamed by heavy-handed protectionism, which risks stifling the very digital dynamism that fosters jobs and services. Or platforms can be harnessed through a combination of smart regulation, social insurance for dependent workers and incentives for interoperability that reduce lock-in.

Practical steps are straightforward: mandatory minimum standards for algorithmic transparency; portable social insurance contributions for gig income; clear limits on anti-competitive tying; and support for local payment rails that preserve financial inclusion. Those are governance tools, not anti-market placations. 

The digital revolutionĚý

This is ultimately a question of values as much as economics. The digital revolution in Malaysia and across Southeast Asia a chance to craft markets that accelerate dignity rather than hollow it out. Platforms that understand local language, religion, payment habits and labor markets can become partners for inclusive growth — but only if public authorities insist on a fair bargain.Ěý

The policy craft is neither technocratic nicety nor nostalgia; it is the political work of aligning technology with social purpose. Australia’s foreign-policy community and regional partners would be well served to argue for a Southeast Asian digital order that prizes contestability, transparent governance and decent work — as the region’s future prosperity depends on it.Ěý

A century’s worth of institutions did not appear overnight; the digital commons will not be settled by code alone. If the next decade is to deliver both convenience and social cohesion, platforms must be held accountable to the societies they now help to run — and those societies must insist that convenience never becomes a substitute for justice.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Opponents are painting him as a Western and Israeli lackey. Protesters clad in keffiyeh, the distinctive Palestinian scarf, and waving the Palestinian flag after last Friday’s prayers towards the US embassy in Kuala Lumpur and briefly clashed with police.

“What we are protesting here today is the colonization of Palestine, backed by America and Western powers,” said activist Hishamuddin Rais. He insisted that the Gaza war was neither a religious battle between Jews and Muslims nor a war against Hamas. Instead, he suggested, it was in opposition to a Western-backed Israeli effort to deprive Palestinians of their rights.

Rais echoed Ibrahim’s insistence that Hamas’ brutal October 7 attack on Israel in which some 1,400 people, mostly civilians, were killed would not alter Malaysian support for the group.

Among Middle Eastern and Asian nations with a Hamas representation, Malaysia may be the most exposed Hamas host.

The key role of Qatar, and how Turkey and Lebanon matter

Hamas leaders, including Khaled Mishaal and Ismail Haniyeh, are based in Qatar. Qatar has long served as a welcome intermediary between Israel and the group it once tacitly nurtured as an antidote to . It was a policy by the United States, even though the US and various European countries, alongside Israel, have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. Last week, Qatar the release of two American hostages kidnapped by Hamas during its attack.

A highflier, Qatar is seeking to get more of the approximately 222 Israelis and foreigners captured by Hamas liberated. Among the hostages are at least 26 Israeli military personnel. European , including France’s Emmanuel Macron and Britain’s Rishi Sunak, hope Qatar can help them get their nationals freed. Nevertheless, Qatar’s relationship with Hamas is encountering headwinds, with some and Western officials taking the Gulf state to task.

“There can be no more with Hamas,” said US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Blinken thanked Qatar for getting the two American hostages released. Last week, the United States ten Hamas operatives it said were involved in financing and facilitating Hamas in Gaza, Turkey and Algeria, including Ahmad Abd Al-Dayim Nasrallah, a senior Hamas official based in Qatar.

Middle East analyst Hussien Ibish, a senior scholar at the Saudi and United Arab Emirates-funded Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington a reckoning with Qatar may only come once the hostage crisis is resolved. “After the hostage situation concludes — whether it ends in tragedy or with negotiated releases involving possible prisoner swaps — Qatar is likely to face and criticism,” Ibish said.

Turkey, another Hamas host country in which thousands have in support of Gaza has sought to deflect criticism by playing a similar role, so far with less success. In a with Haniyeh this weekend, Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄźan said he was working to get humanitarian aid to Gaza and would welcome wounded Gazans for treatment in Turkish hospitals.

For now, Lebanon, a failed state on the verge of collapse, in which Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Shiite militia, threatens to open a if Israel pushes ahead with a ground offensive in Gaza, is a lost case from a US and Israeli perspective.

˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s unwavering support for the Palestinian people

Ibrahim, the Malaysian prime minister, lacks a veneer for his unabashed support for Hamas to counter likely US pressure. Speaking to parliament after the October 7 attack, Ibrahim insisted, “We, as a policy, have a relationship with Hamas from before and this will continue.” The prime minister unspecified foreign pressure to break with Hamas. “As such, we don’t agree with their pressuring attitude, as Hamas too won in Gaza freely through elections and Gazans chose them to lead.” Ibrahim was referring to Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006, the last time Palestinians voted.

Last week, Ibrahim Malaysia’s “unwavering support for the Palestinian people” in a phone call with Haniyeh. In recent days, Ibrahim also called for an immediate ceasefire and the creation of an independent Palestinian state in territories conquered by Israel during the 1967 Middle East war. Malaysia has no diplomatic relations with Israel.

Ibrahim is likely to find maintaining his position increasingly problematic, particularly when Israel comes around to investigating its intelligence and operational failures in preventing a Hamas attack. Already, Malaysians are divided about their policy towards Hamas, even though criticism is expressed primarily behind closed doors. “With all that’s happening, support for Hamas is far from unequivocal,” said a well-placed Malaysian source.

The source noted that the Hamas-controlled, Kuala Lumpur-based Palestinian Cultural Organization Malaysia (PCOM) organizes well-attended public events joined by prominent intellectuals, journalists and civil society figures but rarely by senior officials.

Even so, former prime minister Mahathir Mohammed invited Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to a 2019 Islamic summit in Kuala Lumpur. In addition, Mahathir met Hamas leaders on several earlier occasions in the Malaysian capital. Some analysts suggested that the government, rather than changing its public stance, could quietly distance itself from Hamas by not renewing the residency visas of the group’s operatives.

PCOM was in 2011 by Ibrahim’s Rural and Regional Development Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi and the prime minister’s Home Affairs Minister Saifuddin Nasution Ismail. The Hamas attack has revived debate in government circles and security forces about the risks involved in allowing Hamas to operate in Malaysia.

Officials and security officers first questioned the value of relations with Hamas after the 2018 of Kuala Lumpur-based Palestinian electrical engineering professor and Hamas operative Fadi al-Batsh in a drive-by shooting on the streets of the Malaysian capital.

Media reports asserted that Al-Batsh helped Hamas its rocket and drone arsenal and may have been negotiating an arms deal with North Korea. Al-Batsh, who obtained his PhD from the University of Malaya, where he lectured on electrical engineering, extensively on power, electricity, and battery-related issues.

Moreover, in 2014, the Israeli military said that a captured Hamas commander had told Israel’s domestic intelligence service that he was one of ten fighters who in Malaysia for the use of motor-powered hang gliders. Fighters on hang gliders landed on the Israeli side of the Gaza border in the first minutes of the October 7 Hamas attack.

Malaysian analysts believe the company that trained the fighters was duped into believing it was developing a new tourism opportunity.

Hamas uses PCOM, the cultural center, described by Malaysians as an “unofficial embassy,” for public outreach and fundraising. PCOM denies being a political organization with Hamas links.

The analysts said Malaysian governments allowed PCOM to operate alongside the Palestinian embassy in Kuala Lumpur to balance ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s relations with Hamas and its archrival, Al Fatah, which dominates the officially recognized Palestine Authority and has an embassy in the Malaysian capital.

PCOM raises funds through a network of Malaysian civil society groups. The center advises potential donors knocking on its door to contact those groups.

Ibrahim “[was] committed to the Palestinian struggle from his younger days in Abim (Muslim Islamic Youth Movement) until he became the prime minister… His efforts in the last few hours were important in the Western narrative and Western pressure on the international community,” said Muslim Imran, a member of Hamas’ international bureau and founding director of the Kuala Lumpur-based Asia Middle East Center for Research & Dialogue.

[ first published this piece.]

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Both India and Vietnam face a security dilemma because of China’s regional power ambitions. They fear Asian domination by a single power. Being China’s neighbors, India and Vietnam are rightly insecure about their borders. China has invaded both countries in the past: India in 1962 and Vietnam in . 

Han and Hindu Nationalism Come Face to Face

To raise the cost of another Chinese military aggression, India and Vietnam are joining hands to counter Beijing. New Delhi and Hanoi completed 50 years of diplomatic engagement last year. It is the last five years that have been the most consequential in their diplomatic history though. During this period, the countries have been intensifying cooperation and are in a position to act in concert on many fronts.

The Dragon Spits Fire

Assertive Chinese behavior in the last few years has rattled India and Vietnam. Be it in the Himalayas or expansive territorial claims in the South East China Sea, Beijing has upped the ante. 

Countries on China’s periphery have borne the brunt of the dragon’s fire. For example, China claims portions of Indian territory in the western and eastern sectors of its border with India. Beijing also frequently crosses into the Indian side of the disputed border. 

Similarly, Beijing continues to claim all of the South China Sea, disregarding the sovereign rights and of Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. China has also repeatedly targeted Vietnamese fishing boats and carried out maritime activities in disputed areas in the chain. Vietnam claims these islands as its territory. So does Taiwan. However, Beijing exercises de facto over the island chain. China also controls the Spratly Islands and Woody Island. Beijing is turning these disputed territories into military installations in the South China Sea. 

The roots of China’s assertive behavior lie in its self-perception. Beijing views itself as a natural Asian hegemon with great power status. Now, China is seeking to become a and challenge the US for the top of the global totem pole.

New Delhi and Hanoi, like Tokyo and Canberra, do not accept China’s self-proclaimed hegemony. These countries do not see themselves as subordinate to Beijing. Naturally, they are critical of any attempts by China to dominate the post-World War II regional order. 

This is also true of the other players in the region. They might not admit it openly, but Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea are uncomfortable with Beijing’s unilateral attempts to dominate the region. However, the fear of a backlash from Beijing, a sizable number of citizens of Chinese origin in their own territories and economic dependence on China prevent these countries from voicing their worries. 

Even in 1978, Lee Kuan Yew, the then prime minister of Singapore, caught the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping by surprise, that he was more concerned about Beijing than about Hanoi. Deng had gone to Singapore to mobilize Lee Kuan Yew’s support against an ambitious Vietnam. The canny Singaporean statesman perceptively understood that the long-term challenge emanated from Beijing. Since then, it is clear that Beijing has aroused feelings of insecurity amongst its neighbors in Southeast and East Asia.

The fear of outright dominance by a single power compels Asian nations like India, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam to seek multipolarity. These nations believe that multipolarity will maintain a stable regional order. Therefore, their geopolitical and diplomatic strategy aims to counter China. These Asian nations are only following what eminent theorists like Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer have long posited about achieving a balance of power in international relations. 

Coalescing around shared interests such as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and freedom of navigation of the seas helps regional powers build a coalition against China. Like other Asian countries, both and have concerns about China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Both want a multipolar, rules-based regional order that  constricts the space for unilateral adventures by Beijing. Therefore, the recent “” announced by Hanoi and New Delhi seeks to make structural and institutional changes that make multipolarity a reality. 

From the mid-1970s, New Delhi and Hanoi were on the same side of the geopolitical and ideological fault lines in Asia. Vietnam was communist and India was socialist. Both were of the Soviet Union and harbored a deep distrust of the United States. 

Communist Vietnam soon found that ideological similarities could not avoid geopolitical rivalries. Deng was deeply about the deepening Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Deng sought to teach the Vietnamese a lesson for “” Beijing and siding with Moscow. Deng believed that Hanoi sought regional dominance in Southeast Asia and he wanted China to have that privilege.

Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia to overthrow the Pol Pot regime further poisoned its relations with Beijing. China was Pol Pot’s benefactor. Beijing saw Pol Pot’s regime as a bulwark against Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Once Vietnam got rid of Pol Pot in Cambodia, Deng attacked Vietnam in 1979. stood by Vietnam. Moraji Desai, the then Indian prime minister, issued a statement calling for an immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam as the first step towards ensuring peace in Southeast Asia. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India’s then foreign minister, shortened his visit to China in protest against this invasion. 

Polygamous Foreign Policy

Over the years, New Delhi and Hanoi have followed a multidirectional foreign policy. Neither wanted to anger their giant northern neighbor. Both regularly championed the idea of “strategic autonomy” that focuses on avoiding sclerotic alliances and security commitments. Given the structural changes in due to China’s rise, both India and Vietnam are moving closer.

Yet there are limits to Vietnam’s relationship with India. Retired Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan believes that given their relatively small sizes and strategic location, major Southeast Asian countries have no choice but to pursue a foreign policy. As a result, these countries seek friendship with all and confrontation with none. Vietnam is no exception.

By simultaneously juggling many relationships and contradictions, Vietnam aims to diversify its partners. Fundamentally, Vietnam uses these partnerships to pursue its national interests. India is following the same . India buys oil from Russia, conducts military exercises with the US and welcomes investment from Japan. It is friends with Israel and, at the same time, maintains relationships with Iran. Like India, Vietnam also has meaningful in place with all five members of the UN Security Council. Both India and Vietnam have defied conventional Cold-War era wisdom of making binary choices. 

