These groups, which have formed an advocating the end of the Islamic Republic and the establishment of a federal, democratic Iran, have long been treated by Tehran not just as external adversaries but as potential catalysts of internal uprising. The concern extends beyond Kurdish regions alone to the possibility that unrest could spread into other marginalized areas, including Baloch, Ahwazi, Azeri and others.

Following the announced by US President Donald Trump on April 7, Tehran intensified pressure on Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to these Kurdish parties, accusing them of links to the US and Israel. While framed publicly as a security measure, the underlying concern remained the prevention of these groups from becoming focal points for internal dissent and political mobilization within Iran as they have done during past political upheavals.

Iran’s domestic repression and surveillance campaigns

During the war, Iranian intelligence services and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted a sustained campaign to deter Kurdish involvement in the conflict, according to sources that spoke to . Inside Iran, Kurdish civilians faced waves of threatening text messages warning against cooperation with foreign powers, followed by surveillance operations targeting satellite communications. These measures escalated into house raids conducted by IRGC officers in both urban neighborhoods and rural border areas suspected of links to opposition networks.

At the same time, Iran has maintained a broader and long-standing pattern of repression against other marginalized communities. Human Rights , and the for Human Rights in Iran have documented repeated arbitrary arrests, executions and violent crackdowns in Baloch and Ahwazi regions, particularly during periods of political unrest. Iran Human Rights has further recorded recurring waves of executions and security operations in Sistan and Baluchestan, reinforcing a wider pattern of coercive state control across multiple ethnic regions.

Cross-border military pressure and regional impact

Across the border in Iraq, Tehran applied direct pressure on the KRG, warning that Kurdish forces near the border would face attacks if they did not withdraw. Despite compliance by Iraqi Kurdish authorities, Iranian drone and missile strikes continued to hit Kurdish offices, compounds and training bases, killing fighters and civilians and destroying infrastructure previously believed to be secure. According to monitoring, the Kurdistan Region has been struck by more than 638 drones and missiles since the start of the war, underscoring the scale and intensity of Iran’s campaign. Many of these attacks were carried out by Iranian-backed militias operating inside Iraq, illustrating Tehran’s willingness to project force across borders to prevent internal mobilization.

IRGC deployments during this period were extensive and deliberate. Intelligence indicated the presence of forces stationed in forests, mosques, schools and even hospitals, reflecting a strategy of embedding within civilian environments to monitor, intimidate and deter potential uprisings. Senior commanders also personally oversaw operations in border regions while strikes continued against Kurdish exile offices and training bases in Iraq.

The Kurdish alliance and the threat of wider resistance

Although the Kurdish alliance does not currently field a large enough military force to conduct a major ground offensive, it has historically mobilized thousands in past uprisings and rebellions. Its networks extend across Iranian Kurdistan and carry the potential to inspire wider resistance in other marginalized regions, including Baloch and Ahwazi areas. Tehran fears this greatly because it is aware that previous waves of unrest, most notably the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, in Kurdish regions before spreading across the country and gaining international reach.

This historical precedent shapes the regime’s calculations and actions against Kurdish opposition forces both inside and outside of Iran. Local uprisings have previously diverted security forces and exposed the fragility of state control in peripheral regions. The concern is not simply rebellion in one area, but the possibility of coordinated unrest across multiple regions simultaneously.

The regime’s strategy and future outlook

Whether the ceasefire holds or collapses, the Islamic Republic continues to act with ruthless precision to maintain control. From threatening civilians to deploying forces in civilian locations, conducting drone and missile strikes, and pressuring the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, Tehran’s strategy illustrates a singular objective: to prevent the formation of organized opposition that could spark an internal uprising. The regime’s fear of losing control across Kurdish, Baloch and Ahwazi regions, and potentially beyond, drives both its internal repression and its external military operations into Iraqi territory.

The next phase of Iran’s internal conflict is likely to be shaped by this persistent fear. Historical precedent and recent events suggest that if the population is left with no safe avenues for protest, the potential for armed resistance may rise, not because citizens desire conflict, but because the Islamic Republic has left them no other options for meaningful change.

The regime’s approach ensures that Kurdish, Baloch and Ahwazi communities remain under constant pressure, illustrating its strong reliance on suppression to prevent revolt and highlighting why Tehran views these opposition movements as an existential threat to its grip on power. Regardless of what happens with the external war and negotiations, it is only an internal uprising that stands a chance of toppling the Islamic Republic and bringing about meaningful change for the people.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The prospect of Kurdistan as a homeland for the Kurds began with the colonial division of western Asia, which followed World War I. With the breakup of the Middle East that created new borders in the Levant, the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 betrayed promises to give the Kurds their own state.

The Scattered Lands of Kurdistan

Since then, Kurdistan has come to be recognized across the borders of four different countries: Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey — different Kurdish regions, yet with the same problems throughout the last century.

The fight for Kurdish rights has always been a problem for those Kurds willing to use their own language, which is often banned in state institutions. This is just one aspect of repression that Kurds face in their demand for autonomy and historical recognition.

Today, a part of Kurdistan lies within Turkey, where a ceasefire was agreed upon between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in early 2013. The conflict in Turkey has lasted for over 30 years, resulting in approximately 40,000 deaths.

The Kurds in the Middle East have adopted different strategies. The PKK opted for guerrilla warfare to prevent the Turkish Army from trampling on Kurdish rights. In Syria, after the uprising in 2011, which turned into a civil war, the Kurds were able to establish a higher degree of self-organization in the predominantly Kurdish parts of the country by building new institutions such as hospitals and schools.

The Kurds in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan or northeastern Syria) have achieved a certain degree of emancipation from Assad’s regime, but are forced to fight against rebel groups such as the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra.

In Iran, there even existed a Kurdish Republic from 1946-47. After its demise, a long period of repression against the Kurds began. Today, Kurds in Iran enjoy cultural benefits since they are allowed to write and publish in the Kurdish language. Nevertheless, the political problems have not been resolved.

After many years of popular struggle against Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraqi Kurds carved out an autonomous region and a parliament, officially part of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq.

During my recent journey, I crossed three parts of Kurdistan to create a first-hand account of the territory, which is important for the region’s contemporary geopolitics and human rights struggle. I traveled along the borders of Iraq, Turkey and Syria.

PKK Fighters: How a Guerrilla Lives

My first stop was Iraqi Kurdistan. One night, I was getting ready to meet several Kurdish guerilla fighters camped out in the Qandil Mountains. I passed through countless inspections by the Iraqi Army and soon, almost every sign of human life seemed to have disappeared. I didn’t know where I was exactly, I just knew I was very close to the Iranian border.

Finally, I reached the Kurdish outpost. Following further security routines, I could finally leave my pick-up. After spending one night at their camp, where I slept in a small, concealed hut, at 5:30am I began my day, following two guerrilla fighters: a man and a woman. These people have chosen to dedicate their lives to the Kurdish struggle.

I conducted several interviews with them, which took place both in military training areas and in sites used for studying. The guerillas placed great emphasis on issues such as feminism and environmentalism. I talked with them about the guerrillas’ personal lives, what they missed from their old lifestyle and what, instead, is essential and indefeasible about their life in the mountains. They also discussed the Middle East’s political issues and gave their opinion about the “crisis” of the ceasefire with the Turkish government.

A guerrilla fighter told me: “We want the Kurdish, the Turkish and the Arabs to live side by side in all the countries of the Middle East, just like they do in Lebanon, Jordan or Turkey. So, you see, we don’t want to overpower other communities and create a Kurdistan supreme.”

The woman I spoke to grew up in a Kurdish family in Germany, but every summer used to go back to Turkey where she suffered different forms of humiliation and discrimination. She believes that Europe has accepted the Turkish oppression of the Kurds.

Looking for a way to counter this repression, during one of her summer holidays spent in Turkey’s Kurdish regions, she decided to climb Qandil and joined the guerrillas’ fight.

Meanwhile, the man has been living in the Qandil Mountains since 1995. He said he does not trust the negotiation process with Turkey. He is worried that it will lower the attention toward the conflict, which could carry dangerous consequences.

The journey into the guerrillas’ world continued along the bunkers used for medical assistance, up to a hospital built by the PKK, but only for use by civilians living around Qandil.