Indo-Vietnamese Push for Multipolarity

Over the last few years, Vietnam has become a focal part of India’s “.” As a result, defense and security have improved. This includes joint exercises and training programs, cooperation and trade in defense equipment. New Delhi has also given $600 million of defense lines of credit to Hanoi. 

Increasing trade and have brought both countries together. Bilateral trade has ballooned from $200 million in 2000 to $14.114 billion in 2021-2022. Several Indian are investing in Vietnam. They are in diverse sectors such as IT, education, real estate, textiles and garments, healthcare, solar technology, consumer goods, and agricultural products. India is Vietnam with infrastructure and connectivity projects, development and capacity-building assistance, and . Despite Chinese apprehensions, India also has oil exploration projects with PetroVietnam in the South China Sea. Cooperation in has also grown at a healthy pace. 

Slowly and surely, a silent change is unfolding in Asian waters. China’s increasing aggression is no longer going unanswered. The Indo-Pacific will not become a Chinese lake. Regional powers are responding. Not only the US and Japan but also India and Vietnam are working more closely together to preserve a multipolar Asia. 

[Contributing Editor and CFO Ti Ngo edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Territorial spats between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors over Beijing’s infamous “” dotted across the South China Sea have substantially soured the mood of its allies.

China’s insistence to play by its own rules, especially in the case of the Spratly, Paracel and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, has put Beijing at loggerheads with virtually all littoral countries in the region and, farther afield, with the United States. As a result, the fact that China has chosen to go its own way regarding territorial claims has become a burr under the saddle of many of its once loyal allies.

Turning Tide in Malaysia

Malaysia provides a particularly good example of China’s alienation of its friends over the South China Sea. China’s incursions in ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s territorial waters have increased in frequency since 2009, when it began to more stringently adhere to the informal “nine-dash-line” area established in 1947. For many years, Malaysia considered itself in a “special relationship” with China and had chosen to handle such issues privately with Beijing, as it has done with other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) when the South China Sea issue arose.

However, over the past two years, the incursions into ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s territorial waters have become more frequent, more open and notorious. One particularly egregious example isĚýthe vessel currently anchored at Luconia Shoals. Situated 84 nautical miles from Sarawak, which is well-within ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s territorial waters, the vessel has been anchored for two years and counting, possibly in an attempt to establish a territorial claim on a new island forming in the area.

Rather than handling the encroachment privately as before,Ěýthe has been forced to become more public and more confrontational in its approach. High-level officials from Malaysia have had emergency meetings with their own government, Malaysian vessels have been dispatched to the area to reinforce its claim to the territory and to monitor China’s movements in the area, and the issue was on the agenda at a meeting betweenĚýheads of state this summer.

China’s actions have clearly alarmed Malaysia and threatened the “special relationship” the two parties claim to have. It has also begun to drive Malaysia into the arms of the other power in the region: the United States.

The US has already done a great deal to woo Malaysia away from China. As China’s economy experiences a slowdown, theĚýUS is finalizing the (TPP) with MalaysiaĚý(among others). The TPP, a paradigm-shifting agreement to which China is not a party, stands to open AmericanĚýmarkets to ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s electronics, rubber and palm oil industries, which are expected to help make up for the recent decline of Malaysian products exported to the US, and then some.

Washington and Kuala LumpurĚýhave taken steps to increase the level of their security partnership as well. Malaysia has joined the US and other states in establishing the Global Coalition to Counter Islamic State. As part of this, Malaysia has pledged to establishĚýa Ěýto counter messaging from the Islamic State (IS)Ěýby the end of 2015 with the help of Washington. Additionally, Malaysia hasĚýĚýwith the US in the fight against IS.

Vietnam and the US

Meanwhile, another example of a close relationship gone south comes from Vietnam. After ChinaĚý an oil rig in Vietnam’s territorial waters in 2014, tensions escalated to the point that President Truong Tan Sang seemed to forgive Washington for imprisoning him during the Vietnam War, and instead lashed out at China.

In a September interview to Associated Press, he unambiguously declared that Beijing’s large-scale reclamation of submerged islands in the South China Sea “.” During the same interview, Sang talked warmly about the US, lauding the steps made by US President Barack Obama toward normalizing bilateral relations and lifting an embargo on armament sales.

While Beijing has been making overtures recently in a bid to pacify Hanoi, the damage will not be reversed easily. The two candidates vying for the top position of secretary general in the Communist Party of Vietnam are bothĚýĚýas having strong intentions ofĚýdeepening ties with the US. Coupled with the recent signing of the TPP, Hanoi seems set to pursue its core national interests by playing the powers against one another, in the hope of restraining China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea.

That strategy has already borne fruit. During Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to Vietnam, the two communist countriesĚýĚýto solve their maritime disputes peacefully by helping each other and proceeding “hand in hand” on a path to building a “truly trustworthy” bond.

China’s assertion of its non-existent and unrecognized claims in the South China Sea, especially as it relates to Malaysia and Vietnam, is positioning the razor of fruitless aggression over the special relationships’ face. China’s incursions are making international recognition of its claims in the area even less likely. Continuing down this road will likely find many more of China’s relationships in ruins.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.Ěý

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With an increasingly heavy investment footprint spanning the length and breadth of the African continent, Malaysia is establishing itself as an important dynamic in the emerging ASEAN-Africa nexus.

In the run-up to the Bandung Asia-Africa Summit in April 2015, statements from Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s office suggested a long-range view for enhancing relationships on the continent. Driven by “commitment in strengthening cooperation” and achieving “prosperity through South-South cooperation,” Malaysia is expressing great enthusiasm and commitment to exploring opportunities in Africa.

Indeed, Africa could find itself playing a central role as part of ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s effort to develop a latticework of political and trade relationships with developing nations. Since the 1990s, Singapore’s northern neighbor has undertaken a sustained effort to build partnerships across the developing world as part of its vision to achieve greater resiliency on the global stage through political and economic diversification. In the wake of the recent financial crisis, this aspiration has all but certainly been renewed.

Taking note of Africa’s burgeoning investment opportunities, which have delivered some of the highest returns globally in recent years, Malaysia has responded with ever larger amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) that have blazed a trajectory of consistent 20% year-on-year growth over the past decade. These FDI flows culminated at a whopping $19.3 billion in 2011, eclipsing those of both China and India on the continent, and following behind only the United States and France as the third largest international investor that year.

Malaysian firms can now be found operating in a wide range of sectors across Africa, includingĚýresource extraction, hotel and leisure, shopping and financial services. The diversity of undertakings reflects ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s own recent transformation into a more multi-sectored and dynamic economy, and it indicates the private sector’s appetite to establish meaningful in-roads into frontier markets well-beyond the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Malaysian company Probase Manufacturing Sdn Bhd, for example, completed its first road development project in Kenya this past June, which leveraged new soil technology to cut the expected price tag of such a project by more than half, while in the process pricking the interests of Rwanda and Swaziland to undertake similar pilot projects worth $3 million each in their countries. Other companies, like Pacific Inter-Link, are already long established with a well-entrenched presence on the continent with regional offices in markets like Ethiopia, Nigeria and Ghana, among others, that are engaged in manufacturing and commodities trading.

Next Wave of Opportunities

While Africa may not be reciprocating in terms of FDI, the relationship is nonetheless a two-way street of growing awareness and integration. Preceding the 2011 investment surge, 2010 was marked by an equally rapid increase in the number of African students enrolling in Malaysian universities. According to official UNESCO figures, Malaysia welcomed 120% more African student enrolments in 2010, reaching 11,825 from 5,373 in the previous year.

This number has only continued to rise thereafter. Political engagement has also been two-way, with the Malaysian agenda driven by a robust network of diplomatic missions on the continent that is comparatively larger than many of its ASEAN counterparts.

This current rhythm of engagement is priming the Malaysia-Africa corridor to take advantage of the next wave of opportunity. According to the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre, there are increasingly attractive and feasible possibilities for linking Kuala Lumpur’s bustling Islamic finance community to address substantial investment needs for critical African infrastructure projects.

Several African nations have already successfully turned to the global sukuk (Islamic bond) market for funding. When considering the ongoing $31 billion per year funding gap for infrastructure on the continent, Malaysian underwriting could play a relevant role in advancing the continent’s broader economic development agenda. With Africa currently accounting for less than 3% of global Islamic banking assets, this is the next frontier for Islamic finance.

Similarly, the halal industry presents Malaysia with excellent opportunities for joint-entries into Africa with ASEAN regional partners in Singapore and Indonesia. Halal players in food, travel and lifestyle products should begin incorporating Africa into their global expansion strategy, if they have not already, with a view to tapping into the fastest growing middle-class in the world, dense urban centers and a nearly 30% Muslim population.

Smart Partnerships

Through smart partnerships, the risk and complexity associated with first market entry can be reduced, enabling companies to increase the probability of success in securing a strategic foothold while Africa’s competition barriers are still low.

As the largest exporter of halal goods in the world already, with exports reaching to around $11 billion in 2013, Malaysia is well-positioned to lead such a charge into Africa. The global halal market is rapidly expanding beyond the traditional confines of the food and beverage space, to include products such as cosmetics, tourism and health products, becoming a more holistic concept.

Although Africa currently represents only 15% of this global market, the continent’s population is expected to double to about 1.9 billion by 2050, with the Muslim population growing at a rate of 170%—both highly favorable growth drivers ahead for halal.

While the ASEAN-Africa nexus is still in nascent stages, Malaysia is standing out as a trailblazer for new markets and industries. Africa is rising and its nations are turning to Asia for partners in development. With Malaysia on track to achieve First-World status by 2020, it is a development showcase for what this once mislabeled “hopeless” continent is set to achieve in its own right in the coming decades.

*[This article was originally published byĚý’s content partner, theĚý.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The July 2015 US State Department Trafficking in People report was met with staunch criticism both from congressional lawmakers and human rights activists after Malaysia, previously given the worst available Tier 3 ranking for modern slavery and trafficking, was upgraded to a Tier 2 status, despite the lack of evidence to justify the move. Critics were quick to note that the decision was a political one. US President Barack Obama’s newfound authority to lead the fast-track Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations essentially banned any Tier 3 countries on the trafficking list to partake in it, leading Democratic Senator Bob Menendez to “is a clear politicization of the report.”

That’s enough of a problem in and of itself, but what is even worse is the fact that, in an attempt to fast-track the deal, the US may not even include the environmentally protective measures necessary to change such harmful international business practices and ensure that obligations are enforced.

But the word on the street is the TPP, set to be the in history, affecting 792 million people and making up 40% of the world economy, could significantly slow down and even stop harmful business practices that lead to environmental damage. So far, the TPP is still a pending trade agreement between the United States and 11 nations: Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile, New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and Japan.

One crucial issue from the negotiations has come to the forefront of the current discussion and attracted some of the largest criticisms’ from environmental advocates: the environmental impact of the deal. According to a of the deal obtained by TheĚýNew York Times, the 12 countries “cover environmentally sensitive regions from tundra to island ecosystems, and from the world’s largest coral reefs to its largest rain forest.” The document says the deal “addresses these challenges in detail.”

In most of the countries that would fall into the agreement, illegal logging, wildlife trafficking and overfishing are common. If enforced, such a concrete chapter would be a gamechanger for these countries’ environmental landscape. For Vietnam and Malaysia, stringent environmental requirements on wildlife trafficking could oblige environmental ministries to crack down on poachers. Furthermore, for Malaysia—which not only suffers from migrant and wildlife trafficking, and deforestation from palm oil plantations, but also a —the environmental chapter of the TPP could provide incentives to regulate these industries and promote a sustainable development growth model.

Currently, ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s unregulated bauxite mining industry, having grown significantly over the past year as China seeks to (the country banned exports of raw materials in January 2014), has largely contributed to the deforestation of vast rainforests, releasing toxic gases into the atmosphere that have led to an uptick in health problems for the population concerned.

According to local media, the “leaking radioactive material into parts of the Malaysian state, turning natural green waters to a deep dark hue.” The TPP environmental chapter could play a vital role in ensuring stringent guidelines for the industry are adopted to ensure mining operators are bound by strict health and environmental regulations. This would weed out the illegal bauxite miners, loggers, poachers and traffickers. This is one instance where the controversial investor state dispute settlement clause could actually be used to force compliance from states.

An Agreement Shrouded in Secrecy

However, the key issue today, in the event of the deal being successful, is the fact that the enforcement of environmental protections in the agreement would be very difficult to uphold. While promotingĚý“,” the environmental chapter may result in a failure of these countries to adhere to environmental standards. But ignoring obligations may result in trade sanctions, which supporters claim will discourage countries from failing to comply.

According to Jeffery Frankel, a professor of capital formation and growth at Harvard: “In , and international agreements of any sort, enforcement is always an issue because no country wants a violation of their sovereignty. But trade sanctions as part of trade agreements have turned out to be pretty effective relative to anything else in enforcing international agreements.”

Despite optimistic promises, another complaint against the TPP is the , with access reserved for certain Congress members and staffers with security clearance, essentially eradicating any method of accountability for the deal. While assurances from negotiators that agreements have been reached for the “environmental protection of some of the most sensitive, diverse and threatened ecosystems on earth,” a previous version of the agreement leaked in January 2014 poured cold water on such reports. According to the , the use of language such as “seek” or “attempt” mean that any steps taken to protect the environment would lack legal enforce-ability.