Here I met Medya, a German volunteer doctor, who has decided to support the Kurdish fight with her knowledge. Medya doesn’t want to go back to Germany, since its government does not recognize the Kurdish struggle and labels the PKK a terrorist group. In contrast, she considers the PKK to be a party that fights for freedom.

In the hospital with around 60 beds, Medya and a few volunteers are in charge of surgeries for the civilians of the area.

After leaving the guerrillas in the Qandil Mountains, my trip continued over the lands of Iraqi Kurdistan to reach one of the places where, during the 1990s, some Kurds, escaping from mass repression in Turkey, found refuge in Mahmura, a province of Mosul which is located in Iraqi Kurdistan.

In the past this was only a desert and a few tents; but now, 14 years later, the camp has become part of daily life for refugees. The people living there have transformed their unstable situation and temporary set-up into something normal, with stable habitations and even self-organized elections.

Escaping From Syria

Afterward, I decided to continue my journey inside Iraqi Kurdistan, which is where new perspectives and dreams for all Kurdish people hope to be realized, since it has become an autonomous region. This area has recently become a shelter for many fleeing the Syrian Civil War. Six refugee camps are located there, accommodating Syrians who have managed to escape the violence. In essence, the Kurds of Iraq are helping the Kurds of Syria.

In Bardarash, Mosul province, refugees are welcomed and babies are born, but people die as well. Everybody is waiting, hoping for better — this is the life of a refugee.

I traveled to the enormous refugee camp near the city of Domiz in Iraqi Kurdistan. For decades, the Assad regime of both father and son had ignored the hardships of the Kurds, scoffing at them.

On many occasions, the Syrian government has refused to grant basic rights such as education, health care and identity cards to the Kurdish people. With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution and the civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad finally made some concessions to the Kurds and gave some of them citizenship.

The Kurds in Syria have survived the chaos of the recent upheavals, established a network, and eventually taken control of the cities they were allowed into.

However, just when the Kurds had resolved their issues with the Syrian Army, new threats were posed by various factions within the rebel ranks — by jihadists, smugglers and mercenaries, all involved in the effort of opposing Assad’s regime.

In Domiz, I was able to meet Edrees N. Salih, the director of Domiz camp. In our conversation, he denounced the lack of aid from the international community.

Oil, Autonomy and Interests: Iraqi Kurdistan

Iraqi Kurdistan is very rich thanks to the oil that the region sells to foreign companies like Chevron. When I was there, I visited the autonomous parliament, where I talked to Aso Kareem, an MP from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

He discussed the relationship between Kurdish rights and the economy of the region, arguing that it is important not to disturb the building of a gas pipeline between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. Moreover, despite the presence of PKK fighters in the region, the Kurdish Iraqi government does not have official contact with the guerrillas, whilst it has strong commercial relations with Turkey. Indeed, the Kurdish struggle has its own logic and inner challenges.

The Heritage of Colonialism and Turbulent Borders

I left the Kurdish Iraqi landscapes and headed to the Syrian-Turkish border. The place is emblematic of the colonial division of Nusaybin (in Turkey) and Qamishlo (in Syria), which used to be one city during the Ottoman-era.

The Syrian War, that has dramatically affected the lives of Kurds in Syria, has also had strong reverberations on those Kurds who live on the other side of the border, in Southeast Turkey.

In Nusaybin, I witnessed how the city’s mayor, AyĹźe Gökkan, was about to start her hunger strike to protest against the Turkish government’s construction of a wall along the Turkish-Syrian border. The mayor claimed it would sharply affect the solidarity relations with Kurds across the border and also prevent the delivery of aid to the suffering Syrian population. Despite her protests, the wall was built.

In this city, right at the border of Syria, I was also able to meet Abdulbari Eren, head of the local section of the Kurdish political movement, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). He talked very enthusiastically about a new life for Kurds who live in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan) and their capacity to self-organize their society by building new institutions such as hospitals and schools.

He also pointed out that, despite their emancipation from Assad’s regime, Syrian Kurds are forced to fight against Jabhat al-Nusra.

We Want Kurdish

The last step was again a trip inside Kurdish territory. I traveled to “the capital” of Turkish Kurdistan: Diyarbakir. In the streets, I spoke to three young men: two lawyers and a journalist — meaningful jobs for the protection of human rights in Turkey.

Sitting on a bench, the young lawyer explained his stance toward the ceasefire between the Turkish government and the PKK. To him, the PKK took the first step and tried to respect the agreement by withdrawing its fighters from the borders.

The lawyer was certain that this time the public’s reaction would be very optimistic in comparison with the past because, all in all, what people ultimately want is an answer to the Kurdish question. He said: “Maybe today there aren’t the same casualties of the past, but people are killed anyway. We need to keep working in order to find a durable solution.”

The two other men focused on the hard life of a community that strives to achieve their rights. First and foremost, language remains a big issue. While in the past it was forbidden to speak the Kurdish language even in daily life, today it is possible to speak it in the streets but still not in hospitals, courts and schools.

They reminisced about their adolescence when one of them had been arrested because he owned a Kurdish record. All of them do not agree with the package of proposals the Turkish government presented during the last negotiations.

One point of contention is that Kurdish-language lessons are only available in some private schools:

“During my education, why can I learn [the] Turkish language and not Kurdish? As a second language we can learn English [and] French, but the courses for the Kurdish language are forbidden. We want to study Turkish and other languages, but above all we would like to enjoy Kurdish courses.”

This last encounter in Diyarbakir, at the end of my journey across Kurdistan, has reinforced my awareness that there still is a long-road ahead for Kurdish rights.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Iraq, a founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), has large oil reserves which are unevenly spread across the country. As of January 2013, it also held the 12^th largest natural gas reserves in the world, with over 60% being located in southern Iraq. 

Situated along some of the region's key fault lines, Iraq's future is likely to determine some of the wider issues and conflicts in the Middle East.

51łÔąĎ's Middle East Editor, Manuel Langendorf, speaks to , a senior analyst specializing in Middle East affairs for the risk management group Helios Global. Langendorf and Zambelis talk about the causes of violence in Iraq, the players involved, and the country's potential in the world energy market.

Manuel Langendorf: I would like to talk about energy. Iraq is estimated to have the fifth largest proven crude oil reserves in the world, with many analysts pointing to a lot of exploration potential not being realized yet. How do you assess Iraq's position on the world energy market and its potential?

Chris Zambelis: Without a doubt, Iraq is a vital player in international oil markets. Its position as a major oil producer is especially important, given that a wide consensus of projections for global oil demand sees it as remaining steady in the foreseeable future and likely to rise over the long-term on the back of strengthening demand from Asia. We also have to remember that Iraq's potential as an energy producer has been stymied over the years due to conflict, economic sanctions, underdevelopment, mismanagement and politics.

In this context, Iraq has tremendous potential. This is the case despite the ongoing global economic downturn. Other factors, including neighboring Iran's anticipated return to international energy markets — Iran is another major oil player that has failed to realize its full potential as a producer and exporter due to economic sanctions and politics, among other things — have not diminished Iraq's significance as an oil producer. 

The growing availability of tight (shale) oil; natural gas and related natural gas liquids (NGL); oil sands; coal-to-liquid (CTL) derived fuels; biofuels; widespread interest in new and alternative energy resources; and the rapid pace of technological innovation that is yielding more efficient energy consumption patterns have not erased the importance of crude oil. 

There are other factors to consider when assessing the importance of Iraq in international oil markets. Let us not forget that Libya, a major oil producer in its own right, has failed to realize its potential as an oil producer due to ongoing violence and political instability. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster also rattled international energy markets; Japan, a huge energy importer, was forced to increase its imports of oil (and other hydrocarbons) to compensate for the lack of nuclear energy that had to be taken offline. 

In short, crude oil remains vital to the functioning of the global economy today and will remain critical for some time to come. Consequently, the presence of additional supply of oil is welcomed by consumer nations around the globe. And when you have a country with the unrealized potential of Iraq, naturally, it is no surprise why so many are watching its steady return to energy markets with great interest.

Langendorf: How does the location of energy reserves within Iraq affect Iraqi politics?

Zambelis: The placement of Iraq's oil reserves is certainly an important factor in affecting Iraqi (and regional) politics. This is best illustrated in Iraq's northern Kurdish region, which is home to a significant percentage of Iraqi oil reserves. The ability of Iraqi Kurds to leverage the crude oil resources lying within their jurisdiction in northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan) has bolstered their efforts to secure autonomy and otherwise gain substantial geopolitical influence under the auspices of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). 