But hope still remains that challenges can be addressed and the TPP can indeed become a gamechanger agreement with positive impacts on the environment. It is up to the US to ensure that it respects its own values enough, and not bend over and sacrifice vital parts of the agreement, in the name of “fast-tracking” one of the most important trade deals the world has ever seen.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Soccer fans are on a roll in the Middle East, Europe and Southeast Asia. Fans in Turkey and Egypt have defeated legal efforts to criminalize them as terrorists, while Malaysian ultras are tackling corruption and mismanagement of their country’s soccer association. In Germany, the pitch anticipated the government’s shift in policy toward the wave of refugees sweeping Europe, with fans expressing support a week before the country opened the floodgates.

Although these incidents were unrelated and occurred in widely different political and social environments, they share a number of things in common: They all focused on aspects of social justice, repression, corruption and compassion toward the needy.

The incidents further highlighted the soccer pitch’s significance as an early indicator of societal distrust in government and institutions. That distrust was similarly expressed in the recent electoral victory of controversial leftist Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the British Labour Party. Corbyn’s success constituted a rejection of corporate politics.

Turkey in the Spotlight

In the latest development, Turkish prosecutors advised an Istanbul court to drop all charges against 35 members of Carsi, the militant support group of storied club Besiktas JK. The defendants had been charged in a nine month-old, ill-documented, political showcase trial of seeking to topple the government of then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and belonging to a terrorist organization—offences that could have put them for life behind bars.

Carsi, one of Turkey’s largest fan groups, has long campaigned for social justice-related issues. In 2013, it played a key role in the biggest anti-government protests since Erdogan’s rise to power in 2003.

The prosecutors’ turnaround followed the acquittal earlier this year of 26 members of Taksim Solidarity, an umbrella group that was among the leaders of the 2013 protests in Taksim Square. The court’s decision has come at a moment when Erdogan has been cracking down on his critics, including media, in the run-up to parliamentary elections in November. In June, President Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to win the majority it needed to form a one-party government.

Here Comes Egypt

While Erdogan’s autocratic tendencies stop far short of the brutality that Egyptian General-turned-President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi employs, Turkish and Egyptian efforts to stymie militant soccer fans—who in both countries have often emerged as a backbone of popular protest—often develop in step. Like in Turkey, Egyptian courts were employed in unsuccessful attempts to criminalize militant fans, who had played a key role in the 2011 uprising that toppled President Hosni Mubarak.

Earlier in September, militant Egyptian fans forced the Interior Ministry to partially lift the longstanding ban on spectators attending soccer matches, which was enforced to prevent the pitch from re-emerging as a platform for dissent. The decision was widely seen as a potential signal that Egypt’s military-backed regime recognized that its brutal choking off of all public space was backfiring.

Like in Turkey, Egyptian soccer fans scored their tactical victory in advance of parliamentary elections, which will have no veneer of being free and fair, unlike the Turkish ones—even taking into account Erdogan’s undemocratic measures against his opponents.

In Egypt, Sisi recently appeared to pour salt on open wounds after first arresting his agriculture ministers on charges of corruption and then appointing a new prime minister, Sharif Ismail, whose image is tarnished by allegations of corruption.

Mortada Mansour, the controversial, larger-than-life president of crowned Cairo club Al Zamalek SC, was quick to criticize Sisi’s appointment of Ismail, warning him on television not to become another Mubarak. Mansour had earlier accused Ismail of nepotism following a dispute over a player with ENPPI SC, a club controlled by a state-owned company, with whom Ismail has long been associated.

Even Malaysia

Corruption and mismanagement were also at the root of ultras forcing the abandonment of a Malaysia-Saudi Arabia World Cup qualifier, in an effort to make President Sultan Ahmad Shah resign. Shah has headed the Football Association of Malaysia (FAM) for 30 years. Eleven fans were arrested in connection with the incident.

Malaysian soccer, much like Malaysian politics, has long been dogged by accusations of corruption. In 2014, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Agency detained 16 players, including nine from the Police Football Association, on suspicion of match fixing. Malaysia has in recent months been rocked by charges that $700 million held by beleaguered Prime Minister Najib Razak involved illicit payments.

“Sorry players. Sorry Malaysians. Sorry Saudi Arabians. But it had to be done,” the group, Ultras Malaya, said on Twitter. “Our protests have been going on for three years. We have gone through all the official channels … We do not care what others think,” a leader of the group identified as Freddie Been was quoted as telling local media. “We had to hit FAM where it hurts the most. We had to humiliate FAM to get the message across,” added Al-Fadli Awaludin, a founder of Ultras Malaya.

Responding to charges by Youth and Sports Minister Khairy Jamaluddin that the ultras had embarrassed Malaysia, Been said: “I should ask him: When we were beaten 10-0 [by] the United Arab Emirates, did he not feel embarrassed?”

Countering repression and corruption were at the core of Middle Eastern and Malaysian fan activism for social justice. German and British fans focused on making compassion the yardstick of European policy toward the mass of people fleeing wars in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, many of which Western powers either ignited or exasperated.

Different Story in Europe

Fans displayed banners during various German Bundesliga matches in support of Europe’s responsibility toward refugees, days before the image of a dead Aylan Kurdi, a 3-year-old Syrian boy, went viral. “Welcome Refugees,” many of the banners read. Similar banners appeared during English Premier League games.

In response to Marina Hyde’s assertion that the refugee crisis could give meaning to the artificial construct of a football family, fans in Britain launched a fundraising campaign; Bayern Munich reserved $1 million for efforts to aid refugees; and clubs like Celtic, Real Madrid and FC Porto promised to play their part. “If such a thing [like a football family] can ever be said to exist, then this issue gripping Europe should be among the very closest to its heart,” Hyde wrote.

Many fans and some clubs would argue that their proactive welcoming of refugees long preceded Hyde’s Guardian column or the recent adoption of more welcoming policies by the European Union and western European governments.

Nonetheless, the response to Hyde’s clarion call, as well as fan protests in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, illustrate the importance that segments of the football family attribute to social justice. Rory Smith said on ESPN FC: “While football and politics do not mix, football and social responsibility certainly do.”

He astutely wrote: “Football has traded on its universality for long enough. It has grown fat and rich on television contracts and foreign tours. It has said we are all part of one family, one set of families. And that means it has a duty to respond now, to show that this is not a one-way street, to show that it meant what it said. That is the point, surely, of being a family: that you are there for your family when it needs you.”

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The RohingyaĚýrefugee crisis presents a test of ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The most recent by Malaysia and Indonesia to provide temporary shelter for the refugees, following an emergency meeting on May 20 in Kuala Lumpur, was a diplomatic breakthrough. It reflected ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s delicate efforts to maintain its regional commitment to ASEAN while allaying domestic concerns about illegal immigrants in Malaysia.

In May, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand turnedĚýaway ships carrying mostly Muslim Rohingya refugees, who were fleeing from Myanmar due to religious and ethnic persecutions in the Rakhine state. Estimates at that point of time showed that approximatelyĚýĚý6,000 people were stranded in the open seas. Indeed, the plight of the Rohingya people stranded in Malaysian seas drewĚýan international outcry. The United Nations’ human rights chief, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand for turning away the vessels, while the European Union Myanmar to end the persecution of its Rohingya minority.

Initially, Malaysia had rejected the additional influx of the Rohingya boat people because an unrestricted acceptance of these refugees is not a viable, long-term solution to the crisis that was largely caused by a problem within Myanmar.

Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and it does not possess a legislative and administrative framework to address refugee matters. Therefore, the inclusion of more Rohingya refugees would have further strained country’s domestic capacity to cope with illegal immigrants in the country.

Nevertheless, these issues do not deny ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s long-standing concern for the plight of the Rohingya people. In 1992, the government of then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad had urged Myanmar to take immediate steps to resolve the Rohingya problem. This was consistent with Mahathir’s foreign policy to project Malaysia as an Islamic nation concerned for the welfare of Muslim minorities. However, Malaysia could not interfere directly in the domestic affairs of Myanmar, given the ASEAN principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other member-states.

Refugee Policy under Najib

Although Prime Minister Najib Razak has largely avoided the strong Islamic zeal of Mahathir’s foreign policy, Malaysia continues to be sympathetic to the Rohingya refugees. Notwithstanding the initial resistance to accept more Rohingya refugees, Malaysia has, on the whole, exhibited credible leadership as ASEAN chair by being subsequently assertive in its response to the Rohingya crisis. At the recentĚý26^thĚýASEAN Summit, Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah Aman expressed the for the Myanmar government to resolve the Rohingya problem domestically as a long-term solution.

Malaysia and Indonesia have agreed to provide temporary shelter for the refugees in their respective countries for up to a year, after which the international community should assist to repatriate and resettle the refugee to a third country.

Indeed, if the humanitarian crisis had not been temporarily mitigated, the consequences could have been worrisome not only for Malaysia, but also for the Rohingya refugees and ASEAN. An obvious outcome would be the continued suffering of the Rohingya people. Malaysia could also be perceived as lacking leadership as chair of ASEAN. In addition, the failure to tackle the refugee crisis could have cast skepticism on the credibility of the ASEAN community if it could not provide a viable solution to alleviate the suffering of the Rohingya people.

The Rohingya refugee crisis also poses domestic challenges for Malaysia. On one hand, the growing presence of Rohingya refugees could worsen the social, economic and political problems associated with illegal immigrants in Malaysia. The Home Affairs Ministry has indicated that health and security problems could arise as a result.

In June 2013, ethnic violence between Buddhist and Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar over into Malaysia, resulting in clashes between Buddhist and Muslim Myanmar nationals working in Malaysia in Selayang and the Klang Valley. These incidents threatened the safety of Malaysian citizens. Thus, a wholesale acceptance of the Rohingya refugees without addressing potential domestic problems is a risky political move thatĚýcould easily trigger a backlash from the general public.

On the other hand, several members of parliament from both the ruling coalition and the opposition, as well as local nongovernmental organizations, have criticized the government for not doing enough to alleviate the suffering of the Rohingya people.

Hence, the acceptance of the refugees by providing shelter for one year—subject to an international solution to the Rohingya refugee crisis—is stop-gap measure that enables Malaysia to preserve its credibility as ASEAN chair. This also placates domestic pressure to help the Rohingya refugees and, at the same time, reduce the negative impact of the presence of Rohingya migrants.

Rohingya AreĚýASEAN Citizens

In the end, opening borders indefinitely to the Rohingya people would not improve the domestic situation in Myanmar. In fact, it may the send the wrong signal to Myanmar that diverting its internal problem to other countries is an acceptable solution. Instead, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand are sending a strong message to Myanmar that pushing responsibility to others is contrary to the ideals of the ASEAN community.

Indeed, a long-lasting solution must come from an internal change within Myanmar, supported by a more inclusive ASEAN community that develops conducive measures to tackle the Rohingya problem. The Rohingya people are part of Southeast Asia, and a people-centric ASEAN community should live up to its promise of a regional body that cares for the welfare of its citizens.

*[This article was originally published byĚý’s content partner, theĚý.]

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The sexual relationship between husband and wife is one of the most contentious aspects of life in Malay polygamous unions. It can cause great strife and misery among co-wives. At issue is husband sharing, a polygamous husband’s obligatory equal distribution of his physical attention between all his wives. As with other aspects of polygamy, what is prescribed is not necessarily what is practiced, and hence the perspectives and experiences of first and subsequent wives can differ substantially with regard to sex.

Malays technically practice polygyny – a plural marriage in which a man is permitted more than one wife at a time. In , the right to polygamy is based on , which conditionally allows a Muslim man to marry up to four wives. I use the term polygamy, however, as this is used in daily conversation and legal texts in Malaysia. Some elite Malay men have three or four wives, but it is most common for a man to have only two wives; I only refer to the first and second wife.

’s role in elite Malay polygamy is complex, because it entails negotiations between Muslim and Malay norms, ideals and practices. In Islam, sexuality is acknowledged in both men and women, and sexual pleasure is encouraged within sanctioned marriage. In traditional Malay adat, women like men are seen as having a sexuality that a spouse has a duty to satisfy. Adat is a body of knowledge and cultural codes in accordance with which Malays order their social relations, and it involves principles of mutual needs, responsibilities and rights between men and women in marriage.

Disruptive Potential

In contemporary Malaysia, women experience various constraints regarding their sexuality through the increased importance of Islam in Malays’ everyday lives. Influenced by global Islamic resurgence, Malay women’s sexuality has become more contentious, as Islamic discourse represents women’s active sexuality as a disruptive potential that needs to be controlled. Contemporary understandings and practices of Islam limit Malay women’s control over their own bodies, as sexuality increasingly becomes tied to women’s responsibility of motherhood and notions of chastity and purity associated with it.