But there remains a great deal of controversy over the disposition of Iraqi oil originating in KRG-administered territory relating to extraction, export rights and revenue sharing. The central authorities in Baghdad want to limit the ability of the KRG to extract and export oil out of fears that it will lead to the region's eventual secession. 

The KRG has already secured numerous agreements with international oil majors and currently operates a pipeline that ships oil to Turkey. Baghdad considers the KRG's efforts to engage with foreign companies as a way of evading its authority. The central government has also punished foreign oil companies over their relationship with the KRG. For example, Baghdad barred US oil major Chevron Corporation from operating in central and southern Iraq as a result of its engagement with the KRG. 

The location of significant oil reserves in southern Iraq, such as in Basra Province, has also impacted Iraq's domestic political picture. Some of Iraq's most important oil fields are located in Basra Province. It is no surprise the region has enjoyed a contentious relationship with Baghdad over a range of issues. Basra Province continues to lobby for more political autonomy from Baghdad and to have greater input on energy-related investment issues. A number of local factions also continue to push for the region to be granted a formal autonomous status. 

Langendorf: What interests do other countries in the region have in Iraq, especially when it comes to its energy reserves? Which other countries are involved in Iraq's energy market? China, for example, is expanding its influence across the region.

Zambelis: On the demand side, owing to its position as a key source of crude oil reserves and potentially natural gas further down the line, key consumers in Asia led by China but also India and South Korea have a major stake in Iraqi oil. China, in particular, has been among the most active in terms of increasing its purchases of Iraqi oil and also engaging in upstream and downstream activities. For its part, Iraq has identified China as a strategic market for its exports of crude oil. 

In 2008, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) concluded an agreement with Iraq's North Oil Company (NOC) to develop the al-Ahdab oil field. The agreement, which was estimated at around $3.5 billion, represented the first between Iraq and China since 2003. China imported around 500,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) from Iraq in 2012. In 2013, China's imports of Iraqi oil increased by 50%. China has also expressed its intention to import even more oil from Iraq in 2014. The geopolitical implications of growing Chinese interest in Iraqi oil will be profound, especially in the context of China's relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran.

It is worth mentioning that China has also engaged with the KRG over energy projects, however, nowhere to the extent comparable to its dealings with Baghdad.

At this stage, the United States and Europe also represent an important destination for Iraqi oil exports. Iraqi oil, by way of Iraqi Kurdistan, is also flowing to Turkey by way of a newly minted pipeline that became operational in January. In terms of development of upstream and downstream projects, a host of international energy majors representing the United States, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia are, to different degrees, active in the Iraqi energy sector.

Langendorf: How do you see the situation in Iraq evolving? What regional role is Iraq likely to play in the future?  

Zambelis: I see the situation in Iraq remaining highly volatile in the near- to medium-terms. Iraq is likely to continue to experience escalating violence and terrorism. Much of these hostilities will be expressed through sectarian animosities but will ultimately remain a product of deeper social, political and economic grievances. These circumstances will be inflamed by the ongoing conflict in Syria. 

I also believe the role of regional players, particularly Saudi Arabia, is underreported when it comes to the trajectory of events in Iraq. A stable, strong and unified Iraq has tremendous potential to project power in the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East. By default, this scenario threatens Saudi Arabia. 

When considered in the context of the incremental rapprochement between the United States and Iran, Saudi Arabia's long-term prospects as a regional power start to look dim. As a result, it is likely that Saudi Arabia will up the ante in terms of attempting to shape events in Iraq. Saudi Arabia's aggressive stance toward Syria may provide a window into its possible approach toward Iraq down the line. I think this is something that warrants closer attention in the months to come.     

*[Note: The opinions expressed here are the interviewee's alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of Helios Global, Inc.] 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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It appears there are two ways to depict life in Iraqi Kurdistan. Western journalists covering the area commonly invoke the region’s new luxury hotels and airports as symbols of its progress and prosperity. On the other hand, however, local journalists who document the corrupt deals behind the business boom report receiving death threats regularly, while some have been murdered for their work.  

Kawa Garmyani, a reporter for the weekly  and editor of Rayal Magazine, was shot and killed in front of his home in Kalar City on the night of December 5, 2013. He had covered corruption by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and had reportedly filed several lawsuits after being threatened.  

It has been widely reported by Kurdish media that Garmyani had been threatened by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) politburo member Mahmud Sangawi, who allegedly failed to appear at a court hearing concerning the incident.

An audio file of an alleged telephone conversation between Garmyani and Sangawi , exposing an exchange where Sangawi appears to be threatening to kill the journalist. A Kalar Court issued an arrest warrant for Sangawi, who has been sued by the Garmyani family. Sangawi was arrested ahead of his appearance in court.

Garmyani’s death — along with the earlier murders of journalists Soran Mama Hama and Sardasht Othman and the 2011 killing of demonstrators in Sulaimaniyah — raises serious questions about the KRG’s claim to be a pillar of democracy in the Middle East and a model for the rest of Iraq.

Further Attacks on Journalists

On the evening of October 26, 2013, in Sulaymaniya, gunmen in a gray unlicensed BMW shot and wounded Shaswar Abdulwahid, hitting him in his right leg. Abdulwahid is the owner of , the first independent Kurdish satellite station in the Iraqi Kurdistan region. No investigations have been carried out to date.

“I am not a politician or a famous figure in politics in the KRG. I have no private connections with any politicians or political parties,” Abdulwahid stated. “The only reason that they wanted to kill me is my ownership of Nalia TV, as we have been facing many other terrible events in the past three years.” 

It was the second time that Nalia TV had been the target of attack by unknown assailants. In the first incident, which took place on February 17, 2011, Nalia’s facilities were set on fire. The attack occurred on the first day of , in which ten people were killed and 500 injured by security and Peshmerga (Kurdish armed forces).

Abdulwahid underscored that the attempt to kill him was actually an attempt to “silence his TV.” He said: “The court has issued arrest papers for the [perpetrators], but they are still free [because] they may be above the government or rule [of law].” Wary of the KRG’s judiciary, Abdulwahid said he is working with lawyers on possibly finding an international venue for his case. 

The damage to Nalia TV’s facilities was estimated at $10 million. Abdulwahid said he was promised compensation, but there has been no independent investigation or processing of any claims. 

 in Iraqi Kurdistan has experienced dark times in the past. In July 2008, , an independent Kurdish journalist, was shot and killed in Kirkuk.

Two years later, in May 2010, another journalist, , was abducted and murdered in Erbil. Othman was a journalist who wrote investigative pieces about corruption in the KRG’s ruling parties, in particular the KDP and its tribal structure. Yet the case has not been adequately investigated.

According to documentation assembled by  in the Kurdistan region, in the past 11 months more than 200 violations have been recorded, most of them during the campaign for parliamentary elections last September.

Iraqi Kurdistan: A Thriving Democracy?

Many have praised the KRG’s thriving democracy. But during the political unrest, the security apparatus treated journalists harshly. Kamaran Muhammad, spokesman for the Zar (Mouth) Group for Defending Freedom of Speech, questioned how democratic the region actually is, arguing that the KRG’s treatment of journalists should be judged on the security forces’ response to them during coverage of riots, election campaigns, and sensitive issues.

In May 2013, Metro Center, an organization defending human rights and freedom of speech, criticized the KRG for 40 recorded violations in just four months: “Believing in  cannot be carried out only by words; [the] KRG should act.” The center recorded 61  surrounding the September elections.

In an interview four days before Garmyani’s murder,  — general director of the Awene (Mirror) Co for Publishing, founder of Hawllati (Citizen), and winner of the  for the Defense of Press Freedom in the Middle East — expressed his anger at the situation facing journalists.

Hardi asserted: “Our main problem is that there’s no guarantee for the freedom we have achieved in the KRG. Meanwhile, there are two administrations – KDP and PUK – on the ground, and that has made the KRG chaotic.”

Hardi was attacked himself in August 2011 in Sulaimaniyah by a group of men. Five of the assailants were arrested, while three were sentenced to two years in prison. Commenting on the attack, Hardi said: “Many of the higher officials within the KRG and the two ruling parties have their own thugs. Unfortunately, these thugs attack journalists in the center of the cities. Most times, investigations go nowhere.” 