Curbing active female sexuality also forms part of expectations that all Malay women (and men) marry. Yet urban Malaysia, with its cosmopolitan influences, provides Malay women with new opportunities. Greater exposure to non-Muslim – especially Western – gender relations and sexuality, particularly in the media, have penetrated and shaped local discourses on sexual relations and male-female relations generally, and challenge traditionally more rigid Malay sexual mores. Urban Malay women must negotiate their sexuality within several competing discourses of desire, including polygamy.

© Shutterstock

For a Malay Muslim woman, premarital sex is considered completely unacceptable, bringing shame to the woman herself and her entire family. Parents who are otherwise liberal in religious matters tend to be strict regarding daughters’ physical intimacy before marriage, and enforce stringent measures to avoid exposing them to “risks.” Women hence cannot have sex, let alone live with boyfriends before marriage for religious and cultural reasons, as they could be arrested for .

A Malay Muslim man and woman who are not married may not be alone due to the danger of engaging in immoral acts, that is, suspected khalwat – close proximity. Premarital sex is forbidden under Ěýand can carry penalties of up to three years in prison, a fine of up to 5,000 ringgit or six strokes of the cane. Caning was previously rare in Malaysia, but it is increasing as interpretation and implementation of Islamic law is becoming more strict and less influenced by adat. In 2008, in a widely publicized , a young couple caught “attempting” to have premarital sex were sentenced to six strokes each.

The First Wives Club

Strong sanctions against premarital sex means that many Malay women have no sexual experience upon marriage. Sexual fulfillment in marriage is recognized as important in both Malay culture and Islam, yet studies have showed that many Malay wives appear to never experience sexual relations as pleasant or fulfilling. When it comes to sex, modern Muslim women who may otherwise feel equal and not subservient to their husbands, may feel less assertive about their rights. There are, of course, numerous Malay women who find sex important and fulfilling in marriage, yet a dominant cultural narrative is that Malay women should be sexually submissive, inside as well as outside marriage.

Some first wives in polygamous unions go as far as linking their husband’s second marriage to their own lack of sexual prowess or enjoyment. Malay women, even when acknowledging that husbands must attempt to please them sexually, often feel that it is primarily the wife’s duty to please her husband. This is in line with adat understandings of women’s sexual assertiveness and pleasures. Some first wives may, therefore, partly blame themselves and their perceived sexual deficiency for the fact that their husband married a second wife.

A common discourse on Malay sexuality portrays men as having consistently strong desires which cannot be suppressed, whereas women are seen as having less consistent, more manageable needs. Malay women’s sexual desires are furthermore considered to diminish with age, so if a woman gets divorced or widowed she may not remarry, the implication being that if she does not need sex she does not need to remarry. Managing women’s sexuality as part of polygamous marriage may hence be considered appropriate: Women who are able to suppress their desires may consent to their husband marrying another wife, in order to satisfy his longing for more than they alone could give.

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Many first wives, it is often argued, have few or no sexual relations with their husband by the time of his second marriage. Having regular sexual relations is often cited as a reason why men marry a new wife, even by first wives themselves. Some first wives, who have typically been monogamously married for years before their husbands marry a second wife, might simply not want to have sex with their husbands anymore, a pattern found in polygamous unions cross-culturally.

Some first wives, however, may stop having sexual relations with their husband precisely because he has married another woman. A first wife’s lack of sexual relations with her husband is as likely to be a result of her husband’s polygamy as necessarily the cause. Indeed, a man may humiliate his first wife sexually through polygamy, by implying her inability to satisfy him sexually. First wives who remain unassertive about their sexuality in marriage may, therefore, suffer greatly as they experience their husbands’ progressive neglect of them in turning his attention to his new wife.

Yet according to ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s Islamic Family Law, a Muslim man should engage in polygamy only if he can share himself equally between his wives, including sexually. Few men appear able or willing to do that, however. First wives who seem to cope physically and emotionally with polygamy might still suffer because of their husbands’ sexual relations with their other wives. Sexual jealousy is a staple part of polygamous unions cross-culturally.

Polygamy may spell celibacy for Malay women who cannot accept sharing their husband sexually with another woman, particularly if forced into polygamy by husbands marrying second wives without their consent. Yet lonely first wives, married in name only, may find having sexual relations with other men difficult in a religious and cultural context where sex is acceptable only within marriage. Some first wives refuse to remain bound by marriage vows to husbands who have married other women and act on their sexual needs. Rather than divorcing their husbands and losing all support, they may opt for affairs when abroad, where contact is easier and more discrete, or risk local affairs, despite fear of gossip and social ostracism.

“Legitimate” Sex

Second wives may perceive and experience sexuality in polygamous marriages differently than first wives. Sex may constitute a central reason for some Malay women to marry polygamously, sometimes as a “legitimate” way of conducting an affair. Traditionally, a Malay women’s sexuality should exist only in marriage, and Malay women having difficulty finding outlets for their sexual needs may feel that marriage is their only option for having “legitimate” sex.

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Second wives are, in the popular imagination in Malaysia, often accused of marrying because they “need a man” or “crave sex.” So much so that they don’t care about hurting another woman whose husband they “steal.” Particularly divorced or widowed women are considered “man-eaters,” as they used to have legitimate sexual relations in marriage and are considered in special need of resuming them. Men are similarly seen as marrying polygamously for sexual gratification, but this remains less shocking and more understandable, going back to the “strong desires” to be satisfied within sanctioned marriage.

Career women, in particular, are assumed to marry as second wives for sex. The sanction against sex outside of marriage applies to all women (and men) regardless of their marital history or circumstances. Becoming second wives might fit their lifestyles, as engaging in legitimate sexual relations might be the only pressing reason why an otherwise socially and financially independent woman should marry at all. Many career women have studied or worked in Western countries, where “access” to premarital sex was easier. For women used to sexual autonomy abroad, coming back to Malaysia as single women and finding themselves forced to marry, to cohabit or conceive – or just engage in sex – can be a difficult transition.

Contentious Domain

Sexuality remains a contentious domain for contemporary urban elite Malay women, whatever their marital status. Choosing to become second wives in order to have legitimate sex may be an option for some women who feel unable to commit the time or the effort to be full time-wives, yet still crave sex and companionship. Polygamy can be a constructive time-management strategy for women prioritizing independent time for work and own interests, an argument promoted by pro-polygamists around the world. Many women discover that it is a risky strategy, fraught with potential pain and silent suffering.

Polygamous unions in modern Malaysia, rather than seeing “husband-sharing” in all aspects of marriage, see different wives getting different types of attention. The first wife may remain the husband’s official wife, sharing his public and social life, whereas the second wife may get his emotional and physical attention, leaving the first wife with a husband in name only. Yet being a second wife does not mean automatically being showered with all the husband’s affection and attention. Second wives can just as easily as first wives become neglected when their husbands’ interest in them wanes. Sometimes a husband returns to his first wife and sometimes he marries a third – or fourth – wife.

Polygamous husbands who are able to share themselves equally among all their wives certainly do exist. Yet even in such ideal cases, the emotional and contentious nature of shared sexual access to one man can cause grief and conflict among co-wives, no matter how well they seem to cope. Achieving more satisfying sex lives may be challenging in a Malay cultural context, which generally de-emphasizes sex and sexuality, resulting in lack of communication regarding sexual matters between husbands and wives. Yet as all cultural forms are malleable and dynamic, sexual sharing will continue to be negotiated in Malay Muslim polygamy.

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My taxi driver laughed as the newsreader concluded the announcement that ’s appeal against his conviction for sodomy had been Ěýand that the leader of ’s fragmentary opposition coalition wasĚýto return to jail for five years. “Malaysia Boleh!” (Malaysia can) he chortled — invoking an early 1990s slogan familiar to all Malaysians.

Back then, “Malaysia Boleh!” summoned Malaysians to play their part in the building of the country. These days, after 57 years of continuous power in the hands of, in effect, one party, the phrase is most often accompanied with a shake of the head, a rolling of the eyes, a gloomy shrug or laughter.

These two words capture many people’s sense that the Malaysian ruling elite can get away with anything – and also that here in Malaysia, just about anything can happen.

Clinging On

˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s governing coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN), is dominated by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which has ruled since independence, but it now faces unprecedented challenges to its mandate. In the most recent general election, it lost the popular vote by some distance. But thanks to some artful constituency boundary tweaks by the electoral commission, the ruling coalition still ended up with a significant parliamentary majority.

The decision to uphold the verdict against Anwar is part of a wider pattern: The administration’s response to its eroding support is at once increasingly repressive and increasingly incoherent. Despite the immediate denials from the Prime Minister’s Office that the prosecution was politically motivated or the judges anything but impartial, there is widespread feeling that this verdict can only confirm the reality of a badly compromised legal system.

For many observers, the Malaysian government is a wounded animal, unpredictable and defensive, uncertain and aggressive — a government confronted by a fearful combination of troubles, not least the recent precipitous drops in oil , so critical to the national budget.

The failure of Anwar Ibrahim’s appeal could have any number of effects on the Malaysian political landscape. But ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s future hinges more on the behavior of the government than on the strength or motivation of the political opposition or civil society. This is the central irony of Malaysian politics. The opposition is so weak, so fragmented, so internally divided, so ideologically incoherent, that its essential message and manifesto amounts quite explicitly to the slogan “Anyone But UMNO” (ABU T-shirts are widely available).

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Of course, the government has done much that has served to intensify and inflame such sentiments. It has openly manipulated the mainstream media to promote its own agenda, used such as the Sedition Act to threaten and silence opposition figures, and gerrymandered electoral boundaries to its advantage.

It also deliberately nurtures conservative, even extreme, currents of Islamic thought to convince the Malay Muslim majority that their faith and culture are under threat and that only it can protect them. It articulates explicitly propaganda marginalizing and attacking non-Malay minorities. And above all, it suffers from an overwhelming perception of endemic . Malaysia boleh, indeed.

On Track

Aside from Anwar Ibrahim, there seems to be no figure with sufficient stature or credibility to harness the antigovernment sentiment to any real political gain – and it’s far from clear that even he would have been able to hold the fragile opposition coalition together.

For many people, Anwar is a deeply compromised figure, part of the problem rather than in any sense the answer. He rose spectacularly through the UMNO ranks to the position of minister of finance and heir-apparent in Prime Minister’s Mahathir Mohamad’s administration, and his fall from grace in the late 1990s, was just as sensational, amid torrid allegations of corruption and abuse of power.

The largest party in Anwar’s opposition alliance, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), is campaigning to augment ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s existing sharia laws with a much more severe form, known as , a system much more akin to that which prevails in Saudi Arabia. None of the other opposition parties could countenance such a move – but PAS, which has around 1Ěýmillion members, is essential to any viable opposition, and it must be accommodated to assemble any real force against the government. Can a viable new politics be founded upon such shaky foundations?

Moreover, the leaders of the opposition political parties are publicly divided, their disagreements and feuds magnified in the popular press. It would be yet another irony if Anwar’s latest conviction and incarceration ended up uniting them, rather than depriving them of the leadership they so require.

There are likely to be widespread popular demonstrations against the Anwar Ibrahim verdict, and some rallying of opposition support. There will be appeals to Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Commonwealth and the . There will be much frowning and disapproval from statespeople and politicians around the world — the British minister for Asia, Hugo Swire, has already out.

But in all likelihood, unless the Malaysian government and security forces engage in unusually brutal repressive measures and provoke some kind of popular uprising in response (extremely unlikely, given ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s history), the verdict will not do much to change the country’s political trajectory. Only with the emergence of the next generation of political agents, both within and without the existing parties, will there be significant change.

For an indication of the potential futures for Malaysia, we need perhaps to look at the contrasting fortunes of the regimes of the former Ěýand of the People’s Republic of . In the Soviet Union, the ruling party collapsed under the weight of its appalling internal contradictions and was swept away (for better or worse). In China, incremental change transformed what appeared a sclerotic and bankrupt regime and a process best described as a Long Revolution continues to this day (again, for better or worse).

If the Malaysian opposition stands little chance of changing things any time soon, it will be interesting to see whether Barisan Nasional can.

*[This article was originally published by .]

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It is a fact that many acts of physical as well as verbal violence are perpetrated in the name of . Therefore, it is necessary to clarify that the problem lies not in the religion of Islam itself but in certain orientations to be found among Muslims. One such orientation is that of .

While it is true that not all Salafists espouse intolerance and violence, it is also true that some individuals and groups do have highly intolerant views toward those who differ from them in terms of what they consider to be the right Islamic way of life.

This intolerance has sometimes translated into sectarian violence. In , violence had been perpetrated against members of the minority sect, while in , Shiites have been persecuted.

Islam: A Long History of Division

and Shiites represent the two main divisions in Islam, the Sunnis being the majority. The split into Sunni and Shiite Islam took place during the first few centuries after the religion’s birth, and were due to different historical experiences and competing views about who should have succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as leader of the young community after his death.

Extremism among Muslims had existed from the early days of Islam. The early Muslims had terms that described such extremism. An example is the concepts of ghuluw, often translated as zealotry. The roots of extremism today, however, can be traced to ideas that began to appear in the 18^th century in Arabia. The founder of , a particular orientation within Salafism, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, saw himself as returning the Arabs to the true monotheistic teachings of Islam.