He further explained: “Murdering journalists is still a possibility, and almost all independent, critical journalists feel unsafe. Writing on sensitive issues, which are red lines for journalists — like the corruption of the [top] officials in the KRG and the two ruling parties and their families, oil, some historical events and several other issues — may lead to the death of the writer.”

The “Other Iraq”

While KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani spends millions of dollars on advertisements in the international media depicting the KRG as “the other Iraq” and a “region of democracy and freedom of speech,” Kurdish journalists feel unsafe in their own homes.

An independent journalist who works in Erbil, argued: “During Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime, people were not sure if they would come back [home] in the evening. Today, in a free Kurdistan, journalists go out, but they are not sure if they [will] come back safely.” 

In a similar vein, Abdulwahid noted that freedom of the press in the KRG is allowed to the extent that “your media outlets are not critical enough to be a threat to the power. Once you cross the red lines, you are in danger.”

One journalist summed up the current situation succinctly in saying that: “Kurdistan is no longer a safe place for a critical journalist.” 

Although the Kurdistan region’s parliament passed  in 2007, journalists are concerned that it is not being enforced. So far, some ten journalists have fled the KRG and sought asylum in the United States and Europe.

On January 5, in most cities of the Kurdistan region, as well as many European countries and Canada, Kurdish people protested to put pressure on the KRG to bring those responsible for these crimes to justice.

In the cities of Slemani, Erbil, and Kalar, these protests have been larger and more sustained, often every week. Erbil’s protest on January 5 featured a large roving lorry that drove along a main street in the city center for 17 kilometers. The lorry, named “The Red Caravan,” carried protesters who held up signs commemorating the victims of the attacks. They demanded for the KRG to investigate the murders of journalists and put an end to violence.

Kurdish intellectuals, scholars, writers, and journalists fear setbacks to the freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and democracy that they have gained by risking their lives. They are concerned that the KRG will become a region where, in their leadership’s eyes, oil contracts and large profits trump freedom and democracy. 

*[A version of this article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Press Freedom at a Crossroads in Iraqi Kurdistan appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The civil war in Syria has opened new windows of opportunity for the Kurdish cause. After decades of nationalist struggle in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, the Syrian conflict may redistribute the cards.

While Iraqi Kurds gained regional autonomy in 1991, Syrian Kurds have taken advantage of the chaos caused by battles between pro-governmental and revolutionary forces to  in their region in northeastern Syria. In Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has shown an increased  with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, since 2012.

Thus, today seems to be a historical opportunity for the Kurdish people to reach for its long-held dream of achieving independence. Logically, what we could be expecting is:

• Coordination and collaboration between different Kurdish groups across the region
• United front against national governments

Instead, what we are currently witnessing is:

•  between the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
•  between the KRG and the Turkish government
•  between the KRG and the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) 

Therefore, the overall Kurdish project might be threatened by intra-Kurdish tensions, especially those between the two main Kurdish organizations: the Iraqi KRG and the Turkish PKK. This apparent paradox actually has rational explanations.

Indeed, as is often the case in the Middle East, relationships between different political or ethnic groups are shaped by a great sense of pragmatism. Thus, Kurdish groups are not merely concerned with achieving Kurdish autonomy. Undoubtedly, ideology is part of the equation. However, this is sometimes supplanted by other imperatives, notably political and economic ones.

A closer look at the PKK's and the KRG's strategies helps us understand why two brothers have chosen the path of confrontation rather than that of fraternity.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

For the PKK, the equation is quite simple. Its primary goal is to achieve autonomy for the Kurdish people in Turkey. To do so, it has fought an armed struggle against the Turkish government for nearly three decades. Since late 2012, an  has taken place.

After Prime Minister Erdogan announced he wanted to  with the Kurds and initiated , the PKK's imprisoned political leader, the Kurdish organization  in March 2013.

Yet today most of the Kurdish population remains very suspicious of the central government. They fear Erdogan's apparent conciliatory attitude is nothing but a political strategy aiming at stopping the Kurdish insurgency before the next municipal and presidential elections — which will be held respectively in March and August 2014.