In his time, the veneration of not only saints but also trees and other objects was common.ĚýThese were all manifestations of unbelief (kufr) and polytheism (shirk), and ibn Abd al-Wahhab saw his role as rooting these practices out by emphasizing the unity of God, and returning the people to the true beliefs and practices of Islam. However, he enforced rules and punishments considered excessive by many Muslims. These included the public stoning to death of women accused of adultery.

Salafism

The most important extremist orientation in Islam today is that of Salafism. Some of the traits of Salafism include: intolerance of others, particularly Muslims who disagree with their orientations — this sometimes amounts to the pronouncement of takfir or excommunication on such Muslims; overemphasis on rules and regulations at the expense of spirituality; forbidding beliefs and practices allowed by the majority of Muslims; non-contextual/non-historical interpretation of the Quran and hadith, or the sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad; and literalism in the interpretation of texts. Salafism is generally understood to be a literalist, strict and puritanical approach to Islam.

Although Sunni consensus regards Shiism as a legitimate school of thought and jurisprudence in Islam, this has not prevented action against them. In August 2012, a deadly anti-Shiite rampage in Sampang on the Indonesian island of Madura turned houses into ashes and left Shiites dead and others homeless.

Some Salafists also advocate violent action against non-Muslims and certain Muslims. They erroneously refer to this action as jihad. However, it is the minority of Salafists who take this approach.

There are some Salafists who also direct their energies against certain sects or schools of thought within Islam. Take the example of a modern-day Salafist, , founder of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and an leader in the 2000s. In the following quotation, Zarqawi compares non-Muslims with Shiites, both described as enemies:

“[They are] the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom. We here are entering a battle on two levels. One, evident and open, is with an attacking enemy and patent infidelity. [Another is] a difficult, fierce battle with a crafty enemy who wears the garb of a friend, manifests agreement, and calls for comradeship, but harbors ill will and twists up peaks and crests …The unhurried observer and inquiring onlooker will realize that Shi’ism is the looming danger and the true challenge.”

Zarqawi goes on to say that Shiism has nothing in common with Islam.

Persecution of Shiite Muslims in Southeast Asia

The impact of such thinking is devastating. An example is the wave of violence and persecution of Shiites in Indonesia and Malaysia. Although Sunni consensus regards Shiism as a legitimate school of thought and jurisprudence in Islam, this has not prevented action against them. In August 2012, a deadly anti-Shiite rampage in Sampang on the Indonesian island of Madura turned houses into ashes and left Shiites dead and others homeless.

A Sunni leader, Rois al-Hukama of the Nahdlatul Ulama, was charged with having participated in the arson attacks and destruction of property. However, the Surabaya District Court of Indonesia acquitted him of the charges, citing a lack of evidence. At the same time, the Shiite community of Sampang were apparently forced to take an oath of allegiance to Islam as a condition for their return to their homes.

Over the last 30 years, the attitude of Malaysian authorities toward the Shiite had changed from acceptance to rejection and even persecution. In 1984, the Fatwa Committee of the National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs declared that following Shiite schools of jurisprudence — that is, the Jafari and Zaidi schools — was acceptable in Malaysia. In 1996, this decision was revoked. It was followed by a series offatwas between 1998 and 2012 issued by various states in Malaysia that placed restrictions on the spread and practice of Shiism.

In the state of Selangor, Shiites have been arrested for practicing their rituals. In December 2010, approximately 200 Shiites, including some foreigners, were arrested by state religious authorities during a raid at a Shiite center.

Much of the struggle for Islam in this century will be that of the Sufis to reclaim Islam from the one-dimensional Salafism and other extremisms.

Under Section 16 of the Perak Criminal (Syariah) Enactment, 1992, it is an offence to possess items on Shiism, including books, audio-visual materials and posters. In early August 2013, two Shiites were arrested, followed by another six arrests in September of that year. The Perak Islamic Religious Department (JAIPk) enforcement chief, Ahmad Nizam Amiruddin, is reported to have said that the Shiite should be eradicated.

In March 2014, Perak state religious authorities arrested more than 100 people believed to be Shiite. The arrests were carried out while they were commemorating the birth of Zainab bint Ali, the daughter of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth of Islam, and the grand-daughter of Prophet Muhammad.

The position taken against Shiism in Indonesia and Malaysia is also found among Salafists and Wahhabis. It is in this sense that we can speak of the Salafization of Sunni Islam in the Malay world.

It is ironic that in Malaysia there is also a 2013 fatwa issued by the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) that considers Wahhabism as inappropriate for the country. Nevertheless, state religious officials themselves have adopted an anti-Shiite position that does not differ from conventional Wahhabi or Salafist views.

A Truly Free Muslim World

These examples of extremism are to be contrasted to the tolerant and open tradition of Islam in the Malay world. Historically, Islam in the Malay world had been very accommodating to the cultural diversity of the region. This was in part due to the fact that it was through the tradition that Islam came to the region. Although the Malays did not compromise on the fundamentals of Islam, they were accepting of a variety of beliefs and practices often influenced by local customs known as adat.

The 15^th century saints of Java, Sunan Drajat and Sunan Kalijaga are said to have used traditional Javanese art forms such as the wayang kulit and gamelan to convey the spiritual teachings of Sufism. Another example is Habib Alawi bin Tahir al-Haddad, the mufti of Johor from 1934-61. Habib Alawi is probably the most well-known mufti that Malaysia has ever had.

An indication of his openness is the fact that he granted permission (ijazah) to transmit hadith to a senior Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Mar’ashi Najafi from Iran. This shows that Habib Alawi respected the Shiites. A leading Sunni scholar would not grant an ijazah to scholar of a sect that he regarded as deviant.

In a truly free Malaysia, adherents of all religious orientations, including Salafists, should not be made to feel threatened and unwelcome. There should be no talk of the eradication of a group on the grounds of its perspective. Differences should be addressed through polemics and intellectual argumentation.

It is important to educate the thinking public that it is not the religion of Islam, but certain minority orientations developed by Muslims that are extremist and that are responsible — at least in part — for intra-Muslim and inter-religious intolerance and violence that we witness today.

It is also important to state that it has become increasingly clear to scholars and activists alike that one of the main forces working against “religious” extremism in Muslim societies is that of the Sufi tradition of Islam.

The Sufi way is not an aspect or part of Islam, but is the core of Islam itself. In fact, Sufism is as old as Islam. Ali bin Uthman al-Hujwiri, the author of the first Persian treatise on Sufism, cites one Abu al-Hassan al-Bushanji, who says: “Sufism today is a name without reality, whereas it used to be a reality without a name.” Much of the struggle for Islam in this century will be that of the Sufis to reclaim Islam from the one-dimensional Salafism and other extremisms.

*[A version of this article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Thai-Malaysian relations have in the past decade been predominantly shaped by the situation in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand. In 2004, under the Thaksin Shinawatra administration, an Islamist insurgency re-erupted, seen in the incidents at Krue Sae Mosque in Pattani, where 32 Muslim militants were executed, and at Tak Bai district in Narathiwat, where 78 Muslim detainees suffocated to death while being transported to a military camp.

But the real turning point in Thai-Malaysian relations took place in August 2005, when 131 Thai Muslims fled across the border into the Malay northern states. Reportedly, Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Alba agreed to release them only if Bangkok could "guarantee" their human rights and safety. Thaksin was infuriated, perceiving his remarks as interfering with Thailand's internal affairs.

Malaysia subsequently proposed a dialogue to resolve the problem as a means to defuse tensions. Accordingly, then-Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad held informal discussions with former Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, who was then the head of the National Reconciliation Commission. They reassured Anand that Malaysia did not support the separatist movement in Thailand.

However, the complexity of Thai politics and its impact on the issue of the southern conflict has continued to influence bilateral relations. As Thailand attempted to isolate its southern conflict, it also isolated Malaysia. Such isolation reflected on a Thai policy of externalizing the cause of conflict, and Malaysia was painted as a prime manipulator behind the Thai Muslim insurgents.

In December 2009, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, in striving to improve ties with Thailand, made a high-profile visit to Narathiwat. Razak said:

"I don't expect things to change overnight. This is a journey, but there is a commitment and plans by Thailand to move toward a comprehensive solution. Malaysia's stand is to be a partner who will respect that this is domestic, and the message is clear that the people of Thailand must be loyal to the country."

Clearly, Razak's mission was to dispel the existing mutual distrust. At the end of the meeting, the two countries initiated a number of joint projects to rebuild Thailand's southern region. For example, Thai Muslim teachers were to be trained in Islamic teachings in Malaysia, while Thai businesses were invited to visit Malaysia with the possibility of investing in the country.

In June 2013, peace talks between the Thai government and members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) reached a milestone when the two parties decided to sit down and discuss ways to rebuild mutual trust, eliminate suspicion, and find a long-lasting solution to the protracted conflict. Malaysia hosted the peace talks in Kuala Lumpur, signaling a new role as a peace mediator.

Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein told the media that he was hopeful of progress through development of the southern provinces: "The issue of development, poverty, fair treatment of everybody — those are the issues to be navigated by both sides based on trust. Building up trust is the difficult part."

Until recently, Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has tried to reach out for peace with the Thai Muslim community and for better ties with Malaysia. There were obstacles to the government's efforts. For one, local Thai Muslims could not forget what her elder brother, then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, did in 2004.

In the political context, the south has never been the territory supportive of the ruling Pheu Thai Party, but instead, are long-time supporters of the Democrat Party — the current opposition party.

The Thailand Crisis

Thailand has fallen into another crisis and Yingluck's resolve will once again be tested. It has been more than five months since the antigovernment protesters seized Bangkok, driving Yingluck to dissolve the parliament. General elections were held but outcomes were inconclusive. The Yingluck administration is now in a limbo. The Thai political situation is unpredictable, to say the least.

Daily killings in the restive south, meanwhile, have been normalized. The more Bangkok is preoccupied with other domestic crises, the longer the insurgency will prolong in the south. Since the last meeting between the government and the BRN, the Thai public has been kept in the dark regarding progress on peace talks. If the violence escalates in the Thai south, it will further complicate Bangkok politics and Thailand's relations with Malaysia.

Insurgency issue aside, democratic and anti-democratic movements in Thailand could also impact Malaysia. Political power in Thailand, long-dominated by the old elite, are now being seriously challenged by new political alternatives. The end game could be traumatic. The imminent royal transition could serve to exacerbate the already fragile situation.

In Malaysia, the United Malays National Organisation has been in power for far too long. It has been too inert, complacent and perhaps too authoritarian. The Thai example could influence political developments in Malaysia, particularly through the rising political awareness of the Malaysian masses and their demand to gain better access to political resources, economic wealth and better social status. Like Thailand, it will be interesting to see where Malaysian politics would be heading toward — reforms or struggle.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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By Sukjoon Yoon

Since the mysterious disappearance of Malaysia Airlines MH370 on March 8, several countries have been participating in extensive Search and Rescue (SAR) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in the South China Sea and beyond.

This provides a welcome contrast to the heated rhetoric of the past few years and may generate enough goodwill for the nations of the region to reconsider how they use their maritime security forces, paving the way for a fresh approach to the resolution of maritime conflicts and confrontations.

The Search for MH370

Prior to the MH370 issue, the regional media was preoccupied with the deployment of Chinese maritime security forces in disputed waters in the South China Sea, which tended to thwart rather than foster regional maritime peace and stability. For example, during the Chinese navy's largest-ever joint fleet exercise last November, a vessel escorting the refurbished aircraft carrier Liaoning was involved in a near collision with the Aegis cruiser USS Cowpens. Another example was the harassment of the USNS Impeccable by Chinese Maritime Surveillance vessels in international waters in July 2013.

Significantly, the missing Malaysian airliner has led to maritime security assets being engaged in SAR and HADR operations in waters with overlapping jurisdictional claims: there are disputes between Vietnam and Malaysia, and between China, Vietnam and Malaysia in the areas being searched.

Overcoming their reluctance to work together, these rival claimants have managed to set aside their quarrels, with the tragedy apparently facilitating genuine maritime cooperation amongst them.

The number of countries involved in the search and rescue operation has increased from 14 to 26 as of March 19, including Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam. The Chinese contingent comprises four naval vessels (including two large amphibious ships), four maritime patrol craft, six coastguard vessels and 14 rescue ships, with ten Chinese satellites also joining the search.

Arguments over territorial claims in the South China Sea have been put on hold, and instead there is bilateral and multilateral cooperation aimed at rescuing the victims and recovering the wreckage of the aircraft from waters that have been a major bone of contention between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Role of Maritime Security Forces

This is an appropriate moment for the Asia Pacific region to take a fresh look at the role of its maritime security forces. They have undergone significant changes in recent years, with an expansion of inventories and improved capabilities, but their ultimate raison d’être has remained national defense.

The growth of non-military threats has, however, significantly broadened the function of maritime security forces. They are no longer concerned only with the protection of resources within their 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones, but must also undertake law enforcement tasks to counter maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery, for which they must project force well beyond their territorial waters.

The protection of sea routes, which are vital economic lifelines, especially for energy supplies, is an essential aspect of this broader role, and the prevailing mistrust among the nations of the region has inevitably made such tasks more difficult and complex.

Unfortunately, in this climate of suspicion, there is an increasing risk of prolonged stand-offs between maritime forces giving rise to serious incidents. Even minor altercations can rapidly escalate into military conflict, because many regional security forces are now adopting proactive or even offensive postures.

This problem is aggravated by the close geographical proximity of potential adversaries, and constrained sea space in which their operations take place in disputed waters. Nevertheless, the established diplomatic and benign role of the maritime security forces in the furtherance of peace and stability has expanded considerably.

Improving Maritime Crisis Management

Maritime cooperation comprises more than just the use of maritime security forces. To maintain stability, a crisis management framework between disputing parties is essential to prevent miscalculations and misunderstandings escalating into serious incidents.

Perhaps the most sensitive issue demanding such cooperation concerns preserving the freedom of the skies over areas where maritime jurisdictional rights and interests are contested. Specifically, the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea is particularly perilous.

The Chinese government has unilaterally declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which includes coverage of these islands; and maritime patrol surveillance aircraft from these countries continue to monitor one another closely, with frequent dangerous interceptions.

Thus, the possibility of severe clashes, at sea or in the air above the South and East China seas, remains unacceptably high, and these risks can only be mitigated by improved maritime crisis management mechanisms like hotlines, policy channels and strategic dialogues.

Seen in this light, the disappearance of Flight MH370 offers an opportunity for various parties who are deeply mistrustful of one another to engage with potential opponents in a constructive manner.

For example, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama have spoken by telephone to coordinate SAR and HADR operations between their maritime security forces and to avoid clashes in the disputed areas of the South China Sea.

To build upon this new spirit of cooperation, some helpful maritime crisis management measures may be identified: 

• Enhance maritime security and confidence-building measures, without undermining national maritime rights and interests 
• Make use of strategic dialogues and hotlines, and conduct exercises and operations only after giving prior information; establish protocols similar to the Incident at Sea (INCSEA) or the Code for Un-alerted Encounters Between Ships (CUES) 
• Agree upon a common understanding of the law of the sea 
• Encourage information sharing of "actionable intelligence" to facilitate maritime cooperation

Fresh Start for Maritime Security?

Although the disappearance of MH370 is undeniably tragic, something positive may come out of it. Regional maritime security forces are involved simultaneously in SAR and HADR operations, and the cooperation which this obliges presents a useful opportunity to build confidence, and thus to make unwanted maritime confrontations less likely in the future.

By allowing a fresh start, this tragedy should contribute to ensuring peace and good order at sea by helping to alleviate the widespread distrust which so bedevils the security of the Asia Pacific region.

*[Note: Captain (ROK Navy Ret.) Sukjoon Yoon is a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy and visiting professor with the Department of Defense Systems Engineering in Sejong University, Seoul. This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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By Kalyan M. Kemburi

Over the last two decades, cruise missiles were predominantly deployed by a select group of advanced industrial countries, in particular the United States. Subsequently, there had been a wider use of this weapon system by militaries, partly due to globalization which accelerated technology diffusion, but also because of affordability and operational requirements (in particular the search for asymmetric capabilities). 

Asian militaries top this list. The main advantage of cruise missiles involves the ability to strike targets accurately almost under any weather condition from a long-range by evading most air defenses, and with minimal risk to friendly forces. 

Asian Militaries and Cruise Missiles

Although most countries in Asia have acquired anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), China, India, Pakistan, South Korea and Taiwan are developing or have deployed land-attack cruise missiles (LACM). Some Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam have also expressed interest. Japan has indicated interest in a system that could endow it with preemptive strike capabilities — for which cruise missiles could fit the bill.  

For countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the high-cost of deploying missile defenses and the treaty restrictions in developing ballistic missiles have made cruise missiles an attractive system to strike against potential adversaries' ballistic missiles and artillery systems. 

As with any military technology, there is always a dynamic between defense and offence. Deployment of cruise missiles have also resulted in consequent developments in defense: active countermeasures include advances in early warning systems and the deployment of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, as well as the strengthening of passive defenses such as installations holding critical assets like aircraft or command and control equipment. Moreover, new operational requirements have intensified efforts to acquire high-speed cruise missiles. 

R&D in Supersonic and Hypersonic Systems 

Five countries in Asia — China, Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan — have either civilian and/or military programs aimed at developing supersonic and hypersonic systems. It is generally agreed that supersonic systems (powered by ramjet engine) operate in the range of Mach 2-4 and hypersonic (scramjet engine) over Mach 5; most of the deployed LACMs fly at subsonic speeds of around 800km/hr. 

China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center and the National University of Defense Technology are currently working toward scramjet propulsion, pulse-detonation engines and turbine-based combined cycle (TBCC) engines, with an aim to eventually develop hypersonic missiles and aircraft. Further, the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics has reportedly developed an experimental scramjet. 

The Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) is involved in developing high-speed air-breathing propulsion for a hypersonic aircraft. JAXA is also collaborating with institutions based in Australia, Germany, Italy and the US in developing scramjet-based systems for space access. In 2012, Japan reportedly tested a rocket-based combined-cycle engine model under Mach 8. 

India currently deploys the ramjet-powered supersonic LACM Brahmos flying at 2.5-2.8 Mach, and has plans to collaborate with Russia to develop a kerosene-based hypersonic Brahmos 2. Concurrently, the Defense Research and Development Organization is working on a hypersonic system that could fly at Mach 6-7 speed propelled by scramjet. Similarly, for space access, India's civilian space agency has been working on a hydrogen-fueled scramjet engine. 

Taiwan's Hsiung Feng III (HF-3) LACM is propelled by a ramjet engine flying at a maximum speed of Mach 2 with an estimated range of 150-200 km. Initially developed as an ASCM by Chung Shan International Institute of Science and Technology, it was later reported that the missile also has land attack capabilities and entered into service in 2008. 

A new entrant of the cruise missile club, South Korea, has also been developing a supersonic Haeseong-2 LACM from the existing ASCM Haeseong-1 (Sea Star, or SSM-700K). In September 2011, Korea Times reported that the missile was slated for deployment by the end of 2013 and has a range in excess of 500 kms.

Additionally, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) has on the drawing board a two-stage Mach 4 scramjet propelled surface to air interceptor. Reportedly, KARI has ground-tested various scramjet components required for this concept. 

Evolution or Revolution in Fire Power 

Supersonic cruise missiles would increasingly become an attractive option due to the following factors.

Firstly, they reduce sensor-to-shooter to-target times. A supersonic LACM flying toward a target at a distance of 1,000 kms has clear time advantage of over 60 minutes over its subsonic counterpart.

Secondly, the kinetic energy of a supersonic missile not only increases the explosive power of a warhead, but also facilitates reduction of the warhead payload, which helps in expanding the range of the missile. Moreover, they are also very useful for targeting hardened targets; this is important given the hardening of installations as part of key passive defensive measures undertaken by many countries.

Thirdly, supersonic LACM used in conjunction with subsonic and theatre ballistic missiles create processing difficulties for any advanced early warning and air defense system. 

On the other hand, hypersonic air-breathing missile is a key emerging technology. For an effective and efficient use of this technology, changes are necessary in organizational structures, decision-making processes, operational concepts, and C4ISR systems. For most Asian militaries, accustomed to organizational and procedural inertia, bringing these changes in itself is revolutionary.

Moreover, enormous technical and financial resources are necessary to deploy a hypersonic cruise missile; therefore, over the next 10-15 years, supersonic cruise missiles offer a more viable complement to the existing cruise and ballistic missiles. 

Asian militaries are still in the process of inducting subsonic LACMs — supersonics in some cases — in significant numbers, and currently are working on innovative concepts and organizational changes that aim to take advantage of these systems in affecting the outcomes on the battlefield. Therefore, induction of high-speed missiles is evolutionary. 

Nevertheless, in a decade, military commanders in Asia would be able to have a cruise missile delivered to their target 1,500 kms away in less than 30 minutes. 

*[Note: Kalyan M. Kemburi is an Associate Research Fellow with the Military Transformations Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Analysts claim human trafficking is rife on every continent on the globe; present in almost every country and, according to the recent annual report of the US State Department on (TIP), the situation in Malaysia paints a grim picture.

Malaysia is mainly a destination country of trafficking for the purposes of prostitution and labor — manual or domestic — from countries in South and Southeast Asia. Victims may be held forcefully by their “employers” or have been compelled to stay in their situations through duress —  such as threats of reporting them to the police, keeping their passports, and holding persons in debt bondage are common.

More Convictions

The US TIP aims to monitor and rank the progress of countries according to efforts they are making to combat the crime. So for the Southeast Asian federal constitutional monarchy, is the situation getting better? Lacking in statistics and efforts to monitor the situation, it is hard to say. A number of improvements have been cited such as implementation of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons (ATIP) statute, regional partnership agreements, and a national action plan to tackle human trafficking.

However, the 2013 report says more needs to be done. What is apparent is that prosecutions have been ramped up against those complicit in trafficking, but this has not translated into more convictions.

While the identification of traffickers and, subsequently, the rescue of victims is a good thing, there is much criticism of the way victims are treated and the care they receive. Apart from the humane aspects of their immediate situation, victims constitute a key part of the prosecutorial process and their cooperation can be harnessed for law enforcement purposes.

Criminals Rather Than Victims

Victims, once identified, are placed in 24-hour custody, and a sessions court judge can provide a 14-day interim protection order; after which they will be placed in a shelter. If needed, a three-month protection order can be requested, during which time the victim will need to remain in a government-run shelter while their evidence is recorded. If the victim agrees to testify, they will participate in the court proceedings — if not, they will be repatriated.

The number of cases have admittedly increased over recent years, but convictions remain low. The legal reasoning behind most of these is a failure to prove a prima facie case. A closer look at cases will uncover discrediting and distress of witnesses, who have endured long trial periods and ill-treatment.

A common complaint among victims is the fact that they are held in the shelters for such long periods of time, with little or no contact to the outside world, restricted movements, and little to do. This frustrates them, leaving them depressed and in some cases, suicidal. By the time the trial comes around, all victims want to do is go home.

In the labor dispute case of Spektra Alucast Sdn Bhd vs Vietnamese Workers, the men were kept in a male shelter for trafficking victims in Malacca, a small state in the south of Malaysia. They were detained for seven months, with no access to the outside world except for meetings with their counsel, NGOs, or to attend court.

Their state during this period had deteriorated to depressed and desperate, and the only thing they wanted was to return to Vietnam. They were treated physically well, but other factors took a bearing on their health: for example, being kept in the dark about court proceedings; being transported to and from the court house in Selangor (a substantial journey of approximately 100 miles); and being handcuffed and kept in lock-up while waiting to attend court, and not provided with food or water during this process. In other words, they were treated like criminals rather than victims.

In another case, victims were actually kept in the same cell as their perpetrators due to no shelter facilities being available at the time. It then could not be of any surprise that none of them wanted to speak against the traffickers. Some cases have been noted as ongoing for over 12 months. Placing a witness to testify after this amount of time has little merit as minimal detail on facts can be remembered after this period.

All victims want is to go home – that is what they associate with being safe. But it is not always the case, as they will go back to no job and are at risk of being re-trafficked.

Victim-Centric Approaches

Little attention is also placed on the needs and experience of the victim. As a victim of human trafficking, they have gone through potentially enormous psychological and physical trauma and abuse. However, there are no rehabilitative or protective measures other than rudimentary medical attention.

Besides going home, particularly in the case of labor trafficking, victims want their unpaid wages but recovery of this is dependent on the goodwill of helpful NGO workers, rather than state support. The state’s priority and intention with victims is solely to garner their cooperation during trials and are, therefore, acting in their own best interests. However, adopting more victim-centric approaches would encourage victims to assist as witnesses; for example, a reflection period, right of residency and the ability to work while they are waiting for proceedings to go through, would all positively enhance this process.

Several positive outcomes have indeed been achieved through the efforts of the (CAMSA) Malaysia – a body mandated by the ATIP statute to implement the National Action Plan. For example, it is now recognized that victims need to be provided with counseling; the Department for Social Welfare, together with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), is embarking on a project with trainee psychologists and counselors – there are currently between 100-120. Training is being rolled out through NGOs, though it is not yet robust enough, or regular.

Also, regarding a recent GSS News Agency case involving a newspaper distribution company that “employed” five Indian nationals to facilitate the distribution and sale of newspapers in various locations of Puchong, workers were not paid for between five and eight months and were maintained in slave-like conditions without sufficient rest or adequate food. The initial trial failed, however, CAMSA lawyers were successful in attaining work permits for the appellants while awaiting the appeal process, which resulted in the witnesses being more cooperative in aiding the justice process.

Adopting the human rights approach to tackling trafficking, and placing the victim’s needs at the forefront of anti-trafficking strategies, therefore, pays off in increasing awareness of human trafficking networks and prosecutions.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Corruption is the misuse of a trusted position for illicit private ends. Corruption ranges across phenomena, including bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism, and outright theft. Corruption is difficult to measure, of course. In perceptions of people around the world, corruption is closely related to administrative efficiency, rule of law, and ethics in the private sector. We can spend days or even academic lifetimes debating definitions and the deeper causes of corruption and weak governance. Let’s instead focus on a separable, practical question: What can be done to reduce corruption? 