According to some experts, armed struggle is . In September 2013, the PKK  because it believed the Turkish government was not honoring the agreements made. As a result, opposition to the central government has been and is likely to remain the core component of the PKK's strategy.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)

For the KRG, the picture is more complex. Undoubtedly, it is also concerned with Kurdish autonomy. However, it has been facing its own challenges, meaning it has adopted a different strategy.

Firstly, Iraqi Kurds have achieved some degree of autonomy. Since the ratification of a new  in 2005, Iraqi Kurdistan has been  , with its own government: the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). It also has its own parliament and armed forces – peshmergas.

Consequently, the KRG's strategy primarily aims to consolidate and deepen its autonomous status. This is especially true since it has been facing constant pressure from the federal government, which is worried about losing complete control over the region.

Secondly, the KRG enjoys a good economic situation. The Kurdish region of northern Iraq is oil-rich. It has  of proven reserves.  for the last couple of years. Erbil, the region's capital city, is becoming the "" as foreign companies invest in hotels and luxury companies.

Foreign investments have been facilitated by an advantageous : companies benefit from tax exemptions for the first ten years and are allowed to repatriate their profits. It is worth noting that Turkish companies represent more than half the foreign firms located in the region.

Compared to the rest of the country, Iraqi Kurdistan looks like an island of prosperity and security in an ocean of instability and economic difficulties. As a result, a major component of the KRG's strategy is also to preserve and develop its economic interests, even if this means partnering with Turkey.

Thirdly, Iraqi Kurdistan has  of the Kurdish cause. Since it has been the first Kurdish region to succeed in achieving autonomy, it has enjoyed great popular support across Kurdish territories. Current KRG President Masoud Barzani strives to . In this respect, another component of the organization's strategy is to maintain and expand its leadership.

Bones of Contention: Syria and Turkish-KRG relations

These two Kurdish organizations have a common goal: promoting the rights of the Kurds and achieving independence (or at least autonomy). But they both are embedded in geostrategic calculations as they face challenges of a different nature stemming from different sources. Their respective strategies are shaped accordingly. This sheds light on the ongoing tensions between the two organizations. There are currently two main bones of contention.

The first issue is related to the situation in Syria. As mentioned above, the Kurdish region in Syria has achieved de facto autonomy since government troops left the region. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) declared self-rule in November 2013 and it is now   Created in 2003 by Syrian PKK remnants, the PYD is affiliated with the PKK and is one of its most important allies.

Yet the Iraqi KRG does not approve of this relationship. First, it is hostile to the PYD because it has . Second, the KRG is afraid that this newly-born cross-border Kurdish axis represents a threat to its own political leadership.

The second issue is concerned with a rapprochement between the KRG and the Turkish government. Indeed, over the past few months Erbil and Ankara have initiated a new relationship, based on mutual understanding and tightened economic cooperation.

In November 2013, Erdogan and Barzani met in Diyarbakir, the capital city of Turkish Kurdistan. This was an unprecedented historical event. Later on, they also signed a 

For the PKK, this new relationship is like a knife in its back. While the KRG is supposed to be its Kurdish brother, it is now siding with the enemy. But for the KRG, it is the result of pragmatic calculations.

In political terms, getting closer to Ankara enables the Iraqi organization to tackle the influence of the PKK on its own territory. It is also a means to assert itself against the new PKK-PYD Kurdish axis. In economic terms, signing oil deals with Turkey increases the KRG's economic prospects and furthers its independence from Baghdad. Thus, Barzani's new friendship with Erdogan is in line with the KRG's overall strategy.

Inter-Kurdish tensions are damaging not only because they hinder the Kurdish national project. They also represent a gift to other regional actors eager to instrumentalize them. For the Turkish government, PKK-KRG rivalries are a godsend.

By allying with the Iraqi Kurdish government, Turkey shows openness towards the Kurds, presenting itself as a conciliatory and cooperative actor. But at the same time, it also weakens its most important domestic opponent: the PKK.

Today, the overall Kurdish project is at a crossroads. Regional events along with the emergence of new powerful Kurdish actors seem to provide all the necessary ingredients to give a dynamic impulse to the idea of an autonomous Kurdistan.

Yet Kurdish groups across the region lack a general view of the situation and still determine their strategies in response to direct, close and pragmatic issues. Therefore, it is likely that inter-Kurdish tensions will continue as long as self-interest will be the primary motto of most Kurdish organizations.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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