Here there is good news. Even in very corrupt settings, corruption can be reduced, leading to greater investment and public satisfaction. And the success stories exhibit some common principles, regardless of cultural setting. 

Success Strategies

“Success” means significant improvement in governance measures, followed by increases in investment and improvements in public services. The success stories range from classic cases such as Singapore and Hong Kong to more recent ones such as the Republic of Georgia, Qatar, Colombia, and the Philippines. Some people would also include Indonesia, which has risen under President Susilo Yudhuyono from the very bottom in terms of quality of government, and Malaysia, whose government transformation program has already yielded promising results.

Their strategies recognize the following principles. Corruption is an economic crime, not a crime of passion. Givers and takers of bribes respond to economic incentives and punishments; corruption follows a formula:  C = M + D – A. Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. To reduce corruption, you have to try to reduce monopoly and enhance competition, limit official discretion, and clarify the rules of the game. Accountability about processes and especially about results can be enhanced in many ways, including citizen- and business-driven scorecards for government agencies and programs.

Lessons

Lessons can also be discerned about the politics of anti-corruption. Identify and mobilize allies. Fry big fish. Diagnose and subvert corrupt systems. Do a few things that can show results in six months, to build momentum. Don’t try to do everything at once. 

Lessons do not mean one-size-fits-all. They suggest principles, which must be tuned and applied by locals to their inevitably unique situations.

Here are two more lessons for reformers. Don’t think of corruption primarily as a legal or moral issue. In very corrupt countries, new laws, codes of conduct, and better training for public officials will, alas, make little difference.

Second, think of collaboration across the public-private-nonprofit divide. Business and civil society can play key roles. They are part of corrupt systems, stuck in a corrupt equilibrium. To get out, they have to be given ways to expose corruption without taking personal risks.

Ipaidabribe.com in India is a promising example. Successful partnerships, such as Ciudadanos al DĂ­a in Peru and the Bangalore Agenda Task Force in India, exploit credible information supplied by NGOs and the pressure, resources, and technical expertise of the business community.

Forces of Change

Some people, tired of corruption and endless chatter about it, may rightly wonder if change is even possible. Why would politicians ever want to reform corrupt institutions or systems?

Politicians are ready to move when several forces converge. Expanding opportunities for international trade, investment, financing, and emerging industries that depend on fast-moving knowledge and innovative styles breed young entrepreneurs with little tolerance for corrupt practices. Finally, a growing popular dismay for corruption: Anti-corruption is a major force behind demonstrations in many Arab countries, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Bulgaria. 

Around the world, elections are being fought with corruption as a key issue. In my experience, many new presidents, governors, ministers, and mayors are eager to reduce corruption. They know that corruption is constraining development. What politicians need is help which recognizes that corruption is a system that needs a hard-headed, politically tuned strategy — and that fighting corruption can help them win elections and advance their countries.

And so, I am optimistic about progress here and elsewhere in making government more effective and efficient, with the help of business and civil society. Someone even more optimistic is John T. Noonan, author of Bribes, the best book ever written on corruption. 

In 1985, Noonan predicted that systemic corruption would eventually go the way of systemic slavery. Both, he noted, were once widespread, even ways of life, in most parts of the world. Nowadays, slavery seems almost incomprehensible. Noonan says that in the not too distant future, we will feel the same way about the corrupt systems that characterize some of the poorest places on the planet.

Moral outrage will be part of the solution, he says. So too will be learning from practical ways to reduce corruption, even in very corrupt settings. Progress will be made with an approach that combines economics and shrewd politics. And business and civil society, which are part of the problem, will be indispensable parts of the solution.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright ©  All Rights Reserved

The post Tackling Corruption: The Solution Is? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Training and supporting insurgents against one’s adversaries has been a cost effective strategy since the late 20th century, when states co-opted their adversaries’ enemies as proxy forces, avoiding the monetary cost of deploying their own soldiers and the political cost of casualties.

The recent announcement that the United States is considering deploying its forces to train Syrian rebels en masse in a friendly third country, in a bid to improve the insurgents’ capability to counter the Syrian military, suggests that Washington might be heading down that path. This might backfire badly.

Short-Term Logic

It is known that the CIA supported the Afghan Mujahideen with weapons and training against Soviet forces during their occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to1989. Although this resistance cost the USSR dearly and contributed to their eventual withdrawal, it also destabilized Afghanistan and fostered a territory controlled by rival warlords who were no match for the Pakistani-backed Taliban, which ended up controlling most of Afghanistan. The Taliban then provided refuge and training grounds for al-Qaeda, the prime enemy of America.

Turning to Britain’s support for insurgents who would eventually bite the hand that fed them, the communist-led Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army received guerilla training as well as arms from the British during World War II, but ended up forming the main body of the Malayan National Liberation Army, the armed-wing of the Malayan Communists who engaged in the insurgency in Malaya from 1948 to 1960.

Even though the British would eventually win this counter-insurgency campaign, they had to pay the price of at least 1,860 British and allied deaths and over 2,400 wounded.

Minimizing Risks

In Syria, excluding the ostensibly secular Free Syrian Army — and assuming that the US would be able to screen out al-Qaeda affiliates like the al-Nusra Front from receiving combat training — the groups in the anti-Assad rebel alliance, including the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, al-Tawhid Brigade, and Syrian Islamic Front, are all driven by Islamist ideology. Training them would conflict with US foreign policy.

Hence, there is a distinct possibility that anti-Assad regime insurgents given warfighting training by the US and armed by sympathetic Arab governments, could end up using their lethal capabilities against US forces or interests in a future conflict.

While caution advises against widespread training of Syrian rebels, the instruction syllabus should be carefully designed to minimize any risk of strategic blowback on the US, if the Obama administration decides to go ahead and upgrade the skills of Syrian rebels.

Specifically, any training program should strictly omit instruction on special forces-type skills like combat demolitions and long range sniping, avoid teaching the rebels commando tactics — such as enemy personnel seizure raids, sabotage operations and other missions — and leave out any mention of psychological operations and counter-intelligence measures.

Essentially, training for the rebels should exclude skills useful for terrorism and/or assassination, preclude the possibility that the insurgency could acquire special forces capabilities that might be used against the US in future, and prevent the rise of violent Islamist leaders who have keen persuasive abilities while being resistant to Western/US intelligence monitoring or surveillance.

On the other hand, training should concentrate on imparting the tactical skills and mindsets necessary to operate in disciplined groups of platoon, company, and even battalion strength so that the insurgency can more effectively face the al-Assad military and function despite casualties.

Next, detailed instruction in the employment of anti-tank weapons and tactics along with the effective use of light artillery would help to even the odds against government forces.

Avoid Shooting Its Own Foot

Additionally, effort should not be spared in inculcating a sense of professionalism and ethics amongst junior and mid-level commanders so that civilians will be respected and atrocities against captured government troops avoided. In essence, the training should not only sharpen the edge of the insurgency but also lay the foundation for a respected, professional, and reformed Syrian military if the al-Assad regime is ever deposed.

In as much as the regime needs to be actively opposed for reasons laid out by the Obama administration such as the use of chemical weapons, it bears repeating that any friendly intent of Syrian insurgents towards the US cannot be guaranteed over the long term.

Hence, to avoid blowback from combat training provided to any Syrian rebel faction, Washington needs to be very circumspect regarding the type of warfighting training conducted so that the US does not unwittingly sow the seeds for a future Hezbollah or al-Qaeda. In short, America’s policy vis-à-vis Syria must avoid shooting itself in the foot.

*[This article was originally published by the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Enemy of My Enemy: Perils of Training Syrian Rebels appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Despite independence in 1948, Burma has been plagued by problems since the military junta took state control in 1962. Power struggles, conflict, occupation, resource extraction and ethnic tensions have all incited Burma’s displacement issue. While exact numbers are unknown, estimates are in the region of 1 million internally displaced and 1 million .

Recently, the media has recognized the crisis that is happening in Rakhine State, Burma, where Buddhist and Muslim tensions have forced many Rohingya to flee, even though their safety options elsewhere are limited. However, Burma is made up of 136 and many that are unrecognized — the dominating group being the Barma (the indigenous majority). Many tribes belong to one overarching regional group; but even within that group, tribal rivalries exist.

Making it in Malaysia

Returning from a recent trip to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, I volunteered at a school set up for Burmese refugee children. The school consisted of children between the ages of five and 12, all from the Matu tribe of the Chin group. The Chin are the largest Burmese ethnic group in Malaysia and have fled Burma due to military occupation and persecution by the Barma.

The school was housed in an unkempt apartment in the backstreets of Bukit Bintang (downtown Kuala Lumpur’s main shopping street), and was given some assistance by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Although true, they relied heavily on volunteers and private generosity for funding. Seventeen-year-old Sara coordinated the school, and she, like many others, was waiting for resettlement and seeking English language skills needed to prepare her for the US.

There are nearly residing in Malaysia. They often live in squalid conditions in overcrowded apartments within the capital, or in makeshift camps on the outskirts of the Klang Valley and the Cameron Highlands. In order to survive, they work in the informal sector on low wages in occupations that make up the three Ds: dirty, dangerous, and difficult. Many employers exploit their vulnerable situation and do not pay them at all. Children do not have access to formal education, but some do attend community-run learning centers like the one Sara ran. Refugees can access healthcare services, but they are not free and are far too costly for most. They have no access to benefits, as Malaysia is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention and the general registration process closed in 2006.

Due to the squalid conditions in which they live, disease is widespread, and they experience pervasive abuse from the authorities who continually threaten them if they are caught extracting bribes or subjecting them to physical abuse. However, the Malaysian government does cooperate with the United Nations, and the UNHCR office still exists. Displaced persons can still register with the office in order to gain resettlement in a third country, as Sara did.

Communal Responses Ěý

Holding a UNHCR card does not provide irregular migrants with protection or access to benefits and services, so these groups have to rely on forming communities for the provision of informal services and for coordinating help from NGOs. The ethnic tensions that divide Burma were not left at home, but instead exported to Malaysia.

The school that Sara coordinated had a maximum of 15 children of mixed ages. Children were split between kindergarten and “the rest.” This made delivering lessons suitable for everyone challenging, as children as young as seven were included in grammar sessions for teenagers. While Sara’s efforts are highly commendable, the education model is far from ideal and could be improved if two or more schools were to collaborate and combine resources. Michael, one of the main volunteers, commented that there was no chance of another school collaborating with this school, as the children are from the Matu tribe and hated by other tribes. Therefore, collaboration could never happen.

However, there are some organizations that are trying to overcome this problem in order to gain common goals. The Alliance of Chin Refugees, for example, is an informal NGO that tries to unite different Chin groups in order to provide a community center, so issues can be resolved constructively. They have helped the wider Chin community by acting as a correspondent for the UNHCR resources and registration of newly arriving NGOs providing healthcare clinics. They organize schooling and help women to market their handicrafts. Another group, the Chin Emergency Relief Group, was also formed to tackle social issues within the community — homelessness, in particular. The Chin Refugee Committee works closely with the UNHCR to assist and facilitate their operations in Kuala Lumpur, providing a safe house for Chin people in need.

The second largest ethnic group from Burma currently present in Malaysia is the Rohingya, a Muslim minority group from Rakhine state. Rendered stateless by the Burma Citizenship Law of 1982, they have been subjected to persecution, discrimination and intrusive restriction on their rights to marry and have families. Like the Chin in Malaysia, they have no access to benefits or services and no protection even if they are registered with the UNHCR. The separation of the Rohingya by the international community and by Burmese groups has led to an overall lack of support, resulting in extreme illiteracy, substandard health and living conditions with little hope for improvement. Due to their lack of status, children do not have access to the school system, nor may they share services with the Chin.

There has been some civil society response, however, and , the Burmese Rohingya Refugees Community Malaysia (BRRCM) was set up with their headquarters in Penang. They work on key issues affecting the Rohingya — for example, status: the Rohingyas’ situation is further complicated because they are “stateless,” and not recognized by any country. The BRRCM work with the UNHCR to enable registration of refugee status along with their own “registration letter,” claiming they are asylum seekers.

The effect this has in protectingĚýRohingyaĚýfrom RELA (a civilian para-policing group that tackle illegal immigration) and the police is unclear, but they feel this is better than nothing. If members of the Rohingya are detained, they work with organizations such as Suhakam (the Malaysian Human Rights Commission) and UNHCR to mitigate any violence or abuse they may have encountered. They also collect data to inform their work and provide a platform for interested parties such as students or film-makers, to gain knowledge on the plight of the Rohingya and their experience in Malaysia.

In order to join forces when possible, they have formed part of the organization named the All Burmese Muslims Council Malaysia (ABMCM), which they set up in 2009 to enable them to pursue common goals. With regard to basic services such as health, BRRCM links to local organizations to help organize provision of services such as free medical camps for basic health screenings and to tackle emergency health problems. In 2008, there were nearly 350 seriously sick Rohingyas, who were immobile and unable to seek medical treatment. BRRCM informed a local group, who immediately sent a team of doctors and ancillaries to attend to them in Bagan Dalam, Butterworth. The doctors diagnosed their illnesses and provided them with antibiotics, iron tablets, ointment and multi-vitamins.

What’s Next?

Community and civil society-led provisions are only drops in the ocean toward providing migrants from Burma with the dignity of living a free and fair existence – one where they can fully realize their human rights. Ultimately, the solution to this is for the Burmese government to be called to account or take action on the abuse within Burma.

The international community will have to focus its humanitarian and political lens on this area so there is a safe place to return to. Within Malaysia, non-cohesive services between the two groups or any other Burmese ethnic groups, cause disparities in the level of services available to minority ethnic groups.Thus, both groups seem to encounter similar problems around access to formal services. UNHCR provides no guarantee of protection and this needs to change. The national authorities must recognize their status and refrain from detaining individuals. Therefore, the Malaysian government must ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention and establish an official process.

The Rohingya seem to have the added disadvantage of not being recognized as belonging to a state – they belong niether to Burma or Bangladesh. Their particular situation and long-standing persecution should mean that the UNHCR and resettlement countries revise their policies to include the Rohingya more centrally in resettlement programs. This might create incentives for destination countries such as Malaysia to provide more sustainable solutions for populations who cannot return and are forced to remain refugees.

Donors also have a role to play, as they can urge governments to ease restrictions on the Rohingya and support programs that will lead to more self-reliance. Though complex, the issue of tribal rivalry and xenophobia amongst Burmese groups should be tackled, even outside of Burma. Not only would more solidarity enable them to survive and cope better within interim host countries such as Malaysia, these refugees will eventually have to move on to other countries where such attitudes would not be tolerated. Therefore, there is a role for impartial NGOs to mediate between groups and provide education on social and racial cohesion.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright © . All Rights Reserved

The post Cutting Borders: Ethnic Tensions and Burmese Refugees appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Malaysian security forces have been battling a militant Filipino organization called the “Royal Army of Sulu” (RAS) in Malaysia’s Sabah State, in the northeastern region of the Borneo island. RAS fighters, the majority of whom are ethnic Tausug from the Philippine islands of the Sulu Archipelago that border Sabah, claim fealty to the Manila-based Sultan Jamalul Kiram III. Sultan Jamalul III is one of nine competing descendants of the historical Sultanate of Sulu who claim control over Sabah. The fighters are also reported to be led militarily in Sabah by his brother Agbimuddin Kiram.

The Sultanate

The Sultanate of Sulu was a local maritime empire dominated by the Tausug. It was based on the island of Sulu in the Sulu Sea between the Philippine islands of Mindanao, Sulu, and the Sabah Province of Malaysia. Historically, it controlled the region of Borneo island that is now the Sabah State in Malaysia, after being granted that part of the island by the Sultanate of Brunei as a reward for being a steadfast and effective ally in war. 

In 1878, the Sultanate of Sulu either ceded or leased (there is a dispute over the exact translation of the agreement) control of northern Borneo to the British North Borneo Company in exchange for a yearly sum of money. The British claim to North Borneo was subsequently recognized by the Spanish who controlled the Philippines, and in 1885, the Spanish agreed to relinquish their claim to sovereignty over northern Borneo. Following the onset of US control over the Philippines, the United States and Filipino diplomats continually attempted to regain control over northern Borneo for the Philippines — an effort that was rebuffed by the British, who made the area a colony under direct control of the British king through the charter of the North Borneo Company in 1946.  

Although the Filipino government never relinquished its historical claim to northeastern Borneo, the region was incorporated into Malaysia upon the country's independence in 1963. Sabah joined the federation government of Malaysia on the condition that it remain an autonomous state with powers of self-determination. These powers of self-determination were generally respected by the Malaysian government.

The Philippines vehemently contested the annexation of northern Borneo into Malaysia as Sabah State. Strained diplomatic relations existed between Malaysia and the Philippines until the early 1990s partly due to the dispute over northern Borneo. The government of the Philippines still considers northeastern Borneo as part of the country, and the Malaysian government pays the descendents of the Sultanate of Sulu $1,700 a year as either "payment" or "rent" of Sabah State.  One of the major demands of the Royal Army of Sulu, in the absence of the transfer of power of Sabah from Malaysia to the Philippines, is a larger rent payment from the Malaysian government to the Sultan of Sulu.

The RAS

The RAS invasion began on February 9, when approximately 200 southern Filipino militants belonging to the group landed in Sabah from the southern Philippine islands near the busy port city of Lahad Datu . On March 1, fighting between Malaysian security forces and the RAS broke out after several weeks of failed negotiations for the withdrawal of the RAS from Sabah. The fighting, which has included air strikes and mechanized raids by Malaysian security forces, is reported to have killed 62 RAS fighters and 10 Malaysian soldiers. Malaysian and Philippine naval forces are attempting to stop the movement of RAS reinforcements by imposing a blockade on vessels moving from the islands of the Sulu Archipelago into Sabah. The Philippine navy seized three vessels carrying 38 RAS members, while the government is reported to be seeking to indict the fighters on charges of possessing illegal weapons.

Interests From Abroad

Sabah’s palm oil industries are very important to the state’s economy —  the state is the third-largest palm oil producing region in the world. Sabah’s most productive areas for palm oil production are in the eastern region of the state, in and around Lahad Datu . As a result of the fighting in the area, three palm oil shipping ports in eastern Sabah, Tawau, Shabat, and Kunak have been closed. Sabah is estimated to have 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 1.5 billion barrels of petroleum in both on- and offshore reserves, equaling 25% and 12% of the Malaysia’s total natural gas and petroleum reserves.

China is emerging as one of the most important investors and trade partners for Sabah. Chinese government officials and investors have expressed a willingness to work with Malaysian partners to explore implementation of projects focused on the eco-tourism, environmental rehabilitation, information and communications technology, aquaculture, and palm oil processing industries. China is the largest importer of palm oil products originating in Sabah. Sabah is also beginning to be aggressively marketed as a vacation destination for wealthy Chinese, and as a new concentration of Islamic banking firms for Chinese and southeast Asian Muslim investors. 

US corporations have also committed to investment in the state’s agriculture and aquaculture industries. Darden Aquasciences, a subsidiary of Darden Restaurants Inc., the world’s second-largest full service restaurant company, agreed to invest over $640 million in a partnership with the government of Malaysia and Malaysian companies to develop a large lobster farming project off of the Sabah coast. Dole Fruit, the world’s largest fruit and vegetable producer, has agreed to invest over $300 million in vegetable and fruit farming in Sabah.

A widened rural insurgency in Sabah outside of the region of Lahad Datu would threaten international investment in the state. International investment in Sabah has been increasing due to the state’s large deposits of energy resources, fertile farmland, deep ports, and natural beauty. Sabah's palm oil industry feeds the three largest markets for palm oil in the world — China, India, and Indonesia — and is considered an important "cluster" industry for further economic growth in the state. Continuing conflict in the Sabah region is reported to be delaying the production of processed palm oil products in Sabah. A lengthy conflict could severely damage the long-term health of the industry in the state.

Wider insurgency in Sabah would also present the government of the Philippines, particularly President Benigno Aquino III, with the difficult choice of participating militarily against Filipinos in Sabah, and inflaming public opinion in the southern Philippines in an election year, or doing nothing and risking the ire of Malaysia. Malaysian diplomatic and military peacekeeping support helped strengthen the process of negotiations between the Philippine government under President Aquino III and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which was seen as an important accomplishment of his administration. Malaysia has also become an important investor in the Philippine economy and an important destination for employment for Filipino workers who send remittance income back to the Philippines. 

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Malaysia’s Sabah: A Rich Prize in an Old Conflict appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The debate and proposals currently under discussion in Europe regarding austerity, Euro bonds, easing of interest rates and other choices of economic direction to resolve the problem are akin to debates in Malaysia during the Asian Financial Crisis. Further, similar to Europe today, the Asian Financial Crisis saw the advent of proponents for tough austerity measures as some wished to punish countries for errors in economic management.

Malaysia: A Buildup to Crisis

In the prelude to the Asian Crisis the Malaysian economy enjoyed a period of high growth, huge capital inflows, runaway stock market, credit expansion and a property boom. However, the economy faced a large current account deficit exacerbated by fixed exchange regime and exponential credit growth for banks and corporations that had over extended themselves due to lax lending standards and even, at times, fraudulent lending. In 1997, devaluation of the Thai Baht sparked a crisis and soon the contagion effect was felt in Malaysia. Initially, many errors were committed in response to the crisis: Malaysia defended the Ringgit, resulting in increased interest rates; inevitable capital flight dried up liquidity; and credit tightening forced severe economic contraction.

Like the current European outlook, there was anticipation in Asia for long-term decline and bleak prospects of economic growth. In fact in 1998 senior most government officials Ěýwere Ěýconcerned about Malaysia being afflicted by a Latin American styled economic crisis which would marginalize youths from employment and participation in society. Thus, unlike Korea and Thailand, which had implemented IMF advised measures, the Malaysian government opted not to implement harsh austerity measures which it felt would unduly hurt the general population.

The Malaysian Response to 1997/98 Crisis

First, at the time of the crisis, Malaysia ensured that political stability was maintained. Despite the highly publicized sacking and arrest of the then Deputy Prime Minister and its ensuing demonstrations, the political situation in Malaysia remained stable (contrary to the images shown by the international press that sensationalized protests). With political stability intact, the single most important ingredient to recovery and economic growth was firmly in place. Further, the Government ensured the continuation of safety nets to support the weakest members of society, such as subsidies and welfare payments. Despite early rhetoric to the contrary, the Government pursued sensible fiscal prudence, for example, delaying the huge hydro-electric dam in Bakun and shelving several high-profile commercial development projects.

In line with maintaining political stability, the Government had to stabilize critical components of the economy by addressing the wildly fluctuating exchange rate and the untenable interest costs. In 1998, the Government pegged the Ringgit and introduced capital controls to stem the flight of capital which had completely disrupted the economy.Ěý Though in the short term inflation was high due to high import costs, eventually prices stabilized and the low interest rate regime did not affect the price of goods as demand had collapsed. Gradually, demand for goods and services increased in a more favorable interest rate climate.

Internal demand, which had in large part ushered in the crisis by fueling a property bubble and Government spending, was replaced by strong export growth. A depreciated currency also ensured imports were curtailed.Ěý Commodity prices denominated in United States Dollars resulted in booms for Malaysian companies operating at Ringgit costs. ĚýFurther, with political stability, the tourism industry also contributed to exchange earnings. An unexpected spin-off resulting from import substitution was the growth in private higher education institutions to provide education for those who could no longer afford to go to the UK,US, Australia and Canada to pursue higher learning. It would be hard to imagine in Malaysia that repositioning of industries by wage adjustment and efficiency gains such as the suggested solution in the Eurozone today, could have built up demand for products and services so rapidly.Ěý This is because labour is simply not as mobile as capital to create substantial economic adjustment in the short term.

The health of the banking system and credit for productive purposes which had been severely affected by the crisis was addressed by comprehensive measures. Three institutions were set up within 12 months to implement these measures (Danaharta, Danamodaland CDRC) and emergency legislation was passed to allow these institutions to work effectively. The objective of these institutions was to ensure recapitalization of banks and the removal of Non-Performing Loans, effectively enabling banks to get back to the business of lending. Further, financial restructuring of companies facilitated viable companies to return to the economic fold and contribute to demand and economic growth, whilst foreclosed assets bought by investors and put back to economic use also drove growth. Effective techniques were employed to clear and hold properties where there was clear justification, that is to say where they could be either developed or used to achieve commensurate rental yield. Not only did these measures encourage return of activity to the property sector; they also stemmed the outright collapse of property prices.

These measures – property sales (by Danahartavia), extensive promotion, and setting benchmark prices – resuscitated the collapsed property market. Although there are pockets of properties that remain abandoned till today, the numbers are insignificant.

Malaysia recovered unscathed by the Asian crisis and according to some estimates; the cost of the initiatives taken by the Government to recapitalize banks and write off bad loans was no more than 4% of GDP. Today, the economy grows steadily, albeit no longer at the near double digit growth observed during the pre-crisis period. (This is not to ignore ˛Ń˛ą±ô˛ą˛â˛őľ±˛ąâ€™s challenges today; there is concern about rising domestic debt and Government budget deficit, as well as fear of being caught in the middle income trap, but these are beyond the scope of this article.)

What Europe Can Learn

Though in some respects it is difficult to compare Europe and Malaysia, there are fundamental lessons to be learned. Like Europe, Malaysia had legacy economic issues at the time of the crisis: a current account deficit, an over extended property sector, crony capitalism, protected industries, etc. However, Malaysia opted for measures to restore demand before addressing legacy problems. This ensured clarity of direction and purpose of initiatives undertaken to restore the economy. Improved corporate governance and long-run fiscal discipline are important in the long run, but as the Asian crisis shows they do not restore demand in the short-term.

It takes bold and visionary leadership to make courageous decisions during crisis that take a country back on the road to recovery. Europe must recognize that the demand collapse is the most pressing issue and should set priorities accordingly.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post In Demand: Lessons For Europe From the Asian Financial Crisis appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.